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Hegel's Concept of God SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies Lauer, Quentin. State University of New York Press 0873955978 9780873955973 9780585078472 English God--History of doctrines--19th century, Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,--1770-1831--Contributions in theology. 1982 BT101.H423L38 1982eb 231/.092/4 God--History of doctrines--19th century, Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,--1770-1831--Contributions in theology.
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Hegel's Concept of God
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SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies Quentin Lauer, S.J., Editor
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Hegel's Concept of God Quentin Lauer, S.J. Department of Philosophy Fordham University
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State University of New York Press ALBANY
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Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 1982 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N.Y., 12246 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Lauer, Quentin. Hegel's concept of God. Bibliography: p. 331 Includes index. 1. GodHistory of doctrines19th century. 2. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17701831Theology. I. Title. BT101.H423L38 231'.092'4 81-21452 ISBN 0-87395-597-8 AACR2 ISBN 0-87395-598-6 (pbk.) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3
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Contents Abbreviations
vii
Introduction
1
1. Religion and Philosophy
21
2. The Concept
57
3. God as Spirit
128
4. The Infinite
162
5. "Proofs" of God
203
6. The Question of Pantheism
243
7. Philosophy and Theology
283
Epilogue
325
Bibliography
331
Index of Names
333
Analytic Index
335
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Abbreviations BDGVorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes, ed. Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Himmelheber, 1966). BS Berliner Schriften, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1956). Diff "Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie," Jenaer kritische Schriften, edd. Harmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968). EGP Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1940). EpW Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830), edd. Friedhelm Nicolin and Otto Pöggeler (Hamburg: Meiner, 1959). GPR Grundlinien der Philosophie der Rechts, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1955). GW Glauben und Wissen, ed. Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Himmelheber, 1962). JL Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie, ed. Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Meiner, 1967). JR Jenaer Realphilosophie, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1969). PdG Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952). VA Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik (3 vols., Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1970). VGP Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (3 vols., Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1971). VPG Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1970).
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VPRVorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (2 vols., Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1969). WG Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (4 vols.) Vol. I, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, 1955; Vols. IIIV, ed. Georg Lasson, 1976 (Hamburg: Meiner). WL Wissenschaft der Logik (2 vols.), ed. Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Meiner, 1963).
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Introduction It could well seem that I am being facetious if I refer to this study as "a book in search of a title," but many an author will recognize that the expression designates an experience which is not unfamiliar. I had already completed the first draft of this volume before coming to a decision as to just what title it should bear. What is a title, after all, but a concise symbol of what one hopes one has said? As I looked back, then, over what I had saidor tried to saythe rather obvious title that suggested itself was "Hegel's Idea of Philosophy," but that title had already been preempted by a book I had published ten years previously. The question then became: Is there another way of saying virtually the same thing? If one takes a panoramic view of Hegel's entire philosophical endeavorthe endeavor to come to grips with and to be committed to reality in the concreteone is struck by one inescapable idea: The Hegelian enterprise is an extraordinarily unified and grandiose attempt to elaborate one concept, which Hegel sees as the root of all intelligibilitythe concept of God, whatever that term is going to turn out to mean. Hence, the title Hegel's Concept of God represents an attempt to encompass the global character of the Hegelian philosophical enterprise. To those, of course, who are at all familiar with the enormous body of secondary literature that surrounds Hegela body of literature which has been expanding rapidly in recent yearsit will be immediately evident that Hegel's "God" has come under fire from a number of directions both among his own contemporaries and in subsequent generations. In the course of this study it will be necessary to take into consideration the various facets of opposition to Hegel's "God-language." Here it should be sufficient to indicate the main directions this opposition has taken. (1) There are, first of all, those who claim that Hegel has no business bringing Godparticularly the God of Christian religioninto a philosophical
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discussion at all, either because (a) there is no such God to bring into the discussion, other than negatively (Feuerbach, Marx); or (b) because the only God there is is beyond the capacity of rational thinking to comprehendGod is defined most adequately as the "incomprehensible," the "transcendent," the "mysterious" (Kierkegaard, Barth). (2) Then there are those who contend that regardless of the terminology he employs, Hegel is not really talking about God but only about the "absoluteness,'' the "infinity" of the human spirit, a sort of overarching "Spirit," which at once transcends and embraces all its finite instantiations, but which bears no resemblance whatsoever to the God of any religion, least of all the God of Christian religion (Kojève, Findlay, Kaufmann). (3) There are those, too, who take Hegel seriously enough but assert that, by "logicizing" God, Hegel has deformed him and has put in his place Hegel's own questionable concept of "infinite reason," the "logic" of which is Hegel's own invention (Maréchal, Küng, Ricoeur). (4) Finally, there are those who contendand in a sense this contention is common to all the objectionsthat there is only one reason, an essentially finite human reason, and that therefore God is simply beyond reason, either (a) as irrational and therefore nonexistent (Nietzsche, Sartre), or (b) as suprarational and therefore only to be believed in, not to be known (Kant, Fichte, Jacobi). There is no need at this point to seek answers to the objections that have been raised. The question with which we are facedand this will be true in all of what followsis neither whether Hegel is correct in what he says nor whether his interpreters are justified in what they say of him. Rather the question is one of finding out just what Hegel does say and of determining what impact that can have on our own thinking. The point is, however, that it is enormously difficult to determine exactly what Hegel is saying. There are two reasons for this: (1) The language he employs is frequently that of the Christian religious and theological tradition, a language which those who do not share the tradition will decipher only with great difficulty and which those who do share the tradition may feel Hegel is using in such a way as to make its meaning hopelessly obscure; and (2) only in the framework of an elaborate philosophical "system," which no one claims to have unraveled adequately, is the meaning of all that Hegel says intelligible. When Hegel employs such terms as "God," "revelation," "elevation," "infinite (or absolute) Spirit," "trinity," "creation," and "incarnation," it is clear that the vocabulary is borrowed from Christian theology. Yet the terms, as he employs them, have a peculiarly philosophical significance, and it is questionable whether turning to the theological tradition will make their meaning clear, precisely because Hegel is quite definitely trying to make what is initially the content of faith rationally comprehensible. To put all this in another way, we might say this: There can be no question in anyone's mind that Hegel repeatedly employs the term "God"; nor
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should there be any question that, when he uses the term, he intends it not to refer to some unknown or unknowable being, but to have a conceptual content with which human reason can come to grips. It is here that the objections we have seen come in. Has Hegel simply made God too comprehensible? Is the God who is the content of finite human conceptual thinking really God at all? Has Hegel, perhaps, rationalized God out of existence? has he finitized infinite Being by making it the object of finite thought? or has he illegitimately infinitized a human thinking which is essentially finite? When the questions are put in this way, we can, perhaps, see that the questions themselves may well be illegitimate, since they are based on three unverified (or unverifiable) presuppositions: (1) that rational thought is finite and only finite; (2) that the questioner knows precisely what Hegel means by "infinite"; and (3) that the questioner has drawn an intelligible distinction between "finite" and "infinite." If rational thought is finite and only finite, then of course it cannot know infinite Being; it can only, as did Kant, "postulate" infinite Being and resign itself to not knowing what it has postulatedunless, of course, it is not infinity at all that has been postulated, but only indeterminacy. The human mind can come to grips with mathematical infinity, with the infinity of time or space, or with the infinity of endless repetition, but this would seem to run up against an equally grave problem, namely, the intelligibility of indeterminacyunless what is being said is that indeterminacy is preferable to intelligibility. Perhaps Hegel too is postulating what he has no right to postulate, the intelligibility of reality, a necessary condition of which is an intelligible God. The Intelligibility of Reality Perhaps, then, the trouble is that Hegel is too optimistic about the intelligibility of reality, even finite reality. Because he simply will not accept an unintelligible realitywhich may very well be a nonphilosophical (or prephilosophical) refusalhe will presuppose that intelligibility and then spell out in detail the necessary conditions for the conceivability of an intelligible reality. That, after all, is where his logic takes him. But it takes him further than that: As he sees it, a condition for the reality of the real is that it be intelligible, susceptible of rational comprehension; and by the same token a condition of the intelligibility of the real is that it be actual, a determinate object of rational comprehension. Here, then, philosophy and theology come together again. According to Hegelian logic, being is intelligibleand it must be, since being is the foundation of all intelligibilityonly if being is both finite and infinite. By the same token thought can comprehend beingand it must, or else nothing is comprehensibleonly if thought is both finite and infinite. To say that reality is intelligible, however, or that the thinking mind
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knows reality, is not to say that the mind imposes a form on reality and thus renders it intelligible, known. Hegel is content to let reality speak for itself, and he is convinced that it does speak, not only to the mind but also through the mind, in the mind's thinking. If we can go this far with Hegel, there seems to be no "logical" reason why we cannot go further and say that knowledge of being is being's self-revelation both to thinking spirit and in thought. Nor does it require a "logical" leap to move from this to the conviction that the ultimate principle of all being, intelligibility, and knowledge reveals itself to thinking spirit in thought. Thus, when Hegel says that God is comprehensible (or better, perhaps, not incomprehensible) to the human mind, Hegel is not saying that the human mind can know all that there is to know about God ("comprehension" does not signify that sort of all-embracing grasp). What he is saying is that God, who is infinitely self-knowing Spirit, reveals himself to man, to the human mind, and that this revelation, indispensable as it is to any knowing of reality, is comprehended. If not, it is no revelation; comprehension of the revelation is part and parcel of the revelation, whether of finite or of infinite being. The very being of spirit is self-revelation, but self-revelation is, in fact, revelation only if comprehended. The Intelligibility of Divine Reality It must be admitted at this point, however, that it is not difficult to see why both nonbelievers and believers might balk at Hegel's contention. Has he not overlogicized God? Does a logic of infinite Being really make sense? Can the infinite being to which Science of Logic ineluctably leads, identified as it is with "absolute Idea," legitimately be identified with the infinite Spirit of which faith speaks? To the nonbeliever, obviously not. What about the believer? Without going into the argumentation with which this entire volume will be concerned, we can let Paul Ricoeur be the spokesman for the many believers who fear that the God of whom a Hegelian "logic" speaks cannot fail to be a degradation of the "transcendent" God who is the object of religous faith. A teleology carried out in Hegelian style does not have as eschaton, as final term, the sacred delivered in myth, cult, belief. Of itself what this teleology envisions is absolute knowing, not faith; and absolute knowing bespeaks no transcendence, only the subsumption of all transcendence in a thoroughly mediated self-knowledge.1 Ricoeur, of course, is not alone in fearing that a Hegelian "logic" makes
1. Paul Ricoeur, De L'interprétation (Paris: Seuil, 1965), pp. 505506.
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God too comprehensible, thus doing away with the "sacred," the "numinous," the "transcendent"in short, the "mysterious." What does not seem to bother such thinkers, however, is that their own logic may well run the risk of making God not only logically incomprehensible, but logically reprehensible. What needs to be said here is that in a certain sense, perhaps, Feuerbach, Marx, and Engels,2 were right: the thought of Hegel does mark the "end" of philosophy, that is, of a rationalism which tries to retain its theism. Hegel would be the first to agree with thathe sees in "rationalism" (particularly "Enlightenment" rationalism) the enemy of both philosophy and religion.3 Whether, as marking the end of that sort of rationalism, Hegel's thought marks the beginning of a rationalism which is nontheistic, is at least debatable. It will be the argument of this volume that Hegel's philosophy is theistic, but in a new sort of way. That what he has to say in Phenomenology of Spirit (Chap. VII, section C, "Revealed Religion") and in Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (part III, ''Absolute Religion") does much to discredit belief in God who is only "transcendent," that Hegel bids us seek God elsewhere than "outthere," and that he would turn our gaze to the overarching "spirit" of man if we are to find a God who makes sense, can well be admitted. This, however, makes Hegel neither an "atheist" nor a "pantheist"; it makes him one who does not think that saying "God" necessarily involves knowing what one is saying and one who does think that knowing what one is saying is indispensable to saying anything. On the other hand, it would be foolish to deny that the "humanist" approach (say, of Feuerbach and Marx)according to which when one says "God" one is not saying anything but merely projecting a mental constructreceives more than merely moral support from Hegel's argumentation. Hegel is in the position of having to say that the term "God" does have a very determinate meaning which the mind can both grasp and see the necessary reality of, if it is to be able to assert the reality of any object of thought whatever. One can at least understand the fear of those who feel that this sort of argumentation downgrades God to the level of human self-conscious knowing. The real problem, howeverand this is where the philosophy of Hegel must meet the crucial testdoes not come with the assertion that the mind must affirm the reality of infinite being if it is going to affirm any reality whatever, nor with the assertion that any spirit, absolute Spirit, can be infinite, but rather with the contention that the God (ultimately the God of the Judaeo-Christian tradition) whom religious consciousness believes in can in no way be other than the God whom "speculative thinking"
2. See F. Engels, L. Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie. (Berlin: Dietz, 1951.) 3. See the section "God and Philosophy" in this introduction.
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recognizes as a logical necessity. But here a caution is in order. It would simply be a mistake to claim that Hegel anywhere contends that "speculative thinking" can dispense with religious consciousness in asserting the real existence of the "infinite Spirit" it affirms. Even more obviously, this sort of thinking cannot dispense with religion in affirming the identity of its own God and the God of religion. The problem, then, is that of holding on to religion and at the same time affirming the thorough-going rationality of religion's God, such that there simply can be no essential difference between the God religion believes in and the God whom reason comprehends. If God be real, there can be no abstract "God of the philosophers," who would be other than the God of faith. The key concept here, it would seem, is that of "transcendence." In relation to this concept, those who attack Hegel from opposing sides are in agreement: either God is immanent or God is transcendenthe cannot be both. For Feuerbach and Marx there cannot be a "transcendent" God as that would be an insult to human dignity. Therefore, Hegel's God must be immanent, and this is no God at all in any intelligible sense, only a projection of human needs and aspirations. As we have already seen, for Paul Ricoeur the only God who can truly be God is the "transcendent" God of faith; and thus, because Hegel's God is immanent "in thoroughly mediated selfconsciousness," he cannot be truly God. From a slightly different point of view Emil Fackenheim says much the same. "There is no greater attempt than the Hegelian to unite the God of the philosophers with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The 'result' of its failure is that the two fall radically apart.''4 For Fackenheim a God whose inner logic of "love" demands a world in which God can reveal himself is a God in whom faith cannot believe, because faith and logic, belief in God and knowledge of God, are incompatible. Philosophic knowledge of God is more hostile to faith than is an out-and-out atheism which wages open war against faith5to affirm the reality of a non-God is worse than to deny the reality of God. Object of Reason vs. Object of Understanding These objections from both sides bring us to the very heart of Hegel's "speculative logic." It has so often been asserted that Hegel denies the principle of noncontradiction, that the assertion has taken on the air of a commonplace which needs neither proof nor explanation. The fact is that Hegel affirms over and over again that noncontradiction is an indispensable principle of formal logic, of abstract understanding (Verstand); to ignore it on
4. Emil Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 240. 5. See ibid., p. 204.
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this level can lead to nothing but confusion. What is a necessary principle of abstract understanding, however, need not be a principle of concrete reason (Vernunft). This is not to say that reason violates the rules of understanding, nor, worse still, that reason dispenses with understanding. It is to say that reason, whose standpoint is that of totality, infinity, is not compelled, as is understanding, to fight shy of contradiction. In the light of infinity, contradictories call each other forth and are continuous with each other, and contradiction can be allowed to resolve itself. If to abstract understanding infinity means nonfinitude and only that, and if finitude means noninfinity and only that, then "never the twain shall meet." If, on the other hand, to concrete reason the finite (concrete) and the infinite (concrete) are continuous, such that the finite implies the infinite and the infinite implies the finite, their contradictoriness is resolved in their necessary relationship to each other. The same applies, in the light of infinity, to freedom and necessity, individuality and universality, possibility and actuality, faith and knowledge, immanence and transcendence, and so on. A parade example for Hegel, then, of the continuity of contradictories is that of immanence and transcendence. If immanence is nontranscendence and only that, if transcendence is nonimmanence and only that, they are clearly incompatible, and that is the end of the line, as it is for abstract thinkingwhich is inadequate to reality if it does not move on to concrete thought. It would clearly be going too far to claim that what we have thus far seen answers all the objections that Hegel's opponents raise against him. Nor is it the function of an introduction to do that. We might ask ourselves, however, whether the atmosphere has been cleared with regard to the charges which have been brought against Hegel from the standpoint of "orthodoxy." That these charges were brought against him even during his own lifetime we know, if from no other source, from the preface to the third edition of Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences and from numerous references in Berliner Schriften. One thing does seem to be clear; he was convinced that his thinking, as striking as it might appear, was orthodox. Along with that went the conviction that only adequate philosophical thinking could legitimate theological reflection on the content of faith, and that neither Wolffian "metaphysics," Kantian "criticism," exegetical "erudition,'' nor romantic "intuitionism" could accomplish the task of making "orthodoxy" intellectually respectable. One might still find it debatable whether Hegel's "speculative thinking" succeeds in accomplishing the task; it will be the task of the present study to examine in detail the degree to which Hegel can be looked upon as successful in his endeavor. The only point here is to see whether, in fact, Hegel's endeavor was to make orthodoxy intellectually respectable by making it speak intelligibly to the enquiring mind. Does a "logic of concept" prove to be at once philosophically satisfying and theologically (or, perhaps, religiously)
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acceptable, or has Hegel opted for philosophical satisfaction at the expense of religious acceptability? More pointedly, perhaps, was Hegel serious in trying to come to grips philosophically with the self-revealing God of Christianity? A hint as to the answer to this last question may be found in Hegel's conviction that a revelation must be intelligible if it is to be a revelation at all. To put it more bluntly, Hegel is convinced that God has told us nothing of himself if what he has told us is unintelligible to human reason. He is also convinced, however, that philosophical knowledge of the infinite Spirit who is God is just as much divine self-revelation as is the word of God in scripture or in the teaching of the Christian religion. Opposed as he was to "rationalism," considering it a kind of abstract burlesque of reason, he was a vigorous advocate of supremely rational thinking, to which he would assign no limits. That there should have been opposition to this attitude can come as no surprise, but the grounds of the opposition would seem to be more emotional than rational. This, of course, his "theologian" opponents would not deny, since in religious matters they considered emotion more reliable than reason. But, it is not difficult to see that, precisely from the point of view of his supreme confidence in reason, Hegel should sense the danger of such a reliance on emotion. Can one honestly be religious and at the same time be satisfied with an unknown or unknowable God? Is not a non-God preferable? Hegel's endeavor, then, can be looked on as a mighty effort to avoid the second conclusion. One wonders, in fact, whether his "theologian" opponents were opposed to him on truly religious grounds or merely fearful of the conclusion to which rational thinking would lead them. Since the reason of "rationalism" does not permit them to know God, and since they cannot conceive of a reason which is not rationalistic, they must resist Hegel's claim that reason can know God. ''Mystery"and therefore unknowingis much more comforting. Since it is not rational either to affirm or deny God, it would seem imperative to drop reason, if one is not to drop God. Hegel's contention is diametrically opposed to this; as he sees it, relinquishing reason is tantamount to relinquishing religion, and both relinquishments are unworthy of the human. If man alone is capable of religion, it is through that which is most characteristic of man, that is reason.
Given the prejudice of our own time which so separates feeling and thinking, it can be considered a need that they be opposed, even that they be inimical to each other, in such a way that feeling, particularly religious feeling is sullied, even annihilated, by thinking, so that it is essential to religion and religiousness not to be rooted in thinking. To separate in this way is to forget that only man is capable of religion, whereas the brute has no religion, no more than law or morality. [EpW, no. 2]
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If to be religious is to be nonrational, then to be religious is to be nonhuman. Such an attitude is indeed grist for the atheist mill! What Is Reason? As one moves through Hegel's writings it becomes more and more clear that he is constantly working out three consistent convictions: (1) that reason both can and must make sense, not nonsense, out of God who is real; (2) that it is an abdication of reason not to make sense out of God, either by claiming that God is not real or by claiming that the human response to the real God is not rational; and (3) that reason cannot make sense of any reality whatever, if it does not make sense of God. One question, however, still remains: Why must it be reason which makes sense of God? or, why is it reason alone that can make sense of God? At this point we must try to make sense out of Hegel's ultimate identification of infinite Being, infinite Thought, and infinite Spirit. Although we shall have to wait until chapter 4 for a detailed exposition of Hegel's thought on the "infinite," we can say here that Hegel sees thinking as a continuous process of self-purification, thought purifying itself of all sensible content whatever. It must be emphasized, however, that Hegel never says that reason does not think what is sensible; rather he says that thought must transform the sensible into the nonsensible if it is to think the sensible adequately. Rational thought, then, can think both the sensible and the nonsensible; butand this is importantonly rational thought can think the nonsensible. Since it is of the essence of the sensible to be finite, if the infinite be it must be non-sensible, and with this only rational thought can come to grips. That the infinite cannot be sensed is clear enough to all; that it cannot be imaged should also be clear. That the infinite cannot be "represented" (vorgestellt) in "understanding'' (Verstand), may not be so clear; but if we follow Hegel's claim that "representation" (Vorstellung) is always at least linked to images, we can see why he makes the claim. Hegel is not claiming that "understanding" does not "represent" the infinite; that is what "understanding" does when it seeks to think the object of religious consciousness. What he does claim is that "understanding" cannot be successful in this, because it cannot dispense with "representations." Only rational thinking can be successful, precisely because only "reason" goes beyond "understanding," beyond "representations," and it is the insistence on identifying "reason" with "understanding" which underlies the claim that the reality of God must be impervious to reason. Here, it would seem, something needs to be saidin a preliminary way, at leastregarding Hegel's notion of the function of "representing" (vorstellen) and "representation" (Vorstellung) in human thinking. A great deal has already been written on this subject, and, it seems to me, much of
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what has been written misses the point. When human consciousness is presented with an object, whether the presentation be in the form of sensorial awareness, linguistic communication, or, in the case of religious content, in the teaching, for example, of the Church, Hegel refers to it as "immediate" awareness. It is characteristic of the human to seek to think the content thus "immediately" given. This "thinking" of the content presented to consciousness in "images'' initially takes the form of "representations" (Vorstellungen) which the mind subjectively makes to itself in an effort to come to grips with the content presented. Precisely because this is thinking, the process of vorstellen (Vorstellung) constitutes the beginning of a dynamic movement away from the imagecharacter of what is present. It is important to note that Vorstellung (the form is participial) is itself a process, a progressive movement from image toward thought. So long, however, as the process is still one of subjective "representation," what Hegel frequently calls "one-sided," the link to images has not been superseded. The movement of Vorstellung, then, is oriented to transcending itself in thought, which is no longer merely subjective but objective. It may well be that the counter-claim could be made that it is asking too much to demand, with Hegel, that there be human thought without images. To make this counter-claim, of course, is equivalent to the claim that there is no rational thought in the way Hegel understands it. So be it. It is not the function of an introduction to establish the validity of Hegel's claim, only to assert that he makes it. One thing, however, is clear: If there cannot be human thought without images, then it is the case that the human mind cannot have the infinite as its object; a conclusion which can satisfy atheists but can hardly satisfy the theists. Even religious consciousness, which represents the God of faith in various metaphorical ways, thinks of God as nonimageablean infinite which could in any way be imaged would not be infinite. It is, nevertheless, necessary to admit that the Hegelian logic does make great demands on us, if we are to come to grips with it. One might say that we have to have reached the lofty heights of this sort of "speculative thinking," before we can recognize the conceivability of such thinking. This is one reason why Hegel does not treat us to the luxury of a "proof" in the formal-logical sense of the term. His logic is not a theory of "proof" at all; it is a study of the logos in which reality is revealed, or reveals itself, in thought. There is no question of "demonstrating" that the infinite can be grasped in imageless thought, or that there is imageless thought to grasp it; there is question only of following Hegel's thought and "seeing," so to speak, that it does make eminently good sense. It is small wonder that Hegel looked upon Plato's Parmenides (part II) as the profoundest work of ancient philosophy; it nowhere calls upon sensible images to bolster its philosophical dialectic. If we are to think with Hegel we must be both will
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ing and able to follow a process of thought which finds no need of touching ground in the images constantly present in our ordinary thinking and which, nevertheless, claims to be more "concrete" (penetrating to the heart of reality as it is in its total interrelatedness) than is a thinking which relies on "representations." Perhaps the difficulty we experience in following this sort of "logic" stems not so much from our inability or unwillingness to think of the infinite as concrete as it does from our inability or unwillingness to accept a thinking which Hegel calls "untrue to itself" if it does not progressively divest itself of reliance on sense. It is not that Hegel denies that thinking begins in sense perceptionthat is too obvious to need discussionrather he contends that only in constantly and consistently moving away from the sensible can thought be the pure spiritual activity which alone can come to grips with "all reality." Reason (spirit) must transform (spiritualize) even nature, because only as thus idealized does nature itself reveal its own "truth" to and in thought. Only if we can do this can we avoid a return either to an indefensible causal metaphysics of cognition or to an equally indefensible Humean scepticism. God and Philosophy All of this brings us around full circle to where we began: Just what can it mean to say that the whole of Hegel's philosophy is wrapped up in his concept of God, that his philosophy stands or falls in the rationality of that concept? Perhaps the problem is not that Hegel has so philosophized theology that he has dispensed with faith, but that he has theologized philosophy to such an extent that, even as purely philosophical thinking, it cannot dispense with faith, that is, with faith's content. Here it might do well to emphasize once more that Hegel nowhere says that we can rationalize faith; what he does say is that if reason takes a long hard look at the content of faith it will find that content not only rationally acceptable but also rationally necessary, and that reason fails as reason if it does not see this. As he sees it, in terms of the overall process of human experience, religious "experience" is not something either to be left out of the rational process as a sort of aberration, nor is it suprarational in the sense that it simply defies the power of reason to come to terms with it. Thus, religion is not to be superseded, in the sense of canceled and only canceled, as it is for Marx, nor is it to supersede reason, in the sense that religion can attain to an object which is opaque to reason. Rather, as Phenomenology of Spirit makes abundantly clear, religious experience is integral to and continuous with the march of experience in the process of becoming "absolute knowing." Nor is "religious experience" to be given the rather narrow interpretation which it has, say, in James; for Hegel, thinking is the experience
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of thinking's object or content. Religious experience, then, is the religious mode of thinking (in Vorstellungen) the absolute content which is God. Religion, however, will not be true to itselfor to its contentif it rests content with not knowing that to which it is oriented. It might be argued, of course, that "the faith of a Breton peasant" could well be superior to that of the philosopher; it would be questionable, however, whether it would be good for the philosopher to have that kind of faith. To insist on a faith which bypasses reason is, according to Hegel, to capitulate to Enlightenment rationalism, which is just as inimical to philosophy as it is to religion. The Enlightenment, that vanity of the understanding, is the most vigorous opponent of philosophy; it is displeased when the latter demonstrates reason in Christian religion, when it shows that the foundation for the testimony of the spirit of truth has been established in religion. In philosophy, which is theology, the only thing that counts is to demonstrate the rationality of religion. [VPR II, p. 341] What Hegel has done, then, is not so much to "theologize" philosophy as to attempt to show, from the philosophical point of view, that philosophy and theology are oriented to one and the same truth, the logos of being in its infinity. Erwin Metzke has expressed this as clearly and succinctly as has anyone. Hegel's world of thought is religiously rooted (cf. the footnotes to the Preface of the second edition of the Encyclopedia). For Hegel, of course, this does not result in surrendering philosophy to theology; rather he seeks to illumine philosophically the profounder common ground of both. Not only for faith but also for philosophical knowing the supreme and unique object, the being of God as the truly absolute Being, includes in a comprehensive way the being of the world: the world is nothing but the unfolding of God himself through the otherness of nature. The world is God's other. Truth is the unity of the infinite and the finite. To see God only as transcendent would be to truncate truth, an abstraction.6 God and Human History We can at this point look at what could at first sight seem a rather implausible source for a confirmation of the present interpretation of the movement of Hegel's thought. Between 1822 and 1831 Hegel presented five times a course of lectures on the philosophy of world history. We now have these lectures in a monumental 938-page edition, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, which, it would seem, presents Hegel's
