CURRENT CONTINENTAL RESEARCH 218
Joseph J. Kockelmans
HEIDEGGER'S "BEING AND TIME" The Analytic of Dasein as Fundament...
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CURRENT CONTINENTAL RESEARCH 218
Joseph J. Kockelmans
HEIDEGGER'S "BEING AND TIME" The Analytic of Dasein as Fundamental Ontology
1989
Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 1990 by The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. University Press of America®, Inc. 4720 Boston Way Lanham, MD 20706 All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America British Cataloging in Publication Information Available Co-published by arrangement with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kockelmans, Joseph J., 1923Heidegger's being and time : the analytic of Dasein as fundamental ontology I Joseph J. Kockelmans. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. I. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. Sein und Zeit. 2. Ontology. 3. Time. I. Title. B3279 .H485K63 1989 111-
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
TABLE OF CONTENfS
Preface Acknowledgments
Vll
Xl
I.
Being and Time: Its Author and Its Origin
II.
The Necessity, Structure, and Priority ofthe Question ofBeing
41
The Twofold Task in Warking Out the Question of Being. Reflections on Method
63
III.
Division 1: The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein IV.
On the Nature and Task of the Preparatory Analysis of Dasein's Being. Being-in-the World as the Basic Structure of Dasein
1
91
93
V.
On the Being ofthe World
111
VI.
Spatiality and Space. Being-in-the-World as Being-With
131
"Being In" As Such. The Fundamental Structure of Dasein
145
VII.
IX.
Death, Conscience, and Resolve
163 183 187
X.
Dasein's Authentie Potentiality for Being-A-Whole. Care and Selfuood. Temporality as the Meaning of Care
215
XI.
Temporality and Time
239
XII.
The Temporality ofBeing-in-the-World and the Problem of the Transcendence of the W orld
VIII. Care and the Being ofDasein. Reality and Truth
Division II: Dasein and Temporality
XIII. Temporality and Historicity
289
XIV. Temporality and Within~time-ness as the Sources of the Ordinary Conception of Time
309
Conclusion
325
Bibliography
333
Index of Names
345
Index of Subjects
347
PREFACE In 1962 I wrote abrief introduction to Heidegger's philosophy; it was first published in Dutch and later, in 1965, translated into English and slightly revised. The English version of this short introduction has been used by many over a number of years. When it finally went out ofprint quite a number ofpeople asked me to prepare a new edition of the same book in which I would substantially maintain its structure and content. I have constantly refrained from re-editing the book because I was convinced that the time had passed for such an introduction. There are now a number of treatises and introductions that can be used with great profit as a first introduction to Heidegger's thinking. What I am presenting here is a commentary on Being and Time as a whole. Yet the present book is not meant tobe a paragraph by paragraph commentary or paraphrase of Heidegger's work. Instead I have selected a number of basic themes which play an important role in Being and Time. I have tried first to locate these themes within their historical and thematic context. I have then made an effort to familiarize the reader with the terminology and all the background information which I thought to be important or relevant to understanding Heidegger's text as maximally as possible. Finally, I have attempted to describe Heidegger's position in detail. There are several sections in Being and Time which will not be discussed explicitly in my commentary. Limitations of space made difficult choices necessary. For the sections not explicitly discussed here I must refer the reader to other commentaries on Being and Time. YetI am convinced that the content of this book will present the reader with the basic ideas which Heidegger tried to develop in his important work. If I have been successful in my effort, my reflections will lead the reader back to Heidegger's own text for which obviously no other text can be a substitute. The interpretation of Being and Time which will be given here will be strictly ontological. Thus I shall stay away from any nonontological interpretation of the book that some readers might have liked to have seen, such as an anthropological interpretation. I have particularly avoided a political interpretation of the work. Under the influence of the appearance of recent publications in which Heidegger's involvement with politics has been discussed pro and con, many author.s have begun to look critically at Heidegger's
Vlll
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME
philosophy from that perspective. Some of them even include in this discussion Heidegger's earlier work that was written after 1919. I have decided to stay away from such an interpretation because I find such interpretations irrelevant to the basic intention of the book. What I am interested in here is an effort to come to a founded understanding of the meaning of Heidegger's first great work. As far as the ontological content of the book is concerned, the work in my opinion is in all likelihood the greatest philosophical text written in this century. As the text explicitly states time and again the book is meant to present a fundamental ontology. It is true that the author of this book had his political opinions, but I do not feel qualified to say much about Heidegger's personal political views of 1927. I merely claim that the book, Being and Time, is not a treatise in political philosophy, nor does it cryptically try to promote certain political ideas. The book is a fundamental ontology that attempts to make an all-important contribution in regard to many vital problems of modern philosophy. The author tries to move away from every form of onto-theology. The basic thesis that the book tries to prepare isthat the totality of meaning is inherently historical and that notwithstanding this fact we need not worry about either relativism or "metaphysical" nihilism. It tries to avoid the pitfalls of the philosophies of a closed consciousness that worry about the reality of the world. Yet it transcends the pre-critical philosophies that were developed between Plato and Kant by developing a theory that can be called critical and transeendental in the deep sense of these terms. It is understandable that such a position will have to develop an analytic that is not concerned with consciousness, but with the human reality as such. Furthermore, such an analytic can no Ionger be a transeendental logic; rather it must be a transeendental ontology instead. In addition, it can no Ionger speak about an immortal soul or about isolated human faculties, such as intellect, reason, will, and feeling. It can no Ionger begin with a theory of perception, nor can it take its starting point in an a priori conception of a thinking substance. It begins with an analytic of Dasein that is both hermeneutical and transeendentaL It defines the mode of Being of man as ek-sistence, i.e., as Being-in-the-world. What one therefore may expect of this book is not an overt or covert political theory, but a precise formulation of the genuine problern of the meaning of Being, an explanation of the fact that Being is for us problematic and should be so, a precise determination and articulation of the mode of Being of man taken as Dasein which
PREFACE
IX
implies a detailed analysis of the notions of world, freedom, transcendence, truth, etc. Finally one may expect a completely original conception of both time and history, temporality and historicity. I do not see that anything is gained by projecting these all important ontological ideas upon a political background in which the book itself does not appear to belang and to which it did not intend to make a contribution.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
In writing this book I have sometimes made use of ideas which I have developed elsewhere. As a consequence slightly revised versians of sections of book chapters and articles have been included in some of the chapters of this book. I am very grateful for the permission of the publishers and editors of these sources to reprint slightly revised portians of what has appeared previously. In chapters V, VI, and VII I have included revised versions of chapters 3 through 6 of my book Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to His Philosophy. Copyright © 1965 by Duquesne University Press and Lannoo, Tielt. In chapters II and III I have incorporated sections of my article "Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology in Being and Time," which first appeared in Research in Phenomenology, 7(1977), pp. 106-133. Reprinted by permission of Humanities Press International, Inc., Atlantic Highlands, N.J. In chapter X I have made use of sections of my essay, "Heidegger on the Self and Kant's Conception of the Ego," which appeared in Frederick Elliston, ed., Heidegger's Existential Analytic. Copyright© 1978 by Mauton Publishing Company. Reprinted by permission of Mauton Publishing Company. In chapters XI and XII I have included sections of my article, "Heidegger on Time and Being," which appeared in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 8(1970), pp. 55-76. Reprinted by permission of the Editor of The Southern Journal of Philosophy. In chapters IV, VIII, XII, and XIII I have incorporated sectians of chapters III, IV, and VI of my book, Heidegger and Science, which was published by The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, Inc. Washington, D.C. Copyright © 1985 by The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. and University Press of America, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the Director of the Current Continental Research series. In the first chapter I have included a brief characterization of Being and Time which appeared in Thinkers of the 20th Century, edited by Roland Turner. Copyright© 1987 by Reference Publishers International Ltd. Reprinted by permission of the Editor of Reference Publishers International Ltd.
CHAPTERI BEING AND TIME: ITS AUTHOR AND ITS ORIGIN
1: Martin Heidegger. A Biographical Sketch Martin Heidegger is one of the most important and influential philosophers of the twentieth century who from 1927 on has enjoyed a world-wide reputation. Yet for a long time relatively little was known about hisprivate life and personality. Heidegger himselfvery seldom spoke or wrote about personal matters, and his close friends and students have reverently respected his silence on these issues. This silence about his personallife can perhaps be accounted for in part by his attitude toward the Nazi movement between 1933 and 1945. Yet, in view of the fact that Heidegger was already very uncommunicative about his own life long before 1933, other factors must have played an important part, also. One of these factors may have been Heidegger's conviction that in the life of a thinker it is the course of his thinking and his work that is important, not the person and his personal life. In 1914 when Heidegger received his doctorate in philosophy and, thus, was required to add an autobiography to his dissertation, he confined hirnself to the following terse statement: I, Martin Heidegger, was born on September 26, 1889, at Messkirch (Baden) as the son of Friedrich Heidegger, sexton and cellarer, and his wife Johanna, born Kempf, both of the Catholic religion. After having attended the public school of my home town, I studied at the Gymnasium of Konstanz from 1903 until 1906, and after the third year I transferred to the Bertholds-Gymnasium in Freiburg-im-Breisgau, where I received my diploma in 1909. Until my oral examination for the doctorate I attended the University of Freiburg-im-Breisgau. During the first two years I attended lectures in philosophy and theology. After 1911 I concentrated mostly on philosophy,
2
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME mathematics, and the natural sciences, and during the last semester I added history. I
Friedrich Heidegger (1851-1914) and Johanna Kempf(1858-1927) had three children: Martin, Mariele, who died early, and Fritz who survived Martin and often helped him with the typing of his publications. Heidegger always spoke very positively about his gymnasium years. "I acquired there everything that was to be of lasting value."2 There he learned to read Greek, Latin, and French. There he also discovered Adalbert Stifter, one of the greatest German story-tellers of Austrian descent, and the famous poet Hölderlin. In 1907 Father Conrad Gröber, then pastor of the Trinity Church in Konstanz, later bishop ofMeissen in Saxony, and finally archbishop ofFreiburg, gave Heidegger a copy of Brentano's book, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, which Heidegger later described as "my first guide through Greek philosophy in my secondary school days."3 Heidegger studied this book carefully and was finally led by this work to the question ·which was to dominate the development of his entire career as a philosopher: if that which is in Being (das Seiende) has several meanings, what then does Being itself (das Sein) mean in its unity? Heidegger had originally planned to become a priest. After the completion of his gymnasium studies he thus entered the archdiocesan seminary in Freiburg and at the same time enrolled at the Albert Ludwig Universität in Freiburg in theology and philosophy in 1909. After he had abandoned the idea of becoming a priest in 1911, he continued his study at the University, but from then on he concentrated mainly on philosophy, mathematics, physics, and history. As early as 1912, while still a student in philosophy, he published a short essay on epistemology under the title: "The lMartin Heidegger, Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritischpositiver Beitrag zur Logik. Leipzig: Barth, 1914. This work was reprinted in Frühe Schriften, vol. I, ed. Fr.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1978, pp. 59-188. For further information on Heidgger's Iife see Thomas Sheehan, ed.,
Heidegger. The Man and the Thinker. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1981, Part I, pp. 1-75; Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, trans. J. L. Mehta. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976. 2Martin Heidegger, A Recollection (1957), Ibid., p. 21. 3Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Neske, 1960, pp. 9192; English, On the Way to Language, trans. P. Hertz. New York: Rarper and Row, 1971, p. 7.
BEING AND TIME
3
Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy."4 In this article Heidegger defended the realism of Geyser, Messer, and Külpe against a form of psychologism that rejected all metaphysics; yet he did not yet express a personal opinion; nor is there in this essay a trace of any infl:uence of Dilthey, Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche. In his doctoral dissertation, which he wrote under the direction of Arthur Schneider, he abandoned the traditional point of view. Furthermore, in The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism, Heidegger also took distance from Brentano's philosophy; yet here, too, he had not yet arrived at a genuinely personal position.S Already in 1907 Heidegger appears to have been in contact with the work of Husserl. In his first semester at the university Heidegger started to read Husserl's Logical Investigations. He had hoped to find there "a decisive aid in the questions stimulated by Brentano's dissertation,"6 in view ofthe fact that Husserl in that book introduced a new kind of philosophical method and, above all, in view of the fact that Husserl was a student of Brentano. Yet Heidegger soon became "alienated" from Husserl's conception of phenomenology, when in 1913 it became clear in Husserl's Ideas, that the latter had turned from some form of realism to a kind of transeendental idealism. Heidegger must have realized even then that although the phenomenological method developed by Husserl might have helped him articulate the whole domain of Being, Husserl's turn toward transeendental subjectivity nonetheless would have stood in the way of his ever achieving that goal. Some time between 1911 and 1913 Heidegger began to realize that neither consciousness nor transeendental subjectivity, but rather aletheia is the central issue of philosophy. According to Heidegger hirnself Werner Jaeger's book, The History and the Genesis of Aristotle's Metaphysics (1912) awakened his interest in the problematic of truth as disclosure in Metaphysics IX, 10.7 During the same period at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger also made a careful study of Maurice Blondel's L'Action 4Martin Heidegger, "Das Realitätsproblem in der modernen Philosophie," in Jahrbuch (Fulda), 25 (1912), 353-363; Frühe Schriften, vol. I, pp. 1-15. scr. note 1 above. 6Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969, p. 82; English: On "Time and Being," trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1972, p. 75. 7Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Bibliography," in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, pp. 3-19, p. 5.
4
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME
and the works of Ravaisson.S Yet the influence of Carl Braig, a Catholic theologian of the school of Tübingen, who taught in Freiburg, was probably the most important. In his book, On Being: An Outline of Ontology, Braig provided Heidegger with a great number of philosophical texts of the tradition. In addition, the book led Heidegger to the notion of the onto-theological structure of metaphysics. Finally, it taught Heidegger the importance of searching out the etymology of fundamental philosophical concepts. In conversations with the young Heidegger, Braig also spoke about the inherent restrictions of scholasticism in theology and about the possibilities opened up for theology by German idealism, notably by Schelling and Hegel.9 Finally, at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger also discovered Kierkegaard, Dilthey, and Nietzsche as weil as the works of Dostoevsky, Rilke, and Trakl. Heidegger also seems to have learned a lot from the historian, Wilhelm Vöge.lO In 1911 Heidegger would have liked to have gone to Göttingen to study with Husserl. Financial problems made this move impossible. He thus stayed in Freiburg and completed his doctoral dissertation under Schneider. Yet he also affiliated hirnself closely with the neoKantian scholar Heinrich Rickert whose lectures and seminars he attended between 1911 and 1913. Rickert, in turn, introduced Heidegger to the work of Emil Lask.ll In August of 1914 Heidegger enlisted in the army but was so0 n dismissed on October 9, 1914 because of frail health. From 1915 until 1917 he worked with the Control Board of the Post Office in Freiburg; this work left him with sufficient time to continue his studies at the University. As early as 1916 he published his second book, Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning.12 The basis of this BJbid., cf. Henri Dumery, "Blonde! et Ia philosophie contemporaine," in Etudes blondeliennes, 2(1952), n. 1; Jean Guitton, "Visite a Heidegger," in La Table Ronde, 123, March, 1958, p. 155. 9sheehan, lbid. and p. 16-17, notes 4 and 5; cf. Kar! Braig, Vom Sein. Abriss der Ontologie. Freiburg: Herder, 1896; Vom Denken. Freiburg: Herder, 1897; Das Dogma des jüngsten Christentums. Herder: Freiburg, 1907. 10Sheehan, lbid., p. 6. llSheehan, lbid., p. 6; cf. Emil Lask, Die Lehre vom Urteil, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Eugen HerrigeL Tübingen: Mohr, 1923; Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 12Sheehan, Ibid., pp. 6-7; cf. Roderick M. Stewart, "Signification and Radical Subjectivity in Heidegger's Habilitationsschrift," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed.,
BEING AND TIME
5
historico-critical study was the Grammatica Speculatiua which at that time was still attributed to Duns Scotus; Grabmann has later been able to show that this work must have been written by Thomas of Erfurt.13 Heidegger had presented this work which was written under the guidance of Rickert, in 1915 as his probationary thesis (Habilitationsschrift); this book, tagether with a public lecture on "The Concept of Time in the Science of History," gave Heidegger the right to lecture on philosophy within the German university system.14 Heidegger began immediately to lecture in Freiburg as Privatdozent. His first course, affered in the fall of 1915, was on Parmenides. During the next two semesters he presented lectures on Kant, Fichte, nineteenth century philosophy, and Aristotle. In April of 1916 Husserl received his appointment at Freiburg. Heidegger immediately established contact with him and worked closely with him until 1923 when Heidegger moved to Marburg. In 1920 Heidegger became Husserl's official assistant,15 Yet one year after Husserl's arrival in Freiburg, Heidegger was drafted for service in the army, first with the infantry on the Western Front and later with the meteorological service at Verdun. During the period in which Heidegger was in the army, Husserl received a letter from Natorp in Marburg, asking whether Heidegger would he a fitting candidate for the position of Professor Extraordinarius left vacant by Georg Misch who was appointed as a full professor in Göttingen. Natorp would have liked to have made this a position in medieval philosophy and thought that Heidegger, because of his book on the Grammatica Speculatiua, would be an eligible candidate. Husserl responded that he thought that Heidegger was too young and immature for the position; his Scotus' book was in Husserl's view still the work of a beginner and Heidegger had not yet had the opportunity to prove hirnself extensively as a teacher. Natorp had been particularly interested in knowing whether Heidegger's commitment to Catholicism could affect the appointment. With A Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time." Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1986, pp. 1-21, and the sources discussed there. 13Roderick Stewart, loc. cit., p. 2; cf. Martin Grabmann, ''Thomas von Erfurt und die Sprachlogik des mittelalterlichen Aristotelismus," Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Munich, 1943. 14Sheehan, loc. cit., p. 6. 15Jbid.
6
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME
respect to this question Husserl informed Natorp that Heidegger had just married a Protestant woman by the name of Elfride Petri)6 When he returned from the army Heidegger continued to lecture in Freiburg. He offered courses on a great variety of subjects ranging from St. Paul and St. Augustirre to Aristotle. All of these lectures were developed with the help of a phenomenological method which, although derived from Husserl's conception, was nonetheless also completely different from it. Husserl had focused mainly on theoretical issues; Heidegger was concerned then mainly with the area of "everyday life." Heidegger also rejected the transeendental reduction and had no need for a transeendental subject. In 1925 Heidegger would give a careful descriptüm of how he understood Husserl's own conception of phenomenology and why he hirnself preferred to develop this method in a completely different direction.17 Weshall retum to this in one ofthe chapters to follow. Already at that time, the basic concern of Heidegger's own way of thinking was with the meaning of Being which determines all modes of Being of the beings. At some time between 1919 and 1922 it must have occurred to Heidegger that the human reality, taken in its everyday life, must be the subject matter of a careful philosophical examination if one is ever to find the proper access to the study of Being itself; a fundamental ontology that concerns itself with the mode of Being of man, the being that _asks the basic ontological question, is to prepare the way to a genuine ontology. And furthermore, both the fundamental ontology and the ontology proper must be developed in close contact with the great texts of our Western philosophical tradition; these texts are to be reread in a radical manner and the basic words that occur in these texts must be reinterpreted in such a manner that what was still unthought in these texts can be retrieved.18 In 1922 Heidegger was appointed extraordinary professor of philosophy in Marburg, where at that time Nicolai Hartmann was the leading philosopher. In Marburg, Heidegger also met Rudolf Bultmann who became a very close friend and with whom Heidegger l6Jbid., p. 7. 17Jbid., p. 8. Cf. Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena, trans. Theodore J. IGsiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, pp. 27-131. 18cf. Theodore J. IGsiel, "The MissingLink in the Early Heidegger," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays. Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1988, pp. 1-40.
BEING AND TIME
7
cooperated in several joint ventures. In the same year he also built his cabin in Todtnauberg in the Black Forest. Whenever he was free he would go to his cabin to think and work. The greater part of Being and Time was written in Todtnauberg; and the same is true for many of his other lecture courses and books.19 When Heidegger got the basic idea for Being and Time is not known to me; it must have been some time between 1919 and 1922. The basic idea of Being and Time seems to have been developed for the first time in an Introduction to a book on Aristotle which was written in 1922. This idea then regularly returns in lectures and lecture courses, such as the lecture "Dasein and Being-true," "The Concept of Time," and above all his course of 1925, Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time. 20 I shall return to these lectures in a subsequent chapter. Being and Time was completed on April 8, 1926 and appeared in 1927 in the journal Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung, founded by Husser1.21 In 1928 Husserl retired and Heidegger was named his successor, upon Husserl's recommendation. Heidegger had cooperated with Husserl closely since 1916. Gradually Heidegger had moved away from Husserl in order to develop his own conception of phenomenology. Husserl was aware of this development and regretted it. Yet Husserl fully realized the quality of Heidegger's thinking and, thus, wholeheartedly recommended him as his successor. At that time they still cooperated closely as is clear from their effort to write the essay on "Phenomenology" for the Encyclopaedia Britannica tagether and from Heidegger's edition of Husserl's Lectures an Inner Time Consciousness.22 In 1929 Heidegger participated in the Kant Conference in Davos and defended there his own Kant interpretation against the criticism formulated by Ernst Cassirer who at that time was considered to be the leading neo-Kantian philosopher. Heidegger also published in that year his book, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. On June 24, 1929 he delivered his inaugural address 19Sheehan, loc. cit., pp. 7-12. 20Sheehan, loc. cit., pp. 12-15; Kisiel, "The MissingLink," pp. 20-39. 21 Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung (Halle), 8(1927), pp. i-xi and 1-438.
22Cf. Walter Biemel, "Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and Heidegger's Remarks Thereon," in Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick, eds., Busserl. Expositions and Appraisals. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, pp. 286-303; Sheehan, loc. cit., p. 15.
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HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME
under the title, What is Metaphysics? In the same year Vom Wesen des Grundes was published. In 1930 Heidegger gave a special lecture On the Essence of Truth in which there is a first indication of a basic turn (Kehre) in his thinking, a turn away from the ontology of Dasein toward an attempt to think the happening of the truth of Being itself.23 In 1933 Heidegger made the mistake of letting hirnself be talked into accepting the position of Rector of the University. After Hitler had grasped power in Germany the influence of national socialism was present everywhere, including all universities. Drastic measures were being prepared to bring the universities under the influence of the Party and to use the university for the propagation of Nazi ideas. It was at that time thought in Freiburg that Heidegger, because he was already then considered Germany's leading philosopher, would be the only one who because of his reputation could stand up against the attempt on the part of the Party to destroy the spirit of the university. Heidegger's colleagues approached him on this issue, but at first Heidegger rejected this offer politely but also firmly. His colleagues, however, insisted and after long reflection and after seeking counsel from close friends, Heidegger reluctantly accepted the nomination and joined, as he knew he had to do, the Party. For nine months Heidegger tried to negotiate between what he thought to be his duty as Rector and the demands which the Party placed upon him. Realizing that things would not work out at all, he resigned in February of 1934, nine months after his appointment. Like all other government offleials Heidegger remained a nominal member ofthe Party until1945.24 Heidegger's involvement with the Nazi party and the Nazi movement in general has been discussed time and again over the years. There are people who defend the view that Heidegger was a 23Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1927). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951; English: Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969. Vom Wesen des Grundes (1929). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1929; English: The Essence of Reasons, trans. Terence Malick. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969. Was ist Metaphysik? (1929). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1955; English: What is Metaphysics?, trans. David Farrell Krell, in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: Rarper & Row, 1977, pp. 95-116. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (1930, 1941). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1961; English: On the Essence of Truth, trans. J ohn Sallis, in Basic Writings, pp. 117-41. 24Cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, On the Truth of Being. Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, pp. 262-72.
BEING AND TIME
9
devoted foliower of Hitler, whereas others defend the position that he never was a Nazi, but merely had affiliated hirnself for a short time with the Party because he conceived that to be a condition for his acceptance of the position of Rector of the University. It is extremely difficult to sort out the truth of the matter. For those who would like to defend Heidegger against unjust attacks on grounds that have realiy nothing to do with the issue, there are the many notes, letters, and short essays that Heidegger wrote during the years 1933 through 1945. Forthose who defend the position that Heidegger was a devout foliower of Hitler, there are the many facts that speak against such a theory, above ali the fact that Heidegger was made a persona-nongrata between 1934 and 1945. Yet in my view a few points can be made on the matter: 1) There were a number of actions which Heidegger took which certainly are not condonable; these actions involve letters, speeches, brief essays, and administrative decisions. 2) I take it that Heidegger was an ardent nationalist and also a socialist (within Iimits); yet one should realize that Heidegger shared these two convictions with virtualiy ali Germans ofthat generation. However, this does not at ali entail that he agreed with the basic ideas of National Socialism as defended by the NSDAP. As a matter of fact that "philosophy" was criticized and branded by Heidegger on many occasions. 3) Although several authors have defended the thesis that Heidegger's involvement with the Nazi movement, is no more than a logical outflow of his philosophy, I must say that I have been unable to find any arguments for such a view. There are a few texts that could be interpreted to substantiate the position just mentioned, but they are rare and aliow for a quite different interpretation. I have discussed some of these texts elsewhere and shalllimit myself here to referring to my previous remarks on the subject.25 4) Heidegger has been accused of anti-semitism. I have been unable to find evidence for this. It is true that there were actions, speeches, and letters that seem to support the thesis. Yet it seems to me that this is so only if such actions, speeches, and essays are taken out of the context in which they occurred. Many of these actions and texts are suchthat almost everyone can find in them what he or she may be looking for. 5) When it is ali said and done (if such a way of speaking makes sense in this context), it must be said that Heidegger is one of the 25Jbid.
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HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME
greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. The man lived under extremely difficult and complicated circumstances and, like many great thinkers, was not a very practical person. Many of the views that are attributed to Heidegger, were in fact shared by most Germans; yet these views for the Germans of that_time did not at all have the meaning that many critics now attribute to them. We can say with certainty that during the thirties Heidegger gradually drew away from the Nazi movement. Soon he would be forbidden to take part in international conferences, and for some time it was made virtually impossible for him to publish anything. At any rate from 1934 to 1947 he published very little. His book on Hölderlin and two essays, one on Plato and one on truth, are exceptions. In 1945 after the occupation of Freiburg by the French army, Heidegger was removed from his position as professor of the University. Between 1945 and 1951 he devoted hirnself to his work and gave a number oflectures outside the University. In 1951 he was reinstated but shortly thereafter he retired. Yet he continued to lecture and write. Some of the lecture courses presented during these difficult years belong tothebest he hasever written.26 Heidegger died on May 26, 1976 in Messkirch. ll: On the Origin and Development of Being and Time'Z'l 1. The Basic Change in Heidegger's Thinking After 1916. At the age of 27 Heidegger had already established hirnself as an outstanding scholar. Two books and several articles had clearly shown that he had a solid knowledge of systematic philosophy as weil as of its history since Plato and Aristotle. Between 1916 and 1926 drastic changes would take place in Heidegger's thinking; from an outstanding scholar who was fully familiar with the philosophical tradition, he developed into one of the most original thinkers of our 26Martin Heidegger, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität (1934). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983, in which Heidegger's memoir of 1945, "Das Rektorat: Tatsachen und Gedanken," is included. For its interpretation see Graeme Nicholson, "The Politics of Heidegger's Reetoral Address," Man and World, 20(1987) 171-87; F. Fedier, "Trois attaques contre Heidegger," in Meditations, 3(1961), 151-59; Heidegger: Anatomie d'un scandale. Paris: Laffont, 1988. 27For what follows here see Theodore J. Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, A Campanion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time," pp. 22-39; ''The MissingLink in the Early Heidegger" quoted in note 18 above.
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century. Several factors have played an important role in this development: Heidegger's concern with religion and theology (St. Paul, St. Augustine, Luther, Kierkegaard, Otto, Bultman), his vast and deep knowledge of the philosophy of Aristotle, his reinterpretation of the meaning of phenomenology, his knowledge of hermeneutics and the hermeneutic tradition, his constant concern with literature from Pindar and Sophocles via Hölderlin and Dostoevsky to George, Rilke, and Trakl, his deep insight into German idealism and its neo-Kantian reinterpretation, his contact with Dilthey's works, etc. For a long time relatively little was known about the manner in which Heidegger's thinking developed during those years and what elements really have played important parts in this development. The publication of most of Heidegger's lecture courses and the archives in Marbach have made it possible to get a better insight into Heidegger's path of thinking. Kisiel has succeeded in establishing a reliable list of courses and seminars which Heidegger actually delivered and conducted between 1919, the time Heidegger returned to the University after having been in the army because of WW I, and 1923, when we for the first time see an outline of what later would become Being and Time.28 2. ''The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem ofWorld Views." In 1919 Heidegger gave a course on "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of World Views." In this course Heidegger focused on the "hermeneutic situation" of philosophy, as he found it in 1919, and tried to determine his own approach to philosophy in regard to philosophy, understood as a doctrine of world views (Dilthey), on the one hand, and philosophy, understood as an original and basic science (Aristotle, Kant, Husserl), on the other. At the same time, Heidegger also made an effort here to come to terms with the philosophy of values as this was developed in neo-Kantianism, mainly by Windelband and Rickert. The neo-Kantians occupied some kind of middle position between the two extremes mentioned, insofar as they tried to develop philosophy as a system of values which would provide us with the scientific means for developing one's own world view. Heidegger makes it quite clear that he finds a philosophy of world views completely unacceptable. His reading of Husserl's article, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," may have influenced
28Theodore J. Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lectures," pp. 28-29; "The Missing Link," pp. 20-27.
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HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME
him in this move.29 Genuine philosophy has nothing to da with world views. Rather it is an original and basic science which is radically different from all other sciences, and it is a science that is capable of justifying its own "foundations." Heidegger then tried to define the subject matter of philosophy by means of an historical and critical examination of traditional solutions to the problem. In this part of his lectures Heidegger shows his preference for asking pertinent questions: Does philosophy really have a subject matter? How is its matter given? What does "there is something" really mean? Heidegger also shows here already a preference for the use of impersonal sentences: es wertet (it values), es weltet (it governs), es gibt (it gives, there is), etc. Heidegger may have been influenced in this by the typical langnage use of Meister Eckhart. We also find here a first indication of the important role that Aristotle's conception of aletheia (truth) as non-concealment will have in his later thinking. But most importantly, in this lecture course Heidegger time and again appeals to everyday experiences that everyone can have in his environing world (Umwelt). This is clearly a deliberate effort on his part to get away from a type of philosophy that is concerned exclusively with the theoretical and perceptual dimension of our lives as we for instance find it in Husserl. Dilthey's philosophy of life may have inspired Heidegger to make this move. Yet, in this move Heidegger may also have been influenced by E. Lask who was the first to realize the phenomenological problern of the theoretization of experience, but appears to have been unable to find a non-theoretical solution for the problem.30 Kisiel has described the importance which Heidegger attributes to this notion in the following terms: Theoretization de-signifies, de-historicizes, unlives and unworlds our most original experiences. Philosophy's radical quest for a pretheoretical something, not only a worldly but also a preworldly something, makes the primal science at once a supratheoretical science. Philosophy must counter the theoretical tendency of other sciences to unlive the world and replace it with concepts, by 29Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston, eds., Husserl: Shorter Works. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, pp. 166-97. Husserl's article was translated by Quentin Lauer. 30Theodore J. Kisiel, "Heidegger's Early Lectures," p. 30.
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formulating 'recepts' (Rückgriffe) which root back in the life-contexts underlying the sciences. The primal sense of this pretheoretical preworldly something must be seen phenomenally, i.e., purely intuitively. We must learn how to experientially live such lived experiences in their motivations and tendencies. In short, we must come to understand life. For life is not irrational, it is understandable through and through. Phenomenological intuition as the living of primal experiences is hermeneutic intuition.31 3. "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion. ''32 Similar ideas are found in the other courses which Heidegger taught in 1919 and 1920. In the fall of 1920 we see a "new" element appear in Heidegger's reflections, namely in his course, Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion, which to some degree was inspired by Otto's book on the holy_33 The course consisted clearly of two parts, one devoted to an introduction to the phenomenon of factical lifeexperience (8 lectures), and the other concerned with a phenomenological interpretation of original Christianity in St. Paul's Epistles to the Galatians and Thessalonians. In this second part Heidegger first explained in what sense original Christianity constitutes a factical life-experience, in order then to show that Christianity, as a factical life-experience, is primordial temporality. Thus the first part of the course contains a phenomenological analysis of a very important phenomenon often forgotten in our Western tradition; in Heidegger's view this phenomenon was understood very well, although unthematically, by the early Christians, namely life in its here-and-now facticity, the factical experience of life. In Being and Time we shall encounter this same phenomenon under the title Dasein, Being-in-the-world, ek-sistence. Sheehan has pointed to the parallels that exist between Heidegger's approach to early Christianity and his approach to Greek philosophy. In both instances Heidegger discovered a level of experience that was lived in an unthematized way, but which in later 31Ibid., pp. 30-31.
32For what follows here cf. Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's 'Introduction to Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., A Companion, pp. 40-62. 33Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John Harvey. London: Oxford University Press, 1923.
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ages was covered up; this level of experience can be rediscovered only by a de-construction of the tradition, which often appears "violent." It is important to note that in both cases this experience was pretheoretical and that it was an experience of self-exceediilg, one of being drawn out beyond one's ordinary self-understanding. However different the two cases may be, what they have in common is a movement taken as a dynamic interplay of presence and absence. The difference between the two experiences consists in this that in early Christianity this movement was understood in terms of temporality, whereas the early Greeks interpreted this movement in terms of disclosure or truth.34 The course begins with a reflection on what philosophy is and on the pre-questions (Vorfragen) that must be asked before one can go any further. In Heidegger's view the true meaning of philosophizing is always to stay with these prior questions. Of these prior questions in his view the very questionability of life itself, of the factical experience of life, is the most fundamental one. It is in this experience that the elusive ground is to be found out of which philosophy develops and to which it also must return. Heidegger will later in Being and Time repeat this statement, but there he substitutes ek-sistence for the factical life-experience, as we shall see later. (SZ, 38) If one begins the philosophical reflection from the factical experience of life one realizes soon that a complete transformation of philosophy will be necessary. One will see that what is needed then is a radical turning away from all philosophies that are built on the relation between man as a stable subject and beingness as the stable presentness of the beings; this turning away from all philosophies implies a turning into the primordial experience of being thrown into nothingness within which the beings become present in a meaningful manner; this experience is the event (Ereignis), the movement of presence and absence. With some hesitation Heidegger at first called this event the factical experience oflife.35 This experience of life cannot be identified with a mere cognitive experience; it is man's overall concern and coming-to-grips with the world. Furthermore, it is not to be described in terms of a simple subject-object relation. That which is experienced and lived in this experience is the world, i.e., the world of meaning in which we find ourselves (Umwelt), the world we all share (Mitwelt), as weil as each 34Sheehan, loc. cit., p. 46. 35Sheehan,Ibid., p. 47.
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individual's own world (Selbstwelt). And the one who has the experience is not a knowing subject, a pure ego, but the historical self with its factical experience oflife. What binds world and self tagether is not just an intentional relation, but rather the fact that each self in essence is Being-towards-the-world and that world is, gets opened up, and becomes revealed only in and through man's Being-towards. In other words, what holds the two tagether is not a cognitive but an ontological relation. 36 All things that are experienced in the factical experience of life have in common that they all have meaning or significance. And every form of human experience has the form of care and concern. Thus factical experience of life is concern for meaning and meaningfulness which must be qualified by the following characteristics: 1) in each case it corresponds to a certain attitude, 2) it is always "falling," 3) as far as relation is concerned it is indifferent, and 4) it is self-sufficient. It is clear that if the subject matter studied with the help of the method of philosophy, namely phenomenology, is the factical experience of life, phenomenology, taken in the sense of Husserl, must be reinterpreted. The most important change consists in the turn to the historical. For the factical experience of life is inherently historical. For Heidegger philosophy is therefore first of all the return to the primordial historical. The methodical implications of this move toward the primordial historical can be shown by an analysis of the meaning of experience in the expression "experience of life." Experience (Erfahrung) can be taken in the sense ofthat which is experienced as well as in the sense of the experiencing of that which is so experienced. These two sides of the experience cannot be separated; they are bound tagether in the basic structure of the human self. This implies that the term "phenomenon," too, signifies not just that which is experienced, but equally the mode of experiencing of what is experienced. 37 The correlation between the experiencing and the experienced is worked out by Heidegger with the help of three distinct but inseparable moments of meaning: first there is the primordial meaning which is had in the content of what is experienced (Gehaltssinn), then there is the relational meaning contained in the primordial "how" of the act of experience (Bezugssinn), and finally there is the "how" or way in which the relational meaning is carried 36Jbid., pp. 47-48. 31Jbid., pp. 48-50.
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out and brought to completion (Vollzugssinn).3 8 In Heidegger's view the latter is the core of what is called "phenomenon." The phenomenon in turn is tobe characterized by its time-character. In other words, phenomenology must thematize the very temporal enactment of the event of meaning that comes-to-pass in each concrete experience of life. Thus phenomenology cannot limit itself to that which the experience intends, nor to the relations that are established in the act of experience. Heidegger often refers to this enactment by the term "how." For him all philosophical questions are basically questions of the "how," and thus also questions of method, provided method be understood in the Aristotelian sense of met-hodos, pursuit of a certain matter. This met-hodos appears for Heidegger tobe closely related to temporality ifit is nottobe identified with it. The manner in which temporality and the historical cometo-pass is both the theme and the met-hodos of Heidegger's new phenomenology. 39 Sheehan has pointed out that in the distinction between meaning as content, meaning as relation, and meaning as enactment one may perhaps see a first and "primitive" articulation of the later distinction between being (in the sense of a being, in Greek on), the beingness of this being (in Greek ousia), and the event of the coming-to-pass of the truth of Being or Being-itself (das Sein selbst). That which the tradition called beingness (ousia, essence) and presented in various transformations, shows the mode ("how") of presentness of whatever is meaningfully present; hence it is the "how" of relationality, although this element of relation is usually forgotten. "To retrieve beingness, in all of its forms, as a phenomenon of relationality is to have uncovered the implicit but mostly forgotten phenomenological basis of traditional ontology."40 But this is obviously only the first step in phenomenology. One must next try to uncover the very enactment of this relationality in its timedetermined character. Because of the negativity (the "not yet") that is inherent in time, the uneavering of the enactment of such a relationality is a retrieve of the problern of the nothing in traditional ontology. And to move into this area is to turn away definitively from all philosophies presented thus far, "and to enter the area of man's
38Jbid., pp. 50-51; cf. Kisiel, "The MissingLink," pp. 21-22. 39Jbid., p. 51. 40Jbid.
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temporal projectedness into the 'nothing' whence beings become meaningfully present."41 In the second part of the course Heidegger then focuses on a phenomenological interpretation of a few letters by St. Paul; the Epistle to the Galatians and the two Epistles to the Thessalonians were chosen because they are the oldest Christian documents, which even predate the Gospels. Since they are the oldest documents available they may perhaps reveal the original features of the Christian experience of life. Many contemporary philosophers conceive of religious phenomena in terms of the irrational. Heidegger rejects this view, held among others by his later colleague Rudolf Otto, and suggests to approach these religious phenomena in terms of the factical experiences of life, and particularly in terms of the temporality and historicity of these experiences. For Heidegger the "historical" is an authentic "stretch of eksistence" into its past; it is not a past which eksistence drags along behind itself as a piece of luggage, but a past that is experienced historically, so that eksistence really possesses it as well as itself within the horizon of expectations which it has already projected ahead of itself.42 "The historical" is therefore the having-of-oneself by the enacting of one's own eksistence in historical contexts. This concernful, historically enacted self-having is the "how" of man's Being. The phenomenological explication of the "how" of this enactment of experience, according to its basic historical meaning, is the main task of a phenomenological reflection on the phenomenon of eksistence.43 In the second part of this course Heidegger thus focuses on the enactment of the early religious experience and specifically on the how (Wie) of that enactment; he focuses in other words on the religious si tuation insofar as this is enacted historically (vollzugsgeschichtliche Situation). The term "situation" must here be understood phenomenologically; thus it does not mean a natural and spatial something, nor an objectifiable historical context of meaning. The term "situation" rather anticipates what later in Being and Time will be made explicit in the context of a discussion of conscience and resolve, namely the openness that ek-sistence is on the basis of a decision to accept oneself as finite. (SZ, 299) Here in 41[bid., p. 52 (with one minor change). 42Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers' Psychologie der Weltanschauungen," in Wegmarken. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976, p. 31, quoted by Sheehan, p. 61, note 10. 43Sheehan, loc. cit., p. 51.
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Heidegger's reflection on the Epistles of St. Paul he is concerned mainly with the factical experience of life that structures the religious situation, as well as with the specification of that situational experience in terms ofits temporality.44 In his interpretation of I Thessalonians, Heidegger points out first that in the first twelve verses of the letter various forms of the verb genesthai (to have become) and the verbs mnaomai (to remember) and oida (I know) are used. Genesthai refers to the basic state of being of St. Paul as well as of the Thessalonians, their "already having become." This "already having become" is not to be taken in the sense of some past that is gone, but rather as the whole of what is operative and determinative of their present now. Their "already having become" is their present Being. But equiprimordial with this "already having become," or genesthai, there is also an eidenai-dimension, some kind of experiential knowledge. The knowledge meant here is the comprehension of the situation that comes out of the factical experience of life. These two moments of genesthai and eidenai are always found together. The genesthai-dimension is specified by St. Paul in terms of affectivity where he speaks of tribulation as well as joy. Sheehan has observed correctly that in these reflections several themes of Being and Time are anticipated: the typical interpretation of the past as Gewesenheit, the conception of Verstehen (the knowhow, the knowing one's way araund in one's own Being andin one's world) and its relation to Befindlichkeit (affective disposition), and finally the relation between Befindlichkeit and Verstehen, on the one hand, and Gewesenheit and Zukünftigkeit, on the other.45 Be this as it may, from his reflections on the relationship between genesthai and eidenai Heidegger derives then his second basic thesis, namely that the original Christian experience generates primordial temporality and lives out of it.46 This second thesis is discussed in the context of St. Paul's teaching on eschatology in chapters 4 and 5 of I Thessalonians and in chapter 2 of II Thessalonians. Heidegger approaches this issue by formulating two questions: 1) If it is true that St. Paul and the Thessalonians were bound tagether in one common religious experience, what is it that makes 44Jbid., p. 53. 45Jbid., pp. 54-55. 46Jbid., p. 55.
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this experience possible? 2) If it is true that the Christian experience is a factical experience of life, how is God present in that facticallifeexperience? Heidegger derives his answer to the first question from an analysis of I Thessalonians 1:10: "You have turned to God and away from idols in order to serve a living and true God and to wait for His Son from Heaven." In this text St. Paul suggests that the "turning" and the "serving" receive their meaning from the unifying Christian experience of waiting for the Parousia. The term "parousia" is here not to be taken in the common Greek sense in which it was used by Plato and Aristotle; in that tradition the term means Beingness as presentness. In St. Paul the word has a strictly eschatological meaning. Yet the term "parousia" and "eschaton" should not be taken in the Jewish sense of the term, either. In St. Paul's Epistles the word means Jesus' second coming in glory. Thus the Christian relation to the Parousia is basically not the awaiting of some future event. The structure of the Christian hope does not at all have the character of an awaiting (Erwartung). In I Thessalonians chapter 5 Paul writes that he needs not to write to them concerning the chronoi and the kairoi, for they know already that the day of the Lord will come like a thief in the night. The question of the "when" of the Parousia, the chronos (Zeit, time) and kairas (Augenblick, critical moment) is unique in that it is answered without a reference to objective time; rather the question is bent back and referred to the factical experience of life. The attitude in regard to the Parousia is furthermore not one of waiting for, but rather one of being awake. This explains that the Christian's state of wakefulness in the factical experience of life means a constant, essential, and necessary uncertainty. In other words the Christian meaning of eschatology which St. Paul specifies here has shifted from the expectation of a future event to a presence before God; Heidegger speaks here about a context of enacting one's life in uncertainty before God who remains unseen. Thus the attention has shifted from the when to the how, from the when of the event to the how of man's eksistence. St. Paul maintains the imminence of the Parousia; yet this imminence now characterizes the how of the factical experience of life, namely its essential uncertainty.47 Thus starting from a context of the enactment of the factical experience of life before the hidden God, Heidegger's thinking is led to primordial temporality. In other words, the meaning of facticity appears to be temporality and the meaning of temporality is 47Jbid., pp. 55-58.
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME determined by starting from one's basic relation to God. One is in each case becoming, in the uncertainty of the future (Zukunft), what one already has become. Christian life is nothing but the living through of this uriique temporality; only from out of this temporality can the meaning of God be determined. No objectivist conceptions of time can ever be of use in this context. Sheehan is of the opinion that Heidegger's conception of temporality and historicity which we shall encounter later in Being and Time was developed in outline already in 1920-21 and that this conception issued from his interpretation of the factical experience of life in early Christianity.48 Obviously, in the course of 1922 Heidegger discussed a number of other themes which will appear later in Being and Time; we find for instance a first indication of his view on resolve which is said here to have its root in being-awake; in addition we find the expression "the anticipation of death" (das Vorlaufen zum Tode) which here is discussed in a context that is quite different from that found in Being and Time. Yet Sheehan also warns us that it is risky to speak of these connections because in other courses of the same period it becomes clear that Heidegger's ideas were "inspired" often by different sources which are employed in different contexts.49 We must now turn to the next phase in Heidegger's development, namely the introduction to a projected book on Aristotle that as such was never completed. 4. The "Introduction" to the Book on Aristotle.50 In 1922 Heidegger began to realize that it would not be easy for him to find a good position in philosophy, if he were not to be able to publish a good book. Thus under the influence of academic pressures he announced a book on Aristotle which he hoped to write on the basis of two courses on Aristotle which he had just delivered. In October of the same year he composed an Introduction to this book which was to appear in Husserl's Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. This Introduction tagether with some of the chapters of the projected book were sent to Marburg where Heidegger was considered for a position as "extraordinarius in philosophy with the rights and status of a professor ordinarius." The themes treated 48Ibid., pp. 58. 49Jbid., pp. 58-59. 50For what follows, see Theodore J. Kisiel, "The MissingLink," pp. 27-38. The archives in Marbach has an incomplete copy (22 pages) of Heidegger's "Introduction;" the rest is lost. In what follows I paraphrase Kisiel's reconstruction ofthe content ofthis important document.
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in this Introduction constitute the first major step toward Being and Time. Both Sheehan and Kisiel have described the origin and the content of this "Introduction" in detail, insofar as today we have textual evidence of it. In this document one finds basic concepts that will receive a central position in Being and Time, a clear indication of the hermeneutico-phenomenological method to be used in the investigation of the basic issues, the distinction between the development of a fundamental ontology on the one hand and the destruction of the history of metaphysics on the other; one finds also the notion of the public "one," the concept of falling, the idea of the original anticipation and grasp of my own death, etc. It is also clearly indicated there that all of this is to lead to a new, "ontological" way of access to the temporality of human existence. The basic concern of the Introduction, however, seems to have been more methodological than thematic. Although religious and theological ideas were mentioned, it nonetheless is the case that Heidegger wanted to explain in what sense for him philosophy is totally independent oftheology.51 In the "Introduction" Heidegger first stated that his interpretations of the ontology and logic of Aristotle are concerned with the history of ontology, as the doctrine of Being, and with the history of logic, as the science of the ways in which Being is said and spoken. These interpretations presuppose as the condition of their possibility the hermeneutic situation of the interpreter and, thus, we must first make this hermeneutic situation, from which the interpretation flows, sufficiently manifest. The hermeneutic situation mentioned implies a certain point of view (Blickstand), a certain line of sight (Blickrichtung), as well as a breadth of vision (Sichtweite) that goes with them.52 The situation in which the past is appropriated by means of interpretation, is always that of a living present. The idea that we have of philosophical research, of its object and methodical approach, decides in advance our attitude in regard to the history of philosophy. At the root of our hermeneutic situation, therefore, lies the decision in regard to the question of what philosophy is supposed to be. The answer to this question will somehow be projected into the history of philosophy. Thus we must begin with the question of what philosophy is. The subject matter of philosophical investigation is our factic life; it is 5lJbid., pp. 39-40; cf. Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years," pp. 11-15. 52Jbid., pp. 27-28, and note 34.
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human Dasein questioned in its mode of Being. Philosophy's questioning must thus be oriented toward an effort to camprehend the basic movement of factic life, in which life is concerned about its Beingin the concrete temporalization ofits Being. Factic life must be shown as it actually is, as hard and difficult; the metaphysical tradition has usually tried to portray it as easy in an effort to comfort and encourage people. Philosophy must turn to its own history, not to increase its knowledge, but instead to increase this knowledge's questionability which reflects the questionability of life itself which, in turn, flows from the fact that human life is affiiction. Philosophy is nothing but the actualization of the basic movement of factic life; this explains why philosophical investigation must co-temporalize the very Being oflife itselfin its own actualization.S3 Yet, Heidegger continues, it is not possible here to work out the basic structure of facticity in a systematic and complete manner; we can merely indicate here the hermeneutic situation and bring the most important constitutive elements into our "fore-having." The basic movement of factic life consists in caring, being open to and oriented toward something, namely the temporally particular world in which we find ourselves. Our caring has the character of a preoccupation and that which we are preoccupied with, is the world. This world appears first as surrounding world (Umwelt); but it also appears as with-world (Mitwelt) and self-world (Selbstwelt). Our caring preoccupation with the world is characterized by a certain familiarity and habituality; it is thus always guided by its own way of seeing, namely by circumspection; circumspection is always in harmony with the way in which the world already has been interpreted. But the movement of life has also the inclination to give up this circumspection for the sake of careful inspection and investigation; this has first the form of a simply-looking-atsomething, but eventually it may develop into research and science.54 Our concernful preoccupation with the world is not just an indifferent fulfillment of our original intentionality to the world. In this movement there is also the propensity for us to become totally absorbed in the world. This inclination is the expression of a basic tendency of factic life to turn away from its true self; it has the tendency of fallenness (Verfallen). Fallenness has three dimensions: temptation, tranquilization, and self-alienation. Due to fallenness which applies to both circumspective concern and scientific 53Jbid., p. 28. 54Jbid., p. 29.
BEING AND TIME inspection, factic life is for the most part not lived by each individual as it in truth is; instead it is usually lived in a certain averageness of the public "they." It is the "one" who factically lives the life of each individual. In the world in which Dasein is absorbed, and in the everyday averageness in which it is preoccupied with the world, life conceals itself from itself. One sees this most clearly in the way factic life stands before death. 55 The ontological structure of facticity is constituted by the fact that in our everyday concern we flee from death and are seized by affliction and pain before our impending death. If Dasein deliberately seizes its own death which is certain, then life in itself becomes visible. Death provides us with a peculiar sight on life which leads it to its ownmost present and past. Thus the ontological problematic of the Being of death, and particularly the vision which it provides us with, are the phenomena from which the temporality of man's Dasein is tobe unfolded. Furthermore, it is from the meaning of temporality that the basic meaning of the historical is to be defined; the latter can never be understood from a careful analysis of the work in which historians actually engage. 56 The genuine Being of life can thus be approached via a detour which runs counter to the movement of falling. Heidegger calls this mode of Being of life eksistence (Existenz). Eksistence is always a possibility for every concrete factical life; it is one way of temporalizing its facticity and of bringing it to full development in its temporality. One can only indirectly indicate what eksistence is, namely by making the actual facticity questionable, and by the destruction of the concrete facticity in its particular motives, inclinations, and tendencies. One gains insight into factic life by means of a negation of its eksistentiell fallen position, so that one can arrive at an insight into its eksistentiell possibilities.57 By now it should be clear that philosophy can no Ionger be defined as a casual occupation with principles and generalities. It is itself radical interrogation and investigation. "As such it is 1) the 55Ibid., pp. 29-30. 56Jbid., p. 30. 51Jbid., pp. 30-31. The term "eksistentiell" refers to the concrete manner in which something that is a basic constitutive element of Dasein's Being (=eksistential), is realized in the life of an individual human being. What is eksistentiell is always also ontic, whereas what is eksistential is always ontological. Cf. William J. Richardson, Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 49-50.
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explicit actualization of the interpretive tendencies already operative in the basic movements of the life which 'goes about its being'."58 Philosophy must in addition 2) attempt to bring the decisive possibilities of factic life into sight and try to camprehend it radically and clearly without any concern for world views. From this it is clear that philosophy, because it assumes the skepticism which is typical for any form of radical questioning, must be fundamentally atheistic. Philosophy is thus the very "how" of life's own, indigenous exposition; it is the interpretation of the meaning of life on the basis of the ways in which factic life temporalizes itself and so speaks with itself. As such philosophy is fundamental ontology. It is from this ontology that all regional ontologies derive their ground and the meaning of their problems. Insofar as philosophy is the fundamental ontology of facticity, it is also the categorial interpretation of the ways in which this facticity of life is articulated (logic). "Ontology and logic are to be taken back to their original unity in facticity and understood as developments of fundamental research, which we shall call phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity."59 This investigation must take the concrete interpretations which are already at work in factic life in their temporalized unity, from the insights of circumspective concernful dealing with things and caring to the more extreme insights of affliction; it must also make them categorially transparent in their fore-having and foreconception. This type of investigation is phenomenological insofar as it regards the field of its subject matter as a whole, as a phenomenon which is to be characterized in its full intentionality; thus this phenomenon includes the relational meaning, the meaning that is had as the content of each experience, and the meaning as actualized and temporalized.60 Intentionality which Busserl understood mainly as a cognitive relation, is understood here as caring which is the basic preoccupation of life. Phenomenology is radical philosophical research; thus it is not just a propaedeutic science that serves merely to clarify the basic concepts of philosophy descriptively. 61 The idea of a phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity includes the task of both logic and ontology; it includes first a doctrine 58Jbid., p. 33. 59Jbid., p. 32. 60The phenomenon thus includes what was called earlier:
Bezugssinn, and Volzugssinn. 61Kisie1, loc. cit., pp. 32-33.
Gehaltssinn,
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of formal and material objects, a science, but at the same time a doctrine that focuses on the "logic of the heart" as well as the "logic of pretheoretical and practical thinking." Our next task consists in an effort to understand what kind of historical investigations belong to such a hermeneutics and why Aristotle should have the central place in such investigations. To explain this Heidegger begins here with a comparison between the experience of factical life and the investigations of philosophy. The idea of facticity implies that only one's own facticity which implies the facticity of one's own time and generation, is the authentic and proper subject matter of research. Yet because of its fallenness factic life is lived for the most part in an inauthentic way, in what is transmitted and handed on to it, and appropriated by it only in an average way. And even that which has been brought to authentic possession soon falls back again in the customary form ofthe "one." Now since philosophy is only an explicit interpretation of factic life, its forms of inquiry are affected by the same inclinations of factic life. In other words, the phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity equally begins in a manner in which factic life has already been interpreted for it; this interpretation is assumed without further discussion as something that is self-evident and obvious without an explicit appropriation of its origins; thus this hermeneutics, too, begins inauthentically. Philosophy in 1923 still operated inauthentically on the basis of insights taken over from Greek philosophy and the Christian conception of what it means to be human. Over the centuries philosophers in the West have interpreted these insights in different ways and even anti-Greek and anti-Christian tendencies may have played an important role here. Yet in the final analysis all these conceptions are such that they maintain the same basic way of seeing and the same kind of interpretation. Phenomenological hermeneutics must loosen the hold of this still dominant interpretation, uncover its hidden motives and unexpressed tendencies, and find its way back by means of deconstructive regression to the original motivating sources of explication. Hermeneutics can materialize this task only by means of destruction. Philosophical research is essentially "historical;" yet it is equally essentially critical in regard to its history. Its destructive confrontation with its history is not added merely as an illustration of how things once were. "The destruction is rather the way in which the present in its basic movements has to be confronted in order to
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assume original custody of one's past, to safeguard one's roots, in short to be." 62 The complex and basic forces which constitute the present situation in regard to its facticity can be called the Greek and Christian interpretation of life which also includes the anti-Greek and anti-Christian tendencies. Heidegger explains in what sense this is true not only for early Christian and medieval philosophy but also for the philosophical anthropologies of Kant, German Idealism, and the reactionary movements which German idealism provoked in the 19th century.63 Mter a brief exemplification of these basic ideas with the help of the re-interpretation of the Greek idea that man is a zoion logon echon, Heidegger states that the Christian interpretation of the human life perhaps has shown much richer life-contexts than that of Aristotle. Yet in his view, this was possible only because in that interpretation one could derive the fundamental interpretation from experiences that presuppose the religious faith. "Viewed philosophically, it must be said that all of the later psychology remains completely behind Aristotle. When it comes to original explication, what Aristotle accomplished has never again been attained." This explains why Aristotle had to receive a special place in Heidegger's own investigations; obviously, this implies that the common interpretation of Aristotle's psychology be subjected to a radical and thorough "destruction" in the sense indicated above. 64 For Aristotle, so understood, primordial Being is life. Life is the Being of man. Since life usually is given a broader meaning, Heidegger prefers to say that the mode of Being of human Dasein is facticity. Facticity includes the Being of the world in which life is factically lived. Facticity is neither world nor life, but rather the relation between them. The world is there to the extent that the living being is there. Human Dasein lives by occupying itself with a world. Life (zoe) is Da-sein in its world. Ofthis world only the immediate surrounding world is known; the restlies in darkness. By means of its preoccupation human Dasein illuminates and makes visible what was formerly concealed. It is this process to which the Greek term aletheia refers. The following three Aristotelian theses must be understood from the perspective of this conception of aletheia, 62Jbid., pp. 34-35. 63Jbid., p. 36. 64Jbid., p. 36.
BEING AND TIME "truth." 1) The first form of aletheia is aisthesis, in which one receives and accepts the world. 2) The real bearer of aletheia is logos as judgment which can be true or false. 3) The highest forms of aletheia, in which aletheia achieves its arete, are techne, episteme, phronesis, sophia, and nous.65 In contemporary philosophy these Aristotelian ideas and theses are usually understood from an epistemological point of view in which Aristotle's genuine understanding becomes lost completely. For Aristotle theoretical knowledge is not a privileged way of knowing and Being; being is not a mere correlate of (theoretical) knowledge. One must ask first what for Aristotle the basic motives for knowing are, and what the basic sphere is in which knowing is first encountered. Heidegger promised to examine these questions with the help of concrete texts, beginning with chapter I of the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics where Aristotle hirnself demonstrates how the philosophical investigation emerges naturally from the common preoccupations of factic life.66 In 1923 Heidegger gave his last course in Freiburg before he moved on to Marburg. This course was entitled, "Hermeneutics of Facticity." In this course Heidegger explained that facticity does not mean the mode of Being of man taken as the object of some immediate intuition, but rather the mode of Being of man insofar as he lives in his own time and his current "there" (Da). The term hermeneutics does not mean here exegesis or commentary as in Hellenism and Christianity, nor a theory of interpretation in the sense of Schleiermacher, Boeckh, and Dilthey, but rather the systematic effort to disclose one's facticity which thus far had remained undisclosed. Finally, hermeneutics is not some form of description in function of some theory of rational man, but rather a matter of awakening eksistence to and for itself. Heidegger then explained what is to be understood by "historical consciousness" and what attitude one has to adopt in regard to it; he also discussed the philosophical views which are predominant today. But soon thereafter he focused mainly on the world of movement that is human eksistence. To explain this complex phenomenon Heidegger called for a return to Greek philosophy, especially to Aristotle. Yet in order to understand Aristotle genuinely one must first subject the entire philosophical tradition to the process of destruction. During the last two lectures of the course Heidegger 65Jbid., pp. 37-38. 66Jbid., p. 38.
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presented the students with what appears to be a first outline of the structure of Being and Time. In these final lectures many basic expressions which would occupy a privileged position in Being and Time are mentioned and briefly discussed: Being-in-the-world, everydayness, readiness-to-hand, meaningfulness, curiosity, forehaving, "as," resolve, having-been, etc.67 5. The Time Lecture of 1924.68 In July of 1924 Heidegger delivered a lecture to the theologians at the University of Marburg. In this lecture he mentioned again a number of ideas which would later play an important part in Being and Time. These ideas are all structured araund the question concerning the Being of time. Heidegger ultimately defends the thesis there that Dasein insofar as in each case it is as whiling, gives time because it is time. This thesis is introduced by reflections in which the mode of Being of man, taken as Dasein, is laid out in detail, even though without adequate explanation and justification. The mode of Being of man taken as Dasein is again defined as Being-in-the-world. His primary mode of Being in the world is that of concern. Yet the mode of Being characteristic of man is care. The temporal character and structure of care is explained in outline. The problern of death and conscience are mentioned, etc. I plan to discuss the content of this lecture in greater detail in chapter XI of this book. After the lecture was delivered Heidegger continued to work out the basic ideas briefly discussed in this lecture with the intention of eventually completing a book that later indeed would appear as Being and Time. In 1925 he gave a course under the title, Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time. 69 In this course, which was published posthumously and is now also available in English, one can see clearly that in 1925 Being and Time was nearing completion. Division I of part I of Being and Time is found there almost in its entirety, whereas Division II is discussed in outline. Drafts of part of the second part of the book were already completed, also. But it would still take another year before Heidegger could send the manuscript of the greater part of part I to the printer. At that time Heidegger had hoped to publish the rest of the book in the near future. Yet for 67Jbid.
68Martin Heidegger, "Le concept de temps (1924)," trans. Michel Haar and Mare B. de Launey, in Martin Heidegger, ed. by Michel Haar. Paris: Edition de l'Herne, 1983, pp. 27-37. 69Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore J. Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.
BEING AND TIME several reasons he later rejected this plan and as far as we know the relevant sections of the rest of the book have never been written in a final form, even though some sections of this part of the book have appeared elsewhere.
lll: Purpose and Structure of ''Being and Time." Linguistic Peculiarities 1. Purpose and Structure of Being and Time. 70 Being and Time is a truly innovative work and it was immediately recognized as such. According to many it may very well be the most important contribution to philosophy written in the twentieth century. The book was supposed to have had two major parts, both subdivided into three major subdivisions. Yet in 1927 the book was published in an incomplete form, partly due to time pressures, partly as a consequence of difficulties which Heidegger had been unable to solve at that time. In its present form the book contains only the first major subdivisions of the first part. In Being and Time Heidegger attempts to apply "hermeneutic phenomenology" to an analytic of man's Being, and carefully explains the sense in which hermeneutic phenomenology is to be understood. In Heidegger's opinion philosophy's main concern is to be found in the question concerning the meaning of Being. This question is to be dealt with in ontology; yet such an ontology is to be prepared by a fundamental ontology which must take the form of an existential analytic of man's Being which is to be understood as Being-in-the-world. It is particularly in this fundamental ontology that the hermeneutic phenomenological method is to be employed. At the outset the author makes it quite clear in Being and Time that what is to be understood by hermeneutic phenomenology is not identical with Husserl's transeendental phenomenology. He explicitly claims the right to develop the idea of phenomenology in his own way, beyond the stage to which it had been brought by Husserl himself. On the other hand, it is clear also that Heidegger sees the indispensable foundation for such a further development in Husserl's phenomenology. The reason why Heidegger was unable to follow Husserl more closely is to be found in Husserl's conception of the transeendental reduction and his idea that the ultimate source of 70Cf, also William J. Richardson, "Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology to the Thinking of Being," in Thomas Sheehan, Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, pp. 79-93.
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME all meaning consists in transeendental subjectivity which as such originally is world-less. This explains why Heidegger tries to conceive man's Beingas Being-in-the-world. As the title of the book suggests the concept of time occupies an important place in Being and Time. Already in the brief preface to the book Heidegger indicates how Being and time are to be related. "Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question concerning the meaning of Being... Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being." (SZ, 1) In the first division of Part I Heidegger takes as his guiding clue the fact that the essence of man consists in his ek-sistence; that toward which man stands out is the world; thus one can also say that the essence of man is Being-in-the-world. The main task of this first division now is to unveil the precise meaning of this compound expression; but in so doing the final goal remains the preparation of an answer for the question concerning the meaning of Being. Heidegger justifies this approach to the Being question by pointing out that man taken as Being-in-the-world is the only being who can make hirnself transparent in his own mode of Being. The very asking of this question is one of this being's modes of Being; and as such it receives its essential character from what is inquired about, namely Being itself. "This entity which each of us is hirnself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being we shall denote by the term 'Dasein'." (SZ, 7) Thus the technical term "Dasein" which usually is left untranslated, refers to man precisely insofar as he essentially relates to Being. The preparatory analysis of Dasein's mode of Being can only serve to describe the essence of this being; it cannot interpret its meaning ontologically. The preparatory analysis merely tries to lay bare the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being. Once this horizon has been reached, the preparatory analysis is to be replaced by a genuinely ontological interpretation. The horizon referred to here is temporality which thus determines the meaning of the Being of Dasein. This is the reason why all the structures of man's Being exhibited iri the first division are to be re-interpreted in the seco~d as modes of temporality. But even in interpreting Dasein as temporality, the question concerning the meaning of Beingis not yet answered; only the ground is prepared here for later obtaining such an answer. Being and Time was thus meant to lay the foundations for an ontology (metaphysics) and, with Kant, to stress the finitude of man in any attempt to found metaphysics.
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In Being and Time Heidegger uses the phenomenological method. For him phenomenology (legein ta phainomena: to let what shows itself be seen from itself) is that method by means of which we let that which of its own accord manifests itself, reveal itself as it is. The "thing itself' tobe revealed in Being and Timeis man taken as Dasein. Thus Being and Time attempts to let Dasein reveal itself in what and how it is, and the analysis shows concretely that the genuine self of Dasein consists in the process of finite transcendence whose ultimate meaning is time. Characteristic for Dasein is its comprehension of Being and this is the process by which Dasein transcends beings in the direction of Being, and comprehends all beings, itself included, in their Being. This explains why the essence of Dasein can also be defined as transcendence. It should be stressed here at once that the process of transcendence is inherently finite. For, first of all, Dasein is not master over its own origin; it simply finds itself thrown among beings (thrownness). Secondly, thrown among beings, Dasein must concern itself with these beings and, thus, has the tendency to lose itself among them (fallenness), and to forget its ontological "destination." Finally, transcendence is a process which inherently is unto Dasein's end, death. The ground of the negativity which manifests itself in these modalities is what Heidegger calls "guilt" which is not to be understood here in a moral sense. The basic structure of finite transcendence consists of understanding (Verstehen), i.e., the component in and through which Dasein projects the world, ontological disposition or mood (Befindlichkeit), i.e., the component through which Dasein's thrownness, fallenness, and the world's non-Being are disclosed, and logos (Rede), i.e., the component through which Dasein ean unfold and articulate "in language" what understanding and original mood disclose. These components constitute a unity insofar as transcendence essentially is care (Sorge): ahead of itself Being already in the world as Being alongside beings encountered within the world. When this unity is considered as a totality, it is understood as coming to its end, i.e. death. Finally, that which gives Dasein to understand its transcendence as well as its finitude and "guilt" and thus calls it to achieve its own self, is what Heidegger calls the voice of conscience. To achieve itself Dasein must let itself be called toward its genuine self, i.e., the process of finite transcendence. The act in and through which Dasein achieves authenticity is called resolve (Entschlossenheit).
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Heidegger finally shows how care itself is founded in time insofar as the basic components of care, namely ek-sistence, thrownness, and fallenness, inherently refer to the three ekstases of time, namely future, past, and present. By transcending beings toward Being Dasein comes to its true self (Zu-kunft, coming-up-to, future), but this self is always already as having been thrown forth (past), and concerns itself with beings, thus making them manifest and present (present). Interpreted from the perspective of temporality, resolve manifests itself as retrieve (Wiederholung); it lets the process of finite transcendence become manifest as historical. By fetehing itselfback time and again, Daseinlets its own self be in terms of its authentic past; in addition it also is as constantly coming toward its authentic self. It is thus in this complex process that Dasein hands over to itself its own heritage and thus finds its true self. In Being and Time Heidegger gives clear evidence that he is exceptionally weil informed about the history of philosophy. Between 1919 and 1926 he bad already dealt with the works of several great philosophers. In the lectures which he presented in these years he discussed at great length works of Aristotle, St. Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus, Thomas of Erfurt, Descartes, Kant, Regel, Kierkegaard, and Dilthey. It is obvious that Heidegger was excellently acquainted with the basic ideas of these important authors; yet he sometimes speaks about their ideas in a way that at first is perplexing to say the least. Many people have criticized Heidegger for bis lack of historical sense in that he appears to attribute ideas to philosophers of the past that in bis critics' view they could not possibly have held. Yet these critics should have realized that it was not Heidegger's intention to make a contribution to the history of philosophy and to engage in philological and historical interpretation and critique. In bis "historical" meditations he always tried to find and to clarify important problems and themes with which he was occupied at that time and to present bis own viewpoint on these issues. In bis reflections on the ideas of great thinkers of the past Heidegger is not concerned with presenting their ideas faithfully and critically; rather he assumes that one has already engaged in this kind of research. Heidegger's main question is one of how these great ideas can be retrieved and given a place within our own actual thinking about the same or related problems.
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2. Heidegger's Use of the German Language. 71 Finally a word about Heidegger's use of the German language is in order. Many people find it extremely difficult to read Being and Time and even many of his countrymen have great difficulty coming to grips with the ideas Heidegger tri es to develop in Being and Time. Many Germans are even of the opinion that Heidegger writes atrocious and bombastic German. His language contains many individualistic peculiarities and characteristics and seems to some degree to have undergone the influence of the regional dialect. Heidegger moreover likes to use archaic expressions. And whenever the current language seemed to him to be inadequate for the proper expression of his ideas, Heidegger forged new words in the manner of a poet. Some people have said that Heidegger often writes bad poetry. Furthermore, this practice of creating entirely new words and expressions for entirely new ideas has often been termed presumptuous arrogance. Heidegger has even often been ridiculed for this use of the German language. In the thirties in some circles one used to imitate Heidegger's use of language by employing expressions such as "The thing things," "The world worlds," and "Man mans," etc. Yet when one Iooks more carefully at the matter, then it will become clear that Heidegger tried to create a new philosophical terminology which would be adequate to the new ideas he was developing by following procedures used by the great thinkers who preceded him. It is very weil possible that Heidegger's use of the German language is sometimes deficient from a literary point of view; it is certainly the case that Heidegger's German is not the most beautiful German ever written; it even may be true that his inventiveness sometimes carries him too far. Yet in the view of many scholars Heidegger did succeed in constituting a philosophical terminology which is excellently suited for an adequate expression of his often very profound and important thoughts. Heidegger's word derivations are frequently far-fetched and they certainly are not always correct if one looks at them from the perspective of a scientific etymology. Heidegger would have been the first person to admit and grant this. Yet he would have raised the
71Cf. Jan Aler, "Heidegger's Conception of Language in Being and Time," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., On Heidegger and Language. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 33-62.
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question (and in his later works he has actually done so) 72 of whether it is possible to engage in, and make a contribution to, a philosophical etymology that makes an effort to come to a better understanding of basic philosophical words and their relevance for our own way of thinking. Many expressions which the reader at first sight will find strange and puzzling, resulted from a "literal" translation of typical Greek expressions used by Aristotle; this is true particularly for formal and relational expressions; the "for the sake of which" is Aristotle's hou heneka, the "toward which" is Aristotle's pros ti, the "in the virtue of which" is his kath-ho, etc. Similar remarks can be made for basic nouns and verbs. Other basic terms and expressions of Heidegger's philosophy have their origin in his knowledge of the German mystical tradition (Meister Eckhart), German theology (Luther), the philosophies of Kant and above all Regel. Finally, that part of the terminology which is manifestly derived from the Latin language originated from his knowledge of Augustirre and the entire medieval tradition. As a matter of fact it is possible to make a distinction in Being and Time between two large groups of technical terms and expressions. On the one hand, we find a certain nurober of Latin words and phrases as well as expressions derived from them. These usually refer to the formal dimension of his thinking. To this group belang terms such as "structure," "mode," "modality," "character," "constitutive," "deficient," "construction," "destruction," "reduction," "negation," "motive," etc. On the other hand, there are many words which have been derived from the Greek language. These technical expressions usually belang to the core of Heidegger's philosophical vocabulary. To this group belang expressions such as the formal, relational expressions mentioned above, but also expressions such as the following: unconcealment (a-letheia), issue (Austrag, diaphora), Beingness (Seiendheit, Wesenheit, ousia), being (on), category, ekstasis, ontological, ontical. Then there are many technical expressions and terms which either belang to, or are derived from, ordinary German but which one does not often encounter as technical terms in the works of other philosophers, even though Heidegger obviously also uses numerous technical terms which all German philosophers before him have used. To the group of words that are typical for Heidegger the following belang: care (Sorge), 72Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Heidegger on Metaphor and Metaphysics," in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 47(1985), 415-450.
