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Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment Hinchman, Lewis P. University Press of Florida 0813007844 9780813007847 9780813019765 English Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,--1770-1831, Enlightenment, Political science--History. 1984 B2948.H525 1984eb 320/.01 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,--1770-1831, Enlightenment, Political science--History.
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Hegel's Critique of the Enlightenment Lewis P. Hinchman University Presses of Florida University of South Florida Press / Tampa University of Florida Press / Gainesville
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Hinchman, Lewis P. Hegel's critique of the enlightenment. "A University of Florida/University of South Florida book." Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17701831. 2. Enlightenment. 3. Political scienceHistory. I. Title. B2948.H525 1984 320´.01 84-7286 ISBN 0-8130-0784-4 University Presses of Florida is the central agency for scholarly publishing of the State of Florida's university system. Its offices are located at 15 NW 15th Street, Gainesville, FL 32603. Works published by University Presses of Florida are evaluated and selected for publication by a faculty editorial committee of any one of Florida's nine public universities: Florida A&M University (Tallahassee), Florida Atlantic University (Boca Raton), Florida International University (Miami), Florida State University (Tallahassee), University of Central Florida (Orlando), University of Florida (Gainesville), University of North Florida (Jacksonville), University of South Florida (Tampa), University of West Florida (Pensacola). Copyright © 1984 by the Board of Regents of the State of Florida Printed in the U.S.A. on acid-free paper
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To my wife, Sandra
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Contents
Preface A Note on Editions Abbreviations Introduction 1. Being and Thinking from Descartes to Schelling
Descartes and Hume,
Kant,
Fichte,
Schelling and Spinoza, 2. Hegel's Speculative Philosophy
The Deficiencies of Schelling's Absolute,
The "I" and the Concept,
Toward a Systematic Science,
Spirit, 3. The Metaphysics of Experience
Experience, Understanding, and Reflection,
The Reductionism of Empiricist Metaphysics,
Empiricism Comprehended,
ix xiii xv 1 10 11
16
26
37
41 42
44
48
63
71 73
75
84
4. Political Power and Personal Fragmentation: The Culture of Early Modern Europe
97
The Demise of Ethical Life,
104
The Modern State and the "Denaturing" of Man,
115
The Fragmentation of the Self: "Rameau's Nephew,"
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5. Enlightenment, Faith, and Revolution
The Enlightenment and Faith,
The "Positive Program" of the Enlightenment,
The French Revolution, 6. The German Enlightenment: From Absolute Freedom to Pure Subjectivity
The Moral World View in Kant,
Conscience,
The Beautiful Soul, 7. The Transcendence of Liberalism: Speculative Foundations of the Modern State
The Origin and Meaning of Right,
Abstract Right,
Morality, 8. Ethical Life
Ethical Life in Its Speculative and Historical Significance,
The Family,
Civil Society,
The State, 9. Hegel and the Enlightenment: The Debate in Contemporary Perspective
The Philosophy of Self-Consciousness and Its Critics,
122 124
134
141
155 156
169
175
185 187
202
209
216 217
219
221
232
249 250
253
Culture and Personality in an Enlightened Age,
The Origins of Human Rights and the Struggle for Recognition,
255
258
Hegel and the "Hamiltonian" State, Notes
265
Selected Bibliography
285
Index
291
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Preface Although this book concerns a problem in the history of political philosophyHegel's relationship to the Enlightenmentit actually grew out of my aspiration to understand more clearly the contemporary political and philosophical situation. I first discovered Hegel when I was a visiting student in Germany during the late 1960s, a time of intense political crisis and, for many of us, of bitter disappointments. Initially drawn to Hegel's works merely because of their influence on Marx, I gradually came to suspect that Hegel might still shed some light on our modern predicament in his own right, and perhaps just in those matters where Marx did not see so clearly. Like the men and women of my own generation, Hegel reached maturity in a revolutionary age when, so it seemed to sanguine souls, the old order was tottering. In his time and ours, human beings appeared finally to be on the verge of a breakthrough toward greater freedom and a deeper sense of community. Moreover, the unsettled times of the late eighteenth century spawned a bewildering assortment of movements, philosophies, protests, and personal credos (again reminiscent of the sixties and seventies): the Enlightenment itself and the radical political movements affected by it in diverse ways, move-
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ments of romantic nostalgia and poetic renewal, religious awakenings and reactionary coteries, ideologies of egoistic self-affirmation as well as old-fashioned cynicism. But, again like my generation, Hegel and his age had to come to terms with the disillusionment of seeing those movements of "liberation" either peter out, turn into tyrannical or obscurantist cliques, or unleash the very forces they had fought against. It is easy to see why Hegel mistrusted the venerable assumption that each entity is selfidentical and not another thing. He had too many experiences of movements and ideas turning out to be the very opposite of what their proponents had believed and expected them to be. The great lesson, if that is the right word, that one learns from Hegel is humility and self-criticism. One can readily discern, in his analyses of the "fragmented egos" and "beautiful souls" of his age, implicit criticisms of the various ideologies that have won adherents in our own. He makes us sensitive to the one-sidedness and blindness of these world-views, their tendency to inspire us to act on a flawed understanding of man and his situation. But more important, Hegel helps us see the shortcomings of the Enlightenment (and perhaps through it, of modern "enlightened'' positions such as mainstream social science and analytic philosophy). He encourages us to believe that philosophers have the ability, and indeed the responsibility, to bring their critical acumen to bear on the issues and ideologies that dominate the "consciousness" of ordinary people, to encourage rational thought and self-reflection. My approach to Hegel, then, is designed to illuminate those aspects of his thought which seem the most insightful, thought-provoking, and relevant for our time. Although I have not been uncritical of Hegel, I have most often been guided by his maxim that it is easier to find fault with something than to show its positive and fruitful side. The single exception to this rule of thumb is in chapter eight, where I take issue with Hegel over what seems to me a serious inconsistency in his entire political thought. Let me acknowledge the influence and help of several people who contributed more than they realize to the completion of this book. First, I am grateful to the members of my dissertation committee at CornellWerner Dannhauser (my chairman), Eldon Eisenach, and Myron Rushfor their patience and many helpful contributions when I first embarked on this project and for their encouragement thereafter. Allen Wood, then of Cornell's Philosophy Department, aided me considerably in understanding the Phenomenology of Mind
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and Philosophy of Right in seminars he gave on those works. I would further like to emphasize my special indebtedness to two men I have never met but whose books assisted me in innumerable ways: Charles Taylor, author of Hegel, and Stanley Rosen, author of G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom. Professor Taylor and Paul Eisenberg of Indiana University read an earlier draft of this manuscript carefully and made many valuable suggestions toward improving it. Finally, I should say a word of appreciation to some very good friendsMichael Votichenko, Baylor Johnson, and Thomas Meyerfor our many philosophical discussions which stimulated my interest in this project to begin with and helped to generate the ideas and criticisms necessary to finish it. In a different category altogether, I want to thank my wife, Sandra, even though words fail to convey what her help has meant to me. Without the hundreds of hours she put into editing and revising this manuscript it could never have been completed. Indeed, the book is really a joint effort, to which she contributed fully as much as I did.
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A Note on Editions For the sake of consistency, I have done virtually all of the translations of passages from German-language works cited in this book. Wherever possible I have also noted parenthetically in the footnotes the page number (and, if appropriate, the paragraph) of the more familiar English translations in which these passages may be found. Exceptions are those cases in which material available in the German text does not appear in the English version. The most important instance of an exception is the third volume of Hegel's Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, usually called the Philosophy of Mind in English. The Zusätze, notes taken by Hegel's students from his lectures, are included in my German edition but not in Wallace's translation. In two cases I have had to cite English translations of books written in German but not available here in the original. One is Hegel's Jena lectures on Realphilosophie, and the other is the text (though not the introduction) of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre (Science of Knowledge). In these cases references will be made only to the English edition listed in the bibliography.
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Foreign words are italicized for the first usage and appear in roman type thereafter. Finally, the reader should note that the Haldane translation of Hegel's lectures on the History of Philosophy does not always correspond, either in content or in the length of the volumes, to the German edition I used. Whenever a passage from one volume of the German work appears in a different volume of the English translation, this discrepancy is pointed out in the footnotes. Otherwise, the reader may assume that the volume number is the same for both editions.
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Abbreviations Works by Hegel "Differenzschrift"
"Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie"
Einl. G. Phil.
Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie
Enz. 1
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, vol. 1 (Logik)
Enz. 3
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, vol. 3 (Philosophie des Geistes)
G. Phil.
Geschichte der Philosophie
"G. W."
"Glauben und Wissen"
Logik
Wissenschaft der Logik
"Naturrecht"
"Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts"
P. Gesch.
Philosophie der Geschichte
Ph. G.
Phänomenologie des Geistes
P. R.
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse
Realphilosophie
Hegel's Social Philosophy in the Jena Realphilosophie
"Skeptizismus"
"Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie"
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Works by Fichte Wiss. Ein.
Erste und Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre
Sci. Knowl.
Science of Knowledge
Voc. Man
Vocation of Man
Works by Kant K. p. V.
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft
K. r. V.
Kritik der reinen Vernunft
Works by Schelling "Darstellung" "Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie" "Bruno"
"Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge. Ein Gespräch."
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Introduction What impels human beings to start thinking philosophically? According to Hegel, they do so because the affective bonds of their polities have begun to unravel. When the "power of unification disappears from the life of man," 1 political or public existence no longer satisfies him. The pleasures of what Hannah Arendt liked to call "public freedom" yield to the more esoteric attraction of the vita contemplativa. Philosophy therefore bespeaks a "rupture in the actual world . . . the demise of a real world."2 It is the symptom of and consolation for the decline of an integral ''ethical life" or Sittlichkeit. But while philosophy in Hegel's sense (here he is thinking especially of Socrates and Plato) involves a loss of something very valuable, it allows us to gain something even more precious. To think philosophically, one must disentangle the self, the "I," from the world. The individual who philosophizes begins to regard himself as separate from and independent of the web of natural and human relationships which had hitherto circumscribed him and yet made him an integral part of the political whole.3 Philosophy thus marks the emancipation of human selfconsciousness from all particularistic norms and perspectives.
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If we isolated only this second, emancipatory aspect of philosophy, it would be identical to "enlightenment" in its broadest meaning. While Hegel usually writes of the Enlightenment, referring to the eighteenth-century movement we are familiar with, he sometimes mentions an ancient Enlightenment as well. 4 He stretches the connotation of the word because he regards its core content as applicable whenever the self emerges as a distinct element in human history. In this sense, the modern Enlightenment epitomizes and completes a process of enlightenment which began several millennia ago. Understood in this way, enlightenment contains both cognitive and moral-political dimensions. Or rather, these are merely different features of the very same phenomenon. When I abstract from specific circumstances, isolating my self or my ego from everything else, I simultaneously become an arbiter of the moral-political milieu I left behind. On this point such diverse "enlightened" positions as ancient sophism, Humean skepticism and Kantian moral philosophy all converge. There is nothing absolute about traditional standards of conduct. Rather they must be subjected to scrutiny by the self, now become a sort of absolute in its own right. To position myself "outside" a moralpolitical community entails also that I place myself "above'' it, requiring it to justify its claims on me before the bar of standards that I thereby proclaim superior to or perhaps more "natural" than those of the actual world. Even if I subsequently find a justification for existing laws, gods, and institutions, these will henceforth derive their validity from principles that I have established. And what I have established, I can also change. Enlightenment understood as the isolation of self-conscious individuality lays the foundations for political freedom in the modern sense. Where the Greek citizen exercised an ethical or "beautiful" freedom that is impossible in modern states (cf. chapters 5 and 8), he could only do so as a Spartan or Athenian, not as a human being possessed of inalienable rights. By dissolving the bonds of specific political communities, enlightened self-consciousness promotes the conception of man as a universal being. He can now base his claim to rights and human dignity on "natural" grounds rather than on the traditional order of a given society: "political freedom, freedom within the state, commences when the individual feels himself to be an individual, when the subject knows himself to be such in his universality, or when the consciousness of personalitythe consciousness of having an inherently infinite worthcomes to the fore."5 However, enlightenment makes this kind of freedom possible only
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at the cost of rendering it empty and in a way meaningless. Thought, the very power which enabled the individual to conceive of himself as an individual, simultaneously devalues the codes of conduct that tradition had passed down as unquestioned goods: "All that we recognize as right or duty can be shown by thought to be nugatory, limited, and by no means absolute." 6 Although he is free, the individual now lacks any concrete, certain principles of action. Moreover, Hegel interprets the alienation between enlightened self-consciousness and the ethical life of a community as a rift between human and divine spirit: "as subjective freedom arises and man descends from external actuality into his spirit, there emerges a reflective opposition that contains within itself the negation of actuality. Specifically, this withdrawal from the present already constitutes an opposition of which one aspect is God or the divine and the other is the subject in his particularity."7 The withdrawal from the present (Gegenwart) of a living ethical community is simultaneously withdrawal from the presence of the divine in human affairs. If philosophy consisted only in this act of separation or abstraction of oneself from an ethical (sittlich) or politicalreligious whole, then philosophy would be essentially identical to enlightenment. But for Hegel true philosophy differentiates itself from enlightenment precisely in attempting to reconstruct, in thought, the wholeness of life that enlightenment has undermined: "Philosophy is . . . the reconciliation of the corruption initiated by thought; this reconciliation occurs in the ideal world, in the world of spirit [Geist] to which man flees when the earthly world no longer satisfies him . . . . But this reconciliation concerns only the world of thought, not the earthly world."8 The paradoxes of enlightenment take us to the heart of Hegel's philosophical enterprise. Philosophy must try to restore, albeit only on an intellectual plane, a sense of totality and completeness to human life. To accomplish this, Hegel must show us that the isolated self of enlightenment is an untenable construct, both theoretically and practically. He must demonstrate that a true comprehension of the self of enlightenment will cause us to redefine our entire notion of selfhood. Hegel expects we will come to realize that our identity diffuses beyond our immediate selfconsciousness as discrete individuals toward the totality of existence. The philosopher in Hegel's sense cannot truly think himself without including in that thought, at least by implication, the whole of nature and culture. In this way, philosophy provides a totality-in-thought to replace the pre-enlightened totality of naïve natural existence symbolized by personal childhood and also
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by the ancient polis, man's collective childhood. As Hegel expresses it in one of his most moving passages: Thinking is spirit's entry into itself, and thereby it makes into an object what it is qua intuitive, collects itself within itself and thus separates itself from itself. This separation is . . . the first condition and moment of self-consciousness from whose self-collecting as free thought alone the development of the universe in thought, i.e., philosophy, can emerge. This is precisely what constitutes the infinite labor of spirit, to withdraw into the night and loneliness of self-consciousness from its immediate existence, its happy, natural life, and to reconstruct in thought the actuality and intuition it had separated from itself solely by virtue of its own strength and power. 9 Once the "I" has been extricated from the matrix of experience as a distinct "subject" confronting an object, the problems of epistemology become especially urgent. It is only a short step from positing the subject-object dichotomy to doubting whether we can ever know the object as it truly is. Hegel credits Descartes with having revolutionized philosophy by addressing the problem of knowledge on this abstract plane. But he sees that Descartes' philosophy is only the tip of an iceberg. The Frenchman gave only abstract, formal expression to the modern "revolution of subjectivity" which had been proceeding apace in every sphere of life. Therefore, to Hegel, "Cartesian dualism" meant not just a philosophical doctrine but an entire worldview which had to be combatted on all levels: Every aspect of living culture as well as philosophy should have to seek antidotes both to Cartesian philosophy, which, in philosophical form, has given expression to the universal, rampant dualism in the culture of the recent world, and to the universal culture of which it is an expression. The noisy political and religious revolutions as well as the quieter transformations of man's public life are generally only variegated façades of this dualism, which is the demise of all the old ways of life.10 What disturbed Hegel especially about Descartes' philosophy (as well as Kant's) was its willingness to put the seal of necessity and irrevocability on the estrangement of the self from the world. To Hegel, the rigid separation of mind (res cogitans) and world (res extensa) was a phenomenon typical only of modernity. He saw no reason to suppose that this modern experience of extreme alienation represented the
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final condition of all mankind. Still, one could not escape dualism by regressing to more naïve stages of metaphysics (e.g., the Greek). Somehow, the inner logic of the Cartesian position would have to be represented as culminating in its own negation. In effect, this was the philosophical task Hegel set for himself, and the one that informs all his writings. From this perspective, we can see why all aspects of philosophy are so tightly connected for Hegel. Aesthetic, religious, political and moral issues point toward the more abstract problems of epistemology. And epistemology, as we shall see shortly, is the specifically modern way of dealing with ontological questions. On the other hand, the abstract principles of Hegel's Logic do not come into sharp focus until we see them fleshed out in his other works. Logic and history, metaphysics and politics do not just complement each other in Hegel's writings; they are absolutely inseparable. And no other concept shows this more clearly than that of enlightenment. A complete picture of Hegel's critique of the modern Enlightenment will thus take us from the most abstract realms of logic to a consideration of the French Revolution and the modern state. But to understand Hegel in all these endeavors, we must try to grasp the underlying continuity of his thought, the recurrent pattern which makes it uniquely "Hegelian." The key to such an understanding, I believe, lies in what Hegel calls "the concept." Of course, the concept is not the only crucial term in Hegel's discourse. We also need to know what Hegel means by mind or spirit (Geist), the idea, "subject," and many more. But all these terms are simply variations on a theme. "The concept" lies at the bottom of them all. Since the first two chapters of this study are devoted to explaining Hegel's speculative philosophy, and hence the concept, I will not try to anticipate those arguments here. But I will try to show what Hegel wishes to accomplish and why his project is so important. Let us return for a moment to Cartesian dualism. According to Descartes, if we doubt (i.e., abstract from) the content of all our experience, we still retain the intuition of an "I think" from which no further abstraction can be made. We are immediately certain of its existence because to deny it would require an "I" to do the denying, thereby involving us in self-contradiction. What is more, we do not know of the res cogitans by means of discursive or syllogistic thinking. We do not say: All beings that think, are; I think; therefore, I am. Rather, thinking and being are inextricably linked without reference to any major premise designating "all beings" of a class. The comple-
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ment of res cogitans is "extended being," or res extensa, which means simply all the world (including our own bodies) which is not-"I" and which therefore cannot be known directly and immediately by introspection. I cannot doubt that I am, but I can doubt that everything else is. The effect of Descartes' dualism is a reduction of man and his world to their most abstract determinations. If I ask what I am, the only answer seems to be that I am an empty res cogitans, certain of my own existence but of nothing else. Likewise, my world is reduced to nothing but extension, or, to use Hobbes' phrase, "matter in motion," cognizable in terms of mechanical causation. More exactly, if I wish to know what I am there are really two answers available. I am first that which I know myself to be by abstraction from everything else, a res cogitans. But since the res cogitans is an empty "I," the search for a more concrete answer leads me to consider what Descartes called the "passions of the soul" or the mechanics of my own motivations. We thus find ourselves to be dual beings: on the one hand, detached observers, res cogitans, or the contentless "I think" which forms the subject in every case of knowing; and on the other hand, appetitive machines explicable in terms of cause and effect or res extensa. The purpose of the knowledge we acquire of extended beings is, as Descartes frankly expressed it, to render ourselves ''the masters and possessors of nature." 11 Cartesian dualism illuminates the strange paradox of self-knowledge as it is conceived throughout the modern Enlightenment. The "I" is accorded the remarkable power to abstract from everything except itself, to dissolve all its bonds to the world and isolate itself as self-certainty, the only certainty. Yet this certainty remains empty. To arrive at any concrete knowledge of myself, I must turn my attention away from myself and toward the world (which includes my empirical existence). But the world or res extensa has already been defined as precisely not what I am. Thus, strictly speaking, knowledge of myself as a part of extended substance is not self-knowledge at all, but rather knowledge of the not-"I." One solution to this puzzle would be to deny the reality of the "I" and hence of self-knowledge as distinct from the knowledge of nature. This is the course Hume and many other Enlightenment philosophers chose to pursue. It is also, I think, implicit in modern social science. On this theory, we are at bottom "bundles of perceptions"; there is no unifying force in consciousness distinct from our impressions or thoughts. So it follows that self-knowledge, if it is to make any
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sense, must mean knowledge of man insofar as his behavior (whether individual or collective) follows the same predictable patterns or laws that we observe to have force in nature. The schema or paradigm used to explain human behavior may be crude or highly complex. But all, from simple attraction-aversion psychologies to the subtle and intricate "systems theories" of today, rest on the same assumption: that self-knowledge proceeds by indirection. We first construct a paradigm based upon apparently sound knowledge of nature; in other words, we begin with what we are not; we go outside ourselves. Then, subsequently, we return to ourselves with an allegedly appropriate model in hand. Drawing on the Kantian tradition (and on Descartes himself), Hegel inverts the typical procedure employed by the Enlightenmentand its offspring, modern scienceto acquire knowledge of oneself. Instead of approaching selfknowledge by means of behavior models elicited from the external, natural world or res extensa, Hegel suggests that self-knowledge, knowledge of the "I," provides us with a paradigm for which we find approximations in external reality. Further, those approximations extend from the prebiological natural sphere, which is still mainly mechanical, to the phenomena of life, human interaction, and above all politics and the creations of "absolute spirit," art, philosophy, and religion. In these latter, the model of knowledge, the "I," finds complete expression and selftransparency. From a Hegelian perspective, those phenomena which were least amenable to comprehension by the prototypes of the Enlightenment become the most clearly and easily understood. At the same time, what is sheerly mechanical or automatic becomes for Hegel the least comprehensible because it least resembles the special character of self-knowledge. In Hegel's terms, we know most completely that in which we can "find ourselves." Clearly, this brief outline of Hegel's approach to the problem of self-knowledge makes sense only if we suppose that the mind can indeed have knowledge of itself, and furthermore that such self-knowledge would furnish a model through which reality could be made comprehensible. Hegel's claim is that his speculative philosophy has found a way to grasp the mind's knowledge of itself not just as an object, but also as a subject (or, more exactly, as subject and object at the same time). What is more, the structure of the "I" defines the intelligibility of all experience. So there is no longer any point in hanging on to the rigid Cartesian dichotomy of res cogitans and res extensa. The concept is present both subjectively and objectively; in-
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deed, it is the ground of the distinction between subject and object. The concept, which will be examined in chapter 2, is Hegel's great discovery. Even if he had never written a line about history, Hegel's discovery of the concept would have assured him of a place in the first rank of philosophers. The implications of Hegel's new theory are far-reaching and constitute the subject matter of his various works. But I would like to concentrate on just those implications of his discovery which bear on the issues clustered around the modern Enlightenment, particularly those of a political character. The Enlightenment's ambiguous posture toward the self and self-knowledge shows up especially clearly in liberal political philosophy. By deriving political authority from a contract among individuals, or from utility, liberals put political philosophy on a new footing. Implicit in their argument is the tenet that we need only obey an authority which we ourselves have constituted. At first glance, this doctrine seems like a celebration of the autonomy of the individual against oppressive, irrational traditions. And in a sense it is. Yet the liberals' individualist, critical premises are conjoined to a theory of human personality which seems to make autonomy meaningless or valueless. Their attack on tradition usually involved the assertion (or veiled suggestion) that existing institutions are "unnatural." To real historical development they contrasted an image of how men would think and act if the pernicious influence of artificial institutions had never been present, or if it could be removed. By thinking away all these supposedly artificial distortions of natural behavior, they arrive at a reductionist, mechanical image of human thought and action. Man appears as a machine or a passionate animal set in motion (aversion or desire) by sense impressions received from without. Like nature generally, man may no longer be thought of as an entelechy. Thus from Hobbes to Helvétius, there can be no summum bonum. Man is instead doomed to an endless striving for satisfaction, a chain of desire-gratification-renewed desire which would cease only in death. The "sunlit" side of the Enlightenmentits emphasis on reason and autonomy and its opposition to religious and political tyrannywas inseparable from its dark side, gloomy acquiescence in the knowledge that I am a mere machine propelled onward by inscrutable drives toward an ever-receding fata morgana of satisfaction. In political-philosophical terms, we could regard Hegel's project as the quest to preserve and enhance the "human rights" tradition of the Enlightenment while detaching it from what he saw as its crudely in-
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adequate image of man. For Hegel, we are what we know ourselves to be. If our self-knowledge culminates in a vision of mechanical necessity dominating all nature (ourselves included), we will have failed to become what potentially we could be: genuinely free beings. Our political liberty will be built on a sort of personal unfreedom, our rational society on individual irrationality. To accomplish his intellectual task, Hegel will have to reshape our thinking about ourselves from the ground up. He must show us that the atomized, desiring self depicted by the Enlightenment is a necessary and yet incomplete representation of man in the modern world. He must explain how a more careful examination of our experience will reveal to us that the "natural" man depicted by liberal theorists is actually the creature of the historical collectivity to which he belongs. Everything about us that is really human, Hegel will argue, arises out of our interaction with society and the state. And it is precisely our individuality, our consciousness of ourselves as separate, isolated beings, which will appear to be the most perfectly "social" and "mediated" self-conception. In this manner, Hegel will try to portray the starting point of the Enlightenment's social philosophy as the result of a long process of civilization and spiritual development. Or, to return to our original theme, Hegel will show that the Cartesian cogito represents an artificially arrested, frozen movement of thought, whether considered in its logical, metaphysical manifestation or in its political guise as "natural" man negating all tradition and positing himself as the point of departure for political philosophy.
