Heidegger Reexamined
Edited w i t h introductions by
Hubert Dreyfus University
of California,
Berkeley
Mark Wrathal...
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Heidegger Reexamined
Edited w i t h introductions by
Hubert Dreyfus University
of California,
Berkeley
Mark Wrathall Brigham
Young
University
A R O U T L E D G E SERIES
Contents of the Collection Volume 1 Dasein, Authenticity, and Death Volume 2 T r u t h , Realism, and the H i s t o r y of Being Volume 3 A r t , Poetry, and Technology Volume 4 Language and the Critique of Subjectivity
Heidegger Reexamined Volume 1
Dasein, Authenticity, and Death
Edited w i t h introductions by
Hubert Dreyfus University
of California,
Berkeley
Mark Wrathall Brigham
Young University
Published in 2 0 0 2 by Routledge 2 9 West 3 5 t h Street N e w York, N Y 10001 www.routledge-ny.com Published in Great B r i t a i n by Routledge 1 1 N e w Fetter Lane L o n d o n EC4P 4EE www.routledge.co.uk R o u t l e d g e i s a n i m p r i n t o f the T a y l o r & Francis G r o u p . C o p y r i g h t © 2 0 0 2 by T a y l o r & Francis B o o k s , I n c . P r i n t e d i n the U n i t e d States o f A m e r i c a o n acid-free paper. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or r e p r o d u c e d o r u t i l i z e d i n any f o r m o r b y any e l e c t r o n i c , m e c h a n i c a l , o r o t h e r means, n o w k n o w n o r hereafter i n v e n t e d , i n c l u d i n g p h o t o c o p y i n g a n d r e c o r d i n g , o r i n any i n f o r m a t i o n storage o r r e t r i e v a l system, w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n i n w r i t i n g f r o m the publisher. 1 0
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
L i b r a r y o f Congress C a t a l o g i n g - i n - P u b l i c a t i o n D a t a H e i d e g g e r r e e x a m i n e d / edited w i t h i n t r o d u c t i o n s b y H u b e r t D r e y f u s , M a r k Wrathall p. cm. I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 1 - 9 (set : a l k p a p e r ) — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 2 - 7 (v. 1: a l k . p a p e r ) — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 3 - 5 (v. 2 : a l k . p a p e r — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 4 - 3 (v. 3 : a l k . p a p e r ) — I S B N 0 - 4 1 5 - 9 4 0 4 5 - 1 (v. 4 : a l k . p a p e r ) . 1 . Heidegger, M a r t i n , 1 8 8 9 - 1 9 7 6 . I . Dreyfus, H u b e r t L . I I . W r a t h a l l , M a r k A . B3279.H49 H35228 2002 193—dc21 2002005873
Contents vii
Series I n t r o d u c t i o n
xi
Volume Introduction
1
The Young Heidegger and Phenomenology John
35
van
Dasein, the Being that Thematizes Robert
73
R.
Brandom
Heidegger on Being a Person John
85
Buren
Haugeland
H e i d e g g e r a n d Dasein's ' B o d i l y N a t u r e ' : W h a t i s t h e H i d d e n Problematic? David
R.
Cerbone
107 Being and the L i v i n g Didier
Franck
1 2 1 I n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d the S e m a n t i c s o f ' D a s e i n ' M.
Roderick
Stewart
1 3 5 H e i d e g g e r ' s C r i t i q u e o f t h e Husserl/Searle A c c o u n t o f I n t e n t i o n a l i t y Hubert 157
L.
Sexual D i f f e r e n c e , O n t o l o g i c a l D i f f e r e n c e
Geschlecht: Jacques
177
Dreyfus
Derrida
E x i s t e n c e a n d S e l f - U n d e r s t a n d i n g in Being and Time William
D.
Blattner
191 Heidegger's " A u t h e n t i c i t y " Revisited Charles 211
B.
Guignon
I n d i v i d u a l a n d C o m m u n i t y i n E a r l y H e i d e g g e r : S i t u a t i n g das Man, the M a n - S e l f , a n d S e l f - o w n e r s h i p i n Dasein's O n t o l o g i c a l S t r u c t u r e Edgar
C.
Baedeker,
Jr.
2 4 8 H e i d e g g e r o n the R e l a t i o n o f O n e s e l f t o Oneself: C h o o s i n g O n e s e l f Ernst
Tugendhat
2 6 7 H e i d e g g e r a n d the Sources o f I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y Pierre Keller and David S. Weberman
ν
Contents
VI
285
Social C o n s t r a i n t s o n C o n v e r s a t i o n a l C o n t e n t : H e i d e g g e r o n Rede a n d Gerede Mark A. Wrathall
3 0 7 T h e C o n c e p t of D e a t h in Being and Time William
D.
Blattner
330 Dasein, Existence, and Death Carol J. 345
White
M e t a p h y s i c s , M e t o n t o l o g y , a n d t h e E n d of Being and Time Steven Galt Crowell
371 Acknowledgments
Series Introduction M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r i s u n d e n i a b l y one o f t h e m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l p h i l o s o phers o f t h e 2 0
t h
c e n t u r y . H i s w o r k has been a p p r o p r i a t e d b y s c h o l a r s i n
fields as diverse as p h i l o s o p h y , classics, p s y c h o l o g y , l i t e r a t u r e , h i s t o r y , socio l o g y , a n t h r o p o l o g y , p o l i t i c a l science, r e l i g i o u s studies, a n d c u l t u r a l studies. I n t h i s f o u r - v o l u m e series, w e ' v e c o l l e c t e d a set o f articles t h a t w e believe represent some o f the best research o n the m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a n d d i f f i c u l t issues i n c o n t e m p o r a r y H e i d e g g e r s c h o l a r s h i p . I n p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r t h i s c o l l e c t i o n , w e h a v e q u i t e d e l i b e r a t e l y t r i e d t o i d e n t i f y the papers t h a t engage c r i t i c a l l y w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t . T h i s i s n o t just because w e w a n t e d t o focus o n " l i v e " issues i n H e i d e g g e r s c h o l a r s h i p . I t i s also because c r i t i c a l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the t e x t is, i n o u r o p i n i o n , the best w a y t o grasp Heidegger's t h o u g h t . Heidegger is a n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t r e a d — i n part, because h e i s d e l i b e r a t e l y t r y i n g t o b r e a k w i t h t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , i n p a r t , because his w a y o f b r e a k i n g w i t h the t r a d i t i o n w a s o f t e n t o c o i n n e o l o g i s m s (a less s y m p a t h e t i c reader m i g h t d i s m i s s it as o b f u s c a t o r y j a r g o n ) , a n d , i n p a r t , because H e i d e g g e r b e l i e v e d h i s task w a s t o p r o v o k e his readers t o t h o u g h t f u l n e s s r a t h e r t h a n p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h a facile a n s w e r t o a w e l l - d e f i n e d p r o b l e m . Because o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n r e a d i n g H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , w e believe t h a t i t i s i n c u m b e n t u p o n t h e c o m m e n t a t o r t o keep the m a t t e r f o r t h o u g h t i n t h e f o r e f r o n t — t h e issue t h a t H e i d e g g e r i s t r y i n g t o shed l i g h t o n . W i t h o u t such a n e n g a g e m e n t i n the m a t t e r f o r t h o u g h t , Heidegger scholarship all t o o often devolves i n t o e m p t y w o r d play. So, t h e f i r s t a n d m o s t i m p o r t a n t c r i t e r i o n w e ' v e used i n selecting papers i s t h a t t h e y engage w i t h i m p o r t a n t issues i n H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t , a n d d o s o i n a clear, n o n - o b f u s c a t o r y f a s h i o n . N e x t , w e h a v e b y a n d large a v o i d e d r e p u b l i s h i n g articles t h a t are a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e i n o t h e r c o l l e c t i o n s o f essays o n H e i d e g g e r . W e h a v e m a d e e x c e p t i o n s , h o w e v e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n t h e essay i s l o c a t e d i n a v o l u m e t h a t w o u l d easily b e o v e r l o o k e d b y Heidegger scholars. Finally, as o u r p r i m a r y i n t e n t was to collect and m a k e r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e w o r k o n c u r r e n t issues a n d p r o b l e m s a r i s i n g o u t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t , w e have t r i e d t o select recent r a t h e r t h a n d a t e d a r t i cles. I n selecting t h e m e s f o r each v o l u m e , w e h a v e , i n g e n e r a l , been g u i d e d b y t h e o r d e r i n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r , o v e r the c o u r s e o f h i s career, d e v o t e d extended a t t e n t i o n to the p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d . T h u s , the first v o l u m e c o n vii
Series
Vitt
Introduction
t a i n s essays f o c u s i n g o n D a s e i n — t h e h u m a n m o d e o f e x i s t e n c e — a n d " e x i s t e n t i a l " themes l i k e a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d d e a t h , because these w e r e p r o m i n e n t c o n c e r n s i n the years l e a d i n g u p t o a n d i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n o f Being and Time i n 1 9 2 7 . T h e s e c o n d v o l u m e centers o n H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f t r u t h , a n d his c r i t i q u e o f the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y , because these w e r e areas o f e x t e n d e d i n t e r e s t i n the 1 9 3 0 s a n d 1 9 4 0 s . T h e t h i r d v o l u m e i s o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d themes i n d i g e n o u s t o the ' l a t e ' H e i d e g g e r — namely, Heidegger's w o r k on art, poetry, and technology. B u t t h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t the v o l u m e s are g o v e r n e d b y a s t r i c t n o t i o n o f p e r i o d s i n H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k . I n the past, i t has been c o m m o n p l a c e t o s u b d i v i d e H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k i n t o t w o ( e a r l y a n d late) o r even three (early, m i d d l e , a n d late) p e r i o d s . W h i l e there i s s o m e t h i n g t o b e s a i d f o r s u c h d i v i s i o n s — t h e r e is an o b v i o u s sense in w h i c h Being and Time is t h e m a t i c a l l y a n d s t y l i s t i c a l l y u n l i k e H e i d e g g e r ' s p u b l i c a t i o n s f o l l o w i n g the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r — i t i s also m i s l e a d i n g t o speak a s i f there w e r e t w o o r t h r e e d i f ferent H e i d e g g e r s . T h e b i f u r c a t i o n , a s i s w e l l k n o w n , i s s o m e t h i n g t h a t H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f w a s uneasy a b o u t , a n d s c h o l a r s t o d a y are i n c r e a s i n g l y h e s i t a n t t o d r a w t o o s h a r p a d i v i d e b e t w e e n the e a r l y a n d l a t e . S o w h i l e the themes o f the f i r s t t h r e e v o l u m e s have been set b y H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n h i s t o r i c a l course t h r o u g h p h i l o s o p h y , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f papers i n t o v o l u m e s does n o t respect a d i v i s i o n o f s c h o l a r s h i p i n t o e a r l y a n d late. W e have f o u n d instead t h a t the papers r e l e v a n t t o a n ' e a r l y H e i d e g g e r ' issue o f t e n d r a w o n H e i d e g g e r ' s l a t e r w o r k , a n d vice versa. 1
T h e last v o l u m e i n the series i s o r g a n i z e d less b y H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n t h e m a t i c c o n c e r n s t h a n b y a n i n t e r e s t i n H e i d e g g e r ' s relevance t o c o n t e m porary philosophy. Given mainstream analytic philosophy's preoccupation w i t h language a n d m i n d , h o w e v e r , t h i s v o l u m e does have t w o t h e m a t i c c e n ters o f g r a v i t y — H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k o n the essence o f l a n g u a g e , a n d h i s c r i tique of modernist accounts of subjectivity. I n its focus o n H e i d e g g e r ' s relevance t o o n g o i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e r n s , h o w e v e r , v o l u m e f o u r m e r e l y m a k e s o b v i o u s the i n t e n t i o n o f the series a s a w h o l e . I n his 1 9 2 5 - 2 6 l e c t u r e course o n l o g i c , H e i d e g g e r b e m o a n e d the fact t h a t p e o p l e " n o l o n g e r p h i l o s o p h i z e f r o m t h e issues, b u t f r o m t h e i r c o l league's b o o k s . " I n a s i m i l a r w a y , w e believe t h a t H e i d e g g e r i s d e s e r v i n g o f a t t e n t i o n a s a p h i l o s o p h e r o n l y because h e i s such a n e x c e l l e n t g u i d e t o the issues themselves. W e h o p e t h a t the papers w e have c o l l e c t e d here d e m o n s t r a t e H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n t i n u i n g p e r t i n e n c e t o the m o s t p r e s s i n g issues in contemporary philosophy. 2
NOTES 1
W r i t i n g to Richardson, Heidegger noted:
"The distinction you
make between
Heidegger I and II is justified o n l y on the c o n d i t i o n that this is kept c o n s t a n t l y in m i n d : o n l y b y w a y o f w h a t [ H e i d e g g e r ] I has t h o u g h t does o n e g a i n access t o w h a t
Series
Introduction
tx
is t o - b e - t h o u g h t by [ H e i d e g g e r ] I I . B u t the t h o u g h t of [ H e i d e g g e r ] I becomes possible o n l y i f i t i s c o n t a i n e d i n [ H e i d e g g e r ] I I . " W i l l i a m J . R i c h a r d s o n , " L e t t e r t o
R i c h a r d s o n , " in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought ( T h e H a g u e : M. N i j h o f f , 1963), 8. 1
Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit,
Klostermann, 1995), 84.
Gesamtausgabe 21
( F r a n k f u r t am M a i n :
Volume Introduction H e i d e g g e r ' s Being and Time w a s p u b l i s h e d in 1 9 2 7 a n d r e m a i n s one of the m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k s o f the past c e n t u r y . I n i t , H e i d e g g e r u n d e r t a k e s a n a m b i t i o u s o n t o l o g i c a l p r o j e c t — t h e c e n t r a l task o f the b o o k i s t o d i s c o v e r the m e a n i n g o f b e i n g — o n the basis o f a s u b t l e a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the h u m a n m o d e o f existence. T h e articles c o l l e c t e d i n t h i s v o l u m e focus o n s o m e o f the m o s t v e x i n g p r o b l e m s t h a t g r o w o u t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f h u m a n existence. I n o r d e r t o set u p these papers, w e w o u l d l i k e t o offer a b r i e f i n t r o d u c t i o n t o H e i d e g g e r ' s w a y o f d o i n g p h i l o s o p h y , his a c c o u n t o f h u m a n existence, a n d the c o n c e r n s w i t h a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d d e a t h t h a t g r o w o u t o f t h a t a c c o u n t . H e i d e g g e r ' s e a r l y p h i l o s o p h y w a s p r o f o u n d l y shaped b y his s t u d y o f the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l w o r k s o f H u s s e r l , D i l t h e y a n d , t o a lesser degree, Scheler. B u t H e i d e g g e r b r o k e v e r y e a r l y o n w i t h any f o r m a l " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d " a n d e v e n t u a l l y d r o p p e d the t e r m ' p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' a s a s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n , w o r r i e d t h a t r e p r e s e n t i n g his t h o u g h t a s p h e n o m e n o l o g y w o u l d cause h i m t o b e associated w i t h H u s s e r l ' s s u b s t a n t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s . W i t h the o n g o i n g p u b l i c a t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s Collected Works, i t has b e c o m e possible t o d o c u m e n t the f o r m a t i v e i n f l u e n c e o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y on H e i d e g g e r (see J o h n v a n Buren's p a p e r ) , as w e l l as his e v e n t u a l break w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y . O n the l a t t e r p o i n t , see Steve C r o w e l l ' s paper, w h i c h explores Heidegger's struggle w i t h the l i m i t a t i o n s of p h e n o m e n o l o g y as a m e t h o d f o r m e t a p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y , a n d his m o v e b e y o n d H u s s e r l i a n phen o m e n o l o g y in the decade f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of Being and Time. D e s p i t e his b r e a k w i t h the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m o v e m e n t , H e i d e g g e r c o n s i d e r e d his w o r k t h r o u g h o u t his life t o b e " a m o r e f a i t h f u l adherence t o the p r i n c i p l e o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y " ( i n his o w n loose sense o f the t e r m ) . F o r H e i d e g g e r , p h e n o m e n o l o g y i s a n ' a t t i t u d e ' o r p r a c t i c e i n 'seeing' t h a t takes its d e p a r t u r e f r o m l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e . I t a i m s a t g r a s p i n g the p h e n o m e n a o f l i v e d i n v o l v e m e n t i n the w o r l d , before o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the w o r l d becomes d e t e r m i n e d a n d a l t e r e d i n ' t h e m a t i c ' o r r e f l e c t i v e t h o u g h t . I n t h i s respect, H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k i s i n m a r k e d c o n t r a s t t o the m e t h o d o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis t h a t has c o m e t o d o m i n a t e p h i l o s o p h y i n the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g w o r l d f o l l o w i n g the " l i n g u i s t i c t u r n " o f the e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . F o r H e i d e g g e r , o u r c o n c e p t s a n d l a n g u a g e c o m e t o o late, a n d have a d i f f e r e n t s t r u c t u r e t h a n o u r p r e - p r o p o s i t i o n a l w a y o f c o m p o r t i n g i n the w o r l d . I t i s 1
xi
xii
Volume
Introduction
t h u s n o t possible t o d i s c o v e r the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l features o f h u m a n e x i s tence t h r o u g h a n a n a l y s i s o f l a n g u a g e a n d c o n c e p t s . 2
T h e c o r e o f Being and Time i s a n analysis o f the h u m a n m o d e o f b e i n g , w h i c h H e i d e g g e r names w i t h t h e t e r m ' D a s e i n . ' D a s e i n means existence i n c o l l o q u i a l G e r m a n , b u t H e i d e g g e r used i t a s a t e r m t o refer t o t h e p e c u l i a r l y h u m a n w a y o f e x i s t i n g ( w i t h o u t , o f course, d e c i d i n g i n advance w h e t h e r o n l y h u m a n s e x i s t i n t h i s w a y ) . T r a n s l a t o r s o f H e i d e g g e r have elected t o leave the t e r m u n t r a n s l a t e d , a n d s o i t has n o w passed i n t o c o m m o n parlance a m o n g Heidegger scholars. O n e o f the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g features o f H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis o f D a s e i n i s the p r i o r i t y he discovers in n o n - c o g n i t i v e modes of b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . T h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l i n t e n t i o n a l states t h a t t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n has seen a s c o n s t i t u t i v e o f D a s e i n are, i n H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis, d e r i v a t i v e p h e n o m e n a . H u b e r t D r e y f u s ' s a r t i c l e , " H e i d e g g e r ' s C r i t i q u e o f the Husserl/Searle A c c o u n t o f I n t e n t i o n a l i t y , " explains Heidegger's practice-based account o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , a n d explores the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Heidegger's radical r e t h i n k i n g o f h u m a n b e i n g f o r m a i n s t r e a m a c c o u n t s o f the m i n d - w o r l d r e l a t i o n s h i p . J o h n H a u g e l a n d offers a defense o f the idea t h a t h u m a n existence c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d a s p r i m a r i l y p r a c t i c a l i n n a t u r e . T h i s v i e w o f h u m a n existence, f o r H a u g e l a n d , u n d e r w r i t e s a r a d i c a l d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e Kantian/Cartesian t r a d i t i o n of t h i n k i n g a b o u t p e r s o n h o o d . As a result, H a u g e l a n d argues, D a s e i n s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a p a t t e r n o f n o r m s ( a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d m e a n i n g s t h a t are based i n s u c h n o r m s ) . O t h e r i n t e r preters o f H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , argue t h a t w h i l e H e i d e g g e r ' s a n a l y s i s cert a i n l y emphasizes n o n - c o g n i t i v e states, l a n g u a g e a n d c o g n i t i o n nevertheless p l a y a c r u c i a l r o l e i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a s e i n . I n " I n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d t h e Semantics o f D a s e i n , " f o r i n s t a n c e , J o h n S t e w a r t argues t h a t H a u g e l a n d ' s a n d Dreyfus's readings of Dasein underemphasize d e l i b e r a t i o n and other t h e m a t i c states. R o b e r t B r a n d o m s i m i l a r l y argues t h a t l a n g u a g e i s essential t o Dasein's b e i n g . C r i t i c i z i n g " l a y e r - c a k e " m o d e l s o f l a n g u a g e — t h a t is, theories i n w h i c h l a n g u a g e c a n s i m p l y b e a d d e d o n t o a n a l r e a d y h u m a n b u t n o n - l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t y — B r a n d o m argues t h a t a p r e - l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y w o u l d n o t c o u n t as Dasein for Heidegger. O t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t issues r e m a i n s u r r o u n d i n g the n a t u r e a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n of D a s e i n . A c e n t r a l a i m of Being and Time is to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t D a s e i n i s a m o d e o f existence d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t e n j o y e d b y objects i n the w o r l d , a n d t h a t i t c a n n o t b e reduced t o o r g r o u n d e d i n the m o d e o f being o f objects. I n s t e a d , D a s e i n i s essentially a l w a y s i n a w o r l d , w h i c h , i n t u r n , i s a l w a y s o r g a n i z e d m e a n i n g f u l l y . W i t h i n the w o r l d , D a s e i n e n c o u n t e r s o t h e r Daseins, a n d also o t h e r objects w i t h m o d e s o f b e i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m D a s e i n . T h e o t h e r p r i n c i p a l m o d e s o f b e i n g t h a t H e i d e g g e r discusses i n Being and Time are t h e ' a v a i l a b l e ' ( o r ' r e a d y - t o - h a n d ' ) a n d the ' o c c u r r e n t ' ( o r ' p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d ' ) . E q u i p m e n t is p a r a d i g m a t i c of the a v a i l a b l e .
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S o m e t h i n g i s a v a i l a b l e w h e n (1) i t i s d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f its place i n a c o n t e x t o f e q u i p m e n t , t y p i c a l a c t i v i t i e s i n w h i c h i t i s used, a n d t y p i c a l p u r p o s e s o r goals w i t h w h i c h i t i s used, a n d (2) i t lends i t s e l f t o such use r e a d i l y a n d easily, w i t h o u t need f o r r e f l e c t i o n . T h e c o r e case o f availableness i s a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t o f w h i c h w e have a p r i m o r d i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (i.e., w e k n o w h o w t o use i t ) , a n d w h i c h t r a n s p a r e n t l y lends i t s e l f t o use. T h e o t h e r p r i m a r y m o d e o f b e i n g i s O c c u r r e n t n e s s ' o r 'presence-ath a n d . ' T h i s i s the m o d e o f b e i n g o f t h i n g s w h i c h are n o t g i v e n a w o r l d l y d e t e r m i n a t i o n — t h a t is, t h i n g s c o n s t i t u t e d b y p r o p e r t i e s t h e y possess i n themselves, r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h t h e i r r e l a t i o n s t o uses a n d objects o f use. M o s t a v a i l a b l e t h i n g s c a n also b e v i e w e d a s o c c u r r e n t , a n d i n b r e a k d o w n s i t u a t i o n s , the o c c u r r e n t n e s s o f a n a v a i l a b l e o b j e c t w i l l o b t r u d e . A n i m p o r t a n t t h e m e in Being and Time is H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i e s a n d sciences have t a k e n the o c c u r r e n t a s p r i m o r d i a l , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y f a i l e d t o p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e o f the a v a i l a b l e . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , H e i d e g g e r argues t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n has also t r i e d t o i n t e r p r e t D a s e i n o n the m o d e l o f o c c u r r e n t e n t i t i e s . A c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , there i s n o w a y t o reduce the m e a n i n g f u l n e s s o f the w o r l d o r b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d t o a c o l l e c t i o n o f o c c u r r e n t entities w i t h o c c u r r e n t p r o p e r t i e s . A k e y e l e m e n t in H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t is the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the o n t i c a n d o n t o l o g i c a l . Being and Time is c o n c e r n e d w i t h the m e a n i n g of b e i n g — t h a t o n the basis o f w h i c h b e i n g i s u n d e r s t o o d . H e i d e g g e r argues t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l t r e a t m e n t s o f b e i n g have f a i l e d t o a d e q u a t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h the t w o k i n d s o f q u e s t i o n s w e c a n ask a b o u t b e i n g : the o n t i c q u e s t i o n t h a t asks a b o u t the p r o p e r t i e s o f beings, a n d the o n t o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n t h a t asks a b o u t w a y s o r m o d e s o f b e i n g . D a s e i n , the a v a i l a b l e , a n d the o c c u r r e n t are o n t o l o g i c a l categories. I f one o n t o l o g i c a l l y investigates a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t , say, a p e n , t h e n o n e asks a b o u t the s t r u c t u r e s b y v i r t u e o f w h i c h i t i s a v a i l a b l e o r r e a d y t o h a n d . I n a n o n t i c i n q u i r y , o n the o t h e r h a n d , one asks a b o u t the p r o p e r t i e s , a n d the p h y s i c a l a n d r e l a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s p e c u l i a r t o the p e n . H e i d e g g e r ' s c r i t i q u e o f the t r a d i t i o n c o m e s f r o m the s i m p l e observ a t i o n that an ontic i n q u i r y , no matter h o w exhaustive, cannot tell anyt h i n g a b o u t the o n t o l o g i c a l m o d e o f b e i n g o f a t h i n g . T h i s i s because a listi n g o f a pen's p r o p e r t i e s c a n n o t t e l l m e w h y i t i s a v a i l a b l e r a t h e r t h a n occurrent. O n e o u t c o m e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f D a s e i n i s the c l a i m t h a t c e r t a i n features o f h u m a n existence are m e r e l y o n t i c p r o p e r t i e s — t h i n g s l i k e s e x u a l i t y a n d o t h e r features o f o u r e m b o d i m e n t , f o r i n s t a n c e — a n d p l a y n o role i n the o n t o l o g i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a s e i n . I n "Geschlecht," D e r r i d a q u e s t i o n s t h i s o u t c o m e , a n d uses i t t o e x p l o r e the v a l i d i t y o f the o n t i c / o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n . D e r r i d a , t o o , i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h the difference b e t w e e n e x i s t e n t i e l l a n d e x i s t e n t i a l features. H e q u e s t i o n s H e i d e g g e r ' s readiness t o t r e a t t h i n g s l i k e s e x u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a s o n t i c .
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Introduction
S i m i l a r c o n c e r n s are raised b y a n " o n t i c " feature o f h u m a n existence l i k e b e i n g e m b o d i e d (see D a v i d C e r b o n e ' s " H e i d e g g e r a n d Dasein's ' B o d i l y N a t u r e ' : W h a t i s the H i d d e n P r o b l e m a t i c ? " ) o r b e i n g alive (See D i d i e r F r a n c k ' s " B e i n g a n d the L i v i n g " ) . T h e r o l e o f l a n g u a g e i n Dasein's c o n s t i t u t i o n — a t o p i c w e ' v e a l r e a d y t o u c h e d o n — i s d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h the " e x i s t e n t i a l " themes o f Being and Time. It is s o m e t i m e s s u p p o s e d t h a t the source of Dasein's t e n d e n c y t o w a r d i n a u t h e n t i c i t y i s the i n h e r e n t b a n a l i t y a n d l e v e l l i n g o f p u b l i c l a n guage. D r a w i n g o n a n a l y t i c w o r k i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e , M a r k W r a t h a l l argues t h a t t h i s v i e w i s n o t s u p p o r t a b l e o n the basis o f H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w s o f l a n g u a g e . E v e n i f Dasein's use o f l a n g u a g e i s n o t d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the f a l l i n t o i n a u t h e n t i c i t y , i t i s s t i l l possible t h a t i t p l a y s a r o l e i n i t . T h e p r o b l e m c a n b e p o s e d i n t e r m s o f the f o l l o w i n g p a r a d o x : to fail to acknowledge a constitutive role for language a n d public p r a c t i c e s t h r e a t e n s t o l e a d t o s o l i p s i s m ; t o give t h e m t o o s t r o n g a r o l e , o n the o t h e r h a n d , w o u l d e n t a i l t h a t there i s n o h i g h e r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y t h a n e v e r y d a y i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . Heidegger, h o w e v e r , b o t h denies t h a t his v i e w i s s o l i p s i s t i c , a n d , t h r o u g h his v i e w s o n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d his c r i t i q u e o f the b a n a l i t y o f das Man (the source o f p u b l i c i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y ) , suggests t h a t there is a higher sort of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y uncovered in authenticity. We've included f o u r articles t h a t s t r u g g l e w i t h the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Dasein's i n a u t h e n t i c i t y a n d its beholdenness t o p u b l i c sources o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y : " H e i d e g g e r a n d the Sources o f I n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , " b y Pierre K e l l e r a n d D a v i d W e b e r m a n , E . C . Boedeker's " I n d i v i d u a l a n d C o m m u n i t y i n E a r l y H e i d e g g e r , " E r n s t Tugendhat's "Heidegger on the Relation of Oneself to Oneself," and Charles Guignon's "Heidegger's ' A u t h e n t i c i t y ' Revisited." T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a u t h e n t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n arises f r o m the fact t h a t , u n l i k e o c c u r r e n t e n t i t i e s , t h e w a y t h a t D a s e i n takes u p its residence i n the w o r l d i s n o t f i x e d o r necessitated. T h a t i s t o say, the r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t D a s e i n enjoys w i t h o t h e r t h i n g s , a n d the s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t o t h e r t h i n g s h o l d f o r D a s e i n , are c o n t i n g e n t a n d a l w a y s subject t o c h a n g e . H e i d e g g e r m a k e s t h i s p o i n t b y s a y i n g t h a t f o r D a s e i n , " i n its v e r y B e i n g , t h a t B e i n g i s a n issue f o r i t . " A n o t h e r w a y o f d e v e l o p i n g t h i s p o i n t , h o w e v e r , p o i n t s o u t the p a r a d o x i c a l i t y o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t f r o m the a c c o u n t o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n : " T h e essence o f D a s e i n , " H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s , " i s its e x i s t e n c e . " In " E x i s t e n c e a n d S e l f - U n d e r s t a n d i n g in Being and Time," W i l l i a m B l a t t n e r helps d i s s o l v e the p a r a d o x b y u n f o l d i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s n o t i o n o f Dasein's existence i n t e r m s o f Dasein's s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t i e s . T h i s m e a n s t h a t D a s e i n , u n l i k e mere o b j e c t s , i s a l w a y s o p e n t o e x i s t i n g i n d i f f e r e n t ways. A consequence o f t h i s i s t h a t a n y p a r t i c u l a r w a y o f e x i s t i n g i n the w o r l d i s necessarily f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n g r o u n d e d — " i t i s the n u l l basis o f its o w n n u l l i t y . " T h i s i s a d i s q u i e t i n g fact, a n d o n e t h a t D a s e i n disguises f r o m 3
4
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i t s e l f — p r i m a r i l y b y t a k i n g u p societal n o r m s a s i f t h e y s o m e h o w r e v e a l e d the t r u t h a b o u t h o w one s h o u l d l i v e . B u t a n x i e t y i n the face o f d e a t h , H e i d e g g e r argues, i f faced u p t o , c a n o p e n the d o o r t o a n a u t h e n t i c existence: " A n x i e t y , " H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s , " l i b e r a t e s o n e f r o m p o s s i b i l i t i e s w h i c h ' c o u n t f o r n o t h i n g ' , a n d lets o n e b e c o m e free-for those w h i c h are authentic." 5
A l t h o u g h there c a n b e n o q u e s t i o n t h a t d e a t h p l a y s a c e n t r a l r o l e i n t h e a r c h i t e c t o n i c of Being and Time, c e r t a i n features of H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t of d e a t h m a k e i t u n c l e a r w h a t e x a c t l y i t i s t h a t ' d e a t h ' refers t o . H e i d e g g e r i s e m p h a t i c t h a t he d o e s n ' t m e a n a m e r e o r g a n i c d e m i s e — t h i s in i t s e l f is e n o u g h t o raise q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e d e a t h h e has i n m i n d , f o r s u r e l y ' d e a t h , ' a t least i n o r d i n a r y uses o f the t e r m , has o r g a n i c demise a s a n i n t e g r a l p a r t . A n d H e i d e g g e r i s clear t h a t d e a t h i s a c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h D a s e i n i s u n a b l e t o b e . A t the same t i m e , H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s t h a t d e a t h , a s " t h e poss i b i l i t y o f the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f existence i n g e n e r a l " i s a w a y o f b e i n g o f D a s e i n . W e have i n c l u d e d t w o d i f f e r e n t efforts a t r e c o n c i l i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s various c o m m e n t s o n d e a t h — C a r o l White's " D a s e i n , Existence and D e a t h , " and W i l l i a m Blattner's " T h e Concept o f D e a t h i n Being and Time." 6
7
8
NOTES Mn W i l l i a m J. R i c h a r d s o n , Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, ( T h e H a g u e : M . N i j h o f f , 1 9 6 3 ) , 4 . See a l s o " M y W a y t o P h e n o m e n o l o g y , " i n M a r t i n Heidegger,
On
Time
and
Being,
trans.
Joan
Stambaugh
(New
York: Harper
&
Row, 1972), pp. 74-82. 2
F o r a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e relevance o f H e i d e g g e r ' s w o r k t o c o n t e m p o r a r y a n a l y t -
i c p h i l o s o p h y , see t h e essays i n v o l u m e f o u r o f t h i s c o l l e c t i o n . 3
Being and
Time,
trans.
John
H a r p e r & Row, 1962), p. 32. "Ibid.,
354.
'Ibid.,
395.
«Ibid., 2 9 1 , 2 9 5 . 7
Ibid.,
»Ibid.
307.
Macquarrie
and
Edward
Robinson
(New
York:
Man and World 2 3 : 2 3 9 - 2 7 2 , 1990. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Printed
in
the
Netherlands.
The young Heidegger and phenomenology
JOHN V A N BUREN
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ottawa, 65 University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada KIN 6N5
Ways of t h i n k i n g - for w h i c h the past (Vergangenes) remains indeed what has past, but for w h i c h what has been (Gewesendes) persists in c o m i n g - wait u n t i l at some time t h i n k i n g goes along them. (VA, 7 ) 1
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
In
h i s Being and Time, w h i c h appeared
in t h e
1927
issue of H u s s e r l ' s
Jahrbuch, H e i d e g g e r stated t h a t t h e " b a s i s " o f h i s w o r k h a d b e e n p r e p a r e d f o r by H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations. Being
and Time
was
the
result
(SZ, 5 1 / 6 2 ) He also i n d i c a t e d that
of a l o n g p e r i o d
of p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l
a p p r e n t i c e s h i p a n d d e v e l o p m e n t . (SZ, 9 7 , n . 1/102, n . i ; 3 5 6 , n . 3 / 3 1 3 , n . 2
i i i ) T h e recent p u b l i c a t i o n o f m a n y o f h i s y o u t h f u l l e c t u r e c o u r s e s b e f o r e Being and Time n o w a l l o w s us to f o l l o w up these i n d i c a t i o n s , w h i c h he h i m s e l f l e f t f o r the m o s t part u n e x p l a i n e d b o t h a t the t i m e a n d a f t e r w a r d s . I w o u l d thus l i k e t o present a r e - c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g o f h i s y o u t h f u l p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r e n t i c e s h i p b e t w e e n the years 1 9 1 9 a n d 1 9 2 6 . M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , I w a n t t o argue, f i r s t , that h i s y o u t h f u l , p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Denkweg i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s i s a u n i q u e p e r i o d i n h i s d e v e l o p m e n t a n d thus
cannot
be
absorbed
into
either
his
Being
and
Time
or
his
later
w r i t i n g s , a s h e h i m s e l f a n d others h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o d o ; s e c o n d , I w a n t t o argue f u r t h e r that the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r h a d a l r e a d y w o r k e d o u t the themes o f t h e " q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , " the " t u r n , " the " e n d o f p h i l o s o p h y , " and the " o t h e r b e g i n n i n g , " o f w h i c h t h e l a s t - m e n t i o n e d are o f t e n t h o u g h t t o b e l o n g e x c l u s i v e l y t o h i s l a t e r p e r i o d after 1 9 3 0 ; a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , I w a n t t o s h o w , w i t h o u t n e g l e c t i n g the o t h e r d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e s o n his y o u t h f u l t h o u g h t , h o w e x a c t l y i t w a s , t h e n , that h e o r i g i n a l l y w o r k e d o u t h i s question of being through a critical appropriation of Husserl's phenomenol-
1
240
o g y a n d e s p e c i a l l y the s i x t h
investigation
in h i s Logical investigations on
the " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " o f " b e i n g . " O n t h e w h o l e , I w i s h t o s h o w that, i n a l l o w i n g u s t o see a l l t h i s , h i s y o u t h f u l l e c t u r e courses o f f e r a n e w a n d m o r e adequate w a y o f r e a d i n g a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g h i s e n t i r e t h o u g h t . L e t u s b e g i n w i t h a n e x p l o r a t i o n o f the g e n e r a l " h e r m e n e u t i c a l situation"
within
which
the
young
Heidegger was
interpreting
Husserl's
phenomenology.
2. The hermeneutical situation
The
young
Heidegger's
preoccupation
with
Husserl's
phenomenology
w e n t , i n fact, a s far b a c k a s h i s e a r l i e s t p u b l i s h e d essays ( 1 9 1 2 - 1 9 1 6 ) , his 3
doctoral dissertation (1914), and his habilitation w r i t i n g (1916). ( F S ) It was
only
financial
reasons
that
had
prevented
him
from
going
to
Göttingen t o d o h i s d o c t o r a l a n d h a b i l i t a t i o n w o r k u n d e r H u s s e r l , instead o f s t a y i n g i n F r e i b u r g u n d e r the N e o - K a n t i a n H e i n r i c h R i c k e r t .
4
I n his
e a r l i e s t s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s , h e used H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y , a l o n g w i t h c o n t e m p o r a r y N e o - K a n t i a n i s m , t o p u r s u e " p u r e l o g i c , " the " d o c t r i n e o f j u d g m e n t , " " a p r i o r i g r a m m a r , " the " d o c t r i n e o f c a t e g o r i e s , " a n d also the " d i v i s i o n o f the e n t i r e f i e l d o f ' b e i n g ' i n t o its v a r i o u s m o d e s o f r e a l i t y . " (FS, 186) H e later c a l l e d t h i s use o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y a m e t a p h y s i c a l " o n t o l o g i c . " ( F S , 55) I n the c o n c l u s i o n t o his h a b i l i t a t i o n w r i t i n g o n D u n s Scotus,
which
also
drew
on
Meister
Eckhardt,
German
Idealism
( e s p e c i a l l y H e g e l ) a n d R o m a n t i c i s m ( N o v a l i s , S c h l e g e l ) , a n d the c o n t e m porary
Neo-Hegelian
theology
of
Carl
Braig,
he
used
Husserl's
phenomenology in a speculative, religious "metaphysics," whose "genuine o p t i c " w a s " t h e t r u e r e a l i t y a n d the r e a l t r u t h " o f t h e " a b s o l u t e s p i r i t o f G o d . " (FS, 3 9 9 - 4 1 1 ) H e r e h e w a s a p p r o p r i a t i n g p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n the c o n t e x t o f w h a t h e w o u l d later c a l l " o n t o t h e o l o g y , " i.e., t h e a c c o u n t o f b e i n g a s a d i v i n e g r o u n d . I n spite o f a f e w i n t i m a t i o n s o f w h a t w e t o d a y k n o w o f a s h i s " q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , " h i s e a r l y s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s f r o m 1912 t o 1916 a n d h i s use o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n t h e m r e m a i n e d c a u g h t u p w i t h i n metaphysics. I n 1916 H u s s e r l t o o k u p the c h a i r o f p h i l o s o p h y i n F r e i b u r g . B u t d u e t o H e i d e g g e r ' s absence f r o m the u n i v e r s i t y i n 1917 a n d 1918 because o f h i s w a r service, it was not u n t i l
1 9 1 9 that h e r e a l l y " m e t H u s s e r l i n h i s
w o r k s h o p " (SD, 8 5 / 7 8 ) a n d a c l o s e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e m developed.
5
B y that t i m e H e i d e g g e r h a d d i s a s s o c i a t e d h i m s e l f f r o m b o t h
2
241
his N e o - K a n t i a n teacher H e i n r i c h R i c k e r t a n d his C a t h o l i c - p h i l o s o p h i c a l affiliations.
(BK,
541)
He
became
Husserl's
assistant
6
(1919-23),
his
7
" f a v o r i t e s t u d e n t , " a n d the " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c h i l d . " D u r i n g t h i s t i m e , 8
H u s s e r l o f t e n s a i d : " Y o u a n d I are p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " I n t u m , H e i d e g g e r w r o t e i n 1923 that " H u s s e r l g a v e m e m y eyes." (HF, 5 ) Because o f h i s c l o s e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y , the 1920s h a v e been c a l l e d h i s 9
"phenomenological decade," even though he ascribed to phenomenology b o t h b e f o r e t h i s p e r i o d i n h i s s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s a n d after t h i s p e r i o d i n h i s later w r i t i n g s , a l t h o u g h i n different ways. T h e titles t o r o u g h l y h a l f o f his l e c t u r e courses a n d s e m i n a r s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d c o n t a i n s o m e f o r m o f t h e w o r d " p h e n o m e n o l o g y " ("Phenomenological Exercises i n enological Interpretations o f . . . " , e t c . ) .
1 0
"Phenom-
A l t h o u g h his thought d u r i n g this
p e r i o d certainly w o u l d not have been possible w i t h o u t his dialogues w i t h o t h e r t r a d i t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y A r i s t o t l e a n d C h r i s t i a n a u t h o r s , his p h i l o s o p h i c a l l e x i c o n i s , a s w e s h a l l see, p r i m a r i l y a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l o n e . H i s n e w p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y after 1 9 1 9 w a s n o t a n u n c r i t i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f i t , a s h a d b e e n the case f o r the m o s t p a r t in his doctoral dissertation and habilitation w r i t i n g . He was n o w very m u c h concerned w i t h c a r r y i n g out a " d e s t r u c t i o n " of Husserl's p r i m a r i l y logical self-understanding of his fundamental notion of " i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " by t r a c i n g i t b a c k i n t o the concreteness a n d h i s t o r i c i t y o f " f a c t i c a l l i f e . " I n d e e d , a s e a r l y a s 1910, h e h a d w r i t t e n the f o l l o w i n g m a r g i n a l n o t e beside H u s s e r l ' s sentence i n h i s " P h i l o s o p h y a s a R i g o r o u s S c i e n c e " " N o t from
philosophies
but
from
issues
(Sachen)
and
problems
must
the
1 1
His
i m p u l s e t o research p r o c e e d " : " W e w i l l t a k e H u s s e r l at h i s w o r d . "
h a b i l i t a t i o n w r i t i n g h a d h i n t e d a t the necessity o f p u s h i n g H u s s e r l ' s " p u r e l o g i c " i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a " p h i l o s o p h y o r i e n t e d t o w o r l d - v i e w . " (FS, 2 0 5 , n . 10) I n 1 9 1 7 , h e w r o t e t o t h e m e d i e v a l i s t M a r t i n G r a b m a n n t h a t h i s m o s t i m m e d i a t e plans i n v o l v e d a " c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h v a l u e - p h i l o s o p h y and p h e n o m e n o l o g y from
the
inside
out."
(BG,
104)
Indeed,
we
find
him
c a r r y i n g o u t t h i s c r i t i q u e i n d e t a i l i n h i s f i r s t l e c t u r e c o u r s e o f 1919. (IP) I n h i s 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e , h e p r e s e n t e d w h a t e v e n t u a l l y b e c a m e " D i v i s i o n O n e " a n d t h e f i r s t t h i r d o f " D i v i s i o n T w o " o f Being and Time a s a "fundamental
critique
of phenomenological
inquiry."
(GZ,
420/304,
1 9 2 / 1 4 1 - 2 ) A s w e s h a l l see, h e also l a u n c e d t h i s c r i t i q u e i n o t h e r l e c t u r e courses i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s .
1 2
I t w a s n o t r e a l l y u n t i l 1919 a n d t h e years
f o l l o w i n g that his earlier suspicions about Husserl's p h i l o s o p h y were g i v e n actual expression in a full-scale c r i t i q u e . T h e later Heidegger c o u l d thus r e p o r t that at this t i m e he w a s e n g a g e d in a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l b a t t l e
3
242
o f t h e g i a n t s w i t h H u s s e r l a b o u t die Sache selbst, the " t h i n g " o r " t o p i c i t s e l f o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " I s i t c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d its o b j e c t i v i t y , " h e a s k e d h i m s e l f , " o r i s i t the b e i n g o f b e i n g s i n its u n c o n c e a l m e n t a n d c o n c e a l i n g ? " (SD, 8 7 / 7 9 , 4 7 / 4 4 ) Husserl's
Logical
Investigations
1 3
H i s s t a t e m e n t in Being and Time that
laid t h e
"basis"
for
this
work
must,
t h e r e f o r e , b e u n d e r s t o o d i n reference n o t t o his f i r s t n a i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s t e x t i n h i s e a r l y s t u d e n t w r i t i n g s , b u t r a t h e r t o h i s subsequent, v e r y c r i t i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n b e g i n n i n g around 1919. I n the l o g i c a l c o n c e r n s o f h i s d o c t o r a l d i s s e r t a t i o n a n d h i s h a b i l i t a t i o n w r i t i n g , he had
relied
o n H u s s e r l ' s Ideas a n d e s p e c i a l l y
on the first
v o l u m e o f his Logical Investigations i n w h i c h H u s s e r l d e v e l o p s h i s i d e a o f a n a n t i - p s y c h o l o g i s t i c " p u r e l o g i c . " B u t his n e w r e t r i e v a l o f H u s s e r l ' s w o r k after
1919 t u r n e d t o w a r d t h e s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n the s e c o n d
v o l u m e . H e r e p o r t e d l a t e r that i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s h e " w o r k e d o n t h e Logical Investigations e v e r y w e e k i n s p e c i a l s t u d y s t u d e n t s . " (SD, 8 7 / 7 9 )
1 4
groups w i t h advanced
E v e n t h o u g h a t that t i m e t h e " m a s t e r n o l o n g e r
h e l d h i s w o r k i n v e r y h i g h e s t e e m , " H e i d e g g e r , s o w e are t o l d , h a d h i s " o w n reasons t o p r e f e r the Logical Investigations f o r the p u r p o s e s o f a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o p h e n o m e n o l o g y . " (US, 8 6 / 5 ) I n d e e d , i n h i s 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e , w e f i n d h i m b o l d l y d e c l a r i n g t h a t H u s s e r l ' s e a r l y Logical Investigations, a n d n o t a n y o f h i s l a t e r ' ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " w o r k s , i s t h e "fundamental book
of phenomenology."
(GZ,
30/24)
He
came
to
see
Husserl's
later
"transcendental" self-understanding" ( G Z , 188/139, 124/91) of his earlier, "philosophically
neutral"
(SD,
84/77)
Logical Investigations
as
a
"fall"
(GZ, 1 7 9 / 1 2 9 ) i n t o m e t a p h y s i c a l p r e j u d i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y those o f D e s c a r t e s , F i c h t e , a n d N e o - K a n t i a n i s m (SD, 4 7 / 4 4 , 8 4 / 7 7 ; BR, x i v / x v ) . W h a t interested the y o u n g Heidegger in Husserl's s i x t h investigation w a s h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e "acts o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s " i n k n o w i n g a n d espec i a l l y the s p e c i f i c acts o f " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " i n w h i c h " b e i n g " i s " g i v e n " a s a n object o f consciousness. T h u s , i n his key discussions o f t r u t h and time
in h i s Being and Time, he c o u l d refer t h e reader to H u s s e r l ' s
sixth investigation.
1 5
In
1 9 7 3 , h e h e l d a s e m i n a r o n the i n f l u e n c e o f
H u s s e r l ' s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n o n h i s y o u t h f u l t h o u g h t (S, 3 7 2 - 4 0 0 ) a n d b r i e f l y s k e t c h e d o u t w h a t h e h a d m e a n t b y h i s e a r l i e r s t a t e m e n t i n Being and
Time
that
Husserl's
Logical
Investigations
had
provided
the
"basis"
(S, 3 7 8 ) f o r h i s w o r k . I n H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f t h e " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " o f b e i n g , h e h a d seen, w e are t o l d , t h e "essential d i s c o v e r y " a n d " b u r n i n g p o i n t o f H u s s e r l ' s t h i n k i n g , " s i n c e i t was here t h a t H u s s e r l " b r u s h e d against
the
question
of
being."
(S,
4
373,
376)
Husserl's
notion
of
243 " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " b e c a m e a n " e s s e n t i a l s p r i n g - b o a r d " (Triebfeder) f o r the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n p r o j e c t o f r e - t h i n k i n g the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g . (S, 3 7 7 ) I n h i s 1963 essay " M y W a y i n P h e n o m e n o l o g y , " h e w r o t e : A s I m y s e l f after 1 9 1 9 , t e a c h i n g a n d l e a r n i n g i n H u s s e r l ' s p r o x i m i t y , p r a c t i c e d p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l seeing . . . m y interest l e a n e d a n e w t o w a r d the Logical Investigations, a b o v e a l l the s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n in the first e d i t i o n . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h i s w o r k e d o u t there b e t w e e n sensuous a n d c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n r e v e a l e d i t s e l f t o m e i n its scope f o r the determ i n a t i o n o f t h e " m a n i f o l d m e a n i n g o f b e i n g . " (SD, 8 6 / 7 8 , 4 7 / 4 4 ; c f . BR, x i / x )
W e d o i n d e e d f i n d that i n h i s 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e , one o f m a n y f i r s t drafts
of
his
Being
and
Time,
Heidegger
presented
what
eventually
b e c a m e " D i v i s i o n O n e " a n d t h e f i r s t t h i r d o f " D i v i s i o n T w o " o f Being and Time a s a " r e t r i e v a l , " a n " i m m a n e n t c r i t i q u e " o f H u s s e r l ' s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , w h i c h w a s the f o c a l p o i n t o f h i s a l m o s t t w o h u n d r e d page i n t r o d u c tory discussion of Husserl's phenomenology. ( G Z , 32/26, 192/141-142, 4 2 0 / 3 0 3 , 124/91 ) draft
of his
"Dasein
1 6
Being
and
I n h i s 1 9 2 5 - 2 6 l e c t u r e c o u r s e (LW), s t i l l a n o t h e r e a r l y and Time
(primarily
Temporality"),
his
what
discussion
became
Division T w o ,
of human
existence
and
t e m p o r a l i t y w a s p r e c e d e d b y a n a l m o s t one h u n d r e d page d i s c u s s i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f " t r u t h . " I n o t h e r l e c t u r e courses h e h e l d b e t w e e n 1919 a n d 1926, o n e also f i n d s , a s w e s h a l l see, d i s c u s s i o n s a n d a p p r o p r i a t i o n s o f the basic c o n c e p t s o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y . The
y o u n g H e i d e g g e r saw
indication"
or "hermeneutical
H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations concepts"
(GZ,
58/44,
as " f o r m a l
109/79)
which
pointed interpretively to "the things themselves" and were to be c r i t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e d i n l i g h t o f a r e n e w e d s h o w i n g o f these " t h i n g s " a s the u l t i m a t e c r i t e r i o n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l research. (IP, 109; PA, 1 9 1 ; G Z , 103/75) (GZ,
"Phenomenology,"
178/128)
H e thus
he
maintained,
"is
unphenomenologicall"
felt c o m p e l l e d t o o u t s t r i p t h e " a c t u a l " "self-
u n d e r s t a n d i n g " o f the mens auctoris a n d p u r s u e H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n its " p o s s i b i l i t i e s . " ( G Z , 6 3 / 4 7 , 1 8 4 / 1 3 6 ) H e c a l l e d t h i s the " w o r k i n g o u t o f the h e r m e n e u t i c a l s i t u a t i o n " (PA, 3 ) , i.e., the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f past t h o u g h t i n l i g h t o f its f u t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h i n the present s i t u a t i o n o f philosophy.
His o w n philosophy was to be a "more radical internal
d e v e l o p m e n t " o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y (GZ, 6 2 / 4 6 ) a n d i n d e e d t h e " m o s t r a d i c a l p h e n o m e n o l o g y , w h i c h begins i n the g e n u i n e sense ' f r o m b e l o w ' " (PA, 1 9 5 ) , " i.e., f r o m t h e basis o f f a c t i c a l l i f e . " T h e q u e s t i o n o f
5
244
b e i n g , " h e w r o t e , " i s s p r u n g l o o s e t h r o u g h the i m m a n e n t c r i t i q u e o f the natural
trend
of phenomenological
research
itself."
(GZ,
124/91)
In
1 9 2 1 - 2 2 , he called his o w n philosophy "ontological phenomenology." (PA, 6 0 ) I n 1925, h e t o l d h i s s t u d e n t s that h e was s t i l l a " l e a r n e r i n r e l a t i o n t o H u s s e r l " a n d expressed t h e h o p e t h a t H u s s e r l , w h o s e " q u e s t i o n i n g i s s t i l l f u l l y i n f l u x , " w o u l d take u p his suggestions for radically transformi n g phenomenology. He understood h i m s e l f as a phenomenologist, if not a Husserlian phenomenologist.
(GZ,
1 6 7 - 1 6 8 / 1 2 1 ) T h u s , later i n
1931,
H u s s e r l c o u l d w r i t e t o Pfänder, e v e n i f s o m e w h a t i n e x a g g e r a t i o n , that, d u r i n g the early 1920s, H e i d e g g e r "behaved entirely as if he w e r e my f o l l o w e r a n d f u t u r e c o - w o r k e r , w h o w o u l d stand o n the g r o u n d o f m y c o n s t i t u t i v e p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n a l l essentials o f m e t h o d a n d p r o b l e m atic."
1 7
W h a t t o o k place i n the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s c r i t i c a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i s w h a t G a d a m e r has c a l l e d a h e r m e n e u t i c a l "fusion of horizons"
1 8
between Husserl's thought and Heidegger's o w n
c o n c e r n t o r e - t h i n k t h e q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f " f a c t i c a l l i f e . " I n k e e p i n g w i t h G a d a m e r ' s n o t i o n o f " f u s i o n , " the p o s i t i o n H e i d e g g e r o p e n e d u p b e t w e e n t h e t w o d i a l o g u i n g p a r t n e r s w a s n e i t h e r t h e one nor the other, but rather an agreement in w h i c h both had been, as it were, w o u n d e d i n the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l b a t t l e o f g i a n t s . were
motivated
o r i g i n a l l y had
not only been
by
the
tradition
1 9
Heidegger's concerns
of western
ontology
that
transmitted to h i m through Brentano's w o r k on
A r i s t o t l e a n d C a r l B r a i g ' s On Being: Outline of Ontology, b u t also v e r y m u c h by a cluster of anti-metaphysical traditions w h i c h consisted of D i l t h e y ' s philosophy of life, Aristotle's practical w r i t i n g s , skepticism, Confessions,
"original Luther's
Christianity"
"theology
of
the
(Paul's cross,"
letters, Pascal,
2 0
ancient
Augustine's Kierkegaard),
Jasper's " p h i l o s o p h y o f e x i s t e n c e , " D o s t o e v s k y ' s n o v e l s , a n d V a n G o g h ' s letters. W h a t these t r a d i t i o n s m a d e t h e m a t i c f o r h i m w a s t h e h o r i z o n o f concrete, h i s t o r i c a l l i f e i n terms o f w h i c h h e c o u l d r a d i c a l l y r e - t h i n k the traditional
question
of being.
If Husserl
could
say
"you
and
I
are
p h e n o m e n o l o g y , " Heidegger c o u l d w e l l have replied: y o u and I - and D i l t h e y a n d K i e r k e g a a r d a n d A r i s t o t l e . H u s s e r l l a t e r c a m e t o see that "unfortunately I d i d not determine his p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o r m a t i o n , o b v i o u s l y h e w a s a l r e a d y i n t o his o w n t h i n g w h e n h e s t u d i e d m y w r i t i n g s . "
2 1
The
y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s project o f r a d i c a l i z i n g Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g posed w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l l i f e is n o w h e r e m o r e c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d t h a n i n a passage f r o m
6
245 his
1919-21
essay on K a r l Jaspers' Psychology of World-Views;
I n the f i r s t b r e a k t h r o u g h o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n its s p e c i f i c g o a l o f o r i g i n a l l y r e - a p p r o p r i a t i n g the p h e n o m e n a o f theoretical e x p e r i e n c i n g a n d k n o w i n g ( L o g i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , i.e., p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f the t h e o r e t i c a l l o g o s ) , there w a s t o b e f o u n d a w i n n i n g o f a n u n s p o i l e d seeing o f the m e a n i n g o f t h e o b j e c t s e x p e r i e n c e d i n such t h e o r e t i c a l e x p e r i e n c i n g a n d a l s o o f the h o w o f i t s b e i n g - e x p e r i e n c e d i n the g o a l o f research. B u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r a d i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a g e n u i n e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l t e n d e n c i e s d e p e n d s u p o n the fact that n o t o n l y the " o t h e r " d e p a r t m e n t a l i z e d " r e g i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e " ( t h e aesthetic, the e t h i c a l , the r e l i g i o u s ) c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o s o m e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n are t h o r o u g h l y researched i n a n " a n a l o g i c a l " w a y . R a t h e r , it d e p e n d s o n the fact that e x p e r i e n c i n g i n its f u l l sense is seen i n its a u t h e n t i c a l l y f a c t i c a l c o n t e x t o f e n a c t m e n t i n the h i s t o r i c a l l y e x i s t i n g self. T h i s s e l f i s s o m e h o w the u l t i m a t e issue i n p h i l o s o p h y . . . w h a t i s r e l e v a n t i s that the c o n c r e t e s e l f i s t o b e t a k e n i n t o t h e p o i n t o f d e p a r ture f o r the p r o b l e m s a n d i s t o b e b r o u g h t t o " g i v e n n e s s " a t the a u t h e n t i c a l l y f u n d a m e n t a l l e v e l o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i.e., the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h r e m a i n s r e l a t e d t o the f a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f l i f e a s such. ( A / , 3 4 - 3 5 )
H i s p r o j e c t o f r e - t h i n k i n g H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y w a s t o h a v e been s k e t c h e d o u t n o t o n l y i n his essay o n Jaspers ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d o n l y i n 1 9 7 3 ) , b u t also i n a large b o o k o n A r i s t o t l e , e n t i t l e d " P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Interpretations of A r i s t o t l e , "
2 2
w h i c h he had planned to publish in H u s -
s e r l ' s Jahrbuch in 1 9 2 3 , as w e l l as in a s e v e n t y - p a g e essay e n t i t l e d " T h e Concept of T i m e " w h i c h was unsuccessfully submitted to a j o u r n a l in 1924.
2 3
When,
instead
of his
book
on
Aristotle,
h i s Being
and Time
appeared f o u r years later in H u s s e r l ' s Jahrbuch, it c e r t a i n l y p r e s e n t e d the results o f h i s " f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s " w i t h H u s s e r l ' s t h o u g h t . B u t i t p r o v i d e d few details about h o w
H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations a n d e s p e c i a l l y
his
s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n a c t u a l l y p r o v i d e d the " b a s i s " f o r t h i s w o r k . F o r o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l , w e h a v e been i n t h e past d e p e n d e n t o n h i s s k e t c h y r e m a r k s i n h i s Being and Time a n d i n his
later b r i e f a c c o u n t s o f t h e e a r l y d e v e l o p m e n t o f his
thought.
He
p u b l i s h e d n o t h i n g i n t h e years 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 2 6 a n d later, e x c e p t f o r h i s essay o n Jaspers, s t i l l d i d n o t p u b l i s h a n y t h i n g f r o m h i s y o u t h f u l p e r i o d . B u t H a n n a h A r e n d t has said that d u r i n g the e a r l y 1920s the r e p u t a t i o n o f the y o u n g Privatdozent M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r spread t h r o u g h o u t G e r m a n y l i k e t h e " r u m o r o f the h i d d e n
king."
2 4
F o r decades,
student t r a n s c r i p t s o f h i s
y o u t h f u l l e c t u r e courses c i r c u l a t e d f r o m h a n d t o h a n d a s " e s o t e r i c a " i n a
7
246
kind of philosophical underground,
2 5
s u r f a c i n g o c c a s i o n a l l y i n t o the w i d e r
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p u b l i c i n r e p o r t s g i v e n b y h i s earliest students s u c h a s O s k a r Becker, Helene Weiss, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah A r e n d t , and K a r l Löwith. U n t i l the p u b l i c a t i o n o f his early F r e i b u r g and M a r b u r g lecture c o u r s e s i n t h e last d e c a d e , h i s y o u t h f u l r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l (as w e l l a s o f A r i s t o t l e and K i e r k e g a a r d )
2 6
has h a d t o r e m a i n t o a great e x t e n t o n the
level of "rumor." I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o a t t e m p t , o n t h e basis o f t h e p u b l i s h e d t e x t s o f his l e c t u r e courses b e t w e e n 1919 a n d 1 9 2 6 , a m o r e d e t a i l e d r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e m a j o r d i r e c t i o n s o f the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s " f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s " w i t h Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y and especially the s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n in his Logical Investigations.
21
I
themes of his project
will
begin
with
a short sketch
o f the general
f o r r e - t h i n k i n g the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g a n d t h e n
proceed to show h o w he critically appropriated Husserl's phenomenology i n d e v e l o p i n g these t h e m e s . T h e y o u n g H e i d e g g e r saw h i s p r o j e c t a s that o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t the " e n d o f p h i l o s o p h y " a n d a " g e n u i n e b e g i n n i n g " f o r the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g .
2 8
By
" p h i l o s o p h y , " h e meant the w h o l e h i s t o r y o f western t h o u g h t , w h i c h h e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f a " f i r s t b e g i n n i n g " w i t h the G r e e k s that u n d e r w e n t v a r i o u s " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s " a n d " r e - s t r u c t u r i n g s " i n the o t h e r t w o " e p o c h s " o f t h e M i d d l e A g e s a n d m o d e r n i t y . (PA, 2 - 3 , 170, 9 2 ; IP, 2 0 ) H i s y o u t h f u l
f o r m u l a t i o n of the Seinsfrage was "Seinsfraglichkeit," the " q u e s t i o n a b l e ness o f b e i n g . " (PA, question
of b e i n g
189) H e e x p r e s s e d h i s " g e n u i n e b e g i n n i n g " f o r the in t h e
following
formula:
"Leben
= Dasein,
in
und
durch Leben 'Sein'," " l i f e = t h e r e - b e i n g , 'being' in and t h r o u g h l i f e " . (PA, 85,
187) He c a l l e d this his " p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l e x i s t e n t i a l t o p i c , " the
" p l a c e " (Ort) (PA, 3 1 ) o f " f a c t i c a l l i f e " a s the " o r i g i n " o f a l l m e a n i n g . B u t he understood this place of l i f e precisely as the " t h e r e " of b e i n g . He was not developing some f o r m of mere existentialism or philosophy of life. A l t h o u g h his t h o u g h t d i d c h a n g e after 1930, i t i s n o t the case that h i s t h o u g h t here u n d e r w e n t a m i r a c u l o u s c o n v e r s i o n f r o m a p u r e l y h u m a n centred philosophy to a Being-centred o n e .
2 9
A s w e s h a l l see m o r e c l e a r l y ,
m a n y o f the basic n o t i o n s w h i c h h e f i r s t m a d e p u b l i c i n his
1927 Being
and Time a n d i n h i s w r i t i n g s after 1 9 3 0 , e.g., the " q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , " t h e "first
beginning,"
philosophy,"
the
the
three
"step-back,"
"epochs" the
of
"turn,"
metaphysics, the
"other
"end
of
beginning,"
the
the
" m e a n i n g o f b e i n g , " t h e " t r u t h " c h a r a c t e r o f b e i n g , the " p l a c e " c h a r a c t e r o f b e i n g , " E r e i g n i s , " t h e " w o r l d i n g " o f the w o r l d w e r e e i t h e r a l r e a d y e x p l i c i t l y used o r else o p e r a t i v e i n his u n p u b l i s h e d y o u t h f u l t e x t s , e v e n i f
8
247
in a f o r m peculiar to this p e r i o d of his thought. F o r the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r , H u s s e r l b o t h b e l o n g e d t o the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h was to be b r o u g h t to an end, and was to occupy a special p l a c e i n the r a d i c a l r e p e t i t i o n o f t h i s t r a d i t i o n . A d o p t i n g the l a n g u a g e o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , he articulated his n o t i o n of " b e i n g - m e a n i n g " i n t o the three
intentional moments of "content-meaning" (intentional
object), "relational
m e a n i n g " ( m a n n e r o f i n t e n d i n g ) , and "enactment-
m e a n i n g " o r " t e m p o r a l i z i n g - m e a n i n g " (performance o f the i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n a s t e m p o r a l i z i n g ) . (PA, 5 2 - 5 3 ) B u t h i s " d e s t r u c t i o n " a t t e m p t e d t o " u n - b u i l d " (abbauen) within
"factical
Husserl's
life"
by
phenomenology back
exposing
the
into
"founded"
its
"origin"
character
of
his
" t h e o r e t i c a l " a r t i c u l a t i o n o f these three i n t e n t i o n a l m o m e n t s a s n o e m a t i c "objectivity,"
"noesis"
"making-present."
(to
use
Heidegger's
the
language
"retrieval"
of
o f H u s s e r l ' s Ideas), these
three
aspects
and of
intentionality attempted to re-think them more o r i g i n a l l y as " w o r l d , " " c a r e , " a n d " t e m p o r a l i z i n g " w i t h i n the " g e n u i n e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y p r i m o r d i a l s t r a t u m (life in and for itself)." (PW, 1 2 1 ) He thus d e s c r i b e d h i s radicalization Sprung)
o f phenomenology
as
an
"original
i n t o t h e " o r i g i n " (Ursprung), a " c r i t i c a l
(Erörterung)
(GZ,
phenomenology
178/128, back
140/102)
i n t o the
which
original
leap"
(ursprüngliche
p l a c i n g in d i s c u s s i o n " would
place
"phenomenological
t o p i c , " the " p l a c e " (Ort) o f f a c t i c a l l i f e .
3 0
Husserl's existential
Phenomenology was to be
r e t r i e v e d f r o m t h i s o r i g i n o f "'being' i n a n d t h r o u g h l i f e . " Let us n o w consider, in turn, Heidegger's destructive appropriations of the H u s s e r l i a n a r t i c u l a t i o n s o f the t h r e e i n t e n t i o n a l m o m e n t s o f " b e i n g meaning."
3. Intentional w o r l d i n g
I begin w i t h Heidegger's critical appropriation of Husserl's articulation of t h e i n t e n t i o n a l m o m e n t o f " c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g " (Gehaltssinn). M y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , here a n d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g sections, f o l l o w s the general directions o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n interpretation p r i m a r i l y , b u t n o t e x c l u s i v e l y , i n his 1925 l e c t u r e c o u r s e (GZ, 6 3 - 1 0 3 / 4 7 - 7 5 ) . I n c h a p t e r six ("Sense a n d U n d e r s t a n d i n g " ) o f his s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , H u s s e r l o v e r s t e p s the e m p i r i c i s t a n d K a n t i a n r e s t r i c t i o n o f " i n t u i t i o n " t o "sense i n t u i t i o n " o f sensual o b j e c t s . H e s h o w s h o w w e are a l w a y s p e r f o r m i n g acts o f " c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n " i n w h i c h the c a t e g o r i a l e l e m e n t s o f
9
248
p e r c e p t u a l statements ( e . g . , the ' t h i s ' a n d t h e ' i s ' i n ' t h i s p a p e r i s w h i t e ' ) are b r o u g h t t o o b j e c t i v e " g i v e n n e s s . " F o r H e i d e g g e r , w h a t w a s d e c i s i v e here w a s t h a t " b e i n g " i s c o n c e i v e d a s a " p h e n o m e n o n " o f l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e and as capable of b e c o m i n g an e x p l i c i t p h e n o m e n o n for p h e n o m e n o l o g i cal investigation. H u s s e r l e x p l a i n s that i n t u i t i o n i s a f u l f i l l i n g i n t e n t i o n w h i c h f i l l s a n e m p t y i n t e n t i o n w i t h the i m m e d i a t e g i v e n n e s s o f the m a t t e r i t s e l f . F o r e x a m p l e , m y i n t e n t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f w h i t e p a p e r ( e . g . , the i m a g i n e d p a p e r ) c a n b e f u l f i l l e d b y m y i m m e d i a t e p e r c e p t i o n o f the w h i t e p a p e r ( t h e p e r c e i v e d paper t h a t i s b o d i l y t h e r e b e f o r e m y e y e s ) . B u t H u s s e r l insists that t h e e m p t y m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n i n a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o f a n o b j e c t ('the paper is w h i t e ' , 'the w h i t e paper') cannot be f u l f i l l e d merely t h r o u g h my "sensuous i n t u i t i o n . " W h a t I understand and express in my statement 'the paper-fcemg-white',
'the paper-as-white' - cannot be
found
in the
sensuously intuited object, even t h o u g h it is g i v e n " w i t h " this object. H u s s e r l w r i t e s : "Being is no real predicate [ K a n t ] . . . I c a n see c o l o u r , b u t not being-coloured.
I can
feel
smoothness,
b u t n o t being-smooth.
I can
hear a s o u n d , b u t n o t t h a t s o m e t h i n g is s o u n d i n g . B e i n g is n o t h i n g in t h e object
...
being
31
is absolutely imperceptible."
Therefore,
he c a l l s " b e i n g "
a n "excess (Überschuss) o f m e a n i n g . " E v e n t h o u g h , i n m y s t a t e m e n t ' t h e p a p e r is w h i t e ' , I say o n l y w h a t I see, w h a t I see ( i n t h e w i d e r sense of i n t u i t ) i s also t h e b e i n g - w h i t e , t h e a s - w h i t e , w h i c h e x c e e d s the sensuous aspect o f the w h i t e paper. A g a i n H u s s e r l w r i t e s :
I see w h i t e p a p e r a n d say ' w h i t e p a p e r ' , t h e r e b y I e x p r e s s , w i t h p r e c i s e a d e q u a c y , o n l y w h a t I see . . . W e are n o t t o let o u r s e l v e s b e l e d astray b y s u c h w a y s o f s p e a k i n g ; t h e y are i n a c e r t a i n m a n n e r c o r r e c t , y e t are r e a d i l y m i s u n d e r s t o o d . . . I n this k n o w i n g a n o t h e r act i s p l a i n l y present, w h i c h p e r h a p s i n c l u d e s the f o r m e r o n e , b u t i s n o n e t h e l e s s d i f f e r e n t f r o m i t : the paper i s k n o w n a s w h i t e , o r rather a s a w h i t e t h i n g , w h e n e v e r w e e x p r e s s o u r p e r c e p t i o n i n the w o r d s ' w h i t e p a p e r ' . T h e i n t e n t i o n o f the w o r d ' w h i t e ' o n l y p a r t i a l l y coincides w i t h the colour-aspect o f the a p p e a r i n g o b j e c t ; there r e m a i n s a n excess o f m e a n i n g , a f o r m , w h i c h f i n d s n o t h i n g i n the appearance t o c o n f i r m i t . W h i t e , i.e., being w h i t e paper. I s t h i s f o r m n o t also repeated, e v e n i f r e m a i n i n g m o r e h i d d e n , i n t h e n o u n ' p a p e r ' ? (LU, 6 5 9 - 6 6 0 / 7 7 5 )
I n a n act o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n , I c a n b r i n g w h a t w a s p r e v i o u s l y o n l y e m p t i l y i n t e n d e d i n " t h e l i t t l e w o r d ' i s ' , " i.e., the p a p e r - " a s " - w h i t e , t o a n explicit
self-givenness.
"[The
is]
is,
however,
self-given
or
at
least
p r e s u m a b l y g i v e n i n the fulfillment w h i c h u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n v e s t s t h e
10
249 j u d g m e n t : i n the becoming aware o f the p r e s u m e d state o f a f f a i r s . N o t o n l y w h a t i s m e a n t i n the p a r t i a l m e a n i n g gold i t s e l f appears, n o r o n l y w h a t is m e a n t in the p a r t i a l m e a n i n g yellow, b u t a l s o gold-being-yellow appears." (LU, 6 6 8 / 7 8 2 ) F o r H u s s e r l , the " b e i n g " (Sein) o f a p a r t i c u l a r " b e i n g " (das Seiende) is able to appear, as it w e r e , " b e f o r e o u r e y e s . " (LU, 6 7 1 / 7 8 5 ) I n t u r n , m y h i g h e r l e v e l act o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n , w h i c h i s s t i l l f o u n d e d o n sensuous i n t u i t i o n , c a n b e c o m e the basis f o r a n o t h e r t y p e o f categorial i n t u i t i o n , namely, "universal i n t u i t i o n " o r " i d e a t i o n . " I n this u n i v e r s a l i n t u i t i o n , I n o l o n g e r c o - i n t e n d the f o u n d i n g sensuous o b j e c t ( t h e w h i t e piece o f paper) o f m y categorial i n t u i t i o n , but rather abstractively i n t e n d its a p r i o r i c a t e g o r i a l e l e m e n t ( b e i n g - w h i t e , w h i t e n e s s ) , w h i c h w a s p r e v i o u s l y o n l y u n t h e m a t i c a l l y u n d e r s t o o d . T h e " ' a s - w h a t ' , the u n i v e r s a l character of house,"
Heidegger comments,
"is
itself not expressly
ap-
prehended in w h a t it is, but is already co-apprehended in simple i n t u i t i o n a s that w h i c h t o s o m e e x t e n t here i l l u m i n a t e s w h a t i s g i v e n . " (GZ, 9 1 / 6 7 ; c f . LU, 6 7 0 / 7 8 4 , 6 9 0 / 7 9 9 ) H u s s e r l later c a l l e d t h i s i d e a t i o n " i n t u i t i o n o f essence" gives
(Wesensschau).
access
to
and
It
is
this categorial
organizes
the
or eidetic
various
intuition
"regional
which
ontologies"
of
p h e n o m e n o l o g y . (HF, 2; GZ, 9 3 - 9 7 / 6 8 - 7 1 ) H e i d e g g e r f o u n d H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f the c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n o f b e i n g s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a n u m b e r o f reasons. F i r s t , b e i n g i s freed f r o m its t r a d i t i o n a l c o n f i n e m e n t t o the f u n c t i o n o f the c o p u l a , i.e., the m e r e b i n d i n g t o g e t h e r o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d c o n c e p t s i n a j u d g m e n t . (GZ, 7 2 / 5 4 )
3 2
N o r is being
seen t o b e d e r i v e d f r o m r e f l e c t i o n o n i n n e r sense ( e m p i r i c i s m ) o r c o n c e i v e d a s a s u b j e c t i v e f o r m w i t h w h i c h sensuous m a t e r i a l i s o r d e r e d ( K a n t ) . (GZ, 7 8 / 5 8 , 9 6 / 7 0 ) N o r is it d e s c r i b e d as a r e a l part of an o b j e c t , a b e i n g , e v e n t h o u g h i t i s a l w a y s the b e i n g o f a b e i n g . (GZ, 7 8 / 5 8 , 2 3 7 / 1 7 5 , 362/262)
3 3
R a t h e r , b e i n g i s c o n c e i v e d here i n s u c h a w a y that i t i s able t o
b e b r o u g h t t o a n "originary self-giving
in corresponding
acts o f g i v i n g . "
(GZ, 8 0 / 6 0 ) B e i n g c a n b e c o m e a p h e n o m e n o n , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h appears, " s h o w s " i t s e l f . (GZ, 9 7 / 7 1 ) O n t h i s basis, o n e c a n raise the q u e s t i o n o f the "meaning" o f t h i s b e i n g , o f w h a t is meant b y the w o r d " b e i n g . " (GZ, 73/54,
193/143)
3 4
" B e i n g " is t h u s n o t a " m e r e flatus vocis." (GZ, 9 8 / 7 1 )
S e c o n d , H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s that H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n a s "universal
i n t u i t i o n " provides
investigating
the
categorial
the
empirical
structures
methodological
of being.
Husserl
basis
showed
for how
c a t e g o r i a l - o n t o l o g i c a l structures c a n b e b r o u g h t t o " e v i d e n t i a l " g i v e n n e s s . (GZ, 9 7 - 9 8 / 7 1 - 7 2 ) T h i r d , b y c o n s i d e r i n g b e i n g a s " o b j e c t i v i t y , " H u s s e r l ' s phenomenology
i m p l i c i t l y takes u p the research o f " a n c i e n t o n t o l o g y "
11
250
( G Z , 9 8 / 7 2 ) , the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g i n G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . B u t p r e c i s e l y h o w H e i d e g g e r a p p r o p r i a t e d these three b r e a k t h r o u g h s b e c o m e s c l e a r o n l y i n t h e l i g h t o f h o w h e a t the same t i m e c r i t i c a l l y " u n b u i l t " t h e m back into their o r i g i n w i t h i n factical l i f e . He c l a i m e d to be d o i n g n o t h i n g other than f o l l o w i n g up D i l t h e y ' s critique and appropriation o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y f r o m the v i e w p o i n t o f his o w n project o f a " p h i l o s o p h y of l i f e . "
3 5
H e w r i t e s that D i l t h e y s o u g h t a " p s y c h o l o g y a s a d e s c r i p t i v e
s c i e n c e , a n d w e are i n d e b t e d t o h i m f o r v a l u a b l e i n t u i t i o n s a b o u t the i d e a o f t h i s science . . . T h e secret l o n g i n g o f h i s l i f e b e g a n t o b e f u l f i l l e d b y p h e n o m e n o l o g y . . . B u t he was no l o g i c i a n , and he saw i m m e d i a t e l y the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations
which
h a r d l y n o t i c e d a n d i n d e e d m i s u n d e r s t o o d . . . " (PW,
at that
time
were
164-165) Heidegger
f o l l o w e d D i l t h e y ' s a t t e m p t to use H u s s e r l ' s Logical Investigations n o t , as H u s s e r l h a d s o u g h t t o d o , f o r the sake o f a " p u r e l o g i c , " b u t r a t h e r f o r t h e sake
of a
"fundamental
" D i l t h e y , " he
science
maintained,
"was
of l i f e . " the
first
(GZ,
30/24;
PA,
to understand
the
80,
117)
aims of
p h e n o m e n o l o g y . . . t h e essential p o i n t here i s n o t s o m u c h t h e c o n c e p t u a l p e n e t r a t i o n a s the sheer d i s c l o s u r e o f n e w h o r i z o n s f o r the q u e s t i o n o f the being
o f acts
and,
164-165/118-119)
in In
the
broadest
sense,
the
this
passage,
Heidegger
being
of man."
mentions
what
(GZ, these
h o r i z o n s o p e n e d u p b y D i l t h e y are. A s w e s h a l l see, t h e y c o r r e s p o n d exactly
with
the three
"being-meaning,"
i.e.,
intentional moments of Heidegger's notion of content-meaning,
relational
meaning,
and
e n a c t m e n t - m e a n i n g . R e g a r d i n g the m o m e n t o f c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g p r e s e n t l y u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , h e paraphrases D i l t h e y ' s thesis that " t h e p e r s o n i n h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e l f h o o d f i n d s h i m s e l f o v e r a g a i n s t a w o r l d u p o n w h i c h h e acts a n d w h i c h reacts u p o n h i m . " H e r e D i l t h e y pushes H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f the i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t o u t o f the r e a l m o f l o g i c a n d i n t o the sphere o f t h e l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e o f the p r a c t i c a l a n d c u l t u r a l w o r l d . T h e y o u n g H e i d e g g e r f o l l o w e d h i m i n this project. T h u s he argued that Husserl's characterization of b e i n g is taken f r o m the s p e c i f i c w a y that i t i s e x p e r i e n c e d i n " t h e o r y , " the s i m p l e " g a z i n g " u p o n the w o r l d w h i c h c o n s u m m a t e s i t s e l f i n j u d g m e n t a n d a s s e r t i o n . T h e basic sense o f b e i n g here i s o b j e c t - b e i n g , t h i n g - b e i n g , r e a l i t y , n a t u r e , " b o d i l y n e s s " (Leibhaftigkeit). (IP,
108, 8 7 ,
100,
109; PA, 9 1 ; G Z , 8 3 / 6 1 .
1 6 5 / 1 1 9 ) H u s s e r l f u r t h e r sees v a l u a t i v e a n d aesthetic r e a l i t i e s a s f o u n d e d o n t h i s basic s t r a t u m . W h i l e a p p r e c i a t i n g H u s s e r l ' s passionate i n t e n t i o n t o w a r d s " t h e t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , " H e i d e g g e r nonetheless m a i n t a i n s t h a t h e has n a i v e l y t a k e n o v e r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l idea o f b e i n g a s present a t h a n d
12
251 t h i n g h o o d f r o m Descartes a n d u l t i m a t e l y f r o m G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . (GZ, 1 3 9 / 1 0 1 ) H e f a i l s t o discuss e x p l i c i t l y " t h e q u e s t i o n o f the m e a n i n g o f b e i n g . " (GZ,
1 7 9 / 1 2 9 ) M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , H e i d e g g e r describes H u s s e r l ' s
approach
the
to
being
of
the
world
as
an
alienating
process
of
" t h e o r i z a t i o n " a n d " o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , " w h i c h l e a d t o the " e x t i n g u i s h i n g " a n d the
"de-worlding"
(Entweltlichung)
of
the
immediate
weitet) o f the p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l , p r a c t i c a l w o r l d .
3 6
"it
worlds"
(es
"The ' i t worlds'," Heideg-
ger w r i t e s , " i s a l r e a d y e x t i n g u i s h e d i n [ t h i n g h o o d j . T h e t h i n g i s m e r e l y s t i l l there as s u c h , i.e., it is r e a l , it e x i s t s . R e a l i t y is t h e r e f o r e n o t a charact e r i z a t i o n o f w h a t has t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e w o r l d a r o u n d u s (Umwelt), b u t r a t h e r a s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e o r e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n , w h i c h lies i n the essence of t h i n g h o o d .
What
has
the c h a r a c t e r o f s i g n i f i c a n c e
(Bedeutsamkeit)
is
d e - s i g n i f i e d d o w n t o the r e m n a n t : b e i n g - r e a l . " (IP, 8 9 ) F o l l o w i n g u p D i l t h e y ' s c r i t i c a l r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l , H e i d e g g e r ' s basic i n t e n t i o n w a s t o reverse t h i s process o f t h e o r i z a t i o n a n d d e - w o r l d i n g a t w o r k in Husserl's characterization of intentional "content-meaning" and to b u i l d - b a c k " t h i s " c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g " i n t o its " o r i g i n " i n t h e "Lebenswelt," the " l i f e - w o r l d . " (IP, 4 ; PA, 6 , 9 4 , 9 7 , -115) H e r e w e c a n h i g h l i g h t three focal points of Heidegger's critical appropriation. First, Husserl's notion o f b e i n g a s o b j e c t - b e i n g (substance, a c c i d e n t , p r o p e r t y , e t c . ) w a s t o b e rethought as the " s i g n i f i c a n c e " ("being-ready-to-hand-there," " f r o m w h i c h , " " f o r w h i c h , " " t o w a r d s w h i c h , " " f o r the sake o f ) a n d the l i v e d " s p a t i a l i t y " o f t h e p r a c t i c a l w o r l d a r o u n d us, w h i c h i s t h e " e v e r y d a y w o r l d . " (HF, 8 5 , 9 3 - 1 0 4 ) " W o r l d , " H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , " i s the f u n d a m e n t a l c a t e g o r y o f c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g i n the p h e n o m e n o n o f l i f e . " (PA, 8 6 ) Second,
Husserl's
"ideation"
was
"hermeneutical
to
theoretical be
intuition,"
method
transformed the
"lived
into
of
"universal
Heidegger's
experience
of l i v e d
intuition"
own
method
experience"
or of (IP,
117) w h i c h " i n t e r p r e t i v e l y e x p l i c a t e s " the f a c t i c a l " p r e - c o n c e p t i o n " o f being w h i c h belongs to factical l i f e .