6. Erwin Metzke, Hegels Vorreden (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1949), p. 269.
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maturest thought. It is precisely here that he stresses again and again the intimate link between the development of philosophical "culture" (Bildung) and the process of religious experience. "Culture" (Bildung could also be rendered as "cultivation") is that process of development which is unique to the human spirit; a process which is at once the activity and the product of spirit, whereby spirit comes to be what it is to be spirit. What is peculiar to the spirit's process of self-cultivation is that "culture" is inadequate to the task it has to perform until the human spirit is "alienated'' from the merely "natural" in which it is immersed, and that the alienation, as at once a "spiritualization" and a "denaturalization," does not take place independently of the religious consciousness from which emerges into reality a progressively more concrete human spirit (WG, pp. 125, 128, 13132). Thus, in Hegel's view, religion and culture can never be separated in the process of man's becoming human (ibid., pp. 134, 733, 821, 878). The Enlightenment, which, as he sees it, is the last futile attempt to accomplish naturalistically what can be accomplished only spiritually, effectively showed the impossibility of making this separation. The culture of the Enlightenment, like the vast cultural edifices which preceded it, proved to be self-defeating, because it sought to leave out of the picture the only possible integrator of spiritual development, that is, absolute Spirit. When Hegel speaks of Bildung, of course, he speaks of that process of self-cultivation which is proper not so much to the individual as to the spirit of a people, all of whose members share, albeit in varying degrees, in a Bildung which is common to all. By the same token religion is not primarily that which characterizes the orientation of the individual spirit to absolute Spirit; rather it is that which orients the collective spirit. Spiritual activity, then, is not only the activity which most properly characterizes the human; it is the very process of humanizing the human; and this it does by authentically orienting the human to the divine (ibid., pp. 6162, 7273, 530, 554, 576). At this point we may, as has been noted earlier, be brought up short by the objection that it is arbitrary to identify the overarching spirit which unifies the totality of the human, the "absolute Spirit" of which Hegel speaks, with the "divine Spirit" of which religion speaks. The objection, however, has the disadvantage of not appealing to what Hegel does say. It is difficult to see how anyone could read Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte and say that Hegel is not identifying absolute Spirit with Godwhether or not one likes this "God" of whom Hegel speaks (see WG, pp. 12526, 131, 745). Perhaps, however, it would be better to approach this question from another angle. It may be that one could interpret what Hegel says regarding the humanizing of the human in terms of an orientation of human spirit to absolute Spirit as no more than an absolutizing of human spirit through philosophical knowing. This interpretation, however, runs up against the
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difficulty of Hegel's consistent refusal to look upon human self-development as a process of man's lifting himself by his own bootstraps (see ibid., pp. 182, 57273, 821, 878). To those who are familiar with the seventh and eighth chapters of Phenomenology of Spirit this will be clear enough; it is also clearly the teaching in Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte. Not only is the dialectic of spirit's culture one of self-activity, whereby man rises to ever-higher awareness of what it is to be human (WG, p. 35); not only is the goal to which man is oriented one which is not antecedently inscribed in a blueprint of human "nature," precisely because the human spirit is to bring into being that to which it is oriented (ibid., pp. 58, 74); but the process toward the goal is to be the activity of both the human spirit and of the divine Spirit. The ascension of the human spirit is both a "self-lifting" and a ''being-lifted-up" (Erhebung). "It is essential to this process that there be levels [of development], and worldhistory is the manifestation of the divine process, the ascension by stages, wherein spirit both knows and actualizes itself and its truth" (ibid., p. 74). Strong medicine this, it is true; but the question is not at the moment whether the medicine is too strong to take or even whether what Hegel says is true; it is simply a question of whether Hegel means what he says. We can, if we wish, say that when Hegel speaks of man as "in himself his own goal" (ibid., p. 106)a goal, nevertheless, that is not predetermined, as it would be if man were simply a being of natureand as his own goal "only through the divine that dwells in him" (ibid.), he is not speaking religious language, but rather he is using the term "divine" metaphorically. However, it would seem that the evidence for this contention has yet to be uncovered. When Hegel further says that "the goal of the spirit" is "to give itself consciousness of the Absolute," and that "this consciousness of his is alone true," or that this is at once "honor paid to God" and the "glorification of the truth" (ibid.), it is indeed difficult to see why we should not take him at his word. Nor does this take away from (rather it enhances) the dignity of man, since "in honoring God the individual spirit too finds its own dignity," in the recognition that man's "activity for the honor of God is the absolute [for man] (ibid.). Precisely here is where philosophy comes in, for it is "philosophy" which "thinks and comprehends what is contained in religion in the mode of representation, both sensible and spiritual" (ibid., p. 134; see p. 172). The point Hegel is trying to make, however, is that the activity of honoring God concerns man more than it does God, since "the dignity of man is to be found in honoring the divine . . . such that the divine receives honor through the honor given to the human, and the human receives honor through the honor paid to the divine" (ibid., p. 572; see pp. 181, 573). This last statement, it is true, is made in the context of Hegel's discussion of Greek religion, wherein the beauty of Greek art honors both the divine
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which it portrays and the human which does the portraying, but it has to be read in continuity with a whole series of texts wherein ever higher forms of religious representation give rise to an ever more purified conceptualization of what it is to be human, to be spirit, since "God is the essence of the human" (ibid., p. 575). Nor is this to be separated from man's progressive realization of his own rationality; reason, after all, "is the substance of spirit" (ibid., p. 733). But, the rationality of spirit is not to be divorced from the rationality of spirit's object; that object is rational, whether it be present in the explicitly rational form of philosophical thinking or in the implicitly rational form of religious consciousness (ibid.). The move to explicit rationality is accomplished in the progressive overcoming of the naturality in which the human spirit, even religious spirit, is immersed (ibid.). It may seem that Hegel is taking a very large leap when he moves quite rapidly from this vague religious consciousness of the unity of the divine and the human, to the Christian dogma of the unity of the divine and the human in the Incarnation (ibid., p. 729). In a sense, of course, it is a leap, but Hegel is convinced not only that the move must be made but also that the move is philosophically defensible. That there are dogmas at all, he claims, is true only because there is philosophical explication of religious beliefnor is the philosophical explication alien to the content of religious belief (ibid., p. 742). More than that, the human and the divine are not simply to be equated (ibid., p. 734)a contradiction which "understanding" sees so readilya union with the divine is essential to the actualization of spirituality in the human; and this, "speculative" thinking can comprehend. Man becomes actual as a spiritual being only when he overcomes his naturality. This overcoming becomes possible only under the supposition that the human and the divine natures are substantially and consciously (an und für sich) one, and that man, to the extent that he is spirit, possesses the essentiality and substantiality which pertains to the concept of God. [Ibid., p. 821] This human consciousness of union with the divine is neither immediately given nor readily comprehensible; man must grow into it. "The consciousness of this union with the divine is given in Christ. What is important, then, is that man come to grips with this consciousness and that it be constantly awakened in him" (ibid.). "Denaturalization" of the Human Now, what is important in all this is Hegel's claim that the whole of post-Roman "European" cultural development has been tied in with and conditioned by Christian religious consciousness and by the latter's explication in
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a philosophical awareness of just what it is to be human, to be spiritual, to be spirit in a way which images in a this-worldly context the spiritual reality of God. The crux of Hegel's claim is his contention that man, as the unique combination of the "natural" and the "spiritual," must by his own activity "overcome" the merely natural in himself and thus actualize the truly spiritual, which is his destiny and his dignity, by being reconciled with God as ''Spirit," the paradigm of all spirit (WG, p. 878). The process of this overcoming is the Bildung which characterizes Western man, a Bildung marked by centuries of vicissitudes whose overtones are moral, religious, legal, and political, but whose orientation is ineluctably the realization of man's true being as spirit, since only spirit is self-determining, free. We have to admit at this point that Hegel, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, leaves us with what can be termed an unsolved riddle. All along he has been talking of philosophical thought and its orientation to absolute Spirit, to God. In tracing the development of European cultureand pari passu of European philosophical thinkinghe describes a movement of separation of thought and culture from their foundation in the Absolute, the Divine. He does not, however, describe any process of reintegration. The reason, perhaps, is that, because he is speaking of a philosophy of history, he will not anticipate; the process of reintegration is yet to come. Be that as it may, we can, I think, recognize in his description of the period of disintegration a hint that he is describing a transitional stage in philosophical thought, a stage ushered in by the scientific revolution emerging from the Renaissance. There can be no question that the modern spirit of philosophical inquiry, the beginning of which Hegel finds in Descartes, has effected a separation of the human thinking subject from that which had previously been conceived of as ruling that spirit from above. To find itself, the human spirit now looks to itself alone, and this is the prelude to a thinking which is conceived of as self-determining in itself (WG, p. 914). No longer, to the scientific mind, is there question of the grace of God coming from without to enlighten that mind. It was Descartes who had turned the mind's gaze inward, and his cogito, ergo sum is to be interpreted not as an inference from thought to being, but as a recognition that being and thought (human thought) are one. That this insight should be elucidated in the conviction that the external world must exhibit the same rationality that human thought does, may itself not be a thoroughly rational conviction (one is reminded of Whitehead's contention that the scientist "must begin with an act of faith in the decency of the universe"). The pattern now is one of observing nature, discovering that it is regulated by "laws" which constitute its rationality and which imperceptibly become prescriptive rather than descriptive. Enter the Enlightenment, and the disintegration is complete (ibid., p. 915). Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher accept the
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disintegration as complete, even though they continue to insist that the validity of faith is not compromised thereby. One thing is clear: A philosophical thinking which, with Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi, has lost its mooring in the concrete Absolute has given up the very possibility of an effectual reintegration. Thus, although Hegel does not, in the Lectures, map out the path of reintegration, he does, in the very last section, entitled "The Present Situation," hint at the solution. There he suggests that the disintegration has come about because of the spirit's failure to recognize itself for what it is, a recognition which will come about only if it listens to the testimony of absolute Spirit which bears witness to the true reality of the human spirit, which, if we are willing to inquire carefully, Spirit does in "World-History"the history which on the very last page Hegel calls "the true theodicy," the "justification of God." The spirit is only what it makes of itself; and for that it is necessary that it presuppose itself. Only this insight can reconcile the spirit with world-history and with actuality, the realization that what has happened and what happens at all times not only comes from God and is not without God, but is essentially the work of God himself. [WG, p. 938; see pp. 78, 81] However, the answer is not contained here. What Hegel does is to send us back to the final chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit, where religious consciousness and rational self-consciousness are reconciled in "Absolute Knowing," the elaboration of which constitutes the whole of Science of Logic and the "System" which flows from it. The answer, then, depends on the ability of the human spirit to go beyond the "analytic" thinking of Verstand to the "speculative" thinking of Vernunft; only in the latter can the spiritual destiny of man (cultural and religious) be realized. It will be the task of the present volume to follow Hegel in his attempt to articulate this realization in his own "speculative system,'' which he takes to be what "philosophy" has made of itself. Hegel's Language That the task of following Hegel proves to be enormously difficult will come as no surprise to those who are at all familiar with his writing. There is no need here to expand on the complexityor better, perhaps, tortuousnessof his thought. However, the difficulty is compounded by the language he employs in expressing that thought. What does one do, for example, with a language which is at once so elusive and so allusive? Can one say what Hegel is saying in a language which is other than Hegel's own? Nor is the problem simply that of saying in English what Hegel has said in Germanas tantalizing as the translation of that German into English may be.
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The problem, rather, is that of finding any language adequate to express that thought. The initial assumption must be, if we are to get on with the task at all, that what he says does make sense, whether or not we agree with that sense. But even this last point presents a problem: Can we agree or disagree with what Hegel says, if we do not know exactly what he is (or is not) saying? As we shall have occasion to note again and again in what follows, one way of not getting the task done is to insist on having precise definitions of the terms Hegel employs. By the same token we cannot insist that he use grammar in the way we want him to use it; which is but another way of saying that we cannot legitimately interpret any author by taking his words to mean simply what we would mean if we used the same words. Language is in the service of thought, not vice versa. If Hegel stretches language (or grammar) to fit thought, we have no right to insist that he confine thought so as to fit a preconceived language (or grammar). The danger, of course, in approaching the problem in this way is that we run the risks: (1) of rendering it impossible to determine just what Hegel is saying, of throwing up our hands, or of simply guessing what he might be saying; (2) of looking upon language as doing more to veil thought than to reveal it; (3) of simply allowing Hegel complete liberty to say what he pleases, since there is no way of checking on the validity of what he says. Even granting these risks, however, it does seem necessary to issue a number of cautions in the effort to come to terms with Hegel's thought, which must be expressed in language or else not expressed at all: (1) We must not demand of language more than language can deliver. Perhaps language renders to reality the fullest justice it can by admitting its incapacity to express reality adequatelywhich does not mean that thought must stop short of reality. It may well be that language itself is formed in the either/or realm of what Hegel calls "mere understanding," needing to be fleshed out in the more comprehensive realm of "reason." No philosopher has ever wrought out a language totally adequate to either reality or thought. (2) Meaning cannot be confined to what can be defined. Plato taught us that lesson many years ago, and the lesson still stands; the quest for definition is a help, but meaning as it emerges bursts the bonds of definitionbut it need not suffer from so doing. (3) Hegel is difficult, but he is not unintelligible. His language conveys a meaning which we can grasp, not completely, perhaps, but that is not necessarily the fault of the language; the language flows from an experience which is not oursnot merely in the sense that it is separated from ours by a century and a half, but more significantly because his is a special experience (as is that of all genius), and it requires great effort on our part to share that experience, even partially. (4) It may be true to say that Hegel's philosophical thought resists being put into our philosophical language; but that does not relieve us of the burden of coming to grips with his thought through his language, which itself may well be not
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totally adequate to the thought it expresses. If nothing else, precisely because Hegel's language has interesting things to say, it will not say them with perfect precision.7 (5) Hegel's grammar does, in fact, break the rules of grammar as we know them, but that need not be a fault in Hegel's grammar. Grammar as we know it may well be unable to handle what Hegel has to say. In any event we must make the effort to come to grips with what Hegel says, in the way he says it. Having said so muchrather abstractly, it is to be fearedof how Hegel says what he has to say, we are brought around full circle to where we began, to the title of this book, Hegel's Concept of God. Why can a title such as this be said to encompass the entire thrust of Hegel's philosophical thought? It can be said without much fear of contradiction that Hegel's philosophy is from beginning to end a philosophy of manthe focus is constantly man as thinking spirit. The "system," as Hegel sees it in outline, is divided into three quite unequal parts: Logic (or the philosophy of thought), philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit (subjective, objective, and absolute). It is still true, however, that the focus is consistently man: man, the human spirit, thinking thought; man finding the logic of thought, the logical Idea, expressed in the thinking of nature; man coming to grips with the spiritual being which he himself essentially is. Why, then, the "Concept of God"? The answer is to be found in the culmination of the entire Hegelian system, "The Philosophy of Absolute Spirit." Only in the light of "absolute Spirit" is anything Hegel says intelligible. It will be the contention of all that follows that, in Hegel's view, ''absolute Spirit" is in fact to be identified with God and that, therefore, only if Hegel's "Concept of God" is intelligible, will anything Hegel says be intelligible. It will not be necessary to claim here that Hegel's concept of God does in fact correspond with the Christian concept of God. I am convinced, however, that Hegel indeed thought it did. More than that, I am also convinced that, if he did not think it did, there is no way to make sense out of Hegel's philosophy. Question of Sources A few final words about sources. Some might argue against the wisdom (or even the honesty) of relying so heavily on Hegel's lectureson aesthetics, on the philosophy of history, on the history of philosophy, on the philosophy of religion8which were published posthumously and taken for the most part from the notes of his students (which we all know with pain does not necessarily make for accuracy). The same could be said of the
7. "Where a language has interesting things to say, precision is never perfect" (William Barrett, The Illusion of Technique [New York: Doubleday, Anchor, 1979], p. 280). 8. The objection might be considered particularly weighty against the use of Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, the definitive edition of which we still await.
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many quotes from the Zusätze, which have been added to the text of the Encyclopedia, again from the notes of Hegel's students. A number of answers to such objections suggest themselves. (1) If the interpretation were supported exclusively from the lectures, with no confirmation from the Phenomenology, Logic, Encyclopedia, or Philosophy of Right, the objections would indeed have weight (it is for this reason that I have made no references to his Early Theological Writings, which Hegel presumably deliberately did not publish). The interpretation, however, can be quite clearly supported from the writings Hegel himself had published. (2) To my knowledge, it has not been possible to show, without taking quotes out of context, that Hegel repudiates what either the lectures or the Zusätze say. (3) Hegel himself says, in his prefaces to the Encyclopedia, that the whole work is but a compendium, a sort of textbook outline, which is of value only when supplemented by the oral presentation of the professorpresumably what the notes of the students contain, with considerably more accuracy than a lecturer could hope for today. A considerably more serious objection, from the scholarly point of view, could be made against my use of the Suhrkamp edition of the lectures rather than the more critical Meiner edition (the latter does not contain the Zusätze at all). My reason for so doing was simply practical: the Suhrkamp edition is more readily available for those who wish to check my references. In checking the Meiner edition myself I have found nothing that would make me want to change the interpretation. I shall be grateful, however, if anyone can furnish me with texts from the critical edition which would modify my interpretation. It should, perhaps, be noted here that I give no references to English translationssimply because I use no translations. One possible further complaint is that, in referring to Berliner Schriften, I have not given the dates of the pieces referred to. Since, however, all these Writings belong to the period of Hegel's professorship in Berlin (18181830)and thus postdate all Hegel's published writings, except Philosophy of Rightit seems reasonable to assign all of them to the period of Hegel's philosophical maturity. When all this has been said, one concluson still seems inescapable: Hegel is clearly the most "God-inebriated" of philosophers. We may or may not like Hegel's God, but we cannot refuse to take him seriouslyboth Hegel and Hegel's God. Nor can our own thinking remain unaffected if we have reflected long and seriously on "Hegel's Concept of God."
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Chapter One Religion and Philosophy To one who read's Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit for the first timeespecially if this first reading is also one's initiation to a grasp of Hegel's thinkingit cannot but come as a surprise that chapter VI, "Spirit," which would seem to be a culminating point of the inquiry, should be immediately followed by a chapter entitled "Religion," that is, religious consciousness. Not only does this indicate that, in Hegel's thinking, human self-conscious awareness of being "spirit'' and not merely "nature" is inadequate, it also indicates that the consciousness of being spirit is not a consciousness of what it is to be spirit until it goes beyond the self-enclosed consciousness of being merely human spirit. There are those, of course, who think that when, in the chapter on religious consciousness, Hegel speaks of God he is not being serious, that he is speaking at most metaphorically of an absolute unity of spirit which continues to be no more than human, even though not individual, but it is difficult to see how those who hold this can themselves be taken seriously. There are those too who, like Loewenberg, contend that by bringing religion onto the scene, thus focusing on a more-than-human spirit, Hegel has in some way ceased to engage in a phenomenology of the human spirit at all. Loewenberg considers the entry at this point of a "superhuman spirit" to be "intrusive" into the "biography of human spirit."1 However, it should be emphasized that, although the object of religion is divine, infinite Spirit, the religious experience of which Hegel is here speaking is essentially human experience. Perhaps the trouble lies in beginning a study of Hegel with the Phenomenology at all. It is in Science of Logic that Hegel makes clear his contention that all philosophical thinking is "speculative" thinkingthat
1. J. Loewenberg, Hegel's Phenomenology: Dialogues on the Life of Mind. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1965), p. 298; see pp. 33637.
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phenomenology, therefore, is speculative thinkingand that speculative thinking in its search for truth can never be confined to finding that truth in what is immediately present to thought, but only in that to which the immediately present points as its "truth." No one, so far as I know, has any difficulty in seeing that this is what goes on at every stage of the Phenomenology, up to and inclusive of section C, "Spirit Certain of Itself: Morality," which ends chapter VI. That some do not see that this points beyond itself to a spirit more than human is due, not to a determination to take what Hegel says seriously, but to an antecedent conviction that there is no more-than-human spirit to which morally self-conscious spirit can point. They are faced with a rather desperate alternative: either to refuse to follow Hegel any further or to interpret him in such a way as to make him say something quite other than what he quite obviously seems to be saying.2 If we take as our guidelines for interpretation what Hegel quite clearly does say in Science of Logic, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Lectures on Proofs for God's Existence, and the final sections of Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, rather than some unfounded antecedent conviction, we are, I think, more likely to come to grips with the real Hegel, for whom a thought which fails to rise to the absolute fails to come to terms with itself,3 and for whom religion attains to the absolute sooner than philosophy does.4 The overriding question with which logic (and, hence, the entire Hegelian system) is concerned is, "What is the true, what is the absolute foundation of everything" (WLI, p. 51)and this makes sense only if "absolute foundation" is at once logical, epistemological, and ontological. In Phenomenology of Spirit, it is true, precisely because its subject matter is "the experience of consciousness," which reveals itself to be "spirit," Hegel is more directly concerned with "religious consciousness' than he is with the "Absolute" which is the object of that consciousness.5 Nevertheless, it is clear even here, as it is throughout the Phenomenology, that consciousness is of interest only because it is the progressive revelation of the truth of its object and because consciousness will be true to itself as consciousness only if, ultimately, it is "absolute" consciousness of an ''absolute" object. What is, perhaps, of even more significance in this context is that the culminating stage of "spirit's" itinerary in coming to adequate con-
2. It is true, of course, that any interpretation of any authorincluding my interpretation of Hegelwill be colored by the interpreter's wanting the author to make sense, which usually means "my kind of sense." By itself, however, this need not invalidate the interpretationespecially where the evidence seems to be heavily weighted in its favor. 3. The thrust of the whole introduction to the Phenomenology. 4. "The content of religion, therefore, expresses what Spirit is sooner than science does, but the latter alone is its own knowledge of itself" (PdG, p. 559). See also BDG, pp. 5, 9, 17679. 5. In BDG, pp. 4647, Hegel speaks in scornful terms of those who would speak of religion as a form of human experience and yet consistently refuse to speak (philosophically) of religion's object, i.e., God.