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concern (Besorgen), Dasein (Being-there), equipment or tool (Zeug), involvement (Bewandtnis), ontological disposition or moodness (Befindlichkeit), project (Entwurf), conscience (Gewissen), to temporalize (zeitigen), etc. Moreover, Heidegger quite frequently constructs rather complex phrases in order to express with accuracy the complex but basic eksistential character-istics of Dasein's mode ofBeing. The crucial terms of his whole reflection on man, the words "eksistence" and "transcendence" do not quite harmonize with our division, since they belonged originally to the formalizing terminology that is typical for our Latin scholasticism. However, as far as their content is concerned, "eksistence" (standing-out-toward) and "transcendence" (going beyond) represent the key terms outlining the entire horizon of Heidegger's conception of the mode of Being of man taken as Dasein. As far as the strange expressions which seem tobe tautologies in the form of the forma etymologica such as "Das Ding dingt," "die Welt weltet," "die Zeit zeitigt," are concerned, it should be noted first that the forma etymologica is used quite commonly in German in expressions such as to play a play, to sleep the sleep of the just, etc. Secondly, Heidegger uses these expressions only when the German language does indeed contain a noun and a verb of the same stem or root. In the cases mentioned there is indeed a German noun Ding (thing) and a verb dingen (to engage, to ask for), Welt (world) and welten (to hold sway, old German for walten), Zeit (time) and zeitigen (to mature, to ripen), etc. It is true that in the etymological figure Heidegger uses the verb in a meaning related directly to that of the corresponding noun. The sentences mentioned thus mean: "To let the thing be a thing and let it do what things do (namely to ask for the proper world)", "To let the world be and do what a world does (namely to hold sway over the entities that appear within it)", "To let or make time be." I always avoid using the parallel English expressions for the simple reason that in many instances there is no corresponding etymological figure in English because the relevant verbs or nouns are missing. There is no English word "to thing," "to world," and "to time," etc. In his use of the traditional philosophical terms one can observe that Heidegger uses them often with a certain freedom. When it suits him, he derives a new word from an existing traditional term; yet one should realize that such practice is not unusual in German; other philosophers have often done the same. Thus Heidegger speaks of "eksistential" and "eksistentiell"; and in addition to the
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adjective "eksistential" he also uses the noun "Eksistenzial," to indicate the typical categories to be used in the articulation of the mode of Being of Dasein. Heidegger also speaks of ontic in Opposition to ontologic; a way of speaking is ontic when it is concerned with onta, beings; on the other hand, a way of thinking or speaking is ontological when it belongs to the philosophical discipline "ontology." Moreover, it often happens that a standard term receives a new meaning; this is the case with eksistence and transcendence. In such cases Heidegger generally remains faithful to the way the technical terms have been formed. For example, he describes "Existenz" as "standing out toward," "standing open for," etc., since "Existenz" can be taken to belong to "ex-sistere ." Realizing the confusion this terminology would cause he later used the expression "Ek-sistenz," an expression which for that reason I have been using all along. Be this as it may, Heidegger's attention to themes or issues suggested by original parts of certain words manifests itself also in his habit of hyphenating some basic expressions, such as "ek-stasis." Such splitting of words into syllables often increases the plasticity of the relevant expressions. The living vernacular offers Heidegger even greater opportunities and he often takes full advantage of it. Boldly, but also cautiously, he lets hirnself be guided by the genius of the German language which in this regard is very similar to the Greek language. Yet it is important to note first, that it is striking that he avoids as much as possible the customary technical terms. Thus such words as "soul," "body," "spirit," "consciousness," "subject," "object," "intellect," "will," "emotion," "feeling," "perception," "intellection," etc. are not used in Being and Time as technical terms, even though they may once in a while appear at places where Heidegger speaks of the opinion of other thinkers. Heidegger sometimes attributes two different meanings to words which are taken tobe synonymaus in everyday parlance. For instance, he opposes anxiety (Angst) to fear (Furcht);he paraphrases both of them in a way which does not completely correspond to their generally accepted meanings. In addition, Heidegger often enlarges his carefully chosen vocabulary with refined differentiations by using appropriate prefixes and suffixes. In the process he then creates new German words; yet in these cases he creates new words in a way which always conforms to the rules governing analogous cases in the German language. At times Heidegger introduces obsolete or forgotten terms, such as for instance Befindlichkeit (the state of finding oneself in a certain
BEING AND TIME disposition); this term was still used in the 17th century; I shall translate the term by ontological disposition or moodness. Sometimes variations of a basic word appear tagether in one and the same context to accentuate the common root; for instance, he speaks of das sich überhörende Hinhören, "the listening (away from one's own self toward the 'they') that fails to hear (what is really being said)." Occasionally Heidegger also assigns new meanings to existing words. The German verb zeitigen means "to mature" or also "to bring to maturity." Heidegger gives it the meaning of "letting time be," "to create the structures of time." In this way he gives the word a more profound meaning than it usually has in everyday speech and draws attention to something that may, or even must, have been at the root of the accepted meaning. A typical example of such a linguistic creation which follows the general rules of word derivation in the German language and yet leads to a completely new word with a totally different meaning, is Entfernung. This word is composed of the privative prefix ent-, the stem fern (far), and the common ending -ung. Heidegger uses the word in the sense of "removing distance," "bringing close," whereas the word usually is taken in the sense of distance. Heidegger does not only create new words through combination but sometimes he also detaches a component from generally accepted combinations of words; for instance, he gives the word Zeug the meaning of equipment which by itself it hardly ever has, even though it has that meaning in certain compounds, such as Schreibzeug for pen. Yet in all these cases Heidegger extremely rarely violates the grammar of the German language in these changes and new creations. When he does so-for instance, where he creates the present participle "gewesende," for "actually being in the process of having-been," from the past participle "gewesen," "having been,"-he apologizes for taking such liberties and tries to indicate why in his view they are unavoidable in a certain context. These few remarks, of course, do not exhaust all the linguistic peculiarities of Heidegger's use of language in Being and Time. One would have to consider also the dialectical features that occasionally are found in his use of language as well as the strange way in which he often constructs his sentences. Yet the examples given, which I derived from a study by Jan Aler, are offered here as examples of Heidegger's attitude toward the technical use of language.
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We must now still ask the question of why Heidegger assumed this attitude in regard to the philosophical use of language. In an effort to answer this question, one must keep in mind that Heidegger's ultimate aim in Being and Time was to build up a new ontology and that he considered an analytic of the mode of Being of man, taken as Dasein, a necessary condition for such an ontology. The method which he followed in the analytic is hermeneutic phenomenology, which permitted him to adopt the usual philosophical terminology in the purely formal part of the work. On the other hand, as far as the content of the book is concerned the phenomena had to be described in the analytic of Dasein in harmony with the demands of hermeneutic phenomenology, that is, as they manifest themselves immediately and, therefore, as they are "in themselves." Yet human beings have opinions about almost everything, including themselves. These have often been developed during the course of many centuries and they were often deeply influenced by traditional philosophy and the sciences. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's mode of Being is not at all concerned with the opinions one has about things and human beings, but rather with letting things and human beings appear and manifest themselves as they are. We are used to expressing the accepted views in a commonly accepted language; this language does not always express what truly is, but usually alone that which is thought about them. If one wants to describe unambiguously that which manifests itself primordially as it is in itself, one is practically forced to develop a new terminology. Thus Heidegger's linguistic peculiarities can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that it is necessary to reduce the cultural world phenomenologically to the world that immediately presents itself. Yet wherever Heidegger finds hirnself compelled to avoid the accepted words and technical terms and where he, thus, is forced to find or create new possibilities of expression, he always tries to adhere as much as possible to the rules of the German language and idiom or to procedures that are used in analogous cases elsewhere in German. Very often also he searches in the history of the German language for obsolete and forgotten words which can express that which shows itself immediately in the hermeneutic analysis. On other occasions he attempts to endow existing words with a more primordial meaning by going back to Greek and sometimes even Latin expressions or linguistic procedures. The reason for this is that the old Greek philosopherB were less influenced by culture and therefore must have been much closer to the primordial
BEING AND TIME phenomena than we are. For instance, Heidegger conceives of aletheia "etymologically" as un-concealedness (a-leth-eia). Later he uses this "etymology" to "confirm" his own interpretation of what truth eksistentially is, namely "to be as discovering," to which the state of discoveredness or unconcealedness corresponds. Although Heidegger does not claim that the Greeks ever understood it in this manner, his interpretation of the term appears to be supported by his hermeneutico-phenomenological analysis of truth. His explanation of the word aletheia is meant to clarify the "original" content of this term and this procedure can be defended, especially if one can explain how this conception of truth had to lead of necessity to its generally accepted interpretation. (SZ, Beetion 44) Whether the Greeks ever intended this or not, one can say that the structure of the word points in this direction, and this is precisely the point which Heidegger considered important. After these introductory observations we must now turn to Heidegger's own "Introduction" to Being and Time which is devoted to an exposition of the question concerning the meaning of Being. (SZ, 140)
CHAPTERII THE NECESSITY, STRUCTURE, AND PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION OF BEING (Being and Time, Sections 1-4, pp. 1-15)
1: Introductory Refl.ections
For most people, philosophers and non-philosophers alike, a first contact with Being and Time must have led to an unexpected experience and perhaps even to estrangement. For there is something very paradoxical about Being and Time. On the one hand, the book Iooks very much like every other basic text in philosophy; it is somewhat like Aristotle's Metaphysics, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, or Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The book begins by stating its aim, describes the basic problern to be studied, the method to be employed, the various issues that will be raised in the order in which they will be discussed, and then proceeds to deal with these issues in a systematic fashion. Speaking generally, one could say that the book certainly is very weil "constructed" and composed on the basis of a clearly defined outline; it is orderly and systematic; wherever relevant, it relates to the existing literature; briefly, in many respects it Iooks like a solid treatise in philosophy. Yet the book also shows signs of having been written under stress and perhaps even in a hurry, connected with academic pressures. But this aspect the book also has in common with most of the classical treatises just mentioned. Kant's Critique of Practical Reason was written in a very short period of time and Hegel's Phenomenology was still being written while the first part was already being printed. But on the other hand, the reader also quickly realizes that in many respects this is a very unique book. One even may become bewildered when one realizes that the book does not seem to speak about anything one is already familiar with, and that it nonetheless also appears to deal with something with which everyone should be acquainted. The book claims to be dealing with the question of the meaning of Being from the perspective of time. (SZ, 1) It is said that most people think that they already know what Beingis so that the issue need not be raised again. Yet Heidegger gives convincing
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reasons for why the question concerning the meaning of Beingis to be raised time and again. But the strangest thing is that the book itself never treats the question concerning the meaning of Being as such. Instead the book appears to be some kind of a philosophical anthropology which tries to answer the question of what it means to be a human being. Yet the reader is quickly told that this is not the true aim of the book. Issues about the human reality are raised only to prepare the question of the meaning of Being. Furthermore, as far as the human reality itself is concerned, none of the common themes usually dealt with in philosophical studies of man, are touched upon; Heidegger does not speak about the body, the sexes, the soul, the nous or the logos, the senses, the intellect, the emotions, the will, the imagination; there does not seem to be a concern with psychology, aesthetics, ethics, or politics; also religious issues are never mentioned. Rather the book speaks about the human reality in terms of complex technical expressions which in this context never have been used in this way before: Dasein (there-being), eksistence, transcendence, affective disposition (Befindlichkeit), understanding in the sense of knowing one's way about (Verstehen), "they," "self," "guilt," "conscience," "death," "resolve," "world," etc., but also such formal expressions as ontic, ontologic, eksistential and eksistentiell, Being-ready-to-hand, Being-present-at-hand, etc. For most readers it takes quite some time before they are so used to this new terminology that they can begin to focus on what is being said by means of these expressions. Many scholars have already discussed the sources from which this book appears to flow: Aristotle, St. Paul, St. Augustine, medieval philosophy, Luther, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, Husserl, etc. Yet all ofthem had also to admit that this book is highly original and approaches the Being-question in a manner never employed before. On the other hand, there are also people who have said that Heidegger claims for hirnself an originality which really is not his, in view of the fact that what he has to say about the human reality has already been said by others before. Yet when everything in this regard is said and done, it must be admitted that, after all, this is one of the most outstanding and original philosophical treatises of the 20th century.
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II: Some Presuppositionsl
In Being and Time Heidegger tried to establish a meaningful relationship between ancient Greek philosophy and modern thought. In the process he attempted to maintain basic ideas from both positions in regard to the meaning of philosophy as weil as to overcome others. In this process of "retrieve" Aristotle and Kant appear to be the leading players. Heidegger wonders how Aristotle's concern with the question concerning the meaning of Being can be related to Kant's concern with the scientificity of philosophy and, thus, with method and foundations. In Being and Time and other works of the same period Heidegger was convinced that the question of the meaning of Being, which is to be dealt with in ontology, is to be prepared by a fundamental ontology which is concerned with the mode of Being characteristic of man as Dasein. At that time he was also of the opinion that phenomenology must be the method of ontology and that phenomenology can fully justify the scientificity of ontology. Thus ontology must apply the phenomenological method in order to be capable of being a genuine science. (SZ, 31, 153, 230) This idea is developed in much greater detail and also much more systematically in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and The Basic Problems of
1 In what follows, throughout the entire book, I shall make use of Macquarrie's and Robinson's translation of Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1963): Being and Time (London: SCM Press, 1962). Yet in some cases I shall make minor changes in the translation to achieve greater clarity or to correct errors. All references to this work in my text are to the 7th edition of the German original whose pagination is maintained in the 19th edition and is indicated in the marginal nurober of the English translation. Following the common practice Sein is translated as Being, whereas Seiendes is translated as being or also as entity. For the reflections to follow, cf. William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963, pp. 27-46, and passim; Gethmann, Carl Friedrich, Verstehen und Auslegung. Das Methodenproblem in der Philosophie Martin Heideggers. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1974, pp. 1-126; Schulz Walter, "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers," in Otto Pöggeler, ed., Heidegger. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969, pp. 95-139; Karl Löwith, Zu Heideggers Seinsfrage. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1969; Lehmann, K., Vom Ursprung und Sinn der Seinsfrage im Denken Martin Heideggers. Versuch einer Ortsbestimmung. Philos. Dissertation, Gregoriana, Rome, 1962.
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Phenomenology. 2 In the latter work Heidegger wrote that phenomenology is the label for the method of scientific philosophy and that to explain what the idea of phenomenology means is tantamount to clarifying the concept of scientific. philosophy. 3 In Heidegger's view, in philosophy it is impossible to develop a method independent from the subject matter to be disclosed by the method. Any genuine method is based on viewing in advance and in the appropriate manner the basic constitution of the "object" to be disclosed and of the domain within which it is to be found. Thus any genuinely methodical consideration which is not just an empty discussion of techniques, must give information about the kind of Being of the being which is to be taken as the theme. (SZ, 303) In the positive sciences this information follows with necessity from the a priori synthesis which each science "freely" projects (SZ, 356-364); in ontology this information is to be derived from that peculiar synthesis which as the comprehension of Being is constitutive of Dasein's own Being. (SZ, 15 ff.) This is the reason why in philosophy every effort to deal with the method of philosophy itself implies a dilemma: this effort comes either too early or too late. For strictly speaking the method of ontology can be determined adequately only after the process of thought has reached its destination and its subject matter has been articulated. Yet on the other hand it is precisely this process of thought which is to be conducted methodically. Solving this dilemma is one of the basic problems of every philosophy which concerns itself explicitly with its method. Somehow the basic problems must be solved at the very beginning and yet they cannot be solved definitively except at the end. Thus at the beginning one can do no more than make some provisional and suggestive remarks; these are then to be reconsidered toward the end ofthe philosophical reflection. (SZ, 303, 15ff.) Heidegger justifies this way of proceeding by means of a reference to the hermeneutic character of all finite understanding and to the hermeneutic circle which all research about ontological issues appears to imply. (SZ, 58, 152ff.,314(,436() 2Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1927). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951; English: Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James C. Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962; Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927), ed. by F.-W von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975; English: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. 3Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems, pp. 1-23; 324-330.
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Cancern for method and methodology has been a characteristic of modern philosophy since Descartes. In view of the fact that the deductive method in principle is incapable of clarifying the basic axioms of any given deductive system, from the very beginning there was the question of whether it would be possible to develop a new science which as prima philosophia could give an ultimate foundation to some basic insights from which then all of our theoretical knowledge could be derived according to principles and laws. Since all rationalist and empirieist attempts in this direction had failed, Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason attempted to provide a theoretical framework which would lay the foundation for philosophy as weil as for all other sciences. Thus the Critique does not contain the system of science, but is concerned primarily with its method. 4 The possibility of scientific knowledge is explained only when reason can develop for itself a method which will both guide and bind reason itself in all of its theoretical endeavors. This implies that the method to be developed must be of a totally different nature than the methods employed in the formal and empirical disciplines; thus the new method cannot be either analytic or empirical. According to Kant the great discovery of the modern age from which philosophy and science must learn a lesson is that "reason has insights only into that which it produces after a plan of its own."5 What is needed then in Kant's view is a transeendental logic, a philosophical reflection on the projective achievement of reason by which reason provides itself with an a priori framework which is the necessary condition of our theoretical knowledge of all objects. What is completely new in this view is not the reference to the fact that there is to be an a priori of some kind, but the fact that in the question concerning our knowledge a priori the stress is placed on method, which alone can guarantee the necessity and universality of all of our scientific insights. In Kant's view the proper application of the "transcendental" method alone is capable of closing the gap between subject and object to which Descartes had pointed and which both rationalism and empiricism had been unable to bridge. Knowledge of objects is possible only if the transeendental method is capable of showing that the objectivity of the object is projected in advance by reason itself. In the final analysis the projection of this 4Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965, B, xii. 5Jbid., B, xiii.
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objectivity is the reason why all of our theoretical knowledge constitutes a harmonious unity and can be developed into a system.6 Between Fichte and Husserl various forms of transeendental philosophy were developed. They all have Kant's basic concern in common and share his view that there is to be a highest principle of all synthetic judgments a priori which has fundamental implications for the systematicity of all genuine knowledge. The difference between the various forms of transeendental philosophy is to be found in the concrete manner in whieh eaeh author or group of authors has tried to eoneeive of the a priori synthesis and the principle which founds its unity.7 From his earliest works it is clear that between 1914 and 1930 Heidegger coneeived of hirnself as one who was seriously coneerned with the development of transeendental philosophy as found in Kant, the neo-Kantians, and Husserl. Thus it wastobe expected that in the first sections of Being and Time we would find an attempt by Heidegger to formulate his own position in regard to the basic problems of transeendental philosophy, even though it would not be stated explieitly in so many words.S However, if we now turn to the opening sections of Being and Time it seems at first that Heidegger is really interested in a quite different problematie. He begins there by stating that Being and Time will be concerned with the question concerning the meaning of Being and with the interpretation of time as the transeendental horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being. (SZ, 1, 39) On several oceasions he explieitly suggests that his main eoncern is with the eategorial multiplicity of the various modes of Being which presupposes what we really mean by the expression "Being" (SZ, 11), the Being of beings, the "material meaning" of Being in general (SZ, 27), Being and its derivatives (SZ, 35). However, on other oceasions it becomes apparent that his basic eoneern is rather with the neeessary and a priori eondition of the categorial multiplicity of the various modes of Being. (SZ, 230; ef. 212-230, 436-7) Although the latter, transeendental problematie is less explicit in Being and Time than the categorial-ontological problematie described in the opening seetions of the book, there cannot be any doubt that the 6Jbid., B, 735-36. 7Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 14-21. 8Martin Heidegger, Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritischpositiver Beitrag zur Logik, in Frühe Schriften, vol. I, pp. 1-119; KM, section IV, pp. 211-255; The Basic Problems, pp. 122-76.
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transeendental problematic is nonetheless the one to which the expression "the question concerning the meaning of Being" ultimately refers.9 It is generally known that Heidegger's concern with the Being question was influenced historically by Brentano's work on Aristotle.lO According to Brentano, Aristotle divides "being" in four different, but somehow related ways; and of these ways the division of "being" into the ten categories is the most important. Yet if Being can be said in a multiplicity of significations, which one then is the guiding and basic signification? What does "Being" really mean?ll One should realize that the fundamental problems with which Heidegger was concerned in Being and Time and other works of the same period are problems which did not really exist for the entire Aristotelian tradition. In Heidegger's view these problems and their possible solutions presuppose the transeendental framework of modern philosophy. For according to the Aristotelian tradition the Being question which is implicit in the ontological-categorial problematic can be solved in principle by an appropriate doctrine of analogy. For Heidegger such a solution is in part inadequate. Although the classical doctrine of analogy contains part of the solution of the problern in that it is capable of explaining at least one condition to be fulfilled if any division of "being" into categories is to be meaningful, it nonetheless leaves unanswered the basic question of what we really mean by the expression "Being." Secondly, without any justification all classical theories of analogy take "natural being" as the primary analogate from which the basic meaning of Being is then tobe derived.12 Classical tradition as weil as modern philosophy failed to examine the possibility of taking the very Being of man as the primary analogate.13 But most importantly, the entire problematic is without any "ground" as long as the transeendental problern has not been solved satisfactorily. Thus Heidegger can write "Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly constructed a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its 9Martin Heidegger, KM, pp. 211ff.; "My Way to Phenomenology," in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Rarper & Row, 1972, pp. 74-82; Letter to Richardson, Heidegger, pp. xiii-xiv. lOF. Volpi, Heidegger e Brentano. Padova: Cedam, 1976. llOn Time and Being, p. 74; Letter to Richardson, op. cit., p. xi. 12The Basic Problems, pp. 17-19, 67-76, 99-112, 112-121, 154-176. 13Jbid., pp. 122ff.
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own-most aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived of this clarification as its fundamental task." (SZ, 11) It is undoubtedly true that in Being and Time and related works Heidegger was indeed concerned with showing that the temporality of Dasein is the principle of the division of Dasein's own modes of Being, and that time as temporalized by Dasein is the principle of the division of the meaning of Being into possible significations of Being (namely Being as ek-sistence, Being as present-at-hand, Being as ready-to-hand, etc.), so that a description of the various interplayings of the three dimehsions of temporality can be taken as guiding-clues for the division of the significations of Being. (SZ, 350-366)14 Yet one should realize also that all of this does not constitute Heidegger's basic concern. (SZ, 230) Toward the end of Being and Time Heidegger writes: "The distinction between the Being of ek-sisting Dasein and the Being of beings, such as reality, which do not have the character of Dasein, may appear very illuminating; but it is still only the point of departure for the ontological problematic; it is nothing with which philosophy may tranquillize itself." (SZ, 436-7) And it is for that reason that the book ends with questions which point to work still to be done: Is there a way which Ieads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the transeendental horizon ofBeing? (SZ, 437) That which constitutes the determining unity of the multiplicity of the various modes of Being is something which is to be determined "critically"; it cannot just be postulated. There is to be some final "ground" which as identity of difference can be taken as the foundation of the difference. The question concerning the meaning of Being is answered adequately only when the various modes of Being with which man is confronted can be justified. This is possible only when a naive realist as weil as a dogmatist position has been given up in favor of a transeendental perspective in the sense of Kant. As Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics clearly shows, with respect to the latter problematic, Heidegger's main concern was to substitute a "transcendental ontology" for the Kantian and neo-Kantian transeendental logic; and this implies a fundamental reinterpretation of Kant's conception of the transcendental, a priori synthesis. 15 14Cf. Otto Pöggeler, "Heideggers Topologie des Seins," in Man and World, 2(1969), 331-357, pp. 337-345. 15KM, section 45.
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Being and Time was meant to lead up to the transeendental problematic and, thus, in that book the problematic itself is not explicitly dealt with, so that the question concerning the meaning of Being remains unanswered there. Yet in the notion of Being implied in the comprehension of Beingwhich is constitutive of Dasein's own Being, the answer to that question is already contained implicitly. What later will be called "Being itself' is found in Being and Time merely in the form of "world" in that "Being itself' always reveals and conceals itself concretely in the form of a given world. From this general perspective it becomes clear why Heidegger later could say that in Being and Time both the classical conception of the transcendentalia and a new conception of truth, namely the "truth of Being," played an important part.16 In this connection it should be noted also that the transeendental problematic plays an equally important role in Heidegger's conception of the ontological difference. The expression "ontological difference" is not found in Being and Time itself, but the problematic hinted at by this expression most certainly constitutes an essential part of the book's basic concern; this is clear from both The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and On the Essence of Ground.17 Sometimes Heidegger characterizes the difference by means of the distinction tobe drawn between a being and its Being. Some authors have interpreted the meaning of this distinction as a further development of Kant's distinction between the a posteriori and the
1 6Martin Heidegger, Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus, in Frühe Schriften, pp. 131-353, p. 344; KM, pp. 119-129, 18-22, 69-72; What is a Thing?, trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and V. Deutsch. Chicago: Regnery, 1967, pp.181-184, 242243; What is Called Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. New York: Rarper & Row, 1968, pp. 242-244; Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 31-41; M. Brelage, Transzendentalphilosophie und konkrete Subjektivität. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Erkenntnistheorie im 20. Jahrhundert. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965, p. 199. For the relationship between "world" and "Being" cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, The World in Science and Philosophy. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1969, pp. 69-71 and the literature discussed there. 17The Basic Problems, pp. 318-324; The Essence of Reasons (Vom Wesen des Grundes), trans. Terrence Malick. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969, pp. 26ff.; Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Ontological Difference," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, On Heidegger and Language. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 195-234; for what follows cf. also Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 41-45 and KM, pp. 242-47.
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a priori.18 Yet such an interpretation overlooks what is most typical of Heidegger's entire way of thinking, namely the attempt to reflect on the relationship between the transeendental synthesis and the categorial-ontological problematic. The identity presupposed by the ontological difference is first the categorial identity of those beings which have the same mode of Being; yet this identity in turn presupposes the transeendental identity of the a priori synthesis as its necessary condition. Heidegger alludes to this dual principle of identity in Vom Wesen des Grundes where he distinguishes between the ontic and the ontological conceptions of truth.19 At any rate, the categorial-ontological difference is the difference between a being and its Being, between the Beingness (ousia) of a being and this being itself (on). On the other hand, the transcendental-ontological difference refers to the distinction between the meaning of Being, the truth of Being, Being-itself (Sinn von Sein, einai) on the one hand, and the Beingness of a being (die Seiendheit eines Seienden, ousia) on the other. Already in the second section of Being and Time Heidegger speaks of his attempt to examine the meaning of Being (Sein als Sein) by examining a being (namely Dasein) in its Being (Seiendheit). (SZ, 5ff.)20 In Heidegger's thought the two differences are often taken in some combination. The essential point then is to realize that the categorial-ontological difference is founded upon the transcendentalontological difference in harmony with the general thesis that Sinn (meaning) is that within which the Understandability of something must maintain itself. (SZ, 151) Finally, one should notice also that Beingness can be correctly called the "ground" of a being, but that Being itself can never be conceived of as ground. (SZ, 152)21 These introductory reflections on some of the presuppositions which play an important part in Heidegger's investigations concerning the subject matter and the method of ontology, however incomplete and inadequate in themselves, may suffice to put us on the "right way" in our attempt to come to a better understanding of 18K.-0. Apel, Dasein und Erkennen, p. 71 (quoted in Gethmann, op. cit., p. 41 and p. 342, note 45).
19The Essence of Reasons, pp. 27-29; William J. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 174-75. 20Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 2 vols. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961, vol. I, p. 654; An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959, pp. 25ff. 21An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 70ff.
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what Heidegger understands by fundamental ontology and "hermeneutic phenomenology." ID: The BasicProblem ofHeidegger's Philosophy: The Question ofthe Meaning ofBeing According to Heidegger, "every thinker thinks only one single thought. This essentially distinguishes him from the scientist. Research constantly needs new discoveries and ideas; otherwise, science would lapse into stagnation and falseness. A thinker needs only one single thought.. .. "22 As we have seen already, it is not diffi.cult to discover such a focal point in Heidegger's own thinking. This is the question concerning the meaning and truth of Being. Man alone of all existing things experiences the wonder of all wonders, namely that there are beings and that it is Being that lets them be what they in fact are. 23 There is perhaps no better way to describe the basic difference between Heidegger's and Husserl's conceptions of philosophy than to cantrast this sentence with a parallel statement in Husserl's writings: "The wonder of all wonders is the pure ego, its pure consciousness."24 The same fundamental difference can also be expressed in terms of both authors' interest in the history of philosophy. In Heidegger the history of philosophy plays an essential role, as we have seen already; in Husserl's phenomenology this role is of minor importance. Furthermore, Heidegger is oriented mainly to the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle, German idealism, and Nietzsche; these are thinkers whom Husserl seldom if ever mentions; Husserl appeared to have been inspired more by Hume, Kant, and Descartes. In the first section of Being and Time Heidegger implicitly suggests that he is the first thinker in the whole history of philosophy since Aristotle to have raised the question concerning the meaning of Being as a serious and even as the most fundamental problern of philosophy. Although there is no doubt whatsoever that Being itself represents the persistent theme of Heidegger's thinking, there have been a nurober of scholars who have failed to see this. This is one of the reasons why at first his thinking has been subject to so many 22what is Called Thinking?, p. 50 (my translation ofWD, p. 20). 23Was ist Metaphysik?, "Einleitung," p. 12; cf. An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 43-77. 24Edmund Husserl, Ideen, vol. III, p. 75.
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misinterpretations. These misinterpretations are reflected in the various labels with the help of which one has tried to characterize his thought. Same authors have described Heidegger's philosophy as a form of existentialism (a label which fits Sartre's philosophy), as a philosophy of existence (as defended by K. Jaspers), as a philosophical anthropology of the kind of Scheler, as metaphysics in the classical sense, or as an ontology. Heidegger has protested against all these labels, in some cases directly from the start, in others only in the course ofhis develöpment after 1930. From the very beginning Heidegger has made it quite clear that his philosophy is essentially different froni those proposed by either Scheler or Jaspers. For him, the human eksistence is neither the primary nor the ultimate philosophical issue. The belief on the part of some that Heidegger was a philosopher of existence was due to some degree to the fact that Being and Time remairred incomplete and that the basic issue of the ontological difference between a being, its mode of Being, and Being itself was not raised explicitly. Heidegger hirnself had planned to use the analytic of Dasein's eksistence as an "Introduction" to the study of the question concerning the meaning of Being; the non-appearance of the later parts of the book hid the true meaning of the work. Furthermore, the outstanding quality of the published sections of the book was responsible for the fact that the analytic of Dasein's eksistence began to have an enormaus influence on studies of the human reality. This again reinforced the idea that Being and Time really was meant to be a philosophical anthropology. Be this as it may, Heidegger begins the introduction to his book with the observation that the question of the meaning of Being has been forgotten. It was indeed the question which gave a stimulus for the investigations of Plato and Aristotle; yet since that time the question has been forgotten as a theme for actual investigation. But this is not all. On the basis of the Greeks' initial contributions toward an interpretation of Being, a dogmatic position gradually developed which not only declared the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but even sanctioned its complete neglect. As such Being resists every attempt at definition. It was therefore widely accepted that this most universal, and hence undefinable, concept does not require any definition, since everyone uses it constantly and claims to understand what he means by it. In this way, that which the Greek philosophers found continually disturbing as something very obscure and hidden, has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such, that if anyone today were to ask about the question of Being, he is immediately charged with an error in method. (SZ, 1-2)
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At the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger continues, it is not yet possible to give a detailed account of the presuppositions and prejudices that are constantly supporting the beliefthat an inquiry into the meaning of Being is not necessary. These pre-judgments are rooted in traditional ontology itself and it will not be possible to interpret that ontology adequately until the question concerning the meaning of Being has been clarified and answered. (SZ, 2-3) Heidegger intended to do the latter in the second part of his book; but until now this part has never appeared. Yet what Heidegger would have liked to have said there i!l known from other publications such as Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, What is Metaphysics?, On the Essence of Ground, On the Essence of Truth, Introduction to Metaphysics, and several of his posthumously published lecture courses.2 5 Heidegger discusses these presuppositions in Being and Time only to the point at which the necessity for restating the question concerning the meaning of Being becomes clear. In his view there are three such presuppositions: 1) It has been maintained for a long timethat Beingis the mostuniversal concept.26 But the universality of Being is not that of a class or a genus. The term "Being" does not mean the highest genus; it does not define that realm of entities that is uppermost when these entities are articulated conceptually according to genus and species. Thus if it is said that Being is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that it is also the one which is clearest, or that it needs no further discussion. In
25Cf. Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Ingtraut Görland. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977; Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, ed. Klaus Held. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978; Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart, ed. Ingraut Görland. Frankfurt: Klosterman, [to appear]; Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Ingtraut Görland. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980; Aristoteles: Metaphysik IX, ed. Heinrich Hüni. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981; Parmenides, ed. Manfred S. Frings. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 182; Heraklit, 2 vols. ed. Manfred S. Frings. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979, Schelling's Abhandlung Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, ed. Hildegard Feick. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971; cf. also the works on Nietzsche quoted above. 26Aristotle, Metaphysics, B, 4, 1001a21; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III, 94, 4, c.
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Heidegger's view, it is rather the darkest of all, and the history of philosophy shows this clearly. CSZ, 3)27 2) It has been maintained also that the concept of Being is indefinable. This, too, is derived from its supreme universality.28 For every real definition must specify the relevant genus and the specific difference; now Being is the "highest genus" and furthermore there can be no specific difference outside Being. In other words, in our philosophical tradition it was held that Being cannot be derived from higher concepts; nor can it be presented by means of lower ones. But, Heidegger asks here, does this imply that Being no Ionger is problematic? In his view, this is not at all the case. The only thing we can derive from this state of affairs is that Being cannot have the character of a being. Thus we cannot apply to Being the theory of definition as presented in traditional logic. Furthermore, the fact that Being cannot be defined does not eliminate the question of its meaning. (SZ, 4) 3) Finally, it is generally held that Being is of all concepts the one that is self-evident. Whenever we get to know something or make assertions about it, whenever we comport ourselves toward beings, even toward ourselves, some use is made of Being. And this expression is held to be intelligible without further examination, just as everyone understands the phrase, "The sky is blue." Yet, Heidegger contends, the use of "is" makes also manifest that in every way of comporting oneself toward entities as beings, there lies a priori a problem, even an enigma. For the very fact that we already live in some understanding of Being and that nevertheless the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary to raise this question again. Heidegger concludes these reflections with the observation that by considering these prejudices it has become clear not only that the question ofthe meaning ofBeing Iacks every answer, but also that the question itself still Iacks direction. If the question is to be asked again, we must fitst try to work out an adequate way of formulating it. (SZ, 4)
27Cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, On the Truth of Being. Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, pp. 45-72. 28Cf. B. Pascal, Penseeset Opuscules. Paris: Flammerion, 1913, p. 169.
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N: The Formal Structure ofthe Question ofBeing The question concerning the meaning of Being is to be formulated carefully. If it is a fundamental question, or perhaps even the fundamental question, it must be made transparent in an appropriate manner. In order to achieve this we must explain first very briefly what belongs to any question as such, so that from this general perspective the question of the meaning of Being can be made manifest as a very special question with its own distinctive character. Every question is a looking-for (Suchen). Every seeking is guided beforehand by what is thought. Every inquiry is an understanding seeking for a being with regard to the fact that it is and with respect to what it is. This understanding seeking can take the form of an explicit investigation (ein Untersuchen); this term should be taken here as a process that lays bare what the question is about and determines it. Now, any inquiry, as an inquiry about something, has its own that which is asked about (sein Gefragtes). But all inquiry is also somehow a questioning of something (ein Anfragen bei); so in addition to what is asked about, every inquiry alsohasthat which is interrogated (ein Befragtes). Furthermore, in what is asked about there lies also that which is to be found out by the asking (das Erfragte); this is what really is intended in the question; with this the inquiry reaches its goal. If one wishes to know something about the energy state of an electron (that which is to be found out by the question), I must turn to an examination of certain spectra (that which is interrogated); that which is asked about is the electron. In our case, the question about the meaning of Being is to be formulated. We must therefore discuss it with an eye to these three same structural elements of every inquiry. Inquiry is here too a kind of seeking; it must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already somehow be available to us. We always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being. Out of this implicit understanding arise both the explicit question about the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us toward its conception. We do not really know what Being is. But if we ask "What is Being?", we keep within an understanding of the "is" even though we are unable to fix conceptually what this "is" signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which this meaning is to be grasped and determined. But this vague and average understanding of Being is still a fact. However much this understanding of Being may fluctuate and grow ever dimmer, its very indefiniteness is itself
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a positive phenomenon which needs to be clarified. An investigation of the meaning of Being cannot be expected to give us this clarification already at the very beginning. If we want to obtain the clue that we need for our interpretation of this average understanding of Being, we must first develop this initial concept of Being. In light of this initial concept and the ways in which it may be explicitly understood, we can then make out what this obscured and still unilluminated understanding of Being really means, and what kind of obscuration of the meaning of Being is possible and perhaps even inevitable. Furthermore, this vague average understanding of Being may be so infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about Being that these remain hidden as the proper sources of the prevailing understanding. What we seek when we inquire into Being is not so mething entirely unfamiliar, even if in the beginning we cannot yet grasp it at all conceptually. In our question concerning the meaning of Being, that which is asked about is Being itself; it is that which determines beings as beings, that in the direction of which (woraufhin) beings are always already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of the beings is not itself a being. If we are to understand the problern of the meaning of Being, our first philosophical step consists not in telling stories; that is to say, we cannot define beings as beings merely by tracing them back to their origin, to some other being, as if Being had the character of some possible being. Hence Being as that which is asked about must be exhibited in a way of its own; it must be essentially different from the way in which the beings are discovered. Accordingly, what is to be found out by the asking-the meaning of Being-also demands that it be conceived of in a way of its own; we must determine it conceptually in a way that essentially contrasts with the concepts in which the beings acquire their determinate signification and meaning. Now, ifit is true that Being constitutes what is asked about, and Being means the Being of beings, then the beings themselves appear to be what is to be interrogated. They are, so to speak, questioned with respect to their Being. But therefore it is necessary that .these beings must, on their part, have become accessible to us just as they are in themselves. Now there are many things which we designate as beings, and we do so even in various senses. Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything to which we comport ourselves in any way, is a being or is a set of beings. What we are ourselves is also a being. In which beings now is the meaning of
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Being to be discerned? Can we just choose a set of beings or does some particular being have priority when we ask the question concerning the meaning of Being? Which being shall we select as our guiding clue and in what sense does it have priority in this regard? If the question about the meaning of Being is to be formulated explicitly and developed in such a way that it becomes completely transparent, then any treatment of the kind we have in mind, would require us to explain how Being is looked at, how its meaning is to be understood. Looking-at-something, understanding and grasping it-all these ways of behaving are constitutive of this kind of inquiry and, therefore, also of the modes of Being ofthat particular being that we who ask the question, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of the meaning of Being adequately, we must make this being, the inquirer, transparent in his or her own mode of Being. The very asking of the question itself is a mode of Being of a determinate being; and as such this being gets its essential character from what is inquired about, namely Being itself. This beingwhich each of us is hirnself or herself and which includes "inquiring into the meaning of Being" as one of the possibilities of its own mode of Being, we shall indicate from now on with the term Dasein, "Therebeing." Thus if we want to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explanation of this being mentioned, namely Dasein, with regard to its own mode of Being. (SZ, 5-7)
V: The Ontological Priority of the Question ofBeing Until now, Heidegger continues, we have tried to show that the question concerning the meaning of Being is to be asked again and formulated more carefully with the help of arguments that are justified by Being's venerable origin, by the lack of a definitive answer, and even by the question itself. One will ask now what purpose this question is supposed to serve. Is it a liiere matter of pure speculation, or is it rather of all questions both the most basic and the most concrete? Being is always the Being of beings. The totality of beings can, in accordance with its various domains, become a field of scientific investigation. Every science, however, actually has its crisis in its basic concepts. Among the various disciplines everywhere today there are freshly awakened tendencies to put the relevant research on new foundations. This is so for mathematics, physics, biology, the
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human sciences, and even theology. This research on the foundations of the different sciences is the main task of the various corresponding regional ontologies. Now it is evident that these regional ontologies remain themselves naive and opaque if in their research into the Being of the different beings in question, they fail to discuss the meaning of Being in general. The question of the meaning of Being therefore aims at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine the beings as beings of such and such a type and, in so doing, operate with an understanding of Being in advance, but also for the possibility of those regional ontologies themselves which are prior to those ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly constructed a system of categories it may have at its disposal, remains blind and misguided in its basic aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. (SZ, 8-11) In the preceding reflections it was said that every science has the manner of Being which that being has that we ourselves are. This being we have denoted by the term "Dasein." Scientific research now is not the only manner of Being which this being can have, nor is it the most fundamental and original manner of Being of Dasein. On the other hand, Dasein is a being which does not just occur among other beings. It is precisely as being distinguished from all other beings by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue and a task for it. This implies that Dasein constitutively has a relationship to that Being; this relationship, however, is not a relationship constituted in and by our knowledge only, but a relationship of Being (ein Seinsverhältnis). Thus there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its mode of Being, and to some degree it does so even explicitly. It is peculiar to this being that with and through its own mode of Being this Being that is proper to it is disclosed to Dasein itself. The understanding of Being thus is a definite characteristic of Dasein's mode of Being. One could then say that Dasein itself is precisely as being pre-ontological: it is in such a way that it always already has some understanding of Being. This mode of Being that is proper and characteristic of Dasein and towards which Dasein in one way or another always comports itself, we call eksistence. Thus it will be clear at once that our radical investigation concerning a possible answer to the question about the meaning of Being, and also every regional ontology, must take its point of departure from a fundamental ontology and that this
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fundamental ontology must have the form of an eksistential analytic of the mode of Being of Dasein. For, if to interpret the meaning of Beingis our task, then Dasein is not only the primary being to be interrogated; but it is also that being which already comports itself, in its own mode of Being, towards that which we are asking about, when we raise the question. But in that case the question concerning the meaning of Being is nothing but the radicalization of the essential tendency-toward-Being (Seinstendenz) which belongs to Dasein itself as such, namely its preontological understanding ofBeing. (SZ, 12-15)
VI: Man's Radical Comprehension of Being Summarizing the preceding reflections one could perhaps say that man has always some comprehension of Being, even before he asks the question concerning the meaning of Being. No matter how dark Being itself may be to us, still in our most casual interaction with other beings, they are sufficiently open to us so that we may experience that they are, concern ourselves about what they are and how they are, concern ourselves about the truth of them. We camprehend somehow what makes them be what they are, and this is their Being. Every sentence that we utter contains an "is." Our very moods reveal to us that each of us "is" in such and such a way. We must camprehend then, no matter how obscurely, what this "is" means, eise all this would have no meaning. This radical comprehension of Being, however, even if undeniable, is notforthat reason articulated by means of any clear concept. It is still pre-conceptual and for the most part undetermined; therefore it is inevitably vague. If one maintains that all knowledge is conceptual, then even though beings may be known, the mode of Being through which they are what they are, and which man comprehends, still remains unknown. Finally, this preconceptual comprehending of Being is unquestioning; for the Being that thus yields itself, is so obvious that it calls no attention to itself and, thus, raises no questions. Vague, undefined, unquestioning, the comprehension of Being is nevertheless an irreducible fact which the ontological research accepts in order to be able to begin. 29 As a matter of fact, it is our pre-conceptual comprehension of Being, even though it itself is unquestioning, that makes the beingquestion possible. For to question is to search, and every search is 29KM, pp. 204-205; SZ, 5.
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polarized by its end-term. One could not ask, then, what Being means, unless one somehow comprehended the answer already. The task of pursuing the Being-question, then, is reduced to this: what is the essence of the comprehension of Being that is rooted so deeply in man. 30 It is this comprehension of Being that for Heidegger most profoundly characterizes the human reality. "Man is a being who is immersed among beings in such a way that the beings which he is not, as weil as the being that he hirnself is, have already become constantly manifest to him .... "3 1 This fact explains why Heidegger prefers to designate the questioner who questions Being by a term that suggests this unique prerogative which distinguishes it from all other beings, namely its comprehension of Being as such: Dasein, There-being, the presence and openness among beings. Dasein must here be understood completely ontologically and not just anthropologically. The analytic of Dasein is not meant primarily to say something about the human reality, but ratherabout its comprehension of Being and about Being itself. Dasein is to be understood as an irruption (Einbruch) into the totality of beings by reason of which these beings as beings may become manifest. "On the basis of this comprehension of Being, man is There through whose Being the revealing irruption among beings takes place .... "32 In other words, Dasein is the "There" of Being among beingsDasein Iets beings be, it manifests them, thereby making all encounter with them possible. lt follows then that, correlative to the referential dependence of Dasein on beings, there is a dependence of beings on Dasein in order that they may be manifest. In letting things be manifest, however, Dasein obviously does not create them; Dasein merely discovers them as what they are. Although in the first sections of Being and Time Heidegger does not explicitly state the relationship between Dasein and Being, it is nonetheless clear from other publications of the same period that Dasein is merely the "place" where Being itself manifests itself in the concrete form of world and that it is Being as world that in the final analysis lets the beings be manifest as what they in fact are. Yet Being cannot let the beings be what they are, if it were not for the Dasein of man.
30KM:, p. 207; sz, 5, 7. 31KM:, p. 205. 32KM, p. 206.
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Now if it is by the irruption of Dasein among the beings that these beings become manifest, then it is not difficult to understand how Dasein lets these beings be (seinlassen). In letting them be manifest, Dasein liberates them from concealment and, hence, makes them free. It is perhaps important to note here that Dasein is not identical with man, although the relationship between them is very intimate. Dasein is the ontological structure of man taken in its intrinsic finitude. This structure will be explained in one of the chapters to follow. 33 33Richardson, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
CHAPrERIII THE TWOFOLD TASK IN WORKING OUT THE QUESTION OF BEING. REFLECTIONS ON METHOD. (Being and Time, Sections 5-7, pp. 15-39)
I: The Analytic ofDasein is to Make Manifest the Horizon for an Interpretation of the Meaning ofßeing as Such In the preceding reflections, Heidegger continues, we have indicated the tasks that are implied in the careful formulation of the Being question; we have shown there not only that we must determine which being is to serve as our primary subject of investigation, but also that the right way of access to this being must be secured. We have already indicated which being must have the privileged part in our examination of the question concerning the meaning of Being; we must therefore now turn to the question of how we are to conceive of this being; how are we to approach it and how are we to interpret its meaning? Wehave shown that Dasein both ontically and ontologically has priority here; this may have suggested to some that Dasein must be that being which is also given as ontically and ontologically prior, not only in the sense that it itself can be grasped immediately, but also in the sense that the mode of Being that is characteristic of it is presented as equally immediate. Ontically, Dasein obviously is close to us; it is even that which is closest to us, because we are it, each of us. But because of this it is also that being that ontologically is farthest from us. It is true that its ownmost Beingis suchthat it has an understanding ofthat Being; in each case Dasein maintains itself as if its Being has already been interpreted in some way. But this pre-ontological understanding cannot be taken over as an ontological guiding clue, for there is no guarantee that this way of understanding its Being is that which also will emerge when one's ownmost mode of Being is considered ontologically. For the kind of Being that belongs to Dasein is rather such that, in understanding its own Being pre-ontologically, it has the tendency to understand itself in terms ofthat being to which it constantly comports itself, namely the world. In Dasein's own understanding of its Being, the manner
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in which the world is understood is reflected back ontologically upon the way in which Dasein itself becomes interpreted. We shall substantiate this latter claim in due time. (SZ, 15-16) Thus although Dasein is ontically and ontologically in a privileged position with respect to the Being-question, its own mode of Being, its own categorial structure, remains at first concealed from it. This explains why a thorough, philosophical interpretation of this being will be confronted with peculiar difficulties which have nothing to do with limits imposed upon our cognitive powers or with the lack of a suitable way of conceiving it; rather these difficulties are grounded in the kind of Being which belongs to this being. But it is not only the case that Dasein always already has some understanding of its Being; this understanding also grows or deteriorates along with the kind of Being that Dasein in each case possesses. The mode of Being of Dasein has been interpreted in many ways. Furthermore, its way of behavior, its capacities, powers, possibilities, and vicissitudes have been studied by different sciences: philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, political science, poetry, biography, and the science "history," and each of them has done so in its own way. Assuming that these approaches indeed did start from experiences that in the full sense of the term can be called existentiell, then the question still must be asked whether these interpretations of the mode of Being of Dasein were carried through with the corresponding primordial existentiality. For it is one thing to take one's point of departure from experiences that in each case were genuine experiences of an eksisting Dasein; it is quite another thing to interpret the mode of Being so revealed with the help of the proper categories, i.e., in the case of eksisting Dasein, the proper eksistentials. The pre-ontological existentiell interpretation of the mode of Being of Dasein must become the subject matter of an eksistential analytic of man's mode of Being as Dasein. Our ontological interpretation of the mode of Being of Dasein will be justified eksistentially only if the basic structures of Dasein have been worked out with an explicit orientation toward the question of Being itself. (SZ, 16) Thus as far as the question of Being is concerned an analytic of Dasein's mode of Being must remain our first task. But the problern of securing the proper access which will lead to Dasein's Being becomes even more urgent. We cannot just dogmatically construct what we take to be the Being of Dasein, nor can we force any categories upon Dasein which such an idea might suggest. We must rather choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation
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that this being can show itself in itself and from itself. (SZ, 16; cf. 28, 34) But this means that we must show it first in the way it is proximally and for the most part, i.e., in its average everydayness. In our investigations we must focus on those essential structures which in every kind of Being that each factical Dasein may possess in each case, persist as determinative for the character of its Being. In this way it will be possible to bring the mode of Being of Dasein to light, albeit also only in a provisional manner. (SZ, 16-17) It should be noted that such an analytic of Dasein's mode of Being remains oriented completely toward our main task, namely of working out the question concerning the meaning of Being. Thus no complete ontology of Dasein is envisaged here, nor some kind of philosophical anthropology. But this investigation is not only incomplete, it is also still provisional. It merely brings out the mode of Being of this being without interpreting its meaning yet. It is rather a preparatory procedure which is to make manifest the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Dasein's Being. In other words once the preparatory analytic of Dasein has been completed it will have to be repeated on an authentically ontological basis. (SZ, 17) Heidegger next explains that for him the meaning of the Being ofthat beingwhich he has called Dasein is tobe found in temporality. If we are to demonstrate that this is indeed the case, then all the structures which we shall discover in the preparatory analytic will have to be re-interpreted as modes of temporality. This will be the task of the second major division of part I of Being and Time. Conceiving of the mode of Being of man in terms of temporality and by claiming that Dasein is time, we still have not yet found an answer to the question concerning the meaning of Being itself, but we certainly will have provided in this way the ground for obtaining such an answer. (SZ, 17) We have already indicated, Heidegger continues, that Dasein has a pre-ontological mode of Being as its ontic basic structure. Dasein is in such a way that it is something that understands something like Being. In the reflections to follow we hope to show that any time Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being it does so with time as its standpoint. Thus we must bring time to light as the horizon for all understanding of Being. In other words, time must be unfolded primordially as the horizon for every understanding of Being and it must in addition be explicated in terms of temporality which is the mode of Being of Dasein that understands Being. It stands to reason that the conception of time
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that will be obtained in this way must be distinguished from our everyday conception of time as weil as from the philosophical conceptions of time that have been maintained from Aristotle to Bergson. Thus it will be our task also to explain how the ordinary conception of time and the traditional philosophical concepts of time developed from original temporality. (SZ, 17-18) For many centuries one has used time as a criterion for naively distinguishing various realms of beings. We make a distinction between temporal beings such as natural and historical entities, nontemporal beings such as spatial and numerical relationships, and supra-temporal or eternal entities. We are used to contrasting the timeless meaning of the proposition with the temporal course of our propositional assertions. Thus time, in the sense of "Being in time," has functioned in the West often as a criterion for distinguishing various realms of beings. Yet until now no one seems to have asked the question of why time has come to have this distinctive ontological function. Heidegger is thus fully aware of the fact that in contrast to the commonly held view his own treatment of the question of the meaning of Being must show "that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained," and why this is the case. (SZ, 40; cf. 18) But if Being is to be conceived in terms of time, and if its various modes and derivatives must become intelligible in their respective modifications and derivations by taking time into consideration, then Being itself is made visible in its "temporal" character. Yet, as we have indicated already, in that case the talk is about Being, not the beings, and "temporal" no Ionger just means "being in time." From this point of view even the non-temporal and the supra-temporal must then be temporal in their mode of Being. But be this as it may, the manner in which Being and its various modes have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, will be called Being's temporal determinateness. Thus the fundamental ontological task of interpreting the meaning of Being as such implies that we work out the temporality of Being so that the question concerning the meaning of Being will first be answered concretely in the exposition ofthe problematic oftemporality. (SZ, 18-19) The question concerning the meaning of Being cannot be answered with the help of some isolated statement. The question must be considered in its entire historical context so that the answer can make full use of the possibilities which the ancient philosophers have made ready for us already. Finally, if the answer to the question of the meaning of Being is to provide us with a clue for our
REFLECTIONS ON METROD own research in fundamental ontology, it cannot be adequate until we have been brought to the insight that the specific kind of Being characteristic of the ontology of the past, has been made necessary by the character proper to Dasein. (SZ, 19) li: Heidegger's Concern with Method
We have seen that Heidegger was concerned with methodological issues from the very beginning of his career. This interest led him in 1909 to Husserl's phenomenology which in turn still may have enhanced his concern with methodology. When Heidegger in 1909 started to read Husserl's Logical Investigations he had hoped that Husserl's phenomenology would help him solve the problern which the study of Brentano's book on Aristotle had raised for him: If that which is in Being has several meanings (on, ens), what then does Being itself mean in its unity (einai, esse)? Yet when Heidegger began to realize that Husserl had made a turn from his original "realism" in the direction of a form of transeendental idealism, it was clear to him that the phenomenological method would have to be rethought rather thoroughly. It was also soon obvious to him that Husserl's concern with transeendental subjectivity would not help him at all solve the Being-question, but rather would bar the way to approaching this all important issue. Instead of focusing all its attention on consciousness, phenomenology, in his view, would have to focus on aletheia, the process of discovering, "truth." His study of Jaeger's book on Aristotle's development and the subsequent study of the works of Aristotle set him on that path. In chapter I we have seen that in 1911 Heidegger had had plans to go to Göttingen to study with Husserl, but financial difficulties prevented him from doing so. Luckily for Heidegger in 1916 Husserl hirnself moved to Freiburg. Heidegger immediately established contact with him and began to work with him closely. Yet in his own courses almost from the beginning Heidegger began to employ a conception of phenomenology that was notably different from that developed by Husserl. In all of these courses Heidegger used a phenomenological method even though these courses were concerned with the thought of Parmenides, Kant, Fichte, 19th century philosophy, etc. After World War I, Heidegger resumed teaching and lectured on St. Paul, St. Augustine, and above all on Aristotle. In these courses again a phenomenological method was used between 1919 and 1929. Yet as far as we know between 1916 and 1925 no official account of this method was ever presented.
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In his published work, Heidegger mentioned the phenomenological method for the first time in Being and Time. When one year before his death The Basic Problems of Phenomenology appeared (in 1975) it became clear that in 1927 Heidegger had discussed the method of phenomenology in that work as well, but in a manner that is notably different from the one used in Being and Time. But what is most remarkable hereisthat in both works, Being and Time and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger gives us only a preliminary explanation of phenomenology and in both cases he also promises to present us with a definitive and systematic treatise on phenomenology, in each case to be developed toward the end of each work. Yet in both cases we only have the preliminary treatise on phenomenology, but not the full-fledged account. We do not know what the content ofthe systematic treatise on phenomenology promised in Being and Time would have been. As far as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is concerned, we have at least the titles of the part on phenomenology as well as the titles of its four main chapters; for these have been included in the "Outline of the Course." The section tobe devoted to phenomenology was entitled: "The Scientific Method of Ontology and the Idea of Phenomenology." This section was tobe divided into 4 chapters: 1) The Ontical Foundation of Ontology: the Analytic of Dasein as Fundamental Ontology. 2) The A Priori Character of Being and the Possibility and Structure of A Priori Knowledge. 3) The Basic Components of the Phenomenological Method: Reduction, Construction, Destruction. 4) Phenomenological Ontology and the Concept of Philosophy.l It should be noted that although the conceptions of phenomenology explained in both works are quite different from one another, there nonetheless is no contradiction. The method described in Being and Time is the method of fundamental ontology which has the character of an analytic of the mode of Being of Dasein; on the other hand, the method described in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is the method of ontology proper. This latter conception of phenomenology was later given up by Heidegger. Finally, in 1979 a lecture course was published which Heidegger had delivered in 1925 when he was already deeply involved in the actual writing of Being and Time. The book contains the first "outline" of the content of Being and Time. 2 This part of the book is lMartin Heidegger, The BasicProblems of Phenomenology, pp. 23-24. 2Martin Heidegger, History ofthe Concept ofTime. Prolegomena, pp. 135-320.
REFLECTIONS ON METROD preceded by a long preparatory part, entitled "Meaning and Task of Phenomenological Research"3 which itself is still preceded by a very short Introduction which explains the title of the course, the subject matter to be treated, and the roethod to be used. His treatise on phenomenology proper consists of three long chapters. Heidegger first describes there the origin and first developroent of phenomenological research. He then discusses the fundamental discoveries of phenomenology, namely intentionality, the categorial intuition (kategoriale Anschauung), and the original meaning of the term "a priori." Heidegger next gives a brief explanation of the name of phenomenology and explains its basic principles. Finally, in a third chapter he subjects Husserl's conception of the phenomenological roethod and phenomenology itself to a radical criticism. In Heidegger's opinion, the basic weakness of Husserl's phenomenology consists in the fact that the mode of Being of consciousness was never systematically exaroined, that the mode of Being of that which is intended was misinterpreted, and finally that the question concerning the meaning of Being was never explicitly asked and discussed.4 After these very brief and schematic observations on the historical side of Heidegger's concern with method and methodology, we must now again return to Being and Time.
lll: The Character of Being and Time's Section on Method Wehave seen that Being and Time begins with an introduction which is similar to the introductions found in many classical treatises on metaphysics. The book opens with a brief description of the task to be accomplished, the road to be taken, and a provisional division of the subject matter. The goal to be achieved in the book is a critical reflection on the question concerning the meaning of Being in light of an interpretation of time as the transeendental horizon for the question of Being. (SZ, l, 39) Since Beingis always the Being of beings, the question concerning the meaning of Being is to be approached by means of a careful study of the mode of Being of a particular kind of being. In view of the fact that some comprehension of Being is already implied in the mode of Being ofthat being
3Jbid., pp. 13-131. 4[bid., pp. 90-131.
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which asks the question, namely Dasein, it is the Being of Dasein which is tobe examined first. (SZ, 5-15) As far as the road to be taken is concerned, Beidegger makes two suggestions. The first recommends a "destructive retrieve"5 of the metaphysical tradition; the other states that "hermeneutic phenomenology" is the method of ontology. If one considers these suggestions concerning the method to be employed, it is clear that they, too, are similar to the Suggestions on method made by Descartes, Kant, Regel, and Busserl. Analysis of Beidegger's text reveals that this similarity is, indeed, intended, although one should be aware of the fact that the concrete suggestions made in each case are fundamentally different from what these other authors have proposed in this regard, although there is in each case an important element of agreement, also. From the way Beidegger determines both subject matter and method of ontology it is clear that he is trying to find and justify a personal stance in regard to the entire philosophical tradition. In the manner of the Westerntradition since Plato, Beidegger subscribes to the view that ontology is a science. Like Descartes he defines the scientificity of ontology by means of the method to be employed. 6 With the entire modern tradition he admits that in a science, that which counts is not what other thinkers have already thought, but that which can be methodically justified in regard to the "things themselves" tobe studied in that science.7 Heidegger even seems to join Descartes, Kant, and Busserl in their negative evaluation of philosophy's history, when he speaks about the need for a destruction of the traditional content of ancient ontology.B (SZ, 22) Finally, 5Following Richardson I translate Wiederholung as re-trieve or retrieve. Cf. Richardson, op. cit., p. 89. 6Rene Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule IV, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, 2 vols. New York: Dover Publications, 1931, vol. I, p. 9. 1Jbid., Rule III, p. 5. Bcf. Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences, Part I, op. cit., pp. 85-87; Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation I, op. cit., pp. 144ff.; Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis White Beck. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950, pp. 3ff.; Edmund Husserl, Philosophy as Rigorous Science, in Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer. New York: Rarper and Row, 1965, pp. 7lff.; ldeas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982, pp. 33-48.
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Heidegger is deeply aware of the intimate relationship between method and subject matter in ontology and, thus, seems to subscribe to the view that it is incorrect to conceive of method in a purely instrumental fashion. This intimate relationship appears to imply that the explication of the immediately given is to be mediated by what is already somehow implicitly contained in what is given immediately, without, however, being explicitly thematized there. (SZ, 15ff., 7f., 152f., 314f.)9 Yet at the same time Heidegger makes it abundantly clear that he does not share any of these views without major modifications. Ontology is a "science", indeed, but it is a science whose scientificity has nothing in common with either the formal or the empirical sciences.IO Secondly, although it is true that as a science ontology is to be defined in its scientificity by means of the method to be employed, yet this method cannot possibly be conceived of as consisting in deduction (Descartes) or description (Husserl). Rather this method is to be conceived of as being both transeendental and hermeneutic.ll It is true, also, that no philosopher canthink without both explicitly standing in a tradition and taking a critical stance in regard tothat tradition. Yet this critical attitude is not a rejection of the tradition, but rather a "destructive retrieve" of what was worth being thought about in that tradition. (SZ, 22)12 Finally, although it is true that method and content are intimately intertwined in ontology and that the mediation of the immediately given presupposes that what guides the explication takes its clues from what is already somehow present in the immediately given, the latter is not to be found in some anticipation of Hegel's absolute Truth, but rather in the finite "truth of Being" which functions as the necessary synthesis a priori in all finite understanding. If these reflections are correct, it is obvious that the destructive retrieve and the phenomenological method cannot be taken to be independent and unrelated procedures; rather both procedures belong intimately together13 and the one (hermeneutic phenom9 Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. Baillie. London: Allen & Unwin, 1964, Introduction, pp. 131ff. lOMartin Heidegger, The BasicProblems of Phenomenology, pp. 1-4, 11-15. llMartin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 211·255; cf. SZ, 37-8.
12Cf. The Basic Problems, pp. 21-23. 13Jbid., pp. 19-23. Heidegger characterizes phenomenology here with the help of the following three Iabels: reduction (the turn from a being toward its Being),
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enology) cannot possibly achieve its goal without the other (destructive retrieve). Just as hermeneutic phenomenology is the methodical development of what is constitutive of Dasein's understanding as such (SZ, 142-153), so destructive retrieve is no more than the methodical correlate of the retrieve which is constitutive ofDasein's search for its authentic self. (SZ, 316-323)
W: Destructive Retrieve and Hermeneutic Phenomenology In the Introduction to Being and Time, after indicating that ontology is concerned with the Being question and is to be prepared by a fundamental ontology which takes the concrete form of an analytic of Dasein's Being, Heidegger turns next to the question concerning "the right way of access" to the primary subject of investigation, namely Dasein. He stresses the point that this problern is a very difficult one, because Dasein is to be taken as something already accessible to itself and as something yet to be understood. We must thus be able to explain how and why Dasein itself can be grasped immediately, although the kind of Being which it possesses is not to be presented just as immediately, but is to be mediated by explanation and interpretation. (SZ, 15) Dasein is in such a way that it is capable of understanding its own Being; yet it has the tendency to do so in terms of those beings toward which it comports itself proximally. And this means that its "categorial structure" remains to some degree concealed. Thus the philosophical interpretation of Dasein's Being is confronted with very peculiar difficulties. Furthermore, Dasein has been made the subject of both philosophical and scientific investigations. Thus there are already many ways in which Dasein has been interpreted. It is not clear how all of these interpretations can go together. This complexity makes the problern of securing the right access which will lead to Dasein's Being even a more burning one. W e have no right to resort dogmatically to constructions and to apply just any idea of Being to Dasein, however self-evident such an idea may be, nor may any of the "categories" which such an idea prescribes be forced upon Dasein without proper ontological consideration. (SZ, 16) construction (the projection of a pre-given being upon its Being and its structures), and destruction (the critical analysis of the concepts which are handed down to us, in light of the original sources from which they have been derived). It is important to note that in this work which is not concerned with fundamental ontology, the term "hermeneutic" is not mentioned.
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1. Destructive Retrieve. In Heidegger's view temporality constitutes the meaning of Dasein's Being. (SZ, 17ff.) Temporality is also the condition which makes historicity possible as a temporal mode of Beingwhich Dasein itself possesses. Historicity stands here for the state of Being which is constitutive for Dasein's coming-topass as such. Dasein is as it already was and it is what it already was. Dasein is its past, not only in the sensethat it possesses its own past as a kind of property which is still present-at-hand; Dasein is its past particularly in the way of its own Being which comes-ta-pass out of its future on each occasion. Regardless of how Dasein is at a given time or how it may conceive of Being, it has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself; in terms of this tradition it understands itself proximally and, to some degree at least, constantly. Its own past, which includes the past of its generation, is thus not something which just follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead ofit. (SZ, 19f.; cf. 372ff.) But if Dasein itself as weil as its own understanding are intrinsically historical, then the inquiry into the meaning of Being is to be characterized by historicity as well. The ownmost meaning of Being which belongs to the inquiry into Being as an historical inquiry, points to the necessity of inquiring into the history ofthat inquiry itself. Thus in working out the question concerning the meaning of Being one must take heed of this pointing, so that by positively making the past his own, he may bring hirnself into full possession of the very possibility of such inquiry. When a philosopher turns to philosophy's own history he must realize that this tradition constitutes that from which he thinks as well as that from which he, to some degree at least, must try to get away. Yet Dasein is inclined to fall prey to its tradition. This tradition often keeps it from providing its own guidance whether in inquiring or in choosing. When a tradition overpowers one's own thinking it often conceals what it really tried to transmit. Dasein has the tendency to take what the tradition hands down to it as being selfevident. This blocks the access to those primordial sources from which the categories, concepts, and views handed down have been drawn. Dasein is in fact so caught in its own tradition that in philosophy it often confines its interest to the multiformity of the available standpoints of philosophical inquiry; but by this interest it seeks to hide the fact that it has no ground ofits own to stand on. The state in which philosophy's concern about the Being question finds itselftoday, is the clearest evidence of this tendency.
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Thus in the inquiry of the question concerning the meaning of Being one has to have a ground of his own and yet one's thought must carefully heed its own philosophical tradition. Both these demands are met in the "destructive retrieve." One must "destroy" in the tradition what is philosophically unjustifiable and maintain those primordial experiences from which any genuine philosophical insights ultimately flow. The meaning of the retrieve is not to shake off the philosophical tradition, but to stake out the positive possibilities of a tradition and keep it within its proper limits. (SZ, 2023) By the re-trieving of a fundamental problern we understand the disclosure of its original potentialities that long have lain hidden. By the elaboration of the potentialities, the problern is transformed and is thus for the first time in its intrinsic content conserved. To conserve a problem, however, means to retain free and awake all those inner forces that render this problern in its fundamental essence possible.14 It is obvious that in these reflections Heidegger takes a critical stance with respect to Descartes, Kant, and Husserl whose positions in regard to the philosophical tradition are too negative. In this regard Heidegger's position is closer to that adopted by Hegel. The only point in which he does not follow Hegel in this respect consists in the fact that Hegel saw the various philosophical perspectives developed in the past as elements of an organic unity or system and that, thus, some form of necessity is constitutive for "the life of the Whole." In Heidegger's view, philosophy's history does not bind the philosopher who lives today with the necessity of the unbreakable laws of the Hegelian dialectic; rather, the philosophical tradition, like every other form of tradition, delivers and liberates man. The answer to a philosophically relevant question consists in man's authentic response to what in philosophy's history is already on the way to him. Such a response implies, at the same time, his willingness to Iisten to what is already said and the courage to take distance from what he has heard. This makes a certain criticism of the past necessary in philosophy. Yet such a criticism should not be understood as a break with the past, nor as a repudiation of philosophy's history, but as its adoption in the form of a transformation and adaptation to the requirements of the world in which we live and of what in this world has been handed down to us. Heidegger, thus, does not deny the necessity to re-think every l4Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 242-243; William J. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 90-93.
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"experience," to mediate it and transcend it. Yet he does deny that this should be done from the perspective of the absolute knowledge of the Absolute. In his opinion, each "experience" is to be mediated from the perspective of Being. It is in this finite perspective that man understands his own Being in its full potentialities so that he can compare each mode of Being, present in each "experience," with the whole of possibilities and thus understand its genuine, limited meaning. Furthermore, it is within this finite perspective that one can "let things be seen from themselves andin themselves," because within this perspective, by projecting the things upon this a priori synthesis, one can show them in their full potentialities so that the concrete mode of givenness as found in a given "experience" can appear in its true and limited sense.15 Reidegger obviously maintains that the philosophical reflection should be methodical and critical. Although he rejects presuppositionlessness (Russerl) and absoluteness (Regel), he does not reject method and rigor. The first, last, and constant task of our philosophical reflection is never to allow our pre-judgments to be dominated by merely arbitrary conceptions, but rather to make the relevant themes secure scientifically by working out our anticipatory conceptions in terms of "the things themselves." (SZ, 153) In other words, the destructive retrieve is guided by a hermeneutic phenomenology which in each case allows for a careful comparison of the claims made by thinkers of the past with the "things" to be reflected upon.1 6 I shall return to the relationship between retrieve and phenomenology in section 5. 2. Phenomenology: The Method of Ontology. From Reidegger's own development, as witnessed by his earliest publications (19121927), Being and Time, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, it is clear that he had a solid knowledge of the history of philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus, Suarez, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Regel, the entire neo-Kantian tradition, Russerl). We may thus expect that as far as the question concerning the method of ontology is concerned, section 7 of Being and Time contains a systematic attempt to determine ontology's method in reference to the authors just mentioned. Yet, at first sight at least, this expectation is not fulfilled. Section 7 makes the impression of not being thought-out as carefully as many other 15Cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, The World in Science and Philosophy, pp. 23ff. 16The BasicProblems of Phenomenology, pp. 19-23.
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sections of the book. The conception of phenomenology is explained not with reference to Regel or Husserl, but merely with the help of some brief comments on the expression phenomenon and logos of which the compound expression consists. On the other hand, Heidegger states explicitly that section 7 gives no more than a provisional characterization of the method which is to be reexamined and further developed at a later stage. (SZ, 28, 34, 34 7) Upon closer investigation, however, it becomes clear that this first impression is unjustified and that the Introduction to Being and Time contains all the information on ontology's method which may be Iegitimately expected at that stage of the investigation. Yet it is undoubtedly important that any commentary on the introductory reflections on method carefully heeds all the methodological reflections which in harmony with the eirewar character of all ontological investigation, are found on many pages of the book and other related works of the same period. In Heidegger's opinion the question of the "right approach" is a very important one in ontology. (SZ, 15-16) Ontology must deal with its subject matter by employing the phenomenological method. The concept "phenomenology" is no more than a methodological concept: it does not characterize the subject matter of ontology, but merely the manner in which ontology must treat its subject matter. What is meant by phenomenology can be explained by means of a reference to the maxim: Zu den Sachen selbst. Thus Heidegger points to Husserl for a first specification of the method of ontology. In Heidegger's interpretation Husserl's maxim: To the things themselves, implies that ontology avoid all free-floating constructions, all artificial and accidental findings, all seemingly justified conceptions, and all adherence to pseudo-problems. Heidegger admits that this first characterization of the phenomenological method is almost trivial and that perhaps it can be applied to any method to be employed in any type of scientific research. It appears that Heidegger deliberately wished to keep his remarks on phenomenology as "formal" as possible in order to avoid giving the impression that the term "phenomenology" was to be taken to refer to a historical position in philosophy. In his view it is dangerous to seek help from methodological conceptions of the past. (SZ, 27) In his letter to Richardson (1962) Heidegger provides us with the following information. The concept of phenomenology contained in section 7 of Being and Time was prepared by the immediate experience of the phenomenological method which was provided to him through his conversations with Husserl. In the development
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which subsequently took place the two basic words of Greek thought: [ogos (to make manifest) and phainesthai (to show oneself) played an iroportant part. A careful study of some sections of the works of Aristotle had led him to the view that aletheuein is to be understood as a process of revealment and, correspondingly, that truth is to be characterized as non-concealment, to which all self-manifestation of beings pertains. Furthermore, it became clear to him also that the question about Being under the guise of presence is to be developed into the question about Beingin terms of its time-character. Once aletheia and ousia were re-interpreted in this manner, the meaning and scope of the principle of phenomenology became clear. The xnaxim "to the things themselves" does not refer to intentional consciousness or the transeendental ego; instead Being is to be the first and last "thing-itself' of thought. Meanwhile Husserl had developed his own conception of phenomenology as a distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte which leaves no room for the historicity of thought. Thus the Being-question, unfolded in Being and Time, had to part company with this philosophical position; yet the unfolding of that question was effected on the. basis of a more faithful adherence to the very principle of phenomenology as Husserl originally conceived it. Heidegger concludes his reflections with the remark that these developments constituted a tangled process which at that time was inscrutable even to himself.17 Thus from Being and Time as well as from his later reflections on the development of his work, it is clear that Heidegger felt that he should give tribute to Husserl, particularly to Husserl's original conception of phenomenology as contained in Logical Investigations;lB yet on the other hand, he makes it quite clear also that he had to take distance from Husserl's transeendental idealism, systematically developed in the first volume of Ideas. Thus he could write in Being and Time: "Our comments on the preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical trend. Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon its possibility." (SZ, 38) Anyone who subscribes to the historicity of all human thought and yet adheres to the view that in ontology all problems are to be examined in the light of "the things 17Letter to Richardson, pp. x-xvi. lBsz, 38 note; On Time and Being, pp. 74-82.