3 7
"The phenomenological criterion,"
h e w r i t e s , " i s s o l e l y the u n d e r s t a n d i n g e v i d e n c e a n d the e v i d e n t i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e s , o f l i f e i n a n d f o r i t s e l f i n its e i d o s . " (PW, 1 2 6 ) T h i s c o n c r e t e , i n t e r p r e t i v e a p p r o a c h t o the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f b e i n g i s s u c c i n c t l y expressed i n the t i t l e t o his
1923 lecture course, " O n t o l o g y
( H e r m e n e u t i c s o f F a c t i c i t y ) . " H e was i n f l u e n c e d here also b y D i l t h e y ' s d e v e l o p m e n t o f " h e r m e n e u t i c s " a s the m e t h o d o f h i s t o r i c a l a n d i n t e r p r e tive understanding Moreover,
in the h u m a n sciences. (HF,
for Heidegger,
philosophy
was not
1 3 - 1 4 ; SZ, 5 2 6 / 4 5 0 ) to arrive at
3 8
Husserl's
a t e m p o r a l "essences" t o w h i c h a f i x e d p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l t e r m i n o l o g y
13
252
w o u l d correspond. He thought that p h i l o s o p h y is l i m i t e d to g i v i n g " f o r m a l i n d i c a t i o n " or "hermeneutical concepts,"
w h i c h can o n l y
p o i n t t o the
things themselves and have to be constantly re-appropriated,
since the
" t h i n g s " o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y are c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a r a d i c a l f a c t i c i t y a n d historicity. (PA,
3 9
A l o n g w i t h Aristotle's method of providing a rough "outline"
192) for practical life and Kierkegaard's n o t i o n of "indirect c o m -
munication" Husserl's
(AJ,
41),
notion
in
Heidegger his
Logical
"occasional expressions" (e.g., " i n d i c a t e " the e s s e n t i a l l y
T,
here
radicalized
Investigations 'here',
of
and
a
universalized
certain
' y o u ' ) , whose
class
function
of
is to
variable, situational m e a n i n g of such expres-
sions. T h i r d , Husserl's recovery of Greek o n t o l o g y was thus to be pushed in the d i r e c t i o n o f H e i d e g g e r ' s o w n e x i s t e n t i a l - p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l o n t o l o g y , w h i c h h e c a l l e d a " s c i e n c e o f the o r i g i n , " a " p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l o r t r a n s t h e o r e t i c a l , in a n y case a n o n - t h e o r e t i c a l science, a g e n u i n e t / r - s c i e n c e o u t o f w h i c h the t h e o r e t i c a l i t s e l f takes its o r i g i n . " (IP, 9 6 )
4. I n t e n t i o n a l life
Heidegger manner
in
(Bezugssinn)
likewise which of
performed Husserl
a
had
intentionality,
destructive worked
i.e.,
the
out "how"
retrieval the of
of
the
"relational the
specific meaning"
relation
to
the
intentional object. T h i s becomes visible w h e n we consider Heidegger's r e a d i n g o f H u s s e r l ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f " t r u t h " i n his Logical Investigations. T h e q u e s t i o n o f c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n w a s f o r H u s s e r l p r e c i s e l y the issue of
the
truth
present
in
the
sphere
of
categorial
intentions.
(LU,
6 5 1 - 6 5 6 / 7 6 5 - 7 7 0 ) H e d e f i n e s t r u t h a s the " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " w h i c h I a c h i e v e w h e n the object gives itself i m m e d i a t e l y in my i n t u i t i v e , f u l f i l l i n g intention just as I had signified it in my e m p t y intention: " W e experience h o w the same o b j e c t i v e s o m e t h i n g w h i c h w a s ' m e r e l y t h o u g h t ' i n a s y m b o l i c act i s n o w i n t u i t i v e l y p r e s e n t e d i n i n t u i t i o n , a n d that i t i s i n t u i t e d a s b e i n g p r e c i s e l y the d e t e r m i n a t e so-and-so that i t w a s a t f i r s t m e r e l y t h o u g h t t o b e (merely
s i g n i f i e d ) . " (LU, 5 6 6 / 6 9 4 )
He
identifies t w o meanings
o f the
t r a d i t i o n a l A r i s t o t e l i a n a n d s c h o l a s t i c n o t i o n o f " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h " (on hos alethes; ens tanquam verum): f i r s t , b e i n g i n the sense o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the s i g n i f i e d a n d
the i n t u i t e d ( ' t h e p a p e r [ r e a l l y ]
is
w h i t e ' ) ; s e c o n d , b e i n g i n the sense o f the " t r u e - m a k i n g t h i n g , " the i n t u i t e d " b e i n g " w h i c h b e s t o w s fullness o n m y e m p t y s i g n i f i c a t i o n . H e p o i n t s o u t
14
253 that these t w o senses o f t r u t h u n d e r l i e the s t a n d a r d d e f i n i t i o n o f t r u t h a s the " c o r r e c t n e s s o f o u r i n t e n t i o n . . . the p r o p o s i t i o n ' d i r e c t s ' i t s e l f t o the t h i n g i t s e l f , i t says t h a t i t i s so, a n d i t r e a l l y i s s o . " (LU, 6 5 3 / 7 6 6 ) I n t h e case of c a t e g o r i a l i n t e n t i o n s , t r u t h is e x p e r i e n c e d as the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n I a c h i e v e w h e n i n m y f u l f i l l i n g c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n t h e t h i n g i t s e l f (paperbeing-v/h'ile,
paper-oj-white)
"appears"
in
its
"self-appearance"
(LU,
651/765) just as it was intended in my empty categorial meaning-intent i o n . O n H e i d e g g e r ' s r e a d i n g , t h i s m e a n s t h a t " t h e f o u n d e d acts disclose t h e s i m p l y g i v e n o b j e c t s anew
..." (GZ,
8 4 / 6 2 ) " C a t e g o r i a l acts," h e
e x p l a i n s , " c o n s t i t u t e a n e w o b j e c t i v i t y . . . [ C o n s t i t u t i n g ] m e a n s l e t t i n g the b e i n g b e seen i n its o b j e c t i v i t y . " ( G Z , 9 7 / 7 1 ) H u s s e r l m a i n t a i n s that e s p e c i a l l y i n the " s t a t i c u n i o n s " o f s i g n i f i e d a n d intuited, w h i c h we have already achieved and in w h i c h we habitually l i v e , we
"experience"
truth
as
"identity"
without,
however,
thematically
a p p r e h e n d i n g i t . (LU, 5 6 9 - 5 7 0 / 6 9 7 , 6 5 2 / 7 6 6 ) H e i d e g g e r ' s c o m m e n t a r y o n this Husserlian theme runs a s f o l l o w s : " I n the c o m i n g into coincidence o f t h e p r e s u m e d w i t h the i n t u i t e d , I a m s o l e l y a n d p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e subject m a t t e r i t s e l f . . . T h i s i s the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l sense o f s a y i n g t h a t i n e v i d e n t p e r c e p t i o n I d o n o t t h e m a t i c a l l y s t u d y the t r u t h o f t h i s p e r c e p t i o n i t s e l f , b u t r a t h e r l i v e in the t r u t h . B e i n g - t r u e is e x p e r i e n c e d as a distinctive
relation,
a
comportmental
relation
between
presumed
and
i n t u i t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the sense o f i d e n t i t y . " ( G Z , 6 9 - 7 0 / 5 2 ) I n m y disclosive categorial i n t u i t i o n of the t h i n g itself as-something ( b e i n g ) , I focus i n t e n t i o n a l l y o n the t h i n g itself w i t h o u t t h e m a t i c a l l y c o n s i d e r i n g m y c a t e g o r i a l m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n , w h i c h r e m a i n s i n the b a c k g r o u n d . I t i s o n l y i n a subsequent i n t e n t i o n a l act that I c a n m a k e t h e " i d e n t i t y " i n v o l v e d here i n t o a t h e m a t i c o b j e c t or, f u r t h e r , t h e m a t i z e the o p e r a t i v e a p r i o r i d i m e n s i o n o f the c a t e g o r i a l i t s e l f ( i d e a t i o n ) . W h a t captivated Heidegger's attention i n Husserl's analysis o f " t r u t h " w a s that t r u t h w a s i n v e s t i g a t e d here at a m o r e basic l e v e l t h a n its t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n a s t h e " c o r r e c t n e s s " o f p r o p o s i t i o n s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , H u s s e r l refers t o b e i n g i t s e l f a s " t r u t h " i n the sense o f the appearance o f beings in their b e i n g (the " t r u e - m a k i n g t h i n g " w h i c h is disclosed), a n o t i o n w h i c h , according t o Heidegger, i s first f o u n d i n the G r e e k meaning o f truth
as
aletheia,
169-182) Second,
i.e.,
literally
"unconcealment."
(GZ,
71/51;
LW,
H u s s e r l ' s c o n c e p t o f t r u t h a s b e i n g - t r u e ( t h e act o f
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ) p o i n t s t o the act o f " d i s c l o s u r e , " o f " l e t t i n g appear," w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , i s w h a t A r i s t o t l e m e a n t b y aletheuein, " b e i n g true," "unconcealing." (GZ, 7 1 - 7 3 / 5 3 - 5 4 )
15
254
B u t a g a i n H e i d e g g e r ' s r e t r i e v a l a t t e m p t e d t o trace these t w o m o r e basic senses o f t r u t h b a c k i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l sphere o f f a c t i c a l l i f e . H e r e , t o o , he was t a k i n g u p D i l t h e y ' s c r i t i c a l appropriation o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e s e c o n d basic thesis f r o m D i l t h e y , w h i c h H e i d e g g e r m e n t i o n s a s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g h i s o w n u n i q u e use o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y , i s " t h a t i n e v e r y aspect o f b e i n g the p e r s o n , the t o t a l p e r s o n , reacts, n o t s i m p l y i n w i l l i n g , f e e l i n g , a n d r e f l e c t i n g , b u t a l l t o g e t h e r a l w a y s a t the same t i m e . " ( G Z , 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 / 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 ) " [ D i l t h e y ] , " H e i d e g g e r also w r i t e s , " w a n t s t o get a t the t o t a l i t y o f the s u b j e c t w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e s the w o r l d a n d n o t t o a b l o o d l e s s t h i n k i n g t h i n g w h i c h m e r e l y i n t e n d s a n d t h e o r e t i c a l l y t h i n k s the w o r l d . " (GZ,
302/220)
H e i d e g g e r thus a t t e m p t e d t o s h o w t h a t H u s s e r l ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e " h o w " o f i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e w a s d r a w n o n e - s i d e d l y f r o m the a t t i t u d e o f ' " m e r e b e i n g d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s ' " (WU, 2 0 7 ) w h i c h b e l o n g s t o " t h e o r y " a n d its r e l a t e d c o m p o r t m e n t s o f " i n t u i t i o n " (PA, 1 5 3 ) , "sense p e r c e p t i o n " (PA,
40;
GZ,
"assertion" thinking
246-247/182,
(GZ, or
219/163).
objective
254/188), "The
"knowing,"
so-called
theoretical
logical
knowing,"
"judgment,"
and
comportments
Heidegger
" r e p r e s e n t o n l y a p a r t i c u l a r a n d n a r r o w sphere w i t h i n
of
criticizes,
the d o m a i n o f
intentionality . . . " ( G Z , 106-107/78; cf. 73/54, 124/91) A g a i n he writes: "Every
directing-itself-toward
(fear,
hope,
love)
has
the
feature
of
d i r e c t i n g - i t s e l f - t o w a r d w h i c h H u s s e r l c a l l s noesis. I n a s m u c h as noein is t a k e n f r o m the sphere o f t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w i n g , a n y e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e p r a c t i c a l here i s d r a w n f r o m t h e t h e o r e t i c a l . " ( G Z , 6 1 / 4 5 ) H u s s e r l , H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s f u r t h e r , v i e w s h u m a n b e i n g a s a present a t h a n d o b j e c t , s i n c e h e c h a r a c t e r i z e s the h u m a n b e i n g , w h i c h has i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f o r its basic s t r u c t u r e , p r i m a r i l y a s i t i s g i v e n t o t h e o r e t i c a l observation.
In
phenomenology
Husserl's under
later the
"transcendental" influence
of
self-interpretation
Neo-Kantianism
of
(GZ,
1 2 4 - 1 2 8 / 9 1 - 9 3 ) , t h e p e r s o n appears e x p l i c i t l y a s a t h i n g - l i k e c o m p o s i t e o f a p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l a n i m a l and an intentional consciousness, w h i c h c o n sciousness i s u l t i m a t e l y s u p p o s e d t o b e " a b s o l u t e b e i n g " i n r e l a t i o n t o the c o n t i n g e n t a n d f o u n d e d b e i n g o f the e m p i r i c a l self. T h e f a c t i c a l h u m a n b e i n g gets c h a r a c t e r i z e d
as ' " a real object l i k e others
in
the n a t u r a l
w o r l d ' , " a n ' " a n i m a l b e i n g ' . " ( G Z , 1 3 1 / 9 6 ) T h e g u i d i n g i d e a o f b e i n g here i s a g a i n that o f b e i n g - r e a l , b e i n g a n a t u r a l o b j e c t . ( G Z , 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 / 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 ) H u s s e r l f a i l s t o raise t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e " b e i n g o f t h e h u m a n , " " t h a t o f w h i c h i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s the structure." ( G Z , 6 2 - 6 3 / 4 6 - 4 7 , 148/108) T h e q u e s t i o n o f the " s u m " o f the t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l " c o g i t o " i s left u n a s k e d . (PA, 1 7 3 )
16
255 H e i d e g g e r r e a d i l y a d m i t s that H u s s e r l ' s " r e d u c t i o n " f r o m o u r " n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e " b a c k t o p u r e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s does i n d e e d b e g i n w i t h a n attempted description o f our concrete being i n everyday l i f e . B u t t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , h e argues, i s a l r e a d y c o l o r e d b y a v e r y u n n a t u r a l t h e o r e t i c a l a n d o b j e c t i f y i n g a t t i t u d e . " I n t h e n a t u r a l w a y o f e x p e r i e n c e , does m a n e x p e r i e n c e h i m s e l f , to p u t it c u r t l y , z o o l o g i c a l l y ? Is t h i s a t t i t u d e a natural attitude o r i s i t n o t ? I t i s a n e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h i s t o t a l l y u n n a t u r a l . " ( G Z , 155/113) A f t e r such an unnatural description of natural everyday life, Husserl
then
performs
his
"reduction"
back
to
transcendental-eidetic
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h , a s h e says, i s " n o t h u m a n . " T h i s r e d u c t i o n t h e r e b y i n v o l v e s "precisely g i v i n g u p the g r o u n d u p o n w h i c h alone the question o f the b e i n g o f t h e i n t e n t i o n a l c o u l d b e b a s e d . " ( G Z ,
150-151/109; cf.
157/113-114) H e i d e g g e r m a i n t a i n s , t h e n , that H u s s e r l ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the p e r s o n i s derived not so m u c h f r o m "the things themselves" as f r o m his " f a l l i n g " t o w a r d s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l n o t i o n o f the h u m a n b e i n g a s the "rational a n i m a l , " w h i c h derives f r o m Greek thought and still prevails in Descartes
and
Neo-Kantianism.
(PA,
47,
173;
GZ,
147/107,
1 7 8 - 1 8 0 / 1 2 8 - 1 3 0 ) H i s emphasis o n the role o f " i n t u i t i o n " i n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s d e r i v e d f r o m the G r e e k o r i e n t a t i o n t o theorein ( l i t e r a l l y " g a z i n g " ) , w h i c h gets t a k e n u p i n A u g u s t i n e ' s n o t i o n o f the " e n j o y m e n t o f G o d "
(fruitio Dei), A q u i n a s ' "contemplation Descartes' "clara et distincta perceptio," K a n t ' s "intuitus derivativus," a n d the d i a l e c t i c a l "noesis noeseos'
1
of H e g e l .
(LW,
56,
115-123;
GZ,
381/276)
Heidegger
saw
Husserl's characterization of the "relational m e a n i n g " of intentionality as b e l o n g i n g t o o m u c h to what he at that t i m e ( f o l l o w i n g L u t h e r and K i e r k e g a a r d ) c a l l e d the " o c u l a r , " " a e s t h e t i c , " a n d " q u i e t i v e " c h a r a c t e r o f w e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s . (AJ, 2 3 , 4 - 5 ; PA, 1 1 1 , 1 4 0 ) He described (WU,
210)
practical
Husserl's
toward
mere
"modification to "objects"
"lived-experience"
as
theoretical
a "de-living"
(Er-lebnis).
In
theory,
comportment"
(Ent-leben) my
of o u r
"emotional
r e l a t i o n " (WU, 2 1 1 ) t o the w o r l d a n d m y p r a c t i c a l w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d s p e a k i n g are suppressed. T h e o r e t i c a l c o m p o r t m e n t i s a n act o f "selfa l i e n a t i o n " (HF,
1 5 ) , w h i c h d r i v e s a w a y t h e p e r s o n a l character o f m y
e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e w o r l d a s a n " o w n m o s t e v e n t " (Er-eignis), i n w h i c h "ich
selbst Idas Er-leben]
mir er-eigne,"
"I
event
(ap-propriate)
lived
ex-
p e r i e n c e t o m y s e l f , " a n d i n t u r n m y e x p e r i e n c e o f the w o r l d "er-eignet
sich seinem Wesen nach," "e-vents ( a p - p r o p r i a t e s ) i t s e l f a c c o r d i n g to its essence." (IP,
73-75)
"The lived-experience-of-the-environing
17
world,"
256
H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s , " i s d e - l i v e d t o the r e m n a n t : k n o w i n g s o m e t h i n g r e a l a s such
... Thing-experience
(Erfahrung)
is
undoubtedly
l i v e d experience
(Erlebnis), b u t u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f its o r i g i n o u t o f the l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e o f the e n v i r o n i n g w o r l d i t i s a l r e a d y d e - l i v i n g , u n - l i f e (Ent-lebnis)." (IP, 89-90)
Theoretical
comportment
is,
therefore,
a
"derived
mode"
of
intentional experience. ( G Z , 215/160) I t w a s o n t h e basis o f t h i s d e s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e that H e i d e g g e r ' s science o f the
origin
attempted
to
retrieve
Husserl's account
of intentional
" r e l a t i o n a l m e a n i n g . " He defined his task precisely as that of g o i n g back to the
original
starting
point of Husserl's
transcendental
and
eidetic
r e d u c t i o n s i n the " n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e " a n d here b e g i n n i n g a g a i n b y i n v e s t i g a t i n g the " b e i n g
o f the
w h o l e concrete m a n . " ( G Z ,
148-152/107-110,
173/125) In contrast to Husserl's " d e - l i v i n g " of factical l i f e , Heidegger's hermeneutics was to be a " r e p e t i t i o n " or " r e t r i e v a l " of factical life and thus an " e n - l i v e n i n g "
(Verlebendigung)
of phenomenological philosophy.
(PA, 8 0 , 166) H i s basic a p p r o a c h t o t h e H u s s e r l i a n t h e m e o f i n t e n t i o n a l t r u t h w a s t o investigate it not p r i m a r i l y as "the t r u t h of theoretical k n o w i n g , " but rather p r i m a r i l y a s the t r u t h o f " p r a c t i c a l i n s i g h t . " (LW, 8 ) H e r e h e w a s t a k i n g u p the A r i s t o t e l i a n t h e m e o f a d i s t i n c t i v e t y p e o f " p r a c t i c a l t r u t h " (aletheia praktike)
which
is
given
in
phronesis,
"practical
understanding."
(HF,
1 0 - 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 6 - 2 7 ) R e g a r d i n g H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h " as the "self-appearance" of beings in their o b j e c t i v i t y (the disclosed " t r u e - m a k i n g t h i n g " ) , H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t e d t o r a d i c a l i z e i t i n t o the n o t i o n o f the " d i s c l o s e d n e s s " o f the p r a c t i c a l " s i g n i f i c a n c e " o f " r e a d y t o h a n d " b e i n g s . (HF, 9 3 ; G Z , 3 4 8 - 3 4 9 / 2 5 3 ) H u s s e r l ' s o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h , " i.e., the i n t e n t i o n a l act o f d i s c l o s i n g b e i n g s i n the " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " o f t h e s i g n i f i e d a n d t h e i n t u i t e d , w a s t r a n s f o r m e d b y Heidegger in a number of ways. First, he placed Husserl's theoretically biased n o t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y as a d i s i n t e r e s t e d " d i r e c t i n g - i t s e l f - t o w a r d s " b a c k i n t o its o r i g i n a l m e a n i n g a s " b e i n g - i n - a - w o r l d . " (HF, 102) T h e basic c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s " b e i n g - i n " i s i n fact " c a r i n g " o r " c o n c e r n " (HF, 7 0 ; c f . AJ, 2 2 ; G Z , 4 2 0 / 3 0 3 - 3 0 4 ) ,
4 0
which
takes t h e f o r m s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , m o o d , a n d l a n g u a g e . I n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s s o m e t h i n g " u l t i m a t e , " H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s , b u t t h i s u l t i m a c y has t o b e properly characterized: W h a t has a l w a y s d i s t u r b e d m e : d i d i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f a l l f r o m h e a v e n ? I f s o m e t h i n g u l t i m a t e : in w h i c h u l t i m a c y is it to be taken? C e r t a i n l y not secured in a s p e c i f i c a l l y theoretical d i s c o v e r y and experience. T h a t I
18
257 must l i v e i n t e n t i o n a l l y and must ' b e ' i n t e n t i o n a l l y , ' e l u c i d a t e ' ! . . . i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s the f o r m a l and f u n d a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e f o r a l l c a t e g o r i a l structures o f f a c t i c i t y . C a r i n g i s the f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g o f the r e l a t i o n o f l i f e
... F u l l
m e a n i n g o f intentionality i n w h a t i s o r i g i n a l ! T h e t h e o r e t i c a l a t t i t u d e f a d e d . {PA, 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 , 9 8 ) Second, H e i d e g g e r attempted t o r e - t h i n k Husserl's n o t i o n o f e m p t y and h a b i t u a l c a t e g o r i a l m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n such t h a t i t c o u l d n o w m e a n the unthematic
"prestruction"
being,
anticipatory
the
(Prestruktion)
or
"preconception"
"being-ahead-of-itself'
(Vorgriff)
(sich-vorweg-sein),
of
which
belongs to pre-theoretical, factical l i f e . In other w o r d s , he re-interpreted it t o m e a n the p r i o r n o n - o b j e c t i v e " d i s c o v e r e d n e s s " o f t h e " w o r l d h o o d " o f p r a c t i c a l " s i g n i f i c a n c e . " (GZ, 3 4 9 - 3 5 0 / 2 5 4 ; HF, 9 7 ; LW,
146-147)
He
w r i t e s : " P r e s t r u c t i o n . . . a s a n e x p r e s s i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y : the f o r m a l a n d p r i m o r d i a l s t r u c t u r e o f f a c t i c i t y ( o f the m e a n i n g o f the b e i n g o f l i f e ) . " (PA, 131) A g a i n h e w r i t e s : " W h a t i s m e a n t b y i n t e n t i o n a l i t y - the bare a n d i s o l a t e d d i r e c t i n g - i t s e l f - t o w a r d s - m u s t s t i l l b e set b a c k i n t o t h e u n i f i e d a n d basic s t r u c t u r e o f b e i n g - a h e a d - o f - i t s e l f - i n - a l r e a d y - b e i n g - i n v o l v e d - i n . " (GZ,
420/303-304)
Third,
he
pushed
Husserl's
notion
of
the
disclosing
activity
of
c a t e g o r i a l i n t u i t i o n , w h i c h f u l f i l l s the e m p t y m e a n i n g - i n t e n t i o n ( b e i n g t r u e ) , i n the d i r e c t i o n o f h i s o w n t h e m e o f the " i n t e r p r e t i v e " a c t i v i t y o f factical life,
w h i c h " f u l f i l l s " the p r i o r u n t h e m a t i c disclosedness o f s i g -
nificance ( w o r l d h o o d ) w i t h the interpretive disclosure o f beings i n their " a s " - s t r u c t u r e , s i g n i f i c a n c e , or b e i n g . (GZ, 2 2 6 / 1 6 7 , 7 3 / 5 4 , 3 2 8 / 2 3 8 ; PA, 3 3 ; HF, 2 9 , 8 0 )
4 1
H u s s e r l ' s static " a p o p h a n t i c a l ' a s ' " ( t h e a s s e r t o r i c paper-
as-white) was transformed into Heidegger's m o r e situational and interpretive
"hermeneutical
throwing,
etc.)
of
'as'"
(the
practical
interpretation.
(GZ,
paper-as-for-writing-wiping-
73/54,
116/85;
LW,
135-161)
M o r e o v e r , w h e r e a s , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , H u s s e r l v i e w s sense p e r c e p t i o n a s the basic s t r a t u m o n w h i c h c a t e g o r i a l i n t e n t i o n s ( e x p r e s s i o n s ) are f o u n d e d , H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f w i s h e s t o m a k e p r i m a r y p r e c i s e l y the p r i o r unthematic
categorial
"interpretedness"
or
"expressedness"
of all
ex-
p e r i e n c e i n p r e c o n c e p t i o n , w i t h o u t w h i c h the sensed o b j e c t w o u l d n e v e r h a v e been a c c e s s i b l e . W h a t i s p r i m a r y i s n o t sense p e r c e p t i o n b u t r a t h e r interpretation. F o c u s i n g o n the w a y i n w h i c h our i m m e d i a t e experience o f things is articulated in advance t h r o u g h public everyday understanding, he w r i t e s : " . . . o u r s i m p l e s t p e r c e p t i o n s a n d c o n s t i t u t i v e states are a l r e a d y
19
258
expressed, e v e n m o r e , are interpreted i n a c e r t a i n w a y . . . T o p u t i t m o r e p r e c i s e l y : w e d o n o t say w h a t w e see, b u t r a t h e r t h e reverse, w e see w h a t one says a b o u t t h e m a t t e r . " ( G Z , 7 4 - 7 5 / 5 6 ; c f . 6 5 / 4 8 , 3 7 3 / 2 7 0 , 4 1 6 / 3 0 0 ) F o u r , r e g a r d i n g H u s s e r l ' s t h e m e o f the h a b i t u a l , u n t h e m a t i c c h a r a c t e r of categorial
meaning
intentions
in
the
only
"experienced"
and
not
e x p l i c i t l y " k n o w n " identification o f signified and intuited, Heidegger t r a n s f o r m e d t h i s t h e m e i n t o h i s n o t i o n o f h o w f a c t i c a l l i f e has the t e n d e n c y t o " f a l l " t o w a r d s t h e b e i n g s i n w h i c h its " c a r e " i s a b s o r b e d , such t h a t its p r i o r discoveredness o f the w o r l d and i t s e l f i n p r e c o n c e p t i o n remains u n t h e m a t i c . F a c t i c a l l i f e has the t e n d e n c y t o i n t e r p r e t i t s e l f s o l e l y i n t e r m s of beings. T h u s , for Heidegger, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l " r e d u c t i o n " meant a l e a d i n g b a c k n o t t o the a p r i o r i o f a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - e i d e t i c c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t r a t h e r t o t h e a p r i o r i o p e r a t i v e w i t h i n the p r e c o n c e p t i o n o f f a c t i c a l l i f e ( " h e r m e n e u t i c a l i n t u i t i o n " ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s notes f o r h i s course read: " T h e ruinant f l i g h t
into the w o r l d ;
p o s i t i v e m e a n i n g o f H u s s e r l ' s ' r e d u c t i o n ' . " (PA, 3 9 )
1 9 2 1 - 2 2 lecture
away
f r o m objects;
4 2
F i n a l l y , f o r H e i d e g g e r the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f f a c t i c a l l i f e w a s n o t t o b e investigated in Husserl's manner as an impersonal, thing-like " w h a t " (essence) b e l o n g i n g t o t h e e q u a l l y t h i n g - l i k e " t h a t " o f the p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l subject ( p a r t i c u l a r ) w h i c h has t h i s i n t e n t i o n a l reason a s its u p p e r s t o r e y . Rather, he wanted to understand the " w h a t " (intentional consciousness) a n d the " t h a t " ( e m b o d i m e n t ) u l t i m a t e l y i n t e r m s o f a " h o w " o f a p o s s i b l e " w a y to be" or "exist" for a personal " w h o , " w h i c h is always " m i n e " and is
characterized by
(GZ,
the
finitude
of temporal
"awhileness"
(Jeweiligkeit).
151-152/109-110, 205-207/152-154)
5. Intentional history
F i n a l l y , the y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s d e s t r u c t i v e r e t r i e v a l w a s also d i r e c t e d t o Husserl's
characterization
o f the
"enactment-meaning"
(Vollzugssinn)
or
" t e m p o r a l i z i n g - m e a n i n g " (Zeitigungssinn) o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . T h i s t e m p o r a l e n a c t m e n t u l t i m a t e l y d e f i n e s the " h o w " o f t h e w h o l e i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n itself. I n h i s s i x t h i n v e s t i g a t i o n , H u s s e r l refers t o the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e f u l f i l l i n g intentions in w h i c h an identification of signified and intuited, i.e., t r u t h , i s a c h i e v e d . H e d e s c r i b e s the f u l f i l l i n g i n t e n t i o n a s a n act o f
" m a k i n g - p r e s e n t " (gegenwärtigen) or " p r e s e n t i n g " (präsentieren): " T h e intentional character of p e r c e i v i n g . . .
20
is making-present (presenting)."
259 (LU, 6 4 6 / 7 6 1 ) " T h e o b j e c t i s a c t u a l l y ' p r e s e n t ' o r ' g i v e n ' , a n d present a s just
what
we
have
"presents"
the
sensuous
"temporalizes
intended
(zeitigt)
it."
object
a
(LU,
anew
new
647/762) in
its
Categorial
categorial
consciousness
of
intuition
structure
objectivity."
and
The
c a t e g o r i a l l y s t r u c t u r e d o b j e c t , the b e i n g i n its b e i n g , b e c o m e s " ' p r e s e n t ' , "
is "set before our eyes." (LU, 6 7 0 - 6 7 5 / 7 8 4 - 7 8 7 ; c f . G Z , 8 5 - 9 0 / 6 3 - 6 6 , 9 6 - 9 7 / 7 0 - 7 1 ) I n t h e s e c o n d v o l u m e o f h i s Ideas, h e c a l l s t h i s m a k i n g present
"appresentation."
4 3
In
his
Logical
Investigations,
he
does
not
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s c u s s the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t i o n a l acts, b u t i n h i s
early
Lectures
on
the
Phenomenology
of Internal
Time-Consciousness,
w h i c h w e r e later e d i t e d b y H e i d e g g e r , h e does g i v e d e t a i l e d analyses o f " m e m o r y , " "expectation," and "presentation." W h a t a p p e a l e d t o H e i d e g g e r i n H u s s e r l ' s d i s c u s s i o n s o f the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y w a s t h a t here " b e i n g i n the sense o f t r u t h " p o i n t e d i n the d i r e c t i o n o f its basic m e a n i n g a s t i m e : T h e d i s c l o s e d " t r u e m a k i n g t h i n g " b e c o m e s " p r e s e n t " f o r the " m a k i n g - p r e s e n t " o f m y d i s c l o s i v e f u l f i l l i n g i n t e n t i o n . B u t a g a i n h i s r e t r i e v a l o f these i n d i c a t i o n s passed t h r o u g h the c r u c i b l e o f h i s d e s t r u c t i v e c r i t i q u e . H e r e h e t o o k u p D i l t h e y ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the t h e m e o f h i s t o r y i n t o H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y . T h e t h i r d basic thesis o f D i l t h e y , w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , w a s o p e r a t i v e i n the f o r m e r ' s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f H u s s e r l , w a s that " t h e l i f e c o n t e x t o f the p e r s o n i s i n e v e r y s i t u a t i o n one o f d e v e l o p m e n t . " ( G Z , 164-165/118-119)
4 4
H e i d e g g e r p o i n t s o u t that, i n h i s r e f u t a t i o n o f p s y c h o l o g i s m , H u s s e r l d r a w s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n " b e t w e e n t h e real b e i n g o f the p s y c h i c a l a n d the i d e a l b e i n g o f p r o p o s i t i o n s i n j u d g m e n t s - a n d m o r e o v e r , b e t w e e n the t e m p o r a l h a p p e n i n g o f the r e a l a n d the a t e m p o r a l subsistence o f the i d e a l . " (LW, 5 0 ) Thus,
in
h i s Logical Investigations,
Husserl
writes
that " w h a t is t r u e
is
a b s o l u t e , i s true ' i n i t s e l f ; t h e t r u t h i s i d e n t i c a l l y the same, w h e t h e r h u m a n s o r n o n - h u m a n s , angels o r g o d s c o m p r e h e n d i t i n j u d g m e n t s . " (LU, 1 2 5 / 1 4 0 ) H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t s t o s h o w that H u s s e r l u n d e r s t a n d s b e i n g a n d t r u t h w i t h i n the t e m p o r a l h o r i z o n o f the static " p r e s e n c e " o f i d e a l m e a n i n g o v e r against t h e t e m p o r a l
v a r i a n c e o f i n t e n t i o n a l acts. H e subscribes,
H e i d e g g e r m a i n t a i n s , t o the t r a d i t i o n a l ' " c o u p l e t s o f o p p o s i t i o n ' r e a l - i d e a l , s e n s i b l e - n o n s e n s i b l e , b e i n g s - t h e v a l i d , the h i s t o r i c a l - t h e t r a n s h i s t o r i c a l , the
temporal-the
atemporal."
(LW,
92-93)
For
Husserl,
the
acts
of
" m a k i n g - p r e s e n t " are thus a t b o t t o m i n d i v i d u a t i n g acts that i n s t a n t i a t e i d e a l m e a n i n g i n the s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l w o r l d . H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s t h a t i n t h i s regard
Husserl belongs to a t r a d i t i o n w h i c h begins w i t h Plato's and
21
260
Aristotle's notion
o f b e i n g a s " a l w a y s - b e i n g " (aei on)
(ousia),
correlated
which
is
to
"theorein"
"gazing."
and "presence"
(LW,
67-72,
56)
Husserl's notion of m e a n i n g as " i m m u t a b l e and invariant i d e n t i t y " is " i d e n t i c a l w i t h the d i s c o v e r y o f the c o n c e p t o f b e i n g i n P a r m e n i d e s a n d i n P l a t o . " ( G Z , 9 2 / 6 8 , 1 0 2 / 7 5 ; HF, 4 2 ) T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g c o m e s t o H u s s e r l , h e f u r t h e r argues,
via L o t z e ' s n o t i o n of " v a l i d i t y " and
also
t h r o u g h the N e o - K a n t i a n i s m o f N a t o r p , W i n d e l b a n d , a n d R i c k e r t , w h o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n the v a l i d i t y o f t h e a t e m p o r a l , i d e a l c o n t e n t ( l o g i c a l t r u t h , v a l u e ) o f j u d g m e n t s a n d the r e a l t e m p o r a l act o f j u d g i n g .
(LW,
6 2 - 8 8 ; PA, 4 7 , 1 1 1 , 1 6 3 ) H e w r i t e s : " W h a t k i n d o f b e i n g stands here i n p r e - h a v i n g ? B e i n g p r e s e n t at h a n d , b e i n g p r e s e n t (Gegenwärtigsein) ..." "...
p u r e presence
(Gegenwart). T h i s
temporal
determination
comes
into
p l a y in the characterization of o b j e c t i v i t y . W h y this is so must be made u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . " (HF, 4 3 , 6 5 ) M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s H u s s e r l ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f the i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n ( i . e . , the c o r r e l a t i o n o f t h e static presence o f i d e a l m e a n i n g a n d p a s s i v e o c u l a r m a k i n g - p r e s e n t ) a s t h e " e x t i n g u i s h i n g o f t h e s i t u a t i o n " (WU, 2 0 5 - 2 0 7 ) , t h e " d e - h i s t o r i c i z a t i o n " (Entgeschieht lie hung)
o f the
"ownmost
event"
of one's
lived
experience
a n d o f the " i t w o r l d s . " " T h e h i s t o r i c a l I , " h e w r i t e s , " i s d e - h i s t o r i c i z e d t o t h e r e m n a n t o f a s p e c i f i c I-ness a s the c o r r e l a t e o f t h i n g h o o d . . . " (IP, 8 9 , c f . 8 5 ) " T h e p u r e e g o , " h e s a i d i n a c o n v e r s a t i o n i n 1919, " w o u l d d e r i v e f r o m t h e ' h i s t o r i c a l e g o ' v i a the r e p r e s s i o n o f a l l h i s t o r i c i t y . " In
his
"critique
o f the
[Neo-Kantian
and
Husserlian]
4 5
critique
of
p s y c h o l o g i s m " (LW, 8 7 ) , H e i d e g g e r t o o k u p n o t o n l y D i l t h e y ' s t h o u g h t , b u t also t h e i m p u l s e s o f a n c i e n t s k e p t i c i s m a n d m o d e m p s y c h o l o g i s m , since
he
thought
that
they
made
problematic
precisely
the
relation
(methexis) o f t h e i d e a l t o " l i v i n g t h o u g h t . " (LW, 8 8 ; c f . 5 2 , 5 4 , 9 2 )
4 0
He
a t t e m p t e d t o a p p r o p r i a t e H u s s e r l ' s d i s c u s s i o n s o f the t e m p o r a l c h a r a c t e r o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e f u l l p h e n o m e n o n o f h i s t o r i c a l t i m e i n f a c t i c a l l i f e . F i r s t , h e r e - i n t e r p r e t e d H u s s e r l ' s P l a t o n i c n o t i o n o f the a p r i o r i ( l i t e r a l l y t h e " b e f o r e , " the " e a r l i e r " ) t o m e a n t h e f u t u r a l b e i n g a h e a d - o f - i t s e l f o f f a c t i c a l l i f e , its " n o t y e t , " a n d " h o r i z o n o f e x p e c t a t i o n . " (IP, 115; G Z , 9 9 / 7 2 ; AJ, 2 2 ) S e c o n d , h e t r a n s f o r m e d H u s s e r l ' s n o t i o n o f " m a k i n g present," a s the act o f static i n d i v i d u a t i o n , i n t o h i s o w n n o t i o n o f the " t e m p o r a l i z i n g " o f one's futural understanding, w h i c h i n t e r p r e t i v e l y "presents"
(HF,
55-56,
79),
"makes-present,"
or
"appresents"
47
beings
w i t h i n a p r a c t i c a l " s i t u a t i o n " that i s shaped also t h r o u g h t h e past. ( G Z , 2 9 2 / 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 , 3 5 9 / 2 6 0 ; LW, 1 9 2 )
4 8
" T h e l i f e - r e l a t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n - I , "
22
261
he writes, "is no mere being-directed to mere objects. E v e r y l i v e d experience is intentional, it contains a ' v i e w t o w a r d s ' something or other ( t h e v i e w w h i c h g r a s p s , foresees a n d r e m e m b e r s i n a v e r y p r e f e r e n t i a l m a n n e r ) . T h e v i e w has a ' q u a l i t y ' ( q u a l i t y o f the a c t - c h a r a c t e r ) . " (WU, 206-207)
4 9
F i n a l l y , H e i d e g g e r a c c o r d i n g l y saw the " p r e s e n c e " o f b e i n g s
i n t h e i r b e i n g n o t a s the i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f t i m e l e s s m e a n i n g , but r a t h e r a s e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e r p r e t i v e a n d h i s t o r i c a l presence. " T h e f u l l m e a n i n g o f a p h e n o m e n o n , " h e m a i n t a i n s , " e n c o m p a s s e s its i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n - c h a r a c ter, c o n t e n t - c h a r a c t e r , a n d e n a c t m e n t - c h a r a c t e r . . . " (AI, 2 2 )
5 0
6. C o n c l u s i o n
I n c o n c l u s i o n , I w o u l d l i k e t o s k e t c h b r i e f l y t h e fate o f t h e y o u n g H e i d e g g e r ' s f u s i o n o f h o r i z o n s w i t h H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n h i s subsequent d e v e l o p m e n t a n d f i n a l l y e n d w i t h s o m e c o m m e n t s o n the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f his y o u t h f u l existential-phenomenological way for our understanding of his w h o l e t h o u g h t . A l r e a d y a r o u n d the t i m e o f the c o m p o s i t i o n o f his Being and Time i n 1926, H e i d e g g e r b e g a n t o d i s t a n c e h i m s e l f f r o m h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h p h e n o m e n o l o g y . F o r e x a m p l e , the a l m o s t t w o h u n d r e d p a g e i n t r o d u c t o r y discussion o f Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y , w h i c h had o r i g i n a l l y appeared a t the start o f o n e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s f i r s t drafts o f " B e i n g a n d T i m e , " n a m e l y ,
his
1925 lecture course e n t i t l e d The History of the Concept of Time,
d i s a p p e a r e d in the p u b l i s h e d t e x t Being and Time in 1 9 2 7 .
S 1
H i s detailed
discussions o f h o w his c r i t i c a l appropriation o f Husserl was carried out a n d a l s o his a d o p t i o n o f H u s s e r l ' s t e r m i n o l o g y s u f f e r e d the same fate. W h a t m a r k e d Being and Time as a d i s t a n t i a t i o n f r o m h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h H u s s e r l w a s h i s n e w l y e m e r g i n g p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the t r a n s c e n d e n tal thought of K a n t .
His
1 9 2 5 - 2 6 l e c t u r e c o u r s e w a s t o h a v e been a
reading o f the n o t i o n o f t r u t h i n Husserl and A r i s t o t l e , but h a l f - w a y through
the
semester h e
instead
turned to an examination of K a n t ' s
t r e a t m e n t o f t i m e i n his " d o c t r i n e o f s c h e m a t i s m . " I n a l e c t u r e c o u r s e devoted
to
Kant's
Critique
of Pure
Reason
in
1927-28,
he
told
his
students: " W h e n I b e g a n a g a i n to s t u d y K a n t ' s Critique of Pure Reason a f e w years a g o a n d r e a d i t , a s i t w e r e , against the b a c k g r o u n d o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y , i t w a s a s i f t h e b l i n d e r s f e l l f r o m m y eyes, a n d K a n t b e c a m e f o r m e the c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e correctness o f the w a y f o r w h i c h I was s e a r c h i n g . " (IK, 4 3 1 ) H i s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f K a n t ' s a n a l y s i s o f t i m e i n
23
262 the " d o c t r i n e o f s c h e m a t i s m " p l a c e d h i s w h o l e w o r k Being and Time i n the l a n g u a g e o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t h o u g h t . H e c a l l e d t h i s n e w 1927 d r a f t o f "Being
and T i m e "
"fundamental
ontology," which
was
supposed
to
p r o v i d e "transcendental k n o w l e d g e . " (SZ, 51/62) H i s n e w l e x i c o n f o r the three
intentional
"structures"
moments
of "being-meaning"
(content-meaning),
a
transcendental
appeared "Dasein"
as
worldly
(relational
m e a n i n g ) w h i c h seemed t o b e a n e x i s t e n t i a l i z e d v e r s i o n o f K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and t e m p o r a l " s c h e m a t a " ( t e m p o r a l i z i n g - m e a n i n g ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s Being and Time is r e a l l y o n l y one i n t e r p r e t i v e d r a f t of h i s y o u t h f u l p r o j e c t o f e x p l o r i n g the r e l a t i o n o f " B e i n g a n d T i m e " - a n d a late o n e a t that. T h u s , O s k a r B e c k e r , w h o a t t e n d e d H e i d e g g e r ' s l e c t u r e courses f r o m 1 9 1 9 o n w a r d s , c o u l d say, e v e n i f s o m e w h a t i n e x a g g e r a t i o n , that Being and Time is " n o l o n g e r the o r i g i n a l H e i d e g g e r . "
5 2
T h e earlier drafts
o f h i s " B e i n g a n d T i m e " are t o b e f o u n d i n h i s l e c t u r e courses f r o m 1919 o n w a r d s , i n h i s 1 9 1 9 - 2 1 essay o n K a r l Jaspers, i n h i s p l a n n e d b o o k o n A r i s t o t l e i n 1 9 2 2 - 2 3 , and i n h i s 1924 essay " T h e C o n c e p t o f T i m e . " T h u s , I c o n s i d e r h i s 1927 Being and Time to be a l m o s t o n e of h i s ' l a t e r w r i t i n g s ' a n d c o n s i d e r the a u t h o r t o b e a l m o s t a l r e a d y the ' l a t e r H e i d e g g e r ' . T h i s m a k e s a mess o f o u r p r e v i o u s l y adequate d i v i s i o n i n t o " t h e e a r l y H e i d e g g e r " a n d the " l a t e r H e i d e g g e r , " b u t w i t h the o n g o i n g p u b l i c a t i o n o f his y o u t h f u l w r i t i n g s , I t h i n k w e w i l l be f o r c e d t o start r e - t h i n k i n g o u r m a n n e r o f m a k i n g d i v i s i o n s i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f his t h o u g h t . I n the 1930s, after h i s r e a l i z a t i o n that h i s a d o p t i o n o f the l a n g u a g e o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l t h o u g h t in his Being and Time was an a b e r r a t i o n w h i c h l e d to an "inadequate interpretation of my o w n
i n t e n t i o n " (BR, x v / x i v ) ,
H e i d e g g e r t u r n e d t o the e a r l y G r e e k t h i n k e r s , Hölderlin, a n d N i e t z s c h e a s his
preferred
allowed,
dialoguing
now
his
partners.
If such
n e w draft of " B e i n g
a crude
and
schematization
Time"
appeared
as
is the
" f o u r f o l d " o f " e a r t h a n d s k y , g o d s and m o r t a l s " ( c o n t e n t - m e a n i n g ) , p o e t i c "dwelling"
(relational
(temporalizing-meaning).
meaning),
and
the
"destiny
of
Husserl's phenomenology, along w i t h
being" Aris-
totle's practical w r i t i n g s and Kierkegaard's existential thought, slipped more
and
more
into
his eschatological
" f o r g e t f u l n e s s o f b e i n g . " (S, 3 7 9 , 3 8 7 - 3 9 4 )
n o t i o n o f the 5 3
history
o f the
I n h i s 1969 L e T h o r s e m i n a r ,
h e d i v i d e d the d e v e l o p m e n t o f h i s q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g
i n t o the
three
" t h o u g h t - p a t h s " o f the " m e a n i n g o f b e i n g " (Being and Time), t h e " t r u t h o f b e i n g " ( 1 9 3 0 s a n d 4 0 s ) , a n d the " t o p o s o f b e i n g " ( 1 9 4 0 s o n w a r d s ) . ( 5 , 3 4 4 ) H e m a d e t h i s d i v i s i o n r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y w i t h the t h e m e s o f h i s later t h o u g h t after 1 9 3 0 i n m i n d , i.e., a t a t i m e w h e n h i s y o u t h f u l t h o u g h t i n the
94
263 early twenties no longer interested h i m , a situation w h i c h is further i n d i c a t e d b y t h e fact that h e m a d e n o p l a n s t o h a v e h i s e a r l y F r e i b u r g l e c t u r e courses i n c l u d e d i n the Collected Edition o f his w r i t i n g s .
5 4
I a m a r g u i n g , t h e n , that a m o r e adequate r e a d i n g o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f Heidegger's
thought
involves
viewing
his
p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l " t h o u g h t - p a t h " o f "'being'
youthful
existential-
i n a n d t h r o u g h l i f e " as at
least a f o u r t h w a y i n w h i c h h e t h o u g h t h i s e n d u r i n g q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , o r , better, a s the original w a y subsequent
which
thought-paths.
he t o o k up
Moreover,
a n d t r a n s f o r m e d i n his
his
youthful
existential-
phenomenological w a y provides us w i t h a different language for t a l k i n g a b o u t a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g h i s c o n c e r n s , one w h i c h i s n e i t h e r t h e q u a s i t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l a n g u a g e of Being and Time n o r t h e m y t h o - p o e t i c l a n g u a g e o f t h e H e i d e g g e r after 1 9 3 0 .
5 5
I n r e a d i n g a n d a p p r o p r i a t i n g H e i d e g g e r i n these w a y s , w e s h o u l d n o t b e i n t i m i d a t e d b y the fact that h e h i m s e l f m i g h t n o t h a v e l o o k e d o n i n a p p r o v a l , p e r h a p s i n m u c h t h e same w a y that the l a t e r H u s s e r l l o o k e d o n i n d i s a p p r o v a l w h e n i n the e a r l y t w e n t i e s H e i d e g g e r p r e f e r r e d h i s e a r l y
Logical Investigations to h i s later Ideas as an i n t r o d u c t i o n to p h e n o m e n o l o g y . (SD, 8 7 / 7 9 ) T o stress t h i s p o i n t , I w o u l d l i k e t o c l o s e w i t h t w o b r i e f passages. T h e f i r s t i s f r o m H e i d e g g e r , w h o states that the deeper m e a n i n g o f f i d e l i t y t o a t h i n k e r a l w a y s m e a n s f i d e l i t y t o the Sache, the m a t t e r o f h i s or her thought:
" W h o e v e r gets
involved
in
being-on-the-way
to
the
s o j o u r n i n the o l d e s t o f the o l d , w i l l b o w t o the n e c e s s i t y o f l a t e r b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d d i f f e r e n t l y t h a n h e m e a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d h i m s e l f . " (WM, i x ) T h e s e c o n d passage, w h i c h speaks f o r i t s e l f , i s f r o m o n e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e a r l y students i n the t w e n t i e s , H . - G . G a d a m e r : " O n e needs t o h a v e a l o t o f c o u r a g e t o a d m i t t o o n e s e l f that a great m a n can h i m s e l f nonetheless u n d e r e s t i m a t e h i s o w n r a d i a n c e a n d a b o v e a l l the p r o m i s i n g r i c h n e s s o f h i s b e g i n n i n g s . . . I can e v e n i m a g i n e that H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f w o u l d h a v e found
many
new
things
in
this
his
youthful
text
[Phenomenological
Interpretations of Aristotle], h a d he been able to r e a d it w i t h the eyes w i t h w h i c h s o m e o n e reads, w h o i s n o t h i m . "
5 6
Notes 1. The f o l l o w i n g abbreviations for Heidegger's writings w i l l be used i n parentheses in the body of my essay (the page numbers given after the slash are those of the available English translation; however, I take responsibility for all translations appearing in this essay):
25
264 GA
M a r t i n Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am M a i n : V i t t o r i o Klostermann, 1976 - ) .
Earliest FS BG
BK
(1910-1917)
Frühe Schriften ( G A , v o l . 2). " B r i e f an G r a b m a n n " ( i n Hermann Köstler, "Heidegger Grabmann," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 87 [1980]).
Youthful AJ
Works
works
schreibt
an
(1919-1925126)
" A n m e r k u n g e n zu K a r l Jaspers 'Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" (1919-1921)" (in G A , vol. 9) " B r i e f an K r e b s " (1919) ( i n Bernhard Casper, " M a r t i n Heidegger und die Theologische
Fakultät
Freiburg,"
in
Freiburger Diözesan-Archiv,
1980,
Kirche am Oberhein, hrsg. Remigius Bäumer, K a r l Suso Frank, Hugo Ott [Freiburg: V e r l a g Herder, 1980]) Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs ( G A , v o l . 20; translated as History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, tr. Theodore K i s i e l [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1985]) HF Ontotogie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität) ( G A , v o l . 63) IP " D i e Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem" (in G A , v o l . 56/57) LW Logic. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit ( G A , v o l . 21) PA Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung ( G A , v o l . 61) P W "Phänomenologie und transzendentale W e r t p h i l o s o p h i e " ( i n G A , v o l . 56/57) WU "Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen S t u d i u m s " ( i n G A , v o l . 56/57) GZ
Later BH
Works
(1927-1976)
" B r i e f an Husserl" ( i n Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, Husserliana, ΓΧ, ed. Walter B i e m e l [The Hague: M a rt in us N i j h o f f , 1968], pp. 600-602)
B K B " B r i e f a n Krämer-Badoni" ( i n Rainer A . Bast, " B e r i c h t : E i n B r i e f M a r t i n Heideggers an R u d o l f Krämer-Badoni über die K u n s t , " Phänomenologische Forschung, 18 [ 1 9 8 6 ] , pp. 175-182) BR " B r i e f an Richardson" (German and English) ( i n W i l l i a m J. Richardson, EM
Through Phenomenology to Thought [The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1963]) Einführung in die Metaphysik ( G A , v o l . 40; translated as An Introduction to Metaphysics,
GP
tr.
Ralph M a n n h e i m
[ N e w Haven: Y a l e University
Press,
1959]) Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie ( G A , v o l . 24; translated as Basic Problems of Phenomenology, tr. A l b e r t Hofstadter [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1982])
26
265 IK
Phänomenologische ( G A , v o l . 25)
KM
Ρ
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik ( G A , v o l . 3; translated as Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. C h u r c h i l l [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1965]) Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz ( G A , v o l . 26; translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, tr. M i c h a e l H e i m [ B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1984]) " D i e Idee der Phänomenologie" ( i n E d m u n d Husserl, Phänomenologische
S
Psychologie, Husserliana, IX, ed. Walter B i e m e l , pp. 2 5 6 - 2 6 3 ; translated as "The Idea of Phenomenology," tr. Thomas J. Sheehan, Listening, 12 [1977], pp. 111-117) Seminare ( G A , v o l . 15)
ML
SD SZ
Interpretation
von
Kants
Kritik
der
reinen
Vernunft
Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: M a x Niemeyer, 1976); translated as On Time and Being, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New Y o r k : Harper & R o w , 1972) Sein und Zeit ( G A , v o l . 2; translated as Being and Time, tr. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson [ O x f o r d : Basil B l a c k w e l l , 1967])
US
Unterwegs zur Sprache ( G A , v o l . 12; translated as On the Way to Language, tr. Peter D. Hertz [San Francisco: Harper & R o w , 1971]) VA Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1985) W M Wegmarken ( G A , v o l . 9 ) ZP
"Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im D e n k e n der Seinsfrage" ( i n Phänomenologie - lebendig oder tot?, hrsg. Helmut Gehrig [Karlsruhe Badenia, 1969], p. 47; translated as "The Understanding of T i m e in Phenomenology and in the T h i n k i n g of the Being-Question," tr. Thomas Sheehan and Frederick Elliston, The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10 [1979]: 200-201) A shorter version of my essay was presented in June, 1988 at the Semicentennial Meeting of the North American Husserl Circle at W i l f r i d Laurier University, Ontario, Canada. I am grateful to especially Burt Hopkins for his helpful comments, as w e l l as for his m a k i n g available copies of Husserl's letters to Heidegger between 1916 and 1932, the originals of w h i c h are preserved in the Husserl Archives in Leuven, B e l g i u m .
2. For a list of his already published youthful writings, as w e l l as those planned for publication, see the publisher's prospectus: Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Stand: Juni 1989 ( V i t t o r i o Klostermann). As of 1988, his unpublished youthful writings planned for publication have been turned over to the respective editors and thus presumably w i l l all be published by the turn o f the century. 3. In his later reflections on the origins of his early thought, Heidegger reported that he had been studying Husserl's Logical investigations " f r o m 1909 onwards" and had expected "decisive a i d " from it for the question of being which he had discovered in Franz Brentano's On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle and in Carl Braig's On Being: An Outline of Ontology. (SD, 8 1 - 8 2 / 7 4 - 7 5 ; FS, 56/translated by Hans Seigfried as "A Recollection,"
27
266 in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Precedent Publishing, 1981], p. 21). 4. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1982), p. 340.
Sheehan
Movement
(The
[Chicago: Hague:
5. T h e i r philosophical collaboration p r i o r to 1919 was apparently restricted to some correspondence and Husserl's assistance in getting Heidegger's habilitation w r i t i n g on Duns Scotus published in 1916. (FS, 191) 6. Thomas J. Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical B i o g r a p h y , " Listening 12 (1977): 7. 7. K a r l Jaspers, " O n Heidegger," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 7 (1978): 108. 8. D o r i o n Caims, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, ed. Richard M. Zaner (The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1976), p. 9. 9. Theodore J. K i s i e l , "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," in A Companion to Heidegger's "Being and Time," ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D C : Centre for A d v a n c e d Phenomenological Research and U n i v e r s i t y Press of A m e r i c a , 1986), p. 24. 10. See "Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen von M a r t i n Heidegger," in W i l l i a m J. Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1963), pp. 6 6 3 - 6 6 5 ; K i s i e l , "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," pp. 2 8 - 2 9 . 1 1 . Quoted in Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years," p. 5. 12. For example, his unpublished 1923-24 lecture course The Beginning of Modern Philosophy (Introduction to Phenomenological Research) contains a detailed discussion of Husserl's Logical Investigations (see Theodore K i s i e l , " O n the W a y to Being and Time; Introduction to the Translation of H e i d e g ger's Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs", Research in Phenomenology, X V , p. 196). 13. Cf. SZ, 51/63; BR, x i i i / x i i ; S, 379; ZP, 4 7 / 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 . 14. In 1923, he held an o f f i c i a l seminar entitled "Phenomenological Exercises (Husserl's Logical Investigations, V o l . I I ) " and, in 1922-23, held another seminar entitled "Husserl, Ideas, I . " 15. SZ, 67, n. 9/75, n. x; 289, n. 15/261, n. x x x i v ; 480, n. 10/414, n. x x i i i . 16. Regarding p. 192 (lines 22-29)/pp. 141 (lines 3 9 - 4 0 ) - 1 4 2 ( I i n e s 1-5), see the "Errata" published at the beginning of PA, I I . 17. E. Husserl, A. Pfänder, "Fünf B r i e f e , " in Pfänder-Studien, hrsg. Η. Spiegel berg, Ε. Ανέ-Lallemant (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 345. 18. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger's Wege (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1983), pp. 130, 118; Gesammelte Werke, Bd. II (Tübingen: J.C.B. M o h r , 1986), p. 484; "Der Eine W e g M a r t i n Heideggers," in Jahresgabe der MartinHeidegger-Gesellschaft, 1986, p. 13. Heidegger's interpretations of the history of philosophy in the early 1920s became a model for Gadamer's notion o f "fusion o f horizons." 19. When Husserl finally became aware of the differences between h i m s e l f and his "phenomenological c h i l d " Heidegger, he took up in his o w n way Heidegger's suggestions for r e - t h i n k i n g phenomenology in terms of "factical
78
267 l i f e " and undertook his o w n "fusion of horizons" w i t h Heidegger's new version of phenomenology. He d i d this in the r e w o r k i n g of his Cartesian Meditations and in his Crisis, w h i c h for the first time systematically introduced his notion of the " l i f e - w o r l d . " See Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 56; Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D o r i o n Cairns (The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1970), p. 158. In his later introduction to his Ideas, Husserl discussed Heidegger's new version of phenomenology and spoke of how "transcendental phenomenology" "includes all questions that are raised concerning concrete human l i f e " ( E d m u n d Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie and phänomenologischen Philosophie, Drittes Buch, Husserliana, Bd. V [ D e n Haag: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1952), p. 141). Husserl once remarked that Heidegger's analyses of the environing w o r l d were rooted in paragraph 27 of Husserl's o w n Ideas (Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's ' I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Phenomenology of R e l i g i o n ' , 1 9 2 0 - 2 1 , " in The Personalist, 60 [ 1 9 7 9 ] : 318). 20. He maintained that " A r i s t o t l e [was] really in De A n i m a phenomenological (without the e x p l i c i t Reduction)" (quoted in Herbert Spiegelberg, "Husserl to Heidegger; F r o m a 1928 D i a r y by W . R . Boyce G i b s o n , " Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2 [ 1 9 7 1 ] : 73). 2 1 . Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 4 1 . 22. Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 118. See also Theodore K i s i e l , "The M i s s i n g L i n k in the Early Heidegger," in Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington, D C : University Press of America, 1988), pp. 1-40. 23. See Theodore K i s i e l , " W h y the First Draft of Being and Time was Never Published," in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 20 (1989): 3-22. Heidegger's essay was an expanded version of his 1924 M a r b u r g talk w h i c h bore the same title and w h i c h Gadamer has called the " o r i g i n a l f o r m of Being and Time" (Gadamer, Heideggers Wege, p. 29). Cf. SZ, 356, n. 3/313, n. i i i . 24. Hannah Arendt, " M a r t i n Heidegger at E i g h t y , " in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. M i c h a e l M u r r a y ( N e w Haven and L o n d o n : Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 . 25. K i s i e l , "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," p. 24. 26. For a general account of Heidegger's youthful period, w h i c h also deals w i t h his readings of Aristotle and Christian authors, see my "The Y o u n g Heidegger: Rumor of a Hidden K i n g ( 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 6 ) , " Philosophy Today (1989) (forthcoming). 27. In addition to those already cited, the f o l l o w i n g studies of the y o u n g Heidegger's relation to Husserl have also influenced my o w n study: Jacques Taminiaux, "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations: In remembrance of Heidegger's last seminar (Zähringen)," in Radical Phenomenology, ed. John Sallis (Atlantic Highlands, N J : Humanities Press, 1978), pp. 5 8 - 8 3 ; Theodore K i s i e l , "Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorial," in Continental Philosophy in America, eds. H u g h J. Silverman,
29
268 John Sallis, Thomas Μ. Seebohm (Pittsburgh: Duquesne U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983),
pp.
177-185;
Phänomenbegriffs,"
Otto
Pöggeler,
Phänomenologische
"Heideggers
Forschung
9
Neubestimmung
(1980):
des
124-162.
28. See PA, 35: "Skepticism is a beginning, and as the genuine beginning it is also the end of p h i l o s o p h y . " In a 1919 letter to Engelbert Krebs, his Catholic patron at the university in Freiburg, Heidegger wrote that "epistemological insights, extending to the theory of historical knowledge, have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me - not, however, Christianity and metaphysics (these, though, in a new sense) . . . " (BK, 541) He w r o t e to K a r l Löwith in 1921 that he was "not a 'philosopher' in any sense at a l l , " but rather someone " w h o has the single task (completely unsuitable for the schoolroom and progress) of c r i t i c a l l y destroying the traditional conceptuality of western philosophy and theology, where it can indeed also turn out that sometimes he is o n l y threshing ' e m p t y straw'." ( K a r l Löwith, Heidegger:
Denker in dürftiger Zeit,
2.
Aufl.
[Göttingen:
Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, I 9 6 0 ] , p. 106) In his 1923 lecture course, he told his students "that, as far as he was concerned, philosophy was over." (reported in Thomas Sheehan, " T h e ' O r i g i n a l F o r m ' of Sein und Zeit: Heidegger's Der B e g r i f f der Zeit ( 1 9 2 4 ) , " in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 10 [ 1 9 7 9 ] : 82) 29. In his letter to W i l l i a m Richardson, Heidegger explained that there was a " b e n d " or " t w i s t " (Wendung) in his thought around 1930, w h i c h , however, was not really a " t u m " (Kehre) or "reversal" (Umkehr) f r o m a "Heidegger I" to a "Heidegger I I . " (BR, x v i i ) "Heidegger Π , " he insisted, was already contained i n " H e i d e g g e r I . " T h a t i s t o say, the basic " i n t e n t i o n " (Vorhaben) (BR, x v ) of his questioning remained the same f r o m the early 1920s onwards, namely, to ask what "'being' in and through l i f e " means, or, put in other words, to think the relation of being and factical life. Since this intention originated in the early twenties, one can rightly conclude, in the words of one commentator, that "Heidegger I I put i n a n appearance before Heidegger I . " (David
Farrell
Heidegger's
K r e l l , Intimations of Mortality:
Thinking
of
Being
[University
Time, Park:
Truth,
and Finitude
Pennsylvania
in
State
U n i v e r s i t y , 1986], p. 180, n. 3) The " b e n d " in his thought after 1930 concerns not so m u c h a transformation in the basic intention of his thought as rather the realization that the quasi-Kantian, "transcendental" language of his Being and Time led to an "inadequate interpretation of my o w n i n t e n t i o n " (BR, x v ) , w h i c h realization forced h i m to search for new and what he though! were more adequate ways of realizing his intention. If there is anything l i k e a basic " t u m " in his development, it is to be found rather in his y o u t h f u l turn away from the " o n t o - l o g i c " and the " o n t o t h e o l o g y " of his doctoral dissertation and his habilitation w r i t i n g . In his 1920-21 lecture course, he thus spoke of the necessity of a " c o m p l e t e tuming-around (Umwandlung) of p h i l o s o p h y . " He also
spoke
of his
philosophy
as
"the
going-back
(Rückgang)
into
the
o r i g i n a r y - h i s l o r i c a l . " (reported in Sheehan, "Heidegger's ' I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Phenomenology o f R e l i g i o n ' , 1 9 2 0 - 2 1 , " pp. 316, 317) T h i s notion o f " g o i n g back", along w i t h that of phenomenological " r e - d u c t i o n " as a "leading back"
30
269 from beings to being, are his first appellations for what he later called the "step back" out of metaphysics into an "other b e g i n n i n g . " After 1919, he turned away f r o m his earlier metaphysical lexicon of being as objectivity and value (content-meaning) for a transcendental consciousness (relational meaning), both of w h i c h were conceived w i t h i n the horizon of the fixed presence of l o g i c a l atemporality and the eternity of G o d (temporalizingmeaning). As I attempt to show below, what he turned towards was the "genuine b e g i n n i n g " of being as the " i t w o r l d s " of the w o r l d (contentmeaning) for the factical self (relational meaning), w h i c h happens as an " e v e n t " {Ereignis) (temporalizing-meaning). T h i s " e v e n t " o f the " i t w o r l d s " is more being than consciousness. As Gadamer has said, this is "the t u m before the t u m . " ( " D e r Eine W e g M a r t i n Heideggers," pp. 14-15) For Heidegger's
critique of m o d e m
"ego-metaphysics" f r o m
Descartes to
G e r m a n idealism and N e o - K a n t i a n i s m , see PA, 173, 88, 9 1 ; IP, 7 1 - 7 3 . For his critique of m o d e m technology, where he discusses Spengler's Decline of the West, see PA, 26, 74; PW, 130, 136; LW, 37; cf. AJ, 9. 30. Cf. Heidegger's later discussion of his early appropriation of the theme of intentionality as a " r e v o l u t i o n in the place of t h i n k i n g , " a "shift of place" from "consciousness" to " D a s e i n . " (S, 379-385). 3 1 . E d m u n d Husserl, Logische
Untersuchungen, Husserliana,
(Den
Bd. ΧΓΧ.Ι2
Haag; Martinus N i j h o f f , 1984), pp. 665-666; translated as Logical Investiga tions, Vol. 11, tr. J . N . Findlay ( L o n d o n : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 7 8 0 - 7 8 1 . A l l further references to this w o r k w i l l be given w i t h the abbrevia tion LU i n parentheses i n the body o f m y essay. 32. For a f u l l discussion of the traditional restriction of being to the copula in judgment, see Chapter 4 of Heidegger's 1927 lecture course (GP), w h i c h undoubtedly draws on his early reading of Husserl's s i x t h investigation. See also SZ, 212/202, 476/411. 33. In a later seminar, Heidegger described the Greek experience of being as a "superabundance" (Überfülle) and "excess (Übermass) of presence" (S, 331), thereby echoing Husserl's notion of being as an "excess" (Überschuss) (S, 334). Husserl's notion has to be seen as the precedent for Heidegger's talk of "transcendence," the "ontological difference," "ecstasis" and "existence" in Being
and
Time
and
his
1927
lecture
course
Grundprobleme
der
Phänomenologie (GP) (see especially Chapter 1 of the latter, w h i c h discusses Kant's statement that "being is not a real predicate"). See also Jacques Taminiaux, Likewise,
"Heidegger
and
Husserl's Logical Investigations," pp.
Heidegger's description of being as
77-83.
the " n o t h i n g " and
his
preference for saying of being not being ' i s ' , but rather es gibt, there is/it gives/it is given hearken back to Husserl's discussion of how, even though being is " g i v e n , " it is not a thing w h i c h is (SZ, 281/255; GP, 13-14/10). For other passages w h i c h hearken back to Husserl's notion of being as an "excess," see EM, 3 6 - 3 9 / 3 3 - 3 6 ; SD, 3/3. 34. See also .9, 3 7 7 - 3 7 8 : "Husserl's accomplishment consisted precisely in this m a k i n g present of being, w h i c h is phenomenally present in the category. T h r o u g h this accomplishment . . . I finally had a basis: ' b e i n g ' is no mere
31
270 concept, is no pure abstraction, w h i c h arises in the course of a derivation." (cf. 334) 35. For a discussion of D i l t h e y ' s influence on the young Heidegger, see Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983), pp. 3 0 - 3 6 ; K i s i e l , "Heidegger ( 1 9 0 7 - 1 9 2 7 ) : The Transformation of the Categorial," pp. 173-176; Gadamer, "Der Eine Weg Martin Heideggers" pp. 11-12. See also SD, 48/45. 36. IP, 7 1 - 7 3 , 8 8 - 8 9 ; WU, 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 ; PA, 9 1 , 97; GZ, 266/196, 300-301/219. 37. See also SZ, 67, n. 9/75, n. x: " B u t disclosing the a p r i o r i is not 'a-prioristic' construction. T h r o u g h E. Husserl we have once again learned not only to understand the meaning of all genuine philosophical e m p i r i c i s m , but also to make use of the necessary tools. ' A - p r i o r i s m ' is the method of every scientific philosophy w h i c h understands itself. There is nothing constructivistic about it. B u t for this very reason research on the a p r i o r i requires the proper preparation of the phenomenal basis. The horizon w h i c h is closest to us, w h i c h must be made ready for the analytic of Dasein, lies in its average everydayness." 38. See K i s i e l , "Heidegger ( 1 9 0 7 - 1 9 2 7 ) : The Transformation of the Categorial," pp. 173-176. 39. IP, 13-15; PA, 3 4 - 3 5 , 47, 88; HF, 10, 16, 7 1 ; GZ, 190/140. 40. See also Oskar Becker's report on Heidegger's 1923 lecture course in his "Mathematischer Existenz: Untersuchungen zur L o g i k und Ontologie mathematischer Phänomene," Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, 8 (1927), p. 626. 4 1 . See also SZ, 201/193: "Dasein o n l y 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be ' f u l f i l l e d ' through the beings w h i c h are discoverable i n i t . " For Heidegger's acknowledgment o f Husserl's sixth investigation as the "basis" for his long discussion of " t r u t h " in Being and Time, see SZ, 289, n. 15/261, n. x x x i v . 42. Cf. Heidegger's c r i t i c a l appropriation of Husserl's " r e d u c t i o n " in his 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GP, 29/21). 43. E d m u n d Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch, Husserliana IV (Haag: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1952), pp., 161-169. 44. In his Being and Time, Heidegger presents his analysis of " h i s t o r y " as an "appropriation of D i l t h e y ' s w o r k " (SZ, 525/449). 45. Quoted in Thomas Sheehan, ' " I n t r o d u c t o r y N o t e ' to ' T h e Understanding of T i m e in Phenomenology and in the T h i n k i n g of the Being-Question," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1 0 ( 1 9 7 9 ) : 199. 46. The lecture course w h i c h Heidegger scheduled for the winter semester of 1922-23 was entitled Skepticism in Ancient Philosophy (Phenomenological Interpretations of Sextus Empiricus, Hyporyposeon, I I I ) . See also W i l h e l m Szilasi, "Interpretation und Geschichte der Philosophie," in Martin Heideggers Einßuss auf die Wissenschaften (Bern: A. Franke A G . Verlag, 1949), pp. 7 5 - 7 6 . In his 1921-22 lecture course, Heidegger calls his o w n philosophy "skepticism." (PA, 35, 197) H i s interest in ancient skepticism belonged
32
271 together w i t h his interest in ancient rhetoric and the ethics of Socrates-Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, since all these have the virtue of making "factical l i f e " thematic. 47. In his 1925 lecture course, Heidegger notes that he has been studying the unpublished manuscript of the second v o l u m e of Husserl's Ideas (GZ, 168/121), in w h i c h the term "appresentation" occurs. He uses the terms "making-present" and "appresentation" interchangeably throughout this lecture course. 48. In his Being and Time, Heidegger acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl's notion of "making-present": "Husserl uses the expression ' m a k i n g present' to characterize sense perception . . . The intentional analysis of perception and i n t u i t i o n in general must have suggested this ' t e m p o r a l ' description of the phenomenon. That and h o w the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded i n the ecstatical temporality o f Dasein w i l l be shown in the f o l l o w i n g [never published] section" (SZ, 480, n. 10/414, n. xxiii). 49. Cf. Heidegger's comment in his 1928 lecture course (ML, 264/204): "That w h i c h Husserl s t i l l calls time-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of time, is precisely time itself, in the p r i m o r d i a l sense . . . Temporality in its temporalizing is the p r i m o r d i a l i y self-unifying unity of expectancy, retention and making-present." 50. In GZ, 106/78, Heidegger says thai the "matter itself" of Husserl's phenomenology is "intentionality in its apriori, understood in the t w o directions of intentio and internum." Here, in a glance, we can see his f u l l description of the "matter i t s e l f to w h i c h phenomenological i n q u i r y is supposed to be directed in accord w i t h Husserl's slogan " B a c k to the things themselves": first, the intentio-intentum relation is to be studied w i t h i n the sphere of factical life; and, second, the t h i r d moment of historical "temporalizing-meaning" is to be e x p l i c i t l y added. Here we n o w have the f u l l "matter i t s e l f o f the "phenomenon" o f intentionality. Heidegger's insight into especially the intentional moment of "temporalizing-meaning" is the genesis o f his life-long "matter" or " t o p i c " (Sache), w h i c h he w i l l pursue on his many later "thought-paths" ( p r i m a r i l y "the meaning of being," the "truth of being," and the "topos of being"). 5 1 . The general plans in Heidegger's t w o texts, his 1925 lecture course and his Being and Time, are v i r t u a l l y the same. 52. Quoted in Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, p. 3 5 1 . Cf. HansGeorg Gadamer, Philosophische Lehrjahre: Eine Rückschau (Frankfurt: V i t t o r i o Klostermann, 1977), p. 173. 53. The w o r d "phenomenology" no longer occurs in the titles of Heidegger's lecture courses and seminars after 1929 ("Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen v o n M a r t i n Heidegger," pp. 6 6 3 - 6 6 5 ) . The later Heidegger does still consider his thought to be some form of phenomenology, e.g., a "phenomenology of the inconspicuous" (S, 399, cf. 288, 297; SD, 48/45, 90/82; BR, x v / x i v , x v i i / x v i ; WM, 357; ZP, 4 7 / 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ) . See also Bernard Boelen, " M a r t i n Heidegger as Phenomenologist," in Phenomenological
33
272 Perspectives: Historical and Systematic Essays in Honor of Herbert Spiegelberg (The Hague: Martinus N i j h o f f , 1975), pp. 9 3 - 1 1 4 ; Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, pp. 4 0 1 ^ t 0 7 . But the later Heidegger reads Husserl's phenomenology no longer in the light of D i l t h e y , A r i s t o t l e ' s practical thought, and Kierkegaard, but rather in the light of especially the Pre-Socratics. See his 1973 seminar on his youthful appropriation of Husserl's Logical Investigations, in w h i c h he concludes by retrieving Husserl's notion o f truth f r o m the point o f v i e w o f Parmenides' concept o f aletheia (S, 133-138; cf. SD, 7 1 - 8 0 / 6 4 - 7 3 ) . Husserl's thought is here v i r t u a l l y eclipsed. One of the participants of Heidegger's 1973 seminar, Jacques T a m i n i a u x , found " s u r p r i s i n g " Heidegger's "reservation" and "silence" regarding the "extent of insight that this fascinating text had exerted on h i m " ( T a m i n i a u x , "Heidegger and Husserl's Logical Investigations," pp. 75, 82). 54. Friedrich W i l h e l m von Herrmann, " D i e E d i t i o n der Vorlesungen Heideggers in seiner Gesamtausgabe letzter H a n d , " Heidegger Studies 2 (1986): 154. 55. See my " D e m y t h o l o g i z i n g Heidegger," in Philosophy in Canada, V o l . 1, ed. Fiore G u i d o ( M i l l i k e n , Ontario: A g a t h o n Books, 1989) (forthcoming). For an example of e m p l o y i n g Heidegger's y o u t h f u l language in an interpretation of his w h o l e thought, see John Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, De construction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987). 56. Gadamer, " D e r Eine W e g M a r t i n Heideggers," p. 9.
34
Dasein, the Being that Thematizes
ROBERT B R A N D O M
I . Background
D
OES t h e s t r u c t u r e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t c o m m i t h t m to understanding
D a s e i n a s i n v o l v i n g language
in
p r i n c i p l e ? I w i l l argue h e r e t h a t h e is c o m m i t t e d t o
t h e c l a i m t h a t the sort o f l i n g u i s t i c assertional practice h e
c a l l s " t h e m a t i z i n g " i s a n essential feature o f D a s e i n , a n d so, t h a t n o t h i n g c o u l d b e D a s e i n unless i t t r e a t s s o m e t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t . T o see w h y t h i s w o u l d b e a n
interesting and
i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t , i t i s necessary t o rehearse some o f t h e basic features t h a t m a k e Heidegger's a p p r o a c h d i s t i n c t i v e a n d o r i g inal.
Being and T i m e c a n be u n d e r s t o o d as p r o p o u n d i n g a
n o r m a t i v e p r a g m a t i s m . T h e e x p l a n a t o r y strategy i n v o k e d b y this expression comprises t w o d i s t i n c t c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e first regards t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d t h e f a c t u a l
'"Das thematisierende Seiende, das Da$em" (364; English 415). A l l references w i l l be given i n this form: the page numbers i n the German original ot the Gesamtausgabe ( v o l . 2) are given first, and the Macquarrie and Robinson English translation page numbers or Being and Time are given thereafter, e.g., (364; English 415).
35
1
realms; t h e s e c o n d regards t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n n o r m s t a k i n g t h e e x p l i c i t f o r m o t rules a n d n o r m s t a k i n g t h e i m p l i c i t t e r m of proprieties of practice. I n e a c h case t h e q u e s t i o n i s o n e o f c o n c e p t u a l a n d e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n treats t h e f a c r u a l a s t h e basic f o r m o f t h e r e a l a n d seeks t o e x p l a i n t h e n o r m a t i v e b y adding s o m e t h i n g , w h i c h m i g h t g e n e r i c a l l y b e c a l l e d v a l ues. W h a t i s o b j e c t i v e l y r e a l has a c l o a k o f s u b j e c t i v e v a l u e s o r s i g n i f i c a n c e s t h r o w n o v e r i t b y its r e l a t i o n t o h u m a n i n t e r ests or desires.
2
By c o n t r a s t , H e i d e g g e r t r e a t s as p r i m i t i v e a
c e r t a i n k i n d o f s o c i a l n o r m a t i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n a n d seeks t o d e f i n e t h e f a c t u a l as a s p e c i a l case p i c k e d o u t by subtracting something, namely certain kinds of relations to h u m a n projects. A g a i n ,
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n treats n o r m s as
c a n o n i c a l l y c o d i f i e d i n t h e f o r m o f e x p l i c i t rules w h i c h d e t e r m i n e w h a t i s c o r r e c t b y saying o r d e s c r i b i n g w h a t i s c o r r e c t . E a c h p r o p r i e t y o f practice,
t h e grasp o f w h i c h consists
k n o w i n g how t o d o s o m e t h i n g c o r r e c t l y ,
in
is c o n c e i v e d as
u n d e r w r i t t e n b y a pnnciple, t h e grasp o f w h i c h consists i n k n o w i n g thai a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t o f p e r f o r m a n c e i s c o r r e c t . B y c o n t r a s t , H e i d e g g e r treats a s p r i m i t i v e a c e r t a i n k i n d o f n o r m t h a t is implicit in p r a c t i c e a n d seeks to d e f i n e explicit r u l e s , principles, and claims in terms of the practical proprieties o f using t h e m . H e i d e g g e r sets o u t these c o m m i t m e n t s i n t h e f o r m o f a n account of the relations between three fundamental o n t o l o g i c a l categories, o r m o r e o f f i c i a l l y , r e g i o n s o f b e i n g w i t h i n which
different
sorts
of entities
Zuhandensein, a n d Vorhandensein.
2
are
disclosed:
Dasein,
Dasein is the k i n d of b e i n g
Heidegget formulates his view by opposition to this: " I n inter-
pretinE we do not.
so to speak, throw a 'signification over some naked
t'hin^ which is p r e s e n t - a t - h a n c i , we do nor stick a value on i t " (150; English 191). See also (68; English 97) and (99; English 132).
36
w e ourselves h a v e . ' A l t h o u g h t h e task o t t h e w h o l e b o o k i s t o l a y o u t t h e basic make-Lip (Cmmdverfassung) o f D a s e i n , t w o features m a y b e s i n g l e d o u t b y w a y o t i n t r o d u c t i o n . F i r s t , D a s e i n is an e s s e n t i a l l y social sort of b e i n g . H e i d e g g e r ' s t e r m 4
(cir o u r s o c i a l i t y is .Mitsein, or b e i n g - w i t h . S e c o n d , an essent i a l s t r u c t u r e o f D a s e i n i s t h a t i r a l w a y s alreadv f i n d s i t s e l f i n a worlds To say t h i s is to say t h a t t h e o n t o l o g i c a l categories of D a s e i n a n d Zu/iandensein ( a v a i l a b i l i t y ) are i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d .
6
F o r apart f r o m o t h e r s w h o s e w a y o f b e i n g i s also t h a t o f D a s e i n , t h e w o r l d consists o f w h a t i s zuhanden, t h a t is, readyto-hand,
or
available.
The
available
comprises
what
H e i d e g g e r c a l l s e q u i p m e n t ( Z e u g ) — t h i n g s t h a t are used o r d e a l t w i t h i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s a n d s o are t h i c k w i t h p r a c t i c a l proprieties or significances that d e t e r m i n e h o w it is appropriate t o t r e a t t h e m . T o c a l l s o m e t h i n g a v a i l a b l e i s t o t r e a t i t a s s o m e t h i n g t h a t c a n b e used c o r r e c t l y o r i n c o r r e c t l y , a c c o r d i n g t o proprieties i m p l i c i t i n practices i n s t i t u t e d a n d pursued b y D a s e i n . H a m m e r s are a p a r a d i g m o f a k i n d o f e n r i t y t h a t e x h i b i t s t h i s sort o f b e i n g — t h e y are p r o p e r l y used i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f d r i v i n g n a i l s , a l t h o u g h i t i s possible t o use t h e m a s
'The section titled "The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein" states "We are ourselves the entity to be analyzed" ( 4 1 ; English 67). '"Dasein in itself is essentially Being-wirh" (120; English 156). "So tar as Dasein is at all. it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being" (125; English 163). s
"'Being-in' is thus the formal existential expression for the Being ot
Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state" (54; English nö). "'Dasein' means Being-m-ilie-woud" (165, English 208). 6
1 use category here not in Heidegger's technical sense (for Existenz is
not in that sense a category), but in the sense of "ontological category" 'hnt I detail in "Heideggers Categories in Being and Time." which was reprinted in Heidegger A Ctiu'iui Rcudey. pages 45—64· This essay, to which the present one is a companion, is hereafter referred to as "HCBT."
37
ballast o r weapons.
7
T h e practical norms d e t e r m i n i n g the cor-
rect way o f u s i n g bits o f e q u i p m e n t t y p i c a l l y reiate t h e m t o o t h e r hits o f e q u i p m e n t — h a m m e r s t o nails, nails t o boards, tires to cars, cars to roads, a n d so o n . T h e w o r l d is a h o l i s t i c t o t a l i t y o f such p r a c t i c a l n o r m a t i v e e q u i p m e n t a l i n v o l v e m e n t s . " V'or/ujndensein ( o c c u r r e n c e ) is t h e r e a l m of o b j e c t i v e facts. It consists o f o b j e c t s t h a t are m e r e l y present a n d o f t h e i r m a t t e r of-factual,
non-normative
properties.