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sciousness of itself and, therefore, to the "truth" of what at the beginning of chapter V was only "immediate certainty" that "Reason is all reality"the culmination which Hegel calls "Absolute Knowing"is continuous with and inclusive of ''Religion." It would be worse than arbitrary to look upon chapter VII as either a parenthesis between chapters VI and VIII or as not really saying seriously what it purports to be saying, that is, that religious consciousness, which has God as its object, is indispensable to authentic philosophical thinking and knowing. In truly dialectical fashion "religion" is "speculative" in the sense that it is the "truth" of consciousness as "moral spirit" and that it irresistibly "points to" the fulfillment of its own "truth" in "Absolute Knowing," where the philosophical form of "knowing" is suited to the religious content of "believing," and where "thought" supersedes "representation" without thereby either losing or distorting its "object." It may well be that we must go beyond the pages of the Phenomenology if we are to appreciate fully Hegel's identification of the "God" of religion and the "Absolute" of "Absolute Knowing," but there is no reason why from the vantage-point of a more mature working out of Hegel's thinking we may not look back and interpret where the Phenomenology was "pointing." One thing is clear: Hegel was dissatisfied with the views of his contemporarieswhether with the absence of a philosophical absolute in Kant's thought, with an absolute which is the object of feeling or intuition in that of Jacobi or Schleiermacher, or with an absolute which is the starting-point rather than the result of philosophical enquiry, as it is for Fichte and Schelling. This dissatisfaction begins to surface as early as the unpublished Theologische Jugendschriften; it continues, still in somewhat tentative form in Hegel's earliest published writings, Die Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie and Glauben und Wissen, on into the writings of the Jena period; it is, as we have seen, far less tentative in Phänomenologie des Geistes; ultimately it becomes most explicit in Wissenschaft der Logik and has its place in all subsequent writing, even, obliquely, in Philosophie des Rechts. In a very important sense the history of Hegel's dissatisfaction is autobiographical: in his formative years the most potent influences on the development of his philosophical thought were Kant, Fichte, and Schellingby a strange sort of reversal, perhaps due to his rereading the history of philosophy in light of his own Logic, the effective influence of Plato, Aristotle, the medieval theologians, and Spinoza manifests itself for the most part only subsequently. It was Kant's and Fichte's emphasis on the rationality of the "moral order" which opened the way for Hegel to a synthesis of the theoretical and the practical which was to issue in his version of "speculative thinking," and it was Schelling's insistence on the "identity" of "spirit" and "nature" which provided Hegel with the impetus to bridge
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the seemingly yawning chasm between the subjective world of thought and the objective world of reality. The key to Hegel's dissatisfaction with all three, however, was the failure of each of them to come to grips either with religion as a fundamental mode of consciousness integral to the human spirit's orientation to the Absolute or with the Absolute itself as the focus of religion's thrust. We can take Kant's Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft of 1793 (Fichte's Kritik aller Offenbarung had preceded it by one year) as symbolic of Hegel's dissatisfaction, which was to grow with the years. Two expressions in Kant's title alone will provoke in Hegel a reaction which will develop into a "philosophy of religion" which is at the same time a philosophy of God. "Within the limits" will signify to Hegel that, for Kant, philosophical thinking is essentially "finite" and, therefore, incapable of coming to grips with an "infinite'' object; and "mere (blossen) reason" will tell him that Kant's "reason" is not reason at all but only "understanding" trying to stretch itself beyond its limited capacities. Kant, it is true, sees, as will Hegel, an identity of content in religious consciousness and in philosophical thought, but that "identity of content" is vastly different from what Hegel will ultimately take it to be. Not that Hegel will ever deny the close connection between religious truth and moral truth, but he will consistently refuse to identify them, especially in the interests of permitting philosophical "reason" to come to terms with religious truth. Like Hegel, Kant seeks to ground religion in reason, but, because for Kant this means giving a rational foundation for a subjective religious response, he is under no compulsion to assign to reason a task which, as an essentially finite human capacity, he is convinced it is not equipped to carry out. Reason must remain silent in regard to God, the ultimate object of religious orientationexcept to the extent that "moral reason" must "postulate" God as the guarantor of a happiness to which moral activity is ordered but which reason alone "cannot demand." Better still, perhaps, Kant will recognize "postulates" as "demands of reason which need not be met." Kant will appeal to reason to give an account of religious consciousness, but he is convinced from the start that "mere" reason can give only a very limited account. In human affairsand religion is a human affairmoral reason is supreme; it needs neither a superior being in order to know duty nor a superior motive in order to accomplish it.6 It is unquestionably helpful to see in moral duty the "will of God," but there is no rational demand that
6. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (Hamburg: Meiner, 1956), p. 3. Earlier Herder (Schriften, ed. Walter Flemmer [Munich: Goldman, 1960], p. 143) had criticized Kant for formulating a morality which for lack of adequate motivation resulted in no action: "It is easy to formulate a law which is not followed, which without motives even cannot be followed."
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morality do this, even though there is a close parallel between morality's reverence for the moral law and religion's reverence for God. If morality recognizes in the sacredness of its law an object of greatest reverence, by the same token, on the level of religion morality represents in the form of a supreme cause completing those laws an object of adoration and thus becomes manifest in the majesty of this cause.7 It should be noted that morality, although it can be quite certain of the universal validity of its laws, can only "represent to itself" a "supreme cause completing those laws"; it cannot say unequivocally that there is such a cause or what this cause is. If there is a content to "supreme cause," it is supplied by religion, and reason has nothing to say about that aspect of religion. For Kant, religion is in principle subservient to morality. The only religious teaching which counts is moral teaching, which religion helpfully sets forth as the "will of God."8 God is, so to speak, the personified idea of the good principle,9 and religion consists in recognizing the demands of moral reason as divine commands,10 which is not to say that religion is not right in doing this, only that religion is not "rationally" justified in doing this. Religion (considered subjectively) is the recognition of all our duties as divine commands. The religion in which I must know ahead of time that something is a divine command in order to recognize it as my duty is revealed religion. . . ; on the other hand, the religion in which I must first know that something is duty before I can recognize it as a divine command is natural religion.11 It is instructive that, although Kant does not explicitly identify God and universal moral will (as does Fichte, after him), he nevertheless makes moral will the criterion for any rational approach to God. God is recognized, as it were, as the "universal lawgiver" of a moral law which "mere reason" can infallibly know to be true without knowing God. The authority of the law does not reside in its character as "divine" but in the intrinsic moral value reason finds in it. At the same time, however, we do "sanctify'' moral duty by interpreting it as God's command, and we honor God by observing 7. Ibid., p. 8.
8. Ibid., p. 10. 9. Ibid., p. 63. 10. Ibid., p. 92. 11. Ibid., p. 170. Since, fairly obviously, religion is for Kant significant to the extent that it shows the ends of moral reason, its object, God can well be a postulate of reason, without being an object of reason.
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the duties dictated by reason, because we have interpreted them as God's commands;12 if they are dictates of moral reason they do have a sanctity to them. It is important to note that the reason here in question is individual reason (Kant's) universalized, that is, seen to be necessary.13 In the moral order, then, the "content" of religion and of philosophical reason is identical, but that content is law, not God. The only true religion contains nothing but laws, i.e., the sort of practical principles of whose unconditional necessity we can be conscious and which we can, therefore, recognize as revealed through pure reason (not empirically).14 The "Divinity" of Thought This is the Kant Hegel read during his formative years (interpreted, perhaps, through the eyes of Fichte), and his influence is recognizable in Theologische Jugendschriften, although even there Hegel's dissatisfaction has begun to manifest itself. That dissatisfaction comes to a head in the Phenomenology, where Hegel is striking out on uncharted waters. Here, Hegel effectively dissociates himself from the "rationalism" of the Enlightenment, whose criterion of rationality was, he thought, primarily negative; namely, opposition to authority of any kind, particularly religious. He also distances himself from the "critical philosophy" of Kant and Fichte, for whom the absolute rationality of the moral order bespeaks no direct connection between human and divine reason, but only the need the mind has to "represent" to itself a God whom nonrational religion supplies. What Hegel has doneand, it would seem, quite consciouslyis to insert his own thinking into the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Anselm, and Spinoza, all of whom saw human rational thinking as somehow divine and oriented to the divine. Thought reveals itself as infinite activity, and infinite activity is seen to be activity of the infinite. This is not the place to unravel the intricacies of the development through which "spirit" goes in coming to a realization of its own infinity, nor, perhaps would it be possible to do so, if we did not have Science of Logic to use as a guide in interpreting the Phenomenology (which in his preface to the former Hegel authorizes us to do). One thing, however, is clear from a reading of the Phenomenology without appeal to later works for clarification: on the subjective side moral reason is not, for Hegel, the ultimate in rationality, since "absolute knowing,'' through the mediation of religious consciousness, transcends moral reason; on the objective side, "moral law" is the ultimate content neither of religion nor of philosophy, but rather "ab-
12. Ibid., p. 114. 13. Ibid., p. 143. 14. Ibid., p. 187.
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solute Spirit" is. Whether or not those who assert that there is no justification for the claim that Hegel equates "absolute Spirit" and "God" have validated their own claim will be the subject of the rest of this study. On the face of it, Hegel's statement, in as unlikely a place as Philosophy of Right, that the "content" of ''philosophy" is "the comprehensive knowledge of God and [thus] of physical and spiritual nature" (GPR, p. 12) would seem to demand serious consideration. On the other hand, it should be too obvious to need textual demonstration that religious consciousness is consciousness of God, not consciousness of moral lawor whatever elsewhich permits the human mind to "represent" to itself a "supreme lawgiver," who, if there be such, adds a "sacredness" we do not really need. God is self-consciousness; he knows himself in a consciousness which is distinct from him, which is implicitly the consciousness of God, but is also this explicitly, since it knows its identity with God, an identity which is, however, mediated by the negation of finitude. It is this concept which constitutes the content of religion. This is what God is: to distinguish himself from himself, to be object to himself, and yet in this distinction to be simply identical with himselfto be Spirit. [VPR II, p. 187] Whether the "God" of religion and the "God" of philosophy are one and the same may still remain to be seen, but, once again, on the face of it Hegel would seem to give abundant evidence that this is precisely what he is saying: The God whom human self-consciousness implicitly knows in religion is one and the same God that human selfconsciousness (infinitized) knows philosophically. Religion, then, is itself the standpoint of the consciousness of the True, which is in and for itself; and it is consequently the stage of spirit at which the speculative content as such is object for consciousness. Religion is not consciousness of this or that truth in individual objects, but of the absolute truth, of truth as the universal, the all-comprehending, outside of which there lies nothing at all. The content of religious consciousness is further the universally True, which exists in and for itself, which determines itself, and is not determined from without. . . . It is this speculative element which comes to consciousness in religion. [VPR I, pp. 3031]15 Nor does he confine statements such as this to his explicit treatment of the philosophy of religion: philosophy as such and religion as such have one and the same objective, that is, truth, absolute truth, God.
15. It scarcely seems open to dispute that "speculative content" is the "absolutely true" to which the entire elaboration of Science of Logic is oriented.
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First of all, it is true, philosophy has in common with religion that their objects (Gegenstände) are the same. Both have the truth as their object, and that in the highest sensei.e., that God and God alone is the truth. In addition both treat the sphere of the finite, nature and human spirit, their relation to each other, and the relation of both to God as their truth. [EpW, no. 1] Although, then, Hegel in no way denies the close connection between religion and morality, he has come a long way from the Kantian position that religion stands in the service of morality. Nor did Hegel adopt the diametrically opposed position that morality is subservient to religionhe was careful in all matters to avoid either-or options. In a very significant sense he continued to agree with Kant that the moral roots of religious consciousness were not to be ignored. True religion, or religiousness, arises only out of morality; it is thinking morality, i.e., a morality becoming conscious of the free universality of its concrete essence. Only from the standpoint of morality are we conscious of God as free spirit. It is vain, then, to look for true religion or religiousness apart from the moral spirit. [Ibid., no. 552] The point of all this, however, is to insist that what is important for the human spirit is to be in the service of truth, which it is in philosophy, and that by serving the truth it is serving God. In a text which highlights the intimate relation not only of religion and philosophy but also of art to the highest truth, to God, Hegel makes his point very clear. By occupying itself with the true as the absolute object (Gegenstand) of consciousness, then, art too belongs to the absolute sphere of spirit and, therefore, from the point of view of its content, along with religion . . . and philosophy, art stands on the same ground. For philosophy, too, has no other object but God and is, thus, essentially rational theology, and because it is in the service of truth, it is enduring service of God. [VA 1, p. 139]16 But, Hegel is not saying, along with Kant, that moral reasoning comes first and is "absolute," finding only a kind of "sacralizing" prop in the religious "representation" of God. What he is saying is that "truth" comes first, that ''absolute truth" is God, and that to seek truth, whether morally (in the realm of "objective spirit") or artistically, religously, and philosophically (in the realm of "absolute Spirit") is to seek God. If, then, we say that philosophy ("speculative thinking") and religion
16. The German term Hegel uses is Gottesdienst, which translates the Latin liturgia, Greek leiturigia *, and could be rendered in English by "liturgy."
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("religious consciousness") have the same content but in a different form, just what are we saying? Perhaps we can get at the meaning of what we are saying by first turning to two levels of enquiry which do not have the same contentempirical science and philosophy. We have just seen that, for Hegel, the content of philosophy is the "comprehensive knowledge of God and [thus] of physical and spiritual nature." We have also seen that both philosophy and religion have the same "objects" (Gegenstände) in common, "truth . . . in the highest sense, [which is] God,'' and both treat finite reality, that is, "nature and the human spirit." To say, however, that religion and philosophy "treat" (handeln) nature and finite spirit is not to say that as "objects" (Gegenstände) they come under the "content" of philosophy; only their "truth" does, and truth is fully true only as "absolute truth," or as related to "absolute truth." Thus, for Hegel, there is a "philosophy of nature" and a "philosophy of spirit" (subjective and objective), but the "content" of such philosophy is not the same as that of "empirical science," even though the latter shares with philosophy "the formal aspect of thinking," the "universal in experience" (EGP, p. 158). In "science," then, we can have a "content" which is "empirical" and a "form" which is "philosophical"; whereas in philosophy both "content" and "form" belong to thought and to thought alone. From this diversity of content and identity of form we can now turn once more to the identity of content and diversity of form in religion and philosophy. If it is true to say that short of a "comprehensive knowledge" of "absolute truth," philosophical thinking has not attained to "knowledge of truth" at all, then it is also true to say that only "absolute truth" can be the adequate "content" of philosophy. But "God and God alone is the truth," and, thus "philosophy, too, has no other object but God." Are we correct then, in claiming that when Hegel says "religion" is "consciousness . . . of the absolute truth" or that "it is this speculative content which comes to consciousness in religion," he is saying that the "truth," which is "God and God alone," is one and the same in philosophy and religion? The conclusion, it would seem, is difficult to avoid, unless one wishes to say that Hegel has two different meanings for the term "God," and that is difficult to prove. What, then, of "form"? The "form" of thinking of which God is the "content" in religion, Hegel says, is not the "form" of thinking of which God is the "content" in philosophy. What does this mean? Minimally it would seem to have to mean that, although the "God" of whom each thinks is the same (there is only one God), the way in which each thinks of God is different. For some, of course, this can mean nothing more than that "belief" (faith) and "knowledge" (reason) are not the same. In view, however, of Hegel's ongoing controversy with the "theologians" of his day, which begins to take definitive shape as early as 1802 in Glauben und
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Wissen, it is imperative to see in the distinction of "form" both more and less than did those "theologians." It is necessary to see more, because it is not sufficient to be content either with the ''Enlightenment's" simplistic conception of "reason" or with "Pietism's" simplistic view of "faith"17 (see PdG, pp. 385407); and less, because at the hands of Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher, the distinction tends to be seen in terms of a dichotomy rather than a continuity. If knowledge is interpreted as a function of subjective thinking and faith as a function of subjective feeling, intuition, or what have you, the likelihood that either the distinction or the continuity will ever be grasped in their truth is slim indeed. What it comes down to, Hegel tells us, is the prejudice, inherited from the Enlightenment (aided and abetted by Pietism) that philosophy is supremely rational (the "reason" of the "philosopher") and that faith is simply nonrational (if not irrational). Hegel has many pungent things to say about this prejudice, particularly in his critique of the Enlightenment in the Phenomenology and other works, in his abundant criticisms of Kant18particularly of the latter's attitude expressed succinctly in the statement, "I had to suspend (aufheben) knowledge in order to make room for faith"19and in scattered remarks about the "modern theologians" who want to confine the approach to God to "immediate" feelings or intuition. The issue is highlighted in Hegel's Introduction in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, wherein he is trying to characterize philosophy in such a way as to justify saying that it has a "history." He tells us that philosophy is the highest form in which spirit reveals itself at any time or place (EGP, pp. 3839). To say that it is the "highest form," however, is not to say that it is the "only" form. There are also nonphilosophical ways in which the "absolute idea" (spirit) can be present in thought, and these are art and religion"the way in which the supreme idea is present for nonphilosophical consciousness, for sensitive, intuitive, representational consciousness" (ibid., p. 42) (hence, "art" and "religion" as integral to the "philosophy of absolute Spirit" in the Encyclopedia; hence Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik and Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion). It would be a mistake, however, to look upon this nonphilosophical presence as nonrational; it is not totally spiritualsince only "pure" thought is thatbut it is eminently rationalso long as it is oriented to and continuous with the supremely spiritual form. As we shall see later (chap. 5,
17. What comes out in these pages of the Phenomenology is the view that Enlightenment and Pietism are but two sides of the same coin. Insisting on its own "reason" the former is merely negating the naiveté of pietistic "belief," and the latter is taking Enlightenment "reason" far too seriously. 18. For a more extended study of these criticisms, see Quentin Lauer, S.J., "Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theology," in God Knowable and Unknowable, ed. Robert J. Roth, S.J. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1973), pp. 85105. 19. Kant, KrV B., P. xxx.
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"Proofs of God"), a content can be supremely "rational" without having been discovered by subjectively rational thinking. (It has been remarked above that, like philosophy, so too religion must first of all be comprehended, i.e., it must be recognized and acknowledged as rational.) For religion is the work of self-revealing reason, its supreme, most rational work. Those are but absurd notions according to which priests out of self-serving deceit have simply manufactured a religion . . . . Rather, this region of the spirit is the sanctuary in which the remaining deception of the sense-world, of finite representations and goals, the region of opinion and arbitrariness, has been dissolved. [Ibid, p. 43] There is much in the above quotation which will have to await the next chapter for its explication. One thing, however, is clear: That the truth as presented in art and religion is not the conclusion of "subjectively rational argumentation" (Räsonnieren) is no indication that the truth of it is nonrational. Its presence in the mind is the result of rational activity, which is not synonymous with "logical argument" nor with merely subjective thinking. What makes the content of consciousness "rational'' is not the rationality of the procedure whereby the truth was arrived atwhich does not mean that rational procedure should be ignored or abandonedbut the internal rationality of the content. In fact, the procedure in question will be authentically rational only if it accords with the inherent rationality of its object; no "reasoning" at all can make the claim for itself of being rational, if the conclusion at which it arrives is not rational. For the purposes of an exercise in formal logic, perhaps, one can by a perfectly correct procedure arrive at a nonsensical conclusion, but that is merely the game of reasoningwhich has but little to do with "reason." The Rationality of the Religious Hegel, however, is saying a great deal more than that. He is saying that, if reason characterizes the human, then reason sets its mark on whatever is specifically human, be it thought, intuition, emotion, or "representation." This does not mean that whatever is the object of intuition, feeling, representation is eo ipso rational and true; it does mean that to the extent that the object of consciousness is not rational, not true, to that same extent the consciousness is not authentically human. One is not being authentically human if one's intuitions or feelings come up with what is irrational. By the same token, however, if what intuition comes up with is a truly rational content, reason has not been absent from the "thinking" in question. There is an affinity in man for what is rational: "Whatever is human, rational, finds an echo in us, in our feeling, emotion, heart, in our subjectivity in
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general" (EGP, p. 48). "Universal reason"which, for Hegel, is not individual subjective reason abstractly universalizedreveals itself best in human reason properly so called, but it is not limited to that manifestation. We might put it this way: If the content of an affirmation is true, it is rational; the subjective process of arriving at the affirmation may not be rational, but this does not take away from the rationality of the contentnor of the human response to it. Concretely this is saying that if God, absolute truth, absolute Spirit, is objectively supremely rational, then, even if the affirmation of that truth is not itself a supremely rational activity, as it is not in art or religion, still it is the affirmation of what is rational and, as such, partakes of the rationality of its content. In no way does this mean that as human beings we should be satisfied with a procedure which is less than rational in coming to grips with inherently rational objectivityin fact it is the function of philosophical thinking to transform thought which is inadequately rational in form into adequately rational thoughtbut it does help us to understand what Hegel means when he says that the presence of truth to the mind is rational; it is rational that the mind should think what is objectively rational. As we shall see, "speculative thinking" is the adequately rational procedure which has "speculative truth" (the rational) as its "content," but this does not mean that as the subjective thinking of any individual philosopher it discovers ultimate rational truth. This truth can be discovered (made manifest) to thought at a level of less than total rationality and then be ''transformed (speculatively, "spiritually") into the rational form proper to it. (See chap. 7, "Philosophy and Theology.") It is here that the distinction between "immediate" and "mediated" becomes important. Basically "immediate" refers to that which is "given" in consciousness without the intervention of transforming"mediating"thought. It is the "immediacy" of which Hegel speaks in the first chapter of the Phenomenology in reference to "sense certainty"; it is the "immediacy" of the first content of thought, that is, "being," in Science of Logic. That no consciousness or content of consciousness is "absolutely" immediate, since both immediate consciousness and its immediate content are seen to be "mediated," if by nothing else, by each other, is of no great consequence here. What is important is that no relatively "immediate given," whether empirical "data" or the object of faith "given" in revelation, can remain simply as "given" but must be mediated by the hard labor of rational thinking in order that it may reveal its own inherent rationality. What is characteristic of "knowing" in the truly "spiritual" sense is that it is in no way "immediate," not even relatively (VGP II, p. 494). The distinction between "immediate" and "mediated" becomes particularly important for Hegel when he comes to the question of "knowing" God, the God in whom religion "believes," the only "God" of whom it will
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make any sense to speak of as being "known," since, when the nonactual is known, it is not in truth known. The problem of human mind as "finite" capacity coming to grips with God as ''infinite Being" is not, of course, one which became crucial only with the advent of Kant. It is a problem which worried Saint Augustine and the medieval Scholastics, notably Saint Anselm and Saint Thomas Aquinas. It is to be noted, however, that in seeking a solution to the problem, each of these men, "theologians" though they were, manifested a greater confidence in human reason than did Kant, or, for that matter, the Enlightenment "rationalists," for all of whom a rational knowledge" of God was simply out of the question. What saved the medieval thinkers, perhaps, was their faith in reason, which issued in the confidence that "faith" could "seek understanding" and could bring reason to bear on the questions not only of whether God is but also of what God ishowever limited they may have thought the answer to the second question would be and however close they tied their answer to what "divine revelation" and the "teaching" of the church had already made known. Given the influence of Kant, however, Hegel had a rather different problem to face: not only that of vindicating the capacity of reason to know God but also that of counteracting the opposite convictiona reactionthat God could indeed be known, but only "immediately," either in the sense that scripture tells us all we need to know or that "feeling" or "intuition" were adequate to the task which thought could not accomplish. "Through Kantian and Jacobian philosophy the public was strengthened in its conviction that knowledge of God is immediate, that one knows right off the bat (von Haus aus), without having to study" (VGP III, p. 414). That this sort of "immediate" knowledge told the "public" no more than "that" God is, leaving the name "God" to stand for an indeterminate "I-know-not-what" seems to have caused little disturbance either among the pious or among the "Deists." Finally, immediate consciousness of God is supposed to go no further than telling us that God is, not what God is; for the latter would be an act of cognition, demanding mediated knowing. Thus God as immediate object of religion is expressly limited to God in general, to the indeterminate supra-sensible, and religion is, as far as its content is concerned, reduced to a minimum. If it were really necessary to accomplish only so much that the belief, there is a God, would still be retained, or perhaps, that such a belief should come to be, then one could only wonder at the poverty of an era which lets the merest pittance of religious knowledge count as a gain and has had in its church to seek refuge at the altar which long ago stood in Athens, the altar dedicated to the unknown god. [EpW, no. 73] What is gradually coming to the fore here is Hegel's unshakable convic
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tionprephilosophical rather than philosophical in characterthat the "content" of religion, that is, what is believed, particularly in the Christian religion, which he calls "absolute religion," is "rational" and, therefore, suited to a human mind attuned to rationality. What is rational, however, must also be developed rationally, and this development, too, is characteristic of Christian religion; its beliefs cannot simply stand still but must unfold. Because Christian religious consciousness is in principle knowing (Erkenntnis), it develops its content; for its ideas (Vorstellungen) regarding its overall object (Gegenstand) are given to it as in themselves thoughts, and as thoughts they must expand. [VPR I, p. 26]20 As products of "thought," Vorstellungen here stand somewhere between mere acceptance of what is given and conceptual comprehension. On the other hand, because the content belongs essentially to representation, it is thus distinguished from immediate opinion (Meinung) or intuition and pierces right through the distinction. In short, over-against subjectivity the content counts as absolute, as being in and for itself. [Ibid] Merely as religious consciousness, then, Christianity is not a "knowing" in the full sense (Wissen), but it involves a movement away from immediate acceptance toward "knowing." Christian religion, therefore, of itself touches on the opposition between feeling or immediate intuition and reflection or knowing. [Ibid., pp. 2627] What it comes down to is that what Christians believe has a thought-ful content; it is something for the mind, not simply for feeling. Here we come, willy nilly, on the distinction between "representation" (Vorstellung) and "concept" (Begriff), which will be of utmost importance not only for the distinction between philosophy and religion but also for their relation to each other. Scholars have always had difficulty translating the term Vorstellung, particularly as Hegel uses it. It should be obvious from what has gone before that the term cannot be translated by "image"; it belongs too clearly to the realm of thought and not to that of sensibility or imagination (unless, of course, the meaning of the latter term is broadened considerably). It is not totally incorrect to translate Vorstellung as "image thinking," but in this the stress on ''image" would seem to be too strong,
20. The "in themselves" (an sich) here is important: as thoughts only an sich, Vorstellungen, have a true content only implicitly; the content must developexpand.