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themselves," will understand immediately that even the reflections on ontology's method necessarily imply the destructive retrieve. At this point it is tempting to subject the relationship between Husserl's and Heidegger's conceptions of phenomenology to careful scrutiny, but I have finally decided to refrain from any attempt in that direction in that it has become clear to me that it is totally impossible to do justiee to such an encompassing task within the eonfines of this ehapter.19 However, to clarify Heidegger's eonception of phenomenology it seems important to focus at least on one issue which occupies a central position in a comparison of hermeneutic phenomenology with transeendental phenomenology. For Husserl transeendental subjectivity is the universal constitutive force. Transeendental subjectivity performs the constitution and is at the same time the ground of everything that will be so constituted. "The phenomenological explication of this monadie ego-the problern of its constitution for itself-must in general inelude all problems of eonstitution. And in the final aeeounting this eonstitution of the self for the self eoineides with phenomenology as a whole."20 If all transeendental Being is really no more thari the life of the ego, the problern of Being's eonstitution eoineides with the self-eonstitution of the ego.21 Onee the eonstituting subjeet is understood exhaustively, everything eise is so understood as weil. Heidegger, on the other hand, does not subscribe to the view that the universal eonstituting foree is tobe found in the human subjeet; rather this foree is to be found in "the truth of Being," whereas Dasein merely plays a subordinate part in its eonstituting aehievement. Dasein is that in whieh the eonstitution eomes-to-pass. Thus for Heidegger the problern of man's understanding ultimately presupposes the eoming-to-pass of the eonstituting "truth of Being" in Dasein. In other words, the meaning of Being is not aceessible to 19Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 45-52, 85-92, 102-108, 123-126, 135-153, 200-236, passim; cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, A First Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967, pp. 330-334; Ludwig Landgrebe, Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, Hamburg: Schröder, 1949, pp. 83-100; Paul Ricoeur, Busserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967; "Phenomenologie et hermeneutique," in Man and World 7(1974) 223-255; Joseph J. Kockelmans, "World-Constitution. Reflections on Husserl's Transeendental Idealism," in Analeeta Husserliana 1(1971) 11-35. 20Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960, p. 68. 21Paul Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 113.
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transeendental subjectivity by means of the latter's constitutive selfdisclosure, but it must be "wrested" free and made explicit from the comprehension of Beingwhich comes-to-pass in Dasein's Being. (SZ, 36) Thus to explain something phenomenologically means to make it explicitly comprehensible by means of the a priori comprehension of Being through which Dasein understands Being unthematically. Ontological investigations must be oriented first toward a being, namely Dasein; but they must then be steered away from this being and led back to this being's Being. This step of the phenomenological method is called the phenomenological reduction. Yet this tuming away from being is still a negative step. In addition, a positive step is to be taken which has the character of an achievement. Being is not just found in beings as pebbles in a brook; it must be brought1 into view by means of a projection. To project a given being upon its Being and its structures is the task of the phenomenological construction. Such a projection presupposes that there is a transeendental a priori framework in which the projection can take place; this is the truth of Beingwhich comes-to-pass in an implicit form in the comprehension of Beingwhich is constitutive of Dasein's Being.22 The Being of being for Husserl is posited in the subject and by the subject, whereas the subject as transeendental is self-positing. For Heidegger, on the other hand, the Being of being is indeed posited in Dasein: "Only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible) 'is there' Being." (SZ, 212) Yet the Being ofbeing is not posited by Dasein, but by the truth of Beingwhich functions as the transeendental a priori synthesis.23 3. Phenomenon. Heidegger begins his own explanation of what is to be understood by phenomenology with the remark that the expression itself has two basic components: "phenomenon" and "Iogos." In his view a preliminary conception of phenomenology can be developed by characterizing what one means by the term's two components and by then establishing the meaning of the name in which these two components are put together. (SZ, 28) The concept of phenomenon is first determined purely formally as "that which shows itself," the manifest. Now a being can show itself in many ways, depending in each case on the kind of access one has to it. Furthermore, a being can show itself as something which in itself it is not. Then it Iooks like something eise; but it is not this 22The BasicProblems of Phenomenology, pp. 20-22. 23Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 45-52, 135-140, 185-203, and passim.
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME being. This kind of showing-itself is called semblance. It is important to observe that when phenomenon signifies "semblance," the primordial signification of the term (namely phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded. (SZ, 28f.) Both phenomenon and semblance must be distinguished from what is called appearance. When we speak about an "appearance" we arenot speaking about something which shows itself, but about something which announces itself in something eise which shows itself, although that which so appears does not show itself. Examples of appearances are for instance: symptoms, signs, symbols, etc. In this case, too, that which announces itself is never a phenomenon, although its appearing is possible only by reason of the showing itself of something eise and, thus, by reason of a phenomenon in the proper sense ofthe term. (SZ, 29-31) Until now we have limited ourselves merely to defining the purely formal meaning of the term phenomenon and distinguishing phenomenon from semblance and appearance. W e have not yet specified which entities we consider to be phenomena and have left open the question of whether what shows itself is a being or rather some characteristic which a being has as far as its Being is concerned. In order to be able to answer this question, Heidegger makes a distinction between the ordinary and the phenomenological conception of phenomenon, both of which are then defined with an explicit reference to Kant. Phenomenon in the ordinary sense is any being which is accessible to us through the "empirical intuition." Formulated again within the perspective of the Kantian framework the phenomenon in the phenomenological sense is that which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the phenomenon in the ordinary sense and as accompanying it in every case. Even though it shows itself unthematically, it can nonetheless be brought to show itself thematically. Thus the phenomena of phenomenology are those beings which show themselves in themselves, Kant's forms of intuition. In other words, the phenomena in the phenomenological sense refer to the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. (SZ, 31) In section 5 to come, I plan to clarify these references to Kant from Heidegger's own perspective. 4. Apophantic Logos and Truth. In the introduction to the section on method Heidegger stresses the point that the element "-logy" in the expression "phenomenology" refers to the scientific character of the investigation concerning phenomena. (SZ, 28) In an essay on method, therefore, the scientificity of phenomenology is to be
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Jllade thematic. One may thus say that phenomenology does not Jllerely indicate the approach to, but also the clarifying mode of determination of, the subject matter of ontology. In other words, two elements are contained in the concept of phenomenology: one dealing with the question of how the things are to be discovered and another concerned with the question of when such discovery may be taken tobe adequate, i.e., when a discovery may be taken tobe true. Thus we may expect that section 7B contains a provisional analysis of the concept of truth. To this end Heidegger tums toward Aristotle who in his opinion originally conceived of truth as the unhiddenness of what is present, its unveiling, its manifesting-itself.24 The analysis shows that the phenomenological conception of phenomenon implies a conception of truth which is notably different from the one found in Kant as weil as from that developed by Husserl. Heidegger contends that the classical definition of truth as agreement is concerned with a derivative conception of truth, whereas Husserl's thesis that truth is tobe defined in terms ofperfect, i.e., apodictic and adequate evidence,25 is unacceptable. (SZ, 212-230) Section 7B begins with a reference to the fact that for Plato and Aristotle the concept "logos" has many, competing significations, none of which at first sight seems to be primordial. And yet the term appears to have a basic meaning in light of which all other, derivative meanings can be understood. One could perhaps say that the basic signification of logos consists in articulating discourse (Rede). But such a translation remains unjustified as long as one is unable to determine precisely what is meant by this expression and indicate how from this basic meaning all other significations of the term can be derived. (SZ, 32) Logos is related to legein which means to make manifest what one is talking about. As such it has the same meaning as apophainesthai. Logos lets something be seen, namely what the talk is about; and it does so for those who are somehow involved in the discourse. Logos furthermore Iets something be seen from the very thing the talk is about. In logos as discourse (apophansis) what is said is drawn from what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says, makes manifest what the talk is about and makes it accessible to others. When in this context logos
24Sz, 32 note; On Time and Being, pp. 79-80; Letter to Richardson, pp. x-xii. 25Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 12.
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becomes fully concrete, then discoursing, as letting something be seen, has the character of speaking. (SZ, 32-3) Furthermore, because logos is a letting something be seen, it can therefore be true or false. But it is of the greatest importance to realize that truth cannot be understood here in the sense of an agreement between what is and what is said. Such a conception of truth is by no means the primary one. The Greek word for truth is aletheia and this means unconcealment. The being-true of the logos as aletheuein means that the beings about which one is talking must be taken out of their original hiddenness: one must let them be seen as something unhidden (a-lethes); this means, the beings must be discovered. And only because the function of the logos as apophansis lies in letting something be seen by pointing it out, can it have the structural form of a synthesis. Here "synthesis" does not mean a binding together of representations or the manipulation of psychical occurrences from which the pseudo-problem arises of how these bindings, as something inside, agree with something physical outside. Synthesis here means letting something be seen in its togetherness with something, letting it be seen as something. When something no Ionger takes the form of just letting something be seen, but always harks back to something eise to which it points, so that it Iets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesisstructure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. Being-false amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering-up: putting something in front of something eise in such a way as to let the former be seen, thereby passing the latter off as something which it is not. (SZ, 33-4) Seen from the perspective of the enormous task in regard to the tradition, particularly in regard to Aristotle, Kant, and Husserl, which Heidegger appears to have set for hirnself here, section 7B seems to be disappointing. First of all, it is not very clear precisely what the basic issue is with which Heidegger is concerned. Secondly, the section seems to suggest that methodical thought in ontology is not really necessary in view of the fact that a simple letting-be-seen seems to suffice.26 Yet one should realize once more that section 7 contains merely the provisional conception of phenomenology, which later is to be developed further, once the analytic of Dasein has reached its conclusion. Secondly, what Heidegger suggests in section 7B is to be understood from the 26Cf. Hans Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft. Tübingen: Mohr, 1968, p. 145; cf. Gethrnann, op. cit., p. 93.
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perspective of what will be said later about the precise function of theoretical knowledge (SZ, 59-62), about "reality" (SZ, 200-212), and particularly about disclosedness and truth (SZ, 212-230). Finally Heidegger explicitly indicates that the reflections contained in section 7B were inspired by a careful study of Aristotle.27 When all of this information is taken together it becomes clear that the real meaning of section 7B consists in the following: a being, whose ontological conception becomes manifest to Dasein (alethes), is, as far as its mode of becoming manifest (logos apophantikos) is concerned, dependent upon Dasein's disclosure. The identity expressed in the apophantic logos rests on the synthesis a priori (the truth of Being) and at the same time presupposes a difference with which Dasein's disclosure is concerned and which accounts for the fact that all finite letting something be seen really is a letting something be seen as. It is the latter which demands methodic justification and most certainly does not exclude it.28 5. The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology. From the interpretation of the words "phenomenon" and "Iogos" it becomes clear that there is an inner relationship between the things meant by these words. Taken as legein (=apophainesthai) ta phainomena, the expression "phenomenology" means: to let that which shows itself be seen from itself the very way it shows itself. This is the formal meaning of the term phenomenology which expresses the same thing as the maxim formulated earlier: to the things themselves. (SZ, 34-5) But what is it that phenomenology is to "Iet us see"? Wehave seen already that this question must be answered if we are ever to be able to go from a purely formal conception of phenomenon to the phenomenological conception. What is it, therefore, that by its very Being must be called a "phenomenon" in a distinctive sense? What is it that is necessarily the theme whenever we try to exhibit something explicitly? Obviously, it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself; it is something that lies hidden in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself. Yet at the same time it must be something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it must belong to it so essentially as to constitute its very meaning and ground.
27Aristotle, Peri Hermeneias, c. 1-6; Metaphysics, Z; and Eth. Nicom. Z. 28Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 113-114; cf. 107-114.
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME History of philosophy shows us that that which remains hidden in a specific sense, which relapses and gets covered up time and again, is not this or that being, nor this or that kind of being, but rather the Being of these beings. Being can even be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and there no Ionger is any question which arises about it and its ultimate meaning. In other words, that which demands that it become a phenomenon, and which demands this in a distinctive sense and in terms of its ownmost content as a thing, is precisely that which phenomenological philosophy wants to make the very subject matter and theme of its own investigations. But if phenomenology is Dasein's way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, it is clear that the phenomenological conception of phenomenon as that which shows itself must refer to the Being of the beings, to its meaning, its modification, and its derivatives. (SZ, 35, 230) For phenomenology to be possible and necessary, something must be manifest and something eise, inherently connected with the manifest, must still be hidden. That which is manifest essentially implies both truth as unconcealment and immediacy. Thus being, taken as phenomenon, means being taken in immediate unconcealment. In view of the fact that each being can show itself in different ways, depending upon Dasein's manner of approach (SZ, 28), the showing-itself always and necessarily implies some form of mediation in that the manner of approach to the things appears tobe constitutive of what will show itself as the manifest. Therefore, phenomenology means the methodical mediation of the immediacy of the truth of the phenomena. Here Heidegger takes his point of departure in the conviction that before things appear to us, they obviously "are" already. The basic question is not whether there are "real" things; there obviously are "real" things, because otherwise nothing at all would appear to us. The fundamental question is connected rather with the necessary conditions which must be fulfilled in order that things can appear to us the way they do, so that it will be possible to ask the question of what their appearance precisely means. When beings appear to us, they always appear as either this or that. They can appear to us in many ways; how they in fact will appear to us depends upon the kind of access we have to them in each case (SZ, 28). In the final analysis, the question of how a being will appear to us, depends upon the a priori synthesis from which this being is taken in each case; all letting be seen as presupposes some synthesis a priori. (SZ, 34) When a being appears to us in its "genuine" mode of
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Being, when it appears to us "the way it really is," it appears to us from the perspective of the transeendental synthesis a priori, which consists in the meaning or the truth of Being. Thus the expression "to show itself' can be applied meaningfully in ontology to both a being and to its Being. Thus we can now determine the concept of phenomenon more adequately: phenomenon in the ordinary sense of the term is not a being, but the showing-itself of a being; phenomenon in the phenomenological sense of the term is not the Being of a being, but the showing-itself of this being in light of the truth of Being. The immediacy of Dasein's relation to a being is to be mediated by the truth of Being; for a being to show itself to Dasein, there must be a transcendental, a priori horizon which consists in the truth of Being. In other words, the showing-itself of the beings is conditioned by the truth of Being. The showing-itself of a being is really a being-brought to show-itself on the basis of the a priori synthesis. There is a showing-itself of a being (phenomenon in the ordinary sense) if and only if there is an a priori horizon within which this being can show itself as that which it really is. This showing-itself of beings is precisely the immediacy which every methodical mediation must presuppose; that which is mediated by the method is the phenomenon in the phenomenological sense of the term. Yet there can be an explanation of phenomena (phenomenology) only if there is a transeendental ontological synthesis, i.e., the truth of Being. Thus it is clear that phenomenology is possible only as ontology.29 Heidegger hints at all of these implications when in defining the term phenomenon in the strict sense he does not use the expression: das Sich-selbst-teigende (that which shows-itself), but das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende (that which shows itself with respect to itself). This "an" implies that in what shows-itself there is some difference; it is this difference in the immediacy of the phenomenon which requi'res the mediation to be brought about by the methodical approach. 30 (SZ, 35fi) This difference is to be determined for both the phenomenon in the ordinary sense and the phenomenon in the phenomenological sense. The phenomenon in the ordinary sense, the being, shows-itself; yet it manifests itself in such a way that the "activity" implied in the showing is not the activity of the being itself. It shows itself in the framework of an apriori synthesis; it shows itself as something. The showing is accomplished with 29Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 46-7; Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 93-107. 30Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 99-101.
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respect to it; it is even constitutive for the it-self of the being that the showing is accomplished with regard to it. This occurs by means of the "projection" of Being accomplishe
REFLECTIONS ON METROD explaining the task of ontology we have already referred to the necessity of a fundamental ontology which has to take the form of an ek-sistential analytic of Dasein. Fundamental ontology must prepare our investigation of the question concerning the me;;tning of Being. Thus that which phenomenology is concerned with first is the Being of Dasein. This Being which is now concealed, was once revealed; it has slipped back into oblivion; it is revealed now again, but in a distorted fashion so that man's Dasein now seems to be what in fact it is not. It is precisely inasmuch as Being is not seen that phenomenology is necessary. For Dasein to reveal itself of its own accord as that which it is and how it is, it must be submitted to phenomenological analysis in order to lay the Being of Dasein out in full view. Such a laying-out necessarily takes the form of an interpretation; this is the reason why phenomenology is essentially hermeneutical. (SZ, 37) The term "hermeneutic" seems to have its historical origin in biblical exegesis. Later it was applied to the interpretation of the meaning of historical documents and works of art. As the expression is used here by Heidegger it no Ionger refers to documents and results of man's artistic activities, but to man's own Being. But what does it mean to interpret a non-symbolic fact such as man's Being? Interpretation focuses on the meaning of things; it presupposes that what is to be interpreted has meaning and that this meaning is not immediately obvious. Dasein obviously has meaning and this meaning allows for interpretation. For as ek-sistence Dasein is essentially related to its own Being as that which continuously is at stake for it. In view of the fact that Dasein as eksistence is oriented toward possibilities which reach beyond itself, Dasein is capable of interpretation. But Dasein's Being also requires interpretation. For just as Being has the tendency to fall into oblivion, so man's Being has the tendency to degenerate. The phenomenology of Dasein is even hermeneutic in three different senses. It is hermeneutical first because (as we have just seen) in this particular case phenomenology cannot be anything but interpretation. It is hermeneutic also in the sense that by uneovaring the meaning of Being and the basic structures of Dasein the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends become worked-out. And finally, insofar as Dasein, because of its ek-sistence, has ontological priority over all other beings, hermeneutic, as the interpretation of Dasein's Being has also the specific meaning of an analytic of the ek-sistentiality of Dasein's ek-
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sistence. And this latter is the sense which is philosophically primary. (SZ, 37 -38) By specifying the phenomenological method with the help of the concept of hermeneutic Heidegger again makes any interpretation of his claims very difficult. Hermeneutic has a relatively lang and complex history to which Heidegger does not really relate his own efforts. 32 Furthermore, hermeneutic is often taken as the method characteristic for the humanities, whereas the term is taken here to refer to the method of fundamental ontology. Yet one should note again, that in section 7 Heidegger merely developed a preliminary conception of the method of ontology. What is said here about hermeneutic must be understood from the perspective of his view on understanding (SZ, 142-160), temporality (SZ, 301ff.), and the implications of all of this for the so-called hermeneutic circle. (SZ, 7, 152f., 311ff., 436-7) In an attempt to understand what Heidegger precisely means by hermeneutic, one must begin by bracketing all treatises which deal with hermeneutic as the doctrine of the method of explanation.33 Heidegger first states that hermeneutic means the business of explanation (SZ, 148-153); explanation (Auslegung) determines the methodical sense of the phenomenological "description." We have seen that phenomenon in the phenomenological sense consists in the Being of beings; this shows itself only by means of a methodical mediation. Explanation therefore is the methodical procedure throU:gh which the Being of beings as well as the basic structures of Dasein's Being are made accessible to Dasein's understanding. (SZ, 37) Explanation is concerned ultimately with the meaning of Being; thus the task of hermeneutic is an ontological one. Yet the meaning of Being must be made known to Dasein's understanding. Although Dasein is to be characterized by its comprehension of Being, the meaning of Beingis still somehow hidden for it. This fact explains the possibility as well as the necessity of a method for ontology. Dasein's comprehension of Being does not exclude the methodical mediation, but makes it both possible and necessary. This is the reason why Heidegger can say that hermeneutic, as the interpretation of Dasein's Being, has the specific sense of an analytic of the eksistentiality of ek-sistence. (SZ, 38, cf. 436) 32Cf. E. Palmer, Hermeneutics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969. 33Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York: Rarper and Row, 1971, pp. 29-31.
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Hermeneutic characterizes the specific character of that method which is determined by the fact that the thing to be investigated by it, always already functions as a condition for its application, so that the quest for the "thing itself' coincides with the quest for the conditions of the possibility of the investigation of the things through method. This leads us to the second characterization of hermeneutic: it becomes a "hermeneutic" in the sense of working out the conditions on which the possibility of any ontological investigation depends. (SZ, 37) From all of this it follows that hermeneutic is the methodological, fundamental concept of ontology as such. Because the questio:ri concerning the meaning of Being is oriented toward that which, as the transeendental synthesis a priori conditions all knowledge of whatever there is, the method of the investigation concerning the meaning of Beingis conditioned by the very subject matter of the investigation. And in view of the fact that the subject matter of the investigation is always already "there" in Dasein's primordial comprehension of Being, the method must have the form of an explanation (Auslegung) in which what is constitutive of Dasein becomes explained by Dasein and for Dasein. The explanation found in Being and Time constitutes a form of man's hermeneutic-transcendental questioning. 34 The hermeneutic character of the phenomenological method is intimately connected with the transeendental conception of the philosophical method as such. The meaning of Being for which ontology searches is knowable only through the fact that as a condition it itself must function as the a priori synthesis in that process in which a being of the mode of Being of Dasein constitutes the beings which do not have that mode of Being. Thus Being becomes methodically accessible only as that which is constituting in the effective constitution of beings which occurs in Dasein's understanding. Heidegger replaces an absolute conception of the a priori by a regulative one. The meaning or truth of Being is not something absolute from which the Being of beings can be deduced; the meaning of Being is not a universal principle of deduction or construction, but merely the universal horizon of explanation. The reason Heidegger employed the expression "hermeneutic" to characterize the regulative conception of the a priori, is the similarity that appears to exist between the efforts of the person who 34Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. II, p. 415; cf. Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 114118.
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME tries to discover the meaning of a text and that ofthe philosopher who is concerned with the question concerning the meaning of Being. Yet the determination of the phenomenological method as hermeneutical really follows from the theme itself that is to be examined. Ontology is transeendental because it conceives of the Being question in a fundamental ontological manner as the question concerning the meaning of the unthematic comprehension of Being which is constitutive of Dasein's Being. Being can be comprehended thematically only on the basis of this a priori comprehension of Being. Thus in order to make the Being question explicit, it is necessary first to develop an analytic of Dasein's ek-sistentiality which must have the form of a hermeneutic. Being itself which is "there" in Dasein's comprehension of Being, must be explained from this Being-there. The analytic taken as a hermeneutic of facticity is thus a "methodical" component or element of transeendental ontology. But this means that hermeneutic phenomenology is really "founded upon" ontology and not the other way around. 35 35sz, 72 note; Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 118-122.
DIVISION I THE PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DASEIN (Being and Time, pp. 41-230)
In the Introduction to Being and Time it was explained that in the question about the meaning of Being the beings which are interrogated primarily are those entities that have the characteristic mode of Beingof Dasein. Now, human beings can be examined in different ways in different sciences; thus we must explain first, at least in outline, the peculiar character of the eksistential analytic of Dasein and distinguish it from other kinds of investigations that are concerned with human beings. This will be our first task. We must then turn to a set of reflections which are meant to bring to light a fundamental structure in Dasein, namely its Being-in-the-world. This structure is something "a priori"; furthermore, it is not pieced together, but always and constantly given as a whole. Yet in this whole various constitutive moments can be distinguished. As we make an effort to make these moments, as phenomena, stand out we must keep the whole constantly in view. Thus after explaining the overall structure, Being-in-the-world, we shall then turn to the following items as objects for analysis: the world in its worldhood, Being-in-the-world as Being-with and Being-one's-self, and the structural components of Being-in as such. W e shall conclude these preparatory reflections by showing that the eksistential meaning of Dasein is care. (SZ, 41)
CHAPTERIV ON THE NATURE AND TASK OF THE PREPARATORY ANALYSIS OF DASEIN'S BEING. BEING-IN-THE WORLD AS THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF DASEIN (Being and Time, Sections 9-13, pp. 41-62)
1: Exposition of the Task ofthe Preparatory Analysis of Dasein's Mode ofßeing In the preceding chapters we have made an effort to explain the subject matter to be dealt with in Being and Time as weil as the method tobe used in doing so. We must now turn to the eksistential analytic of Dasein's mode of Being and, as was indicated before, we shall do so in two phases; first there is a preparatory analysis of Dasein's Being (SZ, sections 12 through 44) which will be followed by the temporal interpretation of the Being of Dasein (SZ, sections 45 through 83). · Before we can begin with our analysis it is necessary first to clarify in greater detail what is meant by Dasein and how its mode of Being is to be understood. Yet before we can turn to this issue it may be good first to indicate briefly what our task in this preparatory analytic of Dasein's Being precisely consists in. In an effort to define this task Heidegger begins with a brief reflection on the theme of the analytic. He teils us that the preceding reflections have already indicated that we ourselves are the beings to be analyzed. The Being of each human being is in each case "mine." In other words, in their very Being these beings relate and comport themselves toward their own Being; they are consigned to their own mode of Being. That which is for every such being the basic issue is its own Being. (SZ, 41-42) This way of characterizing the mode of Being of Dasein Ieads to two insights: 1) The mode of Being of this being, namely Dasein, consists in its to-be. Its what-it-is (Wassein, essentia), insofar as we can speak of this at all, must be understood in terms of its own Being (existentia). Heidegger realizes the ambiguity which the term "existence" causes here. Normally existentia refers to the act of actually being real, being present at hand; here in the eksistential
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analytic the term is taken in its literal sense for the act of standing out; we thus shall write it always in such a manner that this notion is clearly expressed; instead of "existence" we shall use "eksistence" as Heidegger in his later works suggests we do. We can thus say that the "essence" of Dasein consists in its eksistence, in its standing-out-towards, and as we shall see later, in its transcendence. Yet all the characteristics which one can attribute to Dasein cannot be understood as if they were properties present at hand which belong to another entity that is present at hand. These characteristics are in all cases for Dasein possible ways for it to be. Its entire what-it-is, all the Being-such-and-such of this being, is primarily Being. In other words, it is impossible to conceive of Dasein in terms of natural or man-made things. Heidegger will later explain this point by suggesting that things are to be determined by categories whereas the mode of Being of Dasein is to be articulated with the help of eksistentials. (SZ, 42) 2) That Beingwhich is an issue for this being in its own Being, is in each case mine. When one addresses Dasein one must always use either I or you. Furthermore, each Dasein must in each case decide about the way in which it in each case will be mine. Thus that Being for which its own Being is an issue, comports itself towards its own Being as its ownmost possibility. As a matter of fact, in each case Dasein is its possibility and it has its possibility, but it never has it as a property and as something that is just present at hand. Since Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can always choose itself and win itself, or it can also lose itself; in other words Dasein can be either authentic (in the sense that it is then its own genuine self), or inauthentic; but both authenticity and inauthenticity are grounded in Dasein's mineness. It should be noted here that being inauthentic is not a lower degree of Being or a less Being. Dasein, even if taken in its fullest concretion, can still be characterized by inauthencity. (SZ, 42-43) The two basic characteristics of Dasein just described clearly show that in our analytic we are concerned with a very peculiar domain, in that Dasein does not have the mode of Being that is characteristic for the beings that are merely present at hand within the world. The proper way to present this being is not at all evident; to determine what form its presentation is to take, is itself an essential part ofthe ontological analytic ofDasein. (SZ, 43) Dasein thus has in each case to determine itself. In determining itself as a being Dasein must always do so in light of some possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it also
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somehow understands. This constitutes the formal meaning of Dasein's eksistential constitution. Thus if we are to interpret the Being of this being ontologically, the problematic of its mode of Being must be developed from the eksistentiality of its eksistence. Yet this does not mean that Dasein is to be construed in terms of some particular concrete possible idea of eksistence. At first Dasein must not be interpreted in our analysis from the perspective of some special and definite way of eksisting either; rather it must be uneavered in terms of the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part; it thus must be uneavered in its everydayness, in its average everydayness. This average everydayness makes up what is ontically closest to Dasein. Yet it has time and again been passed over in the explication of Dasein's mode of Being. Thus that which ontically is closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not known at all, because its ontological signification is constantly overlooked. To uncover it properly will be a difficult task. (SZ, 43-44) One should also realize that if one analyses Dasein's mode of Being by starting from its average everydayness, one will be able to discover Dasein's formal ontological structure which is equally constitutive for the Being of Dasein when it is in the authentic mode. Thus the structures which will be discovered by starting from Dasein's average everydayness are structurally indistinguishable from those one will discover later by starting from the authentic Being of Dasein. The basic notions with the help of which the mode of Being of Dasein is made explicit and to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein's basic structure of eksistence. And, Heidegger continues, because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of the eksistentiality of Dasein's eksistence, we call these basic notions eksistentials to distinguish them from the categories with the help of which the mode of Being of things is articulated. (SZ, 44) From these reflections it should be clear that the analytic of the Being of Dasein is essentially different from anthropology, psychology, biology, and even theology. But, Heidegger adds, in setting the analytic off against these human sciences on the ground that they all fail to give an unequivocal and ontologically adequate answer to the question of the mode of Being which belongs to those beings which we ourselves are, we do not mean to pass judgment on the positive work that is being done in these disciplines. (SZ, 45-50) Finally, in view of the fact that the interpretation of Dasein's Beingin
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME its average everydayness is not identical with the description of some primitive stage of Dasein through which one can become acquainted empirically through the science "anthropology," it is clear also that the eksistential analytic intended here is to be distinguished from the scientific interpretation ofprimitive Dasein. (SZ, 50-52)
ll: Eksistence, Transcendence, and World In his eksistential analysis Heidegger has introduced a small number of technical expressions with which many people will be unfamiliar. For some people the struggle with these new terms becomes eventually so important that for them understanding Being and Time seems to become identical with getting to know the basic categories and eksistentials with the help of which Heidegger explains his views. Wehave encountered already the term "ontic" for anything that has to do immediately with the beings as such. A methodological approach is said to be ontic if it focuses on the beings, the things. On the other hand, it is said to be ontological if it focuses on the meaning and Being of these beings or things. If we articulate the mode of Being that is characteristic of man as Dasein, then we must do so with the help of eksistentials, not with the help of the categories which are the basic notions with the help of which we articulate the mode of Being of beings, things. Many other technical expressions could be mentioned here. We shall discuss them when they are introduced. Yet before moving on to the next section of Being and Time it seems important by way of introduction to say a few words about the meaning of the terms "eksistence," "transcendence," and "world." Heidegger has identified the mode of Being characteristic of man with the eksistentiality of his eksistence. Dasein is said to be such that its essence, its mode of Being, is its eksistence. This expression indicates that Dasein has to make itself be what it will be. Dasein must accomplish this by transcending the beings with which at first it is always concerned, in the direction of the world and ultimately also in the direction of Being. Thus to say that the essence of Dasein is its eksistence is tantamount to saying that the essence of man is transcendence. Now since transcendence means going beyond beings in the direction of the world, saying that the essence of man as Dasein is transcendence is also tantamount to saying that his essence is to be Being-in-the-world. Before we turn to a systematic explanation of what is meant here by Being-in-the-world, Iet us first focus on transcendence and world.
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In the preceding chapters we have seen already that the comprehending understanding of Being which most profoundly characterizes man as Dasein, is not simply some form of theoretical k.nowledge, but Dasein's manner of Being as such which essentially includes some comprehension of Being. As a radical comprehension of Being, Dasein is such that in its own Being, i.e., that by which it is what it is, it is to be concerned about Being. Thus this comprehending of Being constitutes the ontological structure of Dasein. This comprehension of Being includes its own Being as well as that of all other beings. Thus as a being, Dasein enjoys some primacy among the beings. It is this manner of Dasein's Being that is called eksistence. Thus eksistence is possible only on the basis of a comprehension of Being. Eksistence for Heidegger means: to be in that relationship to Being which we have just called comprehending. Comprehension constitutes the inner possibility of eksistence and eksistence constitutes the inner possibility of Dasein. Now human eksistence was also called transcendence.l It is this notion of transcendence that in the final analysis also determines the transeendental character of this investigation. Let us see briefly why this is so. In Being and Time and related works, Heidegger focuses mainly on the movement of transcendence in which Dasein transcends beings in the direction of Being. Transcendence is interpreted there to be closely related to both freedom and truth. In On the Essence of Truth as well as in The Essence of Reasons these relationships are unfolded in detail. Transcendence means surpassing.2 That which executes the action of surpassing and remains in the conditions of surpassing is called transcendent. As a happening, surpassing is proper to a being. Formally one can construe transcendence to be a relationship which stretches from something to something. The surpassing implies something toward which the surpassing occurs; this is usually, but improperly, called the transcendent. Taken in the common sense transcending refers to a spatial happening. But transcendence can also be understood as the basic characteristic of human Dasein, as the basic constitutive feature of Daseinthat occurs before all behavior. If one were to choose the term "subject" for the being which all of us are, and which we here lKant und das Problem der Metaphysik, pp. 204-208 (E. 233-348); cf. Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 33-37. 2The Essence of Reasons, p. 35.
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME understand as Dasein, then transcendence denotes the essence of the subject, the basic structure of its subjectivity. To be a subjeet then means tobe a being inandas transcending. But perhaps it is better not to introduee the notion of subject; transeendenee eannot be defined in terms of a subjeet-object relationship. Transeendeut Dasein surpasses neither a boundary which stretehes out before the subjeet and forees it to remain in itself (immanenee), nor a gap whieh separates it from an objeet. Moreover, objectified entities are not that toward whieh the transeending oeeurs. That whieh is surpassed are simply the beings themselves, i.e., every being that ean beeome uneoneealed to Dasein, even and precisely the very being as which Dasein itself eksists. In surpassing Dasein first attains to that being that it itself is; what it attains to is its self. Transeendeuce thus constitutes selfhood. But transcendenee obviously also touehes on beings whieh Dasein itself is not. It is important to note here that whatever being Dasein may transeend, it never transeends a random aggregate of objeets; whatever is transcended, it is always transcended as a totality. Surpassing always occurs totally. It is there with the fact of Dasein's Being-there. But if it is not a being or some beings toward whieh transeending oeeurs, how then is this toward which to be defined? That toward whieh Dasein transeends beings is the world so that we ean now define transcendenee as Being-in-the-world. World coeonstitutes the unified structure of transeendence; the eoncept of world is called transeendental precisely beeause it is part of transeendenee's structure. Thus we use the term "transcendental" to designate everything that belongs in its essenee to transeendenee, everything that owes its inner possibility to transcendenee. For the same reason we can eall the explanation of transeendenee a transeendental investigation. A philosophy whieh treats the transeendental as a mere standpoint, even as an epistemologieal standpoint, eannot give us a real clue as to what the term "transeendental" means. But this is not to deny that Kant, in partieular, recognized the "transcendental" as a problern of the inner possibility of ontology, although for him the term has also a critical meaning. For Kant, the transeendental has to do with the "possibility" of (in the sense ofthat which makes possible) the kind of knowledge which does not illegitimately "go beyond" experience, i.e., which is not "transcendent," but is experience itself (nicht
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"transzendent," sondern Erfahrung selbst).S Thus the transeendental provides us with a restrictive, yet positive delimitation (definition) of the essence of nontranscendent knowledge, i.e., of the ontical knowledge which is accessible to man. If the essence of transcendence is construed more radically and universally, it will then be necessary to work out the idea of ontology more primordially. We defined transcendence as Dasein's Being-in-the-world. In this expression the term "world" is to be understood not ontically as the totality of all beings, but rather ontologically, i.e., as the totality of meaning as which Being now manifests itself concretely to us today.4 Let us therefore see now how in 1927 Heidegger understood the concept of world. In his essay, On the Essence of Ground,5 Heidegger discussed several meanings of the concept "world." In his view, "world" is philosophically a basic concept. In such cases the popular meaning of the world is seldom the essential and primordial one. The essential meaning of such basic words remains usually hidden and if they are ever expressed conceptually then this is done with difficulty. Yet part of the essence of "world" shows itself already in the PreSocratic philosophers. For them the Greek word, kosmos, did not mean any particular being, nor the sum of all beings, but rather the how in which being in its totality is. Heraclitus mentions another essential feature of kosmos; he understands the world in terms of the basic ways in which humans factically eksist. 6 These few remarks reveal already several important things: 1) World means a how of the Being of the beings rather than these beings themselves taken as a unity. 2) This how defines the beings taken as a totality; in the final analysis world is the possibility of every how as Iimit and measure. 3) This how in its totality is in a certain sense primary. 4) This primary how in its totality is itself relative to Dasein. Thus the world belongs strictly to human Dasein, although it encompasses all beings, Dasein included, in its totality. 7
3Jbid., p. 41. 4For the preceding see The Essence of Reasons, pp. 35-45. 5Jbid., pp. 47-85. 6Cf. H. Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Berlin: Melissos. Fragment 7 and Parmenides, Fragment 2. 7The Essence of Reasons, pp. 47-51.
de Gruyter, 1954.
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In the Christian era the word "kosmos" came to signify a basic type of human eksistence. In the Epistles of St. Paul kosmos houtos does not mean primarily the condition of the "cosmic," but rather the condition and the situation of man, the character of his position in regard to the kosmos and of his evaluations of what is good. Kosmos was for the early Christians the mode of Being of man in the how of a way of thinking that is estranged from God. St. Paul sometimes speaks of the wisdom of the world in Opposition to God's wisdom. The world, this world, refers to human Dasein that is involved in a particular historical form of eksistence in opposition to another form of eksistence that already had begun. For St. John, who uses the term very often, the word "kosmos" simply stands for the basic form of human Dasein that is estranged from God; sometimes it even just means the character of the Being of man as such. Sometimes kosmos means the whole of mankind without any further distinction. 8 The influence of the early Christian conception of world left its traces on medieval philosophy and theology. In St. Augustine the world "mundus" sometimes means the whole of creation; but it very often also means those humans who delight in the world, the impious.9 On the other hand, those who are just are not called the world, because they really are with God. This conception of world could have been drawn directly from the first chapter of the Gospel of John.IO Aquinas, too, uses mundus sometimes as synonymaus with universe or the whole of creation; yet he also uses it for the worldly way ofthinking about what is.ll In the tradition of Wolff and the metaphysics of his school "world" was defined as the series of actually existing, finite things such that the series is not part of something else. Here world is equivalent to the totality of all that is just preserit at hand in the sense of all created things. This means that the notion of world cannot be understood fully except under the condition that one accepts the proofs for the existence of God. At any rate, in this conception of
BJbid., pp. 51-53. 9st. Augustine, Opera (ed. Migne), 1842, vol. IV. lOJohn, 1:10.
llSt. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II II, 187, 2, ad 3. The Essence of Reasons, pp. 53-57.
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world, world is explicitly opposed to both God and any other individual being or group of things.12 In the conception of world as we find it in the metaphysics of the School of W olff a full understanding of the concept of world presupposes both the School's ontology and natural theology. Kant in his effort to lay the foundation of any acceptable form of metaphysics, had to change that conception of world, even though in his anthropology Kant maintained the School's conception of world, yet without its typical Christian connotations. In his Dissertation of 1770 Kant wrote: "Taken as a terminus, world is essentially related to "synthesis." "Just as in dealing with a complex of substances, analysis only ends with a part which is not a whole, i.e., with the simple, so synthesis only ends with a whole which is not apart, i.e., with the world."13 Later he added to this that the parts of the world are substances (its matter), that these parts must be coordinated (its form), and that the parts must constitute an absolute totality of conjoined parts. As for the notion of absolute totality Kant observed there that this totality appears to be an easily understandable concept, especially when it is formulated negatively. If one looks at it more carefully, however, one will see that it confronts the philosopher with a crucial problem. Kant thought about this problern for a long time and in the Critique of Pure Reason he later explained why the totality of the world is problematic from several points of view: 1) To what is the totality presented by the term "world" related? 2) What is it that is presented by the concept? 3) What character does the proposing presentation of such a totality have? What is the conceptual structure of the concept of world? In his answer to these questions Kant completely transformed the problern of world.14 Kant still takes the totality which is presented in the concept of world tobe the totality of finite things present at hand. But Kant no Ionger defines finitude in relation to God's creating act. Instead, he explains the finitude of all things by pointing out that they are things only insofar as they are possible objects of finite knowledge; they are objects of a knowledge that must let things give themselves as already present at hand; they give themselves in man's sensory perception (finite intuition) and thus are present only as appearances, "things in appearance." If the same things are understood as the possible 12ßaumgarten, Metaphysica (1743), section 354, p. 87. 13Jmmanuel Kant, De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis, sections 1 and 2. (Cassirer edition of 1912, vol. II). 14The Essence of Reasons, pp. 61-65.
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"objects" of an absolute and creative intuition, Kant calls them "the things in themselves." Since the unity of the appearances necessarily depends on a factically contingent givenness, this unity is for us always conditioned andin principle incomplete. We can however think the manifold of appearances as complete, but then we make present to ourselves an aggregate whose content and reality cannot in principle be intuited. Thus the concept of world is not really a concept of human understanding but rather an idea of reason. It is transcendent. The notion of world is that idea of reason in which the absolute totality of objects accessible to finite knowledge can be presented a priori. The notion "world" then only means the totality or aggregate of all possible appearances, the aggregate of all objects of possible experience.15 From what has been said thus far about Kant's conception of world, it becomes clear in what sense Kant really has transformed the concept. Heidegger explains this transformation in such a way that at the same time the three questions raised earlier can be answered. 1) The concept of world is no Ionger taken in the sense of the totality of all (finite) things in themselves, but rather in the ontological (= transcendental) sense of the aggregate of all things as appearances. 2) What is exhibited in the concept of world is not a coordination of substances but rather a Subordination of the conditions of synthesis ascending to the unconditioned; this second thesis follows from the fact that Kant defines each transeendental idea ofreason as "the concept ofthe totality ofthe conditions ofa given conditioned ... , thus a pure concept of reason can generally be explained through the concept of the unconditioned insofar as the latter contains a ground of the synthesis of the conditioned."16 3) The concept of world is not to be defined as a rational representation which is conceptually undetermined, but rather as an idea, i.e., a pure synthetic concept of reason; in other words, it is not one of the concepts of the understanding.17 As an idea, the concept of world is the representation of an unconditioned totality. This totality remains related to the appearances which are the sole possible objects of finite knowledge. Thus world taken as an idea is transcendent; it surpasses the 15Jmmanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, B, 391; Was heisst: sich im Denken Orientieren? (1786), in Werke (Cassirer ed. 1912), vol. IV, p. 355; The Essence of Reasons, p. 69. 16CPR, B, 390. 17CPR, B, 367, 379, 384, 860, and passim.
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appearances in such a way that, in their totality, it is directly related back to them. Transcendence in Kant always means the surpassing of experience. As such it can still have two meanings: first it can simply mean to go beyond what is given within experience, namely to go beyond the manifold of appearances; in this sense the world is transcendent. But transcendence can also mean to step outside of all appearances considered as the domain of finite knowledge and represent the possible entirety of all things insofar as they are the object of the intuitus originarius of the creating God. The concept "world" in Kant thus constitutes the Iimit of human knowledge; it denotes finite human knowledge in its totality. It even ultimately signifies the totality of the finitude of man's mode of Being_l8 In addition to this "cosrriological" concept of world Kant also uses world in the sense of the existence of man within his historical communi ty .19 In the context of his pragmatic anthropology he speaks about "knowing the ways of the world," "to have a world and act like someone who has it," etc. In his view, both these expressions refer to man's eksistence; yet the first person only knows the ways of the world, only understands the game, whereas the latter has played the game. World is here the name for the "game" of everyday Dasein and for Dasein itself. Kant also speaks here about worldly wisdom in opposition to personal wisdom and about knowledge about the world in opposition to school wisdom. Finally he mentions philosophy in accordance with the concept of world in opposition to philosophy in the scholastic sense. The former is the concern of the "ideal teacher," who tries to reach the divine man in us. In these cases the concept of world is that concept which concerns what is necessarily of interest to everyone.2° World thus serves here as the name for the mode of Beingof human Dasein. World means here human beings in their relationship to the beings taken as a totality. Heidegger concludes these retrieving, historical reflections with the observation that in his view it is thus wrang to use the expression "world" either as a name for the totality of allnatural things (natural concept of world) or as the name for the community of men (personal concept of world). Ontologically essential to the meaning of world is that it must aim at explaining human Dasein in Dasein's relationship to the beings taken in their totality. World appears to 18CPR, B, 434, 446-448, 600 note. Cf. The Essence of Reasons, pp. 69-75. 19Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefasst (1800, second edition). (In the Cassirer edition, vol. VIII, p. 3). 20The Essence of Reasons, pp. 75-79.
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belang to a structure of interrelationships which characterize Dasein as such; this structure is called Being-in-the-world. This notion is stilltobe explained in what follows.21
111: Man's Being-in-the-World Originally Heidegger had intended to divide Being and Time into two large parts. In the first part an interpretation of man's mode of Being was to be given andin this interpretation the focus would have to come from Dasein's temporality. He also wanted to show in this part that time is to be conceived as the transeendental horizon for the question concerning the meaning of Being. The second part would then critically examine the history of ontology, on the basis of the insights gained in the first part; here Heidegger hoped to pay special attention to the philosophies of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle. Actually, however, only the interpretation of man's mode of Being has been published. The question concerning the meaning of Being and the question regarding the relation between Being and time remained unanswered; the same is true for the problems which Heidegger had planned to discuss in the second part of the work in connection with the history of ontology. In the works published after Being and Time, Heidegger returned to different problems which originally he had intended to consider in Being and Time. Among these issues the ontological difference, the question of the meaning of Being, and his critical retrieve of the philosophy of Kant must be mentioned specifically. Later we shall return to the question of why the last portion of the first part as well as the whole second part of Being and Time were never published. At present we shall limit ourselves to the interpretation of man's mode of Being as this is found in the first part of Being and Time. It is important to stress once again that these considerations must be read from a strictly ontological perspective; what follows will therefore not present a complete philosophical anthropology. The reflections to follow have as their sole purpose to prepare an answer to the question concerning the meaning of Being. (SZ, 39-40)
As we have seen already, Heidegger expresses the mode of Being characteristic of and proper to man with the technical expression "eksistence" (Existenz). This term means "standing-out" 21Jbid., pp. 79-85.
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(ek-sistere). It is characteristic of man that in order to realize his own self, man has to "come out" of hirnself and turn to the world. As a matter of fact, man is primordially and essentially directed to the world and therefore every manifestation of his Being is a way to relate hirnself to the world. Man is primordially and essentially an "intentional," self-transcendending Being. Only through his familiarity with the world does man as Dasein become himself. His mode of Being is therefore Being-in-the-world. Since this Being-in-the-world is the first and fundamental feature which we encounter as we look at Dasein, the analysis of human eksistence has to start with the explanation of Being-in-theworld. From this first and fundamental relation we must then try to understand all other characteristics of man's Dasein. (SZ, 52-3) The expression, "Being-in-the-world" indicates a single, primordial phenomenon which contains a plurality of constitutive, structural elements. A thorough investigation of these structural elements of man's Being-in-the-world will allow us to clarify the genuine meaning of the mode of Being proper to Dasein. These elements are 1) "Being-in," 2) the Being of the being that is in the world, and 3) the world in which this being is. As we shall see presently a careful analysis of the first element will lead us to the second and the third. (SZ, 53) The preposition "in" usually indicates a relation of the contained to its container; for example, the chair is in the room and the room is in the house. Dasein evidently is not in the world in the same way in which a match is in a box. With respect to the match, the preposition "in" merely indicates a spatial relation between two or more beings; but in the expression "Being-in-the-world," the preposition "in" indicates that man's Being can be understood only through Dasein's essential relationship to the world. Without the organized and structured other-than-man, which we call the "world," Dasein can neither be nor be understood. Hence when we say that Dasein means Being-in-the-world, this statement does not merely express an actual situation; rather it expresses something about Dasein's own mode of Being itself, which cannot be without this essential relation to what is other. (SZ, 53-54) Thus instead of referring to a spatial relation, the preposition "in" here indicates a familiarity with, and also a Being with. In this case, "in" and "with" express that Dasein is acquainted with something, is used to something, is conversant with something, and that it takes this something to heart. This, of course, does not mean that one should not accept a certain spatiality as far as Dasein is
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concerned. There certainly is such a spatiality and we shall have to speak about it later. At present we merely want to say, Heidegger continues, that the expressions "Being-in" and "Being-with" must be understood in the sense indicated above. (SZ, 54-56) Dasein's Being-in can take on many different forms, all of which could be analyzed here phenomenologically. All these modalities, however, appear to be concrete ways of a fundamental form of Being-in which Heidegger calls concern (Besorgen). Like Being-in and Being-in-the-world, this Being-concerned-with is also an eksistential, i.e., a fundamental and constitutive element of the basic structure of the mode of Being that is proper to Dasein. (SZ, 57) The transeendental relationship of Dasein to the world thus assumes primarily and primordially the form of Being-concerned-with. For this reason a careful study of primordial concern will be a suitable guide toward a total interpretation of man's own mode of Being as Dasein. IV: Concern as the Primordial, Theoretical Knowledge as a FoundedMode ofBeing-In We have seen that in the compound expression, "Being-in-theworld," the word "in" has the meaning of "being familiar with," or also of "being accustomed to." Thus Dasein is, essentially seen, familiar with the world and this Being-alongside-the-world means concretely and factically that Dasein is normally absorbed in the world (fallenness). Dasein's factical mode of Being is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these ways can be clarified by the following examples: having to do with, producing, attending, looking after, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining, etc. AU these ways of Beingin have concern (Besorgen) as their common kind of Being. (SZ, 5657) All concrete forms of Being-in can thus be characterized generally as forms of concern. Classical philosophy almost without exception has assumed that knowing the world theoretically is the original and basic mode of Dasein's concern; and Dasein itself according to its own facticity shares this view, namely that knowing the world is the fundamental mode of its own Being-in-the-world. In both classical philosophy and Dasein's everyday understanding the ontological structure of Dasein, namely its Being-in-the-world, was never explicitly explained. That is why many people have thought of knowledge in terms of a relation
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which exists between one entity (the world) and another entity (the soul or the mind), both according to their own modes of Being understood as merely present-at-hand. Thus, in every metaphysics of knowledge a subject-object-opposition is presupposed. For what is more obvious than that in knowledge a "subject" is related to an "object"? Thus, the encompassing phenomenon of Being-in-the-world has for the most part been represented exclusively by one single example: knowing the world theoretically. Because knowing has been given the priority here, our understanding of Dasein's mode of Being was led astray. That is why we must show now that knowingthe-world is really a founded mode ofDasein's Being-in. (SZ, 57-59) In traditional epistemology there is first given a being called "nature"; this being is given proximally as that which becomes known. Knowing as such is nottobe found in this entity. Knowing belongs solely to those entities who know. But even in these entities, namely human beings, knowing is not present-at-hand and externally ascertainable as bodily properties are. Now, inasmuch as knowing belongs to these entities, it must be inside of them. But if knowing is proximally and really inside, there comes immediately the problern concerning the relation between subject and object. For only then can the problern arise of how this knowing subject comes out of its inner "sphere" into one which is "other and external," of how knowing can have any object at all, and of how one must think of the object itself so that eventually the subject knows it without needing to venture a leap into another sphere. But in any of the numerous varieties which this approach may take, the question of the kind of Being which belongs to this knowing subject is left entirely unasked, although whenever its knowing is examined, its manner of Being is already included tacitly in one's theme. Of course, we are sometimes assured that we are certainly not thinking of the subject's "inside" and its "inner sphere" as a sort of "box." But when one asks for the positive signification of this "inside" or immanence in which knowing is proximally enclosed, then silence governs. And no matter how this inner sphere may be interpreted, if one does no more than ask how knowing makes its way "out of" it and achieves "transcendence," it becomes evident that the knowing which presents such enigmas will remain problematic unless one has previously clarified how it is and what it is. With this kind of approach one remains blind to what is already tacitly implied even when one takes the phenomenon of knowing as one's theme in the most provisional manner: namely, that knowing
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is a mode of Being of Dasein taken as Being-in-the-world, and is founded ontically upon this state of Being. If we now ask the question of what shows itself in the phenomenal findings about knowing, we must keep in mind that knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-theworld, which is essentially constitutive for Dasein's Being. Proximally, this Being-already-alongside is not just a fixed staring at something that is purely present-at-hand. Being-in-the-world, as concern, is fascinated by the world with which it is concerned. lf knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the present-at-hand by observing it, then there must be first a deficiency in our having-to-do with the world concernfully. When concern withdraws from any kind of producing, manipulating, etc., it puts itself into what is now the sole remaining mode of Being-in, the mode of just sojourning-alongside and dwelling-upon. This manner of Being toward the world is one which lets us encounter beings withinthe-world purely in the way they look (in ihrem Aussehen-eidos) .. On the basis of this manner of Being and just as a mode of it, looking explicitly at that which we encounter is possible. Looking at something in this way is a definite way of taking up a direction towards something. It takes over a viewpoint in advance from the entity which it encounters. Such looking-at enters the mode of dwelling autonomously alongside beings within the world. In this kind of dwelling as holding-oneself-back from any manipulation or utilization, the perception of the present-at-hand is consummated. Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something and discusses it as such. This amounts to interpretation in the broadest sense which implies determination and expression with the help of propositions. But in all these cases knowing is not to be conceived of as a procedure by which a subject provides itself with representations of something which remain stored up inside as having been thus definitely appropriated, and with regard to which the question is to be put of how they agree with actual reality. When Dasein directs itself toward something and grasps it, it does not somehow first go out from an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary manner of Being is suchthat it is always "outside," alongside beings which it encounters and which belong to the world already discovered. And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the inner box of consciousness after one has gone out in order to grasp it. Even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, Dasein which knows, remains outside, and it does so as Dasein. In
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knowing, Dasein achieves a new status of Being towards the world which has already been discovered in Dasein itself. This new possibility of Being can develop autonomously; it can become a task to be accomplished in the different sciences. But a commercium of the subject with a world does not get created for the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the world acts upon a subject. Knowing the world is a mode of Dasein's Being which is founded upon its Being-in-the-world. (SZ, 59-62) In this passage Heidegger really accomplishes two different but closely related things which are of vital importance for a correct understanding of man. First of all, he tries to show that knowingthe-world theoretically is a derivative mode of man's Being-in-theworld. If knowing-the-world is a special mode of our Being-in-theworld, then it can be shown easily that the subject-object-opposition is not a fundamental datum of our immediate experience. This opposition comes about merely on the level of reflection. Furthermore, if the subject-object-opposition is not fundamental, it is easy to show that the farnaus epistemological problern with which Descartes and Kant struggled is really a pseudo-problem. But in addition to this first thesis, namely that theoretically knowing-the-world is only one particular mode of Dasein's concern for the world, Heidegger also tries to show that in man's primordial concern with the world there is found a kind of "knowledge" which is quite different from what we normally call knowledge, namely theoretical and scientific knowledge. Heidegger shows the difference between our concernfully knowing the world and our theoretical knowledge of the world not only from the viewpoint of man's approach to the world, but also from the viewpoint of the world itself. He carefully analyzes the difference which undeniably exists between the world of Dasein's everyday concern and the derivative world as found in the sciences. The primordial world has its center in Dasein itself and originally coincides with our personal environment (Umwelt) insofar as this is experienced in our concernful dealing with the things and our fellow-men in the world. Heidegger shows convincingly that the things found in our world are given primarily not as physical objects which simply are lying there "before our hands" (Vorhanden), but as usable things or utensils of some kind, as equipment which refers to possible applications within a "practical" world and, thus, is "ready-to-hand" (zuhanden). Things of this kind inherently refer to one another and form systems of mutual references of meaning. World and things are very closely related here, and yet the world itself is not a thing, nor the sum of all
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things, but rather the totality of meaning toward which all equipment points by its very structure. What we call the world is the totality of all mutual reference-systems within which every thing is capable of appearing to man as having a determinate meaning (Sinn). (SZ, 63-88) It is to that notion of "world" that we must turn in our next chapter.
CHAPrERV
ON THE BEINGOF THE WORLD (Being and Time, Beetions 14-18, pp. 63-88)
I: The World and Its Being. Introductory Observations! In the preceding chapter we have already indicated in a provisional way what Heidegger understands by world and how his conception of world relates to those defended in our Western pbilosophical tradition. Here we must follow Heidegger's own effort to explain what world is, as we find this in Being and Time. In the German edition this chapter is entitled, "Die Weltlichkeit der Welt." It is difficult to translate this expression in such a way that the translation indeed expresses what Heidegger had in mind. The "literal" translation of the expression would have been: the world-liness of the world. Yet the expression "worldliness" means the condition of being worldly, i.e., of being devoted to worldly affairs to the neglect of religious duties or spiritual needs. Since Heidegger most certainly is not advocating "Iove for the world and its pleasures," the translators, Macquarrie and Robinson, rejected this translation and went instead for "worldhood." This is a word that is now obsolete. Yet it has the advantage of having the meaning meant by Heidegger, namely the state or condition of a world. One could say that a world can change in its worldhood. Richardson correctly suggests translating the term according to its meaning and function in Heidegger's philosophy, i.e., as the Being of the world.2 I shall use "the Being of the world" where it is essential to avoid misunderstanding; yet I shall also use the expression "worldhood"
Ion Heidegger's conception of world cf. William Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 52-58; Walter Biemel, Le concept du monde chez Heidegger. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1950; Fernand Couturier, Monde et etre chez Heidegger. Montreal: Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1971; Eugen Fink, Sein, Wahrheit, Welt. Vor-Fragen zum Problem des Phänomen-Begriffs. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958; Eugon Vietta, "Being, World, and Understanding. A Commentary on Heidegger," The Review of Metaphysics, 5(1951-52), pp. 157-72. 2Ibid., p. 52.
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which here always has the meaning of the mode of Being characteristic of the world. When Heidegger wrote this section of Being and Time he was fully aware of the fact that one can introduce people to an ontological conception of world in several ways. In Being and Time he selected the approach which takes its starting point in the notion of concern. Several people have criticized Heidegger for his approach to the problern of world on the ground that he deals with the basic issues with the mentality of a carpenter or a shoemaker. The fact that Heidegger's father was to some degree indeed a carpenter may have something to do with the examples Heidegger sometimes gives. Yet from the context it is obvious that these examples were meant to show the nature of world as such. Also, from Heidegger's effort to retrieve the meaning of world, discussed in the preceding chapter, it is obvious that he indeed was concerned mainly with the discovery of the Being of the world as such. Be this as it may, in Being and Time Heidegger begins with the remark that it is very difficult to answer the question of what the world really is. A first but very superficial answer could be obtained by enumerating all the things that are in the world. It stands to reason, however, that one will never succeed in saying what the world really is by assuming that the world just is the sum total of all beings in the world. One could, of course, go about the issue more systematically by distinguishing different domains of beings, determining which of these is the most fundamental domain, and then trying to explain its properties. Even this, however, would not Iead to an insight into the mode of Being of the world, not even if one were to use the data gathered by the social sciences. For the proper character of things is known from the world and not the world from the things. (SZ, 63-64) If then the world cannot be understood as a characteristic of the things because the things presuppose the world, is it then perhaps possible to discover what the world is in its own Being by considering it as a characteristic of Dasein's own mode of Being? (SZ, 64) Of course, this question does not immediately eliminate all difficulties, for this change in point of view raises a whole set of new questions. Is the world not ultimately a determination of the being that does not belong to the order of Dasein? But in that case how can this being be defined as a being within the world? Is the world then perhaps nonetheless an eksistential of Dasein's Being? But does it not follow then that each Dasein has its own world? Does not the world become something merely subjective? How can there still be a common world
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in which we all live? And if we raise the question about the world, what world do we have in mind? Neither the common nor the subjective world, but rather the worldhood of the world as such. How does one meet this worldhood? In these suggestive questions Heidegger's intention begins to assume a more concrete form. The real problern here is the worldBeing of the world, the worldhood of the world, i.e., that which constitutes the world as such, regardless of whether it is my world or your world, or even our world. These questions also indicate that the world is not to be taken as the sum of things, but as another structural element of Dasein's mode of Being. The word "world" has for Heidegger here an ontologico-eksistential meaning: it says something about the mode of Being of a being whose essence is eksistence. We have already seen that the distinction between "ontic" and "ontological" is derived from the distinction between being and Being. One can regard a being simply as it manifests itself at first sight; one then takes an ontic standpoint; this standpoint is related to on, ens, being. But one can also try to understand the mode of Beingof the beings, that which makes a being be what it is, its fundamental and constitutive structure. In this case one does not stop with the being as it is immediately given, but one tries to understand this being as being, i.e., the mode of Being proper to this being, in short its Being. This way of looking belongs to the ontological order. But as we have seen already, it is also important to keep in mind that in addition to the beings, and the Being of each kind of being (ousia, beingness), there is also still Being itself to be mentioned. It is to prepare an answer to the question concerning the meaning of Being itself that the analytic of Dasein's mode of Beingis necessary. The beingness of Dasein is to be b:rought to light in order that then the question concerning the meaning of Being as such can be asked in a meaningful manner. Be this as it may, by saying that the word "world" has an ontologico-eksistential meaning, Heidegger wants to indicate that he does not intend to Iimit his search to a mere description of what human beings ordinarily call "world." Rather he wants to discover its essential structure. He also wants to express that this structure is founded upon human eksistence, on the mode of Being that is characteristic of man as Dasein. "Ontologically 'world' is not a way of characterizing the beings which Dasein essentially is not; but it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself." (SZ, 64) "Worldhood" is in itself an ontological concept because it indicates the structure of a
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constitutive moment of Being-in-the-world, which itself determines Dasein's eksistence. If we inquire about the world from this perspective, we consider it in an ontologico-eksistential way, so that the term "world" has an ontologico-eksistential meaning, too. (SZ, 64) In this way Heidegger shows the direction in which he wants us to look for a solution to the problern concerning the Being of the world. In his attempt to explain and justify his viewpoint, Heidegger starts by accurately circumscribing the different meanings which the term "world" can assume. 1. As an ontic term, "world" signifies the totality of the beings which can be present within the universe. 2. As an ontological term, "world" can mean the Being of the world taken as the totality of all beings. In a derivative way "world" can also be used in this sense in reference to a particular realm encompassing a particular group of beings; for instance, the "world" of the mathematician or the "world" of the physicist. 3. "World" can also signify that "wherein" Dasein concretely lives, my or your personal world, or our common world. Here the term "world" is again taken in an ontic sense, because it refers to Dasein as a being and assumes that no effort has been made yet to bring the intrinsic structure of Dasein's Being to light. In this case Heidegger speaks of the pre-ontological, concrete-eksistentiell meaning of "world." It should be recalled here that Dasein, as eksisting, necessarily is somehow related to, and also has some knowledge of, its own Being. This knowledge which is essential for Dasein as eksisting, however, is not yet explicit and thematic, and for this reason Heidegger calls it a pre-ontological understanding. Moreover, Dasein as eksisting is Being-in-the-world; but since this Being-in-the-world is taken here only as a concrete fact, this understanding of Dasein's own Being and therefore also this understanding of the world is a pre-ontological eksistentiell understanding. If one would have understood Dasein here according to its essential structure and not just as a concrete fact, this understanding would have been called eksistential and not concreteeksistentiell. 4. In its ontologico-eksistential sense "world" means the Being of the world, the worldhood, which is the subject matter of the present inquiry. (SZ, 65) This sense is ontological because it explicitly and thematically aims at the Being of the world, and it is eksistential insofar as it is to be understood as a structural element of Dasein's own Being which is Being-in-the-world. In cantrast to Dasein, which Heidegger calls "worldly," Heidegger refers to intraworldly beings as
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"belonging to the world" (weltzugehörig). The terms "intraworldly" and "belonging to the world" thus indicate the distinguishing features of the presence of things in the world to man. (SZ, 64-5) Anyone who has gone through the history of philosophy and has focused on the problern of world, will have noticed that the world has never been understood as a structural element of Dasein's own Being. The brief summary of this history which we have presented in the preceding chapter shows this most clearly. The reason for the absence of this conception of world lies in the fact that Dasein itself has never been regarded as Being-in-the-world. When the problern of the world is considered at all, it is usually restricted to a certain < group of beings within the world, for instance, nature; yet even nature itself has never been discovered explicitly as such. Nature as studied by physics, is considered to be the basis for the other domains of beings which, in cantrast to the domain of nature, are then called the domains of values. We hope to explain later that such a conception of nature as the basis for all other domains of beings, can arise only through a change of Dasein's primordial viewpoint with respect to the world, a change through which the world is deprived of its worldhood. At any rate, this much should be clear, that nature as the categorial aggregate of certain structures of Being possessed by a certain group of beings within the world cannot possibly explain the worldhood of the world. (SZ, 65-66)
ll: The Mode ofBeing of the Beings Within The World Before a positive answer can be given to the question of the mode of Being proper to the world, we must first speak about the mode of Being characteristic of the beings within the world. Our everyday eksistence is, according to Heidegger, characterized by concern, our concernful dealing with beings within the world. In these dealings and preoccupations Dasein is not primarily interested in mere knowledge but in action, in manipulating things and putting them to use. Our theoretical knowledge is only a derivative mode of this primordial concernful Being-in-the-world (SZ, 59-62); we shall return to the change from concern to theoretical knowledge in one of the chapters to follow. Let us now Iimit ourselves provisionally to the question of how exactly beings within the world are present to Dasein in its concernful preoccupation with them as things. For this purpose we must carefully analyze and describe our own concernful dealings with beings within the world. It is difficult to describe the
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phenomenon of concern correctly because of the obstacles created by all kinds of prejudices which we have already formed in our everyday life. (SZ, 67) Moreover, one could also object that such an analysis would be a waste of time because it obviously deals with matters that everyone knows already. What could be moretrivial than knowing that in our daily concem we deal with things? However, this objection takes for granted that we already know what precisely makes a thing be a thing. In what does the thinghood of the thing really consist? Some think that it lies in the reality or materiality of the things, which could then be further explained through extension; for others, things are objects of value. Yet the things which we encounter in our everyday concernful preoccupations clearly do not appear to us as material objects or as objects of value. Starting from either view Ieads us to overlook the typical character of things. In this regard Greek thought was more primordial than ours because the Greeks were closer to that which primordially appeared to man. The ancient Greeks spoke about pragmata in reference to that with which one has to do in one's praxis, one's concernful preoccupation with things. Following the ideas of the ancient Greeks Heidegger calls everything we encounter in our everyday concern a piece of equipment, gear (Zeug). In this sense one still speaks of equipment or gear for fishing, working, or playing in reference to the things used "in order to" fish, work, or play. Thus everything that in any way serves an "in order to ... " will be called a piece of equipment from now on. The question now is: What is characteristic of equipment, what constitutes the mode of Being of equipment as such, what is it that makes equipment equipment? A tool is never by itself, but it is always found in reference to other equipment. What constitutes the unity of this equipmental manifold? Each separate piece of equipment is something "in order to ... ", it "serves to ... " The various modalities of this "serving to ..." characterize the "in order to ... ," the meaning of the equipment. Thus the various pieces of equipment are connected by their "in order to ... "; and this "in order to ... " gives the equipment manifold its unity. (SZ, 68) The "serving to ..." necessarily includes a reference and assignment to something eise. In order to make progress with our analysis we must therefore consider first a concrete equipment manifold and pay special attention to the totality of the mutual references. Heidegger takes a room as an example to clarify the point. Each piece of equipment in the room is as such defined through its references to other pieces of
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equipment. Moreover, one does not meet first the separate pieces of equipment and then add them up in order to construct the room from them as a unity, but one first encounters the room as such. Only in and through this totality do the separate things receive their proper meaning. Our knowledge of the room does not have to be explicit or theoretical, for a certain preknowledge of what the term "room" designates is sufficient to understand what is present in the room. (SZ, 68-9) Accordingly, a particular piece of equipment does not show itself and cannot be understood without the equipment manifold to which it belongs; this manifold has to be previously discovered. The terms "to know" and "to understand" refer here to that kind ofknowledge which is still completely and immediately related to our concernful preoccupation itself. For example, one uses a hammer in the right way without explicitly understanding the proper mode of Being of this piece of equipment. In our everyday life we do not know the hammer theoretically as "simply given" and "merely there," but we know how to use it. By using the hammer in the right way within a certain equipment manifold, Dasein has appropriated it in the most suitable way, for the hammer is not there to be looked at, but to hammer with. By using the hammer, Dasein in its everyday concernful preoccupation with things, has to submit to the assignment that is constitutive for this piece of equipment, namely, its "in-order-to." By using the hammer, Dasein discovers its manipulability (Handlichkeit); this term indicates the hammer's relationship to the hand (manus, hand). A piece of equipment is a thing that is "ready to hand" (zuhanden); it possesses "readiness-to-hand": "The kind of Being which equipment possesses-in which it manifests itself in its own terms-we call 'readiness-to-hand'." (SZ, 69) The fact that each piece of equipment can be used "in order to ..." gives it its own Being, its own character, its own "in itself' (An-sich). By saying that our ordinary knowledge of pieces of equipment and materials is not theoretical knowledge which later somehow would be changed into practical knowledge, we do not intend to state that our everyday concernful preoccupation with beings within the world does not imply a standpoint and view in regard to equipment. On the contrary, our concernful preoccupation really includes a certain view of the equipment which immediately discovers the fundamental assignment of each piece of equipment, its peculiar reference to its "in order to .... " Our concernful preoccupation with things uses the piece of equipment according to the reference which manifests itself in its "serving to," its "being good for," its usability.
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Heidegger calls this way of looking which Dasein has in regard to equipment "circumspection" (Umsicht). Circumspection is Dasein's overall view of the mode of Being characteristic of the things around us that helps us to make or use or even recognize a piece of work, in which precisely their "in order to ... " is discovered. (SZ, 69) Before we proceed with this analysis of a piece of equipment a few observations seem to be important. First of all, in this analysis, as in many others, Heidegger very often uses expressions such as: the "in order to ... ," the "for the sake of which ... ," the "toward which ... ," "that in virtue of which ... ," "that from which ...." As we have seen already, these and similar expressions were created by Heidegger in his reflections on Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics.3 They are "creative" translations of expressions such as pros ti ... , kath'o, to ek tinos, hou heneka, etc. Secondly, one should note also that Heidegger has not made an effort here to define the thinghood of the thing, but rather the mode of Being characteristic of pieces of equipment. It is undoubtedly true that in our everyday concern we encounter things as pieces of equipment; this explains why Heidegger, who is trying to develop an ontologico-eksistential conception of world, focuses on pieces of equipment. The reason for his doing EO isthat pieces of equipment cannot be understood except in an equipmental context, a set of relationships, some kind of a "world."4 Be this as it may, the proper character of equipment, its "readiness to hand," is not explicitly evident in our everyday concernful dealing with things. In its concern Dasein is not primarily occupied with the equipment itself but with the piece of work that is to be produced by it. It is the work to be done that makes Dasein go to the above-mentioned referential totality; the work itselfis present first. (SZ, 70) But the work whose realization is previously projected has itself also the characteristic of being an equipment, insofar as it also is "meant for ... " and is to "serve to ... ". In the piece of work we do not only discover a constitutive reference to its "what for," its usability, but also a reference to the material which Dasein uses, a reference to the "whereof." A tableis 3Cf. Chapter I, section III, 2 above. 4For the meaning of the term "thing" and the relationship between thing and world in Heidegger's later philosophy, see Joseph J. Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Art Works. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1985, pp. 112-117, 122-124, 184, 199, and passim.