Treating
things
as
vorhanden i s t a k i n g t h e m t o b e w h a t t h e y are, i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any p r o p r i e t i e s o f p r a c t i c e i n s t i t u t e d b y Dasein's a c t i v i t i e s . T h u s o c c u r r e n c e i s Heidegger's w a y o f t a l k i n g a b o u t w h a t t h e p h i l o sophical t r a d i t i o n talked about under the h e a d i n g of Reality. W h a t i s o c c u r r e n t differs f r o m w h a t i s a v a i l a b l e i n t h a t i t i s n o t made t o b e w h a t i t i s b y b e i n g c a u g h t u p i n n o r m a t i v e s o c i a l practices, w h i c h situate i t w i r h respect t o D a s e i n ' s p r o j e c t s . '
'"But the 'indicating' of the sign and the 'hammering' of the hammer are not properties of entities. A n y t h i n g ready-to-hand is, at the worst, appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others" (83; English 114-15). "Serviceability, too, however, as a constitutive state of equipment . . . is not an appropriateness of some entity; it is rather the condition (so far as Being is in question) which makes it possible for the character of such an entity to be defined by its appropriatenesses" (83; English 115). s
" A s the Being of something ready-to-hand, an involvement is itself
discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements" (85; English 118). "Being-in-the-world, according to our interpretation hitherto, amounts to a nonthematic circumspective absorption in references or assignmenrs constitutive for the readiness-tohand of a totality of equipment" (67; English 107). 'These projects are not to be understood as explicitly conceived and adopted. "Projecting" is an implicit practical attitude or orientation: "Projecting has norhing to do w i t h comporting oneself towatds a plan thar has been thought out. The character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects—thai is to say, possibilities" (145; English 185).
38
ι - ft ft ι
M«-
l A u e m . ihe Being injc Tncrr,.
I n Being and Time H e i d e g g e r ' s p r i m a r y c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t t h e t r a d i t i o n i s t h a t i t gives o n t o l o g i c a l a n d e x p l a n a t o r y p r i d e o f place
ro
this
category—attempting
to
understand
and
e x p l a i n D a s e i n , t h e p r o p r i e t i e s D a s e i n i n s t i t u t e s b y its s o c i a l practices, a n d t h e e q u i p m e n t a l roles defined by those prac tices i n t e r m s o f w h a t i s m e r e l y o c c u r r e n t . ' " T h i s a p p r o a c h , he thinks,
is wrong-headed and doomed to failure. T h e
t h o u g h t u n d e r l y i n g this c l a i m i s t h a t i f n o r m - l a d e n prac t i c e s are t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n w h a t i t i s t o treat t h i n g s a s matters o f fact, w h i l e i f o n e starts w i t h matters o f fact, n o r m s o f a l l sorts w i l l b e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e — c o n s t r u a b l e o n l y i n t e r m s o f e s s e n t i a l l y s u b j e c t i v e responses to
facts."
Heidegger
What pursues
matters the
for
the
direction
present
story
of explanation
is
how
that
he
endorses, r a t h e r t h a n h o w h e t h i n k s t h e r e v e r s e d i r e c t i o n c a n be seen to be d e f e c t i v e . A s was a l r e a d y r e m a r k e d , H e i d e g g e r i s c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s n o e q u i p m e n t w i t h o u t Dasein, a n d n o Dasein w i t h o u t equip ment
Dasein
and
Zuhandensein
mutually
presuppose
one
a n o t h e r a s s u b s t r u c t u r e s o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . Vorhandensein, by c o n t r a s t , is a d e r i v a t i v e c a t e g o r y , to be u n d e r s t o o d a n d explained in terms of the o t h e r t w o . 1 2 H o w is the occurrent d e r i v e d f r o m t h e o t h e r t w o sorts o f b e i n g . ' T h i s i s a l o n g story, for w h i c h o n l y t h e barest s k e t c h c a n b e p r o v i d e d h e r e . I n o u t l i n e , i t goes l i k e t h i s : S o m e o f t h e e q u i p m e n t t h a t i s a v a i l a b l e
' " I n general our understanding (it being is such that every entity is understood in the first instance as occurrent" (225; English 268, transla tion revised). "1 argue tor this interpretation of Heidegger's project in H C D T . I!
"
rhe nntolo«ical meaning of c o g n i t i o n , w h i c h we have exhib
ited as a jounded mode of being-m-the-world. To lay bare what is just occurrent and no more, cognition must first penetrate beyond what is available in our concern" (71; English 101, translation revised).
39
Dmem
l'ic Being J u l
in
/
r^mauia
the
·* ρ ο t h r
environing
totality
of equipmental
involvements
p r a c t i c a l l y disclosed i n t h e w o r l d i s s p e c i f i c a l l y linguistic e q u i p m e n t . I n p a r t i c u l a r , o n e sort o f e q u i p m e n t i s sentences, used i n practice
t o m a k e assertions o r c l a i m s .
H e i d e g g e r calls
using
s e n t e n c e s a s o n e does i n t h e p a r a d i g m case o f a s s e r t i o n thematiding. 1 3 T h e basic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s u c h sentences consists i n b e i n g able
to distinguish
in
practice
between correct
and
i n c o r r e c t uses, as w i t h a n y sort o f e q u i p m e n t . T h e p r o p r i e t i e s o f p r a c t i c e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f s e n t e n c e use i n t h e m a t i z i n g are o f t h r e e f u n d a m e n t a l sorts o n Heidegger's a c c o u n t : n o n i n f e r e n t i a l uses i n m a k i n g p e r c e p t u a l r e p o r t s , i n f e r e n t i a l uses (as premises and
conclusions),
and
interpersonal
communicative
Grasping the significance of the claims made
uses.
b y sentences
consists i n p r a c t i c a l mastery o f these k i n d s o f p r o p r i e t i e s o f use. T h i s i s t h e p r a c t i c a l k n o w i n g how i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e capac i t y t o t h e m a t i z e e x p l i c i t l y , k n o w i n g that s o m e t h i n g is t h e case, is to be e x p l a i n e d . H O r d i n a r i l y , H e i d e g g e r t h i n k s , a t h i n g i s first d i s c l o s e d t o D a s e i n a s a v a i l a b l e i n t e r m s o f t h e p r a c t i c a l p r o p r i e t i e s gov erning what it would be correct to do w i t h it. Even unfamiliar t h i n g s first c o m e i n t o o u r w o r l d a s e q u i p m e n t w e d o n o t k n o w what to do w i t h . 1 5 Responding to s o m e t hin g as merely occur r e n t requires a c e r t a i n s o r t o f h o l d i n g b a c k f r o m p r a c t i c a l
"E.g., (149; English 189) and (354; English 405). l4
For derails on how to read Heidegger this way, see H C B T .
,;
" T h e question simply remains as to how entities are discovered in
this previous encountering, whether 2S mere thip.gs
w
' h i c h occur, , ί γ
rather as equipment which has not yet been understood—as something available w i t h which wc have hitherto not known 'how to begin' A n d here again, when the equipmental characters of the available arc still cir'••'rr,ri>art-ly
undiscovered
tHev 3te not to be Interpreted as bsre
Thinghood presented for an apprehension of what is just occurrent and no more" ( 8 1 ; English 112, translation revised).
40
·-(>'/<
i >
Dasein. ?·ν D€>ng ;h^ii TVunmiij.'ö
ι-
involvcmenf.
1 6
I n s t e a d o f t r e a t i n g t h e t h i n g a s a v a i l a b l e for
v a r i o u s sorts o f p r a c t i c a l uses, o n e treats i t a s a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e s p o n d e d t o only b y m a k i n g a s s e r t i o n s a b o u t i t . t h e o r e t i c a l r a t h e r t h a n a p r a c t i c a l response,
1 7
T h i s is a
t h e difference
b e i n g m a r k e d o u t b y t h e fact t h a t t h e assertional o r j u d g m e n t a l responses are themselves available or serviceable
18
for f o r m u l a t i n g
t h e u p s h o t o f p e r c e p t i o n , u s i n g a s f o d d e r for i n f e r e n c e s , o r f o r
" " I f knowing is to be possible as a wav of determining the nature of the occurrent by observing it, then there must be tirsr a deficiency in our having-to-do-with the world concernfully. W h e n concern holds back from any kind of producing, manipulating, and the like, it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just tarrying alongside. T h i s kind of being towards the world is one which lets us encounter entities withm-the-world purely in the way ihey look" (61; English 88). "Thematizing Objectifies. It does not first 'posit' the entities, but frees them so that one can interrogate them and determine rheir character 'Objectively'. Being w h i c h Objectifies and which is alongside the occurrent within-the-world, is characterized by a distinctive kind of making-present. This making-present is distinguished from the Present of circumspection in that—above all—the kind of discovering which belongs to the science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of the occurrent. We shall not trace further how science has its source in authentic existence. It is enough for now if we understand that rhe thematirmg of entities within-the-world presupposes Being-in-the-world n< the basic state of Dasein" (363; English 414, translation tevised). 1
Thus one can themati:e (make assertions about! what is nor present-
ar-hand "Even that which is ready-to-hand can be made a theme for scientific investigation. The teady-to-hand can become the O b j e c t ' of a science without having to lose its character as equipment" (361; Enuli^h 413). M u c h of Being and Time does just that (cf. the title of section La: "The task ol a themanc analysis of Being-in"), "'"The assertion is something available" (224; English 267, translation revised)
41
L\'iSL'in
inc' B o n g irml i h i ' m a t i i v i
c o m m u n i c a t i n g t o o t h e r s . T h e assertions w i t h w h i c h i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o respond t o s o m e t h i n g p e r c e p t i b l e d o n o t d e p e n d on the particular practical projects t h a t a n i m a t e the a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e assertor ( a l t h o u g h t h e p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e s i n w h i c h o n e goes on
to
use
those
assertions
as premises
may
well
so
depend). T h e h o l d i n g - b a c k t h a t underlies treating something a s m e r e l y occuiTent, t h e " j u s t l o o k i n g " a t i t , consists i n m e d i a t i n g one's p r a c t i c a l responses b y a l e v e l o f a s s e r t i o n , t h e p r a c t i c a l p r o p r i e t i e s o f w h i c h s w i n g free o f p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c a l p r o j e c t s . T h i s i s w h y " o c c u r r e n c e . . . i s t h e s p e c i a l t y o f assert i o n " (158; E n g l i s h 2 0 1 ) . " I t i s i n this way t h a t k n o w - h o w , p r a c t i c a l mastery o f w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s s p e c i f i c a l l y l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e , distances o b j e c t s a n d states o f affairs f r o m t h e p r o j e c t s o f D a s e i n b y r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e m ( f o r i n s t a n c e , perceptually). Knowing-that is founded on knowing-how. A s p e c i a l case o f t h e t h e m a t i z i n g use o f s e n t e n c e s i s t o state rules. W i t h respect t o t h i s p r a g m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y o f n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n practice over those e x p l i c i t i n rules, H e i d e g g e r belongs i n a b o x w i t h t h e later W i t t g e n s t e i n . F o r i n t h e investigations, W i t t g e n s t e i n argues t h a t e x p l i c i t rules c a n n o t b e t h e o n l y f o r m t a k e n b y n o r m s , o n t h e basis o f t h e regress t h a t i s r e v e a l e d w h e n i t i s n o t i c e d that f o l l o w i n g a rule is itself s o m e t h i n g t h a t can be done correctly or incorrectly. C a l l i n g a rule t h a t governs the a p p l i c a t i o n of another rule
an "interpretation," Wittgenstein
argues t h a t " t h e r e m u s t b e s o m e w a y o f f o l l o w i n g a r u l e t h a t does n o t c o n s i s t i n a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , b u t i n f o l l o w i n g o r
" T h e whole passage reads: "This leveling of the primordial 'as' of circumspective interpretation to the 'as' with which presence-at-hand is given a definite character is the specialty of assertion. Only so does it obtain the possibiliry ot exhibiting something in such a way that we just look at it." (See also 162; English 89] concerning the relation between perception and assertion, which is discussed below in connection w i t h curiosity.)
42
1 • ι > < > I 11 < -
U a s c m . ihe Being th*u
g o i n g against
i t i n p r a c t i c e " (Phibsophical investigations 2 0 1 ) .
T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o t m a k i n g n o r m s e x p l i c i t i n t h e f o r m o f rules, w h i c h determine
what
is correct and
i n c o r r e c t b y saying
w h a t does a n d does n o t q u a l i f y , d e p e n d s o n a n u n d e r l y i n g possibility o f d i s c r i m i n a t i n g n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n t h e practice o f doing t h i n g s c o r r e c t l y a n d
incorrectly and responding
to such performances n o n l i n g u i s t i c a l l y as correct and incorrect. W i t h o u t s u c h p r a c t i c a l a b i l i t i e s , rules c o u l d n o t b e a p p l i e d — i t c a n n o t b e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( i n t h i s sense) a l l t h e w a y d o w n . 2 0 These,
then,
are
the
two
n o r m a t i v e p r a g m a t i s m : first,
components
of
Heidegger's
understanding the factual
in
t e r m s o f t h e n o r m a t i v e ( v i a t h e n o r m s g o v e r n i n g t h e use o f assertions, w h i c h
are
t h e o n l y a p p r o p r i a t e response t o t h e
o c c u r r e n t as such); a n d second, u n d e r s t a n d i n g g o v e r n m e n t by n o r m s e x p l i c i t i n t h e f o r m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y s t a t a b l e rules i n terms o f g o v e r n m e n t b y n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n the f o r m o f skillful practical discriminations of appropriate and inappropriate performances ( i n particular, applications to i n d i v i d u a l unre p e a t a b l e cases o f t h e r e p e a t a h l e s e n t e n c e s t h a t express g e n e r a l rules).
T h e first
is
u n d e r s t a n d i n g Vorhandensein
in
terms of
Zuhandensein, a n d t h e s e c o n d is u n d e r s t a n d i n g Zuhandensein as i n t h e first i n s t a n c e a m a t t e r o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e r a t h e r t h a n individual propositionally contentful cognition or intellectual a c h i e v e m e n t ( " t h e m a t i z i n g " ) . I t i s n a t u r a l t o u n d e r s t a n d these p r i o r i t y claims in terms of a "layer cake" m o d e l , according to which
there
could
be
Dasein
and
Zu/ianaensem
without
Vorhandensein, w h i c h arises f r o m t h e m o n l y i f D a s e i n a d o p t s c e r t a i n o p t i o n a l practices a n d p r a c t i c a l attitudes, i n v o l v i n g t h e use o f c e r t a i n sorts o f s o p h i s t i c a t e d e q u i p m e n t , n a m e l y sentences used
t o m a k e c l a i m s a n d state
rules. T h i s
is an
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e c l a i m t h a t "assertion i s
discuss this line of thought in more detail in the first chapter of Making It Explicit.
43
I r^cmauiei
:Λζν:η
epoch*
[ho fvir.i; thai nwmdli^e^
derived f r o m i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g " (160; E n g l i d i 2 0 1 ) i n v o k e s d e r i v a t i o n i n a sense i m p l y i n g t h e autonomy o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g layet o t " c i r c u m s p e c t i v e ' ' ( t h a t is, p t a c t i c a l ) acknowledgments of proprieties in dealing w i t h equipment. T h e l e v e l o f assettions. a n d s o o t a d o p t i n g t h e p t a c t i c a l a t t i t u d e o f t r e a t i n g t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t , l o o k s l i k e a n o p t i o n a l super structure, w h i c h m i g h t b e erected o n t o p o f h u m a n existence (Dasein) and the being of equipment
(Zutanderisein),
but
w h i c h equally w e l l m i g h t n o t b e found along w i t h t h e m . 2 1 I n a n s w e r i n g t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n " B y what existential-
ontological modifications does assertion arise from circumspective interpretation?" ( 1 5 7 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 0 ) , H e i d e g g e r a p p a r e n t l y says n o t h i n g t h a t w o u l d i n d i c a t e t h a t , g i v e n t h e sort o f b e i n g f r o m w h i c h t h e y are d e r i v e d , a s s e r t i o n a n d presentness must arise. I t w o u l d seem possible, a n d i n t h e s p i r i t o f t h e e n t e r p r i s e , t o sup pose t h a t o n e c o u l d c o h e r e n t l y t a k e s o m e c o m m u n i t y t o consist o f e n t i t i e s w i t h Dasein's k i n d o f b e i n g , i n s t i t u t i n g b y t h e i r p r a c t i c e s a w o r l d o f zuhanden e q u i p m e n t , w h i l e n o t supposing t h a t they c a n talk, a n d do so w h i l e d e n y i n g t h a t t h e y t r e a t a n y t h i n g a s vorhanden. O n t h i s r e a d i n g , H e i d e g g e r portrays
an
autonomous,
preconceptual,
prepropositional,
prelinguistic level of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y — n a m e l y practical, skillladen, n o r m - g o v e r n e d directedness t o w a r d e q u i p m e n t treated as available. As b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , Dasein can already be d i s c e r n e d a t t h i s l e v e l . I t m a y o r m a y n o t b e t h e case f o r a n y particular c o m m u n i t y o f e x i s t i n g entities, entities whose way o f b e i n g i s t h a t o f D a s e i n , t h a t o n t h i s p r a c t i c a l base a t h e o r e t i cal superstructure of c o n c e p t u a l , p r e p o s i t i o n a l , linguistic, or i n Heidegger's t e r m i n o l o g y , t h e m a t i c i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , i s e r e c t e d
: i
l n tact, 1 endorse priority of implicit practical norms over the
capacity to make anything explicit ;r. Mating Ii Explicit. Bur 1 have come to believe that, tempting as it is to attribute this view to Heidegger, as I argue below, he is in fact committed to rejecting i t .
44
'-A^cir. iMe Bern? inc.: i ncrr.,inzL.
«' ρ <» < t i «-
T h o ^ e i n t e r p r e t e r s of Being and Time w h o take it to be a p r a g m a t i s t w o r k i n s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h e d u a l sense d e l i n e a t e d above, most p r o m i n e n t l y Dreyfus, H a u g e l a n d , a n d O k r e n t , t y p ically u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r i o r i t y H e i d e g g e r a c c o r d s t o p r a c t i c a l over
propositional
intentionality
accotding
to
this
"layer
c a k e " m o d e l - I t i s t h e thesis o f t h i s essay t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n o f this m o d e l of the p r i o r i t y d o c t r i n e is a mistake — H e i d e g g e r is c o m m i t t e d to the c l a i m that there is no Dasein (and hence no Zuhandensein) w i t h o u t language, w i t h o u t t h e m a t i z i n g , w i t h o u t t r e a t i n g t h i n g s as vorhanden. A s t h e passage q u o t e d i n t h e t i t l e indicates, Dasein is t h e being ( e n t i t y ) t h a t thematizes. A n o t h e r way o f p u t t i n g t h i s c l a i m i s t o say t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y t o treat t h i n g s as e x t a n t or o c c u r r e n t is an existentiaie, a p e r m a n e n t a n d c o n s t i t u t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y o f D a s e i n . T h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t t h e r e c a n n o t b e n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n social p r a c t i c e s w i t h o u t n o r m s e x p l i c i t i n t h e f o r m o f rules, w h i c h d e t e r m i n e w h a t i s c o r r e c t by saying or describing w h a t is correct, a n d hence, w i t h o u t l i n g u i s t i c practices i n c l u d i n g assertion. It is to say t h a t s u c h a prelinguistic
community
would
not
count
as
Dasein.
An
i n s t r u c t i v e case i n p o i n t is H a u g e l a n d ' s r i c h a n d o r i g i n a l r e n d e r i n g o f the n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n t h e practices t h a t institute e q u i p m e n t . H e e x p l a i n s these n o r m s i n t e r m s o f s o c i a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n s o f d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a t q u a l i f y a s " c o n f o r m i s t . " H e asks u s t o i m a g i n e u n d e r t h i s h e a d i n g creatures w h o n o t o n l y c o n f o r m t h e i r b e h a v i o r t o t h a t o f o t h e r c o m m u n i t y m e m b e r s i n t h e sense o f i m i t a t i n g e a c h o t h e r , a n d s o t e n d t o act a l i k e ( n o r m a l l y i n t h e sense o f t y p i c a l l y ) i n s i m i l a r c i t c u m s t a n c e s , b u t also sanc tion
each
orhet's
perfotmances,
positively
and
negatively
r e i n f o r c i n g responses t o s t i m u l i s o a s t o m a k e i t m o r e l i k e l y t h a t f u t u r e b e h a v i o r w i l l c o n f o r m t o t h e e m e r g e n t standards.
n
C.<
H u h e n L. Dreyfus, Being m the world: A Commentary on
Heidegger's
Being and Time; John Haugeland, "Heidegger;" Mark
Okrent, Heidegger's Pragmatism.
45
T h e clusters that coalesce can he cailed " n o r m s " ( a n d n o t just
groups or rypes,) precisely because they are generated and main tained by censoriousness; the censure attendant on deviation automatically gives the standards (the extant clusters) α de f a c t o normative force. ( H a u g e l a n d , " H e i d e g g e r " 1 6 )
I t is i n t e r m s o f n o r m s i m p l i c i t i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e i n t h i s sense that he explains the proprieties constitutive of equipment and the constitution of the norm-governed c o m m u n i t y as the anyone
(das
Man),
the
conforming
individual
creatures.
Dasein is t h e n identified w i t h this c o m m u n i t y and any n o r m a t i v e structures i n s t i t u t e d b y i t ( H a u g e l a n d , " H e i d e g g e r " 1 9 ) . M y thesis i s t h a t a l t h o u g h s u c h a n a c c o u n t i s n o d o u b t o f crucial i m p o r t a n c e in understanding h o w Heidegger approa ches i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , 2 3 i t c a n n o t b e c o r r e c t a s a n a c c o u n t o f w h a t D a s e i n a n d Zuhandensein c o n s i s t i n . F o r t h i s account c a n be t o l d a b o u t pre- or n o n - l i n g u i s t i c creatures, as e x e m p l i f y i n g an a u t o n o m o u s l e v e l o f f u n c t i o n i n g o n w h i c h t h e c a p a c i t y for l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e is causally a n d c o n c e p t u a l l y parasitic, a n d , i t w i l l b e argued, H e i d e g g e r i s c o m m i t t e d t o t h e c l a i m t h a t a n y t h i n g t h a t does
n o t have
language a n d does
not make
assertions ( a n d t h e r e f o r e does n o t t r e a t t h i n g s a s v o r h a n d e n ) c a n n o t qualify as Dasein, a n d so c a n n o t i n s t i t u t e proprieties r h a t q u a l i f y as a w o r l d of Zuhandensein.
23
u
1 take issue w i t h the reduction of the normative to regularities of
behavior and disposition (even to censure) in chapter I of Maiung it Explicit, and 1 would take issue w i t h it also as a reading ot Heidegger 24
Haugeland does say, " I n my pains to avoid any hidden presupposi
t i o n of mentality or reason, I have spoken exclusively of dispositions, behavior, and know-how—making everything sound 'mindless' and inarticulate. But of coutse it isn't. A m o n g Dasein's many institutions are those of language" (Haugeland, "Heidegger" 23). The question is thus one of the status of this institution. We have also been told that among
46
*• ρ ο r h c
W h y n o t say t h a t o n e c a n g i v e a separable a c c o u n t o f a n autonomous
level
of
practice
that,
for
instance,
Dasein's
b e i n g - i n - a - w o r l d o f e q u i p m e n t consists i n , h o p i n g later t o a d d t h o s e features r e q u i r e d t o e x p l a i n o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f D a s e i n , for i n s t a n c e its b e i n g b e i n g a n issue for i t , o r care, which
need
approach
is
n o t be exhibited precluded
on
at the
basic
base
level.' S u c h an
methodological
grounds.
Heidegger claims t h a t in his discussion of Dasein he is n o t just d o i n g a n t h r o p o l o g y , but f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y . Part o f t h e cash value o f t h i s c l a i m m u s t b e t h a t h e i s n o t m e r e l y o f f e r i n g u s a set o f d e s c r i p t i o n s , i n h o w e v e r r i c h a v o c a b u l a r y , w h i c h a l l j u s t h a p p e n t o b e t r u e o f us. R a t h e r , h i s c h a r a c t e r i : a t i o n s f o r m a t i g h t l y i n t e r l o c k e d set o f features, n o o n e o f w h i c h could be e x h i b i t e d w i t h o u t all t h e others. W h e n he t e l l s us t h a t D a s e i n is b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , D a s e i n is its disclosedness, a n d t h a t D a s e i n i s t h e e n t i t y w h o s e b e i n g i s a n issue f o r i t , * 5 for i n s t a n c e , p a r t o f t h e s p e c i f i c a l l y ontologicai f o r c e o f these c l a i m s , ontic
force
w h a t raises t h e m a b o v e
of anthropological
observations
the merely
or generaliza
t i o n s , i s t h e i r i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n . I n effect t h e c o m m i t m e n t being u n d e r t a k e n is t h a t a n y t h i n g t h a t is correctly specified a s w o r l d e d m u s t t h e r e f o r e also b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h its d i s c l o s e d ness, a n d m u s t c o u n t a s h a v i n g i t s b e i n g a s a n issue f o r i t , t h a t n o t h i n g w h o s e b e i n g i s a n issue for i t c o u l d f a i l t o b e w o r l d e d o r t o b e i t s disclosedness, a n d s o o n . T h e existentielle o f D a s e i n c o m e as a package. T h u s to c l a i m t h a t e n t i t i e s c o u l d e x h i b i t s o m e o f these wavs o f b e i n g w i t h o u t o t h e r s i s t o c l a i m t h a t
Dasein's institutions are chemistry, philately, Christmas, and C i n c i n n a t i (19). For all Haugeland says here, language could be as optional and latecoming in Dasein's development as these are. It is this possibility that the present reading attempts to close off. :3
E.g., see (165; English 208), (133; English 171), and (143; English
182).
47
[λΐ5(Νπ,
rht
' • [ M i l
Beine Out T t e m d n r c s
t I «"
t h e r e i s n o s u c h t h i n g a s D a s e i n , t h a t H e i d e g g e r has g o t t e n i t w r o n g . I t i s b y t h a t same t o k e n t o cast d o u b t o n one's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f w h a t i s r e q u i r e d t o c o u n t as, for e x a m p l e , w o r l d e d , o r s t r u c t u r e d b y care, r e l a t i v e t o a n a l t e r n a t e r e a d i n g t h a t does n o t p e r m i t these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Dasein's basic c o n s t i t u t i o n t o f a l l a p a r t f r o m o n e a n o t h e r . If, 1 w i l l argue h e r e , i t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t a s s e r t i o n a l l a n g u a g e i s a n essential s t r u c t u r e o f t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n o f D a s e i n , t h e n i t w i l l f o l l o w t h a t , f o r Heidegger, n o t h i n g c a n be w o r l d e d , a n d so treat t h i n g s as e q u i p m e n t a v a i l a b l e unless i t c a n also t r e a t t h i n g s a s o b j e c tively occurrent.
II.
D i r e c t A r g u m e n t s f o r Dasein's H a v i n g Sprache
T h e basic a r g u m e n t t o b e p r e s e n t e d c a n b e p u t s c h e m a t i c a l l y i n f o u r steps: 1 . T h e r e c a n b e n o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Rede ( d i s c o u r s e ) . 2. T h e r e c a n be n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede ( i d l e t a l k ) . 3. T h e r e c a n be n o Gerede w i t h o u t Sprache ( l a n g u a g e ) . 4. T h e r e c a n be n o Sprache w i t h o u t Aussage ( a s s e r t i o n ) . T h i s a r g u m e n t w i l l t h e n b e s i t u a t e d w i t h i n a larger f r a m e , w h i c h argues m o r e g e n e r a l l y t h a t 5 . T h e r e c a n b e n o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Verfallen ( f a l l i n g ) . Verfallen e x h i b i t s t h r e e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c substructures, Gerede, Neugier ( c u r i o s i t y ) , a n d Zu/eideutig/<eit ( a m b i g u i t y ) . Gerede is d e a l t w i t h i n t h e first a r g u m e n t . T o c o m p l e t e t h e f r a m i n g a r g u m e n t , i t i s argued t h a t 6. T h e r e c a n be n o Neugier w i t h o u t Aussage. 7. T h e r e c a n be n o Zweideutigkeit w i t h o u t Aussage. T h e conclusion is that 8 . T h e r e c a n b e n o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Aussage. A n d so: T h e r e can be no Dasein rhat c a n n o t treat things as jrhanden. E a c h o f these steps requires e x p l a n a t i o n a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
48
e- ρ ο <: he
Dasein,
the öt'in£ that Themaurcs
A s s u m i n g for t h e m o m e n t t h a t s u c h j u s t i f i c a t i o n s c a n b e given,
the
a r c h i t e c t o n i c c o m m i t m e n t s a t t r i b u t e d b y these
premises w i l l r e q u i r e r e j e c t i o n o f t h e "layer c a k e m o d e l " o f t h e c o n c e p t u a l p r i o r i t y o f t h e way o f b e i n g o f t h e a v a i l a b l e o v e r that of the occurrent, in view of the untenability of the picture o f a n a u t o n o m o u s s t r a t u m o f p r a c t i c e i n w h i c h e n t i t i e s already c o u n t a s h a v i n g Dasein's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c b e i n g a n d a s o p e r a t i n g a m i d s t a w o r l d o f e q u i p m e n t b u t are n o t y e t t a k e n t o b e able t o t a l k . T h e p r i o r i t y thesis must t h e n b e u n d e r s t o o d t o address t h e order of e x p l a n a t i o n — o n e
cannot
understand
Vorhandensein
unless o n e first u n d e r s t a n d s Zuharidensein. T h e reason for t h i s e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y i s t h a t i n d i c a t e d a b o v e : t o t r e a t somet h i n g as merely o c c u r r e n t is to treat it as o n l y appropriately r e s p o n d e d t o b y m a k i n g t h e sort o f j u d g m e n t s a b o u t i t t h a t are expressed b y assertions ( i n c l u d i n g t h e j u d g m e n t s t h a t are t h e output of perception).
2 6
B u t s u c h assertions are a k i n d o f e q u i p -
m e n t , s o m e t h i n g a v a i l a b l e , w h o s e use m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d as governed by proprieties i m p l i c i t in practice—paradigmatically intrapersonal inference and interpersonal c o m m u n i c a t i o n . By contrast, the proprieties of practice that institute prelinguistic equipment can be understood in advance of any understanding of specifically linguistic e q u i p m e n t . T h i s c a n be true even t h o u g h , as w i l l be argued, unless s u c h p r e l i n g u i s t i c p r o p r i e t i e s o f p r a c t i c e are a c c o m p a n i e d by l i n g u i s t i c ones, t h e y w i l l n o t count as instituting a world, and the i n s t i t u t i n g entities w i l l n o t c o u n t a s h a v i n g t h e sort o f b e i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f D a s e i n .
26
" ! n this kind of 'dwelling' as holding-oneself-back from any manip-
ulation or utilisation, the perception of the occurrent is consummated. Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something as something and discusses it as such. W h a t is thus perceived and made determinate C2T\ he expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted" (62; English 89, translation revised).
49
P*ücin.
β^αι^- dial ι hcmatizcs
I I I . N o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Rede
D a s e i n , w e are t o l d , i s its disclosedness ( 1 3 3 ; E n g l i s h 171 ) . "Disclosedness"
is
Heidegger's
t e r m for,
roughly,
: 7
Dasein's
o n t o l o g i c a l access t o a n y e n t i t y ' s sort o f b e i n g . ( H i s t e r m f o r m e r e l y o n t i c access t o e n t i t i e s , a s o p p o s e d t o t h e i r b e i n g , i s " d i s c o v e r y . " ) T h e first t h i n g w e are t o l d a b o u t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f disclosedness i s t h a t " t h e f u n d a m e n t a l existentialia w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e b e i n g o f t h e ' t h e r e ' [ D a s e i n ] , t h e disclosedness of
being-in-the-world,
understanding
are
[Verstehen]"
situatedness
(160;
English
[Befindlichkeit] 203).
and
"Existenaale"
i s a t e r m H e i d e g g e r uses f o r s t r u c t u r e s o f D a s e i n ' s b e i n g w i t h o u t w h i c h i t w o u l d n o t q u a l i f y a s D a s e i n . T h e l i s t o f existentialia a s s o c i a t e d w i t h D a s e i n ' s d i s c l o s e d n e s s is g i v e n i n d i f f e r e n t f o r m s i n d i f f e r e n t places ( m o r e w i l l b e said a b o u t t h e o t h e r f o r m s l a t e r ) . A l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y , t h o u g h , w e are t o l d , w i t h e m p h a s i s , t h a t " D i s c o u r s e [Rede] i s e q u i p r i m o r d i a l [existenzial gieich-ursprüngüch]
w i t h situatedness and
under-
s t a n d i n g " ( 1 6 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 3 ) . T o say t h i s i s t o say t h a t o n e c a n n o t h a v e Befindlichkeit o r Verstehen w i t h o u t Rede. S i n c e t h e f o r m e r are enstentialia, so is t h e l a t t e r .
28
T h u s t h e r e is no
D a s e i n w i t h o u t Rede. T h i s m u c h is n o t in any way a controversial c l a i m . But if i t i s n o t c o n t r o v e r s i a l t h a t Rede i s p a r t o f t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n of Dasein, t h e n can it n o t immediately be concluded that language
is? A f t e r a l l , Rede i s t h e o r d i n a r y G e r m a n
w o r d for discourse, for t e l l i n g , for a r t i c u l a t i n g i n language. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is n o t i m m e d i a t e , h o w e v e r , for Heidegger uses Rede as a t e c h n i c a l t e r m , w h i c h at least i n c l u d e s , a n d is
27
The best discussion of this docttine
is Haugeland's "Dasein'';
Disclosedness." 2 8
A t (165; English 209) we hear about "the basic α prion structure of
discourse as an existenuale."
50
ο ρ ο t. r i
often taken ro be l i m i t e d to, various kinds of prelinguistic a r t i c u l a t i o n . T h u s H a u g e l a n d offers t h e f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n :
Telling ( R e d e ) is the articulation of significance or intelligibility, both in the sense of separating or c a r v i n g u p , a n d in the sense of
expressing in words. T h e carving up is .. an essentially public or shared way of distinguishing determinate entities in determinate regards. ( " D a s e i n ' s D i s c l o s e d n e s s " 6 4 )
T h u s Rede i s t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n b y w h i c h a shared w o r l d o f e q u i p m e n t i s i n s t i t u t e d b y s o c i a l p r a c t i c e . T h e gloss, H a u g e l a n d suggests, o n t h i s i s t h a t t h e basic n o t i o n i s t h a t o f t e l l i n g , i n t h e sense o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g i n p r a c t i c e those p e r f o r m a n c e s t h a t are appropriate o r i n accord w i t h i m p l i c i t n o r m s f r o m those t h a t are n o t : " T h e u r - p h e n o m e n o n o f t e l l i n g i s t e l l i n g w h e t h e r b e h a v i o r does o r does n o t a c c o r d w i t h t h e c o m m o n n o r m s — i n effect t e l l i n g r i g h t f r o m w r o n g " ("Dasein's D i s c l o s e d n e s s " 6 5 ) . O n e i m p o r t a n t c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h i s p r a g m a t i c r e a d i n g o f Rede, a s h e goes o n t o p o i n t o u t , i s t h a t " s u c h t e l l i n g w o u l d i n d e e d be the originary a r t i c u l a t i o n of significance, and w o u l d , at the same t i m e , b e f u n d a m e n t a l t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o r r e c t n e s s — f o r e x a m p l e o f assertions." T h i s i s a n i m p o r t a n t b e n e f i t o f t h e pragmatic
interpretation,
because
Heidegger
emphasizes
( i n v o k i n g h i s sense o f " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " a s " c i r c u m s p e c t i v e " practical, prelinguistic k n o w - h o w ) , "Discourse is t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies b o t h interpretation and a s s e r t i o n " ( 1 6 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 4 ) , a n d " w e h a v e seen t h a t assertion is d e r i v e d f r o m i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d is a n e x t r e m e case o f i t . . . .
T h e existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse or talk iRede] 1 ' ( ί ό ΰ - ό ί ; E n g l i s h 2 0 3 ) . H e r e a g a i n , t h e n , w e see expressions o f t h e p r i o r i t y thesis c o n c e r n i n g t h e g r o u n d i n g o f linguistic practice
in prelinguistic know-how,
which
it
is
t e m p t i n g to interpret as c o m m i t m e n t s to the possibility of an autonomous level of practical circumspective interpretation by Dasein of e q u i p m e n t m a k i n g up
a w o r l d o f Zuhandensein.
51
A g a i n , the c l a i m to be defended here by contrast is t h a t a l t h o u g h such a n a u t o n o m o u s l e v e l o f p r a c t i c e i s n o d o u b t p o s s i b l e — t a l k i n g does n o t d e v e l o p ex nihilo—it w o u l d n o t be p r o p e r to describe it in Heidegger's t e r m i n o l o g y as c h a r a c t e r i z e d by Dasein,
being-in-the-world,
Zuficmdensem,
or,
the
presently
r e l e v a n t p o i n t , as a r t i c u l a t e d by Rede. H e i d e g g e r says t h a t " T h e w a y i n w h i c h discourse \Rede] gets expressed is l a n g u a g e [Sprache]" ( 1 6 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 4 ) . T h i s i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e v i e w t h a t Rede c o m e s i n t w o f o r m s , a n i m p l i c i t f o r m i n w h i c h i t consists i n p r a c t i c a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t i n g the proprieties that institute a w o r l d and an optional, derivative
form
in
which
those
proprieties
can
be
explicitly
expressed a n d discussed. T h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r i t i s o p t i o n a l t h a t t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n t h a t i s Rede b e expressed. T h e c l a i m t h a t i t must be e x p l i c i t l y expressed c a n be u n d e r s t o o d i n e i t h e r a l o c a l o r a g l o b a l sense. I n t h e l o c a l sense, t h e c l a i m w o u l d b e that no particular practical articulation or discrimination of p r o p r i e t i e s c o u l d c o u n t as d i s c u r s i v e
(redend)
unless it was
expressed e x p l i c i t l y , t h a t is, i n language, i n t h e g l o b a l sense, the claim w o u l d be that no practical articulation or discrimin a t i o n o f p r o p r i e t i e s c o u l d c o u n t a s d i s c u r s i v e unless some s u c h a r t i c u l a t i o n s o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s are expressed e x p l i c i t l y in
language.
T h e stronger
local
claim would
seem
to be
i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a n y v e r s i o n o f t h e p r i o r i t y thesis. I t i s clear that not all "articulation of intelligibility according to signif i c a t i o n s " ( t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f Rede) takes t h e f o r m o f e x p l i c i t assertions.
2
29
I n a n y case, i t i s t h e w e a k e r , g l o b a l c l a i m t h a t i s
' " l n discourse the intelligibility of being-in-the-world . . . is articula-
ted according to significations" (162; English 205). It is tempting to identify "significations" with signs and to take this as an endorsement of the exclusively explicit nature of Rede. But this would be incorrect. "Significations" is ''Bedeutungen,'' which is used to refer to the purely practical references and assignments that articulate the world of equipment. W h e n he talks
52
to be d e f e n d e d h e r e . H e i d e g g e r does seem to say t h a t it is n o t o p t i o n a l t h a t Rede b e expressed i n t h i s g l o b a l sense:
Because discourse [ R e d e j is constitutive for the being of the there (that means
is,
for
situatedness and understanding),
ßemg-m-the-u>or!d,
Dasein
as
discursive
while
"Dasein"
Being-in
has
already expressed itself. Dasein has language. M a n shows himself as the entity which talks. This does not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to h i m , hut that he is the entity which is such as
to discover the world and Dasein itself. ( 1 6 5 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 8 ) R e c a l l t h e p r e v i o u s a r g u m e n t t o t h e effect t h a t H e i d e g g e r s h o u l d n o t b e t e l l i n g u s a b o u t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t D a s e i n just h a p p e n s t o h a v e , o n t i c features o f s o m e i n t e r e s t i n g e n t i t i e s , but o n l y about d e f i n i t i v e , i n t e r n a l l y related o n t o l o g i c a l characteristics. S i n c e i t i s n o t o p t i o n a l t h a t D a s e i n b e d i s c u r s i v e b e i n g - i n , i t i s n o t o p t i o n a l t h a t i t express itself, a n d s o i t i s n o t o p t i o n a l t h a t i t h a v e language. A n o t h e r d i r e c t a r g u m e n t i s available for t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e i s n o Rede w i t h o u t Sprache. T h i s has t o d o w i t h t h e r o l e
about the special sort of equipment that consists of actual signs, Heidegger uses "Zeichen." We are told explicitly that not all Rede has propositional form: "we must inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything understandable, and to do so in accordance w i t h significations: and this articulation must not be confined to entities within-the-world which we cognize by considering rhem theoretically and which we express in sentences" (165; English 209). This specific wording of the definition of Rede cited above is significant, however. "According to significations" is "bedeutungsmassige'' and the word that Kant uses to talk about norms explicit in the form of rules is "regelmässige." Heidegger may be picking up on this usage and therebv emphasizing the second thesis of his normative pragmatism, that norms i m p i i c i i in prac tice must be presupposed in explaining those explicit in rules.
53
ι-Λΐΐιΐπ. rnt? Seine tnat Themauzc
o f e x p l i c i t expressions o f t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n s c o m p r i s i n g Rede i n 5
communication, - t h e r o l e o f s u c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n b e i n g - w i t h , and t h e r o l e o f b e i n g - w i t h i n b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d . T h e c l a i m i s t h a t a l l o f these are necessary features o f D a s e i n . H e r e i s t h e c e n t r a l passage:
Discoursing or t a l k i n g is the way in which we articulate "signifi c a n t l y the intelligibility of Being-in-the-ii'orid. Being-with belongs to B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , which in every case maintains itself in some
definite
way
of concemful
Being-with-one-another.
is
[redend]
Being'With'one'another
discursive
as
Such
assenting
or
re/using [ z u - u n d a b s a g e n ] , as demanding, or warning, as pro nouncing lAussprache./,
consulting/Rücksprache],
or
interceding
[Fürsprache], as "making assertions," a n d as talking in the way of "giving a talk" [ R e d e n h a l t e n ] . ( 1 6 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 4 )
Every m e m b e r o f t h i s l i s t o f p a r a d i g m a t i c ways i n w h i c h b e i n g w i t h is articulated discursively is e x p l i c i t l y and essentially
J0
"Discourse w h i c h expresses itself is communication [Mitteilung!"
(168; English 211). We see again that it is n o t optional that Rede be expressed ( i n the global, not the local sense), for communication is n o t an optional structure of Dasein. Thus: "For rhe most part (zumeist), discourse [Rede] is expressed by being spoken out, and has always been so expressed; it is language [Sprache]" (167; English 211). These passages cannot yet be taken to be decisive, however, because they are balanced by others such as: " ' C o m m u n i c a t i o n ' in w h i c h one makes assertions— giving information, for instance —is a special case of that communication which is grasped in principle existentially" (162; English 205). Heidegger is not contradicting himself here, because there is more to language than assertion—not a l l Sprache is Aussage. I t w i l l be argued below, however, that there is no iprache without Aussage ( i n the global sense that the capacity to talk at all requires the capacity to make assertions).
54
«
p u t
Μ «*'
D o s e m , uui Being [na: T n e m a l l r e s
l i n g u i s t i c . S i n c e b e i n g - w i t h i s n o t a n o p t i o n a l feature o f D a s e i n , b u t r a t h e r a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f its Grundverfassung, a n d since Rede l i k e w i s e has t h i s status, t h e e x c l u s i v e l y l i n g u i s t i c character o f this b o t a n i z a t i o n o f modes o f discursive beingw i t h c e r t a i n l y suggests, t h o u g h i t falls s h o r t o f d e m o n s t r a t i n g , t h a t t h e r e c a n b e n o Rede, a n d t h e r e f o r e n o D a s e i n , w i t h o u t SpToche.
IV.
Rede a n d Gerede
H o w e v e r , t h e strongest a r g u m e n t for t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e i s n o Rede ( a n d t h e r e f o r e n o D a s e i n ) w i t h o u t Sprache i s n o t a d i r e c t a r g u m e n t r e l y i n g o n passages s u c h a s t h e s e , b u t a n i n d i r e c t o n e . T h i s proceeds i n t w o steps: T h e r e i s n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede ( i d l e t a l k ) ,
a n d n o Gerede w i t h o u t
Sprache. T h e s e p o i n t s w i l l be addressed s e q u e n t i a l l y . Gerede i s a s p e c i a l f o r m o f Rede: " D i s c o u r s e , w h i c h b e l o n g s t o t h e e s s e n t i a l s t a t e o f D a s e i n ' s B e i n g a n d has a share i n c o n s t i t u t ing
D a s e i n ' s disclosedness, has t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e c o m i n g
idle t a l k " (169; E n g l i s h 213). T h e first question is w h e t h e r it is o p t i o n a l t h a t this possibility be realized. C o u l d entities qualify as a r t i c u l a t i n g practical significances in t h e f o r m of Rede i f t h e y n e v e r a r t i c u l a t e t h e m i n t h e f o r m o f Gerede? A g a i n i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t w o ways i n w h i c h t h i s question c a n be understood. It is clear t h a t n o t every articu l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o s i g n i f i c a t i o n s takes t h e f o r m o f Gerede. T h u s t h e stronger, l o c a l f o r m o f t h e c l a i m t h a t there i s n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede does n o t h o l d — n o t e v e r y b i t o f Rede is a b i t o f Gerede N o n e t h e l e s s i t w i l l h e c l a i m e d t h a t t h e weaker, g l o b a l f o r m o f t h e d e p e n d e n c e c l a i m does h o l d — u n l e s s s o m e a r t i c u l a t i o n s t a k e t h e f o r m o f Gerede, n o n e c o u n t a s R e d e — a n d so the creatures in question, a l t h o u g h t h e y m i g h t by t h e i r social practices i n s t i t u t e n o r m s t h a t t h e y i m p l i c i t l y acknowledge
as governing
their performances,
c o u n t as Dasein.
55
would
not
.9α.ίάί.7:.
the
ΰέ:ης
inj:
e ρ ο c Ii
Thematik*
e
W h a t sort of m o d i f i c a t i o n of Rede is Gerede? T h e first p o i n t is t h a t Gerede is j u s t t h e everyday (alltäglich) f o r m o f Rede. " T h e e x p r e s s i o n ' i d l e t a l k ' [Gerede] i s n o t t o b e used h e r e i n a ' d i s p a r a g i n g ' s i g n i f i c a t i o n . . . i t signifies a p o s i t i v e p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e k i n d o f B e i n g o f e v e r y d a y Dasein's u n d e r 3
standing and interpreting" (167; English 211). ' T h e i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n thus becomes w h e t h e r it is o p t i o n a l t h a t Rede sometimes appear i n its e v e r y d a y f o r m . H e i d e g g e r says o f Gerede:
This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In i t , o u t of it, and against i t , all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all rediscovering and appropriating anew, are performed. ( 1 6 9 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 3 ) T h u s Gerede,
t h e e v e r y d a y f o r m o f Rede, f o r m s t h e b a c k -
g r o u n d f o r t h e o t h e r f o r m s . I t i s n o t a n o p t i o n a l species, b u r a f u n d a m e n t a l o n e . T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s p r i v i l e g e d status i s t h a t "idle talk i s the k i n d o f B e i n g t h a t belongs t o B e i n g - w i t h - o n e a n o t h e r i t s e l f " ( 1 7 7 ; E n g l i s h 2 2 1 ) . B e i n g - w i t h , o f course, i s itself n o t o p t i o n a l .
It is a
fundamental
characteristic
of
Dasein's GTundver/assung. T h e s e passages m a k e i t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e i s n o Rede ( a n d therefore
no
Dasein)
without
its
everyday
form,
Gerede.
H o w e v e r , i n o r d e r t o see t h a t Gerede i s a n e s s e n t i a l l y linguistic p h e n o m e n o n , i t i s necessary t o l o o k m o r e c l o s e l y a t w h a t i d l e t a l k is, a s t h e e v e r y d a y f o r m i n w h i c h s i g n i f i c a n c e s are a r t i c u l a t e d - Its essence is, as t h e w o r d suggesrs, gossip. H e r e is t h e c e n t r a l passage t o b e u n p a c k e d :
'Talk
r ,
f interpreting (a form of understanding) w- talk of Rede, for
Reap underlies all these forms of intelligibility: "Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies borh interpretation and assertion" (161; English 203-04).
56
ο
fi
ο «
Ii.
tt/hai is said-m-the-iaili /das G e r e d e t e ] as such, spreads i n w i d e r circles a n d takes on an authoritative character.
Things are so
because one says so. Idle talk is c o n s t i t u t e d by just such gossiping and passing the w o r d a l o n g — a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on f B o d e n s t ä n d i g k e i t ] becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness / B o d e n l o s i g k e i t J . ( 1 6 8 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 2 )
Gerede
is f u n d a m e n t a l l y a s t r u c t u r e of a u t h o r i t y , a w a y in
w h i c h justificatory grounds can be treated in practice. ( T h i s is o n e o f m a n y places w h e r e i t c a n seem t h a t H e i d e g g e r i s s i n n i n g against h i s o w n p r e c e p t t h a t Gerede i s n o t t o b e t a k e n i n a d i s p a r a g i n g sense. T h i s i m p r e s s i o n o u g h t t o b e a l l e v i a t e d b y t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t , a l t h o u g h H e i d e g g e r i s far f r o m r e c o m m e n d i n g this structure of authority, he t h i n k s t h a t it provides t h e p e r v a s i v e b a c k g r o u n d against w h i c h a l o n e i t i s possible t o understand
the
possibility
of more
authentic
justificatory
s t n i c t u r c s . ) Gerede consists i n t h e t h o u g h t l e s s passing o n o f what
is s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k , das
Geredete.
Understanding
what
this means requires r e v e r t i n g to the f u n d a m e n t a l structure o f Rede:
T h e items constitutive for discourse are: what the discourse is about (what is talked about) fdas Worüber d e r R e d e (das B e r e d e t e ) J ; w h a t is said'in'the'talk, as such [das G e r e d e t e als s o l c h e s ] ; the communication [die
Mitteilung];
and
the m a k i n g - k n o w n
/die
Bekundung], (162; English 206)
O n l y t h e f i r s t t w o o f these, w h a t i s t a l k e d a b o u t a n d w h a t i s s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k . das Beredete a n d das Geredete, m a t t e r h e r e . T h e other t w o can b e understood i n terms o f t h e m , since c o m munication
is
making-known
the is
p a s s i n g a l o n g o f das Geredete, the
establishment
of a
and
relation
to
the das
Beredete b y such passing a l o n g . W h a t i s s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k a n d w h a t i s t a l k e d a b o u t are t h e t w o e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s i n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s p e c i f i c a l l y linguistic c o n t e n t s , t w o aspects o f a
57
Doic'ir,
rhc Hang; ihat ι aeTruiciit-
distinctive k i n d of equipment, equipment employed in order to communicate and make-known. T h u s these e l e m e n t s h a v e a l l b e e n i n t r o d u c e d before w e ever h e a r a b o u t i d l e t a l k . W h a t - i s - s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k i s i n t r o d u c e d , w i t h o u t u s i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t e r m , w h e n w e first h e a r a b o u t assertion, a s t h e essence o f t h e r o l e assertion plays i n communication:
As something communicated, that which has been put forward in the assertion is something that Others can "share" with the per son making the assertion, even though the entit-y which he has pointed o u t a n d to which he has given a definite character is n o t close enough for them to grasp and see i t . That which is put forward in the assertion is something which can be passed along in "further reteUing." There is a widening of the range of that mutual shanng which sees.12 ( 1 5 5 ; E n g l i s h 1 9 7 )
A g a i n before w e are i n t r o d u c e d t o Gerede, w e hear a b o u t t h e o t h e r s t r u c t u r a l e l e m e n t a n d its r e l a t i o n t o t h e first:
Talking is talk about something [ R e d e n ist R e d e überj. What the discourse is about is a s t r u c t u r a l i t e m that it necessarily possesses; for discourse helps to constitute the disclosedness of Being-m-theu w l d , a n d in its own structure it is modeled upon this basic state of Dasein. Inany talk or discourse, there is s o m e t h i n g s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k as such f e i n G e r e d e t e s als solches/ whenever one wishes, asks, or expresses oneself about something. In this "something said," discourse communicates. ( 1 6 2 ; E n g l i s h 2 0 5 )
I t i s p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d Gerede i n t e r m s o f these t w o struct u r a l e l e m e n t s , das Geredete a n d das Beredete. Gerede is discourse
ii
Notice thar communicating by asserting is the sharing of seeing,
that is, of treating things as occurrent.
58
('(><><
h >•
ΐλι<πη
the Bein£ that i kcrntia-.
t h a t pays a t t e n t i o n o n l y t o das Geredete, t o w h a t is s a i d - i n - t h e talk, but n o t to w h a t the talk is about:
W h a t is said-m-tfie-taik f G e r e d e t e n J gets understood; but what the
talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially. We have t h e same t h i n g in view, because it is in t h e same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said. ( 1 6 8 ; English 212)
I t w i l l emetge t h a t for l i n g u i s t i c e q u i p m e n t g e n u i n e l y t o b e i n play, b o t h s t r u c t u r a l e l e m e n t s o f saying m u s t i n fact b e p t e s e n t — w i t h o u t t h e m n o g e n u i n e c o n t e n t s are i n s t i t u t e d b y t h e practice of using t h e m to communicate, and so no knowledge o r i n f o r m a t i o n i s a c t u a l l y shared b y passing t h e m a r o u n d . W h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e of Gerede is n o t t h a t das Beredete, w h a t is t a l k e d a b o u t , i s absent, b u t r a t h e r t h a t i t s c r u c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to
the
authority
acknowledged
by
structure
distinctive
of talking
t h o s e w h o are n o n e t h e l e s s
is
not
dependent on
that structure. T o understand exactly w h a t i m p l i c i t presuppositions o f l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e Gerede fails t o a c k n o w l e d g e , i t is h e l p f u l t o apply a m o d e l of the structure of a u t h o r i t y t h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e of specifically
linguistic equipment.33
D e c l a r a t i v e sentences,
w h i c h are e q u i p m e n t for asserting, are g o v e r n e d b y t w o d i f f e r e n t d i m e n s i o n s o f a u t h o r i t y , o n e c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e i r use i n communication, t h e o t h e r t o t h e i r use i n inference. T h e s e c o r respond
t o t w o d i f f e r e n t ways i n w h i c h o n e c a n
become
e n t i t l e d t o t h e sort o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d c o m m i t m e n t
3,
T h e case that this general model is found in Being and Time is
argued in detail in H C B T . Only the barest sketch of this argument can be presented here. 1 undertake, rather than attribute to Heidegger, com mitment to a recognizable, similar model in the first tour chapters ot Making h Explicit.
59
e ρ υ c h e
t h a t i s expressed b y a n assertion. B y t h e first m e c h a n i s m , c o m m i t m e n t s c a n become shared, spreading f r o m one i n d i v i d u a l to
another,
as
the
communicates to and
speaker
w h o expresses
possibly
infects a n
an
assertion
audience.
In
this
way, e n t i t l e m e n t t o m a k e a c l a i m c a n b e i n h e r i t e d b y t h e c o n s u m e r o f a n a s s e r t i o n f r o m its p r o d u c e r . I n s u c h i n h e r i tance of e n t i t l e m e n t by c o m m u n i c a t i o n , the c o n t e n t of the commitment
is
preserved
intact
and
merely
transferred.
H o w e v e r , this i s n o t t h e o n l y way i n w h i c h a n i n d i v i d u a l c a n b e c o m e e n t i t l e d t o a c l a i m . I t i s also possible t o j u s t i f y a c o m m i t m e n t inferentially by e x h i b i t i n g it as a consequence of f u r t h e r premises t o w h i c h o n e i s c o m m i t t e d a n d e n t i t l e d . T h e particular c o n t e n t determines what follows f r o m c o m m i t m e n t to that content, and w h a t that content follows from, w h a t it justifies a n d w h a t j u s t i f i e s i t . T h a t i t i s c a u g h t u p i n s u c h i n ferences b o t h as p r e m i s e a n d as c o n c l u s i o n is w h a t m a k e s it a s p e c i f i c a l l y propositional ( o r assertible) c o n t e n t a t a l l . T h a t i t e x h i b i t s t h e particular i n f e r e n t i a l grounds a n d consequences t h a t i t does makes i t t h e p a r t i c u l a r d e t e r m i n a t e c o n t e n t t h a t it
i s — s e t t l i n g , for instance, w h a t i n f o r m a t i o n
it conveys,
the significance that undertaking a c o m m i t m e n t w i t h that c o n t e n t w o u l d h a v e for w h a t else o n e i s c o m m i t t e d a n d e n t i t l e d t o . T h e first, or c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l , m e c h a n i s m is interpersonal, intracontent commitment.
inheritance The
of entitlement
second,
intrapersonal, intercontent propositional
commitment
or
to
inferential,
a
propositional mechanism
inheritance of e n t i t l e m e n t (since
the
to
is a
c o n t e n t s o f premises
a n d conclusions w i l l differ in any inference that is n o n t r i v i a l i n t h e sense o f b e i n g a v a i l a b l e t o d o j u s t i f i c a t o r y w o r k ) . T h e f u n c t i o n s p e r f o r m e d b y b o t h m e c h a n i s m s are essential t o t h e use o f sentences a s e q u i p m e n t for expressing p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t s i n t h e f o r m o f assertions. W i t h o u t t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n provided by proprieties governing the practice of interring, i n c l u d i n g inferences f r o m t h e c o m m i t m e n t s t h a t agents f i n d themselves
with
perceptually,
60
sentences
would
not
express
CWm.
the
Beine
determinate proposirional contents at all. W i t h o u t acknowledgment in practice ot the propriety ot i n h e r i t i n g e n t i t l e m e n t t o c l a i m s f r o m t h e assertions o f o t h e r s , t h e r e w o u l d b e n o c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d assertion w o u l d b e socially i d l e , i n s t i t u t i n g n o sort o f e q u i p m e n t a t a l l . W i t h t h i s c o n c e p t u a l apparatus, i t i s possible t o characterize straightforwardly
the
practical
attitude
Heidegger
calls
Gerede. Gerede consists i n a c k n o w l e d g i n g o n l y t h e c o m m u nicative
structure
of authority
and
not
the
inferential.
" W h a t - i s - s a i d - i n - t h e - t a l k " is passed a l o n g , b u t n e v e r g r o u n d e d i n " w h a r - i s - t a l k e d - a b o u t " — i t does n o t h a v e t o answer t o a n y justificatory
demands
beyond
a
communicational
prove-
nance. T h o s e repeating a c l a i m they overhear do n o t take p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t , m e r e l y d e f e r r i n g t o w h a t " t h e y " (das
Man)
say:
T h e fact that something has been said groundlessly, a n d then gets passed along in further retelling, a m o u n t s to p e r v e r t i n g the act o] disclosing [ErschliessenJ into an act of closing o / / [ V e r s c h l i e s s e n J . F o r uihat is said is always understood proximail-y as "saying" something—that is, an uncovering something. Thus, try its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off, since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something w h i c h it leaves u n d o n e . ( 1 6 9 ; English 213)
T h u s t h e f u n c t i o n of w h a t is t a l k e d a b o u t , das Beredete, is to ground t h e authority o f t h e c o n t e n t s t h a t are c o m m u n i c a t e d . T a k i n g a c l a i m b a c k t o its g r o u n d i s j u s t i f y i n g i t i n s o m e w a y other t h a n b y a p p e a l t o w h a t o t h e r s say. I t i s t a k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for i t oneself, j u s t i f y i n g i t b y appeal t o o t h e r c l a i m s , i n c l u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t e d t o p e r c e p t u a l l y a c q u i r e d ones, t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l also takes r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for. Gerede is a p r a c t i c a l stance t h a t ignores s u c h g r o u n d i n g i n das Beredete, a n d cieaves o n l y t o das Geredete, i g n o r i n g g r o u n d i n g i n f a v o r o f j u s t passing t h i n g s a l o n g . T h e t r o u b l e i s t h a t e n t i t l e m e n t c a n
61
ch^iTficin^iiiZ'is
Dasein. tAe Being thxxt T h e m a t i k
f ρ ο c Ιί
b e i n h e r i t e d f r o m , a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y deferred t o , a n o t h e r o n l y if the other i n d i v i d u a l is e n t i t l e d or can fulfill the justificatory responsibility i m p l i c i t in m a k i n g a c l a i m . If everyone adopts the
attitude
o f Gerede,
and
defets
responsibility
without
a c c e p t i n g i t , t h e n a l l o f t h e t i t l e s supposedly passed a r o u n d b y c o m m u n i c a t i n g are d e f e c t i v e a n d e m p t y . T h a t is, i n t h e w o r d s quoted
above:
What is saidAn-the-talk [das G e r e d e t e ] as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so, idle talk is constituted by j u s t such gossiping and passing the word along—a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on [ B o d e n s t a n d i g k e i t J becomes aggravated to complete groundlessness [ B o d e n l o s i g k e i t j . ( 1 6 8 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 2 )
Gerede i s t h e e v e r y d a y , i n a u t h e n t i c v e r s i o n o f Rede p r e cisely because o f t h e f a i l u r e t o t a k e p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t i s i t s essence. T o c o m e i n t o a n a u t h e n t i c p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n t o one's c o m m i t m e n t s i s t o t a k e o n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r justifying t h e m , rather t h a n deferring it or evading it by a p p e a l t o w h a t e v e r y o n e (das Man) says. O n e a l w a y s a l r e a d y f i n d s o n e s e l f " f a i l i n g , " t h a t is, e q u i p p e d w i t h a n d c o n s t i t u t e d b y a set o f c o m m i t m e n t s o n e j u s t f i n d s o n e s e l f w i t h , w i t h o u t i n general b e i n g able t o justify t h e m b y g r o u n d i n g t h e m i n w h a t t h e y arc a b o u t . T h i s i s w h y t h e p r a c t i c e o f Gerede i s t h e background out o f w h i c h every a u t h e n t i c c l a i m i n g and justi f y i n g m u s t arise a n d f r o m w h i c h i t m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h itself.'" To
undertake
practice
a
responsibility
basic
oneself is
ontological
featute
to of
1
acknowledge
in
Dasein—that
it
c o m e s i n w h a t H a u g e l a n d calls " u n i t s o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , " o r "primitive
l o c i o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y (je m e i n e s ) " : " H e i d e g g e r
places t h i s s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h h e calls ' i n - e a c h - c a s e - m i n e n e s 5 '
" A s i n che passage quoted above from (169; English 213).
62
ο ρ ο c h
D a s e i n , thi* i S c i n g ι λ α : J ,'ιίτπαιι^
(Jememigkeit), a m o n g Dasein's m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s tics
( H a u g e l a n d , " H e i d e g g e r " 2 1 , 2 4 ) . G e r e d e precisely refuses
t o assign a c c o u n t a b i l i t y for t h e p r o p r i e t y o f a c l a i m t o a n y par ticular i n d i v i d u a l , deferring demands for j u s t i f i c a t i o n instead t o t h e g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e , a p p e a l i n g t o " w h a t o n e says" o r " w h a t i s said." I n f a c t , h o w e v e r , t h e p u b l i c s o c i a l p r a c t i c e o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g and the undertaking of individual responsibility presuppose a n d c o m p l e m e n t o n e a n o t h e r . U n l e s s b o t h w e r e always a l r e a d y
i n play, n o g e n u i n e l y c o n t e n t f u l c l a i m s ( o r
e q u i p m e n t for asserting a n d i n f o r m i n g ) w o u l d b e i n s t i t u t e d a t a l l . Gerede e x c l u s i v e l y a c k n o w l e d g e s t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e public communicative dimension,
while
ignoring
that
of
Jemeinigfceit ( h e r e t h e i n d i v i d u a l u n d e r t a k i n g o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) . O n e t h i n g lost w h e n t h e d u a l s t r u c t u r e o f a u t h o r i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c l a i m i n g i s c o l l a p s e d b y Gerede i n t o a single d i m e n s i o n sense),
in
which
i s experience
claims
and
( i n something concepts
are
like
Hegel's
winnowed
and
groomed as the c o m m i t m e n t s one undertakes responsibility t o r oneself ( i n c l u d i n g those o n e finds oneself w i t h p e r c e p t u a l l y , a n d t h e i r i n f e r e n t i a l c o n s e q u e n c e s ) are c o n f r o n t e d b y those o n e w o u l d b e e n t i t l e d t o p i c k u p f r o m t h e assertions o f o t h e r s . I t i s t h e i n t e r p l a y o f these t w o d i m e n s i o n s o f a u t h o r i t y t h a t makes i t possible for w h a r i t i s c o r r e c t t o say t o e x h i b i t a k i n d of independence b o t h from what 1 happen to be c o m m i t t e d to a n d f r o m w h a t o t h e r s h a p p e n t o b e saying. T h i s i s a n s w e r i n g
" Heidegger introduces the idea in the first two sentences of the body of part I ot Being and Time. "We Are Ourselves the Entities to Be Analysed: The Being of anv such entity is in each case mine \je meines]" (42; English 67). He says just a bit further along: "Because Dasein has in each case mmeness [Jememigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: I am,' 'you are'" (42; English 68). ( I ' m not sure how well chemistry, Christmas, and philately score on this criterion for being cases of Dasein.)
63
t u t h e w a y t h e objects are, a n d , i n t h i s sense, b e i n g a b o u t objects.
This
objectivity
is
what
Heidegger
talks about
as
assertions r e p r e s e n t i n g t h i n g s as o c c u r r e n t , as f a c t u a l a n d c o n s t r a i n i n g in a different way f r o m the social proprieties of practice t h a t institute e q u i p m e n t , by settling a c o m m o n way i n w h i c h o n e uses ( t h a t is, o u g h t t o use) a h a m m e r .
3 6
It s h o u l d be clear at t h i s p o i n t t h a t Gerede is a t h o r o u g h l y linguistic
phenomenon,
indeed
a s p e c i f i c a l l y assertional o n e .
T h e c o n c e p t o f gossip c a n n o t b e made sense o f i n p r e l i n g u i s t i c terms. T h e d i s t i n c t i o n between c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d inference as t w o structures of a u t h o r i t y — p a s s i n g a l o n g w h a t is said-int h e - t a l k (das Geredete), a n d t a k i n g i n d i v i d u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for g r o u n d i n g w h a t i s said i n w h a t t h e t a l k i s a b o u t (das Beredete)—defines e q u i p m e n t for m a k i n g a n d
communicating
p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y c o n t e n t f u l claims. I n d e e d , t h e specific p r a c t i cal failure to c o m p r e h e n d this dual structure of a u t h o r i t y that H e i d e g g e r i d e n t i f i e s w i t h Gerede ( f o c u s i n g o n das Geredete t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f das Beredete) a m o u n t s t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d i s t i n c t l y linguistic assertional e q u i p m e n t employed i n expressing a n d c o m m u n i c a t i n g a d i s c u r s i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f i m p l i c i t significances b y a s s i m i l a t i n g i t t o o r d i n a r y e q u i p m e n t s u c h a s h a m m e r s . T h e p r o p r i e t i e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e l a t t e r are e x h a u s t e d by h o w o n e uses a h a m m e r — t h e r e is o n l y " w h a t o n e does w i t h h a m m e r s , " i n t h e sense o f h o w i t i s a p p r o p r i a t e for a n y o n e t o use a h a m m e r . T h e p u b l i c p r o p r i e t i e s o n e p i c k s u p f r o m o t h e r s are a l l t h e r e i s t o s u c h n o n l i n g u i s t i c e q u i p m e n t — i f o n e uses h a m m e r s a s o t h e r s d o , t h e n o n e uses t h e m c o r r e c t l y . Gerede fails t o a p p r e c i a t e h o w t h e d u a l s t r u c t u r e o f a u t h o r i t y g o v e r n i n g t h e use o f e q u i p m e n t for m a k i n g
36
These few remarks cannot pretend to be mote than an indication
of the region w i t h i n which we should look for an account of objectivity. 1 discuss the issue further in H C B T and in much greater detail in chapter 8 of Making it Explicit
64
t* ρ Ο Γ I i f
assertions differs f r o m t h e u n i d i m e n s i o n a l s t r u c t u r e g o v e r n i n g t h e use ot p r e l i n g u i s t i c e q u i p m e n t . 1 hus Gerede is a l i n g u i s t i c phenomenon
i n v o l v i n g t h e use o t assertions.
Since
i t has
already been a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e is n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede ( i n t h e g l o b a l , r a t h e r t h a n t h e l o c a l sense), a n d n o D a s e i n w i t h o u t Rede, i t t o l l o w s t h a t t o t a k e s o m e t h i n g a s e x h i b i t i n g t h e k i n d o f b e i n g H e i d e g g e r calls D a s e i n i s t o t a k e i t t o b e a l i n g u i s t i c e n t i t y , o n e t h a t c a n m a k e assertions, a n d s o o n e t h a t can treat t h i n g s as o c c u r r e n t .
V.
F a l l i n g : G e r e d e , Neugier, Zweideutigkeit T h i s a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e linguistic a n d assertional
n a t u r e o f Gerede, t h e m a t r i x o f e v e r y d a y n e s s o u t o f w h i c h t h e expression o f o t h e r forms o f t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y m u s t arise, c a n b e c o n f i r m e d a n d e x t e n d e d b y c o n s i d e r i n g i t i n t h e larger f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f Gerede o c c u r s . R e c o r d e d a t t h e close o f t h e s e c t i o n s o f d i v i s i o n 1 t h a t are b e i n g discussed. H e i d e g g e r offers t h e f o l l o w i n g s u m m a r y :
Our theme has been the ontological constitution of the dischsedness which essentially belongs to Dasein. The Being of that disclosedness is constituted
by
situatedness
[Befindlichkeit./,
understanding
/ V e r s t e h e n / , a n d discourse / R e d e / . Its everyday kind of being is characterized by idle talk / G e r e d e J , curiosity / N e u g i e r / , a n d ambiguity / Z w e i d e u t i g k e i t / . These show us the m o v e m e n t of falling/Verfallen/.37
(180;
English
224,
translation
revised)
''Also, "Idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity chatacterize the way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its 'there'—the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. In these, and in the way they ate intetconnected in their being, thete is revealed a basic k i n d of Being w h i c h belongs to everydayness [AütäglichkeU]; we call this the '/ailing' [V'erfaiienl of Dasein. This term does nor express any negative evaluation" (175; English 219-20).
65
ο ρ ο c
Ii
e
F a l l i n g i s r h e e v e r y d a y f o r m o f disclosedness, a n d t h e r e l a r i o n b e t w e e n Gerede a n d Rede is s i m p l y a special case of t h e rela t i o n b e t w e e n f a l l i n g a n d disclosedness. A s w e saw t h a t , i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r case, t h e r e i s n o Rede w i t h o u t Gerede ( i n t h e g l o b a l r a t h e r t h a n t h e l o c a l sense), so, i n t h e g e n e r a l case, t h e r e i s n o disclosedness w i t h o u t f a l l i n g . " B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d i s always f a l l e n " ( 1 8 1 ; E n g l i s h 2 2 5 ) . A s w e saw t h a t i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r case, Gerede is a t h o r o u g h l y l i n g u i s t i c p h e n o m e n o n — d e p e n d i n g o n t h e use o f sentences a s e q u i p m e n t for c o m m u n i c a t i o n b y a s s e r t i o n — s o i s i t i n t h e g e n e r a l case for t h e o t h e r forms o f e v e r y d a y disclosedness: c u r i o s i t y a n d a m b i g u i t y . C o n s i d e r f i r s t c u r i o s i t y , w h i c h t r a n s l a t e s Neugier, l i t e r a l l y "greed for w h a t is new." It is associated w i t h a " t e n d e n c y just to perceive" (172; English 216)
and is i n t r o d u c e d as the
e v e r y d a y f o r m ot u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( j u s t as Gerede is t h e everyday f o r m ot Rede):
In our analysis of understanding [ V e r s t e h e n ] a n d of the dis
closedness of the "there" in general, we have . . . designated the disclosedness of being-in as Dasein's clearing, in which it first
becomes possible to have something Uke sight. Our conception of "sight" has been gained by looking at the basic kind of disclosure which is characteristic of D a s e i n — n a m e l y , u n d e r s t a n d i n g . The
basic state of sight shows itself in a peculiar tendency-of'Being which belongs to everydayness—the tendency towards
"seeing."
We designate this tendency by the term "curiosity" [ N e u g i e r ] ,
which characteristically is not confined to seeing, but expresses the
tendency
towards a peculiar way of l e t t i n g the w o r l d be
encountered by us in perception. ( 1 7 0 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 4 )
T h r e e features o f p e r c e p t i o n are o f i n t e r e s t h e r e . First, m e r e l y p e r c e i v i n g i n v o l v e s b r a c k e t i n g one's p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s a n d concerns w i t h proprieties of action. Second, this bracketing is accomplished by making c l a i m s — t h e output of perception for
Heidegger is an
assertion.
66
As
has
been
pointed
out,
assertions are a v a i l a b l e as e q u i p m e n t f o r i n f e r e n c e , b o t h p r a c t i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l . T h a t is, one responds a p p r o p r i a t e l y to
assertions
as
such
by
drawing
conclusions from
them,
either using t h e m to justify n o n s e n t e n t i a l performances or f u r t h e r assertions. B u t t h e i r a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s a s responses t o an
observable
situation
are
not
hostage
to
any
particular
practical project. T h i r d , responding to things perceptually, by
making
noninferential
reports
(which
t h e n available for further inferences),
are
themselves
is t r e a t i n g t h e m as
occurrent. W e f i n d all three themes c o m b i n e d i n a n earlier passage d e a l i n g w i t h p e r c e p t i o n :
in
this k i n d of "dwelling" as a holding-oneself-back from any
m a n i p u l a t i o n or utilization, the p e r c e p t i o n of the occurrent is con summated. Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something αν something a n d discusses it as such. What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as w h a t has thus been asserted. (62: English 89)
A d o p t i n g the attitude of perceiving can be done authentically, w h e n the ultimate concern is w i t h understanding, or it can be i n a u t h e n t i c , a f o r m o f f a l l i n g , a s c u r i o s i t y , w h e n t h e assertions i t results i n are e m p l o y e d o n l y i n a k i n d o f i n f e r e n t i a l play. ( I n t h e discussion o f a m b i g u i t y below, t h i s s o r t o f i n f e r e n t i a l p l a y w i l l be called " s u r m i s i n g " [ahnen]).
When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, n o t in order to understand what is seen . . . but j u s t in order to see i t . i t seeks noi'eit-y only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty. It concerns itself with a kind of k n o w i n g , but just in order to have known. ( 1 7 2 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 6 - 1 7 )
I t s h o u l d h e clear t h a t c u r i o s i t y , n o less t h a n Gerede, is, for Heidegger, a p h e n o m e n o n t h a t presupposes language, specifically
67
Dasein,
Oit
Being inat
<- l_» <_» < 11 «-
Tnemaiizcn
assertional
language, a n d so t h e c a p a c i t y to t r e a t t h i n g s as
occurrent. As a form of falling, it amounts to an inauthentic w a y o f t r e a t i n g t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t . I t contrasts w i t h science, w h i c h is an a u t h e n t i c way of understanding things as merely 8
present.' E a c h o f these depends o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e s p o n d i n g to things by m a k i n g claims about t h e m . T h e t h i r d f o r m o f f a l l e n disclosedness, a m b i g u i t y , i s equally a l i n g u i s t i c affair. By t h i s t e r m Heidegger refers to a w a y of t a l k i n g a b o u t t h i n g s t h a t b o t h evades a n y g e n u i n e search for u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d separates i t s e l f i n p r i n c i p l e f r o m t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c t i o n . A m b i g u i t y i s a k i n d o f speaking, w h i c h substitutes for actual
understanding:
When, in our everyday being-with-one-another, we encounter the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not. This ambiguity f Z w e i d e u t i g k e i t ] extends not only to the world, but just as much to Being-with-one-another as such, and even to Dasein's Being towards itself. Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not. ( 1 7 3 ; E n g l i s h 2 1 7 ) F a l l i n g i n t o social practices e m b o d y i n g a m b i g u i t y i n v o l v e s h o l d i n g back f r o m a c t i o n i n a stronger sense t h a n m e r e l y m a k i n g
'-"The kind of discovering which belongs to the science in question awaits solely the discoveredness of the occurrent. This awaiting ot disroveredness has its existentiell basis in a resoluteness bv which Dasein projects itself towards its potentiality-for-Being in the ' t r u t h ' . Thi.i projection is possible because Being-in-the-truth makes up a definite way in which Dasein may exist. We shall not trace further how science has its source in authentic existence" (36S>; English 414, translation revised).
68
e ρ <->«. ii e
assertions does.
Dasein,
Indeed,
the practices
the Being that TKrmntirrs
instituting ambiguity
d e m a n d t h a t o n e refuse t o c o m m i t o n e s e l f t o assertions. For these c a n be used as premises for i n f e r e n c e s ,
i n c l u d i n g the
p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e s w h o s e c o n c l u s i o n s are a c t i o n s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s t o a c t . I n s t e a d , o n e m e r e l y entertains c l a i m c o n t e n t s , e m p l o y i n g t h e m o n l y i n surmises.
Even supposing that what "they" have surmised and scented out should someday be actually translated into deeds, ambiguity has already taken care that interest in w h a t has been realized will
p r o m p t l y die away. Indeed, this interest persists, in a kind of curiosity and idle talk, only so long as there is a possibility of a non-committal
just-surmising-with-someone-else.
When
con
fronted with the carrying-through of what "they" have surmised together, idle talk readily establishes that "they" "could have done that too." In the end, idle talk is even i n d i g n a n t that w h a t it has
surmised and constantly demanded now a c t u a l l y happens. In that case, indeed, the opportunity to keep on surmising has been snatched away.
In the ambiguity of the way things have been publicly
interpreted, talking about things ahead of the game and making surmises about them curiously, gets passed off as what is really
happening, while taking action and carrying something through get stamped as something merely subsequent and unimportant. ( 1 7 4 ; English 218)
T h e cash value o f t h i s i s t h a t t h e c l a i m c o n t e n t s are e m p l o y e d o n l y i n hypothetical reasoning, r e a s o n i n g o f t h e " w h a t i f " sort. F o r m a l l y t h i s means t h a t t h e y appear n o t a s p r o p o s i t i o n s w i t h a s s e r t i o n a l force, t o w h i c h t h e speaker i s u n d e r t a k i n g a c o m m i t m e n t , b u t o n l y as e m b e d d e d as t h e unasserted a n t e c e d e n t s o f asserted c o n d i t i o n a l s .
However, the c l a i m contents that
appear t h u s e m b e d d e d a c q u i r e t h e i r c o n t e n t s f r o m t h e i r asser t i o n a l use. I n p a r t i c u l a r , o n e m u s t b e able t o m a k e a c t u a l i n f e r e n c e s u s i n g an a s s e r t i o n as a p r e m i s e in o r d e r to be able t o use a c o n d i t i o n a l
i n w h i c h t h a t same c o n t e n t appears
69
unasserted. For t h e c o n d i t i o n a l m e r e l y makes e x p l i c i t , i n t h e form of a c l a i m , w h a t is i m p l i c i t in the actual performing ot an inference. T h e possibility of merely surmising is thus a sophisticated, l a t e c o m i n g possibility, one that is b u i l t on a n d depends o n t h e c a p a c i t y t o t a k e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for o r d i n a r y assertions, w h i c h are a v a i l a b l e , as mere surmises are n o t , for e m p l o y m e n t i n p r a c t i c a l inferences l e a d i n g t o a c t i o n . T h e p r a c t i c a l m i s t a k e u n d e r l y i n g f a l l i n g a s a m b i g u i t y consists i n t r e a t i n g t h i s parasitic f o r m o f discourse a s i f i t were a u t o n o m o u s , a game o n e c o u l d p l a y t h o u g h o n e p l a y e d n o other. Thus
all
Heidegger
o f GeTede,
essentially
Neugier,
linguistic
and
Zweideutigkeit
are
phenomena—further,
for ones
t h a t d e p e n d o n t h e c a p a c i t y t o m a k e assertions, a n d s o t o t r e a t t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t . T h e s e are t h e e s s e n t i a l substructures o f Verfallen, w h i c h i s a n existentielle o f D a s e i n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e y are t h e f a l l e n f o r m s o f Dasein's disclosedness, a n d D a s e i n i s its disclosedness. T h u s t h e r e is n o D a s e i n w h i c h does n o t f a l l i n t o these p r a c t i c e s , a n d h e n c e n o D a s e i n t h a t c a n n o t a n d does n o t m a k e assertions a n d t r e a t t h i n g s a s o c c u r r e n t . T h e widespread interpretive
impression to the contrary
a m o n g readers o f Being a n d T i m e i s t h e r e s u l t o f m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h r e e sorts o f passages. T h e first
sort asserts
the
o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y o f Zuhandensein o v e r Vorharidensein. T h e s e passages are t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f e x p l a n a t o r y p r i o r i t y — t h a t assertion is to be u n d e r s t o o d as a k i n d of e q u i p m e n t (assertions
are
something available"
[224;
English
267]),
w h i l e e q u i p m e n t is n o t to be understood in terms of matter-offactual presence plus s o m e t h i n g . T h i s does n o t e n t a i l t h a t i t i s c o h e r e n t t o describe a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h D a s e i n has t h e c a p a c i t y ro treat t h i n g s as zuhanden a n d n o t to t r e a t t h i n g s as vorhanden. T h e second sort o f passage insists t h a t t h e r e c a n b e
" T h i s view of Heidegger's treatmenr of assertion is not common currency. I argue for it in H C B T
70
e ρ ο c h «
Dzsein.
che
Being thai
cases o f c i r c u m s p e c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d e v e n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h i c h d o n o t take t h e f o r m o f assertion, o r i t makes t h e same sort o f c l a i m o f p r i o r i t y for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o v e r assertion. 4 0 H e r e i t i s necessary t o k e e p i n m i n d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n l o c a l i n d e p e n d e n c e — i t m u s t b e a d m i t t e d t h a t n o t a l l cases o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are cases o f a s s e r t i o n — a n d t h e g l o b a l c l a i m t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y t o i n t e r p r e t c o u l d exist w i t h o u t b e i n g a c c o m p a n i e d b y t h e c a p a c i t y t o assert. T h e s e passages d o n o t s u p p o r t t h e stronger, g l o b a l c l a i m , w h i c h i s t h e o n e b e i n g d e n i e d h e r e . A l s o , i t i s n o t d e n i e d t h a t creatures t h a t d o n o t q u a l i f y a s D a s e i n , because t h e y d o n o t h a v e Rede, Gerede, a n d s o o n , m i g h t nonetheless have practices t h a t i n s t i t u t e s o m e t h i n g a l o t like equipment and do something a lot like interpreting according to it.