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unless, of course, we can think of a "spiritual" image (see WG, pp. 134, 172). "Representation" is, perhaps, not the best possible translation, but it has two advantages: (1) it captures the nuance of the ''notion" which finite mind "forms" for itself in "representing" its object to itself; and (2) as Hegel himself observes,21 it conveys the additional meaning of "standing for" (stellvertretend or repräsentierend) the object which is not yet totally "spiritually" present to the mind. When the Christian, then, hears the "word of God"be it in scripture, Church teaching, or preachinghe forms for himself Vorstellungen which he must "think through" in order to arrive at Begriffe which are only implicitly present in the Vorstellungen. That Hegel's "representation" has not yet totally freed itself from sensible "image-content" is clear enough, but it leans, so to speak, more in the direction of "concept" than of "image." It has to be noted, of course, that Vorstellung covers a gamut of meanings, ranging from almost image to almost pure thought (e.g., "notion," "idea"). When Hegel says, then, that the "content" of religion and philosophy is the "same," but that the "form" is different (in the former the form is "representation," which is not adequate to the content, while in the latter the form is "concept," which is adequate to the content) we must use utmost caution in interpreting him. What adds to the difficulty is that although Hegel's more constant distinction is that between Vorstellung and Begriff, sometimes he distinguishes between Vorstellen and Denken, even though, as in the above quotation, he also says that Vorstellung belongs to the realm of Gedanke. We must interpret this: As I see it, his meaning is that Gedanke may be either in the form of Vorstellung or Begriff, but only the latter is the form of Denken in the fullest and most precise sense of that term. In any event, what Hegel is trying to do is clear enough. Having disposed of the contention that, because human "knowing" is essentially finite, its object too must be essentially finite, he sets up a distinction which will make his denial of that contention intelligible. As the activity of an essentially finite subject human thinking is essentially finite, and the form in which its "thoughts" (Gedanken) are cast is that of "representation," which is simply not adequate to an infinite object. This is human "thinking" (Denken) in its role as "understanding" (Verstand), and it is adequate only to "abstract" objects. As the activity of "spirit" which is neither merely human nor merely finite, "thinking" (Denken) in its role as "reason" (Vernunft) is adequate to its object as "concrete" (totalized). The "thoughts" (Gedanken) of the human "spirit," however, need not remain at the level of "representation": they can be raised to the level of "concept" (Begriff), and when they are they partake of the all-embracing universality of "thinking" (Denken)
21. See PdG, p. 216.
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whose form is "concept in-and-for-itself" (Begriff an-und-für-sich). The object of this "conceptual thinking" is ''infinite." All of this will have to await chapters 2 and 4 for further elucidation. Knowing and Believing If nothing else, what has been said here should alert us to the nuances of meaning contained in Hegel's statement that "the more highly cultivated consciousness" cannot be satisfied with religious thinking of its object, because only when "thinking" is "knowing" is the mind satisfied. This Aufhebung of the "form" of religious thinking is neither the "cancellation" of religion nor its "downgrading"; it is its "completion" and "justification" as authentically human. There is no question in Hegel's mind that religious Vorstellungen, derived as they can be from a variety of sources, can and do contain truth. Only, however, when they have been adequately "thought out" can they satisfy the educated mind, which is not to say that the "educated mind" can then discard them.22 Philosophy, then, has the same purpose and content as religion, only as thinking, not as representation. The form (Gestalt) of religion, therefore, does not satisfy the more highly cultivated consciousness, which must want to know, to transcend (aufheben) the form (Form) of religion, but only in order to justify its content. This, then, not the historical, the scholarly, the extrinsic, is the true justification. The eternal does not have its grounding in the temporal, in facts, etc. What does that is the testimony of spirit. [BS, p. 15] What this is saying is that philosophy is itself a form of religion, the highest formGottesdienst (see above, p. 14 and note 16) and that to comprehend God in "systematic thinking" is religious activity"worship" in purest "interiority." For religion, in which God is for consciousness initially an external objectbecause we must first be taught what God is and how he has revealed
22. Authentic religious representation has a content which is supremely rational. In characteristically empathic fashion Emil Fackenheim interprets Hegel as authentically Christian in his approach. "In the above brief account, one decisive characteristic is not mentionedthat religious representation moves toward, but fails to reach, the universality of speculative thought. . . . We may presently only say, negatively, that the thought in question is not finite reflection and that it does not expose religious representation as mere human projection and illusion as it reflects on it. Careless readers have always mistaken it for such a reflection, and they have therefore viewed Hegel as a demythologizing enemy of religious faith. In fact, however, Hegel regards a thought of this kind as inferior to religious representation and declares himself to be in alliance with Christianity or Theology against it (e.g., Werke XI, pp. 28 ff.; XII, pp. 350 ff.)." E. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 155.
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himself and still doesoccupies itself, it is true, with the interior, moves and inspires the community. Still the interiority of devotion limited to emotion and representation is not the highest form of interiority. It is selfdetermining (freies) thinking which has to be recognized as this purest form of knowing. It is in this that science brings the same content to consciousness and thus becomes that spiritual worship which, by systematic thinking appropriates and comprehends what is otherwise only the content of subjective sentiment or representation. [V A I, p. 143] This "scientific" comprehension of the truth contained in religious Vorstellungen is no less profoundly religious than is religious consciousness in its representational form. When Hegel says, then, that the religious form of consciousness is not satisfactory for the "more highly cultivated consciousness"by which he clearly means highly educated modern manhe is evidently talking about "religion" in the way he has described it in the seventh chapter of the Phenomenology and in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion; that is, as a consciousness of the divine dependent on a "revelation," whether that be contained in created nature, art, the word of the Bible, or the incarnate Word of Christianity. This revelation has a ''content," and "religious consciousness" expresses that content in the form of "representation," which the religious mind employs to translate the revelation into products of the human mind in "seeking" to "understand" it. This may or may not be what others mean by religion; it is certainly not what medieval theologians like Anselm and Aquinas meant by "faith seeking understanding," which was not so much man looking for "representations" to interpret the content of faith as it was faith itself seeking a "rational understanding" of itselfthe "rational understanding" being part and parcel of the "faith" in question. It is significant in this connection that, when Hegel composed his Lectures on Proofs of God's Reality, he conceived them as an extension, not of his philosophy of religion but of his logic,23 and that his most extensive treatment of the "ontological argument," which he considers to be the most valid, is contained in his Science of Logic (see chap. 5). If, however, we consider all he has to say about the "religious" character of philosophy itself and about the confidence in reason manifested by the medieval theologians, we may find that he is not so far from them after all. That he distances himself, on the other hand, quite definitively from the "theologians" who are his own contemporaries is abundantly clear. These "modern theologians" (presumably under the influence of the Enlightenment) do what the "Scholastics" never dreamt of doing; they make "faith"
23. See chapter 5, " 'Proofs' of God," pp. 211212. It might be well to note here that it was not Hegel but his editors, who appended Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes to Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.
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and "knowledge" discontinuous, and in so doing they either surrender faith to "feeling and intuition" or they degrade knowledge to the level of abstract "understanding" by means of "representations" which simply do not do justice to the content of faithabove all to Hegel's Lutheran faith which rests on the "interior testimony of the Spirit.''24 The time has come, then, to get back to that "interior testimony of the Spirit." It is a traditional commonplace that God reveals himself in nature, either because the very existence of a nature which cannot account for itself cries out for an infinite "first cause" which does account for nature's finite existence (cosmological proof), or because the rationality manifested in the nature we observe bespeaks a supremely intelligent cause of that nature (physicotheological proof). In Hegel's view, however, God does not manifest himself to man primarily in "nature" but in the activity of the human spirit; it is the human spirit, after all, which makes nature the mirror of God (EGP, p. 201). What is more, God also reveals himself preeminently in the symbols of religion, which, again, are manmade but not arbitrary; they are the human spirit's way of permitting God to come into human consciousness (ibid., pp. 5557). The point is that in religion (or religions) men have expressed the consciousness they actually have of the supreme being, and no matter how subjective the form of expressing may be, the expressing itself is a function of reason, since what is expressed is supremely rational (ibid., p. 168). Now, although supremely rational truth is "contained" in religious consciousness, its presence is a "given" which religion as such cannot verify; only the process of "thought" can (ibid., pp. 17374). When the divine Spirit is present to the human spirit in thought, the divine is present in the medium proper to itself and not merely in a "representation" standing for it, and it is for this reason that only philosophy "knows" God, who manifests himself to the human in that activity which is most proper to spirit. The difference between individual and universal spirit, then, should be expressed thus: the subjective, individual spirit is25 the universal, divine Spirit to the extent that the former is rationally conscious of the latter, to the extent that the latter manifests itself in each subject, each man. Thus, the spirit which is rationally conscious of absolute Spirit is subjective spirit. [Ibid., p. 176] It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this that philosophical "knowing" can dispense with "religious consciousness." In fact, the very
24. What Hegel has to say in the final section ("The Religion of Revelation") in the seventh chapter of PdG and in "Absolute Religion," the culmination of VPR, makes this abundantly clear. 25.The difficulty of integrating Hegel's use of the copula "is" is admirably illustrated here. In this citation only this "is" clearly connotes orientation, movement to; for the rest he employs "is" as the simple prepositional copula.
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logic of the situation precludes this; de facto not every individual human being, not even every philosopher, knows God. The human spirit needs the revelation "given" in religion in order to be able by its own activity to think the revealed content through. There is even a sort of parallel to this in man's knowledge of "nature." The "thinking through" which is the "knowing'' of nature is entirely man's "spiritual" activity, but that nature be "given" in sense perception is a precondition for the spiritual activity.26 That, for Hegel, philosophy in this sense "needs" religion is eloquently expressed by Emil Fackenheim: It is a central Hegelian doctrine that the true religion already is the true "content," lacking merely the true "form" of speculative thought; that philosophy could not reach truth unless its true content pre-existed in religion; that philosophic thought therefore requires religion as its basis in life, and that the true philosophy, in giving the true religious content its true form of thought, both transfigures religion and produces itself.27 Thus, when Hegel tells us that religion and philosophy have the same content, he really intends to tell us more about philosophy than about religion. What he intends to tell us is that, in the concreteness of "life," it is only when philosophical thinking passes beyond its empirical beginnings to that which is its inescapable objectfreedom, spirit, Godis it authentically philosophical thinking. At the present time religion has more and more contracted its cultivated expansion of its content and retreated into the intensity of piety or of feeling, frequently indeed a feeling which manifests a thin and scanty content. As long as religion has a creed, a doctrine, a system of dogma, it has that with which philosophy can occupy itself, thus uniting itself in this with religion. This, however, is not to be understood in the bad, separatist sense, which restricts contemporary religiousness, making it interpret both religion and philosophy in such a way that they are mutually exclusive, so separated that unity can only be imposed from without. Rather what is also implied in what we have already seen is that religion may well exist without philosophy, but not philosophy without religion; philosophy includes religion. [EpW., pref. to 2nd ed. 1827, p, 12, Meiner] In the words of Henry Harris, Hegel's mature system of philosophy "grows out of what was called 'religion' before."28
26. Obviously one should not push the parallel too far; neither is the mode of "givenness" the same, nor is the "inner testimony" of "Spirit" operative other than, perhaps, obliquely in coming to grips conceptually with nature. 27. Fackenheim, Religious Dimension, p. 23. Note the point made that it is in "life," not in the abstract, that philosophy needs religion. 28. H. S. Harris. Hegel's Development (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), p. 391.
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In the concreteness of life, then, Hegel would say, "belief" comes before "knowledge," religious belief before ''speculative" philosophy. But the mind cannot stand still; it must go on to a "knowing" of what it initially "believes." This it can do, however, only if it goes beyond a Kantian philosophy of "understanding" which, in fact "has placed God beyond knowing as indeterminate, without predicates, without properties" (BS, p. 70). This philosophy has given to this kind of understanding a correct consciousness of itself, namely that it is incapable of knowing truth. But, because it has viewed mind as nothing but such an understanding, it has come up with the universal propositionas though apart from God there could be absolute objects or a truth at allthat man can know nothing of God or of anything which is in itself. [Ibid.]29 Whether or not the criticism of Kant is justified, the words tell us clearly enough what Hegel's own position was. One wonders how in the light of texts such as those we have just seen, and they could be multiplied, Richard Schacht can say, "This self-realizing 'system' is the essential nature of the whole of reality and of the only God Hegel recognizes."30 The point that Hegel is constantly making is the one he makes in the introduciton to Science of Logic that the only possible starting point for philosophizing is "God as he is in his eternal being before the creation of the world or of a single finite spirit" (WL I, p. 31). If one's own "logic" tells one that this cannot be, then one is forced, I suppose, to say that, "the only God Hegel recognizes" is not the God of transcendent faith. In criticizing Kant and Fichte, however, what Hegel is actually saying is that, if philosophy cannot "know" God, then neither can faith know what it "believes" (GW, pp. 1314), "since the religious mode of representation does not make use of the critique of thought, it does not comprehend itself" (EpW, no. 573). To speak in a very simplified way (which will be remedied in the next chapter), thinking in general begins in sense experience with what is "immediately given." The thinking subject then "reflects" on its experience and forms "representations" which reproduce experience in the form of abstract generalities. Only when thinking, however, reflects on its own reflection, thinking it through ("speculative thinking"), can it become "knowledge" in the strict sense. Religious thinking, then, can be said to follow a parallel course. It begins with what is "immediately given"be it written or spoken words, man-made images, or, perhaps, nature itselfas
29. As early as Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie Hegel has equally harsh words to say of Fichte. 30. Richard Schacht, Hegel and After (Pittsburgh: University Press, 1975), p. 7; see pp. 6768, 127.
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the result of which it forms to itself "representations" of the "supreme Being." Here, Hegel says, religion runs the risk of not passing on to the highest stage of thinking, either because it is satisfied with the "givens'' and the "representations" they call up or because it is convinced that, where the "Absolute" is in question, there is no "higher stage" to which it can go. In this, we might say, the person of simple faith who is not a "critical thinker" has the advantage over the sophisticated "theologians" who are "critical thinkers"; the former is not satisfied with "words," which do not say enough, nor with "representations" which are too abstract to say anything. Let the "critical theologians" tell the common man what his religious thinking is; he is not likely to pay much attention. When we Europeans say, "God is the supreme Being" this predicate is just as abstract and empty as is the word "God," and the metaphysics of understanding which denies knowledge of God, i.e., knowing what characterizes him, and demands that the notion (Vorstellung) of God be confined to this abstraction, is destined to know nothing more of God than it does of what Brahm is. Despite this critical wisdom the European notion will in general contain this: that in using the expression "supreme Being" and even more the word "God," it has before it something concrete, God as Spirit, and that what the notion means is richer and fuller than what it says. [BS, pp. 13839] What the "critical mind" can be satisfied with the "religious heart" cannot: God must be a reality, not an abstraction, not an indefinite object of whom content-full predicates cannot be said. If the concept of God is viewed as that of abstract "most real Being," then God becomes for us a mere "out there," and of that there can be no further talk of knowing, for where there is no qualification no knowledge is possible. Pure light is pure darkness. [Ep W, no. 36, Zusatz] Philosophy of God Once again, Hegel may or may not be fair in his criticism of "critical philosophy," but it is significant that the criticism flows from a philosophy of religion which is worlds apart from that, say, of Kant or Fichte. Hegel will have none of a philosophy of religion which confines itself to an analysis of the subjective response to notions which are not thought through and, hence, contain no knowledge. There is, in fact, a very significant sense in which Hegel's philosophy of religion is not a philosophy of religion at allexcept, perhaps, in the Phenomenology, where "Religion" is explicitly treated as a stage in the evolution of consciousness toward "absolute knowing." Hegel's is rather a philosophy of God, that is, of religion's "object." In religion, God, "absolute truth," is present to consciousness; it is
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philosophy's task to plumb the depths of that "absolute truth" and, in so doing, to discover what its own truth is. What God is is for us who possess religion a familiar object, a content which is present in subjective consciousness; but from the scientific point of view God is initially a general abstract name, which has as yet received no true content. For only philosophy of religion is the development and knowledge of what God is, and it is through this philosophy that we first experience in a knowing way what God is. God is this very familiar (be-kannte) notion, but one which is not known (er-kannte) in the sense of being scientifically developed. [VPR I, p. 92] The content of religious consciousness, then, is rational, just as rational as is the content of speculative philosophy, because it is one and the same content. Only because the content of religion is objectively rational can philosophy "think" it, "know" it. Conversely, it can be said, if philosophy cannot think the content, then that content is not rationalwhich, of course, is what Hegel's adversaries would saybut, if it is not rational, is the consciousness of it adequately human? It is clear from his "Philosophy of Subjective Spirit" that Hegel does not completely discredit the nonrational in human behavior, but in religion he will have none of itor, perhaps, he will lift what is nonrational in it to rationality, and thus "revealed (geoffenbarten) religion becomes manifest (offenbare) religion."31 There are, however, two ways in which one can say that God, "absolute truth,'' "absolute Spirit," is the object of reason. (1) It can mean that human reason, functioning as reason, can come to a knowledge of God; or (2) it can mean that God, as "absolute truth," "absolute Spirit," having in him absolutely no admixture of the sensible, being pure spiritual activity, can be the object of reason only, because only reason is purely spiritual activity, having in it no admixture of sense activity.32 It is quite obvious that one can make the statement, "God is the object of reason" in the second sense without making it in the first sense; but it is doubtful that one can make the statement in the first sense without making it in the second sense too. In any event, when he makes the statement in the first sense, Hegel quite clearly intends both senses, precisely because he holds the statement in the second sense to be true. What it comes down to is that "on God's part there can be no obstacle to a knowledge of him by men" (BDG, p. 48). God can reveal himself to the human spirit; it would be a limitation
31. See PdG, pp. 52830. It would seem that one is thus justified in entitling the final section in the chapter of the Phenomenology on "Religion" as "Revealed Religion," even though "die offenbare Religion" literally means "manifest religion." 32. Quite obviously this means in addition that one's affirmation of God's reality is objectively rational, no matter what the subjective source of the affirmation may be.
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to the purity of "absolute Spirit" if he could not. It bespeaks no limitation at all in God to say, "God cannot reveal himself to nature, to the stone, to the plant, to the animal [it would be to assert a contradiction to say that he could] because God is spirit." Spirit can reveal itself to spirit alone, because spirit alone can receive a communication which has nothing of the sensible about it. God, therefore, "can reveal himself to man only, who thinks and is spirit" (ibid., p. 49). If God cannot reveal himself to man, then, this inability must be due either to the inability of the human spirit in its finitude to receive the revelationand this cuts out religion entirelyor "it is owing to human caprice, to an affection of humility, or whatever you like to call it, that the finitude of knowledge, of the human reason, is put in contrast to the divine knowledge and the divine reason, and that the limits of human reason are asserted to be immovable and absolutely fixed'' (ibid.). It might, of course, be countered, as it was by Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher, that God reveals himself to man but not to man's "reason," which might well provoke the query, how can God reveal himself to man, if he does not do so through man's highest capacity? Hegel is not about to deny that man cannot know God, if God does not reveal himself; what he does claim is that in revealing himself it is to the human spirit, which is reason functioning at its highest pitch, that God communicates. One is reminded in all this of the medieval disputes about the distinction between intellectus and ratio, in which knowledge of God was assigned to intellectus but not to ratio. We must remember, however, that for the Scholastics intellectus meant "intellectual intuition" and ratio meant "discursive thinking." For Hegel, Vernunft, which is the equivalent of the Greek nonV *, combines "dialectically" both intellectus and ratio: intellectus without ratio is what he calls "mere intuition," the intuition of Jacobi and Schleiermacher; ratio without intellectus is mere Räsonnieren (ratiocination), the function of Verstand (understanding), not of Vernunft (reason). Human Spirit as Divine Revelation God's revelation, then, is not simply a communication to man of knowledge about God; it is self-revelation in the sense that God communicates himself to man. This communication of himself to man is not contained primarily in words (or signs or symbols) but in the human "spirit" which is the revelation of the divine in man, the presence of the divine in man. Because even infinite Spirit can communicate himself only finitelyother than to himselfthe human spirit is finite, but its link to the infinite makes it essentially oriented to the infinite, to "knowing" God. Thus, God not only can reveal himself to man; he does reveal himself to manelse, God would, in fact, be "jealous." To say that God as Spirit is
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present in man is to say that man's very finite existence is God's self-revelation to man.33 For what is here suggested is that God is not jealous, but, on the contrary, has revealed and is revealing himself; and we have here the more definite thought that it is not the so-called human reason with its limits which knows God, but the Spirit of God in man; it is, to use the speculative expression previously employed, the self-consciousness of God which knows itself in the knowledge of man. [Ibid., p. 49]34 Whether this last statement raises the ugly specter of "pantheism" in Hegel's philosophy can await discussion in chapter 6. For the present, no more need be said than that it throws added light on those mysterious words with which Hegel ends Phenomenology of Spirit. The goal, absolute knowing, or spirit knowing itself as spirit, has as the road it has traveled the memory (Er-innerung) of multiple spirits, as they are in themselves and as they bring to completion the organization of their realm. Their retention from the point of view of their self-determining existence appearing in the form of contingency is history; from the point of view of their comprehended organization, on the other hand, it is the science of knowing as it appears; both together, as comprehended history, constitute the memorial and the calvary of absolute Spirit. The actuality, truth, and certainty of his throne, without which he would have been the lifeless solitary; only from the chalice of this realm of spirits foams forth to him his infinity. [PdG, p. 564]35 Looking back now, we can begin to understand what Hegel means by the "necessity" of the rational, its necessary objectivity, which makes sense only if it is rooted in the all-embracing necessity of "absolute truth" and which, thus rooted, makes sense of Hegel's talk about the objective necessity of logical truth, moral truth, and religious truth. There is no truth, not even "absolute truth," which is not "rational,'' the object of "reason." Man is in himself the purpose of his own being, only in virtue of the divine that is in him, of that which was designated from the outset as reason, which in view of its activity and power of self-determination was called freedom. And we affirmwithout at present being able to enter into the proof of the asser-
33. As we shall see in chapter 7, "Philosophy and Theology," Hegel sees in "creation" a relation internal to God, not a transient activity external to him. Hence the creation of finite human spirit is God's selfmanifestation to finite human spirit. 34. It should be emphasized that in calling this a "speculative expression" Hegel is serving notice on those who confine themselves to interpretinig the expression in terms of "understanding," which cannot but find it contradictory, that they must "think it through" rationally. 35. As Hegel sees it an infinite God who would not create would be one who condemns himself to an empty life of solitary splendor.
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tionthat religiousness, morality, etc., have their foundation and source in that principle in man and so are essentially elevated above all extrinsic necessity and chance. [Ibid., p. 50] Hidden beneath much of what Hegel has to say about God or "absolute Spirit," both in his positive assertions regarding God's knowability and in his opposition to those of his contemporaries who deny that knowability, is his desire to make sense out of what today is called "language about God," or simply, "God-language." There can be no question that "God-language" is tricky, that philosophers should be cautious not to be misled by it, and that, to an extent at least, thinkers like Spinoza, Lessing, and Hegel took great pains to ''demythologize" that language. The question, however, is not whether Hegel was trying to "demythologize" the language but whether, in doing so, he was trying to rob it of all cognitive value. If he was trying to do the latter, one is forced to wonder if he was not guilty of "over-kill." The language he employs is certainly not the most convenient language for a philosophereven for one who had to be cautious of Prussian state censors, nor is it, if intended to be metaphorical, free of numberless ambiguities. Nevertheless, even taken at face value, it makes eminent good sense. It might make sense for a philosopher to say that philosophers should not talk about God, because it is beyond philosophy's competence to do soKant and Fichte, after all, were not nonsensical. It might even make sense to say that philosophy should not talk about God, because there is no God to talk aboutFeuerbach and Marx were not purely nonsensical either! It is difficult, however, to make sense out of the contention that a philospher of Hegel's competence would choose to employ a highly elaborate "God-language" as a smoke screen for something else he wanted to saywhich is another question entirely from that of whether the language he employed was an apt language for what he did want to say.36 There is another question, which it is beyond the scope of this study to go into: Were Hegel's contemporariesbe they "pietists," "rationalists," "dogmatic metaphysicians," or "critical theologians"able to give more than a vague and indefinite meaning to the term "God"? Our question is a different one; namely, Was Hegel able to give to the term a meaning that was not vague and indefinite? Two other questions might also be asked: (1) Did he give to the term a meaning which does not weaken its religious significance? and (2) Did he give it an acceptable meaning? These are questions for the reader to answer.
36. There was a time when philosophers of the stature of Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzscheeven Schopenhauercould say that Hegel was simply wrong. Today, we might say, Hegel has won his spurs and no oneexcept perhaps Eric Voegelin (see his "On HegelA Study in Sorcery," Studium Generale 24 (1971): 33568)has the nerve to say that Hegel is talking nonsense. Still less does anyone want to say, "if Hegel is right, I am talking nonsense." Solution: "Hegel is obviously saying what I am saying"!