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1 Being and Thinking from Descartes to Schelling Hegels' speculative philosophy is notoriously difficult. At first one is inclined to blame its obscurity on Hegel's terminology since all his crucial concepts are defined by reference to one another. But closer inspection usually convinces the reader that Hegel's terminology is in fact very well suited to convey the thoughts which stand behind it. The real problem in interpreting Hegel's work is less semantic than it is conceptual. He forces us to think in new ways that often defy expression in the language of common sense or even of traditional philosophy. Hegel's system can best be made accessible by examining his central contention: that the "I," the structure of selfconsciousness, was the ultimate paradigm for the structure of all reality. Of course, not all of reality would display the presence of this "I"-paradigm in equal measure or with equal clarity. Still, the "I" was to Hegel the horizon of intelligibility for all things in much the same way that geometry or mechanism was for Hobbes and entelechy for Aristotle. All his important concepts can be traced back to it. For instance, he notes that spirit is "I, that is we, and we that is I"; and also that "self-consciousness [is the] concept of spirit.'' 1 Similarly, he asserts that "I is the pure concept
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itself which qua concept has achieved empirical existence." 2 And since the absolute idea is the "rational concept,"3 it too is indirectly grounded in self-consciousness. However, by identifying the "I" as the paradigm animating Hegel's speculative philosophy, one has exposed a host of new problems. At first glance, the notion that the "I" could be a model for all reality seems puzzling and even nonsensical. How can something so apparently subjective and personal be transformed into the essence of objective reality? In fact, one might be tempted to ask whether the "I" exists at all, whether it is not a pseudo-entity that language has foisted on us and our philosophers. To resolve these doubts we must form a distinct idea of what Hegel means by the "I." This task in turn is rendered far easier if we can isolate certain pivotal figures in the history of philosophy whose theories of self-consciousness point toward Hegel's own position. Each of the thinkers considered in this chapterDescartes, Hume, Kant, Fichte, and Schellinghad a profound influence on his immediate successor and each contributed decisively to a rethinking of the problem of the "I" and its relation to the world. By studying them, we can move toward Hegel's speculative philosophy in a series of easily negotiated steps. Moreover, when we examine thinkers such as Kant and Fichte we will in a way be studying Hegel himself. Hegel unfailingly argued that "truth . . . is one . . . and so only one philosophy can be the true one."4 The "one philosophy" to which Hegel refers is not his own as distinct from others, but rather the whole of philosophic thought, which constitutes a many-faceted though still unitary truth. Indeed perhaps one of Hegel's most significant contributions to philosophy was his demonstration that it could be regarded as a whole instead of a disconnected series of contradictory opinions. Since the thinkers included in this chapter have all played important parts in the articulation of what Hegel considered this one true philosophy, it is fair to say that they do not only "lead up to'' Hegel's own view but in fact form an essential constituent element in it: "The study of the history of philosophy [is the] study of philosophy itself."5 Descartes and Hume In the History of Philosophy, Hegel remarks that the philosophy of the modern age begins with the standpoint which the older philosophers had struggled to attain: actual self-consciousness. By this he means that modern philosophers try not only to analyze the objects of knowl-
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edge but also to include the philosopher himself in their conception of true knowledge. The modern perspective ushers in a deep distinction between thinking and being, the Cartesian dualism that philosophy must attempt to reconcile: "the interest is then solely to reconcile this opposition, to comprehend reconciliation in its highest form of existence, i.e., in the abstract opposition of thinking and being. Their reconciliation must be apprehended. The interest of all philosophies from that time forward has been to attain this unity." 6 Because modern philosophy reaches the "standpoint of absolute consciousness" and thinks the thinker as an integral part of any knowledge, it inevitably raises the question of how, or whether, we can acquire any ''objective" knowledge. Hegel argues that the Greeks did not conceive of the wholly abstract opposition of being and thinking: "Spirit and nature, thinking and being are the two infinite aspects of the idea. The idea can only truly emerge when its aspects have been apprehended, each for itself, in their abstraction and totality. Plato conceived them as the bond, as limiting and infinite, as one and many, but not as thinking and being."7 According to Hegel, Descartes initiates the philosophy of the modern world by recognizing that "self-consciousness is an essential moment of the true."8 When Descartes urges us, as part of his new method, to begin by doubting everything, he is by no means trying to revive skepticism. The real significance of Descartes' principle is that it turns thinking into an "absolute beginning."9 It expresses the essential character of the Enlightenment, the conviction that "man must see for himself, by virtue of his own thinking, whatever is to be established as authoritative and valid in the world."10 To Hegel, Cartesian radical doubt is important because it permits thinking to abstract from all content and to arrive at the notion of a pure "I." The aspect of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum which especially attracts Hegel's attention is the unity, within the "I," of being and thinking. Indeed, Hegel calls the cogito ergo sum the "principle about which revolves the whole interest of modern philosophy."11 In Descartes' own self-understanding, the cogito argument simply reveals the existence of one "fact" which I cannot doubt. My existence is absolutely certain because if I doubt it, I cannot doubt that I doubt; the "I" which does the doubting apparently cannot itself be an object of doubt without a self-contradiction. But when Hegel reconstructs Descartes' argument, it looks somewhat different: "Descartes is seeking something certain and true in itself. This would be neither simply
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true, like the object of faith without knowledge, nor would it be the sensuous or even skeptical certainty which lacks truth." 12 p}Descartes' explicit version of the ontological proof merely reiterates, in a somewhat misleading way, the premise which he introduced apropos of the "I": "There is given here, in the form of God, no other presentation [Vorstellung] but that of cogito, ergo sum, . . . being and thinking inseparably connected."13 The ''I" is a sort of being the existence of which requires only that it be thought. Furthermore, an "I" that could not be an object of thought would simply not exist at all. It would be an absurdity. Hegel is suggesting in these lines a radical hypothesis which will be developed more fully later: If we comprehend God's nature, we shall find it to be like that of selfconsciousness, provided we understand correctly what the latter is. We must discern the underlying common structure of both God and the "I" in the paradoxical characteristic of self-positing, the unity of "to be" and "to be thought": "The determination of being is in my own 'I'; this connection itself is primary. Thinking as being and being as thinking, that is my certainty, 'I'. . . . What is inseparable is nevertheless different: but identity is not endangered by this difference [Verschiedenheit], they are a unity."14 But Descartes does not conclude from the identity of thinking and being in consciousness that thinking and being are identical per se. He lapses into the dualism decried by Hegel, because he makes the cogito a merely subjective principle confronted by a world (being) that cannot be known with the immediate certainty given to self-knowledge. To rephrase this idea in Hegel's terms, Descartes has hit upon "certainty itself" (the "I"), since certainty is only a predicate of all other judgments while it is the very essence of the "I."15 But he has not sufficiently developed his insight to arrive at what Hegel calls truth (Wahrheit), that is, a differentiated content which could be an object of knowledge. Although Descartes sees that self-consciousness is a vital part of truth, he has not yet conceived the principle, first encountered in Kant's philosophy, that all knowledge of being is in some sense self-knowledge. Descartes has thus uncovered "the most interesting idea of modern times"16 without apprehending the full import of his discovery. Because Descartes understands the cogito as only a subjective principle, knowledge of objective reality becomes problematic. God alone, here introduced as a sort of deus ex machina, can guarantee the correctness of our knowledge of the external world (including our own
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bodies) because it is contrary to His nature to deceive us. In other words, God secures the correspondence of our perceptions and concepts to the world of res extensa of which we lack immediate certainty. To this formulation, Hegel objects that God is taken as a third thing outside of, and different from, res cogitans and res extensa which, as the terms indicate, are themselves understood merely as things. He criticizes the form of Descartes' argument in which there are "two things, thinking [soul] and body . . . [and] God now appears as a third thing outside of both, not as the concept of unity, nor are both members themselves the concept." 17 Descartes' metaphysics, constructed in terms of separated "things" linked in an inexplicable way, remains open to serious criticism from empiricists like Hume. Hume's objection has the following form" "There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. . . . "Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain'd."18 Hume is clearly denying that the knowledge we believe we have of a self corresponds to any actual entity. But it is important to take note of his terminology. He maintains that we have no idea of a self which is continually in existence, perfectly identical and simple (i.e., uncompounded). These are among the predicates which rationalist metaphysicians ascribed to the self as a means to draw conclusions about the immateriality and immortality of the soul. Hume's presentation continues: From what impression cou'd this idea [of the self] be deriv'd? . . . It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives. . . . But there is no impression constant and invariable. For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe any thing but the perception. . . . I
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may venture to affirm of . . . mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions. 19 Hume's argument is thus an obvious, practically inescapable conclusion of a consistent empiricism. Our ideas all arise from sense impressions or relations among them. But there is no single impression corresponding to the "I"; rather, introspection discloses to us a ceaseless flux of differing perceptions. Hence we ourselves are nothing but a flux, "a bundle or collection of differing perceptions." Hume's position is valid only if one takes the self to refer to a thing, res cogitans. And that is not the view held by German idealism. Hume's arguments are relevant to Descartes' conception of the "I," but not to Hegel's. To demonstrate this point, let us analyze Hume's contention more carefully. He proposes to clarify the nature of the "I" by means of introspection, i.e., by directing his thoughts upon himself in search of a self. This means he has literally split himself asunder. We now have Hume the observer, the seeker, and Hume the observed, the object of the entire investigation. Hume the observer scans his mental activity trying to spot some one impression that would correspond to a self and, naturally, he finds instead only diverse perceptions. In short, Hume qua observer finds in Hume qua observed nothing that would qualify as a self. Why? The answer is at once obvious and perplexing. The "I," when it tries to make itself into an object, cannot discover itself. It "is" only as a subject. Clearly, Hume the observer, the seeker after himself, betrays the "existence" (though this is a poor expression) of an "I'' in the very act of denying it. He says: "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception." He does not realize that the "I" that reflects or "looks for" the self is the very self he is seeking, although if that introspecting "I" is made into an object of thought, it too becomes a fleeting perception. These reflections point to another problem in Hume's reasoning. When he affirms that for the self to validate itself before his inquiry it must provide a single impression of itself, he is making a tacit comparison to our mode of knowing external objects. Hume demands that the self be cognizable in the same way as an object of perception. This is not altogether surprising given the tendency, already evident in Descartes, to treat the "I" as a thing. But one must ask Hume how he can be so sure in advance that the self is knowable in the same way as a dog or a rock (a mere object that is not at the same time a subject).
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Hume simply assumes that both the things of perception and the "I" stand on the same plane of cognition, and that whatever does not qualify as a thing is not at all. German idealism will challenge Hume by reversing his priority: selfconsciousness will be the ground of knowledge of all other things. Hegel indeed asserts that a complete analysis of the "thing" of perception leads, by way of the categories of force and understanding, to the concept of the "I.'' 20 For these reasons, Hume's attempt to overcome Cartesian dualism by denying the possibility of self-knowledge appears to be incomplete. Nevertheless, he has demonstrated that we cannot regard the "I" as an object of perception. Consequently, the question must arise of how exactly we ought to conceive of the "I" if it eludes every attempt to pin it down as a thing. In order to understand how this problem might be solved, it is necessary to survey Kant's doctrine of transcendental apperception and its relation to possible objective knowledge. Kant The Critique of Pure Reason, in which Kant's theory of self-consciousness finds its fullest expression, was written with two purposes in mind. First, Kant intended to prove that reason (Vernunft) is incapable of acquiring knowledge of objects outside our experience. Its legitimate use is restricted to the formulation of the rules governing the operation of the faculty of understanding (Verstand). Pure reason, or reason applied beyond the bounds of formal logic, is illicit, since it has led us into unsolvable dilemmas about the traditional objects of metaphysics: God, the cosmos, and the soul. Kant's second purpose was to refute the skepticism Hume had fostered by demonstrating that causal explanations lack the universality and necessity characteristic of mathematics. Hume maintained that what we take to be necessity of causal connection in fact springs from a habit of associating certain phenomena with others always observed to accompany them. Cause and effect for Hume are concepts we form on the basis of experience. Hence any specific causal link can never enjoy the status of being any more than a probable inference from the past. Because causal inferences are a posteriori, they lack the universality and necessity characteristic of mathematics. Kant concluded that Hume's destruction of the causality principle would be valid only if that principle were indeed derived from experience. His doubt about this aspect of Hume's argument was the catalyst that triggered a reexamination of the logical status of all catego-
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ries of the understanding in his Critique of Pure Reason. In Kant's view, Hume's arguments undermined not just the principle of causality but the foundations of all objective knowledge, including even mathematics. The objectivity of our knowledge (its universality and necessity) hinged for Kant on the question of whether synthetic judgmentsthose that add to our understanding of the logical subject rather than simply explicating what is already contained in itthat were also a priori, or not merely induced from experience, were possible. The apriority of synthetic judgments could only be certified if the understanding contributed certain elements to the cognition of an object. This contribution could not take the form of a subjective association of perceptions superadded to a preexisting objective world. Rather, the understanding would have to participate in the very constituting of perceived reality. Kant discerns a possible rebuttal of Hume's skepticism in the notion of what an object of experience is. Normally we regard the concept "object" as an abstraction from the various concrete things we encounter (be these sensuous like houses or trees, thought constructs like triangles, or even our own selves taken as objects of what Kant calls "inner sense"). But Kant reflects that what we call an object is actually a unity of diverse perceptions, a manifold that must first have been connected so as to constitute one thing about which predications may be made: "Connection does not however reside in the objects, and could not by any means be elicited from them by perceptions; rather it is solely an accomplishment of the understanding which itself is nothing but the faculty of connecting a priori." 21 In this sense the concept "object" is the very condition for having any experience at all, not just an abstraction made ex post facto. Not everyone can give a philosophical account of what an object is, but everyone presupposes that he knows what an object is by making any judgment whatsoever. Thus, for Kant, ''object" is an a priori construction to which we automatically "assign" the plurality of perceptions we encounter. What then are the prerequisites of there being objects (and, by extension, experiences) at all? First, the manifold of sense must be intuited as in space and time. Space and time are not concepts, because we do not subsume specific spaces or time intervals under them in the way, for instance, that we subsume different cats under the concept, cat. Space and time are unitary and continuous. We indeed subdivide them into inches, seconds and so on, but we presuppose them as undivided and continuous before undertaking these divisions. Yet the mere intuitions of space and time, although a priori and required for
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experience, do not in themselves yield knowledge of objects. Crudely put, they allow us to say "now" or "then" and also "here" or "there," but they do not permit us to say what object is out there now. As suggested above, the ultimate precondition for having an object of experience is unity of the manifold or a connecting of diverse perceptions. But how is unity possible? The condition of the possibility of unity in the object is the unity of self-consciousness or the "synthetic unity of apperception" which Kant describes as follows: The "I think" must be able to accompany all my presentations; for otherwise something would be presented [vorgestellt] in me that could not be thought at all, which means as much as: the presentation would either be impossible or at least nothing for me. That presentation that can be given before all thinking is called intuition [that is, the intuitions of space and time; L. H.]. Thus every manifold of intuition has a necessary relation to the "I think," in the same subject in whom the manifold is encountered. This presentation however is an act of spontaneity, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception . . . or also original apperception, because it is that selfconsciousness that can be accompanied by no further presentation since it evokes the presentation "I think" that must be able to accompany all others and is one and the same in every consciousness. I also call the unity of apperception the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. 22 The "I think" referred to by Kant designates our awareness that any given "presentation" is our own. It does not mean that we consciously reflect on experience as our own at every instant. Kant says only that the "I think" must be able to accompany our presentations, not that it actually does so in each case. The "I think" underscores the fact that I can disengage myself from all my specific presentations and regard them as united within my self-consciousness. It does not suggest any uncertainty about my presentations but only the fact that they are mine, that I know that I have them. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the importance of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception is to employ a metaphor. A mirror and a wax tablet have this much in common with human consciousness: all three duplicate, in some way, that which is given to them from outside themselves. A mirror reflects images, a tablet receives impressions, and the mind has "presentations" of objects. However, only the mind unites this diversity within one consciousness. A mirror and a
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tablet differ from the mind because they are not aware that these diverse contents are their own. Kant expresses this theme when he says that without the power of consciousness to unify a manifold, "I would have as variegated and diverse a self as I have presentations of which I am conscious." 23 The relationship between the unity of an object of experience and the transcendental unity of self-consciousness should now be apparent. A unitary object or connected manifold is only possible because of its internal correlate, the unity of consciousness: "The a priori conditions of possible experience as such are simultaneously the conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience."24 Kant says much the same thing when he writes that "the unity, which the object makes necessary, can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold into presentations. So we say: we know [erkennen] the object when we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition."25 Two corollaries of Kant's argument must be given proper consideration in order for us to realize what he has gained by his insight into the relationship between subjective and objective unity. First, because any object of cognition is, qua unitary object, constituted by the unity of self-consciousness, Kant reasons that our cognition is always of appearances (phenomena) and not of things-in-themselves (noumena). The "I" of which we are aware when we reflect is also an appearance, essentially different from the "I" of transcendental apperception: "The transcendental unity of apperception is that [unity] through which any manifold given in an intuition is unified into the concept of the object. It is therefore called objective and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness which is a determination of inner sense."26 The "I" of which we become aware when, like Hume, we introspect is a determination of "inner sense" because it is given as an intuition in time. We feel that we persist over time (Hume to the contrary notwithstanding!) such that the "I" of introspection, if we can disentangle it all from our ever-changing inner states, is an object of consciousness. But transcendental apperception is the "I" that observes or introspects, not the "I'' that is fixated as object. Hence the former is noumenal, the latter phenomenal. Second, although we can only have knowledge of appearances, that knowledge is universal and necessary. If the objects of cognition were truly other than we are, i.e., things-in-themselves, then Hume would be right in saying that causality and the other categories were only
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contingent, subjective "habits" of thought. However, since we constitute the objects themselves, our knowledge of them includes the explication of their objectivity. To know an object means to say what it is. The "what" concerns not just contingent matters of fact such as color and shape, but also certain relationships which belong to the very concept of an object. These are Kant's twelve categories, which serve to transform subjective into objective judgments. The table of judgments represents the explication of the nature of mind as such, i.e., of the transcendental unity of consciousness. The categories, which correspond to and are derived from the table of judgments, represent the explication of the nature of any object. The subject sidethe unity of consciousness and the table of judgmentscorresponds exactly to the object sidethe object's unity and the categoriesbecause the object is a construct of transcendental apperception and an external manifestation of the structure of consciousness. The relationship between the transcendental unity of self-consciousness and the (unitary) object provides the answer to the status of our knowledge of nature and its laws: "We ourselves thus import the order and regularity, which we call nature, into the phenomena; and we should not be able to find it there, if we, or the nature of mind [Gemü] had not originally put it in." 27 Kant's conviction is that specific natural laws are only special cases of higher laws, and that the chain of increasing generality leads ultimately to the functions of the understanding itself. Hence he calls the understanding "legislation for nature."28 Kant seems successfully to have shown how "subjective conditions of thinking should have objective validity."29 Subjective conditions of thinking are involved in the constituting of an object; when we apply the categories in a particular cognition, we are only giving an account of the objectification of the mind's own structure. Kant's entire philosophy thus hinges on the mind's capacity to know itself, or at least to recognize that its synthesizing activity is a precondition for any knowledge at all. Kant explicitly acknowledges the absolute importance of his doctrine of selfconsciousness when he writes that "the synthetic unity of apperception is the apex on which hinges all employment of the understanding, even all of logic and, accordingly, transcendental philosophy; indeed this faculty is the understanding itself."30 For Hegel, Kant's philosophy in some respects has a truly speculative core and thus marks an advance over Cartesian dualism. Hegel had called the unity of being and thinking expressed in Descartes' cogito principle the most interesting idea of modern philosophy. But
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it was still deficient because it remained a subjective principle. Selfknowledge did not ipso facto imply any knowledge of the world. The task of philosophy as Hegel saw it was to free the unity of being and thinking from its subjective form and transform it into an absolute unity. 31 This unity begins to emerge in Kant as a synthetic unity of apperception which simultaneously constitutes the ground of all objective knowledge. The mind and the world of objects can now be seen to possess a common structure. Hegel regards the question "how are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" as an indication that Kant has come close to comprehending the true idea of reason.32 This idea is of course quite different from Kant's "unconditioned synthesis." It is the idea of the absolute identity of the "I" and the world. If one reads Kant from a common sense perspective, it appears that a knowing subject and an independent world of things-in-themselves are simply given as the absolute point of departure for philosophy. Then the subject casts the net of space and time and the categories of the understanding, thereby generating objects which, though only appearances, can be known by means of universal and necessary rules. What interests Hegel in Kant's argument is the question of how the completely heterogeneous, namely the unity of self-consciousness and the manifold of perceptions, could also be seen as identical: ''How are synthetic judgments a priori possible? This problem expresses nothing other than the idea that in the synthetic judgment subject and predicate, the former particular and the latter universal, the former in the form of being, the latter in the form of thinkingthat these heterogeneous elements are at the same time identical a priori, i.e., absolutely."33 In other words, the Cartesian problem emerges again here. If the "I think" is the only certainty, how can the subject ever acquire reliable knowledge of what is not-"I"? Hegel discerns in Kant's analysis of synthetic judgments a dramatic reformulation of the problem. Subject and object can only be synthesized in an a priori judgment if they are originally identical and only subsequently opposed by the understanding: Thus, on account of the expression "synthetic unity," identity can take on the appearance of having presupposed the antithesis and of requiring the antithetical manifold as something independent of it, something existing for itself. Thus identity can be made to seem by nature subsequent to opposition. But that unity is, in Kant, incontrovertibly the absolute, original identity of
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self-consciousness that posits the judgment [das Urteil] absolutely or a priori out of itself, or rather, as the identity of the subjective and objective, appears in consciousness as judgment; this original unity of apperception is called synthetic precisely on account of its dual aspect, because the opposites are absolutely one in it. 34 This citation expresses the peculiarly Hegelian "twist" to Kant's theory of pure apperception. The transcendental "I" is not immediately accessible to thought as an object. Yet it is present in every mental activity and, as Kant explained, is the point on which the whole system of transcendental philosophy turns. Both the ''I" of "inner sense" and the unitary object are presentations that are possible because of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. The subject-object dichotomy is thus a necessary manifestation of the unity of self-consciousness but is not that unity itself. On Hegel's reading of Kant, the structure of subject-objectivity is a self-differentiating of the unity of selfconsciousness (itself not accessible to us as an object). Transcendental apperception "splits apart" into a knower confronted by a world that seems independent, but is in truth only comprehensible (in terms of the categories and space and time) because it is originally identical with the knower. We have seen, then, that Kant laid the groundwork for Hegel's own theory of the mind's self-discovery in its experiences of the world. Yet in Hegel's view, Kant never really abandoned Cartesian dualism despite the identity of being and thinking postulated in the cognition of appearances. Kant's theory of our knowledge of appearances cut in two directions. It certified the universality and necessity of our a priori synthetic judgments, providing a counterargument against Humean skepticism. But it also signified that we could not acquire knowledge of things-inthemselves, a reality not subject to the syntheses of transcendental intuition (space and time) and the categories. Any "unconditioned" principle that would be by definition outside of experience either could not be known at all, or would generate "antinomies" as soon as the categories were applied to it. It is Kant's insistence that pure reason cannot know the unconditioned to which Hegel objects most strenuously. This limitation on reason is closely related to the dualism at the heart of Kant's epistemology. Because being as it is in itself is for Kant originally different from thinking, the only possible knowledge open to us is relative: relative, that is, to the mind's capacity to "legislate" for nature by
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means of the categories. The only sure knowledge we can have is mathematical and physical, and the latter only insofar as it can be comprehended under the categories of causality, substance, and reciprocity (Wechselwirkung). God, the beautiful, purposiveness in organic nature, and even mind, except in its logical function as transcendental apperception, are not amenable to rigorous, scientific study. Hegel takes issue with Kant's version of Cartesian dualism in his famous introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit. He attacks the entire enterprise of a "critique of reason" as a false application of an instrumentalist epistemology, calling it a "natural notion" that one ought to examine the "tool" of knowledge before embarking upon knowing itself. However, the analogy between cognition and a tool leads unavoidably to skepticism. Whether we picture cognition as an implement that forms its object or as a medium (like a prism) through which the ''light of truth" is supposed to reach us, being as it is in itself does not reach us unaltered. Consequently, instrumentalism transforms itself into the conviction that "the entire beginning, acquiring for consciousness whatever is in-itself by means of cognition [Erkennen] is absurd in its very concept and that a limit utterly separates cognition and the absolute." 35 Hegel here takes things-in-themselves or an unsynthesized manifold as equivalent to the absolute, the "unconditioned" which reason desires to, but cannot, know. Thus, absolute knowledge would be knowledge of what is simply true and not merely true in relation to the particular cognitive faculties of finite beings. Hegel recommends that we not accept Kant's mistrust of knowledge for two important reasons. First, the distinction between ourselves and our cognitive faculties suggests that we can observe and analyze cognition from a neutral vantage point which itself would not already be an act of knowing. In other words, a "critique of pure reason" presupposes the application of reason as analyzing and criticizing, to reason as analyzed and criticized. Yet the analyzing reason must itself be analyzed if the whole instrumentalist argument is not to end in a petitio principii. As Hegel says, anyone who tries to examine his cognitive faculty before proceeding to actual cognition is like a man who wants to swim before getting into the water.36 Furthermore, Kant's instrumentalist approach to knowledge assumes that it makes sense to distinguish things as they truly are from things as they appear to us, while still claiming that we know nothing at all about the noumenal world. This would seem to be a self-contradictory assumption since we cannot say that the two worlds differ unless we know some-