I t i s c l a i m e d t h a t such creatures w o u l d n o t q u a l i f y a s
D a s e i n , a n d so, g i v e n t h e package-deal t h a t Heidegger's o n t o logical claims i n v o l v e , that w h a t they institute c a n n o t qualify a s Zunandensein, a n d w h a t t h e y are d o i n g i s n o t s t r i c t l y i n t e r p r e t i n g . F i n a l l y , t h e r e are passages t h a t p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e r e is m o r e t o t a l k i n g t h a n a s s e r t i n g — t h a t n o t a l l Sprache is Aussage, because t h e r e i s also w i s h i n g , c o m m a n d i n g , a n d s o o n . 4 1 A g a i n , h o w e v e r , these passages d o n o t speak against t h e g l o b a l c l a i m t h a t o n e c o u l d n o t h a v e t h e c a p a c i t y t o d o these t h i n g s unless o n e also h a d t h e c a p a c i t y t o assert, t h o u g h o f course n o t a l l instances o f e x e r c i s i n g t h e o n e c a p a c i t y are instances o f exer cising the other. T h e c o n c l u s i o n , t h e n , i s t h a t w h e n H e i d e g g e r talks a b o u t Dasein, he
i s t a l k i n g a b o u t a k i n d o f b e i n g t h a t essentially
i n v o l v e s t h e c a p a c i t y t o use language. M o r e p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t essen t i a l l y i n v o l v e s t h e c a p a c i t y t o use assertional language, t h a t is, t o m a k e c l a i m s w h o s e correctness a s c l a i m s does n o t d e p e n d
- E g . , 0 4 9 ; English 189-90), *. 154; English 195), (158; English 201), (160-61; English 203), and (223; English 266). 4l
E.g., (162; English 205), (161; English 204),and (165-66; English 209).
71
I'hemauze?
<· p <> C IΊ
o n t h e p a r t i c u l a r projects o f those w h o m a k e t h e m . T h u s i t essen tially
involves
the
capacity
to
treat
things
as
occurrent.
Heidegger is indeed a n o r m a t i v e pragmatist in t h e sense of t h e t w o theses stated a t t h e o p e n i n g o f t h i s essay. B u t t h e sort o f e n t i t y about w h i c h he is s u c h a p r a g m a t i s t is, as t h e passage q u o t e d in t h e t i t l e puts i t , ' D a s e i n , t h e b e i n g ( e n t i t y ) t h a t thematizes." 1 -
42
Special thanks are due to John Haugeland for many conversations
and much assistance with the topics discussed here, to Bill Blattner, to my fellow staff members, and to the participants at the N E H Summer Institute on Heidegger and Davidson during which the original version of this paper was written, and to the N E H for supporting that form of Dasein.
WORKS
CITED
Brandom, Robert. "Heidegger's Categories in Being and Time." Mcmw 66 (1983): 387-409. Rpr. in Heidegger: A Critical Reader. Ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison H a l l . Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 45-64. . Making It Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994. Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being in the World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time. Cambridge: M I T Press, 1991. Haugeland, John. "Dasein's Disclosedness." Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1989). ."Heidegger on Being a Person." Nous 16 (1982): 15-26. Rpt. in Heidegger: A Criacai Reader. Ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison H a l l . Oxford: Blackwell. 1992. Heidegger, M a r t i n . Being and Time. Trans. Macquarrie and Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. .. Sem und Zeit Ed. Friedrich W i l h e l m von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. Vol. 2 of Gesamtausgabe. 80 vols. 1976. Okrent, Mark. Heidegger's Pragmatism. Ithaca: Cornell, 1988. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Macmiilan, 1953.
72
Heidegger on Being a Person JOHN HAUGELAND UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
This
paper
presents
a
non-standard
t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Being and Time,
and
rather
free-wheeling
in-
w i t h e m p h a s i s on t h e first d i v i s i o n .
1
I
m a k e H e i d e g g e r o u t t o b e less l i k e H u s s e r l a n d / o r S a r t r e t h a n i s u s u a l , and more like
D e w e y a n d (to a lesser e x t e n t ) Sellars a n d t h e l a t e r
Wittgenstein. My central point will be Heidegger's radical divergence from
the
Cartesian-Kantian
tradition
regarding
the
fundamental
q u e s t i o n : W h a t is a p e r s o n ? A c c o r d i n g to Aristotle, m a n is a logical or " w o r d - u s i n g " a n i m a l , a political or " c o m m u n i t y - p a r t i c i p a t i n g " a n i m a l , a n d a featherless b i p e d . I n a sense e a s i e r t o a p p r e c i a t e t h a n t o e x p l a i n , t h e l a s t i s o n l y i n c i d e n t a l , while the first t w o are i m p o r t a n t ; b u t those t w o are not o u r o n l y i m p o r t a n t differentia. People (and probably o n l y people) m a k e a n d use
tools,
play
games, j u d g e
develop cultural traditions.
themselves
and
others critically,
and
I t m a y seem t h a t apes a n d social insects
share s o m e o f t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , a t least p r i m i t i v e l y ; yet p e o p l e a r e clearly q u i t e d i s t i n c t i v e . A satisfactory a c c o u n t of w h a t it is to be a person w o u l d expose the roots of this distinction, thereby s h o w i n g w h y certain differentia are i m p o r t a n t , a n d others only incidental. For
instance,
Christian
and
modern
philosophers
interpreted
Aristotle's "logical" as "rational," a n d proposed this rationality as o u r fundamental distinction.
Thus
Descartes h e l d
that
people can
talk
because t h e y c a n r a t i o c i n a t e ; a n d h e c o u l d w e l l h a v e s a i d t h e s a m e f o r m a k i n g a n d u s i n g tools. Similarly, H o b b e s t r i e d b o t h t o e x p l a i n a n d t o j u s t i f y o u r l i v i n g i n a c o m m o n w e a l t h b y s h o w i n g t h a t i t i s r a t i o n a l . I see Heidegger, on the other hand, as
starting f r o m
Aristotle's second
d e f i n i t i o n — t r y i n g , i n effect, t o g r o u n d all o t h e r i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n t i a o n o u r basic c o m m u n a l n a t u r e . B u t h o w can we conceive animals that are " p o l i t i c a l " in the relevant sense, w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e y a r e r a t i o n a l o r w o r d - u s i n g ? M y reconstruction of Heidegger's answer to this question is the f o u n d a t i o n of my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I m a g i n e a c o m m u n i t y of versatile a n d interactive creatures,
not
otherwise
specified
73
except
that
they
are
conformists.
NOUS
16
" C o n f o r m i s n i " h e r e m e a n s n o t j u s t i m i t a t i v e n e s s ( m o n k e y see, m o n k e y d o ) , h u t a l s o c e n s o r i o u s n e s s — t h a t is, a p o s i t i v e t e n d e n c y t o see t h a t one's n e i g h b o r s do likewise, a n d to suppress v a r i a t i o n . T h i s is to be t h o u g h t of as a c o m p l i c a t e d behavioral disposition, w h i c h the creatures have by n a t u r e ( " w i r e d i n " ) . Ii p r e s u p p o s e s in t h e m a capacity 10 react d i f f e r e n t i a l l y (e.g.,
perception), and
also s o m e
p o w e r to alter one
a n o t h e r ' s d i s p o s i t i o n s m o r e o r less p e r m a n e n t l y ( c o m p a r e r e i n f o r c e m e n t , p u n i s h m e n t , etc.). B u t i t does not p r e s u p p o s e t h o u g h t , reasoning, language, or any other "higher" faculty.
2
T h e net effect of this c o n f o r m i s n i is a systematic p e e r p r e s s u r e w i t h i n the c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h can be v i e w e d as a k i n d of m u t u a l attract i o n a m o n g t h e v a r i o u s m e m b e r s ' b e h a v i o r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s . U n d e r its i n f l u e n c e , these d i s p o s i t i o n s d r a w " c l o s e r " t o each o t h e r , i n t h e sence t h a t t h e y b e c o m e m o r e s i m i l a r ; t h a t is, t h e c o m m u n i t y m e m b e r s t e n d t o act a l i k e ( i n l i k e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) . T h e result i s a n a l o g o u s t o t h a t o f gregariousness a m o n g range animals:
given only their tendency
a g g r e g a t e , t h e y will t e n d also to f o r m a n d
to
maintain distinct herds.
O t h e r factors ( i n c l u d i n g chance) will d e t e r m i n e h o w m a n y herds f o r m , o f w h a t sizes, a n d w h e r e ;
gregariousness determines only that there
w i l l be h e r d s — d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , r e i d e n t i f i a b l e clusters o f a n i m a l s , separ a t e d b y c l e a r g a p s w h e r e t h e r e a r e n o a n i m a l s (save t h e o d d s t r a y ) . W h e n behavioral dispositions aggregate t i n d e r the force of"conf o r m i s m , i t i s n ' t h e r d s t h a t c o a l e s c e , b u t norms. O t h e r f a c t o r s ( i n c l u d i n g chance) will d e t e r m i n e the n u m b e r o f n o r m s , h o w n a r r o w (strict) they are, a n d w h e r e t h e y are i n the "space" o f feasible b e h a v i o r ; c o n f o r m i s n i d e t e r m i n e s o n l y t h a t t h e r e will be n o r m s — d i s t i n c t , e n d u r i n g clusters o f d i s p o s i t i o n s i n b e h a v i o r a l f e a s i b i l i t y s p a c e , s e p a r a t e d i n t h a t s p a c e byc l e a r g a p s w h e r e t h e r e a r e n o d i s p o s i t i o n s (save t h e o d d s t r a y ) . L i k e herds, n o r m s are a k i n d of "emergent" entity, w i t h an identity a n d life o f their o w n , over a n d above that o f their constituents. N e w animals slowly replace the o l d , a n d thus a single h e r d can outlast m a n y generat i o n s ; l i k e w i s e , t h o u g h e a c h i n d i v i d u a l ' s d i s p o s i t i o n s e v e n t u a l l y pass away, t h e v beget t h e i r successors i n c o n f o r m i s t y o u t h , a n d t h e r e b y t h e n o r m s are h a n d e d d o w n t o the generations. T h e clusters t h a t coalesce can
be called " n o r m s "
(and
n o t just
g r o u p s o r types) precisely because t h e y are g e n e r a t e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d by censoriousness; gives the standards
the censure attentant on deviation automatically ( t h e e x t a n t c l u s t e r s ) a d e facto
normative
force.
O u t - o f - s t e p b e h a v i o r is not just atypical, b u t a b n o r m a l a n d unacceptab l e ; i t i s w h a t o n e i s " n o t s u p p o s e d t o " d o , a r i d i n t h a t sense i m p r o p e r . N o r m s should not be confused w i t h conventions (in
David Lewis',
1 9 6 9 , s e n s e ) , w h i c h a r e " t a c i t " o r "as i f " a g r e e m e n t s , w h e r e t h e p a r t i e s have settled on a certain a r r a n g e d b e h a v i o r p a t t e r n , f o r m u t u a l benef i t . T h o u g h n o t h i n g i s i m p l i e d a b o u t the o r i g i n o f these a r r a n g e m e n t s , their persistence is e x p l a i n e d by s h o w i n g h o w , for each i n d i v i d u a l , it is
74
HEIDEGGER ON B E I N G A PERSON
17
rational to go along w i t h whatever pattern is already established. T h e difference between appeal:
n o r m s a n d c o n v e n t i o n s lies i n t h i s e x p l a n a t o r y
conformisni
does
not depend
on
any
rational or
interest-
m a x i m i z i n g decisions (and thus the n o r m s themselves need not be beneficial).
Also,
insofar as conventions depend on
r a t i o n a l self-
interest, they f o r f e i t the n o r m a t i v e force o f n o r m s . The
total
assemblage o f n o r m s
for a c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y
largely d e t e r m i n e s the behavioral dispositions of each
non-deviant
m e m b e r ; in effect, it defines what it is to be a " n o r m a l " m e m b e r of the community.
Heidegger
calls
this
assemblage
the
anyone.
3
(Perhaps
Wittgenstein meant something similar by "forms of life.") I regard it as the
pivotal
notion
for
u n d e r s t a n d i n g Being and Time.
U n l i k e a scatter of herds, the a n y o n e is elaborately o r g a n i z e d a n d s t r u c t u r e d , because the n o r m s that m a k e it up are h i g h l y i n t e r d e p e n dent. It is c r u c i a l that w h a t get n o r m a l i z e d are not, strictly s p e a k i n g , actual instances of behavior, but r a t h e r dispositions to behave, c o n t i n gent o n the circumstances.
Thus,
norms
have a
kind of "if-then"
s t r u c t u r e , c o n n e c t i n g v a r i o u s sorts o f c i r c u m s t a n c e t o v a r i o u s sorts o f behavior. It follows that the c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y (in the d i f f e r e n t i a l responses o f n o r m a l b e h a v i o r a n d n o r m a l censorship) m u s t effectively categorize b o t h behavior a n d behavioral circumstances into various distinct
sorts.
We
say
that the
a n y o n e institutesthese
sorts.
I m a g i n e , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t t h e r u l e s o f chess w e r e n o t e x p l i c i t l y codified, but were observed o n l y as a body of conformists n o r m s — "how one acts"when in chess-playing circumstances. T h u s , it is p r o p e r (socially acceptable) t o m o v e t h e k i n g i n a n y o f e i g h t d i r e c t i o n s , b u t o n l y one square at a t i m e . F o r this to be a n o r m , players a n d teacher/censors must b e able t o " t e l l " ( r e s p o n d d i f f e r e n t i a l l y , d e p e n d i n g o n ) w h i c h piece is t h e k i n g , w h a t t h e squares a n d d i r e c t i o n s are, w h a t c o u n t s as a m o v e , a n d s o o n . A c c o r d i n g t o o t h e r n o r m s , t h e k i n g starts o n a g i v e n square,
must
be
protected
whenever
attacked,
cannot
cross
a
t h r e a t e n e d s q u a r e , c a n castle u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , etc. T h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i s t h a t i t i s t h e same k i n g , t h e s a m e i n s t i t u t e d s o r t , t h a t ' s involved in each n o r m ; hence, the n o r m s themselves are i n t e r r e l a t e d in d e p e n d i n g o n the same s o r t i n g of circumstances. We call a sort w h i c h is i n v o l v e d i n m a n y i n t e r r e l a t e d n o r m s a role—e.g., t h e r o l e o f t h e k i n g i n chess. M a n y n o r m s a r e a l s o r e l a t e d t h r o u g h t h e s o r t i n g o f s q u a r e s , moves, threats, o t h e r k i n d s o f pieces a n d w h a t have y o u ; o b v i o u s l y , i n fact, a l l t h e n o r m s a n d r o l e s o f chess a r e b o u n d u p i n a d e e p l y i n t e r d e pendent
bundle.
Heidegger
makes
these
points
in
terms of the e q u i p m e n t a n d
p a r a p h e r n a l i a o f e v e r y d a y life; b u t the u p s h o t i s the same. H a m m e r s , nails, b o a r d s , a n d d r i l l s , s c r e w d r i v e r s , screws, a n d g l u e are all b o u n d together in a (large) nexus of i n t e r t w i n e d roles, i n s t i t u t e d by the n o r m s of carpentry
practice;
and
that's
what
75
makes t h e m what
they are.
18
NOUS
C o n s i d e r w h a t m a r k s o f f o u r u s e o f t o o l s f r o m t h e uses a p e s s o m e t i m e s m a k e o f sticks, o r ants o f a p h i d s . I t isn't t h a t p e o p l e use t h i n g s m o r e c l e v e r l y , o r m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y , o r t h a t o n l y w e use t h e m t o f a s h i o n o t h e r t h i n g s , t h o u g h all o f these m a y b e t r u e . T h e m a i n d i f f e r e n c e i s that t o o l s h a v e p r o p e r u s e s — f o r e a c h t o o l , t h e r e i s " w h a t it's f o r . " I f a n a p e uses a s t i c k t o g e t b a n a n a s , w h e t h e r c l e v e r l y o r n o t , w h e t h e r succ e s s f u l l y o r n o t , i t has i n n o sense u s e d i t e i t h e r p r o p e r l y o r i m p r o p e r l y . Y o u o r I , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , m i g h t use a s c r e w d r i v e r p r o p e r l y t o d r i v e i n screws, o r i m p r o p e r l y t o carve g r a f f i t i o n the s u b w a y w a l l ; a n d either w a y , t h e p r o p r i e t y i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r c l e v e r n e s s o r success. O n e misues ( o r abuses) a s c r e w d r i v e r to g o u g e walls—that's n o t w h a t screwd r i v e r s are f o r . An ape c o u l d n o t misuse a stick, no m a t t e r w h a t it d i d . B e i n g a s c r e w d r i v e r , like b e i n g a chess-king, is b e i n g that w h i c h plays a c e r t a i n r o l e , in r e l a t i o n to o t h e r t h i n g s w i t h i n t e r - d e t e r m i n e d roles. T h e s e m u t u a l l y d e f i n i n g role relations are c o n s t i t u t i v e o f e q u i p ment or paraphernalia as such. T h o u g h Heidegger distinguishes and n a m e s q u i t e a few v a r i e t i e s (especially sections 15-17), we n e e d o n l y his generic
term,
referral.
4
T a k e n strictly, there never "is" a n e q u i p m e n t . . . . I n the structure [essential to e q u i p m e n t ] t h e r e lies a referral of o n e t h i n g to a n o t h e r . . . . E q u i p m e n t always a c c o r d s w i t h its [ o w n ] e q u i p m e n t a l i t y A y b e l o n g i n g t o o t h e r e q u i p m e n t : p e n , n i b , i n k , b l o t t e r , table, l a m p , f u r n i t u r e , w i n d o w s , d o o r s , r o o m . ( p . r>8) 5
T h e t o t a l i t y o f a l l p a r a p h e r n a l i a cum "referral
nexus of significance";
referral relations is called the
b u t since
paraphernalia
is taken
broadly e n o u g h to include practically everything w i t h which we o r d i n a r i l y w o r k , cope, or b o t h e r (except o t h e r people), this totality is t a n t a m o u n t , i n fact, t o the e v e r y d a y w o r l d . T h e everyday w o r l d , of course, is not the universe or the planet Earth, but rather the " w o r l d " o f daily life a n d affairs—the w o r l d w h i c h has t h e business w o r l d a n d t h e w i d e w o r l d o f s p o r t s a s s p e c i a l i z e d portions.
6
It is essentially a c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t , g i v e n d e t e r m i n a t e char-
acter b y — i n s t i t u t e d b y — t h e n o r m s o f the c o n f o r m i s t s w h o live i n it. T h e anyone itself . . . articulates the r e f e r r a l nexus of significance, (p. 129) T h i s i s a c e n t r a l t h e s i s o f Being a n d Time, w h i c h I v e n t u r e t o s u m u p i n a
m e m o r a b l e s l o g a n : All constitution is institution. L a n g u a g e , n o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , i s e n t i r e l y o n a p a r w i t h t h e (rest o f the) everyday w o r l d , as fundamentally instituted a n d d e t e r m i n e d by c o n f o r m i s t n o r m s . T h i s is o n e area, h o w e v e r , w h e r e recent "social
76
HEIDEGGER ON B E I N G A PERSON practice"
accounts
are
19
decidedly
more
sophisticated
t h a n Being and
Time; s o 1 r e s t w i t h q u o t i n g t w o p a s s a g e s e x h i b i t i n g t h e b a s i c i d e a : B u t signs are a b o v e a l l themselves e q u i p m e n t , w h o s e specific e q u i p m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r consists in indicating. . . . I n d i c a t i n g can be d e f i n e d as a "species" o f r e f e r r a l , ( p . 7 7 ) and [ T h e r e f e r r a l nexus o f ] significance. . . harbors w i t h i n itself the o n t o l o g i cal c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y . . . [ o f d i s c l o s i n g ] " s i g n i f i c a t i o n , " on w h i c h are f o u n d e d i n t u r n the possible b e i n g o f w o r d a r i d l a n g u a g e , ( p . 8 7 ; c o m p a r e p . 161) T h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t is that l i n g u i s t i c f o r m s are u n d e r s t o o d as (special) equipment, a n d hence the w o r d / o b j e c t reference relations are j u s t a s p e c i a l case o f i n t e r e q u i p i n e n t a l another
slogan:
All
intentionality
referral is
instituted
relations—which
suggests
referral.
W e a r e a t last i n a p o s i t i o n t o a d d r e s s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n f o r a n y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Being and Time:
W h a t i s Dasein? A c c o r d i n g t o t h e
text, the a n y o n e ( p p . 126-30), the w o r l d ( p p . 6 4 , 3 6 4 , a n d 3 8 0 ) , l a n guage ( p . 166), a n d e v e n t h e sciences ( p .
11) a U h a v e "Dasein's k i n d o f
b e i n g . " W e c a n m a k e sense o f t h i s a s t o n i s h i n g d i v e r s i t y i f w e u n d e r s t a n d Dasein t o b e t h e a n y o n e a n d e v e r y t h i n g i n s t i t u t e d b y i t : a vast intricate
pattern—generated
and
maintained
by
conformisni—of
n o r m s , n o r m a l dispositions, c u s t o m s , sorts, roles, r e f e r r a l relations, public institutions, a n d so o n .
7
On this reading, the anyone, the (every-
day) w o r l d , a n d l a n g u a g e are d i f f e r e n t c o h e r e n t " s t i b p a t t e r n s " w i t h i n the
grand
pattern
that
i s Dasein;
they
h a v e Dasein's
kind
of b e i n g
b e c a u s e e a c h o f t h e m i s Dasein ( t h o u g h n o n e o f t h e m i s a l l o f D a s e i n ) . W i t h i n t h e a n y o n e a n d all it institutes, t h e science of c h e m i s t r y is a coherent
subpattern:
chemistry
is
Dasein—and
so
are
philately,
Christmas, and Cincinnati. T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , o n e c r u c i a l o m i s s i o n f r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g list. A c c o r d i n g to the first sentence of the b o o k p r o p e r (p. 41), we are ourselves Dasei«. B u t this is the most m i s u n d e r s t o o d sentence in all of H e i d e g g e r . F o r r e a d e r s h a v e s u r m i s e d t h a t 'Dasein' i s j u s t a n e w f a n g l e d t e r m f o r ' p e r s o n ' ( o r ' e g o ' o r ' m i n d ' ) — i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h a t eac h o f u s i s o r has o n e Dasein, a n d t h e r e i s a Dasein
f o r e a c h of us. T h i s is w r o n g ;
and the first i n d i c a t i o n is a s i m p l e t e x t u a l p o i n t . 'Person' is a c o u n t n o u n ( w e c a n " c o u n t " a p e r s o n , s e v e r a l p e o p l e , a n d s o o n ) ; Dasein i s ( v i r t u a l l y ) never used as a c o u n t n o u n .
8
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , it isn't a mass n o u n
e i t h e r ( s u c h a s ' w a t e r ' o r ' g o l d ' ) ; Dasein c a n n o m o r e b e m e a s u r e d o u t (e.g., i n g a l l o n s o r o u n c e s ) t h a n i t c a n b e c o u n t e d . G r a m m a t i c a l l y , 'tuberculosis' is a closer analogy. We neither c o u n t "tuberculoses" n o r
77
NOUS
20
m e a s u r e a m o u n t s o f i t ; i t c o m e s , r a t h e r , i n d i s t i n c t o c c u r r e n c e s o r cases (which can, of course, be counted). A person is like an occurrence or "case" o f D a i « ' n - e x c e p t t h a t o n e d o e s n ' t c a t c h i t , let a l o n e g e t o v e r i t . Dasein i s n o t a s p e c i e s o f w h i c h w e a r e s p e c i m e n s , a t y p e o f w h i c h w e a r e t o k e n s , a f e a t u r e w h i c h we h a v e , a s p i r i t w h i c h is in us, a c o n d i t i o n w h i c l i w e are i n , o r e v e n a w h o l e o f w h i c h w e are parts ( t h o u g h that's closest).
P e o p l e a r e t o Dasein
as baseball g a m e s are
to baseball, as
u t t e r a n c e s a r e t o l a n g u a g e , a s w o r k s a r e t o l i t e r a t u r e . Dasein
is the
o v e r a l l p h e n o m e n o n , c o n s i s t i n g e n t i r e l y o f its i n d i v i d u a l " o c c u r r ances," a n d y e t p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a n v o f t h e m b e i n g w h a t i t is. E n g l i s h l a c k s a c o n v i n c i n g w o r d f o r t h i s r e l a t i o n ; so 1 w i l l s e t t l e f o r s a y i n g t h a t a person
is a case
of Dasein.
9
P e o p l e a r e , i n o n e sense, o n a p a r w i t h e v e r y t h i n g else t h e a n y o n e institutes; they are identifiable coherent subpatterns w i t h i n the overall p a t t e r n t h a t i s Dasein. I n t u i t i v e l y , e a c h p e r s o n i s t h a t p a t t e r n o f n o r m a l dispositions a n d social roles that constitutes a n i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r o f the c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y . N o w , it is a f u n d a m e n t a l r e q u i r e m e n t of the story so far t h a t D i w m t h a v e such " m e m b e r - p a t t e r n s " (conformists); but
n o t h i n g has b e e n
either
from
one
said about w h a i
another,
or
from
d i s t i n g u i s h e s these p a t t e r n s
other
subpatterns
o f Dasein—in
effect, a " t o p - d o w n " version of the personal identity p r o b l e m . We can emphasize b o t h this r e m a r k a b l e d o c t r i n e a n d the special d i f f i c u l t y it raises
with
a cryptic
third
s l o g a n : People are primordial institutions.
In
o t h e r w o r d s , y o u a n d I are institutions, like G e n e r a l M o t o r s , m a r r i a g e , a n d the c o m m o n law, except that we are " p r i m o r d i a l . " W h a t c o u l d that mean? T r y t o i m a g i n e a c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y whose m e m b e r s are ( p h y s i c a l l y ) l i k e b e e h i v e s ; t h a t is, e a c h b e e i s j u s t a n o r g a n o r a p p e n d a g e o f some c o n f o r m i s t hive, a n d m a n y such hives m a k e u p the g r o u p . T h e s e hives i m i t a t e a n d censure one another, thus s u s t a i n i n g n o r m s o f h i v e b e h a v i o r . B u t w h a t is h i v e b e h a v i o r ? If a p a r t i c u l a r bee visits a f o r b i d d e n f l o w e r , h o w i s t h a t t h e h i v e ' s d o i n g , a n d n o t t h e bee's? W e l l s u p p o s e , a s a m a t t e r o f p h y s i o l o g i c a l fact, t h a t s t i n g i n g any o n e bee w o u l d t e n d t o s u p p r e s s w h a t e v e r a n y bees i n h e r h i v e w e r e ( r e c e n t l y a n d c o n s p i c u o u s l y ) e n g a g e d i n ; so, t o k e e p b e e s a w a y f r o m f o r b i d d e n f l o w e r s , i t suffices t o s t i n g t h e sisters o f a n y o n e t h a t w a n d e r s . I n e f f e c t , t h e h i v e a s a w h o l e i s h e l d t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e a c t i v i t y o f its p a r t s ; a n d i t ( t h e h i v e ) i s m a d e t o c h a n g e its w a y s . C o m p a r e t h i s w i t h s p a n k i n g a c h i l d ' s b o t t o m w h e n i t ( i h e c h i l d ) s t e a l s w i i h its f i n g e r s , o r b l a s p h e m e s w i t h its m o u t h . T h e w h o l e h i v e , l i k e t h e w h o l e c h i l d , i s o n e " u n i t o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , " a n d t h e r e f o r e the "subject" o f the b e h a v i o r , because i t is w h a t lakes the heat, a n d learns f r o m "its" mistakes. By t h e same t o k e n , it can be one m e m b e r of a c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y .
78
HEIDEGGER ON B E I N G A PERSON
21
U n i t s of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y are as s t r u c t u r e d a n d m u l t i f a r i o u s as the norms t o w h i c h they are h e l d . T r i v i a l l y , for instance, institutions o f enduring ownership and debt require e n d u r i n g owners and debtors. More i m p o r t a n t , m a n y n o r m s require "sorting" c o m m u n i t y members in the s t a n d a r d s o r t i n g of b e h a v i o r a l circumstances; thus, if y o u ' r e a sargeant a n d y o u e n c o u n t e r a c a p t a i n , t h e n salute.
In other words,
w h a t a u n i t o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s a c c o u n t a b l e f o r i s a f u n c t i o n o f its official r a n k — o r , m o r e g e n e r a l l y , its v a r i o u s social a n d i n s t i t u i i o n a l roles. T h e r e i s a n o b v i o u s a n a l o g y b e t w e e n t h e s e s o c i a l r o l e s , a n d t h e roles w h i c h d e f i n e e q u i p m e n t ; b u t p a r a p h e r n a l i a a r e n e v e r h e l d t o account ( c e n s u r e d ) , n o m a t t e r h o w b a d l y t h e y p e r f o r m . Social roles ("offices") a r e r o l e s w h o s e p l a y e r s a r e a c c o u n t a b l e f o r h o w t h e y p l a y them. Each u n i t of accountability, as a pattern of n o r m a l dispositions a n d social r o l e s , i s a s u b p a t t e r n o f Dasein—an i n s t i t u t i o n . B u t i t i s a d i s t i n c tive i n s t i t u t i o n , i n t h a t i t c a n h a v e b e h a v i o r a s " m y " b e h a v i o r , a n d c a n be c e n s u r e d
if that
behavior
is
improper;
it
is
a
case
o f Dasein.
Moreover, i n s t i t u t i o n s o f this k i n d are essential t o all others; f o r w i t h out a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t h e r e w o u l d b e n o c e n s o r s h i p , h e n c e n o n o r m s , n o anyone,
n o Daesin
a t a l l . T h u s , a c c o u n t a b l e cases a r e " p r i m o r d i a l "
institutions. H e i d e g g e r places t h i s s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h h e calls " i n - e a c h case-mineness"
(Jemeinigkeit;
p. 4 2 ) ,
a m o n g Dasein's
most
fundamental
characteristics. T h e r e i s m o r e , h o w e v e r , t o p r i m o r d i a l cases o f Dasein t h a n c o n f o r m i s t a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . T o see w h a t i t is, w e m u s t u n p a c k a f o u r t h slogan—this t i m e , o n e w h i c h
H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f states a n d e m p h a -
sizes: The "essence" of Dasein lies in its being extant.
10
" B e i n g e x t a n t , " o f c o u r s e , i s o n e o f t h e b a s i c t e c h n i c a l n o t i o n s o f Being and Time; i t i s n o t a t a l l t h e s a m e a s " b e i n g r e a l " — i n d e e d , t h e s e a r e contrasted.
R e a l i t y i s t h e m o d e o f b e i n g o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l res, t h e
i n d e p e n d e n t " t h i n g " o r s u b s t a n c e . Dasein, i t s h o u l d b e c l e a r b y n o w , i s not a t h i n g i n a n y t r a d i t i o n a l s e n s e ; i t i s n o t r e a l , b u t e x t a n t . B y t h e s a m e token, electrons a n d galaxies are n o t extant ( b u t real). T h e contrast is not i n v i d i o u s i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n — t h e r e g e n u i n e l y are b o t h e x t a n t a n d real b e i n g s ( e n t i t i e s ) . N o r , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , i s i t e x h a u s t i v e : m u t u a l l y defining ( i n t e r d e p e n d e n t ) p a r a p h e r n a l i a are neither real ( i n d e p e n d e n t t h i n g s ) n o r e x t a n t (Dasein), b u t " a v a i l a b l e " ; a n d t h e r e a r e o t h e r modes as w e l l .
1 1
R o u g h l y , to be extant is to be instituted; but H e i d e g g e r doesn't put it that w a y . T h e closest he c o m e s to a d e f i n i t i o n is m o r e l i k e : s o m e t h i n g i s e x t a n t i f w h a t ( o r " w h o " ) i t i s , i n e a c h case, i s i t s o w n e f f o r t s t o
79
22
NOÜS
u n d e r s t a n d w h a t ( o r w h o ) i t i s (see. e . g . . p p . 5 3 , 2 3 1 . a n d 3 2 5 ) . N o w t h e r e m a y b e s o m e p l a u s i b i l i t y t o s a y i n g t h a t w h o w e a r e is, i n p a r t , a f u n c t i o n of o u r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g : I ' m a pacifist or a baseball fan if I t h i n k I a m . B u t n o t h i n g I c o u l d t h i n k w o u l d m a k e m e e m p e r o r , let alone N a p o l e o n ; a n d m u c h m o r e t h a n m y self-image seems i n v o l v e d i n my b e i n g a p h i l o s o p h y teacher, an electronics hobbyist, a middle-aged m a n , a n d so o n . T h e p r o b l e m concerns the n o t i o n o f " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ; Heidegger says: We s o m e t i m e s use . . . t h e e x p r e s s i o n " u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o m e t h i n g " to m e a n " b e i n g able t o m a n a g e a n u n d e r t a k i n g , " " b e i n g u p t o i t , " [ o r ] " k n o w i n g h o w t o d o s o m e t h i n g . " ( p . 143 Understanding something is equated with competence or know-how. S o , t h e p e r s o n w h o " r e a l l y u n d e r s t a n d s " r a c e c a r s i s t h e o n e w h o can m a k e t h e m g o fast, w h e t h e r b y f i n e t u n i n g o r f i n e d r i v i n g ( t w o w a y s t o understand
them);
understanding formal
mathematics amounts to
mastery o f the f o r m a l i s m s , ability t o f i n d p r o o f s , a n d such like. But w h a t , i n t h i s sense, c o u l d b e m e a n t b y " . ^ / / - u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ? W h a t w o u l d be the relevant " k n o w - h o w " ? r
W ell, it w o u l d be each i n d i v i d u a l ' s ability to be h i m or herself, to m a n a g e h i s o r h e r o w n l i f e — i n o t h e r w o r d s , k n o w i n g h o w ( i n each case) t o b e " m e " . A n d w h a t k n o w - h o w i s that? A c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , a n y a n d a l l k n o w - h o w t h a t I m a y h a v e i s ipso facto s o m e p o r t i o n o f m y k n o w i n g h o w t o b e m e . I f I u n d e r s t o o d race cars i n the w a y thai mechanics d o , t h e n I w o u l d k n o w h o w to be a race-car mechanic— w h i c h , i n p a r t , i s w h a t I w o u l d b e . E v e n t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , e.g., :
of e l e c t r o n s , is a s o p h i s t i c a t e d a n d specialized aspect of k n o w i n g how to b e a p e r s o n o f a c e r t a i n s o r t : a q u a n t u m m e c h a n i c , say. So far, h o w e v e r , this is o n l y "dispersed" self-understanding, in t e r m s o f separate w o r l d l y roles; i t lacks a n y character o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n e s e l f a s a c o m p l e t e i n d i v i d u a l — a s a self. I m a g i n e a c h e s s - p l a y i n g d e v i c e w h i c h c a n c o m e u p vvith a s t r o n g m o v e f o r a n y g i v e n p o s i t i o n , b u t w h i c h l a c k s a n y o v e r a l l sense o f t r y i n g t o w i n . T h e c o l l e c t e d m o v e s of such a device do not really a d d up to a c o m p l e t e game, but are o n l y a series o f u n c o n n e c t e d exercises; i t d o e s n ' t r e a l l y p l a y chess. A n a l o g ously, a collection of dispersed roles does not really a d d up to a whole p e r s o n , a c o m p l e t e " l i f e " . W h a t is left o u t istrymg to u n d e r s t a n d oneself (as s u c h ) . T w o p r e l i m i n a r y observations are i n o r d e r before proceeding. First, every n o r m a l c o n f o r m i s t is at the same t i m e a u n i t of accountability a n d a censorious g u a r d i a n of the t r a d i t i o n . Each n o r m a l disposition t o d o A i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s C is, b y t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f c o n f o r m i s n i , p a i r e d
80
HEIDEGGER ON B E I N G A PERSON
23
with a n o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n to censure a n y failures to do A in C. B u t these dispositions are distinct, m e a n i n g that it is possible to censure one's o w n failures.
T h u s , a c o n f o r m i s t u n i t of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y is also a p o t e n t i a l
unit o f s e l f - a c c o u n t a b i l i t y . S e c o n d , i n m y pains t o a v o i d any h i d d e n presupposition of mentality or reason, I dispositions,
behavior,
and
have s p o k e n exclusively of
know-how—making everything sound
"mindless" a n d i n a r t i c u l a t e . B u t of course it isn't.
Dasein's
institutions are those of language a n d explicit c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
many
These c a n
be p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t to a serious e f f o r t at s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g : w h a t I say a b o u t m y s e l f , f o r e x a m p l e , a n d w h y . M o r e o v e r , t h e y e n a b l e a case o f Dasein t o j u d g e i t s o w n d i s p o s i t i o n s w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y a c t i n g t h e m o u t . I t d o e s n ' t h a v e t o w a i t a n d see w h a t i t w o u l d d o i n a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n ; i t can "ask i t s e l f . A n d i f i t t h e n d i s a p p r o v e s , i t d o e s n ' t h a v e t o s p a n k i t s o w n b o t t o m ; i t c a n " c h a n g e its m i n d " . I n v a r i a b l y , a case o f Dasein p l a y s m a n y r o l e s . W h a t i s p r o p e r f o r i t on any o c c a s i o n w i l l be a f u n c t i o n o f w h a t roles these are; s o m e priests, for i n s t a n c e , a r e n ' t s u p p o s e d t o h a v e l o v e a f f a i r s , t h o u g h o t h e r b a c h e lors m a y . A l s o i n v a r i a b l y , t h e d e m a n d s o f t h e s e r o l e s w i l l o f t e n c o n f l i c t . What is a p p r o p r i a t e for me, the b r e a d w i n n e r , may not be compatible with what is a p p r o p r i a t e for me, the a s p i r i n g artist, not to m e n t i o n me, the s h o p f o r e m a n ,
me, the political activist, a n d
me, the would-be
adventurer, d r e a m i n g o f the o r i e n t . T h i s gives s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , the ability to be m e , a m o r e c h a l l e n g i n g aspect. A l l these c o m p e t i n g p r o p r i e t i e s m u s t s o m e h o w b e j u g g l e d ; a n d there are basically t w o ways t o d o t h a t . O n e , o f c o u r s e , i s j u s t t o " s l i d e , " t o take a t e a c h m o m e n t t h e p a t h o f least resistance. T h a t m e a n s a t t e n d ing to w h a t e v e r p r o p r i e t i e s h a p p e n , at that m o m e n t , to be the most conspicuous or pressing, f o r g e t t i n g about w h a t e v e r others are t e m p o rarily o u t of sight. T h i s is to r e m a i n dispersed in the w o r l d l y . T h e opposite possibility is to c o n f r o n t the conflicts, a n d resolve t h e m : that is, t o m a k e u p o n e ' s m i n d .
1 2
T r y i n g to understand oneself is seeking
out a n d p o s i t i v e l y a d j u d i c a t i n g the c o n f l i c t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s o f one's various roles, i n the exercise o f a h i g h e r - l e v e l d i s p o s t i o n w h i c h w e m i g h t c a l l " s e l f - c r i t i c i s m " ( I t h i n k it's close t o w h a t H e i d e g g e r m e a n s b y "conscience"). A case o f Dasein
is g e n u i n e l y self-critical
when,
in
response
to
d i s c o v e r e d t e n s i o n s a m o n g its r o l e s , i t d o e s s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e m . Thus, I m i g h t quit the priesthood a n d embrace my lover, or decide to subordinate e v e r y t h i n g to my art. T h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t is that I don't just let s o m e d i s p o s i t i o n s o v e r r i d e o t h e r s ( w h i c h m a y b e w e a k e r a t t h e moment); rather, in the light of some, I resolutely alter or eliminate others. As a u n i t of s e l f - a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , I find a n d r o o t o u t an inconsistency i n m y o v e r a l l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; i n s t e a d o f v a c i l l a t i n g u n w i t tingly b e t w e e n
one
"me"
and another,
81
I
become one of t h e m
(or
NOUS
24 perhaps a t h i r d ) constantly and explicitly, and
thereby achieve a
"truer" self-understanding. A l l s e l f - c r i t i c a l a d j u d i c a t i o n i s a m o n g c u r r e n t r o l e s . I n t e r m s o f the whole, some may be rejected, others adjusted; but there is no external or h i g h e r s t a n d a r d against w h i c h all are j u d g e d . T h e o n l y e n d is self-constancy—a clearer, m o r e coherent self-understanding ability to be me. W h e n a role survives such critical scrutiny (perhaps adjusted), H e i d e g g e r says i t i s " t a k e n o v e r a s o n e ' s o w n " (zugeeignet; M & R : a p p r o p r i a t e d ) . It is no l o n g e r my role j u s t because 1 h a p p e n to play it, but mine
because
I
claim
it,
by
my
own
choice.
Insofar
as
self-
u n d e r s t a n d i n g c r i t i c a l l y t a k e s o v e r its r o l e s , i t i s s a i d t o b e self-owned (eigentlich;
M&R:
authentic).
Inconstant
(dispersed
and
wavering)
s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g is, i n t h e s a m e t e r m s , disowned ( b u t , o f c o u r s e , it's s t i l l / V meines: i n e a c h c a s e m i n e ) . A d i s o w n e d case of Dasein d o e s n o t lack a s e l f o r " p e r s o n a l i t y , " e v e n a s u b t l e a n d d i s t i n c t i v e o n e ; it's j u s t u n s e l f - c r i t i c a l . " W h o " i t i s i s s t i l l d e t e r m i n e d b y its s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t this u n d e r s t a n d i n g remains u n e x a m i n e d a n d dispersed in the w o r l d . T h e o p p o s i t e o f d i s p e r s a l , s e l f - o w m e d - n e s s , is, r o u g h l y , " g e t t i n g y o u r act t o g e t h e r . " A s t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f c o n f l i c t s t h a t l e a d t o w a v e r i n g i n c o n s i s t e n c y , i t i s a l s o resoluteness. E v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s o w n e d , e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s g o t t e n t o g e t h e r o r r e s o l v e d u p o n , i s a d o p t e d i n t h e first place f r o m the a n y o n e ; e x c e p t for small variations, t h e r e is no o t h e r source for ways of u n d e r s t a n d i n g oneself. To be self-owned ("authentic") is n o t t o rise above t h e a n y o n e , n o t t o wash away the taint o f c o m m o n sense a n d v u l g a r c u s t o m , b u t r a t h e r t o e m b r a c e ( s o m e p a r t o f ) w h a t these have to o f f e r in a p a r t i c u l a r selective way. T h e result is a critically realized, m a x i m a l l y self-constant ability to lead an i n d i v i d u a l , cohesive, l i m i t e d life: w » i f ! T h i s is what's at stake in t r y i n g to u n d e r s t a n d oneself. It
is also t h e rest of w h a t is
m e a n t b y s a y i n g t h a t p e o p l e are
" p r i m o r d i a l " institutions. N o b o d y is every wholly disowned or wholly s e l f - o w n e d ; m o s t l y , we're i n b e t w e e n . M o r e o v e r , that's essential. T h e v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y o f m u l t i p l e r o l e s , a n d t h u s o f c o m m u n i t y a n d Dasein i n any
nontrivial
sense,
depends
on
a
fair
measure
of routine
self-
c o n s t a n c y i n t h e m e m b e r "cases". T h a t p e o p l e t r y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m selves, a n d h e n c e a r e a l w a y s s e l f - o w n e d i n s o m e m a n n e r a n d d e g r e e , i s a s m u c h a p r e r e q u i s i t e o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f Dasein primitive
loci
of accountability
(je
meines).
as t h a t t h e y are
H e e d i n g the call
to
this
self-critical e f f o r t (conscience), a n d not mere c o n f o r m i s t accountabili t y , i s f u l l y - h u m a n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T h u s H e i d e g g e r c a n say t h a t t o b e e x t a n t i s t o b e t h a t b e i n g t h e cases o f w h i c h t r y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m selves: i n b e i n g w h a t t h e y a r e , w h o t h e y a r e i s a n issue t o t h e m . P o r t i o n s o f these last f e w p a r a g r a p h s m a y s o u n d d i s c o n c e r t i n g l y "existentialist,"
as,
indeed,
do
large
tracts
o f Being and
Time.
But,
t h o u g h the comparison is not empty, it is more often misleading than
82
HEIDEGGER O N B E I N G A PERSON
25
helpful. T h e central question is not h o w to be a " k n i g h t of faith" or a " s u p e r m a n , " let a l o n e a " f u t i l e passion," b u t r a t h e r w h a t it is to be a person at all. I have t r i e d to sketch an a c c o u n t of h o w o u r distinctively h u m a n use o f t o o l s a n d l a n g u a g e , sense o f c u s t o m a n d p r o p r i e t y , a n d capacity
for
self-criticism
m i g h t all
be
grounded
in
o u r distinctive
c o m m u n a l i t y . A c c o r d i n g to the analysis, a p e r s o n is n o t f u n d a m e n t a l l y a t a l k i n g a n i m a l o r a t h i n k i n g t h i n g , b u t a case o f Dasein: a c r u c i a l s o r t o f subpattern in an overall pattern instituted by c o n f o r m i s m , a n d h a n d e d d o w n f r o m g e n e r a t i o n t o g e n e r a t i o n . I f t h e s a m e a c c o u n t t u r n s o u t also to l e n d an i n s i g h t i n t o the special existentialist c o n c e r n s of p e r s o n a l integration a n d self-ownership . . . well t h e n , so m u c h the b e t t e r . 1 3
NOTES 'Heidegger (1927); all page citations are to this text, unless otherwise indicated; translations are my o w n . For reference, the German pagination is reproduced in the margins of the Macquarrie and Robinson (1962) translation; when necessary, this trans lation will be cited by the initials " M & R " . ' C o n f o r m i s n i is deeply related to the crucial n o t i o n of " f a l l i n g " ; compare also the discussion of "Sorge um . . . Abstand" (p. 126). 3 Das Mau ( M & R : the "they"); see, e.g., pp. 126f, 194. and 288. l Verweisung ( M & R : reference o r assignment); the sense o f the G e r m a n is roughly "being sent or directed, by or away f r o m one t h i n g , toward another," for w h i c h English lacks a comfortable equivalent. B u i nuances in the o rigin al are at best a guide; α priori, it's just as likely that no G e r m a n w o r d is exactly r i g h t as thai no English w o r d is. Philosophical sense is ultimately d e t e r m i n e d not by dictionaries or etymologies, but by examples and the doctrines themselves. 5 Dewey makes a similar point: "A tool is a particular t h i n g , but it is more than a particular t h i n g , since it is a t h i n g in which a connection, a sequential bond of nature is embodied. It possesses an objective relation as its own d e f i n i n g property. . . . its p r i m a r y relationship is to other external things, as the hammer to the nail, and the plow to the soil." (1925, p. 103) "Compare Well, sense 3, p. 65, and Uniuelt, p. 66. ' C o m p a r e this w i t h Dewey's remark about " m i n d " (which he clearly distinguishes from personal consciousness): ". . . the whole history of science, art, and morals proves that the m i n d that appears in individuals is not as such i n d i v i d u a l m i n d . T h e f o r m e r is in itself a system of belief, recognitions, and ignorances, of acceptances and rejections, of expectancies and appraisals of meanings w h i c h have been instituted under the influence of custom and t r a d i t i o n . " (1925, ρ . 180; compare p. 184) 8 T h e M a i q u a r r i e and Robinson translation, however, is poor in this regard; thus, they render the o p e n i n g sentence (just mentioned) as: "We are ourselves the entities t o b e analysed [i.e., Dasein]." T h e p l u r a l 'entities' w o u l d suggest a count n o u n , but the German is singular; such errors are c o m m o n . (But on rare occasions, Heidegger himself seems to slip up; see e.g , pp. 240 and 336 ) "German doesn't have a terrific t e r m for it eilher; when Heidegger wants to speak of individuals, he qualifies with 'je' or 'jeweilig', meaning, roughly, " i n each case," or " i n the given case." 10 p . 42 (italics and scarequotes in original); compare pp. 117. 212, 2 3 1 , 318, etc. " I have been t a k i n g s o m e liberties. ' B e i n g e x t a n t ' translates 'Existenz' (German lacks the cognate pair we have in English); being real' translates 'Vorhandensein' ( M & R : presence-at-hand), w h i c h is n o l strictly correct, but pedagogically defensible in the context of Being and Time; 'being available' translates 'Zuhandensem' ( M & R : readiness-iohand). For relevant texts, see pp. 42. 69, 92, 21 I f , and 313f.
83
26
NOUS
''Readers familiar with Being and Time will notice thai "forgetting," "remaining dispersed in the w o r l d l y , " and "resolution" (and also several ocher expressions in the following paragraphs) are theoretical notions, discussed at length by Heidegger. T h i s paper would not have been possible were it not for years of close and fruitful collaboration with B e n Dreyfus. I am also grateful for comments and questions from Bob B r a n d o m , Jerry Massey, Nick Rescher, and the audiences ai O h i o State University, Yale University, and the Council for Philosophical Studies Summer Institute on Phenomenology and Existentialism, where earlier versions were read and discussed. J 3
BIBLIOGRAPHY Dewey, J o h n (1925; second edition, 1929). Experience and Nature, La Salle. 1L: Open Court. Heidegger, M a r t i n (1927). Sein und Zeit, T u b i n g e n : Max Niemeyer Verlag. Lewis. David (1969). Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press Marquarrie, John, and Robinson, Edward, translators, (1962). Being and Time (a translation of Sein und Zeit), New Y o r k : Harper and Row.
84
International
journal
of
Philosophical
Studies
Vol.8(2),
209-230
Heidegger and Dasein's 'Bodily Nature': What is the H i d d e n Problematic?
David R. Cerbone Abstract In Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly defers any consideration of ourselves (Dasein) as embodied. I try to account for Heidegger's reluctance to talk about 'the b o d y ' in connection w i t h his explication of Dasein, by arguing that doing so w o u l d be at odds w i t h the k i n d of investigation his 'phenomenology of everydayness' is meant to be. That Heidegger omits discussion of the body in Being and Time might lead one to t h i n k of the human body in terms of the other categories Heidegger deploys: readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand (Being and Time) and biological organisms (Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics). I argue that any such idenlificalion ought to be resisted, as these categories serve only to deprive our bodies of their specifically human dimension. Indeed, by surveying the failure of these categories as proper to the h u m a n body, we gain further insight i n t o Heidegger's i n i t i a l deferral: only given the existential analytic can one begin to offer a proper account of ourselves in bodily terms. Keywords: Heidegger; body; embodiment; interpretation; organism
T h e b o d y p h e n o m e n o n i s the m o s t d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m .
1
In the course of his discussion of spatiality in the t h i r d chapter of D i v i s i o n I of Being and Time, H e i d e g g e r r e m a r k s t h a t D a s e i n ' s " " b o d i l y n a t u r e " h i d e s a w h o l e p r o b l e m a t i c o f its o w n ' (BT, 1 4 3 ) . H e c o n c l u d e s t h e sentence b y n o t i n g t h a t ' w e s h a l l n o t t r e a t i t h e r e ' . T h i s d e l i b e r a t e o m i s s i o n on H e i d e g g e r ' s part is especially f r u s t r a t i n g given the character of the 'exist e n t i a l a n a l y t i c ' o f D a s e i n , t o w h i c h D i v i s i o n I i s d e v o t e d . T h a t is, i n t h i s analytic, Heidegger is p r i n c i p a l l y concerned to u n d e r m i n e the p r e d o m i n a n t C a r t e s i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n beings, n a m e l y t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s are 2
1
International Journal of Philosophical Studies I S S N 0 9 6 7 - 2 5 5 ' ) p r i n t 1 4 6 6 - 4 5 4 2 o n l i n e © 2 0 0 0 T a y l o r & F r a n c i s Ltd hltp://www.tandf.cu.uk/journals
85
I N T E R N A T I O N A L JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES essentially
minds
or
egos,
which
are
autonomous
and
self-contained,
a n d w h o s e p r i m a r y r e l a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d i s best u n d e r s t o o d i n e p i s t e m i c 1
t e r m s ( p e r c e i v i n g , b e l i e v i n g , k n o w i n g , etc.)." I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n , H e i d e g g e r offers an account of w h a t it is to be h u m a n in terms o f w h a t h e calls ' D a s e i n ' . H e a r g u e s t h a t a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f D a s e i n r e v e a l s its w a y o f b e i n g t o b e b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , w h e r e t h i s m e a n s i n t h e first i n s t a n c e b e i n g i n v o l v e d w i t h i n a p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t w h i c h i s s t r u c t u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o i m p e r s o n a l l y articulated norms. O n this c o u n t e r - c o n c e p t i o n of w h a t it is to be h u m a n , o u r p r i m a r y r e l a t i o n to the w o r l d is one of practical engagement, rather than detached, theoretical contemplation or b e h o l d i n g . In o t h e r words, w h a t a p h e n o m e n o l o g y of everydayness reveals i s agents w h o s e m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l a c t i v i t y i s the s k i l f u l m a n i p u l a t i o n o f e q u i p m e n t i n t h e s e r v i c e o f a v a r i e t y o f tasks. O n l y o n t h e basis o f t h i s p r i m a r y a c t i v i t y , H e i d e g g e r argues, c a n t h e e p i s t e m i c a c t i v i t i e s a t the h e a r t o f the C a r t e s i a n e n t e r p r i s e b e m a d e i n t e l l i g i b l e .
5
G i v e n t h e p r o m i n e n c e , a n d i n d e e d the p r i o r i t y , o f p r a c t i c a l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the w o r l d w i t h i n Heidegger's conception of w h a t it is to be h u m a n , an
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o u r s e l v e s
as embodied agents w o u l d
seem
to
be
a
central concern, and not something whose treatment c o u l d be casually d e f e r r e d . O n a C a r t e s i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n beings, e m b o d i m e n t is, t o b e sure, a p r o b l e m ( i n d e e d , a p o t e n t i a l l y i n t r a c t a b l e p r o b l e m g i v e n t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h a t t e n d d u a l i s m ) , b u t i t c a n b e seen a s h a v i n g a s e c o n d a r y o r d e r i v a t i v e status r e l a t i v e t o t h e c e n t r a l p r o j e c t o f a d e q u a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the ' i n n e r ' w o r k i n g s o f a c o g n i z i n g s u b j e c t . F o r H e i d e g g e r , however,
the
b o d y w o u l d seem
to be
immediately implicated in
his
p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f e v e r y d a y a c t i v i t y , i n w h a t h e calls ' c i r c u m s p e c t i v e , n o n thematic
absorption'.
For
this
activity
involves
the
manipulation
of
c o n c r e t e i t e m s such a s h a m m e r s , pens, d o o r k n o b s , a n d t h e l i k e , a n d t h o s e m a n i p u l a t i o n s are e f f e c t e d b y m e a n s o f the b o d y . A s H e i d e g g e r tells us, D a s e i n ' s d e a l i n g s are w i t h ' t h i n g s w h i c h are r e a d y - t o - h a n d a n d used f o r t h e b o d y ' , a n d m a n y o f his c e n t r a l e x a m p l e s i n v o l v e a ' c r a f t s m a n ' s t o o l s [ s u c h a s a h a m m e r ] w h i c h are h e l d i n the h a n d a n d m o v e d w i t h i t ' (BT, 143). So, w h e r e a s D e s c a r t e s in the c o u r s e of his Meditations can d e c l a r e h i m s e l f t o b e i d e n t i f i e d s o l e l y w i t h his m i n d a n d c a n d o u b t t h a t h e e v e n has a b o d y , o n H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f D a s e i n , o n e w o u l d e x p e c t t h e b o d y to occupy a m o r e central role. Thus, Heidegger's unwillingness lo engage i n the l a s k o f a d d r e s s i n g i h e ' w h o l e p r o b l e m a t i c ' h i d d e n i n D a s e i n ' s ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' a p p e a r s t o b e m o r e t h a n j u s t a casual o v e r s i g h t : e i t h e r i t c o n s t i tutes
a serious e r r o r on Heidegger's part or he
has g o o d
reasons
for
deferring consideration of the body. Many
commentators
appear
to
lean
toward
the
former possibility.
F o r e x a m p l e , D i d i e r F r a n c k w r i t e s : ' N o w i t i s essential - a l t h o u g h t h i s necessity was s o m e t h i n g t h a t H e i d e g g e r n e v e r t o o k i n t o a c c o u n t - t h a t Dasein have h a n d s s o t h a t , a l l m e t a p h o r s aside, t h e b e i n g o f the b e i n g
86
Η EI I) EG (ί ER
A N D
t h a i it is could be n a m e d being-al-hand'.
D A S E I N 6
H e r e , Heidegger is criticized
f o r n e g l e c t i n g o u r e m b o d i m e n t i n his a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n . I n d e e d , F r a n c k c o n c l u d e s his p a p e r w i t h t h e v e r d i c t t h a t ' t h e d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e b o d y is
the phenomenological price
of t h e
appearance
of
Being',7
which
suggests
t h a t t h e b o d y i s c o n d e m n e d t o b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d o n l y i n t e r m s o f priva tion, a n d s o n e v e r a s i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g . A f u r t h e r example
is
David
suggests
Philosophy,
Krell, that
who,
in
Heidegger's
his
Daimon
neglect
of
Life: the
Heidegger body
and
(and
Life-
of
the
c a t e g o r y o f life m o r e g e n e r a l l y ) r e v e a l s d e f i c i e n c i e s i n his p h i l o s o p h y . A t o n e p o i n t , K r e l l asks: D i d H e i d e g g e r s i m p l y f a i l t o see t h e a r m o f t h e e v e r y d a y b o d y r i s i n g i n o r d e r t o h a m m e r shingles o n t o the roof, d i d
he overlook
the
q u o t i d i a n gaze d i r e c t e d t o w a r d I h e t i c k i n g w a t c h t h a t o v e r t a k e s b o t h s u n a n d m o o n , d i d h e miss t h e b o d y p o i s e d d a i l y i n its b r a z e n car, a c a r e q u i p p e d w i t h t u r n signals f a b r i c a t e d b y a n d f o r the h a n d a n d eye o f m a n , d i d h e n e g l e c t t h e h u m a n b e i n g c a p a b l e d a y - i n , d a y - o u t o f m o v i n g i t s b o d y a n d s e t t i n g i t s e l f i n m o t i o n ? I f so, w h a t c o n c l u sion must we d r a w ? s K r e l l ' s a n s w e r t o t h e f i n a l q u e s t i o n i s t h a t ' D a s e i n seems d e s t i n e d t o s h a r e the
fate
of the
cherubim and seraphim."' Despite
the
heal
of Krell's
r h e t o r i c , il's unclear to me precisely w h a t the a r g u m e n t is to show that H e i d e g g e r i s mistaken i n o m i t t i n g t h e b o d y f r o m his e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n ; p e r h a p s i t i s d u e t o his r e a l i z a t i o n o f h o w m i s l e a d i n g i t i s t o t a l k o f the b o d y , a s
it
i m m e d i a t e l y invites
a c o n t r a s t w i t h the m i n d .
C o n s i d e r , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e f o l l o w i n g passage, i n w h i c h i t i s c l e a r t h a t Heidegger
has
not
s i m p l y forgotten
our
embodiment:
W h e t h e r [ D a s e i n ] Ms c o m p o s e d of the physical, psychic, a n d spiri tual
and
how
these
realities
are
to
be
determined
is
here
left
c o m p l e t e l y u n q u e s t i o n e d . W e place ourselves i n p r i n c i p l e outside o f this e x p e r i e n t i a l a n d i n t e r r o g a t i v e h o r i z o n o u t l i n e d b y the d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e m o s t c u s t o m a r y n a m e f o r t h i s e n t i t y , m a n : homo animal ratio nale. W h a t i s t o b e d e t e r m i n e d i s n o t a n o u t w a r d a p p e a r a n c e o f t h i s e n t i t y b u t f r o m t h e o u t s e t a n d t h r o u g h o u t s o l e l y its way t o be, n o l t h e w h a t of t h a t of w h i c h and
the
characters
of this
it
is c o m p o s e d b u t the how of its being
how. (HCT,
154)
F i n a l l y , t h o u g h n o t e x a c t l y c r i t i c a l o f H e i d e g g e r , H u b e r t D r e y f u s , i n his c o m m e n t a r y , d i s p l a y s a c e r t a i n d e g r e e o f d i s c o m f o r t i n his h a n d l i n g o f t h e issue o f e m b o d i m e n t . D r e y f u s t w i c e c i t e s H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k c o n c e r n i n g the p r o b l e m a t i c h i d d e n in Dasein's b o d i l y nature, and concludes that,
87
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
for Heidegger,
J O U R N A L
'having a
O F
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
b o d y does n o t
belong to
S T U D I E S
Dasein's essential
structure', that ' D a s e i n is not necessarily e m b o d i e d ' , a n d that 'the b o d y is not essential'.
10
T h e s e r e m a r k s c o m e p r e c a r i o u s l y close t o t h e C a r t e s i a n
p o s i t i o n ("the r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m i n d a n d b o d y ' ) H e i d e g g e r ( a n d D r e y f u s ) i s o t h e r w i s e s o c a r e f u l t o a v o i d . T h e q u e s t i o n t h a t needs t o be
addressed
is
whether Heidegger's deferral
of a
discussion
of the
b o d y c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d i n such a w a y t h a t o n e i s n o t l e f t t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n ( o r e x p l a i n a w a y ) t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d i s e m b o d i e d D a s e i n . T h a t is, c a n H e i d e g g e r a t o n e a n d t h e same t i m e m a i n t a i n t h a t h a v i n g a b o d y ( b e i n g e m b o d i e d ) i s n o t a f e a t u r e o f D a s e i n ' s e s s e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e and t h a t D a s e i n is n e v e r w i t h o u t a b o d y ? I n t h i s p a p e r I w a n t t o resist these n e g a t i v e assessments, a n d i n s t e a d ask w h a t it is a b o u t t h e p r o j e c t of Being and Time t h a t d i c t a t e s a d e f e r r a l o r p o s t p o n e m e n t o f t a l k a b o u t the b o d y . " A s 1 s h o w below, e x p l i c i t conside r a t i o n o f t h e b o d y , o r o f D a s e i n ' s ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' , m a y b e seen t o b e a t odds w i t h the k i n d o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n H e i d e g g e r takes h i m s e l f t o b e engaged in, namely a
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f those
f e a t u r e s w h i c h are
distinctive of Dasein's ( o u r ) way of being. G i v e n Heidegger's apparent refusal to i n c l u d e e m b o d i m e n t as one of the c o n s t i t u t i v e features of Dasein's w a y of b e i n g , it is t e m p t i n g to l o o k for a place for the b o d y in o n e o f t h e o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s o f w o r l d l y e n t i t i e s H e i d e g g e r d e p l o y s : Being and
Time p r o v i d e s t w o such c a n d i d a t e s ,
n a m e l y the
ready-to-hand
(or
e q u i p m e n t ) a n d the present-at-hand ( o r mere things). M o r e o v e r , it w i l l p r o v e t o b e u s e f u l t o e x a m i n e a s u b s e q u e n t l e c t u r e c o u r s e , his 1929/30 Fundamental
Concepts
of Metaphysics:
in
these
later
lectures,
Heidegger
d e v o t e s c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e 'essence' o f o r g a n s a n d o r g a n i s m s , t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g us w i t h a t h i r d c a n d i d a t e . I w i l l a r g u e , h o w e v e r , t h a t n o n e o f these t h r e e c a n d i d a t e s p r o v e s t o b e a s a t i s f a c t o r y c a t e g o r y f o r the h u m a n b o d y . '
:
Nevertheless, by w o r k i n g t h r o u g h the various cate-
g o r i e s o f e n t i t i e s w h i c h don't h a v e D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g , a n d b y s e e i n g the difficulties a n d deficiencies i n v o l v e d i n t r y i n g t o locate the b o d y w i t h i n them, we will come to a better understanding o f Heidegger's initial deferral o f a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o D a s e i n ' s ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' and w e w i l l b e g i n t o see h o w that investigation ought to proceed. We w i l l , i n other words, begin t o see w h e r e t h e p r o b l e m a t i c i s h i d d e n a n d w h a t i t consists i n .
I In t h e first I n t r o d u c t i o n to Being and Time, H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s : D a s e i n is an e n t i t y w h i c h does not just occur a m o n g o t h e r entities. R a t h e r i t i s o n t i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y t h e fact t h a t , i n its v e r y b e i n g , t h a t b e i n g is an issue f o r i t . (BT, 3 2 )
88
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
T h i s passage m a k e s c l e a r t h a t f o r H e i d e g g e r , D a s e i n i s a n e n t i t y , a l b e i t a distinctive one. Thus, it is t e m p t i n g to t h i n k of Dasein as a b o d i l y entity, a n d t h e r e i s c e r t a i n l y n o t h i n g w r o n g w i t h s u c c u m b i n g t o this t e m p t a t i o n i n t h e sense t h a t H e i d e g g e r g i v e s u s n o r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e i n t h e possib i l i t y o f d i s e m b o d i e d D a s e i n (as D e s c a r t e s does w i t h t h e m i n d ) . H o w e v e r , t h e r e a l q u e s t i o n w o u l d seem t o b e w h e t h e r e m b o d i m e n t i s p a r t o f t h e essence o f D a s e i n , w h e t h e r b e i n g e m b o d i e d , a n d e v e n b e i n g e m b o d i e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, is part of w h a t it is to be D a s e i n . Put this way, H e i d e g g e r w o u l d , I t h i n k , b e m o r e r e l u c t a n t t o g o a l o n g , a s c a n b e seen i n t h e f o l l o w i n g passage: The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. A c c o r d i n g l y those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w h i c h c a n b e e x h i b i t e d i n t h i s e n t i t y are n o t " p r o p e r t i e s ' present-at-hand of some entity w h i c h ' l o o k s ' so and so and is i t s e l f p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d ; t h e y are i n e a c h case p o s s i b l e w a y s f o r i t t o be, and no more than that. A l l t h e b e i n g - a s - i t - i s w h i c h t h i s e n t i t y possesses is p r i m a r i l y b e i n g . So w h e n w e d e s i g n a t e t h i s e n t i t y w i t h t h e t e r m ' D a s e i n ' , w e are e x p r e s s i n g n o t its " w h a t ' (as i f i t w e r e a t a b l e , h o u s e , o r t r e e ) b u t its b e i n g . (BT, 67; s e c o n d i t a l i c s m i n e ) Thus, w h i l e D a s e i n is i n d e e d an entity, one w h i c h can be e n c o u n t e r e d w i t h i n the w o r l d , H e i d e g g e r i s e m p h a t i c i n r e s t r i c t i n g the t e r m "Dasein' to designating o n l y that entity's way of being, and 'no m o r e than that'. S u c h a r e s t r i c t i o n i n t h e scope o f t h e t e r m ' D a s e i n ' e n t a i l s a r e s t r i c t i o n in the characteristics w h i c h can be p r o p e r l y ascribed to it: A l l explicata t o w h i c h t h e a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n g i v e s rise are o b t a i n e d b y c o n s i d e r i n g D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e - s t r u c t u r e . Because D a s e i n ' s c h a r a c ters o f b e i n g are defined i n t e r m s o f existentiality, w e call t h e m 'existentialia'. T h e s e are t o b e s h a r p l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m w h a t w e c a l l 'categories' - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of b e i n g f o r e n t i t i e s w h o s e c h a r a c t e r is not that of Dasein. (BT,
70)
This division of characteristics into 'existentialia' and 'categories' appears e x h a u s t i v e : D a s e i n qua D a s e i n s h o u l d o n l y b e d e s c r i b e d i n t e r m s o f exist e n t i a l i a , a n d n o w h e r e does H e i d e g g e r suggest t h a t e m b o d i m e n t i s o n e o t t h e m . I f t h i s i s so, t h e n i t w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t o n l y ' c a t e g o r i e s ' r e m a i n , a n d s o t h a t t h e b o d y i s a n e n t i t y "whose c h a r a c t e r i s n o t t h a t o f D a s e i n ' . W e w i l l r e t u r n t o this i m p l i c a t i o n s h o r t l y . 1 1
H e i d e g g e r ' s r e l u c t a n c e t o i n c l u d e b o d i l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n his e x p l i c a t i o n o f D a s e i n (because such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a r e ' c a t e g o r i a l ' ) c a n b e seen b y p r o b i n g f u r t h e r i n t o his basic c o n c e p t i o n o f D a s e i n , n a m e l y a s
89
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
O F
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
b e i n g - i n - l h e - w o r l d : Heidegger is careful to p o i n t out that the ' i n ' c o n t a i n e d in this d e f i n i t i o n is not to be u n d e r s t o o d as d e n o t i n g spatial c o n t a i n m e n t ; D a s e i n i s n o t i n t h e w o r l d i n t h e same w a y a s a q u a n t i t y o f w a t e r i s i n a glass. I n s t e a d , t h e ' i n ' i s m e a n t t o s i g n i f y i n v o l v e m e n t o r e n g a g e m e n t w i t h o r i n t h e w o r l d . T h e sense o f ' i n ' b e i n g a p p e a l e d t o h e r e i s a k i n t o t h e sense i n w h i c h o n e i s i n t h e a r m y o r i n business: a l t h o u g h b e i n g i n v o l v e d in such things m a y by and large c o m m i t one to b e i n g spatially c o n t a i n e d i n t h i n g s l i k e b a r r a c k s a n d mess h a l l s i n t h e f i r s t e x a m p l e , o r offices a n d c o n f e r e n c e r o o m s i n t h e s e c o n d , t h e ' i n ' i n q u e s t i o n c a n n o t b e reduced t o these s p a t i a l senses. ( O n e i s n ' t i n t h e a r m y s i m p l y b y b e i n g i n s i d e a mess h a l l , n o r does o n e cease t o b e i n t h e a r m y j u s t b y s t a y i n g a w a y f r o m all b u i l d i n g s a n d structures associated w i t h i t . ) A t t e n t i o n to D a s e i n as a p h y s i c a l l y e m b o d i e d a g e n t m i g h t b l u r these k i n d s o f d i s t i n c t i o n s , w h i c h are c e n t r a l to H e i d e g g e r ' s project. T h e r e are, I t h i n k , d e e p e r r e a s o n s f o r H e i d e g g e r ' s refusal t o i n c o r p o r a t e a n a c c o u n t o f t h e b o d y i n t o his e x p l i c a t i o n o f D a s e i n . T h e s e reasons have to do w i t h the kinds of conclusions he wishes to d r a w c o n c e r n i n g D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g . T h a t is, H e i d e g g e r ' s a i m i s t o c o n d u c t a k i n d o f transcendental i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e p u r p o s e o f w h i c h i s t o r e v e a l v a r i o u s n o n c o n t i n g e n t features o f Dasein's w a y o f b e i n g . For e x a m p l e , i n the second I n t r o d u c t i o n to Being and Time, H e i d e g g e r o u t l i n e s w h a t he e x p e c t s an investigation of 'Dasein's everydayness' to uncover: I n t h i s e v e r y d a y n e s s t h e r e are c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h w e s h a l l e x h i b i t - n o t j u s t a c c i d e n t a l f e a t u r e s , b u t essentia] ones w h i c h , i n e v e r y k i n d o f b e i n g t h a t f a c t i c a l D a s e i n m a y possess, persist a s d e t e r m i n a t i v e f o r t h e c h a r a c t e r o f its b e i n g . T h u s b y h a v i n g r e g a r d f o r t h e basic state o f D a s e i n ' s e v e r y d a y n e s s , w e s h a l l b r i n g o u t t h e b e i n g of this entity in a preparatory fashion. (BT,
38)
A t t e n d i n g t o D a s e i n ' s ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' m a y b e seen t o b e a t o d d s w i t h this c o n c e p t i o n of w h a t a p h e n o m e n o l o g y of everydayness is meant to achieve: o u r e m b o d i m e n t , especially o u r b e i n g e m b o d i e d in this particular way, may be considered t o o contingent to be part of the existential analytic. H e i d e g g e r may w a n t to leave it an o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r there c o u l d be b e i n g s w h o are e m b o d i e d i n r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f b o d i e s , b u t w h o n o n e t h e l e s s possess o r e x h i b i t o u r w a y o f b e i n g , a n d a r e thus, i n a d e e p sense, t h e same k i n d o f b e i n g s a s u s . 14
G i v e n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c h a r a c t e r o f his p r o j e c t , H e i d e g g e r i s c a r e f u l t o insist t h a t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n n o t b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h , o r b e t a k e n t o b e c o m p e t i n g w i t h , v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s o f t h e ' p o s i t i v e sciences'; i n s t e a d , his a n a l y t i c m u s t b e seen a s c o m i n g b e f o r e the i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f h u m a n b e i n g s u n d e r t a k e n b y t h e s p e c i a l sciences. T h u s , H e i d e g g e r w r i t e s :
90
H E I D E G G E R
A N Π
D A S E I N
| I | n t h e e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n w e also m a k e h e a d w a y w i t h a
task
that
is
hardly
less
pressing
being itself - the
task of l a y i n g b a r e
be
the question
visible
before
than
that
of
the
question
of
t h a t a priori basis w h i c h m u s t
of "what
man
is" c a n
b e discussed
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . T h e e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o t D a s e i n c o m e s before a n y psychology or anthropology, and certainly before any biology. While these t o o are w a y s i n w h i c h D a s e i n c a n b e i n v e s t i g a t e d , w e c a n d e f i n e the t h e m e of o u r analytic w i t h greater precision if we distinguish it from
these. (BT.
In
the section
immediately
f o l l o w i n g this p a r a g r a p h
(§10),
71)
Heidegger
c o n t i n u e s t o d e l i n e a t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n his e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f Dasein
and
the
various
investigations of h u m a n
beings
undertaken
by
a n t h r o p o l o g y , p s y c h o l o g y a n d b i o l o g y , a n d c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e y "all f a i l t o give
an u n e q u i v o c a l a n d o n t o l o g i c a l l y adequate answer to the q u e s t i o n
a b o u t t h e kind o f being w h i c h b e l o n g s t o t h o s e e n t i t i e s w h i c h w e o u r s e l v e s are'
(BT.
75).
T h i s insistence on special The
sciences
Metaphysical
is
t h e p r i o r i t y o f his i n v e s t i g a t i o n o v e r t h o s e o f t h e
further
Foundations
revealed of Logic,
in
his
where
1928 he
lectures,
stresses
published
the
as
importance
o f firel u n d e r s t a n d i n g D a s e i n i n w h a t h e calls its ' n e u t r a l i t y ' . T h i n k i n g o f D a s e i n i n b o d i l y t e r m s i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , H e i d e g g e r insists, o c c l u d e s a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f its m e a n i n g . I n §10, w h i c h i s d e v o t e d t o e x p l i cating what
H e i d e g g e r calls ' D a s e i n ' s
transcendence', w h i c h
is
another
n a m e f o r its b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , h e p o i n t s t o t h i s ' n e u t r a l i t y ' o f D a s e i n : T h e p e c u l i a r neutrality o f t h e t e r m ' D a s e i n ' i s e s s e n t i a l , because the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this being must be c a r r i e d o u t p r i o r to every factual c o n c r e t i o n . T h i s n e u t r a l i t y also i n d i c a t e s t h a t D a s e i n i s n e i t h e r o f the
t w o sexes.
...
Γ η its n e u t r a l i t y D a s e i n i s n o t
the i n d i f f e r e n t
n o b o d y a n d everybody, but the p r i m o r d i a l p o s i t i v i t y and potency o f t h e essence. (MF I . .
136-7)"
A s t h i s passage i n d i c a t e s . H e i d e g g e r r e g a r d s m a i n t a i n i n g t h e n e u t r a l i t y o f D a s e i n a s e s s e n t i a l t o s e c u r i n g a p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f its w a y o f b e i n g . T h i s is n o t to say t h a t t h e r e e v e r is s u c h a t h i n g as n e u t r a l D a s e i n , as H e i d e g g e r p o i n t s o u t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g passage: N e u t r a l D a s e i n i s n e v e r w h a t exists; D a s e i n exists i n e a c h case o n l y i n its f a c t i c a l c o n c r e t i o n . B u t n e u t r a l D a s e i n i s i n d e e d the p r i m a l source of i n t r i n s i c possibility that springs up in every existence and m a k e s i t i n t r i n s i c a l l y possible. (MFL,
91
137)
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
O F
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
W i t h i n ' f a c t i c a l c o n c r e t i o n ' i n t h e a b o v e t w o passages, H e i d e g g e r i n c l u d e s e m b o d i m e n t : 'as f a c t i c a l , D a s e i n is, a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , d i s p e r s e d i n a b o d y and c o n c o m i t a n t l y , a m o n g o t h e r things, d i s u n i t e d in a p a r t i c u l a r sexuality'. T h e d i s t i n c t i o n H e i d e g g e r d r a w s b e t w e e n D a s e i n ' s ' n e u t r a l i t y ' a n d its ' f a c t i c a l c o n c r e t i o n ' d i s p l a y s just h o w s l i p p e r y his p o s i t i o n i s w i t h respect t o t h e issue o f e m b o d i m e n t . . C o n s i d e r a g a i n t h e r e m a r k s b y D r e y f u s n o t e d above: (1) ' h a v i n g a b o d y does not b e l o n g to Dasein's essential structure'; ( 2 ) ' D a s e i n i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y e m b o d i e d ' ; a n d ( 3 ) ' t h e b o d y i s n o t essent i a l ' . R e m a r k s ( 1 ) a n d ( 3 ) a p p e a r t o a c c o r d w i t h w h a t H e i d e g g e r says b o t h in
Being
and
Time
and
in
The
Metaphysical
Foundations
of Logic
(for
the
latter w o r k , just replace 'essential' w i t h ' n e u t r a l ' ) . H o w e v e r , (2) is m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c ; is it s i m p l y e q u i v a l e n t to ( 1 ) a n d (3)? D o e s ' n o t necessarily e m b o d i e d ' m e a n ' p o s s i b l y d i s e m b o d i e d " ? I f so, h o w d o e s o n e t h e n u n d e r s t a n d H e i d e g g e r ' s c l a i m t h a t ' n e u t r a l D a s e i n i s n e v e r w h a t exists'? W h a t is the m o d a l force of 'never'? If ' n e v e r ' means 'necessarily never', t h e n ( 2 ) i s false, b u t t h e n i f ( 2 ) i s false, ( 1 ) a n d ( 3 ) b e c o m e h a r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d , l e t a l o n e j u s t i f y . " ' T h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n d i c a t e t h a t c o n s i d e r a b l e care must
be
taken
in
properly
locating Dasein's
'bodily
nature', w i t h i n
H e i d e g g e r ' s o v e r a l l project: in p a r t i c u l a r , the contrast b e t w e e n essential and accidental is likely to prove misleading. Heidegger's talk of 'neutrality' and 'dispersal' is indeed likely to mislead, a s s u c h t a l k m a k e s i t t e m p t i n g t o t h i n k o f t h e b o d y a s s o m e t h i n g other t h a n D a s e i n , i n t o w h i c h i t , u n d e r s t o o d i n its ' p e c u l i a r n e u t r a l i t y ' , i s dispersed.
17
I n other words, the exclusion o f e m b o d i m e n t f r o m a n e x p l i -
c a t i o n of n e u t r a l D a s e i n m a y lead one to t h i n k that the b o d y is not so m u c h secondary r e l a t i v e to the e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c as it is a m e m b e r of a n o t h e r category altogether. In the next section, I w a n t to e x p l o r e this t e m p t a t i o n , if o n l y to show u l t i m a t e l y that it ought to be avoided.
II Since i t i s c l e a r t h a t H e i d e g g e r d o e s n o t w a n t i n a n y w a y t o i d e n t i f y D a s e i n w i t h its b o d y o r e v e n i n c l u d e t a l k o f its ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' i n a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f its ' p e c u l i a r n e u t r a l i t y ' , i t w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t t h e b o d y b e l o n g s i n o n e o f those c a t e g o r i e s o f e n t i t i e s w h i c h d o n ' t h a v e D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g . H e i d e g g e r o f f e r s t w o c a n d i d a t e s in Being and Time, w h i l e in a s u b s e q u e n t l e c t u r e c o u r s e f r o m 1929/30, a t h i r d c o m e s i n t o v i e w . A s w e s h a l l see, h o w e v e r , n o n e o f these c a t e g o r i e s p r o v i d e s a d e q u a t e r e s o u r c e s f o r c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e b o d y as a s p e c i f i c a l l y human b o d y ; t h e f a i l u r e of these t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s u n d e r s c o r e s , i n t u r n , H e i d e g g e r ' s i n i t i a l reluctance t o discuss t h e b o d y , r a t h e r t h a n r e l e g a t e i t t o a n o t h e r c a t e g o r y . I s t h e b o d y a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t , i.e. s o m e t h i n g r e a d y - t o - h a n d , o r i s i t i n s t e a d a m e r e t h i n g , s o m e t h i n g p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d ? H e i d e g g e r insists t h a t
92
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
D a s e i n is n e v e r lo be r e g a r d e d as a b e a r e r of p r o p e r l i e s , as s o m e t h i n g e n c o u n t e r e d present-at-hand, b u t this insistence m a y not e x t e n d lo the b o d y . A f t e r a l l , the b o d y can be the p r o p e r subject of a scientific i n q u i r y , indeed many different such inquiries, all the w a y d o w n to chemistry and physics a n d all the w a y up to a n a t o m y a n d physiology. W h e n the b o d y is t r e a t e d i n s u c h a m a n n e r , its p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d aspects are r e v e a l e d a n d s y s t e m a t i z e d . T h u s , t h e r e i s a sense i n w h i c h t h e b o d y , a s o n e m o r e k i n d of c o r p o r e a l o b j e c t , c a n be r e g a r d e d as s o m e t h i n g p r e s e n t - a t - h a n d , as a b e a r e r o f p r o p e r t i e s such a s h e i g h t a n d w e i g h t ( a n d c h e m i c a l c o m p o s i tion . . . ) . 1 8
S e v e r a l p r o b l e m s arise, h o w e v e r , i n c o n s i d e r i n g p r e s e n c e - a l - h a n d a s the category for the h u m a n b o d y To b e g i n w i t h , t r e a t i n g the b o d y as a mere t h i n g w h i c h D a s e i n i n s o m e w a y infuses o r i n h a b i t s i s a p t t o b r i n g w i t h i t t h e s u s p i c i o n t h a t d u a l i s m has n o t s o m u c h b e e n o v e r c o m e , a s s i m p l y redescribed. G i v e n the a n t i - C a r t e s i a n aspirations that i n f o r m m u c h o f Being and Time a n d H e i d e g g e r ' s o t h e r e a r l y w r i t i n g s , t h i s s u s p i c i o n s h o u l d b e p a r t i c u l a r l y u n w e l c o m e . B u t t r e a t i n g the b o d y a s a m e r e t h i n g b r i n g s w i t h i t other, m o r e pressing, difficulties i n terms o f h o w t o characterize w h a t a b o d y does: t h e p o v e r t y o f t h i n k i n g o f o u r b o d i e s a s j u s t m o r e s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l t h i n g s a m o n g o t h e r s c a n be seen b y t h i n k i n g o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g h u m a n a c t i o n s a n d gestures i n t e r m s o f the concepts associated w i t h presence-at-hand. R a i s i n g m y a r m , f o r e x a m p l e , treated as a m e r e b o d i l y m o v e m e n t , can be described in the l a n g u a g e s o f p h y s i c s a n d b i o l o g y , a s t h e m o t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g w i t h such a n d s u c h mass w i t h v a r i o u s g o i n g s - o n a t t h e m i c r o - a n d m a c r o - p h y s i c a l l e v e l . S u c h d e s c r i p t i o n s d o n o t , h o w e v e r , c a p t u r e t h e significance o f t h e m o v e m e n t : 1 m a y , f o r e x a m p l e , be r a i s i n g my a r m to ask a q u e s t i o n at a c o l l o q u i u m , t o w a v e t o a f r i e n d , o r t o d r i v e a n a i l i n t o a piece o f w o o d . U n d e r s t a n d i n g h u m a n a c t i o n s a n d gestures i n t h i s l a t t e r way, a s h a v i n g a significance that cannot be c a p t u r e d in p u r e l y physical or b i o l o g i c a l terms, moves the b o d y out of the r e a l m of the present-at-hand, and i n t o the d o m a i n o f m e a n i n g f u l w o r l d l y activity. T h i s brings u s t o o u r second c a n d i d a t e , r e a d i n e s s - t o - h a n d , since t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n u n d e r s t a n d i n g entities as mere things a n d as significant items w i t h i n the e v e r y d a y w o r l d c a n b e seen i n h o w o n e i s t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t i t i s f o r a n e n t i t y t o b e a n i t e m of equipment. Consider one of Heidegger's favourite examples: a h a m m e r . For Heidegger, what it is for something to be a h a m m e r cannot b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s (shape, w e i g h t , c o l o u r , m o l e c u l a r c o m p o s i t i o n , etc.) o f a n o b j e c t . T o say w h a t a h a m m e r is, o n e m u s t d e s c r i b e hammering; o n e m u s t , t h a t is, d e s c r i b e t h e w a y s in w h i c h a h a m m e r i s used. I n d o i n g so, o n e w i l l i n e v i t a b l y m e n t i o n o t h e r ' t h i n g s ' s u c h as nails, saws, a n d l u m b e r , a n d purposes s u c h as h o l d i n g t w o pieces o f w o o d t o g e t h e r , c o n s t r u c t i n g a h o u s e o r p i e c e o f f u r n i t u r e , a n d roles such as b e i n g a c a r p e n t e r or c r a f t s p e r s o n .