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made of wood or iron and as such it refers to "nature." Thus nature is primordially discovered in the piece of work as the material out of which it is made; nature is always co-discovered in the referential totality. (SZ, 70) Later, of course, nature can also be the theme of a special consideration, but it primarily appears in our everyday concernful preoccupation with things, i.e., in its necessary relation to equipment. The field, the woods, the hill, all stand first in function of the equipment of our daily concern: the fields are there for wheat or vegetables, the forest for timber, and the hills for grapes. Finally, each piece of equipment and each piece of work refers also to Dasein itself for which it exists as such; equipment and work are there for me, for us, for all. (SZ, 70) The important point in these considerations is that in our everyday concernful dealings the things do not appear first as a kind of pure world stuff, so to speak, as "raw beings" which subsequently somehow would receive a "form" of some kind. Things appear primordially as "ready to hand." A sign of this is that when we meet something new we always ask immediately what it is for. We put ourselves always in a perspective that immediately reveals to us fundamental references to tools and materials. In our everyday life we are first of all concerned with things in our concernful preoccupation. Of course, we can later change our perspective and regard the things only as "merely there," by abstracting them from the references that are constitutive for the mode of Being of equipment as such. But in that case, we must first change our primordial attitude toward things. The primordial characteristic of being "ready to hand" of the beings within the world is not an invention of philosophy, but indicates the Being that is characteristic of, and proper to, equipment as such. (SZ, 71-72)
ID: Th.e Worldly Character of the Environmental World Reference and Sign What then, one may ask, has all this to do with the question of the mode of Being of the world? First of all, Heidegger continues, it should be evident that the world itself cannot possibly be a being within the world. On the contrary, the world is precisely that which makes all beings within the world as such possible, for it is always necessarily presupposed by them. (SZ, 72) What then is the mode of Being proper to the world? Andin what sense can one say that there is a world? If Dasein is
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME fundamentally and in essence Being-in-the-world and always has an implicit understanding of its own Being, then it seems to follow that Dasein also has necessarily a certain understanding of the world. Hence, by analyzing Dasein as Being-in-the-world in its relation to beings within the world, it must be possible to understand something of the world "wherein" our everyday concernful dealing with things occurs. Such an analysis demands that we first elucidate the innerworldly character of these beings more precisely. The traditional conceptions that start from things as simply given are deficient here. Their defect is that they take off from presuppositions, while giving the appearance that they do not presuppose anything. The simply given thing is not primordially given, but a reduced and abstract being that no one encounters directly in this form. It is really a piece of equipment which by abstraction is reduced to an object of theoretical knowledge. Of course, this knowledge is also a way of Being-in-the-world, but it is not our primordial way. Our primordial way of Being-in-the-world is our dealing with pieces of equipment in our everyday concern. (SZ, 72) The innerworldly character of things in the world manifests itself most clearly when the equipmental order is disturbed. This can happen in at least three different ways: 1) First, a piece of equipment can become unusable, so that it is no Ionger good for what it was originally meant to serve. We become aware of this, in the first place, in our concernful preoccupation itself and by understanding what is immediately connected with our concern. The thing that has become unusable, the broken hammer for example, draws attention, and its pure Being-there now becomes conspicuous. (SZ, 73) It has lost its equipmental character and asks for repair or replacement so that it, or something else, can be ready to hand again. 2) Secondly, when a piece of equipment that should be there appears to be missing, the pieces that are there become obtrusive. Through the absence of the one the others also become unusable; they are no Ionger ready to hand but appear now as merely given and just being there. 3) It can also happen that a piece of equipment that was lost suddenly reappears and by its presence asks Dasein to produce a certain piece of work. If this is impossible at that moment because Dasein is already busy with something eise, the equipment can then become disturbingly obstinate and an obsession to Dasein.
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In all these cases a being that, strictly speaking, should be ready to hand appears to us now as merely given and as merely being there. At such moments Dasein becomes clearly aware of the special character of what is ready to hand: that which is conspicuous as unusable, that which is obtrusive through the absence of something eise, and that which is obstinate in presenting itself at a moment when it cannot be used, can be conceived as "merely given" only in function of a more primordial readiness to hand. (SZ, 73-74) As we have seen above, the mode of Being proper to the equipment with which we deal in our everyday concern must be determined through reference. On closer examination, however, it appears that our concern is not primarily oriented toward this referential character; it uses it without explicitly aiming at it. The referential character comes to the fore only in special cases. In our everyday concernful preoccupation with things the referential character is recognized, but the ontological structure of equipment is explicitly understood only in reflective thought. What is experienced implicitly can be made explicit. In this explication the worldhood of the world must finally come to the fore. (SZ, 75) The worldly character of equipment manifests itself clearly only when an unusable piece of equipment begins to appear as merely given, i.e., at the moment when the equipment is deprived of its worldly character. This fact shows that the world cannot be the sum of things. Generally speaking, one can state that the references which are constitutive for Dasein's world cannot be thematically and explicitly understood by a Dasein which is still absorbed in its concernful preoccupation with things. If one wants to meet what is ready to hand as it is "in itself," then it should precisely not be obtrusive and not conspicuous. This non-obtrusiveness and inconspicuousness are negative expressions for positive aspects of what is ready to hand. What constitutes the equipment as it is "in itself' is the fact that it is daily ready to hand without ernerging from the referential whole of its being "in itself' as a merely given being. (SZ, 75-6) However, if the world can appear in concern, then it must have been discovered previously to Dasein in some way or other. For if the encounter of Dasein with what is ready to hand is to be possible, then the world must already have been discovered. Thus the world appears explicitly as that "wherein" Dasein already was and to which it later also can return explicitly. Dasein cannot encounter equipment save insofar as the equipment already belongs to Dasein's world, for what is ready to hand would be meaningless if it were not
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interwoven with this worldly structure. Accordingly, Dasein in its circumspective concern operates in a totality of equipmental references, and this circumspective concern presupposes a certain familiarity with the world. How is this familiarity possible and how can the worldly character of the beings within the world be explained by it? (SZ, 76) It will be necessary at this point to study more carefully the phenomenon of reference in order to be able to answer these questions. As we have seen above, any piece of equipment has meaning only within a totality of references, and it has become clear also, to some degree at least, that there must be a relation between this referential totality and the world. There must, therefore, be a way from the phenomenon of reference to the worldhood of the world. In order to be able to show more clearly the referential character proper to equipment, one can best begin by contemplating a piece of equipment in which two different references are present at the same time, such as for instance in signs. (SZ, 76-77) The word "sign" can designate many kinds of things, but in the first instance, signs appear to be pieces of equipment whose specific character as equipmei:lt consists in indicating. In our everyday life we find such signs in traffic signs, signposts, boundary markers, water buoys, signals, banners, and the like. Showing or indicating can be defined as a kind of referring and referring itself is, if taken as formally as possible, a form of relating. But relation cannot be conceived of here as the genus for the kinds of references which may become differentiated as sign, icon, symbol, expression, signification, and so on. A relation is something formal that is constituted by a process of formalization which may take its point of departure from any concrete kind of context. The formally general character of relation can be brought to the fore, when we realize that every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference; that every indication is a reference, but not every reference an indication, and finally that every indication is a relation, but not every relation an indication. This being the case, it becomes evident that, if we are to investigate such phenomena as references, signs, or even significations, there is nothing to be gained by characterizing them as relations. One may even ask the question of whether relations, because of their formally general character, do not have their ontological root in the phenomenon of reference. (SZ, 77) Therefore, even if the present analysis is to be confined to the interpretation of the signs as distinct from the phenomenon of reference, as suggested by our analysis of an item of equipment, even
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within this Iimitation we cannot properly investigate the full roultiplicity of possihle signs. For among them there are indices, numhers, pointer-readings, warning signals, symptoms, signs which refer to something in the past, signs to mark something, signs by which things can he recognized, all having different ways of indicating, regardless of what may he serving as such a sign. Furthermore, from such "signs" we must still distinguish traces, residues, memorials, documents, testimonies, significations, appearances, expressions, symhols, etc. Ohviously these phenomena can he formulated quite easily hecause of their relational character. But what we shall find in this way in the end says nothing that is roore than the easy schema of content and form. It is for this reason, Heidegger says, that we intend to restriet ourselves to an analysis and description of signs which-from the viewpoint of our common language-are signs in an authentic and, moreover, original way, in order to focus not on their reference-structure as such, which theyas we have seen-have in common with every item of equipment, hut on the characteristic traits of the reference-structure of the sign as such. (SZ, 77-78) Let us, therefore, Heidegger continues, take as an example the turn-signal which a hus or a car uses to indicate the direction it will take at an intersection. This sign is an item of equipment which is ready to hand for the driver in his concern with driving as well as for those who are not traveling with him and make use of it either hy yielding the right of way or hy stopping. This sign thus is ready to hand within the world in the entire equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment, it is constituted hy references. It has the character of the "inorder-to ... " of every equipment; hut in addition to this it has also its own definite serviceahility: it is for indicating. This indicating which is characteristic of the sign can again he determined as a kind of referring-to, hut then this referring is different from the ontological structure of the sign as equipment. (SZ, 78) Referring taken as indicating is rather founded on the ontological structure of equipment, thus on the "serviceahility-for" which is characteristic of equipment as such. But a thing may he Serviceahle without for that matter heing a sign. As equipment, a hammer, too, has a certain serviceahility, hut this does not make it a sign. Indicating, as a form of referring, is a way in which the toward-which of a serviceahle thing hecomes concrete; it determines an item of equipment as for this concrete "toward-which." On the other hand, the kind of reference we have in "serviceahility-for," is a
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characteristic trait of equipment as equipment. That the "towardwhich" of a serviceable thing is made concrete here in the form of "indicating" is accidental for the constitution of an equipment as such. In this example the difference between the reference of Serviceability and the reference of indicating is already roughly indicated. These two certainly do not coincide; and only when they are united does the concreteness of a definite kind of equipment manifest itself. It is certain that indicating differs in principle from referring, taken as a constitutive characteristic of equipment as such; but it is certain also that the sign is related in a distinctive way to the kind of Being which is characteristic of whatever equipmental totality may be ready to hand in the environment. Thus we may conclude that in our concernful dealing equipment-for-indicating is utilized in a very special manner. The meaning and the root of this special manner must be clarified next. (SZ, 78-79) A sign indicates. What precisely is meant by this? In answering this question one must focus on man's typical kind of dealing which is appropriate to equipment for indicating, and see what this teaches us about the readiness-to-hand characteristic of that kind of equipment. The appropriate way of dealing with a sign, such as a turn-signal, certainly does not consist in staring at it, or explicitly identifying it as an "indicating thing." Nor is such a sign authentically encountered if we turn our glance in the direction which the signal indicates, and focus on something present at hand which is found in the region indicated. Such a sign seems rather to address itself immediately to man's circumspection which is characteristic of his concernful dealing with things, impelling it to bring into an explicit survey whatever the environment may contain at that moment. Such a survey obviously does not grasp the sign's · readiness-to-hand, but tries to bring about an orientation in the environment. (SZ, 79) But if it is true that signs of this kind make some environment accessible to us in such a way that our concernful dealing receives an orientation, then it is evident that a sign does not stand in the relationship of indicating to just one other thing or some other things in concreto; it is rather a piece of equipment which explicitly brings an equipment totality within the range of our circumspection. In other words, signs indicate two things: first the environment wherein one lives and where one's concern dwells, and then the typical way in which man is involved in something. (SZ, 79-80; cf. 66) Be this as it may, it appears thus that signs are pieces of equipment which in addition to referring to a possible equipment
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totality also indicate something. This indicating is founded upon the equipment structure, the "in-order-to" of the equipment as such and concretizes the "toward-which" of its serviceability. Furthermore, the sign's indicating, just as the equipmental character of everything that is ready to hand, functions in an equipment totality, i.e., in a whole context of references. Finally, a sign is not merely ready to hand tagether with other pieces of equipment, but its readiness-tohand precisely makes the environment in each concrete case explicitly accessible for circumspection. Thus a sign is something ontic which is ready to hand and which in addition to being this piece of equipment also explicitly indicates the ontological structure of what is ready to hand as a whole, i.e., the structure of certain totalities or "worlds," and in the final analysis "the" world. (SZ, 80-83) It is clear, therefore, that the reference structure as such is indeed a necessary, but not a sufficient characteristic of a sign as sign, because that structure is characteristic of every item of equipment. The distinguishing characteristic of a sign is that it, via this general reference structure, indicates something, points to something within a concrete context of references; in indicating something concrete the sign also points to this referential totality and finally even to the world, or at least to a certain world. The final meaning of this indicating and pointing-to consists in the fact that it makes a certain environment or referential totality explicitly accessible for circumspection by pointing in a certain direction, indicating an orientation, making possible a differentiation, making a structute understandable, etc. (SZ, 82)
IV: Destination and Meaningfulness. The Beingof the World What is ready to hand always manifests itself as a being within the world, as a being that belongs to the world. That which determines what is ready to hand as such, its readiness-to-hand, therefore, has somehow a relationship with the world and its worldhood. Moreover, as we have seen, whenever we encounter anything, the world itself has already been discovered previously. As pre-discovered, the world precedes the discovery of the individual beings within the world. The question now is one of how the world can let the ready to hand be encountered as such? (SZ, 83) Wehave already discovered two modes of reference: the Serviceability of equipment and the usability of materials. The "in-order-to" of Serviceability and the "what-for" of usability always determine the possible ways in which
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the fundamental reference, proper to any piece of equipment as such, can be made concrete. Usually these concretizations are called properties; for example, we say that an arrow has the property of being able to indicate something, and that a stone has the property that one can use it in building a house. However, this is not a correct way of speaking: merely-given-beings have properties, but the readyto-hand has appropriatenesses and suitabilities. The appropriateness of a piece of equipment determines its properties; thus the suitability of the hammer for hammering determines the form and the weight of its head and handle. We also have to distinguish between Serviceability and appropriateness; Serviceability is the necessary condition for the appropriateness of the equipment. The reference or assignment of the hammer determines its appropriateness and suitability, and the latter determine its properties. A thing is suitable-for ... because as ready-to-hand it is determined by the "in-order-to ... " of its serviceability. Serviceability and suitability are therefore related to each other as necessary condition and concrete realization. The mode of Being that is proper to what is ready-to-hand is characterized by a referential structure; it has in itself the character of "beingrelative-to ... ". For example, the hammer is essentially relative to and involved in hammering. This being-relative is not a secondary or accidental characteristic of what is ready to hand, but defines precisely its mode of Being. Heidegger calls this "being-essentiallyrelative-to ... " the Bewandtnis, which we perhaps may translate by being-destined. (SZ, 83-84) This destination includes that which is destined for and that for which it is destined. Through its destination one can adequately determine the mode of Being that is proper to something which is ready to hand. (SZ, 84) The destination implies something that is destined for ... , namely the piece of equipment or the material, as well as that for which it is destined, namely the work to be done with it. The hammer is destined for hammering, the hammering can be destined for making furniture, the furniture for holding books, the books for reading, and so on. The "what-for" of a piece of equipment is ultimately determined by the totality of all these partial destinations. Since an infinite series of destinations is impossible, there must be a last "what-for," that itself is no Ionger destined for anything eise. This last "what-for" can only be Dasein itself. Dasein is the ultimate "what-for" in which all references included in destination find their final term. Dasein in its concern discovers intraworldly beings as having a certain destination.
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Heidegger calls this form of Dasein's discovering of beings within the world Bewendenlassen, i.e., letting be destined, or briefly Zetting be, making possible and allowing the encounter with the beings. In order that a being within the world can be ready to hand Dasein must first discover its destination within a given totality of destinations. In this way Dasein does not produce the mode of Being and the actuality of the equipment, but only unveils it; thus letting-be is a necessary condition for the encounter with beings as ready to hand. (SZ, 84) This letting-be can take place in different spheres; and at each time a particular kind of destination of the beings within the world appears. In the sciences it Ieads to beings whose kind of destination is totally different from the one encountered in the letting-be of our everyday concern. In any case, the beings are never first discovered as "raw beings," or as mere things; they manifest themselves primordially as beings with a certain destination, and they can manifest themselves only with this destination once the latter has been discovered by Dasein's letting-be. (SZ, 85) Accordingly, the mode of Being proper to what is ready to hand is its being-destined-for. If such a being is to be discovered, the totality of destinations proper to the multitude ofthe beings within the world involved of which this piece of equipment is a part, must have been discovered previously. Precisely this pre-discovery of a complex of destinations brings to light the worldly character of the beings. But this is not all: the discovery of the complex of destinations which must Iead to the discovery of the final "what-for," is ultimately based on a fundamental projection of Dasein; in this "that-for-and-towardwhich ... " (das Woraufhin), Dasein discovers its world. This fundamental projection opens the domain "wherein" Dasein discovers its world. This fundamental projection opens the domain "wherein" Dasein unveils the constitutive references of equipment, thereby discovering the beings within the world and freeing them as such. (SZ, 86) Dasein itself must be characterized essentially by a certain understanding of Being in Dasein's own mode of Being itself. On the other hand, Dasein is essentially Being-in-the-world. But in that case it always already has a certain understanding of the world. This understanding of the world, as considered above, can now be explained as follows: that wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of referring itself, isthat for which it has let the beings be encountered beforehand. The "wherein" of an act of understanding which refers itself is "that for which" one lets the
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME beings be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to their destinations; and this "wherein" is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of "that to which" Dasein assigns and refers itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world. (SZ, 86) Heidegger's term "wherein" should not be understood here in a spatial sense. The term here merely indicates the being-with and the being-open-to which are essential to Dasein. By remaining within the references which_ this "wherein" includes, Dasein discovers the destination of the beings within the world, their being ready-to-hand. At the same time Dasein discovers its Being as a Being-able-to-be insofar as it learns to understand its own eksistence by grasping the references as a priori conditions and foundations of its own activities. For this reason one could also speak about the referential character of all the references included in the "where-in" as signifying (bedeuten). If the totality of all signifying relations is called total meaningfulness, then this term can be suitably used to indicate the worldhood of the world, the essential structure ofthat "where-in" in which Dasein is eksistent. (SZ, 87) All this enables us to have a better understanding of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. In its familiarity with the context of references to which it itself contributes, and which determine the character that is proper to the world, Dasein is the ontic condition for the possibility of discovering the beings within the world. These beings, as beings that are ready-to-hand, are always encountered in that world and can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves. (SZ, 87) Dasein is in this way defined as such: along with its own Being, a context of ready-to-hand things is essentially co-discovered. Dasein, insofar as it is what it is, has always related itself already to a world which it encounters, and this reference to, and dependence on, such a world belongs essentially to Dasein's own Being. The context of references itself, however, which is familiar to Dasein, includes the ontological condition that makes it possible for Dasein's understanding to bring to light meaning and significance. These, in turn, form the basis for words and language. (SZ, 87) We shall retum to language in one of the chapters to follow. Concluding we may say thus that under the heading of the worldhood of the world, Heidegger investigates the world of Dasein in its everydayness in contrast to the derivative world of the sciences. World has its center in Dasein itself and originally coincides with our own environmental world (Umwelt) insofar as this environment is experienced in our lived experiences. Heidegger shows impressively how the things within this world are given not as physical objects
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which simply occur as obviously present-at-hand (vorhanden), but as usable things or pieces of equipment (Zeuge) which refer to possible applications within our "practical" world and are thus ready-to-hand (zuhanden). Things of this type refer to one another and constitute reference-systems and only within these systems does the meaning of these things become manifest. Heidegger's investigation of the things in their surrounding world shows how closely things are related to the world, and how closely both are connected with man as Dasein. Heidegger also shows that the world is not a thing, nor the sum total of all things, but rather the a priori totality of meaning toward which the different pieces of equipment point by their structure, their "for-what's." What we call "the world," taken in the strictest and mostoriginal sense, is the totality of all mutual reference-systems within which everything is to be put by man as Dasein in order for it to be able to appear to man as having such determinate meaning. Dasein first builds up this world by means of its concern (within the context of a historical community) and then lives and dwells in it.
CHAPTERVI
SPATIALITY AND SPACE BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS BEING-WITH (Being and Time, Sections 22-27, pp. 101-130)
In this chapter I should like to discuss two issues which Heidegger treats in different contexts. The issue of Dasein's spatiality is raised in connection with the notion of world and particularly with the "aroundness" of our environmental world. The section on Dasein's Being with others is devoted to an issue that is dealt with independently of the notion of world and seems to form a preparation for the second part of the next chapter, namely the everyday Being of the "there" of Dasein. I have nevertheless brought these issues tagether in this chapter merely for "aesthetic" reasons; both issues can be discussed briefly so that bringing them tagether in one chapter would result in a better balance with respect to the length of the chapters of this book. In view of the fact that both issues are presented herein the order in which they appear in Being and Time, the reader should not encounter a serious difficulty in following Heidegger's own train of thought. In the explanation of the Being-in structure which is proper to Dasein as Being-in-the-world, it was pointed out that this Being-in should not be understood in a spatial sense. Yet Dasein obviously does possess a certain spatiality. Furthermore, in the preceding reflections it was not stressed either that each of us is in the world tagether with other human beings and that the world thus is our common world. An explanation of our Being with others and our Dasein with others is essential to come to a better understanding of the "who" of Dasein in its everyday concern. But before turning to these issues let us first focus on spatiality and space. Here we shall consider the spatiality of the beings within the world first in order then to focus our attention on "space" itself. (SZ, 102)
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SECTION 1: SPATIALITY AND SPACEl 1: The Spatiality of the Beings Within the World If space somehow belongs to the world, then beings within the world must have spatiality. This point was already implicitly affirmed in our analysis of the ontological structure of beings within the world. Among the things which are ready-to-hand there are some which are proximally ready to hand; indeed, the concept of closeness is implied in the expression "ready to hand". This closeness is, of course, different in each concrete case and, as should be clear from the foregoing, this closeness cannot be measured by yardsticks- or derived from "pure" space. The closeness of equipment is regulated by the use we make of it. Things which we frequently use are closer to us than others which we rarely need. Dasein in its concernful dealings with things gives each piece its proper place according to the importance it has in life. Each piece of equipment has its place within the totality of the equipmental context of our everyday concern. Thus the closeness of equipment is primordially defined by an organization whose ordering principle lies in Dasein's activities. The space which arises in this way has no relation to geometric space, of which we shall speak later. The various places of space, in the sense in which we take it here, do not all have the same importance; their hierarchy is determined by the degree of necessity which the pieces of equipment have for the work that is to be done. "Place" therefore means here the location which Dasein gives to a piece of equipment within a certain equipmental context in function of its destination with regard to the work to be done. The various places in a certain space are thus related in the same manner as pieces of equipment within a certain equipmental context. (SZ, 102-3) This means that the space involved is neither homogeneaus (because there is a privileged topos) nor isotropic (because there is a privileged direction); this space. is not isometric either. Be this as it may, before Dasein can assign places, a certain region (Gegend) is tobe discovered in which they will appear in the intended connection. U sually such a region is said to be the sum total of all the places; it appears, however, that the region is rather lCf. George F. Sefler, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Space," in Philosophy Today, 17(1973), 246-54; Ch. H. Seibert, "On Being and Space in Heidegger's Thinking." Phil. Diss. DePaul University, Chicago, 1972.
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the necessary condition for the assignment of places. One should keep in mind that a place is never an isolated point, sufficient unto itself; a place necessarily means a relation to other places. Being remote from one another, orientation, and position in reference to one another always presuppose the relevant region. (SZ, 103) The given hierarchy of places within a certain region determines the typical character of Dasein's world, which Heidegger calls "the aroundness" (das Umhafte). As we have seen already, the hierarchy of places itself is dependent on the function and destination of each piece of equipment that has its place in the hierarchy. Hence the places cannot be deduced from pure distance since the latter excludes all forms of hierarchy and does not consider the worldly character of space. Thus it follows that space cannot be understood separately and independently from the beings that occupy the space. On the contrary, space gets its meaning from these beings. Dasein does not first discover space itself, but rather the places; that is to say, in our everyday concern with beings within the world, space is given in the form of places which the different pieces of equipment occupy within a certain equipmental totality. Dasein thus discovers the places of the things that are "merely there," but it assigns places to those things that areready to hand. In this way I discover the place of the sun in the sky, but I assign a place to my pen within the equipment totality needed for writing. Dasein meets the region only in its own action; the discovery of this region, however, is connected with the discovery of the referential context in which each piece of equipment becomes meaningful to Dasein. (SZ, 103-104) As in the case of what is ready to hand, Dasein in its everyday concern is familiar with the region, the work domain, without grasping it explicitly as such. Only the deficient modes of concern make the region explicitly conscious to Dasein; for example, only when a piece of equipment appears not to be present, does Dasein become conscious ofits place as place. (SZ, 103-104)
II: Dasein's Spati.ality People usually think that first there is empty space, and that this space is subsequently filled in some way. According to Heidegger, however, worldhood is the basis for the referential relations between pieces of equipment, and these relations, in turn, are the foundation for the various places. In all this Dasein exercises a spatializing function; Dasein makes place and spaces be. Since we
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have defined the spatiality of what is ready-to-hand in terms of the place which it occupies, the question arises of how we are to describe Dasein's own spatiality. Would there not be the same difference between these two forms of spatiality as between the modes of Being that are proper to the two beings to which they belong? Dasein's Being in space, at any rate, must be conceived in terms of the relations which unite Dasein with its familiar ready-to-hand things. The spatiality of its own Being-in is determined by the activities of removing distances (Ent-fernung), i.e., bringing-close, and of giving directions (Ausrichtung), i.e., situating. (SZ, 104-105) First of all, Dasein makes distance and farness disappear wherever feasible. We may even say that Dasein essentially removes distances; it brings beings close so that they become ready to hand. In doing so, Dasein implicitly discovers distance, for distance appears to Dasein only insofar as Dasein brings close. A point is not away from another point; for a point cannot bridge the distance, it cannot make it larger or smaller, it does not bring close. Distances manifest themselves only to Dasein's activities of bringing close. In everyday life this bringing close is always a question of circumspective, concernful dealing with things. By bringing beings close, Dasein wants to make these things available to itself and keep them so. In a derivative sense the different forms of theoretical knowledge also have something ofthis bringing-close. (SZ, 105-106) Accordingly, in Dasein there is an essential tendency to closeness; speed records, radio, television, planes, and space travel can be viewed in this perspective. But this bringing close itself does not yet give Dasein explicit awareness of space. In everyday life, remoteness is never understood as sheer distance; all judgments of concernful Dasein refer to its concernful dealing with beings within the world and are more concerned with lived estimates, such as a stone's throw, than with the exact measurements of the sciences. Even when Dasein uses scientific measurements and views, it understands them only in terms of its everyday concernful dealing with things. For example, one hour is for Dasein primordially not a duration of sixty minutes, but the time needed to perform this or that work. If the estimate of Dasein does not coincide with that of the sciences, it should not be said that therefore it is wrong or subjective. If, for example, the distance of three miles is ten times as long for a sick person as for a healthy one, the former is not necessarily mistaken, for he needs indeed ten times as much energy as the healthy person to go that distance. This form of subjectivity has
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nothing to do with arbitrariness; it is nonsense to oppose to Dasein's world a "world in itself' as the only real world. The world which Dasein discovers in its concernful dealings with things is the "real" world: "Dasein's circumspective 'bringing together' in its everyday concern discovers the 'true world,' the beings near which Dasein, as eksisting, is already." (SZ, 106) The spatiality of Dasein, which is essentially Being-in-theworld, is not to be compared with scientific space; the distances of Dasein's concernful living cannot be compared with objective measurements, either; rather they are defined only by that activity of Dasein in which it concernfully deals with things and by the directing intention that created them. Dasein's bringing close does not consist in placing a thing closer to the body, but in placing it within the sphere of things that are ready to hand, i.e., by making this thing itself ready to hand. The bringing closer is not oriented toward our body but toward the center of our everyday concern. It is even false to state that our body occupies a place similar to the places of other "material bodies." The place of my own body should also be understood only in terms of these activities of bringing close. (SZ, 107) When Dasein speaks of here it does not mean a point of space, but only the where-at of its present occupation. Dasein is not a being that is closed in itself; it is always already there (Da), near a piece of work to be done. Its here is only the center of all theres. Forthis reason Dasein never moves according to the demands of geometry from one point to another; Dasein can only change its here. Likewise, Dasein cannot cross over certain distances, for these distances are not fixed but precisely projected from the place where Dasein in each case is concernfully active. Dasein cannot eliminate distances either; it can do no more than change them. (SZ, 107-8) As Being-in-the-world Dasein brings-close and at the same time situates. It has the character of directionality. (SZ, 108) Whenever Dasein brings-close, a certain situation is implied within a region. This situating brings to light directions and regions which Dasein can subsequently use. By its eksistence Dasein brings close and situates regions, and in doing this it is led by its circumspection. Fundamentally both bringing close and situating are based on Dasein's Being-in-the-world itself. (SZ, 108-110) In our consideration of the world we came to the conclusion that Dasein as Being-in-the-world already has discovered a world. This discovery frees beings within a certain referential context: Dasein Iets beings be (Bewendenlassen) by discovering them within a given referential context for a totality of destinations. Dasein is guided in
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this by circumspection, which in turn presupposes knowledge of the total meaningfulness as the worldhood of the world. We have seen also that the beings are not attained in their spatiality unless Dasein itself spatializes. By establishing a context of references Dasein discovers spatiality, i.e., the place of a piece of equipment within the referential context and through this context within the region in which this context is situated. What is ready to hand is not first a-spatial but it already has a place which by virtue of its own destination is determined for it. There is no question here yet of geometrical space, but only of the place which belongs to a piece of equipment within an equipmental totality. Dasein gives itself and the equipment a place, it assigns the places, makes room for what is ready to hand, discovers the place that is proper to each being, even though a spatial determination is always proper to the totality of characteristics of the beings within the world. Dasein's spatializing activity is an eksistential. Because of this fundamental characteristic, Dasein can instaU itself in space, it can assign a place to beings and, when necessary, also change this place again. (SZ, 111) In Heidegger's view, therefore, space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space. But, one may ask, is it possible to conceive of space as being neither subjective (Kant) nor objective (Democritus)? Heidegger says that there appears to be a third possibility: "Space is rather 'in' the world insofar as space has been discovered by the Being-in-the-world which is constitutive for Dasein." (SZ, 111) Space is neither subjective nor objective; one must say rather that Dasein spatializes. Because Dasein is neither a pure ego nor a pure subject, traditional subjectivism is radically transcended. Since, however, Dasein itself spatializes, space is an a priori element, in the sense that Dasein's mode of Being founds the discovery of space, a discovery which is possible only in Dasein's encounter with things. Strictly speaking spatiality is never conceived as such, but it remains attached to what is ready-to-hand and therefore also to Dasein's concernful dealing with things. Space is discovered primordially only by concernful Dasein and remains as such connected with the spatiality, i.e., the places, of pieces of equipment. But because of this discovery, because of this presence of spatiality, Dasein can develop a theoretical science of pure space, namely geometry. Heidegger does not claim that these answers fully solve the problems of space, but he only wanted to shed light on the function of space in the structure of Dasein's daily concern. He appears to
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approach the problern in the right way because space is primordially present in our everyday life; and only by starting from this primordial presence can we obtain knowledge of space as such. The preceding analyses make us understand how space is primordially encountered, but the fundamental problern of the ontological meaning of space itself remains still unsolved.2 The sciences certainly are not able to solve this basic problem, either, for scientific space abstracts from every relationship of space to the world. The places which have their own role and their own character in the world are stripped of all individuality in the eyes of the sciences. In this way, spatiality loses its typical character of destination. In the sciences the world in which Dasein concernfully lives changes into a scientific world, into "nature" as the correlate of the empirical sciences, and so what is ready to hand is ultimately reduced to an extended being that is merely there. Thus the homogeneous and isotropic space of the sciences deprives the environment of what is ready to hand of its worldhood. In our era, however, we are so strongly influenced by the sciences that we find Dasein's primordial attitude toward space difficult to understand. Heidegger's main intention here was to try to make us understand this primordial attitude. (SZ, 110-113)
SECTION 2: BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AS "BEING WITH" 1: ''Being With.'' and ''Dasein With Others" The preceding chapters have merely offered a preliminary idea of Being-in-the-world. In the analyses of the world's worldhood and spatiality, the whole phenomenon of Being-in-the-world was always included in our considerations; but the constitutive structure of Being-in-the-world did not stand out as distinctively as the phenomenon "world" itself. The ontological interpretation of the world came first because Dasein in its everyday life is not only in the world but also related to it in a very special way. For this reason it was necessary also to devote a few considerations to spatiality and space. Now, however, we must pay attention to the other constitutive 2In his later works Heidegger often returns to the notion of space, particularly in its relationship to time and Being. Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, pp. 143-61; On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, pp. 101-108; On Time and Being, pp. 14-24.
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structures of Being-in-the-world. Two of these structures are indicated by "Being with" (Mitsein) and "Dasein with others" (Mitdasein), which are just as primordial as Being-in-the-world itself. Only after considering these structures will it be possible to answer the question of "who" the Dasein is of everyday, concernful living. (SZ, 113-114) Concerning "Being with," others are as equiprimordially present to Dasein as equipment is: in our dealing with beings within the world the presence of others is discovered at the same time because they also are involved in these pieces of equipment. A house belongs to someone, it is inhabited by someone, and built by someone. It is therefore absurd to think that Dasein first encounters equipment and only afterwards, by abstraction and reflection, the others. We did not mention the others explicitly in the preceding analyses, but they were always implicitly present; for the world cannot possibly be understood without any relation to them. As Being-in-the-world, our eksistence is already a Being tagether with others. (SZ, 116) What exactly is this "Being with" and what does it make fundamentally possible? At first one would be inclined to interpret "Being with" as the co-presence of two simply given beings, in the sense in which even two marbles in a bag suffice to constitute a copresence. What makes "Being with" possible, however, is not the spatial proximity of two beings but their mutual relation. Where no mutual relation is possible there can be no "Being with." In other words, "Being with" is proper to Dasein. The term "with" indicates a community: if I want to be "with" someone, there must be a certain communion between him and me. What we have in common binds us together. Sometimes even community is conceived of as ifit had a spatial aspect so that whoever is closest to me is then "with" me. This is, of course, a false idea because it transfers a way of looking at things to Dasein. Things that aretagether often do constitute a unity, but this unity has nothing to do with a community. Genuine community has nothing to do with space; for example, travelers in the same plane are often strangers to one another, while a friend away in Africa can be very close to me. Another view of "Being with" regards a common nature as the basis of Being together. This could perhaps be defended, but one would have to be able to indicate clearly what is to be understood by "nature." To bring to light the different characteristics of "Being with," it is probably best to start from concrete examples. Before doing so, however, it will be necessary to devote our attention to Sartre's critique of Heidegger's approach.
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Sartre has serious objections to Heidegger's way of thinking3 and his critique appears to be very useful for a correct understanding of Heidegger's intention. 4 According to Sartre, one should never pass from the ontological to the ontic Ievel in considering topics such as these; therefore, one can never confirm a general theory with concrete examples. However, Sartre's objection arises from the fact that he misunderstands the meaning which Heidegger attaches to the terms "ontological" and "ontic." The ontologicallevel is not distinct from the ontic Ievel, but precisely is the Ievel which contains the essential structure of the ontic, which Sartre wrongly identifies with the concrete. Heidegger hirnself never speaks of the concrete since this immediately makes one think of the abstract; the antithesis between the concrete and the abstract is both meaningless and wrang here. There is no antithesis whatsoever between the ontological and the ontic. In this sense Heidegger says that "Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological." (SZ, 12) Such a statement becomes meaningless if one separates the ontic from the ontological as the concrete from the abstract and the immanent from the transcendent. For Heidegger, that which makes the Being of things and of Dasein intelligible is ontological. In an ontological understanding of a being one tries to grasp the essential structure which makes this being possible as such. As long as this understanding is not yet explicit, it is called preontological; properly ontological understanding is found in ontology, which raises the question of the meaning of Beingin a radical way. In view of the fact that Being is intimately related to the beings it is clear that the ontological belongs essentially to the ontic. (SZ, 13) In the ontological examination of the existentiell, one tries to make manifest that which is characteristic of ontic eksistence. The fundamental structures of Dasein are not abstract structures constituted by men, but real structures present in each concrete Dasein. Heidegger always starts from the ontic; ontology only explicates what is included in the ontic as in the root which makes ontology possible. Sartre, however, separates them, so that his
3Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, pp. 244250. 4Cf. Walter Biemel, Le concept du monde chez Heidegger. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1950, pp. 67-74.
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antithesis between the concrete and the abstract remains locked up within traditional metaphysics. Secondly, Sartre thinks that the difference on this point between Hegel and Husserl, on the one hand, and Heidegger, on the other, lies in this that for the former "Being with" expresses an Opposition while for the latter it means primarily a solidarity.5 This is incorrect in the sense that Heidegger does not yet want to speak about the various types of man's "Being with," but only about the conditions which make possible love as weil as hatred, solidarity as weil as indifference. Every relationship with others presupposes already "Being with." For Heidegger, "Being with" does not necessarily mean to live in harmony, but only that man from the first moment of his eksistence lives in. a certain openness in which the other is already enclosed. Only because of this fundamental openness to the other are the different types of"Being with" possible. But Iet us now try to understand "Being with" concretely through an example taken from daily life. When two people admire a painting and are similarly affected by it, this harmony of feelings brings them closer together, it develops a bond between them which could become the root of a community. What exactly occurred there? Together, the one with the other, they looked at a painting. The one entered the domain which was being unveiled by the other; the being which became manifest in it to the one also became manifest to the other. Thus the one shared with the other that which had become open to him in his world and thereby shared that world itself with the other. This sharing of one world is what constitutes their Being together. Because of the fact that they share one world they have something in common, viz., this world. On the basis of this common possession of one world, a community can be constituted according to the different modalities of "Being with," which range from Iove to hatred, from solidarity to indifference. As we have pointed out above, what is "ready to hand" in everyday life always refers to an other as to its maker or its user. For this reason there is never any completely isolated Dasein. As soon as Dasein discovers the world, it has also already discovered the other who co-exists with him, who is also in the same way open to other beings and who, therefore, insofar as he shares in the same world, enters into a mutual relation with Dasein. 5ßeing and Nothingness, pp. 245-247.
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"Thus Dasein's world frees beings which not only are quite different from equipment and things, but which also, in accordance with their mode of Being as Dasein, themselves are 'in' the world as 'Being-in-the-world' and are at the same time encountered in an intraworldly way. These beings are neither 'merely there' nor ready to hand; on the contrary, they are like the Dasein itself which frees them: they are there too, and are there with it." (SZ, 118) "By reason of this 'with'-like (mithaften) Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with others. The world of Dasein is our world, a 'with-world' (Mitwelt). 'Being in' is 'Being with' others. Their intraworldly 'Being in itself is 'Dasein with others' (Mitdasein)." (SZ, 118) Heidegger refers here to "Being with others" by means of two different words: Mitsein, i.e., my Being with others, and Mitdasein, i.e., the being "open" (da) of the other to me and other people. Seen from my standpoint the other's way of Being is "Dasein with" me and others. I can discover the others as co-existent because I myself am "Being with," that is, I share with them my openness to things and the world. Although "Being with" them presupposes an equality of nature, co-existence is possible only because this equality of nature applies to beings which by their nature are open to whatever manifests itself to them and which therefore can share the world that is common to them. The basic mistake of modern philosophy since Descartes lies, according to Heidegger, in the fact that it understands the human "subject" too narrowly. Modem philosophy starts with a pure subject to whom it later tries to give a world; and still later it tries to bring this subject in contact with others. Such post-surgical constructions of the world and of man's fellow subjects are arbitrary and meaningless. Preoccupied lest it presuppose anything whatsoever regarding the subject's essence, modern philosophy fails to camprehend Dasein in its complexity, that is, as a being which is already Being-in-the-world, which is open to other things and other beings of the mode of Dasein and which co-exists with them. Heidegger intends to avoid this fundamental mistake. For this reason he does not divorce man from the world or conceive the world as a sum of things, but starts from Being-in-the-world and attempts to attain from there a more profound vision of the world. Heidegger characterizes the way men act toward one another as "solicitude" (Fürsorge). Solicitude, too, indicates an eksistential characteristic of Dasein and encompasses all modalities of men's behavior toward one another. Thus it includes much more than
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what is usually conveyed by the term "solicitude." To neglect someone, to be against someone, and to hate someone-these are possible forms of solicitude. As we have seen, Dasein is related to what is "ready to hand" through its everyday "concern," and this concern's own vision of things is called "circumspection." With respect to other human beings, Heidegger speaks of "solicitude" (Fürsorge) and "attention" (Rücksicht). This last term has tobe taken in a very broad sense so that it can also indicate the more negative modes of "regard." "Being with" discloses the eksistence of others to us. This disclosing of the others' eksistence is also a co-constitutive element of "meaningfulness" (Bedeutsamkeit): The others' disclosedness, constituted beforehand with their "Being with," also goes to make up meaningfulness, that is, worldhood. (SZ, 123) For this reason we cannot first isolate a world of things in order to add a world of subjects to it later; the eksistence of others is co-present with the equipment encountered in our everyday concern. The world's structure of worldhood is such that others are not present in it as "free-floating subjects" next to other intraworldly beings, but manifest themselves in the world in their own Being and do so in terms of what is "ready to hand" in the world. Dasein is primordially with the others; it is therefore not correct to make the others' constitution dependent upon empathy as Scheler and Husserl have done. One could object that Heidegger's view of"Being with" leaves no more room for the phenomenon of "Being alone." His reply is that "Being alone" is essentially a separation of oneself from the others and therefore is not possible without a certain understanding of the others. Separation and isolation presuppose the existence of others so that "Being alone" is possible only on the basis of a previous "Being with." CSZ, 121)
II: The ''Who" ofDasein in its Everyday Concern After these remarks about "Being with" we must now try to find an answer to our initial question: Who is Dasein in its everyday concern? The answer seems very simple: I myself, of course. Selfhood is essential to Dasein. But what precisely is that "I myself'? What is this selfhood? In ordinary speech "self' refers to a real being which, despite the many changes it undergoes, continues to.remain itself. However, we have repeatedly emphasized that Dasein is not a thing among things and that its Being is not even given once and for
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all. Dasein also Iacks permanent characteristics such as those ascribed tothingsthat are "merely there." How then is selfhood tobe understood? Moreover, one has also to keep in mind that the words "in its everyday concern" are deliberately part of the question. Is it not possible that the "I myself" which I would like to be is not the "I myself'' which I am in everyday life? Can the "I" not lose itself and is the "I" of everyday life not always an "I" that has already lost itself? (SZ, 114-115) In our consideration of "Being with" it became evident that Dasein in its everyday concern is radically and inexorably dependent on the others. (SZ, 126) If I ask myself to whom I am really subject and upon whom I am precisely dependent, this question cannot be answered. In everyday life my eksistence seems to be necessarily heteronomaus without my being able to concretely indicate who determines this heteronomy. In the morning I have to be at the station on time; I have to be in school or at work on time; I have to sleep during the night and work during the day if I want to succeed with my business. Of course, I can withdraw from these "obligations," but this withdrawal merely binds me immediately with other fetters inherent to these other possibilities of my Being which I then want to realize. The unnamable tyrant upon whom I am inescapably dependent is a neutral and impersonal subject; this is the "they" (das Man). In my everyday life I have to bow to the dictatorship of the impersonal "they." This "they" is the "subject" of my everyday eksistence, which at all moments and on all occasions of my life dictates what I should do and should be. In my everyday life the "I" is fully submerged in the "they." The "they" cultivates averageness as the norm of everything. It has only one yardstick, which is used for everyone and everything on every conceivable occasion. This averageness must always and anywhere be respected. If anyone deviates from this norm, he is condemned and called to order with all possible means. Total leveling down, even in the smallest details, is its ideal. No one is allowed to keep personal secrets, for everyone has to be open to everyone and merge with all others. Because the "they" does not tolerate any critique ofits authority in any matter, the personal sense of responsibility is taken away from everybody. Whatever decision I face, the "they" have long ago prescribed what should be done in such a case. Since the "they" is responsible for everything, no one has really any responsibility at all. U nder this yoke of bondage it is not possible any Ionger to be oneself; in exchange for this, the "they" gives security, tranquillity, and guarantee. Under the dictatorship of the
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"they" everyone is someone eise and no one is himself. The "they" is actually the "nobody" to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itselfin everyday life. (SZ, 128) As long as one lives in this way, the self of one's own Dasein and the selves of others have not yet found or lost themselves. They are there in the way of inauthenticity and failure to stand by themselves. These remarks, however, should not be misunderstood. What has been said here about the "they" has a very real sense. "This way of Being does not imply any lessening of Dasein's facticity, just as the 'they,' the 'nobody,' is by no means nothing at all. On the contrary, in this kind of Being, Dasein is an ens realissimum, if by 'reality' we mean a being having the character ofDasein." (SZ, 128) Nor is it the intention here to reduce Dasein to a thing that is "merely there." The "they" is a mode of Being proper to Dasein, even though this mode is precisely that in which Dasein is not itself. The "they" also has nothing to do with a kind of "general subject" or "collective subject" in the sense in which it is sometimes used in sociology. "The 'they' is an eksistential, and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution." (SZ, 129) It is also important to note that these considerations of the "they" do not have an immediate ethical character. (SZ, 175-76) The self of everyday Dasein is the "they-self." It must be carefully distinguished from man's authentic self. As "they-self," Dasein in its everyday concernful dealing with things is already "dispersed." This dispersal characterizes the "subject" that is concernfully absorbed and lost in the world of its immediate surroundings. If Dasein in its everyday life is familiar with itself as a "they-self,'' this means at the same time that the "they" essentially determines the first interpretation of the world and of Being-in-theworld. Everything therefore that has been discovered above about the world and beings within the world, as weil as everything that thus became clear concerning Dasein and Dasein-with, presupposed that Dasein was taken in its primordial mode of Being, in the way of the "they-self." (SZ, 129)
CHAPTERVII
''BEING IN'' AS SUCH. THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF DASEIN (Being and Time, Sections 28-38, pp. 130-180)
1: Dasein's Disclosednessl From the very start the eksistential analysis of Dasein has been guided by Being-in-the-world. The purpose of the analysis was to bring to light through the phenomenological method the unitary primordial structure of Dasein's Being, in terms of which its possibilities, its modes of Being, can be determined. Until now this analysis has placed emphasis on the structural aspect called "world" and attempted to answer the question of "who" Dasein is in everyday life. At the very beginning, we spoke in an introductory fashion about "Being in." We now want to examine the structural element of "Being in" itself. The outcome of this examination will shed a completely new light on what has already been said. At the same time we hope to have an opportunity to emphasize again the unity of the structure of Dasein's Being, for this unity could easily have been obscured by the necessity of making distinctions. (SZ, 130-31) We should keep in mind that the different structural elements of Dasein's Being are all irreducible and equiprimordial, although they are considered and clarified one by one. (SZ, 131) In our further explanation of the "Being in" proper to Being-inthe-world, we start from what we have already discovered regarding "Being in." These discoveries were mainly expressed in negative statements. We must now try to describe "Being in" in positive terms. In this positive description emphasis will be put on the Da of Dasein, i.e., its openness to the world. As we have indicated above, this Da has nothing to do with a spatial here or there, for such spatial indications refer only to beings within the world. The spatial "here" and "there" are possible only through a Da, i.e., if there exists a being lFor the interpretation of Dasein's openness and its three eksistential components see William J. Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 58-71.
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that as Dasein has disclosed spatiality. Dasein's own Being is characterized by openness. The particle Da "refers to this essential openness. By reason of this openness, this being (Dasein), tagether with the 'Being there' of the world, is 'there' for itself." (SZ, 132) This existential-ontological structure of the human being, namely, that it is in such a way as to be its own Da (=openness), can also be expressed by saying that man is a lumen naturale, a "natural light." Dasein itself is "enlightened"; as Being-in-the-world, it is "lighted" in itself in such a way that it is itself a "place of light." Things that are "merely present" and concealed in darkness can come to light only through a being that is itself "lighted." We must now ask ourselves how the Da of Dasein, its openness, is constituted. Here also we will discover constitutive elements which, although they form an unbreakable unity, will have to be studied one by one. Heidegger expresses these elements in the following words: "We see the two equiprimordial constitutive modes of being Da in 'understanding' and 'disposition' ... 'Ontological disposition' and 'understanding' are characterized equiprimordially by logos." (SZ, 133) We must now see what is tobe understood by these terms, "disposition" (Befindlichkeit), "understanding" (Verstehen), and "logos" (Rede).
ll: Ontological Disposition In this existential-ontological discussion, what is meant by "disposition" is ontically something very familiar, our mood. No matter what we do, we already find ourselves in a certain mood. Heidegger carefully avoids the words "sentiment" and "emotions" because, according to him, these expressions speak in terms of an unacceptable Opposition between "soul" and "spirit." Moreover, the use of the terms "sentiment" and "emotion" easily conveys the impression that sentiments and emotions, and the soul connected with them, are regarded as merely secondary elements subordinated to the absoluteness ofthe spirit or reason (ratio). In this way one fails to pay attention to the great importance sentiments and emotions possess for correctly understandi~g man's own Being. Besides, one usually omits explaining what is meant by "spirit," "soul" and "life," so that everything remains vague. Finally, such considerations divorce man as "subject" from the world. It is likewise incorrect to consider Sentiments and emotions as something purely "subjective" that would exist inside man and thus be opposed to the things outside him, which alone would be
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"objective." For, by doing that, one would again disregard the fundamental relationship between man and other beings. Accordingly, the term "affective disposition" should be taken to refer to that characteristic of Dasein whereby it always seems to be enlightened in one way or another about its own position among the things to which it is naturally open. Because of this basic disposition, man realizes his own situation in the world: "Every way of acting of historical man, whether stressed or not, is 'tuned' to an affective disposition and by this attunement raised to being in its totality."2 It cannot be denied that affective or ontological disposition is something primordial which is characteristic of our being human. It is difficult to say precisely in what the ontological structure of "disposition" consists because our thematic knowledge of all that is connected with man's "frame of mind" always falls short. Undoubtedly disposition communicates something to us about our own mode of Beingin relationship to the other as a whole; but it is very difficult to determine why one is disposed, or "tuned," in a determinate way and what this disposition tells us about ourselves and the other. The "original disposition" informs man about his position in the midst of things in the world. (SZ, 134) Contained in this "insight" are different elements that must be carefully distinguished. First, in his disposition man is aware of his own Being, of the fact that he is. Without wanting to be, and without freely having chosen tobe, man is. His Being appears to him as a Being "thrown"; he appears to hirnself to be thrown among things. In disposition man becomes conscious not only of the fact that he is, but also of the fact that he has tobe, that his Being has tobe realized by hirnself as a task. (SZ, 135) Second, the fact that man is in this or that disposition depends on the modalities of the involvement which he always has with things in the world. Affective disposition is an implicit, continuous "judgment" regarding man's self-realization. Hence man can be disclosed to hirnself in a primordial way more through disposition than through theoretical reflection. However, if man ek-sists, is as Being-in-the-world, then disposition must also disclose to him not only his own Being as being "thrown" but also the Being of other men and things. (SZ, 137) It was mentioned previously that man, in his everyday concern, encounters the beings within the world as things ernerging from the 2Qn the Essence ofTruth, p. 18.
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horizon of the world taken as a referential totality. But this is possible only if the world has been disclosed as such beforehand. Precisely because the world is given to man beforehand, it is possible for him to encounter the beings within the world as such. This prior disclosedness of the world is constituted by one's disposition; the fact that man is openness in the direction of the other in the world is given to man in the most original way, through that fundamental and primordial "feeling" ofhis "Being there." (SZ, 137-138)
m: Primordial Understanding Not only does man possess an existential possibility of being always "in a disposition," his mode of Being is determined equiprimordially by his "understanding." This "understanding" is to be conceived of not as a concrete mode of knowing but precisely as that which makes all concrete modes of knowing possible. On the level of the "original praxis" this primordial understanding always is already present in disposition, and all understanding in its turn is connected with disposition. This original understanding has reference not so much to this or that concrete thing or situation as to the mode of Being characteristic of man as Being-in-the-world. In original understanding the mode of Being characteristic of man manifests itself as a "Being-able-to-be." However, man is not something present-at-hand that possesses its Being-able-to-be by way of an extra; he hirnself is primarily a Being-able-to-be. This Being-able-to-be, which is essential for man, has reference to the various ways of his being concerned for others and for things and of his concern with the world. But, in all this, man always realizes in one way or another hisBeing-able-to-be in regard to hirnself and for the sake of himself. (SZ, 143) According to Heidegger, the term Verstehen (to understand) can be related to the word Vor-stehen, in the sense of prae-stare, to stand before a thing in order to master it. To be able to take hold of something is a form of Being-able-to-be. In primordial understanding this "power to be" is not a limited power but Dasein's essential possibility ofbeing able to eksist. Dasein always is what it can be; it is its possibilities. (SZ, 143) lt is important to note here that a clear distinction is to be made between eksistential and logical possibilities. The logical possibility indicates that what is not yet nevertheless can be; this logical beingpossible is less important than being-actual and being-necessary.
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The eksistential possibility, on the other hand, is the most primordial and the ultimate, positive ontological characterization of Dasein. (SZ, 143-144) This fundamental possibility has to do with the different rnodalities of concernful dealing with things and of solicitude while, at the same time, it also constitutes the realization of Dasein itself. That Dasein essentially isaBeing-able-to-be does not mean that Dasein is not actually "real," but only that, as it actually eksists, it aiways is certain possibilities and consequently excludes others. By choosing one particular possibility, Dasein has to abandon others. It is in this sense that Dasein is essentially a Being-able-to-be. This ability is given to Dasein with its own Being. Dasein is thrown into this ability and as such it is a "thrown possibility through and through." (SZ, 144) Through primordial understanding these possibilities become clear to Dasein so that it can take them up and materialize them. Original understanding always pertains to man's Being-in-theworld as a whole. That is why man's "moodful" understanding brings to light not only man hirnself as Being-able-to-be but also the world as a referential totality. By revealing the world to man, his primordial understanding also gives him the possibility of encountering the beings within the world in their own possibilities. That which originally was ready-to-hand (zuhanden) is now explicitly discovered in its "serviceability," its "usability," and so on. Accordingly, primordial understanding always moves in a range of possibilities; it continuously endeavors to discover possibilities, because it possesses in itself the eksistential structure of a "project." In his primordial understanding man projects hirnself onto his ultimate "for the sake of which"; but this self-projection necessarily implies at the same time-and equally originally-a world-projection. (SZ, 145) In his original understanding man thus opens and frees hirnself in the direction of his own Being but, at the same time, also in the direction of the world. For this reason primordial understanding implies essentially a certain view-a "sighting" of things, of fellow men, of the world as a whole, and evidently also of man's own mode of Being. To the extent that man's view is concerned with "equipment," fellow men, himself, or the world as a whole, this "sight" appears in each case in a different modality. (SZ, 146-147) Thus primordial understanding, which is always inseparably connected with affective disposition, always has the character of an interpretive conception in which man discloses hirnself as Beingable-to-be in the different modalities that are possible for him. This
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interpretive conception, which is equiprimordially oriented to the other, is as such not yet explicitly articulated in understanding. However, it can develop in that direction by means of explanation (Auslegung). In and through explanation understanding appropriates comprehendingly that which is already understood by it. In explanation understanding does not become something different; it becomes itself. Man does not acquire further information about what is already understood. Explanation is, rather, the.development ofthe possibilities that were projected in understanding. (SZ, 148) Perhaps what is meant here can best be explained by taking one's starting point in man's everyday concernful dealing with things. In each concrete form that can be adopted by the "original praxis," man's concernful dealing with things within the world implies an original understanding of those things and of man hirnself as Being-in-the-world, an understanding which at first is not articulated. However, this form of understanding can be further explained so that what is ready to hand comes explicitly into that sight which understands it. In this case the "circumspection" characteristic of man's concernful dealing with things discovers intramundane things by unraveling and thereby explaining them. In the final analysis all preparing, arranging, repairing, and improving are enacted in such a way that what was ready to hand circumspectively in its serviceability, that is, in its "in order to," now is taken apart, unraveled, and thus ex-plained. That which has been taken apart in this way, in regard to its in-order-to, thereby receives the structure of "something as something." To the circumspective question as to what this particular ready-to-hand thing may be, the circumspectively explanatory answer is that it serves such and such a purpose. By explicitly pointing to what a thing is for, we do not simply designate that thing; what is designated is understood as that as which we are to take that particular thing. The "as" constitutes the structure of the explicitness of each thing that is understood. It is the constitutive element of what we call explanation. If in dealing with what is environmentally ready to hand we explain it circumspectively, we "see" it, for instance, as a hammer, a table, a door, a car, a bridge. However, what is thus explained need not necessarily be taken apart in an explicit enunciation (Aussage). Any mere prepredicative using and thus "seeing" of what is ready-to-hand is in itself already something that understands and explains. The articulation of what is understood in the explaining and bringing close of each thing within the world with the help of the guiding clue "something as something"-is there before any explicit statement is
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made about it. Thus the as does not emerge for the first time in the explicit statement but it only gets expressed and enunciated therein. This is possible only because that which is enunciated was as such already at man's disposal. (SZ, 149-50) If we never perceive things within the world which are ready to band without already under,standing and explaining them, and if all perception Iets us circumspectively encounter something as something, does this not mean that at first something purely present at band is experienced and is later interpreted as a door, a house, and so on? Evidently this is not the case. Man's explanation does not throw a meaning over some "naked" thing that is present at hand, nor does it place a value on it. The thing within the world which is encountered as such in the original understanding that is cbaracteristic of man's concernful dealing with things, already possesses a reference that is implicitly contained in man's counderstanding of the world and thus can be articulated by explanation. In our original understanding what is ready-to-hand is always already understood from a totality of references which we call "world"; but this relationship between wbat is ready to hand and the world need not be grasped explicitly in a thematic explanation, although such an explanation is evidently, at least in principle, always possible. If the thematic explanation occurs, it is always grounded in the original understanding. In this sense one can say tbat our "having" intramundane things-as weil as any "seeing" of tbem and the "conception" of them to be found in the explanation-is founded on an earlier having, on an earlier sighting, and in apreconception, all of which are characteristic of our original understanding. (SZ, 148-149, 150-151) It is to this state of affairs that Heidegger has given the name of "hermeneutic situation." At any rate, in the pro-ject (Ent-wurf) cbaracteristic of original understanding, a thing is disclosed in its possibility. The character of this possibility corresponds in each case with the mode of Beingof the thing which is understood. Intramundane tbings are necessarily projected upon the world-that is, upon a whole context of meaning, a totality of references to which man's concern as Beingin-the-world has been tied in advance. When things within the world and the mode of Being characteristic of man are discovered and come to be understood, we say that they have meaning. But what is understood is, strictly speaking, not the meaning but the thing itself. Meaning is that in which the intelligibility of something maintains itself. Thus, meaning is that which can be articulated in the disclosure of understanding. · The concept of meaning contains the
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formal framework of what necessarily belongs to that which can be articulated by our understanding. Meaning is a project's "uponwhich," which can be structured by our original understanding, and from which each thing as this or that becomes understandable. Meaning is therefore the intentional correlate of the disclosedness which necessarily belongs to our original understanding. Thus only the mode of Being characteristic of man "has" meaning insofar as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be "filled" by the things which are discoverable in that disclosedness. There can be a question of meaning only within the dialogue between man and the things in the world. Because meaning is the disclosure of the openness characteristic of man, his original understanding always has reference to his Being-in-the-world as a whole; in other words, in each understanding of the world man's ek-sistence is co-understood and vice versa. (SZ, 151-153)
IV. Logos (Rede). Language and Speech.3 The third component of Dasein's disclosedness which is as equally fundamental as understanding and disposition, is called Rede by Heidegger. It is that eksistential component of Dasein's Being because of which Dasein is capable of bringing to expression that which it understands. The literal meaning of Redeis speech; it can also mean language and discourse. Yet from the claims which Heidegger makes it is clear that he is not dealing here with the act of speaking or with language as spoken, but rather with the ontological component of Dasein's Being which renders spoken language possible. (SZ, 160-161) Richardson is of the opinion that one could translate it by "articulateness"; in that case one could translate spoken language by "articulation." Richardson hirnself prefers to translate the term by logos, a suggestion made first by J oseph Möller in his book, Existenzialphilosophie und katholische Theologie.4 Richardson's reason for translating Rede as logos is that the word logos assumes ever increasing importance throughout the whole evolution of Heidegger's thinking; the term is then to be understood to refer to the process of making-manifest or letting-be-seen.5 In what ensues I shall follow Richardson's suggestion. 3William Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 66-70. 4ßaden Baden: Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft, 1952, p. 57. 5Richardson, ibid., pp. 66.
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W e have seen that all explanation is rooted in the original understanding of our "primordial praxis." That which is articulated in this explanation and thus was already predelineated in the original understanding as something articulable is what we call "meaning." Insofar as enunciation, as a derivative mode of explanation, is also grounded in our primordial understanding, it too bas meaning; but this meaning cannot be defined as that which is found "in" the enunciation along with the enunciating act. (SZ, 153-
154) An explicit analysis of an enunciating act can take different directions. One of the possibilities consists in showing how in an enunciating act the structure of the as, which is constitutive for understanding and explanation, is modified; in so doing one is able to bring both understanding and explanation into a new light. If the enunciating act is considered from this perspective, it soon becomes clear that one must attribute three meanings to the enunciating act; these are interconnected and originate from the phenomenon which is thus designated. In the first place e-nunciating means "pointing out," "showing." In this we adhere to the original meaning of logos as apophansis, that is, as letting things be seen from themselves. In the enunciating statement "This hammer is too heavy," that which is discovered is not a melmihg but a thing manifesting itself as ready-to-hand. Even if the thing is not close enough to be grasped or seen, man's pointing out refers to the thing itself and not to a representation ofit. What is pointed out is thus neither a "merely" represented thing nor a psychic state of the one who does the enunciating. Enunciating also means "attributing." In each statement or enunciation a "predicate" is attributed to a "subject"; the subject is determined by the predicate. However, that which is enunciated is not the predicate but the thing itself-in the example given, the hammer. On the other band, that which determines is fourid in the "too heavy." That which is shown in the enunciation taken in this second signification of enunciation (that which is determined, the thing, the hammer) has undergone a narrowing of content as compared with what is shown in the enunciation taken in the first sense of the term (the too heavy hammer). That is why each attribution as such necessarily presupposes a pointing out, so that the second signification of enunciation has its foundation in the first. Therefore, the elements of the attributing articulation, namely, subject and predicate, arise only within this pointing out. The determination does not, in the first place, consist in a discovering,
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but as a mode of the pointing out it restricts our seeing to what manifests itself there; by this explicit restriction of our view, that which was already manifest (the hammer) may be made manifest explicitly in its being determined. The determination must, in the first instance, take a step backward when confronted with that which is already manifest (the too heauy hammer) in ordertobe able to let that which was already manifest be seen in its further determinable determinateness. Thus, the positing of subject and predicate, as well as the attribution, are thoroughly "apophantic" in the strict sense of the term. (SZ, 154-155) Finally, enunciating means "communicating." As such it is related directly to enunciation taken in the first and second significations. It means letting someone see with us what we have pointed out, by determining it. Letting someone see with us means sharing with the other that thing which has been pointed out in its determinateness. In so doing we share the intelligibility of the mode of Being characteristic of such a thing by keeping it in that world in which what has been pointed out can be encountered. Therefore, any being expressed necessarily belongs as a correlate to enunciation as communication; for, as something communicated, that which has been shown in the enunciation is something that others can share with the one who makes the enunciation, even though the thing which has been pointed out and which has been determined is not close enough for them to grasp or see. Once a thing is expressed, it can be passed on in a further re-telling; but in that case what has been shown may become veiled again, although even then one still has the thing itself in view and does not affirm some "universally valid meaning" which has been passed around. (SZ, 155-156) Summarizing, we may conclude that a statement or "enunciation" is a determining and communicating pointing out. One may object to this view on the ground that enunciation is not very likely tobe a derivative mode of explanation. Furthermore, it is not clear just what in the explanation must change for explanation to become enunciation. In order to cope with these difficulties it is necessary to. make the following observations. That enunciation is a derivative mode of explanation is evident from the fact that explanation does not come about originally in a theoretical, predicative judgment but is already present in our concernful dealing with things in the "primordial praxis." The only problern remaining then is to identify the modification through which enunciation originates from our concernful explanation. In our "primordial praxis" an intended thing-a hammer, for
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instance-is at first ready-to-hand as a tool. If this thing becomes the object of enunciation in the sense indicated above, then along with the enunciation a modification of the character of the intentional orientation must first be enacted. The ready to hand with which we were originally concerned in our "practical" achievements changes now into something about which we are going to enunciate something. The necessary condition for this is that we orient ourselves intentionally in what is ready to hand toward a certain presence at hand. Through this new way of looking at, precisely that which at first was ready to hand becomes concealed as ready to hand. Within the discoverlog of a thing's presence at hand, which at the same time is a concealing of its readiness to hand, the thing which is encountered as present at hand becomes determined as present at band in such and such a way. Only at this moment are we given any access to "properties" or the like, which evidently are drawn from that which is present at hand as such. In other words the as structure, which we have already met in the explanation, undergoes a typical modification in enunciation. The as, whose fimction was to appropriate what was understood, no Ionger refers to the totality of references within which the "primordial praxis" comes about. As far as its possibilities for further articulation are concerned, the as is now cut off from the referential totality that constitutes my world and is pushed back into the homogeneaus domain of what is merely present at hand. Therefore the as characteristic of the enunciation has as its function only the determining letting be seen of what is present at hand. This leveling of the primordial as of our circumspective explanation to the as in which something is determined in its presence at hand is the specifying characteristic of enunciation. It is only in this way that the possibility of a pointing out, which merely looks at, comes about. It is to be noted that between our concernful understanding of what is ready to hand (in which the explanation, as it were, is still completely implicit) and the extreme opposite, namely, the purely theoretical enunciation of what is merely present at hand (in which the explanation is clearly articulated) there are many intermediate forms; a careful analysis of these is of great importance for the philosophy of language. Although we will not deal with these forms at this time, there is one thing upon which we must focus attention because of its immediate pertinence to the main subject of this study. (SZ, 157-158)
It was stated several times in the preceding discussion that disposition and original understanding are the fundamental
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eksistentials of that mode of Being which is characteristic of man as Being-in-the-world. It was also said that original understanding as such already contains the possibility of explanation, that is, of the explicit articulating appropriation of what is understood. What is called enunciation in the strict sense of the term appeared in the foregoing analyses as a derivative mode of explanation. Only where we dealt with the third meaning of enunciation, namely, the communication or expression, did we come across speech and language. Language was mentioned there because it, too, via mood and original understanding, is ultimately rooted in the essential openness characteristic of the proper mode of Being of man as Being-in-theworld. In those analyses, however, we did not deal explicitly with the discursively articulating logos (Rede), which is the immediate, ontologico-existential fundament oflanguage. (SZ, 159-160) Discursive and articulating logos, viewed eksistentially, is as original as ontological disposition and original understanding. Its essential function is to articulate discursively the intelligibility of something. Only when the intelligibility is explicitly articulated can the appropriating explanation come about, so that discursive logos, in the final analysis, constitutes the fundament of explanation and enunciation. What can be articulated in explanation is meaning. It appears then that, properly speaking, one ought to say that meaning is what can be articulated in and through logos. Furthermore, what becomes articulated in discursive articulation as such can be called the total meaning, which can be disclosed as a whole in various particular significations. Thus these significations, taken as articulations of the total meaningfulness, always carry meaning. (SZ, 161) However, if logos as the discursive articulation of the intelligibility of all that is implicitly contained in man's concernful dealing with things in the world, is a primordial eksistential of disclosedness, which itself is primarily constituted by Being-in-theworld, then logos, too, must essentially have a specifically mundane mode of Being. This mode of Being consists in the fact that the totality of meaning of what is intelligible can be put into words in and through logos. It is in logos that words can be attributed to significa~ions; thus it becomes immediately clear that the view according to which significations aretobe attributed to "word-things" must be unacceptable. (SZ, 161) The "enunciatedness" of logos is language. Taken as that in which language has its mundane Being, the totality of the words and of the other language structures that are systematically built up from
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them is, once it is constituted, something which one encounters as an intramundane reality, ready to hand for anyone who wants to speak. It is true that language can be conceived of also as the totality of all word-things that are present at hand, those which can be brought together in a dictionary and whose usage can be described in grammar and syntax. Eksistentially seen, however, language is the "enunciatedness" of the logos, because that being whose disclosedness is articulated by logos has the mode of Being of a Being-in-theworld that is entirely committed to the world. Discursive logos is therefore the "signifying" articulation of the intelligibility of man's Being-in-the-world and of everything that is essentially contained in it. Being-in-the-world is essentially Beingwith others. Through discursive logos this Being-with others takes the form of inviting, warning, assenting, refusing, pronouncing, consulting, promising, speaking on a person's behalf, and so on. However, speaking is always the enunciation in regard to each other of the discursive logos with respect to something. This logos does not necessarily have to refer to a determining assertion; a command or a wish can be the theme of logos, also. Whatever its concrete form may be, the logos always has an intentional structure because it coconstitutes the disclosedness of man's Being-in-the-world. In all forms of speaking there is something said as such, and this "something said" is what language communicates. (SZ, 161-2) It must be repeated here that in this context the phenomenon of communication is to be taken in a very broad sense. Communication, insofar as it is explicitly enunciated-giving information, for example,-is merely a special case of communication taken in the original meaning of the term. In the communication which is enunciated, our understanding of Being-in-the-world with others becomes articulated. Communication is therefore never anything like a conveying of experiences, opinions, or wishes from the interior of our subjectivity to the interior of another's. Our Being-with others is already essentially manifest in mood and understanding. In discursive logos our Being-with others only becomes explicitly articulated. In our discourse it becomes explicitly shared in an appropriate way. In discursive logos the intelligibility of our Being-in-the-world, which is always connected with a certain disposition, becomes articulated in significations. The constitutive elements of this articulation are: what our speaking is about, what receives its shape and form through it, communication, and making known to others. However, these are not properties empirically found in each
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language; they are, rather, the essential characteristics of the logos rooted in original understanding and primordial disposition and making anything like language precisely possible. It is more than likely that in many factical linguistic forms some of these elements remain implicit and unnoticed. The fact that not all of them always receive verbal expression is merely an indication that in concrete cases we always deal with one ofmany possibilities. (SZ, 162-163) Attempts to bring the essence of language to light have been limited for the most part to one or some of these elements. This is why language is often characterized as "expression," "symbolic form," "communication," "assertionf" or "the making known of experiences." Clearly, even if these various characterizations were to be added together, nothing would be achieved in the way of a comprehensive conception of language. Such a conception can be reached only by means of an accurate analysis of the mode of Being characteristic of man as Being-in-the-world. (SZ, 163) We still have to explain the relation between understanding and logos. Todetermine this relationship Heidegger pointsout that logos, taken as an eksistential component of the Being of Dasein, means the capacity of letting be seen what understanding projects. It is through logos that the total meaningfulness comes to word. (SZ, 161) The world, taken as total meaningfulness, is projected by the eksistential component of understanding; the eksistential component of logos is the power of articulating total meaningfulness by letting-be-seen meanings in eksistentiell situations; this is done by means of concrete expressions which constitute language. In Heidegger's view we can explain this relationship also by considering two possible modes of logos, namely keeping silent and being-attentive-to or attending. Keeping silent is an essential possibility of logos. If two people are in discourse with each other, the person who keeps silent can often make the other understand. The person who talks too much has often little to say. On the other hand, a person who keeps silent at the proper moment is often able to communicate what he has to say. Thus keeping silent can be very revealing. (SZ, 164-65) As for attending, Heidegger distinguishes two types. The first type consists in listening to others. Wehaveseen that Dasein's Being is inherently a Being with others. As an eksistential component of Dasein's Being, Being-with is the eksistential condition of all eksistentiell dealings with others. Thus without Being-with all dialogue and community would become impossible. But this also means that the disclosedness of the world in and through Dasein's
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understanding comes to pass not so much in Dasein, but in Mitdasein, in Dasein with others. Logos, taken as the capacity of letting-be-seen, has the same communal character as understanding: it is a letting-be-seen that comes to pass only together with others and, thus, always has the form of communication. When, by attending to others, Daseinlets-be-seen the project which it shares with others, this attending, too, is a mode of logos. (SZ, 163) The second type of attending occurs when Dasein attends to its own self. Sometimes there is a letting be seen of Dasein which occurs as if Dasein is listening to the voice of a friend hidden within itself and telling it something about its own self. This form of attending, too, is a mode of logos. In this case, attending constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost Being-able-to-be. (SZ, 163) Later we shall see how this form of attending can develop into an attending to the call of conscience, when Dasein tries to achieve the totality of finite transcendence. 6 V: Dasein's ''Fallenness" We have already mentioned that, according to Heidegger, the Being-in-the-world, which essentially characterizes Dasein, is a structure that can assume two different fundamental modalities, one authentic and the other inauthentic. We have also pointed out that what has been said above about the worldhood of the world and about "Being in," describes that which immediately manifests itself to Dasein in its concernful dealing with beings within the world. In other words, we considered Dasein in its inauthenticity. In the preceding pages we have examined the fundamental structure of Dasein's openness, which is essential to Dasein in both ways of Being. We now want to describe explicitly how the three eksistential components of openness manifest themselves when Dasein has fallen into the inauthentic form of Being. Heidegger likes to refer to the inauthentic Being of Dasein as "fallenness" (Verfallen). Explaining this term, he says that it "does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is first of all and for the most part 'at' (bei) the 'world' of its concern .... Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic Being able to be its own self, and has 'fallen' to the 'world'." (SZ, 175) The "world" is put in quotation marks to indicate that there is no reference here to the worldhood of the world, but only 6Jbid., pp. 66-70.