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thing of the world of things-in-themselves. In Hegel's view, both of these assumptions are open to doubt and, what is more, they constitute a formidable barrier to actual knowledge, a "fear of truth." 37 Kant's strictures against the use of pure reason to know the unconditioned apply just as much to self-knowledge as to knowledge of what appears to be other than self. On the one hand, Hegel praises Kant for demolishing the Seelending of rationalist metaphysics, the "I" taken as a substance with certain attributes (such as simplicity and unalterability). However, he objects to the grounds Kant deploys to support his critique of so-called rational psychology. The predicates traditionally ascribed to the soul are not false simply because they are an attempt by reason to overstep its limits and acquire knowledge of something outside experience. Rather, they are false because "such abstract determinations of the understanding are too vulgar for the soul, and it is something quite different than the merely simple, immutable, etc."38 Similarly, Hegel agrees with Kant that "'I' is not a sensible thing, something dead and permanent, a soul-thing having a sensible existence."39 Kant, however, did not draw the proper conclusion from his critique, the conclusion that the "I" might exhibit a mode of being fundamentally different from that characteristic of ordinary objects, yet still be indisputably real. Instead of taking this step, Kant apparently clung to the conviction that what is real must be a ''thing" amenable to sense perception.40 Here one can readily discern a similarity between Kant's refutation of rational psychology and Hume's search for a self. Despite their differences, they concur that if the "I" is to exist, it must be an empirically given thing. It is this tacit equation of being and thing that disturbs Hegel. Certainly, if only things qualify as real, Kant's critique is justified, even though it leaves us with the empty logical subject of transcendental apperception about which nothing at all can be known. But are "thing" and "empty subject" the only alternative conceptions of the "I" or of the mind's knowledge of itself? In his critique of rational psychology, Kant had referred to the "circular" character of self-thinking: the fact that one cannot think the "I" as object without an "I" as subject to which the object is given. If one attempts to make this subject-"I" into an object, the circle repeats itself. For Kant, this is an "inconvenience" (Unbequemlichkeit), "since we must at all times make use of the presentation of it, in order to make any judgment about it."41 However, he never hit upon the idea that this "inconvenience" might betoken a mode of being or actuality that,
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in Hegel's words, would be far "richer" than the being of a mere thing. In a revealing passage from the Logic, Hegel disputes Kant's remark about the "inconvenient," circular character of the "I'': [I]t is surely ridiculous to call this nature of self-consciousness an inconvenience or a circle as though it were something deficient, just because the "I" thinks itself and cannot be thought without it being the "I" which thinks. This is a relationship in which the eternal nature of self-consciousness and of the concept manifests itself within immediate empirical consciousness. It manifests itself because self-consciousness is precisely the existing and thus empirically perceptible, pure concept, the absolute relation to itself which, as separating judgment [Urteil], makes itself into an object and is solely thisto make itself into a circle by that very act.A stone does not have that inconvenience; when it is thought or when judgments about it are to be made, it does not stand in its own way. 42 We recall that in Hume, the "I" splits itself apart in an unsuccessful attempt to find itself as an object. Hegel argues in the above quotation, against Kant's empty subject of transcendental apperception, that the "I" is precisely that activity of splitting itself apart into subject and object and seeking itself in the object. Hence it is neither an abstract, isolated "I"-subject as in Kant nor a "thing" or "I"-object of the sort Hume sought in vain and rationalist metaphysicians claimed to have understood. For Hegel, self-knowledge is different from the knowledge of things since it does not offer a stable, determinate object to our observation. The "I," as observer, can never become objective to itself. It is not a passive thing or res extensa but an activity. Indeed the "I" of self-knowledge exhibits not only a different but also a far more complex and subtle structure than the things we learn of in perception. To use Kant's term, it is a spontaneity or an act of selfcreation. Where the things of res extensa simply are what they are, the "I" makes itself into what it is through its inherently active character. For Hegel, the "I" is thus a window to the absolute since it is the concept itself accessible within empirical existence. Specifically, the "I" and the concept share the same structure: self-differentiation. Each can only be thought as an activity of fission, but in such a way that the differentiated entities are implicitly identical. We see this in the "I" since its dif-
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ferentiae, subject and object, both have their origin in the same act of self-differentiation or what Hegel calls selfdiremption (sich-Entzweien). Against the backdrop of Hegel's critique of transcendental apperception, another deficiency of Kant's philosophy becomes evident. Because Kant begins with an empty "I"-subject of transcendental apperception, he cannot satisfactorily explain the relationship between the categories and the unity of self-consciousness. "Kant examines them [the categories; L. H.] empirically and does not recognize [erkennen] their necessity. He does not think of positing unity and developing differences out of unity." 43 Here we encounter the notorious Hegelian claim to deduce a conceptual system from pure unity or (in the Logic) pure being. Usually, one understands by "deduce" the operation of eliciting from a set of propositions or concepts other propositions implicitly contained in those that are given. Hegel, when he criticizes Kant for not deducing the categories from the pure unity of apperception, obviously cannot have this sort of deduction in mind because nothing at all is "contained" in the pure unity of selfconsciousness. From unity understood as abstract self-identity, no deduction can be made. Hegel means in the above passage that the unity of apperception must, like the ''I" and the concept, be thought of as self-differentiating. What Hegel himself undertakes is not a deduction in the sense mentioned above but rather a conception of unity based on the model of self-consciousness, or the mind's knowledge of itself as self-differentiating. Fichte forms the connecting link between Kant and Hegel on this score, because he did indeed try to deduce the categories from the unity of self-consciousness or the "I" = "I." Fichte The difference between self-knowledge and the knowledge of things, already present in a rudimentary way in Descartes, becomes explicit and essential for Fichte. We have seen that Kant tends to view being or knowledge of being as identical in some respects to the self or self-knowledge. Fichte proposes to explain experience, or what he calls "presentations accompanied by a feeling of necessity," by showing how it arises out of the very structure of selfconsciousness.44 In his radical formulation, "I am concerned with the complete reversal of the ways of thinking about these points of reflection [i.e., traditional philosophical concepts and modes of thought; L. H.] so that, in all se-
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riousness and not just 'so to speak,' the object would be posited and determined by the cognitive faculty and not the cognitive faculty by the object." 45 Fichte thus confronts us with what he considers a clear dualism of philosophical method and principle. Either we are "posited and determined" by objects qua passive recipients of sense data, or else the world of experience is somehow determined in and through our "cognitive faculty." To see what Fichte means by the latter alternative, one must bear in mind that he viewed Kant's philosophy as having demonstrated, although not with sufficient clarity, that the object of experience is possible only by virtue of a prior synthesis of transcendental apperception. Hence he regarded at least his early writings as a systematization of Kant's insights: "I have long said . . . that my system is none other than the Kantian.''46 What then are the philosophical principles underlying each dualistic "school"? According to Fichte, we must find a ground that would enable us to explain experience. That ground must be sought not within experience (lest a petitio principii arise) but outside it, and the only method open to us is abstraction. Since we find ourselves in the relation subject-object or knower-known, there are two alternative grounds of experience. We can either abstract from the "thing" of experience, which leaves us with the intellect (in itself), or from ourselves as knowers, which gives us the thing (in itself). Fichte calls the adherents of the first principle "idealists" and those of the second "dogmatists."47 Why Fichte chose such polemical designations for these antagonists becomes plain when he identifies dogmatism with what we would call determinism and idealism with freedom and moral responsibility. The idealist, according to Fichte, is capable of the "free act" of abstraction from all specific contents of thought such that the "I" alone becomes an object for him. I hasten to add that Fichte means by an "I-object" neither the "thing" of rational psychology nor an "impression" that would correspond to a self such as Hume sought. Rather, he thinks of it "as 'I' in itself: not as an object of experience, for it is not determinate, but is rather determined solely by me, and is nothing without this determination, and is generally not at all without determination; rather [it is] something sublime and raised above all experience."48 When Fichte says the "I" is not determinate he means that it lacks the specific given being characteristic of a thing. Like Proteus of mythology, the "I" is infinitely determinable in the sense that it can have any number of objects, yet it must have some object, some form,
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or it is nothing at all. I can "determine" myself as the thinker of any object, including myself as thinking it. And in some cases the "state" of myself is determinable solely by the intellect (e.g., as we will see later, in the case of obedience to a moral law). Fichte insists that to form a conception of this infinitely determinable and selfdetermining ''I" is a free act which cannot be demonstrated to someone in the way a geometric proof could, since it requires that each person introspect and understand the significance of his introspection: "That self-consciousness does not obtrude, and does not come of itself; one must really act freely, and then abstract from the object and attend solely to oneself. . . . In a word, this self-consciousness cannot be demonstrated to anyone; each person must produce it in himself by his own freedom." 49 Fichte concludes that neither dogmatism nor idealism can refute its opponent, the former because it must ultimately have recourse to an unprovable thing-in-itself, the latter because it cannot compel the dogmatist to perform the abovedescribed free act of self-consciousness. The absence of a final arbiter in this dispute led Fichte to the notorious position that the philosophy one chooses is a matter of interest or even character. In Fichte's harsh judgment, "What sort of philosophy one chooses thus depends upon what sort of person one is: for a philosophical system is not a dead household object which we can lay aside or take hold of just as it pleases us; rather it is animated by the soul of the man who has it. A character indolent by nature or rendered weak and stunted by intellectual servitude, learned luxury and vanity will never elevate himself to idealism."50 Fichte's pronouncement seems to undermine the very basis of truth: intersubjectivity. He seems to have reduced philosophy in the end to an existential choice or psychological inclination. Yet the verdict should not be quite so severe once one weighs in Fichte's unyielding commitment to discursive truth within a chosen philosophical framework. Hegel was obviously influenced by Fichte on this issue, although he could never accept Fichte's strict either-or because it was an outgrowth of the very dualism or alienation that had to be overcome by speculative reason. As we have observed, there is only one philosophy for Hegel, of which empiricism (Fichte's "dogmatism") is a moment. However, Hegel never considered such "dogmatism" genuine philosophizing. In fact, he echoes Fichte when he remarks that "If the given matter of intuition and the manifold of presentation is taken as the real vis-à-vis the concept and what is thought, this is a viewpoint which one must have dismissed not only as the condition for
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philosophizing; even in religion, it is presupposed that one has dismissed it." 51 In constructing his system of idealism, Fichte begins with a step that had a profound impact on Hegel's conception of philosophic method. There is a "double series" of mental acts that underlies Fichte's entire science of knowledge, "that of the 'I' which the philosopher observes, and that of the observations of the philosopher himself."52 This double series roughly parallels what we noted earlier in Hume: the split, within introspection, between a subject-"I" and a putative object-''I" which is to be sought. However, for Fichte the subject-"I" encompasses both observation by the student of idealism of his own mental acts and the observation of his procedure by the philosopher. The object"I" consists in the observed mental acts which the philosopher bids his readers to perform. The situation is similar to any case in which one person asks another to perform some act (e.g., holding his breath) and to observe that act and its results (e.g., dizziness). Both the requester and the performer stand on the same level of observation. However, the student does not yet know what the consequences of his deed will be, nor how to interpret it, while the philosopher, or commander of the act, does know these things because he has presumably already performed the act and analyzed it. The purpose of this mental experiment is to show how the "I" can be construed as the ground of all experience and how an objective world arises through the very fact of self-consciousness. For this reason the first postulate of the doctrine of science is, "Think yourself, construct the concept of yourself; and note how you do it."53 Immediately the peculiar quality of the "I" begins to emerge. If I ask you to perform a physical act, that act can be observed in a detached fashion, even though it occurs in your own body, because you differentiate that act from your own consciousness of it. It is an object for you. But in thinking oneself, the observation of that act and the self-thinking itself are one and the same. As Fichte expresses it, "The intellect, as such, watches itself; and this self-seeing extends immediately to everything that it is, and in this immediate unification of being and of seeing consists the nature of the intellect. What is in it, and what it is as such, it is for itself; and only insofar as it is what is for itself, is it this as intellect."54 To put it another way, the "I"-subject of introspection is actually constituted in and through the act of introspecting. I am what I know myself to be. In this concept of the intellect is already the embryo of Hegel's concept of spirit. Hegel writes: "Spirit is essentially only what it knows of
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itself." 55 This definition of spirit is practically a paraphrase of Fichte. But there is a serious objection to this line of reasoning which Fichte must confront before he can establish the doctrine of science on a firm footing. We have seen that the "I" as observed by us is actually this very self-observing, an activity of returning-into-oneself or making oneself into an object. Does this not presuppose that the "I" is already there? One can only return from "B" to "A" provided that ''A" is already present. Fichte replies to this objection: "By no means. Not until this act, and solely by means of it, through an act upon an act itself, which determinate act is preceded by no act at all, does the 'I' become for itself originally. It is only there previously for the philosopher, as a fact, because the latter has already undergone the entire experience."56 In a later essay clarifying the Science of Knowledge, Fichte enlarges on this explanation: "you must think of your present self-positing, elevated to clear consciousness, as preceded by another such positing which occurred without clear consciousness to which the present [clear consciousness] relates itself and by which it is conditioned."57 In other words, the return-into-self of the "I" does not presuppose any substratum called an "I" that is already in existence. It is the tendency of language to make us think in terms of substances to which attributes adhere that leads us to conceive of the "I" as "already there." Hence Fichte steers a course between the entirely empty "I"-subject of Kant, which can never be thought, and the "I"-object or "impression," which Hume sought in vain, by regarding the "I" as a pure act: "'I' and action returning-into-itself [are] completelyidentical concepts."58 One must understand the "I" neither as pure subject nor as pure object but as subject-object, or rather the activity of returning-into-itself through which subject and object arise: "I am subject and object: and this subject-objectivity, this return of knowledge upon itself, is what I mean by the term 'I' when I deliberately attach a definite meaning to it."59 To shed some light on this idea we may recall the discussion of Kant's transcendental apperception. Kant says that the "I think" must be able to accompany all my presentations. There is no object for us without our being aware that we are aware of it. I cannot have an object of consciousness without distinguishing myself from that object and yet simultaneously being related to it as a subject. This is one of the fundamental insights of all German idealism. Fichte and Kant claim that self-consciousness is the precondition of all consciousness,
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not, of course, in the sense that we are self-conscious at time "A" and then conscious of an object other than we are at time "B." Rather, consciousness and self-consciousness are simultaneously present. Fichte calls the knowledge we have of this "I" intellectual intuition an intuition which we (as philosophers) find in ourselves if we observe what we do when we think ourselves. This intuition, as we saw earlier, cannot be demonstrated but only grasped by introspection. Fichte explains it in the following way: Certainly however it can be demonstrated to anyone in the experience he himself concedes he has had, that this intellectual intuition occurs in every moment of his consciousness. I cannot take a step, move either hand or foot, without the intellectual intuition of my self-consciousness in these actions; only by this intuition do I know that I do it, only by means of it do I distinguish my action, and in it myself, from the pre-given object of the action. Anyone who ascribes an activity to himself makes reference to this intuition. In it is the source of life, and without it is death. 60 The intuition of the "I" is now called by Fichte a "self-positing, as positing (anything objective, which can also be I myself as a mere object)."61 He means that the ''I" arises or is posited only in conjunction with an object (myself or something else) that arises at the same time. Although I can only conceive of myself within the framework of subjectobjectivity, as an "I" posited as opposed to some object, I must conceive of subject and object as originally identical: "Any possible consciousness, as the objective correlate of a subject, presupposes an immediate consciousness in which subjective and objective are utterly one. . . . One will always seek in vain for a bond between subject and object if one has not grasped them equally originally in a unification."62 To take the case of Hume's "search" for a self, his diremption into observer and observed presupposes a higher unity in which these terms are identical; for how could Hume "split himself apart" if he (qua subject and object, respectively) were not originally one? This immediate intuition of unity (intellectual intuition) is the precondition for all discursive thought, yet it itself is not capable of discursive analysis, since we should have to think it as object (for a subject) to explicate it and hence destroy its original unity. That Fichte took this intellectual intuition to be unthinkable emerges plainly in his "popular" work, The Vocation of Man, in which a "spirit" holds a dialogue
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with him and reveals the essentials of the Science of Knowledge. After Fichte terms the "I" a subject-object, the following conversation ensues: Spirit: "Canst thou then comprehend the possibility of thy becoming conscious of this identity, which is neither subject nor object, but which lies at the foundation of both, and out of which both arise?" I: "By no means. It is the condition of all my consciousness, that the conscious being, and what he is conscious of, appear distinct and separate. . . .In the very act of recognizing myself, I recognize myself as subject and object, both however being immediately bound up with each other." Spirit: "Canst thou become conscious of the moment in which this inconceivable one separated itself into these two?" I: "How can I, since my consciousness first becomes possible in and through their separationsince it is my consciousness itself that thus separates them? Beyond consciousness itself there is not consciousness." Spirit: "It is this separation, then, that thou necessarily recognizest in becoming conscious of thyself? In this thy very being consists." 63 The conception of the "I" analyzed here gives Fichte the key to a deduction of the categories. He begins with the principle of identity (A = A) and inquires what entitles us to employ this principle. It soon emerges that the identification of the two A's in A = A is based on an original act of self-positing, "I" = "I,'' the subject-objectivity of consciousness described above. Again it must be emphasized that this self-positing, this absolute "I," is not opposed to anything. As Fichte analyzes it, it has not yet bifurcated into subject and object: "The absolute self of the first principle is not something (it has, and can have, no predicate)."64 Clearly Fichte has only reinterpreted the Kantian tenet that empirical identity, the unity of an object, must have its origin in the unity of transcendental apperception. Fichte calls his second principle, not-A A, the principle of opposition. He derives this principle, too, from a primordial act of consciousness: "Every opposite, so far as it is so, is so absolutely, by virtue of an act of the self, and for no other reason. Opposition in general is posited absolutely by the self."65 Of course, the content (A) of not-A A is the same in both position and opposition. The A and not-A of
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not-A A must each be self-identical in order to be thought at all, so that the formula could just as well read: (not-A = not-A) (A = A). But according to Fichte, the form of negation, difference, or opposition can never be derived from identity or self-sameness. Just as in the case of identity, the logical principle of opposition has its analogue in an act of consciousness, namely: not-"I" "I." Any distinction between one thing and another rests upon the original distinction between myself and what I am not. Fichte seems to be arguing that, in positing difference (not-"I") or the world, the absolute "I" also posits itself as a finite, empirical "I" confronted with an object which it is not. As in the case of Hume's introspection, we have here an unthinkable unity which splits itself apart into subject and object in order to think itself. To identify ourselves as "I" or to think ourselves we must differentiate ourselves into knower and known. In this way, an object (not-"I'') is distinguished from the "I" but is also identical with it since both subject and object stem from a primordial act of selfdiremption. This is Fichte's third principle, ground. In the absolute "I" (or through its diremption) are posited a divisible "I" opposed to a divisible not-"I," each of which limits the other. Fichte maintains that there must be an activity in the human mind which limits the "I" and not-"I," such that in every subject-object relation there is a shifting border (labeled "X" by Fichte, the product of the limiting act, "Y") between the subjective and objective components. Thus we have an original unthinkable identity of "I" = "I" which then posits a not-"I" confronted by a (finite) "I": "The self is to be equated with, and yet opposed to itself. But in regard to consciousness it is equal to itself, for consciousness is one: but in this consciousness the absolute self is posited as indivisible; whereas the self to which the not-self is opposed is posited as divisible. Hence, insofar as there is a not-self opposed to it, the self is itself in opposition to the absolute self." 66 Fichte thought he had demonstrated that the three categories of qualityreality, negation, and limitationare explicitly grounded in the activity of the "I." But has he really accomplished his goal of explaining experience by reference to a principle which is outside experience? He has indeed located identity and difference, reality and negation, subject and object, within the absolute self. However, a dualism remains insofar as each of the elements within these conceptual pairs appears to have arisen by a separate act of the absolute "I." Self-consciousness and consciousness of the not-"I" are not conceived as identical acts: "How the self is able to distinguish something from it-
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self, can be deduced from no higher ground of possibility anywhere, for that distinction itself lies at the very base of all derivation and grounding." 67 In Hegel, by contrast, the act of distinguishing is at the same time an identifying, such that identity and difference are not two separate forms. Before we consider the deficiencies of Fichte's doctrine of science as understood by Hegel, we should take special note of what Fichte has contributed to Hegel's philosophy. As was mentioned earlier, Fichte conceived of the doctrine of science as a dual series in which the philosopher bids us to perform certain mental acts. We thus have the primary series of the acts themselves and the secondary series of the philosopher's interpretation. The unique feature of this double series is that the first series is not static, but rather is self-developing: What [the science of knowledge; L. H.] makes into the object of its thinking is not a dead concept which would only behave passively toward the investigation of it, and which is made into something only because the science of knowledge thinks about it. Rather it is living and active, generating cognitions out of itself by its own activity so that the philosopher need merely observe it. His business in the matter is nothing more than starting this animate object upon a course of purposive activity, watching its activity, conceiving it and comprehending it as one.68 Here we have arrived at the blueprint for Hegel's conception of philosophic method. He writes in the Logic that philosophy cannot borrow its method from subordinate sciences such as mathematics: "Rather it can only be the nature of the content, setting itself in motion, which provides the subject matter of philosophic cognition. It is this content's own reflection which then posits and originates the specific character [Bestimmung] of philosophy."69 He expresses the same conviction even more forcefully in the Encyclopedia: "Our thinking, moved by the concept, remains thoroughly immanent in the object which is likewise moved by the concept; we only watch, as it were, the proper self-development of the object and do not alter it by interpolating our subjective presentations and notions."70 Furthermore, we have ascertained that the "I," as an act of returning-into-itself, is both observer and observed. It only is what it is for-itself. Hence the first series of mental acts (or the development of the concept in Hegel) eventually transforms itself into the standpoint of the philosopher, that is, the second series of mental acts that "sets in motion" and observes the first series. This is roughly the structure of
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Hegel's Phenomenology in which the first series consists of the successive forms of appearing consciousness and the second series in the philosophic "we." The philosopher, represented by the observing "we," merely preserves the continuity of the experience undergone by appearing consciousness. Fichte has also furnished Hegel with an explicit doctrine of self-knowledge as tantamount to knowledge of the object. Of course, the same principle may be elicited from Kant's writings, but there it is beclouded by the notion that reason cannot legitimately be employed to know things-in-themselves. In Fichte, the principle is quite explicit: "in that which we call knowledge and observation of outward things we at all times recognise and observe ourselves only; and. . . in all our consciousness we know of nothing whatever but of ourselves and of our own determinate states." 71 Yet there is a profound ambiguity in Fichte's program since this identity of thinking and being is bought at the price of reducing the world to a negative of the self, literally a not-"I" with no further content than this mere "not." How can there ever be a unity of being and thinking if identity and difference are posited by two separate acts without any formal continuity or identity between them? Fichte formulates his own dilemma: "The truly supreme problem which embraces all others is, how can the self operate directly on the not-self, or the not-self on the self, when both are held to be utterly opposed to each other?"72 His solution is practical rather than theoretical: "Since there is no way of reconciling the not-self with the self, let there be no not-self at all!"73 Thus, what began as an attempt to give the ultimate ground for "presentations accompanied by a feeling of necessity" transforms itself into the dictum that there shall be no such presentations or that the "I" should stand alone in the world. Here we encounter one of the critical parts of our discussion. Cartesian dualism has become self-aware in a double sense. First, the conquest of nature, announced by Descartes as philosophy's goal in the Discourse on Method, finds its most extreme expression in Fichte's definition of the external world as "infinite shock'' (unendlicher Anstoss). We posit it, says Fichte, simply as an obstacle which we can then overcome on our way to true autonomy. Second, we see in Fichte's philosophy the moral-religious counterpart of Cartesianism, the Protestant idea that salvation (liberation) is attained only by the repression of our inner nature through strict obedience to the moral law. For Hegel, the ethical dualism of Fichte is inseparable from his the-
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oretical dualism: "'I' = 'I' is the absolute principle of speculation, but this identity is not demonstrated by the system; the objective 'I' is not equivalent to the subjective 'I,' both remain absolutely opposed to each other. The 'I' does not find itself in its appearance or its positing; in order to find itself as 'I,' it must annihilate its appearance. The essence of the 'I' and its positing do not coincide: 'I' does not become objective to itself." 74 Self-knowledge, the foundation of Fichte's entire system, is only partial because the "I" cannot find itself in the world or is not objective to itself. Two steps are required to transform Fichte's partially speculative, but still dualistic, philosophy into absolute idealism. First, identity and difference, or position and negation, must be viewed as identical in their difference. Fichte does not conceive "positing, pure activity of the 'I,' and opposition. . . as the same."75 This amounts to saying that being and nothingness are still separated in Fichte, not thought together as the same. A correct understanding of the relationship between "I" and not-''I" would not represent them as products of two different acts that are then conjoined by means of a border between them. Rather the limit as an activity (a negative activity, since it posits "I" and not-"I" as being each what it is only by virtue of not being the other) would simultaneously posit the "I" and not"I" as what they are. But in that case, "I" and not-"I" would no longer be in simple opposition. The one, since it would only by by not being the other, would be essentially identical to its opposite. The absolute "I" would then be a negative activity which, by limiting "I" and not-"I," would also create them as specific, determinate entities. This brings us close to what for Hegel is the second deficiency in Fichte's system. We have seen that the absolute self is an "unthinkable one," that which the "I" is "before" it differentiates itself into subject and object. If it is entirely indifferent to its being a subject or object (since it is both and neither as the activity which generates them), then why should we think of it as subjective at all? Hegel advances this conclusion by arguing, "To obtain transcendental intuition in its pure formlessness, one would have to abstract from its character as something subjective; speculation would have to remove this form from its subjective principle to elevate it to the true identity of subject and object . . . . It remains [in Fichte; L. H.] a subjective subject = object, for which appearance is absolutely alien and which never reaches the point of intuiting itself in appearance."76 The route from Descartes through Fichte has ended in a paradoxical conclusion. We began with the premise that selfconsciousness, the