93
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
Ο Γ
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
W h a t a h a m m e r is, first a n d f o r e m o s t , is a p i e c e of equipment, a n d in s a y i n g w h a t a n y o n e p i e c e o f e q u i p m e n t is, o n e m u s t r e f e r t o o t h e r pieces o f e q u i p m e n t , as w e l l as t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e uses i n f u l f i l l i n g v a r i o u s a i m s a n d p u r p o s e s . T h a t i s w h y H e i d e g g e r says t h a t ' t a k e n s t r i c t l y , t h e r e " i s " n o s u c h t h i n g a s a n e q u i p m e n t ' (BT, 9 7 ) . H e c o n t i n u e s : To the being of any e q u i p m e n t there always belongs a t o t a l i t y of e q u i p m e n t , i n w h i c h i t c a n b e t h i s e q u i p m e n t t h a t i t is. E q u i p m e n t i s e s s e n t i a l l y " s o m e t h i n g - i n - o r d e r - t o . . .'. A t o t a l i t y o f e q u i p m e n t i s c o n s t i t u t e d by various ways of the ' i n - o i d e r - t o ' , such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, m a n i p u l a b i l i t y . (BT, 9 7 ) Thus, any piece of e q u i p m e n t is n o t m e r e l y some discrete, s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l t h i n g : w h a t i t i s i s c a p t u r e d o n l y b y d e s c r i b i n g its p l a c e w i t h i n a h o l i s t i c s t r u c t u r e c o n s t i t u t e d b y a n a r r a y o f tasks a n d p u r p o s e s , a l o n g w i t h o t h e r items of e q u i p m e n t .
A h a m m e r i s s o m e t h i n g with
to h a m m e r in
which
n a i l s in order to h o l d pieces of w o o d t o g e t h e r toward t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of s o m e t h i n g for the sake
of D a s e i n ' s s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g as
a
carpenter.
B u t is, say, m y a r m , o r m y b o d y a s a w h o l e f o r t h a t m a t t e r , l i k e i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t s u c h a s h a m m e r s a n d nails? C a n t h e h u m a n b o d y b e l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h i s s t r u c t u r e c o n s t i t u t e d b y the w i l h - w h i c h / i n - o r d e r - t o / l o w a r d w h i c h / f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h i c h s y s t e m o f r e l a t i o n s ? A p a r t f r o m the o d d n e s s of treating the h a n d and other parts of the b o d y as themselves ready-toh a n d , u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e b o d y a s o n e m o r e i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t m a y a t first a p p e a r p r o m i s i n g a s a n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t o f its w a y o f b e i n g . T h r e e c o n s i d erations
i m m e d i a t e l y present
themselves:
First, consider again the e x a m p l e o f m y raising m y a r m : this episode m a y be explicated in such a m a n n e r that my a r m plays a role analogous t o o n e p l a y e d b y a h a m m e r i n t h e w o r k s h o p . W e m i g h t b e i n c l i n e d t o say s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h i s : my a r m is s o m e t h i n g with which I w a v e to a f r i e n d toward t h e act of e x t e n d i n g a g r e e t i n g in order to in fact g r e e t t h a t f r i e n d for the sake of my
being a
friendly
person.
( O f course,
the
arm
is
an
e x t r e m e l y v e r s a t i l e p i e c e o f e q u i p m e n t , since w h a t i t ' s e q u i p m e n t f o r i s m u c h m o r e o p e n - e n d e d t h a n , say, a h a m m e r : I c a n use m y a r m t o w a v e , ask a q u e s t i o n , g r a b s o m e t h i n g , p o k e s o m e t h i n g , a n d s o o n a n d s o o n . ) S e c o n d , t h e k i n d o f h o l i s t i c s t r u c t u r e H e i d e g g e r r e g a r d s a s necessary f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g the w a y o f b e i n g o f e q u i p m e n t m i g h t b e suitably a p p l i e d to parts of the b o d y : in o r d e r for s o m e t h i n g to be a h a n d , it must be inte grated p r o p e r l y w i t h i n a larger structure; it must be connected to an a r m , w h i c h i s c o n n e c t e d t o a t o r s o , etc. A h a n d t h a t has b e e n s e v e r e d f r o m the rest o f t h e b o d y i s n o l o n g e r a h a n d , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , since i t n o l o n g e r has t h e p r o p e r f u n c t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h hands. T h i r d , p a r t s o f t h e b o d y h a v e the same k i n d o f •transparency' a s s m o o t h l y f u n c t i o n i n g i t e m s
94
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
o f e q u i p m e n t . W h a t I m e a n h e r e c a n best b e seen i n t h e f o l l o w i n g passage, w h e r e i n H e i d e g g e r describes e q u i p m e n t ' s tendency t o ' w i t h d r a w ' insofar as i t ' s b e i n g u s e d : T h e p e c u l i a r i t y o f w h a t i s p r o x i m a l l y r e a d y - l o - h a n d i s t h a t , i n its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, w i t h d r a w in order to be readyto-hand quite authentically. That w i t h w h i c h our everyday dealings p r o x i m a l l y d w e l l is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that w i t h w h i c h we c o n c e r n ourselves p r i m a r i l y is the w o r k - that w h i c h is to be p r o d u c e d at the t i m e . (BT,
99)
In the same way, it m i g h t be a r g u e d that the parts of the b o d y have this same t e n d e n c y t o w i t h d r a w i n s o f a r a s w h e n w e are a c t i v e l y c o p i n g w i t h o u r e n v i r o n m e n t , w e d o n o t , f o r t h e m o s t p a r t , focus o u r a t t e n t i o n o n t h e p a r t s o f t h e b o d y w e are e m p l o y i n g b u t i n s t e a d w e focus o n t h e a c t i v i t y itself. I f I h a d t o t h i n k a b o u t a l l t h e v a r i o u s m o v e m e n t s I m u s t effect t o t y p e , say, o r t o w a l k f r o m m y a p a r t m e n t t o c a m p u s , I w o u l d b e u n a b l e t o 1
act i n a n y t h i n g l i k e t h e s m o o t h a n d seamless m a n n e r I u s u a l l y d o . ' ' D e s p i t e the apparent s u b s t i t u t a b i l i l y of my a r m for a h a m m e r in the above e x a m p l e of w a v i n g to a f r i e n d , the holistic structure of parts of the body, and the 'transparency' or tendency to w i t h d r a w of b o t h e q u i p m e n t a n d t h e b o d y m o s t l a t e l y n o t e d , t h e r e s t i l l seems t o be s o m e t h i n g o d d a b o u t t r e a t i n g o u r b o d i e s a s just m o r e i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t t o b e s k i l f u l l y m a n i p u l a t e d l i k e s o m a n y h a m m e r s a n d f o u n t a i n pens. A s w e s h a l l see shortly, b o t h the a l l u r e a n d the oddness o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t the b o d y and its p a r t s i n t e r m s o f e q u i p m e n t p r o v i d e , a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , a p o i n t of entry for a r r i v i n g at a p r o p e r understanding of biological organisms. Indeed, it is precisely by distinguishing organs and organisms f r o m items o f e q u i p m e n t t h a t he, i n his 1929/30 l e c t u r e s , b e g i n s t o a r t i c u l a t e w h a t h e c o n s i d e r s t o b e t h e 'essence' o f t h e o r g a n i s m . T o a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h o s e lectures w e n o w t u r n . Part
II
of
the
Fundamental
Concepts
lectures
is
concerned
primarily
w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n , ' W h a t i s w o r l d ? " I n o r d e r t o a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n , h o w e v e r , H e i d e g g e r m a k e s a l e n g t h y d e t o u r t h r o u g h a n u m b e r o f theses, t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f w h i c h h e r e g a r d s a s necessary t o a n s w e r i n g his f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n . T h r e e o f these s u b s i d i a r y theses are t h e f o l l o w i n g : ( 1 ) M a n i s w o r l d - f o r m i n g ; (2) T h e a n i m a l i s p o o r i n w o r l d ; and (3) T h e stone i s w o r l d l e s s . B y a t t e n d i n g t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n a n d a m o n g stones, a n i m a l s , a n d h u m a n beings, H e i d e g g e r h o p e s t o c l a r i f y w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n a n s w e r i n g his p r i m a r y q u e s t i o n . W i t h i n his c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e s e c o n d o f t h e t h r e e s u b s i d i a r y theses, n a m e l y t h a t t h e a n i m a l i s p o o r i n w o r l d , H e i d e g g e r b r o a c h e s t h e issue o f j u s t w h a t it is f o r s o m e t h i n g to be an organism, a n d it is h e r e t h a t he
95
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
Ο Γ
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
t u r n s his a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n b o d i l y o r g a n s a n d i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t . H o w t h e p l a c e m e n t o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i t h i n his c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the
essence
o f animals affects t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h w e c a n a p p l y
c o n c l u s i o n s t o human
bodies w i l l . b e considered
the
later.
H e i d e g g e r begins by n o t i n g that ' b o t h unicellular and m u l t i c e l l u l a r l i v i n g b e i n g s a l i k e possess a unity of t h e i r o w n in e a c h case, i.e. t h e y h a v e a specific
essential
(FCM, 2 1 2 ) . is
an
by
wholeness
virtue
of
the
fact
that
B u t , as H e i d e g g e r i m m e d i a t e l y goes on
organismV
(FCM,
212),
and
answering this
they
are
to ask,
question,
it
organisms'
'whatprecisely turns
out,
requires a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of various k i n d s of beings: "purely m a t e r i a l things, equipment,
instrument,
apparatus,
device,
machine,
organ,
organism,
a n i m a l i t y ' (FCM, 2 1 3 ) . U n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t a n o r g a n i s m is, t h e n , r e q u i r e s a c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h this range of different kinds of beings in o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h a t m a r k s or features distinguish organisms as organisms f r o m that e n t i r e array. H e i d e g g e r b e g i n s t h e task o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g o r g a n s f r o m e q u i p m e n t b y n o t i n g the difference
in
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f use.
He
observes
that whereas
i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t are a v a i l a b l e f o r use b y m o r e t h a n o n e p e r s o n , t h e same i s n o t t r u e f o r b o d i l y o r g a n s : ' R a t h e r , e v e r y l i v i n g b e i n g c a n o n l y e v e r see w i t h its eyes' (FCM, 2 1 9 ) . U n l i k e e q u i p m e n t , w h i c h e n j o y s a k i n d of independence
relative
to various
potential
users, o r g a n s ' a r e
incor
p o r a t e d i n t o t h e b e i n g t h a t m a k e s use o f t h e m . T h u s w e c a n r e c o g n i z e a n initial distinction by s a y i n g t h a t an o r g a n is an i n s t r u m e n t w h i c h is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e u s e r ' (FCM, 2 1 9 ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s p o i n t h e r e is t h a t t h e sense o f ownership sense
in
the
case
of ownership
there
of a
body
might
be
is
hardly
in
t h e case
on
a
par w i t h whatever
of particular items
of
e q u i p m e n t : w h i l e I m a y be able to ' l e n d y o u a h a n d ' , my d o i n g so is a v e r y d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f act t h a n
my lending you my hammer.
Items of
e q u i p m e n t are t h i n g s w h i c h c a n b e h e l d i n c o m m o n , a n d c a n b e used i n the same way b y anyone, w h e r e a s t h i s is c l e a r l y n o t t h e case w i t h m y o r a n y o n e else's b o d y . To r e t u r n to the example of my raising my a r m , w h i l e it is certainly t r u e t h a t y o u c a n raise m y a r m f o r m e , y o u r d o i n g s o a n d m y d o i n g s o o n m y o w n a r e t w o r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f act. I raise m y a r m directly, w h e r e a s s o m e o n e else w o u l d f i r s t h a v e t o l o c a t e m y a r m a n d b y m e a n s o f h e r a r m get m i n e t o m o v e : t h e m o v e m e n t is, w e m i g h t say, o n l y i n d i r e c t i n t h e l a t t e r case. 2 " M y a r m i s n o t s o m e t h i n g o u t s i d e o f m y s e l f , w h o s e m o v e m e n t I effect b y m e a n s o f s o m e t h i n g else: I j u s t m o v e m y a r m . T h e idea of there b e i n g a direct c o n n e c t i o n between parts of the b o d y a n d the
organism
is h i n t e d
at
in
Heidegger's
talk
o f o r g a n s a s incorporated
i n t o the entity: my a r m , for example, is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o my body, w h i c h i s w h y I c a n m o v e i i i n a d i f f e r e n t w a y t h a n s o m e o n e else c a n . 2 1 H e i d e g g e r continues,
however,
by
noting
that
the
idea
of
incorporation
being
a p p e a l e d t o h e r e i s q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g , since w h a t a n o r g a n i s i n c o r p o r a t e d
96
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
i n t o i s a n o r g a n i s m , b u l i l i s t h e essence o f I h e o r g a n i s m w h i c h i s b e i n g investigated. I n c o r p o r a t i o n , t h e n , serves t o m a r k o n l y a n i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e q u i p m e n t a n d b o d i l y o r g a n s ; s o m e t h i n g m o r e needs t o b e said i n o r d e r t o m a k e the d i s t i n c t i o n c l e a r e r . I n d e e d , e v e n w i t h t h e a p p e a l t o i n c o r p o r a t i o n , organs a n d items o f e q u i p m e n t still have this m u c h i n c o m m o n : b o t h are used f o r s o m e t h i n g ( t h e h a m m e r f o r h a m m e r i n g , t h e eye f o r s e e i n g ) ; b o t h are, H e i d e g g e r notes, c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y b e i n g w h a t h e calls 'serviceable'. B u t w h a t is i t , then, w h i c h distinguishes equipment f r o m b o d i l y o r g a n s i f b o t h ' f i n d t h e i r essence i n s e r v i c e a b i l i t y ' ? I t has b e e n seen t h a t t h e w a y i n w h i c h these t w o k i n d s o f e n t i t i e s are s e r v i c e a b l e i s d i f f e r e n t i n t h a t i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t are a v a i l a b l e f o r use b y m o r e t h a n one
creature,
whereas
bodily
organs,
by
being
incorporated
into
an
o r g a n i s m , are a v a i l a b l e f o r use o n l y b y t h a t o n e b e i n g . B u t t h i s o n l y seems t o d e m a r c a t e b o d i l y o r g a n s a s a s p e c i a l class o f e q u i p m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n an altogether different k i n d of things. A f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n i s c a l l e d f o r , w h i c h takes i n t o a c c o u n t b o t h t h e idea of i n c o r p o r a t i o n and w h a t I have called the 'directness' of the connect i o n b e t w e e n t h e o r g a n i s m a n d its v a r i o u s organs. T h e s e ideas are c a p t u r e d i n H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a n i t e m o f e q u i p m e n t ' s readiness a n d a
bodily
o r g a n ' s capacity:
R e a d i n e s s i n t h i s specific a n d w e l l - d e f i n e d sense b e l o n g s t o e q u i p m e n t . A s e q u i p m e n t the p e n i s r e a d y f o r w r i t i n g , b u t i l has n o c a p a c i t y f o r w r i t i n g . As a p e n il is n o t capable of w r i t i n g . It is a matter
of
distinguishing
readiness,
as
a particular
kind
of potentiality
w h i c h w e a s c r i b e t o e q u i p m e n t , f r o m capacity. (FCM,
220)
E q u i p m e n t i s a l w a y s r e a d y f o r s o m e t h i n g , a n d a n o r g a n has a c a p a c i t y f o r s o m e t h i n g , b u t e q u i p m e n t i s r e a d y f o r use regardless o f w h e t h e r i t ' s a c t i v e l y b e i n g t a k e n h o l d o f o r g a t h e r i n g d u s t i n the b a c k o f the w o r k s h o p ; o r g a n s , b y c o n t r a s t , h a v e the c a p a c i t i e s t h e y h a v e , t o see, t o g r i p , t o p u m p b l o o d , a n d s o f o r t h , o n l y i n s o f a r a s t h e y are i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a l i v i n g o r g a n i s m , a n d t h e r e is n o sense t o be m a d e o f an o r g a n ' p r i o r ' t o its b e i n g i n t e g r a t e d ; t h i s i s w h y H e i d e g g e r insists t h a t a n o r g a n 'is n e v e r f i r s t a n i n s t r u m e n t w h i c h subsequently also gels i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o s o m e t h i n g else'. I n d e e d , H e i d e g g e r goes s o far a s t o say t h a t t h e e x p r e s s i o n , ' A n o r g a n has a c a p a c i t y ' i s i t s e l f m i s l e a d i n g , a n d h e suggests i n s t e a d t h a t t h e r e v e r s e i s t r u e : ' w e c a n n o t say t h a t t h e o r g a n has c a p a c i t i e s , b u t m u s t say t h a t the capacity has organs' (FCM, 2 2 1 ) . U n l i k e an i t e m of e q u i p m e n t , w h i c h i s s e r v i c e a b l e f o r s o m e t h i n g , the o r g a n , H e i d e g g e r m a i n tains, is in t h e s e r v i c e of s o m e t h i n g , n a m e l y the c a p a c i t y w h i c h is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r its p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s r e v e r s a l o f t h e p o s s e s s i o n - r e l a t i o n
97
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
J O U R N A L
O F
P H I L O S O P H I C A L
S T U D I E S
b e t w e e n a n o r g a n a n d a c a p a c i t y s u c h t h a t i t ' s m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e t o say t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y has a n o r g a n serves t o u n d e r s c o r e t h e p r i o r i t y o f t h e o r g a n i s m o v e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l parts. R e c a l l a r e m a r k o f H e i d e g g e r ' s I c i t e d p r e v i o u s l y : h e b e g i n s his d i s c u s s i o n o f o r g a n s a n d o r g a n i s m s b y e m p h a sizing the 'essential wholeness' o f a n o r g a n i s m . I l i s i n terms o f that e s s e n t i a l w h o l e n e s s t h a t a n o r g a n i s t h e k i n d o f t h i n g i t is. F u r t h e r m o r e , w e are n o w i n a p o s i t i o n t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h i s ' e s s e n t i a l w h o l e n e s s ' o f a n o r g a n i s m : t h e o r g a n i s m i s its c a p a c i t i e s , o r a n i n s t a n t i a t i o n o f a set o f c a p a c i t i e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e o r g a n i s m , t a k e n a s its c a p a c i t i e s , has a k i n d o f a u t o n o m y t h a t m a k e s i t d i f f e r e n t f r o m a m a c h i n e . W h i l e m a c h i n e s c e r t a i n l y h a v e c a p a c i t i e s i n some sense, t h e y l a c k t h e k i n d o f essential wholeness o f organisms b y standing i n need o f s o m e t h i n g o r s o m e o n e else t o " a c t i v a t e ' o r e x e r c i s e t h o s e capacities, a n d , m o r e o v e r , t o maintain
and
repair
them
when
malfunctions
occur.
Organisms,
by
c o n t r a s t , are "essentially w h o l e ' i n t h a t t h e y possess a n d exercise t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s i n d e p e n d e n t l y ; t h e r e is, i n o t h e r w o r d s , n o n e e d f o r s o m e f u r t h e r t h i n g o r a g e n t t o e x e r c i s e a n o r g a n i s m ' s capacities. A n o r g a n i s m i s c a p a b l e , o n its o w n , o f such t h i n g s a s m o v e m e n t , e a t i n g , a n d d i g e s t i o n ; its p a r t s , its v a r i o u s o r g a n s , are i n s o m e sense t h e p r o d u c t o f those c a p a c i t i e s , o r , perhaps, the m a t e r i a l r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e m . ( T h i s is w h y , I take i l , H e i d e g g e r insists on s a y i n g t h a t a c r e a t u r e d o e s n o t see because it has eyes, b u t r a t h e r has eyes because i t c a n see.) B o d i l y o r g a n s are, t h e n , t h e m a n i f e s tation
of an
o r g a n i s m ' s c a p a c i t i e s a n d serve
t o effect
the o r g a n i s m ' s
e x e r c i s i n g o f t h e m . T h i s a g a i n serves t o m a r k a f u n d a m e n t a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n organs and items of e q u i p m e n t , b e t w e e n serviceability and w h a t H e i d e g g e r calls ' s u b s e r v i e n c e ' . A s H e i d e g g e r p u t s i t , ' t h e o r g a n stands i n s e r v i c e o f t h e c a p a c i t y t h a t d e v e l o p s i t ' (FCM, 2 2 6 ) a n d s o i s s u b s e r v i e n t t o t h a t c a p a c i t y . 'This i s i n m a r k e d c o n t r a s t t o t h e s e r v i c e a b i l i t y o f t h e pen, for example, w h i c h , once
produced, is no longer tied
to what
produced it. Heidegger's talk of subservience as opposed to serviceability is meant t o r e i n f o r c e the d i r e c t n e s s o f t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n a n o r g a n i s m a n d its parts: the b o d i l y o r g a n is a part of the o r g a n i s m insofar as it is subservient to a capacity a n d is the r e a l i z a t i o n of i t . I t e m s of e q u i p m e n t , by contrast, are n o t s u b s e r v i e n t t o a n y p a r t i c u l a r c a p a c i t y : t h e y are r e a d y t o b e used, b u t n o t b y a n y o n e i n p a r t i c u l a r . A h a m m e r m a y b e t a k e n u p a n d used b y s o m e o n e o r o t h e r , o r a g a i n i t m a y s i m p l y b e cast aside. W h o uses t h e h a m m e r a n d w h e n i s i r r e l e v a n t t o its b e i n g the h a m m e r t h a t i l is; i n d e e d , w h e t h e r it's u s e d a t a l l m a k e s n o d i f f e r e n c e , a s i l w e r e , t o the h a m m e r . A s H e i d e g g e r n o t e s : "The h a m m e r i s c e r t a i n l y r e a d y f o r h a m m e r i n g , b u t t h e b e i n g of t h e h a m m e r is not an urge toward h a m m e r i n g . By c o n t r a s t s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h e eye, f o r e x a m p l e , w h i c h b e l o n g s t o a c a p a c i t y a n d subserves the c a p a c i t y of s e e i n g , c a n do so o n l y because t h e capacity is itself intrinsically subservient a n d
as such
can
98
lake something i n t o service'
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
(FCM, 2 2 6 ) . B o d i l y o r g a n s are a n u r g e t o w a r d t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s by b e i n g caught up in a n e t w o r k of self-activating capacities.
Ill Heidegger's
discussion
of
organs
and
organisms
in
his
Fundamental
Concepts l e c t u r e s p r o v i d e s at t h e v e r y least a s k e t c h of t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a n o r g a n i s m a n d its p a r t s o n the o n e h a n d , a n d m a c h i n e s a n d i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t o n t h e o t h e r . Parts o f a n o r g a n i s m f o r m a n i n t e g r a t e d w h o l e a n d are s u b s e r v i e n t t o t h e c a p a c i t i e s o f w h i c h i l i s c o m p o s e d ; t h e o r g a n i c b o d y i s a n essential w h o l e , i n t h a t i t i s a u t o n o m o u s a n d selfp e r p e t u a t i n g . H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c u s s i o n , m o r e o v e r , serves t o fill i n a g a p i n Being and Time in t h a t he has l i t t l e to say in t h a t e a r l i e r w o r k a b o u t b i o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s m s . H o w e v e r , t h e q u e s t i o n I w a n t t o pose i s w h e t h e r his d i s c u s s i o n fills i n t h e g a p w i t h w h i c h w e h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d ; does i t , i n o t h e r words, help t o clarify the ' w h o l e p r o b l e m a t i c ' h i d d e n i n Dasein's ' b o d i l y n a t u r e ' , t o w h i c h H e i d e g g e r , a s w e h a v e seen, a l l u d e s w i t h o u t further commentary It
might
answered
seem
by
in
that
means
Being and various
of
the
Time!
questions
array
of
about
the
concepts
human
afforded
body
are
by
the
us
Fundamental Concepts l e c t u r e s : h u m a n b e i n g s are, at least in p a r t , b i o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s m s , a n d are t h u s ( a g a i n , a t least i n p a r t ) b u n d l e s o f c a p a c i t i e s , for movement, ingestion and digestion, and so forth.
P r o b l e m s arise,
h o w e v e r , i n s o f a r a s w e t r y t o s p e l l o u t those c a p a c i t i e s , since w h a t a h u m a n b e i n g , a n d s o a h u m a n b o d y , does, a c c o r d i n g t o H e i d e g g e r , i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the b e h a v i o u r o f a n a n i m a l . Recall that H e i d e g g e r s i t u a t e s his d i s c u s s i o n o f o r g a n s a n d o r g a n i s m s w i t h i n a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e thesis t h a t t h e a n i m a l i s ' p o o r i n w o r l d ' . T h e a n i m a l ' s p o v e r t y i s d i r e c t l y related
to
its
existence
as
a
collection
of capacities,
namely
as
an
a u t o n o m o u s , e s s e n t i a l l y c l o s e d s y s t e m o f i n s t i n c t u a l responses a n d b i o l o g i cal d r i v e s . H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s t h e a n i m a l a s ' c a p t i v a t e d ' , a n d a s ' e n c i r c l e d b y a d i s i n h i b i t i n g r i n g ' , a n d t h e a n i m a l ' s c a p t i v a t i o n i s a p r o d u c t o f its c a p a c i t i e s ; a s c a p t i v a t e d a n d e n c i r c l e d , t h e a n i m a l i s n o t o p e n t o the w o r l d i n the way i n w h i c h h u m a n beings a r e .
:2
A t o n e p o i n t i n his d i s c u s s i o n , H e i d e g g e r n o t e s t h a t ' i t i s i n d e e d quest i o n a b l e w h e t h e r w h a t w e c a l l h u m a n seeing i s t h e same a s a n i m a l seeing. S e e i n g a n d s e e i n g are n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g , a l t h o u g h h u m a n b e i n g s a n d a n i m a l s b o t h possess eyes a n d e v e n t h e a n a t o m i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e eye is alike
i n b o t h cases'
(FCM, 2 1 9 ) , a n d f u r t h e r o n ,
he
is even m o r e
e m p h a t i c i n his d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f h u m a n b e i n g s f r o m a n i m a l s : ' [ W ] e s h o u l d not c o m p a r e o u r o w n seeing w i t h that o f the a n i m a l w i t h o u t f u r t h e r ado, since
the
seeing
and
the potentiality
to
see
w h e r e a s our potentiality to see u l t i m a t e l y possibility
and
possesses
a
quite
different
99
of the
has a manner
animal
is
a
capacity:
quite different character of of being'
(FCM,
231).
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P H I L O S O P H I C A L S T U D I E S
Heidegger's point in
these passages i s t h a t
h u m a n seeing, a n d h u m a n
p e r c e p t i o n i n g e n e r a l , i s c o n c e p t u a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d : h u m a n b e i n g s see t h i n g s a s the t h i n g s t h e y are, w h i c h i s t o say t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s are c a p a b l e o f b r i n g i n g the o b j e c t s i n t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t u n d e r c o n c e p t s , a n d s o o f f o r m i n g j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e m , w h i c h i s s o m e t h i n g e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the animal's m e r e l y d i f f e r e n t i a l responses.
11
T h a t is why, when Heidegger turns
t o t h e thesis t h a t ' m a n i s w o r l d - f o r m i n g ' , h e d e v o t e s c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n to the nature of assertion. Heidegger's p o i n t about p e r c e p t i o n a n d specifically linguistic capacities e x t e n d s t o h u m a n a c t i v i t y i n g e n e r a l , w h i c h h e p r e f e r s t o c a l l comportment r a t h e r t h a n
behaviour:
T h e specific manner in w h i c h
m a n is we s h a l l c a l l comportment a n d
t h e specific manner in
the
which
animal
is we
shall
call
behavior.
T h e y are f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m o n e a n o t h e r . . . . T h e b e h a v i o r of the a n i m a l is n o t a doing and acting, as in h u m a n c o m p o r t m e n t , but
a
driven performing.
In
saying
this
we
mean
to
suggest
that
instinctual drivenness, as it were, characterizes all such a n i m a l p e r f o r mance. {FCM.
237)
C o m p o r t m e n t , i n c o n t r a s t t o the b e h a v i o u r o f the a n i m a l , consists o f m e a n i n g f u l a c t i o n s , a n d t h u s i s m o r e t h a n i n s t i n c t u a l responses t o e n v i r o n m e n t a l cues; m o r e o v e r , t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f h u m a n a c t i o n p o i n t s t o its l a c k o f a u t o n o m y : D a s e i n , we are t o l d in Being and Time, j u s t is its c a p a b i l i t y t o be, b u t h o w t h o s e c a p a b i l i t i e s are s p e l l e d o u t i s i n t e r m s o f s o c i a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d n o r m s a n d practices. In this way, a h u m a n being, u n d e r s t o o d a s D a s e i n , d o e s n o t h a v e c a p a b i l i t i e s i n the a u t o n o m o u s w a y i n w h i c h a b i o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s m has c a p a c i t i e s , a n d t h i s l a c k o f a u t o n o m y , I w o u l d suggest, e x t e n d s t o h o w t h e b o d y i t s e l f i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d .
2 4
As we have
a l r e a d y seen, H e i d e g g e r e x p l i c i t l y w a r n s against a p p r o a c h i n g q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g o u r w a y o f b e i n g f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f b i o l o g y , a n d i n d e e d , echoes o f t h i s s e n t i m e n t c a n b e f o u n d i n his l a t e r ' L e t t e r o n H u m a n i s m ' , where he writes: T h e fact t h a t p h y s i o l o g y a n d p h y s i o l o g i c a l c h e m i s t r y c a n s c i e n t i f i cally e x p l a i n m a n as an o r g a n i s m is no p r o o f that in this O r g a n i c ' t h i n g , t h a t is, i n t h e b o d y s c i e n t i f i c a l l y e x p l a i n e d , the essence o f m a n exists. (BW,
205)
T h i s last passage suggests a d i s t i n c t i o n t o b e d r a w n b e t w e e n the ' b o d y s c i e n t i f i c a l l y e x p l a i n e d ' , as, t h a t is, o n e m o r e b i o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s m , a n d t h e body u n d e r s t o o d as a locus of Dasein's way of being. ^ 2
100
H E I D E G G E R
A N D
D A S E I N
T h e h u m a n b o d y , a n a t o m i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , has m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h the bodies of animals: H e i d e g g e r c e r t a i n l y c a n n o t d e n y that we have hearts, l i v e r s , k i d n e y s , etc., b u t h e d o e s r e f e r t o such t h i n g s i n ' L e t t e r o n H u m a n i s m ' a s p a r t o f O u r a p p a l l i n g a n d scarcely conceivable b o d i l y k i n s h i p w i t h t h e b e a s t ' (BW, 2 0 6 ) .
E l s e w h e r e i n t h i s essay, H e i d e g g e r
remarks that 'the h u m a n b o d y is s o m e t h i n g essentially o t h e r than an a n i m a l o r g a n i s m ' (BW, 2 0 4 ) . T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s p o s e d b y D a s e i n ' s b o d i l y n a t u r e lie i n h o w t o m e d i a t e b e t w e e n these t w o ideas, h o w , i n o t h e r w o r d s , t o sort out w h a t features o f o u r e m b o d i m e n t m a r k o u r k i n s h i p w i t h the beast, a s o p p o s e d t o w h a t i n o r a b o u t o u r b o d i e s i s ' e s s e n t i a l l y o t h e r ' t h a n a n i m a l . T o d o s o i n v o l v e s , I w o u l d suggest, a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f w h a t t h e r e i s a b o u t t h e b o d y t h a t i s o p e n t o interpretation, r a t h e r t h a n e x p l a n a t i o n .
2 6
I n t e r p r e t i n g the b o d y means placing b o d i l y performances w i t h i n a b r o a d e r s t r u c t u r e a n d so r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e b o d y not be t r e a t e d as a c l o s e d s y s t e m o f c a p a c i t i e s ; r a t h e r , t h e b o d y m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a s y s t e m o f capabilities, as a l o c u s of c o m p o r t m e n t as o p p o s e d to ( m e r e ) b e h a v i o u r . B u t this b r o a d e r s t r u c t u r e i n t o w h i c h the b o d y must be p l a c e d in o r d e r to be p r o p e r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a human b o d y is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e world i n H e i d e g g e r ' s ' o n t o l o g i c a l - e x i s t e n t i a l ' sense, n a m e l y t h a t w o r l d w h i c h i s p a r t l y c o n s t i t u t i v e o f Dasein's w a y o f being. Thus, i n o r d e r t o sort out the b o d y i n t o its a n i m a l - l i k e aspects a n d its c a p a b i l i t i e s , t o s o r t o u t w h i c h f e a t u r e s o f t h e b o d y are o p e n t o e x p l a n a t i o n a n d w h i c h t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d m u s t first b e m a d e clear, w h i c h i s j u s t w h a t D i v i s i o n I of Being and Time sets o u t to d o . In t h i s w a y , we see a g a i n w h y H e i d e g g e r insists o n d e v e l o p i n g his e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n , a n d s o his a c c o u n t o f t h e w o r l d , f i r s t : u n t i l t h a t ' s c o m p l e t e d , t h e w h o l e problematic of Dasein's b o d i l y nature must r e m a i n h i d d e n . West
Virginia
University,
Morganstown,
West
Virginia,
2 7
USA
Notes 1 2
3
M a r t i n Heidegger and Eugen Fink, Heracliius Seminar, trans. C. Siebert (Evanston: N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993), p. 146. I make use of the f o l l o w i n g abbreviations to cite works by Heidegger: BT = Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson ( N e w Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1962); BW = Basic Writings, ed. D. K r e l l (New Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1977); FCM = Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. trans. W. M c N e i l l and N. Walker ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1995); HCT = The History of the Concept of Time, trans. T. Kisiel ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1985); MFL = Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. trans. M. H e i m ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1984). A s translated by Macquarrie and Robinson, the full passage from which this sentence is taken reads as follows: O u t of this directionality arise the fixed directions of right and left. Dasein constantly lakes these directions along w i t h it, just as it does its
101
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F P H I L O S O P H I C A L S T U D I E S
de-severances. Dasein's spatialization in its 'bodily nature' is likewise marked out in accordance w i t h these directions. (This bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of ils o w n , though we shall not neat it here.) Thus things which are ready-to-hand and used for the body - like gloves, for example, which are to move w i t h the hands - must be given directionality towards right and left. A craftsman's tools, however, which are held in the hand and moved w i t h i t . do not share (he hand's specifically 'manual' movements. So although hammers are handled just as much w i t h the hand as gloves are, there are no right- or left-handed hammers. (BT, 143) The parentheses, and likewise the repetition of "bodily nature', are an artifact of the translation; the original G e r m a n for the central sentence is: Die V e r r a u m l i c h u n g des Daseins in seiner " ' L e i b l i c h k e i l " , die eine eigene hier nicht zu behandelnde Problematik in sich birgt, ist mit nach diesen Richtungen ausgezeichnet.' Note the use of scare quotes around the phrase ' b o d i l y natute' ( " L e i b l i c h k e i t ' ) , w h i c h suggests a certain uneasiness on Heideggers part in t a l k i n g of Dasein as having a bodily nature and thus that he regards it as only a k i n d of loose talk. 4
Descartes is discussed at length in Chapter 3 of D i v i s i o n I. However, two points should be noted concerning Heidegger's engagement w i t h Cartesianism: first, the most immediate target for Heidegger's attack is the phenomenology of Husserl, whose m e t h o d of 'bracketing' or 'phenomenological r e d u c t i o n ' performs a function similar to, and clearly influenced by, Descartes's M e t h o d of D o u b t ; second, Heidegger's interest in D i v i s i o n 1 is not restricted to underm i n i n g Cartesianism; rather he wishes to examine the credentials of an entire way of t h i n k i n g , roughly the subject-object distinction, of which Cartesianism is a sophisticated product.
5
That is, Heidegger wants to claim that k n o w i n g is what he calls a 'founded mode' of Dasein's being-in-the-world, where founded' means thai another mode serves as a c o n d i t i o n for its possibility. See Being and Time, D i v i s i o n I, Chapter 2, §13. See D i d i e r Franck, Being and the L i v i n g ' , in E. Cadava, P. Connor, and J. Nancy (eds) Who Comes After the Subject? ( L o n d o n : Routledge, 1991). p. 144. Ibid., 146. David Farrell Krell. Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press. 1992), p. 52. Ibid., 52. H u b e r t Dreyfus, Being-in-the-Worlil: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, Mass.: M I T Press, 1991), pp. 41 and 137. In his The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being, trans. R. Lilly ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1993), M i c h e l Haar asks: 'Can one phenomenologically and ontologically justify placing the body in a secondary position in the existential analytic?' (p. 34). In this paper, my aim is to show why Heidegger thinks that the answer to this question is yes'. Haar maintains, I think correctly, that Heidegger does not acknowledge the body as an 'existential', and justifies this by holding that transcendence (in other words, understanding) like the other existenlials such as attunement and " t i n ownness" - b o t h permeated w i t h transcendence - are siructuies more original than the body' (p. 35). The question that remains, and which I w i l l try at least lo sketch an answer to here, is what the "secondary position' occupied by the body looks like: is it a category w h o l l y different from Dasein,
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such as readiness-to-hand? Or does one need to w o r k through Dasein's existential features in order to characterize the body us Dasein's! 12 To put it more carefully, none of these categones proves to be satisfactory for the human body understood as a distinctively human body. 13 In a recent paper. W i l l i a m Blattner has argued that we must accept that Heidegger is operating w i t h a subterranean f o r m of dualism', between 'natural and self-interpreting characteristics'. He argues that this dualism is integral to one of Heidegger's principal claims in Being ami Time, namely that Dasein is its ability-to-be. On Heidegger's behalf, Blattner offers what he calls 'the D u a l i t y Thesis', namely that 'Dasein can be considered both in its proper ontological make-up, as essentially self-understanding, and in an abstracted, factual way. as something that merely occurs (esp.. naturally).' On this reading, embodiment and bodily characteristics w o u l d be part of the abstracted, factual way' of considering Dasein, as opposed to its proper ontological make-up'. See his 'Existence and Self-Understanding in Being and Time', in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56(1) ( M a r c h , 1996), pp. 97-110. 14 It's w o r t h n o t i n g that M e i leau-Ponty. a post-Heideggerian phenomenologist who does give the body a central place in investigations, holds that even what I ' m calling the particularities of our bodily existence cannot be regarded as merely contingent features of our existence. In Phenomenology of Perception (trans. C. Smith ( N e w Y o r k : Routledge, 1962)). he writes that ' i f we conceive man in terms of his experience, that is to say. of his distinctive way of patterning the w o r l d , and if we reintegrate the "organs'' into the functional totality in which they play their part, a handless or sexless man is as inconceivable as one without the power of thought'. Further on in the same paragraph, he writes: E v e r y t h i n g in man is a necessity. For example, it is no mere coincidence that the rational being is also the one who holds himself upright or has a t h u m b which can be brought opposite to the fingers. On the other hand everything in man is a contingency in the sense that this human manner of existence is not guaranteed to every human c h i l d through some essence acquired at b i r t h , and in the sense that it must be constantly reforged in h i m t h r o u g h the hazards encountered by the objective body. (p. 170)
15
Even w i t h o u t going so far as M e i leau-Ponty does here, his remarks help to render problematic the appeal to the 'transcendental' character of Heidegger's investigation as a reason for ignoring questions concerning the body. That is. even if it is not conceded that every feature of our embodiment is necessaty to our way of being, it still may be true that being embodied (even if not in the particular way that human beings are) is a non-contingent feature, and so is a structure that is. as Heidegger puts it. determinative for the character o f Dasein's way o f being. This peculiar neutrality' has been explored by Jacques D e r r i d a . in 'Geschlecht: Sexual Difference. O n t o l o g i c a l Difference' (in P. K a m u f (ed.) A Derrida Reader: Benveen the Blinds ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1991), pp. 380-402). Derrida is principally concerned to understand the m o t i vations for Heidegger's insistence that Dasein is neither of the two sexes', and the consequences that insistence has for our understanding of gender and sexuality. I should note here that Derrida's conclusions regarding Heidegger's
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placement of sexuality in a secondary position apply to the category of the body more generally. Thus, when D e r r i d a writes: 'There is no properly sexual predicate; at least there is none that does not refer, for its sense, to the general structures of Dasein' (p. 400), the assertion can be extended to the body more generally. What D e r r i d a in this essay calls Heidegger's 'order of implications' means that sexual (and, 1 w o u l d contend, b o d i l y ) predicates rely for their sense on the 'general structures of Dasein', but not the other way around. That is, one can spell out what it is to be Dasein w i t h o u t reference to sexuality (the b o d y ) , but one cannot spell out human sexuality (what a human body is) w i t h o u t first explicating what it is to be Dasein. That this is so for Heidegger w i l l become clearer as we proceed through his categories of entities w h i c h don't have Dasein's way of being in Section I I . 16 For his part. Dreyfus does not appear to address these difficulties, though his appeals to Merleau-Ponty in his commentary display his discomfort w i t h this aspect of Heidegger's position. 17 M o r e t r o u b l i n g still are Heidegger's remarks about embodiment in his Davos debate w i t h Ernst Cassirer in Kunl and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. R. Taft ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1990), A p p e n d i x I I ) . There Heidegger speaks of Dasein as being ' t o a certain e x t e n t . . . fettered in a body' (p. 181). It is, however, through this 'fetteredness in the body' that Dasein stands in a particular c o n d i t i o n of being bound up w i t h beings' (p. 181). In other words, embodiment, as a dimension of thrownness, places Dasein in 'the midst of beings'. Despite this apparently essential role, Heidegger here speaks of Dasein's 'incursion' into beings as 'always spiritual and, in the ultimate sense, accidental' (p. 181). These remarks thus underscore, at the very least, the secondary status of the body, relative to Heidegger's attempts to delimit 'the original unity and the immanent structure of the relatedness of a human being' (p. 181). Whether they relegate the body to a different category (or make for its "disappearance' altogether) is an issue I address i n Sections I I and I I I . 18
Heidegger does, however, say that 'even entities which are not worldless Dasein itself, for example - are presenl-at-hand " i n " the w o r l d , or, more exactly, can w i t h some rights and w i t h i n certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand' (BT, 82). What I take Heidegger to mean here is that there is a standpoint f r o m which Dasein can be regarded as a thing, as something which has physical attributes. He is quick to point out that such a standpoint involves a neglect of just those characteristics that pick out Dasein as Dasein: "To do this [take Dasein as something present-at-hand], one must completely disregard or just not see the existential state of being-in' (BT, 82). I try to spell out what Heidegger means here by 'disregard' in the discussion to follow.
19
Of course, the body can break d o w n , and so become an object of our explicit attention, but this fact does not, in and of itself, m a r k a separation between the body and items of equipment (except, perhaps, for the degree of interest we take in bodily breakdowns, as opposed to those in other items of equipment). See D i v i s i o n 1, Chapter 3, §16 of Being and Time for Heidegger's discussion of the /iready-to-hand: the k i n d of obtrusiveness he describes there might be seen to be applicable to parts of our body when they're not functioning properly. Here I find a passage from Merleau-Ponty to be especially clear on this point; in Phenomenology of Perception, he writes:
20
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I move external objects w i t h the aid of my body, w h i c h takes h o l d of them in one place and shifts t h e m to another. B u t my body itself I move directly, I do not find it at one point of objective space and transfer it to another, 1 have no need to look for it. it is already w i t h me - I do not need to lead it towards the movement's c o m p l e t i o n , it is in contact w i t h it f r o m the start and propels itself t o w a r d that end. (p. 94) 21
22
23
One may get the impression here that I am glossing over i m p o r t a n t distinc tions in speaking of limbs like arms, internal organs like hearts and kidneys, and body parts like eyes all as organs. There w o u l d seem to be serious differ ences among these items, most p r o m i n e n t l y manifest in the distinction between voluntary and involuntary movements: the animal excercises its capacity to walk by m o v i n g its legs, but it's unclear, to say the least, that a similar locu t i o n applies to the functioning of its liver. In his discussion, it does not appear that Heidegger is particularly sensitive to these sorts of distinctions, but I do not t h i n k that this is simply carelessness on his part. On the contrary, given his ultimate conception of animal life, discussed below, the distinction between what an animal voluntarily excercises and what, in its body, just happens of its o w n accord is ultimately a specious one: what Heidegger denies in the case of animals is any sense of agency on the basis of w h i c h such distinctions might be supported. M a i l e r s are more complex in the case of h u m a n beings, where the n o t i o n of agency does apply: 1 discuss some of these complexities below. These kinds of distinctions between animals and h u m a n beings have lately been discussed at some length by John M c D o w e l l , in his Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994), especially at pp. 114-23. It is interesting to note that on this issue, M c D o w e l l acknowledges that he is b o r r o w i n g heavily f r o m Gadamer's discussion in Truth and Method, which in t u r n owes a considerable debt to Heidegger's philosophy. 1 have not. however, been able to find in Gadamer a reference to these specific lectures. See also Simon G l e n d i n n i n g , "Heidegger and the Question of A n i m a l i t y ' (International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 4(1), pp. 67-86), which, on roughly D e r r i d e a n grounds, is highly critical of Heidegger's sharp distinction between animals and human beings (though, surprisingly, G l e n d i n n i n g cites M c D o w e l l as a corrective to Heidegger's position). I am not concerned, in this paper, to defend Heidegger's insistence on the separation between the human and the animal; rather, my aim here is to assess the impact o f this insistence on the question of where to place the h u m a n body in his phenomenology. Consider the f o l l o w i n g passage: When we say that the lizard is lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the w o r d ' r o c k ' in order to indicate that whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given in some way for the lizard, and yet it is not k n o w n to the lizard as a rock. If we cross out the w o r d we do not simply mean to i m p l y that something else is in question here or is taken as some t h i n g else. Rather we i m p l y that whatever it is is not accessible to it as a being. (FCM. 198)
24
We have thus come full circle back to the criticisms levelled at presence-athand: the concepts associated w i t h preserice-at-hand were seen to be insufficient for picking out bodily movements as meaningful gestures and
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actions, and the same holds for the n o t i o n of a capacity. In the lirst instance, those criticisms led to a consideration of readiness-to-hand as a candidate category lor the human body, but it was precisely for the deficiencies in this latter category that Heidegger's appeal to capacities seemed to promise a remedy. The three candidates thus push and pull against one another, so that no one of them seems exactly suitable. Similar remarks can be found in his Nietzsche, for example: O u r being embodied is essentially other than merely being encumbered w i l h an organism. Most of what we k n o w f r o m the natural sciences about the body and the way it embodies are speciticalions based on I h e established misinterpretation of the body as a mere natural body.
26
See Nietzsche. V o l . 1 (The Will to Power as Art), trans. D. F. K r e l l ( N e w Y o r k : Harper and Row. 1979). Chapter 14 (citation from pp. 99-100). These later remarks contrast sharply w i t h Heidegger's talk of ' n e u t r a l i t y ' and 'fetteredness', and may even appear to contradict his earlier o u t l o o k . It's not clear to me that this is so, since Heidegger's concern in I h e earlier material is p r i m a r i l y to distance his explication of Dasein from any consideration of the workings of "a mere natural body'- What I ' m suggesting in this paper is that Heidegger's existential analytic helps to remedy such a 'misinterpretation' of o u t e m b o d i ment, and helps lo b r i n g I h e more appropriate interpretation into view. The distinction I ' m after appears to be under discussion in the following difficult passage, wherein Heidegger writes: Every explanation, when we speak of an explanation of nature, is distinguished by its involvement in the incomprehensible. It can be flatly staled that explanation is the expository interpretation of the incomprehensible. . . . Nature is in principle ' explainable and to be explained because il is in principle incomprehensible. Il is the incomprehensible pure and simple. A n d it is the incomprehensible because il is the 'unworlded' world, insofar as we take nature in this extreme sense of I h e entity as it is discovered in physics. (HCT. 217-18)
27
Though Heidegger in this passage refers to explanation as a k i n d of interpretat i o n , 'expository interpretation', he clearly dislinguishes it from his usual meaning of interpretation, namely m a k i n g explicit the as-stiucture of the ' w o r l d e d ' w o r l d . The body-as-interpreted (in Heidegger's standard sense of interpretation) means the body-as-meaningful, as intentional, and thus as something worldly. Recall, for example, i h e difference discussed above between describing a bodily event as an action (like waving) and an arm's going up (at a certain speed and in a certain direction): the former characterization is an interpretive rendering of the body, whereas the latter might play a role in scientific explanations. Versions of this paper were presented to the Continental Philosophy W o r k s h o p at the University of Chicago, and to the Philosophy Departments at D a r t m o u t h College and West V i r g i n i a University. I w o u l d like to thank the members of the audiences for their questions, comments, and criticisms. I w o u l d also l i k e lo thank H u b e r l Dreyfus, Randall Havas. Wayne M a r t i n . K a r e n P i l k i n g l o n , D a v i d Stern, and an anonymous referee for comments on w r i t t e n versions of the paper. 1 am especially grateful to Steven A f f e l d t and Irad K i m h i for discussing earlier drafts at'length w i t h me.
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W h o are we? W h a t essence do we bear, and whence is this essence determined? Do we s t i l l have an essence, or have we become the provisional figure for the decaying of essence? Are we as m u c h as ever, or almost as much, as we say, the rational animal? But are a n i m a l i t y or rationality, body, soul, or m i n d , adequate to our being? In other words, has not the metaphysical interpretation of man as a rational animal reached its l i m i t in that absolutization of human subjectivity that demarcates the end of philosophy by opening onto the truth of Being? Is it not through a constraint on Being itself that our essence is originally constituted? A n d how might we arrive at this Being, how might we properly be that which we have to be without destroying the history of that long error about ourselves—I he history of ontology? But to destroy is not merely to return to the things themselves, it is also to take account of a t r a d i t i o n by starting out Iroin what made the tradition possible. It is thus just as necessary to define the essence of man as Dasein, while ceasing to understand it against the horizon of subjectivity, as it is to endorse, albeit in a restricted way, the concept of the rational animal. Since man's rationality is the d i s t i n c t i v e mark of his a n i m a l i t y , the specific trait of his l i f e , we cannot lake the name of Dasein and assume the tasks that this name imposes upon us without first e x a m i n i n g if and how our life, life as it manifests itself in us, can acquire an existential meaning. bet us return to the context in which this problem first emerges. Having established that ;i Ituulamenlal ontology must follow the path of an analytic of Dasein, and having sketched out its g u i d i n g lines and set in place its cardinal concepts, Heidegger secures the originality of such an analytic with regard lo all those d i s c i p l i n e s with w h i c h it might he confused. In Section 10 of Being and Time, in order lo d i s t i n g u i s h his phenomenology of existence from a philosophy of life or a general biology that would include the fields of anthropology and psychology, he
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affirms that " l i f e , in its own r i g h t , is a k i n d of B e i n g ; but essentially it is accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a privative interpretat i o n ; it determines what must be the case if there can be a n y t h i n g l i k e mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-leben].
Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand [Vorhandensein],
nor
1
is it Dasein." T h i s thesis is taken up again in Section 4 1 , w h i c h Heidegger devotes to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the Being of Dasein, and where he shows that care cannot be brought back to elementary drives that, on the eontrary, are ontologically rooted in i t . He goes on to point ovit that " t h i s does not prevent w i l l i n g and w i s h i n g from being ontologically constitutive even for entities that merely ' l i v e ' , " and that "the basic ontological state of ' l i v i n g ' is a problem in its own right and can be tackled only r e d u c t i v e l y and p r i v a t i v e l y in terms of the ontology of Dasein."
The same
stance reappears finally in Section 4 9 , w h i c h aims at rejecting any medical characterization of death. If Heidegger acknowledges that "death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of l i f e " and that " l i f e must he understood as a k i n d of Being to w h i c h there belongs a B e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , " it is only to add right away that "we can fix its character o n t o l o g i c a l l y only if this k i n d of Being is oriented in a privative way to Dasein," whereas biology and physiology can always treat Dasein as a theme by c o n s i d e r i n g it as pure life on the same basis as animals and plants. W h i l e a d m i t t i n g that Dasein is also a l i v i n g being since life is accessible in i t , and conceding that Dasein can have a physiological death "co-determined by its p r i m o r d i a l mode of 3
B e i n g , " Heidegger nonetheless argues for the p r i o r i t y of the existential concept of death over any science or ontology of l i f e . These b r i e f references d e a l i n g w i t h the B e i n g of life raise a number of d i f f i c u l t i e s . These concern Dasein i t s e l f a n d , beyond this, fundamental ontology in its entirety. C e r t a i n l y , Dasein does not begin as a l i v i n g being to w h i c h existence is subsequently added o n , hut rather, in the manner of everything that lives, it is b o m , reproduces, 4
and d i e s . How then can death, as the phenomenon of a life that does not exist, be co-determined by the p r i m o r d i a l mode of Dasein: ecstatic temporal existence? A n d conversely, in what way can death, as the supreme possibility of existence, be cod e t e r m i n e d by a l i f e whose mode of B e i n g is different? In short, is the life in Dasein, the life of Dasein, c o m p a t i b l e w i t h its existence? How can something ontologically foreign to Dasein be ostensible, thanks to Dasein, and in Dasein? How can existence he reduced to life? W h a t significance can be granted to the phenomenological m e t h o d , according to w h i c h access to a b e i n g is governed by its B e i n g , if in order to grasp l i v i n g and " l i f e " one must proceed p r i v a t i v e l y , starting w i t h a being that is ontologically other? Supposing this privative channel to be practicable, what pre-understanding of life w o u l d guide its trajectory? W h e r e i n would this preunderstanding find its legitimacy and pertinence if understanding is precisely a structure of Dasein, an existential! More generally, against what horizon of meaning of B e i n g and of negation can it be said that " l i f e is not Being-present-at-hand nor Dasein" if universal phenomenological ontology is shared between these two modes of B e i n g that have t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y in two temporalities, one of w h i c h is d e r i v e d from the other, and if the meaning of negation depends on the meaning of Being?
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A r e life and l i v i n g phenomena forever at a remove from the clearing of Being, refractory to a l l ontology, "phenomena" that time cannot constitute, that have no temporal meaning, absolutely incomprehensible? As disconcerting as this question might be, it has been if not exactly asked then at least formulated by Heidegger h i m s e l f w h e n , h a v i n g described the temporality of feeling and disposition, he ends Section 6 8 b of Being and Time w i t h this strange reservation: " I t remains a problem in i t s e l f to define ontologically the way in w h i c h the senses can be stimulated or touched in something that merely has l i f e , and how and whether the Being of animals, for instance, is constituted by some k i n d of Hirne.' "
5
But can the temporal constitution of life and the l i v i n g be considered a separate, that is to say, in the e n d , a secondary problem? From the moment Being is understood in terms of t i m e , does not the ontological analysis of a n i m a l i t y assume on the contrary a decisive role? Is it not liable to disconnect Being from t i m e , opening up once again the issue of the determination of the essence of man as Dasein, and shattering the very ground of fundamental ontology? Indeed, if the being of an a n i m a l were to be excluded from t i m e , Being itself would thereby lose the e x c l u s i v i t y of its temporal meaning, a n d , if we live only by being incarnate in 6
a body that testifies to our k i n s h i p w i t h the a n i m a l , the ontological detemporalization of the a n i m a l w o u l d i m p l y that the l i v i n g incarnate that we are is existentially inconceivable, and that we must abandon the name of Dasein. T h e interpretation of a n i m a l i t y and of life is in part the topic of a course given in the w i n t e r semester of 1 9 2 9 - 3 0 , entitled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik) and dealing w i t h
the concept of
w o r l d . H a v i n g described in Being and Time the worldly character of the being w i t h w h i c h we d a i l y enter into relation, and having retraced, in The Essence of Reason (Vom Wesen des Grundes), the history of the word " w o r l d " along w i t h the various meanings that have been attributed to i t , Heidegger takes the path of a "comparative c o n s i d e r a t i o n , " whose g u i d i n g thread is furnished by the following three theses: " T h e stone is without w o r l d , the a n i m a l is poor in w o r l d , man is formative of w o r l d . " If each of these theses determines the essence of the stone, the a n i m a l , and man, it is not a matter, regarding the second thesis, of understanding animality from the standpoint of the w o r l d and its impoverishment, but of understanding poverty-inw o r l d from the standpoint of a n i m a l i t y . A n d to conceive the essence of a n i m a l i t y , says Heidegger, is "to conceive the essence o f life i n g e n e r a l . "
7
The phenomenology of the l i v i n g must first of a l l make sure of its theme by answering the question of k n o w i n g whether or not we can have access to the a n i m a l . For this p o s s i b i l i t y to be offered to us, it is necessary that the animal itself relate to something other than itself. Now whereas the stone does not enter into any relation w i t h the Earth that supports i t , whereas the stone is without w o r l d , the animal that stalks its prey or builds its nest is essentially open to its surroundings. The a n i m a l itself, therefore, points to a possible sphere of access. But an animal is not Dasein, and is thus not p r i m o r d i a l l y constituted by b e i n g - w i t h , and we cannot both share the same rapport to being. If w o r l d is the condition for any rapport to
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b e i n g , the a n i m a l has a w o r l d because b e i n g is open to i t , bul it has no w o r l d because this o p e n i n g is foreclosed. To have and not to have a w o r l d is to be poori n - w o r l d in the sense of a p r i v a t i o n , for only a being capable of having a w o r l d can be d e p r i v e d of one. W h a t is this p o v e r t y - i n - w o r l d that characterizes a n i m a l i t y , and how can one define it positively if not by c a r r y i n g out an ontological analysis of life oriented around the animal? A n d where might this hermeneutic begin if not w i t h the fundamental proposition of zoology, according lo w h i c h everything that lives is an organism? What then is an organism? It is that w h i c h has organs. What does " o r g a n " mean? T h e term comes from the Greek opyetvov: tool. An organism then, f o l l o w i n g W i l h e l m Roux's formula, is a complex of tools. B u l conceived in this way, is not the organism s i m i l a r to a machine, and are the organs nothing but tools? N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g that a machine is not purely and simply an arrangement of tools, if the eye serves to see and the hammer to hammer, this s i m i l a r i t y should not be a l l o w e d lo cover up more definitive differences. Whereas several people can use the same hammer, a l i v i n g being sees only w i t h its own eyes. "The organ is therefore 8
a tool b u i l t into the user." Such a d e f i n i t i o n supposes, however, that the organ is s t i l l understood as a tool, i . e . , misunderstood. Where then is the essence of the organ to be sought? Generally speaking, that which can he used for something opens up a p o s s i b i l i t y for something else. To do so, thai w h i c h is useful must, as s u c h , be in possession of a possibility that constitutes its Being. In other words, to establish the difference between an organ and a tool, or more generally between an organ a n d an i t e m of e q u i p m e n t , the difference must be defined right down to what it is they are capable of d o i n g , to the mode ol being and the ontological d i s t i n c t i o n of their p o s s i b i l i l y . A hammer is used to hammer, and the m a k i n g of it is complete when it can fulfil this f u n c t i o n , when il is end-ready. Being ready for something (Fertigkeit für etwas) defines the c o n s t i t u t i v e p o s s i b i l i l y of ihe i l e m of equipment as such. The hammer, however, w i l l never be capable of h a m m e r i n g i n the way the eye is capable of seeing.
B e i n g capable of something (Fähigkeit zu etwas) defines the constitutive
p o s s i b i l i t y of the organ as such, that is, in its appurtenance to the organism. It is therefore the organism that possesses the capacity of seeing lo w h i c h ihe ocular organ then belongs, and hence it is the capacity that is endowed w i t h an organ, and not the organ that is endowed w i t h a capacity. W h a t is ihe l i n k helween the capabilities of an organism and the organs assigned to them? W h i c h organ might b r i n g out this l i n k most concrelely? Heidegger chooses to describe not the complex organism of a higher animal b u l that of a lower, protoplasmic, s i n g l e - c e l l a n i m a l that, since it seems to have no organs, is l i k e l y to reveal lo us the essence of this l i n k more clearly. Protoplasmic animalcules have no fixed form and have to create for themselves the necessary organs, w h i c h they afterward destroy.
" T h e i r organs are instantaneous organs (Augenblicksorgane)."
In infusoria, lor e x a m p l e , the prehensile organs and the organs for movement remain in place w h e n those used for n u t r i t i o n come into effect. " A r o u n d each
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m o u t h f u l , observes J. V. U e x h i i l l , "there forms a pockel w h i c h becomes at first a 0
m o u t h , then a stomach, then the intestines and finally an a n u s . " ' The n u t r i t i o n a l capacity is thus p r i o r to the n u t r i t i o n a l organs, whose appearance and disappearance it moreover regulates. At this stage in the analysis Heidegger raises an objection and points out a p r o b l e m . If one acknowledges that an organism produces its organs, is one not surreptitiously a d m i t t i n g that these are its equipment? Certainly, in the case of the infusoria, the very instantaneity of the organ precludes making it into an item of e q u i p m e n t ; but one cannot distinguish between an organ and an item of equipment on the basis of their d u r a t i o n since a number of animals have permanent organs. Heidegger then adds: " I t is also clear that the organ and the item of equipment differ precisely and fundamentally in their relationship to lime,
and this marks an
essential difference between their modes of b e i n g . " " This brief allusion indicates that the organ and the i t e m of equipment must each have their mode of temporalization through w h i c h , in accordance w i t h the main p r i n c i p l e of fundamental ontology, their respective modes of being can take on meaning. Conversely, it is only when their appropriate temporalities have been exposed that it w i l l be possible and legitimate to d i s t i n g u i s h the Being of an organ from that of an item of equipment, the organism from the w o r l d , life from existence or from Being-present-at-hand. Thus it is solely the determination of the rapport of the organism and the organs to t i m e that w i l l i n the end decide the ontological meaning of life. We shall leave open the question of the temporal constitution of the l i v i n g to take up the e l u c i d a t i o n of the l i n k between the organ and the organism, and to tackle the objection mentioned above. If the item of equipment is end-ready, if it is a finished product, the organ, subject to vital processes, knows nothing of this finishedness. T h i s means that the organ remains assigned to the organism as capacity. The f o l l o w i n g fact is proof of this: in order to move, pseudopodes produce something that they then reabsorb by amalgamating it into the remaining protoplasm. But when this protoplasmic prolongation comes into contact w i t h another m i c r o o r g a n i s m , this latter w i l l not absorb i t . The organ is thus held i n place by the very capacity that alone can annihilate i t . The organ is retained in the service of the capacity, it is in its service. But how can the capacity make possible such a subservience if not hy itself having p r i m o r d i a l l y the property of service? The eye serves to see and c o u l d not do so were the capacity of seeing not itself in the service of the organism. It is not the eye that sees but the organism, and, i n g i v i n g rise to the organ, the capacity gives itself over to itself, practices, advances toward that of w h i c h it is properly capable. Can we, s t i l l in contrast to the u t i l i t y of the item of equipment, i l l u m i n a t e this subservience of the organ and the capacity w h i c h founds it? Equipment is usable according to its " d i r e c t i o n s for use," a prescription that is not given w i t h or by its Being-end-ready-for . . . since it springs from that which has presided over its fabrication. " B y contrast, that which is capable is not subordinated lo any prescription but brings its own rule with it and rules itself. It propels itself in a specific way
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in its being capable of. . . . T h i s s e l f - p r o p e l l i n g and this being-propelled toward that of w h i c h it is capable [sein Wozu[ is only possible, for that w h i c h is capable, if being-capable is in general a d r i v e - a c t i v i t y [triebhaft]. There is capacity only where there is d r i v e . "
1 2
It is therefore because i h e capacity of the organ —ihe mode
of constitutive p o s s i b i l i t y of its B e i n g — i s i m p u l s i v e that the organ is ontologically d i s t i n c t from the i t e m of e q u i p m e n t . There is nothing impulsive in the readiness to h a m m e r of a hammer; e v e r y t h i n g is i m p u l s i v e in tbe being-capable-of seeing of an eye. If w i t h the d r i v e (Trieb) wc have a r r i v e d at the essence of capacity, w h i c h is to say the essence of Ihe organ in its appurtenance to the organism, it should now be possible to gain access to the Being of the organism itself. Being-capable-of . . . is lo be self-driven toward that of w h i c h the capacity is capable; toward itself. Capacity therefore i m p l i e s a relationship to self that one finds in the concepts of self-regulation and self-preservation by w h i c h the organism is customarily defined. How is this "self" that is i m p l i e d in the capacity to be thought? In function of the capacity alone, and without having recourse to an entelechy or any sort of vital force. To say that the capacity drives itself toward that of w h i c h it is capable is not to say that it turns away from i t s e l f to expend or lose itself in something else: on the contrary, in this d r i v e - m o v e m e n t , the capacity i t s e l f never stops appropriating itself (sich zu eigen), never ceases to be in the process of its own appropriation of itself. T h e fundamental trait of capacity is property (Eigentümlichkeit), w h i c h here obviously has no significant or categorical attribute, b u l w h i c h denotes a mode of being as i r r e d u c i b l e to existence as it is to Being-present-at-hand, that d i v i s i o n that runs through and sustains a l l of fundamental ontology. The drive's self-appropriation takes place without reflection, and this is why Heidegger refuses lo speak of an ipseity of the capacity or the organism. " W e reserve," he writes, "the expressions ' s e l f and 'selfhood' to characterize the specifically human property,
its b e i n g - i n -
appropriation-of-itself, and for this reason we say: everything w h i c h has the nature of a self, of a b e i n g w h i c h , in a general sense, has the character of a person (everything w h i c h is personal) is property, but not a l l property has the nature of a self o r o f a n I . " "
We are s t i l l far from having a r r i v e d at a sufficient concept for the organism, for we have left aside that of w h i c h the capacity is capable, that "for w h i c h " or in view of w h i c h {wozu) there is capacity. Capacity is, for example, capable of seeing. But what is vision here? T h e worm sees the mole; this means: it flees before the mole, it behaves in a certain way toward the mole. Being-capable-of . . . is thus capable of a behavior (Benehmen). To ascertain the behavior we must proceed from what we have already learned, namely the i n s t i n c t u a l property of the capacity and of the organism. By p r o p e l l i n g i t s e l f toward that of w h i c h it is capable, the capacity doesn't d w i n d l e away in self-expropriation. There is consequently in this appropriation .something held back that cannot fail to affect the behavior. In behaving amidst that
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w h i c h surrounds it an a n i m a l does not expulse itself outside of itself; on the contrary, it withdraws into itself, absorbed in and by its drive. "Behaviour as a general mode of being is only possible on the basis of the being absorbed [Eingenommenheit] in itself of the a n i m a l .
We characterize the being-alongside-itself specific to the ani-
mal—which has n o t h i n g to do w i t h an ipseity of man behaving as a person—we characterize this being-absorbed in itself of the animal w h i c h makes any behaviour possible,
as
captivation
(obnubilation:
Benommenheit).""
In
the
same
way
that
b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d is fundamentally constitutive for Dasein, captivation is the essential structure of a n i m a l i t y and must be explicated in terms of the animal's behavior, its drive-capacity. How does this captivation manifest itself in behavior? f o l l o w i n g Heidegger, let us borrow an observation from entomology. A bee is set in front of a bowl w i t h enough honey so that it cannot take it a l l in at one sitting. It begins to eat and then, a moment later, stops and flies away, leaving the remainder. What has happened? The bee has noticed that there was too m u c h honey, that it c o u l d not suck it a l l up and it has therefore terminated its drive activity. This explanation is unacceptable. In effect, the f o l l o w i n g experiment has been carried out: if, w h i l e the bee is s u c k i n g in the honey, its stomach is carefully cut open, the bee continues to suck in w h i l e the honey runs off b e h i n d i t . T h i s proves that the bee had not noticed the abundance of h o n e y — n o r moreover the disappearance of its abdomen—and that it continues to persist in its d r i v e . Absorbed in and by this, it does not have the opportunity to en-counter the honey in order to ascertain its presence. W h y then does the bee stop t a k i n g in the honey when it is not deprived of its abdomen and remains organically whole? Because it is satisfied, and the satiation i n h i b i t s the d r i v e . But the fact that the satiation is necessarily l i n k e d to the food in no way implies that it is connected to the bee's having noticed the abundance of food. Strictly speaking, the d r i v e is not directed toward an object, it has no object; it is a behavior relating to something that is never perceived as such. In our example the drive is captivated by the honey, a n d , when it becomes i n h i b i t e d , the bee tlies off to the hive. T h i s new behavior is just as captivated as the first. How does the bee find its way back? T h a n k s to experiments conducted by Betlie, R a d l , in his Investigations into the Phototropism of Animals of 1905, is able to offer an explanation. A hive is set up in a meadow. T h e bees become used to i t . The hive is then moved back several meters. Now, when returning to the hive, the bees first head for the spot that now stands e m p t y , and only return to their colony after having looked all around. W h y ? What draws them in that direction if neither the scent around the hive nor even the landmarks on the ground can direct them on their way since the bees' territory ranges over several kilometers? How does the bee return to its dwelling? It takes its cue from the sun. W h e n it (lies away, the bee has the sun behind it at a certain angle.
Given that little time elapses between the bee's
departure and its r e t u r n , the position of the sun barely changes at a l l , and so it finds its way back to the hive by positioning itself in front of the sun at the same angle. Another experiment confirms this interpretation: if one captures a bee at the
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spot where it has come to gather honey and encloses il in a box long enough for the sun to change p o s i t i o n , then when it is released it flies off at an angle i d e n t i c a l lo the one il made when il left the hive. W h a t is h a p p e n i n g in this behavior and what does it teach us about captivation? T h e bee does not, in one way or another, take its bearings in order lo orient itself, for, absorbed in its d r i v e , it is given over to the sun as to a structural element of that d r i v e . T h e bee never apprehends the sun as sun. The animal's captivation signifies this i m p o s s i b i l i t y of apprehending a being as being and this i m p o s s i b i l i t y is the c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y of its absorption in and by the d r i v e . To state that c a p t i v a t i o n is the essence of a n i m a l i t y is to say that the a n i m a l is not self-sustained in the manifestation of the being as such. P r o p e l l i n g itself from d r i v e lo d r i v e , it is essentially at a remove from the revelation of Being, and this is why "the a n i m a l is so to speak suspended between itself and its environment without either of these b e i n g experienced as b e i n g . "
1 5
In short, the drive does not understand the as.
The a n i m a l nevertheless has access to that toward w h i c h it behaves. How might we describe this openness specific to c a p t i v a t i o n , and also that to w h i c h the a n i m a l is open and w h i c h nevertheless cannot be present to it in its being? The d r i v e that absorbs the bee in the movement toward the hive is in the service of ihe n u t r i t i o n a l d r i v e . Each d r i v e is thus in itself pushed toward or by o i l i e r drives, and this d r i v e from d r i v e to d r i v e keeps the a n i m a l w i t h i n a circle (Ring) of drives that it cannot get out of. E n c i r c l e d by its drives, the a n i m a l is, however, open to somelhing else. In what way? In the mode of a setting aside. T h e behavior of the drive always has the character of a setting aside (Beseitigung).
Exemplary in this respect is the
sexual behavior of c e r t a i n insects. After c o p u l a t i n g , the female devours the male. Thus for the female the male is not s i m p l y a l i v i n g fellow creature but a sexual partner or her prey, and ihe one excludes the other. "The behaviour 'sets aside,' that is lo say il is in relation to . . . hut in a way such thai the being as being can 6
never essentially manifest i t s e l f . " ' The a n i m a l is open to something else only in a repulsive mode thanks to w h i c h it can be absorbed in the drive proper. H a v i n g defined the openness characteristic of c a p t i v a t i o n , it is now possible to d e t e r m i n e the essence of that to w h i c h ihe a n i m a l relates in its drive behavior. The a n i m a l does not relate to its environment as to a manifest surrounding w o r l d , nor is it associated w i t h it in a mechanical way. Inasmuch as it is capable o f . . . , the a n i m a l opens onto something else in such a way that this other t h i n g can play a role in the d r i v e capacity. The bee is open lo the sun as lo a beacon, as lo that w h i c h sets in m o t i o n and d i s i n h i b i t s its d r i v e . But why must the drive be d i s i n h i b i t e d ? Let us consider the d r i v e itself, leaving aside the behavior to w h i c h it gives rise. It 1
possesses an " i n t e r n a l ex-tension [innere Gespanntheit]" '
a tense restraint,
an
a c c u m u l a t e d l o a d , a c o n s t r i c t i o n , an i n h i b i t i o n that needs to be lifted in order to become a behavior. T h i s means that the d r i v e must he a p r i o r i open to a d i s i i i h i b i t i n g factor that w i l l never be manifest to it since it is what allows the behavior, and therefore the a n i m a l , to appropriate its " s e l f . " E n c i r c l e d by its drives, the a n i m a l is thus necessarily open lo a c i r c l e of d i s i n h i b i l i o n , and ibis " s e l f - e n c i r c l i n g is not
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an encapsulating but precisely the draiving open of a surrounding [ein öffnendes Ziehen eines Umrings[ w i t h i n w h i c h any d i s i n h i b i t i n g factor can d i s i n h i b i t . " "
1
We are now in a position to establish the conditions of possibility for the e x c i t a b i l i t y in terms of w h i c h certain physiologists have defined " l i v i n g matter," and to answer the question of how the senses of a being that is merely alive can be stimulated and affected. E x c i t a t i o n and reflex occur only whenever there is d i s i n h i b i t i o n . That w h i c h is merely alive must first be open to whatever is l i k e l y to concern i t , and " i t is only when this preliminary relation of the excitable to that w h i c h can excite has already the character of a drive and of the drive encounter {Entgegen) that something l i k e the release of excitation is possible in g e n e r a l . " " We can also understand why different species o( animal do not react to the same s t i m u l i ; they are not constituted hv the same circle of d i s i n h i b i t i o n for, among other reasons, they do not all l i v e in the same m i l i e u . Whatever the intensity of a sensory s t i m u l a t i o n may be, for example, it can s t i l l remain without effect. The lizard that hears the slightest r u s t l i n g in the grass does not hear a rifle discharged in its nearest v i c i n i t y , a noise that makes even a distant b i r d flee. Let us recapitulate before proceeding. The phenomenology of the l i v i n g and of the organism began w i t h a comparison between the organ and the item of equipment, and was developed by advancing the organism as the constitutive capacity of the organ, and ended up bv emphasizing behavior as the mode of being of the organism and captivation as the c o n d i t i o n of possibility of the drive behavior. The organism is thus as such neither a complex of tools nor a collection of drives or reflexes but 2
"the capacity of behaviour in the unity of c a p t i v a t i o n . " " It cannot be reduced to the body, and the relation to an environment belongs to its very essence. T h e organization of the orgatvism is not a morphological fact but must be conceived in function of the c i r c l e of possible d i s i n h i b i t i o n . To K.J.J. Buytendijk's argument that "the l i n k between the animal and its environment is almost as intimate as unity of b o d y , " Heidegger r i g h t l y rejoins that "the animal's unity of body is founded, as u n i t y of the a n i m a l body, in the unity of captivation, that is the self-encircling by the circle of disinhibition w i t h i n w h i c h , for the a n i m a l , the environment can unfold. Captivation is the fundamental essence of the o r g a n i s m . "
21
Should not this last proposition now replace the second of our g u i d i n g theses? Is not the captivation of the animal more essential than its poverty-in-world? In light of what has been learned, let us return to the i n i t i a l determination of a n i m a l i t y . If w o r l d means h a v i n g access to being, then the animal has a w o r l d since it is open to something else, but if the world means having access to being as being, then the animal does not have a w o r l d since it is captivated. Hence can one s t i l l speak, using the word in its fullest sense, of the poverty of the world of an animal whose openness to that w h i c h d i s i n h i b i t s the drives forecloses the as? Is not to qualify the a n i m a l as poor in w o r l d lo tacitly understand it as a modification of ourselves and not the way it is in itself? Must not the thesis that the animal is poor in world be abandoned on account ol its phenomenological i n n u l h e n l i i i t y ? If this were the ease, otie w o u l d have to conclude that c a p t i v a t i o n , as the e s s e n c e of the animal but
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separate from i t , situates the p o v e r t y - i n - w o r l d as an expression of our own rapport to the a n i m a l . Is this not however a premature conclusion? Apart from the fact that the concept of w o r l d has not been adequately elaborated, the objection Heidegger makes here against his own thesis presupposes that the retreat of being outside of manifestation constitutes the totality of captivation and that the essence of the organism has been e n t i r e l y constructed. But the expulsion of the animal outside of the manifestation of being as such is only a moment in captivation, and the foregoing analysis of the organism is i n c o m p l e t e . O n l y an exhaustive characterization of the organism w i l l allow us to decide i f the p r i m o r d i a l p r i n c i p l e o f a n i m a l i t y consists i n captivation or in poverty-in-world.
We can now assess the importance that the interpretation of the merely alive assumes in universal phenomenological ontology. This is not a problem of local or secondary interest. T h e i r r e d u c i b i l i t y of life to being and to time would be of l i t t l e significance if Dasein were not alive and c o u l d be thought without organs. Now it is e s s e n t i a l — a l t h o u g h this necessity was something that Heidegger never took into account—that Dasein have hands so that, a l l metaphors aside, the being of the being that it is c o u l d be named being-at-hand. A n d as indispensable as it may be to d i s t i n g u i s h between organ and e q u i p m e n t , the being of the equipment as beingat-hand presupposes the being of the h a n d , something that nothing in the hermeneutic gives us to understand since the ecstatic constitution of existence cannot be reconciled w i t h its i n c a r n a t i o n .
22
Is this to say, however, that the being that we are must posit the name of Dasein in order to be able to echo the life that is incarnate in it? Can the necessity of such a m u t a t i o n be t r u l y established when it stems from the being-at-hand or close-athand that we are not? In brief, for incarnate life to prompt the designation of our b e i n g as Dasein, il does not suffice thai we be alive; it is above a l l necessary that Dasein i t s e l f witnesses that the life that does not exist is "more essential" to it than existence. A n d where m i g h t such a witnessing lake place if nol there where Dasein properly appears to itself: in anxiety? It is hardly necessary to go over in detail the analysis of anxiety that assumes such a c a r d i n a l methodological function in the existential hermeneutic. At the end of Section 40 of Being and Time, after h a v i n g justified the privilege of anxious disclosure, Heidegger makes an odd r e m a r k , w h i c h he goes on to comment on in an even odder way. " A n x i e t y , " he notes, "is often conditioned by ' p h y s i o l o g i c a l ' factors." Of course, this is indeed a descriptive moment, but in view of the context w i t h i n w h i c h it is i n s c r i b e d il cannot fail lo surprise. H a v i n g made this observation, Heidegger adds: " T h i s fact, in its f a c t i c i t y , is a problem ontologically, not merely w i t h regard lo its o n t i c a l causation and course of development. Only because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its B e i n g , does it become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically."
23
W h y does this etiology of anxiety pose, as Heidegger
emphasizes, an ontological problem? If anxiety can have an organic cause, this
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is subject to conditions, and that life belongs
to the being proper of Dasein. Now it is possible, except for the major ontological c o n t r a d i c t i o n , that the anxious freedom of Dasein is a c o n d i t i o n a l freedom and that l i f e , w h i c h is c a p t i v a t i o n , is profoundly rooted in Dasein, w h i c h is understanding of B e i n g . W h e r e is the source of this contradiction to be located if not in the Being of the b e i n g that anxiety reveals? We have already seen that the physiological release of an e x c i t a t i o n cannot come about without that w h i c h is excitable first being open, in the form of the drive and the drive encounter (I'encontrepulsionnel), to that w h i c h can excite. Consequently, the Dasein whose anxiety is physiologically 25
c o n d i t i o n e d c o u l d never reveal itself to itself, in the t r u t h of its e x i s t e n c e , if it is not firstly a l i v i n g d r i v e n being ( t i n etant pulsionnel vivant) whose meaning is neither ecstatical nor categorical. O n the other h a n d , a life d r i v e w i l l never release anxiety, w h i c h is essentially Being-toward-death, if it is not first to some extent l i n k e d to anxiety. A n d how w o u l d it be so without being a death drive w o r k i n g on the p r i n c i p l e of a life drive? A n x i e t y thus has its o r i g i n in the i n t e r t w i n i n g of the death and life drives, and this is precisely where the e l u c i d a t i o n of the organism stumbles, and incarnate life is "more essential" than existence because it precedes the truth of existence. Therefore, resoluteness being motivated by the d r i v e , we must stop understanding ourselves as Dasein and temporality and t h i n k ourselves as l i v i n g , d r i v e n flesh [chair pulsionnelle vivante], a property on the basis of w h i c h d r i v e , path, and thought must henceforth be interrogated. But does this resignation of existence enable us ipso facto to t h i n k our incarnate relationship w i t h the animal? W h a t does "to stop understanding ourselves as Dasein" mean? N o t h i n g less and n o t h i n g other than ceasing to make the ontological difference. F o r m u l a t i n g this idea for the first time, Heidegger declared: "The d i s t i n c t i o n is there, that is to say, it has the mode of being of the Dasein: it belongs to existence. Existence means, as it were, "to be in the performance of this d i s t i n c t i o n . O n l y a soul that can make this d i s t i n c t i o n has the aptitude, going beyond the animal's soul, to become the soul of a human being. The difference between
being
and
beings
is
temporalized
in
the
2
temporalizing of temporality." ''
W h a t does this mean if not that in the operation of ontological difference—and this operation is its whole existence—Dasein institutes the abyss that separates it from the a n i m a l or, the other way a r o u n d , that only the relegation of ontological difference can render our b o d i l y a n i m a l i t y t h i n k a b l e . A n d since temporality exclusively constitutes the meaning of the B e i n g of Dasein, or already of subjectivity, is this not also to say that life is incarnate without either Being or time? This last proposition means, first, that the m o b i l i t y of that w h i c h is alive is ungraspable w i t h i n the vulgar or ecstatic horizon of concepts of time, and, further, that in order lo think incarnate life one must either construct a new concept of t i m e — b u t why persist in c a l l i n g time something that has never been conceived in that way?—or else one must go back to that property of w h i c h time is only a mode among other possible modes. It is therefore necessary to cease to determine the essence of man as Dasein if due consideration is to be given to its incarnation and to its l i f e . T h i s necessity
117
146
I
Didier
Franck
cannot, however, be taken as established and assured in its possibility as long as Dasein has not once more and by itself witnessed, in short as long as it has not r e n o u n c e d , so to speak spontaneously, the understanding of Being. A n d where m i g h t this happen if not, once again, in anxiety? Now what does anxiety i n c l u d e and disclose? " I t discloses the world as world."