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to what we encounter within our referential totality, namely the intraworldly beings with which we deal in our everyday concern and which the "they" usually identifies with the world. "Fallenness" includes two aspects: 1. Dasein understands its own Being in terms of intraworldly beings and thus conceives of itself as a substance possessing certain qualities; 2. the world which is here present is the world of everyone, the world of the "they." The intraworldly beings, which are then considered to constitute the world, are only vaguely understood in the way the "they" generally understands them. The world in which Dasein is absorbed here is an impersonal world, just as its understanding of the world is also an impersonal form of understanding. '"Fallenness' to the 'world' means to be absorbed in Being with one another, insofar as this Being is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity." (SZ, 175) Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity are, for Heidegger, the three constitutive elements of Dasein's openness in its inauthentic Being. Dasein lacks its primordial power-to-be in its inauthenticity and is likewise unable to realize its authentic self. "Fallenness" is not a form of not-being. But ·it is ontically just as real as authentic eksistence. But Dasein here realizes itself in an inauthentic way so that it loses the typical way of Being which it should strive to obtain. Each Dasein comes to authentic Being only by way of inauthentic Being and even thereafter there always is a real possibility that it will relapse into inauthenticity. Dasein then "falls" by losing its own way of Being, it "falls" to the world as the totality of intraworldly beings. By identifying itself with this "world," Dasein's Being becomes as impersonal as this "world" itself. In this "fall" it loses its authenticity, not its Being as such; only its way of Being becomes different. "Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein by the way things are publicly interpreted [by the 'they']-to such an extent that its fall is interpreted as a way of 'rising higher' and 'living concretely'." (SZ, 178) Dasein, then, is not aware of its fall, but regards it precisely as rising to a "concrete" form of life. Public opinion confirms this view and defends it against the restlessness which the great questions of life could possibly arouse in it. The "they" has the answer ready before Dasein in its fallen condition gets a chance to become disturbed. The tranquillity (Beruhigung) which arises in this way is again one of the characteristics of Dasein's inauthenticity.
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Paradoxically, however, there is always a certain whirl and restlessness which dominates Dasein. Dasein wants to surrender itself to this restlessness because it does not really feel satisfied with the seeming tranquillity it possesses. It wants to have security, but it also wants to "live"; it wants to plunge into everything that presents itself in order to forget its emptiness. In spite of everything, it wants to realize itself and thinks to have found its authentic self in the illusion of an eternal restlessness. All this, however, is really but an attempt to deceive itself. It remains blind to its authentic Being: It has not been understood that understanding itself is a Being-able-tobe which must be made free in one's ownmost Dasein alone. By cultivating this restlessness, Dasein becomes more and more alienated from itself. This temptation to become more and more alienated from itself is also characteristic of Dasein in its inauthenticity. It feels attracted to empty and idle talk in which one chatters about everything without really saying anything, and to curiosity in which one gets interested in everything without ever really coming into contact with anything. In this way Dasein submerges increasingly more into an atmosphere of ambiguity and equivocity, in which ultimately, through all the talking and inquisitiveness, nobody knows any Ionger what actually is happening. (SZ, 167-175) Precisely this idle talk and this curiosity usually bring about Dasein's "fallenness" by way of this atmosphere of ambiguity, because this is the road of the least resistance. Typical of "fallenness" is, however, that Dasein is tempted by the easy kind ofBeing proper to the "they.;' This way of Being is characterized, on the one hand, by tranquillity but, on the other, by the attractive alienation of the "whirl" (Wirbel), the plunge into inauthenticity. (SZ, 178-79)
VI: Concluding Refl.ections Although Heidegger's conception of ontological disposition and understanding has received a very positive response from the readers, his view on language, on the other hand, has been criticized by many. Kelkel has discussed this criticism in detail and shown that indeed there is a contradiction in Heidegger's conception which he hirnself later would realize and resolve. In Being and Time Heidegger describes logos as being inherently apophantic; Dasein's logos lets something be seen independently of the structures of the significations of the words of a language which it must employ in so doing, and independently of the community which engages in
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discourse on the basis of the logical and semantic systems which constitute that language. Yet on the other hand, Being and Time as a whole assumes that all speaking and discourse ultimately rests on the "language of Being." Thus on the one hand, Heidegger defends the view that discourse can produce meaning only to the degree that meaning is already constituted in language; yet on the other hand, language is described as being merely the enunciatedness of Dasein's logos, i.e., language is said tobe the totality of meaning in which logos has a worldly Being of its own, after it has been put into words when ·"to significations words accrue." (SZ, 161) In other words, in Being and Time, when speaking about logos, Heidegger still maintains a totality of meaning which itself and taken as such lies outside the domain of language and as such, therefore, is intemporal and invariant. In Being and Time Heidegger only succeeded in part in his effort to overcome the conception of meaning defended by transeendental philosophy. When Heidegger later realized this inconsistency he gave up the idea that Dasein "has" language and showed that Dasein is merely the place where "language speaks."7 Yet one should not exaggerate this criticism. It is indeed true that in On the Way to Language Heidegger has made a systematic effort to present an adequate conception of language and to "define" the essence of language as the language of Being; it is true also that he has tried there to think through all the essential implications of this highly original view oflanguage. Yet this does not alter the fact that the investigations concerning language presented in Being and Time contain extremely valuable ideas. One should keep in mind that some of the shortcomings of the conception of language unfolded there are connected with the limited perspective from which Dasein's logos was approached there. In other words, it was not Heidegger's intention to unfold an "exhaustive" theory of logos. Furthermore, already in 1927 Heidegger was aware of the fact that about the Being of language many questions can be asked for -which Being and Time does not give us an answer. (SZ, 166)
7Cf. Arion L. Kelkel, La legende de l'etre. Langage et poesie chez Heidegger. Paris: Vrin, 1980, pp. 329-336 and the literature discussed there. Cf. also Joseph J. Kockelmans, On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, pp. 145-147.
CHAPTER VIII CARE AND THE BEINGOF DASEIN. REALITY AND TRUTH (Being and Time, Sections 39-44, pp. 180-273)
1: Anxiety and Carel
The eksistential analytic of Dasein's mode of Being tries to bring to light the structural elements of Dasein's own Being and to consider them in detail. At the same time it must try to emphasize the fundamental unity of all these structural elements. Having described these structural elements one by one, we must now consider how all these elements form a single whole, the primordial totality ofDasein's entire structure. (SZ, 180) From the preceding chapters it is clear also that it is possible for Dasein to be in an inauthentic way as weil as in an authentic way. Because so far we have only sketched the basic structural elements from the perspective of Dasein's inauthentic Being, we must now also answer the questions of what precisely is meant by authentic Being and how Dasein can come to be authentic. In light of his previous analyses, Heidegger thinks that a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of anxiety (Angst) can answer the second question, whereas a detailed study of care will be able to answer the first. Since we intend to return to the phenomenon of anxiety in one of the chapters to come weshall confine ourselves here to what is essential to answer these two questions. According to Heidegger, anxiety is a phenomenon which is most suitable to the shedding of light on the unity of Dasein's structural elements. The "entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as actually eksisting Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this being are eksistentiality, facticity, lCf. William J. Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 72-74, 79-80, 84, 196-199; Donald F. Tweedie, The Significance of Dread in the Thought of Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Boston: Roughton Mif'flin Company, 1954; Stephan Strasser, "The Concept of Dread in the Philosophy of Heidegger," in The Modern Schoolman, 35(1957-58), 1-20; A. Silva-Tarouca, Die Logik der Angst. Innsbruck: TyroliaVerlag, 1953.
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and Being-fallen." (SZ, 191) What Heidegger means by the terms eksistentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen has been sufficiently explained in the preceding chapters. Facticity is the technical term for the phenomenon of Being-thrown; and eksistentiality indicates that Dasein projects itself, through primordial understanding, to its own possibilities. This self-projection is at the same time the discovery of the beings within the world. Heidegger believes that anxiety is "caused" by these eksistentials; it places Dasein before its primordial Being-able-to-be. For anxiety makes intraworldly beings disappear just as it also makes Dasein's fellow beings irrelevant. "Anxiety .. . deprives Dasein of the possibility to understand itself, as it 'falls,' in terms of the 'world' and in the way things are publicly interpreted [by the 'they']. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that whi~h it dreads, namely, its authentic Being-able-to-be-in-the-world." (SZ, 187) In anxiety Dasein experiences the nothingness of its own Being; it realizes how much it costs to eksist and at the same time it understands the precariousness of its eksistence. II: Care2
The fact that Dasein is essentially a Being-able-to-be is ontologically of exceptional importance. As such an ability Dasein is always "ahead of itself." This does not mean that Dasein, as a Beingable-to-be, necessarily implies a relationship to those beings which it is not, butthat Dasein's Being points to that Being-able-to-be which it itself is. (SZ, 192) Dasein is always already ahead of itself in its Being. (SZ, 191) Dasein is thus essentially defined by its Being-ableto-be. In this sense it is always ahead of what it actually is and it cannot even realize itself without first anticipating this ability tobe. Wehave already met this anticipating feature when we spoke about primordial understanding; for this understanding proved essentially to be a project. Precisely because Dasein possesses the ontological structure of projecting, it can always be ahead of its actual Being; and it will never cease to anticipate itself. · Every actual activity and every actual choice is made in reference to a certain Being-able-to-be and is never more than a realization of some ability. This having tobe ahead-of-itself can very appropriately be integrated in the total structure of Dasein's Beingin-the-world. Dasein is always ahead ofitselfby being in a world and 2Cf. William Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 71-76, 82, 85-87.
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by being of necessity involved in it. This Being-ahead, the project, constitutes what Heidegger calls "to ek-sist." In this sense, therefore, to eksist means that Dasein is ahead of itself according to its Beingable-to-be. Dasein can realize its possibilities precisely because it is involved in the world. Dasein cannot go beyond itself without being "thrown" into the world. In other words, eksistence presupposes facticity. Eksisting is always factical. "Eksistentiality is essentially determined by facticity." (SZ, 192) Dasein, which in this way is in a world into which it has been thrown, always discovers itself there as absorbed in that which immediately manifests itself there and with which Dasein deals concemfully. Heidegger indicates this very concisely by saying that Dasein's Being means "ahead-of-itself Being-already-in [the world] as being-at [the beings encountered in the world]." (SZ, 192) Dasein's having to be ahead of itself, while at the same time taking into account the limits imposed by Being thrown into the world, and the fact that it really is always absorbed in the things of the world already, constitutes what Heidegger has called "care" (Sorge). Thus care is the necessary consequence of: 1) eksistentiality, or the fact that Dasein always has to transcend itself toward its own Being-able-to-be; 2) facticity, or Being-thrown; 3) and "Being fallen," that is, the necessity of always having to be already "at" the things in the world. Care is the unity of these three structural elements and has little connection with what ordinarily is called "care." It is not a condition of the mind but the fundamental structure of Dasein's Being itself. Because Dasein's Being is care (Sorge), its dealing with intraworldly beings is concem (Besorgen), and its relationship to its fellow beings is solicitude (Fürsorge); In eksisting, i.e., being ahead of oneself toward one's Beingable-to-be, lies the eksistential-ontological condition for Dasein's possibility ofbeing free for its authentic, eksistential possibilities. (SZ, 193) By transcending itself toward these possibilities, Dasein actually makes itself free for these possibilities. Eksistentiality therefore is also freedom. This primordial Being free always contains ultimately the possibility of Dasein's authentic Being. Care, therefore, is not the result of various ways in which Dasein behaves toward other beings that have the character of Dasein or even toward intraworldly beings; care rather refers to the fundamental structural unity which a priori makes all ways of Dasein's actual behaving possible. "As a primordial structural
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totality, care lies eksistentially a priori 'before' every factual 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, that is, it always lies in them." (SZ, 193) Heidegger expressly adds that this "definition" of Dasein is not intended to reduce Dasein by way of care to something which belongs solely to the perspective of practical pursuits. For care is precisely the basis not only of practical pursuits but also of any theory. "' Theory' and 'practice' are possibilities of Being for a being whose mode ofBeing must be defined as 'care'." (SZ, 193) Heidegger concludes his reflections on care with the observation that in defining care as "Being-ahead-of-oneself-in Being-alreadyin ...-as Being-along-side ... " it has been made clear that even this phenomenon is in itself still structurally articulated. Thus we must ask further and further until we finally come to a still more primordial phenomenon, which will provide us with the ontological support for the unity and the totality of the structural manifoldness of care. As we shall see later, reflections ofthat kind willlead us to the phenomena of conscience, death, and temporality. Heidegger sees a confirmation of the view of Dasein's Being as care in the preontological way in which Dasein has often interpreted itself as care, in the ancient cura fable, in Seneca, Herder, and others. (SZ, 197-200)
111: Dasein and Reality: Neither Realism nor Idealism In classical metaphysics, the understanding of Being was, according to Heidegger, oriented onesidedly to the mode of Being of innerworldly beings. Furthermore too much attention was paid there to what is present-at-hand-to such an extent even that being was identified there with thing (res). Thus Being acquired the sense of reality (a term derived from the word "res"). Since Dasein was considered there in the same perspective, it too was conceived like all other beings, as a real thing that is merely present-at-hand. (SZ, 201) In this way the concept of reality received a peculiar priority over all other concepts in the ontological problems with which classical metaphysics concerned itself. This priority, in turn, had several important consequences for classical metaphysics. First of all, Dasein's own mode of Being could no Ionger correctly be understood. Furthermore, the problematic of Being was forced into an entirely wrong direction because classical metaphysics did not start from a primordially given phenomenon. Moreover, in the problern of reality several issues were mixed and thereby confused. 1) Those beings which supposedly transcend
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consciousness, are they indeed actually real? 2) Can we adequately prove the reality of the "external world"? 3) To what extent can this being, insofar as it is real, be known in its being-in-itself? 4) What is the profound meaning of this Being called "reality"? · From an ontological point of view the last of these questions is undoubtedly the most important one. Nevertheless it has never been clearly formulated because it has always been associated with the problern of the external world. That this could happen is, although objectionable, quite understandable. For the analysis and description of reality is obviously possible only if Dasein has an appropriate access to reality. Now, according to the commonly accepted view, philosophy has long held that reality can be understood only and exclusively by theoretical knowledge which, as we have just seen, takes place "in" consciousness. Thus, insofar as reality has the character of being something independent of consciousness and of something in itself, the question of the meanirig of reality becomes necessarily linked with the question of whether reality can b e independent of consciousness, and whether consciousness is able to transcend itself and to know the real world the way it is "in itself." The possibility of an adequate ontological analysis of reality, therefore, depended for centuries upon how far that which is supposed to transcend itself (namely consciousness) has been clarified in its own mode of Being. In the attempt to do so consciousness was quite arbitrarily understood as a "thinking substance," so that the radical clarification of consciousness was to be identified with the radical clarification of consciousness' knowledge. (SZ, 202) In the problern of knowledge, traditional metaphysics since Descartes has always separated subject and object. It is, however, not difficult to understand that whoever adopts such a point of view must, sooner or later, in some way or other, hit upon Descartes' epistemological problem. For whoever conceives of the world as independent of man necessarily throws man back upon himself. If one then speaks of knowledge of the world, he must interpret such knowledge as a special process taking place "within" consciousness. And the more univocally one maintains that knowledge is really "inside" consciousness and has by no means the same kind of Being as the intramundane things, the more reasonable and urgent the question concerning the clarification of the relationship between subject and object appears to become. For orily then can the problern arise of how this knowing subject is able to come out of its inner sphere into another which is "external" to it, and of how one must
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think of the object itself so that the subject is able to know it without having to take a jump into that other sphere. But in all of the numerous varieties which this approach has taken, in the rationaHst as well as in the empirieist tradition, the question concerning the mode of Being characteristic of the knowing subject, that is consciousness or mind, has been left entirely unasked, as we have seen already. Furthermore, one is also confronted with the question of how one can show that this process "inside" man can give reliable knowledge about the "outside world." The existence of this world, finally, is simply postulated without any justification whatsoever. On the other hand, if knowing is viewed as a way of Being-inthe-world, then it does not have to be interpreted as a process in which the subject makes "representations" of "outside" things that are kept "inside" himself. And the question of how these "representations" can agree with reality then becomes a meaningless question. (SZ, 62) Moreover, the questions ofwhether there really is a world and whether its reality can be proven, become, likewise, meaningless as questions asked by Dasein whose mode of Being is Being-in-the-world. And who else but Dasein could possibly ask such questions or try to answer them? (SZ, 202-203) The confusion of what one wants to prove with what one does prove, and with the means to carry out the proof, manifests itself very clearly in Kant's "Refutation of ldealism." According to Kant, it is a scandal of philosophy that the cogent proof for the existence of things outside us has not yet been delivered. But for Heidegger, the basic error of all attempts to find such a prooflies in the fact that they start from the supposition that man is originally "world-less" and that he, therefore, has to assure hirnself somehow of the world's existence in and through philosophical reflection. Being-in-the-world then becomes something that is based on opinion, reasoning, belief, or some kind of "knowing already," whereas all knowledge is precisely a mode of Dasein's Being, based on Being-in-the-world. Accordingly, the problern of reality as the question of whether there is an "outside world" reveals itself as an impossible question, not because its consequences Iead to insurmountable difficulties, but because the beings themselves considered in that question exclude such a problematic. One does not have to prove that and why there is an "outside world," but one has to explain why Dasein as Being-inthe-world tends first to bury the "outside world" epistemologically, in order then to prove its existence. Heidegger feels that the explanation for this state of affairs is to be found in Dasein's fallenness, for in
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fallenness Dasein's primary understanding of Being is diverted to beings which are already there. (SZ, 203-206) Heidegger's Standpoint is in agreement with that of realism insofar as it does not deny in any way that innerworldly beings are there; but it is in disagreement with it insofar as realism thinks that the reality of the world can and must be proved. In principle, Heidegger even has a measure of preference for the standpoint of idealism because idealism clearly realizes that Being cannot be explained in terms ofbeings. However, even though Being cannot be explained in terms of beings, we still have the obligation to investigate the Being of consciousness, the question of the mode of Being of the res cogitans. Only because Being is "in consciousness," i.e., is understandable by Dasein, can Dasein understand and conceptualize such characteristics as the independence of Being, its "in itself' so to speak, its reality. If, then, idealism amounts to realizing that Being cannot be understood and explained in terms of beings, that Being is "transcendental" with respect to every being, then idealism offers the only possibility to posit the problern in a genuinely philosophical manner. But in that case Aristotle was just as much an idealist as Kant. If, however, on the other hand, idealism amounts to reducing all Being to a subject or a consciousness, then idealism is just as naive as the most superficial form of realism. (SZ, 206-208) Accordingly, we must conclude that the problern of reality, no matter how it is approached, is to be included in Dasein's eksistential analysis as an ontological problem, and not merely as an epistemological issue. If the term "reality" indicates the Being of the innerworldly beings, the res that is just there (and it would be very difficult to assign any other sense to it), then, as far as the analysis of Dasein's mode of Being which is called "knowing" is concerned, this means that the innerworldly beings can be ontologically understood only when the phenomenon of the world, which, itself, as an essential aspect of the structure of Being-in-the-world, belongs to Dasein's fundamental constitution. Being-in-the-world, in turn, is ontologically tied up with the structural totality of Dasein's own mode of Being, which is to be characterized as care. These reflections outline the foundations and horizons which must be clarified if an analysis of "reality" is to be possible. (SZ, 208209) As an ontological term, "reality" refers to innerworldly beings. If it is used only to signify this way of Being, then "merely being present-at-hand" and "being ready-to-hand" function as the modes of reality. No matter how one conceives of the mode of Being of
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"nature," all modes of Being of the innerworldly beings are ontologically founded in the worldhood of the world and, consequently, in the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world itself. Thus it follows that reality has no priority among the modes of Being of innerworldly beings and that reality is a mode of Being which is not even suited to characterize the world and Dasein. On the Ievel of the interconnection of the beings in their ontological foundation and on the Ievel of any possible categorial and eksistential explication, reality refers back to the phenomenon of care. The statement that reality is ontologically rooted in Dasein's Being does not mean that an innerworldly being can be what it is in itself only when, and only as long as, Dasein eksists. Of course, it is true that only as long as Dasein is, i.e., as long as the understanding of Beingis ontically possible, "is there" (gibt es) Being. If no Dasein eksists, "independence" "is" not either, nor "is" there an "in itself." In such a case, these expressions are neither understandable nor not understandable, since innerworldly beings can then neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In other words, one can say neither that they are, nor that they are not. Accordingly, the dependence of Being (not the dependence of innerworldly beings) on the understanding of Being by Dasein, i.e., the dependence of reality (not the dependence of real beings) on care, intends to express merely that beings as beings become accessible only when there is understanding ofBeing by Dasein. But now, since there are in fact beings that have Dasein's mode of Being, the understanding ofBeing is possible as a being. (SZ, 208-209) IV: On Truth3 According to Heidegger, the fundamental question of what truth is can be approached in different ways, depending on one's 3Cf. William Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 211-254; W. Bretschneider, Sein und Wahrheit. Über die Zusammengehörigkeit von Sein und Wahrheit im Denken Martin Heideggers. Meisenheim: Hain, 1965; Henri Birault, "Existence et verite d'apres Heidegger," in Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 56(1950), 35-87; J. Beaufret, "Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Truth," in Frederick Elliston, ed., Heidegger's Existential Analytic. The Hague: Mouton, 1978, pp. 197-217; C. F. Gethmann, "Zu Heideggers Wahrheitsfrage," in Kantstudien, 65(1974), 186-200; E. Tugendhat, "Heideggers Idee von Wahrheit," in Otto Pöggeler, ed., Heidegger. Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werkes. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969, pp. 286-97; Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967.
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point of departure. Because of the important discoveries that can be made by approaching truth from more than one point of view, Heidegger has incorporated the most important of these approaches in Being and Time. He starts there from what the analytic of Dasein's mode of Being has already disclosed and then concludes that precisely the phenomenon of truth is that which constitutes Dasein as Dasein. The phenomenological analysis of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and eksistence appears to lead of necessity to the essence of truth, and in this essence of truth Dasein's own mode of Being finds its radical explanation. Heidegger comes to a similar conclusion in On the Essence of Truth by a different and shorter way. Here he explicitly starts from the traditional definition of truth which was also briefly discussed in Being and Time (SZ, 214) as the conformity of intellect and thing (adaequatio intellectus et rei). After asking what precisely is to be understood by conformity, he tries to determine there how, ultimately, this conformity is intrinsically possible. Finally, he attempts to give a definitive foundation to this possibility. In his latest works Heidegger endeavors to clarify the essence of truth from the history of the "clearing" of Being (die Lichtungsgeschichte des Seins),4 i.e., from the essence ofthat to which, in the course of history, truth has led in the field of science, art, technology, and philosophy. The reflections on truth contained in Being and Time can be interpreted in two entirely different ways, insofar as Heidegger's conception of truth in 1927 still contained unresolved problems. One could conclude from the text of Being and Time that, according to Heidegger, the ultimate foundation of truth lies in Dasein's eksistence. However, reading the same text from the perception of the Letter on Humanism,5 it appears that Being itselfis the ultimate
4Martin Heidegger, Identität und Differenz. Pfullingen: Neske, 1957, p. 47; English: Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Rarper & Row, 1969, p. 51. 5Martin Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus". Bern: Francke Verlag, 1947; English translation of the Letter by Frank A. Capuzzi and J. Gien Gray, in David Farrell Krell, ed., Basic Writings, pp. 193-242.
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foundation of truth, although this point is not yet explicitly made in Being and Time or in the first version of On the Essence of Truth. 6 According to Heidegger, since Parmenides philosophy has tried to connect truth closely with Being. Aristotle, too, did not distinguish between searching for truth and investigating Being. (SZ, 213) The famous conception of truth, which is traditionally attributed to Aristotle, however, seems to have been formulated first by Isaac Israeli. It can be formulated in the following two theses: 1) the place of truth is judgment; and 2) the essence of truth lies in the conformity of judgment and object or thing. According to Heidegger, this conception has been maintained until the present, without any serious opposition. Not only did medieval scholasticism take over this view, but Descartes and Kant also adhered to it, though with some reservations and changes. (SZ, 212-214) Husserl, too, never doubted the classical definition of truth; he accepted it as correct, although he gave it a different interpretation, probably without even being explicitly aware of this. The meaning and function of the classical definition of truth in Husserl's works were different from those it had in classical philosophy, as is evident from the fact that in this matter Husserl did not distinguish between intellectual knowledge and sense knowledge, and did not hold that the judgment alone is the true locus of truth. Of course, Husserl accepted that truth is encountered in the judgment, also; but according to him, this judgment is rooted in a pre-predicative experience in which the contrast between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge is already transcended and in which the problern of truth announces itself already in a primordial way. According to Husserl, the problern of truth on the Ievel of prepredicative experience is more complicated because the notions of "presence" and "evidence," which are essentially allied to the notion of truth, are not univocal notions. Nevertheless, he maintained the classical definition of truth on this level also, although, because of the above mentioned analogy, its meaning differs from the one Aristotle had given to it.7 Heidegger agrees with the main lines of Husserl's position in this matter, but adds that Husserl limited hirnself to a theory of 6This is true at least for the lecture which Heidegger delivered in 1930. The first edition appeared in 1943; the first paragraph of the concluding note was added in 1949. Cf. William Richardson, Heidegger, p. 212, note. 7Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2 vols., trans. J. N. Findlay. New York: Humanities Press, 1970, vol. II, lnvestigation VI, sect. 36-39.
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truth, although in addition an ontology should have been provided to give a foundation of this theory. In On the Essence of Truth Heidegger says that the crucial problern about truth does not lie in the question of which things, which judgments, or which acts are in fact ·true, or even in precisely what kinds of truths one has to distinguish from one another. The primary task, he claims, is to define truth as truth.S Undoubtedly, the question of the different levels of truth, its eternity, its necessity, its absoluteness or its contingent character, etc., are of great importance also, and they have to be discussed in a , coherent theory of truth; but all this is not possible until a foundation 'l'has been provided by an ontological doctrine oftruth as truth. ·· From the different ways in which man gives expression to the .::. idea of truth Heidegger concludes that the classical definition of truth is undoubtedly meaningful. Truth is the "conformity" between thing and intellect. If one speaks of true gold, one intends to say that a certain piece of metal is really gold, i.e., that it corresponds to the notion we have formed about genuine gold (adaequatio rei ad intellectum, conformity of the thing with an intellect). On the other hand, we also call a judgment true, namely when it corresponds to the thing which is judged (adaequatio intellectus ad rem, conformity of the intellect with the thing).9 Thus Heidegger does not reject the scholastic conception of ontological and logical (or epistemological) truth. According to scholasticism, all knowledge has to be in harmony with the things, and these, in the last analysis, have tobe in harmony with the ideas that God had about them when He created them. Hence logical truth has to be connected with ontological truth. However, one should keep in mind that in these two cases there is a question of two different intellects and, strictly speaking, also of two different things.lO Later the reference to the divine intellect was omitted, but otherwise the scholastic conception was maintained in its original form. Kant and Regel also spoke about logical truth as conformity of 8Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1961; English translation by John Sallis, in David Farrell Krell, ed., Basic Writings, pp. 117-144. In what follows I shall refer to this essay by WW, and add the page numbers of the German original and the page numbers of the translation between brackets. 9Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 16, I, c; De Veritate, I, 1. lOcf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Being-True as the Basic Determination of Being," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., A Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time." Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1986, pp. 145-160.
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the intellect with the thing, and about ontological truth as conformity of the things with the intellect. According to Kant, the truth of the object is constituted by the transeendental subject while our empirical knowledge is governed by the objects. In Hegel these two aspects of truth became inseparable, and one is only an abstract phase of the other. Yet the idea of conformity continued to define the essence oftruth.ll If, as it is generally done, one conceives of consciousness as being identical with representation, the problems of truth become insoluble, as is clear from the history of epistemology. Husserl was right when he argued that the classical definition of truth is meaningful only when one regards consciousness to be intentional. Yet Husserl did not go far enough because in the final analysis it is impossible to define truth in any way whatsoever without implying an interpretation of the Being of the beings. If one does not accurately indicate what intellect (Dasein) and thing (res) are in themselves, any theory of truth remains empty and certainly without a radical foundation.12 Moreover, the classical conception of truth contains a series of implicit positions in regard to untruth and error, which should have been made explicit and then also justified. Thus it is clear that the classical theory of truth, even in the sense in which Husserl corrected it, requires an ontology oftruth for its foundation.13 This ontology can best be presented by starting from the classical conception of truth. What exactly is meant by the conformity upon which this view is based? Its explanation will immediately lead us to the ontological presuppositions upon which this view rests. The conformity in question is obviously an analogaus notion. We say, for example, that two silver dollars are equal or in conformity with each other; on the other hand, in my true judgment I am in conformity with the object of my judgment. In the first case there is a conformity between two objects based upon their participation in one and the same form. In the second case there is no question of two material objects, but of one material thing and a statement about it. How then can one speak here of conformity? One could say that the judgment refers to "itself'
nww, 5-8 (118-21). 12ww, s-9 (121). 1aww, 9 (121-22).
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in the piece of silver insofar as the judgment represents the object under a certain aspect, just as it is,14 Closer investigation, however, shows that this form of presentation has nothing to do with a representation by means of signs or images (repraesentatio), but means that one places a thing as it is before oneself (appraesentatio). In the judgment I intend and aim at something other than the I. In this intending, this other, to the extent that it is "tended to," and under the formal aspect in which it is "tended to," is presented by me to myself and finds itself now before me, that is, it is constituted as an object. This objectivation is not the samein all cases; but it varies according to different kinds of judgments. This point, however, need not concern us at present. Every judgment and every statement related to a real thing which they represent as it actually is, call forth a special form of human behavior which characterizes Dasein's mode of Being and distinguishes its mode of Being from that of all other beings. This behavior is essentially tied up with reality in an intentional and transeendental manner. But one cannot give a meaning to the real if it is not first made present to man and if man has not first placed it before hirnself and ifhe does not let it rise before him. This, however, presupposes that man is openness, both to things and to himself, i.e., that man is Dasein, Being-in-the-world, eksistence. In this perspective, representation, as a supposedly essential element of every form of finite knowledge, makes no sense at all. Thus we see that Heidegger expressly returns here to Husserl's idea of intentionality, but interprets it in a different manner.15 Accordingly, Heidegger accepts the correctness of the classical definition of truth as Husserl tried to interpret it, but he claims that this view of truth necessarily implies a certain vision of the mode of Being of man. He attempts to clarifY this "vision" first (SZ, 212-220) and then goes on to draw attention to other aspects ofthe issue. (SZ, 220-227) In Heidegger's view, a statement or a claim is true, if and only if, it reveals and uncovers a thing just as it is. A true statement reveals the thing as it is in itself; it asserts and lets the thing be seen (apophansis) in its uncoveredness. In the process of confirmation the thing is made to show itself in its selfsameness; the confirmation shows that the thing itself which now shows itself immediately is indeed just as it was revealed in the statement or the claim. 14WW, 10-11 (122-24). tsww, 11-12 (124-25).
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This implies that Being-true is Being as uncovering; my claim is true to the degree that it reveals and uncovers. At first sight, this seems strange and rather arbitrary. Yet on closer inspection it appears not to be as arbitrary as it seems to be; Heraclitus already had suggested this idea and the Greek word for truth, namely a-letheia, suggests the same idea, also. By "translating" aletheia by un-hidden-ness or non-concealment no word mysticism is intended; rather philosophical reflection must make an effort to preserve the saying power of the most basic and elementary words; it must make an effort to say how things in fact are, phrazon hopos echei, as Heraclitus says. Furthermore, also in this case the task of the philosopher is not to shake off the tradition, but to retrieve it and to appropriate it in a primordial manner. (SZ, 219) But what is more, to be as uncovering and revealing is not only characteristic for my claims; it is first of all characteristic for Dasein as such; Dasein is lumen naturale. (SZ, 133, 170; cf. 220-221) The uncovering of my claims has its eksistential, ontological foundation in the uncovering of me as Dasein. Uneavering or revealing is a mode of Being for Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Dasein can reveal in many ways, in circumspection, in theoretical viewing, in the scientific way of thematizing things, etc. In these different modes of Being things become uneavered and revealed. Thus Dasein, as revealing, is true in a primordial sense; things insofar as they are revealed are true in a secondary sense. The uncoveredness (Entdecktheit) of the beings within the world is grounded in the uncoveredness of the world in Dasein's own Da. Thus the disclosedness (Erschlossenheit) of the world is related to the disclosing which is intrinsic in Dasein's own Being-in, taken as ontological disposition, understanding, and logos. Dasein's own disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of the truth. Everything eise is true to the degree that Dasein discloses it. Only Dasein itself is "in the truth." (SZ, 221) That Dasein is in the truth means from an eksistential point of view many things. First it means that disclosedness belongs to Dasein's mode of Being essentially; it is because Dasein is as disclosedness that beings can become disclosed. Thus Dasein is in the full sense of the term the natural light. Yet since Dasein is thrown, this disclosedness is inherently factical; this means that in each case it is my disclosing. Furthermore, to Dasein's mode of Being belongs projection; Dasein can project itself authentically or inauthentically; the same is true for Dasein's projection of the innerworldly beings. Finally, Dasein is lost in fallenness; thus
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Dasein can equally be in untruth; the beings are then disguised and shown in the mode of semblance. (SZ, 221-222) It is thus essential that Dasein must explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure itself of its own uncoveredness again and again. Thus uncoveredness must always be wrested from the beings by a kind of robbery; the beings are to be brought from hiddenness into the open of non-concealment. Also the fact that Dasein is a thrown projection explains why Dasein is both in truth and in untruth. Finally, one should observe here that the truth of our claims originates from Dasein's disclosedness. In other words, the truth of our claims is a derivative modification of truth taken as Dasein's revealing, so that the phenomenon of agreement or conformity is also derivative in character. (SZ, 223) This thesis runs parallel to a thesis we mentioned earlier to the effect that the hermeneutic as always precedes the apophantic as; only the latter accounts for the theoretical explication of the structure of the truth. (SZ, 223-224) But let us now return to the manner in which Heidegger relates truth and freedom. If it is true, Heidegger states, that our judgments are directed to the things about which they attempt to say something, then one has to ask why our judgments, as well as our entire knowledge, can and must accept the real as their norm. Why does man "consent" to adjust hirnself radically to the beings in his knowledge, his actions, and his entire behavior? Why does he subject hirnself to the beings in order to derive from them the substance and the norm of what he knows and does? Strictly speaking, one cannot really ask the question in this way, because we are confronted with the fact that man does indeed obey the real and that the beings do constitute the norm that governs his knowledge and behavior. It is better therefore to ask under what conditions such an attitude is possible. The answer is that it is possible because man is free. For, if our behavior adjusts itself to the beings, if it meets them as they are, then "the beings taken as they are" have to be the norm that governs the open being, namely Dasein, that faces them. Remaining what they are, things present themselves as they are, and this within the domain of that "open" whose openness is not created by Dasein's representation, but merely is taken over by it as a possible referential system. This "open" is for /
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Heidegger the world as the necessary horizon within whose limits every concrete being can be truly brought to light by man.l 6 Man is essentially and primordially related to this always already given "open," the world, and in each concrete form of behavior this fundamental relation is, as it were, actualized.l7 In this actualization man relates hirnself to the beings which, as beingpresent and manifest, are experienced as such. "What is thus, and solely in the strict sense, made manifest was experienced early in Western thought as that 'which is present' (ousia) and has long been called Being."l8 Because man is open to hirnself and to the world as the "open," and ultimately because man is primordially open to Being as the unconcealed, man is able to make particular things manifest as these particular things, that is, as they are. The judgments and the statements that follow these judgments, must be governed by the beings that have become manifest in this manner. It is clear, therefore, that neither judgment nor statement can be the original locus of truth. The essential locus of truth lies in the primordial relation in which beings become disclosed as they are. Dasein's openness is a necessary condition for this primordial relation. This openness must be regarded as the proper characteristic of freedom, so that we can conclude that "the essence of truth is freedom."l9 In spite of the explanation given, this assertion may still seem strange. One could say, of course, that man must be free in order to be able to perform a certain action and therefore also free to make a representative statement and, thus, to agree or to disagree with a "truth." But the above mentioned assertion claims that freedom is the essence of truth. By essence is meant here the basis of the inner possibility of whatever is accepted and generally admitted as known. But in the idea of freedom one does not think of truth and even less of the essence oftruth. Moreover,' it seems that, by making freedom the essence of truth, truth is left to man's discretion. Such a surrender of truth to man's discretion fundamentally undermines truth by basing it on the subjectivity of the human subject. These and other similar objections, however, proceed from assumptions that are foreign to what Heidegger really wants to say. 16WW, 11 (123). 11ww,
u
(123-24).
18WW, 11 (123-24). I9ww, 12 (125).
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The reason for the confusion lies in the fact that the objectors tenaciously cling to certain prejudices concerning the essence of freedom. They assume that freedom is primarily a characteristic of man, that the essence of freedom is immediately evident, and that everyone knows at once what man is. One of these prejudices is to be e:xamined more closely here.20 The term "freedom" is usually taken to mean the possibility to choose, "the random ability to go this way or that in our choice."21 Although it cannot be denied that freedom is to be found also in choice, the essence of freedom does not lie there. Freedom means ~?·essentially the absence ofnecessity together with a certain autonomy. ; Freedom means primordially that way of Being which enables man < to liberate hirnself from "nature's" grasp. This negative aspect of freedom, however, contains also a positive side. In my power to escape from the grasp of facticity, the positive possibility of my fundamental openness reveals itself equiprimordially and, by virtue of this openness, I can orientate myself to the world and to my own possibilities in regard to the innerworldly beings. This freedom is primordially not a characteristic of man's activity, but, as Being-inthe-world, Dasein is openness; it transcends being necessitated and has the positive possibility to transcend and to project. Primordially, therefore, freedom indicates the Being ofman.22 To e:xplain the relationship between truth and freedom we must return to the classical definition of truth which is to be given an ontological foundation. W e have seen that the locus of truth is not primordially in the judgment but in Dasein's eksistence itself.23 The conformity between judgment and reality has been drawn from concealment. For this purpose a certain light is needed; this is the light of Dasein's eksistence which itself is openness. "Insofar as Dasein is its disclosedness essentially and, as disclosed, discloses and uncovers, it is essentially true." (SZ, 221) Taken in his essence, man is openness and a light to himself; but equiprimordially he is openness and light with respect to other beings. As eksistence, Dasein is a natural light, a lumen naturale. Primordially disclosed, Dasein, taken as eksistence, is equiprimordially disclosing and thereby giving rise to meaning. (SZ, 133) 2frww, 12-13 (125-126).
21ww, 15 (128). 22ww, 15-16 (128-129).
2aww, 6-9 cn8-22).
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The truth of the judgment presupposes truth as unconcealedness of the beings and the truth of human eksistence taken as that which discovers things; and these two presuppose man's fundamental openness. Hence, the truth of judgment ultimately presupposes that man is "in the truth." (SZ, 221) "What is primarily 'true'-that is, un-covering-is Dasein." (SZ, 220) The task of Dasein lies in "taking beings out of their concealedness and letting them be seen in their unconcealedness [their un-coveredness]." (SZ, 218) The untruth of the judgment can also be considered in the same way. The being untrue of ·a judgment presupposes man's being untrue, i.e., the being uprooted ofhis eksistence. (SZ, 220) This being uprooted means that man no Ionger stands in truth as unconcealedness, but stands in semblance (Schein). Reality does not remain completely concealed here but, although it is to some extent disclosed, it is distorted in one way or another. Thus the untrue judgment merely explicates Dasein's standing in semblance. (SZ, 222) Truth in the most primordial sense of the word is, therefore, an eksistential of Dasein's own mode of Being. Thus we must conclude that "Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is a mode of Being that is essential to Dasein. 'There is' (es gibt) truth only insofar as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Beings are discovered only when Dasein is; and they are disclosed only as long as it is." (SZ, 226) Does it follow from this that all truth is merely subjective? If by "subjective" one understands the idea that all truth, by virtue of its own essential way of Being, is relative to Dasein's Being, then this question must undoubtedly be answered in the affirmative. If, however, "subjective" is taken to mean "left to the subject's discretion," then the answer must be negative, because "dis-covering ... places the dis-covering Dasein face to face with the beings themselves." (SZ, 227) Dis-covery aims precisely at the beings as they are, and every judgment and statement likewise aims at these beings as they are. The intended being itself shows itself as it is in itself, i.e., it shows "that it, in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out, discovered, in the statement as being." (SZ, 218) As ek-sistence, Dasein discloses reality itself; it Iets the beings be for itself as they are. "Letting be" sometimes means that one wants to renounce something, but in the present context it means precisely the opposite. "Letting be" here means to Iet the beings be as they genuinely are. It implies also that one wishes to have something to do with the beings, not in order to protect, cultivate, or conserve them, but only to Iet
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them truly be what they are. This "letting be" takes things from concealedness, it brings them to light and makes them participate in the truth of Being.24 This "having something to do with beings" in order to bring them to light does not become absorbed in beings. On the contrary, it unfolds itself precisely in making room for the beings in order that they can reveal themselves as what they are themselves and precisely as they are, and in order that subsequently our judgmerits and statements can find their norm in them. If both truth and freedom are nothing but expressions of Dasein's own mode of Being then it is evident that the essence of ;truth can lie precisely in freedom taken as openness. "The essence of ;freedom, seen from the viewpoint of the essence of truth, shows itself as the "bringing out" of beings into unconcealedness." 25 It also becomes evident then that the locus of truth is not in the judgment, but in that which makes judgments and statements possible, i.e., in primordial understanding and fundamental moodness.26 In Heidegger's own view, these few remarks about truth do by no means exhaust this rich and important subject. As he sees it, at this point of the analysis it is not yet possible to offer a definitive solution for the most important problems. Such solutions become possible only after the basic problern of ontology, i.e., the question of the meaning of Being itself, has been discussed. Yet what has been said here about truth is adequate to understand Heidegger's position in regard to fundamental ontology provided one constantly keeps in mind that in the coming-to-pass of the truth of Being, Being itself occupies the privileged position. 24ww, 14-15 (126-28). 25ww, 15 (128). 2sww, 18-19 (130-33).
DIVISION II DASEIN AND TEMPORALITY (Being and Time, Beetions 45-83, pp. 231-437)
In Heidegger's view, at this point the preparatory analysis of the mode of Being of Dasein has been completed. We must now start all over again and interpret the phenomena discovered thus far from the perspective of time as the transeendental horizon of our understanding of Being as such. This will Iead us to a whole new set of interpretive reflections which "repeat" what we have seen already in another tone scale so to speak. This will imply a rather drastic change in terminology and a turning to issues not yet touched upon in the foregoing pages. In the preceding analysis Dasein was taken in its everydayness. In its everyday concern with the beings within the world Dasein is in a state of fallenness and Dasein encounters itself there in the form of the "they"; this "they" is Dasein's inauthentic self. We must now ask the question of how Dasein can achieve its genuine and authentic self. To achieve authenticity Dasein need not withdraw from the beings within the world; rather it must learn to adopt a completely different attitude in regard to its ontic entanglement. "Authentie eksistence is not something that hovers over everydayness that is falling, but eksistentially it is simply a modified way in which everydayness is apprehended." (SZ, 179) Heidegger's answer to the question concerning Dasein's search for authenticity can be explained only by focusing on the question of how the various structural elements of Dasein's Being can be brought tagether in a unified totality. W e have seen already that the structural elements of Dasein's Being are unified in care. Care was discovered by means of an analysis of anxiety. In anxiety one does not shrink from some being within the world, something specific, imminent, and dangerous, that is either here or there. In anxiety Dasein is anxious about nonbeing and that which threatens it is nowhere. (SZ, 186) Dasein is anxious about non-being, but this non-being is not just nothing. This non-being is grounded in the world as such. (SZ, 187) In the phenomenon of anxiety, which may occur only briefly on rare
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occasions, the beings within the world which occupy Dasein. in its everyday concern, become suddenly insignificant; at that moment, in Dasein's ontological disposition, the dark horizon wherein the beings within the world and also Dasein itself meet and which constitutes the eksistential dimension of Dasein, becomes disclosed. Furthermore, what Dasein is anxious for appears to be its own self. "Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free-for ... (propensio in ... ) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is." (SZ, 188) Anxiety thus brings Dasein before its self as that being it has to be in the world as the coming-to-pass of transcendence. In other words, anxiety is the understanding disposition by which Dasein in its unity is disclosed to its self. (SZ, 188) The unity which anxiety reveals is a synthesis of three elements. Anxiety first discloses Dasein as a being that has to be in the world, as a Being-able-to-be (Seinkönnen): to be an inexhaustible potentiality to transcend beings toward Being. As such Dasein is always in advance of itself in anticipation. Then, anxiety also discloses Dasein in its thrownness into the world; thus Dasein is a process which always is already begun and yet still to be achieved. Finally, anxiety discloses Dasein in its referential dependence on the world. As we have seen already, anxiety thus discloses Dasein's Being as care, taken in the sense of "ahead-of-itself, Being-already-in(the-world), as being-at (the beings encountered in the world)." (SZ, 192) It is in the phenomenon of care that Dasein's finitude and transcendence are mediated.l But what about the totality ofDasein's Being? Showing the unity of Dasein's Beingis manifestly not tantamount to showing its totality. Dasein's Being is a project that is spread out over time. Where Heidegger spoke about care he had already said something negative about Dasein's beginning: Dasein is thrown and as such it is not the author of its self; it has been given over to itself to be. On the other hand, as a process still to be achieved Dasein has also a not-yet that still has to occur. About the end of the process nothing has been said yet thus far. It is only when reflections on the end of Dasein have been added, that weshall have brought to light the process as a whole and, thus, revea_led the completeness of its finitude.2 To focus on
lCf. William Richardson, Heidegger, 2Jbid., pp. 74-75.
pp. 71-74.
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Dasein's totality by focusing on death is the first task which Heidegger now sets for himself. Once this task has been completed, Heidegger will turn to the question of authenticity. Here we shall encounter the very special difficulty that a human being can be authentic only in an eksistentiell situation. Thus the question of authenticity is to be considered at two different Ievels. Heidegger will have to say something about authenticity as an eksistentiell potentiality, as weil as about the eksistential structure that makes it possible. Heidegger decided to treat the two issues in reverse order: first he considers the ontological dimension of authenticity where he discusses Dasein's authentic Being-unto-death. The eksistentiell potentiality is then unfolded by an analysis of conscience, guilt, and resolve.S Thus in what follows Heidegger will present us with an ontological interpretation of the description of the mode of Being of Dasein developed in the first division of Being and Time. In his view (SZ, 232), an ontological interpretation is scientifically acceptable only if it is able to work out all of its basic assumptions, i.e., the entire hermeneutic situation. In the second Division Heidegger wants to examine three basic assumptions. In his view, the condition of the possibility of care taken in an ontological sense is the temporality and historicity of the Being of Dasein. Thus only under the condition that it can be shown that temporality is constitutive for the Being of Dasein, can one maintain that the Being of Dasein can be described as care. This is the first basic assumption made in the first division. Yet before one can show that temporality and historicity, both of which are constitutive of Dasein's Being, are the conditions of the possibility of care, two other assumptions must be explained (Auslegen) and "justified" ontologically. The first assumption is that Dasein's Being is indeed a whole; the other is concerned with the question of whether and how Dasein can be authentic. In discussing these important issues Heidegger was to some degree inspired by ideas from Regel, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, Blonde!, and others. 3Jbid., p. 77.
CHAPTERIX DEATH, CONSCIENCE, AND RESOLVE (Being and Time, Sections 46-60, pp. 231-301)
1: Introductory Refl.ecüons
In the first Division of the book Heidegger had presented a preparatory fundamental analysis of the Being of Dasein. In that Division t:he following important issues were discussed: Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world, the worldhood of the world, Being-with, the "They," Being-in as such with its three basic eksistential components, and care as the genuine Being of Dasein. At the beginning of the second Division of the book Heidegger first reflects briefly on the outcome of the preceding analysis and the task of a definitive, primordial, and eksistential analysis of Dasein's Being which is still to be delivered in the second Division. Section 45 thus deals with what we have discovered already as well as what it isthat we arestill seeking. (SZ, 231) We haue seen that the basic state of Dasein is Being-in-the-world and all of its structures center on disclosedness (Entschlossenheit). The totality of Being-in-the-world taken as a structural whole appeared to consist in care. By unfolding the phenomenon of care, we have received an insight into the concrete constitution of Dasein's eksistence, i.e., into its equiprimordial connection with Dasein's facticity and falling. What we are seehing still is the answer to the question concerning the meaning of Being as well as an answer to the question of how this first question is tobe worked out in a radical manner. Now to unfold the horizon within which Being can become intelligible is tantamount to clarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all and, as we have seen already, this understanding belongs to the very constitution of Dasein. Thus to understand the Being question we must first interpret primordially Dasein in its Being. CSZ, 231) But to say that the Being of Dasein is care, does this mean that one has already given a primordial interpretation of Dasein's Being? A genuine, ontological interpretation must clarify and make sec11:re
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the hermeneutical situation, i.e., the totality of the presuppositions enclosed in the fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception ofthat interpretation. To some extent we have done this already in the first Division. Yetinordertobe primordial our interpretation must also provide us with an explicit assurance that the whole of Dasein's Beingis explained and show that all of its structural elements indeed constitute a unity. (SZ, 231-232) Heidegger quickly concludes that the preceding analysis of Dasein's Being cannot lay claim to primordiality, because our forehaving never included more than the inauthentic, everyday mode of Being of Dasein; furthermore, we always showed Dasein's Being as being less than a whole. Thus the task now arises of putting Dasein as a whole into our fore-having. Thus we must first raise the question of this being's potentiality for being a whole. For as long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can and will be. But to that which is so outstanding, the end itself belongs; but the end of Dasein as Being-in-the-world is death. This end determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein. And for our present aim not just any conception of death will be adequate; what we need is an eksistential conception of death. But in the case of man death has the character of Dasein itself; thus death is only in an eksistentiell Being-towards-death; each human being stands out towards its own death. By considering Dasein's death in this way, the whole ek-sisting Dasein allows itself to be brought into our eksistential fore-having. (SZ, 233-234) But can Dasein also eksist authentically as a whole? The authenticity of Dasein is to be determined with respect to eksistence, to authentic eksistence. We can derive the criterion for this from an ontological interpretation of conscience. Conscience, like death, even demands a genuinely eksistential interpretation. Such an interpretation will show that Dasein has its authentic Being-able-tobe in that it wants to haue a conscience. This, too, is an eksistentiell possibility which in each case must be made definite in an eksistentiell way by each Dasein's own Being-towards-death. (SZ, 234) Our eksistential analytic thus acquires its assurance as to the constitution of Dasein's primordial Being, the moment we can show that Dasein has an authentic potentiality for Being a whole. This potentiality becomes visible there as a mode of care; and the primordial ontological basis for Dasein's eksistentiality, taken as care, is temporality. Thus the eksistential-temporal analytic of Dasein's Being must now be confirmed concretely. (SZ, 234) This will
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Iead to the insight that Dasein is also inherently historical and as such it can and must develop the science of history. (SZ, 234-235) ll: Dasein's Possibility of Being-A-Whole. Being Towards Death1 1. How to Determine Dasein's Being-a-Whole Ontologically? In Heidegger's view, we must first try tobring the whole Dasein into our fore-having. But this seems to be inconsistent with the ontological meaning of care. The primary element in care is Dasein's Beingahead-of-itself. As long as Dasein is, right to its end, it comports itself towards its own Being-able-to-be. This is true even for those who eksistentielly have given up all hope and are now "ready for anything." The Being-ahead-of-itself, as a constitutive structure of care, teils us that in Dasein there is always something still coming and outstanding, something still to be settled in one's own Beingable-to-be. As long as Dasein is as such, it has never reached wholeness. The reason for this does not lie in any imperfection of our cognitive powers, but rather in the very Being of this being. But is it then not hopeless to try to understand Dasein's Being ontologically as a totality? We shall think so as long as we conceive of Dasein as something that is merely present-at-hand, so that what is still ahead of it is not yet present-at-hand, and as long as we take death in a biological sense. But as we shall see shortly, this is not the way we should go about things. (SZ, 235-237) When a Dasein reaches its own wholeness in its own death, then it loses the Being of its "there" in death also. By its transition to no Ionger being as a Dasein, it no Ionger has the possibility of experiencing anything and thus of experiencing its own death. This fact makes the death of other people so impressive. Dasein can have lThere is quite a bit of Iiterature on Heidegger's conception of death and its function in his eksistential analytic of Dasein. Yet most of it has appeared in Japan in the Japanese language. There are also many essays in which Heidegger's conception of death is compared with the view of other philosophers or thinkers in both the East and the West. I shall Iimit myself here to some publications that may be helpful to come to a better understanding of the meaning and function of death in Being and Time. William J. Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 75-80, 83-83, 286-87; Th. Weiss, Angst vor dem Tode und Freiheit zum Tode in M. Heideggers "Sein und Zeit." Innsbruck: Rauch, 1947; Gray, Glenn J., "Martin Heidegger: On Anticipating My Own Death," in The Personalist, 46(1965), 439-58; Ugo M. Ugazio, Il problema della morte nella filosofia di Heidegger. Milano: Murisia, 1976; B. E. O'Mahony, "Martin Heidegger's Existential Analysis of Death," in Philosophical Studies, 18(1969), 58-75; James N. Demske, Being, Man, and Death. A Key to Heidegger. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970.
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some experience of death because its Beingis inherently Being-withothers. Yet as we shall see, reflections on the death of another person do not lead us to our goal, because the end of another human being cannot be chosen as a substitute theme for our analysis of my Dasein's wholeness. For in the dying of the other we can experience only that remarkable phenomenon of Being which may be defined as the change-over of a being that has the mode of Being of Dasein to being no Ionger a Dasein: the end of the being qua Dasein is the beginning of the same being as something merely present-at-hand. (SZ, 238) Heidegger explains that the deceased is obviously not just a thing or a piece of equipment, and that those who remain behind are somehow still "with" him or her; yet the authentic coming-to-an-end of the deceased is precisely that which we can neuer experience. "Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as is experienced by those who remain. In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying person 'suffers'." (SZ, 239) What we would like to know is the ontological meaning of the dying of the person who dies, as a Beingable-to-be which belongs to his Being. But to this we have no access even though we can imagine ourselves somehow in the role of the other with respect to many other things. (SZ, 239) Thus we never can take the other's dying away from him or make it our own. In dying we can show that "mineness" and "eksistence" are ontologically constitutive for death. Dying is not just an event; it is a phenomenon to be understood. This means that we have to form a purely eksistential conception of this phenomenon. (SZ, 239-241) As Heidegger sees it, within the framework of this investigation, the ontological characterization of the end and of totality (Ganzheit) can only be provisional; to perform such a task it is not enough to set forth just some merely formal structure of end-ingeneral and totality-in-general. In a footnote (SZ, 244) Heidegger explains that even though the distinction between holos and pan, whole and sum, has been familiar since the time of Plato and Aristotle, no one seems to know anything about the systematic study of the classification of the categorial variations which this division entails. To such a thing it would be necessary to give a clarified idea ofBeing-in-general first. (SZ, 241) Most characterizations of totality and end are totally inadequate. We must try to develop these concepts as eksistentials. For otherwise it will be impossible to develop an ontological interpretation of death. (SZ, 241-242) Furthermore, the eksistential concepts of wholeness, to-
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tality, and end cannot be derived by means of a deduction; they are to be derived from Dasein's mode of Being itself. The outcome of our discussion of death can be formulated provisionally in three theses: 1) There belongs to Dasein, as long as it is as such, a not-yet which is constantly outstanding. 2) The comingto-its-end ofthat which as such is not yet at its end, has the character of being no Ionger in the form of Dasein. 3) Coming-to-an-end implies a mode of Being in which in each case the particular Dasein cannot be represented by someone else. (SZ, 242)-Let us now try to explain and justify these claims. Heidegger begins his explanation by comparing the "outstanding" characteristic of Dasein, i.e., its permanently outstanding notyet, with the not-yet of the ripening fruit, the cessation of the rain, and the disappearing of the moon in its last phase. Dasein ends in death. Thus we must ask what then the authentic sense of death is which is Dasein's end. One could be tempted to say that in death Dasein simply is at its end; if we were to take the term "end" in the expression "at its end" to mean "perfection" (fruit), "cessation" (rain), "disappearance" (moon in last phase), etc., we would interpret Dasein as a mere being ready-to-hand or present-at-hand; but in so doing we would misinterpret Dasein completely. (SZ, 244-245) The mode of Being of Dasein is characterized by eksistence, its ekstatic Being-able-to-be because of which it is its own potentiality. It constantly is what it can be; thus it constantly also is what it not yet is, namely its end. Since the potentiality of Dasein inherently includes in eksistential fashion its end, the death of Dasein must be described not as a Being-at-an-end (Zu-Ende-Sein) but rather as the Being-unto-its-end (Sein zum Ende) of Dasein. The latter expression indicates that the end, death, always penetrates Dasein's entire eksistence. Thus Heidegger can say that "death is a manner of Being which Dasein assumes just as soon as it eksists .... " (SZ, 245) "As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die."2 But to say that Dasein's ending, in the sense of Being-towardsthe-end, must be explained ontologically in terms of Dasein's own mode of Being (SZ, 245), does not yet immediately lead us to our goal. For thus far we have merely shown that the not-yet which Dasein is in each case, resists interpretation, if we take it as something that is just still outstanding. A positive characterization of the phenomenon under investigation will succeed only if it is unequivocally oriented 2From "Der Ackermann aus Böhmen," quoted in SZ, 245, note. preceding commentary see Richardson, Heidegger, p. 75.
For the
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towards Dasein's own mode of Being, i.e., the phenomenon of care. (SZ, 246) 2. The Eksistential Analysis of Death Compared With Other Possible Interpretations of Death. Preliminary Sketch of the Eksistential Structure of Death. We must now try to distinguish the eksistential analysis of death from other possible interpretations of this phenomenon. Let us do so by indicating first what an eksistential interpretation cannot inquire about. First of all we must exclude every biological and physiological determination of life and death; these are not meaningless; yet they are not pertinent to our present task, because they are ontical in character. (SZ, 246) Secondly we must exclude any medical interpretation of death, even though such an interpretation may be ontological. Underlying every ontical exploration of life and death, there is an ontological one. Yet what we are interested in here is an ontological understanding of death in light of an ontology of Dasein taken as such. Dasein perishes like everything eisethat is alive; yet if dying stands for the way of Being in which Dasein is towards its own death, then Dasein as such never perishes. Thirdly we have to exclude every biographical, ethnological, or psychological interpretation of death. In such a typology of dying the concept of dying is always already presupposed, insofar as such interpretations merely explain the conditions under which Ableben (living towards its end, passing-away) is experienced; furthermore, a psychology of dying teils us so mething about the "living" of the person who is "dying." Psychological investigations can tell us something about the fact of dying and the manner in which a person can deal with it. (SZ, 247) Finally, our analysis is not meant to decide the issue as to whether or not after death there is still another form of Being possible for man. Questions of this nature can be asked meaningfully only after death has been conceived in its full ontological essence. The same is true for metaphysical considerations of death; questions of how and when death "came into this world" and what meaning it really has; these questions presuppose an understanding of the character of Being which belongs to death, an ontology of beings taken as a whole, and especially an ontological clarification of negativity and evil in general. But these notions have not yet been discussed here. (SZ, 248) Concluding these considerations, Heidegger writes, we may thus say that methodologically the eksistential analysis of death is superordinate to the questions posed by biology, psychology, theodicy,
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and a theology of death and dying. Yet looked at from an ontical point ofview, the eksistential interpretation of death appears as formal and empty. We should never forget that an eksistential definition of the concept of death must remain unaccompanied by any eksistentiell commitments. (SZ, 248-249) We must now try to give a preliminary sketch of an eksistential and ontological structure of Death. To this end we must interpret the phenomenon of death as Being-towards-the-end, and we must do so in terms of Dasein's basic structure which is care. Wehave defined care in terms of a Being-ahead-of-itself, Being-already in-the-world, and Being-alongside-beings which we encounter within the world. (Section 41) Care thus comprises eksistence (the ahead of itself), facticity (Being already in), and falling (Being alongside things). Now if death indeed belongs to the Beingof Dasein, death (=Beingtowards"the-end) must be defined in terms of these characteristics. The not-yet of the end of Dasein expresses eksistentially something towards which Dasein comports itself. Death is something not yet present-at-hand, not something that ultimately is still outstanding, but something that always stands before Dasein; it is something impending. It is not impending as the storm or the visit of a friend is impending. Rather with death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost Being-able-to-be. Dasein's death is the possibility of no Ionger Being-able-to-be-there. This ownmost nonrelative possibility is at the same time the uttermost one. (SZ, 249-250) Thirdly, as Being-able-to-be Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. In other words, death appears to be the possibility which is 1) one's ownmost, 2) non-relative, and 3) which cannot be outstripped. As such, death is distinctively impending. Dasein does not proeure for itself death subsequently and occasionally; rather Dasein eksists as thrown into this possibility. This thrownness into death reveals itself as anxiety. That about which one is anxious is thus Dasein's Being-able-to-be-itself. This should not be confused with fear of dying. (SZ, 250-51) 3. Comparison ofthe Everyday and the Eksistential Conception of Death. Most people live as if they do not know about this Beingtowards-the-end which belongs essentially to Dasein's thrownness. Dasein nevertheless is dying as long as it eksists, even though proximally and for the most part it does so by way offalling. We must focus on these implications in what follows. (SZ, 251-252) We have seen in the preceding sections that the self of everydayness is the "they"; it expresses itself in idle talk. This idle
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talk can explain the way in which everyday Dasein interprets Beingtowards-death for itself. How does the "they" comport itself towards death? Death is a mishap, constantly occurring. Death is one of these things that occur within the world; many people die everyday; one day we shall die too; yet right now it has nothing to do with us yet. Secondly, one dies; death is an indefinite something which proximally is not yet present-at-hand. It is no real threat. "One dies" does not mean that I die; the "one" here is really nobody in particular; dying belongs to nobody in particular. Death is just a public occurrence which the "they" just encounters. We encounter death once in a while as something that is actual in others; we do not think of it as our ownmost possibility. Furthermore, when someone is dying we talk him or her into the belief that he or she will escape death and can return to tranquilized everydayness. (SZ, 252-253) Death is thus really no more than a social inconvenience which we shall soon forget for good. (SZ, 253-254) Thirdly, everydayness and the "they" do not permit us the courage to have anxiety in the face of death. In reality, this indifference alienates Dasein from its ownmost-non-relative Beingable-to-be. The typical characteristics of falling which we encounter here are temptation, tranquilization, and alienation. In this way Dasein flees from death. Yet even in average everydayness death is constantly an issue for Dasein even though this has the form of an untroubled indifference towards the uttermost possibility of eksistence. (SZ, 254-255) In our preliminary eksistential outline, Being-towards-the-end was defined as: 1) Being towards one's ownmost Being-able-to-be, which 2) is not relative, and 3) not to be overcome. A being that has the mode of Being of eksistence and also the mode of Being of relating itself as Being-able-to-be towards this possibility, brings itself face to face with the absolute impossibility of eksisting. This characterization of Being-towards-death is seemingly empty. In addition to this ontological characterization we have also given an everyday type of interpretation of Being-towards-death. In our everyday understanding of death what is mostly characteristic is the fact that we try to evade death and escape from it, simply avoid it. Such an evasion really conceals the true meaning of death. Heidegger prefers to take the opposite road: he begins in our everyday understanding and makes an effort to end up in a full eksistential conception of death by rounding out his interpretation of our everyday Being-towards-death. (SZ, 255)
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In our everyday understanding of death we stick to what "they" say and think about death. We have focused mainly on the "one obviously dies one day." In the expression "one day, but not yet right away," everydayness admits that the fact of death is certain, but not important because not imminent. No one doubts that one will die; death is certain; yet this certain fact is not immediately relevant in any way. This evasive concealment in the face of death cannot be authentically certain of death, although it obviously is and remains somehow certain of it. What are we then to say about this certainty of death? Tobe certain of something means to hold it for true and take it as something that is true. As we have seen, for a thing truth means uncoveredness and this is ultimately grounded in Dasein's disclosedness. (Section 44) As a being which is both disclosed and disclosing Dasein is essentially in the truth. But certainty belongs to truth equiprimordially. Both truth and certainty have a double meaning: Dasein is disclosive and it is certain; on the other hand, things are true and said to be certain. On the part of Dasein, one mode of certainty is called conviction; in this case Dasein Iets the testimony of the thing itself which has been uneavered (the true being), be the sole determinant factor for the Being-towards that thing in understanding. The adequacy of Dasein's holding something for true is thus measured according to the truth claim to which it belongs, i.e., such a claim gets its justification from the kind of Being of the thing to be disclosed. Thus the kind of truth, and with it the kind of certainty, varies with the way beings differ and the manner in which they are disclosed. Here we are interested only in Dasein's Being-certain with regard to death. Note that Heidegger bases certainty in objective evidence, i.e., the things insofar as they are revealed; like truth, certainty may vary with the kind of thing revealed and the manner ofrevealment. (SZ, 255-257) Since in its everydayness Dasein for the most part covers up the ownmost possibility of its Being, i.e., death, Dasein as factical is then in the untruth. The certainty which corresponds to this is an inappropriate way of holding-for-true. "They" say that it is certain that death is coming; yet one forgets that Dasein itself must in every case be certain ofits ownmost, non-relative Being-able-to-be. The certainty of death is empirical, not apodictic. In its everydayness Dasein is certain about death; yet it is not authentically certain of its own death. "They" say that man will die, yet he will not die right away. Death is so deferred to something later. The "they" covers up what is
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peculiar in death's own certainty, namely that it is possible at any moment. We can now determine the full eksistential, ontological conception of death: "death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility-non-relative, certain and as such indefinite, nottobe outstripped. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the very Beingof this being towards its end." (SZ, 258-259) This will help us to work out the kind of Being of Dasein in which Dasein, as such, can be a whole. For we now learn to see that the "not-yet" which was taken over from the ahead-of-itself and the care-structure itself, do not prevent us from comprehending Dasein's Being-a-whole; these characteristics of care rather are what makes first of all such a Being-towards-theend possible. We must now examine to what extent Dasein can maintain itselfin an authentic Being-towards-the-end. (SZ, 259-260) 4. Eksistential Projection of an Authentie Being-TowardsDeath. We have seen, Heidegger continues, that Dasein is constituted by disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), by an understanding which itself is also an ontological disposition. Authentie Beingtowards-death cannot evade its ownmost non-relative possibility. We must now ask about those items which in Dasein are constitutive for its understanding of death: 1) Being-towards-death is a Being towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself. Yet this possibility should not be taken to be one that can be eliminated by some process of actualization. Death as possible is not something possible which is ready•to-hand. By Being-towards-death we do not mean either some dwelling upon the end in its possibility; this is the way we comport ourselves when we just think about death, and ponder when and how this possibility perhaps may become actualized. (SZ, 261) 2) Dasein comports itself towards something possible in its possibility by expecting it. When we expect something we not only look away from the possible to its possible actualization, but particularly we even wait for this actualization. But Being-towards-death implies that we comport ourselves towards death as a possibility which we anticipate. "The closest closeness which one may have to Being towards death as a possibility, is as far as possible from anything actual." (SZ, 262) The more clearly this possibility is understood, the more purely our understanding penetrates into it "as the possibility of the impossibility of any eksistence at all." (SZ, 262) Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothingtobe actualized, nothingthat Dasein as actual ever could be. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself toward anything. In the anticipation of this possibility it becomes greater and greater; the possibility
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reveals itself as one which is without measure. As anticipation of possibility, Being-towards-death is what makes this possibility first possible. (SZ, 262) 3) Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a Being-able-to-be ofthat being whose mode of Being is anticipation. In the anticipatory revealing of this Being-able-to-be Dasein discloses itself in regard to its uttermost possibility, i.e., the possibility of authentic eksistence. Furthermore, death is Dasein's ownmost possibility, its ownmost Being-able-to-be in which its very own Being is at issue. In this distinctive possibility its own self has been wrenched away from the "they-self." (SZ, 263) 4) This ownmost possibility is non-relative. Anticipation (Vorlaufen) allows Dasein to understand that its Being-able-to-be in which its own Being is indeed an issue, must be taken over by Dasein alone; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relative character of death individualizes Dasein down to itself. Dasein can authentically be itself only if it makes this possible for itself of its own accord. Dasein is authentically itself only to the degree that, "as concernful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost Being-able-to-be rather than upon the possibility ofthe 'they-self." (SZ, 263) 5) Then, as we have seen, this ownmost, non-relative possibility is not to be outstripped (unüberhohlbar). This anticipation, unlike inauthentic Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped; anticipation precisely frees itself for accepting this. Also, as the non-relative possibility, death individualizes, but only in such a way that, as the possibility which is not to be outstripped, it makes Dasein, as Being-with, have some understanding of the Being-able-to-be of others. Anticipation also includes the possibility oftaking the whole ofDasein in advance in an eksistentiell manner. (SZ, 264) 6) The ownmost non-relative possibility, which is not to be outstripped, is also certain. And the way to be certain of it is determined by the kind of truth which corresponds to it, which is disclosedness. Holding death for true shows a kind of certainty, which is more primordial than any certainty which relates to the beings which we encounter within the world, or even to purely formal objects. (SZ, 264-265) The reason for this is that holding death for true demands Dasein to be in the full authenticity of its eksistence. (SZ, 265) 7) The ownmost possibility which is non-relative, not to be outstripped, and certain, is indefinite with respect to its certainty.
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Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety. Thus anxiety, as a basic disposition, belongs to the self-understanding of Dasein; anxiety is really the disposition which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself which arises from Dasein's ownmost individualized Being. In this basic disposition Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" which consists in the possible impossibility of its eksistence. (SZ, 265-266) We may thus conclude, summarizing the preceding analysis, that "anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the 'they-self and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom-towards-death-a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the they and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious." (SZ, 266) The eksistential projection described herein which anticipation has been delimited, has made the ontological possibility of an eksistentiell Being-towards-death which is authentic, manifest. Therewith, the possibility of Dasein's having an authentic potentiality for Being-as-a-whole emerges, but still only as an ontolo •ical possibility. In our description we have not proposed an ideal ·~ eksistence with any special content which Dasein is supposed to follow; nor did we impose such an ideal from the outside. Yet from an eksistentiell point of view this eksistentially possible Beingtowards-death still remains a fantastic exaction. The authentic potentiality for Being-a-whoie signifies nothing, even after it has been shown to be possible; it means nothing as long as the ontical Beingable-to-be has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself. In other words, there is still the following question: does Dasein ever factically throw itself into such a Being-towards-death? Does Dasein demand an authentic Being-able-to-be which is determined by the anticipation ofits death? (SZ, 266) Before we can answer these questions we must first ask whether Dasein to any extent gives testimony (bezeugt) to a possible authenticity of its eksistence, so that such authenticity is not only possible in an eksistentiell manner, but is also demanded by Dasein of itself. Thus the question of Dasein's authentic Being-a-whoie still hangs in mid-air as long as the question of conscience has not been raised. To put this into a formal question: does the anticipation of death which until now we have projected only as an ontological
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possibility, have an essential connection with the authentic Beingable-to-be which has indeed been attested by conscience.3 (SZ, 266-267) III: Dasein's Attestation of an Authentie Being-Able-To-Be andResolve4 1. Toward the Eksistential-Ontological Foundations of Conscience. Heidegger thus continues his reflections by stating that we must now ask the question of how an authentic eksistentiell possibility can be attested and verified. What we are seeking here is an authentic Being-able-to-be of Dasein which will indeed be attested in its eksistentiell possibility by Dasein itself. Where can we find such an attestation? In this attestation an authentic Being-able-to-beone's-own-self must be given us to understand. In Section 25 the question of the who of Dasein was answered with the expression, the self. Dasein's selfhood has been defined there purely formally as a way of eksisting. Yet for the most part I myself am not the who of my Dasein; usually the they-self is its who. Thus authentic Being-one's-self takes the form of an eksistentiell modification of the they. We must now define this modification in an eksistential manner and ask what are the ontological conditions of its possibility. (SZ, 267) While Dasein is lost in the they, the factical Being-able-to-be, which is closest to it, has already been decided upon by the they: tasks, rules, standards, and all the modes of concernful and solicitous Being-in-the-world that are expected. The "they" continues to keep Dasein from taking hold of these possibilities. The "they" even hides the manner in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden to choose explicitly these possibilities. Thus Dasein makes no choices, gets carried along by "nobody," and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. This process can be reversed only if Dasein explicitly brings itself back to itself. And when Dasein brings itself back from the they, the they-selfbecomes modified in an eksistentiell manner so that it now becomes an authentic Being-one's-self. It must now make up for not choosing, by choosing to make a free choice. But because Dasein is lost in the "they," it must firstfind itself. In terms of its "abstract" possibility, Dasein obviously already is a potentiality 3Cf. SZ, section 60. 4For the following section cf. William J. Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 50-51, 7784, 237, 287, and passim; M. Gelven, "Authenticity and Guilt," in Frederick Elliston, ed., Heidegger's Existential Analytic, pp. 233-46.