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mind's knowledge of itself, is a cognitive principle sui generis different from the knowledge of things. But we also found that, even in Descarte's cogito ergo sum, there is an implicit identity of self-knowledge and being. In Kant and Fichte we have discovered that self-knowledge or self-consciousness provides the key to knowledge of at least the essential structure of being. Finally, having arrived at the highest principle of self-knowledgeintellectual intuitionwe discover that self-knowledge is not really self-knowledge at all. Rather, it is the intuition of a principle beyond the self which, as negative activity, is responsible for the very subject-object structure with which we began and which lies at the heart of modern (Cartesian) dualism. It remains only to sketch out how Schelling drew this conclusion in order to complete the transition from the modern philosophy of self-consciousness to Hegel's absolute idealism. Schelling and Spinoza The first principle of Schelling's philosophy (at least of his early works, which contributed directly to Hegel's own position) is "absolute reason" or "reason insofar as it is thought as the total indifference of subjective and objective." 77 By "indifference" Schelling means a reason which is neither the reason of man qua thinker nor a logos of being (ontology), but which expresses itself as both. He tells us that to arrive at this idea of reason we must reflect upon "that which, in philosophy, takes up a position between subjective and objective and that obviously must behave indifferently toward both . . . . In order to think [reason] absolutely, abstraction must be made from the thinker."78 We recall that Fichte offered only two alternatives for explaining experience. One can either abstract from the object and arrive at a pure "I" as the ground of unity of objects (as transcendental apperception) or abstract from the subject to arrive at a thing-in-itself which produces consciousness by some unarticulated principle of causality. Here Schelling suggests that we must abstract from both knower and known, both subjective and objective unity. But this seems like preposterous advice because it would be tantamount to thinking nothing: a pure identity which, lacking anything to limit or determine it, would also be a pure nothing. This is Schelling's posture indeed, when he calls this absolute reason or highest unity "the holy abyss . . . from which everything emerges and into which everything returns."79 Hegel concurs with him, to a certain degree, when he writes: "For philosophy the first thing . . . is to know [erkennen] absolute nothingness."80
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Reason, as neither subjective nor objective, becomes for Schelling the "true-in-itself" which falls into the point of indifference between subjective and objective. To understand this we should remember Fichte's third principle, that of ground, whereby a divisible not-"I" and a divisible "I" are held apart by a shifting boundary. Schelling realizes that this limit or point of indifference is exactly what makes the subjective and objective be what they are. Rather than a third principle which defines a relationship between two already posited entities, he wishes to think the limit as the image of an absolute unity which appears to us only in the differentiation of subject and object. Another way to state the same idea would be to consider the thought of unity itself. You cannot think it without simultaneously thinking nonunity, difference, or opposition. Yet to think unity and opposition together requires the thought of a higher unity in which both would be contained. If we then try to think this higher unity in the same way, it too will demand the thought of nonunity and so on ad infinitum. Clearly, the only way to avoid an infinite regress is to think the higher unity as that which appears only in and through the positing of a limit between the original unity and the nonunity which defines it. This is the same perplexity which Fichte encountered in trying to think the "I-subject" without an infinite regress. As we said, he solved it by arguing simply: There is consciousness; hence, there is a unity that is subject-object or, better, that articulates itself in the complex subject-object but that in itself is not thinkable, only accessible as ''intellectual intuition." Schelling expresses this idea in this passage: To begin with, then, I praise that as the prius which precedes all else, since, apart from it, only two cases are possible: either unity which has opposition standing opposed to it is to be posited as the first thing; in that case, however, it is itself posited with an opposite; or else the opposites [are posited], in which case, however, they are thought without unity, which is impossible. For whatever is opposed is so truly and in a real way only by being posited within one and the same [unity]. 81 Schelling provides us with an example that may help to render this theme more transparent. There are, he says, two senses of "higher unity." One may be seen in cases of "relative opposition" in which two things are combined to form a third that is a unity of the first two (such as hydrogen and oxygen in water). Here the higher unity is an empirically existing thing that is different from its subaltern parts. The second case occurs when an "absolute opposition" is present, for
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instance, between a person and the image he casts in a mirror. This opposition is absolute in the sense that it cannot be unified in any third thing. Yet the identity we perceive between the original and the image is complete. The absolute identity is what makes them be the same. 82 Schelling concludes that, viewed from the standpoint of absolute reason, everything is one; there is simply no difference in the world. That there seem to be differences (as, for example, between being and thinking) occurs because of "reflection," the fact that we isolate some finite entity from the absolute totality of which it is a part: "There is therefore nothing in itself outside of totality, and if something is regarded as outside totality, this only happens by virtue of an arbitrary separation from the whole performed by reflection. In itself [i.e., from the perspective of absolute reason; L. H.] this does not take place since all that is, is one, and is absolute identity itself within the totality."83 Furthermore, Schelling does not accept Fichte's division of all philosophies into dogmatism and idealism. Since subject and object (roughly, man and nature) are the differentiae of absolute identity, a transcendental philosophy which begins with the "I" and a philosophy of nature which begins with pure objectivity should reach the same conclusions. This leads us to consider briefly the position of Spinoza. I did not discuss his theory earlier because he does not begin with self-consciousness but rather with a substance that has two attributes, being and thinking. But, in Schelling, the doctrine of self-consciousness has become a doctrine of absolute reason that is no longer subjective at all. In fact, Schelling essentially is a Spinozist, as he himself admits: "Thus, true philosophy consists in the proof that absolute identity [the infinite] has not emerged from itself and that everything which is, insofar as it is, is infinity itself, a proposition which only Spinoza among all previous philosophers has known, even though he did not present a complete proof of it."84 Consequently, as far as Hegel is concerned, Spinoza and Schelling share many of the same philosophical defects, to which he alludes in the preface to the Phenomenology: "To regard any existent as it is in the absolute here consists in nothing but saying of it that one has indeed now spoken of it as a something; in the absolute however, the A = A, there is no such thing, rather everything is one in it. This one knowledge, that everything is the same in the absolute. . . or passing off one's absolute as the night in which, so to speak, all cows are black, is the naïvety of empty knowledge."85 Similarly, in Spinoza we find that
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specific, differentiated entities are merely absorbed into substance (the equivalent of Schelling's absolute identity) like matter into the "black hole" of modern astronomy: "All differentiations and determinations of things and of consciousness only return into the one of substance; thus, one can say, everything is only thrown into this abyss of destruction in the Spinozist system." 86 Despite its seeming emptiness, Schelling's conception of absolute unity did point the way toward Hegel's own system and the reconstruction, in thought, of ethical wholeness. The position of absolute unity or identity must be retained, for it is the only means of overcoming Cartesian dualism. But it must be possible for this absolute unity to differentiate and determine itself like Fichte's self-developing object (the "I") of the first series of mental acts. Only from the perspective of this task do Hegel's key philosophical termsspirit, subject, the concept, the Ideebecome wholly intelligible. To these we now direct our attention.
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2 Hegel's Speculative Philosophy Hegel's own position emerged gradually as he emancipated himself from Schelling's influence. At first powerfully attracted to Schelling's absolute idealism, Hegel began, in his Jena period (18017), to appreciate the price philosophy would have to pay for such an amorphous absolute as Schelling professed to have discovered. If the distinctions we characteristically make between subject and object, man and nature, divine and human prove to be mere illusionsas Schelling flatly said they werewould philosophy not willy-nilly relinquish any claim to achieve rational knowledge about concrete problems? Hegel's originality, strongly evident in the Phenomenology of Mind (1807), did not actually consist in his absolute idealism, since Schelling had already broken that ground. Rather, Hegel found a way to conceive of the absolute such that it would only manifest itself to human consciousness (and hence only exist at all!) within the dualistic terms mapped out by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte. Hegel's guiding idea can be simply expressed as follows: Human beings began, in modern times, to experience themselves and their world in dualistic categories. This was not by any means a "mistake" (as it must seem from Schelling's absolute standpoint); it reflected the actual situation in
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which people found themselves in the wake of the breakdown of ethical life and the "revolution of subjectivity" evident in many spheres of modern culture. If philosophy was to retain the notion of an absolute, it would have to be shown that this absolute required, for its very being and appearing, the sort of dualistic, "alienated" world whose typical expression was the Enlightenment. In this manner, philosophy could become a science describing the various guises in which the absolute appeared and pointing out their manifold connections and relationships. One would still "see the whole" in Schelling's sense of grasping the infinite in finite entities; yet the whole would be an articulated series of definite forms, each vitally necessary to the selfdefining of the absolute. In this chapter, we shall see in a more precise way how Hegel worked toward the same insight from two directions, firstly by "finitizing" Schelling's absolute and secondly by transforming the structure of the "I" (as described by Fichte) into a model or paradigm of general applicability to other phenomena. In the remainder of this work, we shall then review in detail how Hegel gathered together the diverse strands of Enlightenment thought and culture into a coherent picture. The Deficiencies of Schelling's Absolute The first clue to Hegel's revision of Schelling is his opposition to the "virtuoso" character of the knowledge of the absolute, intellectual or transcendental intuition. From Hegel's discussion in the "Differenzschrift" of 1801, we learn that he still considered Schelling's version of intellectual intuition as "the absolute principle, the sole real ground and stable standpoint of philosophy." 1 But by 1807, the year in which the Phenomenology first appeared, he had broken with Schelling in the sense that the concept rather than intellectual intuition had become the animating principle of his thought. Schelling, who read only the preface to that work, quickly realized that Hegel had repudiated intuition as a philosophical first principle. In the last letter he wrote to Hegel, Schelling remarked: "So I admit that I have not yet grasped your meaning when you oppose the concept to intuition."2 Schelling's puzzlement is not surprising. In Kant, Fichte, and Schelling himself there is complete unanimity about the inaccessibility of transcendental or absolute identity to thought. Since this sort of identity is logically prior to all subject-object relationships and since one cannot conceive of anything which cannot be an object of one's con-
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sciousness, one cannot form a concept of absolute identity. Hence it must be an intuition. In this sense Schelling's absolute closely resembles the idea of the good in Plato, which is constitutive of all specific goods but must ultimately be apprehended by the "eye of the mind" rather than by an abstract concept. Yet if this absolute is only an intuition, it remains by definition inaccessible to discursive analysis. If one does not have the intuition of absolute identity, the philosophy on which it is based seems to be an arbitrary construct and not truly scientific in the sense of being intersubjectively verifiable. It appears as a "virtuoso" performance in which philosophers have the gift of intuition while the rest of us must continue to view the world as a bundle of dualisms. This deficiency of intellectual intuition, which troubled Hegel, finds clear expression in his Logic. He rejects the suggestion that the Logic should begin with the "I," because the proper conception of the "I" would already presuppose that one had performed the "absolute act" of abstraction from all empirical consciousness. Hegel's program for correcting this "arbitrary standpoint" 3 of Schelling's philosophy has two complementary aspects. First, the movement from ordinary to absolute consciousness (i.e., to the absolute as identity of subject and object) must itself be capable of scientific treatment. It must be shown that there is a necessary line of development for any consciousness toward absolute knowledge. Of the "subjective postulate" of intellectual intuition, Hegel remarks: "In order that it might be demonstrated as a true demand [wahrhafte Forderung], the progress of the concrete 'I' from immediate consciousness to pure knowledge would have to be shown and presented as occurring in the 'I' itself, by virtue of its own necessity."4 This is, of course, the requirement that the Phenomenology is intended to fulfill. But that program cannot be put into effect if Schelling's version of the absolute, the mere repetition of absolute identity, is taken as fundamental. According to Hegel, Schelling's absolute cannot provide anything more than the semblance of an expansion (Ausbreitung) of knowledge since it does not contain any genuine internal development: When this expansion is scrutinized more closely, it proves not to have come about because one and the same [entity] took on diverse forms; rather it ss the formless repetition of one and the same thing that has only been applied ab extra to diverse material. . . . The idea, which is certainly true for itself, does not in fact ever go beyond the beginning. . . . This is as little the fulfill-
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ment of what has been demanded as arbitrary notions about the content would be; namely, the wealth whose source lies within it and the self-determining difference of forms. 5 We may summarize Hegel's objections by asserting that Schelling has indeed demonstrated how a complete analysis of selfconsciousness will lead to the absolute; however, he has not shown why the absolute necessarily appears as a series of finite relationships. This demonstration constitutes the core of Hegel's Logic, Phenomenology, and even the Philosophy of Right. The "I" and the Concept To understand Hegel's unique position within the German Idealist tradition, we must briefly return to Fichte's attempt to analyze the structure of self-consciousness. We saw that he regarded position and negation (A = A and A notA) as two separate acts of the absolute "I." But he never makes clear exactly why or how difference can emerge from a pure identity ("I" = "I"). The answer, for Hegel, is that pure identity is simultaneously nothingness. Fichte's "inconceivable one," which I can never think because thinking requires that I split myself apart into subject and object, is what Hegel calls pure negative activity. It sets the limit "between'' determinate entities by virtue of Spinoza's maxim that all determination is negation. In other words, "I" and not-"I" arise through the very same negative activity which determines each as what it is. When I try to think this "I" as it is "before" it splits apart into subject and object, I thereby split it (i.e., myself) into subject and object. This defeats my attempt to think it as a third thing "behind" them. But I can now think it as the activity of negation through which subject and object are determined (i.e., given limits and hence specific being). Thus, paradoxically, the "I" reveals itself to me in the same movement by which it is concealed. As Hegel puts it, "To appear and to split into two [sich-Entzweien] is one and the same thing."6 Or, in the words of Stanley Rosen, to understand Hegel's doctrine of the absolute one must "distinguish between form and the process of formation":7 "the absolute is not a 'thing,' whether in the sense of subject or object. The Absolute is the formation-process of subjects and objects."8 If negative activity qua determining posits subject and object as the limit through which the one is not the other, then each is at the same time precisely its other. This is because the same negation that distin-
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guishes them also relates them: "'I' as this absolute negativity is implicitly identity in other-being; 'I' is itself and overreaches the object as something implicitly sublated [an sich aufgehobenes]; it is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship;the light which manifests itself and other things too." 9 The "I" is one side of the relation and the whole relation in the sense that as a self confronting a not-self, it is limited, finite, empirical "I." But it is also the absolute as the negative activity that posits the difference between ''I" and not-"I," dividing and identifying them at the same time. In the final chapter of the Phenomenology, Hegel concisely formulates his conception of the "I" as negative activity: the "I" "has a content which it distinguishes from itself; for it is pure negativity or selfdirempting [sich-Entzweien]; it is consciousness. This content in its difference is itself the 'I,' for the content is the movement of selfsublation, or the same pure negativity as the 'I.' 'I' is introreflected in the content as something differentiated from it; the content is only comprehended if the 'I' is with itself [bei sich] in its other-being."10 Hegel's reinterpretation of Schelling's absolute as negative activity suggests a solution to the arbitrariness of "intellectual intuition." If the absolute is only conceivable as the implicit identity-in-difference of subject and object, then what the "I" is, is inseparable from what the object is. The content is only comprehended (begriffen) when the "I" is "with itself" in its other-being: "Thus, the 'I' is only manifest to itself insofar as its other becomes manifest in the form of something independent of the 'I.'"11 In other words, the path to the absolute is not a leap into the abyss of pure identity, as in Schelling, but the long process through which the "I" comes to comprehend itself in its other. In Fichte's terms, the "I" need be only "set in motion" in order to begin the voyage toward the absolute as we philosophers look on. But the unity of subject and object makes sense only from the standpoint of an absolute conceived (like Schelling's) as "indifferent" to its manifestations as subject or object. The "I" could discover itself only in its other if both "I" and other constitute the determination-by-negation of the absolute. The interpretation of the absolute as negative activity also provides a transition from Schelling's "intellectual intuition" to Hegel's "concept." The traditional opposition of concept and intuition parallels the distinction between abstract universality and the particulars that supplied the universal with "instantiations" or cases of application. Modern philosophers from Descartes through Fichte came to regard the thinking subject as the source of universals that were synthesized
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with the particulars of intuition. The difference, for example, between Hume and Kant hinged on whether universal categories such as cause and effect ought to be viewed as impositions of subjective habits of thought upon a manifold of singular sensations, or whether these categories were "already" in the objects as the very conditions for experience. But provided that the German idealists can demonstrate that the subject-object structure of experience is only possible if this dichotomy is a manifestation of the absolute, then the universal does not have to be "applied" to the particular or the latter "subsumed" under the former. Rather, the universal is self-particularizing in exactly the same way in which the absolute differentiates itself within the subjectobject structure. Actually these are only different expressions for the same movement. The universal is just as much in re as it is a subjective activity, or, to reintroduce an earlier distinction, thinking and being are essentially identical: "'I,' the subject of consciousness, is thinking; logically, the object receives further specification by virtue of what is identical in subject and object, their absolute nexus, that which makes the object the object of the subject." 12 Thus, since thinking qua subjective activity involves the use of concepts or universals, it is essentially the comprehension of the object as itself universal. It is in this sense that Hegel describes the "I" as a "melting-pot,'' a "fire," and as "crushing" reality, since the "I" as thinker finds itself in the object by means of its universalizing activity: "Thinking as activity is thus the universal-in-action, and more precisely the self-activating universal, since the deed, what has been produced, is precisely the universal."13 It is crucial to realize that the "universal in action" that we experience as a subjective operation on an independent object is really the activity of the absolute manifesting itself to itself through our thinking.14 Henceand I take this proposition to be the core of Hegel's entire philosophya complete knowledge of the object will culminate in a knowledge of the formation-process by which subjects and objects appear at all. And since that formation-process finds its proximate expression in the self-differentiating activity of the "I," complete knowledge of the object is also knowledge by the "I" of itself qua negative activity or universal-in-action. It is in this sense that the "I" is a theoretical paradigm something like the watch of seventeenth-century philosophy, the organic body of medieval theologians, or the servo-mechanism of modern sociology. Furthermore, the "I" as paradigm is itself nothing but the concept. If we know what the "I" is, then we also know what the concept is: "The
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concept, having blossomed forth in the sort of existence [Existenz] that is itself free, is nothing other than the 'I' or pure self-consciousness. Indeed I have concepts; but 'I' is the pure concept itself, which has attained existence [Dasein] as concept." 15 One could thus assert that the concept is incomprehensible without the "I" as a model accessible to our own self-consciousness: "The self-related universal exists nowhere but in the 'I.'"16 To summarize, Hegel's solution to the formalism and lack of diversity in Schelling's absolute is the concept, but not understood as an empty abstraction requiring singulars to "fill it up." He does speak of "the thought" (der Gedanke) as a universal in the traditional sense, but immediately adds that it is essentially an aspect of the concept which is "concrete'' or self-developing: "the thought is nothing empty and abstract; rather it is determining; or the thought is essentially concrete. We call this concrete thought the concept."17 Hegel elaborates on the distinction between concept as abstractly universal and self-differentiating. In ordinary usage, "concept" designates what is common to a number of particulars. But, says Hegel, "the universal of the concept is not merely a common feature in respect to which the particular has an independent existence. Rather, the universal is self-particularizing [specifying] and remains with itself [bei sich] in its other in undimmed clarity."18 For Hegel, the concept is the essence not only of all thought but of being itself. He underscores its absolute importance in a highly metaphorical passage which, despite its apparently mystical overtones, brings together all the logical relationships included in the concept: [T]he absolute concept may be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the world or the universal blood which is omnipresent and neither interrupted nor clouded by any difference. Rather it is itself all differences as well as their having-been absorbed [ihr Aufgehobensein]; hence it pulsates within itself without moving, trembles inwardly without losing its tranquility. It is self-identical, for the differences are tautological: they are differences which are none. This self-identical essence thus relates itself [bezieht sich] only to itself; to itself. This "itself" is then an other toward which the relation points, so that selfrelating is really self-dirempting, or that self-identity is precisely inner difference. The dirempted moments are thus in-and-for-themselves, each the opposite of an other,such that when we speak of the one, the other is already contained in the expression. . . . What
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is self-identical dirempts itselfthis means as much as to say: it supercedes [aufhebt] itself as something already dirempted, it supercedes itself qua other-being. 19 This cryptic-sounding passage is quite comprehensible if one recalls what has been said about the "I" as a paradigm of the concept. The self-differentiating "I" is here said by Hegel to be the ''soul of the world," "the essence of life," because self-knowledge and knowledge of being converge in one and the same concept. It is active in that none of its moments (namely, the unity that only is as differentiated, the differentiated entities themselves, and their identity as different) can be thought in isolation from the others. It is a perpetuum mobile because it is internally unstable. But it is also "tranquil" when thought of as a self-enclosed totality, just as the "I" of self-consciousness remains identical to itself in differentiating itself into subject and object. Yet this "concept of the concept" suggests that the formalism of Schelling's absolute is only partially remedied. Hegel has reinterpreted absolute identity (the "A=A") as inconceivable apart from the negative activity that separates it and makes it discursively accessible to us. This gives us a framework within which knowledge can be more than the mere absorption of everything into an abyss of absolute identity. The very expression "concept" (as opposed to "intellectual intuition") suggests that knowledge rests on intersubjectivity instead of a subjective capacity which only some people possess. Yet if the knowledge of whatever is, is ultimately knowledge of the concept by the concept, it would seem that Hegel too must pronounce all cognition to be an endless repetition of the same pattern. This is in some sense true, but otherwise most misleading because Hegel's concept of the concept also involves the preservation and enrichment of content, or the development of the abstract toward the concrete. Toward a Systematic Science In the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, which he intended as an introduction to his entire system, Hegel describes his principle of philosophical truth as follows: "In my view everything . . . depends upon conceiving and expressing the true not only as substance but just as much as subject."20 The development of substance into subject is the theme of all Hegel's works from the Logic to the Philosophy of Right. His remark suggests that substance, roughly equivalent to the absolute identity of Spinoza and Schelling, is not an alternative notion to
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subject. Rather, Hegel's subject is a developed and articulated substance, an absolute identity enriched by the explicit inclusion of difference or otherness. Hegel does not reject Spinoza and Schelling; he simply attempts to transform their intuited absolute into a discursively accessible principle. 21 Hegel links the emergence of subject from substance to the proposition that "knowledge is only actual and can only be presented as science or as system."22 These two arguments are essentially the same because substance means an absolute identity (Schelling's A = A) that has not articulated itself, a mere "original" or "immediate'' identity. Substance emerges or "posits itself" only by means of the negative activity that is at its very core, the continuous diremption into a series of dualisms each of which manifests that negative activity more completely. The series of these forms is a system or science. As Hegel asserts, "the true is the whole; the whole however is only the entity completing itself through its development."23 Hegel's point can best be discerned in his theory of language. If we begin with the words "God," "state," "society," "man," we are, in Hegel's view, uttering empty names with no significance. Only the addition of the predicates provides the "what," the determinacy of a name. But the nature of our language implies that the sentence subject is in fact really a substance, something that has being apart from its predications, which are thus accidents. The activity of predication seems to belong to a thinker separated from both the sentence subject (in truth a substance) and the predicates, such that the addition of predicates appears to be the external act of a detached mind. Even to say that the absolute is subject presupposes that the absolute is somehow "already there," and that we, as detached minds, must find a predication (here, "subject") that expresses what it is. Hegel contends that substance cannot really become subject unless predication is understood as the (negative) activity of substance in which it dirempts itself or mediates itself with itself. We must now inquire what the character of this mediation is. According to Hegel, "mediation is nothing but selfsameness that moves of its own accord, or it is introreflection, the moment of the 'I' that is for-itself, pure negativity."24 The "I"-paradigm proves to be the prototype for the identity-in-difference that characterizes the development from substance to subject. Thus the program of Hegel's systematic science in all its forms consists in the mind's study of its self-activity: "For the true is actual only as system; or the principle that substance exists essentially as subject finds expression in the notion