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One thing is quite clear: In September, 1830, less than a year before he died, in the preface to the third edition of his Encyclopedia, Hegel was able to reiterate his enduring opposition to the meaninglessness and emptiness of both Enlightenment "rationalism" and unenlightened "Pietism." In doing so he made an eloquent appeal both for a "faith" with an identifiable doctrinal content and a philosophical ''thinking" which would be more than just "formal and negative" in its relation to that same content. "Pietism," as he had said so often before, had emptied religion of all content "by reducing faith to the shibboleth of 'Lord, Lord,' " and "rationalism," with its "formal, abstract . . . thinking" was no less empty. They cannot even fight with each other, because they have nothing positive in common to fight about, no "matter" that they could possibly investigate and by so doing come to "knowledge and truth" " Enlightened theology" had taken refuge in a "formalism" of "freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach," calling this "reason and science," without even a nod in the direction of the "first condition of truth, namely faith." It is not enough to be "free"; one must be free to "hold" something definite to be true, not simply free to have "arbitrary opinions" (Ep W, pp. 2627). Strong words for one who did not say what he meant when he talked about Godcowardly words, if all he was trying to do was keep his job! God and Metaphysics What it comes down to is that Hegel, following in the footsteps of Aristotle, sees the philosophical pursuit of truth as, ultimately, itself a religious activity. For Aristotle "first philosophy"which is, in fact, synonymous with "ultimate philosophy," since it is oriented to the pursuit of truth, which is at once "beyond" (meta *) and the "root" (arch*) of the orientation of the human mind to knowingis the "divine science." It is "divine" in two ways: (1) its orientation carries it to the ultimate "principle" of all being, knowledge, and truth, that is, to God; and (2) it is the kind of knowing which is worthy of a "divine" being.37 For Hegel this means that the orientation to truth, which is the inescapable characteristic of human thinking, is an orientation to "absolute truth" and, therefore, fundamentally a religious orientation. The doctrine of truth is entirely this, and this alone, to be a doctrine of God ordered to the revelation of God's nature and activity. Understanding, however, because it has dissolved all this content, has again thrown a veil over God and reduced him to what he was before, in the period of mere longing (Sehnsucht), the unknown. For thinking activity, therefore, the only matter
37. Aristotle Metaph. A 983a.
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left is antecedently given finite matter. The only difference is that this is now accompanied by the consciousness that there is no matter other than temporal and finite matter. [BS, p. 65] The attitude that Hegel here impugns implies a relinquishing of man's "religious" vocation to soar above the merely finite, a vocation which, at the same time, does not view the infinite as separated by an "infinite" chasm from finite thinking. If the "atheist" finds in this attitude support of his position he is at least being straightforward in his approach. But, what of those who claim to be religious, to "believe" in God, but deny that in this they are being ''philosophical"? Are they not, in fact, claiming that God is jealous," denying the human mind all access to ultimate truth? What would it then be other than jealousy, if God were to deny to consciousness knowledge of himself? He would at the same time be denying all truth to consciousness, for God alone is the true; whatever else is true and seems somehow not to be a divine content, is true only to the extent that it is grounded in him and is known in the knowing of himwhatever else there is to it is but temporal appearance. It is knowledge of God, the truth, alone which raises man above the beast, that alone which distinguishes man, makes him happyor, rather, blessed. This is true for Plato and Aristotle, and for Christian teaching. [BS, p. 80] If one prefers, of course, to look upon Hegel's "God" as in some mysterious way an "absolute" quite different from the God of religion, or of "transcendent faith," one is, perhaps, free to do so, but one runs the risk of making Hegel even more mysterious than his actual words would seem to imply. It does not seem farfetched to say that James Yerkes has hit the nail on the head when he says that it simply makes better sense to see Hegel's philosophical position as essentially religious. As far as Hegel is concerned, it is not sufficient to say man thinks because he is religious; rather, one must also say that it is the thinking capacity itself which constitutes the fundamental mode of man's selfconscoiusness as religious: man is religious by means of his thinking capacity. To put it yet another way, in thinking, man is inescapably or "necessarily" religious. To understand the nature of man as a thinking being is to understand him ab initio as a religious being.38 One can, of course, shrug this off as "special pleading" on the part of one who is committed to a religious interpretation of Hegela "shrug" which might well turn into a boomerangbut Yerkes' approach does have the vir
38. James Yerkes, Hegel's Christology (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1978), p. 76.
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tue of taking seriously what Hegel actually says (e.g., "true philosophy leads to God," [GPR, preface, p. 17]); unless of course, one wants to say that there is more truth in the "unsaid" than in the ''said." In this connection it might not be amiss to point out also that Hegel never says that "philosophical thinking" deals only with God. Rather, philosophy is "general theory of the universe." The question is whether philosophy can make sense out of the universe if religious truth is beyond philosophy's purview. "Still, it comes down essentially to the relation of religion to man's general theory of the universe, and it is to this that philosophical knowledge is essentially directed, and upon which it essentially works" (VPR I, p. 15). What is important to note, however, is that Hegel is constant and unambiguous in his contention that philosophy's direct concern is not "empirical knowledge" of the universe, but rather, "it is knowledge of what is not of the world . . . of what is eternal, of what God is and of what flows from his nature" (Ibid., p. 28). Philosophy, therefore, explicates itself only when it explicates religion, and it is in explicating itself that it explicates religion. As thus occupied with eternal truth which is in and for itself, and, as indeed an occupation proper to thinking spirit with regard to this object, and not a matter of individual caprice and particular interest, it is the same kind of activity as is religion. [Ibid.] Philosophical thinking, as thus understood, "immerses itself with a like living interest in this object, and renounces its particularity in that it penetrates its object in the same way as religious consciousness does" (ibid.). If the finite human spirit is to think truly it must renounce philosophically its own particularity as thoroughly as it does religiouslywhich, of course, also tells us much of Hegel's view of religion and its "renunciation" of particular interests; for example, in personal salvation rather than in "eternal truth." The barb against Kant in these lines is unmistakable: neither religion's nor philosophy's "God" is to be looked at as the "guarantor" of a reward for having followed one's "duty"no more than he is Kierkegaard's pledge of subjective "eternal happiness." The conclusion of all this, then, is that religion makes known to philosophy what philosophy's "true" content is; and philosophy makes known to religion that this content is "rational." Whether it be in religion, in philosophy, or in both, God can reveal himself to man only in man's "reason," which is the function of "spirit": "For philosophy has this in common with the form of culture referred to, that reason is regarded as the region (Ort) of spirit in which God reveals himself to man" (ibid., p. 50). Philosophy, then, is "theology" (see chap. 7). The "logos of God," which makes known to religion the latter's own "rationality": "Philosophy, which is theology, has as its sole concern showing the rationality of
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religion" (VPR III, p. 341). But, this is a far cry, as we have already seen, from saying that religion is a "rational discipline"; it is not philosophy's function either to replace or to swallow up religion, but rather to plumb the depths of religion's object. Nowhere, perhaps, is the chasm between Hegel's thought and the thought of not only his immediate predecessors Kant and Fichte (his dispute with Schelling lies elsewhere) but also of all his predecessors from Descartes on (with the exception of Spinoza) more pronounced than it is here. When Hegel speaks of the "rationality" of both philosophy and religion, he speaks not so much (or not at all) of the logical purity of the subjective process of thinking as he does of the "objective" rationality of the content of "thought." His, then, is not the problem (even though some might claim that it should be) of explaining how an essentially subjective mental activity of thinking can possibly correspond with an essentially objective order of reality in such a way that the fusion of the two can be characterized as ''rational knowledge." The "rationality" of knowledge is not so much a function of adherence to the a-priori conditions of formal thinking as it is of the "rationality" of what is known. This is not to say that any "method" of thinking is as good as any other for the acquisition of knowledge; it is to say that the rationality of the method and, therefore, of the knowing which ensues is not dictated by the formal a-priori rules of thinking (discovered in some mysterious way prior to the philosophical thinking itself), but by the rationality of the object thought. This means, among other things, that the relation of thought to its object can be "rational," even when the "mode" of thinking in question is not that of "pure thought," when it is "belief" and not "knowledge." Here, however, there arises a difficulty for those who would follow Hegel in the intricacies of his thinking. Does the rationality of his own thinking tell him just what the rational object of that thinking is; an object which he then sees to coincide with the object of religion? If so, it is difficult to see how he has avoided the Kantian dilemma; he still has to connect the "representations" in which his formal thinking issues with the "reality" they are supposed to "represent." Or, does some antecedent intuition into the rationality of the object of religion permit him to see in it the blueprint for the rationality of the thinking which is to correspond to it? If so, his intuitionism would seem to be even less consistent than that of Jacobi and Schleiermacher (not to mention the "mysticism" of Jakob Böhme). The Logic of Being In seeking an answer we have to begin, I think, by banishing the "before and after" pattern, which no antecedent logic imposes on philosophical thinking. The key is to be found in Hegel's Logic, his account of what
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thought inevitably finds when it examines itself (more of that in chapter 2). What this examination first reveals is what the initial "object" of thought cannot but be, that is, "being." This object reveals its essential articulation in its being thought. In doing so it reveals that being simply is not, if infintite being is not. But where to turn to find the self-revelation of "infinite being"? In Phenomenology of Spirit, as we have seen, consciousness in examining itself arrived at a similar impasse, out of which it could not get without turning to an examination of religious consciousness, wherein is revealed the full objective reality of spirit, that is, absolute Spirit. In the Phenomenology that was long in coming, and in the Logic it will be equally long in coming; but in both it will be realized that the "Absolute'' when it comes will reveal itself as having been there all alongin the Phenomenology as "absolute Spirit" and in the Logic as "absolute Idea." At the second level of the Logic we begin to realize that the self-articulation of the object of thought demands more than the "categories of being" in which it manifests itself; we who follow the articulation must also take into account that the characteristics disengaged through thoughtful "reflection" on the "thought" of being reveal what is "essential" to being if it is to be the content of thought at all. This characterization of being in thought, however, will not be complete until the thinking itself is examined as the subjective process whose ultimate claim is to be objective. Here it is that we see "concept" as the essential structure of thought, which will not be objective unless the structure of thought and the structure of reality are seen to coincide, which, Hegel tells us, they do in "absolute Idea." But once again, "absolute" will be meaningful only as "the Absolute," which is God; it simply makes no sense to speak of any other absolute as real. By equally tortuous ways the Phenomenology and the Logic have come to the realization that only God, "absolute truth" can make the whole process hold together. In both, however, it has been the nature of "speculative thinking," which alone is capable of constantly moving on to the "more" to which its own object constantly points, which comes to the realization that what it had been seeking all along was the "absolute truth," God, who, although he was there all along, "could be reached only in pure speculative knowing" (PdG, p. 530). Many years before, Hegel had recognized that knowledge would be deserving of its lofty dignity only as knowledge in the framework of the totality of the knowable: "Speculation recognizes as the reality of cognition only the being of cognition in the totality. For speculation everything determinate has being and truth only in the cognition of its connection with the Absolute" (Diff, p. 31). Only if we can come to the recognition that all knowledge is rooted in the one and only absolute (total) truth, will there be knowledge and truth at all.
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This which formally belongs to our thinking consciousness as such [i.e., that truth is only one] is in the more profound sense the starting point and the goal of philosophy, i.e., to recognize this one truth. But this means recognizing it at the same time as the source from which everything else flows, all laws of nature, all phenomena of life and consciousness, which are simply mirrorings of this one truth. To put it another way: all these laws and phenomena are to be brought back along what could seem to be the reverse path to that one source, for the purpose, however, of comprehending them in comprehending the source, i.e., recognizing that they are derived from it. [EGP, p. 29] To see this, of course, thinking must cease to be the merely subjective activity of the individual (or of accumulated individuals), finding its self-determination not in the arbitrariness of subjectivity but in the infinity of absolute objectivity. Only because the pure infinite form, the self-manifestation which continues to be with itself, has put aside the onesidedness of the subjective, wherein it is the mere pretense of thinking, is it free thinking, which has its infinite determinateness at once as absolute content in and for itself and as object, wherein it is, precisely, free. In this sense thinking itself is simply the formal aspect of the absolute content. [Ep W, no. 571] How are we now to relate this back to God as the object of religious consciousness? Not, certainly, by insisting that religion is no more than a subjective response which stands there in all its glaring subjectivity to be examined. Nor shall we find any answer, if we cling to a narrowly epistemological view of thinking and knowledge. For Hegel, thinking knowledge is not primarily an epistemological matter at all; it is a way of life, and relating it to God is not simply a way of validating its knowledge-claims. Rather, it is the question of the whole of human life in relation to God, of the all-inclusiveness of the divine-human relationship. What Hegel experienced in his own day was a prevalent fragmentation of culture, of lifepolitical, social, religioussuch that his vision of and aspiration toward reintegration are expressed in metaphors taken from the unity of organic life and sought for in an overarching unity of a philosophical conception which would integrate the moral, political, social, and religious life of Western man. In his early years Hegel saw this as the task of healing religious disintegration; subsequently, he sought integration on the level of politics; and ultimately, he saw the necessity of a philosophical underpinning which would make total integration a reasonable possibility. the dim vision of this came to him early.
It is true that a philosophy issues from its time, and if one wants to call the fragmentation of the time its ethical corruption, then philosophy issues from
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that corruption, but it does so in order to reestablish man from within himself, against the confusion of the time and in order to restore the totality which the time has rent. [Diff, pp. 12021] Philosophy by itself, however, especially if it be a "philosophy of understanding" and not a "philosophy of reason," runs the risk of turning man himself into an abstraction, of satisfying the needs of abstract understanding only. A philosophy which is to satisfy the concrete demands of human living must be one which embraces the manysidedness of the humanif nothing else it must take into consideration the reality of the religious and the political in human living. "Consciousness that has received an abstract culture, and whose sphere is understanding, can be indifferent to religion, but religion is the universal form in which truth is contained for non-abstract consciousness" (VPG, p. 527). To many contemporary thinkers, who are, as it were, the unconscious inheritors of both the naive religiousness of Kant and Fichte and the naive atheism of Feuerbach and Marx, Hegel can well seem to be anachronistic in his approach to his own age. He actually thinks that the thought of God plays a far more important role among his contemporaries than it does among ancient and medieval thinkers. In one sense, however, he is correct; his contemporaries agonize over the thought far more than did their predecessors, whether because to them the thought was philosophically unacceptable or because it was totally acceptable for other than philosophical reasons. For Hegel, it would seem, reasons for not accepting the thought of God could scarcely be authentically philosophical. In any event, as he sees it, the question of God perplexes the modern theologian as well as the modern philosopher, precisely because they take man's religious relationship to God and not God himself to be the object of inquiry (see VPR I, pp. 101103). "In naive ancient theology," as Fackenheim puts it, "the object is God; hence, he is . . . one object among others."39 For reflexive modern theology, on the other hand, the object is not God but "the religious divine-human relationship"whether positively or negatively. This goal as all-inclusivepositively or negatively''is identical with reflexive modern philosophy, whose object is the relation between thought and being, in their opposition as well as their union."40 What it comes down to is that, from the viewpoint of "national" culture, paramount in the thinking of Hegel's day, "religion is the sphere in which a nation gives itself a definition of what it regards as the true." One can, so to speak, judge the character of a nation by examining its concept of God: "The conception of God, therefore, constitutes the general basis of a people's character" (VPG,
39. Fackenheim, Religious Dimension, p. 178, note. 40. Ibid.
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p. 70).41 No one today would be so naive as to think, with Hegel, that the members of a nation think alike in this respect, or that a whole "people" has this sort of cohesion in its "conception of God," but it is clearly applicable to individualsas is one's concept of God, so is one's conception of the reality of the human. No matter what distinctions one likes to make, the conception of the human is inextricably tied up with the conception of the divineor the absence thereof! Whether one can go even further with Hegel and say that "in this aspect, religion stands in the closest connection with the political principle; freedom can exist only where individuality is recognized as having its positive and real existence in the divine being" (ibid.), may be a moot question, but one wonders whether Hegel did not have more foresight than many would credit him with. In any event, Hegel saw in religion what few, if any, both before and after him saw: that the religious view of God is inextricably linked to the political view of the human, and only where the relationship of man to God is viewed as all-inclusive is the view of the human all-inclusiveat least logically so. The question, of course, is whether religion is not so ''other worldly" in its view that it cannot come down to contemplate the realities of earthly existence. That Hegel was convinced that religion could and should is fairly obvious; that philosophy follows religion in this might be more open to question. In religions people have set down what they thought of the being of the world, of the Absolute, of the being which is in and for itself; what they held to be the cause, the essence, the substantial in nature and spirit. On the basis of this we can judge what was their view of how the human spiritor human naturewas related to such objects, to the divinity, to the true. [EGP, pp. 16667] Such a view may very well seem to go beyond the evidence available to Hegel, but it is clear that he sees religion and philosophy linked in a concrete way that he has previously developed only minimally: A philosophy which lacks the contribution of "heart" which religion affords is cold; a religion which lacks the contribution of "head" which philosophy affords is empty. A philosophy without heart and a faith without understanding are themselves abstractions from the true life and being of knowing and believing. Whoever is left cold by philosophy or who is not illumined by true faith should carefully look to where the blame lies; it lies in the individual, not in knowledge and faith. The coldness lies outside philosophy; the obscurity outside faith. [BS, p. 325]
41. A theme which, as we know, Feuerbach will exploit but for the purpose of drawing a diametrically opposed conclusion.
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It could be said in this connection that religion is directly concerned more with man's relationship to Godreligious "practice," devotion, worship, moral activity, direction of lifeand less with theoretical questions regarding the "nature" of God, creation, divine providence, and doctrinal truth. By the same token philosophy's concern is more cognitive than practical, oriented more to knowing what we mean when we speak of God than to responding through action to the reality of God. The important question for Hegel is, however, whether we can make a great deal of sense in speaking of man's relationship to God, if we do not know what we mean by the God to whom men are related. The manner in which man thinks of his relationship to God will be determined especially by the way man thinks of God. It is not the case, as is now so commonly said, that one need not know God and can at the same time know man's relationship to God. Because God comes first, it is he who determines that relationship, and thus, in order to know what is true of the relationship, one must know God. [VGP II, pp. 41718] This means, at the very least, that, if an awareness of our relationship to and dependence on God is essential to "insightful reflective judgments about being, truth, and value,"42 which in turn are essential to authentic human living, then "knowing" God is inseparable from the religious relationship to Godheart and mind must go hand in hand, for the arbitrariness of "heart" will go uncorrected if not complemented by the authenticity of "mind." The danger, as Hegel sees it, is that, although in religious consciousness there is a true awareness of God, and the God of whom man is aware is truly God, still what is present to consciousness is teaching about God, not God himself, with the result that the "emotions" raised by "representations" of God may not be adequate to their object (see EGP, pp. 18284). Here we come upon, once more, the difficult conception treated above of the finite human spirit, whose consciousness of itself can be adequate only if it is identified with the divine Spirit's consciousness of itself in the human spirit. We can only hope that this will be adequately worked out in the next three chapters. Suffice it to say here that, if, as Hegel conceives it, the function of religion (from re-ligare) is to relate man, however indirectly, to the "Absolute," and the function of philosophy is to think the "Absolute," it makes sense to say that the ''Absolute" in both is one and the same. Hegel is not saying, however, that religious consciousness does not think God, while philosophy does; he is saying that religion "thinks" God in one form and that philosophy "thinks" God in another, more adequate form. In
42. Yerkes, Hegel's Christology, p. 89.
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both the God who is "thought" is ultimate truth, which is one and only one, the truth of all truth. As a result of all that has been said in this chapter we can note a remarkable evolution in Hegel's thought. From his earliest years he set out to find a religion and a God which would be able to heal the fragmentation of European culture and at the same time be compatible with sophisticated modern philosophical thinking. If we were to look at his Theologische Jugendschriften, which for very good reasons he did not publish, we could come to the conclusion that what he expected to find would be substitutes for the Christian God and the Christian religionperhaps the unified reason of the Enlightenment or the supreme moral principle of Kant and Fichteperhaps even grafted onto the politicosocial Volksreligion he so admired among the Greeks. As early as Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie and Glauben und Wissen, however, we have been able to note his growing dissatisfaction with both of these solutions. What he came up with, then, was a transformed Christian religion and a transformed concept of God. As Fackenheim puts it, "For the early Hegel, philosophy will produce a new religion on the ruins of the old. For the mature Hegel, philosophy comprehends the old religion, and this latter is not and cannot be ruined."43 Earlier Fackenheim had gone even further: "Hegel asserts with unwavering insistence, that Christianity is the absolutely true content, and that his philosophy can and must give that content its absolutely true form."44 It can, of course, be doubtedand it has beenthat the religion Hegel speaks of is in truth the Christian religion, or that the God he speaks of is truly the Christian God. For the present, however, that is not the question. There can be no doubt that the God-question occupied him very profoundly and that he sought to understand God in such a way that the God he spoke of not only would not conflict with the autonomy of philosophical thinking but also would not be an object which simply exceeded the capacity of human reasonwhich a separated God "out-there" would. The Christian God has always been looked on as the supreme Being, infinite Spirit, and absolute Reality. Of Hegel's God the same can be said. The difference is, however, that Hegel's is a philosophical endeavor to understand what such terms can mean to modern man. With this it becomes clear that the endeavor resulted in more than a transformation of Christian religion; it produced also a transformation of philosophical thinking. For Hegel, philosophy is "science" par excellence, which has for its object absolute truth and, as the manner of comprehending this object, "absolute knowing." That knowledge is indeed knowledge
43. Fackenheim, Religious Dimension, p. 209. 44. Ibid., p. 112.
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Hegel never really doubteddespite his insistence on "skepticism" as a necessary stage on the way to knowledge. His problem was that of working through the process of coming to know in such a way that knowledge would reveal itself as precisely knowledge. It can be said with truth of his Phenomenology of Spirit that it attempts to make this process real. Still, if we are to comprehend what even the Phenomenology is attempting to do, we must turn to Hegel's ground plan for the whole philosophical endeavor, his Science of Logic.
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Chapter Two The Concept Hegel's contention that religion and philosophy have one and the same content, that is, have as that which makes them be what they are the same object of investigationthe absolute or Godhas seemed to some to either (1) eliminate religion, since philosophy takes its place, telling us all that religion can tell usand moreabout its object, or (2) downgrade religion to an inferior grasp of that one and the same object, or (3) at the very least permit philosophy to dictate to religion what religion's own concepts are to mean. In the preface to the third edition (1830) of Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, which, unlike the prefaces to the other two editions, has more the character of an emotional outburst, Hegel complains of those who have reviewed his book in such a way as to make him out to be not Christian at all, thus arrogating to themselves not only the exclusive right to be called Christians but also the authority to judge what is to be acknowledged as Christian in the thought of others. Although in that preface he does not specifically answer the objections raised above, it is clear from what he has written elsewhere1in the preface to the second edition of the same work (1827) and in the introductionwhat his answers are. (1) Not only does philosophy not eliminate religioneven religion's Aufhebung signifies its retentionit arrives only subsequently at what religion long before philosophy has grasped in thought, that is, the truth which grounds all truth, the absolute truth which is God. It may be that philosophy thinks God in a way that religion does not, since to know and to believe are not the same (note Hegel's unremitting insistence that belief is a form of thought), but it is religion which tells
1. See Quentin Lauer, S.J., Hegel's Idea of Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971), p. 117.
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philosophy, and not vice versa, what the latter's object must be, if it is to be worthy of the title "philosophical thinking" at all. Only when philosophical thinking passes beyond its empirical, finite beginnings to its inescapable foundation, its only adequate foundation, is it authentic philosophical thinking. Religion cannot, it is true, institute a critique of philosophy's thinking of Godreligion is not critical thoughtbut it contains within itself the criterion for the adequacy of philosophy as authentically rational. If philosophy fails to come to grips with the infinite reality which is religion's object, philosophy fails as philosophy. (2) It is true that, in Hegel's view, philosophical thinking is the highest achievement of the human spirit and is, therefore, more adequate to the object which is absolute Spirit than is any form of "representational" thinking, even religious representational thinking. However, this view would constitute a "downgrading" of religion only if religious thought and philosophical thought were for Hegel discontinuous, as they would seem to be for Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher. Far from being a downgrading of religion, philosophical knowing is an uplifting of religious thought to its true vocation (as Anselm saw so well), the vocation of "seeing-in'' thought (speculare) the God who is there present rather than framing thought about the God who is only represented by these thoughts (with their admixture of images). Perhaps the difficulty lies in the assumption that because Hegel distinguishes philosophical science, "absolute knowing" from religious consciousnessthe latter as the penultimate stage in the movement toward the formerhe is saying that philosophy is not religious. The assumption can be seen not to hold, if we look at Hegel's characterization of philosophy as "comprehending reason . . . whose content is speculative and therefore religious" (EpW, no. 573, italics mine). His polemic, after all, is not against theologians like Anselm who want us to come to know what initially we only believe; it is against "this new theology, which turns religion into a mere subjective feeling and denies a knowledge of God's nature" and in so doing "has made for itself an emaciated and empty God" (ibid.). The absolute, spirit, God, the Concept (Idea) can be the object only of thought, never of mere feeling, whether that thought be belief or knowledge. (3) It is difficult to see how this is even an objectionexcept, perhaps, in its employing the emotion-packed term "dictates." Philosophy is an instrument which the human spirit has at its disposal as a search for meaning. Why should not thought seek to know what the utterances of faith mean? Or, is there to be no theo-logy at all? If we want to know what is true of the object of thought, whatever the form of that thought may be, we turn to the concept of that object, "for a property (Bestimmung) which belongs to the concept of a reality (Sache) must truly be contained in it" (WL I, p. 172). When all this has been said, we can but see that, although there is no need
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to whitewash Hegel in his view of the relation of religion and philosophy,2 we must first look carefully at just what he means by "philosophy," "concept," and ''speculative thinking" before we "cast the first stone." If to this inquiry we bring the antecedent conviction that the only way to get at meanings is to frame definitions of the terms we employ, trusting that others will see the rationality of our procedure and thus accept the meanings which our definitions express, there is little likelihood that we shall be able to follow Hegel, for whom, it is true, meanings reside in the concepts which express them, but not in concepts which we construct for the purpose of establishing our meaning. If we are to follow Hegel, we must be prepared to see meanings emerge in "speculative thinking" which seeks to "see into" the conceptual structure of the reality with which our thinking is engaged, allowing the reality to tell us what concepts mean and, thus, to put us in touch with the reality of the real, not merely with the "representations" (Vorstellungen) we frame of it, no matter how important these Vorstellungen may be as an initial stage (or stages) in our philosophical thinking. I can think of no more efficacious way of tuning in on Hegel's wave-length here than by carefully analyzing the introduction (nos. 117) to his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Philosophical Thinking No. 1. Philosophy, Hegel tells us, begins with what might seem to be an initial disadvantage not shared by other "sciences." It can presuppose neither that the intelligibility of its objects is already given nor that the method of coming to grips with these objects is simply at hand, to be employed at will. Like religion, philosophy has as its goal the attainment of ultimate truth, and, like religion, it recognizes that the ultimate truth, the truth of all truth, lies in the being to which all truths refer for their intelligibility and truth, that is, absolute truth, which for the moment we can simply call "God." Nature, as the sum total of all reality which is not spirit, and human spirit, as the sum total of all spiritual reality distinct from God, are, of course, objects of philosophical inquirythe Vorstellungen of God, nature, and finite spirit can be presumed to be already with us (whatever we are to make of them). The point is that they are to become the objects of thought in its purest form and, thus, to become philosophically known. There can be little dispute that the human mind, at least in modern times, seeks to know itself (even if only to find out that it is part and parcel of the physical structure of the human reality). Nor can there be dispute that the human mind inquires into the reality of the physical world which it inhabits and to whose laws the physical structure of the human is subject. The point
2. I.e., making his thought conform to what I happen to think makes good sense.
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is that the mind, if it wants to know and not merely surmise, must seek some sort of rational necessity in the content of its thoughtwithout simply presupposing that it is there. It may be that the "scientific" mind can base its inquiries on an "act of faith in the decency of the universe"; the philosophical mind must question even that. No. 2. So much having been said, Hegel feels safe in giving a provisional definition of philosophy: "Philosophy can initially be characterized as thinking consideration of objects." The mind already represents to itself objects; now it must think them out. What do they tell the mind about themselves? The "thinking" in question, however, is not merely that which characterizes all specifically human activity, thus distinguishing the human from the nonhuman: "Philosophy is a particular manner of thinking," distinct from other modes of human response, such as emotion, intuition, and representation, which are modes of thinking, Hegel says, but not the thinking mode; because such responses are specifically human they have on them the mark of thought, but they are not themselves modes of thinking properly speaking. This distinction has two consequences: (1) It avoids the oversharp distinction between, for example, thinking and feeling, particularly in the area of religious response, where thinking is considered by some of Hegel's contemporaries ("the new theology'') as not only distinct from but also inferior to feeling, as though religious consciousness had its roots in feeling rather than in thinking. (2) It directly attacks the current prejudice that philosophical thinking is nothing but "reflective" thinking (Hegel calls it Nachdenken and then plays on the prefix nach as though it were a thinking that comes after thinking); a thinking about thinking and not about the objects of thought (today we have "meta-logic," "meta-ethics," etc.). The really important distinction is not, for example, between feeling and thinking about feeling, but rather that between mere feeling and feeling shot through with thought. The emphasis on Nachdenken becomes particularly pernicious, Hegel feels, when reflection is looked upon as the only reliable way to come to grips with eternal truth, as though God could not be an object of thought, since philosophy can handle only thought about God (or, worse still, language about God) but not God himself. It is as though one would say that the validity of belief in God depends on the formal-logical validity of the traditional "proofs" of the existence of God.3 Strangely enough, this view of philosophy would make philosophy absolutely indispensable to a degree beyond that which even Hegel made it. The approach to eternal truth would have to wait on a critique of the logic of the approachas though it
3. If the only acceptable form of "proof" is that of formal "inference" from a set of propositions, the truth of which inevitably entails the truth of a concluding propositiona truth already contained in the propositions which precede itone might legitimately question whether there are any "proofs" for the reality of God.