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for Being-its-own-self; yet it needs to have this potentiality attested. In the interpretation to follow we shall claim, Heidegger says, that this potentiality is attested by that which Dasein in its everyday interpretation ofitself, knows as the "voice of conscience."5 The fact of conscience has been disputed, the function of conscience as a higher court of Dasein's eksistence has been assessed in different ways. We might be inclined therefore to dismiss this phenomenon; yet we encounter in the fact of conscience a primordial phenomenon of Dasein, of which we plan to give here only an eksistential interpretation with fundamental ontology as our main aim. Thus no religious, theological, or ethical interpretations of conscience are attempted here. Obviously, no ''biological" interpretationwill be attempted here either, because that would just mean its dissolution. Heidegger decides here first to trace conscience back to its eksistential foundation and structure, and then to make it visible as a phenomenon of Dasein. In so doing we must neither exaggerate the outcome of our analysis, nor make perverse claims about it and lessen its worth. (SZ, 269) The main point here is to show that the authentic potentiality for Being-a-whoie is not construed by our analysis, but that conscience indeed gives witness to, and verifies, this Being-able-to-be and this having-to-be (Seinkönnen, Seinsollen). (SZ, 269) Conscience gives us something to understand; it discloses; thus it is to be taken back in the disclosedness of Dasein. Now disclosedness of Dasein is constituted by disposition, understanding, falling, and logos. If we analyze the phenomenon of conscience we shall see that it is a call and that calling is a mode of logos, speech or discourse. The call has the character of an appeal to Dasein and calls it to its ownmost potentiality for Being-its-own-self. Thus conscience summons Dasein to its ownmost Being-guilty because it appears nottobe what it has tobe. Our eksistential interpretation of the phenomenon of conscience sets forth the ontological foundations of what our ordinary way of interpreting conscience has always already understood. This is why our eksistential interpretation is to be confronted by a critique of the manner in which conscience is ordinarily interpreted. Only then can we show the degree to which it is proof of an authentic Beingable-to-be of Dasein. To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing. Thus our understanding of the appeal unveils 5This theme seems to have been presented in a paper delivered in Marburg in July of 1924; cf. SZ, 268.
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itself as our wanting to haue a conscience. And in this phenomenon lies the eksistentiell choosing which we call resolve (Entschlossenheit), i.e., a choosing to choose a kind or mode of Being one's self. (SZ, 269-270) We must now try to discover the eksistentialontological foundations of conscience. Conscience gives us something to understand; thus it belongs in the realm of disclosedness. Through disclosedness Dasein is in the possibility ofbeing its own there. With the world, it is there for itself. Proximally and for the most part Dasein eksists as a Being-able-to-be which in each case has already abandoned itself to definite possibilities, because it is a being that has been thrown, and whose thrownness gets disclosed more or less plainly by its having a certain disposition. In this way Dasein knows what it is itself capable of, insofar as it has either projected upon possibilities of its own, or has been so absorbed in the "they" that it only sees the possibilities presented by the "they." The presentation of these possibilities is made possible eksistentially through the fact that Dasein can listen to others; after all, it is as a Being-with others that Dasein understands. But losing itself in the idle talk of the "they" it fails to hear its own self. If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of falling, it must first be able to find itself as something that has failed to hear itself. The call of conscience must break the listening away from the speaking and saying of the "they"; to achieve this the call should be clear and unambiguous. That which by calling in this manner gives us to understand, is the conscience. (SZ, 271) Heidegger then observes why he does not characterize conscience with Kant as a court of justice, but rather as a voice which gives to understand. Furthermore, he points out, we have here only traced the phenomenal horizon for analyzing its eksistential structure. We are not comparing conscience with a call; rather we are understanding it as a kind of discourse or speech, in terms of the disclosedness that is constitutive ofDasein. (SZ, 271-272; cf. note) 2. Conscience and Guilt. We must now turn to the character of conscience as a call. In any discourse there is something that is talked about; the discourse gives information about something. In "normal" discourse this becomes accessible to the Dasein-with of others by way of our utterances of a linguistic nature; normal discourse is communication. But in the case of the call of conscience, what is it that is talked about and to what is the appeal being made? As for the latter, obviously Dasein itself. The call reaches Dasein in the understanding of itself, taken in its average everyday form. Thus the call addresses the "they-self' of concernful Being with others.
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And to what is Dasein called? To its own self. And because only the self of the "they-self' gets appealed to, the "they" collapses; it is passed over and pushed into insignificance. But the self, which the appeal has so robbed of this lodgment and hiding-place, gets now brought to itself by the call. In other words, there are no two selfs; there is one hidden self lodged in the "they-self," which now as genuine self has to come to the fore. (SZ, 273) Thus when the "they-self' is appealed to, it gets called to the genuine self; yet the latter does not in so doing become an object on which one is to pass judgment. The call passes over everything ontic and psychological and appeals solely to the self; yet the genuine self too is not, except as Being-in-the-world. (SZ, 273) But how is one to determine what is said in the call? What does the conscience call to the self to which it appeals? Strictly speaking nothing. Least of all does it try to start a soliloquy in the self. Nothing gets addressed to the self; instead the self is called to itself, sumrnoned to its ownmost Being-able-to-be. Thus the call of conscience dispenses with any kind of utterance; conscience discourses solely and constantly in silence, in the rnode of keeping silent. Yet this obviously does not give it the indefiniteness of a "rnysterious" voice. What the call discloses is unequivocal, although it may undergo a different interpretation in each individual Dasein in accordance with its own possibilities of understanding. Also, the direction to take is a sure one. The call does not require us to search or grope, nor does it need a special sign. It can be "falsified" when it is not authentically understood, when it gets drawn by the "they-self' in the wrong direction. Conscience's call is an appeal to the "theyself' in its self; it summons the self to its Being-able-to-be its genuine self and thus calls Dasein to its possibilities. We must now turn to the question ofwho does the calling in this case. (SZ, 274) Wehave just seen that conscience surnmons Dasein's self from its lostness in the "they." The self to which the appeal is rnade remains indefinite and ernpty in its "what." The call passes over what the self, concerning itself with things and hurnans, usually takes itselfto be. Yet the selfhas been reached and touched. The one who calls maintains hirnself also in conspicuous indefiniteness. The caller does not announce hirnself as such, nor does he leave Dasein any hint. Yet he does not disguise himself; he just does not want to be known. To let hirnself be drawn into getting talked about goes against the mode of his Being. The fact that the caller manifests hirnself as indefinite, and the fact that it is impossible to make him more definite, are distinctive for the caller in a positive way. These
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facts teil us that the caller only wants to summon Dasein; he does not lethirnself be coaxed. He wants only to be heard as the caller. But if this is so, would it then not be appropriate to leave the questions ofthe "who" and "what" of the caller unanswered? Eksistentielly: yes. Yet if it comes to an eksistential analysis of the facticity of the calling and responding, the answer has tobe no. (SZ, 275) In the call of conscience Dasein calls itself. Dasein is both the caller and the called. Yet we ourselves never planned the call, never prepared for it, never voluntarily performed it. Thus the call comes from me and yet also from beyond me. One will be inclined to say that in that case the caller, in the final analysis, must be God. Or one shall try to explain the entire phenomenon away biologically. Both interpretationspass over the phenomenon too hastily. The biological explanation takes the entire phenomenon merely as something present-at-hand and so misses the real point. In Heidegger's view, the theological explanation may be correct; but even then it presupposes the interpretation he is trying to unfold here. (SZ, 275276) Yet the question still remains that if the call is not explicitly performed by me, but rather by an "it," does this not justify us in seeking the caller in some other being? The answer must be no. To understand this one must recall that Dasein is not a free-floating self-projection; Dasein is thrown. Dasein has been thrown into eksistence. It eksists as a being which has to be as it is and as it can be. Original disposition "brings Dasein, more or less explicitly and authentically, face to face with the fact 'that it is, and that, as the beingwhich it is, it has tobe in the mode of Being-able-to-be'." (SZ, 276) Usually Dasein flees from this to the relief which comes from the alleged freedom offered by the "they-self." Anxiety places Dasein face to face with the nothing of the world; in the face of this nothing, Dasein is anxious about its ownmost Being-able-to-be. Dasein, which finds itself in the very depth of its own uncanniness, is the caller of the call of conscience. This explains why the caller cannot be defined by means of anything worldly. The caller is Dasein in its uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit): primördüil, thrown Being-in-theworld as the one who is not at home-the bare "that it is" in the nothing of the world. The everyday "they-self' is not familiar with his caller; he sounds like an alien voice. (SZ, 276) The caller, furthermore, , does not report events; the call discourses in the uncanny mode of keeping silent. It does not invite me into a public idle talk of the "they." Rather it calls me back from
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this idle talk into the reticence (Verschwiegenheit) of my eksistential Being-able-to-be. (SZ, 277) We can thus conclude that conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein which, in its thrownness, in its Being-already-in, is anxious about its Being-able-to-be. The one to whom the appeal is made is the very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost Being-able-to-be, ahead of itself. Dasein is falling into the "they", in Being-already-in and alongside the world of concern; it is now summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience-that is, conscience itself-has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis ofits Being, is care. (SZ, 277278) Thus there is here no need to resort to powers with a character other than that of Dasein. Nothing speaks against this interpretation; on the contrary, all phenomena known speak for it. (SZ, 278) Yet one could object that the real caller of conscience is some objective authority which is valid universally for everybody, some universal conscience, some world-conscience. The interpretation given would thus be much too subjective. Heidegger's answer to this objection is that this public conscience again is no more than the social voice ofthe "they." Another objection will be that it is strange to speak about a caller of which we have no "natural" experience. Also, a conscience that merely summons, but does not warn or reprove, is not a true conscience. The answer to these objections is that we are not giving a complete interpretation of conscience, including the eksistentiell and ontic dimensions. Hitherto we have merely tried to trace back conscience as a phenomenon of Dasein to the ontological constitution of this being. This is to make us ready for the task of making the conscience intelligible as an attestation of Dasein's ownmost Being-able-to-be. Briefly, what has been claimed here thus far is not all that can be said about conscience; yet ontologically it is presupposed in all other talk about conscience in ethics, theology, etc. Furthermore, what conscience ontologically seen attests to, becomes definite only when we have delineated plainly enough the character of the hearing which genuinely responds to the calling. Let us thus proceed with our analysis. (SZ, 278-280) How are we to understand the appeal of conscience? And what about guilt? To understand what one hears in understanding the appeal of conscience, we must once more go back to the appeal itself. The appeal to the "they-self'' summons one's ownmost self to its own Being-able-to-be. Here we are not concerned with how things look from an eksistentiell point of view, but rather with what belongs to the eksistential condition of the possibility of its eksistentiell Being-
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able-to-be. (SZ, 280) Wehave already seen, that from an eksistential point of view the call says nothing which might be talked about; it gives no information about events. The call merely points forward to Dasein's Being-able-to-be. But wehavenot yet fully determined the character of the call as disclosure until we understand it as one which calls us back in calling us forth. (SZ, 280) But what is it then that the call gives us to understand? People usually say that the call of conscience calls one guilty, possibly guilty, or not guilty. It will be clear that the eksistential conception of Being-guilty is still very obscure. Yet it is legitimate to ask what guilt means, and who determines whether one is guilty. To understand ontologically and eksistentially what guilt means we must begin with what the everyday interpretation of Dasein says about it. Let us thus describe what guilt means in our everyday life. (SZ, 281) Being-guilty means first having debts; guilt is related to that with which one can concem himself. (SZ, 281-282) Being-guilty also means being responsible for; in this sense one can be guilty without owing anything to anyone. Thirdly, Being-guilty means coming to owe something to others. Purely formally we can define this aspect as follows: Being-the-ground for a Iack of something in the Dasein of another, in such a manner that this very Being-the-ground determines itself as "lacking in some way" in terms ofthat for which it is the ground. Being-guilty in this sense, which is found in the breach of moral requirements, is a kind of Being which also belongs to Dasein. Heidegger observes here that the concept of moral guilt has been so little clarified ontologically that the idea of deserving punishment or even having debts becomes predominant. But in this way guilt becomes thrust aside into the domain of concern in the sense of reckoning up claims and balancing them off. (SZ, 282-283) The phenomenon of being-guilty which is not necessarily related to having-debts and law-breaking can be clarified only when we go about it ontologically and eksistentially and conceive of the idea of guilt in terms of Dasein's own kind of Being. (SZ, 283) In so doing we must define the concept purely formally so that our concernful dealing with others will be left out of consideration as will all relationships to any law or ought. Guilt is to be defined here as a Iack. (SZ, 283) Thus in the idea of guilt we find inherently the not. Being-guilty means Being-the-ground for a Being which has been defined by a "not," as Being the ground of a nullity. The idea of the "not" excludes
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beforehand any reference to anything present-at-hand. So we shall pay no attention to any "not" which is related to a lacking in some manner or other. Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness; on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only on the basis of a more primordial Being-guilty. We must now try to show this "not." Dasein's Being is care; it implies thrownness (facticity), projection (eksistence), and falling. It has been thrown into its "there," but not of its own accord. (SZ, 284) It has selected a definite form of its Being-able-to-be, to which it has devoted itself, but not as itself. Although it has not laid the ground itself, it nevertheless reposes in the weight of it. Dasein projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. The self which as such has to lay the ground for itself, can never get that ground into its power. Dasein eksists as thrown; it constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never eksistent before this ground but only from it. For Dasein Beinga-ground never means to have power over one's ownmost Being. The "not" belongs to the eksistential constitution of thrownness. Being a ground Dasein is a nullity of itself. This nullity refers to a "not" which is constitutive for the Being of Dasein. Dasein has been released from its ground, not through itself but only to itself. Dasein is not itselfthe ground ofits Being. (SZ, 284-5) Dasein constantly stands in one possibility; but this means that it does not stand in others. Dasein is indeed free eksistentially; yet every choice excludes others. Dasein tolerates not having chosen the other possibilities and its notbeingable to choose them. Thus in the structure of both thrownness and projection there is a nullity. This nullity is the ground for the possibility of inauthentic Dasein in its falling. Care itself is thus inherently permeated by negativity and nullity. Eksistential nullity has nothing in common with a mere privation, where something is lacking in comparison with an ideal. The Being of Dasein is already null as projection; it is null in advance of any of the things it may project. The "not" is not so mething which emerges occasionally and which Dasein might eliminate with some extra effort. (SZ, 285) True, there has been a lot of talk about dialectic and much of it was relevant and important. Yet even there no one has ever made an ontological study of the source of "notness" or, even prior to this, sought the mere conditions on the basis of which the problern of "not" and "notness" can be raised. Such an effort presupposes that the question concerning the meaning of Being be raised first.
DEATH, CONSCIENCE AND RESOLVE The concepts of privation and Iack are thus insufficient for an ontological interpretation of the phenomenon of guilt. Nothing is gained either by starting from the problern of evil as the privation of what is good. (SZ, 286) Let us now return again to guilt. All beings whose Being is care Ioad themselves with factical guilt. Yet what is much more important is that they are guilty in the uery ground of their Being. By accepting their Being as Beingthrown, they are inherently guilty. They are guilty because they accept to be as finite transcendence which implies thrownness and fallenness. This essential Being-guilty is equiprimordially the eksistential condition of the possibility of the morally good and evil; only a being that is as finite transcendence can be good or evil. Thus the primordial Being-guilty cannot be defined by morality, because morality presupposes it already. (SZ, 286) Two questions are in order here now: 1) What kind of experience speaks for this primordial Being-guilty? 2) Is guilt only there if there is an explicit consciousness of guilt? To this Heidegger answers that Being-guilty is more primordial than any explicit knowledge about it. Conscience is possible only because Dasein is guilty in the ground of its Being and closes itself off from itself as something thrown and falling. The call is the call of care; Beingguilty constitutes the mode of Being which we call care. Uncanniness brings Dasein face to face with its undisguised nullity which belongs to the possibility of its ownmost Being-able-to-be. For Dasein as care its Being is an issue; thus it summons itself from its uncanniness towards its genuine Being-able-to-be. And this appeal calls back by calling forth; it calls Dasein forth to the possibility of taking over, as eksisting, the thrown beingwhich it is; it calls Dasein back to its thrownness which is the null basis which it has to take up into its eksistence. In this calling forth and back Dasein is called to bring itself to itself from its lostness in the "they"; this means that it is guilty. Yet the call is not a taking cognizance of, nor does it ask for such taking cognizance. Wehave to interpret the call eksistentially. Dasein also needs not first Ioad a guilt upon itself through failure and omission; it must be guilty authentically, guilty in the way it is. When Dasein lets itself be called to its authentic Being-able~to-be and projects itself upon that possibility, it becomes free for the call and can choose itself. (SZ, 287-288) In making the proper choice Dasein makes possible its ownmost Being-guilty, which remains closed off from the "they-self." The common, everyday opinion knows only the satisfying rules and the public norms that can easily be manipulated as weil as the
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failure to satisfy them. The everyday opinion makes a list of the infractions of them and then tries to balance them off. It talks loud about having made mistakes in order to avoid having to admit that it has fallen away from its ownmost Being-guilty. But in the appeal of conscience the "they-self' gets called to the ownmost Being-guilty of the genuine self. Understanding the call means for Dasein that it has to choose; what is chosen is not conscience, because that cannot be chosen; what is chosen is rather "having-a-consdence as Beingfree for one's ownmost Being-guilty." "'Understanding the appeal' means 'wanting to have a conscience'." (SZ, 288) This does not mean necessarily that one wants to have a "good conscience," but rather that one is now ready to be appealed to. "Wanting to have a conscience is ... the most primordial, eksistentiell presupposition for the possibility of factically becoming guilty." In understanding the call, Dasein lets its ownmost self take action in regard to itself in terms ofthat Being-able-to-be which it has so chosen. Only so can it be answerable. But taken as such it still is conscienceless in the usual sense of the term. Being good or not-good presupposes this ontologico-eksistential choice. (SZ, 288) As we have said, the call gives no information; also, it is not merely critical; yet it is positive because it discloses Dasein's most primordial Being-able-to-be as Being-guilty. (SZ, 288) We must now show that our ontological interpretation is not in contradiction with the familiar findings of the ordinary interpretation of conscience. (SZ, 289) 3. The Eksistential Interpretation of Conscience Compared with the Everyday Conception of Conscience. Conscience is ontologically the call which summans Dasein to its ownmost beingable-to-be-guilty. Corresponding to this call, wanting-to-have-aconscience emerges as the way in which the call is understood. It is impossible to bring these two claims into harmony with the everyday interpretation of conscience without some mediation. For in its everyday form this interpretation sticks rigorously to what "they" know. (SZ, 289) But, Heidegger asks, must the ontological interpretation agree with the ordinary interpretation? Does Dasein from the everyday point of view have any understanding of what we have been trying to explain? Two claims can be made rather easily: 1) the everyday interpretation of conscience cannot be accepted as the final criterion for the "objectivity" of our ontological analysis; 2) yet our ontological interpretation cannot just completely disregard the everyday understanding and the psychological, anthropological, and
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theological interpretations of conscience built upon it. If the ontological interpretation has hit on the essence of conscience, then it is in terms of it that the ordinary interpretation of conscience must become intelligible. N ow from the ordinary interpretation of conscience four objections can be raised against our ontological interpretation. These objections must be discussed here. First, it is said that the ontological interpretation of conscience does not give an account of the basic form of the phenomenon; good, bad, reproving, warning. It is indeed well known that in all theories of conscience "evil" and "bad conscience" receive priority. Conscience is primarily oriented toward the negative, toward evil: you are guilty! 'Furthermore, the experience of conscience turns up only after the evil act has been performed. Heidegger does not deny any of this as long as one looks at things from a non-ontological point of view, and as long as act, conscience, and guilt are understood as things present-at-hand. Hisclaim isthat the call has really the character of care, the kind of Being that is characteristic of care. In the call Dasein "is" ahead of itself in such a way that at the same time it directs itself back to its thrownness. If one assumes that Dasein is just an interconnected sequence of experiences, a stream, it is impossible to take the voice of conscience as something which comes "after the facts" so to speak, and which thus calls back. The voice indeed does call back, but it calls far beyond the concrete action, back to the Being-guilty into which one always already has been thrown; and this is "earlier" than any concrete indebtedness. The authentic, eksistentiell Being-guilty always follows upon the call. Thus the order of the sequence in which our experiences run their course, does not give us the phenomenal structure of eksistence. (SZ, 290-291) If the primordial phenomenon cannot be reached by a characterization of "bad conscience," still less can this be done by a characterization of "good conscience." The reason for this is that a good conscience would have to flow from the conviction of being-good; but who would like to claim to be good without being accused of extreme Phariseeism. Someone with a good conscience would then have to say: I am good! (SZ, 291) Scheler has tried to argue that a good conscience is really a privation of a bad conscience. This will not do either in that it is generally assumed in the ordinary way of looking at things that the bad conscience is the derivative form of the good conscience. In other words, on the level of everyday convictions it is difficult to come to grips with the true issues with which conscience confronts us. (SZ, 292)
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Let us now turn to a second objection. One could say that our everyday experience of conscience does not know anything about getting summoned to Being-guilty. This must be granted. Yet the everyday experience says nothing about the full context of the call of the voice of conscience. We do not deny that an ontic and everyday interpretation of conscience does not know anything about these things. But this is true for many eksistential elements discovered by our preceding analyses. Just think about the everyday versus the ontological interpretation of falling. Furthermore, every noneksistential and non-ontological interpretation has its own ontological presuppositions. This is true of the interpretations of Kant which presuppose the idea of morallaw, as weil as ofthat of modern value theories which presuppose the concept of value. One should therefore rather ask the question of whether these presuppositions are as weil founded as the eksistential components uncovered by the preceding analyses. (SZ, 292-293) A third objection claims that the call of conscience always relates itself to some definite deed. This too loses its force. We do not deny that in our everyday experience conscience is often related to concrete actions which we performed or should have performed. The question only is one of whether a description of this aspect covers the entire range of conscience ontologically. (SZ, 293) Finally, the fourth objection states that conscience essentially has a critical character. Butthis objection is also fruitless in view of the fact that it assumes that conscience in its call is related to guilt. If this is not true, then the objection loses its force. Our ontological analysis has shown that conscience primarily does not give us any practical injunctions; it solely summons Dasein to eksistence, to its ownmost Being-able-to-be. If Dasein is not authentic in its eksistence, it means little to ask about the value of its actions. Scheler's critique of a purely formal ethics in favor of a material ethics of value thus still does not go to the heart of the matter. (SZ, 294)
The most important thing to observe here is the following. In our everyday life we interpret the call of conscience from the limitations of the way in which Dasein interprets itself there in falling. In spite of its obviousness, this is by no means essential and final, even though it is not arbitrary. Once an adequate ontological interpretation of falling has been given, the ontological interpretation of conscience becomes comprehensible. One final remark to prevent misunderstanding is in order here. Our ontological interpretation of the meaning of the call of conscience which showed that the everyday
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interpretation of conscience is eksistentially not primordial, does not imply any judgment as to the eksistentiell moral quality of any Dasein which maintains itself in that kind of experience. Someone's eksistence is not impaired by an ontological interpretation that is inadequate. In the same way, an eksistentially appropriate interpretation of conscience does not entail that one has truly understood the call in an eksistentiell manner. And yet, the interpretation which is more primordial eksistentially, also discloses possibilities for a more primordial eksistentiell understanding, assuming that the ontological interpretation is not cut off from our ontical experiences. (SZ, 294-295) 4. The Eksistential Structure ofthe Authentie Being-Able-To-Be Attested in Conscience. We must now turn to the last issue. It was claimed that the eksistential interpretation of cons-cience gives witness of Dasein's ownmost Being-able-to-be. (SZ, 295) Conscience gives witness not by making something definite known, but by calling and summoning Dasein to Being-guilty. The understanding of the appeal is itself a mode of Dasein's Being. The authentic understanding of the call was called the "wanting-to-have-aconscience." This is a way of letting one's ownmost self, of its own accord and in its Being-guilty, take action in regard to itself. The eksistential structure of this "wanting-to-have-a-conscience" must now be disclosed. This is the only way to uncover the authenticity of Dasein's eksistence as disclosed in Dasein itself. (SZ, 295) Wanting-to-have-a-conscience is a way in which Dasein has been disclosed. Disclosedness implies understanding, disposition, and Iogos. 1) To understand in an eksistential manner implies projecting oneself in each case upon one's ownmost factical possibility of having the potentiality for Being-in-the-world. But this potentiality is understood only by eksisting in this possibility. 2) The disposition corresponding to the understanding is anxiety. Thus wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes really a readiness for anxiety. 3) As for Iogos, in hearing the call one must deny oneself any counter-discourse. By the call the self is brought back from all idle talk; the mode of articulative discourse which belongs to wanting-tohave-a-conscience is one of reticence and keeping silent. Who thus keeps silent has something to say even though the discourse of conscience never comes to utterance. From the viewpoint of the "they" it is said that one does not hear and understand anything of this call. But with this interpretation the "they" merely covers up its own failure to hear the call.
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Concluding these reflections Heidegger says that this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty in which one is ready for anxiety, is tobe called resolve. (SZ, 296-297) Resolve thus is a distinctive mode of Dasein's disclosedness which in Section 44 was interpreted as the primordial truth, and truth is here to be taken not as a quality of a judgment but as an eksistential. In the ontological clarification of the proposition: "Dasein is in the truth," it was pointed out that the primordial disclosedness of Dasein is the truth of eksistence; it was also suggested that for a determination of its character the analysis of Dasein's authenticity is important. In resolve we have arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most primordial because it is truly authentic. Whenever a "there" is disclosed, its whole Being-in-the-world is disclosed with equal primordiality, i.e., the world, Being-in, the self which this being is, etc. And wherever the world is disclosed, beings within the world have been discovered already, and this is true for both what is readyto-hand and what is present-at-hand. For if the current totality of involvements is to be disclosed, this requires that meaningfulness be understood beforehand. Now any discovering of a totality of involvements goes back to a "for the sake of which"; and on that uriderstanding of this "for the sake of which" is based in turn the understanding of meaningfulness as the disclosedness of the current world. In whatever we do we always seek possibilities for Dasein; upon these possibilities the being for which its own Being is an issue, has already projected itself. Thrown into its own "there," every Dasein has been factically submitted to a definite world, i.e., its world. At the same time its factical projections have been guided by its concernfullostness in the "they." One's own Dasein can appeal to this lostness, and this appeal can be understood in the way of resolve. But in that case this authentic disclosedness modifies with equal primordiality both the way in which the world is discovered, and the way in which the Dasein-with of others is disclosed. Thus the "world" which is ready-to-hand does not then become another one in its content, nor does the circle of others get exchanged for a new one; but both one's Being towards what is ready-to-hand understandingly and concernfully, and one's solicitous Being with others, are now given a definite character in terms of their ownmost potentiality for Being their selves. (SZ, 297-298) In other words, resolve as authentic Being one's self does not detach Dasein from its world. Dasein is and remains Being-in-the-world. Yet in the light of the "for the sake of which" of one's self-chosen Being-able-to-be, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. And Dasein's resolve towards itself makes it
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possible also to let others who are with it, be in their ownmost Beingable-to-be. Thus when Dasein is resolute, it can become the "conscience" of others. Only by authentically Being-their-selves in resolve can people authentically be with one another. (SZ, 298) Resolve, by its very essence, is always the resolve of some factical Dasein at a particular time. It eksists only as a resolution. Thus the resolution is precisely the disclosive projection of what is factically possible at that time. And so resolve is not something which one "accomplishes" once and for all. To resolve there belongs the indefiniteness which is characteristic of every Being-able-to-be into which Dasein has been factically thrown. Thus resolve is sure of itself only in a particular resolution. Furthermore, in every concrete resolution Dasein is both in truth and in untruth with equal primordiality as we have seen in Section 44. For resolve signifies letting oneself in each case be summoned out of one's lostness in the "they." (SZ, 298) We cannot stress strongly enough that in resolve the issue for Dasein is its ownmost Being-able-to-be which, as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite, factical possibilities. Butthis means that the eksistential attributes of any possible resolute Dasein include a situation. The term "situation" is often used in a spatial sense. This is even implied in the "there" of Dasein: Being-in-the-world has a spatiality of its own. Yet, just as the spatiality of the "there" is grounded in disclosedness, so the Situation has its foundation in resolve. What we call situation is not determined by any present-athand mixture of circumstances and accidents one may encounter; rather it is determined only through resolve and in it. For the "they" a situation is essentially something that is closed off. Resolve, on the other hand, brings the Being of the "there" into the eksistence of its own situation. This means that when the call of conscience summons us to our Being-able-to-be, it does not hold before us some empty ideal of eksistence or some abstract schema, but calls us forth into the situation. This eksistential positivity which the call of conscience possesses when we understand it correctly, proves that it is incorrect to restriet the inclination of the call to the indebtedness which we have already incurred in the past, or which we now have before us. When our understanding of the appeal is interpreted eksistentially as resolve, conscience is revealed as that kind of Being in which Dasein makes possible for itself its factical eksistence. (SZ, 299-300)
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Thus resolve cannot be confused with an empty habitus, or an indefinite velleity. Also, resolve does not first take cognizance of a situation after it puts itself into that situation. As resolute, Dasein is already taking action; but this term should not be understood so as to refer to an alleged distinction between theory and practice. Resolve is only that authenticity which, in care, is that which one cares about and which is possible as care-the authenticity of care itself. (SZ, 300~ 301) Two concluding remarks are in order here. It is possible to develop an eksistential anthropology which describes factical eksistentiell possibilities. 6 Secondly, we are now in a position to define the ontological meaning ofthat potentiality which we have been seeking earlier, namely Dasein's authentic potentiality for Being a whole. To unfold this is the task of our reflections to follow. 6Both Scheler and Jaspers have done so.
CHAPrERX DASEIN'S AUTHENTIC POTENTIALITY FOR BEING-AWHOLE. CARE AND SELFHOOD. TEMPORALITY AS THE MEANING OF CARE (Being and Time, Beetions 61-66, pp. 301-333)
I: Anticipatory Resolve as the Way in Which Dasein's Potentiality for Being-A-Whole has Eksistentiell Authenticityl In the preceding reflections, Heidegger says, we have projected in an eksistential way an authentic potentiality for Being-a-whoie on the part of Dasein. Our analysis has shown that authentic Beingtowards-death is anticipation. Furthermore, we have exhibited Dasein's authentic Being-able-to-be in its eksistentiell attestation, and then interpreted it eksistentially as resolve. The question which now must be raised is one of how these two phenomena of anticipation and resolve are to be brought together. Ras not the ontological projection of the authentic potentiality for Being-a-whoie led us into a dimension of Dasein which lies far from the phenomenon of resolve? What does death and the "concrete situation" of taking action have in common? If we bring these two phenomena forcibly together we shall end up with an unphenomenological construction. Heidegger sees one possible solution for this problem: let us take our point of departure from resolve as attested in its eksistentiell possibility; then we can ask the question of whether resolve in its ownmost eksistentiell tendency toward Being points forward to anticipatory resolve as its ownmost authentic possibility. Heidegger then indicates the direction in which he is seeking a solution with the help of suggestive questions: What if resolve, in harmony with its own meaning, should bring itself into its authenticity only when it projects itself upon the uttermost possibility which lies ahead of every factical Being-able-to-be of Dasein? What if it is only in the anticipation of death that resolve, as Dasein's
lFor what follows cf. William J. Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 50-51, 77-84, 90, 97103, 188-191, and passim.
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authentic truth, has reached the authentic certainty which belongs to it? csz, 301-302) The subject matter of our eksistential interpretation is a being which has the mode of Being of Dasein. Every step of our interpretation was therefore guided by the idea of eksistence. As for the connection between anticipation and resolve this means nothing less than the demand that we project these eksistential phenomena upon the eksistentiell possibilities which have been delineated in them, and think these possibilities through to the end in an eksistential way. (SZ, 302-303) "We have characterized resolve as a way of reticently projecting oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and exacting anxiety of oneself." (SZ, 305) Being-guilty belongs to Dasein's Being. Dasein is essentially guilty and not just guilty on some occasions. Wanting to have a conscience decides in favor ofthis Being-guilty. Now to project oneselfupon this Being-guilty belongs to the meaning of resolve. The eksistentiell way of taking over this guilt in resolve, is therefore authentically accomplished only when this resolve is understood as something constant. But this understanding is made possible only insofar as Dasein discloses to itself its Beingable-to-be and discloses it right to its end. Eksistentially, however, Dasein's Being-at-an-end implies Being-towards-the-end. As Beingtowards~the-end which understands, i.e., as anticipation of death, resolve becomes authentically what it can be. Thus resolve does not just have a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbours within itself authentic Being-towards-death as the possible eksistentiell modality of its own authenticity. This connection must now be elucidated phenomenally. (SZ, 305) We have defined resolve as "letting oneself be called forth to one's ownmost Being-guilty." Being-guilty belongs to the Being of Dasein itself; this is for Dasein a form of Being-able-to-be. To say that Dasein is constantly guilty is tantamount to claiming that Dasein in each case maintains itself in this Being, regardless of whether it eksists in an authentic or an inauthentic manner. Being-guilty is not just an abiding property of something that is constantly presentat-hand, but rather the eksistentiell possibility ofbeing authentically or inauthentically guilty. In each case Being-guilty is only in the factical mode of Being-able-to-be that at that moment prevails. Because Being-guilty belongs to the Being ofDasein, Dasein's mode of Being must be conceived of as Being-able-to-be-guilty. Resolve projects itself upon Being-able-to-be-guilty and thus understands itself in it. It maintains itself authentically in it if the resolution is primordially what it tends to be. Now the primordial Being of Dasein
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towards its own Being-able-to-be was revealed tobe its Being-towardsdeath. Anticipation discloses this possibility as possibility. This means that only as anticipating does resolve become a primordial mode of Being in regard to Dasein's ownmost Being-able-to-be. Only when it qualifies itself as Being-towards-death does resolve understand the "ability" ofits Being-able-to-be-guilty. (SZ, 306) When Dasein is resolute, in its eksistence it takes over authentically the fact that it is the negative ground of its own negativity. We have seen that, if taken eksistentially, death is the possibility of the impossibility of eksistence, i.e., the utter negativity of Dasein. Death is not added on to Dasein as if it were its end; as care Dasein is the thrown and thus negative ground for its own death. The negativity which dominates Dasein's Being primordially and through and through, is revealed to Dasein in its authentic Beingtowards-death. But this implies that only on the basis of Dasein's Being as a whole does anticipation make Being-guilty manifest. Thus care includes both death and guilt equiprimordially. Only anticipatory resolve understands Dasein's Being-able-to-be-guilty authentically and wholly, i.e., primordially. (SZ, 306) When the call of conscience is understood properly the fact that Dasein is lost in the "they" becomes revealed. Resolve brings Dasein back to its ownmost Being-able-to-be-its-own-self. Thus when Dasein has an understanding of Being-towards-death as its ownmost possibility, Dasein's Being-able-to-be becomes authentic and wholly transparent. The call of conscience furthermore individualizes Dasein essentially down to its ownmost Being-able-to-be, and discloses its anticipation of death as the possibility that is not relative. "Anticipatory resolve Iets the Being-able-to-be-guilty, as one's ownmost non-relative possibility, be struck wholly in the conscience." (SZ, 307) In addition, when, in anticipation, resolve has brought the possibility of death into its Being-able-to-be, Dasein's authentic eksistence can no longer be outstripped. Finally, the phenomenon of resolve brings Dasein before the primordial truth of eksistence. As resolute Dasein is now revealed to itself in its current factical Beingable-to-be in such a way that Dasein is at the same time this revealing and this Being-revealed. Now to any truth there belongs a corresponding holding-for-true and a definite form of certainty. Thus the primordial truth of eksistence demands an equiprimordial Being-certain, in which Dasein maintains itself in what resolve discloses. Dasein's resolve gives itself the current factical situation and brings itself into that situation. The situation cannot be calculated in advance; it merely becomes disclosed in a free resolve
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which has not been determined beforehand either, even though it can be determined later. This state of affairs makes it necessary to ask the question of what then the certainty which belongs to such resolve does signify. This certainty must maintain itself in what is disclosed by the resolve. This means that it cannot stick to the situation as to something that is definitive and final; this certainty must understand that the resolve, in harmony with its meaning as disclosure, must be held open and free in each case for the relevant factical possibility. Thus the certainty of the resolve means that Dasein holds itself free for the possibility of being taken back, a possibility which is factically necessary. Yet this holding it for true in resolve, taken as the truth of eksistence, lets Dasein by no means fall back into irresoluteness. On the contrary, this holding-it-fortrue, taken as a resolute holding-itself-free for its being taken back, is authentic resolve which resolves to retrieve itself. The holding-it-fortrue which belongs to resolve, according to its meaning, tends to hold itself free for Dasein's whole Being-able-to-be. This constant certainty is guaranteed to resolve only so that it will relate itself to that possibility of which it indeed can be totally certain: in its death Dasein must simply "take back" everything. Since resolve is constantly certain of death and anticipates it, resolve attains a certainty which is authentic and whole. (SZ, 308) But Dasein is also and equiprimordially in the untruth. Anticipatory resolve gives Dasein at the same time the primordial certainty that it has been closed-over. In resolve Dasein holds itself open for its constant Being-lost in the irresoluteness of the they. As a constant possibility of Dasein that is essentially connected with the ground of its Being, irresoluteness is co-certain. Resolve which is transparent to itself, understandsthat the indefiniteness of Dasein's Being-able-to-be is madedefinite only in a resolution that pertains to the current situation. But if this knowledge is to correspond to authentic resolve, it must itself arise from an authentic disclosure. This indefiniteness of Dasein's own Being-able-to-be, which becomes certain in a resolution, is made manifest wholly for the first time in Dasein's Being-towards-death. "Anticipation brings Dasein face to face with a possibility which is constantly certain but which at any moment remains indefinite as to when that possibility will become an impossibility. Anticipation makes it manifest that this being has been thrown into the indefiniteness of its Iimit-situation; when resolved upon the latter, Dasein gains its authentic Being-able-to-bea-whole." (SZ, 308) The indefiniteness of death is disclosed
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primordially by anxiety. The "nothing" with which anxiety brings Daseinface to face, unveils the negativity by which Dasein is defined in its very ground; this ground itself is as thrownness unto death. (SZ, 309) Resolve can be authentic resolve and wholly what it can be only as anticipatory resolve. These reflections throw a new light on anticipation itself. For we have now shown that anticipation is not just an ontological projection; it certainly is not just a fictitious possibility which our analysis somehow forced upon Dasein. Rather, anticipation appears to be a mode of an eksistentiell Being-able-to-be that is attested in Dasein, a mode which Dasein demands of itself if it authentically is to understand itself as resolute. "Anticipation 'is' not some kind of free-floating behavior, but must be conceived as the possibility of the authenticity ofthat resolve which has been attested in an eksistentiell way ... " (SZ, 309) To think about death in an authentic way is tantamount to wanting to have a conscience which has become transparent to itself in an eksistentiell manner. Now if authentic resolve tends toward the mode defined by anticipation, and if anticipation constitutes Dasein's authentic Being-able-to-be-a-whole, then in resolve which is attested in an eksistentiell manner, there is also attested together with it an authentic Being-able-to-be-a-whole which belongs to Dasein. "The question of the Being-able-to-be-awhole is one which is factical and eksistentiell. It is answered by Dasein as resolute." (SZ, 309) Heidegger concludes these reflections with the following important observation which summarizes the essence of the issue. Anticipatory resolve is not a way of escape which Dasein has fabricated in order to be able to "overcome" death. Rather it is that understanding that follows the call of conscience and which grants death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein's eksistence, as well as the possibility of dispersing all fugitive self-concealments. On the other hand, wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has been made determinate as Being-towards-death, does not signify some kind of seclusion in which Dasein flees the world; rather it brings Dasein without any illusion into the resolve of taking action. Anticipatory resolve springs from the sober understanding of what are factically the basic possibilities of Dasein. Along with a sober anxiety which brings Dasein face to face with its individualized Being-able-to-be, there goes also an unshakable joy ofthis possibility. (SZ, 310) At the end of this section Heidegger asks the question of whether the entire ontological interpretation of Dasein's eksistence was not guided by a definite, ontical way of taking authentic
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME eksistence. Heidegger does not deny this. Philosophy can never deny its presuppositions; yet it cannot simply admit them either. It must try to camprehend them; it must unfold with more and more penetration both the presuppositions and that for which they are the presuppositions. This makes it necessary to turn to some methodological considerations. (SZ, 310) ll: The Interpretation of the Meaning of the Beingof Care Leads to the Hermeneutical Situation. On the Methodological Character of the Eksistential Analytic
In Section 45 of Being and Time Heidegger explained that the term "hermeneutic situation" signifies the totality of all the presuppositions that are involved in every interpretation. It is the task of philosophical investigations to clarify these presuppositions and to make them secure in a basic experience of the subject matter of research, and in terms of such an experience. This implies that one first gives a phenomenal characterization of the being that has been selected as the theme of investigation and thus brings it into the scope of our fore-having. In the subsequent steps of the investigation one must be guided by a certain fore-sight. Our fore-having and our fore-sight will give us a sketch of the relevant way of conceiving of the theme, fore-conception. (SZ, 310-11) In Section 63 Heidegger claims that in his explanation of the anticipatory resolve he has made Dasein visible with respect to its authenticity and totality. The hermeneutical situation which previously was inadequate for the interpretation of the meaning of the Being of care, has now finally received the required primordiality: Dasein has been put into that which we haue in advance and this has been done with respect to its authentic Beingable-to-be-a-whole; the idea of eksistence which guided us as that which we see in advance has been made definite by the elucidation of Dasein's ownmost Being-able-to-be; and now the structure of Dasein's Being has been worked out concretely, its specific ontological character has become so manifest that Dasein's eksistentiality has been grasped and conceived in advance with the proper articulation to help us work out the eksistentials conceptually. csz, 311) The analytic of Dasein has confirmed the thesis which was formulated in Section 5 of Being and Time, namely that the being which in each case we are ourselves, is ontologically that which is farthest from us. The reason for this lies in care itself: our preoccu-
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pation with the beings in the world covers up ontically Dasein's authentic mode of Being so that our ontology which is directed towards this being was denied its appropriate basis. This explains why the bringing to light of Dasein's primordial mode of Being had to be wrested from Dasein by following the opposite course from that taken by the falling ontico-ontological tendency of interpretation. (SZ, 311) Wehaveseen time and again that it is very difficult to come to a proper understanding of the structures that are inherent in the Being of Dasein because of the fact that Dasein's concemful common sense has taken complete control of Dasein's Being-able-to-be. "Dasein's kind of Being thus demands that any ontological interpretation which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality, should capture the Being of this being, in spite of this being's tendency to cover things up." (SZ, 311) Eksistential analysis, therefore, constantly has the character of doing violence to the claims of everyday interpretation with its complacency and tranquilizing obviousness. This characteristic is typical for the ontology of the Being of Dasein; yet it belongs also properly to any other kind of interpretation; this is due to the fact that the understanding which develops in interpretation has the structure of a projection which necessarily has its presuppositions. (SZ, 312) Heidegger admits that his own interpretation of the Being of Dasein rested on presuppositions but he also shows at once that these assumptions can be made legitimately. Yet ontological interpretation still has other typical difficulties. In an effort to bring to light the eksistential structure of the Being of Dasein one must time and again start from the eksistentiell understanding. Once our eksistential analysis is completed we end up with the idea of eksistence which indeed gives us an outline of the formal structure of the understanding of Dasein, but it does so in a way which is not at all binding from an eksistentiell point of view. Finally, in all cases we encountered the fact that what the investigation was trying to bring to light, was somehow already known to Dasein by means of some preontological form of understanding. But this means that one somehow already knows what one tries to find out by the investigation. Does interpretation then not necessarily move in a hermeneutic circle? (SZ, 314) Heidegger accepts this but immediately explains that the hermeneutic circle is an essential element in Dasein's effort to understand because it reflects the kind of Being that belongs to Dasein. We have seen that in Heidegger's view the circle is a structural element of each human act of understanding as such. The hermeneutic circle is an inherent element of any attempt to
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interpretively understand phenomena. For the interpretive explanation of phenomena is possible only insofar as the one who understands brings with him from his own point of view a certain preunderstanding of this phenomenon and of the context in which it manifests itself. By interpreting the new phenomenon from this perspective, an understanding of this phenomenon can be achieved which in turn will change and deepen the original perspective from which the interpretation was made. Here Heidegger applies insights which Schleiermacher had suggested in connection with the question conceming the conditions of text interpretation, to the act of human understanding as such and to man's philosophic understanding in particular.2 Already on the very first pages of Being and Time Heidegger brings up the hermeneutic circle as an essential element of philosophical discourse. There he states that he wishes to work out the question concerning the meaning of Being, butthat this can be done only by first giving a proper explanation of a being, namely Dasein, with regard to its mode of Being. After making this statement he continues: "ls there not, however, a manifest circularity in such an undertaking? If we must first define a thing in its Being, and if we want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but going in a circle?" (SZ, 7-8) Heidegger pointsout first that there is no circle at all in formulating his basic concern as he has described it. For one can determine the mode of Being characteristic of a thing without having an explicit concept of the meaning of Being at one's disposal. For if this were not the case, no ontological knowledge would ever have been possible. But the fact that there has been such knowledge cannot be denied. In all ontology "Being'' has obviously been presupposed, but not as a concept at one's disposal. "The presupposing of Being has the character of taking a look at it beforehand, so that in the light of it the things presented to us get provisionally articulated in their Being. This guiding activity of taking a (provisional) look at Being arises from the average understanding of Being in which
2Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Vom Zirkel des Verstehens," in Günther Neske, ed., Martin Heidegger zum siebstigsten Geburtstag. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959; Erasmus Schöfer, "Heidegger's Language: Metalogical Forms of Thought and Grammatical Specialties," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., On Heidegger and Language. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 281-287.
RESOLVE, CARE, SELF, AND TEMPORALITY we always operate and which in the end belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself." (SZ, 8) On several occasions throughout Being and Time Heidegger returns to the problems which the hermeneutic circle seems to cause. We have already pointed to the fact that in Heidegger's view any genuine act of understanding implies interpretation, and that interpretation is impossible except on the basis of certain "presuppositions." We have seen that these presuppositions which constitute the hermeneutic situation, are characterized by the technical terms "fore-having," "fore-sight," and "fore-conception." Anyone who tries to understand a human phenomenon, necessarily presupposes a totality of meaning or "world" within which in his view this phenomenon can appear as meaningful (fore-having). Secondly, he assumes a certain point of view which fixes that with regard to which what is to be understood is to be interpreted (foresight). Finally, one tries to articulate one's understanding ofthat phenomenon with the help of concepts which are either drawn from the phenomenon itself, or are forced upon it as it were from the outside. In either case, the interpretive understanding has already decided on a definite way of conceiving of it (fore-conception). (SZ, 149151) The important point, in Heidegger's view is, that such an interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us. True, our interpretation does not "constitute" the meaning things and phenomena have for us; but it is true also that the meaning of things receives its structure and articulation from our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. (SZ, 151-152, 231-232) One of the basic characteristics of philosophical discourse is that, although it itself, too, is subject to the hermeneutic situation, it conceives of its task: to clarify and give a foundation to the totality of the presuppositions which constitute our hermeneutic situation in each case. But if this is indeed so, then it is obvious that philosophy itself will again encounter the circle. One could argue that using a type of circular interpretation implies that one presupposes the idea of Being and that Dasein's Being gets interpreted accordingly, so that then the idea of Being may be obtained from it. Heidegger does not deny that in his analysis he presupposed some understanding of Dasein's Being and of Being itself, but he denies that this process implies positing one or more propositions from which further propositions about Dasein's Being and Being itself aretobe deduced. On the contrary "this presupposing has the character of an understanding projection"; this projection makes possible an
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interpretation which Iets "that which is to be interpreted put itself into words for the very first time, so that it may decide of its own accord whether as the beingwhich it is, it has the state of Beingas which it has been disclosed in the projection as far as its formal aspects are concerned." In other words in an eksistential analytic one cannot but avoid the logical circle and a circular proof, for the simple reason that such an analysis does not do any proving at all by the rules oflogic. Furthermore Dasein is primordially constituted by care; but as such it is already ahead of itself. It has in every case already projected itself upon definite possibilities; and in such eksistential projections it has, in a pre-ontological manner, also projected its own mode of Being and Being itself. And yet, Heidegger continues, we object to the circle not only on logical grounds, we also object to it in that it seems contrary to our common sense conception of what it means to "understand something." But, he continues, when one speaks about the "circle" in understanding, one expresses the failure to recognize two things: 1) that understanding as such makes up a basic kind of Dasein's Being, and 2) that this Being is constituted as care. To deny the circle ... means finally to reinforce this failure. We must rather endeavor to leap into the 'circle,' primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being. (SZ, 315) If, in the ontology of Dasein we take our departure from a worldless T in order to provide this 'I' with an object and an ontologically baseless relation to that object, then we have presupposed not too much, but too little (Husserl). If we make a problern of 'life,' and then just occasionally we have regard to death, too, our view is too short-sighted (Dilthey). The object we have taken as our theme is artificially and dogmatically curtailed if "in the first instance" we restriet ourselves to a "theoretical subject," in order that we may then round it out "on the practical side" by tacking on an "ethic" (Kant). In Heidegger's view this may suffice to clarify the eksistential meaning of the hermeneutic situation of a primordial analytic of Dasein. (SZ, 315-16) It seems to me that in these passages Heidegger has shown not only that the hermeneutic circle is essential to all ontological inquiry, but also that this circle does not have to Iead to relativism in that ontology makes it its task to clarify, and give a radical foundation to, the totality of presuppositions which constitute our hermeneutic situation in each case.
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ITI: Care and Selfhood 1. Formulation of the Issue to be Examined. After these methodological reflections Heidegger returns to his effort to give an interpretation of the basic structures of Dasein's Being discovered in Division I of Being and Time, by turning to the typical form of disclosedness which is implied in the meaning of the Being of care. Care was defined as the harmonious unity of eksistentiality, facticity, and fallenness; through this unity it was possible to define the totality of Dasein's structural whole for the first time. The structure of care itself was expressed in the eksistential formula: ahead-of-itself Being-already-in-a-world - Being-alongside-beings-encounteredwithin-the-world. In the preceding reflections wehavealso indicated the intimate relation which exists between the phenomena of death, conscience, and guilt on the one hand, and care on the other. In this manner the totality of the structural whole (Dasein's Being) has become even more richly articulated. As a consequence of this the eksistential question of the unity of this totality has become even more urgent and problematic. (SZ, 317) How is one to conceive of this unity? How can Dasein eksist as a unity in the many ways and possibilities of its Being which were mentioned? It can so eksist obviously alone in such a way that it is itself this Beingin its essential possibilities, thus that in each case I am this entity. The "I" seems to hold together the totality of the structural whole of Dasein's Being. In the ontology of this being the "I" and the "self'' have always been conceived in terms of substance and supporting ground. In the preceding pages we have come across the question of the "who" of Dasein and learned to make a distinction between the inauthentic self of the "they" and the authentic self. Yet even there the question of the ontological constitution of selfhood itself has remained unexamined. W e must now make an effort to understand the ontological constitution of selfhood and in so doing selfhood must be understood eksistentially. This means that selfhood cannot be understood with the help of those categories we use in our dealing with beings within the world. To clarify the eksistentiality of the self, Heidegger takes as his "natural" point of departure Dasein's everyday interpretation of the self. In saying "I" Dasein expresses itself about itself. With the "I," this being has itself in view and the expression "I" is regarded as something utterly simple. It is something simple and not an attribute of any other thing; it is not itself a predicate, but always the
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subject. What is addressed in saying "I," is always encountered as something that is always the same persisting something. The characteristics of simplicity, substantiality, and personality arise from a genuine pre-phenomenological experience. The question, however, is one of whether that which we experience ontically in this manner may be interpreted ontologically with the help of the categories mentioned. Kant thought that this indeed can be done; Heidegger is convinced that the self cannot be determined ontologically in this way. To clarify his point he turns to a brief reflection on Kant's conception of the ego. (SZ, 318) Since the observations on Kant's views on the ego in Being and Time are rather brief, in the two sections to follow I shall make use of ideas on the same subject taken from The BasicProblems of Phenomenology and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, both of which stem from the sametime period as Being and Time. 2. Heidegger's Phenomenological Critique ofKant's Conception of the Ego. In his critical philosophy Kant made a careful distinction between three conceptions of the ego, the psychological or empirical concept, the transcendental, and the moral. Heidegger Iimits hirnself here to a critical analysis of Kant's conception of the moral personality first in order then to turn to Kant's conception of the transeendental personality. Kant defined the moral personality as a thing (res) which exists as an end in itself. Although it cannot be denied that one of the basic characteristics of the Being of man is to be found in the fact that he is an end in himself, it is nonetheless true also that in this way the Being of man has not yet been explained adequately. The question left unanswered here is one of how the Being of man is to be understood, precisely in view of the fact that he is as an end in himself. The reason why Kant hirnself did not and could not ask this question lies in the fact that he assumed with the entire classical tradition that Being, when applied to man, has the same meaning as when it is applied to things. Being is Being-present-at-hand. Kant's problem, like Descartes', merely is this: How can one explain the distinction between the subject (res cogitans ), taken as one kind of thingspresent-at-hand, from all objects, the res extensa, taken as another kind of things-present-at-hand? Obviously one will say that Kant defined the very Being of the res cogitans by pointing to the fact that it is as an I-think. Thus we must now ask the question of how Kant tried to understand the Being of man from the viewpoint of the transeendental personality. Is Kant, indeed, in a position to determine the mode of Being of the subject in
RESOLVE, CARE, SELF, AND TEMPORALITY his interpretation of the transeendental ego? The answer is again negative. Kant's attempt preeisely was to prove that and why the mode of Being of the subjeet eannot be explained with the help of the eategories. Of the transeendental ego, one ean say only that it is and aets. In the ehapter on the paralogisms of pure reason Kant develops this idea in detail and proves why a philosophieal anthropology (or psyehology) in the sense of the tradition is completely impossible. By applying the categories of the understanding to the ego taken as an Ithink, one cannot possibly make any legitimate claims in regard to the Being of the ego taken as a spiritual and immortal substance. Kant gives two basic reasons for his view. First of all, the ego taken originally as the synthetic unity of appereeption cannot be further determined by that of whieh it itself is the neeessary condition as such. Furthermore, the transeendental ego is the necessary condition of all experience and as such again cannot itself be a daturn of experience. Categories are forms of unity for a synthesis; they can be applied only to some multiplicity. The ego as the condition for the application of the categories and of all synthesis is as such the un-multiple. Thus the only thing one can say of the transeendental ego is that it is as acting. In Heidegger's view, Kant was obviously correct in denying the thesis that the kind of Being of the self could ever be determined by means of eategories which must be employed for the determination of natural things. Yet Kant was wrang in believing that for the same reason the Being of the ego cannot be determined with the help of "categories" other than those we use to determine the Beingofnatural things.3 We must now ask the question of why Kant eould not fully exploit the "I think" ontologically. Why did Kant fall back on the "subject," something which thinks? The reason the question must be asked once again is the fact that Kant fully realized that the ego is not just an "I think," but an "I think something." For on several occasions he stressed the point that the ego remains related to its own representations and would be nothing without them. These representations are the "empirical," whieh is "accompanied" by the ego; they are the appearances to which the ego "clings." But why did Kant never explain what kind of Beingis to be attributed to this "clinging" and "accompanying" and why did he continue to implicitly interpret their mode of Being as the constant Being-present-at-hand? In addition, why did Kant not realize that the "I think something" is not yet definite enough to be taken as a 3The BasicProblems of Phenomenology, pp. 140-142.
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starting point for ontological reflections? Why did he leave this "something" undetermined? If by this something one understands a being within the world, it is clear at once that the world is implied in it. But then it is clear also that this very phenomenon of world codetermines the mode of Being of the ego. Thus in saying "I," I have in view that beingwhich in each case I am as an "I am in the world." Kant, on the other hand, did not see the phenomenon of world, and consistent with it, he kept the representations apart from the a priori content of the "I think." But as a consequence, the ego was forced again to be an isolated subject which merely accompanies our representations in a way which is ontologically quite indefinite.4 (SZ, 202208)
Why did Kant fail to see these ontological implications of the "I think something?" In Heidegger's view, part of the answer to the question is to be attributed to the fact that Kant maintained the view of the tradition, that is, that knowing the world theoretically is the original and basic mode of man's concern with the world, and that knowledge is to be understood in terms of a relationship between two entities, namely nature and the mind or consciousness, and thus that in every theory of knowledge the subject-object-opposition is to be preunderstood. In uncritically maintaining this conception of the tradition, Kant was stuck with a closed consciousness and the entire epistemological problematic that was developed in the tradition in connection with it. (SZ, 59-62) To overcome this entire problematic, Heidegger argues, one must first of all show that knowing the world theoretically is no more than a derivative mode of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. If knowingthe-world theoretically is a special mode of our Being-in-the-world, then it can be shown easily that the subject-object-opposition is not a fundamental datum of our immediate experience. This Opposition comes about merely on the Ievel of explicit reflection. Furthermore, if the subject-object-opposition is not fundamental, it is easy to show that the epistemological problern with which Descartes struggled is really a pseudo-problem. (SZ, 206-207) But in addition to this first thesis, namely that theoreticallyknowing-the-world is only one particular mode of Dasein's concern for the world, one must show also that in man's primordial concern for the world there is found a kind of "knowledge" which is quite different from what we normally call "knowledge," i.e., theoretical and scientific knowledge. This is the reason why Heidegger shows 4Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 97-103.
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the differenee between our eoneemfully knowing the world and our theoretieal knowledge of the world not only from the viewpoint of man's approaeh to the world, but also from the perspeetive of the world itself. He earefully analyses the differenee whieh undeniably exists between the world of Dasein's eoneem and the derivative world as found in the seienees. The primordial world has its eenter in Dasein itself whieh for that reason ean and must be defined as Beingin-the-world. But world should not be understood here as referring to a thing, or to the sum of all things; rather world is the totality of meaning toward whieh all beings point by their very strueture in light of man's eoneern. What is ealled world here is the totality of all mutual referenee-systems within whieh everything is eapable of appearing to Dasein as having a determinate meaning. (SZ, 63-88) Heidegger, finally, summarizes his position in regard to Kant's attempt to determine the subjeetivity of the subjeet in the following statements: a) Kant was able to point to some essential, ontologieal determinations of the personalitas moralis, but he was ineapable of formulating the basie question eoneerning the fundamental and primordial mode of Being of the moral person taken as an end in itself. b) Kant eorreetly proved that the eategories of nature eannot possibly be used for our ontie knowledge of the transeendental subjeetivity. Yet his arguments do not prove that an ontologieal knowledge of the transeendental ego is impossible in principle. e) Kant was unable to explain the ontologieal eonneetion between the moral personality and the transeendental personality (theoretieal and praetieal ego) as weil as the eonneetion between the unity of these two with the psyehologieal personality. Finally, he was unable to explain ontologieally the totality of these eharaeterizations of the human personality. d) Kant was of the opinion that the speeifie eharaeteristie of the ego is to be found in the free "I aet" ofthat being whieh is an end in itself, i.e., in the spontaneity of the human intelligenee. Kant employed the eoneepts of intelligenee and end-in-itself in the same manner. They are not properties of the ego or person; rather the subjeet is as intelligenee and as end-in-itself. e) The intelligenee, i.e., the person, is distinguished from the things of nature as a spiritual substanee from material substanees. Implieit in these ontie theses is the view that it is not possible to
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understand and interpret the ego ontologically as something which is merely present-at-hand.5 Yet these critical remarks notwithstanding, Heidegger still maintains that Kant more than anyone eise in the tradition penetrated the ontological structure of the human personality. But he failed to pose explicitly the question concerning the mode of Being of the person. The reason why Kant was unable to formulate such a question may be found in the fact that he, without any further reflection or criticism, accepted the basic metaphysical conception according to which Being primarily means Hergestelltheit, and thus Being-present-at-hand. 6 3. The Self as Transcendence. Self and Subject. In the preceding pages we have seen that Kant's attempt to characterize the self by means of the concept of the subject is unacceptable. Kant was aware ofthe fact that in our everyday interpretation ofthe selfwe conceive of the self in terms of simplicity, substantiality, and personality. These ontic characteristics arise indeed from a genuine pre-phenomenological experience and describe adequately what everyone experiences ontically. Kant also understood correctly that these characteristics cannot be employed for an ontological interpretation of the selfhood of the self. Yet Kant's own attempt to characterize the self by means of the concept of the subject of theoretical knowledge is equally unacceptable. The concept of subject does not refer to any primordial experience which Dasein has of itself. The concept of subject originates in reflection, when Dasein reflects upon its theoretical knowledge. Yet theoretical knowledge is only a derivative mode of Dasein's Being. Furthermore, what the concept of subject expresses is not the Being of the self, but merely its self-consciousness. Thus consciousness of self must be illuminated ontologically by the Being of the self and not vice versa. If one tries to illuminate the Beingof the self by the consciousness of self, as is done generally in all idealist philosophies, the entire ontological problematic becomes distorted. 7 On the other hand, if, as the analytic of Dasein shows, the Being of Dasein is to be understood as Being-in-the-world, whose essence consists in ek-sistence, then the selfhood of the self is to be understood as transcendence, i.e., as ek-sistence taken in its authentic mode as 5The Basic Problems, pp. 146-147. 6Jbid, 147-154. 7Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 156-157.
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disclosedness in resolve. It is in this sense that Heidegger can then say that the self is that toward which Dasein comes in its authentic future on the basis of resolve. This is to be explained in the pages to come. First we must substantiate the thesis that in Heidegger's view the selfhood of the self is to be sought in transcendence.s In fundamental ontology the term "transcendence" signifies what is characteristic and unique for Dasein. Consequently the term does not refer to one form of behavior among others, but to that basic constitutive moment of Dasein's Being which happens prior to all actual behavior. If we now choose the term "subject" for the being which all of us are, then transcendence signifies the Being ofthe subject, the basic ontological structure of the human subjectivity. To be a subject means to be in transcendence and to be as transcendence. If transcendence signifies the basic structure of the human subjectivity, it obviously is no Ionger possible to define transcendence in terms of the subject-object-relationship. What is transcended is the totality of the beings but they are not that toward which Dasein transcends. If the beings are not that toward which the surpassing occurs, then the question must be asked concerning how then the "towardwhich" is to be determined. That toward which Dasein transcends in each case, is the world. This is why transcendence can be defined as Being-in-the world. World is a constitutive element of the unitary structure of transcendence. When Dasein as being toward the world surpasses every being, including the beingwhich it itself is, it comes toward that being which it really is, which it is as it-self. Transcendence thus constitutes Dasein's selfhood. As a constitutive component of Dasein's Being, "world" refers here to the totality of meaning by means of which and in terms of which Dasein gives to itself the capacity of understanding those beings it can behave toward and how it can behave toward them (transcendental concept of world). Dasein gives to "itself' the capacity of understanding Being from "its" world. By moving from beings toward the world, Dasein temporalizes itself as a self, i.e., a being whose Being implies a Being-able-to-be as well as a having-tobe. Dasein eksists in such a way that it eksists for its own sake. However, since the world is that, in surpassing toward which 8 For what follows, cf. The Essence of Reasons, pp. 35-105 (passim); see also Chapter IV, section li above.
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selfhood first comes-to-pass, the world, too, belongs to that for the sake of which Dasein is. But how then are we to define the precise relationship between Dasein and world? Obviously we cannot conceive of this relationship as one between Dasein as one kind of being and the world as another. As the totality of what is for the sake of Dasein at any given time, the world is brought by Dasein itself before Dasein itself. This "bringing the world before Dasein itself' is the primordial projection of Dasein's possibilities, insofar as through it Dasein can relate itself to beings from within the midst of beings. The projection of world is always a throwing-over; it throws the world over beings. This, in turn, allows the beings to manifest themselves as what they are. The happening of this projecting throwing of the world over beings, in which the Being of Dasein temporalizes itself, is called Being-in-the-world. "Dasein transcends" thus means that the essence of Dasein's Being is suchthat it constitutes the world; it Iets world come-to-pass and through the world provides itself with an original view (Bild) which, although not grasped explicitly, nonetheless serves as a model (Vorbild) for all of manifest being, Dasein included. There is no way that a being or even entire nature as a whole could ever become manifest, ifit could not find the opportunity to enter a world. No being can ever manifest itself except insofar as this aboriginal happening which we call transcendence, comes-to-pass, i.e., insofar as a being of the character of "Being-in-the-world" breaks into the realm of beings. We have seen that the world reveals itself to Dasein as the actual totality of what is "for the sake of Dasein." This is the reason that Dasein can be toward itself as itself only if it surpasses "itself' as being toward the world. Such a surpassing occurs only in a "will" which projects itself toward its own possibilities (resolve). This will is not a specific act of willing-something among others; instead it must be that "will" which, as andin surpassing, constitutes the very "for the sake of...." That which constitutes the "for the sake of...", throwing it forth and projecting it, is what we call freedom. Surpassing beings toward the world is freedom itself. We must now turn to the question of how, in Heidegger's view, the self is to be related to the ego as subject of theoretical knowledge. The answer to this question can be derived from Heidegger's interpretation of the meaning of the transeendental imagination in the first edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.9 9Cf. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 131-208 (passim).
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In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger suggests that Kant's transeendental imagination is more than a mere subject of knowledge. The imagination must institute the horizon in which two beings (the knower and that which is tobe known) can encounter each other and become opposed to each other as subject and object. Thus the transeendental imagination renders the subject-objectopposition possible. This horizon, in turn, implies a self-orientation of the knowing subject toward the being to be known as object. Thus it makes it possible for the knower to be a subject. It constitutes the subjectivity of the subject. On the other hand, the same horizon makes it possible for the being to be known to reveal itself as opposed to the knower, i.e., to be an object. In this way, the horizon also constitutes the objectivity of the object. In other words, the horizon of transcendence instituted by the transeendental imagination simultaneously enables the subject tobe subject and the object tobe object. Thus transcendence, enabling subject and object to be what they are, lies between them, ontologically antecedes both, and makes it possible for the relation between them to come about. The transeendental imagination cannot be called a subject, because it is the center of transcendence, i.e., the center of that particular projection of world from which the subject-object-opposition precisely originates. Yet the transeendental imagination most certainly is the center of the human self. For what most radically characterizes the self of a finite knower as finite is primarily his transcendence, and not his subjectivity.IO The relation between the self (= transcendence) and the subject (= consciousness) is articulated here in terms of the relation between transeendental imagination (= center of transcendence) and transeendental apperception (= transeendental unity of consciousness) expressed by the ego's "I think." With Kant, Heidegger admits that the ego as unity of consciousness cannot be separated from the process which it accompanies (= transcendence), and that the essence of the ego as subject lies indeed in pure consciousness-of-self. Consciousness (= subjectivity) and transcendence (= selfhood) are then tobe related as follows. In the presentative self-orientation toward the beings to be known, the self is carried along with this orientation, in which the self is exteriorized and the ego of this self is necessarily manifest to itself. Insofar as the ego is what it is only in this "I think," the essence of pure thought and therefore also of the pure ego lies in pure-self-consciousness. Yet consciousness and subjectivity are lO[bid., pp. 153-166.
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ontologically subject to the orientation of the knower toward the beings to be known, and thus to transcendence, i.e., the self which consciousness in this way makes manifest to itself. Thus the self is primarily transcendence; the self is not primarily the ego taken as the subject of theoretical knowledge. 11 -We must now return to Section 64 of Being and Time. IV: Transcendence and Temporality
In Heidegger's view it is obvious that Dasein can eksist only in such a way that it is itself, this being in its essential possibilities; in each case I am this entity. Thus it seems that it is the "I" which holds together the totality of the structural whole whose structural elements are brought to light by the analytic of Dasein's Being. In the metaphysics of the tradition, the "I" and the "self' have been conceived from the earliest times as the supporting ground of this totality, i.e., as substance or as subject. For Heidegger, on the other hand, the ground of the unity and totality of Dasein's Beingis not to be found in the ego or the subject, but rather in care. Furthermore, in the tradition the question of the ontological constitution of selfhood as such remained unanswered, in that the ontological characterization of selfhood prohibits us from making use of anything like categories. (SZ, 317-318) From Heidegger's point of view, however, one can say that if the self belongs to the essential attributes of Dasein, whereas Dasein's essence is to be found in its eksistence, then I-hood and selfhood must be conceived of eksistentially. This was the reason why an attempt was made to interpret the Beingof the selfin terms offinite transcendence. Now in view ofthe fact that Dasein's Being is to be defined in terms of care, and care already contains in itself the phenomenon of self, in that Dasein's caring implies the caring for its own self, we must try once more to establish more carefully the relationship between care and selfhood. This we shall do by focusing on the interpretation of Dasein's Beinginterms oftemporality. (SZ, 322; cf. 191-196) To explain the transcendence characteristic of the authentic self, we must take our point of departure from Dasein's everyday interpretation of self. When Dasein says "I," it expresses itself about itself. In each case, the "I" stands for me and nothing else. This "I" is not an attribute of other things and it is not itself P. predicate, but llJbid., pp. 156-158; SZ, 318-322; Gethmann, op. cit., pp. 68-85; Richardson, op. cit., pp. 154-158.