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that the absolute is spirit. . . . The spiritual alone is the actual; it is essence or being-in-itself,the determinate or that which stands in relation, other-being and being-for-itselfbut it remains within itself in this determinateness and selfexternality. . . . Spirit knowing itself as spirit in this developed form is science." 25 The task and meaning of systematic science is the demonstration of how abstract or original identity (substance) can be mediated through a series of finite relationships so as finally to become a subject. What is required for this to happen is the gradual evolution to a new concept of identity that would include negation, otherness and mediation within itself. Here the paradigm of the "I" plays a central role. The identity of human self-consciousness, Fichte's "I" = ''I," has proven to be literally unthinkable apart from its self-differentiation into a series of finite subject-object relationships. My thoughts, actions, and experiences are all other than I am (i.e., I can abstract from them and return into myself); yet they are also paradoxically what I am. I must distinguish myself from them to be conscious at all, but I must also acknowledge them as the constitutive elements of my personal identity if the latter is not to be contentless abstraction. The perfect identity-in-difference of the "I" and its other is the telos of Hegel's Logic and the true experiential referent of the concept and subject as philosophical terms. The Logic must be understood as a movement in which an original pattern of identity, difference, and restoration of identity is retained throughout. Yet we must also see how these basic elements are defined in a progressively more adequate wayadequate, that is, to express the highest form of identity-in-difference which we encounter in the "I." In the course of this movement we will begin with supposedly self-subsistent entities to which relationship (i.e., negation or otherness) is external and accidental. In due course it will be shown that the entities or relata in a relationship are in fact only constituted as what they are by their relationship. As Hegel puts it, "the rational is relationship itself."26 This emphasis on relationship rather than on the relata as self-subsistent entities is already familiar to us. We know that the absolute, and its finite representative, the "I," is not a thing but an activity which separates and identifies its relata. The task of the Logic is to make this premise explicit, thereby permitting thought to think itself in the element of abstract logical categories. The skeletal groundwork of the Logic consists of three moments: the abstractly rational (verständig), the dialectical or negative and mediating, and the speculative or positive-rational (vernünftig). These
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correspond exactly to the three moments of the concept or of self-consciousness. The abstract-rational moment approximates the bifurcation of the absolute into subject and object or the self-differentiation of the concept into specific, determinate identities, except that these entities are now frozen, fixed as stable, finite monads (to borrow an expression from Stanley Rosen), abstracted from the negative activity through which they emerge and persist. The viewpoint of the understanding and of ordinary logic which prevails in the isolation of determinate entities characterizes nearly all of modern philosophy and the Enlightenment. The dialectical moment of logic is intended to dissolve the barrier betwen categories or entities held to be rigidly exclusive of one another. Taking our earlier discussion of the concept as an example, we may observe that the negative activity that separates determinate entities (the activity by means of which A and not-A are each specified as not the other) also tacitly identifies them, since each is what it is (i.e., is determinate or finite) by virtue of a limit that is in fact its other. Were the other removed, each A and not-A would expand out into a vapor of absolute nothing since it would lack a determination or negation which sets bounds to it and makes it be something in particular. The third moment, the speculative, only designates the totality of the process whereby stable entities are posited and separated, then dissolve into each other. Hegel avers, in agreement with Schelling, that "the absolute . . . is . . . the identity of identity and non-identity; within it, opposition and oneness are simultaneously present." 27 The speculative, then, makes manifest what dialectic already contains. If A and not-A (identity and nonidentity) are identical by being different, then the speculative moment merely "gathers up" this result into a concept of totality in which we move from an "ineffable one" which differentiates itself, annuls its differentiae, and returns into a new unity that is totality in the literal sense, since there is nothing "outside" it. To illustrate, we can examine the infamous dialectic of finite and infinite in the Logic.28 When we start with a finite "something" (etwas) and ask what it is, we are driven to its other, which delimits and determines it. But the other is other by reason of its opposition to something. Hence we bounce back and forth from a finite something to a finite other, thereby falling into an infinite regress or what Hegel calls a "bad infinity." However, this infinity only is by virtue of its not being the finite. Hence it is self-contradictory because it is supposed to lack limit (in-fin-ite), which it precisely has insofar as it is contraposed to the finite
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that is its limit. If we seek a new infinite that lies beyond both the finite and the old infinite, we are no better off, since we arrive only at a new opposition of our broader infinite versus the old infinite (now part of the finite). The speculative resolution of this dilemma is to conceive the infinite as the movement through which each is driven to its other, is posited as identical to it, and becomes therefore a unity of itself and its other (or of identity and nonidentity). This solution is obviously the same as what we have come across in the "I" and the concept. Indeed, Hegel remarks: "Self-consciousness is thus the proximate example of the presence of infinity." 29 We think of the unity of differentiated entities as the activity through which they are posited, which is not itself an entity but which reveals itself in the activity of separating and unifying. But the absolute that we conceive as the totality of this movement (here the "true" infinite) is actually a result that includes its moments. As soon as we detach it from the movement by which it manifested itself, it becomes itself a stable entity that stands in opposition to otherness. This is the insight we achieved when we observed what happens when we try to think the "I" as an object. It then becomes an object for a subject (in this case, the "I'') and is thus not revealed as the focal point of all objects but rather as a thing, a fleeting perception, or what have you. We were driven finally to depict it as a subject-object, as Fichte argued. It is this characteristic of the speculative as a result or totality that allows it to accumulate content.30 To understand more specifically how an originally abstract principle can accumulate content and thus become more concrete, we must consider some of the more crucial phases of development in the Logic. Hegel begins the Logic not with the specific being of any given entity but with pure being as such. It quickly becomes apparent that pure being is indistinguishable from nothing (Nichts), since to be is to be determinate, a condition that is absent in a notion of pure being. We can indeed say that pure being is not nothing, thereby giving it a determination, but the "not" indicates that being only is what it is through the negativity separating it from nothing. Yet being and nothing are not simply identical. To equate them requires at the same time that we differentiate them or think them as not the same, otherwise there could not be two terms in the equation. Hegel expresses the identity-indifference of being and nothing in two distinct forms. On the one hand, it is becoming which signifies only the instability of being and nothing, respectively. It is not so much a new motion as it is a description of our paradoxical attempts to think
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being and nothing as stable, separate forms. Or it is, like the "true" infinite, the activity of the absolute which differentiates and identifies being and nothing in a ceaseless oscillation. Hegel calls becoming the "first concrete thought" or the first concept, insofar as being and nothing previously were mere abstractions. 31 By "abstraction" he means that being and nothing were each posed as selfsame, stable thoughts, each having been defined as not the other. Becoming is the concept (in ovo) because it expresses the unity-in-difference of being and nothing, not as a ''third thing" outside them, but as the activity through which each "turns into" its other. Becoming appears to create an impasse for the further development of the Logic, since it only expresses an oscillation. The solution is to posit a being which includes negation in its very notion: namely, determinate being or Dasein. A Dasein is distinguished from other-being by its quality. The empty notions of pure being and nothing are replaced by the more specific idea of a something that is not another thing. Here negation is conceived as a barrier separating one thing from another and thus integral to the definition of determinate being. The final term in Hegel's dialectic of quality is being-for-itself (Fürsichsein), which proves to be the "concept" of being and determinate being. Being-for-itself exemplifies the fundamental leitmotiv of both the Logic and Hegel's thought as a whole, because it is the embryonic form of self-consciousness. It is the explicit exclusion of otherness from itself, regarded as an activity, or "polemical, negative behavior toward the limiting other."32 Furthermore, "In the 'I' we have the proximate example of being-for-itself. As existing, we know ourselves first of all to be distinct from all else that exists and also related to it. Furthermore, however, we know that this whole breadth of existence culminates, as it were, in the simple form of being-for-itself. When we say: 'I,' this is the expression of infinite and, simultaneously, of negative self-relation."33 So far the problem of the Logic has been to find a means of thinking being such that it does not immediately collapse into its other. In other words, we must think anything at all as selfsame and stable; yet it is only so because of the negation that gives it determinacy. Hence we need a model of being which can be self-identical by virtue of its negating activity. In being and Dasein, negation simply "happened to" being as though it were not an integral part of it. Here, in being-for-itself, we find the thought of a being that actively negates. Being-for-itself "is self-relation by virtue of the negation of other-being. When I say I am for myself, I not only am; rather I negate in myself
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all that is other, I exclude it from myself insofar as it appears external." 34 Being-for-itself is thus also a negation of negation since the determination of otherness (which I negate) was itself already an instance of negation. To phrase this in the more familiar terms of the "I"-paradigm, the "I'' is essentially a return-into-itself out of its relationship to other-being. To say "I" means to distinguish oneself from everything else. To be (as "I") and to negate or return-intooneself are the same. As Fichte so strongly emphasized, to be an "I" is to be for oneself, to know oneself as not another thing. The "I" is not a thing, not a determinate being; instead it is pure negative activity.35 Being-for-itself thus reveals Hegel's most fundamental philosophic insight. Every instance of the speculative principle is a case of the concept that, as we saw, follows the pattern of the "I." Even becoming, as abstract as it is, demonstrates the concept. However, not every case of speculative unity exhibits the concept as self-aware in the same degree. The seeming anthropomorphism of Hegel's Logic suggests that the contradictions of philosophic thought can be resolved only if the philosophic subject or thinker is included in the definition of the problems. The internal development of the Logic expands knowledge by introducing new categories, but also intensifies it by arranging those categories in such a way that they manifest the structure of mind to itself in a progressively more adequate form. Eventually, this revealing will culminate in the explicit acknowledgment that the concept is "thought thinking itself," or that it knows itself as knowing. The essential character of all development in Hegel's philosophy requires, then, that the thinker to whom an object is given shed his "detached" attitude toward it and recognize that his increasingly more adequate cognition of the object is simultaneously an ever more concrete development of self-knowledge. This implies that the "I" or selfconsciousness must ultimately make itself its own object in order to be completely transparent to itself: "essentially, the concept can only be grasped as such by mind [Geist]. The concept is not just the mind's property, but rather its pure self."36 We now have the means of understanding Hegel's unusual theory of truth. As a starting point, he takes the traditional "correspondence" theory, the view that truth designates a correspondence between our notion of a thing and the thing itself. But he subdivides this principle of truth into "correctness," which expresses the essentially commonsensical theory of correspondence, and truth proper, which concerns philosophical truth alone. Truth, according to Hegel, means "correspondence of a content to itself." He adds that, in logic, "thought de-
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terminations are considered with a view to how far they are capable of grasping the true." 37 The various categories are true (progressively) to the extent that they express the nature of self-consciousness or mind to itself. "Correctness" differs from truth because it presupposes a thinker, himself not the object of thought, who compares the notion of a thing with the thing itself to see whether the former corresponds to the latter. In this operation, the mind never becomes transparent to itself because it does not make explicit to itself the status of the categories (identity and difference, similarity and dissimilarity) by means of which it judges and compares. The "detached" observer does not see that he himself is the ground of those categories, or the negative activity which separates and identifies them. The thinking activity must become objective to itself if truth in Hegel's sense is to be attained: "That the form of thinking is the absolute form and that truth, as it is in-and-for-itself, appears in the form of thinking, this is the claim of philosophy per se."38 Nevertheless, being-for-itself is by no means the final category even of the first division of the Logic (the doctrine of being). Being-for-itself points beyond itself toward more concrete categories in which the nature of self-conscious activity finds clearer expression. In the second great division of the Logic, the doctrine of essence, Hegel introduces a series of thought-determinations that are characteristic of reflection: "The standpoint of essence is generally the standpoint of reflection."39 In ordinary usage, "reflection" refers to light thrown back from its rectilinear course by certain kinds of surfaces, so that we have the same object duplicated, once as immediate and once as reflected or "posited." And, according to Hegel, we have roughly the same meaning in mind when we say that we reflect on a matter in the sense of thinking it over. We wish to see the matter on two levels: first as it immediately appears to us, and then as it "really'' is after we have found grounds, causes, or motives to explain it. The standpoint of reflection is thus one that divides being into an essence and its appearances. Moreover, reflection characteristically works with relative notions such as cause and effect, force and its manifestations, wholes and parts, which explicitly require their complements if we are to grasp the full significance of statements in which they are used. Hegel often calls these relative terms "introreflected" to emphasize that they impel us to see being in a double way, once as immediate and once as mediated. Recalling the basic problem of the Logicthe search for a way to think being as including negation within itselfit is easy to see that
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"essence" represents a dramatic advance over against the flatness of being. First, when we refer to the essence of something, we have in mind (so Hegel believes) a highly complex thought structure. The essence, say, of Renaissance painting is at first glance that which is distinctive and characteristic of works of art in that period, after one has subtracted the idiosyncratic styles and mannerisms of individual artists. But such an essence obviously has no independent existence apart from those artists' works. And none of those works is, as such, the "essence" of Renaissance art; each is not what the essence is. On the other hand, the essence transcends its appearances. Hegel would say that it is "indifferent'' to its determinate embodiments. If we should discover a whole set of unknown da Vinci works, these would embody the essence of Renaissance art just as much as those works we already have. In no sense is the whole (essence) equivalent to an enumeration of its known parts. In fact, we often judge the parts (the works of art) against the whole (the essence of Renaissance painting) to determine their quality, authenticity, or what have you. Hegel construes essence, then, as an entire movement that includes what is immediately at hand, the separation of this immediacy into the appearance/essence dichotomy, and the recognition that each of these terms only is what it is by its contrast and relation to the other. He calls this a "movement of reflection," a "self-related negation." 40 Hegel's point is that we arrive at essence by abstraction from the immediate data of experience, and that this abstraction constitutes a negation of such data or the postulating of them as dependent, contingent, or derivative. However, we must not exclude the activity of abstraction from its result, the essence. The activity of abstraction is just as much a "return-into-itself" of being, because being and thinking have the same structure. Again we find that the deepening of knowledge in the Logic depends on including the activity of the thinker ever more explicitly within the categories of thought. Moreover, the sphere of essence differs markedly from mere immediate being because its categories are no longer treated as independent existents separated from other-being by a barrier. For example, positive and negative or ground and grounded, typical categories of essence, plainly require each other in order to be at all, whereas we can speak of a unit, a something, a qualitatively defined existent without explicit reference to any complementary category. Hegel illuminates this difference by contrasting becoming in the sphere of being with the movement of reflection within essence. "Becoming" referred to the oscillation between being, originally defined as absolutely dif-
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ferent from nothing, to nothing and back again. The movement of reflection, however, Hegel calls "the movement of nothing to nothing and thereby back to itself." 41 By this Hegel means that the correlative terms of essence are nothing in themselves and explicitly point toward their respective complements, which in turn are likewise nothing in themselves. The sphere of essence or reflection yields in turn to the logical category of the concept and its concrete form, die Idee. The transition depends on the internal instability of the categories of "actuality": substance, cause, and reciprocity. In effect, Hegel is criticizing Spinoza (and, by indirection, Schelling) for attempting to interpret the absolute as a substance with attributes, or as a cause of the world. Spinoza's substance appeared within the sphere of essence as the only category that would permit us to resolve the paradox implicit in such reflective terms as whole and parts, force and its manifestations, inner and outer. All these categories Hegel interprets as progressively more discerning attempts to define the absolute, or to reveal how one could think of it as self-identical in its manifestations. In substance, we have an "absolute" identity because, as Hegel says, "each of its [the absolute's; L. H.] parts [is] itself the whole, or each determinate entity [Bestimmtheit] is the totality. That is, to be determinate at all is a sheerly transparent seeming [Schein] in which each difference disappears as soon as it is posited."42 This passage echoes Schelling's argument that there is only absolute identity and that whatever is, is "in" the absolute or A = A. As we have seen, the substance category is deficient because it displays no internal development, no progressive intensification of self-consciousness or self-knowledge. The attributes of substance (thought and extension) are unconnected to the substance whose attributes they are. Human subjectivity is swallowed up in what Hegel calls the dark, formless abyss of substance, which devours all determinate content.43 In order for substance to be transformed into the concept, human self-consciousness must be understood as the selfknowledge of the absolute. In Spinoza's system, human knowledge is only mathematical and quantitative knowledge of nature, as was the case in Descartes. But Hegel insists upon a self-knowledge which is not merely empty selfcertainty (the cogito) but also the accumulation of a concrete content which reveals the absolute within selfconsciousness. The absolute reveals itself to itself in our self-knowledge. Thus, the concept differs from substance (or Hegel from Spinoza), because it includes human
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self-consciousness as an integral, indispensable element of the absolute. In Spinoza, man cannot genuinely discover himself in the experience of the world, whether of nature or of human things, because all of res extensa is understood as a causal nexus in which human actions are strictly determined. And since self-consciousness is essentially a negation of negation, a self-awareness mediated through our knowledge of other-being, we can discover ourselves for Spinoza only as determined, as ensnared in a web of necessity. Thus the transition from substance to the concept is for Hegel a transition from necessity to freedom. 44 In the "Differenzschrift," Hegel provides his clearest explanation of the relationship between necessity and freedom: Every system is a system of freedom and necessity at the same time. . . . freedom is the character of the absolute when it is posited as an "inside." Thus, even though it is posited in a limited form, in specific points of the objective totality, it remains what it is, something unlimited. As "inside," it is regarded as opposed to its being, i.e., it is potentially able to relinquish its being and take on a different phenomenal state. Necessity is the character of the absolute to the extent that it is regarded as "outer," as an objective totality.45 When the absolute is posited as "inward," as taking on limited or determinate form, it exists above all as human selfconsciousness. The "I" is the proximate example of infinity because it remains identical to itself in all its determinate states and relationships. It is essentially the capacity to abstract from any determinate being. But this negativity is accessible only as an inner phenomenon, as the essential character of self-knowledge. Viewed from the outside or as a mere object, human actions can equally well appear as necessitated, as part of a system of determinism. Hegel is here vindicating self-knowledge as an aspect of the absolute that is of higher significance than the necessity that characterized Spinoza's absolute qua substance. However, this pure negativity, which we also discovered in being-for-itself, is only one dimension of freedom: "The substance of spirit is freedom, i.e., not being dependent on another, or self-relatedness. Spirit is the actualized concept that is for itself, has itself as an object. . . . However, spirit's freedom is not merely independence of the other which has been attained outside the other; rather, freedom is such independence attained in the other."46 In the Logic, this same idea emerges in Hegel's discussion of "reciprocity" (Wechselwirkung),
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the final term of the system of actuality or substance. In reciprocity we have two independent substances acting upon each other in a nexus of mutual causation. Hobbes' state of nature provides a fine political example of reciprocity because each man is driven to violence by the fear of violent death he may suffer at the hands of the other, even though the violence of the other is itself only an effect of his dread of the first man. Reciprocity collapses because the implicit identity of the seemingly independent substances becomes actual; that is, each is implicitly its other and the whole relation within the concept: [The concept], the totality which has resulted from reciprocity, is the unity of both of the substances present in reciprocity, but in such a way that each of them is from now on free. Their identity is no longer blind, or inward; instead each is essentially determined as seeming [Schein] or as a moment of reflection, such that it has immediately collapsed into its other or its posited-being. Each contains its posited-being within itself and is thus posited as sheerly self-identical in its other. 47 The paradigm of reflection, the movement "from nothing to nothing and back to itself," finds complete expression in the movement from the pure negativity of one "I" to that of the other and back to itself, such that the identity of one person is entirely constituted through his recognition as a person, a free being, by all others. The causal reciprocity of Hobbes and Spinoza yields to the mutual recognition of Hegel's concept, each person knowing himself as an individual only through the entire society which recognizes him as such. I am free because the other is no longer an independent, alien substance but another "I" and hence identical to me. I become transparent to myself or ''find" myself in the other. Freedom is not simply "given" as though all men were separate substances or atoms; rather it is achieved by elevating ourselves to insight into the essential ethical unity of all men. Individuation is thus the complement of socialization. Through the nexus of mutual recognition, the contingency of the individual in Spinoza's system becomes genuine freedom: [F]reedom presupposes necessity and absorbs it into itself [enthält dieselbe als aufgehoben in sich]. The ethical man is aware of the content of his actions as something necessary and valid in-and-for-itself. Rather than suffering any diminution of his freedom for this reason, a man's consciousness of the necessity of his acts gives his freedom genuine actuality and content, as distin-
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guished from caprice [Willkür], which is a merely potential freedom still devoid of content. 48 We have again reached the concept, not by way of an analysis of self-consciousness, but by studying the selfdevelopment of logical categories, especially "substance." Nevertheless, we have found that the Logic also treats selfconsciousness as the core of the concept by showing that logical development leads us eventually to freedom or interiority. The attempt to think being as self-identical and excluding nonbeing has generated a series of contradictions, each of which exhibited speculative unity but in progressively more adequate forms. In the logical concept, we have speculative unity in its developed form as identity-in-difference. To express this, Hegel uses the terms "universal," "particular," and "singular," which he explicitly identifies as equivalent to a moment in the selfpositing of the "I.'' The following passage on the moments of the concept ties together many of the strands of my argument: "I" . . . is first of all this pure self-relating unity, but not immediately, rather only by abstracting from all determinateness and content and returning into the limitless identity with itself. Thus it is universality. . . . Second, "I" is, as self-relating negativity, immediately also singularity, absolute determinateness, which opposes itself to the other and excludes it. It is individual personality. That absolute universality which is just as immediately absolute individuation [Vereinzelung] . . . constitutes equally the nature of the "I" and the concept.49 The particular (das Besondere) constitutes a middle term in both "I" and concept. Reverting to the "I"-paradigm, we could say that the universal is the "I" before its self-diremption into subject and object. What Fichte called an "inconceivable one" or subject-object and what was for Schelling an absolute identity no longer subjective in nature, is now found to be the universal. But clearly the "I" or the universal is nothing unless it differentiates itself by means of a determination through negation into subject and object. These its differentiae constitute the particular. From the viewpoint of the Logic, the universal (as a moment of the absolute) can dirempt itself into other dual terms not immediately or obviously related to self-consciousness (i.e., the categories of being and essence hitherto discussed). The concept is indifferent to its manifestation as being or thinking. These differentiae that are, in the "I"-paradigm, finite subject and object are thus specifi-
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cations (Besonderungen) of the universal. Singularity designates the "I" which is a specific individual conscious of himself as at the same time universal or as the negative activity actualizing itself as subject and object. Thus singularity, like the true infinite, denotes the resolution of the opposition between universal and particular as the "formation process" through which they arise. The concept is now explicit to itself in the Logic, but it must still undergo further development in order to become the idea. According to Hegel, the deficiency of the concept in its immediate form is that it lacks objectivity. To become the idea, it must articulate the unity of itself and of actuality: "the idea is the concept insofar as the latter has been realized. To realize itself, it must determine itself, and this determination is nothing other than itself . . . the idea is the fulfilled concept, fulfilling itself with itself. . . . Reason [equivalent to the idea; L. H.] is the concept giving itself reality." 50 The course of development of the concept may be briefly summarized. In its initial forms as the universal, particular, and singular, it is subjective, in the sense of representing the mind's activity to itself within the element of formal logic. The concept, in its first subjective form, now concerns itself with judgments and syllogisms rather than with categories intended primarily to explain the external world. However, Hegel diverges from traditional logic by arranging first forms of judgment then types of syllogisms in an ascending order. These eventually culminate in a notion of the concept as objectivity. As objectivity, the concept develops from mechanism and chemism to teleology, in which its true nature as self-relating activity emerges. The telos of objectivity is the permitting of mind to discover itself as the concept in the world. Even though the concept is now equally present as subjectivity and objectivity, these aspects of it are not of equal significance. This is because only self-consciousness knows that it is the concept: "in the negative unity of the idea the infinite overreaches the finite, thinking overreaches being, and the subjective, the objective."51 Hence, nature is not mere extension as it was for Descartes and Spinoza. But neither can selfconsciousness discover itself with perfect transparency in nature. If the idea is completely present in a specific thing or institution, then we may assert that it is "true" in the Hegelian sense that its actuality corresponds to its concept. A true house must not be ramshackle or unheated, and a true state cannot, for example, be a mere federation like the Holy Roman Empire.52 The idea thus resembles the Greek conception of excellence or virtue (arete*) since it establishes an
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immanent standard of judgment for each thing. However, the idea is not what Hegel derides as a mere "ought," an ideal arbitrarily conceived and employed to discredit all actual institutions: "Thus [the idea] is not to be regarded as a goal to be approached, but which would itself always remain a sort of beyond; instead, anything actual only is, insofar as it has the idea within itself and expresses it." 53 This immanence of the idea is the basis for Hegel's much decried proposition that the actual is rational and the rational, actual. With a proper grasp of Hegel's speculative philosophy, it is not hard to see that his argument represents a tautology. "Rational" or "reason" means the same as the idea: "The idea can be conceived . . . as reason (this is the genuine philosophical significance of reason).''54 So Hegel is simply saying that the idea is actual, which is its definition (the unity of the concept and its actuality). This does not mean that every existent corresponds to its concept or exhibits the idea perfectly: "that sort of reality which does not correspond to the concept is mere phenomenon [Erscheinung], something subjective, contingent, arbitrary, which is not the truth."55 He concedes that anyone can find circumstances that are not what they should be and require reform, but denies that such matters are of interest to philosophy, which deals with essential reality, not with what is contingent.56 In the Logic, the idea is the most complete and highly developed form in which Hegel's subject appears. But the idea, which Hegel, following Aristotle, defines as "thought thinking itself,"57 is more a Greek than a Christian principle: "The Greek world developed thought as far as the idea; the Christian or Germanic world has apprehended the thought of spirit. Idea and spirit are the distinguishing features."58 Logic is not the final expression of the absolute because its native element is pure thinking. As such it does not encompass and penetrate the world as it is actually experienced by finite human beings. The Greek philosophers turned away from the transitory phenomena of experience in order to contemplate the idea in its purity. But in their turn to contemplation, they contributed to the estrangement of man from the political and religious world he inhabited. Eventually this radical break between being and thinking would culminate in the "unhappy consciousness" of the Christian world and the alienation characteristic of modern culture. The fragmentation of man's ethical life called for a new philosophical principle capable of defining his altered situation and ultimately of reconciling him with it. This is the role that Hegel assigns to spirit.