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were rational to demand that the logic of philosophy be simply identical with the logic of positive science without justifying the demand! No. 3. This approach compounds the felony by making the content of thinking not the object of thought but the form in which the object is present to the mind. It is true enough to say that the content of any act of consciousness determines that act of consciousness; be it feeling, intuition, image, or thought and concept. Consciousness is what it is as the form of a content, and the content can be one and the same, no matter what the form; for example, pure feeling, a mixture of feeling and thought, or pure thought. If, however, the form of consciousness becomes the content of thought, then the object being considered is not the same but different for each mode of consciousness; to anticipate, instead of one idea in a multiplicity of manifestations, there is an uncontrollable chaos of ideas and only the unity of reflective thoughtif that be a unity at all. There is an added disadvantage in this approach, says Hegel: it reverses the authentic philosophical procedure of going from inadequate modes of consciousness of an object; from feelings, images, representations, to more adequate modes, thoughts and concepts. It is rooted in an inabilityperhaps just lack of practiceto think abstractly. Our ordinary thoughts are a mixture of the sensible and the spiritual, and when we reflect on them we fail to sort out the sensible and the intelligible elements in themwe are not used to thoughts without images or to recognizing the pure forms of thought (e.g., categories) in our thinking processes. But there is another side to this: We are impatient. We prefer to look for the image or representation which corresponds to our thought or concept, rather than vice versabecause we long for the more familiar; we do not know where we are when we are dealing with thoughts only. Better to deal in expressions we have learned by rote than to ferret out meanings which go beyond the expressions, to stick with the metaphors that stand for reality than to come to grips with reality itselflanguage is so much more comfortable a medium in which to engage ourselves than is reality! No. 4. Philosophy, then, has an important initial task to perform: it has to show that its mode of knowing is very special to itselfor, perhaps, it has to bring about this special mode of knowing, which is neither an immediate mode of consciousness nor a mere reflection on a mode of consciousness which is not its own. If we take this a step further to a consideration of the content of religious consciousness, where the ultimate truth lies, philosophy has to show that it (philosophy) has in itself the capacity to know ultimate truthand, if there seems to be a difference between the representations characteristic of religious consciousness and philosophy's own thoughts, philosophy must be prepared to justify the latter. The implication, of course, is that there can be only seeming opposition between what religion and philosophy say of ultimate truth; it is philosophy's task to
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plumb in thought the meaning of what religion says in metaphorical language. No. 5. Even here, however, there is a dangerthe danger that philosophical thinking will be conceived of, once again, as simply reflection (Nachdenken) in the sense of thinking about thinking. There is, in fact, a significant sense in which philosophical thinking is Nachdenken; it rethinks a content which is initially presented only under the form of feelings, intuitions, opinions, and representations. Its task is to translate, to transform these into conceptual thought. This is, if you will, a Nachdenken; it follows upon other, inadequate, forms of thought, not, be it noted, to eliminate them but to raise them up to a form adequate to their content. The mistake should not be made, however, of thinking that this is all very easy, that the mind, after all, has an inborn capacity to perform this sort of transformation. It is readily conceded that other sciences and skills can be acquired only at the cost of much effort and practice, even though the human mind does have the inborn capacity to acquire them. It is no easier, to say the least, to acquire facility in philosophical thinking. There is no comfortable way to the acquisition of philosophical insight,4 as would be, for example, immediate, intuitive knowledge. Philosophy is hard work; we must not ignore the necessary steps (mediation) to its acquisition. No. 6. Perhaps the chief obstacle to coming to grips with the difficulty of philosophical thinking is the conviction that it has to do, not with the actuality (Wirklichkeit) of the real, but only with a kind of watered-down ideality which belongs to thought about the real. It might be well to note here at the beginning of any discussion of "actuality"a crucial term in the Hegelian vocabularythat the German term it translates, Wirklichkeit, is derived from the verb wirken, which means "to effect." Although the German term is rarely translated by ''effectiveness," it would be well to bear in mind that the overtones of "effectiveness" are never absent from "actuality"; it is the capacity which reality has to "effect" its affirmation through rational thinking.5 Hegel is not about to deny that our initial contact with reality is through sense experience. Nor will he deny that even in this kind of experience a distinction is drawn between that which only appears to be real and that which actually is real. The difficulty lies in knowing just what is the distinction between the apparent and the actual. In Hegel's view it is not a question of simply distinguishing between what is the case and what is not the case. Rather it is a question of distinguishing between what is rationally demanded and what is contrary to what is rationally demanded. What is
4. No "royal road": see PdG., preface, p. 56. 5. That philosophies in particular have shied away from a translation which runs the risk of making knowledge a "cause-effect" relationship is understandable. But, "effectiveness" need not have this connotation, any more than does Plato's remark (Sophist, 248a) that "being" is to be equated with "power."
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simply the case may very well be the latter; the irrational may very well existunfortunately the world is full of it. However, this does not mean that the irrational is actual in the sense that it is the object of philosophical thinkingexcept, of course, in the sense that philosophy can judge its irrationality against the criterion of the rational, which is philosophy's proper object. There are important as well as trivial ways in which, even in our everyday thinking, we consider that which is as it ought to be real and that which is not as it ought to be unreal. The true, the good, and the beautiful are real, even if all we are saying is that "Coke is the real thing," or "Don Giovanni is real opera." By the same token, when we run up against the false, the evil, and the ugly, we can intelligibly say, "That is unreal," that is, it should not be, or it is as it ought not to be. Hegel has had to take a lot of flack for having said, in the preface to his Philosophy of Right, "What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational." The attacks have come from all sides, from the religious as well as from the philosophical point of view (interestingly enough, the statement has been defended from the irreligious side by Engels, who, of course, interprets "the rational" from the Marxist perspective).6 In Hegel's view the opposition from the religious side is unfounded, since he takes the statement to be saying what belief in divine providence has always said. As for the philosophical point of view, Hegel says (to the discomfort, I am sure, of those who finitize his "God"), ''We have to presuppose a degree of education, such that one knows that God is actualthat he is the most actual, that he alone, is truly actual. But we must also presuppose, from the point of view of formal thinking, that existence (Dasein) is in some instances mere appearance and in others actuality." This is but another way of saying what is central to the whole of Hegel's philosophizing: that the "really real" is that which corresponds to its "concept"with the proviso, of course, that only God corresponds totally with his concept; all other (finite) reality corresponds only partially with its concept (see chap. 5). Another way to put this, as Hegel does in the paragraph now under consideration, is in the form of a value judgment, in terms of what can justifiably count as real, that is, effectively" present itself as real. No one doubts that contingent things exist, but they count as really real only to the extent that they are rooted in rational necessity; apart from that they are no more real than is the possible. Hegel is not saying that the contingent is not real; he is not even saying that the contingent is not necessaryit is necessary that there be contingent realitiesbut he is saying that the necessity, and hence reality, of the contingent does not lie in its contingency but in the necessary (e.g., the concept) of which it is a contingent manifestation. The concept of "man" is necessary and, there-
6. Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (Berlin: Dietz, 1951), pp. 69.
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fore, really real; you and I do not wholly correspond to this concept, and it is, therefore, contingent that you and I should be. By the same token, the concept of God is necessary, but, because he corresponds fully with his concept, it is not contingent but necessary that he actually be (see chap. 5) and God's "actuality" lies in his "effectiveness." It might seem to conflict with what was said before about the "really real" being what it "ought'' to be that Hegel goes on to speak here of the inefficacy of arguing from "ought" (Sollen). We must examine carefully what Sollen means in this context. He is talking about a philosophical framework wherein the idea (and the ideal) are looked upon as separate from the real, having no more than the vague "reality" which the human mind gives them. When the ideal has only this sort of vague being which mere understanding attributes to it, then its character is that of an abstract "ought" which has no power to actualize itselfit is not "effective." Rather, it is a kind of utopian dream of "how good it would be for things to be this way"and if they were the way they ought to be, the Sollen in question would lose its meaning, which persists, precisely as Sollen, only if it is not actualized (one is forcefully reminded of Hegel's sharp critique of Kant's whole moral system). It does not take a great deal of intelligence, Hegel tells us, to recognize that there is much around us which is not as it ought to be. It is questionable, however, that there is anything particularly philosophical in this recognition. Philosophy "is concerned only with the idea, which is not so ineffective as to ought to be and not actually be." That none of this can make sense, unless the idea of which Hegel speaks is the "absolute Idea," God, whose nonactuality is inconceivable, should be obvious. As Hegel sees it, it should also be obvious that the actuality of anything else whatsoever is inconceivable without reference to the absolute Idea (see chap. 5). The important point here is that the actuality of the real and the ideality of the real are not opposed to each other; they are inseparable, neither makes sense without the other. Nor does this make sense if conceiving (begreifen) is simply what the mind does when it thinks its object, or if concept (Begriff) is only a mental representation which the mind forms to itself of its object. For thinking to have concept (or idea) as its object is not to have its own mental act as its object. Rather, it is to have as its object a reality which imposes itself on rational thinking precisely because as effectively real, reality is itself rational, and it is rational because like rational thought it is the product of rational activity. It is for this reason that reality and rational thinking are effectively oriented to each other; reality demands conceptual thought for its realization, and concept demands reality for its concretization. No. 7. None of what has gone before is to be interpreted as saying that reflection (Nachdenken) does not constitute the beginning of philosophical thinking. Without reflection there would be no philosophy, only the seemingly measureless mass of that which is present to consciousnesswhat ap
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pears. The function of reflection, however, is not simply to impose a form of unity on the manifold of that which is present in consciousness; it is to permit the rationality of reality itself to emerge in the consciousness had of it; and consciousness itself is authentically rational only to the extent that it is in tune with the rationality of realityits "concept." If reflection is to merit the title "philosophy," it must be a knowing which penetrates the boundless "sea of empirical singularities" to find therein the "necessity" of the ''universal," to find "laws" in the seeming chaos of the contingent.7 The content of philosophical thinking, then, which is properly universal and necessary, is not the form which conceptual thinking imposes on perceptual intuition, à la Kant; it is that which thinking takes from its own intuitive grasp of both an outer and an inner world, from both nature and spirit as present in the human thinking subject. What Hegel says here is couched in surprisingly metaphorical language, but it serves to emphasize that the process of universalization which characterizes thought is not discontinuous with the process of presentation which characterizes the empirical; the form of universality is not external to empirical reality, it is discovered in that reality as present to mind. In rationalizing reality, thought manifests the inherent rationality of reality. Hegel is no enemy of experience; he makes abundantly clear that experience is indispensable even to philosophical thinking; the thinker must not only be present to that which he thinks but also find himself in the content of his thinking, no matter how empirical that content be. The presence-to of experience, however, characterizes both external sensation and internal consciousness of self. A science is called "empirical," if its point of departure is experience, whether external or internal. Such sciences, however, are philosophical only if they find in what is experienced laws, universal propositions, theory, all of which belong in the realm of thought. There was a time when even the natural sciences were called "philosophical." This is no longer necessary or to the point, but it does highlight a consciousness that science has to do, not with things, but with thoughts; and to the extent that investigation is aimed at the "rational" in the content of thought, it is philosophicalhence the propriety of various branches of philosophy, each concerned with the rational content of its object. No. 8. Granted, however, that empirical objects can give rise to and be the subject matter of philosophical inquiry, there is also another realm of objects which are simply not susceptible to this kind of investigataion; for example, freedom, spirit, and God. The reason for this, however, is not that these are not objects of "experience." They cannot, it is true, be experienced
7. Precisely because the contingent is susceptible of being grasped in rational thought it manifests the kind of necessity which is characteristic of rationality; it manifests the working of "law."
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sensibly, but if they are objects of consciousness at all, they are objects of experiencea kind of tautologythey are objects, however, which are neither limited to a particular kind of experience nor limited by the experiencing of them; they are infinite (see chap. 4), the "beyond" to which human experience of self inevitably points. Thought "infinitizes" by breaking down (or crossing over) the barriers which separate reality into finite instances. In the Zusatz appended to this brief paragraph we find a remark which is of utmost importance, if we are to see clearly where Hegel is going. There is, he tells us, a statement erroneously ascribed to Aristotleas though it characterized Aristotle's whole philosophywhich runs, "nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu."8 "There is nothing in the intellect which was not [previously] in sense." The point which those who use the quote seek to make is that the mind is limited as to content by what is contained in sense experience (a sentiment worthy of Locke!). Speculative philosophy is supposed to be missing its vocation if it fails to recognize the truth of this statement. In true dialectical fashion, however, Hegel asserts that speculative philosophy must with equal truth state that "nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in intellectu." This could simply mean that the continuity of sense and intellect is such that it would be erroneous to make the first statement as though it could be separated from the second. But, to Hegel it means much more, and the whole of his philosophy hangs on that ''much more." Taken generally, he tells us, the second statement signifies that reason (nonV *, intellectus)better still, and more profoundly, spiritis prior because it is the cause (Ursache) of the world; that is, the reality of the real is to be found in the order of concept and idea, not in the order of empirical "existence." Even more to the point in this introduction, the second statement (see no. 2) means that the sort of "feelings" Hegel has been talking aboutlegal (rechtliche), moral, religiousconstitute the experience of a content which has "its root and its abode in thought alone." Thus, there are objectsfreedom, spirit, Godwhich are objects of thought and only thought, and there are empirical objects which are truly objects only because and to the extent that they too are objects of thought. No. 9. (See no. 1). Having spoken about the content of rational (speculative) thinking, that is, a content which for thought is essentially universal, Hegel now turns to what characterizes rational thinking from the point of view of form, that is, the way in which it comprehends its object, and this he finds to be the mode of "necessity." The language here may well
8. The statement is, in fact, to be found nowhere in the Aristotelian corpus (nor did Aristotle write in medieval Latin!). Nor is Hegel's citation completely accurate: the old chestnut reads, "quod non prius fuerit in sensu." I am not aware that anyone has been able to pinpoint the source of the quote. One thing is clear: authentic or not, it does not deserve all the mileage it has achieved!
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seem strange to contemporary readers. If by "necessity" is meant the psychological necessity of thinking in a certain way, Hegel would seem to be running afoul of his own complaint against Kantian reflective thinking that it makes only the subjective mental act its object, which yields a rather fruitless form of necessity. If, on the other hand, he is speaking of the logical necessity that the object of thought be so delimited (defined) that only propositions are necessary and that propositions are necessary only if the denial of their truth would violate the law of noncontradiction, he runs the risk of being shown that much of what he saysparticularly about freedom, spirit, and Godcannot be claimed to be, in terms of formal-logical entailment, necessary at all. Hegel even concedes that not infrequently the connections we make in our seemingly logical thinking are quite arbitrary, not necessary at all, such that, for example, the connection between the generalities we set upgeneraand the particularities they are supposed to subsumespeciesare not necessary but quite clearly contingent. Classification can, after all, be quite careless; it can depend on the taken for granted, the accepted, the presupposed. More importantly, where what is in question is what Hegel calls "speculative thinking," it may be impossible to satisfy the demands of formal-logical necessity at all, since this sort of necessity is confined to the connection between concepts which have been limited for the sole purpose of making the connection between them logically unimpeachable. But this is manipulative thinking, which is more interested in not contradicting itself than in knowing what is true. If, then, thinking is to be concerned with more than what is merely plausible or merely noncontradictory (the latter being a condition of abstract possibility), it must move on to the kind of reflection (Nachdenken) which Hegel calls ''speculative thinking." We shall have more to say of this later. Here suffice it to say that Hegel sees it as a kind of thoughtful "looking-in" which sees in the object it contemplates the kind of necessity which characterizes organic structure whose parts have the actuality they have only as the living parts of a living organisman eye plucked out is not an eye, a hand cut off is not a hand, a body which is dead is not an organism. The form which characterizes this kind of thinking is what Hegel calls "concept," whose dynamic structure distinguishes it from all other forms of thought; it is the form which makes thought to be thought in the fullest sense of the term; it is not the isolated activity of an individual subject, not the mental act which represents reality, but the internal rational structure of reality itself. Concepts do not simply "represent" alien reality. They "manifest" the intrinsic rationality which characterizes reality. Once again it is important to note that in Hegel's thought there is never a question of the either/or which makes us deny one side of a seeming contradiction if we affirm the other. Having affirmed the significance of speculative science or of speculative logic, there is no need to consider either
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the empirical sciences or formal logic as of no significance. Speculative thinking does not ignore the empirical content of the particular sciences; it both acknowledges and makes use of such content. By the same token it both recognizes and makes use of for its own content the universal laws and categories which the empirical sciences have uncovered, but it also introduces and validates other categories which are beyond the capacity of the special sciences to comprehend. Nor does speculative logic reject the thought-forms, laws, and objectivities of either formal logic or of a metaphysics tied to formal logic; it simply takes thought beyond where these earlier forms of thought have been able to take it. All of this means, of course, that concept as understood in speculative thinking is not the same as concept is commonly taken to be; from the speculative point of view concept is a dynamic totality constantly on the move, breaking through the bonds which abstract thinking has imposed on it. It is only when concept is understood in this latter arbitrarily limited sense, that abstract thinking can contend that the infinite cannot be comprehended conceptually; of course, it cannot be comprehended in concepts whose source is merely finite thinking but it is arbitrary to claim that the concept as such can be only that. The concept "man," for example, is not simply the product of any (or every) finite activity of thinking the object "man"; it is the reality of man expressing itself in a thought which exceeds all limits of particularity. No. 10. There is, then, something quite special about the kind of knowing proper to philosophical thinking; it is not modeled on but goes beyond abstract modes of thinking, beyond the merely subjective activity of merely individual subjects. The task that Hegel sees before him, then, is that both of coming to grips with speculative thinking and the kind of necessity proper to it and of validating its capacity to know the absolute objects spoken of above. The problem is that doing this is itself a philosophical task, to be accomplished by philosophical thinking itself, not in some sort of non-philosophical propaedeutic (read: "critique"?). An attempt to give an explication here in an introduction would be unphilosophical, resting as it would on a congeries of statements, assertions, and ratiocinations, "i.e., contingent affirmations the opposite of which could be asserted with equal right." Quite obviously we cannot stop here, but we do have some indication as to where we are going. By the time he wrote this Hegel had already distanced himself considerably from Kant's "critical philosophy" which had nourished him in his youth. Here he simply indicates rather succinctly some of the reasons for this distancing. Even granting that the really important questions for philosophy concern, for example, God and the essences of things, critical philosophy, he tells us, will not even attempt to answer such questions without first investigating the mind's capacity to know anything at all. The instrument to be employed in philosophical investigation, it tells us, must be
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examined before it is put to use. Nor can there be any doubt that Kant, following in the footsteps of, but violently disagreeing with, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, had convinced most of his contemporaries of the reasonability of just such an approach, with the result that philosophy tended to concern itself far more with thinking than it did with what thinking thinks. What is more, if one wishes to employ a term such as "instrument,"9 it is fairly obvious that in many instances one can legitimately investigate the trustworthiness of the instrument one employs without using the instrument itself in order to carry on the investigation. What seems to have escaped Kant, howeverat least as Hegel reads himis that the attempt to know that knowing is valid can be successful only if the knowing of knowing is, in fact, valid. The circle is rapidly building up! One way of solving the problem which seems too obvious to be ignored and too devastating if it is not solved, is to do what, Hegel says, Reinhold did, by assuming that knowing is valid, treating it as something problematical, which need not be rejected until it is proved to be untrue. The difficulty is that in treating the validity of knowing as a problematic hypothesis one has not very much changed Kant's procedure, nor has one escaped its pitfallsif knowing is assumed to be true until proved to be untrue, the assumption is still an unproved assumption. No. 11. What has happened is that a thinking which confines itself to the mode of abstract understanding has involved itself in a circle out of which, merely as understanding, it can find no exitunless, of course, thinking can find a virtue in the circularity of its procedure; that is, that the circle is not "vicious" but rather "dialectical," not skirting but rather making use of the very contradictions in which it has become involved. If we see spirit as the unified source of conscious activity (perhaps "source activity" would be better), there is no need to speak of ''faculties" (instruments) at all, as though the mind "employed" them in relating itself to this or that object. When the activity of the mind is that of feeling or intuition, then its objects are sensible; when it imagines, its objects are images; when it wills, its objects are purposes, and so on and on. If the mind goes all the way it will come upon an activity which is, so to speak, in contradiction with all of these lesser forms and can do what none of the others do. It can occupy itself with itself, and this is thinking.10 In the most profound sense of the word, thinking can think itself, and there is no circle here, no unresolved contradiction. Thinking in the fullest sense, that is, as speculative, can both
9. In the introduction to the Phenomenology Hegel is at pains to point out the futility of looking at knowing (thinking) as that which a subject employs (an instrument) in grappling with objects. 10. Sensing does not sense sensing; imagining does not imagine imagining; willing does not will willing; but thinking does think thinking. What is more, thinking thinks the other activities also.
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think and resolve the many contradictions in which thinking on the level of abstraction inevitably becomes involved. Thinking, as we saw before, does not stand still in order to be examined, nor does an analysis of what would have to be the case if thinking is to be counted valid yield particularly satisfactory results. Thinking must think itself as the dynamic activity which it is in order to reveal to itself what it is. We have a foretaste here of what logic is going to be for Hegel. He speaks, however, of an "insight" (Einsicht) into the nature of thinking which reveals that it is essentially dialectic. Of utmost importance in this is the realization that on the level of abstraction proper to understanding (Verstand) thinking cannot but become involved in contradictions. What is new in Hegel's thinking is the conviction that, if the contradictions are faced honestly and not simply wished away, they will resolve themselves in dynamic interaction, showing that the complex manysidedness of thought, rather than being a cause for despair, constitutes the enormous richness which only a thinking unimpeded by images can unravel. At the same time thought can now objectify itself in all its forms, without fear that it will become bogged down in any one of them,11 nor will it have to take refuge in a kind of thinking which deliberately leaves out the dynamic mediation which makes thought to be thoughtit can avoid the pitfall of relying solely on so-called "immediate" contact with its object. No. 12. When philosophical thinking is looked upon in this way, Hegel has no difficulty in acknowledging that philosophy does, in fact, find its point of departure in experience, which provides consciousness with a content. From this point of view experience is seen as a "stimulus" (Reiz) which calls forth thoughta thought which, so to speak, lifts itself above the consciousness which is no more than naively manipulative of the content given in sensation to a level of thinking which does not need an admixture of sensible images, thus moving away from and adopting a "negative relationship" to its point of departure. Its domain is no longer that of successive appearances but rather that of the one universal essence manifested in appearances, call it the Absolute, or God, but still an essence which is at this point more or less abstract. On the other hand, the empirical sciences carry thier own stimulus for thought to raise itself above the merely empirical form of thinking, wherein its manifold content is taken to be simply given and hence contingent, to a level where that same content assumes the form of rational necessity, where the universality of laws of nature rules. It is this stimulus which cancels the satisfaction which thought initially found in its abstract absolute, by goading it on to a development which proceeds from within thought itself. But even on this level thought is no more than the reception of a content, whose determinations simply belong to it as it is,
11. The overall message of Hegel's Phenomenology.
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thus giving thought the appearance of being free, not in the sense of being self-determined, but in the sense of zeroing in on the rationality which belongs properly to the real which is its object. Thinking in this sense is tied down, it is true, but it is tied to reality, not to its own vagaries nor to the merely sensible manifestations of reality. It is too soon, Hegel feels, to speak more in detail of the relationship of immediateness and mediation in consciousness, a theme about which he will have much to say in logic. Suffice it to say here that, even though as moments of thought the two can be distinguished, they cannot be separated, if thought is to be thought. Thus, to know Godor any suprasensible12 object whateveris to be lifted above the sensible, to be negatively related to it, and this negative relation is itself mediation, that is, a movement beyond what is immediately given. The result can seem rather paradoxical: the very immediacy of the initial grasp mediates the movement which carries thinking beyond it, a movement which is inescapable, if thinking is to be true to itself. Still, and this is important, the movement beyond the empirical is not dependent on the empirical, not derived from it. Thinking cancels out the sensible from which it took its rise; it negates that which is immediately before it. The sensible does not remain as an element in thinking. The dialectic of thinking involves not a finding in the sensible what it needs but a going beyond the sensible to find what it needs; and the going beyond must go all the way! Hegel adds here a remark which is seldom noted by commentators, especially by those who complain that for him speculative thinking simply swallows up religious belief. There is unquestionably a very special kind of satisfaction to be found in a thinking which has in itself a universality it gives itself (a priori); a satisfaction which permits it to be rather indifferent to the contingent particularizations of this universality. But the satisfaction runs the risk of being empty if it simply stops here. When we look at religion, he tells us, whether it be developed or undeveloped, brought to the level of a conscious knowing or held on the level of simple, heartfelt faith, we can see that the kind of emotional satisfaction it gives in both cases can be the same; the one does not have to be antagonistic to the other. And here, I think, we have to supply something which, although Hegel does not explicitly state it, seems to be required by what follows (and it is also stated explicitly elsewhere [see BDG, 4th lecture]), namely, that if religion becomes so intellectual that the satisfaction of the heart has been eliminated, religion itself has become empty formalism. By the same token, if philosophy stands still in the universality of ideas, as happened in the case of the "being" of Parmenides or the "becoming" of Heraclitus, there can
12. It should not be amiss to point out that the German term for "suprasensible" is übersinnlich, which means not only "above" the sensible but also ''more than" the sensible.