But is this statement comprehensible if
the two meanings of the as, the hermeneutic and apophantic, as these are d i s t i n guished a n d a r t i c u l a t e d in the analysis of understanding and the statement, presuppose the disclosure of the world? T h e w o r l d as w o r l d , the a p r i o r i of a l l understandi n g , is i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e if one takes existential understanding as one's measure; and if the as designates the t r u t h of Being itself,
then anxious Dasein, g i v i n g rise
lo a life o f drives that is refractory to existence, ceases to relate to Being by d e m i t t i n g its own B e i n g [en se demettant de son etre]. Therefore the incarnate life d r i v e that is ignorant of the as can never become, as Heidegger once wrote, "the other echo [Widerklang[ of Da-sein, ' i n d e e d ' the b e g i n n i n g of overtness [die beginnliche Eröffnung] of the b e i n g in view of b e i n g . "
2 9
T h i s is no doubt the reason why Heidegger held the phenomenon of body to be " t h e most d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m . "
3 0
I n d e e d , since we are incarnate, the body ought to
be rooted, in the manner of e v e r y t h i n g that results from our Being, in existence, but as alive it cannot be so. Body, w h i c h presents itself as outside of Being in the heart of that w h i c h is o n l y through B e i n g , constitutes then the greatest d i f f i c u l t y in a t h i n k i n g of B e i n g that it exposes to its l i m i t s . The ecstatic determination of man's essence i m p l i e s the total exclusion of his l i v e a n i m a l i t y , and never in the history of metaphysics has the B e i n g of man been so profoundly disincarnated. If it might be necessary, in order to pose the question of Being and to understand our Being in this q u e s t i o n , to reduce that w h i c h the t r a d i t i o n a l definition of man as rational a n i m a l concedes to c a p t i v a t i o n , it nonetheless remains that the disappearance of the body is the phenomenological price of the appearance of Being.
Notes
1. Being and Time,
trans.
John Macr|iiarrie and E d w a r d
R o b i n s o n (New
York:
Harper and
Row,
1 9 6 2 ) , p . 5 0 . P a g e r e f e r e n c e s a r e l o the p a g i n a t i o n o f the G e r m a n e d i t i o n , a s i n d i c a t e d i n the margins of Macquarrie and Robinson's edition. 2.
I b i d . , p.
194
3.
I b i d . , pp. 2 4 6 and 2 4 7 .
4.
Cf. i b i d . , pp. 3 7 4 and 3 8 5 concerning "generations."
5.
I b i d . , p . 3 4 6 . W e a r e q u o t i n g from the text o f the e a r l i e r e d i t i o n s h e r e .
6.
Of.
Leiter on
Humanism,
in
Basir
Writings
of Martin Heidegger ( N e w
York:
Basic
Hooks,
1976),
p. 2 0 6 . 7. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, in Gesamtausgabe ( F r a n k f u r t am M a i n : K l o s t e r m a n n , 2 9 / 3 0 , p. 3 0 3 .
118
1986), vol.
Being
H. I b i d . , p.
321.
9.
327.
Ibid.,
p.
and
the
Living
I
147
10. Q u o t e d by H e i d e g g e r , i b i d . 11.
Ibid.,
p.
12.
Ibid.,
pp.
328.
13.
Ibid.,
p.
340.
14.
Ibid.,
p.
347.
15.
I b i d . . p. 361.
333-34.
16.
Ibid.,
p.
368.
17.
Ibid.,
p.
370.
18.
Ibid.
19.
Ibid.,
p.
373.
20.
Ibid.,
p.
375.
2 1 . Quoted by Heidegger, i b i d . , pp. 3 7 5 - 7 6 . 22. Cf.
my Heidegger el le probierte de Vespace ( P a r i s : M i n u i l ,
23.
Bring
and Time,
p.
24.
Cf.
I b i d . , p.
266.
25.
Cf.
I b i d . , p.
307.
26.
The
Basic
Problems
of Phenomenology,
trans,
A.
Hofstadter
Press, 1 9 8 2 ) , p. 3 1 9 . 2 7 . Being and Time, 29.
Cf.
ibid.,
2 9 . Beiträge 3 0 . Heraclitus,
p.
187.
§33.
zur Philosophie, seminar,
1986).
190.
1936-38.
1966-67.
119
(Bloomington:
Indiana
University
Intentionality and the Semantics of 'Dasein' RODERICK M. STEWART West
One
Virginia
of the
University
striking
features
of M a r t i n
Heidegger's
magnum
opus,
Sein
1
und Zeit, is t h a t , w h i l e it e x p l i c i t l y c l a i m s to be c a r r y i n g o u t a v e r s i o n of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h e n o m e n o l o g y ( S Z , H } 8 / E 6 i ) , there i s scarcely a m e n t i o n o f perhaps the key n o t i o n o f H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y , the fact a n d phenomenon of human
intentionality.
1
This seemingly g l a r i n g omission
is, o f c o u r s e , s t r i k i n g even o n the r e a s o n a b l e h i s t o r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s t h a t H e i d e g g e r w a n t e d t o b r e a k r a d i c a l l y w i t h his f o r m e r teacher a n d m e n t o r a t the t i m e o f the w r i t i n g o f S Z . ' F o r , surely his b r e a k w o u l d b e a t its sharpest i f i t w a s e x p l i c i t l y set i n c o n t r a s t t o its i m m e d i a t e predecessor. Moreover,
one
may
well
ask
why
did
he
overtly
label
his
work
"transcendental p h e n o m e n o l o g y " at all, only apparently to ignore w h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y h a d been its p r i m a r y p h e n o m e n o n f o r analysis? Part o f t h i s p u z z l e c a n b e s o l v e d b y r e c a l l i n g H e i d e g g e r ' s o p e n i n g call i n S Z t o recover the a n c i e n t q u e s t i o n o f the ( m a n i f o l d ) m e a n i n g o f B e i n g ( r a t h e r t h a n , say, C a r t e s i a n consciousness) a s the p r i m a r y focus f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c t i v i t y .
'
M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , Sein und Zeit ( T ü b i n g e n : M a x N i e n i c y e r V e r l a g , 1 9 6 7 ] , h e r e a f t e r c i r e d a s S Z ; E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n b y J o h n M a c q u a r r i e a n d E d w a r d R o b i n s o n , Heini; ami Time ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R o w , 1 9 6 z ) . A l l c i t a t i o n s i n t h i s e s s a y w i l l g i v e t h e G e r m a n p a g i n a t i o n f i r s t , t h e n the E n g l i s h : e.g., H 1 1 / E 4 1 .
*
C f . , e.g., H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k s a t H 4 8 / F . 7 ! a b o u t H u s s e r l ' s a n d S e n d e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n s o f a p e r s o n as a p e r f o r m e r of i n r c n t i o n a l acts, w h e r e H e i d e g g e r objects t h a t the " o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g " o f a p e r s o n a s s u c h a " p e r f o r m e r " has n o t been " p o s i t i v e l y " a s c e r t a i n e d . O t h erwise, there is very lirtle e x p l i c i t " t h e m a t i / a r i o n " of the p h e n o m e n o n of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y in SZ.
'
H e i d e g g e r ' s b r e a k w i r h H u s s e r l c a n b e seen q u i t e c l e a r l y i n t h e i r c o l l a b o r a t i o n o n H u s serl's
"Phenomenology"
notes collected i n
article
f o r t h e Encyclopedia
W a l t e r Bieniel, ed.,
Hitsserliana
Britannia. IX:
See
Heidegger's critical
Phänomenologische
Psychologie
( T h e H a g u e : N i j h o f f , 1 9 6 1 ) , p p . 1 1 7 - 3 0 1 . F o r a h e l p f u l d i s c u s s i o n o f these d o c u m e n t s , see H e r b e r r S p i e g e l b e r g , " O n r h c M i s f o r t u n e s o f E d m u n d H u s s e r l ' s E n c y c l o p a e d i a B r i -
tannica
Arricle
'Phenomenology',"
The Journal of the British Society for
Phenome-
nology 1 ( 1 9 7 1 ) : 7 8 - 9 0 .
I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y AND T H E SEMANTICS
121
OF
'OASEIN'
93
F o r t u n a t e l y , there are also n o w a v a i l a b l e H e i d e g g e r ' s p r e - S Z M a r b u r g lectures,
especially
Grundprobleme
der
Phänomenologie,*
where
more
t h a n a passing reference i s m a d e t o the p h e n o m e n o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , a n d especially to the need to " c l a r i f y " {verdeutlichen) the c o n c e p t as used by H u s s e r l (e.g., i n a n a l y s i n g p e r c e p t i o n ) i n t e r m s o f a m o r e p r i m o r d i a l w a y of relating or
"behaving"
(Vcrbalten-zu)
t o w a r d a w o r l d of practical
p r o j e c t s ( o p . c i t . , p . 81). F i n a l l y , f u r t h e r l i g h t can b e shed o n this puzzle a b o u t H e i d e g g e r ' s b r e a k w i t h H u s s e r l i f w e e x a m i n e some recent s c h o l a r s h i p o n H e i d e g g e r , f r o m o t h e r w i s e u n e x p e c t e d q u a r t e r s , w h i c h sees H e i degger's b r e a k w i t h H u s s e r l i a n C a r t e s i a n i s m a s o n a p a r w i t h the a t t a c k s by Dewey, Ryle, Wittgenstein and other " o r d i n a r y language" philosophers o n C a r t e s i a n n o t i o n s o f the e p i s t e m i c a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l status o f the M e n t a l . I n p a r t i c u l a r , i n this essay the focus w i l l be o n J o h n H a u g e l a n d ' s n o v e l r e a d i n g o f w h a t H e i d e g g e r means b y ' D a s e i n ' i n S Z , a s w e l l a s related i n t e r p r e t i v e w o r k b y R o b e r t B r a n d o m , C h a r l e s G u i g n o n , a n d Hubert Dreyfus.' H a u g e l a n d advances a t least t w o b o l d a n d i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t e r p r e t i v e theses:
( 1 ) O n the basis o f v a r i o u s t e x t u a l clues, t h a t ' D a s e i n ' refers n o t t o persons i n any t r a d i t i o n a l sense, b u t t o a c o n c r e t e " e m e r g e n t e n t i t y " ; o r , m o r e f o r m a l l y , t h a t ' D a s e i n ' has a semantics d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f t r a d i t i o n a l c o u r t - a n d m a s s - n o u n s . A n d , o n the basis o f ( t ) ,
(2)
( A l o n g w i t h B r a n d o m ) t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s r e j e c t i o n of H u s s e r l i a n C a r t e -
s i a n i s m ( w h i c h f o l l o w s f r o m the f o r m e r ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis o f o u r b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d ) i s s t r o n g l y a k i n , i f n o t t a n t a m o u n t , t o a social b e h a v i o r i s t strategy i n recent p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d a n d language (i.e., w h e r e a l l reference t o h u m a n
'
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is to be
T h e s e a r e f o u n d a s v o l u m e 1 4 o f H e i d e g g e r ' s n e w Gesamtausgabe ( F r a n k f u r t a . M . : V i t t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n V e r l a g , 1 9 7 5 ) . T h e r e i s also a recent E n g l i s h r r a n s l a r i o n o f these b y Albert
Hofstadter:
Martin
Heidegger,
The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology
(Bloom-
i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 8 1 ) . 5
Robert B r a n d o m , "Heidegger's Categories in
Being and Time," The Monist
(16 ( 1 9 8 3 ) :
3 8 7 - 4 0 9 ; m o r e w i l l be said later on the i m p o r t a n r difference between H a u g e l a n d a n d Brandom.
Charles
Guignon,
Heidegger
and
the
Problem
of Knowledge
(Indianapolis:
H a c k c t t P u b l i s h i n g C o . , 1 9 8 3 ) , especially c h a p . 1 , § 8 , e n r i t l e d , " D a s e i n a s the ' A n y o n e ' . " w h e r e G u i g n o n offers a line of interpreration similar to Haugeland's. Finally, H u b e r t Dreyfus,
"Holism and
Hermeneutics,"
Review o f Metaphysics
34
( 1 9 8 0 ) ; also his a n d
H a u g e l a n d ' s , " H u s s e r l a n d Heidegger: Philosophy's Last Stand," i n : M i c h a e l M u r r a y , e d . , Heidegger and Modern Philosophy ( N e w H a v e n :
Yale,
1978), pp.
1 2 1 - 3 8 . I t is f a i r
t o n o t e h e r e t h a t D r e y f u s has p r o v i d e d t h e o r i g i n a l " B e r k e l e y c o n n e c t i o n " l i n k i n g these works.
94
RODERICK
Μ.
STEWART
122
replaced in o u r Fuitdantcntalontologie to e x c l u s i v e t a l k of a " m e m b e r ' s " n o r m a l i z e d d i s p o s i t i o n s t o behave w i t h i n some " h e r d " o r set o f o n g o i n g social practices). In this paper, 1 shall evaluate the t e x t u a l evidence H a u g e l a n d cites f o r thesis ( i ) , a s w e l l a s cite o t h e r t e x t u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h c o u n t against i t . F i n a l l y , I shall argue a g a i n s t t h e s i s ( i ) t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f o u r b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d m o r e r e a d i l y bears the m a r k s o f a b r o a d l y A r i s t o t e l i a n a p p r o a c h t o the M e n t a l , i n p a r t i c u l a r , o n e w h i c h helps itself t o a n i d i o m of practical intentionality.
The
Semantics
of
'Dasein'
T h e t r a d i t i o n a l r e a d i n g o f ' D a s e i n ' w h i c h H a u g e l a n d wishes t o s u p p l a n t p u t s this t e r m o n a p a r s e m a n t i c a l l y w i t h C a r t e s i a n uses o f 'ego' o r ' m i n d ' , K a n t i a n uses o f ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ego', a n d Husserl's use o f ' i n t e n t i o n a l consciousness'
and 'transcendental
e g o ' ; hence, the t r a d i t i o n a l
para-
phrase or gloss of Dasein as a " p e r s o n " in some s u i t a b l e n o n - C a r t e s i a n sense. H a u g e l a n d m a i n t a i n s , h o w e v e r , t h a t this is a f u n d a m e n t a l m i s u n derstanding of Heidegger's p o i n t , that 'Dasein' is n o t to be treated like m o s t general t e r m s . Indeed, i f this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s c o r r e c t , then the t r u e radicalness of H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis vis-ä-vis the m o d e r n C a r t e s i a n t r a d i t i o n has yet to be fully a p p r e c i a t e d . Haugeland's interpretation draws heavily on Heidegger's description o f Dasein (for n o w , h u m a n existence) i n its " u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d " f o r m i n the p h e n o m e n o n of das Man (the i m p e r s o n a l A n y o n e ) . In brief, the latter p h e n o m e n o n (or, u n d e r l y i n g t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s t r u c t u r e ) is o u r existence as social creatures, a n d H e i d e g g e r ' s e x t e n d e d discussions o f i t bear the clear m a r k s o f his c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the 19th c e n t u r y debate b e t w e e n the H e g e l i a n n o t i o n o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g , conscious f r e e d o m w i t h i n the goals, " g o o d , " a n d even " r a t i o n a l i t y " o f a n o n g o i n g Sittlichkeit, a n d the K i e r kegaardian
and
Nietzschean
attacks on
the
"levelling c r o w d "
and
1
" h e r d . " ' For H a u g e l a n d , the das Man discussions suggest t h a t ' D a s e i n ' is
6
M o r e precisely, this debate emerged " f i r s t a n d f o r e m o s t " for Heidegger t h r o u g h his c o n tact w i t h W i l h e l m D i l t h e y ' s c o n c e r n s t o d e m a r c a t e the h u m a n o r " h i s r o r i c a l " sciences f r o m t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . I n f a c r , as G u i g n o n h a s p o i n t e d o u t ( o p . c i t . , p . 45 f t ' . ) , D i l t h e y ' s allegedly " i r r e d u c i b l e " notions o f " l i f e " ( h o r r o w e d f r o m some early w r i t i n g s o f Hegel) a n d objektiver Geist ( a l s o a d a p t e d f r o m H e g e l ) a n t i c i p a t e q u i t e c l e a r l y t h e s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n c e . H o w e v e r , w h a t G u i g n o n sees a s a w e a k n e s s ( i n c o n s i s t e n c y ? ) i n D i l t h e y , s t e m m i n g f r o m a p r i o r Cartesian epistemological starring p o i n t (op. cit., p. 53 f f . ) , n a m e l y , that i n d i v i d u a l conscious lives t u r n e d o u t to be m o r e t h a n mere place-hold-
INTENTIONALITY
AND T H E
123
SEMANTICS
OF
'DASEIN'
95
best v i e w e d a s p i c k i n g o u t a vast, m e t a p h y s i c a l l y " e m e r g e n t " p h e n o m e n o n o r p a t t e r n o f n o r m s , n o r m a l b e h a v i o r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s , social roles, customs, and
i n s t i t u t i o n s generated
and
maintained
by
the o f t e n
blind
c o n f o r m i s m o f some " h e r d " o f creatures.' O n this view, i t i s p r o b l e m a t i c , b u t n o t a b s u r d , t o say t h a t D a s e i n b o t h consists e n t i r e l y o f its i n d i v i d u a l occurences a n d yet i s " p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r a n y o f t h e m b e i n g w h a t i t i s " ( p . 2.0). As an " e m e r g e n t " e n t i t y , i n s o m e sense D a s e i n has a life o f its o w n o v e r a n d a b o v e its c o n s t i t u e n t s ; i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s c o m e a n d go, h a n d i n g d o w n s i m i l a r b e h a v i o r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s t o succeeding g e n e r a t i o n s . O n Haugeland's view, t h e n , all h u m a n i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d social practices, n o t just the t r a d i t i o n a l p e r s o n w h o p a r t i c i p a t e s i n t h e m , are e q u a l l y ( u n i v o cally?) the " a s t o n i s h i n g d i v e r s i t y " t h a t i s D a s e i n . O n this v i e w o f D a s e i n , w h a t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been c a l l e d a " p e r s o n " i s n o w to be identified w i t h an i m p o r t a n t sub-pattern or sub-institution of n o r m a l d i s p o s i t i o n s a n d s o c i a l roles t h a t g o t o m a k e u p a n " a t o m i c " m e m b e r of an a p p r o p r i a t e c o n f o r m i n g c o m m u n i t y . T h u s , on such a v i e w , i t is o n l y c o n t i n g e n t l y t h e case t h a t a g i v e n m e m b e r is i d e n t i c a l w i t h w h a t w e w o u l d o r d i n a r i l y describe a s a n i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b o d y ( o r , even, w i t h a n d i n d i v i d u a l s o u l ) . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n ( b o t h for r e c o g n i z i n g LTS in a social n e t w o r k (given their p o w e r ot self-reflection), can arguably be r a k c n as a s t r e n g t h , a n d o n e w h i c h H e i d e g g e r saw a n d s o u g h t o n l y r o " c l a r i f y " a n d n o t reject o u t o f h a n d (sec S Z ,
H47/E71,
p r i o r t o his r e m a r k s referred to before a b o u t Husserl's a n d
Scheler's n o t i o n s o f persons a s " p e r f o r m e r s " o f i n t e n t i o n a l acts). I n fact, t o a n t i c i p a t e m y o w n p o s i t i o n here, 1 w o u l d urge t h a t m o r e i n t e r p r e t i v e mileage can be g o t t e n f r o m SZ if it i s r e a d d i a l e c r i c a l l y , h e r e i n t h e sense o f p r e s e n t i n g t w o a p p a r e n t l y i n c o m p a t i b l e v i e w s o f h u m a n p e r s o n h o o d (say, H e g e l vs. K i e r k e g a a r d ) a s necessary " m o m e n t s " o r aspects o f o n e , c o n c e p t u a l l y " l a r g e r " p h e n o m e n o n . I n t h i s w a y , t h o u g h t h e das Man d i s c u s s i o n s a r e " f i r s t a n d f o r e m o s t " i n t h e o r d e r o f d i s c o v e r y , t h e y b e c o m e " e q u i p r i m o r d i a l " (gleichurspriinglicb) i n t h e o r d e r o f ( h u m a n ) b e i n g w i t h t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n s i n SZ
concerning
resoluteness
(Dilthey's
Selbstbesinnung}),
Angst,
and
bcing-towards-
d e a t h . T h e s e l a t t e r , K i e r k e g a a r d i a n n o t i o n s are f o u n d i n b o r h D i l t h e y a n d H e i d e g g e r (cf. G u i g n o n , o p . cir., p . 5 4 f f . ) : i n d e e d , w h a t b e t t e r w a y t o c a p t u r e these features o f u n i q u e , i n d i v i d u a l existence t h a n b y c h o o s i n g the terms 'Dasein' a n d 'Existenz', w h i c h K i e r k e g a a r d d e l i b e r a t e l y chose a s signs o f r a d i c a l p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c o n r r a s t t o H e g e l i a n a b s t r a c t a s u c h a s ' S e i n ' ! See K i e r k e g a a r d ' s Concluding
Unscientific Postscript, t r a n s l a t e d b y D .
S w e n s o n a n d W a l t e r L o w r i e ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, Here we may
distinguish
t w o strands of social
behaviorism
and
1968),
p.
99
idenrify each
F.
ff. wirh
Haugeland's a n d B r a n d o m ' s positions, rcspecrively. Whereas H a u g e l a n d is prepared to speculate parenthetically about some sort of " h a r d - w i r i n g " w h i c h m i g h t underlie the c o n f o r m i s t tendency of a given h e r d of creatures, reserving such latter stories as even m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l versions of the Scientific Image t h a n social b e h a v i o r i s m , B r a n d o m e x p l i c i t l y rejects s u c h s p e c u l a t i o n s a s i r r e l e v a n t a n d a d o p t s a m o r e r a d i c a l ,
Rortyan
e x t e n s i o n o f w h a t w e m i g h t call the Sellarsian p r o g r a m m e i n w h i c h even the Scientific I m a g e o f t h e w o r l d a n d o u r s e l v e s i s n o less a set o f c o n t i n g e n t " s o c i a l c o n v e n t i o n s " o r p r a c t i c e s t h a n a n y o t h e r ser o f d e s c r i p t i v e o r e x p l a n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s . See B r a n d o m , a r t . cit., footnore
96
10 on p.
RODERICK
Μ.
409.
STEWART
124
a n d being) one m e m b e r i s i n t e r m s o f w h a t H a u g e l a n d calls " u n i t s o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , " i.e., w i t h a subset o f m o r e o r less i n t e g r a t e d a n d ( i n H e i degger's phrase) " r e s o l v e d " roles a n d n o r m a l d i s p o s i t i o n s subject t o the m e c h a n i s m s o f (self-)censure a n d a p p r o v a l b y the m e m b e r s o f the h e r d (cf. H a u g e l a n d ' s discussion o f G a u g i n t r y i n g unsuccessfully t o b e b o t h a n a r t ist a n d a p a r e n t ) . T h u s , i f w e t a k e seriously H a u g e l a n d ' s e x a m p l e o f a n e n t i r e beehive b e i n g one u n i t of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ( p . 10), t h e n c o n c e i v a b l y o n his r e a d i n g o f ' D a s e i n ' t w o o r m o r e b o d i e s , o r even parts o f several b o d i e s , c o u l d f u n c t i o n a s a m o r e o r less basic " u n i t o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " i n some h e r d . I n s u m , f o r H a u g e l a n d , a " h e r d - m e m b e r " o r " p e r s o n " t u r n s o u t t o b e w h a t e v e r p h y s i c a l s t u f f c o u n t s a s the m o s t p r i m i t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n o r " u n i t o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " i n the h e r d ; o r , f o r H a u g e l a n d ' s t r u l y m e m o r a b l e H e i d e g g e r , " p e r s o n s " are p r i m a r i l y " p r i m o r d i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s " a n d n o t p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i t i o n e r s o f these i n s t i t u t i o n s . T o b e sure, these i n s t i t u t i o n s are a l w a y s i n s t a n t i a t e d o r m a n i f e s t e d i n some i n d i v i d u a l o r o t h e r . But,
because
of
their
"emergent"
status,
qualitatively
the
same
" i n s t i t u t i o n " i s n o t a l w a y s e x h i b i t e d i n n u m e r i c a l l y the same i n d i v i d u a l . T h u s , t h o u g h " p e r s o n s " t o o are a l w a y s m a n i f e s t e d i n some i n d i v i d u a l o r o t h e r , they are n o t necessarily m a n i f e s t e d in the same i n d i v i d u a l . L e t us n o w t u r n to Haugeland's textual argument for d r a w i n g this novel c o n c l u sion. H a u g e l a n d argues t h a t since i ) persons can b e c o u n t e d , i.e., s e m a n t i c a l l y ' p e r s o n ' i s a c o u n t - n o u n , b u t i ) ' D a s e i n ' i s ( v i r t u a l l y ) never used i n this w a y by H e i d e g g e r , t h e r e f o r e 3) ' p e r s o n ' w o u l d n o t be a g o o d renderi n g o f ' D a s e i n ' . H a u g e l a n d t h e n s u p p l e m e n t s t h i s negative c o n c l u s i o n w i t h a n o t h e r : ' D a s e i n ' also s h o u l d n o t be v i e w e d as a m a s s - n o u n , such as ' g o l d ' o r ' w a t e r ' , since u n l i k e t h e referents o f the l a t t e r t e r m s , Dasein cannot be measured or weighed. Rather, H a u g e l a n d concludes, 'Dasein' s h o u l d be in a d i f f e r e n t s e m a n t i c a l c a t e g o r y of n o u n s t h a t stands f o r a p e c u l i a r sort o f p a r t / w h o l e r e l a t i o n s h i p . H e suggests t h a t ' D a s e i n ' bears a likeness ( t h o u g h i n e x a c t ) t o ' t u b e r c u l o s i s ' , w h i c h h e says f u n c t i o n s n e i t h e r as a c o u n t - n o u n n o r as a m a s s - n o u n . Y e t , m u c h as there are ( c o u n t able) cases of t u b e r c u l o s i s , there are ( c o u n t a b l e ) cases of some w i d e s p r e a d p h e n o m e n o n D a s e i n . T h e cases o f D a s e i n , t h e n , are the v a r i o u s l y d i s c r i m i n a b l e , m o r e a n d less p r i m o r d i a l " u n i t s o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y " w i t h i n the c o n f o r m i n g h e r d . L e t u s evaluate this a r g u m e n t . I t a k e the f i r s t premise t o b e u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l . W e s h o u l d n o t e , h o w e v e r , H a u g e l a n d ' s o w n q u a l i f i c a t i o n t o his second p r e m i s e w i t h the phrase " v i r t u a l l y " a n d t h e t w o e x a m p l e s o f count-uses o f ' D a s e i n ' h e cites i n his f o o t n o t e s ( S Z , 240, "das eine D a s e i n " ; 336, " e i n D a s e i n " ) . In the same v e i n , there i s H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k a b o u t the q u a s i - e t h i c a l feature o f D a s e i n
INTENTIONALITY
AND
THE
125
SEMANTICS
OF
'DASEIN'
97
called
"in-each-case-my-ownness"
Jemeinigkcit,
one
must
always
"Because
jemeinigkcit):
use
a
personal
Dasein
has
when
one
pronoun
addresses i t : Ί a m ' , ' y o u a r e ' . " ( N o t e H e i d e g g e r ' s italics f o r ' p e r s o n a l ' . ) T o the best o f m y k n o w l e d g e , H e i d e g g e r never seriously considers a t t r i b u t i n g Jemeinigkeit (needless to say Angst or h e i n g - t o w a r d s - d e a t h ) * to G. M . o r C h r i s t m a s , needless t o say c a l l i n g t h e m b y first o r second p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s . I n d e e d , surely h a d H e i d e g g e r , w h o s o c a r e f u l l y crafted the ter m i n o l o g y o f S Z , c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d the v i e w o f the " a s t o n i s h i n g d i v e r s i t y " o f D a s e i n H a u g e l a n d i s t e m p t e d b y , t h e n h e w o u l d have m a d e the m o s t o f such r h e t o r i c a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Secondly, surely the c o u n t e r - i n s t a n c e s w h i c h H a u g e l a n d h i m s e l f cites a l l o w f o r the e q u a l l y , i f n o t m o r e , p l a u s i b l e h y p o t h e s i s t o b e t h a t H e i d e g ger o n l y o c c a s i o n a l l y appears to be u s i n g ' D a s e i n ' in a n o n - c o u n t - n o u n w a y a s (say) a treatise o n w h a l e s m i g h t b y s p e a k i n g o f the W h a l e d o i n g , h a v i n g , etc., w h e n i n fact the a u t h o r c o u l d have said " t h e species w h a l e " o r " w h a l e s " d o such a n d such. A t the very least, t h e n , H a u g e l a n d ' s t e x t u a l evidence i s a m b i g u o u s . M o r e o v e r , i t seems reasonable t h a t o n l y i f the m a j o r i t y o f o c c u r r e n c e s o f ' D a s e i n ' c o u l d o n l y b e read i n his n o v e l w a y , w o u l d H a u g e l a n d have a s t r o n g t e x t u a l a r g u m e n t based o n a n u n e q u i v o cal a p p e a l to p r e p o n d e r a n c e of use. B u t , as he h i m s e l f i m p l i e s , this is n o t the case. I c o n c l u d e , t h e n , t h a t H a u g e l a n d ' s t e x t u a l a r g u m e n t w i l l n o t work. F u r t h e r m o r e , even i f w e accept H a u g e l a n d ' s f u r t h e r a r g u m e n t t h a t ' D a s e i n ' f u n c t i o n s l i k e ' t u b e r c u l o s i s ' , w e w o u l d s t i l l need a n i n d e p e n d e n t a r g u m e n t w h y even the l a t t e r t e r m presents u s w i t h a d i f f e r e n t s e m a n t i c a l category a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y describes a d i f f e r e n t m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a n the m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n types a n d t o k e n s , species a n d specimens, universals a n d p a r t i c u l a r s . Prima facie, there w o u l d seem t o b e n o reason n o t t o v i e w t a l k o f ' T . B . ' a s t a l k o f i n d i v i d u a l bodies i n s t a n t i a t i n g a c o m p l e x p r o p e r t y o r fact o f v a r i o u s b o d i l y states caused b y specimens of a c e r t a i n b a c i l l u s species. F i n a l l y , w h e n H a u g e l a n d w r i t e s t h a t " t h e a n y o n e . . . , the w o r l d , language, a n d even the sciences
. . .
a l l have ' D a s e i n ' s k i n d o f b e i n g ' "
(p. 19), it is r e a d i l y a r g u a b l e t h a t H a u g e l a n d has n o t been s u f f i c i e n t l y a t t e n t i v e t o h o w H e i d e g g e r uses the a d j e c t i v a l c o r r e l a t e o f ' D a s e i n ' , n a m e l y , 'daseinsmäßig'. ( I n o w start m y c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t f r o m t e x t u a l g r a m m a t i c a l clues.) T h e "—mäßig" suffix is a s t a n d a r d G e r m a n device for
making
an
adjective
or
adverb
out
of
a
noun,
but
with
the
a p p r o x i m a t e m e a n i n g s o f " — l i k e " o r " i n the m a n n e r o f . " H e i d e g g e r ' s
1
A s i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n has been m a d e by D o r o t h y L e l a n d , " A b s t r a c t of C o m m e n t s : H a u g e land's Heidegger," N o u s (1981): 17-18.
98
RODERICK
Μ.
STEWART
126
coinage here can r e a s o n a b l y be c o n s t r u e d as m e a n i n g t h a t the p h e n o m e n a o f language, a w o r l d o f c o n c e r n s , a n d the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f science are " l i k e " o r " i n the m a n n e r o f " D a s e i n . T o m y k n o w l e d g e , H e i d e g g e r o n l y says o f i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d practices t h a t they are daseinsmäßig, a n d never says persons (or cases of Dasein) are. Cases of Dasein are s i m p l y t h a t — D a s e i n . O n the basis o f t h i s t e x t u a l s u b t l e t y , I p r o p o s e t h a t w e t a k e H e i d e g g e r ' s c o i n a g e a s s a y i n g t h a t statements a b o u t l a n g u a g e , a w o r l d o f concerns, a n d the sciences are in some ( t o be e x p l o r e d ) w a y a d j e c t i v a l u p o n statements a b o u t the m o r e p r i m i t i v e l o g i c a l subjects i n H e i d e g g e r ' s Fundamentalontnlogie, n a m e l y , statements a b o u t i n d i v i d u a l cases of D a s e i n . In any event, this s o r t o f " f r e e - w h e e l i n g " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s s u r e l y n o w e a k e r t h a n H a u g e l a n d ' s g r a m m a t i c o - s e m a n t i c a l detective w o r k . I n fact, o n the a s s u m p t i o n t h a t there are n o occurrences i n S Z o f i n d i v i d u a l s b e i n g described as daseinsmäßig, my c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l w o t d d p r e s u m a b l y be even s t r o n g e r t h a n H a u g e l a n d ' s w i t h its a d m i t t e d t e x t u a l c o u n t e r - i n stances. I c o n c l u d e , t h e n , t h a t H a u g e l a n d ' s n o v e l r e a d i n g is n o t c o n c l u sively a r g u e d f o r o n the basis o f t h e k i n d o f evidence h e cites. B u t i f H a u g e l a n d ' s r e a d i n g i s n o t ( a n d c a n n o t be) c o n c l u s i v e l y a r g u e d f o r , w h a t r e a d i n g s h o u l d be p u t in its place? T h i s b r i n g s us to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f H a u g e l a n d ' s second thesis ( w h i c h h e h o l d s i n c o m m o n w i t h Brandom). -iiIf the second thesis is accepted, t h e n it is reasonable f o r us to t a k e H e i d e g g e r ' s r e j e c t i o n o f H u s s e r l i a n C a r t e s i a n i s m a s t a n t a m o u n t t o some f o r m o f social b e h a v i o r i s t strategy i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d a n d language.
In p a r t i c u l a r , the results of H e i d e g g e r ' s Fnndamentalontologie
o r analysis o f Dasein's b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d (especially g i v e n its emphasis on the necessary, das Man aspect of o u r existence) s h o u l d be v i e w e d as an a t t e m p t t o replace a l l statements a b o u t h u m a n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y w i t h statements a b o u t v a r i o u s creatures' n o r m a l i z e d d i s p o s i t i o n s to behave as m e m b e r s o f some " h e r d , " i.e., t o behave i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h some o n g o i n g set o f social p r a c t i c e s . ' T h e p r o b l e m w i t h this second thesis has been a n t i c i p a t e d i n p a r t i n o u r discussion of the first one. In the p r e v i o u s section we m e n t i o n e d the cases of Dasein's Jemeinigkeit, Angst, a n d B e i n g - t o w a r d s - d e a t h . Each of these e x i s t e n t i a l features c l e a r l y seems to r e q u i r e t h a t D a s e i n be a " p e r s o n " in a
* G u i g n o n docs n o t seem c o m m i t t e d to this stronger r e a d i n g , even t h o u g h he embraces a v e r s i o n o f H a u g e l a n d ' s s e m a n t i c c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f ' D a s e m ' ( o p , c i t . , §8, p . 1 0 4 ) . I n §9, however, he clearly attributes to Heidegger a " i d e o l o g i c a l " conception of everydayness. See e s p e c i a l l y p . 1 1 8 .
INTENTIONALITY
AND
THE
127
SEMANTICS
OF
'DASEIN'
99
t r a d i t i o n a l c o u n t - n o u n sense; at the very least, the onus is on H a u g e l a n d t o s h o w c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d social practices l i t e r a l l y have such features a n d are n o t just daseinsmäßig in the sense a l l u d e d to p r e v i o u s l y . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h o u g h , these self-reflective e x i s t e n t i a l features presuppose f o r H e i d e g g e r t h a t D a s e i n i n general b e the k i n d o f b e i n g f o r w h o m its o w n B e i n g m a t t e r s o r i s a n issue. M o r e o v e r , h a v i n g one's B e i n g m a t t e r t o i t H e i d e g g e r e v e n t u a l l y describes a s b e i n g capable o f e x i s t e n t i a l " r e s o l v e " a b o u t w h e t h e r o r n o t t o " a p p r o p r i a t e " o r " m a k e one's o w n " (zueignen) a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l a n d social s i t u a t i o n (cf. S Z , H199/E345 f f . ) . F i n a l l y , i t i s this d i s t i n g u i s h i n g feature o f Dasein (as o p p o s e d t o w h a t is n o n - D a s e i n ) w h i c h H e i d e g g e r calls by the general n a m e " c a r e " (Sorge). T h e p r o b l e m , t h e n , f o r the second H a u g e l a n d ( - B r a n d o m ) thesis i s t h i s : surely a b e i n g d e s c r i b e d as the locus of " c a r e " w o u l d seem to be replete w i t h i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , i n fact w i t h w h a t w e m i g h t call a p r a c t i c a l i n t e n t i o n a l ity i n the classical G r e e k sense o f t h a t t e r m m a d e f a m o u s b y A r i s t o t l e i n his Ethics. As we shall see, H a u g e l a n d a n d , especially, B r a n d o m are a w a r e of this p r o b l e m a n d c o n s i d e r w a y s t o c i r c u m v e n t i t . B u t before w e e x a m i n e the p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h e i r strategy, let us e x p a n d the case for the p r a c t i c a l intentionality of Dasein. Heidegger's E x i s t e n t i a l A n a l y t i c i n S Z p u r p o r t s t o describe the t r a n scendental features o r " p h e n o m e n a " o f h u m a n existence; o r , e q u i v a l e n t l y , it p u r p o r t s to p r o v i d e a p h e n o m e n o l o g y of w h a t it means for a b e i n g such as D a s e i n to e x i s t - i n - a - w o r l d . P r i o r to his analysis of Dasein's n o r m a l i z e d b e h a v i o r as an instance of das Man ( S Z , §17), H e i d e g g e r presents a r a t h e r f a m o u s p o r t r a i t of D a s e i n as a p r o d u c e r - c o n s u m e r w h o m u s t deliberate a b o u t the m o s t efficient means t o its i n n e r w o r l d l y projects ( S Z , §§15-18). I n this p o r t r a i t , the " p r i m o r d i a l " o r c o n c e p t u a l l y m o s t basic " m e a n i n g , " o r m o d e o f B e i n g o f any b e i n g , i s t o c o m e t o sight either as the p r o d u c e r - c o n s u m e r D a s e i n itself ( p r e s u m a b l y , w i t h all the beliefs, desires, and purposes of such a b e i n g ! ) , or as the i n s t r u m e n t a l " i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t s " r e a d y - t o - h a n d (zuhanden) for such a p r o d u c e r - c o n s u m e r . T h e " i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " o f such e x i s t e n c e - i n - t h e - w o r l d comes o u t m o r e clearly i n the c o r r e s p o n d i n g passages in the probleme der Phänomenologie. T h e r e ,
1917 M a r b u r g lectures, Die Grundas
was
noted
earlier,
Heidegger
argues for the need t o " c l a r i f y " the r a r i f i e d f o r m s o f p e r c e p t u a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , w h i c h H u s s e r l c l a i m e d t o have s t u d i e d i n a n i s o l a t e d o r " b r a c k e t e d " C a r t e s i a n consciousness, b y s h o w i n g t h e m t o b e special f o r m s o f b e i n g i n s t r u m e n t a i l y related t o one's w o r l d o f e v e r y d a y c o n c e r n s .
1 0
See
Grundprobleme,
§§9-12.
10
I n i t s s t r o n g e s t f o r m h e r e , H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t is t h a t i f
a n y sense a t a l l i s t o b e m a d e o f a " b r a c k c r e d " a n d d i s i n t e r e s t e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e n s u c h states p r e s u p p o s e c o n c e p t u a l l y a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t i t i s l i k e t o b e a n " i n t e r e s t e d , "
ΙΟΟ
RODERICK
M.
STEWART
128
A s S Z proceeds, t h o u g h , even t h i s i n i t i a l t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - p h e n o m e n o logical portrait must be expanded. T h e i n n e r w o r l d l y instrumental significance o f beings i s f u r t h e r s h o w n t o b e a f o r m o f w h a t w e m i g h t c a l l W e b e r i a n Sinn o r s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e .
Projects a n d rules f o r a p p r o p r i a t e
a n d i n a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n are h a n d e d d o w n t o each case o f D a s e i n b y p r i o r e x i s t i n g social p r a c t i c e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s ; i n a w o r d , D a s e i n exists i n das Man ( S Z , §§25-27). A n d here, o f c o u r s e , t h e H a u g e l a n d p o r t r a i t gains its strongest
foothold.
B u t t h e p o r t r a i t i s n o t c o m p l e t e here e i t h e r . D a s e i n ' s m o d e o f b e i n g n o t o n l y comes t o s i g h t a s t h a t o f a p r o d u c e r - c o n s u m e r , r e q u i r i n g b o t h t h e various technical j u d g m e n t a l capacities for d e l i b e r a t i n g a b o u t the m o s t efficient means-ends t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d t h e b o d i l y s k i l l s t o c a r r y o u t these p l a n s . " R a t h e r , D a s e i n i s also d e s c r i b e d b y H e i d e g g e r a s t h a t l o c u s o f " c a r e " w h o s e m o d e o f B e i n g i s a l w a y s a n issue f o r i t , w h o s e h i s t o r i c a l a n d s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n m u s t b e v a r i o u s l y " a p p r o p r i a t e d . " T h i s l a t t e r aspect o f Dasein's " c a r e " requires the deliberative and j u d g m e n t a l capacities to assess the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s o f c o m p e t i n g , o v e r a l l ends o r p r o j e c t s , a n d espe c i a l l y t o raise q u e s t i o n s o f t h e f o r m , " W h a t o v e r a l l g o o d , o r o r d e r i n g o f g o o d s ( h a n d e d d o w n t o m e ) d o I t h e agent ( a n d n o t just c o n s u m e r - p r o d u c e r ) w a n t ( n o w ) ? " I t i s i n t h i s l a t t e r sense, t h e n , t h a t D a s e i n ' s i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i n its w o r l d o f c o n c e r n s i s p r a c t i c a l ( a n d n o t just t e c h n i c a l ) i n A r i s t o t le's sense." M o r e o v e r , i n o r d e r t o lessen t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f h u m a n " c a r e " m e r e l y bears a c o i n c i d e n t a l r e s e m b l a n c e t o cer t a i n features o f A r i s t o t l e ' s a c c o u n t o f h u m a n praxis, i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o stress the s t r o n g l y A r i s t o t e l i a n f l a v o r o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t e a c h i n g a n d w r i t i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e w r i t i n g o f S Z , especially his v a r i o u s M a r b u r g lectures o n A r i s t o t l e w h i c h c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e S Z - f o r m a t i v e p e r i o d (the several years p r i o r t o 1927)." W i t h a l l t h i s , t h e n , i t w o u l d seem t h a t t h e s e c o n d concerned World and
consciousness Our
Knowledge
in-action of It
and
in-a-world.
(Dordrecht:
Reidel,
See
h o w e v e r Jay
1980),
especially
Rosenberg, chap,
6,
One
lor
a
defense o f t h e c l a i m t h a t w e c a n o n l y a t t r i b u t e p r a c t i c a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y t o a n agent i f w e presuppose t h a t agent's being able already t o m a k e p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s o f the f a m i l i a r K a n t i a n , caregorial types. " "
C f . S Z , H 3 5 9 / E 4 1 0 ff. T h a t " i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " i s n o t m e r e l y a n a n a c h r o n i s t i c s u p e r i m p o s i t i o n o n A r i s r o r l e ' s psy chology
and
R o r t y , ed.,
a c c o u n t o f h u m a n praxis, see D a v i d Essays on
Aristotle's
Ethics
(Berkeley:
Furley,
Universiry
"Self-Movers," of California,
in:
Amelie
1980), pp.
55-68. "
See v o l u m e 1 8 o f t h e Gesamtausgabe f o r l e c t u r e s o n A r i s t o t l e ' s Rhetoric ( 1 9 2 4 ) a n d v o l u m e 2 1 o n A r i s t o t l e ' s Logic ( 1 9 1 5 - 2 6 ) ; a l s o S Z $ 2 9 , H i 3 8 / E 1 7 8 , w h e r e H e i d e g g e r c a l l s t h e Rhetoric t h e
first
systematic hermeneutic o f everydayness. A g a i n , the impact o f this
research o n the seemingly alien concerns o f H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y comes o u t nicely i n t h e Grundprobleme, § § 9 - 1 1 . I t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e h e r e t h a t t h e s e l a t t e r l e c t u r e s a r e r e w o r k i n g s o f rhe m i s s i n g T h i r d D i v i s i o n o f p t . 1 o f S Z p r o m i s e d b y H e i d e g g e r a t S Z
INTENTIONALITY
AND
THE
129
SEMANTICS
OF
'DASEIN'
ΙΟΙ
Haugeland(-ßrandom) e l i m i n a t i v i s t - t h e s i s can receive l i t t l e o r n o t e x t u a l support. 4
B r a n d o m , in particular, is aware of this sort of p r o b l e m . ' This becomes clear w h e n h e i n t e r p r e t s H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k s a b o u t Dasein's MitseiulMitdasein, i.e., in a c c o u n t i n g f o r Dasein's b e h a v i o r (for B r a n d o m , Dasein's w a y o f r e s p o n d i n g ) n o t just t o beings r e a d y - t o - h a n d a s e q u i p m e n t , b u t t o beings w h o are l i k e w i s e seeming agent-consumers ( a r t . c i t . , p. 397 f f . ) . B r a n d o m ' s d i f f i c u l t y is to e l i m i n a t e a l l i n t e n t i o n a l i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n s o f Hegel's f a m o u s case o f " m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n , " o f t w o beings t a k i n g each o t h e r a s s o m e o n e w h o takes the O t h e r s i m i l a r l y . " T a k i n g . . . as" seems to be an i r r e d u c i b l e r e s i d u u m of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y in
Dasein's
Mitsein.
B r a n d o m ' s s o l u t i o n , h o w e v e r , i s t o d i s t i n g u i s h levels o f b e h a v i o r a l response b y D a s e i n : o n the f i r s t level, Jones responds d i f f e r e n t i a l l y t o objects a n d strategies r e a d y - t o - h a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r they are efficient Zeug or n o t . On a second l e v e l , Jones can r e s p o n d d i f f e r e n t i a l l y t o those beings w h o r e s p o n d s i m i l a r l y ( o r n o t ) t o the Zeug (objects a n d strategies) Jones i s i n c l i n e d t o r e s p o n d t o ; a n d these O t h e r s can o f course r e s p o n d s i m i l a r l y t o h o w Jones responds t o t h e i r Z e i i g a n d p e r f o r m a n c e s w i t h t h a t Zeug, a n d s o f o r t h . T h u s , w h e r e there i s such " r e c o g n i z e d " s i m i l a r i t y o f response, there i s c o m m u n i t y o r Mitdasein. T h u s , o n the B r a n d o m social b e h a v i o r i s t r e a d i n g , even the p h e n o m e n o n o f Mitsein can be seen as n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n v a r i o u s levels of response-possibilities, all of w h i c h i s made antecedently possible b y the h e r d . A n d , t h u s , a l l signs o f the M e n t a l / I n t e n t i o n a l i n H e i d e g g e r ' s E x i s t e n t i a l A n a l y t i c can b e dispensed with.
H39/K64,
u n d e r t h e t i t l e , " T i m e a n d B e i n g . " F i n a l l y , t h e r e is a l s o t h e c r u c i a l t e s t i m o n y o f
G a d a m e r , Jacob K l e i n , a n d others of b e i n g y o u n g students excited to hear an u p - a n d coming Ethics. fornia, 1 4
young See
Professor
H.-G.
Heidegger open
Gadamer,
1976), especially
p.
up
Philosophical
Arisrotle's w o r k s
Hermeneutics
to
(Berkeley:
them,
especially
University
the
of Cali-
196.
I n i n f o r m a l c o n v e r s a r i o n s , H a u g e l a n d t o o has d e f e n d e d h i s p o s i t i o n b y p o i n t i n g t o H e i degger's "formal-existential" definition o f third
aspect
of
Dasein's
care
as
"being
Sorge
at S Z
alongside
§41, Η191/E237, |better:
especially to the
at-home-wirh"
[Sein-hci)\
(beings e n c o u n t e r e d w i t h i n - t h e - w o r l d ) . T h i s T r u n c a t e d p h r a s e refers t o H e i d e g g e r ' s dis cussions of h o w each of us q u i t e n a t u r a l l y a n d u n p r o b l e m a r i c a l l y is " a b s o r b e d " i n t o the f a m i l i a r i t y o f o u r everyday "cares" a n d interests (even c o n c e p t i o n s o f the g o o d ) , w i t h a n e q u a l l y n a t u r a l ( c o n f o r m i s t ) t e n d e n c y t o tlee o u r s u b l i m i n a l a w a r e n e s s o f t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f o u r w a y o f l i f e o r " c a r i n g " versus o t h e r p o s s i b l e o n e s . P e r h a p s e v e n t h e u n i q u e f e a t u r e o f D a s e i n , t h a t i t s o w n B e i n g i s a n i s s u e f o r i r , c a n b e seen t o b e j u s t a n o t h e r n o r m a l i z e d disposirion to behave, b u t (in a n t i c i p a t i o n of B r a n d o m ' s m o v e ) at a second-level a n d in response to first-level dispositions a n d behaviors. Indeed, such social b e h a v i o r i s m m i g h r even b e a u g m e n r e d b y some sort o f e v o l u t i o n a r y - b i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a r i o n o f rhe " s e l e c t i o n " for such a second-level d i s p o s i t i o n .
Γ Ο Ζ
RODERICK
Μ.
STEWART
130
As subtle a n d p e n e t r a t i n g as this m a n e u v e r is, t h o u g h , there is g o o d reason t o believe i t i s n o t w h a t H e i d e g g e r h a d i n m i n d i n S Z . F i r s t , s i m p l y the fact t h a t H e i d e g g e r t a l k s a t great lengths a b o u t n o r m a l i z e d b e h a v i o r i n his f a m o u s das Man discussions is n o t e n o u g h by i t s e l f to w a r r a n t either a necessary
or
probable
inference
to
Fnndamentalontologie
as
social
b e h a v i o r i s m . F o r , o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s have analysed so-called "conventional" behavior, but w i t h no intention of carrying out eliminativist strategies. ( C f . , e.g., D a v i d L e w i s ' w o r k o n c o n v e n t i o n w h i c h b o t h H a u g e l a n d a n d B r a n d o m are clear t o d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m t h e i r o w n o n p r e cisely this p o i n t . ) Is there, t h e n , any place w h e r e H e i d e g g e r even h i n t s at t h e i r strategy? B r a n d o m cites the f o l l o w i n g , t a n t a l i z i n g passage: I n t h a t w i t h w h i c h w e c o n c e r n ourselves e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y , the O t h e r s are e n c o u n t e r e d
as w h a t they
do;
they
are w h a t they
do.
(SZ,
H126/E163) T h e last clause w o u l d seem t o b e just w h a t B r a n d o m ( a n d H a u g e l a n d ) are l o o k i n g f o r . I n fact, this social b e h a v i o r i s t r e a d i n g w o u l d b e a reasonable assessment of H e i d e g g e r ' s i n t e n t if the last clause s i m p l y said " t h e y are t h e i r ( b o d i l y ) b e h a v i o r ( a n d n o t h i n g else)." T h a t , o f course, w o u l d b e clear evidence f o r thesis 1. H o w e v e r , the clause s i m p l y does n o t say t h i s . In the first instance, the G e r m a n "sie s i n d das, was sie b e t r e i b e n " is r e a d i l y ( a n d I t h i n k m o r e r e a s o n a b l y ) c o n s t r u e d as m e a n i n g " t h e y are w h a t they pursue/are busy a b o u t . " F u r t h e r m o r e , even i f the M a c q u a r r i e a n d R o b i n son t r a n s l a t i o n o f ' b e t r e i b e n ' a s ' d o ' i s k e p t , this o f course does n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y r u l e o u t h e a r i n g ' d o ' a s a r i c h a c t i o n c o n c e p t instead o f one r e f e r r i n g to mere b o d i l y b e h a v i o r . T h u s , w h a t e v e r else this passage says against essentialist a n d t r a d i t i o n a l substance theories o f p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y , i t does n o t c l e a r l y e l i m i n a t e i n t e n t i o n a l i t y f r o m f u n d a m e n t a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f cases o f D a s e i n . I n d e e d , i n the b r o a d e r c o n t e x t o f S Z I have sketched above, Heidegger's
Fnndamentalontologie c l e a r l y seems
to have a
mini-
m a l c o m m i t m e n t t o e m b o d i e d p u r p o s i v e b e h a v i o r ( w h i c h i n c l u d e s the " a c t i o n " o f creatures replete w i t h p r a c t i c a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d r a t i o n a l i t y ) . T h u s , i t seems reasonable t o c o n c l u d e t h a t the second
Hauge-
l a n d ( - B r a n d o m ) thesis, w i t h its s o c i a l b e h a v i o r i s t r e n d e r i n g o f H e i d e g ger's a n t i - C a r t e s i a n i s m , is t e n d e n t i o u s at best. To close this d i s c u s s i o n , I shall m a k e a f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t i v e p r o p o s a l a n d a n i m p o r t a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n a b o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g the u n i t y o f S Z a s a w h o l e . F i r s t , I r a t h e r c a u t i o u s l y suggest t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s discussions of n o r m a l i z e d b e h a v i o r a n d the pervasiveness o f social practices i n h u m a n a c t i o n b e m o v e d i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a strategy i n the p h i l o s o p h i e s o f m i n d
I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y AND T H E SEMANTICS
131
OF
'DASEIN'
I03
a n d language l i k e t h a t of J o n a t h a n B e n n e t t in his
Linguistic Behavior.'*
B e n n e t t argues persuasively {pace Q u i n e ) t h a t we can m a k e sense of h o w c o m p l e x , observable p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o r can be t a k e n as evidence for a t t r i b u t i n g t o v a r i o u s l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d creatures a range o f capacities t o " r e g i s t e r , " even believe, c e r t a i n t e c h n i c a l o r p r a c t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t s , t o desire c e r t a i n objects i n t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t s , o n u p the " i n t e n t i o n a l i s t i c l a d d e r " t o t h e i r h a v i n g G r i c e a n i n t e n t i o n s o f a c o m plexity
sufficient
for
"speaker
meaning."
Just
how
these
individual
" i n t e n t i o n a l l i v e s " get subject t o s o c i a l practices o r " c o n v e n t i o n s , " i s h a n dled by Bennett according to D a v i d Lewis' model of a " c o o r d i n a t i o n p r o b l e m " b e t w e e n a t least t w o r a t i o n a l l y self-interested players w i t h v a r i ous " r e g i s t e r i n g s " a n d desires. O n t h i s strategy, a m o r e o r less c o m p l e x p r a c t i c a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d t e l e o l o g y (even r a t i o n a l i t y ) i s a t t r i b u t e d t o creatures o p e r a t i n g o n t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t s a s the best w a y t o e x p l a i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r b e h a v i o r s . ' 6 I t w o u l d seem, t h e n , t h a t t h i s B e n n e t t - G r i c e L e w i s strategy w o u l d i n general d o m o r e justice t o the q u a s i - A r i s t o t e l i a n p r o g r a m 1 a m a r g u i n g H e i d e g g e r lays o u t i n his E x i s t e n t i a l A n a l y t i c . M y dispute w i t h H a u g e l a n d and B r a n d o m , then, can be s u m m e d up as fol l o w s : H e i d e g g e r ' s a n t i - C a r t e s i a n i s m ( i n his b r e a k w i t h H u s s e r l ) i s n o t a n a t t a c k on the M e n t a l / I n t e n t i o n a l per se, b u t on a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n t h a t separates i t ( a n d o u r k n o w l e d g e o f i t ) f r o m o u r p r a c t i c o - i n t e n t i o n a l b o d i l y existence. H e i d e g g e r ' s m o v e is t h e r e b y a n a l o g o u s to r e j e c t i n g Plat o n i s m n o t b y a d o p t i n g n o m i n a l i s m b u t A r i s t o t l e ' s i n rebus v i e w . Yet, even t h i s c o u n t e r - p r o p o s a l f o r " r a t i o n a l l y r e c o n s t r u c t i n g " H e i degger's p r o j e c t i n S Z i n l i g h t o f c u r r e n t w o r k i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d m u s t b e t a k e n w i t h great c a u t i o n . H e i d e g g e r ' s p u z z l i n g r e m a r k s a b o u t truth
as
"disclosedness"
"historicity"
and
(Erschlossenbeit)
"situatedness"
at
SZ
§44
and
about
the
o f Dasein's u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' ^ m a k e i t
e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o see S Z a s u l t i m a t e l y c o n t a i n i n g a n y t h i n g a k i n t o m o s t t r a d i t i o n a l a n d recent w o r k i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d . I m p o r t a n t l y , t h i s n o t e o f c a u t i o n covers n o t o n l y the e l i m i n a t i v i s t a n d dual-aspect, m a t e r i a l i s t strategies m e n t i o n e d s o far, b u r also the " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " strategy H e i d e g g e r c l e a r l y opens w i t h i n S Z . A n y a n d a l l such strategies
1976).
"
J o n a t h a n B e n n e t t , Linguistic Behavior ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i r y Press,
"
I am i g n o r i n g here h o w B e n n e t t w o u l d h a n d l e questions of w h y a g i v e n creature has a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e n t i o n a l i t y " p a c k a g e " a s o p p o s e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e n t i o n a l state. B e n n e t t seems c o m m i t t e d t o p u r e l y m e c h a n i s t i c e x p l a n a t i o n s (say, i n t e r m s o f a d a p r a t i o n , n a t u ral selection, a n d c o n d i t i o n i n g ) for the f o r m e r a n d , for h i m , m o r e " b a s i c " why-qtiesrions. See h i s d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e r i s i n g a n d f a l l i n g o f S t a b l e L a k e , o p . c i t . , § § 11-34, P- 7 5 ff-. especially p.
17
81.
F o r a h e l p f u l d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e p a r t s o f S Z , sec D a v i d H o y , " H i s t o r y , H i s t o r i c i t y , a n d H i s t o r i o g r a p h y i n Being and Time," i n M i c h a e l M u r r a y , o p . c i t . , p p .
1 0 4
RODERICK Μ.
STEWART
132
319-53.
w o u l d surely seem t o r u n a f o u l of, i n d e e d b e c o n t r a d i c t e d b y , " l a t e r " s t a t e m e n t s i n S Z a b o u t t h e situatedness a n d h i s t o r i c i t y o f a l l h u m a n understanding
and
"disclosedness"
(including,
quite
explicitly,
Heideg
ger's o w n ) . A c a r e f u l r e a d i n g o f these p a r t s o f S Z , a s w e l l a s r e l a t e d texts,'* i n d i c a t e s t h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s p o s i t i o n i s m u c h m o r e r a d i c a l t h a n any f o r m o f s c e p t i c i s m a n d f a l l i b i l i s m : the very idea o f T r u t h , the w a y tlje W o r l d i s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f h u m a n efforts a t c o g n i t i o n , a n d o f o u r m e n t a l events a n d l i n g u i s t i c items c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h a t W o r l d , i s d i s m i s s e d a s i n c o h e r e n t ( n o t just u n k n o w a b l e ) . " ' I n a w o r d , H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k s seem t o b e t a n t a m o u n t t o w h a t R o r t y a n d P u t n a m have r e c e n t l y d e f e n d e d as A n t i - R e a l i s m . 1 0 T h u s ,
if such
a
radical
"Anti-Realism"
is the u l t i
m a t e 1 ' result o f S Z , t h e n a l l Images o f ourselves ( i n Sellars' p h r a s e ) , w h e t h e r M a n i f e s t a n d I n t e n t i o n a l i s t i c o r Scientific a n d v a r i o u s l y e l i m i n a t i v i s t i c , o r f o r t h a t m a t t e r a l l " s t a n c e s " t o w a r d ourselves ( i n D e n n e t t ' s phrase11),
whether
physical,
design, or
intentional,
are
nothing but
Images a n d Stances w h i c h reflect m o r e o f a d e c i s i o n o r " r e s o l v e " o n o u r p a r t o v e r t i m e a b o u t h o w t o v i e w ourselves t h a n t h e y d o the w a y w e r e a l l y are b y N a t u r e . " N o p a r t i c u l a r I m a g e o r Stance, t h e n , c a n i n t e l l i g i b l y b e
, s
Sec H e i d e g g e r ' s " O n t h e F.sscncc o f T r u t h , " a n d " T h e O n g m o f t h e W o r k o f A r t , " i n Basic Writings, D a v i d K r e l l , e d . ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d R o w ,
"*
I9",7), pp.
ι ι i-XK.
T w o n o t e s h e r e . F i r s r , t h e r e is a t l e a s t o n e p a s s a g e w h i c h d o c s n o t s q u a r e e a s i l y w i t h t h i s more radical thrust. CI. SZ
§39,
Η ι
89/K12.8.
S e c o n d , t h e r e is a n u n d e n i a b l e a n d ( I t h i n k )
u n a v o i d a b l e "(social) v e r i f i c a t i o n i s t " air t o this w h o l e p o s i t i o n o f w h i c h Heidegger s e e m s t o h a v e s o m e a w a r e n e s s . See h i s r e m a r k s a t S Z
H151-1
5i/K
193
about the differ
ence b e t w e e n b e i n g m e a n i n g f u l a n d m e a n i n g l e s s . "°
Sec
Richard
s i t y Press, and Kegan "
Rorty,
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature ( P r i n c e t o n :
1979); H i l a r y P a u l , 1978).
Putnam,
Meaning and the Moral Sciences
Princeton
(London:
Univer
Routledge
I say " u l t i m a t e " h e r e t o c o m p l e m e n t m y t h u s t a r " p r o g r e s s i v e " r e a d i n g o f t h e r e s u l t s o t S Z . In fact, I t h i n k the w o r k is d i a l e c t i c a l , as n o t e d earlier: it begins w h e r e the t r . u l i t i o n . i l a p p a r e n t a n t i n o m i e s i n the debate are a n d m o v e s b e y o n d t h e m . H o w e v e r , given H e i d e g ger's a p p a r e n t A n t i - R e a l i s m , " b e y o n d " loses its H e g e l i a n , a b s o l u t i s t a n d R e a l i s t o v e r tones a n d p r e s u m a b l y comes to have the force of a W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n " d i s s o l u t i o n " of a p s e u d o - p r o b l e m . At least, I t h i n k t h a t this is a fair d e s c r i p t i o n of the r h e t o r i c a l d y n a m i c s i n v o l v e d i n c u r r e n t d i s c u s s i o n s o f A n t i - R e a l i s m . See R i c h a r d R o r t y , " H e i d e g g e r ' s C r i t i
c i s m of N i e t z s c h e , " 11
Daniel
Dennett,
1984
Chapel Hill Colloquium m
Brainstorms ( M o n t g o m e r y , V e r m o n t :
Philosophy. Bradford
Books,
1 9 7 8 } , espe
c i a l l y h i s f i r s r essay. "
C p . H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k s ar S Z
569b
a b o u t the " d e r i v a t i v e " status of Science f r o m o u r
intercsr-relativc, " r e a d y - t o - h a n d " understanding of o u r w o r l d . For a helpful discussion o f t h i s p o s i t i o n , see J o s e p h R o u s e , " K u h n , H e i d e g g e r , a n d S c i e n t i f i c R e a l i s m , " Man and
World 14(1981): 169-90;
also G u i g n o n , o p . cit.,
5 13,
pp.
181-94.
H o w e v e r , for a m o r e
d e t a i l e d c r i t i c i s m o f r e a l i s t s t r a t e g i e s i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f s c i e n c e g e n e r a l l y , see L a r r y Laudan,
19-49.
" A Confutation
of Convergent
Realism,"
Philosophy of Science 48 (1981):
L a u d a n , h o w e v e r , stops s h o r t o f e m b r a c i n g A n t i - R e a l i s m a n d seems c o n t e n t for
I N T E N T I O N A L I T Y AND T H E SEMANTICS O F ' D A S E I N '
133
105
s a i d to be a p r i v i l e g e d o n e . O n t h i s last n o t e , t h e n , i t w o u l d seem t h a t H e i d e g g e r o n l y appears i n i t i a l l y to be r e j e c t i n g ( H u s s e r l i a n ) C a r t e s i a n i s m in SZ as a b a d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l analysis ( o r , " d e s c r i p t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s " ) o f o u r e m b o d i e d , practical i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . If read dialectically, however, as SZ progresses C a r t e s i a n i s m comes t o b e rejected m o r e f o r the realistic pres u p p o s i t i o n s i t shares w i t h b o t h m a t e r i a l i s t a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l strategies. T r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d , t h e n , falls f o r H e i d e g g e r because t r a d i t i o n a l m e t a p h y s i c s - a s - r e a l i s m has f a l l e n . I t w o u l d seem t h a t o n l y w i t h such a r a d i c a l a t t a c k , t h e n , does H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t o f Dasein i n S Z e v e n t u a l l y address c u r r e n t w o r k i n the p h i l o s o p h y o f m i n d . A n d , i f m y a r g u m e n t is persuasive, it is n o t by a n t i c i p a t i n g in 1917 a n y e l i m i n a t i v i s t metaphysical programs currently afoot.
n o w t o p l a y the role o f sceptic a b o u t o u r ever k n o w i n g i f o u r theories adequarely " c o r r e s p o n d . " F i n a l l y , f o r a c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f s u c h v i e w s , see J a y R o s e n b e r g , o p . c i t . , a n d C . L . H a r d i n a n d A l e x a n d e r R o s e n b e r g , " I n D e f e n s e o f C o n v e r g e n t R e a l i s m , " Philosophy of Science
106
RODERICK
49
(1981):
M.
604-15.
STEWART
134
Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality*/
IN
Being
and
Time,
/ / / / BY H U B E R T L. DREYFUS
Heidegger
seeks
to
undermine
the
Cartesian t r a d i t i o n of the p r i o r i t y of knowledge over practice. A t f i r s t i t l o o k s a s i f H e i d e g g e r seeks s i m p l y t o i n v e r t t h i s t r a d i t i o n by a r g u i n g that detached c o n t e m p l a t i o n is a privative m o d i f i c a t i o n o f everyday i n v o l v e m e n t . M o r e specifically, h e s e e m s t o b e s a y i n g t h a t t h e d e t a c h e d , m e a n i n g - g i v i n g , knowing subject, still a t the center o f H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y , m u s t b e r e p l a c e d b y a n i n v o l v e d , m e a n i n g - g i v i n g , doing s u b j e c t . B u t i f one simply inverts the t r a d i t i o n , one risks being m i s u n d e r stood and r e a p p r o p r i a t e d , a n d , indeed, D a g f i n n Follesdal, the best i n t e r p r e t e r o f H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y , has b e e n l e d t o u n d e r e s t i m a t e H e i d e g g e r ' s o r i g i n a l i t y o n j u s t this p o i n t . I n a n article
on
the
role
of action
in
Husserl
and
Heidegger,
Follesdal interprets H e i d e g g e r as h o l d i n g that Husserl a n d the tradition
overemphasized
detached
contemplation,
and
he
agrees w i t h w h a t h e takes t o b e H e i d e g g e r ' s c l a i m that p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t v i s t h e basic w a y s u b j e c t s g i v e m e a n i n g t o o b j e c t s :
I t has c o m m o n l y been h e l d t h a t p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e w o r l d . . . H e i d e g g e r rejects this. H e r e g a r d s o u r p r a c t i c a l ways o f d e a l i n g w i t h the w o r l d a s m o r e basic t h a n the t h e o r e t i c a l . . . . T h i s idea o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t h a t . . . h u m a n a c t i v i t y plays a r o l e in o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n of the w o r l d , S O C I A L R E S E A R C H , Vol. 60, No. 1 (Spring 1993)
135
S O C I A L
18
and
his
analyses
Heidegger's
main
of
how
R E S E A R C H
this
contribution
to
happens,
I
philosophy.
regard
. . .
as
1
Follesdal reports that "after he came to Freiburg in 1916 . . . Husserl clearly became more and more aware that our practical activity is an important part of our relation to the w o r l d . " He then tries to determine who deserves credit for this new interest in the phenomenology of practical activity. " I t is possible that Husserl influenced Heidegger in this 'practical' direction," he notes. "However, it is also possible," he admits, "that it was Husserl who was influenced in this direction through his discussion with the younger Heidegger." Once one sees the depth o f Heidegger's difference from Husserl on this issue, however, one sees that the question of influence is irrelevant. Much more is at stake than the relation of practice to theory. T h e real issue concerns two opposed accounts of intentionality. As used by Franz Brentano and then Husserl, "intentionality" names the fact that mental states like perceiving, believing, desiring, fearing, doubting, etc. are always about something, i.e., directed at something under some description, whether the extramental object exists or not. T h e mental property that makes this directedness possible is called the representational or intentional content of the mental state. By focusing his discussion on the primacy of the intentional content of action over the intentional content of thought, Follesdal misses Heidegger's radical claim that an account of intentionality in terms of mental content presupposes but 2
3
' Dagfinn Follesdal, "Husserl and Heidegger on ihe Role of Actions in the Constitution o f the W o r l d , " i n Essays m Honour of Jaakko Hmlikka, ed. E. Saarinen et al., (Dordrecht, H o l l a n d : D. Reidel, 1979), p. 3 7 1 . A similar trivializing reduction of Heidegger's work to a practical variation on Husserl's is assumed by M a r k O k r e n t : "[A]s as soon as one realizes that, for Heidegger, intentionality is always practical rather than cognitive and that the p r i m a r y f o r m of intending is d o i n g something for a purpose rather than being conscious of something, the structural analogies between the a r g u m e n t strategies of Husserl and Heidegger become apparent" ( M a r k O k r e n t , Heidegger's Pragmatism [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988], p. 10). 2
:1
Follesdal, Ibid.,
p.
"Husserl and Heidegger," 372. 376.
136
H E I D E G G E R S
19
C R I T I Q U E
overlooks a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l sort o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y — a k i n d o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y that does n o t i n v o l v e i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t at all. Heidegger primary;
does he
not
merely
claim
that
practical
activity
is
w a n t s t o s h o w t h a t neither p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y nor
contemplative
knowing
can
be
understood
as
a
relation
b e t w e e n a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t s u b j e c t w i t h its i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t a n d an i n d e p e n d e n t object. What
Follesdal
traditional
assumes
and
representational
Heidegger
view
of
opposes
practice.
To
is
the
this
day
philosophers such a s J o h n Searle a n d D o n a l d D a v i d s o n , w h o d o n o t a g r e e o n m u c h else, a g r e e t h a t a c t i o n m u s t b e e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f m e n t a l states w i t h i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t . H e i d e g g e r ' s attempt to break o u t of the philosophical t r a d i t i o n is focused in his a t t e m p t t o get b e y o n d t h e subject/object d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t such
views
essential
presuppose.
intention
is
In a to
lecture
first
pose
in
1929
the
h e says,
problem
"My
[of
the
subject/object r e l a t i o n ] a n d w o r k it o u t in such a way that t h e e s s e n t i a l s o f t h e e n t i r e W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n w i l l be c o n c e n t r a t e d 4
i n t h e s i m p l i c i t y o f a basic p r o b l e m . " T h e basic p r o b l e m i s n o t w h i c h k i n d o f intentionality—theoretical o r practical—is m o r e fundamental, b u t what sort o f experience makes b o t h kinds o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y possible. Husserl
defined
phenomenology
as
the
study
of
the
intentional content r e m a i n i n g in the m i n d after the bracketing o f t h e w o r l d , i.e., a f t e r t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l r e d u c t i o n . J e r r y F o d o r calls s u c h a n a p p r o a c h solipsism."
Heidegger
to the m i n d
opposes
the
"methodological
claim
underlying
this
m e t h o d —the c l a i m that a person's relation to the w o r l d a n d the things in it m u s t always be m e d i a t e d by i n t e n t i o n a l content, so that o n e c a n p e r f o r m a r e d u c t i o n that separates t h e m i n d a n d its c o n t e n t f r o m t h e w o r l d . A s h e p u t s i t : T h e usual conception o f intentionality . . . misconstrues the struc-
* M a n i n Heidegger, The Metaphysical University Press, 1984), p. 132.
Foundation
137
of Logic
(Bloomington:
Indiana
S O C I A L
20
tu re
of
the
R E S E A R C H
self-directedness-loward,
the
intention.
This
misin-
t e r p r e t a t i o n lies in an erroneous subjectivizing of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . . . . T h e idea of a subject w h i c h has i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s . capsulated
within
itself is
an
absurdity
which
.
. en-
misconstrues
the
basic o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e b e i n g t h a t w e o u r s e l v e s a r e .
5
T h i s makes H e i d e g g e r s o u n d like what w o u l d n o w be called an e x t e r n a l i s t . I t i s a s i f h e w e r e c l a i m i n g t h a t m e n t a l states g e t t h e i r intentional content by way of some connection w i t h the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . B u t a s w e s h a l l see, H e i d e g g e r ' s v i e w i s m o r e radical. He wants to introduce a k i n d of intentionality that avoids the n o t i o n of mental content altogether. Before
we
can
fully
appreciate
Heidegger's
project
and
d e c i d e w h e t h e r he succeeds, we have to s h a r p e n as m u c h as possible the intentionalistic t h e o r y o f m i n d h e opposes. Just h o w is the subject/object d i s t i n c t i o n supposed to be b u i l t i n t o all ways o f r e l a t i n g t o the w o r l d w h e t h e r they b e k n o w i n g o r acting? Since H e i d e g g e r focuses on a c t i o n as the area in w h i c h i t i s easiest
t o see
that o u r experience
need
not
involve
a
m i n d / w o r l d split, I too will concentrate o n action. B u t since Husserl never w o r k e d o u t a theory o f action, I will t u r n to the w o r k o f J o h n Searle, w h o d e f e n d s a n intentionalist account o f action o f the sort H e i d e g g e r opposes. I will therefore
first
spell
o u t Searle's f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e w a y t h e m i n d / w o r l d s p l i t i s supposedly
built
into
the
experience
of acting,
and
then
present Heidegger's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l critique. ( W h e r e Searle agrees w i t h D o n a l d D a v i d s o n I w i l l also r e m i n d t h e r e a d e r o f Davidson's view.) It is generally agreed
that o u r commonsense concepts of
p e r c e p t i o n a n d action are causal concepts. Paul Grice s h o w e d that
our
concept
of
perception
is
that
of
a
perceptual
experience caused in the r i g h t way by the object p e r c e i v e d .
6
In
"' M a r t i n Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology' ( B l o o m i n g t o n : Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 0 3 - 6 4 . " Paul Grice, " T h e Causal T h e o r y o f Perception," in Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. Robert Swartz (New Y o r k : A n c h o r Books, 1905).
138
H E I D E G G E R S
21
C R I T I Q U E
t h e p a r a l l e l case o f a c t i n g , S e a r l e a n d D a v i d s o n a r g u e t h a t o u r c o n c e p t of an action is likewise causal. An action is a b o d i l y m o v e m e n t w h i c h is u n d e r s t o o d as h a v i n g been caused in the r i g h t way by something mental. movement
to c o u n t as caused
Davidson thinks that,
in
the
r i g h t way,
it
for a
must be
i n t e r p r e t e d a s c a u s e d b y b r a i n states t o k e n i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e beliefs
and
desires
that
count
as
reasons
for
the
action.
D a v i d s o n gives a n a c c o u n t t h a t r e q u i r e s a t t r i b u t i n g s o m e t h i n g like a
prior intention.
actions
can
be
Searle denies
spontaneous,
but
this
requirement,
suggests
that
two
since other
conditions must be met before a b o d i l y m o t i o n qualifies as an action.
First,
a
representation
of the
goal of the action
must
exist t h r o u g h o u t the m o t i o n a n d m u s t play a c o n t i n u i n g causal role
in
shaping
representation
the
of
the
action. goal
Searle
the
calls
this
"intention
in
continuing
action,"
thus
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g it f r o m the " p r i o r i n t e n t i o n " w h i c h corresponds to the initial representation of the goal of the action p r i o r to the
initiation
subject
of
must
intention
in
motion.
Second,
Searle
maintains
that
the
between
the
experience
the
causal
connection
action
the
bodily
movement continuously.
and
I n d e e d , a c c o r d i n g t o Searle, the e x p e r i e n c e o f a c t i n g i s j u s t the experience
of
the
bodily
movement
being
caused
by
the
intention in action. N o t e that i n his account o f a c t i o n , a s elsewhere i n his a c c o u n t of
intentionality,
logical
Searle
conditions
standard
analysis
and
attempts
a
unique
phenomenological
of action
is
"bodily
integration
description.
motion
caused
of The
by
a
reason." Searle i n c o r p o r a t e s a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a n a l o g of this analysis
into
his
account
of action
by
maintaining
that
the
experience of an action must include a direct experience of the causal r e l a t i o n between the i n t e n t i o n i n action a n d the b o d i l y motion. intention
He
argues
that
in
action
are
both
the
causally
prior
intention
self-referential.
and
They
the both
i n c l u d e in their conditions of satisfaction the r e q u i r e m e n t that the
intention
to
bring about
a
goal
139
cause
the
goal-directed
22
S O C I A L
R E S E A R C H
action. T h u s an action is a b o d i l y m o v e m e n t experienced as caused by my i n t e n t i o n to p e r f o r m it. In
his
attempt
to
overthrow
the
subject/object
account,
H e i d e g g e r seeks t o s h o w ( 1 ) t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y w i t h o u t t h e experience of self-referential content is characteristic of the u n i m p e d e d m o d e of everyday activity, whereas Husserl's (and Searle's)
mentalistic i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is a d e r i v a t i v e m o d e that
occurs o n l y w h e n t h e r e i s so m e d i s t u r b a n c e , a n d (2) that b o t h these m o d e s of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y p r e s u p p o s e b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d , a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l f o r m o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y t h a t H e i d e g g e r calls o r i g i n a r y transcendence, and that he claims is the c o n d i t i o n of the possibility o f b o t h active a n d c o n t e m p l a t i v e i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . I n h i s l e c t u r e c o u r s e t h e y e a r Being and Time w a s p u b l i s h e d , h e refers to this double
task ( w h e n
he speaks of Dasein
he is
speaking o f h u m a n beings): T h e task o f b r i n g i n g t o l i g h t Dasein's e x i s t e n t i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n leads f i r s t o f all t o t h e t w o f o l d task, i n t r i n s i c a l l y o n e , o f i n t e r p r e t i n g m o r e radically the p h e n o m e n a o f intentionality and t r a n s c e n d e n c e . W i t h this task . . . w e r u n u p against a c e n t r a l p r o b l e m t h a t has r e m a i n e d u n k n o w n t o a l l p r e v i o u s p h i l o s o p h y . I t w i l l t u r n o u t t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is f o u n d e d i n Dasein's t r a n s c e n d e n c e a n d is possible solely f o r this reason — t h a t transcendence cannot conversely be e x p l a i n e d in terms of intentionality. 7
Heidegger's
Account
of
Primordial
Intentionality
I n u s i n g S e a r l e ' s a c c o u n t as a s t a n d - i n f o r H u s s e r l ' s , I w i l l h i g h l i g h t t w o aspects o f Searle's v i e w t h a t H u s s e r l p r e s u m a b l y w o u l d have shared, b o t h of w h i c h
H e i d e g g e r rejects.
8
Searle
points out that the experience of acting is phenomenologically
7
Heidegger, Basic Problem of Phenomenology, p. 162. T h i s is not to say that Searle was influenced by Husserl, nor that their accounts of the intentionality of perception and action are identical. Searle's account of the logical role of causality and thus of the necessary self-refereniiality of the intentional content of the experience involved in perception and action is not f o u n d in Husserl. 8
140
H E I D E G G E R ' S
23
C R I T I Q U E
distinguishable f r o m the experience of being acted u p o n . I can have
the
experience
of acting
even
if
I
am
deluded —for
e x a m p l e , p a r a l y z e d — a n d the b o d i l y m o v e m e n t I take it I am c a u s i n g is in fact n o t t a k i n g place. Conversely, if electrodes are a p p l i e d to my b r a i n , my b o d y can be caused to m o v e w i t h o u t m y h a v i n g a n experience o f acting. I t follows f r o m the above considerations that the experience of acting a n d the b o d i l y m o v e m e n t i t causes b e l o n g t o t w o t o t a l l y separate d o m a i n s . T h u s , a c c o r d i n g t o Searle, the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m i n d a n d w o r l d , w h a t H u s s e r l a n d H e i d e g g e r w o u l d call the distinction between subject a n d object, is b u i l t d i r e c t l y i n t o the logic of acting:
[J]ust
as
the
components, and
the
an
case
of
seeing
Intentional
conditions
of
the
table
component
satisfaction
involves (the
of
visual
that
two
related
experience)
component
(the
p r e s e n c e a n d f e a t u r e s o f t h e table), s o t h e act o f r a i s i n g m y a r m involves
two
components,
experience
of acting)
component
(the
and
movement
an
the
Intentional
conditions
of my
arm).
component
o f satisfaction
(the
of that
9
H e i d e g g e r questions p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l claims of the sort that a c c o m p a n y Searle's
analysis o f the
logic of perception
and
a c t i o n . H e d e n i e s first t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f a c t i n g m u s t b e a n experience
of
my
causing
e x p e r i e n c e of a c t i n g m u s t the action.
the
action,
and
second
that
represent the conditions o f satisfaction
the of
1 0
Searle begins his account o f intentions i n a c t i o n b y p o i n t i n g o u t that w e always seem t o k n o w d u r i n g a n a c t i o n that w e are
9
J o h n Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 88. Searle could give up his phenomenological claims and stick to the logical conditions of perception and action, viz., [hat thev both must in some way be able to succeed or fail, and that action must be something we do, not what is done to us (and perception vice versa). B u t as long as he accepts the causal theory, he accepts the existence of the terms between which the causal relation holds, viz., physical events and mental experiences, and it is ultimately this ontology that Heidegger is challenging. 10
141
24
S O C I A L
R E S E A R C H
a c t i n g — a t least i n t h e s e n s e t h a t w e e x p e r i e n c e o u r s e l v e s a s t h e source of o u r activity about.
rather than
a s b e i n g passively
Heidegger w o u l d agree, b u t he w o u l d
only
in
deliberate
experience
action
o f one's
is
the
intention
experience
in
action
moved
point out that of
acting
c a u s i n g one's
an
move-
ment. In everyday absorbed c o p i n g , the experience of acting is instead the experience of a steady flow of skillful activity in response
t o one's
sense
of the
environment.
Part
of that
e x p e r i e n c e i s a sense t h a t w h e n o n e ' s s i t u a t i o n d e v i a t e s f r o m some
optimal
body/environment
relationship,
one's
motion
takes o n e closer t o that o p t i m a l f o r m a n d t h e r e b y relieves t h e "tension" of the deviation. As M a u r i c e Merleau-Ponty w o u l d p u t i t , one's b o d y i s s o l i c i t e d b y t h e s i t u a t i o n t o get i n t o t h e r i g h t relation to it. W h e n everyday coping is going well, one experiences s o m e t h i n g l i k e w h a t athletes call f l o w , o r p l a y i n g o u t of t h e i r heads. One's activity is c o m p l e t e l y geared i n t o the demands
of
the
situation.
One
does
not
distinguish
one's
experience o f acting f r o m one's o n g o i n g activity, a n d t h e r e f o r e one
has
no
self-referential
experience
of oneself as
causing
that activity. Aron
Gurwitsch,
a
student
of Husserl's,
yet
a
perceptive
r e a d e r of H e i d e g g e r , gives,
in
h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Being and
Time,
of
this
an
excellent
account
nonself-referential,
[Wjhat
is
nonintentionalistic,
i.e.,
awareness:
imposed
on
us
to
do
is
not
determined
by
us
as
someone standing outside the situation simply looking on at it; what
occurs
situation
and
and
is
imposed
its o w n
are
structure;
rather
and
we do
prescribed more and
by
the
greater
j u s t i c e t o i t t h e m o r e w e l e t o u r s e l v e s b e g u i d e d b y i t , i . e . , t h e less reserved we are in i m m e r s i n g ourselves in it a n d s u b o r d i n a t i n g ourselves
to
interwoven into it.