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When we say that the idea is "thought thinking itself," we do not designate who does the thinking. If the idea is ascribed to God, or identified with His being, then God is at best an impersonal activity. But Geist is explicitly intended to include human spirit as one of its aspects. The ghostly "essential forms" (Wesenheiten) of the Logic are brought down to earth and fleshed out in the field of human aesthetic, political, religious, and moral experience. Hegel's philosophy of spirit thus concurs with the Enlightenment in according unprecedented importance to the "here and now" without, however, reducing the latter to mechanically understood nature or atomistic sense impressions. Spirit First and most obviously, spirit or mind is the "I": "If we examine spirit more closely, we find that its first and simplest determination is to be 'I.'" 59 It is the essential character of the "I" to be a finite subject or individual person, that is, to be a subject confronted by an object which appears to be other than the self. Dualism, fragmentation, and alienation are inherent in the very concept of spirit. Substance cannot develop toward spirit without selfdifferentiation: "the other, the negative, contradiction, diremption thus belong to the nature of spirit. The possibility of pain is inherent in diremption.''60 Furthermore, the dualism inherent in the structure of consciousness means that the "I" must labor ceaselessly in both a theoretical and practical sense to articulate itself: "Thus, spirit is internally at odds with itself; it must overcome itself as its own true nemesis; development, in nature a tranquil emergence, is a harsh, endless struggle against itself. What spirit wishes is to attain its own concept; but it conceals this from itself. It prides itself on its own self-alienation and revels in it. Development is . . . the hard unwilling labor against itself."61 But just as dualism inheres in the "I" as its essential condition of being (what is called "intentionality" in modern philosophy), so too does it have the capacity to assimilate other-being or return into itself. Hegel calls spirit "that which produces itself, pure activity, supersession [Aufheben] of the opposition between subjective and objective which spirit itself presupposed."62 Or again: "Spirit is essentially the result of its own activity; its activity is to transcend immediacy, negate it, and return into itself."63 Thus, the whole movementself-diremption into subject and object, assimilation of the object or other-being and return into pure self-identity that characterizes spiritis
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essentially the same as what we found to be the nature of the concept, being-for-itself, the true infinite, the idea, and every other speculative term in Hegel. In the realm of spirit, the preservation of content takes on an explicit form because we are dealing with a self that undergoes the experience of fragmentation and becomes increasingly manifest to itself in the series of subject-object complexes. The "first series" of mental acts that we observe can accumulate content precisely because the "I" does preserve itself intact throughout its differentiations; spirit "acquires its truth only by finding itself within absolute fragmentation [Zerrissenheit]." 64 This is what Hegel means when he asserts that spirit is only what it knows itself to be.65 Any specific instance of the subject-object dichotomy (for example, the Newtonian scientist who conceives the universe as a force manifesting itself) indeed reveals spirit to itself or discloses to me what I am. Yet the "pure negativity'' of the "I" allows me to differentiate myself from that specific actualization of spirit's activity and acknowledge it as an incomplete definition of what spirit truly is (in this case, because the Newtonian scientist has not yet made his "detached attitude" into an object of critical analysis). These successive realizations of spirit within the subject-object dichotomy constitute what Hegel calls "Schein," seeming or appearance. For this reason, the Phenomenology is a science of "appearing consciousness." Furthermore, these appearances, when fully articulated, exhaust the essence of spirit as it is in and for itself. This is because spiritlike the "I," which is its finite, immediate formis nothing apart from its manifestation or self-knowledge: "The determinateness of spirit is therefore manifestation. Spirit is not just any determinateness or content, whose expression or externality would be only formally distinguished from it; spirit does not manifest something, rather its determinacy and content is this manifesting itself."66 The second aspect of spirit that must be clarified is its universality, its character as "an 'I' that is we, and a we that is 'I.'" It is especially important to examine carefully Hegel's meaning here because his political philosophy stands or falls with the assertion of the universality of spirit given in the very nature of self-consciousness: "When we say 'I,' we mean something singular to be sure; but since everybody is 'I,' we end up saying something quite universal. The universality of the 'I' enables it to abstract from everything, even from its own life."67 Hegel's argument is quite brief and apparently superficial. To say that I can abstract from everything does not mean that I am unable to refer to my distinctly personal self when I say "I." But if we return to
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Fichte's argument concerning the universality of self-consciousness, Hegel's point becomes clearer. Fichte argued that I must distinguish myself, as subject, from everything else (as an object of consciousness) in order subsequently to differentiate myself as a specific person from other specific persons. Thus, the "pure" self appears as a precondition for the empirical, personal self. When Hegel says that I intend to refer to myself as singular, but, because everyone else says "I," I name only something universal, he seems to have Fichte's view in mind. Both consider consciousness essentially the act of self-identification through differentiation from all else. The ''I" is therefore for Hegel, as well as his predecessors as far back as Kant, a "pure" or "transcendental" self as a condition for being empirical and personal. Yet Hegel does not entirely share his predecessors' theories of self-consciousness, because they detach individual, empirical consciousness so radically from the transcendental "I." In the doctrines of Kant and Fichte there seems to be no difference among various transcendental selves. They constitute "one person" synthesizing the manifold of experience in the same way. By contrast, Hegel discovers the true beginnings of spirit in mutual recognition, where I do "find myself" in the other, but only as a distinctive self: "spirit is . . . this absolute substance, which is unity within the perfect freedom and independence of its opposition, namely of diverse self-consciousness, each existing foritself." 68 The universality of spirit is not the undifferentiated unity of transcendental apperception but the unity-in-difference of independent, empirical human beings who must discover or indeed produce the nexus of mutual recognition as a political or ethical community. In universal spirit, each thus is certain of himself, certain he will find nothing in existing reality but himself; he is as certain of the other as of himself.I intuit in all the others that they are just the same independent beings as I am, since they are for-themselves; I intuit free unity with the others in them in such a way that such unity comes into being as much on my account as through the others,they exist as me, I as they. Thus, reason is in truth actualized in a free people.69 One cannot understand the universality of spirit either as a "group mind" or as detached from finite human beings, designating their merely external similarity or identity, in the way that suburban tract houses are alike: "The universality of spirit must not be conceived merely as a set of common characteristics [nicht als blosse Gemeinschaft-
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lichkeit]; instead it is penetrating unity in the sense of unity with itself in the determination of itself and in the determination of the other." 70 The third definition Hegel gives of spirit is freedom: "the essence of spirit is . . . , formally speaking, freedom, the absolute negativity of the concept with itself."71 But freedom, like spirit's universality, has several facets. To be free in Hegel's sense means first of all to be able to abstract from all else, even one's own existence, which is essentially the definition of the "I." The negativity of self-consciousness represents Hegel's version of Greek autarchy: freedom is "not being dependent upon another."72 But self-sufficiency does not mean a "flight" from otherness. Hegel consistently rejects any interpretation of spirit's freedom that would put a premium on withdrawal from the world, whether in the form of Stoic imperturbability, monastic seclusion, or the pietistic inwardness of romantic "beautiful souls." Rather, he understands self-sufficiency to include the labor involved in spirit's assimilation of other-being. Above all, freedom is coterminous with the recognition of oneself in other people, which is of course the same as spirit's universality: "true freedom [consists] in the identity of myself with the other . . . thus I am truly free only when the other is free as well and is recognized as free by me."73 The Phenomenology of Mind and Philosophy of Right become more lucid works if one constantly bears these words in mind. The isolated individual, whether as a liberal "natural man" or Fichtean ego, is not truly free for Hegel. As long as freedom is defined solely as protection of individual rights or as a victory over nature and inclination, it will always remain, Hegel thinks, a defective and perhaps even contradictory idea. As we can already discern in embryo here, Hegel will try to weld together freedom and community into a single concept, not only rhetorically, but in his analysis of what it means to be a self. The definition of spirit as freedom discloses still another of its dimensions. Because neither the pure selfconsciousness of subjectivity nor the mutual recognition essential to spirit are present in their fully articulated form in the primitive modes of human existence, spirit's freedom must be a historical accomplishment: [T]he essence of spirit . . . [is] its deed. . . . More precisely, its deed is to know itself; I am, but immediately I am only a living organism; as spirit I am only insofar as I know myself. . . . However, consciousness essentially implies that I am for myself, an object to myself. With this absolute judgment [Urteil], distinguish-
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ing myself from myself, spirit gives itself existence [Dasein], posits itself as self-external. . . . One mode of this externality, however, is time. 74 An example Hegel often uses to illustrate the historic transition from substance to subject also illustrates the development of spirit as freedom, since "subject" is equivalent to spirit. He claims that the category of substance predominates in the Orient because subjectivity, individuality, and personality have not yet emerged except as "negations" of substantial unity. He means that the Orient is still what sociologists would call a "traditional" society in which individual choice and judgment are powerfully restricted by the incubus of ancestral custom. As Hegel pictures him, the religious or philosophical Oriental desires above all to annihilate his individual self-consciousness, to "submerge" himself in the void (substance in its negative connotation). He thereby intends to eradicate even the inchoate differentiation of substance and subject: ''The affirmative is merely substance; the individual is what lacks substance, the accidental. Political freedom, right, ethical life [Sittlichkeit], pure consciousness, and thinking are not present in what is accidental. That such relationships might emerge requires that the subject posit itself as consciousness contraposed to substance and thus exist as recognized."75 It is fundamental to realize that, for Hegel, a break with ancestral custom and traditionenlightenmentis essential in the "deepening" of substance to subject. As we saw in the introduction, the rupture with substantial ethical unity is the precondition for all philosophy. Now we can also see that it is the very essence of freedom or Geist. Hegel's reconstruction of wholeness in thought can never take the conservative course of simply revivifying tradition. To attempt to restore the dominance of the ancestral would be, from Hegel's perspective, not merely inexpedient or inadvisable but illogical, if the "I" is incorporated into logic as concept. The impossibility of reconciling man with himself or with ethical unity through a return to substance illuminates the fifth and most encompassing definition of spirit, that it is God: "the divine [should] in general be conceived as spirit."76 The knowledge of God as spirit requires that He have within Himself individual personality or "negativity."77 Differently expressed, "God may only be termed spirit insofar as He is known as mediating Himself with himself internally. Only in this way is He concrete, animate, and spirit."78 Hegel is here repeating, in a theological context, his ar-
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gument in the Logic that being must come to include negativity within itself as its essential moment. God is not grasped as a self unless He is understood according to the model of self-consciousness that is negativity or selfmediation. Hegel enlarges on the definition of spirit as God by means of two propositions: "(a) God is only God, insofar as He knows Himself. (b) His self-knowledge is furthermore His self-consciousness in man and the knowledge of God by man which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God." 79 In other words, God as spirit is not separated from the world: "There is only one spirit, the universal, divine spirit."80 The one spirit has existence or determinate being through human self-consciousness. Indeed, Hegel considers the essential teaching of Christianity to be the revelation that human and divine spirit are the same: "the divine nature is the same as the human, and this unity is intuited."81 The consciousness of God in religious faith is in truth the intuition of God by himself in the human spirit, or equally the intuition of each individual of his own inherent divinity: "the subjective spirit that harkens to divine spirit is itself this divine spirit. That is the truly fundamental determination of spirit's behavior toward itself.''82 The definition of Geist as divine spirit sheds additional light on all the other dimensions of spirit and makes the whole course of the Phenomenology more intelligible. To begin with, Hegel's criticism of the substance category proves to have profound theological significance. To conceive God as substance means that one has not understood the divine nature as self-consciousness or as a person. I have already noted that Spinozistic substance reflects, for Hegel, the category of necessity; it shows that Spinoza has not grasped human spirit, self-consciousness, or freedom. Now we can see that his failure adequately to portray human spirit implies equally that he has not understood divine spirit. This conclusion follows from Hegel's argument that God is only what He knows Himself to be, and that His self-knowledge occurs only in and through finite, human spirit. Consequently, the entire movement of the Phenomenology must be taken to represent not only the elevation of human spirit to full self-consciousness, but just as much the development of divine substance toward genuine personality. To use the categories of the Logic, God as the universal must particularize Himself within the (finite) subject-object relationship in order to become "intensified" into self-consciousness as the singular. Hegel's conception of spirit also suggests the outlines of a solution to the problem I raised in the introduction. Spirit, in order to actual-
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ize its nature as freedom, had to break with the "substantial" world of the ancestral; indeed, this breach, which signals the onset of enlightenment, actually makes spirit become what it is an sich. The reconciliation promised by philosophy must thus include enlightenment or free self-consciousness not only as the path of liberation for human spirit, but also as the process by which God first becomes what He isi.e., intensifies the substantial into subjectivity. We can now interpret the dualisms of enlightenment, the fragmentation of ethical, political, and religious life, as the movement of God toward self-knowledge by way of His "alienation" within the subject-object dichotomies of finite mind. God as spirit is essentially what we saw the absolute to be: the pure negativity which manifests itself within the differentiations of human knowledge, such that He eventually grasps that pure negativity as His very essence. God is therefore something like a tracker following footprints in the snow and eventually coming to realize that the footprints are his own. The double movement of the Phenomenologyman's ascent toward universality and free self-consciousness, and God's descent from abstract substance to human subjectivityis effectively captured in a passage from the preface to that work: [T]he disparity that occurs in consciousness between the "I" and the substance that is its object is the difference of substance, its negative as such. It can be regarded as the deficiency of both, but is in fact their soul or the motive force within each of them. . . . Now if this negation at first appears as a disparity [Ungleichheit] of the "I" to the object, it is really just as much the disparity of substance to itself. What seems to take place outside it, to be an activity directed against substance, is its own doing; and it proves to be subject in its very essence. To the extent that this is completely demonstrated, spirit has equated [gleich gemacht] its existence and its essence. . . . Being is absolutely mediated; it is substantial content which is just as immediately the property of the "I,'' self-like [selbstisch] or the concept. With this the phenomenology of spirit is concluded. 83 At the beginning of this essay, I contended that a radical reinterpretation of self-knowledge, the cogito of Descartes, lay at the heart of Hegel's entire philosophical enterprise. Our discussion of spirit has disclosed that all human knowledge is self-knowledge because it is the activity of divine spirit revealing itself to itself as subject, self, or concept within human consciousness. This is a profoundly important
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step because it conditions Hegel's attitude toward the Enlightenment and his expectations that its dualisms provide the key for the reconciliation promised by philosophy. Hegel is now in a position to interpret the most diverse and even antagonistic intellectual and spiritual developmentsthe Lutheran Reformation, modern natural science and empiricism, the French Enlightenment and Revolution, German Romanticism, and even the modern liberal stateas different aspects of a single movement from substance to subject. Hegel's critique of the Enlightenment is designed to elicit and clarify their inner affinity, which is the progressively more adequate knowledge of spirit by itself as selfconsciousness. That critique must go beyond the forms of speculative thinking we have considered so far and enter the "matter at hand" (die Sache selbst) if we are to be convinced that Hegel's speculative philosophy really can overcome, in thought, the fragmentation of modern culture.
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3 The Metaphysics of Experience Thus far we have moved through the rather rarefied air of metaphysical speculation, reconstructing the tortuous ways in which Hegel appropriated and also criticized the principles of his predecessors. The crucial ideato reiterateis Hegel's discovery of the precise nature of self-consciousness and his transformation of this discovery into a sort of paradigm for grasping other complex relationships. Hegel understood his discovery to be a resolution of a philosophic puzzle that had been implicit in metaphysics from Descartes to Fichte. Philosophers have tried to make the "I" an autonomous and independent substance, or an unconditioned and absolute starting point for all further speculation. Yet the "I" is empty. It gets all determinate content from outside itself. So when philosophers have tried to explain what it means to be a self, they have had recourse to straightforwardly naturalistic accounts (e.g., Descartes and Locke), or else to "parallel worlds" theories (e.g., Kant). Hegel's "concept of the concept" is meant to show that the elements of man's being"I" as negation of other-being (being-for-itself) and as participant in definite subject-object relationshipsare inextricably linked to one another. I cannot know who I am outside of the con-
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crete relationships within which my identity is manifested. On the other hand, being a self means negating all these relationships and standing outside of and above them. For Hegel, these possibilitiesinner retreat and engagement, ironic detachment and earnest pursuit of truth, as well as their many other permutationsdefined the situation of the modern Enlightenment. Comprehending the Enlightenment, and thus incidentally becoming truly enlightened oneself, would mean demonstrating the concealed identity of these dichotomous and diverse attempts at selfdefinition, piecing together a whole picture of the self. When we descend from the heights of metaphysics to survey the intellectual struggles of modernity as Hegel saw them, the identity-in-difference of the participants' viewpoints is invariably what he wishes to bring to light. The two most important manifestations of the dichotomous, fragmented ego of modernity were reformed religion and the scientific study of nature (including man taken as an integral part of nature). True to his project, Hegel will try to show why the painful estrangement and struggle of these forces represents a necessary intensification of spirit's quest for self-knowledge. The first aspect opens up the inwardness of man's spiritual life to a deepening and enriching experience; the second changes the world of sense into an object of rational inquiry where man can discover much more order and harmony than he would have previously suspected. As Hegel notes, "Spirit now dwells and moves about in its own proper sphere; in part this is the natural and finite world, in part the inner world, above all that of the Christian religion." 1 For the present we shall confine ourselves mostly to Hegel's account of spirit's struggle to master "the natural and finite world." Here we shall confront directly what has all along been implicit: Hegel's critique of the Enlightenment's philosophic premises, chiefly its commitment to sense experience, scientific method, and/or mathematics as the touchstones of truth. Still it is wise to recall that we are isolating only one horn of the Cartesian dilemma when we examine the difficulties (as Hegel sees them) of empiricism. Both aspects of that dualism are equally one-sided and abstract. On one hand, the Protestant (and his philosophical apologists such as Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte) insists that only faith (or, for the Kantian, respect for the moral law) can render one's actions truly good. The chief concerns of religion shift from dogma and ecclesiastical hierarchy to the nature of a person's inner life. In its extreme form of pietism, modern Christianity degenerates into a species of narcissism that posits a complete divorce be-
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tween the inner self, reduced to the empty "I" = "I," and the world. The modern Enlightenment, at least in its English and French variants, suffers from the opposite failing. Rather than retreating from the world into the self, the man of the Enlightenment turns all his attention to the natural and social environment. There he expects to find everything organized according to rational principles and, if such is not the case, he will change the world to make it conform to reason. To Hegel, the man of the Enlightenment has admirable intentions but is doomed to failure. In effect, he wishes to discover himself in the world since reason is the quintessence of human spirit. But he cannot do so because he does not know himself and hence lacks a correct (i.e., speculative) concept of reason. The theoretical credo of the modern Enlightenment can be summarized fairly easily. First, the source of all our knowledge is experience (empiricism). Second, our experience will inevitably reveal rational principles at work, or at least it can be made to conform to reason (rationalism). On the surface, Hegel does not appear to take issue with either tenet. His Phenomenology is a study of the experience undergone by consciousness, and he consistently affirms the rationality of the actual. However, he regards the concepts of experience and reason employed by most Enlightenment thinkers as woefully inadequate. In general, the Aufklärer have only produced what Hegel calls philosophies of the understanding or reflection. Experience, Understanding, and Reflection The isolation of the understanding as a faculty distinct from reason may be traced back at least to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. There Kant defines the understanding as a capacity for rules and categories insofar as these are applied to an object of experience. Reason, on the other hand, aims at an "unconditioned synthesis" in which the categories are applied to what cannot, by its very nature, become an object of experience. Both Schelling and Hegel seize upon Kant's distinction, but they reserve the term "reason" for speculative identity. They hold the understanding to be a faculty concerned exclusively with finite determinations: "finitude is the most stubborn category of the understanding." 2 The understanding is at once the mental capacity for separating and differentiating and the faculty which works by the principle of identity. Hegel argues that "The capacity to separate the concrete into abstract determinate qualities must be esteemed as the infinite
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power of the understanding." 3 Or again: "The activity of separating is the power and labor of the understanding, the most marvelous and greatest, indeed the absolute power."4 But he also remarks that "the principle [of the understanding; L.H.] is identity, simple self-relation."5 The understanding works by fixing some aspect or quality of its object as self-identical and thereby different from all its other aspects. These citations should dispel the widely held belief that Hegel scorned "mere" understanding for the sake of a higher reason which could dispense with the labor of finite thought. Hegel notes that we can never develop any definite or determinate thoughts, either in the realm of theory or of practice, unless the understanding exercises its power to abstract and to set artificial lines of demarcation in the fluid reality of sense perception.6 The understanding functions whenever we analyze anything, since to analyze means to dissect a whole into parts that, taken by themselves, are merely abstract or "unactual." Even when I analyze an apple into redness, tartness, and roundness, I am abstracting out qualities that have no independent existence. This capacity to analyze a concrete totality is the amazing power of the understanding and of thinking generally.7 Accordingly, Hegel insists that understanding is a moment of reason rather than a separate faculty or mode of cognition.8 In Hegel's various writings, the understanding is only hazily and imperfectly distinguished from common sense (der gemeine Menschenverstand) below it and reflection above it. Generally, Hegel assumes that ordinary thinking operates on the level of presentations, or the mental images of objects. The understanding turns isolated presentations into thoughts (Gedanken) by classifying and ordering them according to more general categories.9 But if the understanding differs from ordinary consciousness in its attempts to categorize and explain its presentations, then it trespasses on the turf of reflection. Indeed, Hegel often speaks of the reflective understanding which is "the understanding which abstracts and thereby separates . . . and does not advance beyond these separated elements."10 However, Hegel occasionally describes reflection with much the same deep respect that he reserves for the "miraculous power" of the understanding to divide and identify: "reflecting is an activity which separates," or "reflection [is] absolute separation."11 And because to be is to be something determinate, reflection is also "the faculty of being and limitation.''12 To confound matters completely, Hegel remarks that the reflective understanding, when it has turned against reason, behaves as common sense (gemeiner Menschenverstand).
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The difficulty one encounters in making sharp distinctions among common sense, understanding, and reflection indicates not that Hegel was a muddled thinker, but that he was profoundly aware of the continuity between ordinary consciousness and science. To Hegel, science and the grounds, explanations, and models it works with in its capacity as understanding or reflection signify an extension of common sense principles, not their reversal. In sum, the real significance of empiricism is not its epistemology, which Hegel held in low esteem, but its conviction that experience is amenable to rational explanation. Even though the empirical sciences claim to begin with raw experience, "What they essentially intend and produce are laws, general propositions, a theory; thoughts about what is present at hand." 13 As we know, Hegel hopes to push empiricism beyond itself and toward a speculative reconciliation. The presence of thought in the empirical sciences (as laws and explanations) makes them potentially philosophical, if only the limitations of reflection and the understanding could be made explicit in them. "The empirical sciences do not rest content with the perception of singular data in the phenomena; instead, they prepare these for philosophical consideration by thinking them through, i.e., discovering general determinations, genera and laws within them."14 This should not be taken to imply that the understanding or empirical investigations come to incorrect conclusions about their proper objects, which are finite. Philosophy must rather show that empiricism, since it is a construct of the understanding, cannot adequately grasp the traditional concerns of metaphysics (freedom, mind, spirit) "because these objects immediately present themselves as infinite in respect to their content."15 But in addition, it must be demonstrated that empiricism leads beyond itself toward knowledge of these "absolute objects." Otherwise, knowledge of being (as a series of finite objects) could never culminate in self-knowledge, and Cartesian dualism could not be overcome. At the same time, the absolute must include the finite thinking of empirical understanding, or knowledge of it would amount to a virtuoso act of intellectual intuition not accessible to whomever is willing to use his mental faculties.16 The Reductionism of Empiricist Metaphysics For Hegel, the power and vitality of empiricism had a twofold source. First, it redirected man's attention to the world and made it possible for him to feel at home there after the long exodus of medieval otherworldliness. The rediscovery of the natural world also affirmed the
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value of the senses and of their testimony in determining the truth. 17 But this renewed trust in the evidence of the senses also prompted many individuals to put more credence in their own experience than in any dogmatic authority, a development which Hegel welcomed: "The principle of experience contains the infinitely important determination that man himself must be mentally or emotionally involved [dabei] if he is to accept some content and hold it to be true. More specifically he must find such a content to be in accord with or united to his own self-certainty."18 So far, Hegel's evaluation of empiricism dovetails reasonably well with what the empiricists themselves might have claimed. But Hegel also ascribes virtues to the empiricists that they almost certainly did not possess. He praises them for demonstrating that the actual is rational: "There is contained in empiricism this great principle, that what is true must be in reality and accessible to perception. . . . Like empiricism, philosophy knows [erkennt] only what is; it knows nothing of what merely ought to be and therefore does not exist."19 This is a serious misrepresentation of the empiricists' intentions. While they did claim to discover natural laws or principles of utility in experience, they surely meant these to be employed as standards for judging the religious and political institutions of their time. Radical philosophes such as Helvétius and La Mettrie could never have accepted Hegel's suggestion that empiricism implies "the reconciliation of self-consciousness with reason that is in being, with actuality,"20 even though such men were uncompromising empiricists. For the most part, Hegel saw little merit in empiricism's self-interpretation, its "uncomprehended" form. Emil Fackenheim, in his study of religion in Hegel's thought, distinguished between comprehended and uncomprehended Christianity, i.e., roughly between Christianity as viewed from Hegel's speculative vantage point and as understood by Christians themselves.21 The same distinction can be applied here to empiricism first as a moment of Hegel's one philosophy that is essentially a speculative reconciliation and then to empiricism as its proponents understood it. Of all the empiricists it is Locke to whom Hegel devoted the most attention because he found in the Englishman's epistemology all the fundamental propositions that were further developed but never repudiated even by later empiricists like Hume and the French philosophes: "A wide-ranging culture [Bildung] begins with Locke, which, although it has assumed different forms, has remained the same in principle."22 And again: "Lockean philosophy is highly esteemed. On the whole it is still the philosophy of the English and the French, and even, in a certain sense, now of the Germans."23
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In Hegel's view, Locke has misperceived the purpose of philosophical thinking, because he has shifted the focus of concern from the truth of ideas to their genesis. Locke does not ask whether a given category (e.g., perception, causality, substance) is true in and of itself; rather, he asks how it arises in our minds. His answer, that our complex ideas are formed by abstraction from sense experience, Hegel calls "trivial." 24 Hegel's theory of truth, as we have seen, concerns the correspondence of a thought content to itself. Hegel always asks whether a given category is internally consistent or whether it exhibits contradictions which drive it beyond itself. This means that each category is examined according to whether it retains its identity in its differentiation or includes pure negative activity within it as its essential nature, as in the concept or the "I." Locke, because he asks only how we come to know such categories and ignores their truth, misses the point of philosophizing: "In this sole concern with derivation and psychological origins, the sole obligation of philosophyto determine whether these thoughts and relationships possess truth in-and-for-themselveshas been overlooked."25 Hegel does not dispute that elementary sense experience is temporally prior to the formation of more abstract or complex categories.26 But he characterizes this as a mere account of "what happens," whereas philosophy is supposed to reconstruct events in thought and thereby comprehend them: "Philosophy is not supposed to be an account of what happens; rather it should be a knowledge of what is true in events. Furthermore it is supposed to comprehend, within the true, what appears to be a mere occurrence when it is recounted."27 The source of the quarrel between Hegel and Locke is the status of universals and, by extension, of thought as the "universal in action." Hegel assails the arguments of Locke, and especially of Hume, that would have transformed the universal into a secondary, subjective addition to sense data. As Hegel expresses it, Locke thought of "immediate actuality [as] the real and true."28 True to his Kantian heritage, Hegel adopts a quite different position. What is true in experience are the universals: laws, relationships, categories, and uniformities. Experience would be impossible without them. Hence they are not subjective additions to experience but its objective core.29 Thought, as the universal in action, does indeed disengage the universal from contingent sense data. And in this sense one could say that thought alters what is immediately given in perception. But it does so only to elicit various logical relationships which constitute a higher-level actuality than immediate sense data: "Reflection [Nachdenken] alters the manner in which the content exists in sensation, intuition, and presentation.