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be a justified complaint that philosophy has stagnated into formalism. Even a highly developed philosophy can get bogged down in abstract propositions; for example, that "in the absolute all is one" or "the subjective the objective are identical,"13 with the result that these abstractions are simply carried over unaltered and applied to particular instances. Philosophy should remain grateful for what the empirical sciences have provided, preparing the material which philosophy can then make its own (i.e., "appropriate''). Philosophy is self-developing, it is true, but its selfdevelopment should not be separated from its appropriation of a content antecedently prepared. It develops that content "speculatively," which is what the empirical sciences are incapable of doing, but there is no reason why, in the deep satisfaction of its own independence, it must downgrade the empirical, the particular. Even the universality attaching to the term "philosophy" itself should not blind philosophers to the diversity of philosophical positions subsumed under the one heading of "philosophy"; not only are particulars no less real than the universal, but they constitute in their diversity the concrete unity of the whole which is the universal. Here is enunciated in a rather unobtrusive way the peculiarly Hegelian principle of concrete universality, arrived at not by the suppression of differences among particulars until a sort of least common denominator is reached, but by embracing in one whole the complementarity of diverse manifestations of the one. This principle of seeing unity in diversity will be of utmost importance in Hegel's philosophy of religion. No. 13. The consequences of this principle are singularly manifest in the development of one philosophy out of the diversity of philosophical positions, a development which is elaborated in the history of philosophy as, so to speak, the "organic" growth of a "concrete universal" whose unity is that of continuous process, not merely the unity of collection (a sequential movement in which "philosophies" accumulate), nor is it the unity of including diversity under one class concept called "philosophy."14 There is a danger, of course, that the continuity of the movement of thought will be missed by those who merely record a succession of philosophical positions without attention to the intrinsic growth of the very idea which is philosophy. It is here that Hegel puts so much stress on that central theme of his philosophizing which so many find unacceptable. The active source of philosophical thinking, and hence of its development, he contends, is "the one living spirit," which in the millennia which have preceded us has been progressively becoming conscious of itself as being the totality of both all thought and all reality. It is this spirit which is the articulated summation of
13. Quite clearly in these remarks Hegel has Schelling in mind. 14. See EGP, pp. 94136; Lauer, Hegel's Idea of Philosophy, pp. 6792.
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finite thinking infinitized in the continuity of its own process. The history of philosophy, in this view, bears eloquent witness to the unity which is philosophy, one "organic" whole of which diverse philosophies are the "branches" and whose consummation in any given age retains the whole of its significant past. What becomes evident here is that the diversityeven contradictorinessof successive philosophical positions, far from arguing to the unreliability of the philosophical enterprise as a whole, rather attests to the living complementarity of diversity, which makes for richness rather than poverty, for growth rather than decline, and for the hope that truth constantly sought after can be attained, on condition that it never be required to stand still. No. 14. Development in the sense in which Hegel understands it, however, is not confined to a chronological sequence of positions. It is exhibited in philosophical thinking itself, independently of chronological sequence. Thinking itself is developmental, or it is not thinking. Truly self-developing thought is itself concrete (from concrescere, a process of internal growth). Seen in this way thought is idea, the objective unity of thought in its development or the unified interrelatedness of objective thinking. If the unity is total universality, what comes to light is the Idea, the Absolute. Philosophy can rightly be called the "science" of the Absolute as Idea, but only if philosophy is "system," wherein concrete truth unfolds itself as united in a totality which not only retains a diversity of determinations but also recognizes that diversity is necessary to the process of self-determination. Hegel will sharpen this even more by stating that a "philosophy without system cannot be scientific"; it can only be a subjective mode of thinking tied to the contingent content which the senses present to it. We must recognize that a content of thought is valid only as a "moment" of the whole, otherwise it is no more than an unfounded presupposition, a mere subjective certainty. A nonsystem is no better than a congeries of conjectures and opinions; truths cannot be isolated from each other nor from the totality. On the other hand, a philosophy which limits itself to one principle which is to explain everything (e.g., Fichte's Ich or Schelling's undifferentiated absolute) is not truly philosophy. It is the true principle of philosophy to embrace within itself all particular principlesthis is "system." No. 15. Imperceptibly, Hegel now shifts from the diversity of philosophical positions within the ongoing whole which is "philosophy" to the "parts" of philosophy, presumably the multiplicity designated by his use of the plural in the title, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Looking at philosophy this way he considers each of its "parts" to have a certain philosophical wholeness in itself, even though the validity of each depends on its being a part of the one whole. If the whole of philosophy, then, can be called ''system," each of its parts is, so to speak, a system
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within the system, or, as he says metaphorically, "a circle enclosed within itself" such that the whole can be seen as a "circle of circles." The philosophical Idea, which is one, is present in each of the parts under a form peculiar to the part. Each of the "circles," because in itself a kind of totality, breaks through the confinement of its own particularized subject-matter, thus laying the foundation for an ever-widening sphere of thought. Each of the parts, then, is a necessary moment of the dynamic whole, in such a way that the overall system which embraces what is peculiar to each of the parts is the one Idea which is manifested in each of the constitutive parts. No. 16 Once again, the point is made in the title: what Hegel is presenting here is an Encyclopedia, the whole circle (cucloV *) of instruction (paideia*) in philosophical thinking. As such its task is not to present the detailed development of particulars but rather to confine itself to the principles and fundamental concepts of the particular sciences which make up the wholea whole in the sense that it is complete, no "philosophical" sciences being left out. It is not as though, however, one could count the number of parts which must be included, if the whole is to be a whole. The parts are not separated units; each is true only to the extent that it is itself a whole. The whole of philosophy, then, can be seen as in truth one science, but it must also be seen as a whole of many particularcomplementaryparts. In this context diverse "philosophies" can be seen, even in their particular inadequacy, as converging beams of light all illumining the one "absolute." If by "encyclopedia" we ordinarily understand a composite work which treats many topics, an aggregate whose loose principle of unity is little more than to be of common interest to the enquiring human mind, then perhaps Hegel should offer an apology for employing the term. In any event what he means by a "philosophical" encyclopedia is not (1) a collection of interesting items of information, nor (2) an arbitrary inventory of what are to be called "positive" sciences, having no rationally necessary connection with each other. This does not mean that philosophy has no interest in the subject-matter of what from their own point of view are, in fact, positive sciences. To the extent that these latter have a rational foundation, they are of interest to philosophical enquiry, even though what is merely "positive" (informational) in them is not of philosophical interest. It is not, however, that facts are unimportant, even to philosophical enquiry; it is simply that philosophy's interest is not in facts as facts, only facts as illustrative of concepts which are philosophy's sole concernan uninterpreted "fact'' is, properly speaking, not a fact. The concept of beauty can be instanced in this or that work of art, the concept of law in this or that particular bit of legislation, the concept of history in this or that event, the concept of nature in this or that treeor even forestbut philosophy's concern is the concept, not the particular instance as such. What it comes down to is that a "science," to the extent that it is "positive," must recognize that it is
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oriented to the knowledge of contingent facts and to the concepts which render these facts intelligible, not to the overall rational interrelation of concepts. Hegel is willing to admit, however, that even an empirical investigation can be so organized that its procedures are dictated by the internal consistency of the guiding concept, in which case the procedures would still be essentially philosophical. It would seem that he is referring, at least indirectly, to his own procedures, particularly in his philosophy of nature, philosophy of subjective spiritand, to a certain extent, in the philosophy of right, philosophy of art, and even in the history of philosophy, in all of which he looks to facts (or events) in order to obtain "empirical verification" for a conceptual structure which his Science of Logic had told him he could justifiably expect to find. "In such a procedure," he contends, ''an experimental physics or a history, etc., rooted in sense experience will present the rational science of nature and of human events in image form, which form, although extrinsic to the concept, still mirrors it." No. 17. It could seem that, if philosophy is to begin, it must do so, like the other sciences, on the basis of a subjective presupposition, which is to say with an initial decision as to what its proper object is.15 Just as mathematics makes space or number the object of thinking, so philosophy makes thinking itself that object. There is a difference, however; thinking is the free, self-determining act which characterizes philosophy, where its standpoint is independent, where it gives to itself an object which it itself has produced. More than that, the standpoint which appears to be immediately given must be the result of the scientific thinking in question, so that only at the end does it attain to its beginning (i.e., to its truth). Philosophy, then, is a sort of circle closing on itself, which does not have a beginning, in the sense that other sciences do, whose beginning is dictated by the scientist's decision to begin. Philosophy's (or logic's) beginning is dictated by the science itself, by the very concept of what the science is. Where does philosophy say that the philosopher must begin? Philosophy has only one purpose, only one goal of its activity, to attain to the concept of its own concept. Philosophy's proper task is to find out what philosophy is, which is to say, to bring itself into being by philosophizing. The foregoing analysis of Hegel's introduction to Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences has been, it might seem, rather prolix. At the same time it has not been erudite in the way, for example, that Theunissen's 220-page analysis of twenty-five paragraphs of the Encyclopedia has been.16 The pur-
15. We are forcibly reminded here, in the introduction to the Encyclopedia of [all] the Philosophical Sciences, of the question which introduces the first part of Science of Logic, "The Doctrine of Being": Womit muss der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden? ("with what must the science begin?"), (WL I, p. 51). 16. Michael Theunissen, Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als Theologisch-politischer Traktat. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970), pp. 103322.
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pose of the analysis here has been twofold: (1) to extract from the text the overall movement and direction of Hegel's philosophical thinking; and (2) to see how the movement of this thinking inevitably culminates in a thinking of God, without a knowledge of whom all thinking is condemned to fall by the wayside and never attain to the grasp of its own truth. It is not that the reality of God is the only necessary truth to which philosophy attains, but that no other necessary truth, be it that of morality, of human freedom and the rights consequent on that, of logical thinking, or of the laws of nature, would be either true or necessary, if not rooted in the necessity of the absolute Idea, which is none other than absolute Spirit, God. The "Necessity" of Truth For contemporary thinking the difficulty with all this is not so much that Hegelian thought culminates in Goddespite various attempts to claim that it does notrather it lies in an uneasiness with a thinking which speaks of "necessary truth" at all or, worse still, that the human mind can claim to know what is necessarily true. It is all right, logically, to speak of necessarily accepting a proposition as true, if it is seen to be logically entailed in another proposition (or propositions) already accepted as true, but that is a far cry from saying that a state of affairs enunciated in such a proposition is necessarily the case, that this state of affairs could not not be true. Nor need there be too much difficulty for the contemporary mind to acknowledge at least the plausibility of the Kantian contention that human reason operates in such a way that it necessarily asserts that certain states of affairs are true, even though it cannot know that this is the case. But Hegel cannot be satisfied with either of these positions. With regard to the first position, he will claim not only that the human mind is logically necessitated to affirm certain universal truths (e.g., that infinite being is real, that the human spirit makes free decisions, that murder is wrong) and is illogical if it does not, but also that what the human mind is thus logically necessitated to affirm is necessarily the case, even when the formal-logical entailment of these propositions in other propositions has not been demonstrated to be necessary. There is a logic of speculative thinking which carries the mind beyond the limitations of formal logicwihtout violating the rules of formal logic in so doing. With regard to the second position, Hegel will make a sharp distinction between the way the human mind in fact necessarily thinks (presuming that this could be known at all) and the way the human mind is logically necessitated to think, under pain of its thinking being a nonthinking. Knowing how the human mind is logically necessitated to thinkespecially if the logic in question is "speculative"may still cause us some difficulties, but Hegel is convinced that "speculative thinking" will
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be seen to validate itself if we go through with it. What it comes down to is that Hegel is making the enormous claim that the human mind must think this way under pain of being irrational if it does not. Nor does "rational" refer only to the way the mind necessarily thinks; it also takes in the way reality necessarily is; reality reveals to and in rational thinking what reality's own rationality is. It might not be amiss here to give a few examples of what this kind of thinking entails. When I speak with you, I can (perhaps must) say "that what is before me is a human being is contingent, not necessary"no "fact" is. That a human being is immortal, if it is true at all, is necessarily true, in such a way that to deny it would be irrational. The same can be put in a slightly different way: To say that I am not human, might very well be untrue, but it is not irrational; there are nonhuman beings. To say that a human being is not immortal is not only untrue, it is irrationalthere are no nonimmortal human beings; immortality belongs to the very "concept" of human. It should be observed, of course, that in this context "irrational" carries with it no moral stigma. You may be doing the best you can, but ''doing the best you can" does not save you from irrationality. Relation of Thought and Reality In one sense all of this is very clearthere is scarcely anything in Hegel's writing clearer than the introduction to the Encyclopedia. In another sense, however, since it was not possible for Hegel, in an introduction, to spell out the doctrine of "concept" upon which the elaboration of philosophical thinking is predicated, a certain lack of clarity persists in clinging both to Hegel's text and to an analysis thereof. In a tradition of philosophical thinking according to which a sharp distinction was drawn between the subjective activity of thinking and the objective order of reality which that thinking sought to reproduce, the guiding principles in the interpretation of human knowing had been (1) the Aristotelian assertion that in knowing, the mind somehow "becomes" that which it knows, and (2) the contention, erroneously attributed to Aristotle, that the "somehow" implies that the mind is a "blank tablet" upon which reality makes its imprint. That the mind has a special capacity of its own both to receive these imprints in such a way as to produce "ideas" which, if properly produced, would be faithful reproductions of reality, was also part of the Aristotelian heritage which dominated philosophy until the eighteenth century. Explicitly or implicitly the presupposition behind all this was that the activity to be explained was causal activity: the causality of reality in imprinting itself, and the causality of the mind in working on the materials at its disposal. What the heritage was left with, however, was two worlds, a world of reality "out there," and
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a world of ideas, which, however faithfully it might be said to reproduce the world of reality, was nevertheless another world.17 With the advent of "modern" philosophy, however, whose beginning is commonly said to be found in the thinking of Descartesalthough it might be more accurate to make the beginning more general, locating it in the overall need to secure a foundation for bourgeoning experimental sciencea new need arose, that of guaranteeing the validity of the knowledge the human mind was supposed to possess. The Aristotelian framework of causal explanation was not immediately abandoned, but a new emphasis was introduced: The world of ideas was still distinct from the world of reality, but the validation of the world of ideas was to be sought within that world itselfideas were true if they had the proper qualities to make them true, which is to say, if they were such as to make it impossible to doubt their truth. Very subtly the emphasis had shifted from the truth of reality which ideas were supposed to reflect to the certainty the mind had concerning the validity of its ideas. On the European continent this resulted in a "rationalism," which found a guarantee for ideas in the rationality of the subjective process of arriving at them. Across the channel it resulted in an "empiricism,'' which sought to guarantee ideas by tracing their derivation from indubitable experiencethe only "rational" way to guarantee them. Then came Hume, who tossed the bombshell which rocked both camps: The only indubitability attaching to ideas was their relationship to each other, which left reality in the dark; and the only indubitability attaching to experience was the experience itself, not what it was the experience of. Causality was of no help as a guarantee, since there can be no certainty of causality itself. There was no escaping Hume's challenge, and so Kant picked up the gauntlet right where Hume had thrown it. It has been said of Kant that he was the first philosopher to have inserted the human thinking subject into the very heart of the logic of thought. No longer would it be a question of validating ideas by tracing the process of arriving at themmetaphysically, rationalistically, or empiricallysince Hume had made all three approaches suspect. Rather, Kant would investigate critically the necessary conditions for the human mind's concepts to be both true and meaningful, and he would find that the human subject had all the equipment it needed for that. It the human subject would employ that equipment in the way it demandedwith necessitythat it be employed, human thinking would be trueeven though not, perhaps, true to a reality presumed to be "in-itself" independently of the experiencing of it. It was a gigantic break with a long
17. In Phenomenology of Spirit, chap. III "Force and Understanding: Appearance and Supra-Sensible World," Hegel depicts the last-ditch stand of the "objective" attitude of a consciousness which would look outside itself for the cause of its being conscious of the world. In doing this Hegel shows how the two worlds (of reality and of the mind) demand that the world of the mind be an image of the real world, where in fact it may be no more than a mirror-imagean "inverted" (verkehrte) world.
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philosophic tradition. In one way or another Kant's predecessors, all the way back to the Greeks, had presupposed that the structure of human thought bore witness to a corresponding structure of reality. Gone now was this presupposition, whose only supportpresumablywas the causality whose cognitional significance had been impugned by Hume. Causality for Kant had not completely left the stage, but it remained on the stage only as a category operative within thought, with no justification for its application to a world of reality beyond thought. There is no question that Kant bequeathed to his successors a problem; it is a mark of his genius that, if the problem is not solved, there is no going beyond Kant. There can be a question, however, as to whether the problem is insoluble. Of the three great "system-builders" who succeeded Kant, that is, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, each attempted in his own way to resolve the Kantian dilemma without returning to the causality principle, at least in the form of it impugned by Hume. This is not the place to describe the efforts of Fichte and Schelling to overcome the Kantian duality of objectivity and subjectivity, or of an independent reality and of a thinking whose task it was to reproduce it faithfully. Suffice it to say that both sought to solve the problem by appeal to an absolute subject which would account for both itself and objectivity, thus leaving no gap between subjectivity and objectivity to be bridged. Hegel would build on both, and he would do so by denying the basic premiss that it makes sense to speak of a world of reality "beyond thought" at all. This is what has been called Hegel's "idealism," but it is not the purely subjective idealism of a Berkeley, not the idealism of an indeterminate absolute à la Fichte or Schelling, nor, to anticipate, is it the idealism of an unidentifiable ''transcendental subject" à la Husserl. For Hegel, as for his great predecessors Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas and Spinoza, the structure of truly rational human thinking does bear witness to the structure of reality; not, however, because the structures of thought and of reality are similar but because they are, ultimately, one and the same. It will be the task of his monumental Science of Logic not only to show that they are one and the sameFichte and Schelling had sought to affirm thatbut also to show how they are one and the same, namely, as dynamic process. Logic is the unfolding in thought of the structure of thought, and the affirmation which Hegel makes in his introduction to Science of Logic, that the "content [of Logic] is the presentation of God, as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a single finite spirit" (WL I, p. 31), however one may want to interpret it, is to be taken seriously. It means at the very least that the thought which logic investigates consists of a unified totality which is both antecedent to (logically), and the source of (ontologically), finite reality and finite thought. The structures of thought are the structures of reality, because subjective rational thinking and objective rational reality are products of a thought which at once transcends and embraces both. This, in turn, means
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that the transcendent concept (the producing) and the transcendent idea (the produced) are identical and constitute both the reality of the real and the truth of thought. The Meaning of Concept It is time, however, to let Hegel himself speak. I have chosen, once more, to let Hegel speak in the words of the Logic contained in his Encyclopedia, not because the language of Science of Logic would not be both more instructive and more satisfying, but because an analysis of what he says in the larger work would by itself turn into a full-length book. The passages to be analyzed here are taken from the third part of the Logic, entitled "The Doctrine of Concept." In it Hegel is telling us what he means by "concept," as opposed to what a great part of the Western philosophical tradition and, in particular, his contemporary opponents have meant. He begins by saying that concept is a self-determining totality, not the mental act of an individual subject, but "independent substantial power," such that whatever is subsumed under the concept is a "moment" of the whole concept and, as a moment, expresses the whole concept and is valid only as inseparably united with the concept, deriving its determinateness from its identification with the whole (no. 160). Quite obviously a statement such as this needs some explaining, which is precisely what Hegel tells us, in the prefaces to both the first and second editions, a lecturer who uses a manual like the Encyclopedia should give. The Zusatz, presumably, contains the explanation which Hegel himself gave when lecturing. In any event, throughout this section the Zusätze are for the most part more enlightening than is the main text. The Zusatz here tells us, then, that when Hegel uses the term ''concept," he is speaking from the point of view of "absolute idealism," according to which what ordinary consciousness looks upon as a "being" independent of consciousness is seen to be but an "ideal moment" of a larger whole which only "begreifendes Erkennen" can come to grips with.18 The "logic of understanding," on the other hand, tends to look upon the concept as simply a form of subjective thinking, the way the in-
18. Apart from the difficulty of coming to grips with what Hegel means by Begriffthe thrust of this entire chapterthere is the difficulty of determining just how the term should be translated (if indeed there can be one undeviating translation). For the most part those who have translated Hegel's works into English (particularly British translators) have opted for the English term "notion." This has its merits, especially if the term recaptures the dynamic connotation of the Greek nonV *, which Hegel translates as Vernunft. It is to be feared, however, that for most of us the term "notion" does not have these dynamic overtones. "Concept," on the other hand, although it is not without its difficulties, has the merit of being related to the activity of "con-ceiving" (producing from within) and of retaining connotations of "concreteness" and "com-prehension," both of which for Hegel are essentially dynamic. It is a question of what one chooses to emphasize, and neither of the English terms emphasizes all that Hegel wishes to emphasize.
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dividual mind "represents" to itself universally the object it thinks, an empty abstraction. As Hegel sees it, the concept is the exact opposite of abstract; it is an "utterly concrete," vital principle. The whole logical movement described up to this point should make that clear; even the distinction of form and content of the concept is seen to be a dialectical distinction, that is, one which in the movement of thought cancels itself outthe thinking is the content of the thinking, and the concept is the unity of form and content. If, of course, one means by "concrete" the sensible, then the concept is abstract, not "graspable" by the senses at all; but as uniting the totality of finite perspectives into an ideal unity, into a determinate whole, it is concrete, the locus of concrete universality, the really real, not the mentally fragmented. In this sense the concept is the definition of the absolute. It might, of course, be asked why "speculative logic'' calls what is here in question "concept," since the term can lead to so much misunderstanding. The fact is, however, that the "speculative" meaning of concept is not so far from the meaning given it in "ordinary language"; we do speak of deriving the properties of an object from its "concept," and we do try to grasp the meaning of what we are faced with by turning to the "concept" of it. What Hegel is saying of the concept, then, is that it is the dynamic reproduction in thought of the rational structure of reality. The overall pattern of logical thinking contains three main parts: (1) the logic of being, or the selfdevelopment of thought's inevitable object; (2) the logic of essence, or reflection on that object as it is reproduced in thought; and (3) the logic of concept, or the investigation of the dynamic structure of thought as expressing the structure of reality. It is not as though the concept is that which thought produces and then attributes to realitya medium between reality and thoughtit is the self-manifestation of conceptually-structured reality in conceptuallystructured subjective thinkingthe discovery of dynamic thought-structure in reality is the same movement as the self-expression of thought-structured reality in thought.19 In thinking itself thought finds that it necessarily thinks its object universally. But, if it is to come to grips with its universalized object, it must also think the particularities of that object, which it can do only if it thinks the particularities of its own structure. Although, then, the abstract universality of the concept in subjective thinking is only a moment in the concrete process of thought, it is a moment and, as such, is indispensable. If it is a function of reason to unify diversity, then unified diversity is a product of reasonbut so is diversified unity. The direction in which Hegel is moving is already clear: toward the all-unifying concept (absolute Spirit), the absolute Idea (God).
19. As Hegel tells us, he had already given an adumbration of this logical method of investigation in the Phenomenology's examination of the structure of consciousness. See WL I, p. 7.