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the "absolute" subject. In view of the fact that what is expressed in saying "I," is always encountered as the same persisting something, we characterize the "I" correctly with simplicity, substantiality, and personality. These expressions, indeed, arise from a genuine prephenomenological experience of self; yet what is so experieilced ontically, may not be interpreted ontologically with the help of these categories. (SZ, 318) In saying "I," Dasein expresses itself; and since Dasein is Being-in-the-world it expresses itself as Being-in-the-world. Yet in its everyday life, in saying "I," Dasein does not have itself explicitly in view as Being-in-the-world. Although, in saying "I" Dasein has in view that being which, in every case, it itself is, in its everyday interpretation the self nonetheless has the tendency to understand itself in terms of the world with which it is concerned. The motive for this fugitive way of saying "I" is to be found in Dasein's falling; it then flees in the face of itself into the "they." What expresses itself in the "I" in that case, is that self which, proximally and for the most part, I am not authentically. Thus in this attitude, the phenomenal content of the Dasein which one has in view in the "I," is continually overlooked. How can one characterize ontologically what is overlooked here. (SZ, 321-322) Dasein is Being-in-the-world. As such it is continually ahead of itself. Thus with the "I," what one has in view hereisthat being for which the Being of the being which it is, is an issue. With the "I," care expresses itself, even though proximally and for the most part in the fugitive way in which the "I" speaks when it concerns itself with something. If now the ontological constitution is not to be traced back either to an 1-substance or a subject, but if, on the contrary, the everyday way in which each of us keeps saying "I" must be understood ontologically in terms of our authentic Being-able-to-be, then the proposition that the self is the basis of care as something that is constantly an hand, is one that still does not follow. Selfhood is to be derived ek-sistentially only from one's authentic possibility of Being one's self, i.e., from the authenticity of Dasein's Beingas care. Thus the constancy of the self and the supposed persistence of the subjectum (hupokeimenon) must be clarified in terms of care. In the ontological interpretation of the self the expression "the constancy of the self' refers to the fact that Dasein has achieved some "definite" position. Constancy, implying steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counterpart of the non-self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute resolve. Thus, ek-sistential self-constancy means nothing other than anticipatory resolve, and the ontological
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structure of the resolve itself reveals the ek-sistentiality of the self"s selfhood. Dasein is authentic self in the primordial individuation of the silent resolve which yields to anxiety. As something that keeps silent, authentic Being one's self is precisely that sort of thing that does not continue to say "I." The self which the reticence of the resolute eksistence reveals, is the primordial phenomenal basis for the question concerning the Being of the "I." Only if Dasein is oriented phenomenally by the meaning of the Being of its authentic potentiality for Being its self, is it in a position to discuss what ontological justification there is for treating substantiality, simplicity, and personality as characteristics of selfhood. (SZ, 322323) We have seen that authentic Dasein realizes its radical finitude by anticipating death and by including it in advance in every project. In so doing Dasein receives its own Being precisely as its own, as its ownmost "personal" ek-sistence so to speak, so that it now genuinely comes to its self. But this coming to its self is what is meant by "future" (Zu-Kunft), if the term is taken in its primordial sense: the letting itself come toward its own self in that distinctive possibility which Dasein is as ek-sistence, is the primordial phenomenon of Zukunft, coming-toward, future. (SZ, 323-25) But Dasein's temporality extends not only to the future; it has also the character of "having-been." Dasein can project itself toward its own death only insofar as it already is. In order to realize its ownmost Being, Dasein has to accept, together with its own death, also its thrownness, its facticity, that which it is already. Death cannot be its own death, if it has no relation to what Dasein is already. Authentically futural, Dasein is equally authentically "having been" (gewesen). To anticipate one's ultimate and ownmost possibility is to come back comprehendingly to one's ownmost "having-been." (SZ, 325-326) Heidegger thus states here that the authentic comprehension of Dasein is made possible by the ek-stasis of the future. Dasein as anticipatory potentiality for Being is continually coming to its own self. Insofar as it comes to its self, Dasein in its very potentiality continually takes over its self, assumes the self that it already is. It fetches its own self all over again and this retrieve is the achieving of Dasein's authentic past, i.e., the self which it already is as havingbeen. (SZ, 326-329) If this retrieve of the authentic self does not come-
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to-pass, the result is an inauthentic past which is tobe characterized by the forgottenness of the true self.l2 Thus far we have seen that Dasein's coming is a coming to a self that already is as having-been; on the other hand, Dasein is what it has-been only as long as the future continues to come. We must now tum to temporal neamess, the present. The genuine meaning of the present consists in "making-present" (gegenwärtigen). Dasein, as temporalizing, makes things be present; this is the essential meaning of the present as it primordially appears to . Dasein. Anticipating resolve discloses the actual situation of the Da in such a way that ek-sistence, in its actions, can be circumspectively concerned with what is factually ready-to-hand in the environmental ·• world. Resolute Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand in any given situation and taking action in such a way as to let one encounter what has presence environmentally, are possible only by making such an entity present. (SZ, 326-327) The making-present of what has presence, however, presupposes the future as anticipation of Dasein's possibilities and the return to what has-been. By virtue of Dasein's understanding of its own Being, thus, Dasein is able to understand the human situation as a whole; at the same time intramundane beings can manifest themselves to it in their belanging to a world. Thus, what Heidegger calls "making-present," presupposes having-been and future. The present is as the resultant of the two other ekstases of time. Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future which already is in the process of having-been releases the present from itself. What is meant by temporality is precisely the unity of this structural whole: the future which makes present in the process of having-been. Only insofar as Dasein is characterized by temporality can it realize its authentic Being. Thus temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care. (SZ, 326) It should be noted, however, that although Heidegger's description of the present is in harmony with what the case is in each concrete situation in which Dasein finds itself, the present which is so described, is not the authentic present. For to the anticipation of authentic future which goes with resolve, belongs another present in accordance with which the resolve discloses the situation "im Augenblick," in the "moment of vision." In resolve, the present is not only brought back from distraction with the things of one's closest concem, but it now gets held in the future and in having-been. That 12Cf. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
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present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, is called Augenblick. (SZ, 337-338 and note) Be this as it may, in Heidegger's view the preceding reflection has shown that temporality makes the unity of eksistence, facticity, and falling possible; thus it is temporality that primordially constitutes the totality ofthe structure of care. It should be noted that the three components of care are not just pieced tagether here just as little as temporality has been put tagether out of the future, the having-been, and the present. As a matter of fact, temporality is not a being at all; one cannot say that temporality is; rather temporality temporalizes itself; it temporalizes possible modes of itself. These modes in turn make possible the various modes of Dasein's Being, particularly the basic modes of authentic and inauthentic eksistence. (SZ, 328) The characterization of future, having-been, and present presented above shows that temporality is the primordial "outside-ofitself' taken in and for itself. (SZ, 329) Future, having-been, and present are the three ekstases of temporality. (SZ, 329) Among these ekstases the future occupies the privileged place; the future is the primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic time. (SZ, 329) Finally, it should be stressed here that primordial time is inherently finite. For we have seen that care is Being-towards-death. If Dasein relates authentically to its death then its anticipatory resolve, as authentic Being towards death, is Being towards that possibility which is to be defined as Dasein's uttermost impossibility. In this Being-towards-its-end, Dasein eksists in a manner that is authentically whole as that being which it can be only when "thrown into death." Thus Dasein is not a beingwhich has an end at which it just stops; Dasein continuously eksists finitely. Dasein's authentic future is temporalized by that temporality which constitutes the meaning of anticipatory resolve; thus it reveals itself as inherently finite. The claim that primordial temporality is inherently finite obviously does not exclude the possibility that "times goes on" in spite ofthe fact that I no Ionger am there as Dasein. (SZ, 330) Heidegger concludes these reflections with the following statements: Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality. As such it makes possible the essential constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially ekstatic. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is inherently finite. (SZ, 331)
CHAPTERXI TEMPORALITY AND TIMEI (Being and Time, Sections 67-68, pp. 334-350)
1: Introduction According to Heidegger hirnself the philosophy of time, developed in Being and Time and other works of the same period, is basicaily different from ail classical theories of time, as weil as from the theories of time developed by Kierkegaard, Bergson, and Husserl. Heidegger's conception of time goes also far beyond the conceptions used in everyday life and in the sciences. Yet Heidegger was convinced that the new conception of time which he developed, provides the foundation for the traditional philosophical as weil as for our everyday and scientific understanding of time. As Heidegger sees it, ail theories of time that developed between Aristotle and Bergson have two characteristics in common, all significant differences notwithstanding: 1) The phenomenon of time is to be studied in a philosophy of nature. And 2) time is to be understood from the now-moment; in other words, the three ekstases of time (past, present, future) are conceived as a now that is no more, or a now that actuaily is, or a now that is not yet; time itself is nothing but the succession of these now-moments. In everyday life and in the sciences we conceive of time also as a succession of now1 For what follows cf. Marion Heinz, Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982; Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 40, 85-89, 117-118, 133-134, 141-147, 173-174, 243-244n, and passim; F. W. von Herrmann, "Zeitlichkeit des Daseins und Zeit des Seins. Grundsätzliches zu Heideggers Zeit-Analysen," in Philosophische Perspektiven, 4(1972), 198-210; Marion Heinz, "The Concept of Time in Heidegger's Early Works," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., A Campanion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time," pp. 183-207; Graeme Nicholson, "Ekstatic Temporality in Sein und Zeit," Ibid., pp. 208-226. Cf. also Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, pp. 305-320; The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 227-318; Charles M. Sherover, Heidegger, Kant & Time. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971; Henri Decleve, Heidegger et Kant. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 69-177; K. Düsing, "Objektive und subjektive Zeit. Untersuchungen zu Kants Zeittheorie und zu ihrer modernen kritischen Rezeption," in Kantstudien, 71(1980), 1-34.
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moments; it is a stream of now-moments which arrive from the future and flow away into the past.2 Heidegger does not claim that these conceptions of time are wrong; thus his theory of time is not meant to replace them. He merely claims that his own conception of time provides the other conceptions with their proper foundation. In so doing his analyses justify the other conceptions, but they also set their limits. Within the history of the theories of time Heidegger gives Kant a very special place and claims that Kant anticipated his own theory to some extent. In Heidegger's own interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason time is for Kant in essence self-affection; time constitutes the basic structure of the subject; furthermore, through the production of horizonal schemata time renders at once also possible the objectivity of all objects. Yet the difference between his own view and Kant's is still basic, as we shall see. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927) Heidegger presents us with a careful analysis of the time conceptions of Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, and Bergson.3 These historical analyses are also found in part in Being and Time 4 where Hegel's conception of time is examined, also. 5 Of special importance in this context is Heidegger's Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.6 In other words, one should realize from the beginning that in developing his own view on time Heidegger was fully familiar with the options which past philosophers have shown us already with respect to time. Of the most important theories of time (Aristotle, Augustine, Kant, and Regel) Heidegger maintains essential elements. It is worth noting that all these authors were somewhat perplexed about time, particularly about the "reality" of time. For instance, in Physics, IV, 10 Aristotle wrote: "But what time really is and under what category it falls, is no more revealed by anything that has come down to us from earlier thinkers than it is by the considerations that have just
2cf. Martin Heidegger, SZ, 426; "Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft (1916)," in Frühe Schriften, ed. F. W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978, pp. 413-433; Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976, pp. 234-251. 3The Basic Problems, pp. 229-256. 4sz, Sections 6, 67ff. ssz, Section 82. 6KM, Section 9, 19-23, 32-35, and passim.
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been completed." 7 In Physics, IV, 14 Aristotle continues: "And if nothing is qualified to count (namely numbers) but the human soul and the soul's reason (nous), it would be impossible that there would be time, assuming that there were no soul, except in case time [in one way or another] were still some kind of being, such as if movement can exist without man's soul, and the before and after [constitutive to our conception of time] are already in movement, and these themselves constitute time insofar as they then are already numerable."8 From the context it is clear that Aristotle feit that he was unable to resolve the dilemma. We find the same ambiguity and uncertainty in Augustine whose analysis finally ends up in a question: could it perhaps be that time is some "distentia in anima," some distention, some stretching out in the sou1?9 As for Kant it is clear, also, that for him time is not something that just exists of itself or even something that inheres in things. Time is for him not an empirical concept which is derived from any experience. It is rather a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. Time is "real," indeed, but only as the real mode of the representation of myself as object. Time is the form of the inner sensibility.lO Regel, too, speaks about time in his Philosophy of Nature; he thus remains within the tradition originated by Aristotle. Like space, time is defined first as the "abstract outside of one another."ll For Regel space and time belong together; for him time is the truth of space.12 If space is thought dialectically as that which it in truth is, the Being of space will unveil itself as time. Regel defines space as the unmediated indifference of Nature's Being outside of itself.13 Space is the abstract multiplicity of the points which can be differentiated in it. Space does not arise from the points and it is not 7Aristotle, Physics, IV, 10, 218a33-218b2. BJbid., IV, 14, 223a25-29.
9St. Augustine, Confessions, XI, 26. lOJrnrnanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 46-59. 11 G. F. W. Hege!, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, trans. Gustav Ernil Mueller, New York: Philosophical Library, 1959, sect. 254ff. Heidegger discusses Hegel's view in SZ, sect. 82 and in Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, sect. 20, pp. 251262. 12Hegel, op. cit., Section 257, Addendum. 13Jbid., Section 254.
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interrupted by them. Though it is differentiated by points that can be differentiated, space itself as such remains without any difference. The point insofar as it differentiates anything in space, is the negation of space; yet as this negation it itself remains in space. Thus the point does not Iift itself out of space. Space is the outside of one another of the multiplicity of points and is itself without any differences. Space itself is thus not a point; rather it is punctuality, but then a punctuality tha.t as such is null, i.e., it is complete continuity. Punctuality as such is the negativity of continuous space.14 This idea forms the basis for the statement in which Regel thinks space in its truth, i.e., as time: "Negativity, which relates itself as point to space, and which in space develops its determinations as line and surface, is, however, just as much for itself in the sphere of Being outside of itself, and so are its determinations therein, though while it is positing as in the sphere of Being outside of itself, it appears indifferent as regards the things that are tranquilly side by side. As thus posited for itself, it is time."15 This explains why Hegellater can define time as the negation of a negation, for time is the negation of punctuality and punctuality itself is the negation of space. In the explanation of these ideas Regel maintains with Aristotle the privileged position of the now-moment, that in time runs parallel to the point in space. This implies that the Beingof time is the "now." But every "now" is either a "now" that is no Ionger or a "now" that is not yet. But this means that time is that being which, in that it is, is not, and which, in that it is not, is; time is intuited becoming.16 As for Bergson, it was his opinion that Aristotle and the tradition (which includes Regel) reduced time to space; he severely criticized this opinion and then built his own conception on this mistaken criticism.17 It is not difficult for Reidegger to show that Bergsan misunderstood Aristotle, and also that Bergson's own distinction between temps and duree does not go to the heart of the matter. If we compare Reidegger's own view with that of the authors just mentioned it is clear that his view comes closer to that of Kant than to any of the other authors. And this is so for several reasons. 14Jbid., Section 254. 15zbid., Section 257, with minor changes made by Heidegger. 16Jbid., Section 257 and 259; SZ, Section 82. 11The Basic Problems, pp. 231-232.
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First of all, Heidegger, with Kant, does not deal with time in a philosophy of nature, but rather in a treatise which is to provide the foundation of metaphysics or ontology. Thus he does not relate time irnmediately to motion in space. Secondly, he does not approach the Being of time from the perspective of the "now-moment." Thirdly, with Kant, and to some degree also Augustine, Heidegger tries to explain precisely in what sense time and the Being of man are intimately related to each other. In Heidegger's conception of time Dasein temporalizes its own Being and as such constitutes time. In this view Heidegger may have been influenced by Husserl who begins his own analysis of time with an analysis of inherently temporal objects, such as a melody, etc.IS For Heidegger man taken as Dasein is the primordial and original inherently temporal being. Before turning to a careful analysis of the origin of Heidegger's view on time let us clarify the point just made by using a lecture course that Heidegger delivered in 1925 when he already was in the process of writing the first draft of what later would become Being and Time. There he wrote the constant running-ahead of itself, which is essentially inherent in Dasein's Being towards death, is nothing but the Being of my own coming to be (Seinwerdens). In other words, for a human being to be means to become; being is becoming. This means that Dasein constantly comes toward itself (Zu-kunft) and, in this sense, its mode of Being implies the future. On the other hand, being-guilty and wanting-to-have-a-conscience is the proper mode of Being of Dasein's hauing-been (Gewesensein) or past. The possibilities of the future insofar as they have been operred up by what has been, constitute for Dasein its true and genuine present. Thus the Being in which Dasein can truly be its own wholeness and totality is time.19 Yet, Heidegger continues there, this does not mean that time really is, because time is not. One can say: "There is time," but this cannot be interpreted to mean that time is a thing, a being that is. One should say rather that Dasein temporalizes time, makes and lets time be; better still Dasein temporalizes its own Beingas time. Time thus is not outside of man as a kind of framework in which events take place. Yet time is neither something that runs-off within my consciousness as a kind of clock 18Cf. Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, ed. Rudolf Boehm. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966; English: The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964, Sections 7ff. 19History ofthe Concept ofTime, pp. 319-320.
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or even an inner movement. Rather time is that which constitutes the Being of care, the having to be ahead of oneself on the basis of a having found oneself as thrown and lost. The time which we encounter in our everyday life is the temporality of the "they"; here time becomes the measure of change which makes social interaction on the Ievel of the "they" possible. The scientific conceptions of time of Newton and modern physics are derived from the everyday conception of time. It is important to observe already now that strickly speaking the motions in nature, such as those of the moon and the planets, which we determine spatio-temporally by specifying for each body at each moment its place and its point in time, do not really run-off "in time"; for taken as such they are "free of time," they are as such timeless. We encounter them "in" time insofar as their being becomes uncovered as "pure nature" in scientific research. But if these beings are considered without any relation to man, then they themselves are without time. Only as long as man is as Dasein is there time.20 Weshallreturn to these ideas later. Yet before moving on to the next section a brief remark on Heidegger's terminology and a possible English translation of it appears tobe necessary. In the sections to come Heidegger uses the following expressions: "zeitlich," "Zeitlichkeit," "zeitigen," "Zeitigung," "temporal," and "Temporalität." Macquarrie and Robinson have suggested the following translations for these terms: "temporal," "temporality," "to temporalize," "temporalization," "Temporal," and "Temporality." I have decided to follow these suggestions, even though I find the use of capitals awkward and artificial. The German word "zeitigen" means to mature, ripen, in the sense of tobring to maturity, effect, produce; but it can also mean to mature and to grow ripe. "Zeitigung" means ripening, maturing, maturation. Although in some instances some of these connotations are meant, Heidegger uses these terms usually in the sense of "to let time be," "to make time be," as we shall see shortly. The English word "to temporalize" usually means "to secularize," to make something that is sacred or divine become temporal and earthly in character; yet the verb can also mean "to make something temporal." If the verb "to temporalize" is taken in the latter sense without any 20Cf. Reiner A. Bast and Heinrich P. Delfosse, Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers "Sein und Zeit." Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1979. Yet in The BasicProblems of Phenomenology the term "Temporalität" is used for temporality insofar as temporality itself is made into a theme as the condition of the possibility of all understanding of Being.
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religious connotation it seems to be a good word to choose for zeitigen in Heidegger's sense. Heidegger uses the expressions "temporal" and "Temporalität," which are derived from Latin roots, to express purely formal structures; they are used then predominantly where historical issues are discussed (cf. Section 6). Yet these two terms are also used to refer to time taken as the horizon for the understanding of Being and as the condition of the possibility of all understanding of Being. As far as I know in Being and Time this occurs only once, namely in the section in which Heidegger presents the design of the book; the term is used there only in the description of the part of the book which actually was not published. (SZ, 39-40) In Being and Time, as we actually have it, the expressions "temporal" and "Temporalität" are thus used almost exclusively in contexts in which Heidegger is concerned with the "destruction of the history of ontology."21 I have decided not to stress the distinction in my commentary in view of the fact that the context in which the expressions are used, will help the reader to determine whether a term is used in the formal or in the ontological sense. II: The Origin ofHeidegger's Conception of Time We have seen that in 1907 Heidegger received a copy of Brentano's book, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle. This book confronted him with the problern ofBeing and the question ofthe condition of the possibility of Being's being able to have several meanings. At some time between 1919 and 1924 Heidegger got the idea that time must be this condition of possibility. In 1924 Heidegger was asked to address the faculty of theology and he selected for this lecture as his theme: the concept of time. As far as we now know this was the first time in which Heidegger unfolded his view on the relation between Dasein, Being, and time.22 Heidegger begins his lecture by explaining that he will not make an effort to define time in terms of infinity or eternity; for this would be the typical approach of the theologian. The philosopher, who as philosopher does not believe and as such is not a believer, will have to approach time from the perspective of time itself. Yet this 21Cf. The Basic Problems, pp. 228 (German ed. p. 324), 324-330 (461-469). Also see Marion Heinz, Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität im Frühwerk Martin Heideggers. Würzburg, Rodopi, 1982. 22Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Le concept de temps (1924)," trans. Michel Haar, in Michel Haar, Martin Heidegger. Paris: Edition de l'Herne, 1983, pp. 27-37.
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investigation is not philosophical either, if by philosophy one means the effort to present a systematic and universally valid definition of the concept of time. The present investigation is neither scientific nor philosophical in the usual sense. These reflections have nothing in common with what usually is called philosophy, except for the fact that they are not theological.23 First a brief observation on the everyday conception of time, about natural and universal time, appears to be in order here. Modern physics has made us raise the question of what time is again in a new way; the theory of relativity is mainly responsible for this. Heidegger notes in passing that the meaning of the theory is often misunderstood; it really meant to establish the invariability of basic equations with respect to arbitrary transformations. Here a close relation between motion and time is stressed, one that we already find in Aristotle: Although time is not movement, yet it must be something closely connected with motion.24 This conception of time makes it possible to use motion as a measure of time. It is in this perspective that clocks and watches should be understood: some "homogeneous" motion of a periodic nature is used to measure time. The clock does not really measure duration, but merely fixes the now moment in a durable manner. In a series of brief questions Heidegger then turns from an objective measured time to the time that is relevant to me, to what I am doing or have to do. This leads to questions about the now and about time and to the realization that we appear to dispose over time, over its Being. This in turn leads him to Augustine who in the Confessions came to a similar realization: In you, my soul, do I measure time. Do not bother me with the question why? Do not let the throng of your affections bother you, either. It is in you, my soul, that I measure time-spans. The things that pass make an impression on you; and while these things pass, this affection remains; it is' this present disposition (Befindlichkeit) that I measure.25 The question of what time is has, thus, led us to consider Dasein by which is meant here the human reality in its Being. This being is the being that I in each case am myself, and continually am myself in each case. One wonders whether it indeed was necessary to go 23Jbid., pp. 27-28. 24Aristotle, Physics, IV, 11, 219a2-10. 25St. Augustine, Confessions, XI, 27.
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through a complicated detour in order to arrive at an insight to which one could have turned immediately. Could we not have said with Husserl (not mentioned) that all acts of consciousness are psychic processes in time even if these acts are concerned with nontemporal objects. In Heidegger's view the detour was necessary to show that there are different modes of being temporal and to make visible in a clearer way the distinction between what is in time and temporality itself. Up until now we have made use of insights that belong to the everyday understanding of natural time. If it now appears tobe the case that Dasein is "in time" in a very special and privileged way to the degree that what time is, is to be derived from its mode of Being, then it is clear that the basic characteristics of the mode of Beingof Daseinare tobe explained first.26 Heidegger lists some of these characteristics without "proof' or "justification": 1) Dasein is defined as Being-in-the-world; Dasein concernfully deals with world. Man thinks, questions, reflects, does, works, in a word is concerned with the world (Besorgen). 2) Dasein as Being-in-the-world is there with others, takes part with others in the da, the world; Dasein is there together with others in the mode ofbeing for each other. 3) Speaking is the privileged mode of Being-in-the-world-withothers. Dasein speaks with others about something. 4) Each Dasein defines itself by its "I am." For Dasein the Jeweiligkeit is constitutive; it is constitutive for each Dasein to be in such a manner that in each case it is present as actually whiling. 5) In most cases I am in a state such that I am not actually my own self, but rather identical with the "they" or the "one." One says, one does, one fears ... 6) The mode of Being characteristic of man is care, Sorge. 7) Although the banality of Dasein's everyday mode of Being does not imply any reflection on the "I" and the "self," nonetheless, Dasein possesses itself; it has a certain disposition in regard to itself. 8) What has been said here about Dasein cannot be proven or even shown; one must realize that the first relation of Dasein to itself is not that established through reflection, but is tobe itself.27 These characteristics suggest and imply that this being is such that its mode of Being can be made accessible by further specification. But this supposition is shakeable. The problern here is not one of the Iimits of our finite understanding, but rather one that is typical for 26"Le concept de temps," pp. 29-30. 27Jbid., pp. 30-31.
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the Being of Dasein itself. Dasein is defined ontologically in a primordial manner if it is defined from its extreme possibility. It is from the determination of that possibility that all characteristic ontological traits mentioned necessarily follow. Now the problern is one of how one can define Dasein before it has reached its final end. Before that moment Dasein is continually on the way. Before it has reached that point it never is properly (eigentlich) what it can be, and is really what it is not yet. One could think. that one could avoid this difficulty by learning from others who were there with us and now have died. Insights gained from the death of others do not illuminate us in our own mode of Being. The Being-there of others cannot replace Dasein in the proper sense. The end of Dasein is its death; its death is its own extreme possibility. This death is certain, always imminent, and yet always to be characterized with a complete indeterminacy. The interpretation of Dasein which surpasses every other affirmation in both certainty and truth in the proper sense, is that interpretation which relates it to its death, the indeterminate certainty of the most proper possibility ofits Being-to-its-end.28 But what does this mean for our question: what is time? and especially for the question: what is Da-sein in time? It means continually and without interruption in each case to be mine (jemeinigen). Dasein knows something about its death, even when it does not want to know anything about it. What does it mean to have one's death as one's own? It is an anticipation on the part of Dasein with respect to its own "done with" (vorbei), insofar as this anticipation for Dasein is an extreme possibility in the immirience of a certainty, and yet also a complete indeterminacy. Dasein insofar as it is human life (menschliches Leben) is primordially a being-possible, the being of the possibility of being-done-with that is certain and indeterminate. As this possibility Dasein knows something about its death: this has usually the form of: "I know something about it but I prefer not to think about it." The kind of knowledge Dasein has of its death is a knowledge that tends to withdraw. This knowledge, which is an interpretation of Dasein, is one that continually tends to hide this possibility of its being. Dasein has even the possibility of eluding its own death. This knowledge conveys the possibility of its no Ionger being as Dasein. And this realization draws everything in my everyday concern into nullity and nothing. The being-done-with is not an incident but an accident in my Dasein. The issue is indeed 2B[bid., p. 31.
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about its being-done-with, not about something that at a certain place originates, disturbs it, and transforms it. This being-done-with is not a what but a how (Was -wie); as a matter of fact, it is the proper how of my there (das eigentliche Wie meines da). This being-done-with which I can anticipate insofar as it is mine, is not something of my Dasein, but simply and purely its how. To the degree that this anticipation of the being-done-with of Dasein maintains itself under the modality of being in each case as whiling (Jeweilig), Dasein itself becomes visible in its modality. This anticipation of this being-donewith (Vorbeisein) is the basic strife of Dasein against its extreme possibility; and to the degree that this running-and-striving-against (Auflaufen gegen) is serious, Dasein is thrown back during this course into the still-being-there of itself. Dasein usually lives in a state of "fallenness." Yet it also realizes its basic "done-with" so that even in its everydayness Dasein finds itself in a state of uncanniness. 29 To the degree that this anticipation preserves for Dasein its extreme possibility, the anticipation is the fundamental accomplishment of the interpretation of Dasein. This anticipation brings with it the fundamental point of view under which Dasein has placed itself. At the same time, it reveals that the fundamental category of this being is its how (Wie). It is thus understandable why Kant could define the basic principle of his ethics in such a way that one could call it purely formal. On the basis of an intimate knowledge of the human reality, he must have known that its basic mode of Beingis its how. Dasein is in the proper way by itself, it is truly eksistent (existent) when it keeps and maintains itself in this anticipation. This anticipation is nothing but the authentic future, unique to Dasein taken in the proper sense. In this anticipation Dasein is its future in such a way that indeed it comes back to its past and present in the heart of this anticipation. Thus Dasein, understood from the perspective of its most extreme possibility of Being, is time itself: Dasein is thus not simply in time.30 Insofar as its Being-ad-ventive (Zukünftigsein) is the proper mode of its temporal being, the Beingad-ventive so understood is the mode of Being of Dasein in and from which it gives itself its temporal dimension, its time (seine Zeit). By keeping myself in this anticipation and close to my Being-done-with, I haue time. When someone says that he has no time, then this means that he projects time into the false present of the everyday 29Jbid., pp. 31-32. 30Jbid., p. 32.
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concem. Being-for-the-future gives time, structures the present, and lets the past repeat itselfin the mode ofits being-lived-again.31 From the perspective of time itself this means that the future is the essential phenomenon of time. Furthermore, it is clear also that our primary relation to time is not that of its being a measure. Time can never become long, because as such time has no length. Finally, those ways of speaking in which the when, at what time, etc. are employed, are also inauthentic ways of speaking about time. The being-for-the-future which lies in the possibility of Dasein insofar as it is Jeweilig, insofar as it is in each case as whiling, "gives" time, because it itself is time.32 Questions that have to do with measure and dating and all questions about the quantity of time, must remain secondary questions which pertain to the everyday conception of time. Obviously in our everyday life we do measure time and use time to articulate dates and specific times. We also calculate time spent and measure motions and other durations. This way of dealing with time, too, belongs to the everyday way of dealing with temporal phenomena.33 Heidegger then briefly characterizes the inauthentic way of dealing with time in our everyday life, where we measure duration, measure motion and use motion to measure time, indicate the quantity of available time, and use time to fix dates and times for .. . It is in this domain that people claim that they have no time (for) .. . Everyday Dasein is mainly in the present. In my everyday concem I am usually in the state of the "one" or "they"; my time is then the time of the "one" (Die "Man "-Zeit). In this context Heidegger also mentions the objective time of the natural sciences which is nonreversible and homogeneous. This scientific conception of time has become part of our everyday conception of time. This explains that in our everyday life the past is taken to be that which is definitively past, gone, done with; the present dominates and the future is understood from the perspective of, and in terms of, the present. This also explains the lack of iriterest in history and tradition in our scientific world.3 4 If Dasein understands itself properly then it knows that it is inherently temporal and historical. Then Dasein also understands 31Jbid., pp. 32-33. 32Jbid., p. 33. 33Jbid., p. 33. 34Jbid., pp. 33-34.
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that it itself is Being-for-and-toward-the-future. As Being-for-thefuture Dasein is its past. It comesback to it in the "how." The mode of this return to the past is that of conscience (Gewissen). Only the how is capable of being retrieved (wiederhohlen). In its everyday life Dasein knows nothing of this; instead it lives in an objective time. It does not understand history and tends to tumble into nihilism. The fear of relativism and nihilism is really a fear for Dasein itself. The past taken as true history is retrievable and repeatable in the how. The possibility of access to history is founded on the possibility according to which a present knows always to be-for-the-future. And Dasein knows this to the degree that it itself is its possibility. That the present knows always to be-for-the-future, this is the first principle of all hermeneutics. It says something about the mode of Being of Dasein which is historicality itself (Geschichtlichkeit).35 In brief, time is Dasein (sie). Dasein is my being taken as in each case whiling (Jeweiligkeit), and the latter can be such only in the being-for-the-future, in the anticipation of what is gone and done with (Vorbei) which is certain but undetermined. Being (Sein) is always in a mode of its possible being temporal. Dasein is time (sie). Time itself is temporal and as such possesses the true and genuine determination of time. This does not imply a tautology insofar as the Being of time and temporality precisely means a reality that is not identical. Dasein is its past that has gone; its possibility consists in the anticipation of this being gone. In this anticipation I am truly time, have time. To the degree that time is always my time, there are many times. Time as such makes no sense. Time is the genuine principle of individuation. It is in the being-for-the-future of the anticipation that Dasein, that is plunged into its everyday life, becomes itself; it is in this anticipation that it makes itself visible under that unique characteristic of the "this present time" (Diesmaligkeit) of its unique destiny, in the possibility of its unique being-gone. This principle of individuation does not set the individual apart in an egotistic and phantastic way; it makes it precisely impossible for each Dasein to feel unique; it makes every individual the same (gleich) as everyone eise. Through the link with death, everyone finds hirnself led to the how that everyone can be in the same way according to a possibility in which no one can stand out above the others.
35Jbid., pp. 34-35.
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In the historicity of man as Dasein and thus in the Being of Dasein there is implied the possibility of retrieve and repetition. Aristotle already stressed the importance of paideia in this regard, which Ieads man from a state of Iack of Bildung over into the state of being well-educated (gebildet). As far as our own topic is concemed, Heidegger continues, we must learn to think and speak again temporally about time. What then is time? The issue here is not what time is, but rather how time is. Timeis the how of Dasein's own Being. Thus in regard to the question of what time is, one should never say that time is either this or that; for then one focuses on a what, a quid. If we focus on the how of time one realizes that the question "What is time?," changes into "Who is time?" Are we really time? Am I time? Am I my own time? If one thinks about these questions one understands why Dasein really means "to be in question."36 TII: Temporality and Time in Being and Time Mter these introductory reflections we must now turn to the question of how Heidegger conceived of time in Being and Time. As the title of the book suggests, the concept of time occupies a privileged position in this book. Already in the work's brief preface Heidegger presents his view on how Being and time are to be related. "Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question concerning the meaning of Being. . . Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being." (SZ, 1) In the title of the first Part of the book Heidegger returns to this relationship; the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality (Zeitlichkeit), and the explication of time as transeendental horizon for the question concerning the meaning of Being. (SZ, 42) The first Part of the book consists of two major divisions: a preparatory analysis of Dasein and a second division on the relationship between Dasein and temporality. As we have seen, in the first division Heidegger takes as his guiding clue the fact that the essence of man consists in his eksistence; that toward which man stands out is "the world"; thus for this reason the Being of man as Dasein can be described as "Being in the world." The main task of the first division of Part I was to unveil the precise meaning of this compound expression; but in so doing the final goal remained the preparation of an answer for the question concerning the meaning of 36Jbid., pp. 35-36.
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Being. Heidegger justified this approach to the Being-question by pointing out that man taken as Being-in-the-world, is the only being who can make hirnself transparent in his own mode of Being. The very asking of this question is one of this being's modes of Being, and as such it receives its essential character from what is inquired about, namely Being. "This entity which each of us is hirnself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term 'Dasein'." (SZ, 7) A preparatory analysis of Dasein's Being can only serve to describe the Being of this being; it cannot interpret its meaning. As a preparatory procedure it merely tries to lay bare the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being. Once this horizon has been reached, the preparatory analytic of Dasein is to be repeated on a higher, genuinely ontologicallevel. Heidegger repeats here that this horizon is to be found in temporality, taken as the meaning of the Being of Dasein. That is why on a second level all structures of Dasein, exhibited provisionally in the first division, must be reinterpreted as modes of temporality. But in thus interpreting Dasein as temporality the question concerning the meaning of Being is not yet answered; only the ground is prepared here for later obtaining such an answer. (SZ, 17) If it is true that Dasein has a pre-ontologic understanding of Being and if it is true that temporality is the meaning of the Being of Dasein, then one can show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Thus time must be brought to light as the horizon for all understanding of Being and this horizon itself is tobe shown in terms of temporality, taken as the Beingof Dasein which understands Being. It is obvious that in this context our pre-philosophical conception of time is of no help and the same thing is true for the conception of time which has persisted in philosophy from Aristotle to Bergson. This traditional conception of time and the ordinary way of understanding time have sprung from temporality taken as the meaning of the Being of Dasein. (SZ, 17-18) Normally we conceive of time as an endless succession of "nows," whereby the "not-yet-now" (future) passes by the "present now" to become immediately a "no-longer-now." The, future thus consists of the "nows" that have not yet come, whereas the past consists of the "nows" that once were but no Ionger are; the present is the "now" which at the moment is. On the basis of this conception we can make a distinction between temporal and non-temporal entities; "temporal" then means "being in time." Thus time, in the sense of
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"being in time," functions as a criterion for distinguishing realms of Being. No one hasever asked the question of how time can have this distinctive ontological function; nor has anyone asked whether the authentic ontological relevance which is possible for time, is expressed when time is used in such a naively ontological manner. These questions must be asked here and it will be clear that if Being is to be understood in terms of time and if its various derivatives are to become intelligible in their respective derivations by taking time into consideration, then Being itself must be made visible in its "temporal" character; but in this case "temporal" no Ionger means "being in time." From this perspective even the non-temporal and supra-temporal are "temporal" with regard to their Being, and this not only privatively but also positively. lt is this temporality of Being which must be worked out in the ontology whose task it is to interpret Beingas such. (SZ, 18-19) Temporality is furthermore the condition which makes historicity possible as a temporal kind of Being which Dasein itself possesses. Historicity stands here for the state of Being which is constitutive for Dasein's coming-to-pass (geschehen) as such. Dasein is as it already was and it is what it already was. lt is its past, not only in the sense that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along "behind" it, and which Dasein thus possesses as a kind of property which is still present-at-hand; Dasein is its past in the way of its own Being which, to put it roughly, "comes-to-past" out of its future on each occasion. Dasein has grown up in a traditional way of understanding itself interpretively. Its own past, which includes the past of its generation, is not something which just follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead ofit. But ifDasein itself as weil as its own understanding are intrinsically historical, then the inquiry into Being itself is to be characterized by historicity as well. Thus by carrying through the question of the meaning of Being and by explicating Dasein in its temporality and historicity, the question itself will bring itself to the point where it understands itself as historical (historisch). (SZ, 19-21) After making these preliminary remarks which merely describe what is to be accomplished by the analytic of man's Being, Heidegger does not return to the question of temporality and time until the last chapter of the first division which is devoted to care (Sorge) as the genuine Being of Dasein. In trying to explain just what is meant by the compound expression "Being-in-the-world" Heidegger first focuses on the ontological structure of the world, (SZ, 63-113) then he tries to answer the question of who it is that Dasein is
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in its everydayness, (SZ, 113-130) and finally proceeds to explain what is meant by "Being-in-as-such." (SZ, 130-180) In the introduction to this last issue Heidegger explicitly repeats that that being which is essentially constituted by its Being-in-the-world, is itselfin every case its own "there" (Da). When one speaks of the lumennaturalein man, one refers to this eksistential-ontological structure of man, that he is in such a way that he is his own "there." This means among other things that Dasein carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off; Dasein because of this "there" is to be characterized by its disclosedness. By reason of this fundamental disclosedness Dasein, together with the Being-there (Da-sein) of the world, is "there" for itself. In the eksistential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness three equally constitutive components are to be distinguished, namely original understanding, ontological disposition, and logos (Rede). (SZ, 133-134) After explaining the meaning of the compound expression "Being-in-the-world" along these lines by describing its basic constitutive elements, Heidegger sets out to account for the unity of Dasein's Being: How are the unity and totality of that structural whole which we have pointed out, to be defined in an eksistentialontological manner? (SZ, 181) Heidegger tries to answer this question by pointing out first that care (Sorge) is the unifying factor which integrates into a unity the multiple elements of the Being of that being whose Being is precisely such that it is concerned about its own Being. By taking his point of departure in a descriptive interpretation of anxiety (Angst) Heidegger is able to show that Dasein is a being who has the inexhaustible potentiality of transcending beings toward Being; but, if Dasein has the ekstatic nature of eksistence, it is always ahead of itself. Dasein's eksistence, however, is essentially codetermined by thrownness; Dasein is like a process which is not its own source; it always is already begun and yet it is still to be achieved. Finally, Dasein in its essential dependence upon world is fallen to the "world," to the intramundane things of its everyday concern and thus caught by the way things are publicly interpreted by the "they." Eksistentiality taken together with thrownness and fallenness explains why the very Being of Dasein is to be understood as care. (SZ, 184-196) In order to be able to show Dasein's Being in its totality Heidegger turns to Dasein's final term, death. He describes death as a genuine, but also as the ultimate possibility of man's Being. It is that possibility in which man's own Being-in-the-world as such is at stake. Death reveals to man the possibility of his further
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impossibility. In other words, death is that possibility which makes the potentiality which Dasein is, limited through and through. Man is thoroughly and irretrievably finite because his own death is that fundamental possibility which from the very beginning leaves its mark upon man's life and, thus, is a manner of Being which Dasein must assume as soon as it begins to eksist. (SZ, 235-246) In his fallen condition Dasein tries to forget the authentic meaning of death so that the question now becomes one of how one is to come to an authentic interpretation of the meaning of death, and thus to genuine authenticity. In Heidegger's view this can be shown by interpreting the basic constituents of care (ek-sistence, facticity (= thrownness), and fallenness) in terms of an eksistentialontological conception of death. Dasein which has come to authentic Being knows that death is constitutive for all of its possibilities and that the ultimate possibility of its own eksistence is to give itself up. (SZ, 263-264) If Dasein genuinely realizes this then it no Ionger flees from the definitiveness of its end and accepts it as constitutive of its finitude and thus makes itself free for it. (SZ, 264-265) Now at the moment that Dasein understands death as its ultimate possibility, as that possibility which makes its own Being impossible, and at the moment that it accepts this final possibility as its very own by listening to the voice of conscience, (SZ, 270-289) Dasein begins to become transparent to itself as that which it is in itself, in its own Self. For death does not just appear to Dasein in an impersonal way; it lays claim to it as this individual Dasein. By listening to the voice of conscience, by really understanding the genuine meaning of death in "guilt," and by accepting it as its own death, Dasein breaks away from inauthenticity in resolve. (SZ, 295-301) Now it will be obvious that if all ofthis is tobe true, then man's Being must be intrinsically temporal and temporality, in the final analysis, must constitute the primordial ontological basis of Dasein's eksistentiality. (SZ, 301-316) For what does the authentic man do? He realizes his radical finitude by anticipating death, by including it in advance in every project. By anticipating death in all its projects Dasein receives its Being precisely as its own, as its ownmost "personal" eksistence so that it really comes to itself. (SZ, 316-323) But this coming-to-itself is what is meant by "future," if the term is taken in its primordial sense. This letting itself come towards itself in that distinctive possibility which Dasein has to put up with, is the primordial phenomenon of Zu-kunft, coming-towards, future. (SZ, 325)
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But Dasein's temporality extends not only to the future; it has also the character of a "having been." Dasein can project itself towards its own death only insofar as it already is. In order to realize its ownmost Being, Dasein has to accept, together with its own death, also its thrownness, its facticity, that which it is already. Death cannot be its death if it has no relation to what Dasein already is. Authentically futural, Dasein is equally authentically "having-been" (Gewesen). To anticipate one's ultimate and ownmost possibility is to come back u;nderstandingly to one's ownmost "having-been." (SZ, 325326) Thus far we have seen that Dasein's coming is a coming to a Self that already is as having-been; on the other hand, Dasein is what it has been only as long as the future continues to come. We must now turn to temporal nearness, the present. According to Heidegger, the genuine meaning of the present consists in a "making present" (Gegenwärtigen). Dasein, as temporalizing, makes things present; this is the essential meaning of the present as it primordially appears to Dasein. Anticipating resolve discloses the actual situation of the Da in such a way that eksistence, in its action, can be circumspectively concerned with what is factually ready-tohand in the actual situation; that is, letting that which has presence environmentally be encountered, is possible only by making such a being present. (SZ, 326) The "making present" of what has presence presupposes, on the one hand, the future as anticipation of Dasein's possibilities and, on the other, the return to what has-been. By virtue of Dasein's understanding of its own Being, thus, Dasein is able to understand the human situation as a whole; at the same time intramundane beings can manifest themselves to it in their belonging to a world. Thus, what Heidegger calls "making-present" presupposes the "having-been" and the "future." The present is as the resultant of the two other ekstases of time. "Having-been" arises from the "future" in such a way that the future which has already been, releases the present from itself. What is meant by temporality is precisely the unity of this structural whole; the future which makes present in the process of having-been. Only insofar as Dasein is characterized by temporality can it realize its authentic Being. Thus temporality reveals itself here as the meaning of authentic care. (SZ, 326-327) From all of this it becomes clear that Dasein can realize its total unity only by temporalizing itself. This "becoming temporal" includes at the same time future, having-been, and present. These three "phases" of time imply one another and nonetheless are
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mutually exclusive. For this reason Heidegger calls them the "ekstases" of primordial time. We must now examine the nature of the relations which connect these ekstases of time with the structural elements of care. According to Heidegger, care must be characterized by eksistence (having to be ahead of itself), facticity or thrownness (already being in the world), and fallenness (being absorbed in intramundane things). As basically Being-able-to-be (Seinkönnen) Dasein is always ahead of itself, ahead of what it actually is. That is why its understanding has the character of a project. It is precisely because Dasein possesses the ontological structure of projecting (Verstehen) that it can always be ahead of its actual being. However, being ahead-of-itself Dasein always is already in a world and is of necessity involved in it. Thus, Dasein cannot go beyond itself without first having been "thrown" into the world. This means that eksistence as Being-ahead-of-itself always includes facticity. Finally, Dasein which is in a world into which it has been thrown, always discovers itself there as absorbed by that which immediately manifests itself there and with which it deals concernfully (fallenness). But now the relationship between Dasein's essential temporality and care will be clear at once. Heidegger expresses it as follows: "The 'ahead-ofitself (eksistentiality) is grounded in the future. The "being-alreadyin" (facticity) makes known the "having-been." "Being-at" (fallenness) becomes possible as "making-present." (SZ, 327)
IV: On the Temporality ofDisclosedness as Such (Erschlossenheit) Heidegger next turns to a temporal interpretation of the basic structures of Dasein's disclosedness which constitutes the Being of Dasein's "there." These structures were brought to light in the preparatory analysis of the first section of Being and Time where the mode of Being of Dasein was analyzed as this mode manifests itself in Dasein's everydayness. The basic structures of Dasein's Being-in discovered there are: understanding, ontological disposition or moodness, and logos (Rede), whereas the primordial way of everyday Being-in as a whole was described as concern.37 Finally, concern was shown to be inherently related to fallenness.38 It is thus understandable that Heidegger can state that the temporal interpretation of everyday Dasein must start with those structures in 37sz, Sections 13,28-34. 38Jbid., Section 38, p. 176.
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which disclosedness constitutes itself: understanding, ontological disposition, falling, and logos. 3 9 (SZ, 334-335) To provide these reflections with their proper ground we shall in each case begin with a brief description of the temporality of each moment of disclosedness in its authentic form which we already have discussed in the preceding section.40 1. The Temporality of Understanding. 41 W e have seen in Section 31 that understanding is a fundamental eksistential of Dasein's Being-in; as such it is not a concrete form of understanding or knowing, but rather the Beingof Dasein's "there" in such a way that, on the basis of such understanding, each Dasein can, in eksisting, develop the different possibilities of seeing and knowing. If the term is taken in the strict eksistential sense it means Being in the mode of projecting in which Dasein projects itself toward a Beingable-to-be which constitutes the "for the sake of which" for which Dasein eksists. Thus in understanding, one's own Being-able-to-be is disclosed such that each Dasein knows understandingly what it is capable of. When a Dasein understands itself projectively in an eksistentiell possibility, the future underlies this form of understanding, and it does so as coming-towards-itself (Zu-kunft) out ofthat current possibility as which Dasein happens to eksist then. Thus the projection of understanding is basically futural. (SZ, 336) Since Dasein can project its own self either authentically or inauthentically, it is necessary to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic future. Heidegger calls authentic future anticipation (Vorlaufen). In this case Daseinlets itself come towards itself as its ownmost Beingable-to-be; yet Dasein's future must in this case win itself not from a present but rather from an inauthentic future. If one wishes to speak about future, without making a distinction between authentic and inauthentic future, one should use the expression: the "aheadof-itself." Thus Dasein is always ahead-of-itself, but it is rarely ahead-of-itself in an anticipatory manner. The inauthentic understanding projects itself upon that with which Dasein is concerned in its everyday business. Thus 39For the problems connected with the seeming incongruency between the moments of temporality and the moment of care, see Marion Heinz, "The Concept ofTime," pp. 191-194. 40sz, Section 65. 41Cf. Graeme Nicholson, "Ekstatic Temporality in Sein und Zeit," quoted in note 1.
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potentiality Iets Dasein come towards itself in its concernful Beingalongside that with which it happens to be concerned. In this case Dasein does not come towards itself primarily in its ownmost nonrelative Being-able-to-be, but rather it awaits its future (seiner) in terms ofthat which yields or denies the object of its concern. In that case Dasein thus comes towards itself from that with which it concerns itself. Thus the inauthentic future has the character of awaiting. Now only because factical Dasein is thus awaiting its own Being-able-to-be in termsofthat with which it concerns itself, can it also expect anything and wait for it. Expecting is thus founded upon a mode of the future which is founded upon awaiting, even though the future temporalizes itself authentically as anticipation. Although understanding is primarily futural, it nonetheless is in its temporalization inherently temporal; thus it is with equal primordiality determined by having-been and by the present. Here, too, we must again distinguish between authentic and inauthentic modes of having-been and present. In its everyday concern Dasein understands itself in terms of that Being-able-to-be which comes toward it from the possible success or failure with respect to whatever is the object of its concern. Corresponding to the inauthentic future there is also a special way of Being-alongside the things of one's concern. The way of Being-alongside is the inauthentic present, the waiting-towards (Gegen-wart). On the other hand, corresponding to the anticipation which goes with authentic resoluteness, we have an authentic present in harmony with which Dasein's resolve discloses the actual situation. In resolve, the present is not only brought back from the distraction of Dasein's concern, but this present is also "held in" the authentic future and having-been. This authentic present is called Augenblick (look of the eye, moment of vision), the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the situation as possible objects of concern; yet this rapture must be held in authentic resolve. lt must not be understood in terms of the "now" which belongs to the time of within-time-ness, the "now" in which something arises, is present, and passes away. In the authentic present nothing can occur; rather as an authentic waiting-towards the Augenblick allows us to encounter for the first time what can be "in time" as either ready-to-hand or present-athand. (SZ, 338-339) In contradistinction to the authentic present the inauthentic present is called a "making present." This inauthentic present which takes the form of making-present can be explained only in
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light of the temporal interpretation of falling into the world of one's concern. We shall return to this shortly. The authentic present, on the other hand, temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future. (SZ, 338) To the inauthentic understanding which temporalizes itself as an awaiting which makes present, there corresponds an inauthentic past which has the form of a "having-been." On the other hand, the authentic coming-towards-itself of anticipatory resolve is at the same time a coming back to one's ownmost self. This ekstasis makes it possible for Dasein to take over in resolve that being which it already is. Thus in anticipating Dasein brings itself again forth into its ownmost Being-able-to-be. If Dasein's "having-been" is authentic, Heidegger calls it retrieve (Wiederholung). But if Dasein projects itself inauthentically toward those possibilities which can be drawn from its objects of concern and which it makes present, then this is made possible by the fact that Dasein has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown Being-able-to-be. This forgetting is an ekstatic mode of one's "having-been;" it has the character of backing away in the face of one's ownmost "having-been." Thus "having-forgotten" is an inauthentic way of "having-been." Only on the basis of such a forgetting can something be retained and remembered. Just as expecting is possible only on the basis of an awaiting, so remembering is possible only on the basis of a forgetting and not the other way around. It is important to note that the awaiting which forgets and makes present is an ekstatic unity in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself with respect to its temporality. The unity of these ekstases closes off Dasein's authentic Being-able-to-be and is thus the condition ofthe possibility ofirresoluteness. (SZ, 339) 2. The Temporality of Ontological Disposition. In Section 28 of Being and Time Heidegger has shown that understanding always goes hand in hand with disposition. Having a certain disposition brings Dasein face to face with its thrownness in such a way that this thrownness is not known as such but disclosed indirectly, far more primordially though, in "how one is." Being-thrown means finding oneself in some disposition or other. Thus one's disposition is based on thrownness. We must now try to show the temporal constitution of having-a-disposition. Bringing Dasein face to face with the fact of its thrownness is eksistentially possible only if Dasein's Being, by its very meaning, constantly is as having-been. The having-been is not what brings Daseinface to face with the thrown being that it is itself;
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yet the ekstasis of the having-been is what makes it first possible to find oneself in a disposition. Whereas understanding was grounded primarily in the future, ontological disposition temporalizes itself primarily in having-been. This means that the eksistentially basic character of dispositions and moods lies in bringing one back to something. It is not the bringingback that first produces a having-been; rather in any disposition some mode of having-been is made manifest for eksistential analysis. We must thus demonstrate that except on the basis of temporality ontological dispositions are not possible in that which they "signify." Weshalllimit ourselves here to the dispositions offear and anxiety. Fear is an inauthentic ontological disposition. We must ask the question as to what extent the eksistential meaning which makes fear possible, lies in what has-been. At first sight one might think that the primary meaning of fear is the future; for fear has been defined in terms of a malum {uturum; fear is the expectation of some oncoming evil. Furthermore, fear does not only relate itself to something in the future, but this self-relating is itself futural in the primordial sense. Heidegger admits that this is correct. It is correct to state that an inauthentic awaiting belongs to the eksistential constitution of fear. Yet Heidegger claims, in fear the awaiting lets what is threatening come back to one's factically concernful Beingable-to-be. Only if that to which this comes back is already ekstatically open, can that which threatens be awaited, back to the beingwhich I myself am; only so can Dasein be threatened. When my Being-in-the-world itself has been threatened, I concern myself with what is ready-to-hand and I do so as a factical Being-able-to-be of my own. In the face of this potentiality and possibility one backs away in bewilderment: this kind of forgetting oneself is what constitutes the eksistential-temporal meaning of fear. This bewilderment forces Dasein back to its thrownness in a way in which this thrownness precisely becomes closed off. Thus the bewilderment is based on forgetting. When one forgets and backs away in the face of a factical Being-able-to-be which is resolute and authentic, one clings to those possibilities of self-preservation which one has already discovered circumspectively beforehand. When Dasein in concern is afraid, it leaps from the next to the next, because it forgets itself and therefore does not take hold of any definite possibility. Every possible possibility offers itself here, · including those which are not really possible. The man who fears does not stop and carefully select one; in his bewilderment he makes present the first thing that comes into his head. When one has forgotten one's self and makes present just
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a jumble of hovering possibilities, one makes possible that bewilderment which constitutes the dispositional character or Being of fear. The specific ekstatic unity which makes it eksistentially possible to be afraid, temporalizes itself thus out of the kind of forgetting of self characterized above; as a mode of having-been it modifies its present and its futurein their own temporalizing. The temporality of fear is a forgetting which awaits and makes present. We must now turn to the temporality of anxiety. In Section 29 of Being and Time it was shown that in anxiety Dasein is anxious in the face of, and about, Dasein itself; anxiety is being anxious in the face of the "nothing" of the world. To be anxious in the face of one's own self does not have the character of an expecting or of any kind of awaiting. For that in the face of which one has anxiety is already there, namely Dasein itself. But is anxiety then not constituted by some future? This is certainly correct; yet this is not the inauthentic future of awaiting. Anxiety discloses the nullity of the world; and this insignificance in turn reveals the nullity ofthat with which one concerns oneself. The revealing of this impossibility signifies that one is letting the possibility of an authentic Being-able-to-be come to the fore. What is the temporal meaning of this revealing? Anxious Dasein is anxious about its naked self as something that has been thrown into uncanniness. Anxiety brings one back to the pure that-it-is of one's individualized thrownness. (SZ, 343) This bringing back is neither an evasive forgetting nor a remembering. But anxiety as such does not imply either that one has already taken over one's eksistence into one's resolve by means of retrieve. Rather anxiety brings one back to one's thrownness as something possible that can be retrieved. In this manner it also reveals the possibility of an authentic Being-ableto-be; this is an ability which in retrieve must come back to its own "there," as something that is futural which "comes towards" it. Thus the character of having-been is constitutive for the ontological disposition of anxiety; the specific eksistential mode of this character consists in "bringing one face to face with retrievability." (SZ, 343) In fear Dasein is bewildered and it Iets itself drift back and forth between "worldly" possibilities which it however does not seize. In contrast to its making present which is not held on to, the present of anxiety is held on to when Dasein brings itself back to its ownmost thrownness. But even though the present of anxiety is held on to, it does not yet have the character of the Augenblick, the authentic present, which temporalizes itself in resolve. Anxiety brings one in
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the disposition or mood for a possible resolve; in the present of anxiety Dasein is ready for that authentic moment. It is important to note that the temporality of anxiety is peculiar insofar as it is grounded primordially in having-been; future and present temporalize themselves only out of this having-been. Furthermore, in anxiety Dasein is taken all the way back to its naked uncanniness and it becomes fascinated by it. This fascination takes Dasein back from its "worldly" possibilities; but above all it gives Dasein at the same time the possibility of an authentic Being-able-tobe. Finally it must be noted here also that fear is occasioned by beings with which we concern ourselves in our everyday world; anxiety, on the other hand, arises out of Dasein's Being-in-the-world itself as Being-thrown-towards-death. Understood temporally, this rising up of anxiety out of Dasein's Being-in-the world means that the future and the present of anxiety temporalize themselves out of a primordial having-been and in this way they bring us back to the possibility of retrieve. Genuine anxiety can arise only in a Dasein that is resolute. Although both fear and anxiety, as modes of ontological disposition, are grounded primarily in having-been, they each have a different source with respect to their own temporalization; this source is to be found in the temporalization of care: anxiety springs from the future of resolve, whereas fear springs from the lost present. The thesis concerning the temporality of various modes of disposition or moods also holds for other moods such as the palid lack of a specific mood, hope, joy, enthusiasm, gaiety, etc. Heidegger briefly indicates how this can be shown with respect to hope and the lack of a specific mood. (SZ, 345-346) 3. The Temporality of Falling. As is to be expected from the preceding sections, falling has its eksistential meaning not in the future (understanding), nor in the past (disposition), but in the present. The phenomenon of falling was analyzed by means of an interpretation of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. In the temporal analysis of falling Heidegger takes the same course but decides to limit hirnself to the phenomenon of curiosity, because the specific temporality of falling can be seen there most easily. In Section 36 of Being and Time it was explained that curiosity is a distinctive tendency of Dasein's Being to concern itself with a being-able-to-see. In curiosity it lets beings both ready-to-hand and present-at-hand be encountered bodily in themselves with regard to
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the way they Iook. This letting them be thus encountered is grounded in a present. This present provides us in general with the ekstatic horizon within which beings can have bodily presence. Yet curiosity does not make the present-at-hand present in order to dwell with it and understand it; it seeks to see only in order to see and to have seen. Since curiosity is a making-present that gets entangled in itself, curiosity's present has an ekstatic unity with a corresponding future and past. Curiosity implies the craving for what is new; thus it is some way of proceeding towards something that is not yet seen, but this is done in such a manner that the making-present seeks to extricate itself from awaiting. Thus curiosity is futural in a way that is totally inauthentic. It does not only not await a possibility, but in its craving instead desires such a possibility as something that is already actual. Curiosity is thus constituted by a making present which is not held on to, but one which, in making present, thereby constantly seeks to run away from the awaiting in which it nevertheless is "held." The present originates in, but also leaps away from, the awaiting that belongs to it. The making-present which leaps away in curiosity is so little dedicated to the thing about which it is curious, that when it obtains sight of anything new, it already Iooks away to what is coming next. The making-present which both "arises and leaps away" from the awaiting of a definite possibility which one has taken hold of, makes possible ontologically that one does not dwell on the relevant thing; and this not-dwelling is, as we have seen, distinctive of curiosity. Yet one must note that the making-present does not leap away from the awaiting and detaches itself from it. This leaping-away is rather an ekstatic modification of awaiting itself, one in which the awaiting in each case immediately 'leaps after the making-present that constantly is seeking for something new. In other words, in this case the awaiting gives itself up, as it were. The modification of the awaiting by this form of making-present which immediately leaps away is the condition of the possibility of distraction. Curiosity makes present for the sake of the present. It becomes entangled with itself; it becomes distracted and never dwells anywhere. This mode of the present is the opposite of the Augenblick, the authentic present. If Dasein dwells never anywhere, it is everywhere and nowhere. In the authentic present, on the other hand, it brings eksistence into the eksistential situation (SZ, 346) and discloses Dasein's authentic "there." (SZ, 347)
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The more inauthentic the present is and the more makingpresent turns toward itself, the more it flees in the face of a definite being-able-to-be and closes this off; but in that case, all the less can the future come back to that Being which has been thrown. In the leaping-away of the present, one also forgets increasingly. Now the fact that curiosity always holds by what is coming next, and always has forgotten what has gone before, is not the result that flows from curiosity; rather it is the ontological condition for curiosity itself. (SZ, 348)
4. The Temporality of Logos. Dasein's disclosedness is constituted by understanding, disposition, and falling. This disclosedness becomes articulated in logos, Rede. This explains that logos does not temporaUze itself primarily in one of the three ekstases. Yet factically, logos expresses itself for the most part in language, and speaks proximally in the way of addressing itself to the everyday world that surrounds us by talking about things with which we concern ourselves; this in turn explains why in logos the making-present has a privileged constitutive function. The verb tenses and all the other temporal phenomena of language, however, do not originate from the fact that logos expresses itself also in temporal processes and events which are encountered "in time." Nor does their basis lie in the fact that speaking runs its course in a psychical time. Logos is in itself temporal, since all talking about, of, or to is grounded in the ekstatic unity of temporality. In Heidegger's view ontological problems that can be raised with respect to logos, language, and other temporal phenomena of language, cannot be formulated with the help of the ordinary, traditional conception of time, to which the science of language needs must have recourse. The genuinely philosophical analysis of the temporal constitution of logos and the explication of the temporal characteristics of our language patterns can be tackled only after the problern has been solved as to how Being and truth are connected in principle. And that problern can be solved only from the perspective of the problematic of temporality. There one can also explain the ontological meaning of the "is" and clarify how "signification" really arises. Heidegger had hoped to tackle these issues in the second chapter of the third part of Being and Time. This part however has never been published. (SZ, 349) 5. Concluding Observations. Wehaveseen that understanding is grounded primarily in the future, disposition temporalizes itself primarily in having-been, and falling has its temporal roots mainly
TEMPORALITY AND TIME in the present. Yet understanding is in every case also a present which is in the process of having-been. In the same way, one's disposition temporalizes itself also as a future which is makingpresent. And the present leaps away from the future that was made possible by a having-been. Thus we can see, Heidegger concludes, that "in every ekstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ekstatic unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself in each case, is grounded the totality of the structural whole of eksistence, facticity, and falling-i.e., the unity of the care structure." (SZ, 350) It is clear from the above also that temporalizing does not signify that the ekstases follow each other in succession. Thus the future is not later than the past as having-been, and having-been is not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which is as both present and having-been. (SZ, 350) Finally, it was shown that the disclosedness of the "there" as weil as Dasein's two basic eksistentiell possibilities, namely authenticity and inauthenticity, are founded upon temporality. But disclosedness pertains with equal primordiality to Being-in-the-world as a whole, i.e., to Being in and to world. The problems which pertain to this issue will be discussed in the chapter to follow. (SZ, 350)
CHAPTERXII THE TEMPORALITY OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD AND THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSCENDENCE OFTHEWORLD (Being and Time, Beetions 69-71, pp. 350-372)
1: lntroduction The unity of the three ekstases of time, future, having-beenness, and present has been shown to be the condition of the possibility of the Being of Dasein. The being that has the mode of Being of Dasein is lighted and cleared so that it can stand in the world as a lumen naturale. (SZ, 133) That by which this being is lighted and cleared (gelichted) and which makes it both open for itself and lit-up for itself, appears to consist in care. In care, Heidegger says, we have discovered the full disclosedness of the "there" of Dasein and we have done so first before any temporal interpretation of the Beingof Dasein. Yet, as we have seen, we did discover the light of this being lighted and cleared of Dasein's in its full meaning only where we interrogated care from the perspective of the basis of its eksistential possibility. Ekstatic temporality, of which we have seen that it primarily is the possible unity of all Dasein's eksistential structures, lights and clears also the "there" of Dasein primordially. In the first section of Being and Time Dasein's Being-in-theworld was interpreted primarily from the perspective of its everyday mode of Being-in-the-world, namely its concern, Dasein's concernful Being alongside what is ready-to-hand. Now that care has been interpreted ontologically and traced back to temporality as its eksistential ground, concern can be conceived explicitly in terms of care and temporality. (SZ, 350-351) Weshall attempt to do so, Heidegger continues, by focusing first on the temporality of concern in its dealing with what is ready-tohand circumspectively; subsequently we shall examine the eksistential-temporal possibility of theoretical knowledge. Our interpretation of the temporality of Being-alongside what is ready-tohand in circumspective concern and what is present-at-hand in theoretical knowledge within the world, shows at the same time how
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this temporality is also the advance condition for that possibility of Being-in-the-world in which Being-alongside beings within-theworld is grounded. Let us thus first turn to the temporality of circumspective concern. (SZ, 351-352) II: The Temporality of Circumspecti.ve Concern
The first question which we must ask ourselves, says Heidegger, is one of how we are to obtain the right perspective from which the temporality of concern can be analyzed. In our concernful Being alongside beings within the world we deal with what is present to us in our environmental world. As examples of Being-alongside we have employed the following phenomena: the using, manipulating, and producing of what is ready-to-hand as well as the undifferentiated and deficient modes of these, as we encounter them in our everyday life. It appeared that the ready-to-hand things with which we concern ourselves are not the causes of our concern. Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand cannot be explained ontically in terms of what is ready-to-hand itself. It is equally impossible to derive what is ready-to-hand from Dasein's Being-alongside. Finally, concern, as a mode of Being which belongs to Dasein, and that with which we concern ourselves, as something that is ready-tohand within-the-world, are not just present-at-hand together, either. And yet there is some connection between them. We thus must face the question of how concern is to be related to things which are readyto-hand. How to answer this question has been prepared in part by our analysis of pieces of equipment. (SZ, 352) It is to be stressed here once more that Dasein's concernful dealing never dwells with any individual item of equipment taken in isolation. In our dealing with a piece of equipment there always is some equipmental context. This suggests that in answering the question just formulated we must orient our investigation toward some equipmental totality. As we have seen any piece of equipment is related to some thing and also to Dasein. The mode of Being characteristic of equipment is involvement (Bewandtnis). This means that something has with a given piece of equipment an involvement in something else. The relational character of the involvement of what is ready-to-hand (its "with ... " "in ... ") suggests that one isolated piece of equipment cannot exist as such. The thing that is ready-to-hand belongs to something. Our concernful dealing with things can let that which is ready-to-hand be encountered circumspectively only if in our dealing we already understand the
TEMPORALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD 271 meaning of the involvement which something has in something. The Being-alongside which discovers circumspectively in concern, lets something be involved, projects an involvement understandingly. If this is so we can conclude that [l]etting things be involved makes up the eksistential structure of concern. But concern, as Being alongside something, belongs to the essential constitution of care; and care, in turn, is grounded in temporality. If all this is so, then the eksistential condition of the possibility of letting things be involved must be sought in a mode of temporalizing of temporality. (SZ, 353) Letting something be involved is implied in every dealing with a piece of equipment. That which we let the equipment be involved in, has the character of a "toward-which"; with respect to this the equipment is in use, or at least can be so in use. The understanding of this toward-which has the temporal character of awaiting. But in awaiting the toward-which, concern can at the sametime come back by itself to the thing in which it is involved. The awaiting (inauthentic future) of what it is involved in, and together with it the retaining (inauthentic past) of that which is thus involved, make possible in its ekstatic unity the specifically concernful way in which equipment is made present (inauthentic present). The awaiting of the toward-which is not tantamount to considering the "goal" of the work, nor does it imply the expectation of the impending finishing of the work to be produced. It has by no means the character of getting something thematically into one's grasp. Nor does the retaining of that with which it has an involvement mean that that thing is heldfast thematically. Letting something be involved is constituted rather in the unity of a retention which awaits; and it is constituted in such a way that the makingpresent which arises from this, makes possible the characteristic absorption of concern in the world of its equipment. (SZ, 353-354) A specific kind of forgetting is also essential for the temporality that is constitutive for letting something be involved. The self must forget itself if, lost in the world of equipment, it is to be able "actually" to go to work and deal with something concernfully. The making-present which awaits and retains, is constitutive for that familiarity in harmony with which Dasein, as Being with one another, knows its way about in its public world. Letting things be involved is something that we understand eksistentially as a
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letting-them-be. On such a basis circumspection can encounter what is ready-to-hand as that being which it is. Thus we can now further elucidate the temporality of concern by focusing on the defective modes of circumspectively letting something be encountered, namely conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy. Let us explain briefly why and how this is so. (SZ, 354) Wehaveseen that a piece of equipment can become unusable; it no Ionger is good for what it originally was meant. We become aware of this in our concernful dealing itself. Within the context of involvement the thing that has become unusable draws attention and its pure being present now becomes conspicuous. What does this mean ontologically? In this case the making-present which both awaits and retains, is now held up with respect to its absorption in relationships of involvement. The making-present, which awaits the "toward-which" with equal primordiality, is held fast alongside the equipment which has become unusable; it is held fast there in such a way that the "toward which" and the "in-order-to" are now encountered for the firsttime explicitly. But the only way in which the making-present itself can meet up with anything unsuitable, is by operating in such a way as to retain awaitingly that with which it has an involvement in regard to something. To say that makingpresent gets held up is to say that in its unity with the awaiting that retains, it diverts itself into itself more and more; in this manner it is constitutive for the inspecting of the situation, the testing, and the elimination ofthe problem. We can thus conclude that Letting something be (involved) must, as such, be grounded in the ekstatic unity of the making-present which awaits and retains, whatever we may make accessible in our dealing with contexts of equipment. (SZ, 355) Sometimes when a piece of equipment that should be present appears to be missing, the pieces that are present begin to become obtrusive. Missing something is by no means a not-making-present. Rather it is a deficient mode of the present in the sense of the "making-unpresent" of something which one has expected or which one has always had at one's disposal. If in letting something be circumspectively one were not from the outset awaiting the object of one's concern, and if such awaiting did not temporalize itself in a unity with a making-present, then Dasein could never find that something is missing. (SZ, 355) On the other hand, when one is
TEMPORALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD 273 making present something that is ready-to-hand by awaiting, the possibility of one's getting surprised by something is based upon one's not awaiting something else which stands in a possible context of involvement with what one awaits. If a piece of equipment that should have been there is missing and if it thus appears impossible to go on with the work at hand, concern resigns itself to it. But resigning oneself to something is a mode of behaving that is peculiar to letting it be encountered circumspectively. On the basis of this kind of discovery, concern can come across something that is inconvenient, disturbing, endangering, or otherwise resistant in some way. One sees that the temporal structure of resigning oneself to something, lies in a nonretaining which awaitingly makes present. (SZ, 356) Finally it can also happen that a piece of equipment that was lost suddenly shows up again and by its presence invites Dasein to engage in a piece of work. If the latter were to appear to be impossible because Dasein is already concerned with something else, the piece of equipment can become disturbingly obstinate. In that case Dasein is surprised and, as we have seen, this is based upon Dasein's not awaiting something which stands in another context of involvement with what one actually awaits. Thus only insofar as something resistant has been discovered on the basis of the ekstatic temporality of concern, can factical Dasein understand itself in its abandonment to a "world" of which it can never become master. Even if it is limited to dealing with everyday needs, concern is never a pure making-present; rather it arises from a retention that awaits. On the basis of such a retention, or perhaps as such a basis, Dasein eksists in a world. (SZ, 356) From the preceding reflections it is clear that the temporality which is characteristic of our everyday concern with things is no more than a slight revision of the temporality of fallenness and that, in all instances considered, the focus is primarily on the present. This mode of temporalization is found also in Dasein's merely theoretical concern with things and in the sciences. But before we can turn our attention to the temporality which is characteristic for our theoretical approach to things within the world, we must first focus on the question of how the theoretical attitude in regard to the "world" arises out of Dasein's circumspective concern with what is ready-to-hand. (SZ, 356)
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ID: From "Concernful Dealing With" to the Theoretical Attitude1 We have seen in Chapter III that according to Heidegger theoretical knowledge is a special mode of Dasein's Being-in-theworld, but that theoretical knowledge is not the primary and privileged mode of Being of Dasein. Dasein's primary mode of Being consists rather in Dasein's concern with the beings that are withinthe-world (Besorgen). These beings are encountered there first as utensils and pieces of equipment with which man is to concern himself. The kind of knowledge that is intrinsic in our effective concern with the beings that are within-the-world, however, is not theoretical in nature. Thus it is not a scientific kind of knowledge, either. One could perhaps say that this kind of knowledge is prescientific. Furthermore, this kind of knowledge is obviously also still prephilosophical and, thus, preontological, even though our effective concern with the beings within-the-world implies already some understanding of their mode of Being. The worldhood of the world and the mode of Being characteristic of utensils and equipment remain still hidden in that kind of knowledge. In our concern with the beings that are within the world our comprehension of Beingis still unthematic and pre-ontological. This is the reason why also our understanding of the mode of Being of the utensils as weil as that of Dasein's own mode of Being remains unthematic and preontological.2 What has been said here is true for Dasein regardless of whether it actually concerns itself with the sciences or not. We must now try to come to a better understanding of how our scientific comportment, taken as a possible mode of Being of Dasein's eksistence, is to be related to Dasein's prescientific concern with the beings that are within-the-world, and how the former somehow originates from the latter.3 We must thus turn to the question of precisely how Dasein's concernful dealing with things changes into a merely looking at things in a purely theoretical manner. At first one might be inclined to think that this happens simply by abstaining from any kind of concernful dealing with things, i.e., by abstaining from every form of 1 For Heidegger's conception of science, see Martin Heideggger, Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977, pp. 11-39. 2Jbid., pp. 23-24. 3Jbid., p. 25; cf. pp. 23-25.