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Thus it is only by means of an alteration that the true nature of an object comes to consciousness." 30 And from this Hegel concludes that "This indispensable basis, the concept, the universal, which is thought . . . itself, cannot be regarded only as an indifferent form, superficially grafted onto a content [an einem Inhalte]."31 In short, even though the universal is a product of thought, it is nevertheless objective: without its presence in being, there would simply be nothing there to experience. As Hegel expresses it, speculative philosophy readily admits the empiricist principle that there is nothing in the intellect that will not also have been in the senses,32 but just as decisively asserts that there is nothing in sense that was not also in the intellect. The inability of Locke and other empiricists to conceive correctly the relationship between universals and sense experience blinds them to the essential character of all philosophical thinking. On the one hand, they take sense particulars to be real and independent of mental activity. Yet in order to say anything about sense experience they must use the categories of the understanding, dissecting and analyzing the concretum of sense experience. This procedure has two consequences. First, the empiricists do not realize that the products of analysisabstract thoughts like force and law or, in political philosophy, natural rights and passionstransform the concrete totality of experience precisely because they are so abstract. Hegel asserts that this form of analytic cognition is the standpoint of "Locke and all empiricists."33 Second, he argues that these empiricists deceive themselves into believing that they have depicted things as they really are, when in fact they are doing just the opposite. Hegel argues that the empiricists strip away from reality whatever seems to them contingent, so that the result of their analyses is a pure abstraction even though they attempt to pass their abstractions off as "real." This is the character of virtually all liberal political philosophy, especially of its depiction of natural men, natural laws, etc. Hegel characterizes this sort of procedure as the first, obvious notion that would occur to ordinary Verstand. One simply peels off the layers of history, custom, etc. just as though these were the skins of an onion in order to find out what is true and necessary: "If one thinks away everything that might even remotely be regarded as particular or evanescent, such as what pertains to particular mores, history, culture or even the state, then all that remains is man imagined as in the state of nature or else the pure abstraction of man with only his essential possibilities left. One can now discover what is necessary in man merely by looking at this abstract image."34
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In Hegel's estimation, then, the empiricists have missed the point of their own discovery. They have managed to winnow out of the historically contingent societies around them a notion of man, pure and simple, to whom they can then ascribe certain fundamental or "natural" rights. But because their own rhetoric has so often stressed the importance of firsthand experience as against pure reason and argument from authority, they assume that their natural man is a datum of experience, obvious to anyone, rather than a construct of the understanding. Hegel levels the same charge against empiricism when it is employed as a philosophy of modern science. However important firsthand observation might be to scientific inquiry, it will not make sense unless it is pursued in the context of what we today might call a scientific paradigm. The very quest for universal principles in nature and society would, Hegel thinks, necessarily commit a consistent empiricist to some metaphysical (i.e., nonexperiential) vision of reality: The fundamental deception in scientific empiricism is always this: it makes use of metaphysical categories such as matter and force, not to speak of one, many, universality, infinite, etc. And, using these categories as guidelines, it makes further inferences, thereby presupposing and applying the forms of inference, all the while not knowing that it contains and practices metaphysics itself, and makes use of these categories and their syntheses in a completely uncritical, unconscious fashion. 35 Hegel's objection, I think, reflects a deeper concern that the unacknowledged metaphysics implicit in empiricism might impoverish and flatten out the reality of man and nature, robbing it of the qualitative gradations that betoken higher and more spiritual forms of life. But we must emphasize yet again that Hegel assigns a very important place to the analytic procedures of the understanding. Since Hegel considers self-knowledge the mind's most vital project, he cannot disparage the necessary condition of analyzing immediate, concrete totalities into abstract (because detached) parts which are amenable to rational cognition. Accordingly, we find him defending, however reluctantly, the highly unromantic abstractions of Verstand even though the latter does violence to the concreteness of the object it analyzes: "Empiricism, in analyzing objects, falls into error when it supposes that it leaves these objects as they are, since it does indeed transform the concrete into something abstract. In this way it also happens that the living is killed, for only the concrete, the one, is animate. Never-
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theless, that separation must occur if we are to comprehend, and spirit itself is internal separation." 36 Indeed, Hegel believes that the true nature of things consists in the universal, which is a thought. The analytic procedure of empiricism thus strikes out upon the right road toward knowledge, but proceeds only half way. Having reduced the manifold of history, nature, spirit, and politics to simple abstract determinations like pleasure and pain or attraction and aversion, empiricism now calls a halt and pronounces this abstraction to be the nature of reality itself. Hegel protests vehemently against this "misunderstanding that takes the natural principle or the beginning, the point of departure in natural development or in the history of the self-cultivating [sich bildend] individual, to be the true and the first thing in respect to the concept."37 Hegel's attack on the abstract thought of the understanding recalls once again the deepest ambiguities which he discerned in the Enlightenment itself. On the one hand, the men of the Enlightenment could employ understanding in the service of principles which Hegel undeniably accepts: rational inquiry against superstition, individual conviction against mere authority, the rights of man against monarchical despotism. But the "negative" power of analytic thought also made it very difficult for the Enlightenment to provide an alternative vision of man, society, and even nature which would adequately describe the "spiritual" relationships and ideas that concerned Hegel so much, such as religion, family life, art, community, and solidarity, even philosophy. Hegel wanted the Enlightenment to put back together the whole which it had disassembled, perhaps an impossible demand for it: "[T]he main thing is that the separated elements must be reunited."38 Hegel does not reflect as often as one might expect on the reasons behind this apparent "blind spot" in the Enlightenment. Why should philosophers as perspicacious as Descartes, Locke or Hume not have seen these flaws in their own thought, if indeed they truly are flaws? In trying to reconstruct Hegel's critique of the Enlightenment, I found only one passage that really starts to provide a clue. Like Jürgen Habermas in our own day, Hegel seems to believe that the philosophic emphasis of the Enlightenment on reduction of the rich totality of life to simple, abstract categories suggests an unacknowledged "cognitive interest" of its exponents. They reason as far as they need to in order to demonstrate how some phenomena might, in principle, be predicted and controlled. To understand something means, for the Enlightenment, to show what factors produced it. If we can imitate those
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same factors, replacing natural agency by human agency, then we ought to be able to produce the same results. Behind what Hegel takes to be the cognitive interest in control lurks the deeper imperative of sheer physical survival. The mind, together with its apparatus of categories, would seem to be an instrument at the disposal of our bodily needs. As Hobbes suggested in Leviathan, reason imitates nature in creating a sovereign for the sake of the survival of those who submit to it. This cognitive interest would then partially explain why the empiricists (again using the term in Hegel's sweeping sense) tend to reduce the manifold of experience to ever-simpler determinations. These ideas are, I think, clearly spelled out in the following passage, where Hegel summarizes critically the views of Köppen, a disciple of Jacobi and of the latter's mentor, David Hume: We can comprehend space, consciousness . . . , and the objective world only in terms of analytical units; we can only break them down into component parts. In this way a boundless field (i.e., open-ended and lacking totality) is opened up for our investigation, which we are compelled to cultivate for the sake of our physical survival alone. Those things whose mechanism we have discovered can also be produced by us if the means themselves are in our hands. In this manner, what we construct at least in our imagination we can comprehend; and what we cannot construct, we also cannot comprehend. The cognitive process of understanding is a ceaseless equating that we call connecting and that is a continual diminution and simplification of the manifold, to the point, if such were possible, of its complete elimination and annihilation. 39 Hegel's argument against this analytic procedure is a reductio ad absurdum. To flatten down the diverse content of concrete experience to some simple determination by discovering a quality of "sameness" in everything ultimately impoverishes experience toward the vanishing point. For example, to argue as Helvétius did that all behavior can be explained on the basis of pleasure and pain means that we merely repeat, apropos of any human action, the same thing over and over, i.e., that the person sought pleasure or avoided pain. Moreover, according to Hegel there is no arbitrary stopping point on the path of abstract empiricism. Some empiricists "find" aggression to be the natural impulse in man and reduce all behavior to it; others find sociability, still others benevolence. Yet as Hegel points out: "First of all empiricism, in this process of separation, lacks any criterion at all for establishing
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the dividing line between the contingent and necessary; that is, empiricism cannot say what, in the chaos of the state of nature or in the abstraction of a human being, should be omitted and what retained as a permanent feature." 40 In other words, these empiricists have not driven abstraction "to the point of absolute, negative unity";41 rather, they have only extinguished a great number of particularities and determinations. In Hegel's view, it was Kant and especially Fichte who showed us that a complete analysis of human activity and the world, a relentless process of abstraction, leads us to conceive human beings as pure negativity, the "I" that excludes from itself every determination. Human beings as empiricists portray them are indeed abstract atoms, reduced to some primitive impulse of motivation. Yet the abstractness which characterizes them seems to come from "outside," from the empirical scientist who strips away "inessential" determinations such as history or custom. From Hegel's perspective, however, they have not come to see that this abstraction is the very activity of thinking, the nature of the ''I." The abstract atoms of empirical analysis are each instances of pure negative activity, stripping themselves of contingency and accidentality. Thus when the analytic procedure of empiricism is pushed to the limit it yields nothing but pure identity (the identity of self-consciousness) that is just as much nothing at all or pure negativity. Empiricism fails not because it thinks and thereby separates the concrete whole into abstract thought determinations, but because it does not carry thought far enough. If it had, it would have discovered not primitive abstractions like pain and pleasure, aggression or force, but the concept: "Abstracting thought must . . . not be regarded merely as the putting-to-one-side of sensuous material, which would not thereby suffer any diminution of its reality. Rather, abstracting thought is the reduction and absorption [Aufheben] of this material, qua mere phenomenon, into its essential being that in turn manifests itself only in the concept."42 Enlightenment empiricism stood halfway between the concrete immediacy of ethical life and the concrete-in-thought of philosophy. It distorted reality by reducing it to primitive abstractions, yet could not overcome that abstractness because it did not grasp the concept, or pure negative activity. For this reason Hegel prefers even nonsystematic empiricism that merely collects data and descriptions to the abstract empiricism of modern theorists of natural right.43 Even an undigested mass of empirical data, suggests Hegel, gives a more accurate representation of a concrete whole than a theory that stretches the whole out on the Procrustean bed of some lifeless, abstract model.
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Hegel believes that his own theory is free from the reductionist bias of empiricism because its heart and soul is the concept, the only "paradigm" of reality that is not abstract and lifeless, but rather a "pulsebeat" or an eternal selfdifferentiation and return-into-itself. In all of Hegel's works, the primitive, abstract or simple indeed marks the beginning, but ''the abstract is the untrue." 44 The more articulated, developed, and concrete is not an illusion behind which lurks the primitive (as in Hobbes where striving after power for the sake of security underlies every aspect of state and society). Instead, these simple abstractions mark only the beginning of philosophical thought, not its completion: "[T]he beginning is the least formed, the least developed and internally defined; it is rather the poorest, the most abstract."45 The reductionistic tendency of empiricism becomes especially evident in its attempt to explain the mind's activity in terms of natural processes. By contrast, Hegel's own philosophy stands or falls with the assertion that the mind can have knowledge of itself that is not mediated through biological or mechanical models. This, in turn, amounts to the assertion that we have not understood Geist by tracing the origins of mental activity back to chemical processes in the brain, the influence of "conditioning" upon our thought processes, or the evolutionary development of mental capacities in man's struggle to adapt to his environment. Hegel asserts the independence of mind from nature in an uncompromising way: "[T]he emergence of spirit from nature [should] not be thought of as though nature were the absolutely immediate, the first thing and originally positing activity, while spirit for its part would only be posited by nature. Rather, nature is posited by spirit and the latter is absolutely primary. Spirit as it exists in-and-for-itself is not the mere result of nature, but is in truth its own result. . . . Spirit does not emerge from nature in a natural fashion."46 The reasons for Hegel's position should be clear by now: if mind is portrayed as an extension (albeit highly refined and complex) of res extensa, then its specific character as negative activity has not been understood. His own version of a philosophy of mind consequently depicts the liberation of the "I" from inner and outer nature through its own activity. Hegel never abandoned Fichte's insight into the self-producing character of the "I" and reasserts it in his doctrine of consciousness: The being-for-itself of free universality is a higher form of the awakening of the soul to selfhood [zum Ich], or to abstract universality insofar as it is for abstract universality. In this way, it is thinking and subject foritself and more precisely it is the subject
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of a judgment in which the "I" excludes from itself the natural totality of its determinations as an object, a world external to it, at the same time relating itself to this external object in such a way that it is immediately introreflected in it or is conscious. 47 The act of self-identification in which I posit myself by excluding everything else from myself as not-"I" has no precise analogue in nature. Hence, it is incomprehensible so long as one adopts the attitude of empiricism and observes the mind from the outside, excluding from consideration the very activity by means of which subject and object arose in the first place: "The self-relating universal exists nowhere outside the 'I.' In external nature, . . . the universal . . . does not reach actual being-for-itself."48 Empiricism tends to reduce mind to nature insofar as it insists upon finding a causal relation between the two. Mind cannot have caused nature since nature existed long before human consciousness. So the only alternative is to assert that nature caused mind, or that mind arose as the result of a causal chain in which nature was gradually modified so as to produce the brain. But, according to Hegel, it is the causal relation itself that must be called into question. He sees no reason to assume its absoluteness, particularly when one is trying to comprehend the mind: ''The assumption made about speculative philosophy, that the causal relationship is especially predominant in it, is fundamentally wrong. For the causal relationship is in fact entirely excluded from it."49 Instead, mind or the "I" is a causa sui in which "producer and product are equated."50 Here again, the natural world may be prior in time, but if we ask what it is we must ultimately have recourse to universals like force, law, and species to provide an answer. Thus the empiricist is put in the position of asserting that mind is reducible to (or caused by) something that, when he attempts to explain or describe it, turns out to be a thought determination or category. Hegel's contention is that if the empiricist took his criterion of experience seriously, it would lead him to reject as insufficient the unacknowledged metaphysical categories through which he had hitherto interpreted experience. The path of experience thus leads away from the formulations of ordinary empiricism and toward the concept. Empiricism Comprehended Empiricism hardly counts as philosophy at all for Hegel because of the self-deception inherent in its attempt to repudiate metaphysics
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while covertly practicing it. Therefore, to demonstrate that the principle of experience really does lead beyond itself toward a speculative reconciliation, Hegel must take it out of the hands of Locke and its other apologists. In the early chapters of the Phenomenology, he sets up a "naïve" consciousness which adopts a more or less instinctively empirical attitude without being committed to any full-blown empiricist philosophy. This consciousness appears twice in the Phenomenology, once as understanding and once as "observing reason." The former still regards its object as other than itself, thereby preserving a distinction between being and thinking, while the latter is "the certainly of consciousness that it is all reality." 51 But both adopt the detached attitude toward their objects which is typical of empirical investigation. Moreover, both employ categories of reflection, i.e., relational notions in which the world is duplicated. It is seen once as immediate and then again as pointing beyond itself to a more essential reality which grounds or explains it. And just as in the Logic, the perplexities occasioned by these categories of reflection lead to the discovery or "positing" of the concept. But in the Phenomenology, the concept takes on the explicit form of self-consciousness, the "I." In other words, Hegel takes the position characteristic of German idealism since Kant: that an adequate analysis of the objects of experience will reveal the presence of the self within them. The chapter entitled "Force and Understanding" is preceded by two shorter sections in which Hegel shows the inadequacies of "sense certainty" and "perception." "Sense certainty" is an attitude that claims that the entire world of sense experience is immediately accessible to us, and that we do not need laws, theories, or universals to explain it. In describing the world, this consciousness has recourse to demonstrative pronouns or vague adverbs like "this,'' "here," and "now." But such words themselves are universals, and the most empty ones at that, since they are entirely indifferent to their content. For "perception," which is a category of reflection, experience consists of a manifold of "things," each distinct from all others and identical to itself in spite of the diversity of its properties. Here the subject is implicated more directly in the process of knowing. It is an obvious step (one taken in different ways by both Locke and Kant) to differentiate the thing as it is in-itself from the thing as it is for-us. But once we declare that there is a gulf between essence and appearance, we must admit that we cannot obtain certain knowledge of the former. Appearances may deceive us. On a more general level, the understanding splits the
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sensuous concrete into various abstractions (as here into one-many, thing-properties, being-for-itself and being-foranother), but cannot reconstruct the concrete-in-thought that would be equivalent to penetrating the façade of deception to attain the essential core of things. Consequently, the gulf between essence and seeming that is also the dualism of subject and object can (indeed must) widen to the point where the necessary connection between the moments is no longer visible. In "force," the understanding has found a superior category, one which more closely approximates the concept. Force is an activity that remains identical to itself throughout all its manifestations. Moreover, force only is, insofar as it expresses itself. Gravitational force, for example, shows itself in a relationship among countless objects, but it is entirely itself in each of these manifestations and indeed would be nothing at all apart from them. This demonstrates that the understanding, in employing the category of force, acknowledges that empirical investigation is not so much concerned with sense data as it is with the theories that explain those data. The scientist regards things in toto as appearances explicable in terms of hypothetical entities which are not themselves accessible to perception. Thus, the theoretical constructs of the scientist constitute a supersensuous realm of laws which is the "inside of" or the "ground behind" the phenomenal world. For Hegel, this attempt to explain the world as it appears to us by a supersensible world different from the world of appearances is characteristic of modern ''reflective" culture. But once we take this approach, we are forced to concede that the supersensible might be the inverse of what it appears to be. For instance, Descartes' evil demon might have fooled him into believing that he had a body, or that a chair was in his room and not a table. The inverted world is a nearly ineluctable consequence of the divorce between being and thinking characteristic of Cartesian dualism. Once the distinction between things as they are forus and as they are for-themselves has been accepted as a genuine limitation on knowledge, then the inverted world becomes at least conceivable. Hegel does not want to say that things ultimately are (or are not) the inverse of what we perceive them to be. He simply wants to draw our attention to a significant difference between modern and ancient thought. For the philosophic tradition from Plato through Aquinas, it seemed self-evident that there was an objective order of things that could be reproduced or reflected in the mental picture that we construct of the cosmos. But from Descartes to Fichte, i.e., in a very sig-
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nificant strand of the Enlightenment, it was not at all clear that any cosmic order existed that could be neatly distinguished from our mental image of it. As a result, any appeal to the experience we have of the world may encounter the objection that all such experience is simply an externalized version of the order of our own thoughts, indeed that the "real" world may not be anything like what we experience it to be. Hegel proceeds to show how the dialectic of law and the inverted world leads us to the concept. But empiricism has not yet spoken its last word in the Phenomenology. It reappears in a more concrete form as "observing reason." Reason is the comprehended phase of scientific investigation. It stands upon the plane of Kant's transcendental apperception, and it is intersubjective in character: its conclusions are intended to be valid for every self, because the manifold of experience is synthesized according to a priori rules anchored in the structure of self-consciousness as such. Consequently, reason adopts the Kantian category as its principle of experience and interprets the category as "essential being [Wesenheit] or simple unity of what exists solely as thinking activity; or reason is this: that selfconsciousness and being are the same essence." 52 However, Hegel is quick to point out that reason has only the naïve certainty that it is all of reality. It is indeed idealism, but not the systematic idealism of Kant and Fichte; rather, reason simply takes an idealistic attitude toward the world. Reason begins by observing external nature, planting the ensign of its sovereignty on all its heights and depths. Unlike the understanding that confined itself to the Newtonian universe of law and force, observing reason must try to come to grips with the phenomenon of organic life. Its downfall is that it uses mechanistic categories like efficient causality and reciprocity that cannot do justice to even the simplest behavior of organisms. Like Kant, Hegel thought that teleological explanations had an important place in biology, a belief that nowadays few would endorse. Still, we should not fail to appreciate the genuine insights in Hegel's argument. Old-fashioned mechanistic explanations frequently pictured organisms as entirely passive, responding like machines to external pressures and forces in predictable ways. Rejecting this, Hegel insisted on ascribing the "purposes" of self-preservation, reproduction, etc. to animals.53 In partial agreement with Hegel, modern biological research has demonstrated both the crucial role of genetic inheritance and mutation in shaping an organism's behavior as well as the myriad adaptations, behavioral and morphological, that organisms have developed to survive in diverse
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environments. Our view of biological organisms may still be mechanistic, but it certainly portrays living creatures as much more complex machinesmore active, adaptive, and environment-shapingthan the mechanistic theories of Hegel's time. A related problem, one perhaps more directly relevant to political theory, concerns whether specifically human behavior can be understood by reference to a mechanistic paradigm. We have already noted that the deepest ambiguity of the Enlightenment surfaces in this very issue. Even though the Enlightenment begins, for Hegel, in Descartes' discovery of the cogito and hence of the distinctive character of spirit or mind, it soon gives rise to an almost antithetical current of thought, typified by Hobbes, Helvétius, La Mettrie, Hume, and others, which comes close to denying self-consciousness, or else treats it as an epiphenomenon of man's biological nature. For Hegel, then, it seemed that the Enlightenment, even in its most ingenious representatives such as Kant, tended to make mechanism its highest constitutive category. In so doing it rendered unattainable the telos of mind to become transparent to itself, since inorganic or mechanically controlled nature never fully approximates the form of the concept or the "subject." Among reason's strategies for observing the human mind or spirit are what Hegel calls "psychological laws." At first, reason had attempted to fathom the mind by enumerating a series of logical laws that supposedly govern our mental processes. But it was forced to concede that the mind is not just a "bag" of disconnected laws. Instead it is a unity modeled on the Logic's being-for-itself. We recall that being-for-itself refers to an identity constituted by the active, explicit negation of otherness, a definition Hegel resuscitates to delineate the field of psychology. The object of psychology is ''the active consciousness that is for-itself in such a way that it annuls [aufhebt] other-being and has its actuality in this intuition of itself as negativity." 54 Hegel believes that the for-itself is an appropriate category for empirical psychology since it investigates the relationship between behavior and external influences. This broad definition of empirical psychology encompasses practically everything that today would be the province of the behavioral sciences. Hegel's psychology considers the various faculties and inclinations which determine the behavior of the individual toward his environment. But it also deals with what today we could call social roles and socialization, the process whereby the individual conforms to the pregiven habits, mores, values, and ways of thinking of the society in which he lives. Hegel insists that neither form of behaviorism
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does justice to the unique character of human self-consciousness: negative activity. The brand of psychology which isolates various faculties and inclinations to explain behavior is compelled to acknowledge some sort of unity in consciousness. After all, it is one person, the individual, that psychology wishes to describe. So it tends to picture the mind as a "bag" 55 in which the various faculties coexist, a metaphor somewhat reminiscent of Hume's "stage" across which diverse impressions parade. Having abstracted out these faculties, psychology now tries to use them to explain the behavior of an individual person. But these explanations are, as Hegel says, even more uninteresting than enumerating the species of insects or mosses.56 Such explanations usually amount to little more than ascertaining that Jones did such and such because he has more common sense or a greater inclination than Smith. In short, the behavior is simply introreflected into a faculty or inclination that is almost identical to the behavior. Such a covertly tautological explanation of behavior by reference to various faculties and inclinations is only one of the pitfalls of empirical psychology. Hegel takes up another problem with explicit reference to what he terms "pragmatic historiography." The pragmatic historian (in our time he would be the Freudian or the psychohistorian) makes use of the reflective distinction of interior and exterior to reduce historical deeds to certain subjective, private motivations characteristic of the person's "inner" life: it is "frequently the case that certain people, in judging others who have accomplished something right and excellent, make use of the untrue distinction between interior and exterior so they can claim that such accomplishments are only external, and that these actors were really interested in something quite differentthe satisfaction of their vanity or of other reprehensible passions."57 Hegel insists on the contrary that "man is nothing but the series of his deeds,"58 a phrase which could have been culled from the writings of Sartre or other existentialists. But his concerns are actually more characteristic of Nietzsche. He fears that the reductionism inherent in the inner-outer category of pragmatic historiography will efface the distinction between acts which really are undertaken for private gain or other particularistic ends, and the res gestae of world-historical individuals who have sacrificed private contentment for the sake of genuinely universal purposes. The approach of the pragmatic historian be-speaks "the attitude of envy"59 reminiscent of Nietzsche's ressentiment, which intends "to divest of its nimbus everything which has hitherto