1 1
Aron
University
it. with
We it,
find
ourselves
encompassed
in
by it,
a
situation
and
are
indeed just "absorbed"
1 1
Gurwitsch, Press,
1979),
Human p.
Encounters
in
the
67.
142
Social
World
(Pittsburgh:
Duquesne
To
get
the
H E I D E G G E R ' S
C R I T I Q U E
phenomenon
focus,
Merleau-Pontyan Merleau-Ponty Heidegger's
example
such
attended
account
of
in
as
a
25
w e »can tennis
Gurwitsch's
consider
swing.
lectures
comportment
in
a
(Since
explaining
terms
of
gestalt
perception, there may well be a direct line of influence here.) If o n e is a b e g i n n e r or is o f f one's f o r m , one m i g h t find oneself m a k i n g a n e f f o r t t o keep one's eye o n the ball, keep t h e racket p e r p e n d i c u l a r t o t h e c o u r t , h i t t h e b a l l s q u a r e l y , etc. B u t i f o n e is expert at the game a n d
things are g o i n g well,
what
is
e x p e r i e n c e d i s m o r e l i k e o n e ' s a r m g o i n g u p a n d its b e i n g d r a w n to the a p p r o p r i a t e position, the racket f o r m i n g the appropriate angle w i t h the c o u r t — a n angle we need not even be a w a r e o f — a l l this so as to c o m p l e t e the gestalt m a d e up of t h e c o u r t , one's r u n n i n g o p p o n e n t , a n d the o n c o m i n g ball. The
phenomenon,
then,
t a x o n o m y as p r e s e n t e d
in
requires
us
to
modify
h i s b o o k , Intentionality.
12
Searle's
Action d o e s ,
as Searle claims, have a w o r l d - t o - m i n d d i r e c t i o n of fit—our actions b r i n g the w o r l d into line w i t h what w e w o u l d want i f w e thought
about
it—but,
experience
of acting
has
contrary
a
to
world-to-mind
Searle's
direction
account, of
the
causation
also. W e e x p e r i e n c e t h e s i t u a t i o n a s d r a w i n g t h e a c t i o n o u t o f us. Searle applies to p e r c e p t i o n t h e same analysis he applies to a c t i o n . H i s e x a m p l e is seeing a f l o w e r : The
seeing consists o f t w o c o m p o n e n t s ,
and
the
flower,
where
the
presence
f l o w e r cause t h e visual e x p e r i e n c e a n d the
presence
and
features
c o n d i t i o n s of satisfaction.
of
the
the
visual
of (and
experience
features
of)
the
t h e v i s u a l e x p e r i e n c e has
flower
as
the
rest
of
its
T h e c o n t e n t of the visual experience is
t h a t t h e r e i s a f l o w e r t h e r e a n d i t i s s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i n t h e sense that,
unless
the
fact
that
there
is
a
flower
there
causes
e x p e r i e n c e , t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s a t i s f a c t i o n d o n o t o b t a i n , i.e., not
actually
flower.'
I J
1:1
Searle,
see
that
there
is
a
flower
3
Intrntionalitx,
p.
95.
Ibid.
143
there,
n o r do
I
see
this I do the
S O C I A L
26
R E S E A R C H
B u t j u s t as s k i l l f u l a b s o r p t i o n does n o t i n v o l v e an e x p e r i e n c e o f a c t i n g separate f r o m a n a c t i o n t h a t i t causes, s o p e r c e p t i o n does n o t i n v o l v e a subjective visual experience separate f r o m a n d c a u s e d b y its o b j e c t . A n o n m e n t a l i s t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f perception
that
parallels
Heidegger's
phenomenology
of
a b s o r b e d a c t i o n i s f o u n d i n M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y ' s Phenomenology
of
Perception.
There
Merleau-Ponty
describes
the
experience of perceiving as the experience of o u r openness to the
world:
The
child
lives
in
a
world
which
he
unhesitatingly
believes
is
accessible t o all a r o u n d h i m . H e has n o awareness o f h i m s e l f o r of others as private subjectivities. . . heads
turned
towards
e v e r y t h i n g takes place. unsophisticated
. F o r h i m m e n are e m p t y
one
single,
. . .
I t m u s t b e t h e case
thinking
of our
self-evident
earliest
years
world .
.
where
. that the
remains
as
an
indispensable acquisition u n d e r l y i n g that of maturity, if there is to be f o r the adult one single intersubjective w o r l d .
1 4
W h i l e t h e i m a g e o f a n e m p t y h e a d gets a t t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g ical t r u t h of direct realism, it is m i s l e a d i n g in a n o t h e r respect. In
perception
we
do
not
experience
ourselves
as
passive
receivers. By t u r n i n g my attention to s o m e t h i n g I experience myself as enabling it to show up. Moreover, I can z o o m in on it a n d reveal it in greater a n d greater detail. In the activity of l o o k i n g I f e e l I a m r e s p o n s i b l e f o r w h a t I see. T h u s looking a s experienced h a s a m i n d - t o - w o r l d d i r e c t i o n o f c a u s a t i o n . Common person
and
sense a
an
unstable
mixture
of a first-
third-person—an
maintains
internal
and
external-
account of p e r c e p t i o n a n d action. or
is
caused
ontologically
by
something
unstable
idea
in
is
an
A private e x p e r i e n c e c a u s e s the
public
expressed
world.
in
our
This
everyday
concepts of perception a n d action. T h e r e t h e n seem to be t w o possible positions for m a k i n g the concepts consistent. D a v i d s o n accepts
objective
causation
of b r a i n
u
states
M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y , Phenomenology of Perception ( L o n d o n : P a u l , 1979), p. 3 5 5 .
144
in
the
case
of
Routledge & Kegan
H E I D E G G E R ' S
27
C R I T I Q U E
p e r c e p t i o n a n d b y b r a i n states i n t h e case o f a c t i o n , a n d t r e a t s the first-person e x p e r i e n c e as a m a t t e r of a t t r i b u t i o n . Searle starts
from
the
first-person
experience
and
builds
the
t h i r d - p e r s o n causal account i n t o the i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f the experience.
Thus
Merleau-Ponty and
both
speaks
are
led
of "the
to
distort
prejudice
the
phenomena.
of c o m m o n
sense,"
Heidegger warns:
The
most
dangerous
and
stubborn
prejudices
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of intentionality are
not the
form
of philosophical
the
from
the
natural
theories
apprehension
but and
relative
to
explicit ones
in
implicit
ones
interpretation
that
the the arise
of things
by
. . . e v e r y d a y " g o o d sense." T h e s e l a t t e r m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e exactly
the
ones
that
are
least
noticeable
and
hardest
to
1
repulse. '
Phenomenology
rejects
common
sense
in
the
name
of the
phenomena of everyday involved perception and action. H e i d e g g e r ' s s e c o n d p o i n t a m o u n t s t o a r e j e c t i o n o f Searle's claim that the intentional content of the experience of acting is a representation of the action's c o n d i t i o n s of satisfaction, viz., a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f m y b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e state o f a f f a i r s I a m t r y i n g to achieve. B u t p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n shows that in a wide variety of situations h u m a n beings relate to the w o r l d in an organized purposive manner w i t h o u t the constant accompaniment what
the
of
action
a
is
representational aimed
at
state
which
accomplishing.
specifies
Examples
are
skillful activity like playing tennis; habitual activity like d r i v i n g t o t h e o f f i c e o r b r u s h i n g one's t e e t h ; casual u n t h i n k i n g activity like
rolling over
speaking;
and
in
bed
spontaneous
or
m a k i n g gestures activity
such
as
while one fidgeting
is
and
d r u m m i n g o n e ' s f i n g e r s d u r i n g a d u l l l e c t u r e . I n a l l t h e s e cases of action it is possible to be w i t h o u t any representation of what one is d o i n g as one p e r f o r m s the action. I n d e e d , at times one is actually surprised w h e n the action is accomplished, as w h e n
u
Heidegger. Basic Problems, p. 59.
145
S O C I A L
28
R E S E A R C H
one's t h o u g h t s are i n t e r r u p t e d by one's a r r i v a l at the office. We should t r y to impress on ourselves w h a t a h u g e a m o u n t of o u r lives — w o r k i n g , g e t t i n g a r o u n d , t a l k i n g , e a t i n g , d r i v i n g , e t c . —is s p e n t i n t h i s i m m e d i a t e c o p i n g m o d e , a n d w h a t a s m a l l p a r t is spent in the deliberate, p u r p o s e f u l , subject/object m o d e , w h i c h is. o f c o u r s e , t h e m o d e w e t e n d t o n o t i c e , a n d w h i c h h a s therefore
formed
our
commonsense
concepts
and
been
studied in detail by philosophers. From recent
Aristotle's accounts
discussion
of action
of the
such
as
practical
Davidson's,
svllogism
to
philosophers
have held that we must e x p l a i n action as caused by the attempt to achieve some goal. A c c o r d i n g to Searle, e v e n w h e n t h e r e is n o p r i o r setting o f a goal, a s w h e n I j u m p u p a n d pace a b o u t the r o o m , I must have in m i n d what I am d o i n g . A c c o r d i n g to H e i d e g g e r , h o w e v e r , s k i l l f u l c o p i n g does n o t r e q u i r e a m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f its g o a l a t a l l . I t c a n b e purposive w i t h o u t t h e a g e n t e n t e r t a i n i n g a purpose. player
Larry
Bird's
Heidegger w o u l d like basketball
description
of
the
experience
c o m p l e x p u r p o s i v e act o f passing the ball i n
of
the
the midst of a
game: [ A lot o f t h e ] t h i n g s I d o o n t h e c o u r t are j u s t reactions t o s i t u a t i o n s . . . . A l o t o f t i m e s , I've passed t h e b a s k e t b a l l a n d n o t r e a l i z e d I've passed it u n t i l a m o m e n t or so later."* We
can
return
to
Merleau-Ponty's
account
of action
to
u n d e r s t a n d this experience. R e m e m b e r the gestalt account o f the experience of an expert tennis stroke.
If one is expert at
tennis a n d things are g o i n g w e l l , w h a t is e x p e r i e n c e d is one's a r m g o i n g u p a n d its b e i n g d r a w n t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p o s i t i o n so
as
to complete
the gestalt
made
up
of the
court,
one's
r u n n i n g o p p o n e n t , a n d the o n c o m i n g ball. W e not o n l y feel t h a t o u r m o t i o n was caused b y t h e p e r c e i v e d c o n d i t i o n s , b u t also t h a t it was caused in s u c h a w a y t h a t it is c o n s t r a i n e d to
" ' Q u e u e d i n L . D . L e v i n e , Bird: McGraw
Hill,
The Making o f a n American Sports Legend ( N e w Y o r k :
1988).
146
H E I D E G G E R S
29
C R I T I Q U E
r e d u c e a sense o f d e v i a t i o n f r o m s o m e s a t i s f a c t o r y g e s t a l t . N o w we* c a n a d d
t h a t the nature of that satisfactoiy gestalt is in no way
represented. To
help convince
us
that the
representation
of the
final
gestalt need play n o role i n a c h i e v i n g the result, M e r l e a u - P o n t y uses
the analogy of a
soap
bubble.
T h e b u b b l e starts
as
a
d e f o r m e d f i l m . T h e bits o f soap j u s t r e s p o n d to local forces a c c o r d i n g to laws w h i c h h a p p e n to w o r k so as to dispose t h e e n t i r e system to e n d up as a sphere, but the spherical result does not play a causal r o l e in p r o d u c i n g the b u b b l e . T h e same h o l d s f o r the f i n a l gestalt o f b o d y a n d racket ( a l t h o u g h , u n l i k e t h e b u b b l e , t h e a c t o r h a s a sense t h a t h e i s c o o p e r a t i n g i n t h e movement
and
could
stop
it
at
will).
Indeed,
I
cannot
r e p r e s e n t h o w I a m t u r n i n g m y r a c k e t since I d o n o t k n o w w h a t I do w h e n I r e t u r n the ball. I may once have been t o l d to h o l d mv racket p e r p e n d i c u l a r to the court, a n d I may have s u c c e e d e d i n d o i n g so, b u t n o w e x p e r i e n c e h a s s c u l p t e d
my
s w i n g to the situation in a far m o r e subtle a n d a p p r o p r i a t e w a y t h a n I c o u l d have achieved as a b e g i n n e r f o l l o w i n g this r u l e . A n e v e n m o r e s t r i k i n g case, w h e r e t h e g o a l t h e b o d y i s t o a c h i e v e is n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e a c t o r as s o m e t h i n g t o a i m at, w i l l m a k e the p o i n t clear. I n s t r u c t o r pilots teach b e g i n n i n g pilots a rule
for
determining
the
order
in
which
to
scan
their
instruments —a rule the instructor pilots were taught and, as f a r a s t h e y k n o w , s t i l l use. A t o n e p o i n t , h o w e v e r , A i r F o r c e psychologists
studied
the
eye
movements
of the
instructors
d u r i n g simulated flight a n d f o u n d , to everyone's surprise, that the instructor pilots were not f o l l o w i n g the rule they were t e a c h i n g ; i n fact, t h e i r eye m o v e m e n t s v a r i e d f r o m s i t u a t i o n t o . situation
and did
n o t seem
to
follow any
rule at all.
The
instructor pilots h a d no idea of the way they were scanning their
instruments
and
so
could
not
have
represented
to
themselves what they were d o i n g . Searle's r e s p o n s e t o s u c h o b j e c t i o n s i s t h a t o n l y t h e b r o a d e r action of w i n n i n g a tennis point or f i n d i n g out h o w e v e r y t h i n g is g o i n g bv scanning the i n s t r u m e n t s is i n t e n t i o n a l , a n d it is this
147
S O C I A L
30
goal
that
is
represented
in
R E S E A R C H
the
intentional
content
of the
i n t e n t i o n in action. Searle points o u t that an e x p e r t skier does n o t have to f o r m a separate i n t e n t i o n to shift his w e i g h t f r o m one ski to the other or to execute each t u r n . He just intends to ski
down
the
mountain.
This
is
a
safe
response
since
the
i n t e n t i o n a l i s t can, i n d e e d , always f i n d a level at w h i c h the actor is t r y i n g to achieve s o m e t h i n g , a n d the experience of acting can be d e f i n e d as the experience of causing my body to b r i n g about that end. T h e r e is no d o u b t s o m e t h i n g r i g h t about this response, b u t s o m e t h i n g t r o u b l i n g about it too. T h e tennis plaver m i g h t well b e t r y i n g t o w i n a p o i n t , b u t w h a t h e o r she i s d o i n g seems t o b e m u c h m o r e fine-grained. For example, expert tennis players l e a r n to rush the net a n d slam the ball b e h i n d t h e i r o p p o n e n t , a n d go on d o i n g so w h e t h e r they are aware of d o i n g so or not. O f c o u r s e , a s Searle p o i n t s o u t , t h e y a r e also w i n n i n g a p o i n t , w i n n i n g t h e set, g e t t i n g e x e r c i s e , m o v i n g a i r m o l e c u l e s , u s i n g e n e r g y , etc. H o w d o w e d e t e r m i n e w h a t t h e y a r e r e a l l y d o i n g ? Searle has a n a n s w e r w h i c h seems r i g h t : A s k t h e a g e n t .
He
argues that there m u s t b e goal-awareness i n action, since, i f one
is
stopped
and
questioned
even
while
acting
in
a
n o n d e l i b e r a t e w a y , o n e c a n say w h a t o n e i s d o i n g . T h i s , S e a r l e concludes,
shows
that
even
in
nondeliberate
activity
our
m o v e m e n t s are b e i n g g u i d e d by a self-referential i n t e n t i o n in action w h i c h represents o u r goal. B u t the agent in o u r tennis e x a m p l e m i g h t w e l l j u s t say i f a s k e d t h a t h e w a s p l a y i n g t e n n i s . W e c o u l d , o f course, t h e n restate o u r question, insisting that h e t e l l u s w h a t h e w a s d o i n g right then. B u t t h e n h e m i g h t a n s w e r h e w a s t r y i n g t o w i n a p o i n t , o r h e m i g h t e q u a l l y w e l l say t h a t h e w a s r u s h i n g t h e n e t , o r , l i k e L a r r y B i r d , h e m i g h t say h e w a s s o a b s o r b e d h e does n o t k n o w w h a t h e was d o i n g . T h e p o i n t i s t h a t i f w e a r e t o t r u s t w h a t t h e a g e n t says h e i s d o i n g , a s S e a r l e says w e s h o u l d , w h a t t h e a g e n t i s d o i n g n e e d n o t b e t h e s a m e a s the conscious i n t e n t i o n that initiated the flow of activity. So it seems w e have n o reason t o d e n y t h a t these are u n i t s o f a c t i v i t y
148
H E I D E G G E R ' S
C R I T I Q U E
31
that count as w h a t the agent is d o i n g but whose conditions of satisfaction are n o t represented
by the agent.
H e i d e g g e r has a n a l t e r n a t i v e a c c o u n t o f o u r a b i l i t y
t o say
w h a t w e are d o i n g , n o t based o n the i n s p e c t i o n o f a n i n t e r n a l m e n t a l state. C o m p o r t m e n t i s n o t s i m p l y a n u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d flow.
O n e can
recognizable
m a k e sense o f i t a s
having a direction
chunks—"toward-whichs"
is
Heidegger's
and
nonin-
t e n t i o n a l i s t i c t e r m f o r these e n d - p o i n t s w e use i n m a k i n g sense of a f l o w of d i r e c t e d activity. F o r e x a m p l e , I leave h o m e , d r i v e to w o r k , park, enter my office b u i l d i n g , o p e n my office door, enter my office,
sit d o w n
at
m y desk,
and
begin
working.
These are all action segments d e f i n e d by t h e i r t o w a r d - w h i c h s . We
thus
make
sense
of our
own
comportment,
and
the
c o m p o r t m e n t of others in terms of a directedness t o w a r d the sort o f l o n g - r a n g e a n d p r o x i m a l ends that are sometimes o u r e x p l i c i t goals. T h a t i s w h y , i f asked w h a t w e o r others are i n the process
of d o i n g ,
we
always
have
an
answer.
But
this
fact
should
not mislead us into postulating mental intentions in
a c t i o n . T h e r e i s n o e v i d e n c e t h a t o u r s h a r e d social segmentation of flows of activity into intelligible subunits is in the m i n d o f the p e r s o n w h o i s absorbed i n the activity. H e i d e g g e r notes explicitly that it is a mistake to t h i n k of the t o w a r d - w h i c h as the goal o f t h e a c t i v i t y , i . e . , a s t h e c o n d i t i o n o f s a t i s f a c t i o n t h e a c t o r has i n m i n d : " T h e a w a i t i n g o f t h e ' t o w a r d s - w h i c h ' i s n e i t h e r a considering o f the 'goal' n o r a n expectation o f the i m p e n d i n g finishing of the w o r k to be p r o d u c e d . "
1 7
T h e p h e n o m e n o n of purposive action w i t h o u t a purpose is n o t l i m i t e d to b o d i l y activity. I t occurs i n a l l areas o f s k i l l f u l coping,
including
intellectual
coping.
Many
instances
of
apparently c o m p l e x p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g w h i c h seem to i m p l e m e n t a l o n g - r a n g e s t r a t e g y , as,
for example,
a
masterful
m o v e in
chess, m a y b e b e s t u n d e r s t o o d a s d i r e c t r e s p o n s e s t o f a m i l i a r p e r c e p t u a l gestalts. A f t e r years o f s e e i n g chess g a m e s u n f o l d , a
1
'
Martin
Heidegger.
Being and Time ( N e w Y o r k :
149
Harper
Sc
Row.
1962),
p.
405.
32
S O C I A L
R E S E A R C H
chess g r a n d m a s t e r c a n , s i m p l y b y r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e p a t t e r n s o n t h e c h e s s b o a r d , p l a y m a s t e r - l e v e l chess w h i l e h i s d e l i b e r a t e , analytic m i n d is absorbed in s o m e t h i n g else.
1 8
Such play, based
as it is on previous attention to thousands of actual a n d book games, incorporates a t r a d i t i o n w h i c h determines the a p p r o p r i a t e response to each s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e r e f o r e makes possible long-range,
strategic,
purposive
play
without
the 1
n e e d i n g to have in m i n d any p l a n or purpose at all. '
player
1
Notice that e x p l a i n i n g Heidegger's objections to Husserl a n d Searle
I
Heidegger
have
had
might
to
well
speak grant
of
activity
Husserl
rather
and
than
Searle
action.
that
their
intentionalistic account reflects o u r c o m m o n s e n s e concept o f action.
He is not, however, t r y i n g to explicate o u r c o m m o n -
sense c o n c e p t , b u t t o m a k e a p l a c e f o r a s o r t o f a c t i v i t y t h a t has been overlooked philosophical
b o t h b y c o m m o n sense a n d a fortiori b y
tradition.
Indeed,
Heidegger
holds
that
the the
c o m m o n s e n s e c o n c e p t o f a c t i o n c o v e r s u p o u r m o s t basic m o d e o f i n v o l v e m e n t i n the w o r l d . H e t h e r e f o r e i n t r o d u c e s his o w n t e r m , Verhalten, t r a n s l a t e d " c o m p o r t m e n t , " f o r t h e w a y h u m a n b e i n g s n o r m a l l y c o p e . H e i d e g g e r uses " c o m p o r t m e n t " t o r e f e r to o u r directed mentalistic
activity,
overtones.
precisely because
But
he
claims
the
that
term
has
no
comportment,
nonetheless, exhibits intentionality. H u s s e r l i a n i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is o f t e n called "aboutness," because m e n t a l c o n t e n t i s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a n object u n d e r a n aspect. H e i d e g g e r ' s m o r e p r i m o r d i a l i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s also a p p r o p r i a t e l y c a l l e d a b o u t n e s s , b u t i n t h i s case i t i s n o t t h e mind w h i c h i s t h i n k i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g , b u t t h e embodied person g o i n g a b o u t
1 8
For a full discussion o f this p h e n o m e n o n , see H . Dreyfus and S. Dreyfus, Mind Over Machine (New Y o r k : Free Press, 1988). * Pierre B o u r d i e u , influenced as he is by Merleau-Ponty, lias seen the same p h e n o m e n o n : "The conditionings associated w i t h a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, s t r u c t u r e d structures predisposed to function as s t r u c t u r i n g structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends" (Pierre B o u r d i e u , The Logic of Practice [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 8 0 ] , p. 5 3 ; my italics). ,!
150
H E I D E G G E R ' S
his
or
her
business.
This
C R I T I Q U E
active
aboutness,
33
like
the
kind
d e s c r i b e d b y H u s s e r l , i s d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h i n g s u n d e r aspects. I c a n be t r a n s p a r e n t l y c o p i n g in s u c h a w a y as to use my d e s k i n o r d e r t o w r i t e o n , o r t o r e a d at, o r t o k e e p t h i n g s i n . T h u s , d e p e n d i n g o n w h a t I a m a b o u t , i.e. u p o n t h e " t o w a r d - w h i c h " of my activity, Heidegger
I
can
r e v e a l t h e d e s k u n d e r d i f f e r e n t aspects. S o say:
"Comportments
have
the
structure
of
d i r e c t i n g - o n e s e l f - t o w a r d , of b e i n g - d i r e c t e d - t o w a r d . . . . [ P ] h e n o m e n o l o g y c a l l s t h i s s t r u c t u r e intentionality."
20
B u t , as we have
s e e n , f o r H e i d e g g e r " c o m p o r t m e n t " d e n o t e s n o t m e r e l y acts o f consciousness, b u t h u m a n activity i n general. T h u s , i n t e n t i o n ality is a t t r i b u t e d n o t to consciousness b u t to Dasein: Because
the
usual
separation
between
a
subject
with
its
i m m a n e n t s p h e r e a n d a n o b j e c t w i t h its t r a n s c e n d e n t s p h e r e — because,
in
general,
the
distinction
between
an
inner and
an
o u t e r is c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d c o n t i n u a l l y gives occasion f o r f u r t h e r constructions, we shall in the f u t u r e no l o n g e r speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, b u t shall u n d e r s t a n d the b e i n g to w h o m i n t e n t i o n a l c o m p o r t m e n t s b e l o n g a s Dasein, a n d way
that
properly
it
is
precisely
understood,
the b e i n g o f Dasein.'^
that
with
the
aid
we
attempt
of
indeed
in
intentional
to characterize
such
a
comportment, suitably
1
Heidegger's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Dasein's c o m p o r t m e n t enables h i m t o contrast his view w i t h that o f the t r a d i t i o n . H e explains w h y i n t h e t r a d i t i o n k n o w l e d g e w a s m i s t a k e n l y t a k e n a s basic, a n d w h y e v e n a c t i o n was i n t e r p r e t e d a s a k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e : T h e previous concept ul conception
.
.
.
intentionality proves to be a restricted
[Bjecause
of this
restriction,
intentionality
is
c o n c e i v e d p r i m a r i l y a s " t a k i n g a s " [as m e a n i n g - g i v i n g ] . . . . T h u s every
act
of directing
oneself
characteristic of k n o w i n g ,
toward
for example,
T h e point is that for Husserl (and
Heidcggei,
Basic
Problems,
p.
58:
first
italics
- ' Ibul.. p . O t . Heidegger.
Metaphysical Foundation,
p.
134.
151
something in
Husserl.'-
receives
the
2
Follesdal a n d Searle too)
mine.
S O C I A L
34
intentionality
always
something, t a k i n g it
R E S E A R C H
amounts
to
my
taking
u n d e r s o m e aspect.
something
So w h e t h e r
I
as take
w h a t I am seeing as a house, or take w h a t I am d o i n g to be r e a c h i n g f o r t h e salt, I a m p e r f o r m i n g t h e same s o r t o f m e n t a l a c t . O n e w a y t o see t h i s i s t o n o t e t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o H u s s e r l a n d Searle, t h e r e m u s t always be an ego d o i n g t h e t a k i n g . I must represent to m y s e l f that my bodily m o v e m e n t is meant to b r i n g a b o u t a s p e c i f i c state o f a f f a i r s . T h e gestalt a c c o u n t o f purposive action, however, shows that one can dispense w i t h this active m e a n i n g - g i v i n g a n d still r e s p o n d to the situation under
one
aspect
or
another.
This
is
why
Heidegger,
G u r w i t s c h , Sartre, a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y each criticized Husserl's egological c o n c e p t i o n o f consciousness. Lest
it
appear
that
Heidegger's
account
of our
dealings, d e n y i n g as it does a self-referential acting,
is
committed
zombie-like behavior,
to
interpreting
we can
in
experience of
involved
summary
everyday
see
activity that
as
skillful
c o p i n g d i f f e r s i n a t least t h r e e w a y s f r o m m i n d l e s s , m e c h a n i c a l behavior: 1. Skillful uses
coping
is
a
mode
of awareness.
t h e t e r m experience (Erfahrung),
characterized private
only
event
as
(Erlebnis,
Heidegger
actually
b u t this e x p e r i e n c e can be
openness.
It
Husserl's
is
not
term),
a
mental,
aware
of
inner,
itself
as
separate f r o m , a n d d i r e c t e d t o w a r d , things i n the w o r l d . 2.
Comportment
is
adaptable
and
copes
with
the
situation
in
a
variety o f icays. I n o n g o i n g c o p i n g o n e r e s p o n d s t o t h i n g s o n t h e basis o f v a s t p a s t e x p e r i e n c e o f w h a t h a s h a p p e n e d i n p r e v i o u s situations, or, m o r e exactly, one's b e h a v i o r manifests dispositions
that have
dealings,
so
been
that
in
shaped
by a
most
cases
vast a m o u n t o f p r e v i o u s when
we
exercise
these
dispositions e v e r y t h i n g works w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n . 3. If the deliberate
going
gets
subject/object
difficult
we
intentionality.
pay
attention
One
then
and has
so a
switch sense
to of
e f f o r t w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n o f s a t i s f a c t i o n t h a t m y e f f o r t causes the
appropriate
goal-directed
movements.
Such
representa-
tions certainly have a place in the overall e x p l a n a t i o n of h o w it
152
H E I D E G G E R ' S
C R I T I Q U E
35
i s t h a t w e m a n a g e t o act i n a w i d e r a n g e o f s i t u a t i o n s . I n d e e d , w h e n the situation is n e w or especially c o m p l e x , m a n i p u l a t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s seems
to be the
p r i m a r y way we have of
carefully c o n s i d e r i n g o u r options a n d o r i e n t i n g ourselves.
Being-in-the- World
as
Originary
Intentionality
H a v i n g a r g u e d so far that m u c h of o u r everyday activity does
not
involve
a
mental
state
whose
intentional
content
r e p r e s e n t s its c o n d i t i o n s o f s a t i s f a c t i o n , b u t r a t h e r i n v o l v e s a n o p e n responsiveness to a gestalt,
H e i d e g g e r next argues that
all h u m a n activity, w h e t h e r absorbed or deliberate, requires a b a c k g r o u n d o r i e n t i n g that makes d i r e c t e d activity possible. S o f a r w e h a v e seen t h a t i n n o n d e l i b e r a t e activities w e e x p e rience ourselves o n l y as an o p e n responsiveness to w h a t solicits o u r activity. H e i d e g g e r n o w adds that such u n t h i n k i n g activity provides
the
nonsalient
background,
both
for
specific
acts
of
ongoing coping and for deliberately focusing on what is u n u s u a l o r d i f f i c u l t . T h e basic i d e a i s t h a t f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n to be d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a p a r t i c u l a r piece of e q u i p m e n t , w h e t h e r using it, perceiving it, or whatever, there must be a correlation between that person's general capacity f o r skillful c o p i n g a n d t h e i n t e r c o n n e c t e d e q u i p m e n t a l w h o l e i n w h i c h t h e t h i n g has a place. F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n I enter a r o o m I n o r m a l l y cope w i t h w h a t e v e r i s t h e r e . W h a t e n a b l e s m e t o d o t h i s i s n o t a set o f beliefs a b o u t r o o m s , n o r a r u l e f o r d e a l i n g w i t h r o o m s i n g e n e r a l a n d w h a t t h e y c o n t a i n ; i t i s a sense o f h o w r o o m s n o r m a l l y behave, a skill f o r d e a l i n g w i t h t h e m , that I have developed by crawling a n d w a l k i n g a r o u n d m a n y rooms. Such familiarity i n v o l v e s n o t o n l y a c t i n g b u t also n o t a c t i n g . I n d e a l i n g w i t h r o o m s I am s k i l l e d at n o t c o p i n g w i t h t h e dust, unless I am a j a n i t o r , a n d not p a y i n g attention to w h e t h e r the w i n d o w s are o p e n e d o r c l o s e d , u n l e s s i t i s h o t , i n w h i c h case I k n o w h o w t o do what is appropriate. My competence for dealing with rooms determines b o t h w h a t I will cope w i t h by using it, a n d w h a t I
153
S O C I A L
36
R E S E A R C H
w i l l c o p e w i t h b y i g n o r i n g i t , w h i l e b e i n g r e a d y t o use it s h o u l d the a p p r o p r i a t e occasion arise. H e r e Heidegger's account sounds deceptively similar to the a p p e a l t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d i n t r o d u c e d b y Searle i n his a c c o u n t of intentionality, Heidegger,
2 3
holds
b u t i n fact i t i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . Searle, l i k e that
the
background
of
intentionality
i n v o l v e s " a b i l i t i e s , " "capacities," a n d "practices," b u t h e insists that
these
are
not a
kind
of intentionality,
but
rather
the
n o n i n t e n t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s that makes i n t e n t i o n a l action possible. F o r H e i d e g g e r , o n the c o n t r a r y , the sort o f b a c k g r o u n d f a m i l i a r i t y that f u n c t i o n s w h e n I take in a r o o m as a w h o l e a n d d e a l w i t h w h a t i s i n i t i s n e i t h e r a set o f s p e c i f i c g o a l - d i r e c t e d actions
nor
merely
a
capacity
that
must
be
activated
by
a
s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i n t e n t i o n a l state. R a t h e r , w h a t H e i d e g g e r calls the background c o n s i s t s i n a c o n t i n u a l i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i v i t y t h a t h e calls
ontological
transcendence.
I n a n early lecture, H e i d e g g e r describes this transcendence as "the b a c k g r o u n d o f . . . . p r i m a r y familiarity, w h i c h itself is not conscious a n d i n t e n d e d b u t is rather present in [an] u n p r o m i nent way."
2 4
I n Being and Time h e s p e a k s o f " [ T ] h a t f a m i l i a r i t y
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h D a s e i n . . . ' k n o w s i t w a y a b o u t ' [sich ,r
"auskennt \
in
its
public
environment."
2 5
In
c a l l s i t t h e " s i g h t o f p r a c t i c a l circumspection .
Basic .
Problems
he
. o u r practical
e v e r y d a y o r i e n t a t i o n . " t h i s f a m i l i a r i t y has a c r u c i a l f u n c t i o n : C i r c u m s p e c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o t h e presence o f w h a t i s o f c o n c e r n p r o v i d e s each s e t t i n g - t o - w o r k , p r o c u r i n g , a n d p e r f o r m i n g w i t h the w a y t o w o r k i t o u t , t h e means t o c a r r y i t o u t , the r i g h t occasion, a n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e . T h i s s i g h t o f c i r c u m s p e c t i o n i s the s k i l l e d p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n c e r n e d d i s c o v e r i n g . 2 6
O n a n a l o g y w i t h t h e w a y s o u r eyes a r e a l w a y s a c c o m m o d a t i n g
23
See Searle, Intentionality, ch. 5. M a r t i n Heidegger, The History of the Concept of Time University Press, 1985), p. 189. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 405. Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 274. 21
23
26
154
(Bloomington:
Indiana
H E I D E G G E R S
37
C R I T I Q U E
to the l i g h t , we m i g h t call this b a c k g r o u n d activity " a c c o m m o dation."
It
is
the
way
we
are
constantly
adjusting
to
our
s i t u a t i o n . H e i d e g g e r has n o s p e c i f i c t e r m f o r t h i s m o s t basic a c t i v i t y . I t i s s o p e r v a s i v e a n d c o n s t a n t t h a t h e s i m p l y calls i t being-in-the-world:
"Being-in-the-world
.
.
. a m o u n t s to a
non-thematic circumspective absorption in . . . an equipmental 2 7
whole."
I n response, t h e n , t o H u s s e r l a n d Searle, H e i d e g g e r points out
that,
whenever
we
are
revealing
entities
by
using
or
c o n t e m p l a t i n g t h e m , we must simultaneously be exercising a general
skilled
grasp of o u r circumstances.
It
is
this
back-
g r o u n d o r i e n t i n g that makes everyday c o p i n g possible. T h u s even if we n o r m a l l y experienced acting as an effort directed t o w a r d a c h i e v i n g some goal ( w h i c h H e i d e g g e r does n o t f i n d i n his n o r m a l c o p i n g e x p e r i e n c e ) t h e r e w o u l d still b e g o o d reason to
deny
that
goal-directed
action
was
the
only
kind
of
intentional activity. J u s t a s i n o r d i n a r y cases o f c o p i n g , D a s e i n i s a b s o r b e d i n its a c t i v i t y i n s u c h a w a y t h a t its e x p e r i e n c e d o e s n o t h a v e a n y s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t , so, i n g e n e r a l ,
Dasein is
a b s o r b e d i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o p i n g t h a t discloses t h e w o r l d a s familiar in such Dasein's
a way
disclosing
Heidegger
tells
that there is
comportment
us:
"[W]e
no separation
and
define
the
world
[concerned
between disclosed.
being-in-the-
w o r l d ] a s absorption i n t h e w o r l d , b e i n g d r a w n i n b y i t . "
Self and
world
belong together in
the single entity,
2 8
Dasein.
Self
a n d w o r l d are n o t t w o entities, like subject a n d o b j e c t . . . b u t self and unity
world
are
of the
the
basic
structure
determination
of
Dasein
of being-in-the-world.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 107. Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. ""·' Heidegger. Basic Problems, p. 297. JH
155
196.
2 0
itself
in
the
38
S O C I A L
Or,
even
more
directly,
R E S E A R C H
"Dasein
. . .
concerned absorption in the w o r l d . " Our
general
background
coping,
is
nothing
but
.
.
.
3 0
our
familiarity
with
the
w o r l d , w h a t H e i d e g g e r calls o r i g i n a r y t r a n s c e n d e n c e , t u r n s o u t to be what Heidegger means by o u r understanding of being.
That
wherein
Dasein
already understands
itself . . .
i s always
something with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity w i t h the w o r l d . . . goes to m a k e up Dasein's u n d e r s t a n d i n g of being. And
3 1
H e i d e g g e r is explicit that this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of b e i n g is
m o r e basic t h a n e i t h e r p r a c t i c e o r t h e o r y .
In whatever wav we conceive of k n o w i n g , it is . . . a c o m p o r t m e n t t o w a r d beings. . . . B u t all practical-technical c o m m e r c e w i t h beings
is
also
a
comportment
toward
beings.
. . .
In
all
c o m p o r t m e n t t o w a r d beings — w h e t h e r it is specifically cognitive, which
is
most
frequently
practical-technical —an
called
theoretical,
understanding
or
of being
whether is
already
it
is in-
v o l v e d . F o r a b e i n g can be e n c o u n t e r e d by us as a b e i n g o n l y in the light of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of b e i n g .
It
is
the
discovery
of the
primacy
3 2
o f this
understanding of
being, not of the p r i m a c y of practical activity, that H e i d e g g e r rightly
holds
to
be
his
unique
contribution
to
Western
philosophy.
30
Ibid.,
31
Heidegger. Being and Time, p.
32
Heidegger.
p.
197. Basic
Problems,
p.
119. 275.
* Some of the ideas in this paper were first expressed in Jerry Wakefield a n d H u b e r t L . Drevfus, "Action and the First Person," in John Searle and His Critics, ed. E. Lepore a n d R. V a n Gulick (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. 1990).
156
Geschlecht sexual difference, ontological difference*
JACQUES DERRIDA
Ecole
normale
superteure
to Ruben Berezdivin 1928 O f sex, o n e c a n r e a d i l y r e m a r k , y e s , H e i d e g g e r speaks a s l i t t l e a s p o s s i b l e , p e r h a p s h e has n e v e r s p o k e n o f i t . P e r h a p s h e has n e v e r s a i d a n y t h i n g , b y t h a t n a m e o r the n a m e s u n d e r w h i c h w e r e c o g n i z e i t , o f the "sexual-relation," "sexual-difference," o r indeed o f " m a n - a n d - w o m a n . " T h a t s i l e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , i s e a s i l y r e m a r k e d . W h i c h m e a n s t h a t the r e m a r k i s s o m e w h a t f a c i l e . A few i n d i c a t i o n s , c o n c l u d i n g w i t h " e v e r y t h i n g happens a s i f . . . , " and i t w o u l d b e satisfied. T h e dossier c o u l d then b e shut, a v o i d i n g t r o u b l e i f n o t r i s k : i t i s a s i f , i n r e a d i n g H e i d e g g e r , there
•First
and
wholly
preliminary
part
of an
interpretation
by
which
I
wish
lo
situate
Gesclileclu w i t h i n H e i d e g g e r ' s p a t h o f t h o u g h t . W i t h i n t h e p a t h o f h i s w r i t i n g s l o o , a n d t h e m a r k e d i m p r e s s i o n o r i n s c r i p t i o n o f t h e w o r d Geschlecht w i l l n o t b e i r r e l e v a n t . T h a t w o r d , I leave it here in its l a n g u a g e f o r reasons t h a i s h o u l d b e c o m e b i n d i n g in the c o u r s e of this v e r y r e a d i n g . A n d i l is i n d e e d a m a t t e r of "Geschlecht" ( s e x , r a c e , f a m i l y , g e n e r a t i o n , l i n e a g e , s p e c i e s , g e n r e / g e n u s ) a n d n o t o f the Geschlecht: o n e w i l l n o t p a s s s o e a s i l y t o w a r d t h e t h i n g i t s e l f ( t h e Geschlecht), b e y o n d t h e m a r k o f t h e w o r d (Geschlecht) i n
which, much
l a t e r , H e i d e g g e r w i l l r e m a r k t h e " i m p r i n t " o f a b l o w o r a s t a m p (Schlag). T h i s h e w i l l d o i n a text w e shall n o t discuss here b u t t o w a r d w h i c h this r e a d i n g w i l l c o n t i n u e , b y w h i c h in t r u t h I k n o w i l i s a l r e a d y m a g n e t i s e d : " D i e S p r a c h e i m G e d i c h t , E i n e Erörterung v o n G e o r g T r a k l s G e d i c h t " ( 1 9 5 3 ) in
Unterwegs zur Sprache ( 1 9 5 9 , p p .
157
36 f f . ) .
66
Jacques
Derrida
Geschleclu:
sexual difference,
ontological difference
were no sexual difference, n o t h i n g of that in m a n , or put otherwise in woman,
to
interrogate
or
suspect,
nothing worthy
of questioning,
fragwürdig. I t is as i f , o n e m i g h t c o n t i n u e , s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e d i d n o t rise t o the h e i g h t o f o n t o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e , o n the w h o l e a s n e g l i g i b l e , i n r e g a r d t o the q u e s t i o n o f the sense o f b e i n g , a s a n y o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e , a determinate d i s t i n c t i o n or an ontic predicate. N e g l i g i b l e for thought, of c o u r s e , e v e n i f n o t a t a l l for s c i e n c e o r p h i l o s o p h y . B u t i n s o f a r a s i t i s o p e n e d u p t o the q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g , i n s o f a r a s i t has a r e l a t i o n t o b e i n g , i n t h a t v e r y r e f e r e n c e , Dasein w o u l d n o t b e s e x e d . D i s c o u r s e o n s e x u a l i t y c o u l d t h e n b e a b a n d o n e d t o the sciences o r p h i l o s o p h i e s o f l i f e , t o a n t h r o p o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , b i o l o g y , o r p e r h a p s even t o r e l i g i o n o r m o r a l i t y . Sexual
difference,
it was
ontological difference.
said,
could
not
rise
to
the
height of
If one wished to find out w h a t height is in
q u e s t i o n , the thought of difference not r i s i n g to any, the silence w o u l d not be lacking. T h a t could then be found arrogant or, precisely, provoking, in a c e n t u r y w h e n s e x u a l i t y , c o m m o n p l a c e o f a l l b a b b l i n g , has a l s o b e c o m e the c u r r e n c y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a n d s c i e n t i f i c " k n o w l e d g e , " t h e i n e v i t a b l e Kampfplatz o f e t h i c s a n d p o l i t i c s . N o t a w o r d f r o m H e i d e g g e r ! I t c o u l d e v e n b e f o u n d a m a t t e r o f g r a n d s t y l e , t h i s scene o f s t u b b o r n m u t i s m a t the very center o f the c o n v e r s a t i o n , i n the u n i n t e r r u p t e d and distracted b u z z i n g o f t h e c o l l o q u i u m ; f o r i n i t s e l f i t has a w a k i n g a n d s o b e r i n g v a l u e ( b u t w h a t e x a c t l y is one speaking about a r o u n d this silence?): W h o , i n d e e d , a r o u n d o r e v e n l o n g b e f o r e h i m has n o t c h a t t e d a b o u t s e x u a l i t y a s s u c h , a s i t w e r e , a n d b y t h a t n a m e ? A l l t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s i n the t r a d i t i o n have
done
so,
from
Plato
to
Nietzsche,
who
for their part
were
irrepressible on the subject. K a n t , H e g e l , H u s s e r l have all reserved it a p l a c e ; t h e y h a v e t r i e d a t least a w o r d o n i t i n t h e i r a n t h r o p o l o g y o r i n t h e i r philosophy of nature, and really everywhere. I s i t i m p r u d e n t t o t r u s t H e i d e g g e r ' s m a n i f e s t silence? W i l l w h a t is t h u s a s c e r t a i n e d l a t e r b e d e r a n g e d f r o m its p r e t t y p h i l o l o g i c a l a s s u r a n c e b y s o m e k n o w n o r u n e d i t e d passage w h e n , w h i l e s e a r c h i n g o u t the w h o l e o f H e i d e g g e r , s o m e r e a d i n g m a c h i n e w i l l h u n t o u t t h e t h i n g a n d s n a r e it? S t i l l , o n e m u s t t h i n k o f p r o g r a m i n g the m a c h i n e , o n e m u s t t h i n k , t h i n k o f i t a n d k n o w h o w t o d o i t . R e l y i n g o n w h i c h w o r d s ? O n l y o n names? A n d o n w h i c h s y n t a x , v i s i b l e o r i n v i s i b l e ? B r i e f l y , i n w h i c h signs w i l l y o u r e c o g n i z e his s p e a k i n g o r r e m a i n i n g s i l e n t a b o u t w h a t y o u n o n c h a l a n t l y call sexual difference? W h a t d o y o u t h i n k b y those w o r d s o r t h r o u g h them? In o r d e r t h a t such an i m p r e s s i v e silence be t o d a y r e m a r k e d o n , to let it appear as such, m a r k e d and m a r k i n g , w h a t , on the w h o l e , w o u l d be satisfactory? U n d o u b t e d l y this:
Heidegger w o u l d have said n o t h i n g
a b o u t s e x u a l i t y b y n a m e i n t h e p l a c e s w h e r e the best e d u c a t e d a n d
158
Research in
Phenomenology
Volume XIII
67
e n d o w e d " m o d e r n i t y " e x p e c t e d i t w i t h a f i r m f o o t , u n d e r its p a n o p l y o f "everything-is-sexual-and-everything-is-political-and-reciprocally" (note i n p a s s i n g t h a t the w o r d " p o l i t i c a l " i s o f r a r e usage, p e r h a p s n u l l , i n Heidegger, another not quite irrelevant m a t t e r ) . E v e n before a statistic w e r e t a k e n , t h e m a t t e r w o u l d s e e m a l r e a d y s e t t l e d . B u t t h e r e are g o o d g r o u n d s t o b e l i e v e t h a t the s t a t i s t i c here w o u l d o n l y c o n f i r m the v e r d i c t : a b o u t w h a t w e g l i b l y c a l l s e x u a l i t y H e i d e g g e r has r e m a i n e d s i l e n t . T r a n s i t i v e a n d s i g n i f i c a n t s i l e n c e ( h e has s i l e n c e d s e x ) w h i c h b e l o n g s , a s
he says, to a c e r t a i n Schweigen ("hier in der transitiven Bedeutung gesagt"), t o t h e p a t h o f a w o r d [parole] h e seems t o i n t e r r u p t . B u t w h a t are the p l a c e s o f t h i s i n t e r r u p t i o n ? W h e r e i s the s i l e n c e w o r k i n g o n t h a t d i s c o u r s e ? A n d w h a t are the f o r m s a n d d e t e r m i n a b l e c o n t o u r s o f t h a t non-said? Y o u c a n bet o n i t , t h e r e ' s n o t h i n g i m m o b i l e i n the p l a c e s w h e r e t h e a r r o w s o f the a f o r e s a i d p a n o p l y w o u l d assign the p o i n t n a m e d : o m i s s i o n , r e p r e s s i o n , d e n i a l , f o r e c l o s u r e , e v e n the u n t h o u g h t . B u t t h e n , i f the b e t w e r e l o s t , t h e t r a c e o f t h a t s i l e n c e w o u l d n o t m e r i t detouring? He doesn't silence a n y t h i n g , no m a t t e r w h a t , the trace does n o t c o m e f r o m n o m a t t e r w h e r e . B u t w h y the
bet? B e c a u s e b e f o r e
p r e d i c t i n g a n y t h i n g w h a t e v e r about " s e x u a l i t y , " i t m a y b e v e r i f i e d , one must i n v o k e chance, the a l e a t o r y , destiny. L e t it be, t h e n , a so-called " m o d e r n " r e a d i n g , an i n v e s t i g a t i o n a r m e d w i t h psychoanalysis, an enquiry authorized by complete anthropological c u l t u r e . W h a t d o e s i t seek? W h e r e d o e s i t seek? W h e r e m a y i t d e e m t o h a v e t h e r i g h t t o e x p e c t a t least a s i g n , a n a l l u s i o n , e l l i p t i c a l a s i t m a y b e , a reference, to s e x u a l i t y , the sexual r e l a t i o n , to sexual difference? To b e g i n w i t h , i n Sein und Zeit. W a s n o t the e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f Dasein near e n o u g h t o a f u n d a m e n t a l a n t h r o p o l o g y t o h a v e g i v e n rise t o s o m a n y misunderstandings
a n d m i s t a k e s r e g a r d i n g its p r e t e n d e d "realite-humaine"
o r h u m a n r e a l i t y a s i t w a s t r a n s l a t e d i n F r a n c e ? Y e t e v e n i n the a n a l y s e s o f b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d a s b e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s , o r o f c a r e e i t h e r i n its s e l f o r as Fürsorge, i t w o u l d be v a i n , it s e e m s , t o s e a r c h e v e n f o r the o u t l i n e o f a discourse on desire and sexuality.
H e n c e the consequence c o u l d be
d r a w n t h a t s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e i s n o t a n e s s e n t i a l t r a i t , t h a t i t does n o t b e l o n g t o t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f Dasein. B e i n g - t h e r e , b e i n g there, the there o f b e i n g a s s u c h , bears n o s e x u a l m a r k . T h e s a m e t h e n goes f o r the r e a d i n g of t h e sense of b e i n g , s i n c e , as Sein und Zeit c l e a r l y states (§ 2), Dasein r e m a i n s in s u c h a r e a d i n g the e x e m p l a r y b e i n g . E v e n w e r e it a d m i t t e d that a l l reference to s e x u a l i t y isn't effaced or remains i m p l i e d , t h i s w o u l d o n l y b e t o the degree t h a t s u c h a r e f e r e n c e p r e s u p p o s e s quite
general
Räumlichkeit,
structures
Rede,
Sprache,
(In-der-Welt-sein
Geworfenheii,
159
als
Mit-
Sorge,
und
Selbst-sein,
Zeitlichkeit,
Sein
68
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
zum Tode) a m o n g m a n y o t h e r s . Y e t s e x u a l i t y w o u l d n e v e r b e t h e g u i d i n g t h r e a d f o r a p r i v i l e g e d access t o these s t r u c t u r e s . T h e r e the m a t t e r s e e m s s e t t l e d , i t m i g h t b e s a i d . A n d y e t !
Und
dennoch] ( H e i d e g g e r uses m o r e o f t e n t h a n o n e w o u l d f a i n b e l i e v e t h i s rhetorical turn: and yet, e x c l a m a t i o n m a r k , next paragraph).
A n d y e t the m a t t e r w a s s o l i t t l e o r i l l u n d e r s t o o d t h a t H e i d e g g e r h a d t o e x p l i c a t e h i m s e l f r i g h t a w a y . H e w a s t o d o i t i n t h e m a r g i n s o f Sein und Zeil, i f w e m a y c a l l m a r g i n a l a c o u r s e g i v e n a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f M a r b u r g / L a h n i n the S u m m e r Semester 1 9 2 8 . ' T h e r e h e recalls c e r t a i n
" d i r e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e s " on "ihe problem of transcendence and the problem of SEIN UND ZEIT" (§ 1 0 ) . T h e e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c of Dasein c a n o n l y o c c u r w i t h i n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y . That's w h y it is not a matter of an " a n t h r o p o l o g y " or an " e t h i c . " Such an a n a l y t i c i s o n l y " p r e p a r a t o r y , " w h i l e t h e " m e t a p h y s i c s o f Dasein" i s n o t yet
" a t the
center"
of the
enterprise, clearly suggesting that
it
is
nevertheless being p r o g r a m m e d . It is by the n a m e of "Dasein" t h a t I w o u l d here i n t r o d u c e the q u e s t i o n of sexual difference. W h y n a m e Dasein
the
b e i n g w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s the
theme of this
a n a l y t i c ? W h y d o e s Dasein g i v e its " t i t l e " t o t h i s t h e m a t i c ? I n Sein und Zeit H e i d e g g e r h a d j u s t i f i e d the c h o i c e o f t h a t " e x e m p l a r y b e i n g " f o r t h e reading o f t h e sense o f b e i n g : " U p o n w h i c h b e i n g s h o u l d o n e r e a d o f f the sense o f b e i n g . . . ? " I n the l a s t i n s t a n c e , t h e r e s p o n s e leads t o t h e "modes o f being o f a determinate
b e i n g , that
being w h i c h we the
q u e s t i o n e r s o u r s e l v e s a r e . " I f t h e c h o i c e o f t h a t e x e m p l a r y b e i n g , i n its " p r i v i l e g e . " b e c o m e s the o b j e c t o f a j u s t i f i c a t i o n ( w h a t e v e r o n e t h i n k o f i t a n d w h a t e v e r b e its a x i o m a t i c s ) , H e i d e g g e r o n the o t h e r h a n d seems t o p r o c e e d b y d e c r e e , a t least i n t h a t passage, w h e n i t b e c o m e s a m a t t e r o f naming that e x e m p l a r y b e i n g , o f g i v i n g i t o n c e a n d for a l l its t e r m i n o l o g i c a l t i t l e : " T h a t b e i n g w h i c h w e o u r s e l v e s are a n d w h i c h i n c l u d e s q u e s t i o n i n g
as o n e o f its p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f B e i n g {die Seinsmöglichkeit des Fragens\, w e n a m e being-there | w e grasp i t , arrest i t , a p p r e h e n d i t " t e r m i n o l o g i c a l l y , '
fassen
wir terminologisch als Dasein]." T h a t " t e r m i n o l o g i c a l "
choice
u n d o u b t e d l y f i n d s its p r o f o u n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the w h o l e e n t e r p r i s e a n d i n the w h o l e b o o k by u n f o l d i n g a there a n d a being-there w h i c h ( n e a r l y ) no other p r e - d e t e r m i n a t i o n s h o u l d be able to c o m m a n d . B u t that does not remove
the
decisive,
brutal,
and
elliptical
appearance
from
that
p r e l i m i n a r y p r o p o s i t i o n , that d e c l a r a t i o n o f name. O n the c o n t r a r y , i n the M a r b u r g C o u r s e , t h e t i t l e of Dasein—its sense as w e l l as its n a m e —
160
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in
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Volume XIII
69
can be found to be more patiently qualified, explained, evaluated. N o w , t h e f i r s t t r a i t t h a t H e i d e g g e r u n d e r l i n e s i s its neutrality. F i r s t d i r e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e : " F o r the being w h i c h constitutes the theme o f this a n a l y t i c , the title
'man'
Dasein.'
[Mensch)
has
not been chosen,
b u t the
neutral
t i t l e 'das
"
A t f i r s t t h e c o n c e p t o f n e u t r a l i t y seems q u i t e g e n e r a l . I t i s a m a t t e r o f reducing or subtracting every anthropological, ethical or metaphysical p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n by means of that n e u t r a l i s a t i o n , so as to keep n o t h i n g b u t a r e l a t i o n t o i t s e l f , b a r e r e l a t i o n , t o t h e B e i n g o f its b e i n g ; t h a t is, a m i n i m a l r e l a t i o n t o i t s e l f a s r e l a t i o n t o B e i n g , t h a t t h e b e i n g w h i c h w e are, a s q u e s t i o n i n g , h o l d s w i t h i t s e l f a n d its o w n p r o p e r essence. T h i s r e l a t i o n t o s e l f i s n o t a r e l a t i o n t o a n ego n o r t o a n i n d i v i d u a l . T h u s Dasein designates the b e i n g that " i n a d e t e r m i n e d sense" is not " i n d i f f e r e n t " to its o w n essence, o r t o w h o m its o w n B e i n g i s n o t i n d i f f e r e n t . N e u t r a l i t y , t h e r e f o r e , i s f i r s t o f a l l the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n o f e v e r y t h i n g n o t b e a r i n g the n a k e d t r a i t o f t h i s r e l a t i o n t o i t s e l f , o f t h i s i n t e r e s t f o r its o w n B e i n g f i n t h e w i d e s t sense o f t h e w o r d " i n t e r e s t " ) . T h i s i m p l i e s a n i n t e r e s t o r a p r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e o p e n i n g u p f o r t h e sense o f B e i n g a n d for the q u e s t i o n s t h u s o r d a i n e d . A n d yet! A n d y e t t h e u n f o l d i n g o f t h i s n e u t r a l i t y w i l l be c a r r i e d o u t w i t h a l e a p , w i t h o u t t r a n s i t i o n a n d f r o m the f o l l o w i n g i t e m o n ( s e c o n d d i r e c t i v e principle) towards a sexual asexuality
(Geschlechtslosigkeit)
neutrality, and even towards a certain of being-there.
The
leap
is
surprising.
I f H e i d e g g e r w a n t e d t o o f f e r e x a m p l e s o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n s t o b e left o u t o f the
analytic
o f Dasein,
especially
of
anthropological
traits
to
be
n e u t r a l i s e d , his o n l y q u a n d a r y w o u l d b e w h i c h t o c h o o s e . Y e t h e begins w i t h a n d keeps h i m s e l f l i m i t e d t o s e x u a l i t y , m o r e p r e c i s e l y t o s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e . I t t h e r e f o r e h o l d s a p r i v i l e g e a n d seems t o b e l o n g i n the f i r s t p l a c e — t o f o l l o w the statements i n the l o g i c o f t h e i r e n c h a i n i n g ( t o g e t h e r | — t o t h a t " f a c t u a l c o n c r e t i o n " w h i c h the a n a l y t i c o f Dasein s h o u l d b e g i n b y neutralising.
I f t h e n e u t r a l i t y o f t h e t i t l e "Dasein" i s e s s e n t i a l , i t i s
p r e c i s e l y because t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h a t b e i n g — w h i c h w e a r e — i s t o be
engaged before
a n d outside o f a c o n c r e t i o n o f t h a t t y p e . T h e f i r s t
e x a m p l e o f " c o n c r e t i o n " w o u l d t h e n b e b e l o n g i n g t o one o r another o f the
two
sexes.
Heidegger doesn't
doubt
that
they
are
two:
"That
n e u t r a l i t y m e a n s also | I u n d e r l i n e — J . D . | t h a t Dasein i s n e i t h e r o f the
t w o sexes [keines von beiden Geschlechtern ist]." M u c h l a t e r , a n d a t a n y rate t h i r t y y e a r s l a t e r , t h e w o r d "Geschlecht" w i l l be c h a r g e d w i t h a l l its p o l y s e m i c r i c h n e s s : sex, g e n r e , f a m i l y , s t o c k , race, lineage, generation. H e i d e g g e r w i l l retrace in language, by means of irreplaceable path-openings ( t h a t is, inaccessible to a c u r r e n t t r a n s l a t i o n ) .
161
70
Jacques Derrida
Geschlecht:
se.xual difference,
ontological difference
t h r o u g h l a b y r i n t h i n e , s e d u c t i v e a n d d i s q u i e t i n g w a y s , the i m p r i n t o f roads usually shut. S t i l l shut, here, by the t w o . T w o : that can not c o u n t a n y t h i n g b u t sexes, i t s e e m s , w h a t are c a l l e d sexes. I ' v e u n d e r l i n e d the w o r d " a l s o " ( " t h a t n e u t r a l i t y m e a n s a l s o . . . " ) . B y its p l a c e i n t h e l o g i c a l a n d r h e t o r i c a l c h a i n , t h i s " a l s o " r e c a l l s t h a t a m o n g the n u m e r o u s m e a n i n g s o f t h a t n e u t r a l i t y , H e i d e g g e r j u d g e s i t necessary to begin not so m u c h w i t h s e x u a l n e u t r a l i t y — w h i c h is w h y he also says " a l s o " — y e t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , immediately w i t h i t after the only g e n e r a l m e a n i n g t h a t has m a r k e d n e u t r a l i t y u p t o t h i s p o i n t i n the passage, t o w i t t h e human c h a r a c t e r , t h e t i t l e "Mensch" f o r t h e t h e m e o f t h e a n a l y t i c . T h a t is t h e o n l y m e a n i n g w h i c h u p t i l l t h e n he has e x c l u d e d or neutralised. Hence a k i n d of precipitation or acceleration w h i c h can not be neutral or indifferent: a m o n g a l l the traits of man's h u m a n i t y f o u n d t h u s n e u t r a l i s e d w i t h a n t h r o p o l o g y , e t h i c s , o r m e t a p h y s i c s , the f i r s t t h a t the v e r y w o r d " n e u t r a l i t y " m a k e s o n e t h i n k of, the f i r s t t h a t H e i d e g g e r t h i n k s o f i n a n y case, i s s e x u a l i t y . T h e i n c i t e m e n t c a n n o t b e due m e r e l y t o g r a m m a r , t h a t ' s o b v i o u s . T o pass f r o m Mensch, i n d e e d f r o m Mann, t o Dasein, i s c e r t a i n l y t o pass f r o m t h e m a s c u l i n e t o the n e u t r a l , w h i l e t o t h i n k o r t o say Dasein a n d t h e D a o f Sein f r o m t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t w h i c h i s
das Sein
("Sein
ist das transcendens schlechthin," Sein
und Zeit,
p.
2 8 ) , i s t o pass i n t o a c e r t a i n n e u t r a l i t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , s u c h n e u t r a l i t y has t o d o w i t h the n o n g e n e r i c a n d n o n s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r o f B e i n g : " B e i n g a s fundamental Gattung)..."
t h e m e of p h i l o s o p h y
(ibid.).
is
B u t once again,
not
a genre
if sexual
of a
b e i n g (keine
difference
can't
exist
w i t h o u t relation to saying, w o r d s , or language, still it can't be reduced to a g r a m m a r . H e i d e g g e r rather t h a n d e s c r i b i n g it designates it as an e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f Dasein. B u t w h y d o e s h e a l l o f a s u d d e n i n s i s t w i t h s u c h haste? W h i l e i n Sein und Zeit h e h a d s a i d n o t h i n g o f i t , asexuality traits
(Geschlechtslosigkeit)
mentioned
n e u t r a l i t y o f the The
first
when
figures
here
r e c a l l i n g Dasein's
t i t l e "Dasein."
at
the
forefront
neutrality,
or
of the
rather
the
Why?
r e a s o n m a y be s u s p e c t e d . T h e v e r y w o r d Neutralität (ne-
uter) i n d u c e s a r e f e r e n c e to b i n a r i t y . If Dasein is n e u t r a l , a n d if it is n o t m a n (Mensch),
t h e first c o n s e q u e n c e
to d r a w
is
that it
may
not be
s u b m i t t e d to the b i n a r y p a r t i t i o n that one most spontaneously thinks of in s u c h a case, t o w i t " s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e . " I f " b e i n g - t h e r e " does n o t m e a n " m a n " (Mensch), a fortiori i t d e s i g n a t e s n e i t h e r " m a n "
nor " w o m a n . "
B u t i f the c o n s e q u e n c e i s s o n e a r c o m m o n - s e n s e , w h y r e c a l l it? A b o v e a l l , w h y s h o u l d o n e g o t o s o m u c h t r o u b l e t o get r i d o f a t h i n g s o c l e a r a n d secure i n the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e C o u r s e ? S h o u l d o n e i n d e e d c o n c l u d e t h a t s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e d o e s n ' t d e p e n d s o s i m p l y o n w h a t e v e r the a n a l y t i c
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can and should neutralise, metaphysics, ethics, and especially anthropology, o r indeed any other d o m a i n o f o n t i c k n o w i n g , for e x a m p l e b i o l o g y or zoology? S h o u l d one suspect that sexual difference c a n n o t be r e d u c e d t o a n e t h i c a l o r a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l theme? H e i d e g g e r ' s p r e c a u t i o n a r y i n s i s t e n c e leaves o n e t h i n k i n g , i n a n y case, that
here
things
are
not
a
matter
of course.
Once
anthropology
( f u n d a m e n t a l o r n o t ) has b e e n n e u t r a l i s e d a n d o n c e i t has b e e n s h o w n t h a t i t c a n ' t engage t h e q u e s t i o n o f b e i n g w h e r e i t i s e n g a g e d a s s u c h , o n c e it has been o b s e r v e d thai Dasein is r e d u c i b l e n e i t h e r to h u m a n - b e i n g n o r t o the ego n o r t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d the u n c o n s c i o u s n o r t o the s u b j e c t o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l , n o r e v e n t o a n animal rationale, o n e m i g h t c o n c l u d e t h a t the q u e s t i o n o f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e d o e s n ' t h a v e a c h a n c e o f m e a s u r i n g u p t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e sense o f b e i n g o r o f the o n t o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e , t h a t even
its v e r y
riddance
w o u l d n ' t deserve p r i v i l e g e d treatment.
Yet
i n c o n t e s t a b l y i t i s t h e c o n t r a r y t h a t h a p p e n s . H e i d e g g e r has j u s t r e c a l l e d Dasein's n e u t r a l i t y , a n d t h e r e h e i s r i g h t a w a y t r y i n g t o c l a r i f y : n e u t r a l i t y also as to sexual difference. Perhaps he was then responding to more or less e x p l i c i t , n a i v e o r s o p h i s t i c a t e d , q u e s t i o n s o n the p a r t o f his h e a r e r s , readers,
students,
or colleagues,
still
held,
aware
or
not,
within
a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l s p a c e : W h a t a b o u t t h e s e x u a l life o f your Dasein! t h e y m i g h t h a v e s t i l l a s k e d . A n d after h a v i n g a n s w e r e d t h e q u e s t i o n o n t h a t t e r r a i n b y d i s q u a l i f y i n g i t , i n s u m after h a v i n g r e c a l l e d the a s e x u a l i t y o f a b e i n g - t h e r e w h i c h i s n o t a n anthropos, H e i d e g g e r w i s h e s t o e n c o u n t e r another question,
even
perhaps
a
new objection.
T h a t ' s where the
difficulties w i l l grow. W h e t h e r a macter o f n e u t r a l i t y o r a s e x u a l i t y (Neutralität, Geschlechtslosigkeit) the w o r d s a c c e n t u a t e s t r o n g l y a n e g a t i v i t y w h i c h m a n i f e s t l y runs counter to w h a t Heidegger thereby wishes to m a r k out. It is not a m a t t e r o f l i n g u i s t i c o r g r a m m a t i c a l signs a t the s u r f a c e o f a m e a n i n g t h a t remains
f o r its
part untouched here.
By means of such manifestly
negative predicates there should become legible w h a t Heidegger doesn't h e s i t a t e t o c a l l a " p o s i t i v i t y " (Positivität), a r i c h n e s s , a n d , i n a h e a v i l y c h a r g e d c o d e , e v e n a p o w e r (Mächtigkeit). the
a-sexual
ontological
n e u t r a l i t y does
negativity
is
not
not
S u c h p r e c i s i o n suggests t h a t
desexualize.
unfolded
with
on
the
contrary,
r e s p e c t t o sexuality
its itself
( w h i c h i t w o u l d i n s t e a d l i b e r a t e ) , b u t o n its d i f f e r e n t i a l m a r k s , o r m o r e
strictly
on
sexual duality.
There
would
be
no
Geschlechtslosigkeit
except w i t h respect to " t w o " ; a s e x u a l i t y c o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d as such o n l y t o the degree t h a t s e x u a l i t y w o u l d m e a n i m m e d i a t e l y b i n a r i t y o r s e x u a l d i v i s i o n . " B u t s u c h a s e x u a l i t y i s n o t the i n d i f f e r e n c e o f a n e m p t y
n o t h i n g (die Indifferenz des leeren Nichtigen), the feeble n e g a t i v i t y of an
163
72
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
i n d i f f e r e n t o n t i c n o t h i n g . I n its n e u t r a l i t y , Dasein i s n o t j u s t a n y o n e n o m a t t e r w h o , b u t t h e o r i g i n a r y p o s i t i v i t y {ursprüngliche Positivität) a n d
p o w e r of essence [etre] (Mächtigkeit des
Wesens)."
I f Dasein a s s u c h b e l o n g s t o n e i t h e r o f t h e t w o sexes, t h a t d o e s n ' t m e a n t h a t its b e i n g i s d e p r i v e d o f sex. O n t h e c o n t r a r y , here o n e m u s t t h i n k o f a pre-differential, rather a pre-dual, s e x u a l i t y — w h i c h doesn't necessarily m e a n u n i t a r y , homogeneous, or undifferentiated, as we shall later v e r i f y . T h e n , f r o m that s e x u a l i t y , m o r e o r i g i n a r y t h a n the d y a d , one m a y t r y t o t h i n k to the b o t t o m a " p o s i t i v i t y " and a " p o w e r " that Heidegger is c a r e f u l n o t t o c a l l s e x u a l , f e a r i n g u n d o u b t e d l y t o r e i n t r o d u c e the b i n a r y l o g i c t h a t a n t h r o p o l o g y a n d m e t a p h y s i c s a l w a y s assign t o t h e c o n c e p t o f s e x u a l i t y . H e r e indeed it is a m a t t e r of the positive and p o w e r f u l source of e v e r y p o s s i b l e " s e x u a l i t y . " T h e Geschlechtlosigkeit w o u l d n o t b e m o r e n e g a t i v e t h a n aleiheia. O n e m i g h t r e c a l l w h a t H e i d e g g e r s a i d r e g a r d i n g
the Würdigung des "Positiven" im privativen Piatons Lehre von der Wahrheit).
Wesen der Aleiheia ( i n
F r o m hence, the C o u r s e sketches a q u i t e singular m o v e m e n t . It is v e r y d i f f i c u l t to isolate in it the t h e m e of sexual difference. I am t e m p t e d to interpret this as f o l l o w s : by a k i n d of strange and quite necessary d i s p l a c e m e n t , i t i s s e x u a l d i v i s i o n i t s e l f w h i c h leads t o n e g a t i v i t y , s o n e u t r a l i s a t i o n i s a t once t h e effect o f t h i s n e g a t i v i t y a n d t h e e f f a c e m e n t t o w h i c h thought must subject it to a l l o w an o r i g i n a l p o s i t i v i t y to become manifest. F a r f r o m c o n s t i t u t i n g a p o s i t i v i t y that the asexual n e u t r a l i t y of Dasein w o u l d a n n u l , s e x u a l b i n a r i t y i t s e l f w o u l d b e r e s p o n s i b l e , o r rather w o u l d belong to a d e t e r m i n a t i o n that is itself responsible, for this n e g a t i v a t i o n . T o r a d i c a l i z e o r f o r m a l i z e t o o q u i c k l y t h e sense o f t h i s m o v e m e n t before r e t r a c i n g it m o r e p a t i e n t l y , we c o u l d propose the f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a : i t i s s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e i t s e l f a s b i n a r i t y , i t i s the d i s c r i m i n a t i v e b e l o n g i n g t o one o r a n o t h e r sex, that destines o r d e t e r m i n e s to a negativity that must then be e x p l a i n e d . G o i n g a bit further, sexual d i f f e r e n c e thus d e t e r m i n e d ( o n e o v e r t w o ) , n e g a t i v i t y , a n d a c e r t a i n " i m p o t e n c e " m i g h t b e l i n k e d t o g e t h e r . W h e n r e t u r n i n g t o the o r i g i n a l i t y o f Dasein,
of this
Dasein
said
to
be
sexually
neutral,
"originary
p o s i t i v i t y " and " p o w e r " can be reconsidered. In other w o r d s , despite appearances, the asexuality and n e u t r a l i t y that should first of all be s u b t r a c t e d f r o m t h e s e x u a l b i n a r y m a r k , i n t h e a n a l y t i c o f Dasein, are i n t r u t h o n the s a m e s i d e , o n t h e side o f t h a t s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e — t h e b i n a r y — to w h i c h one m i g h t have thought t h e m s i m p l y opposed. D o e s this interpretation sound too violent? T h e three f o l l o w i n g s u b - p a r a g r a p h s o r i t e m s ( § 3 , § 4 , § 5 ) , d e v e l o p the m o t i f s o f n e u t r a l i t y , p o s i t i v i t y a n d o r i g i n a r y p o w e r , the o r i g i n a r y itself, w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t reference t o sexual difference. " P o w e r " becomes
164
Research
t h a t o f a n o r i g i n (Ursprung,
in
Volume X I I I
Phenomenology
Urquell), w h i l e
elsewhere
73
Heidegger w i l l
never d i r e c t l y associate the p r e d i c a t e " s e x u a l " t o the w o r d " p o w e r , " the f i r s t r e m a i n i n g a l l t o o e a s i l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the w h o l e s y s t e m o f s e x u a l difference that m a y , w i t h o u t m u c h risk of error, be said t o b e inseparable f r o m every a n t h r o p o l o g y a n d e v e r y m e t a p h y s i c s . M o r e o v e r , the adjective "sexual"
(sexual,
knowledge,
sexuell,
used,
only
is
geschlechtlich) the
nouns
never,
Geschlecht
or
at
least
to
my
Geschlechtlichkeit,
w h i c h i s n o t w i t h o u t i m p o r t a n c e , these n o u n s b e i n g a l l t h e m o r e c a p a b l e o f i r r a d i a t i n g sense t o o t h e r s e m a n t i c z o n e s . L a t e r w e w i l l f o l l o w t h e r e some other paths of thought. B u f w i t h o u t s p e a k i n g o f i t d i r e c t l y , these t h r e e s u b - p a r a g r a p h s p r e p a r e t h e r e t u r n t o t h e t h e m a t i c o f Geschlechtlichkeit. T h e y f i r s t o f a l l efface a l l t h e n e g a t i v e signs a t t a c h e d t o t h e w o r d " n e u t r a l i t y . " T h i s w o r d does n o t h a v e t h e e m p t i n e s s o f a n a b s t r a c t i o n , n e u t r a l i t y r a t h e r leads b a c k t o t h e " p o w e r o f t h e o r i g i n " w h i c h bears w i t h i n i t s e l f t h e i n t e r n a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f h u m a n i t y i n its c o n c r e t e f a c t u a l i t y . Dasein, i n its n e u t r a l i t y , m u s t n o t b e c o n f u s e d w i t h t h e e x i s t e n t . Dasein o n l y e x i s t s i n its f a c t u a l c o n c r e t i o n , t o b e s u r e , b u t t h i s v e r y e x i s t e n c e h a s its o r i g i n a r y s o u r c e (Urquell) a n d i n t e r n a l p o s s i b i l i t y i n Dasein as n e u t r a l . T h e a n a l y t i c o f t h i s o r i g i n d o e s n o t deal w i t h the existent itself. Precisely because it precedes t h e m , such an analytic c a n n o t be confused w i t h a p h i l o s o p h y of existence, w i t h a wisdom
(which
could
be
established
only
w i t h i n the " s t r u c t u r e o f
m e t a p h y s i c s " ) , or w i t h a prophesy t h a t w o u l d teach such or such a " w o r l d v i e w . " It is therefore not at all a " p h i l o s o p h y of l i f e . " W h i c h is to say that a discourse o n s e x u a l i t y w h i c h w o u l d b e o f t h i s o r d e r ( w i s d o m , k n o w l e d g e , m e t a p h y s i c s , p h i l o s o p h y o f l i f e o r o f e x i s t e n c e ) falls s h o r t o f e v e r y r e q u i r e m e n t o f a n a n a l y t i c o f Dasein i n its v e r y n e u t r a l i t y . H a s a d i s c o u r s e o n s e x u a l i t y e v e r b e e n p r e s e n t e d n o t b e l o n g i n g t o a n y o f these registers? I t m u s t b e n o t i c e d t h a t s e x u a l i t y i s n o t n a m e d i n t h a t last paragraph n o r in the one that w i l l treat (we w i l l r e t u r n to i t ) a certain " i s o l a t i o n " o f Dasein. I t i s n a m e d i n a p a r a g r a p h i n Vom
Wesen des
Grundes ( t h e s a m e y e a r , 1 9 2 8 ) w h i c h d e v e l o p s t h e s a m e a r g u m e n t . T h e w o r d i s f o u n d i n q u o t a t i o n m a r k s , a s i f i n c i d e n t a l l y . T h e l o g i c o f α fortiori raises its t o n e s o m e w h a t t h e r e . F o r i n t h e e n d , i f i t i s t r u e t h a t s e x u a l i t y m u s t be n e u t r a l i s e d " w i t h a l l t h e m o r e
r e a s o n " ("a plus forte raison"),
as H e n r i C o r b i n ' s t r a n s l a t i o n s a y s , o r a fortiori, erst recht,
w h y insist?
W h e r e is the risk of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g ? U n l e s s the m a t t e r be d e c i d e d l y n o t o b v i o u s , and there is s t i l l a risk of m i x i n g up once m o r e the q u e s t i o n o f sexual difference w i t h that o f B e i n g and the o n t o l o g i c a l difference? I n that context,
it
is
a m a t t e r of d e t e r m i n i n g the
i p s e i t y o f Dasein,
its
Selbstheil o r being-a-self. Dasein e x i s t s o n l y for its o w n sake [a dessein d e soi\ (umwillen seiner), i f o n e c a n p u t i t t h u s , b u t t h a t does n o t m e a n
165
74
Jacques Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
either the f o r - i t s e l f of consciousness n o r egoism n o r s o l i p s i s m . It is starting
from
Selbstheit
that
an
alternative
between
"egoism"
and
" a l t r u i s m " has a c h a n c e o f a r i s i n g a n d b e c o m i n g m a n i f e s t , a s w e l l a s a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n " b e i n g - I " a n d " b e i n g - y o u " (Iclisein/Dusein). A l w a y s presupposed, ipseity is therefore " n e u t r a l " w i t h respect to b e i n g - m e and b e i n g - y o u , " a n d w i t h all the m o r e reason w i t h regard to ' s e x u a l i t y ' "
(und
erst
recht
etwa
gegen
die
"Geschlechtlichkeit"
neutral).
The
m o v e m e n t o f t h i s a fortiori i s l o g i c a l l y i r r e p r o a c h a b l e o n o n l y o n e c o n d i t i o n : It w o u l d be necessary that such " s e x u a l i t y " ( i n q u o t a t i o n m a r k s ) b e the a s s u r e d p r e d i c a t e o f w h a t e v e r i s m a d e p o s s i b l e b y o r f r o m i p s e i t y , here f o r i n s t a n c e t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f " m e " a n d " y o u , " y e t a s " s e x u a l i t y " n o t b e l o n g t o the s t r u c t u r e o f i p s e i t y , a n d i p s e i t y t h a t w o u l d not as yet be determined as h u m a n being, me or y o u , conscious or unconscious subject,
man or woman.
Y e t i f H e i d e g g e r insists and
underlines ( " w i t h a l l the m o r e r e a s o n " ) , it is because a s u s p i c i o n c o n t i n u e s t o w e i g h o n h i m : W h a t i f " s e x u a l i t y " a l r e a d y m a r k e d the m o s t o r i g i n a r y Selbstheit! I f i t w e r e a n o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f i p s e i t y ? I f t h e D a o f Dasein w e r e a l r e a d y " s e x u a l " ? W h a t i f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e w e r e a l r e a d y m a r k e d i n t h e o p e n i n g u p o f t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e sense o f B e i n g and o f the o n t o l o g i c a l difference? A n d w h a t if, t h o u g h not self-evident, n e u t r a l i s a t i o n were already a v i o l e n t operation? " W i t h all the m o r e r e a s o n " m a y h i d e a m o r e feeble r e a s o n . I n a n y case, t h e q u o t a t i o n m a r k s a l w a y s s i g n a l s o m e k i n d o f c i t i n g . T h e c u r r e n t usage o f the w o r d " s e x u a l i t y " i s " m e n t i o n e d " r a t h e r t h a n " u s e d , " o n e c o u l d say i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f speech act theory; i t i s c i t e d t o b e c o m p a r e d , w a r n e d a b o u t i f n o t a c c u s e d . A b o v e a l l o n e m u s t p r o t e c t t h e a n a l y t i c o f Dasein f r o m t h e risks o f a n t h r o p o l o g y , p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , even o f b i o l o g y .
S t i l l there
p e r h a p s r e m a i n s s o m e o p e n d o o r for o t h e r w o r d s , o r a n o t h e r usage a n d a n o t h e r r e a d i n g o f t h e w o r d "Geschlecht," i f n o t o f the w o r d " s e x u a l i t y . " P e r h a p s a n o t h e r " s e x , " o r r a t h e r a n o t h e r "Geschlecht," w i l l c o m e t o be i n s c r i b e d w i t h i n i p s e i t y , o r w i l l c o m e t o d e r a n g e the o r d e r o f a l l its derivations,
for e x a m p l e t h a t o f a m o r e o r i g i n a r y Selbstheit m a k i n g
p o s s i b l e the e m e r g e n c e o f the ego a n d o f y o u . L e t u s l e a v e t h i s q u e s t i o n suspended. I f t h i s n e u t r a l i s a t i o n i s i m p l i e d i n e v e r y o n t o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o f Dasein. t h a t does n o t m e a n t h a t " t h e Dasein i n m a n , " a s H e i d e g g e r o f t e n says, need b e a n " e g o i s t i c " s i n g u l a r i t y o r a n " i n d i v i d u a l o n t i c a l l y i s o l a t e d . " T h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e w i t h i n n e u t r a l i t y d o e s n o t l e a d b a c k t o the i s o l a t i o n o r i n s u l a r i t y (Isolierung) o f m a n , t o his f a c t u a l a n d e x i s t e n t i a l s o l i t u d e . A n d y e t t h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e w i t h i n n e u t r a l i t y does i n d e e d mean, Heidegger carefully observes, a certain o r i g i n a l isolation of man: n o t , p r e c i s e l y , i n the sense o f f a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e , " a s i f the p h i l o s o p h i s i n g
166
Research in Phenomenology
Volume XIII
75
b e i n g w e r e t h e c e n t e r o f the w o r l d , " b u t a s the "'metaphysical isolation o f m a n . " I t i s the a n a l y s i s o f t h i s i s o l a t i o n w h i c h t h e n raises a g a i n t h e t h e m e o f s e x u a l difference a n d o f the d u a l p a r t i t i o n w i t h i n Geschlechtlichkeit. A t the c e n t e r o f t h i s n e w a n a l y s i s , the v e r y s u b t l e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f a certain l e x i c o n already signals t r a n s l a t i o n p r o b l e m s w h i c h w i l l o n l y b e c o m e a g g r a v a t e d f o r us. I t w i l l r e m a i n e v e r i m p o s s i b l e t o c o n s i d e r them
as either
accidental
or secondary.
At a
certain
moment we
o u r s e l v e s w i l l be a b l e t o n o t i c e t h a t the t h o u g h t o f Geschlecht a n d t h a t o f t r a n s l a t i o n are e s s e n t i a l l y the s a m e . E v e n here t h e l e x i c a l h i v e b r i n g s t o g e t h e r ( o r s w a r m s s c a t t e r i n g ) the series " d i s s o c i a t i o n , " " d i s t r a c t i o n , " " d i s s e m i n a t i o n , " " d i v i s i o n , " " d i s p e r s i o n . " T h e dis- i s s u p p o s e d t o t r a n s l a t e , t h o u g h o n l y b y m e a n s o f t r a n s f e r s a n d d i s p l a c e m e n t s , the zer-
of Zerstreuung,
Zerstreutheit,
Zerstörung,
Zersplitterung,
Zerspaltung.
B u t a n i n t e r i o r a n d s u p p l e m e n t a r y f r o n t i e r s t i l l p a r t i t i o n s the l e x i c o n : dis- a n d zer- o f t e n h a v e a n e g a t i v e sense, y e t s o m e t i m e s a l s o a n e u t r a l or n o n - n e g a t i v e sense ( 1 w o u l d h e s i t a t e here t o say p o s i t i v e o r a f f i r m a t i v e ) . L e t u s a t t e m p t t o r e a d , t r a n s l a t e a n d i n t e r p r e t m o r e l i t e r a l l y . Dasein i n general hides, shelters in itself the i n t e r n a l p o s s i b i l i t y of a factual dispersion
or
dissemination
(faktische
Zerstreuung)
in
its
own
body
(Leiblichkeil) a n d " t h e r e b y in s e x u a l i t y " (und damit in die Geschlechtlichkeit).