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No. 161. The progress of the concept, he goes on to tell us, ceases to be a passage of reality into what is other than itself, that is, thought. Rather it is a "development" of the concept itself. The progressive identification of the diverse and the unified in a whole determinateness is the self-determination of the concept as a whole. Zusatz: Hegel is not denying that there is a passage involved in the movement from reality to thought; reality and thought are distinct. But the distinction is dialectical, and so the term "development" is more accurate than the term "passage"; reality does not become thought, it already is thought-reality. As an illustration of this he takes the development in nature from seed to full-blown plant, where the progressive diversification does not presuppose the antecedent presence of infinitesimal "parts," only the ''ideal" presence of a diversity whose actualization is the growth of the plant. In a very significant sense, then, the plant is, from beginning to end of its growth, one and the same. So too with the concept; it grows according to its own laws of development. Like the plant, it takes on otherness, so to speak, only to find that the otherness is not other; it remains itself in othering itself. As a model of this Hegel takes the Christian teaching on creation, according to which God brings to being what is other than himself, only because from eternity he generates a Son, in whom God remains the same as himself. For some the example could seem farfetched, but it does point up Hegel's contention that it makes no sense to speak of "concepts" except in the framework of the one "concept" transcending all concepts (see chap. 7). No. 162. By this time it should be clear that Hegel's logic has at most a faint family resemblance to the logic with which most of us are familiar, concerned as the latter is with the forms of subjective thinking and with rules for the correct manipulation of those forms. Not only is the investigation of concept, for Hegel, only the third part of logic, but the study of the "forms" of thinking constitutes only a "part of a part." This part Hegel calls "the doctrine of the subjective or formal concept." It is to be followed by a study of the "objectivity" of the concept and by a study of the unity of subject and object, which he called "idea" and which alone contains "truth" in the full sense of the term. It is not a question, however, of repudiating formal logic but rather of clearing out the "empirical material," whether psychological, "metaphysical," or whatever, which has crept into what should be purely logical considerations. What is more, these forms, which are legitimate subjects of logical investigation, tend to be looked upon from the very narrow viewpoint of the "understanding," which is proper to positive science, rather than from the more comprehensive point of view of "reason." The real danger is, as Hegel sees it, that such notions as "being" and "essence" will be looked upon as dictated by subjective thinking alone rather than as "concepts" with their own inner laws of dialectical develop
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ment and interrelatedness in a concrete whole of thought. If what are commonly called "concepts" are no more than the determinations imposed by understanding on the reality it thinks, that is, universalized "representations," they are essentially "finite" and, therefore, inadequate to a thought which transcends all finite instantiations. It is the danger of dealing with the "forms" of thinking in such a way that the "truth'' of thinking's "content" is either ignored (in favor of "correctness") or is considered to be supplied by a source other than thought itself. On the contrary, Hegel will look upon the forms of thought as "the living spirit of the actual," such that it is by virtue of these forms, "through them and in them" that what is said of the actual is true. Therefore, it is necessary to look into the very truth of these forms themselves. Just what are theyin truth? Just what constitutes the necessity of their connection with each other? It is more than merely formal-logical entailmenthowever difficult it may be to grasp what that "more than" can mean. That there is an initial stage in the thinking process when the reality thought is distinct from and over-against the thinking of it is not to be gainsaid; my concept is the product of my thinking, and it is distinct from the reality it represents, "as subjective thinking it is a reflection external to the thing" (WL II, p. 236). In this sense to know thought is to know oneself as positing the object of one's thinking. But, it must not be allowed to stop there; it is only the beginning of a dialectical movement "through which its isolation and consequently the separation of the concept from the thing is superseded. As its truth there emerges the truth which is the objective concept" (ibid.). Thus, "in its objectivity the concept is the thing itself which is in and for itself" (ibid.)."20 It is to be noted, of course, that what is said here is merely asserted, not proved; it is "the concept of concept," what Hegel means. Now we must follow this out. No. 163. The process of development, then, begins with the subjective concept, that which the thinking of an individual subject produces, and we must see what this subjective form, merely as such, involves. It contains the three "moments" of universality, particularity, and singularity. It should be pointed out that, by calling these "moments," Hegel is serving notice that he considers them as dynamic elements in a process, each intelligible only as related to the others in a movement from one to the otherand back. "Universality" designates the character of sameness with itself that the concept retains in each of its instantiations (Bestimmtheit). "Particularity," then, is the generalized instantiation, in which the self-sameness of the universal remains undisturbed, whereas "singularity" is the ultimate instantiation, wherein are reflected both the determinacy of the particular
20. It should be noted that the operative term here is "Objektivität" not "Gegenständlichkeit." Gegenstand is "object" as given ("standing") over-against a subject; Objekt is "object" as that toward which a movement is directed. It contains overtones of purpose, e.g., "my object in doing this."
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and the self-sameness of the universal. The singular is the same as the "actual thing," but it is the conceptualized thing, posited in a universal way as simply this thing identical with itself. The actual thing, on the other hand, is the existing, the self-manifesting thing, which can "effect" (wirken)21 its self-manifestation as what it is. By the same token, the singularity of the concept is its "effectiveness," not like a "cause" which effects something other than itself, but as effectively moving toward its own completion. The singularity of the concept, clearly, should not be confused with the individuality of things, which is pinpointed only in judgment. Since each ''moment" of the concept is the whole concept, the singularity in question, which belongs to the subject of a judgment, is the concept posited as totality, that is, that which embraces all its determinations. Zusatz 1: To say that a concept is at once universal, particular, and singular is obviously a rather uncommon way to speak of concepts. A concept is usually looked upon as a universal, arrived at by a suppression of the particular differences which characterize its instantiations. This is the way, Hegel tells us, that understanding considers concepts, and it tends to make them empty shells. What he is talking about is a universal concept which particularizes itself, and only if we bear this in mind can we avoid the complaint that philosophical thinking deals in mere abstractions. The universal about which he is talking here, in its truly comprehensive signification, has its roots in Christianity's conception of God. The Greeks knew neither God nor man in their truly universal dimensions. Their gods were merely particular powers, and the only universal god for them was the Athenians' "unknown God";22 nor was "man" truly universal, since for the Greeks the barbarians were not men in the same sense the Greeks were. One might doubt what Hegel is saying here, but the point he is making is a familiar one: What is universally true of man, that is, based on the very "concept" of man (e.g., freedom), is not true of only some men, based on a particular reason (e.g., that they were Greek citizens), but of all men, simply because they are human. Thus, slavery is compatible with paganism but not with Christianity, according to which freedom is proper to the human in its infinite universality, because each and every human being is of equal value. There are slaves only when this is not recognized, when some human beings are considered not to be "persons." The difference, however, is not quantitative; the universal is not arrived at by counting noses but by realizing that the concept is true only if it is universally true and, thus, that what is necessarily true of the particular, or of the individual, is necessarily true only because it is universally true, and the universally true is the "concept"but
21. Not, however, by causally "affecting" what is other. 22. Acts 17:23.
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there would be no "concepts" in this sense, if there were no one "Concept" in this sense. Zusatz 2: Nowhere is it more clear than in Hegel's "doctrine of the concept" that Karl Löwith was correct in characterizing Hegel's Logic as "a constantly repeated defining of God."23 Even one who is thoroughly familiar with Hegel's cast of thought is in for a series of surprises as Hegel asserts again and again that human thinking simply makes no sense except against the backdrop of divine thought, that conceptual thinking is valid only because "the Concept" is necessarily valid. Here he very boldly states that "the logic of understanding'' is simply wrong when it speaks of "the emergence and construction of concepts." As a matter of fact, he tells us, we do not construct concepts, "nor is the concept to be considered as something which has come to be." It is true, of course, to say the concept is not simply "being" or a "given," that "mediation" is inseparable from it; but the mediation is not applied from outside, it belongs to the very "concept of concept"; it is its own mediation, its movement. It is not true to say that first there are objects (Gegenstände) which constitute the contents of our "representations," which we then, by the subjective activities of abstraction and combination of what is common to the representations, conceptualize. It is the concept which is truly first, and "things are what they are through the activity of the concepts that dwell in them." We see this most clearly in our religious consciousness, according to which we say, "God created the world out of nothing or, to put it another way, the world and finite things have proceeded from the fullness of divine thoughts and decrees." What is being said in this religious way expresses the philosophical truth that thought or, better still, "concept is infinite form, true creative activity, which requires no already present matter outside itself in order to realize itself." This is not to say, with regard to human thinking, that there is nothing out there; it is to say that, just as divine thought is creative of the conceptual structure of reality, so human thought is recreative of a conceptual structure which is antecedent to finite thinking. No. 164. The concept, then, is what is unconditionally (schlechthin) concrete, because the self-contained unity with itself which constitutes the intrinsic determinateness of singularity is precisely its relation to itself which constitutes universality. The "moments" of the conceptuniversality, particularity, and singularityeach of which is universal (see WL II, p. 246), constitute the dynamic structure of reality itself, which is real only as concrete totality. These "moments," then, cannot be separated from each other; theoretically each has validity independently of its contradictory, but
23. Karl Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzche, 2nd ed., (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1950), p. 39. Gustav Müller (Hegel: Denkgeschichte eines Lebendigen [Munich: Francke, 1959], p. 386) says much the same: "The concept of God is in and for itself the proof of God."
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the concept embraces the contradictions in a unity (shorthand for "the validity of one conditions the validity of the other"), so that only in their complementarity does any of them make sense at all. Universality, particularity, and singularity are, in fact, abstract terms, but they express what we understand by identity, difference, and the real in which identity and difference are united; universality remains identical with itself only to the extent that it includes concretely the particularities which it subsumes. By the same token, the particular is meaningful only to the extent that it is an instantiation of the universal and includes the individual within the scope of its own signification. The singular, too, makes sense only as a "subject" in which the particular (species) and the universal (genus) are actualized. In other words, the concept of any reality whatever is intelligible only if the "moments" which make it up are inseparable; the "clarity" of any concept depends on the degree to which its diverse moments are seen to be embraced in its totalizing unity. All of which sounds unnecessarily complicated, not to say abstract. In two senses this is correct: What Hegel is talking about has neither the so-called concreteness of the sensible, which is not the sphere of thought, nor does it have the complete concreteness of the all-embracing "idea." In one sense the concept of which we are speaking is still merely a "form" of subjective thinking; and yet it has no other content than itselfit does not "receive" a content from outside itself; it is not simply a form imposed on an alien content. It is, nevertheless, the form whereby whatever its content is is determined to concreteness. What this implies is that the subject which gives determinateness to its own content is the very source of concreteness and, therefore, is itself preeminently concrete, and this, in Hegel's thinking, is to say that the subject is spirit, wherein the initial total abstractness of mere "being" is progressively concretized. Thus, the concept, even though a subjective activity and, hence, distinguished from its own objectivity, is, nevertheless, the source of its own objectivity, since it does what the so-called ''concrete" outthere cannot do, that is, unify the diversified manifold of the "given." There are, it is true, determinate abstract concepts, like "man," "house," and "animal," but because they are only universalneither particularized nor singularizedthey are undeveloped and do not have the concreteness of the authentic concept. The determinateness of the concrete concept is precisely the negation of the indeterminateness of the abstract. Judgment No. 165. If, then, any concept whatsoever remains only at this formal, subjective stage of undifferentiated universality it will not be concrete; only if the universal is said of the singular, and this it is only in "judgment," the
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articulated concept, will the movement toward concreteness continue. It is in judgment that the "moments" of the conceptuniversality, particularity, and singularityare "posited" as meaningfully related to each other. To characterize concepts as "clear," "distinct" (Descartes), or ''adequate" (Spinoza), Hegel tells us in the note to this paragraph, is to engage in a "psychological" rather than a "logical" description of concepts. These terms refer to the manner in which the subject conceives. Dependence on "characteristics" such as these is, in fact, inimical to logic, since they refer to something the subject does in "subordinating" or "coordinating" concepts, not to what is proper to the concepts themselves. By the same token, to speak of "contrary or contradictory, affirmative or negative concepts" is to list characteristics which have their place in the sphere of "being" or of "essence," not in that of "concept," because they are not necessary to the very "concept of concept." Even to speak of "universal," "particular," or "singular" is not to designate "kinds" of concepts, whose distinction would be the result of a reflection "external" to the concepts themselves. Necessary distinctions must be "immanent" to the concepts, and these belong to "judgment," that is, the concept in the process of determining itself, which will not be complete until the grounds of its determinateness are manifest. No. 166. It is in the judgment that the "moments" of universality, particularity, and singularity are at once distinguished and uniteddistinction indicating the kind of unity, and unity designating the dialectical character of distinction. This, of course, runs contrary to the common view that the subject and the predicate of judgment are independent concepts linked by a thinking subject who says "is"as though the subject were a "thing" out-there and the predicate a universal determination "residing, so to speak, in my hand," which I then bring together in judging. According to this view, then, the determination which judging gives to the subject24 is subsequently taken to be a determination of the "object" (Gegenstand). Hegel's view, on the contrary, is illustrated by the etymology of the German word for judgment, Urteil, which he takes to be "original" (ur) "division" (Teilung), indicating that the concept divides itself in order to bring its "parts" (Teile) together in a more meaningful unity. Abstractly speaking the fundamental judgment can be expressed in the proposition, "The singular is the universal." It is not likely that anyone today would enunciate it that way, but we can see the point: the subject of the
24. It is unfortunate that, in both German and English, the term "subject" is ambiguous: it can mean either the subject who thinks (experiences) or the subject of which a predicate is said. It should be noted in addition that, in Hegel's use of the term, the two meanings come closer together: what is said of the subject is not simply said by another who is "subject" in the first sense; rather the "subject" in the second sense says the predicate of itselfmediately, of course, in the thinking subject.
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proposition is designated as an individual of which a universal predicate is said.25 In this way the abstract propositions, "the particular is the universal" and "the singular is the particular" can also make sense, but they are further steps in the self-determination of the judgment and can be expressed in the initial form, which is simply Hegel's rendition of "the subject is the predicate." The terminology may vary, but the "identification" characteristic of judgment remains the same. What he is trying to say is that the linking spoken in the "is'' indicates that it is the "nature" of the concept to express itself as identical with itself, that is, in breaking itself up it remains itself. In any event, what is in question is more than a thinking subject attributing a predicate to a subject, thus joining two different concepts. There are no two concepts which are first not joined and then joined by someone; the concept is what it is in the joining, in the judgment, that is, the articulated concept. An indication of this can be found in the very "form" of the judgment, in the "is" of predication. When I say "the rose is red," I do not mean, "I attribute red to the rose," no matter what peculiar philosophical or psychological predispositions I may bring to the question. We might, however, say "the rose expresses itself as red in my consciousness of it," which is equivalent to saying that the rose, which is much else besides being red, particularizes itself in my consciousness as red. "The concept is that which inhabits things themselves, whereby they are what they are, and to conceive an object (Gegenstand) means, thus, to be conscious of its concept." If we pass from this to judging the object, it is not our subjective activity which attaches a predicate to the object, "rather we consider the object under the determination posited through its concept," which of course, it expresses in our conceiving (begreifen). This last sentence is fraught with consequences. It means, at the very least, that all the particular determinations which can be said of an object are already contained in the concept of that object; our thinking lets them emerge and, thus, lets the concept emerge in its fullness, and its emerging is a process whose "moments" are "universality," "particularity," and "singularity." No. 167. Although it is true to say that judgment is a mental operation that takes place only in self-conscious thinking, this observation is of no particular interest to logic. Rather, logic is concerned with the objective status of judgments; not what they tell us about the activity of thinking subjects but what they tell us about the real of which they are said (or of which they speak). In this sense judgment is a structure of the relationships resident in the world of reality. Things, for example, can be looked on as singulars whose inner nature is universal, or they can be seen as singularizations of the universal. In either case, they contain universality and singularity as at once distinct and identified; that is, the singular is destined to univer
25. The caution noted in n. 24 is again to be emphasized.
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salize itself in thought, and the universal is destined to singularize itself in existence. Although, however, judgments find expression in propositions, not every proposition expresses a judgment in the logical sense, that is, as the unfolding of a concept. The statement of a single fact or event remains just that; it may involve the psychological operation called "judging," but it is not a judgment in any logically meaningful senseunless, of course, there is a question of doubt as to what is truly the case, and there is a logical process of seeking the correct predicate for a subject. To say, Hegel tells us, "a car is passing in the street" is not to express a logical judgment, unless there is a doubt that this is true, followed by a logical process of seeking to show that there are reasons for saying that it is truewhich, of course, involves universalizing. No. 168. Because, simply by itself, a judgment does not assert the grounds of its own affirmation, its point of view is that of "finitude"; the "things" it deals with are finite, and the context within which they are dealt with is finite. In them there is a union of the singular and the universal, else "thing" would be meaningless (cf. PdG, chap. II), but if the judgment does not develop beyond the stage of mere judgment it is an inadequate unfolding of the concept, whose moments of singularity and universality are still separate. As we shall see, this cannot be remedied short of the syllogism. No. 169. When the judgment is presented in its most abstract form, "the singular is the universal," the subject is presented as only itself, related to only itself, the so-called "concrete" as given. In this case, the predicate is the diametric opposite of the subject; it is universal, in the sense of abstractly indeterminate. The very presence of the copula "is," however, shows either that such a judgment is not in truth abstract, because the predicate has to contain the particular determinateness of the subject, or that it is not in truth a judgment, because it does not really say anything. Strictly speaking the subject has a determinate content only in its predicate; that is, without the predicate it is not a "thing" but only a ''name." For example, if we say "God is the most real of beings," the subject "God" without its predicate is not a reality but a name which has been given no meaning, and the predicate, "the most real of beings" is truly a predicate only if it has a determinate meaning. This we shall find to be very important: If a predicate, that is, of God, does not involve an advance in concreteness, it says nothing. To take this a step further, which Hegel does not do here, if I say "God is omniscient" without knowing what it means to say this of God, I am not saying anything. To say of a subject, then, that it is simply the singular, or of any predicate that it is simply universal, leaving out the mediation of one with the other through particularity, is to say nothing, to express no judgment, to express only an insignificant, not a significant relationship.
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No. 170. It must be said, then, that the logical relationship of subject and predicate in judgment is such that they are mutually determining: determining, hence distinct; mutually, hence identified in the unity of one concept. The subject is the self-identical foundation, by inhering in which the predicate has its ideal consistency and, in relation to the subject, is only one of the latter's many determinations and demands to be complemented by others. On the other hand, the predicate by itself is in its universality indifferent to this subject, which is only one of many of which it can be said (its determinate intelligibility). But a "determinate" content of the predicate effects the identification of subject and predicate. No. 171. Initially, then, subject, predicate, and determinate content are "posited" in judgment as related to each other and, therefore, as different from each other; relation presupposes difference. As contained in one and the same concept, however, the different are identified: the subject as "concrete totality" is not some undifferentiated manifold, it is this one, embracing both particular and universal in a unity which is the predicate. It is the copula, of course, which posits the identity of subject and predicate, initially again only as an abstract "is," to be concretized (filled) in the syllogism which justifies ("grounds") the linking. The syllogism, then, validates the ''is" of the judgment by moving from what is at first only the generality said of the sensible through "allness," "genus," and "species" to the fully developed "universality of concept," which contains the rationale of the whole movement. Still, simply to enumerate "kinds" of judgment on the basis of these distinctions is superficial; what needs to be shown is that the "kinds" of judgment follow necessarily from each other as the progressive determination of the concept. Thus judgment is "determinate concept." If we look back at the spheres of "being" and "essence," we can see these spheres reproduced as conceptual relations in the framework of judgment determining concepts. Zusatz: Some judgments, then, are logically on a higher plane than others, according to the manner in which they are rooted in their concept. In this sense the judgment, "the wind is blowing," which is little more than the mental record of an observation, is scarcely a significant judgment, whereas a well-thought-out moral or aesthetic judgment, demanding to be firmly rooted in the profound concepts of "good" or "beautiful," are on a much higher plane. We might add, which Hegel does not do here, that a judgment such as "the wind that is blowing is beneficial to the health of the inhabitants," would be on an intermediate logical plane, and "planes" could be multiplied. In our present context it is doubtful whether it would repay the effort to follow in detail all that Hegel has to say about the kinds of judgment in which the unity of concept is articulated. This does not mean that what he has to say in this connection is unimportant both for an understanding of
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Hegel's thought and for the light it throws on the structure of conceptual thinking in its relation to the structure of reality. In view of the limitations of space, however, its importance can be summed up in the realization that Hegel is spelling out the close interrelationships of conceptual determinations, the rational character of reality, be it "natural" or "spiritual," as the self-manifestation of transcendent thought, and the rationality of human thinking as the locus of reality's self-revealing rationality. It is important to be aware (1) that the "qualitative judgment," which simply states that a predicate is to be said of a subject, demands to be filled out in the "judgment of reflection," which focuses on the character of the interrelatedness of universality, particularity, and singularity in one subject (such that what is said of the subject is said because of what the subject is essentially); (2) that the judgment of reflection, in turn, will be fruitful, only if there are ''judgments of necessity" which reveal a necessary relationship of the "moments" of concept (where what the predicate says of the subject, the subject necessarily says of itself); and (3) that, finally, the "judgment of concept" reveals that "necessity" itself is meaningful only if rooted in the concept, the ground for whatever is said, ultimately in the all-unifying Concept whose objective counterpart is "absolute Idea." The entire discussion of judgments, however, finds its culmination in the rational grounding of judgments which is the syllogism. It is to the syllogism that we must turn, if we are to discover the "Why" of whatever can be said of reality, a "Why" which makes sense, only if thought is the ultimate foundation of reality itself. Syllogism No. 181. In Science of Logic (II, p. 308) Hegel had defined the syllogism as "the concept posited in its completeness, the rational." It makes the complete transition, in "reason" rather than in mere abstract "understanding," from the subjectivity of the mental act of judging to the objectivity of truth in the fullest sense, whose rationality transcends that of any subjective rational activity. The framework in which the syllogism is operative is not that of the isolated judgment, which as such does not go beyond "opinion," not even that of the effort on the part of the thinking subject to relate one isolated judgment to another. Rather, its framework is that of an integrated totality of judgments, ultimately the integrated totality of all thought and all reality, whose "objectivity" resides in its fullness. As Hegel puts it in the text we are considering here, "the syllogism is the rational, and it is the whole (alles) of the rational." This is a far cry from the conviction that syllogism is a rational "form" of thinking applied to a content with a view of "proving" it, which, if its content is not true is not rational at all. As Hegel sees it, the function of syllogism is to plumb the rationality of
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the content itself. It is still true, of course, that only if the thinking in question is rational will it perform its task. Rational thinking, then, "is none other than the (at first formally) posited real (reale) concept"the uncovering of the rationality of the real, not the imposition of rationality on the real. Syllogism, then, is "the essential ground of whatever is true." It is what we mean when we say "absolute,'' that is, that whatever really is is a syllogism. "All is concept," and "its expression (Dasein) is the distinction of its moments." Thus, the concept as universal particularizes itself in external reality, which, in turn, exists in singulars. Conversely, one can say, "what is actual is an individual (Eizelnes) which, through its multiplication in particulars, rises to universality and thus realizes its identity with itself," and the syllogism is the circular movement involved herethe universal emerging out of itself to rejoin itself, or the singular breaking itself up in order to reunite itself. This is the unfolding of the truth of boththe transition from subjectivity to objectivity. No. 182. The "syllogism of understanding," as Hegel calls it, is familiar enough to usand to all who have played logic games. A proposition, composed of subject and predicate, is to be proved true. The "understanding," standing-off, so to speak, sets to work constructing a syllogism which will prove it. It becomes a question of justifying what we say rather than of enabling a reality to tell us what is true of it. This, of course, the reality cannot do, unless it is in some sense a "subject""telling" is an activity which "subjects" perform. If, however, we are to comprehend what it can mean to say that an "object" is a "subject," we may have to take time out here and reread Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel is not about to deny, incidentally, that "syllogizing" is something we do when we think rationally. What he does say, however, is that if that is all "syllogizing" is, it is the work of abstract "understanding" only, not the work of concrete "reason." What is more, if the reality we are dealing with is the manifold of "finite things," understanding is the best we can do; we can classify and then draw conclusions on the basis of our classifications. Zusatz: At this point in an addition, presumably reporting Hegel's oral presentation, we find a remark which will be of utmost importance for our subsequent considerations. In terms of a "faculty" psychology, reason has been called the "faculty of syllogizing" and understanding, the "faculty of forming concepts." Apart from the superficiality of looking upon the mind as a composite of "faculties," we are told there is a serious danger that the concept will be looked upon as proper only to understanding, and any and every correct syllogism will be viewed as rational. Not only is it untrue that the concept is merely a form of understanding, but it is abstract understanding itself which has thus degraded what is the truly rational form. What mere formal logic calls syllogism is no more than a syllogism of understanding and in no way deserves to be called the rational form of thinking. It is on the basis of this
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understanding that a distinction is made between concepts of understanding and concepts of reason, as though there were two kinds of concepts or, worse still, as though the distinction simply touches what we do when we think. The result is, for example, that the concept of "freedom" is looked upon as simply the abstract contradictory of "necessity," whereas the truly "rational" concept of freedom contains in itself superseded necessity. Freedom without necessity is unintelligible, not merely in the sense that opposites throw light on each other, but in the more profound sense that truly rational freedom and truly rational necessity do not contradict each other: they are dialectically identified, one necessarily implying the other; to be genuinely free is to be rationally necessitated. By the same token, the definition which ''Deism" gives of God as a simply self-identified supreme Being is no more than a concept of understanding, whereas "the Christian religion, which knows God as triune, contains the rational concept of God." In detailing the kinds of syllogisms the mind "employs" in its thinking and in evaluating their "rational" standing Hegel characterizes them along the lines we have already seen in his treatment of the judgment. He enumerates, however, only three basic kinds, the "qualitative syllogism" (nos. 18389), the "syllogism of reflection" (no. 190), and the "syllogism of necessity" (nos. 19193). There is no syllogism of the concept, however, since the very "necessity" of the "syllogism of necessity" is its grounding in the concept which it makes explicit. Although Hegel devotes seven paragraphs to the "qualitative syllogism," it is of little interest to us here, because it is significant only for a purely formal logic, confining itself to a description of the correct ways in which subjective thinking can proceed from premises to conclusions. Because this syllogism describes only operations of understanding, because the realities to which it directs its attention are only finite realities, and because the relationships expressed in it are only "contingent," not "necessary," it is not, properly speaking a "rational" syllogism at all; so long as the process is merely what mind goes through, error is possible because mind can prove anything. The "syllogism of reflection" is, it is true, significant, because its force lies in what the mind finds to be "essential" in what it thinks. Because, however, Hegel sees its contribution primarily as an introduction to the truly rational "syllogism of necessity," he devotes little space to it (one paragraph). In the "syllogism of necessity," on the other hand, the whole force of logical thinking and of concrete rationality is concentrated. It is only here, in fact, that we can begin to s