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been celebrated and praised, and to reduce it to the level of vulgar mediocrity in respect to its origin and actual significance." 60 But Hegel, unlike Nietzsche, does not propose to become a psychologist himself to combat the corrosive effects of empirical psychology. Rather, he considers the results of pragmatic historiography the outcome of a "category mistake," namely the application of a distinction between interior and exterior, which, when fully analyzed, proves contradictory whether taken in its identity or in its difference aspect. The significance of the remainder of Hegel's section on reason will be to undermine the interior-exterior category and with it the whole attitude of observation. First, however, Hegel must come to grips with the "sociological" aspect of empirical psychology, specifically its attempt to explain behavior on the basis of external influences. Here we have an exterior, the mores and customs of a society, and an interior, the person's motives now pictured as a sort of "block box" such that a complete explanation would demonstrate the identity of the individual and the society: If the exterior [i.e., society; L. H.] were constituted, in-and-for-itself, just as it appears in each individual case [an der Individualität], then individuality would have been comprehended by reference to its exterior. We would have a double gallery of images, of which one would be the reflected appearance of the other. One set would be the gallery of complete determinateness and circumscription by external circumstances, the other would be the same things, but now transposed into the mode in which they exist within the conscious being. The former would be the surface of a sphere, the latter, its center representing [vorstellen] the surface within itself.61 Hegel's objections to this sort of behavioral explanation display his (essentially Kantian) demand that the rational should be universal and necessary. One cannot normally hope for anything more than probabilities or high correlations between circumstances and individual behavior in social science. But for Hegel a finding that 70 percent of all Roman Catholics vote for the Democratic party would not constitute a genuinely rational relationship. He points out that "Individuality . . . is just this: that the individual is the universal both merging in a tranquil fashion with the universal at hand, the mores, customs, habits, etc. and conforming to them, and also reacting to them in a contrary way and inverting them. . . . What is supposed to influence the individual, and what sort of influence it is supposed to havethese
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questions actually have the same meaningdepends therefore only upon the individual." 62 In other words, the societal circumstances that condition individual behavior are not simply "out there" independent of the individual; they only exist for him insofar as they interact with his own subjectivity to form a peculiarly individual world. Thus a sociologist confronted with two people exposed to a Catholic upbringing who react to it in opposite ways must concede that their individual personalities and idiosyncrasies must have predisposed them to act in the ways they did. What began as an explanation of individual behavior by reference to external circumstances ends in the avowal that the influence of such circumstances on the individual can be understood only by reference to the individual himself.63 The modern social scientist would probably make two replies to Hegel's objections. First, he would insist that correlations and probabilities do indeed help us explain the behavior of large numbers of persons even though they do not provide us with anything like necessary connections in individual cases. Second, he would likely argue that if we know all the determining factors of an individual's life as well as their relative importance and priority, we could explain the individual's behavior completely. Here the social scientist parts company with Hegel. Hegel considers negative activity to be the essential feature of mind. He would regard the social scientist's model of behavior as inadequate because it depicts the self as a passive recipient of influences rather than as the activity of negating or transforming them. Moreover, Hegel repudiates the very notion of causality which the social scientist, as a protagonist of the understanding, necessarily presupposes: "[In] relationships of physical-organic and spiritual life . . . what we call a cause does prove to have a different content than the effect. But this is only the case because what affects a living being is independently determined, altered, and transformed by it, i.e., because the living being does not permit the cause to have its effect. . . . It is the nature of spirit . . . not to admit anything originally other into itself."64 Here again we find that the quarrel between Hegel and the empiricist tradition has little to do with the relative value of experience as a source of knowledge. Rather it is a question of which logical categories most faithfully express the various dimensions and levels of what we in fact experience. If, says Hegel, causality cannot illuminate the nature of human consciousness, then it must be deemed inapplicable and a higher category, the concept, must supplement it. But observing reason does not abandon its attempt to find a re-
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ductionist explanation for mind. Where psychological or sociological explanations fall short, it descends to yet more primitive levels of analysis. In physiognomy and phrenology it depicts the exterior of mindfacial features and skull formationas the key to its interior. From an earlier discussion we recall that reason had proclaimed itself to be all of reality and set out to ransack the world of experience to prove its point. In a way it does discover itself in these most crass of pseudosciences, but only by a reductionism so absurd that it must call into question its whole enterprise and begin to see the incommensurability of the "I" to any determination of mere being. Reason thus abandons both the category of being and observation as its guiding epistemological principles. From now on it will be spirit, human self-consciousness inhabiting a human world. Its object will no longer be nature, or even the mind understood as an extension of nature, but another self-consciousness that it recognizes as itself (that is, as an "I") and that in turn recognizes it as a self. "Thus, the object to which it is positively related is a selfconsciousness; the object is in the form of thinghood, i.e., it is independent; but [consciousness] has the certainty that this independent object is not alien to it. Thus it knows it is implicitly recognized by the other self-consciousness; it is spirit which has the certainty of its unity with itself in the duplication of its self-consciousness and in the independence of both." 65 Reason, like the understanding, returns from its mediation through experience to the concept which is selfconsciousness. But the self-consciousness to which understanding penetrated was singular and appetitive. Now reason discovers that the truth of experience is intersubjectivity. Reason (or spirit) cannot be expressed in terms of being or simple self-identity. It must make itself into what it is. But to comprehend the self-producing nature of spirit means essentially to think the "I," for only it is truly for-itself. We thus have a reason for which reason itself (the "I") is the object, the intersubjectivity of mutual recognition. The collapse of observing reason leads us directly into the sphere of human praxis, society, the state, and religion. Reason sees that its observational attitude was essentially a form of alienation. Self-consciousness externalized itself both by seeking itself in the experience of external things (res extensa) and by adopting the detached attitude of scientific investigation in which it abstracted from its practical relations to others. The attitude of modern science is thus seen to be quite literally artificial, a form of self-discipline in which I make myself into what I am. For this reason, scientific empiricism must be considered a
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variant form of the Bildung (self-formation or culture) that Hegel takes to be the characteristic attitude of the Enlightenment. In a wider sense, modern scientific empiricism is self-alienated because it assumes the absolute validity of reflection or reflective understanding. It attempts to fathom itself indirectly and asymptotically by observing an infinite (in the "bad" Hegelian sense) series of finite forms: "When reason has burrowed through all the viscera of things and opened up every artery in them in the hope that reason itself will bound forth to meet it, such good fortune will not be its lot." 66 Instead, reason or spirit conceals the absolute (and here itself) from itself in the endless multiplication of finite, "observed" entities: The power of limitation, the understanding, attaches to the edifice it has constructed between man and the absolute everything that man considers sacred and valuable. Then it buttresses its edifice with all the powers of nature and talent, and extends it into infinity. In it, one can find the complete totality of limitations, but not the absolute itself. The absolute, now lost in the parts, drives the understanding onward toward the infinite development of multiplicity, while the latter, because it endeavors to extend itself toward the absolute but just reproduces itself endlessly, only mocks itself.67 In the end, empiricism is both symptom and weapon of the culture of reflection that paradoxically asserts both the absolute validity of stable, self-identical forms as fixated by the understanding and the absolute power of the self over any fixed determination (as the skepticism and even nihilism of the Enlightenment). The "truth" of empiricism is the "I," and specifically the cultured self of the Enlightenment and French Revolution that adopts empiricism as a means to demolish all authority and tradition. To that world of self-made (in the philosophical sense) individuals we now turn.
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4 Political Power and Personal Fragmentation: The Culture of Early Modern Europe Important as the principle of experience may have been in revolutionizing the study of nature, its significance for human affairs preoccupied Hegel even more. The man of the Enlightenment adopts the same strategy toward the investigation of political and social life that he had toward the world of res extensa generally. He expects that the study of society will yield uniform patterns just as the physical universe had done. Like the scientist of "observing reason," the Aufklärer expects to find rationality behind the contingencies of human affairs. But when applied to political life, the search for rational or "natural" laws has two important consequences: first, such natural laws tend to be extremely abstract and reductionistic; and second, they function as an "ought" or nonactual standard for existing institutions. Thus the Enlightenment's emphasis on independent and critical thought, summed up in the watchword "experience," set the stage for a clash between premodern, authoritarian and traditional institutions and the newly proclaimed rational or natural standards of right. In principle, as we shall see, Hegel approves of the proclamation of the rights of man. Like most progressive thinkers of his time, Hegel had a deep antipathy for corruption, arbitrary government, and of-
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ficially sanctioned cruelty. But he had another agenda as well. The objective world was the stage upon which man, as historical actor, discovered and understood himself. As long as reason had not penetrated and reformed society, human beings could not attain full self-consciousness. The image of human freedom would remain clouded by particularistic, preenlightened forms of life, and man would not truly find and actualize himself as the citizen of a rational state. On the other hand, Hegel sensed a certain ominous one-sidedness in the Enlightenment's political program. The search for rational and transsubjective standards of justice in the form of natural laws resurrects the dialectic of interior and exterior. The latter, what Hegel often calls positive law, draws its legitimacy from the "interior," the abstract rational principles of human associaton now deemed natural. But it is only a small step to assert (as Hume eventually did) that the interior of thingsnatural lawis not objectively present in experience. "Natural" law is not really natural at all. It is a convention whose obligatoriness rests solely on our habit of obedience and its usefulness to our subjective ends. In the political sphere as well as in the metaphysical, empirical reflection tends toward skepticism or even nihilism: "Since perception is supposed to remain the basis for whatever we hold to be true, universality and necessity appear as something illegitimate, as a subjective contingency, a mere habit whose content can be constituted in any number of ways. An important consequence of this is that legal and ethical determinations as well as the content of religion appear to be contingent and to have lost their objectivity and inner truth when considered in this empirical way." 1 The Enlightenment culminates in the "desperate conclusion that our knowledge is something merely subjective."2 To combat this corrosive skepticism and restore the integrity of man's political and ethical life, Hegel must prove to the proponents of the Enlightenment that they are not enlightened enough. He must show them that their dualistic assumptions and adherence to the dogmas of the understanding are self-contradictory and self-defeating. We have already seen how he conducts this argument on a theoretical level. Now we will examine Hegel's contention that the practice of the Enlightenment leads to a hopeless impasse unless it transforms itself into speculative philosophy. To appreciate Hegel's argument we must bear in mind that the consciousness of the Phenomenology has now explicitly reached the level of spirit. The diverse figures we encounter are now regarded as defining and embodying a single spirit that is, however, inwardly fragmented.
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The earlier forms of consciousness, typical of the "detached" attitude of scientific empiricism, experienced the instability of the understanding's self-identical forms. But they did not apply that insight to the "I" itself, the source of the principle of identity and the understanding's rigid abstractions. Yet when the phrenologists claimed that spirit is a thing, they unwittingly laid bare an important truth: that spirit must objectify itself to know itself. It must become alien to itself rather than retaining the stable self-identity typical of scientific thinking: Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing that is not in its experience, for what is in experience is only spiritual substance, and this, more exactly, as object of itself. Spirit, however, becomes object, for it is this movement, to become an other to itself, i.e., object of itself, and then to annul [aufheben] this otherbeing. And experience is just the designation for this movement in which the immediate, the nonexperienced, i.e., the abstract, whether of sensuous experience or of the simple as it is grasped by thought, alienates itself and then returns to itself from this alienation. Only then is the immediate and abstract presented in its actuality and truth as well as becoming the property of consciousness. 3 As we have stressed, the self has no definite or determinate core. What it is only comes to light in the series of subject-object relationships within which experience unfolds, both historically and on a personal level. One could say, as Hegel does, that a person must become "alienated" from himself in order to know himself; that is, he must literally plunge into the human and natural world, apparently alien and "other," in order to discover therein what he really is. The introspective narcissist may believe that he is plumbing the depths of his soul. But he overlooks the enormous extent to which his personality and thought have been formed by the historically transmitted patterns of life beyond his subjectivity. But Hegel wishes to press the issue of alienation toward a higher stage of development. If it is true that all experience is alienation, then we must come to feel and experience that alienation for what it is. We must, in other words, become aware that what we are in some sense depends upon what we are recognized and seen to be by others. Furthermore, we must feel keenly the perhaps unbridgeable gulf between the self we present in everyday life and the inner awareness accessible to no one but ourselves. In Hegel's language, spirit cannot simply be self-alienated. It must know itself as such.
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Of course, the empiricist forms of consciousness in the Phenomenology have certainly gotten a glimpse of the alienated character of experience in the inversion (Verkehrung) of their own theoretical expectations. But it is modern culture, the human world rather than the world of scientific investigation, that reveals the complete personal fragmentation that the theoretical attitudes only point toward. The contradictory, "inverted" character that empiricism discovered in the objects only served to drive consciousness back upon itself, into the seemingly unassailable selfidentity of the Cartesian cogito. But according to Hegel, the fragmentation of modern culture is so complete that it attacks even the "I," providing the historical, cultural precondition for speculative philosophy. 4 The Demise of Ethical Life To grasp the meaning of fragmentation in our modern world, we must first form an acquaintance with its "other," the ethical life or Sittlichkeit that for Hegel was best exemplified in classical Greece. The ethical man is one who carries out his duty not because it coincides with an abstract principle of justice or morality, but rather because it is his duty. To reflect upon duty destroys its ethical character. This turns an abstract, universal principle into the "interior" of concrete duties, the source of their obligatory character. Moreover, when I reflect upon my duty, I put myself outside and above it as the "absolute" point from which specific duties are compared to an abstract principle of justice: "[T]he true [ethical life] of the ancient world has as its princi ple that each man should abide in his duty. An Athenian citizen did what was expected of him, so to speak, instinctively. If I reflect upon the object of my action, I must be aware that my will has been superadded to it."5 Hegel refers to ethical life as a ''second nature,"6 suggesting that the ancient citizen adjusted himself to the prevailing mores and institutions almost as though these were natural conditions of existence that he simply had to accept as inevitable. "For the subject, ethical substance, its law and powers . . . possess as object the character of beingin the highest sense of autarchyan absolute, infinitely more solid authority and power than the being of nature."7 Hegel's treatment of ethical life in the polis constitutes the first section on spirit in the Phenomenology and is entitled "true spirit." By contrast, the last section on spirit is called "spirit certain of itself," and gives an account of the German Enlightenment as exemplified primarily by the moral theories of Kant and Fichte. Our acquaintance
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with speculative terminology should alert us to the character of the development we will witness in this long treatment of spirit. The Greek world is "true" spirit; this means it contains the absolute content without absolute form, i.e., without the for-itself or the "I." We recall from the earlier discussion of Descartes that the cogito is equivalent to self-certainty, the pure "I" or transcendental apperception which lacked all content. In the context of spirit, Hegel is suggesting that the modern Enlightenment in its political form (France) and moral form (Germany) has still not gone beyond the "certainty'' of Cartesian dualism. Thus, spirit can attain certainty and truththe absolute content knowing itself as suchonly if the truth of Greek ethical life and the certainty of modern Enlightenment can be comprehended as aspects of the same self-differentiating "one." This comprehension would be equivalent to a reconstruction of ethical wholeness, which is Hegel's philosophical project, but only in thought. Greek ethical life or "true spirit" embodies a certain absoluteness of content, a complete interpenetration of the individual and his world, which we cannot recapture in practice. To see why this is so, we must examine Hegel's account of ethical life in the ancient world more closely. "True spirit" appears as the culmination of a long series of forms of appearing consciousness, all embodying different attitudes of reason. These various "reasonable" consciousnesses have a single attitude in common. They are convinced that the individual can "actualize" himself or be a world unto himself without having completely assimilated the sociocultural milieu within which he exists. Whether he is intent on reforming society, making it more virtuous, assisting in realizing larger social purposes, or making judgments about the prevailing moral shibboleths, he always assumes that the social whole, the universal, is merely an aggregate of self-actualizing individuals. "True spirit" or genuine ethical life differs from all these reasonable forms of consciousness because in it the individuals are implicitly aware that the universal is their "substance," the ground upon which they stand and the whole content of their actions. Participation in common projects and the performance of family duties illustrate, respectively, the difference in this context between reason and spirit. In a cooperative endeavor, a shared goal holds men together and directs their efforts. They intuit in each other a commitment to a common end. Yet the bond between them is ephemeral. I can equally well choose not to participate, and I regard our efforts as temporary, limited by the purpose we share. Moreover, such coopera-
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tive activities are accidental to my self-identity, predicates which can be changed. By contrast, our responsibilities to family members have a more profoundly obligatory character. The family is an end-in-itself, apart from any utilitarian goals that it pursues. Further, membership in a family is not contingent. The family bond permeates all the individuals who comprise it, determining their identity and giving significance to their lives. Finally, the actions of family members do not have the "accidental" character we encounter in mere cooperation: "In order for the familial relationship to be ethical, the nature of actions performed, in respect both to the person who acts and the person for whose benefit the act is undertaken, may not be contingent, as perhaps occurs in giving aid or rendering service." 8 Thus in the family and in ethical life as such one no longer regards the universal, the whole, or common ends as a predicate of independent subjects (really substances); instead, the universal is itself now a subject acting through the individuals. As in the Logic, the reciprocity of independent substances yields to a new, speculative relationship (the concept) in which the moments, formerly separate substances, now become differentiae of the same self-dirempting "one'' that is wholly present in each. Furthermore, ethical actions concern the whole person, not the person as fragmented into different roles or quasi-independent social relationships: "The content of ethical action must be substantial or whole and universal: it can therefore be directed only toward the whole individual or toward him as universal and general."9 If Hegel's account of ethical life were merely a residual category to which almost every form of merely customary, traditional social organization could be consigned, one would see in him little more than a precursor of modern sociology. But for Hegel, ethical life does not exist in its perfected form until it has been purged of the arbitrary, patriarchal domination characteristic, for example, of ancient China or Egypt. It requires mutual recognition in which I intuit in my fellow citizens the same "self" which I am. This is not possible until a certain degree of political equality has been achieved, or until the citizen emerges from the world of primitive, patriarchal social existence: "[T]he concept which has arisen before our eyes [is]. . . self-consciousness as recognized, possessing the certainty of itself in the other free self-consciousness . . . In this concept is revealed the realm of ethical life. For this is nothing but the absolute spiritual unity of the individuals' essential being within their independent actuality: an implicitly universal self-consciousness."10 Or, in plainer language, "I am only free,
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insofar as I posit the freedom of others and am recognized as free by others. Real freedom presupposes many free men." 11 In its perfected form as mutual recognition, ethical life is freedom: "ethical life is the idea of freedom . . . the concept of freedom which has become the world at hand and the nature of self-consciousness."12 Where the individual described in the earlier section on reason regarded laws, institutions, and mores as external to his own will and projects, the "ethical" citizen sees such environing laws and folkways as integral to his very identity. Hegel stresses that the life of an ethical community provides us with an approximation of the concept, as instantiated in human affairs. The concept, we recall, is the paradigm of an entity whose existence involves selfdifferentiation, and yet the identifying of the moments that are thus separated from one another. A classical republic, in its ethical phase at least, was something like this. Its laws were not like an external bond, holding together an aggregate of independent individuals. Rather, the individuals derived their whole being from the laws. Taking the model of the "I" to describe this relation, we would say that laws and mores are like a pure in-itself which only is as differentiated into subject and object, here the citizens who all know their duty and carry it out. They see in one another only that identity (the laws as in-itself) which each, qua citizen, himself is: "The laws express what each individual is and does; the individual recognizes them . . . as particularized [vereinzelt] in himself and in each of his fellow citizens."13 The concept is present here as freedom because each citizen is not a limit, a pure "other" to his fellow citizens (as is the case, for instance, in Hobbes' state of nature). The identity of each citizen is constituted through the movement of mutual recognition in which each citizen only is a citizen because he is acknowledged as such by all others, who are thus identical to him within the encompassing unity of the laws or ethical life. Recalling Hegel's discussion of the concept as freedom in the Logic, we can see that in ethical life each does indeed have his freedom in the others, not outside them. Hegel's account of the demise of ancient ethical life will now be summarized. In the transition from reason to spirit, the universalthe social, religious, and cultural milieu of the individualhas become a subject rather than a predicate of independent individuals. Yet it is a subject, spirit, which still has the predominant form of substance. That is, the Greek citizen had not yet begun to reflect on the laws and thereby introreflect the ethical world into himself as the "point" in which all judgments arise. But we already know that the "I" or
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the concept is negative activity in which I exclude everything that is not-"I" from myself to become for-myself. To know itself as this sort of negative unity, spirit has to destroy the positive unity of citizen and law in Greek ethical life. Philosophically this "breach with the actual world" came about with the advent of the sophists and then even more clearly with Socrates. Thus, Hegel dates the emergence of modernity as far back as the Peloponnesian War. 14 The emergence of subjectivity or reflective thinking shattered the fragile legitimacy of the laws because the citizen now asked the reasons for the laws' validity. At the moment we ask why we ought to obey, or what rational grounds can be adduced for performing our duties, we demand of customary law what it cannot provide. We alienate ourselves from the laws so that they suddenly appear to be a congeries of irrational commands and taboos in which we can discern no hint of rationality, no hint of our own self-consciousness and will.15 In the Phenomenology, the triumph of subjectivity or rational self-consciousness first takes the form of the victory of the polis over the family, as exemplified by Antigone's death in Sophocles' tragedy. For Hegel, this is essentially a triumph of human law over divine law, of universal, abstract justice over particularistic and customary obligations. The polis, albeit an "ethical" institution in its classical period, had set in motion a fatelike process in which it, too, would be obliterated by an even more rigidly universalistic entity, the Roman empire. The universal citizenship and abstract legal system of imperial Rome already marked the inception of the selfalienated spirit we encounter in the modern Enlightenment. The Roman citizen is a person, an expression which, in its original significance, means "mask." The mask of personhood, the universality of abstract right conferred upon the Roman citizen by the emperor, bestows a superficial sameness upon the individuals of the imperial age. But their identity or mutual recognition is a mere surface phenomenon when compared to the profound ethical unity of ancient Greece. Behind the mask of personhood is simply the natural individual ("nature" in this context denoting the ensemble of one's spontaneous feelings and desires unorganized by reason and self-discipline). In the language of modern political science, the Romans were failures at "nation-building" because they could not foster a political culture in which the citizens felt any affinity toward one another as concrete human beings. Roman law and administration did not aim at "acculturating" the whole individual, but only at outfitting him with certain minimal rights and duties. From Hegel's viewpoint, the universal (here citizenship, person-
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hood, mutual recognition, societal obligations) is merely grafted onto the particular. The two do not interpenetrate. The result is the alienation of the person from himself: [T]he personal independence of legal right [Recht] [is] . . . general confusion and mutual disintegration. For what is now considered as the absolutely essential being is self-conscious as the pure, empty unit of the person. In contrast to this empty universality, substance has the form of fulfillment and content. But now the content is left to its own devices and disordered; for the spirit is no longer present which had subdued it and held it together in its unity.This empty unit of the person is thus a contingent existence in its reality, an inessential movement and activity which does not reach any sort of stability. . . . The consciousness of legal right therefore experiences, precisely in pressing its claims to personal worth, the loss of its reality and its complete inessentiality. To call an individual a person is the expression of scorn. 16 Hegel here is discussing the ambiguity of the status of "personhood" or of "human rights" in general. Universal citizenship, succeeding the diverse and particular "ethical" citizenship of ancient Greece, appears in one sense to be a discovery or reappropriation of the "I" by itself. The notion of cosmopolitanism follows almost inevitably upon the insight that I am not necessarily a Greek, a Roman, a Carthaginian; rather