E v e r y p r o p e r b o d y o f o n e ' s o w n \corps propre] i s s e x e d , a n d
t h e r e i s n o Dasein w i t h o u t its o w n b o d y . B u t t h e c h a i n i n g t o g e t h e r p r o p o s e d b y H e i d e g g e r seems q u i t e c l e a r : the d i s p e r s i n g m u l t i p l i c i t y i s n o t p r i m a r i l y d u e t o the s e x u a l i t y o f o n e ' s o w n b o d y ; i t i s its o w n b o d y i t s e l f , the f l e s h , t h e Leiblichkeit, t h a t d r a w s Dasein o r i g i n a l l y i n t o t h e d i s p e r s i o n a n d in due course \par suite] i n t o s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e . T h i s " i n d u e c o u r s e " (damit) i n s i s t s t h r o u g h a f e w l i n e s ' i n t e r v a l , as if Dasein w e r e s u p p o s e d t o h a v e o r b e a p r i o r i (as its " i n t e r i o r p o s s i b i l i t y " ) a b o d y f o u n d to be sexual, and affected by sexual d i v i s i o n . Here
again,
an
insistence
on
Heidegger's
part
to
observe
that
d i s p e r s i o n l i k e n e u t r a l i t y ( a n d a l l the m e a n i n g s in dis- or zer-) s h o u l d n o t be understood in a negative manner. T h e " m e t a p h y s i c a l " neutrality of i s o l a t e d m a n a s Dasein i s n o t a n e m p t y a b s t r a c t i o n o p e r a t i n g f r o m o r i n t h e sense of t h e o n t i c , it is n o t a neither-nor, b u t r a t h e r w h a t is p r o p e r l y concrete
i n t h e o r i g i n , the " n o t y e t " o f f a c t u a l d i s s e m i n a t i o n , o f
dissociation, Zerstreutheit
of being dis-sociated
or of factual
d i s - s o c i e t y : faktische
here a n d n o t Zerstreuung. T h i s b e i n g d i s s o c i a t e d , u n b o u n d ,
o r d e s o c i a l i z e d ( f o r i t goes t o g e t h e r w i t h the i s o l a t i o n o f m a n a s Dasein) is
not
a
fall
nor
an
accident
nor
a
decline
\decheance\
that
has
s u p e r v e n e d . I t i s a n o r i g i n a r y s t r u c t u r e a f f e c t i n g Dasein w i t h the b o d y , a n d hence w i t h s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e , o f m u l t i p l i c i t y a n d l a c k - o f - b i n d i n g \deliaison\. these t w o s i g n i f i c a t i o n s r e m a i n i n g d i s t i n c t t h o u g h g a t h e r e d
167
76
Jacques Derrida
t o g e t h e r i n the
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
a n a l y s e s o f d i s s e m i n a t i o n (Zerstreuung o r Zerstreutheil).
A s s i g n e d t o a b o d y , Dasein
i s s e p a r a t e d i n its f a c t i c i t y , s u b j e c t e d t o
d i s p e r s i o n a n d p a r c e l l i n g o u t (zersplittert), and t h e r e b y (ineins damit) a l w a y s d i s j u n c t , i n d i s a c c o r d , s p l i t u p , d i v i d e d (zwiespältig) b y s e x u a l i t y
toward
a
determinate
sex
(in
eine
bestimmte
Geschlechtlichkeit).
T h e s e w o r d s , u n d o u b t e d l y , have at first a negative resonance: d i s p e r s i o n , p a r c e l l i n g o u t , d i v i s i o n , d i s s o c i a t i o n , Zersplitterung,
Zerspaltung,
quite
l i k e Zerstörung ( d e m o l i t i o n , d e s t r u c t i o n ) , as H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s ; t h i s resonance is l i n k e d w i t h negative concepts from an ontic point of v i e w , i m m e d i a t e l y d r a w i n g f o r t h a m e a n i n g o f lesser v a l u e . " B u t s o m e t h i n g else i s a t issue h e r e . " W h a t ? A n o t h e r m e a n i n g , m a r k i n g t h e f o l d o f a mani-fold
multiplication.
The
characteristic
sign
(Kennzeichnung)
by
w h i c h s u c h a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n c a n b e r e c o g n i z e d i s l e g i b l e t o u s i n the i s o l a t i o n a n d f a c t u a l s i n g u l a r i t y o f Dasein. H e i d e g g e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h i s multiplication nigfaltigkeit),
(Mannigfaltigung)
from
diversity.
from
The
a
simple
representation
multiplicity of a
grand
(Man-
original
b e i n g w h o s e s i m p l i c i t y w a s s u d d e n l y d i s p e r s e d (zerspaltet) i n t o v a r i o u s s i n g u l a r i t i e s m u s t a l s o b e a v o i d e d . I t i s r a t h e r a m a t t e r o f e l u c i d a t i n g the i n t e r n a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h a t m u l t i p l i c a t i o n f o r w h i c h Dasein's o w n b o d y r e p r e s e n t s a n " o r g a n i s i n g f a c t o r . " T h e m u l t i p l i c i t y i n t h i s case i s n o t a s i m p l e f o r m a l p l u r a l i t y o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o r o f d e t e r m i n i t i e s (Bestimmtheiten),
it
belongs
to
Being
itself.
An
"originary
dissemination"
(ursprüngliche Streuung) belongs a l r e a d y to the B e i n g of Dasein
in
g e n e r a l , " a c c o r d i n g t o its m e t a p h y s i c a l l y n e u t r a l c o n c e p t . " T h i s o r i g i n a r y d i s s e m i n a t i o n (Streuung) dispersion
is
from
a
fully
determined
point o f view
(Zerstreuung): d i f f i c u l t y o f t r a n s l a t i o n w h i c h forces m e
here
to distinguish somewhat arbitrarily between dissemination and dispersion, in order to m a r k out by a c o n v e n t i o n the subtle trait w h i c h distinguishes Streuung
from
Zerstreuung.
The
latter
is
the
determination
of
the
former. It determines a structure of originary possibility, dissemination (Streuung), a c c o r d i n g t o a l l the m e a n i n g s o f Zerstreuung ( d i s s e m i n a t i o n , dispersion, scattering, diffusion, dissipation, distraction). T h e w o r d Streuung
appears
but
once,
it
seems,
to
designate
that
originary
possibility, that disseminality ( i f this be allowed). A f t e r w a r d s , it is a l w a y s Zerstreuung, w h i c h w o u l d a d d — b u t i t i s n ' t t h a t s i m p l e — a m a r k of determination
and
negation,
had
not
Heidegger warned
us
the
previous instant of that value of negativity. Yet, even if not totally legitimate, it is hard to avoid a certain c o n t a m i n a t i o n by negativity, i n d e e d w i t h e t h i c o - r e l i g i o u s a s s o c i a t i o n s , t h a t w o u l d seek t o b i n d t h a t dispersion to a fall and a c o r r u p t i o n of the pure o r i g i n a r y p o s s i b i l i t y (Streuung), w h i c h a p p e a r s t h e n t o b e a f f e c t e d b y a s u p p l e m e n t a r y t u r n . I t w i l l indeed be necessary t o elucidate also the p o s s i b i l i t y o r fatality o f that c o n t a m i n a t i o n . W e w i l l r e t u r n t o this later.
168
Research in Phenomenology
Some
Volume X I I I
i n d i c a t i o n s o f t h a t d i s p e r s i o n (Zerstreuung).
77
F i r s t o f a l l , Dasein
n e v e r r e l a t e s t o a n o b j e c t , t o a sole o b j e c t . I f i t d o e s , i t i s a l w a y s i n t h e m o d e o f a b s t r a c t i o n o r abstention f r o m other beings w h i c h always coa p p e a r a t the s a m e t i m e . A n d t h i s m u l t i p l i c a t i o n does n o t s u p e r v e n e because t h e r e i s a p l u r a l i t y o f o b j e c t s ; a c t u a l l y i t i s the c o n v e r s e t h a t takes place. It is the o r i g i n a r y d i s s e m i n a l structure, the dispersion of Dasein, t h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e t h i s m u l t i p l i c i t y . A n d t h e same h o l d s f o r Dasein's r e l a t i o n t o itself: i t i s d i s p e r s e d , c o n f o r m a b l y t o t h e " s t r u c t u r e o f h i s t o r i c i t y i n t h e w i d e s t sense," t o the e x t e n t t h a t Dasein o c c u r s a s Erslreckung,
a
word
whose
translation
remains dangerous.
The
word
" e x t e n s i o n " c o u l d a l l t o o e a s i l y be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h exiensio, w h i c h Sein und Zeil i n t e r p r e t s as the " f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the w o r l d " according to Descartes (§ Erslreckung
names
a
spacing
1 8 ) . H e r e s o m e t h i n g else i s a t issue.
which,
"before"
the
determination
of
space a s exiensio, c o m e s t o e x t e n d o r s t r e t c h o u t b e i n g - t h e r e , the there o f B e i n g , between b i r t h a n d d e a t h . E s s e n t i a l d i m e n s i o n o f Dasein, t h e Erslreckung o p e n s u p t h e between t h a t l i n k s i t at o n c e t o its b i r t h a n d t o i t s d e a t h , t h e m o v e m e n t o f s u s p e n s e b y w h i c h i t is tended o u t a n d e x t e n d e d o f i t s e l f between b i r t h a n d d e a t h , these t w o r e c e i v i n g m e a n i n g o n l y f r o m t h a t i n t e r v a l l i c m o v e m e n t . Dasein affects itself, a n d t h a t a u t o a f f e c t i o n b e l o n g s t o the o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f its h i s t o r i c i t y : "DIE
SPEZIFISCHE NENNEN WIR Zeit
links
BEWEGTHEIT DAS Geschehen
together precisely
DES erstreckten DES DASEINS" (§
this
intervallic
tension
Sicherstreckens 7 2 ) . Sein und and dispersion
(Zerstreuung) ( n o t a b l y i n § 7 5 , p . 3 9 0 ) . Between b i r t h a n d d e a t h , t h e s p a c i n g o f t h e between m a r k s a t o n c e the d i s t a n c e a n d the l i n k , b u t t h e link according to a k i n d of distension. This " b e t w e e n - t w o " as rapport (Bezug) d r a w n i n t o r e l a t i o n s h i p (trait) w i t h b o t h b i r t h a n d d e a t h b e l o n g s t o t h e v e r y B e i n g o f Dasein, " b e f o r e " a n y b i o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n , f o r
instance
("Im
Sein
des Daseins
liegt schon
das
'Zwischen' mit Bezug
auf Geburl und Tod" p . 3 7 4 ) . T h e l i n k thus e n t e r - t a i n e d , h e l d o r d r a w n b e t w e e n | entre-tenu, entre-tendu\, o v e r or t h r o u g h t h e d i s - t a n c e b e t w e e n \enlre\ b i r t h a n d d e a t h , is i t s e l f e n t e r t a i n e d u/7/ι d i s p e r s i o n , d i s s o c i a t i o n , u n b i n d i n g (Zerstreuung,
Unzusammenhang, etc. C f . p. 3 9 0 for e x a m p l e ) .
T h a t l i n k , t h a t b e t w e e n , could not lake place w i t h o u t t h e m . Y e t t o t a k e t h e m a s n e g a t i v e forces w o u l d b e t o p r e c i p i t a t e the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , f o r instance render it d i a l e c t i c a l . The
Erslreckung
is
thus
one
of
the
determinate
essential d i s p e r s i o n (Zerstreuung). T h a t " b e t w e e n "
possibilities
of
w o u l d be impossible
w i t h o u t d i s p e r s i o n y e t c o n s t i t u t e s o n l y o n e o f its s t r u c t u r a l d e p e n d e n t s , t o w i t t e m p o r a l i t y and h i s t o r i c i t y . A n o t h e r dependent, another p o s s i b i l i t y — c o n n e c t e d a n d e s s e n t i a l — o f o r i g i n a r y d i s p e r s i o n : the o r i g i n a r y s p a t i a l i t y o f Dasein,
i t s Räumlichkeit.
The
spatial
169
or spacing dispersion
is
78
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
manifested in language determined
by
for i n s t a n c e .
spatial
ontological difference
E v e r y language
is 2
significations
(Raumbedeutungen)} '
first o f a l l The
phe-
n o m e n o n of so-called spatialising metaphors is not at all accidental, nor w i t h i n t h e r e a c h o f the r h e t o r i c a l c o n c e p t o f " m e t a p h o r . " I t i s n o t s o m e exterior fatality. Its essential i r r e d u c i b i l i t y can't be elucidated outside of t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f Dasein, o f d i s p e r s i o n , h i s t o r i c i t y o r s p a t i a l i t y . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s t h e r e f o r e m u s t b e d r a w n , i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r the v e r y language
o f the
existential
analytic:
a l l the w o r d s
H e i d e g g e r uses
n e c e s s a r i l y refer b a c k t o these Raumbedeutungen. b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e w o r d Zerstreuung ( d i s s e m i n a t i o n , d i s p e r s i o n , d i s t r a c t i o n ) w h i c h n a m e s the v e r y o r i g i n o f s p a c i n g a t the m o m e n t w h e n a s l a n g u a g e i t s u b m i t s t o its l a w . T h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i s p e r s i o n " (as H e i d e g g e r s t i l l names i t ) thus belongs
t o the
essence o f Dasein
in
its
neutrality.
"Metaphysical"
essence, w e are m o r e p r e c i s e l y t o l d i n a C o u r s e p r e s e n t e d a b o v e a l l a t that
time
as
a
metaphysical
ontology
o f Dasein,
whose
analytic
constitutes o n l y a phase, u n d o u b t e d l y p r e l i m i n a r y . T h i s must be taken i n t o a c c o u n t i n o r d e r t o s i t u a t e w h a t i s here s a i d a b o u t s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e i n p a r t i c u l a r . T r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i s p e r s i o n i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e v e r y dissociation
and
parcelling
out
(Zersplitterung,
Zerspaltung)
into
factual existence. It is itself " f o u n d e d " on that o r i g i n a r y character of Dasein
t h a t H e i d e g g e r t h e n c a l l e d Geworfenheit. O n e s h o u l d b e p a t i e n t
w i t h that w o r d , s u b t r a c t i n g i t f r o m s o m a n y usages, c u r r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s or translations (for instance d e r e l i c t i o n , b e i n g - t h r o w n ) . T h i s should be d o n e f o r e s e e i n g w h a t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e — w h i c h r i g h t a w a y f o l l o w s — r e t a i n s i n i t s e l f o f t h a t Geworfenheit a n d , " f o u n d e d " o n i t , o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i s p e r s i o n . | T h e r e is] n o d i s s e m i n a t i o n t h a t f a i l s t o assume
such
Thrown
a "throw"
"before"
all
the
[jetee],
the Da
modes
of Dasein
as
o f t h r o w i n g [jetee]
thrown that
will
[jetee]. later
determine i t , project, subject, object, abject, trajectory, dejection; t h r o w t h a t Dasein c a n n o t m a k e its o w n i n a p r o j e c t , i n t h e sense o f throwing itself as
a
s u b j e c t m a s t e r of the
t h r o w . Dasein
is geworfen:
that means
t h a t b e f o r e a n y p r o j e c t o n its p a r t i t i s t h r o w n , b u t t h i s b e i n g - t h r o w n i s n o t y e t submitted t o the a l t e r n a t i v e o f a c t i v i t y o r p a s s i v i t y , these | c o n c e p t s ] s t i l l t o o m u c h i n s o l i d a r i t y w i t h the c o u p l e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t a n d h e n c e w i t h t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n , o n e c o u l d e v e n say w i t h t h e i r o b j e c t i o n . T o i n t e r p r e t b e i n g - t h r o w n a s p a s s i v i t y c o u l d r e i n s c r i b e i t w i t h i n the d e r i v a t i v e p r o b l e m a t i c o f s u b j e c t i ( v i ) t y ( a c t i v e o r p a s s i v e ) . W h a t does " t h r o w " m e a n b e f o r e these s y n t a x e s ? A n d b e i n g - t h r o w n e v e n b e f o r e the i m a g e o f the f a l l , be i t P l a t o n i c or C h r i s t i a n ? T h e r e is a b e i n g - t h r o w n o f Dasein " b e f o r e " there e v e n a p p e a r s — i n o t h e r w o r d s , " b e f o r e " t h e r e o c c u r s f o r it there—any thought of throwing amounting to an operation, activity, or
170
Research
in
Phenomenology
Volume X I I I
79
a n i n i t i a t i v e . A n d t h a t b e i n g - t h r o w n o f Dasein i s n o t a t h r o w i n space, i n w h a t i s a l r e a d y a s p a t i a l e l e m e n t . T h e o r i g i n a r y s p a t i a l i t y o f Dasein i s d r a w n t o w a r d [ o r has t o d o w i t h , tieni ά\ t h e t h r o w . I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t the t h e m e o f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e m a y r e a p p e a r . T h e d i s s e m i n a l t h r o w o f b e i n g - t h e r e ( u n d e r s t o o d s t i l l i n its n e u t r a l i t y ) i s p a r t i c u l a r l y m a n i f e s t i n t h e f a c t t h a t Dasein
is Mitsein w i t h Dasein. A s
a l w a y s i n t h i s c o n t e x t , H e i d e g g e r ' s f i r s t gesture i s t o o b s e r v e a n o r d e r o f i m p l i c a t i o n : s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e , o r b e l o n g i n g t o a genre, m u s t b e e l u c i d a t e d s t a r t i n g f r o m b e i n g - w i t h , i n o t h e r w o r d s , f r o m the d i s s e m i n a l t h r o w , a n d n o t inversely. B e i n g - w i t h does not arise f r o m some factual c o n n e c t i o n , " i t cannot b e e x p l a i n e d f r o m some p r e s u m a b l y o r i g i n a r y generic b e i n g , " by a being whose o w n b o d y w o u l d be partitioned according to a sexual
difference contrary,
(geschlechtlich
gespaltenen
leiblichen
On
Wesen).
the
a c e r t a i n g e n e r i c d r i v e o f g a t h e r i n g t o g e t h e r (gattungshafte
Zusammenstreben), the u n i o n o f genres ( t h e i r u n i f i c a t i o n , r a p p r o c h e m e n t , Einigung),
Dasein
has
as
as " m e t a p h y s i c a l
such,
and
thereby
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n " the dissemination of
The
Mitsein.
of Mitsein
Mit
is
an
e x i s t e n t i a l , n o t a c a t e g o r i a l , a n d the same holds for the adverbs of place (Sein und Zeit,
§
26).
W h a t H e i d e g g e r c a l l s here t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
m e t a p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f Dasein is n o t t o be d e r i v e d f r o m a n y g e n e r i c o r g a n i s a t i o n or f r o m a c o m m u n i t y of l i v i n g beings as such. H o w d o e s t h i s q u e s t i o n o f order m a t t e r t o t h i s " s i t u a t i o n " o f s e x u a l difference?
Thanks
problematic
for
us,
to
a
prudent
derivation
Heidegger can
at
least
that
in
reinscribe
turn the
becomes theme
of
sexuality, in rigorous fashion, w i t h i n an ontological questioning and an e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c . A s s o o n a s i t i s n o t p l a c e d u p o n a c o m m o n doxa o r a bio-anthropological
science,
the
one
and
other
sustained
by
some
m e t a p h y s i c a l p r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , s e x u a l difference r e m a i n s t o b e t h o u g h t . B u t the price o f t h a t prudence? I s i t n o t t o r e m o v e s e x u a l i t y f r o m every o r i g i n a r y s t r u c t u r e ? D e d u c e it? O r i n a n y case d e r i v e i t , c o n f i r m i n g a l l the m o s t t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e m e s , r e p e a t i n g t h e m w i t h the force of a new rigour? A n d that d e r i v a t i o n , does it not begin by a neutralisation whose n e g a t i v i t y was l a b o r i o u s l y denied? A n d once the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n i s e f f e c t e d , does o n e s t i l l a r r i v e a t a n o n t o l o g i c a l o r " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " d i s p e r s i o n , at t h a t Zerstreuung w h o s e n e g a t i v e v a l u e w a s so d i f f i c u l t t o efface? I n this f o r m these q u e s t i o n s r e m a i n , u n d o u b t e d l y , s u m m a r y . B u t t h e y c o u l d n ' t be e l a b o r a t e d s i m p l y i n a n e x c h a n g e w i t h t h e passage i n t h e Course of M a r b u r g w h i c h names sexuality. W h e t h e r it be a matter of neutralisation,
negativity,
dispersion,
or
distraction
(Zerstreuung),
i n d i s p e n s a b l e m o t i f s h e r e , f o l l o w i n g H e i d e g g e r , f o r p o s i n g the q u e s t i o n of s e x u a l i t y ,
it
is
necessary
to return
171
to Sein
und Zeit.
Although
80
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
ontological difference
s e x u a l i t y i s n o t t h e r e n a m e d , its m o t i f s are t r e a t e d i n a m o r e c o m p l e x f a s h i o n , m o r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , w h i c h d o e s n o t m e a n , o n the c o n t r a r y , i n a n easier o r m o r e f a c i l e m a n n e r . W e m u s t r e m a i n c o n t e n t here w i t h s e v e r a l p r e l i m i n a r y i n d i c a t i o n s . R e s e m b l i n g in the C o u r s e a m e t h o d i c a l procedure, n e u t r a l i s a t i o n is not w i t h o u t l i n k t o w h a t i n Sein und Zeit is c a l l e d the " p r i v a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " (§
1 1 ) . O n e c o u l d even speak o f m e t h o d , since H e i d e g g e r appeals t o a n
ontology to be
accomplished
by or on
the
"way"
of a
privative
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h a t w a y a l l o w s the " a p r i o n ' s " t o b e e x t r a c t e d , w h i l e a n o t e o n the s a m e p a g e , c r e d i t i n g H u s s e r l , says t h a t i t i s w e l l k n o w n t h a t " a p r i o r i s m i s the m e t h o d o f e v e r y s c i e n t i f i c p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h u n d e r s t a n d s i t s e l f . " T h i s p r e c i s e l y i n the c o n t e x t o f p s y c h o l o g y a n d b i o l o g y . A s sciences t h e y are f o u n d e d o n a n o n t o l o g y o f b e i n g - t h e r e . T h e m o d e o f b e i n g o f l i f e i s a c c e s s i b l e , e s s e n t i a l l y , o n l y t h r o u g h b e i n g - t h e r e . I t i s the o n t o l o g y of life that requires a " p r i v a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " : " l i f e " being neither a pure
Vorhandensein n o r a Dasein ( H e i d e g g e r says t h i s w i t h o u t
c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e issue r e q u i r e s m o r e t h a n a m e r e a f f i r m a t i o n : i t seems to
be obvious),
it
is
accessible
only
by
a
negative
operation
of
s u b t r a c t i o n . I t m a y t h e n b e a s k e d w h a t i s the b e i n g o f a life w h i c h i s nothing but l i f e , w h i c h is n e i t h e r t h i s n o r t h a t , n e i t h e r Vorhandensein n o r Dasein. H e i d e g g e r has n e v e r e l a b o r a t e d t h a t o n t o l o g y o f l i f e , b u t o n e can
i m a g i n e a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s i t w o u l d
h a v e r u n i n t o , s i n c e the
" n e i t h e r . . . n o r " c o n d i t i o n i n g i t e x c l u d e s o r o v e r f l o w s the m o s t b a s i c structural ( c a t e g o r i a l o r e x i s t e n t i a l ) concepts o f the w h o l e existential a n a l y t i c . I t i s the w h o l e p r o b l e m a t i c t h a t i s here i n q u e s t i o n , the o n e t h a t subjects
positive
knowings
to
regional
ontologies,
and
these
to
a
fundamental o n t o l o g y , w h i c h itself at that t i m e was p r e l i m i n a r i l y opened u p b y the e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c o f Dasein. N o c h a n c e ( o n c e m o r e , o n e m i g h t s a y , a n d s h o w ) i f i t i s the m o d e o f b e i n g o f the living, the a n i m a t e d ( h e n c e a l s o o f t h e p s y c h i c a l ) w h i c h raises a n d s i t u a t e s t h a t e n o r m o u s p r o b l e m , o r i n a n y case g i v e s i t its m o s t r e c o g n i s a b l e n a m e . T h i s m a t t e r c a n n o t b e e n g a g e d h e r e , b u t i n u n d e r l i n i n g its a l l t o o o f t e n u n n o t i c e d necessity,
it should
a t least b e o b s e r v e d
that the theme of sexual
difference c o u l d not be dissociated f r o m it. L e t u s f o r the m o m e n t k e e p t o t h a t " w a y o f p r i v a t i o n , " the e x p r e s s i o n picked up by H e i d e g g e r in §
1 2 , a n d t h i s t i m e a g a i n t o d e s i g n a t e the a
p r i o r i access t o t h e o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l i v i n g . O n c e t h a t r e m a r k is elaborated, H e i d e g g e r enlarges
u p o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f those
negative
statements. W h y do negative determinations impose themselves so often w i t h i n this o n t o l o g i c a l characteristic? N o t a t all b y " c h a n c e . " I t i s because one m u s t d e t a c h the o r i g i n a l i t y o f the p h e n o m e n a f r o m w h a t has d i s s e m b l e d , disfigured, d i s p l a c e d or v a r n i s h e d t h e m , f r o m the Verstellungen
172
Research
and
Verdeckungen,
from
a l l those
in
Phenomenology
Volume XIII
SI
pre-interpretations whose negative
effects s h o u l d i n t h e i r t u r n b e a n n u l l e d b y the n e g a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s w h o s e v e r i t a b l e " s e n s e " i s t r u l y " p o s i t i v e . " I t i s a s c h e m a t h a t w e have r e c o g n i s e d b e f o r e . T h e n e g a t i v i t y o f the " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " i s t h e r e f o r e n o t f o r t u i t o u s any m o r e than the n e c e s s i t y o f a l t e r a t i o n s o r d i s s e m b l a n c e s w h i c h it a t t e m p t s in some m a n n e r methodically to c o r r e c t .
Verstellungen
a n d Verdeckungen are n e c e s s a r y m o v e m e n t s i n the v e r y h i s t o r y o f B e i n g a n d its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h e y c a n n o t b e a v o i d e d l i k e c o n t i n g e n t f a u l t s ; o n e m a y n o t r e d u c e i n a u t h e n t i c i t y (Uneigentlichkeit) to a f a u l t or s i n i n t o w h i c h one s h o u l d n o t h a v e f a l l e n . A n d y e t . I f H e i d e g g e r uses s o e a s i l y the w o r d "negative" w h e n i t i s a m a t t e r o f q u a l i f y i n g s t a t e m e n t s o r a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , h e n e v e r does i t , i t seems t o m e ( o r , m o r e p r u d e n t l y , m u c h less o f t e n a n d m u c h less e a s i l y ) , t o q u a l i f y w h a t , i n pre-interpretations o f B e i n g , makes still necessary those
methodical
corrections
of a
negative
Uneigentlichkeit, t h e Verstellungen a n d the
or
neutralising
form.
Verdeckungen are n o t in
the o r d e r o f n e g a t i v i t y ( t h e false o r e v i l , e r r o r o r s i n ) . A n d o n e c a n w e l l u n d e r s t a n d w h y H e i d e g g e r c a r e f u l l y a v o i d s s p e a k i n g i n this case o f n e g a t i v i t y . H e t h u s a v o i d s r e l i g i o u s , ethical, i n d e e d e v e n d i a l e c t i c a l Schemas, p r e t e n d i n g to rise "higher" t h a n t h e y . It should then be said that no negative signification is o n t o l o g i c a l l y a t t a c h e d t o the " n e u t e r " i n g e n e r a l , p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d i s p e r s i o n (Zerstreuung) o f Dasein.
Thus,
w i t h o u t speaking of negative
v a l u e o r o f v a l u e i n g e n e r a l ( H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s t r u s t f o r the v a l u e o f v a l u e i s w e l l k n o w n ) , w e s h o u l d take a c c o u n t o f the d i f f e r e n t i a l and h i e r a r c h i c a l a c c e n t w h i c h r e g u l a r l y in Sein und Zeit c o m e s to m a r k the n e u t r a l a n d dispersion.
I n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s , d i s p e r s i o n m a r k s the m o s t g e n e r a l
s t r u c t u r e o f Dasein. T h i s w e h a v e seen i n the C o u r s e , b u t i t was a l r e a d y
the case in Sein und Zeit, for e x a m p l e in § 12 ( p . 5 6 ) : " T h e being-inthe-world of Dasein
is,
with
its
factivity,
(zerstreut) o r e v e n p a r c e l l e d out(zersplittert)
always
already dispersed
into determinate modes of
being-in." F u r t h e r m o r e , H e i d e g g e r p r o p o s e s a l i s t o f these m o d e s a n d o f their irreducible m u l t i p l i c i t y . Yet elsewhere, dispersion and distraction (Zerstreuung Dasein,
in
both
senses)
t h a t of Man-selbst,
characterise
the
of t h a t One w h i c h
inauthentic has
ipseity
of
been d i s t i n g u i s h e d
f r o m i p s e i t y (Selbst) a s a u t h e n t i c a n d p r o p e r (eigentlich). A s " a n y o n e , " Dasein is d i s p e r s e d or d i s t r a c t e d (zerstreut). T h e w h o l e of t h a t a n a l y s i s i s well k n o w n , w e ' r e o n l y d e t a c h i n g t h a t w h i c h c o n c e r n s d i s p e r s i o n ( c f . § 2 7 ) , a c o n c e p t one c a n a g a i n f i n d a t the c e n t e r o f the a n a l y s i s o f c u r i o s i t y (Neugier, § 3 6 ) . T h a t , let u s r e c a l l , i s o n e o f the three m o d e s o f f a l l i n g (Verfallen) of Dasein in its e v e r y d a y - b e i n g . L a t e r we s h a l l h a v e to return to
Heidegger's warnings:
173
f a l l i n g , a l i e n a t i o n (Entfremdung),
82
Jacques
Derrida
Geschlecht: sexual difference,
a n d e v e n d o w n f a l l (Absturz)
are
not
ontological difference
m e a n t here
as the t h e m e of a
" m o r a l i s i n g c r i t i q u e , " a " p h i l o s o p h y of c u l t u r e , " a dogmatic religious a c c o u n t o f the f a l l (Fall) f r o m a n " o r i g i n a l c o n d i t i o n " ( o f w h i c h w e h a v e neither ontic experience nor ontological interpretation) or of a " c o r r u p t i o n o f h u m a n n a t u r e . " M u c h l a t e r , w e w i l l h a v e t o r e c a l l these w a r n i n g s a n d their p r o b l e m a t i c character, w h e n w i t h i n the " s i t u a t i o n " o f T r a k l , H e i d e g g e r w i l l i n t e r p r e t the d e c o m p o s i t i o n and the dessentialisation (Verwesung), t h a t i s t o say a l s o a c e r t a i n c o r r u p t i o n , o f t h e f i g u r e o f m a n . I t w i l l s t i l l be a m a t t e r , e v e n m o r e e x p l i c i t l y t h i s t i m e , o f a t h o u g h t o f "Geschlecht" o r o f Geschlecht. I p u t i t i n q u o t a t i o n s b e c a u s e t h e issue touches as m u c h on the name as on w h a t it names; a n d it is here as i m p r u d e n t to separate t h e m as to translate t h e m . We shall ascertain i t , it is there
a m a t t e r o f t h e i n s c r i p t i o n o f Geschlecht a n d o f Geschlecht a s
inscription, stamp, and i m p r i n t . D i s p e r s i o n is t h u s m a r k e d twice, as g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e of Dasein a n d as m o d e o f i n a u t h e n t i c i t y . O n e m i g h t s a y t h e s a m e f o r t h e n e u t r a l : i n the Course, w h i l e
i t i s a q u e s t i o n o f Dasein's n e u t r a l i t y ,
no negative or
p e j o r a t i v e i n d e x ; y e t " n e u t r a l , " i n Sein und Zeit m a y a l s o b e u s e d t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the " o n e , " t o w i t w h a t b e c o m e s the " w h o " w i t h i n e v e r y d a y i p s e i t y : t h e n the " w h o " i s t h e n e u t r a l (Neutrum), "the one" ( §
27).
T h i s b r i e f r e c o u r s e to Sein und Zeit has p e r h a p s a l l o w e d us b e t t e r to understand
t h e sense
and
n e c e s s i t y of t h a t order of implications t h a t
H e i d e g g e r tends t o preserve. A m o n g o t h e r things, that o r d e r m a y also r e n d e r a n a c c o u n t o f t h e p r e d i c a t e s m a d e use o f b y a l l d i s c o u r s e o n s e x u a l i t y . T h e r e i s n o p r o p e r l y s e x u a l p r e d i c a t e ; t h e r e i s n o n e a t least t h a t d o e s n o t r e f e r , f o r its sense, t o t h e general s t r u c t u r e s o f Dasein. S o t h a t t o k n o w w h a t o n e speaks o f . a n d h o w , w h e n o n e n a m e s s e x u a l i t y , o n e m u s t i n d e e d r e l y u p o n the v e r y t h i n g d e s c r i b e d i n t h e a n a l y t i c o f Dasein. I n v e r s e l y , i f t h i s b e a l l o w e d , t h a t d i s i m p l i c a t i o n a l l o w s the general sexuality or sexualisation of discourse to be understood: sexual c o n n o t a t i o n s c a n o n l y m a r k d i s c o u r s e , t o the p o i n t o f i m m e r s i n g i t i n t h e m , t o the e x t e n t t h a t t h e y are h o m o g e n e o u s t o w h a t e v e r y d i s c o u r s e implies,
for
example
the
topology
of
those
"spatial
meanings"
(Raumbedeutungen) w h i c h are i r r e d u c i b l e , b u t a l s o a l l t h o s e o t h e r t r a i t s we have situated in passing. W h a t w o u l d a " s e x u a l " discourse or a d i s c o u r s e " o n - s e x u a l i t y " b e w i t h o u t e v o k i n g farness \eloignement], a n inside and an outside, dispersion and p r o x i m i t y , a here and a there, b i r t h and death, a b e t w e e n - b i r t h - a n d - d e a t h , a b e i n g - w i t h and discourse? T h i s order of i m p l i c a t i o n s opens up t h i n k i n g to a sexual difference that w o u l d not yet be sexual d u a l i t y , difference as d u a l . As we have already o b s e r v e d , w h a t t h e C o u r s e n e u t r a l i z e d w a s less s e x u a l i t y i t s e l f t h a n the " g e n e r i c " m a r k o f s e x u a l d i f f e r e n c e , b e l o n g i n g t o o n e o f two sexes.
174
Research in Phenomenology
Volume X I I I
83
H e n c e , i n l e a d i n g b a c k t o d i s p e r s i o n a n d m u l t i p l i c a t i o n (Zerstreuung, Mannigfaltigung),
may
one
not
begin
to
think
a
sexual
difference
( w i t h o u t n e g a t i v i t y , let u s c l a r i f y ) n o t sealed b y a t w o ? N o t t w o y e t o r n o longer? B u t t h e " n o t yet*' o r " n o l o n g e r " w o u l d s t i l l m e a n , a l r e a d y , s o m e dialectical appropriation. The
withdrawal
\retrait\
of the d y a d
leads t o w a r d
another sexual
difference. I t m a y also prepare other questions. F o r instance, this one: How
is
difference
deposited
a m o n g two?
Or
again,
if one
kept to
consigning difference w i t h i n dual o p p o s i t i o n , how can m u l t i p l i c a t i o n be s t o p p e d i n d i f f e r e n c e ? O r i n s e x u a l difference? I n the C o u r s e , f o r the a b o v e g i v e n r e a s o n s , Geschlecht a l w a y s n a m e s s e x u a l i t y s u c h a s i t i s t y p e d b y opposition o r b y d u a l i t y . L a t e r ( a n d sooner)
matters
will
be
different,
and
this
opposition
is
called
decomposition.
NOTES
( 1 ) Metaphysische
Anfangsgrunde
Ausgabe,
26.
Volume
der
Logik
( 2 ) C f . a l s o Sein und Zeil. p . 1 6 6 .
175
im
Ausgang
von
Leibniz,
Gesamt-
Existence and Self-Understanding in Being and Time WILLIAM D.
Georgetown
BLATTNER
University
1
E a r l y in Being and Time
H e i d e g g e r a n n o u n c e s t h a t the p r i m a r y c o n c e p t by
m e a n s o f w h i c h h e a i m s t o u n d e r s t a n d D a s e i n (us h u m a n s ) i s the c o n c e p t t o w h i c h he gives the name 'existence.' B u t w h a t is existence? Existence is, r o u g h l y , that feature o f D a s e i n that its s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o n s t i t u t i v e o f its b e i n g w h a t o r w h o i t i s . I n a n i m p o r t a n t sense, t h i s c o n c e p t e m b o d i e s H e i d e g g e r ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . A t t h e c e n t e r o f e x i s t e n t i a l i s m lies t h e c l a i m t h a t h u m a n s are g i v e n t h e i r c o n t e n t n e i t h e r b y a n a h i s t o r i c a l , t r a n s c u l t u r a l essence, n o r b y n a t u r e . R a t h e r , D a s e i n i t s e l f d e t e r m i n e s t h i s c o n t e n t i n i t s act o f self-understanding. K i e r k e g a a r d expressed this i n his famous ( i f m u r k y ) f o r m u l a t i o n t h a t " T h e s e l f i s that w h i c h relates i t s e l f t o i t s e l f ; " O r t e g a i n h i s c a t c h y phrase, " M a n has n o n a t u r e ; " a n d Sartre i n h i s n o t o r i o u s p r o p o s i t i o n , 1
"Existence c o m e s b e f o r e essence." A l l o f these d i c t a a r t i c u l a t e the same idea. B u t h o w are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s c l a i m , a n d w h a t m u s t w e p r e s u p p o s e t o render it plausible? I shall argue for t w o hypotheses. First, we cannot render t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t i d e a p l a u s i b l e i n its H e i d e g g e r i a n c o n t e x t w i t h o u t p a y i n g s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o h o w i t i s l i n k e d i n Being and Time t o the c o n c e p t o f a n a b i l i t y . Heidegger interprets Dasein's characteristics p r i m a r i l y as ability-chara c t e r i s t i c s , t h a t i s , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t are n o t states, b u t r a t h e r c a p a c i t i e s . S e c o n d , the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t c l a i m i s s u b j e c t t o i m m e d i a t e a n d fatal c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s , u n l e s s w e a c c e p t that H e i d e g g e r i s o p e r a t i n g w i t h a s u b t e r r a n e a n f o r m of d u a l i s m . It is not a Cartesian d u a l i s m of consciousness and matter; it is, r a t h e r , a d u a l i s m o f n a t u r a l a n d s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . W e s h a l l
A l l references to Being and Time are to the 15th German edition: Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (henceforth, S&Z). (Citations to all other sources will be in short title form, with complete bibliographic entries at ihe end of Ihe paper.) A l l translations of S&Z are my own, although of course I have relied heavily on Macquarrie and Robinson's English translation: Heidegger, Being and Time (B&T) . I have tried to indicate most of my divergences from Macquarrie and Robinson's ( M & R ) translations of technical terminology, usually by giving the German in parentheses along with M & R ' s translation. Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 13; Ortega y Gasset, "History as a System," p. 185; Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, p. 26.
177
see, m o r e o v e r , that these hypotheses, i f true, and i f l i n k e d w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis o f s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , e n t a i l further unusual, o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s about D a s e i n .
Existentiality,
Self-Understanding,
and
Ability
In §9 of Being and Time, w h o s e a i m is the p r e l i m i n a r y p r e s e n t a t i o n of " T h e T h e m e o f the A n a l y t i c o f D a s e i n " (the t i t l e o f the s e c t i o n ) , H e i d e g g e r explains
' e x i s t e n c e ' thus: "The
'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence.
... A l l
o f t h i s e n t i t y ' s b e i n g - s o i s p r i m a r i l y b e i n g , " (S&Z, p . 4 2 ) . O r a s h e puts i t i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t w a y , " t h i s e n t i t y , i n its b e i n g , c o m p o r t s i t s e l f t o its bei n g . . . . It is being that is in each case at issue f o r t h i s e n t i t y , " {S&Z, p p . 4 1 - 4 2 ) . H e enlarges o n this d e f i n i t i o n later, this t i m e i n t r o d u c i n g the l a n guage o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g : " D a s e i n i s the e n t i t y that i n its b e i n g c o m p o r t s i t s e l f u n d e r s t a n d i n g l y t o this b e i n g . T h e f o r m a l c o n c e p t o f existence i s h e r e w i t h i n d i c a t e d , " (S&Z, p p . 5 2 - 5 3 ) . D a s e i n is the e n t i t y w h o s e b e i n g is a l w a y s at issue i n w h a t i t does, that is, the e n t i t y w h o a l w a y s has a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t self, a n d w h o s e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o n s t i t u t i v e o f its " b e i n g - s o , " its b e i n g w h a t o r w h o i t is. T h i s c e n t r a l , e x i s t e n t i a l i s t thesis lies a t the heart o f H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n b e i n g . L e t u s f o r m u l a t e i t thus: the Existentiality Thesis:
If D a s e i n is A, then it is A because it understands i t s e l f as A.
T o c l a r i f y this thesis, w e m u s t specify w h a t H e i d e g g e r means b y ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ' To see the dangers of not d o i n g so, c o n s i d e r a rather s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , or perhaps u n t u t o r e d , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s , one based o n the a s s u m p t i o n that b y ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' H e i d e g g e r has i n m i n d s o m e t h i n g l i k e k n o w l e d g e . I n this case, the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s w o u l d e n t a i l that D a s e i n k n o w s about e v e r y t h i n g that it is (Cartesian transparency taken to an e x t r e m e ! ) . T h i s w o u l d render i t i m p o s s i b l e that D a s e i n h a v e any features i t does not k n o w a b o u t a n d w o u l d p r o b a b l y m a k e s e l f - d e c e p t i o n i m p o s s i b l e ( d e p e n d i n g o n one's analysis o f that p h e n o m e n o n ) . F o r t u n a t e l y , w e need not d e f e n d this c l a i m , since H e i d e g g e r makes clear that b y ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' h e does not have i n m i n d some f o r m o f awareness o r cognition: If we
Interpret
phenomenon
is
•understanding' tinguished
from
[understanding] conceived in
the
as
as a fundamental existentiale, we thereby a
fundamental
s e n s e o f one
'explaining,'
mode
o f the
being
possible sort of c o g n i t i o n
must thereby
of
among
i n d i c a t e that this
Dasein. others,
In
contrast,
perhaps dis-
be Interpreted as an existential derivative of
p r i m a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h c o - c o n s t i t u t e s the b e i n g o f the T h e r e . ( 5 < 4 Z , p .
178
143).
Rather, h e uses the t e r m t o p i c k o u t c o m p e t e n c e , c a p a b i l i t y : 3 In onlical discourse we often able t o manage a t h i n g ' sen
sein«],
use
the e x p r e s s i o n
[»einer Suche
vorstehen
Ί ο be capable o f something'
tentiale, that of w h i c h one
is capable
is
Ίο understand something' können«).
[»etwas
to mean
Ί ο be equal t o i t '
können«]
In
'to be
[»ihr gewach
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as a n e x i s -
not a W h a t , but rather b e i n g as e x i s t i n g .
(SaZ, p .
143)
I n fact, the w o r d ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' has a n u m b e r o f c l o s e l y r e l a t e d m e a n i n g s . P r i n c i p a l l y , w e use i t i n t w o w a y s : t o d e s c r i b e a c o g n i t i v e stance o r p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s a c o n t e n t , such a s w h e n w e say, " I u n d e r s t a n d the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s ; " a n d t o describe a sort o f a b i l i t y w e have, a s w h e n w e say, 4
" I u n d e r s t a n d the G e r m a n s . " I n the l a t t e r statement w e express the idea not that w e grasp s o m e c o n t e n t ( t h o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e G e r m a n s w i l l l i k e l y i n v o l v e t h a t ) , b u t rather that w e are c o m p e t e n t w i t h c e r t a i n sorts o f p e o p l e , that w e are c a p a b l e o f h a n d l i n g o u r s e l v e s a m o n g s t t h e m . ( W e c a n use the w o r l d ' k n o w ' this w a y t o o : " B o k n o w s baseball.") T h u s , i n H e i d e g g e r ' s v o c a b u l a r y , t o say that Jones understands s o m e t h i n g is to say that she is c a p a b l e of i t . To say, t h e r e f o r e , that Jones u n d e r s t a n d s h e r s e l f a s b e i n g ( o r , t o be) A , i s t o say that she i s c a p a b l e o f b e i n g A . A n d i n d e e d , H e i d e g g e r endorses this consequence, w h e n he w r i t e s , "Understanding is
the
existential
being
of Dasein's
own
ability-to-be
[Seinkönnen,
M&R:
5
p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - b e i n g ] , " (SaZ, p . 1 4 4 ) . T h u s , i f w e w e d the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s t o H e i d e g g e r ' s account o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w e see that the f o r m e r c l a i m s n o t that D a s e i n i s a w a r e o f w h a t e v e r i t is, b u t rather that i t i s c a p a b l e o f w h a t e v e r i t is. N o w , t h i s is a s u r p r i s i n g c l a i m . S u p p o s e that Jones is s i x feet t a l l . T h e E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s t h e n seems t o c l a i m that Jones i s c a p a b l e o f b e i n g s i x feet t a l l . B u t w h a t c o u l d that mean? Jones m a y be s i x feet t a l l , b u t i s she able to be, or capable'' of b e i n g , or competent at b e i n g s i x feet t a l l ? Jones's h e i g h t is o n e o f her p r o p e r t i e s , not ( c a p ) a b i l i t i e s . Jones is s i x feet t a l l , a n d is able to
T h i s i n t e r p r e t i v e t h e s i s i s p r o m i n e n t i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e . S e e f o r e x a m p l e , D r e y f u s . Being-
in-the-Wortd; man.
Guignon,
Heidegger
and
Knowledge.
Schmitt,
Heidegger
on
Being
Hu-
I t m a y b e that the f i r s t use i s a c t u a l l y d e p e n d e n t o n the s e c o n d , i f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c o n t e n t i s a s o r t o f a b i l i t y , p e r h a p s a n a b i l i t y t o use ( a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o f ) t h e c o n tent. It is not necessary to take a p o s i t i o n on that question. R i c h a r d S c h m i t t i s t h e f i r s t t o see t h a t t h i s l i n e s h o u l d b e r e a d t h i s w a y . See S c h m i t t ,
Heidegger on Being Human, p.
179.
O n e m u s t bear in m i n d that the w o r d s ' c a p a b l e ' and ' a b l e '
h a v e a t l e a s t t w o uses. O n t h e
o n e h a n d , w e say that Jones i s able t o b e h u n g r y , b y w h i c h
w e m e a n t h a t she c a n b e
h u n g r y , t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t she b e h u n g r y . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e o f t e n use and
'capable'
i n t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e y refer t o a n a b i l i t y o r c o m p e t e n c e .
'able'
'Jones is
able t o d r i v e ' a l m o s t a l w a y s has this m e a n i n g . It states that she has a c e r t a i n s k i l l o r
c o m p e t e n c e . F o r t h e s a k e o f c l a r i t y , / will use 'ability' and 'capability' only in the Un-
ter
sense.
179
r u n ten m i l e s per h o u r . L e t u s c a l l these t w o sorts o f i t e m , r e s p e c t i v e l y , 'state-characteristics' and ' a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . ' H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s , then, that a l l o f D a s e i n ' s characteristics are a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . the Ability Thesis:
A l l of D a s e i n ' s characteristics are a b i l i t y - c h a r acteristics.
" B u t s u r e l y , " one m i g h t object, " t h i s A b i l i t y T h e s i s is i n d e f e n s i b l e : Jones has lots o f state-characteristics, e.g., b e i n g six feet t a l l . " T o d e f e n d the A b i l i t y T h e s i s I shall argue, first, that the state-characteristic of b e i n g six feet t a l l is c l o s e l y associated w i t h a s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and second, that D a s e i n i s o n l y t o b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the related ability-char"acteristic, not w i t h the state-characteristic. Jones is s i x feet t a l l . She also, h o w e v e r , u n d e r stands that p h y s i c a l state-characteristic in s o m e d e f i n i t e w a y : she understands h e r s e l f t o b e t a l l . T h i s l a t t e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s not p u r e l y p h y s i c a l , i s not the sort o f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a tree o f the same p h y s i c a l h e i g h t can have. A t least, i t can be seen to be so, w h e n we r e c o g n i z e that b e i n g t a l l is a w a y of c o m p o r t i n g o n e s e l f i n the w o r l d . B e i n g t a l l has i n t h i s w a y t o d o w i t h o n e ' s stature, not j u s t o n e ' s p h y s i c a l h e i g h t . A person w h o understands h e r s e l f as u n u s u a l l y t a l l m i g h t t a l k d o w n t o p e o p l e , use her h e i g h t t o l o r d i t o v e r t h e m ; o n the other h a n d , she m i g h t be embarrassed by her h e i g h t , m o r e shy about p h y s i c a l e n c o u n t e r s . S i m i l a r l y , a l t h o u g h b e i n g a f e m a l e is a b i o l o g i c a l fact a b o u t Jones, b e i n g f e m i n i n e i s her w a y o f i n t e r p r e t i n g that b i o l o g i c a l fact. ( T h i n k o f the w a y i n w h i c h w e speak o f degrees o f f e m i n i n i t y a n d m a s c u l i n i t y , a n d the w a y i n w h i c h baby name b o o k s s o m e t i m e s c a t e g o r i z e b a b y names b y 7
h o w f e m i n i n e o r m a s c u l i n e they a r e . ) T h u s , c l o s e l y related t o the state-characteristics of b e i n g six feet t a l l and female are the s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics o f b e i n g t a l l a n d f e m i n i n e . S e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics are, f u r t h e r m o r e , a b i l i t i e s . O n e m u s t know how to be t h e m . B e i n g six feet t a l l or b i o l o g i c a l l y f e m a l e is a state, not an a b i l i t y ; i t i n v o l v e s n o k n o w - h o w . B u t b e i n g t a l l ( i n the stature sense) o r f e m i n i n e i s a n a b i l i t y . I t i s a w a y o f h a n d l i n g o n e s e l f a n d r e l a t i n g t o others. A b i l i t i e s are easiest to n o t i c e w h e n they break d o w n . I m a g i n e s o m e o n e bad at b e i n g t a l l , say, s o m e o n e w h o tries t o l o r d i t o v e r others p h y s i c a l l y , but f a i l s . H e w o u l d seem r a t h e r f o o l i s h t r y i n g . H e sets his s h o u l d e r s b a c k , c o c k s his head d o w n w a r d , a n d says
" U r n , excuse m e , please." B e i n g t a l l i s l e a r n e d ,
s o m e t i m e s mastered, and can be done better and w o r s e . We are s o c i a l i z e d i n t o o r are t a u g h t o u r s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e stature-characteristics, j u s t a s w i t h m a n y other, m o r e o b v i o u s l y s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics ( b e i n g A m e r i c a n , b e i n g m i d d l e class, etc.). T h e s e characteristics are one a n d a l l a b i l i t i e s . H e n c e , each
7
F o r an a m u s i n g v e r s i o n of this, l o o k at the chapters " F r o m M a d o n n a to M e r y l " and " F r o m R a m b o t o S y l v e s t e r " i n L i n d a R o s e n k r a n l z a n d P a m e l a R e d m o n d S a t r a n , Beyond Jennifer und Jason,
(New
York:
St.
Martin's
Press,
180
1990).
of ihe state-characteristics we have c o n s i d e r e d ( b e i n g six feet t a l l , f e m a l e ) is c l o s e l y associated w i t h a s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ( b e i n g t a l l , feminine). O n e m i g h t t h i n k that the force o f the a r g u m e n t above depends o n contrasti n g a physical state-characteristic w i t h a self-interpretive a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . B u t this is not so. Jones is not o n l y s i x feet t a l l , but also, say, the leader of her w e e k l y b o o k d i s c u s s i o n g r o u p . T h a t is c l e a r l y s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e : one is not the leader of a g r o u p n a t u r a l l y , but rather o n l y by b e i n g s o c i a l l y and i n t e r p r e t i v e l y s i t u a t e d in a c e r t a i n w a y . B u t is it a state-characteristic? H e i d e g g e r w o u l d argue not. Jones must know how to be a g r o u p leader; she m u s t be cap a b l e o f i t . B e i n g a g r o u p leader i s h a v i n g and e x e r c i s i n g a set o f a b i l i t i e s : the a b i l i t y to o r g a n i z e a g r o u p ' s m e e t i n g , the a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l a d i s c u s s i o n , e v e n the a b i l i t y to use a p h o n e . So, w h a t appear to be i n t e r p r e t i v e state-chara c t e r i s t i c s t u r n o u t , in the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , also to be a i u / i ' / v - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , none of D a s e i n ' s i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics are state-characteristics, and thus, the a r g u m e n t does not trade on n a r r o w i n g o u r focus on statecharacteristics to p h y s i c a l ones. T h e second l e g o f the defense o f the A b i l i t y T h e s i s i s the m o r e d i f f i c u l t one: the c l a i m that D a s e i n is o n l y to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h these s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , not w i t h its factual state-characteristics. S i n c e I have already a r g u e d that w h a t appear to be s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e state-characteristics are r e a l l y a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , I can n o w argue that D a s e i n is o n l y its a b i l i t y - c h a r a c teristics by a r g u i n g that D a s e i n is o n l y is its s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e characteristics. I n the passage i n w h i c h H e i d e g g e r d r a w s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the f a c t i cal ( i . e . , i n t e r p r e t i v e ) and the factual ( i . e . , n o n - i n t e r p r e t i v e ) , we can see that D a s e i n ' s p u t a t i v e factual characteristics are not r e a l l y p r o p e r t o i t . ..
e n t i t i e s that are n o t w o r l d l e s s , e . g . , D a s e i n i t s e l f , are a l s o o c c u r r e n t
more
precisely
s t a t e d , can, w i t h a c e r t a i n
legitimacy and
" i n " the w o r l d , or
w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t s , be
conceived
as m e r e l y occurrent. To do this, it is necessary to l o o k c o m p l e t e l y a w a y f r o m , or better, not t o see t h e e x i s t e n t i a l m a k e - u p o f b e i n g - i n [ D a s e i n ' s w a y o f b e i n g i n the w o r l d ) . T h i s p o s s i ble conception of " D a s e i n " as something occurrent and o n l y occurrent should fused
with
Dasein's
own
m a n n e r of " o c c u n e n t n e s s . "
(S&Z,
p.
55,
note
the
not be c o n -
scare-quotes)
H e i d e g g e r makes three s i g n i f i c a n t c l a i m s here. ( 1 ) O n e can " w i t h a c e r t a i n l e g i t i m a c y " c o n c e i v e D a s e i n a s s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r e n t . I n this c o n t e x t , the t e r m ' o c c u r r e n t ' (vorhanden, M & R : present-at-hand) appears s i m p l y t o p i c k o u t t h i n g s u n l i k e D a s e i n , that is, n o n - e x i s t e n t i a l e n t i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g I t h i n k , w h a t H e i d e g g e r c a l l s the ' a v a i l a b l e ' (zuhanden, M & R : r e a d y - t o - h a n d ) , that is, the p a r a p h e r n a l i a o f the s o c i a l w o r l d . " So, one can " w i t h a c e r t a i n l e g i t i m a c y "
The term means "to
be
Occurrent'
h a s t w o s e n s e s i n S&Z.
"to exist independently or to
'available,'
be
dependent
of human
upon
human
In its n a r r o w
practices and practices."
In
a n d m o r e frequent sense, i t
interpretation," as this
sense
it
opposed
contrasts
to
with
w h i c h p i c k s out those n o n - h u m a n things that p l a y a role in o u r practices,
181
c o n c e i v e D a s e i n a s n o n - h u m a n , n o n - e x i s t e n t i a l . ( 2 ) I n d o i n g this one m u s t p r e s c i n d f r o m D a s e i n ' s " e x i s t e n t i a l m a k e - u p . " T h a t is, one can c o n c e i v e Jones f a c t u a l l y , i f one abstracts a w a y f r o m Jones's p r o p e r l y D a s e i n i s h , o r exi s t e n t i a l features. T h i s a b s t r a c t i o n thus grasps a n o n - e x i s t e n t i a l e l e m e n t or aspect o f Jones, i n the f i r s t instance, one w o u l d t h i n k , her b i o l o g y . ( 3 ) T h i s n o n - e x i s t e n t i a l a b s t r a c t i o n is not the same as D a s e i n ' s " p r o p e r o c c u r r e n c e , " i.e., its f a c t i c i t y . ' F a c t i c i t y ' is the n a m e that H e i d e g g e r gives to D a s e i n ' s det e r m i n a c y as an e x i s t e n t i a l e n t i t y . "Dasein's
9
D e s p i t e H e i d e g g e r ' s r e f e r r i n g to it as
own m a n n e r o f O c c u r r e n t n e s s , ' " o r e v e n , p r e c i s e l y b y u s i n g
' o c c u r r e n t n e s s ' here i n scare-quotes, h e w a n t s t o contrast i t w i t h w h a t e v e r m i g h t b e n a t u r a l i n D a s e i n . L e t m e f o r m u l a t e the o v e r a l l c l a i m o f this parag r a p h i n another thesis: the Duality Thesis:
D a s e i n can be c o n s i d e r e d b o t h in its p r o p e r o n t o l o g i c a l make-up, as essentially self-und e r s t a n d i n g , and in an abstracted, factual w a y , as s o m e t h i n g that m e r e l y o c c u r s (esp., n a t u rally).
I w a n t to suggest that this D u a l i t y T h e s i s is c e n t r a l to H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g y . O f i m m e d i a t e relevance i s t h i s : o n l y w i t h the help o f the A b i l i t y and D u a l i t y Theses can H e i d e g g e r m a i n t a i n the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y Thesis. T h e general strategy f o r r e s p o n d i n g to p o t e n t i a l c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s to the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y Thesis is to d i s t i n g u i s h factual c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f r o m the e x i s t e n t i a l a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that are i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e m . T h e three theses c o m e together as a package deal in Being and Time. W e c a n c l a r i f y the A b i l i t y T h e s i s further b y a p p r o a c h i n g i t a g a i n f r o m a slightly different angle. Let us begin w i t h a deceptively direct c o m m e n t by H e i d e g g e r early in Being and Time: T h e characteristics that can be e x h i b i t e d by
[ D a s e i n ] are thus not o c c u r r e n t
a n o c c u r r e n t e n t i t y t h a t " l o o k s " s u c h a n d so, b u t r a t h e r p o s s i b l e w a y s
"properties" of
for [Dasein]
in each
c a s e t o b e a n d o n l y t h a t . (S&Z, p . 4 2 )
O n e m i g h t t h i n k this passage s i m p l y says that w h a t e v e r D a s e i n is (its charact e r i s t i c s ) are p o s s i b l e for i t . B u t i n fact, i t has the A b i l i t y T h e s i s b u r i e d i n i t . If H e i d e g g e r i n t e n d e d here o n l y to say that D a s e i n ' s characteristics are possib i l i t i e s for i t , then h e w o u l d assert n o t h i n g s o d r a m a t i c a s t h e A b i l i t y T h e s i s .
p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y , e q u i p m e n t . I n its b r o a d sense. ties, i.e.,
both the occurrent in the n a r r o w
Occurrent'
picks out non-human enti-
sense a n d the a v a i l a b l e .
S e e Sa'Z, p . 4 5 f o r
a n e x a m p l e o f a b r o a d use o f t h e t e r m . I d o n o t have the space here t o d e v e l o p i n d e t a i l a n a c c o u n t o f f a c t i c i t y . I a i m i n subseq u e n t p u b l i c a t i o n s t o c l a r i f y the c o n c e p t u a l relations b e t w e e n e x i s t e n t i a l i t y a n d f a c t i c ity.
182
Of course, the w e a k e r c l a i m is a t r i v i a l i t y dressed up as a thesis, since it j u s t states that a l l of D a s e i n ' s ( a c t u a l ) characteristics are possible ( c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) . I n o r d e r to see the passage as m o r e than m e r e l y t r i v i a l , w e m u s t f i g u r e o u t w h a t special c o n t e n t i s c a r r i e d b y H e i d e g g e r ' s phrase, " p o s s i b l e w a y s for D a sein to be." H e i d e g g e r suggests that there is a special n o t i o n of p o s s i b i l i t y that applies lo D a s e i n , one q u i t e u n l i k e that w h i c h applies t o , say, a tree. P o s s i b i l i t y , w h i c h D a s e i n i n each case i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y . i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d j u s t a s m u c h f r o m e m p t y , l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y a s f r o m the c o n t i n g e n c y o f s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r e n t , i n s o far a s w i t h the latter this and that can " h a p p e n . " As a m o d a l category of b e i n g - o c c u r r e n t , p o s s i b i l i t y m e a n s t h e not yet a c t u a l a n d t h e not ever n e c e s s a r y .
It c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e
merely p o s s i b l e
..
P o s s i b i l i t y as an existentiale, on the other hand, is the most o r i g i n a r y and last, p o s i t i v e , o n t o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f D a s e i n . . . . (S&Z, p p .
143-44)
H e i d e g g e r i s here c l e a r l y t r y i n g t o argue for a t h i r d sort o f p o s s i b i l i t y o t h e r t h a n l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y and the " c o n t i n g e n c y o f s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r e n t " ( w h i c h I s h a l l c a l l O c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y ' ) . B u t w h a t sort o f p o s s i b i l i t y i s that? T o a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n , i t i s h e l p f u l t o e x a m i n e his c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f o c c u r r e n t possibility. R i c h a r d S c h m i t t is the o n l y i n t e r p r e t e r , so far as I k n o w , w h o has ad1
d r e s s e d t h i s passage d i r e c t l y . " M u c h o f w h a t h e says i s i l l u m i n a t i n g a n d h e l p f u l . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , one aspect o f his r e a d i n g i s c l e a r l y w r o n g . H e i n t e r prets o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y a s " p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . " B u t this i s n o t r i g h t f o r t w o reasons. F i r s t , o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y i s supposed t o a p p l y not o n l y t o the n a t u r a l l y and p h y s i c a l l y o c c u r r e n t , but t o any sort o f o c c u r r e n t i t e m , w h e t h e r i t b e p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , m a t h e m a t i c a l , o r w h a t e v e r . S e c o n d , since H e i d e g g e r does n o t c a r v e o u t any s p e c i a l n o t i o n for the a v a i l a b l e , I suggest that he is here u s i n g the t e r m O c c u r r e n t ' i n its b r o a d sense t o a p p l y t o a n y t h i n g u n l i k e D a s e i n . " I f so, " p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y " i s yet m o r e i n a p p r o p r i a t e , because n o t o n l y i s the a v a i l a b l e far f r o m e x c l u s i v e l y p h y s i c a l , b u t the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that g o v e r n e v e n the p h y s i c a l l y a v a i l a b l e are n o t p r i m a r i l y p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s (e.g., h o w a h a m m e r can be used). H e i d e g g e r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n o f the c o n c e p t o f o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y m a k e s n o m e n t i o n o f " p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . " H e says s i m p l y , and u n f o r t u n a t e l y d a r k l y , that o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y i s the " c o n t i n g e n c y o f the o c c u r r e n t , " and that " w i t h the latter, this and that can h a p p e n . " T h e idea seems to be t h i s . L e t me r e g i m e n t the p h r a s e o l o g y , ' w i t h the latter, t h i s and that can h a p p e n , ' a s ' w i t h respect t o s o m e t h i n g , s o m e event can take p l a c e . ' C o n s i d e r the tree: w i t h respect to the tree, a b u r n i n g d o w n can take place. Put s o m e w h a t m o r e p e r s p i c u o u s l y , the tree can b e the subject o f a b u r n i n g d o w n . I f t h i s p a r s i n g o f H e i -
S c h m i t t , Heidegger on
Being Human, p p .
178ff.
See n o t e # 8 a b o v e .
183
d e g g e r ' s language is c o r r e c t , then o c c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t y is s i m p l y the c o n t i n gent t a k i n g place of an event. N o w , D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s are, a c c o r d i n g to this passage, supposed to be d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d . H o w ? T h e rest o f the paragraph i n w h i c h this passage occurs focuses o n D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y - t o - b e . T h i s leads n a t u r a l l y t o the s u g g e s t i o n — this i s S c h m i t t ' s s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n — t h a t D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s are a b i l i t i e s . W e can say, " T h e tree can b u r n d o w n , " b u t w e s h o u l d not t h e r e b y m e a n , " T h e tree has the a b i l i t y to b u r n d o w n , " at least not in the precise sense that the tree has s o m e c o m p e t e n c e . B u t t h i s is w h a t it is to say of Jones that she can be a translator; it is to say that she is able to translate, that she has that competence. S c h m i t t ' s r e a d i n g o f H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t o f e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y fits i n neatly w i t h the o v e r a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I am o f f e r i n g . D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s are a b i l i t i e s , and as H e i d e g g e r says on p. 4 2 , a l l D a s e i n ' s characteristics are e x i s t e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , i.e., a b i l i t i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the v e r y idea o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t w o d i f f e r e n t sorts o f p o s s i b i l i t y , o c c u r r e n t and e x i s t e n t i a l , reflects the D u a l i t y T h e s i s . W e o u g h t not, i n a c a r e f u l , o n t o l o g i c a l analysis, conflate the t w o d i f f e r e n t w a y s i n w h i c h w e can c o n s i d e r D a s e i n : abstractly a s o c c u r r e n t and p r o p e r l y as e x i s t e n t i a l . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n runs so deep that we m u s t even i n t r o d u c e d i s t i n c t n o t i o n s o f possibility t o d o i t j u s t i c e . T o reiterate: the H e i d e g g e r i a n defense o f the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y Thesis i s c a r r i e d o u t b y w a y o f the A b i l i t y and D u a l i t y Theses. W e e n d u p w i t h a d u a l i s t i c p i c t u r e o f D a s e i n , w h o w h e n c o n c e i v e d p r o p e r l y is characterized o n l y as h a v i n g s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t i e s , but w h e n c o n c e i v e d i m p r o p e r l y ( a b s t r a c t l y ) is also characterized as having
state-characteristics.
Understanding
and
Projection
We have seen that for D a s e i n ( p r o p e r l y ) to be A, it m u s t understand i t s e l f as A . N o w , w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g oneself a s A ? H e i d e g g e r answers this q u e s t i o n b y i n t r o d u c i n g his n o t i o n o f p r o j e c t i o n (Entwurf). T h e G e r m a n word
'Entwurf
does
not
have
all
the
meanings
that
the
English
word
' p r o j e c t i o n ' has. Its c e n t r a l sense is that of a p l a n , sketch, or b l u e p r i n t . H o w ever, H e i d e g g e r goes o u t of his w a y to i n d i c a t e that by ' p r o j e c t i o n ' he does not have in m i n d a n y t h i n g so e x p l i c i t a n d t h o u g h t o u t as a b l u e p r i n t : " P r o j e c t i n g has n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h c o m p o r t i n g oneself t o w a r d s a t h o u g h t o u t p l a n , i n accordance w i t h w h i c h D a s e i n arranges its b e i n g , " (S&Z, p . 1 4 5 ) . So, w h a t i s H e i d e g g e r after w i t h the language o f ' p r o j e c t i o n ? ' H e also p l a y s u p o n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the G e r m a n w o r d t h r o w o r cast f o r t h .
1 2
'projection:'
ent-werfen i s t o
H e seems rather t o w a n t t o e m p h a s i z e this m e t a p h o r .
T h u s , at the b e g i n n i n g of the paragraph in w h i c h he i n t r o d u c e s p r o j e c t i o n , he writes, 1 2
See C a p u l o ,
"Hermeneuiic
Phenomenology."
184
W h y d o e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h alt e s s e n t i a l d i m e n s i o n s o f w h a t c a n b e d i s c l o s e d i n i t , a l w a y s p r e s s a h e a d i n t o [dringt ... i n ...)
possibilities'?
h a s i n i t s e l f t h e e x i s t e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t w e c a l l projection. (S&Z,
p.
Because understanding 145)
W e can see w h y H e i d e g g e r makes these c l a i m s , i f w e bear the A b i l i t y T h e s i s in mind. D o w e relate t o o u r a b i l i t i e s a s t o t h o u g h t o u t plans? I m a g i n e that after f i n i s h i n g her c o l l e g e degree in G e r m a n , Jones decides to b e c o m e a s i m u l t a n e ous i n t e r p r e t e r . She sketches o u t a p l a n for b e c o m i n g o n e : she w i l l g o to G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y ' s S c h o o l o f L a n g u a g e s and L i n g u i s t i c s t o learn the c r a f t a n d t h e n a p p l y f o r an a p p r e n t i c e s h i p at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h a t is a p l a n f o r b e c o m i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r , is it not? It is a p l a n f o r the project of becoming
a
simultaneous
interpreter.
It
is
not
a
plan
for
or
b l u e p r i n t of the ability to be a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r . A n d note that b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r i s a n a b i l i t y : o n e has t o k n o w h o w t o b e o n e . T h e r e i s n o s k e t c h , p l a n , o r b l u e p r i n t f o r b e i n g this a b i l i t y .
1 3
In understand-
i n g h e r s e l f as a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r , Jones does not sketch o u t a p l a n of the p r o j e c t of b e c o m i n g one; rather, she w o r k s at and exercises the a b i l i t y to be one. A n d this is w h a t H e i d e g g e r means by " p r e s s i n g ahead i n t o " a p o s s i b i l i t y , an ability. B u t there i s a d i f f i c u l t y i n d e v e l o p i n g the c o n c e p t o f p r o j e c t i o n .
1 4
When
H e i d e g g e r i n t r o d u c e s the language o f p r o j e c t i o n , h e m a k e s t w o c l a i m s a b o u t its r e l a t i o n t o D a s e i n ' s p o s s i b i l i t i e s . F i r s t , h e w r i t e s , " . . . i n c a s t i n g , p r o j e c t i o n casts the p o s s i b i l i t y as p o s s i b i l i t y before i t s e l f a n d lets it be as s u c h , " (S&Z, p. 145). So, p r o j e c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s p o s s i b i l i t y or "lets it be." S e c o n d , " U n d e r s t a n d i n g is, a s p r o j e c t i o n , the sort o f b e i n g o f D a s e i n , i n w h i c h i t i s its p o s s i b i l i t i e s a s p o s s i b i l i t i e s , " (S&Z, p . 145). T h u s , i n v i r t u e o f p r o j e c t i o n , D a s e i n i s its p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t w o u l d seem that these t w o s t a t e m e n t s stand in t e n s i o n . On the one h a n d , p r o j e c t i o n s e e m i n g l y has as its o b j e c t a l l the p o s s i b l e w a y s i n w h i c h D a s e i n c o u l d be. I f t h i s w e r e so, t h e n J o n e s — w h o n o w c o n f r o n t s a range o f p o s s i b l e w a y s t o be, i n c l u d i n g b e i n g a G e r m a n d o c t o r a l student, b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s interpreter, b e i n g a c o m m e r c i a l transl a t o r — t h u s projects a l l o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s . A f t e r a l l , one w o u l d t h i n k , t h e y are a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r her, a n d i t i s p r o j e c t i o n that lets t h e m be. O n the o t h e r hand, it w o u l d seem that p r o j e c t i o n has as its o b j e c t that (those) d e f i n i t e p o s s i b i l i t y ( i e s ) f o r the sake o f w h i c h Jones i s n o w a c t i n g , her " f o r - t h e s a k e ( s ) - o f - w h i c h . " H e i d e g g e r says that Jones is her p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
This
i s one o f the
principal
burdens of Chs.
4 - 6 of Dreyfus,
15
She is the
Being-in-the-World.
I was first made aware of this difficulty by Ted Schatzki, w h o objected to my t a k i n g p r o j e c t i o n i n j u s t t h e n a r r o w sense e x p l o r e d b e l o w . B u t w h y w o u l d H e i d e g g e r t h e n use the p l u r a l ' p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' w h e n d e s c r i b i n g t h i s f u n c tion of projection? Because Dasein is never just one for-the-sake-of-which, but rather several or m a n y of t h e m at once
Jones is a s i m u l t a n e o u s interpreter, a l o y a l sister, a
c o n s c i e n t i o u s e m p l o y e e , etc.
185
p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r , because she i s c u r r e n t l y p r e s s i n g ahead i n t o that p o s s i b i l i t y . She i s n o t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g a G e r m a n d o c t o r a l student, because she is not c u r r e n t l y pressing ahead i n t o that one. She is her f o r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h i c h , a n d not the o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s that she forgoes. T h u s , there are t w o f u n c t i o n s here: o p e n i n g u p the range o f p o s s i b i l ities, a n d pressing ahead i n t o one o f t h e m ; H e i d e g g e r seems t o s u b s u m e b o t h o f t h e m under the n o t i o n o f p r o j e c t i o n . T h e r e i s g o o d reason t o b e l i e v e , h o w e v e r , that ' p r o j e c t i o n ' refers o n l y t o the
second
phenomenon,
namely,
determining
oneself as
someone
by
pressing ahead i n t o a p o s s i b l e w a y t o be. R e c a l l that H e i d e g g e r e x p l a i n s w h y understanding
always
presses
ahead
into
possibilities
by
pointing
to
projection: W h y does understanding, in accordance w i t h a l l essential dimensions of what can be disc l o s e d i n i t , a l w a y s press a h e a d i n t o p o s s i b i l i t i e s ? B e c a u s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g has i n i t s e l f the existential
structure
that
w e c a l l projection. (S&Z, p .
145)
U n d e r s t a n d i n g presses ahead i n t o p o s s i b i l i t i e s , p r e c i s e l y because u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y p r o j e c t i o n a n d p r o j e c t i o n j u s t i s p r e s s i n g ahead i n t o s o m e p o s s i b i l i t y . F u r t h e r s u p p o r t f o r this c l a i m can b e f o u n d i n C h a p t e r 2 o f D i v i s i o n T w o . I n his t r e a t m e n t o f w h a t h e calls " g u i l t , " H e i d e g g e r b r i e f l y explores Dasein's i n a b i l i t y to be t w o different possibilities at once. He writes, ...
a s a b l e - l o - b e [seinkiinnend], i t [ D a s e i n ] s t a n d s i n e a c h c a s e i n t h e o n e p o s s i b i l i t y o r t h e
o t h e r ; i t i s c o n s l a n t l y not s o m e o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y a n d h a s g i v e n i t u p i n i t s e x i s t e n t i e l l projection.
(S&Z,
p.
285)
I f p r o j e c t i o n w e r e the o p e n i n g u p o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s a s p o s s i b l e , s i m p l y a s such, then D a s e i n w o u l d n o t have t o g i v e u p one p o s s i b i l i t y i n v i r t u e o f p r o j e c t i n g a d i f f e r e n t one. S i n c e , h o w e v e r , i n p r o j e c t i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r , Jones presses ahead i n t o that p o s s i b i l i t y , she m u s t g i v e u p b e i n g a d o c t o r a l student. T h o u g h she c o u l d o p e n u p b o t h p o s s i b i l i ties, she c a n n o t press ahead i n t o b o t h o f t h e m . T h e r e f o r e , t o p r o j e c t o n e s e l f u p o n s o m e p o s s i b i l i t y i s t o press ahead i n t o i t . B u t h o w is this c o n c l u s i o n consistent w i t h Heidegger's c l a i m that it is p r o j e c t i o n that lets p o s s i b i l i t i e s bei A f t e r a l l , i f Jones can o n l y p r o j e c t hers e l f u p o n one o f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , then i t w o u l d s e e m — i f the p r e c e d i n g a r g u m e n t is c o r r e c t — t h a t the others are n o t p o s s i b l e f o r her. B u t that is a strange c o n c l u s i o n at best! T h e s o l u t i o n to t h i s w o r r y lies in rec a l l i n g that H e i d e g g e r uses the t e r m ' p o s s i b i l i t y , ' w h e n a p p l i e d t o D a s e i n , t o refer t o a b i l i t i e s , not s i m p l y t o w a y s i n w h i c h one c o u l d be. A l t h o u g h i t i s p o s s i b l e for Jones to be a d o c t o r a l student in G e r m a n — s h e c o u l d pursue that w a y of l i f e — s h e has not set o u t to do so, she has n o t d e v e l o p e d any of the r e q u i s i t e s k i l l s , and she i s not i n any w a y p r e s s i n g ahead i n t o that p o s s i b i l -
186
i t y . T h o u g h she has the potential to be a d o c t o r a l s t u d e n t , she is ( c u r r e n t l y ) able to be one." The
Unattainabilit)'
not
1
Thesis
and Death
L e t us see w h e r e the a r g u m e n t thus far has gotten us. Suppose that Jones has some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , A. We k n o w (by the A b i l i t y T h e s i s ) that A is an a b i l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . W e also k n o w ( b y the E x i s t e n t i a l i t y T h e s i s ) that Jones understands h e r s e l f as A. F i n a l l y , because u n d e r s t a n d i n g is cashed out in terms of p r o j e c t i o n , that is, in t e r m s of pressing ahead i n t o A, we can see that Jones m u s t be pressing ahead i n t o A. T h i s turns out to have a v e r y s u r p r i s i n g c o n sequence, however. C o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g scenario. Jones sets out to d e v e l o p the a b i l i t y to r i d e a b i k e . She w o r k s at it f o r one year. At the e n d of this year, Jones is a s k i l l f u l b i k e r i d e r ; she has the a b i l i t y to r i d e a b i k e . N o w , I take it that she w o u l d c o n t i n u e to be a s k i l l f u l b i k e r i d e r , at least for a year or so, e v e n if she s t o p p e d r i d i n g her b i k e , say, three m o n t h s later. H e r a b i l i t y t o ride a b i k e w i l l deteriorate s l o w l y due to disuse. Nonetheless, it is correct to say that she s t i l l has the a b i l i t y for a w h i l e after she decides never to exercise it again. We can c o n c l u d e f r o m this that there is some p o i n t at w h i c h it is true to say of Jones that she has the a b i l i t y in such a w a y that she need no l o n g e r press ahead i n t o i t , a l t h o u g h i f she does n o t , she w i l l g r a d u a l l y lose i t . I s h a l l h e n c e f o r t h use the w o r d s ' a t t a i n ' and ' a t t a i n a b l e ' in a t e c h n i c a l sense: attainable:
A n a b i l i t y , A , i s attainable j u s t i n case there can b e some p o i n t in t i m e at w h i c h it is true to say of a person that she has A, even if she never tries to exercise A thereafter.
T h u s t y p i c a l l y , a b i l i t i e s are a t t a i n a b l e , because there is ( o r better, c a n be) s o m e p o i n t a t w h i c h one i s able t o exercise t h e m , e v e n i f one never tries t o do so again. Nevertheless, H e i d e g g e r ' s account o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i t y does not perm i t a t t a i n a b i l i t y . R e c a l l that t o b e s o m e a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x i s t e n t i a l l y , D a s e i n m u s t press ahead i n t o i t . B u t a t t a i n a b i l i t y i s p r e c i s e l y that feature o f a b i l i t i e s that one can ( c o m e t o ) be able w i t h o u t h a v i n g further to press ahead i n t o t h e m . I n other w o r d s , H e i d e g g e r ' s account entails yet another thesis, the Unattainability Thesis:
D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are not a t t a i n able.
This contrast makes plain what is w r o n g w i t h Macrjuarrie and Robinson's translation of
'Seinki/nnen'
as
'potentiality-for-Being,'
rather than
187
as
'ability-to-be.'
B u t a s w e have seen w i t h the e x a m p l e o f r i d i n g a b i k e a b o v e , a b i l i t i e s d o seem to be attainable. So, H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t appears to e n t a i l an unacceptable c o n c l u s i o n . H e r e a g a i n the D u a l i t y T h e s i s u n d e r l i e s H e i d e g g e r ' s c l a i m , f o r t h e U n a t t a i n a b i l i t y Thesis applies o n l y to Dasein's self-interpretive abilities. T h a t is to say, since it is s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t i e s that b e l o n g p r o p e r l y to D a s e i n , whereas factual a b i l i t i e s b e l o n g to D a s e i n o n l y as c o n c e i v e d as occurrent, the analysis o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i t y applies o n l y t o D a s e i n ' s s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t i e s . Jones can attain the a b i l i t y to r i d e a b i k e , because she can w o r k o n her r i d i n g s k i l l s , d e v e l o p t h e m t o the p o i n t w h e r e she can r i d e w i t h ease, e v e n after she decides never to r i d e a g a i n . T h i s a b i l i t y is o c c u r r e n t , and Jones possesses it o n l y in so far as she can be c o n c e i v e d o c c u r r e n t l y ,
w
But
the a b i l i t y to be, say, a w e e k e n d b i k e enthusiast is a s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ( W h a t w e o r d i n a r i l y c a l l "the a b i l i t y t o r i d e a b i k e " i s a m i x o f a n o c c u r r e n t a b i l i t y to stay b a l a n c e d a n d m o v e f o r w a r d on a c o n t r a p t i o n of a c e r t a i n sort and a s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ) Jones is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the s e l f - i n t e r p r e t i v e a b i l i t y , H e i d e g g e r c l a i m s , o n l y in so far as she is c u r r e n t l y pressing ahead i n t o i t . I f she w e r e t o g i v e u p o n her h o b b y , she w o u l d t h e n c e f o r t h n o l o n g e r b e a w e e k e n d b i k e enthusiast. W e are, m o r e o v e r , not d e a l i n g here s i m p l y w i t h a n i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l a n d r e m o t e repercussion of the arcana of H e i d e g g e r ' s o n t o l o g y . T h e m a n y theses I have d r a w n out of Being and Time do not c o n s t i t u t e j u s t the o n t o l o g i c a l i n frastructure o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y t i c . T h e y also m a k e space f o r one 1
of his m o r e c o n c r e t e and salient c o n c e p t s , death. 1 have a r g u e d e l s e w h e r e * that ' d e a t h , ' as H e i d e g g e r uses i t , does not p i c k out the event that happens at the end o f every h u m a n b e i n g ' s l i f e . I t denotes, rather, a c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h one can f i n d oneself, the c o n d i t i o n o f not b e i n g able t o b e a n y o n e i n p a r t i c u l a r . T h i s i n a b i l i t y , here c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n terms o f D a s e i n ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i t y , is the same p h e n o m e n o n that H e i d e g g e r describes a f f e c t i v e l y in his d i s cussion of anxiety. To be anxious is to find all ways to be Dasein equally irr e l e v a n t o r u n i n t e r e s t i n g . S u c h a n affective d i s p o s i t i o n w o u l d disable D a s e i n f r o m b e i n g anyone, because D a s e i n w o u l d not have the a f f e c t i v e g r o u n d s for e x e r c i s i n g any p a r t i c u l a r a b i l i t y - t o - b e . W h a t i s r e l e v a n t here i s t h i s : i f one o f D a s e i n ' s a b i l i t i e s - t o - b e w e r e att a i n e d , D a s e i n c o u l d n o t then, and f o r a w h i l e thereafter, d i e i n H e i d e g g e r ' s sense. Suppose that Jones c o u l d a t t a i n the a b i l i t y - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of b e i n g a s i m u l t a n e o u s i n t e r p r e t e r . I f she attained i t i n F e b r u a r y , then i t w o u l d s i m p l y be false to describe her then as not able to be a n y o n e : she w o u l d be able to be 1 1
R e c a l l the d i s t i n c t i o n ( d r a w n above on p. 7) between and
occurrent'
Occurrent'
i n