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praxis. In that case, the origin of the theoretical attitude would consist essentially in the disappearance of all praxis. Forthose who consider the practical concern to be the primary and dominating mode of Being of Dasein, theory would appear to derive its ontological possibility from some kind of privation; one could perhaps say that for those people theory remains when praxis disappears. It is hardly necessary to show that this view must be wrong. For first of all, every form of praxis at times implies a mere lookingat and, on the other hand, in many instances there can be no theory without praxis. It suffices to point to the technical views which are incorporated in the use of complicated measuring devices in contemporary science. Moreover, the practical handling of innerworldly beings requires a certain circumspection, understanding, and survey which ultimately become deliberation. It is precisely this "viewing" of things as equipment which must be changed if the theoretical attitude is to arise. Accordingly, the theoretical attitude does not consist in abandoning the praxis, but rather in taking a second Iook at the things that are within-the-world which our concernful dealing regards as equipment, and in conceiving and projecting them as "being merely there." The scientific way oflooking at the world, then, results from a shift in Dasein's attitude, which fundamentally modifies the primarily adopted view of the world. The things which initially were handled by Dasein within the framework of its primordial world now assume a different character. They lose their location in their original world and, henceforth, appear only in a place that is unrelated to Dasein and is without limitations. (SZ, 153160, 356-362) "Looking-at," which is so characteristic of the theoretical attitude, always implies a new viewpoint and a new attitude with regard to the things that are present. This attitude, taken in advance, makes a certain specific aspect of the thus encountered beings the center of our attention. Theoretical knowing is thus a "dwelling by" which includes a perceiving of, and an addressing oneself to, and a discussing of, something as something-briefly, an interpretation in the widest sense of the term. On the basis of this interpretation, perception becomes making-determinate. What is perceived in this way can then be pronounced and preserved in propositions. Perception, too, is a mode of Being-in-the-world and need not be interpreted as a "procedure" by which a subject produces "representations" of something which then are stored "inside" and can give rise to the question of whether and how they are "in
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agreement" with reality. In its turning to something and grasping it, Dasein does not first come out of an "inner sphere" as from its shell but, by virtue of its primary mode of Being itself, it is always "outside with" an already encountered being that belongs to an already discovered world. Dasein, thus, does not leave an "inner sphere" when it "whilingly" is with the beings to be known theoretically and tries to determine them, but its "being outside with the object" is Dasein itself as Being-in-the-world theoretically and knowingly. Likewise, the perceiving of what is known is not a returning to the "lockers" of consciousness loaded with "booty," after one has gone out to "gather" knowledge. Even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the knowing Dasein remains "outside" as Dasein. Even when I merely know, merely imagine, or merely remernher some way in which the beings are interconnected, I am not less with them "outside" in the world than I was when I originally perceived them. By knowing in a theoretical way, Dasein achieves a new "state of Being" with regard to the world already discovered in Dasein's basic mode of Being itself. This new power-to-be can develop in an autonomous way and, as science, it can even take control over our Being-in-the-world. The subject's dealing with the world, however, is neither freshly created by theoretical knowledge, nor does it originate from an action of the world on the subject. Theoretical knowledge is a mode of Dasein based upon Being-in-the-world itself. (SZ, 62)
The preceding remarks contain also a reply to the question about the eksistential conditions which make it possible for Dasein to eksist by way of theoretical knowing. Nevertheless, we must now explicitly reflect on this question in order to throw light on the temporal significance of the transition from the original praxis to theory and science. For this reason we must revert also to what was said about the circumspection which characterizes our everyday dealing with beings that are within-the-world. As has already been shown, the origin of theory cannot be explained by simply declaring that theory is that which is left over when the praxis is abandoned. One of the reasons why the origin of theory cannot be explained in this way is the fact that the praxis itself always implies a certain way of viewing the beings that are withinthe-world, which Heidegger calls circumspection. According to him, theory arises precisely because this "looking-at" the beings that are within-the-world is itself changed when there is question of theory.
TEMPORALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD 2:17 Circumspection is concerned with the referential relations that exist within a given equipmental totality. It is guided by a certain "survey" of this totality. The main characteristic of this survey is that it discloses a complex of involvements in which our concernful dealing with things is situated. In other words, this surveying is ultimately a function of the power-to-be that Dasein tries to realize. (SZ, 359) By interpreting what it has seen through "deliberation," Dasein's surveying circumspection brings the beings that are withinthe-world within its area ofinterest. (SZ, 359) The scheme according to which this deliberation takes place can be indicated by the conditional relation "if... then." For example, ifthis is tobe made, then that has tobe done first. I{ I want to build a house, then I must first buy bricks. By such circumspective deliberation Dasein becomes clearly aware of its situation in the world. Thus, circumspective deliberation does not intend to establish what the characteristics of things are, but to provide Dasein with the possibility of orienting itself within the world. Circumspective deliberation brings things closer to us; it is a way of "making present." This circumspective "making present" has several foundations. In the first place, it presupposes the retention of a certain equipmental context, that is, a temporalization of the past, a bringing back of the past. In its circumspective deliberation Dasein is always already with a complex of equipment and materials which it already discovered in its concernful dealing with the beings that are withinthe-world. Secondly, Dasein looks toward the realization of a certain possibility to which it tends. Thus, whatever Dasein does, realizes, or undertakes is conditioned by a "tending to" and is oriented toward an intended possibility. Therefore, the typical "making present" of circumspective deliberation is confined to bringing closer that which is discovered in a retentive "tending to." Thirdly, Heidegger continues, the equipment and the material needed for doing something must already be known as such. But this knowing likewise implies necessarily a retention and a "tending to": a "tending to" because I can grasp bricks as bricks only in the perspective of the house that will be built of them; a retention because I can link bricks to the house which I intend to build only by returning to past events. The condition which makes it possible that what has been projected in circumspective understanding can be brought closer in a
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"making present," lies in the unity of temporalization, i.e., in the way the present is rooted in the futureandin "having-been." (SZ, 360) The importance of all this for the transition from the original praxis to theory and science can perhaps best be shown by way of an example. When I say of a hammer which I am now using, that it is too heavy for me, I want to say that the handling of that hammer requires too much effort on my part. In that case I regard the hammer as a tool which I use within a certain equipmental totality. I can also say, however, that the hammer weighs three pounds. In that case, I no Ionger consider the hammer in function of a definite role within this particular equipmental totality, but rather as a material thing that is subject to the law of gravity. Compared to the first sentence, the second sentence contains a shift in standpoint: the hammer has been detached from the whole within which it was handled and conceived; it is considered now merely as a material thing which is "simply there." In this latter perspective it is no Ionger meaningful to say that the hammer is heavy or light; now the only meaningful statement is the one that expresses precisely how much the hammer weighs. This shift in standpoint is neither the result of the fact that we have actually ceased to wieid the hammer, nor of the fact that we make abstraction from such possible handling of it. These two aspects are left out of consideration in a purely negative way. The only important point is that we have adopted an entirely new attitude in regard to the hammer, in virtue of which we acquire a new view of it. This viewpoint, in turn, Ieads to an entirely new type of understanding in which the hammer is regarded solely as a material thing that is "simply there." Accordingly, there is a change in our understanding of the beings as beings, for the beings that are within-the-world are now divorced from their world; they are no Ionger conceived in their relation to the whole of the surrounding world (demundanization). When we say that the hammer weighs three pounds, we disregard not only its possible use, but also its location relative to a certain equipmental totality. Its actual and possible locations do not matter any more, for the hammer is no Ionger within the spatial and temporal world. We can also reverse this and say that its location has become a spatio-temporal moment, a "world point," which is in no way distinguished from any other such point. (SZ, 362) In this way the world is being stripped of its spatiai determinations. The temporal aspects of the beings are also eliminated, since I no Ionger consider the hammer in the perspective
TEMPORALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD 279 of its use now, on the basis of an actual situation. The advantage of such procedure is that from now on I am able to describe and determine with precision the structural moments of the "merely there." We must now retum to the question concerning the relevance of all of this for our effort to come to a better understanding of the essence of modern seience. An important characteristic of contemporary science can perhaps be seen in the fact that the seiences make the relevant beings appear only in that kind of objectivity which is constituted and maintained by the various scientific objectivations. (SZ, 155-156) This point needs to be explained somewhat more in detail. As we have already seen, the primordial root and source of meaning is for Heidegger not found in a relationship of knowing but in a relationship of Being. Knowing is only a special, derivative mode of our Being-in-the-world. The characteristic feature of this way of Beingin-the-world is that Dasein confines itself to "looking at" the world without being totally involved and engaged in it. This contemplative "looking at" always implies a particular attitude of Dasein toward the beings in the world; hence the beings that are encountered in this way are always seen from a particular viewpoint. Which aspect these beings will reveal to Dasein in its theoretical attitude depends on the attitude Dasein will adopt in regard to them. By making that aspect the object of a critical and methodical inquiry, theoretical Dasein lays the foundation for a particular empirical science. Accordingly, by his very attitude toward the things that are there, the man of science defines an area of the beings that are within-the-world as the domain of his object of study. This discovery and the preeise delimitation of a well-defined domain is the first step of every scientific research. The assertion that the "object" of each of the seiences represents a well-defined domain is evident from the fact that the "object" prescribes a priori the way in which possible problems should arise. Every new phenomenon ernerging in such a domain is examined as long as it fits into the normative object totality of the science in question. 4 The problern now is how this discovery and this delimitation of such an object domain is to take place.
4Martin Heidegger, Holzwege. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1963, pp. 71-76; Vorträge und Aufsätze. Pfullingen: Neske, 1954, pp. 55-59.
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IV: Thematization. Thematization is Objectivation Heidegger thinks that in every theoretical, and a fortiori in every scientific, orientation toward the world, the scientific experience itself contains already a special thematization in which the object of knowledge is taken, constituted, and projected as its theme. (SZ, 363) In this projection a certain domain of the beings is staked out, the approach to this domain is given its particular methodical direction, the structure of the conceptual and discursive explanation receives its orientation, and a specific language is constituted. The thematization comprises the above mentioned primordial projection, the staking out of a definite object domain, the determination of the method as the approach to this domain, and the orientation of the conceptual structure and of the linguistic expression proper to this domain of research. The purpose of the thematization is to free the worldly beings or a particular group of beings in such a way that they can be the object of a purely theoretical discovery and therefore can be examined "objectively." Thematization thus is objectivation. Heidegger demands that every science be "objective," that it adheres to the "facts"; but he refuses to admit that these facts can be completely "dehumanized" (scientism) or ought to be completely divorced from the world (idealism). The reason for this refusal is that the scientific subject also is a Being-in-the-world and as such continues to be at least partially involved in it. (SZ, 59-62, 364) To clarify his position, Heidegger distinguishes between "Being available as equipment" of the beings within-the-world in our everyday concernful dealing and their "merely Being present at hand" when we assume the scientific attitude. He argues that just as our daily concern precedes our scientific "looking at," so also "being available as equipment" precedes "merely Being present at hand." Before we are able to conceive of something under a special aspect in a limiting and abstracting consideration, we must already have been confronted with this thing in its fullness in an allembracing relation in which we were still totally involved. Accordingly, the shift in standpoint of the theoretical scientist has an abstracting and limiting function, by virtue of which that which is primordially given is broken up in such a way that one aspect can be sharply illuminated. Thus every science, even in its scientific experience, is rooted in the a priori character of the formal aspect under which a group of things is considered in each case.
TEMPORALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD 281 Everything eise depends on this formal aspect: the foundations of scientific research, the methods, the language, the type of argumentation, the mode of intelligibility, and the typical conception of truth and certitude. Thus, at the root of every science we find a "making present" of the beings that are within-the-world. This "making present" differs from our everyday concern in that it aims solely at disclosing the beings in an "objective" way, i.e., as pure data of theoretical observation, as "merely being there." (SZ, 153-160, 356364)
The ultimate material object of a science is the perceived real things. The task of science is to describe that which is so perceived as "merely-present-at-hand," i.e., from the viewpoint of the ontic objectivation. Thus it follows that science is not only abstract in itself, but that its proper object also must always be something abstract. For reality, taken as "merely there" is only the correlate of a secondary intentionality which has its foundation in, and results from, our primordial intention which is our eksistence itself. If, then, in science we speak of reality as an object by itself, we envisage it from the start according to a dimension which is only virtually contained in perception, but with which it does not coincide completely. In comparison to perceived reality, objective reality is an interpretation and an explanation but at the same time also an impoverishment. Science makes an objective aspect of the primordial perception explicit, but in doing so it tums away from the real beings taken in the full sense of the term, in order to discover and explain only some of their aspects. Since these aspects are indeed aspects of the real, science remains theoretical knowledge of what is real. Accordingly, the explication, interpretation, and explanation of the purely objective side of the real Ieads to a specific meaning which truly belongs to these beings, but only from the viewpoint of its "merely-Being-present-at-hand." This meaning can be disclosed only by a method and by cognitive processes that correspond to the proper object. (SZ, 364-366) The genesis of a science comes-to-pass in the objectivation of a domain of beings, i.e., in the formation and structural development of the understanding of the conception of the mode of Being of the relevant beings. In this process the basic concepts of a given science become unfolded and articulated. The articulation of the basic concepts also delineates in each case the ground and the foundation of the given discipline and its domain. The domain which in this way is delineated by the process of objectivation can now become the
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theme of investigation; the objectified whole can then be examined in different directions and established and defined as the object of investigation. Thus the thematization develops in each case on the basis of the relevant form of objectivation. The entire process which we have tried to describe here usually takes place in a "naive" manner so that the researchers often are not explicitly aware of what takes place under their eyes, so to speak. Yet that the objectivation constitutes the essential process in the genesis of a given science and that this process is nothing but the formation and articulation of the understanding of the basic mode of Being of the relevant beings which are to become the theme of scientific investigation in a given science, can be shown unequivocally to be the case by means of a description of the genesis of the modern, mathematical science of nature.5 What is decisive for the development of mathematical physics consists neither in its high esteem for the observation of the "facts," nor in its application of mathematics in determining the character of the natural processes and events; rather it consists in the manner in which nature itself is mathematically projected. In this projection something which is constantly present-at-hand, namely, the material beings, is discovered in advance in such a way that a certain horizon is opened up in which only what is somehow quantitatively determinable is further relevant (for instance, mass, motion, force, place, time, and so on). Only in the light of natural things that have been projected in this way can anything like a fact be found and set up for an experiment which will be regulated in terms of this projection. The foundation of the factual science was possible only because the early scientists understood that in principle there are no "bare facts." (SZ, 363-364) In the mathematical projection of nature, moreover, what is decisive is not primarily the mathematical as such, but the fact that such a projection discloses a certain a priori. Therefore, the paradigmatic character of mathematical physics does not consist in its exactness or in the fact that it is intersubjectively valid and binding for everyone. It consists rather in the fact that the beings which it takes as its theme are discovered consistently in harmony with the prior projection of their Being-structure. When the basic concepts of this way of understanding a mode of Being have been wor~ed out in detail, the clues for its methods, the structure ofits way of conceiving 5Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 27-29.
TEMPORALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD 283 things, the possibility of truth and certainty which belongs to it, the way in which things get founded and proved, the mode in which it is binding for everyone, and the way in which it is communicated, all of these are then determined. lt is precisely the totality of all these items which constitutes the full eksistential meaning of a science. (SZ, 363) The aim of the thematization is to free the beings which we encounter within the world in such a way that they can "throw themselves against" Dasein's pure discovering and, thus, become objects. Thematization is thus objectifying. It does not first posit these beings; rather it frees beings which we encounter within the world in such a way that Dasein can interrogate them and determine their character objectively. Dasein's objectifying mode of Being, of being alongside what is present-at-hand within the world, is characterized by a distinctive making-present. This making-present is distinguished from the present of circumspective concern in that, among other things, the kind of discovering which belongs to the sciences awaits solely the discoveredness of what is present-at-hand. This awaiting of discoveredness has its eksistentiell basis in a resoluteness on the part of Dasein by which it projects itself towards its Being-able-to-be in the truth "objectively." (SZ, 363) It is obvious that the condition of the possibility of the scientific thematization is to be found in Dasein's ability to transcend the beings which it thematizes and projects. The temporal problern of the transcendence of these beings and of the world will now be discussed briefly in the section to follow.
V: The Temporal Problem ofthe Transcendence of tb.e World The Temporality ofDasein's Spatiality We have defined Dasein's Being as care and found that the ontological meaning of care is temporality. Wehave seen, also, that temporality constitutes the disclosedness of Dasein's there. Now in the disclosedness of this "there," the world is disclosed along with it. But this means that world, taken as total meaningfulness, must likewise be grounded in temporality. The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, taken as ek-static unity, has something like a horizon within it. For ekstases are not simple "raptures" in which one gets carried away; rather, there belongs to each ekstasis a kind of "whither" to which one is carried away. Let us call this whither of the ekstases the "horizonal schema." The schema then in which
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Dasein comes toward itself futurally is the "for the sake of which"; the schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in its thrownness is to be taken as that "in the face of which" it has been thrown and that "to which" it has been abandoned; this characterizes the horizonal schema of what has been. Finally the horizonal schema for the present is defined by the "in order to." (SZ, 354-365) The unity of the horizonal schemata of future, present, and having-been, is grounded in the ekstatic unity of temporality. The horizon of temporality as a whole determines that whereupon each eksisting being factically is disclosed. With its factical Being-there, a Being-able-to-be is projected in the horizon of the future, its beingalready is disclosed in the horizon of having-been, and that with which Dasein concerns itself in each case is discovered in the horizon of the present. The horizonal unity of the schemata of these ekstases connects in a primordial way the relationships of the "in order to" with the "for the sake of which" so that on the basis of the horizonal constitution of the ekstatic unity of temporality, there belongs to Dasein in each case a world that has been disclosed. Just as in the unity of the temporalizing of temporality ~he present (Gegenwart) arises out of the future and the having-been, so in the same way the horizon of a present temporalizes itself equiprimordially with those of the future and the having-been. Thus, insofar as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world is. In temporalizing itself in regard to its own Being, Dasein as temporality is essentially in a world because of the ekstatico-horizonal constitution of its temporality. The world, therefore, is not ready-to-hand as a piece of equipment, nor present-at-hand as a thing, but it becomes temporalized in temporality. It is there with the outside-of-itselfthat is typical for the ekstases. If no Dasein ek-sists, then no world is "there" either. (SZ, 365) In all forms of concern and in all objectivation, the world is always already presupposed; for all of those forms are possible only as ways of Being-in-the-world. Having its ground in the horizonal unity of ekstatic temporality, the world is transcendent. It is already ekstatically disclosed before any entities-within-the-world can be encountered. Temporality maintains itself ekstatically within the horizons of its own ekstases, and in temporalizing itself it comes back from these ekstases to those entities which are encountered in the "there." Thus the total meaningfulness which determines the structure of the world is not a network of forms which a worldless subject lays over some kind of material; Dasein, understanding itself and its world ekstatically in the unity of the "there," rather comes
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TEMPORALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD 285 back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them. Coming back to these entities in understanding is the existential meaning of letting them be encountered by making them present. (SZ, 366) There is finally a relationship between Dasein's spatiality and its temporality. Dasein must be considered as temporal and "also" as spatial coordinately. In clarifying this relationship, Heidegger says, it cannot be our intention to explain Dasein's "spatio-temporal" character by pointing out that Dasein is an entity which is "in space as weil as in time." Furthermore, since temporality is the very meaning of the Being of care, it will be impossible to "reduce" temporality to spatiality. On the other hand, to demonstrate that spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality is not tantamount to deducing space from time. What we must aim at is the uneavering of the temporal conditions for the possibility of the spatiality which is characteristic of Dasein-a spatiality upon which the uneavering of space within the world is to be founded. When we say that Dasein is spatial, we do not mean to say that as a thing Dasein is present-at-hand in space. Dasein as such does not fill up space, but it rather takes space in; this is to be understood in the literal sense. In ek-sisting Dasein has already made free for itself a leeway (Spielraum). It determines its own position or location by coming back from the space it has made free to the place which it occupies. (SZ, 367-368) When Dasein makes room for itself it does so by means of directionality and de-severance (by making distances disappear). How is this possible on the basis of Dasein's temporality? Let us give an example of our everyday concern with things. When Dasein makes room for itself and the things with which it is concerned, it has first to discover a region in which it can assign places to the things in question. In so doing it must bring these things close, and situate them in regard to one another andin regard to itself. Dasein thus has the character of directionality and de-severance. All of this, however, presupposes the horizon of a world which has already been disclosed. But if this is so, and if it is essential for Dasein to be in the mode of fallenness, then it is clear also that only on the basis of its ekstatico-horizonal temporality is it possible for Dasein to break into space. For the world is not present-at-hand in space and yet only within a world does space let itselfbe discovered. (SZ, 368-369)
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Heidegger concludes this analysis with some brief observations on the problern of the temporal meaning of Dasein's everydayness. First of all one should note that the ontological meaning of Dasein's everydayness still remains obscure from an ontological point of view. Secondly, it is doubtful that the explication of Dasein's temporality given thus far is adequate to determine the eksistential meaning of everydayness. The expression, "everydayness" indicates the way of eksisting in which Dasein maintains itself"every day." The term "every day" does not mean here the sum of all the days of a person's lifetime. Yet even though the expression "every day" is not meant here in a temporal sense, there nevertheless is some temporal overtone in the expression. The expression "everydayness" first and foremost indicates a definite "how" of eksistence which dominates Dasein through and through during its entire life. In speaking about Dasein's everydayness Heidegger has often used the expression "proximally and for the most part." The term "proximally" signifies the manner in which Dasein is "manifest" in the "with-one-another" of Dasein's public life, even if ideally everydayness is something that Dasein tries to overcome and which, in an eksistentiell manner, it even may already have overcome. "For the most part" signifies the manner in which Dasein as a rule shows itself for everyone. (SZ, 370) Everydayness thus means the "how" according to which Dasein lives its life, regardless of whether eksistentielly it means in all its ways or only in some of its ways. To this "how" belongs the comfortableness that goes with being accustomed to how things are done, even if this would mean sometimes having to do difficult and repugnant things. This explains why "that which will come tomorrow (and this is what everyday concern keeps awaiting) is 'eternally yesterday's'." (SZ, 371) Yet these characterizations of Dasein's everydayness do not just determine some aspects of Dasein's Being; everydayness is for Dasein a way to be that is more or less familiar to any individual; everyday Dasein can eksistentielly gain mastery over it, but no one can ever extinguish it altogether. What is ontically very familiar to all of us, nonetheless hides an eksistential-ontological enigma which even at this point of our analysis we are still unable to resolve. Up until now we often have taken Dasein as if it were something that is static and immobile in certain situations; we have not sufficiently put the stress on the fact that Dasein stretches itself along "temporally."
TEMPORALITY AND THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD 2B7 We shall come closer to a resolution of this enigma when we focus on the manner in which Dasein deals with time, reckons with it, and regulates this reckoning calendrically, and when we have come to a better understanding of Dasein's everyday "historizing." Yet because the term "everydayness" in the final analysis means nothing but temporality, while temporality makes possible Dasein's Being, an adequate temporal determination of everydayness cannot be given until the meaning of Being itself and its possible variations have been brought to light. (SZ, 371-372)
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CHAPTER XIII TEMPORALITY AND HISTORICITY (Being and Time, Sections 72-77, pp. 372-397)
1: Introductionl
Up to this point, Heidegger continues, the eksistential analytic was completely oriented toward the goal of finding a possible answer for the question concerning the meaning of Being. We have learned that to answer this question, one must focus first on Dasein's understanding of Being, because Dasein's understanding is the phenomenon in which Being becomes accessible to us while, at the same time, understanding is constitutive to the mode of Being of Dasein itself. In the course of our investigation we have discovered that the Being of Dasein consists in care and that temporality is the primordial· condition for the possibility of care. Temporality appeared to be the condition of Dasein's authentic Being-able-to-be-a-whole. Our eksistential analysis of Dasein's authentic Being-able-to-be-awhole has shown that in care is rooted an equiprimordial connectedness of death, guilt, and conscience. Yet we still must ask the question now of whether we indeed have brought the whole of Dasein's Being, precisely with respect to its authentically being a whole, into the fore-having of our eksistential lFor what follows here cf. Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984; Christopher Fynsk, Heidegger, Thought, and Historicity. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986; Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit bei Martin Heidegger. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968; Fridolin Wiplinger, Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit. Eine Untersuchung über die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit. Freiburg: Alber, 1961; William Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 90-91, 237238; 279-280, and passim; Arion L. Kelkel, "History as Teleology and Eschatology: Husserl and Heidegger," in Analeeta Husserliana, 9(1979) 381-411; Bernard E. Rollin, "Heidegger's Philosophy of History in 'Being and Time'," in The Modern Schoolman, 49 (1971-1972) 97-112; Thomas E. Wren, "Heidegger's Philosophy of History," in The Journal ofthe British Society for Phenomenology, 3(1972) 111-125; David Cousens Hoy, "History, Historicity, and Historiography in 'Being and Time'," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. Critical Essays, ed. Michael Murray. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 329-353.
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME analysis. It may be that with respect to Being-towards-the-end the question may have been answered. But death is only one "end" of Dasein; the other "end" is its beginning, its birth. It seems that only the entity which is "between" birth and death, presents the whole of Dasein which we are seeking here. Thus it seems that our entire analysis thus far has remained one-sided. W e have focused only on Dasein in the way in which it eksists as facing forward, as it were; we seem to have left behind all that has been. And what is more we did not only neglect Dasein's Being towards the beginning, but also the manner in which Dasein stretches along between birth and death. Thus it seems that thus far we have completely overlooked in our analysis of Dasein's Being the whole, the connectedness of its life. But if this is so, then we must ask the question of whether our conception of temporality, unfolded in the preceding chapters is to be taken back; or is it perhaps the case that the connectedness of Dasein's life can somehow find its ontological foundation in temporality? (SZ, 372-373) One could think that it is rather easy to characterize the connectedness of Dasein's life between birth and death. It consists of the sequence of Dasein's experiences in time. But if one reflects on this suggestion and on the ontological assumptions on which it rests, then it would seem that in this sequence of experiences, what is genuinely actual in each case is just that experience which is present-at-hand in the current or actual now, whereas all other experiences either are no longer, or not yet, "actual." It seems as if Dasein goes through the span of time granted to it between the two boundaries of birth and death in such a way that in each case it is actual only in the "now"; it jumps, as it were, through the sequence of "nows" of its own "time." Dasein which is thus said to be temporal in this manner, maintains itself as a self throughout with a certain selfsameness, notwithstanding the constant changing of these experiences. Yet it is clear that in this way of looking at Dasein's connectedness we have posited something present-at-hand in time. (SZ, 373) What the preceding reflection showsisthat it is just impossible to account for the connectedness of Dasein's life in terms of our everyday and ordinary understanding of Dasein, temporality, and time. Dasein does not exist as the sum of momentary actualities of experience which successively come along and disappear. Neither does Dasein fill up a stretch of life with the phases of its momentary actualities. "Dasein stretches itself along in such a way that its own mode of Beingis constituted in advance as a stretching along." (SZ,
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374) The "between" that is found between birth and death lies already in the Being of Dasein. Furthermore, it is simply not true that Dasein is actual only in a point of time and that, apart from this, it is surrounded by the non-actuality of its birth and death. Understood eksistentially birth is never something past in the sense of no-longerpresent-at-hand. And death does not have the mode of Being of something that is still outstanding, not yet present-at-hand but just coming along. "Factical Dasein eksists as born; and, as born, it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death. As long as Dasein factically eksists, both the 'ends' and their 'between' are, and they are in the only way which is possible on the basis of Dasein's Being as care." As care, Dasein is the "between" that lies in each case between birth and death. (SZ, 373-374) If we approach the ontological clarification of the connectedness of Dasein's life, its stretching along within the horizon of Dasein's temporal constitution, we shall see that the constitutive totality of care has a possible basis for its unity in temporality. It is important to note here again that the movement of eksistence cannot be identified or compared with the motion of something that is just present-at-hand. This movement must rather be defined in terms of the way in which Dasein stretches along. Now it appears that the "specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along" consists in what Heidegger calls Dasein's historizing. Thus the question of Dasein's connectedness becomes the ontological problern of Dasein's historizing. To bring to light the structure of historizing together with the eksistential-temporal conditions of its possibility is tantamount to achieving an ontological understanding of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit). In the analysis of the specific movement which is characteristic of Dasein's historizing we shall again be led to a problern touched upon earlier, namely the question ofthe constancy ofthe self. (SZ, 374-375) But if the question of historicity Ieads us back to these sources, namely to Dasein's temporality and time, then the place where the problern of history is to be studied is ontology and certainly not, as Simmel and Rickert suggested, historiology, taken as the science of history. The problern of how history can become the object of historiology will have to be dealt with, also. (SZ, 375) After these preliminary reflections Heidegger decides to proceed in the following way. First he will speak about the ordinary way in which history is conceived. Then he will try to show how historicity can be construed eksistentially. In the next section Heidegger will attempt to explain the relationship between Dasein's historicity and
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME world-history. In his view, the fact that we can make the "process" of history the theme of the science "historiology" is the presupposition for the possibility of the way in which one builds up the historical world studied in the Geisteswissenschaften, in the sciences of man that use interpretive and critical methods. The eksistential interpretation of historiology as a science aims only at demonstrating that historiology is derived from Dasein's historicity. It is in this context that Heidegger stresses the following point: "In analyzing the historicity of Dasein we shall try to show that this being is not 'temporal' because it 'stands in history', but that, on the contrary, it eksists historically and also can so eksist only because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being." (SZ, 376) Heidegger finally decides to conclude these reflections with so~e observations on the importance ofthe work ofDilthey and Count Yorck in this context. (SZ, 377)
IT: The Ordinary Understanding ofHistory and Dasein's Historizing Heidegger begins his analysis that is to lead to an insight into the essence of history (Geschichte) by describing how the expressions "history" and "historical" are understood in the everyday interpretation of the Being of Dasein. In that interpretation these two words are used in several ways. The term "history" is inherently ambiguous because it may mean the actual historical process, the "historical actuality," as weil as the science of it. For the time being we shall focus exclusively on history in the sense of historical actuality. We shall turn to historiology, the "science" of history as a process, in one of the sections to follow. "History," taken in the sense of historical actuality, still has several meanings. The first of these is that history is that which is past. And this can still be taken in either one of two ways: by "past" we can mean that which is no Ionger present-at-hand; but by "past" we can also mean that which is past but which nevertheless is still having effects; that which is past is then understood as to be related to the present, in the sense of what is actual "now." Sometimes we mean by "history" not so much the past but rather that which results from such a past. Thus things which have a history stand in the context of a process of becoming; that which has a history sometimes can "make" a history in the sense that it determines a future in the present. Thus in this case "history" means a context of events and effects which draws on through the
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past, present, and future; the ekstases of time are to be understood here from the everyday point ofview. Sometimes "history" means the totality of those beings which change "in time," the transformations and vicissitudes of human beings, human groups, and their "cultures" as distinguished from "nature." What one has in mind here is the opposite of nature. It is in this sense that one speaks of the distinction between nature and history. Finally, "history" often means the totality of all that has been handed down to us and as such is held to be "historical." This totality comprises both everything that we know historiologically and everything which is handed down as being self-evident, even though we do not know its historical origin. (SZ, 378-379) Heidegger concludes that if we take these four significations together, we see "that history is that specific coming-to-pass of eksisting Dasein which occurs in time, such that the coming-to-pass that is 'past' in our Being with one another, and which at the same time has been 'handed down to us' and is still continuingly effective, is regarded as history in the sense indicated." (SZ, 379) These four significations are connected with each other by the fact that they all envisage man as the subject of events. But how is the coming-to-pass of such events to be defined? Is this coming-topass a sequence of processes, an ever-changing emergence and disappearance of events? In what sense does the coming-to-pass of history belong to Dasein? Is Dasein first just present-at-hand and does it only occasionally get "into history"? Does Dasein become historical by becoming related to events and circumstances? Or is the Beingof Dasein precisely constituted first by its historical coming-topass so that events, circumstances, vicissitudes, etc., are ontologically possible only because Dasein is historical in its Being? Why is the function of the past particularly stressed in the "temporal" characterization of Dasein that comes to pass "in time"? CSZ, 379) If history belongs to the Being of Dasein, and this Being is itself based on temporality, then it would seem to be easy to begin an eksistential analysis of historicity with those characteristics of what is historical which obviously have a temporal meaning. Thus, by defining more carefully the remarkably privileged position of the past in the concept of history, it seems that we shall be able to prepare the way for expounding the basic constitution of historicity. Take as an example the antiquities which we bring tagether in a museum (furniture, utensils, etc.); these belong to the time which is past; yet they are still present-at-hand in the present. In how far is
HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME such equipment historical, when it is not yet past? Is it historical only because it has become an object of historiological interest? It seems that such equipment can be a historiological object only because it is in itself somehow already historical. But then we must repeat the question concerning the right we have to call such a thing historical when it is not yet past? Do these things perhaps have something past in themselves, even though they still are present-athand today? But are they today still what they once were? They manifestly have changed; they may have become fragile and even worm-eaten. Yet the specific character of the past that makes it something historical, cannot lie in perishableness. What then is past in these pieces of equipment? What were they once that today they are no longer? They are pieces of equipment; yet they are out of use. But if they were still in use, would they then still not be historical? Whether they are in use or not, they certainly no Ionger are what they once were. What then is "past"? Nothing eise, it seems, than the world within which they once belonged to a context of equipment, and were encountered as ready-to-hand and used by concernful Dasein which was in that world. That world is no longer. But that which formerly was within that world is still in our world present-at-hand. It is in this sense that we can say that something that is now still present-at-hand can nevertheless belong to the past. When we say that a world no Ionger is, we mean to say that a worid is only in the manner of eksisting Dasein which factically is as Being in the world. (SZ, 380)
Thus the historical character of the antiquities mentioned is grounded in the inauthentic past ofthat Dasein to whose world they belonged. But if this is the whole truth, then only past Dasein would be historical, not Dasein that is now in the present. But can Dasein be past at all, if we define "past" as "now no Ionger either present at hand or ready to hand"? Dasein can never be past in that sense because as such it can never be present-at-hand. If Dasein is, it eksists. A Dasein which no Ionger eksists, is not past in the strict, ontological sense; it rather is as having-been-there. But even now we must ask again whether Dasein is just something that has been in the sense of"having-been-there", or has it perhaps been as something futural which makes present, i.e., has it been in the temporalizing of its temporality? At any rate, it is clear that pieces of equipment which beiong to history, although they are still present-at-hand while also somehow being "past," are historical only by reason of their belonging to the world. And the world has an historicai kind of Being because it is an
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ontological attribute of Dasein. There is still one question left: why is it that the historical is determined predominantly by the past, or more appropriately by Dasein's character of having-been? Before the question can be answered some other observations appear to be necessary. Heidegger contends that what is primarily historical is Dasein. What we encou1,1ter in the world, pieces of equipment and natural entities, are historical in a secondary sense. Beings other than Dasein are historical by reason of their belonging to the world; they are said tobe world-historical. (SZ, 381) We shall show later that the ordinary conception of worldhistory arises from our orientation to what is secondarily historical. Note also that world-historical beings do not first get their historical character by means of an historical objectivation; they get it rather as those beings which they are in themselves, when they are encountered within the world. Two things have become clear from these reflections: 1) it appears that Dasein is that which is primarily historical; 2) the temporal characterization of the historical in general cannot be founded primarily on the Being-in-time of things within the world. For beings of the kind of Dasein the temporal distance from "now and today" is of no primary constitutive significance; this is so not because they are not in time, but because they eksist temporally in such a primordial manner that nothingthat is present-at-hand could ever be temporal in that way. One will say that no one denies that human Dasein is the primary subject of history. Yet one should note that with the thesis that Dasein is historical we do not just mean that man as an ontic fact is historical. Thus we must still ask the question as to what extent, and on the basis of what ontological conditions, does historicity belong as an essential constitutive state to the Being of Dasein? (SZ, 381-382) ID: The Basic Constitution ofDasein's llistoricity Dasein factically has its history; it can have such a history because its Beingis constituted by historicity. We must now justify this thesis by treating the ontological problern of history as an eksistential one. We have seen that the Being of Dasein must be defined as care; care is grounded in temporality; the kind of comingto-pass that gives Dasein its typical historical character must therefore be sought within the range of temporality. The
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interpretation of Dasein's historicity will prove to be a more concrete articulation of this temporality. (SZ, 382) Heidegger reminds the reader that in the preceding sections the relation between temporality and anticipatory resolve was already revealed. (Sections 60-62) But the question still is one of in how far the anticipatory resolve of Dasein implies an authentic coming-to-pass of Dasein. Resolve was described there as a projecting of oneself upon one's own Being guilty. Resolve becomes authentic when it develops into anticipatory resolve in which Dasein understands itself with respect to its genuine Being-able-to-be. It does so by focusing on death in order thus to take over in its thrownness that being which it itself is, and to take it over as a whole. One should realize that the resolute taking over of one's factical "there," implies that the resolution took place in a concrete situation. Now our eksistential analysis cannot in principle reveal what each Dasein factically resolves in any particular case. Such an analysis cannot even speak about the eksistential projection of the factical possibilities of eksistence. Yet in such an analysis one can ask the question of whence Dasein, speaking generally, can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself. One might think that they can be derived from death in view of the fact that anticipatory projection projects Dasein upon its death; but this cannot possibly be the case. Could it be, Heidegger then suggests, that these possibilities can be derived from Dasein's taking over the thrownness of the self into the world? Before we can answer this question we must once more focus on the essential structure of thrownness as a basic constitutive element of care. As thrown, we have seen, Dasein has been delivered over to itself and to its Being-able-to-be, but to itself as Being-in-the-world. As thrown it eksists in a world and eksists there factically with others. Proximally and for the most part it is lost there in the "they." It understands itself there in terms of the possibilities of eksistence that are commonly accepted in the average public way of interpreting Dasein today. The authentic eksistentiell understanding extricates itself from the way of interpreting Dasein which has been handed down to us so little that the possibilities in one's resolve in each case are taken from that interpretation in a manner which is against that interpretation and yet also again for it. (SZ, 383) The resolve in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses actual and factical possibilities of authentic eksisting, and it discloses them in terms of the heritage which its thrown resolve takes over. In Dasein's coming back resolutely to its thrownness, there is hidden a
TEMPORALITY AND HISTORICITY handing down to itself of the possibilities that have come down to it; yet it does not take them over as having thus come down to it, but rather as those which it makes its own. If everything "good" is a heritage, and the character of "goodness" lies in this that it makes authentic eksistence possible, then the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself precisely in Dasein's resolve. The more authentic Dasein resolves by anticipating death and by thus understanding itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibilities, the more unequivocally does it find and choose the possibility of its eksistence, and the less does it do so by accident. For the anticipation of death eliminates all "provisional" possibilities. Only the realization that Dasein is free for death gives it its goal outright and confronts eksistence with its finitude. Once Dasein has grasped the finitude of its eksistence, it snatches itself back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to it, and brings it into the simplicity of its fate. Note that the word "fate" should be understood here, not as destiny (Geschick) or as a state that has been ordained by a power that cannot be conquered or avoided, but rather as fortune (Schicksal). Dasein's primordial coming-topass (Geschehen) must thus be determined in the manner just indicated; in authentic resolve Dasein hands itself over to itself, free for death, by means of a possibility which it has inherited, and yet also has chosen. (SZ, 384) Dasein can be hit by the blows of fate only because in the depths of its Being Dasein is fate in the sense indicated. Dasein which eksists fatefully in its resolve and as such is Being-in-the-world, is disclosed here as being open to both fortunate circumstances and cruel accidents. Yet fate is not the result of the dashing of events and circumstances. Even the human being that is irresolute is driven about by these, even though he has no fate in the sense indicated. If Dasein by anticipation and free for death resolves, it understands itself both in its superiority (the power of its finite freedom) and its powerlessness (in the abandonment of having made a choice); in this way it can come to have a clear vision of the eventualities of the situation that has been so disclosed. But if Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, essentially eksists as Being-withothers its coming-to-pass is a coming-to-pass-with; the latter is determinative for it as its destiny (Geschick). Destiny thus designates the coming-to-pass of the community, of a people. Destiny is not built up out of the fortunes of the individuals. Dasein's fateful
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destiny in and with its own generation makes up the full authentic coming-to-pass ofDasein. (SZ, 384-385) From what has been said it is clear that a being that eksists in the mode of fate must be such that its mode of Beingis care; care presupposes temporality and implies death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude. Only that being whose mode of Being is care, can be historical in the very depth ofits Being, its eksistence. Only a being which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical there by shattering itself against deaththat is to say, only a being which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be in the authentic present for "its time." Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate, i.e., authentic historicity. (SZ, 385) Dasein need not know explicitly the origin of the possibilities upon which it projects itself in resolve. Yet it is the case that only from the perspective of Dasein's temporality can we understand explicitly how the eksistentiell Being-able-to-be upon which Dasein projects itself, has been derived from the way in which Dasein has been understood traditionally. The resolve which comes back to itself and hands itself down to itself, then appears as the repetition (Wiederholung) of a possibility of eksistence that has come down to us. "Repeating" thus is here handing over in an explicit manner, i.e., going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has been there. Authentie repetition of a possibility of eksistence that has been, is grounded eksistentially in anticipatory resolve; only in resolve does one first choose the choice which makes one free for the struggle of following loyally in the footsteps of that which can be repeated. Repetition does not try to actualize again what has been there. Repetition of that which is possible, does not bring back again something that is "past," nor does it bind the "present" back to that which has already been surpassed. Rather, repetition replies to the possibility of eksistence that has been there. Such a reply and rejoinder is always made in the authentic present; and as such it is at the same time a disavowal ofthat which in our "today" is working itself out as the "past." Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. (SZ, 385-386)
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Repetition is thus that mode of resolve by which Dasein eksists explicitly as fate. But if fate constitutes the primordial historicity of Dasein, then history derives its essential importance neither from what is past nor from our "today" and its connection with the past, but from that authentic coming-to-pass of eksistence which arises from Dasein's future. History, taken as a way of Being for Dasein, has its roots so essentially in the future that death throws anticipatory eksistence back upon its factical thrownness, and so for the first time imparts to having-been its peculiar privileged position in the domain of the historical. Authentie Being-towards-death, i.e., the finitude of temporality, is the hidden basis of Dasein's historicity. Dasein does not become historical in repetition; but because it is temporal and historical, it can take over itself in its history by repeating. Historiology is not yet needed for this.(SZ, 386) Resolve implies that Dasein hands itself down to itself by anticipation to the "there" of the authentic present; it is this handing down which Heidegger calls fate. This handing down is also the ground of what he calls destiny, Dasein's coming-to-pass in its Being-with-others. In repetition, fateful destiny can be disclosed as being explicitly bound up with the heritage which has come down to us. By repetition, Dasein first has its own history made manifest. Dasein's coming-to-pass is itself grounded eksistentially in the fact that Dasein, as temporal, is open ekstatically; so too is the way in which we make the disclosedness which belongs to Dasein's comingto-pass our own. Heidegger now decides to call what thus far was called historicity, "authentic historicity ." In his view we are now confronted with the following problem: if the coming-to-pass of authentic historylies predominately in having been, how can this coming-to-pass constitute the whole "connectedness" of Dasein from birth to death? Heidegger begins to wonder whether perhaps the question has been properly formulated. Could it perhaps be the case that it was Dasein's inauthentic historicity that has directed our way of questioning to the "connectedness" of life; could it thus be the case that this inauthentic historicity has blocked off our access to authentic historicity and its own peculiar form of "connectedness"? This is to be examined next where we must tum to Dasein's inauthentic historicity. (SZ, 387)
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IV: Dasein's Historicity and World-History. Jnauthentic and Authentie Historicity For the most part Dasein understands itself in terms of that which it encounters in its environmental world and with which it is circumspectively concerned. This understanding is not just a bare taking cognizance of itself which accompanies all Dasein's forms of behavior (Kant). Understanding here signifies that Dasein projects itself upon its current possibility of Being-in-the-world. Understanding, taken as "common sense," constitutes the inauthentic eksistence of the "they." When we are with one another in the public world, we do not just encounter equipment and work in our everyday concern, but we also encounter there what is given along with these. This includes the world in which all of this occurs. Yet in all of this the focus of attention is on what is going on, what is getting done, and what is going to come of it. This form of understanding may seem obvious, yet ontologically it is by no means transparent. But in that case, why should we not define Dasein's connectedness in terms of what Dasein is concemed with and what it experiences? Do not equipment, work and everything eise which Dasein dwells alongside, also belong to history? Is the coming-topass of history perhaps just the isolated running-off of streams of experiences in individual subjects? (SZ, 387-388) It must be stated that history is neither the connectedness of motions in the alterations of objects, nor a free-floating sequence of experiences which subjects have. Does the coming-to-pass of history then perhaps pertain to the way subject and object are linked together? According to the thesis of Dasein's historicity one should not claim that a worldless subject is historical, but rather that what is historical is that being that eksists as Being-in-the-world. The coming-to-pass of history is the coming-to-pass of Being-in-the-world. Dasein's historicity is essentially the historicity of the world which, on the basis of our ekstatico-horizonal temporality belongs to the temporalization of temporality. As factically eksisting, Dasein encounters whatever has been discovered within the world. Thus with the eksisting of Dasein's historical Being-in-the-world, both what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have in every case already been incorporated in the history of the world. Equipment and work have their "fate," and buildings and institutions have their history. Even nature is historical, namely insofar as it was somehow involved in human concern. These beings within the world are historical as such; and their history is not something external which
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merely accompanies the "inner" history of the human soul. Heidegger calls such beings "world-historical." This expression means first the coming-to-pass of the world in its essential eksistent unity with Dasein's eksistence. At the same time it means the "coming-to-pass" within the world of what is ready-to-hand and of what is present-at-hand, insofar as they in each case are discovered with the factically existing world. Further details are not necessary here. What is important to note though is that because of the fact that the transcendence of the world has a temporal foundation, the worldhistorical is in every case already "objectively" there in the coming-topass of eksisting Being-in-the-world, without being grasperl historiologically. The world-historical is thus not constituted by historiology. Now because factical Dasein, in falling, is absorbed in what it is concerned with, it understands its history at first world-historically. And because, secondly, the ordinary understanding of Being understands "Being" as presence-at-hand without further differentiation, the Being of what is world-historical is interpreted and experienced in the sense of something that is present-at-hand, and which comes along, has presence for a while, and then disappears. And, finally, because the meaning of Being in general is held to be something simply self-evident, the question about the Being of what is world-historical and the movement of its coming-to-pass in general has no foundation here. (SZ, 388-389) Everyday Dasein has been dispersed in many kinds of things which come-to-pass daily. It is driven about by its affairs. Ifit wants to come to itself, it must first try to pull itself together from the dispersion and disconnectedness of the things that have come-topass. lt is from this perspective that the question of how one is to establish connectedness arises; how is one to understand the connectedness of all the experiences in which Dasein encounters what is within the world? Once the origin of the question concerning the connectedness has been made manifest, it is also clear at once that this origin is an inappropriate one if we are aiming at a primordial eksistential interpretation of the totality of Dasein's coming-to-pass. If this question of the connectedness is formulated ontologically in a proper manner, the question does not ask how Dasein gains such a unity of connectedness that the sequence of experiences which has ensued, and is still ensuing, can subsequently be linked together. Rather it asks in which of its own kinds of Being Dasein loses itself in such a way that it must, as it were, subsequently pull itself together out of its dispersal, and think
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up for itself a unity in which that "together" is embraced. We have already seen that Dasein's lostness in the "they" and in the worldhistorical has its root in Dasein's fleeing in the face of death. Yet Being-towards-death is a basic constitutive element of Dasein's care. Wehave also seen that anticipatory resolve brings this Being-towarddeath into authentic eksistence. The coming-to-pass of this resolve is the repetition of the heritage of possibilities which Dasein hands down to itself in anticipation. This coming-to-pass was called authentic historicity. Is perhaps the whole of eksistence stretched along in this historicity in a way which is primordial and not lost, and which as such has no need for connectedness? The selfs resolve against the inconstancy of distraction, is in itself a steadiness which has been stretched along, the steadiness with which Dasein as fate "incorporates" into its eksistence birth and death and their "between," and holds them as thus "incorporated," so that in such a constancy Dasein is indeed, in an authentic present, for what is worldhistorical in its actual current situation. In the fateful repetition of possibilities that have been, Dasein brings itself "immediately," in a way that is temporally ekstatical, to what already has been before. But when Dasein's heritage is thus handed down to itself, Dasein's birth "is caught up into its eksistence in coming back from the possibility ofdeath." (SZ, 390-391) Resolve constitutes the loyalty (Treue) of eksistence to its own self. This loyalty is at the same time a possible way of having reverence for the repeatable possibilities of eksistence. Resolve would be misunderstood ontologically if one were to suppose that it would be actual as "experience" only as long as the act of resolving "lasts." In resolve lies the eksistentiell constancy which, by its very essence, has already anticipated every possible authentic present that may arise from it. As fate, resoluteness is the freedom to give up some definite resolution in accordance with the demands of the situation. But the steadiness of eksistence is not interrupted thereby but precisely confirmed in the authentic present. (SZ, 391) In inauthentic historicity, on the other hand, the way in which fate has been primordially stretched along has been hidden. With the inconstancy of the they-self Dasein makes present its "today." In awaiting the next new thing it has already forgotten the old one. Blind for possibilities, the "they" cannot repeat what has been. It only retains the actual that is left over, the world-historical that has been, and the information about it that is still present-at-hand. Lost in the making present of its "today," it understands the inauthentic past in terms of the inauthentic present.
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We must now turn to a possible projection of the ontological genesis of the science, historiology, from the perspective of Dasein's historicity. (SZ, 392)
V: The Eksistential Source ofHistoriology in Dasein's Historicity The science of history, like any other science, at each time depends factically on the prevailing conception of world. Furthermore, if Dasein's mode of Being is in principle historical, then historiology, like any other science, remains always and manifestly in the grip of Dasein's own historizing. Yet, it must be noted that Dasein's historicity is a necessary presupposition for historiology in a sense which is markedly different from that found in the natural sciences, for instance. For historiology is the science of Dasein's history and, thus, must presuppose as its possible subject matter a being which is primordially historical. However, history must not only be just in order that historical entities may become accessible scientifically. Furthermore, historiological knowledge is not only historical because it is itself a historizing way in which Dasein may manifest itself. For these negative remarks do not yet lead us to the root of the issue at stake here. For taken as such, they do not yet show us why and how Dasein's historicity is the source of historiology. In order to accomplish these tasks one must show that the ontological structure of historiology is such that in itself the historiological disclosure of history has its roots in the historicity of Dasein itself, i.e., that the idea of historiology must be projected ontologically in terms of Dasein's historicity. (SZ, 392-393) In order to discover the idea of historiology, one cannot turn to the way things are factically done in the historical disciplines today. For there is no a priori guarantee that the idea of history which one can discover in this way, will be properly representative of historiology in its primordial and authentic possibilities. On the contrary, one can discover this idea only on the basis of a clarification of the thematization which is characteristic for historiology as such. It is obviously true that the idea of historiology as a science implies that the specific task which historiology has set for itself consists in the disclosure of historical entities. However, one must realize that entities are historical only insofar as they have been projected as historical. To explain this point which is vital for a genuine understanding of the idea of historiology we must dwell for a moment on the thematization characteristic of historiology.
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In the preceding chapter we have seen that every science is constituted primarily by a fundamental thematization in which what was already familiar prescientifically in Dasein itself, taken as disclosed Being-in-the-world, becomes projected upon that mode of Being which is characteristic of it. With this projection, the realm of entities to be examined is bounded off. Furthermore, the thematizing projection predelineates the methodological access to these entities, as weil as the conceptual structure for interpreting them scientifically. If we now assume (as is done generally), that historiology's task is to disclose the past, then the historiological thematization of history is possible only if the past has, in each case, already been disclosed. For it is impossible to go back to the past historiologically, ifthe way to it were nottobe open to it. (SZ, 393) In the analytic of Dasein's Being it was shown that this way is in general prepared for the thematization of the past through historiology insofar as Dasein's Being is inherently historical and, thus, insofar as by reason of its ekstatico-horizonal temporality it is open in its character of "having-been." Furthermore, since it has been shown there, also, that Dasein and only Dasein is primordially historical, that which the thematization of historiology presents as a possible subject matter of research, must have the kind of Being which is typical for Dasein as having-been-there, i.e., Dasein insofar as it has-been-there, the world of Dasein that has-been-there, and all entities which functioned in that world. (SZ, 393-394) The latter may still be present in our world today as the things which belong to a world that has-been-there. Thus remains, monuments, and records, that are still present-at-hand, are possible material for the disclosure of that Dasein which has-been-there. These things can turn into historiological material because, in harmony with their own mode of Being, they have a world-historical character. Thus they are capable of becoming such material only when they have been understood in advance with regard to their within-the-worldness. From this it becomes understandable why the world that has already been projected in this way as a world that hasbeen-there, can then be given its definite and articulate character through an interpretation of the world-historical material we have received "from the past." (SZ, 394) Our going back to the past does not originate from the acquisition, the selection, and critical justification of such material; for these activities necessarily presuppose the historicity of the historian's own mode of Being. It is from the historicity of Dasein itself, thus, that one must try to determine what the subject matter of
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historiology precisely and really is. In other words, the determination of the primordial theme of historiology must be carried through in conformity with the character of the authentic historicity of what-has-been-there, i.e., with retrieve (Wiederholung), taken as this form of disclosure. In such retrieve the Dasein that has-been-there can be understood in its authentic possibility which has-been. Thus when the claim is made that the eksistential foundation of historiology as a science is to be found in Dasein's historicity, this really means that when the historian takes the historiological object as his primary theme, he is projecting the Daseinthat has-been-there upon its ownmost possibility of Being. (SZ, 394)
This point is of the greatest importance for our proper understanding of the scientificity of historiology as a science. It is often said that historiology attempts to understand "the facts," i.e., the individual historical events in a chronological sequence; other philosophers have argued that history is concerned primarily with the laws that somehow govern these facts. It is not difficult to show that both these views are mistaken. The theme of historiology is not that which has happened, taken as that which happened just once and for all. Neither is this theme something universal that somehow floats above these facts. The genuine theme of historiology is the possibility that has been factically eksistent. For one must realize here that Dasein's facticity is constituted precisely by its own resolute projection of itself upon a chosen Being-able-to-be. That which hasbeen-there factually is Dasein's existentiell possibility in which fate (for the individual), destiny (for a society), and world-history (for the given constellation of intramundane things), have been determined factically. Thus because in each case eksistence is only as factically thrown in a world which only then can be its world, historiology will disclose the gentle "force" of the possible with greater penetration, the more concretely it understands Dasein's having-been-there in terms ofits possibilities only. (SZ, 394) It has often been argued that historiology should be concerned with the universal in what has been once and for all. This is then often explained in such a way that the task of historiology woUld be to show what has-been-there in some supratemporal mode. From the preceding reflections, however, it is clear that this, too, cannot possibly be the task ofhistoriology. Historiology is not concerned with passively representing or merely repeating the events of the past, but rather in retrieving what has-been-there in such a manner that in this retrieve the "force" of the possible gets struck home into the
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historian's factical eksistence, i.e., that it comes towards this eksistence in its futural character. For Dasein's historicity does not originate from the present, i.e., from what is actually only today, in order then to grope its way back from there to something that is past. "Only a being which, as futural, is equiprimordial in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibilities it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and momentarily be for 'its' time." (SZ, 437) That is, the historiological disclosure must temporalize itself in terms of the future. The "selection" of what is to become a possible theme for historiology has already been met with in the factical, existentiell choice of Dasein's historicity in which, as we have seen, genuine historiology originates andin which alone it is. (SZ, 395) From this it follows that in historiology objectivity cannot be determined by reference to the universal validity of standards and rules. Historiology is objective if its research is regulated primarily in terms of whether it can confront us with that being which belongs to it as its theme, and can bring it, uneavered in the primordiality of its Being, to our understanding. Historiology must obviously take its orientation from the "facts"; but one must realize here that the central theme of historiology is the possibility of eksistence which has-been-there in a given world. (SZ, 345) It is of importance to note· here also that each given world consists of a great number of beings and events which may be worthy of historiological research. Accordingly, this research as factical has many branches and can take as its basic theme the history of equipment and technology, the history of work, of culture, of the "spirit," and of ideas. From this it follows that history (Geschichte), as handing itself down to the historian, is in itself at the same time and in each case mentioned always in an interpretedness and explicit articulatedness. This articulatedness has in each case a history of its own. Finally, it follows that historiology penetrates to what has-been-there for the most part only through the history which hands itself down in this articulated manner. It is this complexity that explains why in historiology we can distinguish various, relatively independent branches, and why each concrete historiological research can achieve in each case a varying degree of closeness to its authentic theme. (SZ, 395-396) But regardless of whether historiology focuses on the conception of world that was typical and characteristic for an era, or on a relatively independent realm in such a world, or even merely on the critical edition of "original" sources, the actual research itself must
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be such that it contributes to the authentic historicity of the historian and his contemporaries. Historiology is authentic only to the degree that in it the three-fold character of Dasein's historicity itself is materialized. For Dasein eksists authentically as futural in resolutely disclosing a possibility which it has chosen. Coming back resolutely to itself in historiology, it .is by retrieve open for the possibilities of human eksistence. Furthermore, since Dasein is in the process of having-been (als Gewesendes), it has been delivered over to its own thrownness. When the possible is made its own by retrieve, there is adumbrated at the same time the possibility of reverently preserving the eksistence that has-been-there. Finally, Dasein temporalizes itself in the way that future and having-been are united in the authentic present. This present discloses what is the case today in an authentic manner. But if historiology interprets what is the case today in terms of understanding a possibility of eksistence which has been seized upon in the sense that it retrieves what has-been-there in a futural manner, authentic historiology becomes a way in which the inauthentic present becomes deprived of the inauthentic character it always has in the publicness of the "they." Thus authentic historiology is necessarily a critique of the inauthentic present. (SZ, 396-397) From this it follows at once that authentic historiology can never go beyond the hermeneutic situation. Authentie historiology is inherently hermeneutical in that the historical thematization is no more than a cultivation of the hermeneutical situation, which, once a historically ek-sisting Dasein has made its resolve, opens itself to the retrieving disclosure of what has-been-there. (SZ, 397)
CHAPTERXIV
TEMPORALITY AND WITHIN-TIME-NESS AS THE SOURCESOFTHEORDmARYCONCEPTIONOFTIME (Being and Time, Beetions 78-83, pp. 404-437)
I: The Preceding Reflections on Time are Still Incomplete In the preceding reflections the thesis was developed that temporality is constitutive for Dasein's Being. To demonstrate this thesis it was shown that historicity, taken as an ontological structure that belongs to the Being of eksistence, in the final analysis is temporality. In our eksistential analysis of Dasein's historicity until now we have paid no attention to the "fact" that all historizing runs its course "in time." As a matter of fact, in its everyday understanding Dasein knows all history merely as that which happens "within-time." Now if the eksistential analytic of Dasein is to make Dasein manifest ontologically in its very facticity, then the factical ontico-temporal interpretation of history must also be developed explicitly. This is all the more necessary in view of the fact that all natural events and processes are also determined by time. And even more importantly, even before every scientific concern with historical and natural events, there is the fact that Dasein "reckons with time" and regulates itself according to it. Finally, it can be shown that the philosophical conceptions of time developed in the past were built upon the primordial conception of time. We thus must make a systematic investigation of what was just called "within-time-ness," but also of our ordinary conception of time. Finally we must show how both, tagether with the philosophical conceptions of time developed in philosophy's history, have their origin in authentic temporality. (BZ, 404-405) The thesis that temporality is the orlgin of the ordinary as weil as the traditional philosophical conceptions of time, is in Heidegger's view one of great importance. Heidegger hopes to show in this way that temporality indeed constitutes the original phenomenon of time. In Beetion 65 of Being and Time Heidegger described temporality as the ontological meaning of care and defined temporality as the primordial outside-of-itself in and for itself; he wrote:
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Furthermore, in the reflections on both the relation between temporality and the meaning of care, and on that between temporality and historicity, the focus was primarily on temporality as we encounter it in Dasein insofar as it has achieved authenticity. The ordinary conception of time constitutes the manner in which Dasein understands temporality inauthentically. Another reason why in Heidegger's view the thesis that temporality is the origin of the ordinary conception of time is correct, is the fact that it is possible to explain the mode of eksistence which is characteristic of everydayness, from which our eksistential analysis took its point of departure, in its temporal meaning. Finally, the reflections to follow must also show that the ordinary conception of time has its own legitimacy and importance. Thus temporality is not the only legitimate conception of time, even though it is the primordial one. Yet Heidegger will try to showalso that the ordinary conception of time owes its origin to a way in which primordial time has been leveled off. (SZ, 405) ll: Dasein's Everyday Concern with Timel
Wehaveseen that Daseinisthat Being for which its very Being is an issue. Essentially ahead of itself it has projected itself upon its lCf. Marion Heinz, "The Concept of Time in Heidegger's Early Works," in A Companion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time," pp. 198-202.
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Being-able-to-be before turning to any consideration of itself. In this projection it reveals itself as something that is thrown, abandoned to the world, and fallen into it concernfully.2 As eksisting, in the unity of the projection which has been thrown fallingly, i.e., as care, this being has been disclosed as a "there." It is in the world as being with others, and as such it maintains itself there in an average way of understanding and interpreting. Being-in-the-world has always expressed itself, and as being alongside beings encountered in the world it constantly expresses itself in addressing itself to the objects of its concern. The concern of this circumspective common sense is grounded in temporality.3 In this case temporality has the mode of a making-present which retains and awaits. Such a concern is a concernful planning, preventing, taking precautions, in a word a reckoning-up; for concern something always has to happen "then"; something else is to be attended to "beforehand," and that which has failed us "on that former occasion" is something that we must "now" make up for. In concern the "on that former occasion" and the "then" that is still to come are understood here with reference to a "now"; in concern the present as a making-present has a peculiar importance, even though it always temporalizes itself in a unity with awaiting and retaining. The horizon that surrounds the "on that former occasion" is the earlier; the horizon of the "then" is the later on; the horizon of the "now" is today. (SZ, 406-407) What we have called here "now," "then," and "on that former occasion" are always determined with reference to actions, processes, events; thus they have a reference structure. Heidegger calls this structure datability. The precise datability which presupposes a calendar and a clock is founded on this relational structure. This structure, called datability, itself is founded on the everyday conception of time which itself is founded on Dasein's temporality.4 "Then," "on that former occasion," and the "now" are essentially connected with time as Dasein understands this in its everyday concern. The structure ofthe datability ofthe "now," "then," and "on that former occasion" is evidence that these three ekstases themselves are time, and that they ultimately stem from temporality. (SZ, 407) 2sz, Sections 41, 64, 65. 3Jbid., Sections 68, 71. 4Jbid., Sections 68, 71.
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The "now," "then," and "on that former occasion" make it possible to assign and indicate time in a primordial way; they make it possible to indicate time because interpreted time has already been given a dating in terms of the beings within the world which are encountered in the disclosedness of Dasein's there: "Now that the term has started ... ," "now that the bell rings ... ," etc. Yet the "now," "then," and "on that former occasion" not only make it possible to indicate a moment, but they help us also to indicate a time-span which may function as the horizon for a so indicated moment. We can then also speak about from ·~now" until "then," and indicate the time-span "in-between" the two now-moments. (SZ, 408-9) The everyday conception of time reflects itself in the manner in which Dasein in its inauthentic mode finds itself "in" time and "has" time. One can lose one's time by losing oneself in the object of one's concern. One can then also find oneself as having no time, or no time left. It should be noted here that just as inauthentic Dasein constantly loses time and never has any, the temporality of authentic eksistence is such that in its resolve eksistence never loses time, and always "has time." For the temporality of resolve has with respect to its present the character of an Augenblick. When such an authentic moment makes the situation present authentically, the makingpresent is held in a future which is in the process of having-been. But Dasein that is factically thrown can take or lose time only because a time is already allotted to it; but this presupposes that Dasein's temporality is as ekstatically stretched along and that the disclosedness ofthe "there" is founded upon it. (SZ, 410) Insofar as Dasein eksists in the way of Being with others, it maintains itself in an intelligibility which is both public and average. This makes it possible for several people to share a "now." And this, in turn, makes public datability possible. At any rate, as everyday concern understands itself in terms of the world of its concern and takes its time, it does not know this time as its own, but concernfully utilizes the time which "there is," i.e., the time with which "they" reckon. (SZ, 411)
Ill: The Time with Which We Concern Ourselves and Within-Time-Ness In the preceding we have seen how Dasein concerns itself with time in its everyday concern and how, in such interpretive concern, time makes itself public for Dasein as Being-in-the-world. But we have not yet indicated and explained how time itself "is." Before we
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can consider the question of whether time can be considered as a being at all, and before we can determine whether public time is merely subjectively or objectively actual, we must first try to determine its phenomenal character more carefully. (SZ, 411) Time is made public in Dasein's concern. In everyday concern one directs oneself according to the public time; public time must therefore somehow be the kind of thing which everyone can come across. We come across time in our reckoning with time on the basis of an objective measure, with an astronomical and calendrical timereckoning. Such time-reckoning is not accidental; it has its eksistential-ontological necessity in the basic state of Dasein which is care, in Dasein's thrownness and fallenness. As a matter of fact Dasein's thrownness is the reason why there is time publicly. Yet one should note also that in time-reckoning what is decisive from an eksistential-ontological point of view does not lie in the quantification of time, but must be conceived more primordially in terms of the very temporality ofthat Dasein which reckons with time. (SZ, 412) Public time appears to be the kind of "time" "in which" both the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand within-the-world are encountered. This is the reason why Heidegger calls the beings which do not have the character of Dasein, beings-within-time. The eksistential-ontological interpretation of within-time-ness will give us a better insight into the essence ofpublic time. (SZ, 412) Heidegger next describes, therefore, how man as Dasein experiences time in his everyday concern with things with the help of the naturally given day and night. "Then, when the sun rises, it is time for ... " The sun here dates time primordially. In terms of this dating arises the most natural measure of time, the day. It is in the context of Dasein's concern that the clock also has its meaning and function. Furthermore, public time has essentially a worldcharacter. Public time is therefore in the full sense of the term "world-time." World-time is the time wherein the beings within-theworld are encountered. (SZ, 419) The public world-time "in which" what is present-at-hand is in motion or at rest, is not objective if one means by this that time has the mode of Being ofthat which is present-at-hand within-the-world. But this time is equally not subjective if we mean by this that time would be something that has the mode of Being of what is present-athand and yet occurs in a subject. World-time is more objective than any possible object because, with the disclosedness of the world, world-time already becomes "objectified" in an ekstatico-horizonal manner as the condition of the possibility of the beings within-the-
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world. One encounters world-time just as immediately in the physical as in the psychical; Kant was mistaken in his position that time belongs to the psychical. Yet world-time is also "more subjective" than any possible subject, because it is what first makes possible the Being of the factically eksisting self, that mode of Being which we have called care. (SZ, 419) Time is present-at-hand neither in the subject nor in the object, neither inside nor outside, and it is "earlier" than any subjectivity or objectivity; it is "a priori" because it is the condition of the possibility forthat "earlier." But does world-time then have any Being? And if not, is it then not a mere phantom? Does it perhaps have more Being than any other being? These questions must be answered in what follows. But in whatever way they will be answered, one must first understand that temporality, as ekstatico-horizonal, temporalizes world-time, which constitutes the within-time-ness of what is both ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. (SZ, 420) But in that case such beings themselves can never be designated as "temporal" in the strict sense, for only Dasein is temporal in that sense. (SZ, 420)
IV: Within-Time-Ness and the Genesis ofthe Ordinary Conception of'I'ime Dasein regulates itself according to time by using the clock. The eksistential-temporal meaning of the use of clocks turns out tobe a making-present of the traveling pointer of the clock. For by following the positions of the pointer in a way which makes present, one counts the positions. As we have seen such a making-present temporalizes itself in the ekstatical unity of a retention that awaits. But to retain the "on that former occasion" and to retain it by making it present, means that in saying "now" one is open for the horizon of the earlier, i.e., of the now-no-longer. To await the "then" on the other hand, by making it present, means that in saying "now" one is open for the horizon of the later, i.e., of the "now-not-yet." Time therefore is what shows itself in this kind of making-present. But then we can define "ordinary" time as follows: This time is that which is counted and which shows itself when one follows the traveling pointer, counting and making present in such a way that this making present temporalizes itself in an ekstatical unity with the retaining and awaiting which is horizonally open according to the "earlier" and "later." (SZ, 421)
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But this is really nothing eise but an eksistential-ontological interpretation of Aristotle's definition of "time." "For this is time: that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later." (Phys. IV, ll, 219blff.) In making the latter claim Heidegger tries to show two things: 1) it is possible to give an account of Aristotle's conception of time from the perspective of the analytic of Dasein; 2) that which Aristotle calls time, is time as seen from the perspective of within-time-ness. Aristotle's definition of time has been maintained in our tradition until today. One was preoccupied with what Heidegger calls the "now-time," in which one counts "now here, now here, now here, and so on." Heidegger calls world-time, as viewed in this manner from the perspective of using a clock, now-time. In this conception time shows itself as a sequence of "nows," as a succession of "nows," and as a "flowing stream" of "nows." (SZ, 422) This conception was still present in the reflections of Husserl. In Heidegger's view we must now ask the question of what is implied by this interpretation of world-time with which we concern ourselves. In his view we shall find the answer to this question if we compare the full essential structure of world-time and compare this with that which the ordinary understanding of time knows. Datability was shown to be the first essential element of the time with which we concern ourselves. This is, as we have seen, grounded in the essential constitution of temporality. We saw that the "now" is essentially a "now that I have to concern myself with ... " The datable "now" which is understood in concern is in each case such that it is either appropriate or inappropriate. Meaningfulness is essential to the structure of the "now." This was the reason why the time with which we concern ourselves, was called world-time, because world was shown to be the total meaningfulness. On the other hand, in the ordinary conception of time we find neither datability nor meaningfulness. These two structures cannot come to light when time is described as a pure succession of now-moments. When these two structures are covered up, the ekstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality, in which datability and meaningfulness of the "now" are grounded, becomes leveled off. (SZ, 422) When the two structures mentioned are covered up, the nowmoments appear merely as entities that can be counted when one measures time concernfully. The now-moments then become counderstood in one's concern with what is ready-to-hand or presentat-hand. In other words, the "nows" are now seen within the horizon
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ofthat understanding of Being which guides our concern. Thus the "nows" are then in a certain sense co-present-at-hand: in our concern we encounter things and also the now-moments. The "nows" are taken tobe present-at-hand in the same way as things are present-at-hand. One then says that the "nows" pass away: the totality of the "nows" that passed away make up the past. The "nows" are also said to come along; and the totality of the "nows" still to come make up the future. In all of this the ordinary conception of time, or world-time as now-time, never mentions the horizon by which such things as world, meaningfulness, and datability can be made manifest. Heidegger then states that this conception of time as a sequence of now-moments is also found in Plato when he wrote: "But he decided to make a kind of moving image of the eternal; and while setting the heaven in order, he made an eternal image ofthat eternity which abides in oneness. To this image we have given the name of time."5 In view of the fact that in the ordinary conception of time the sequence of "nows" is uninterrupted and has no gaps, time is taken to be continuous; one can divide time up in as many parts as one wishes; what is left is always a now. But if time is taken to be a continuum, the specific structure of world-time must remain covered up. World-time manifests itself not only as connected with datability; it shows itself also as spanned. The spannedness of time must here not be understood in terms of the horizonal stretching-along of the ekstatic unity ofthat temporality which has become public in one's own concern with time. Rather the fact that in every "now," no matter how momentary, there is in each case already another "now," must be understood from the perspective of a "now" that is earlier still, and from which every "now" stems; thus it must be conceived in terms of the ekstatical stretching-along ofthat temporality which is alien to the continuity that is characteristic of something present-athand, but which yet constitutes the condition of the possibility of our access to anything continuous. (SZ, 423-424) The thesis of the ordinary way of interpreting time according to which time is infinite most clearly shows that and how world-time, and acccrdingly also temporality in general, have been leveled off. If time is no more than a sequence of "now-moments," then in time as sequence there is in principle neither beginning nor end. Then time is endless on both sides, so to speak. In Heidegger's opinion, this 5p}ato, Timaeus, 37 D.
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thesis is made possible only on the basis of an orientation towards a free-floating "in itself' of a course of now-moments which is presentat-hand. In this orientation the full phenomenon of the "nows" is covered up with respect to its datability, its worldhood, its spannedness, its meaning, and its character of having a location of the same kind as Dasein's. If one tries to think the sequence of "nows" through to the end from the perspective of Being-present-athand and not-Being-present-at-hand, then an end of time can never be found. In this way of thinking time through to the end, one must always think more time. From this fact one then derives that time is infinite. (SZ, 424) It is Heidegger's position that this leveling-off of world-time has its ground in man's fallenness. In the state of fallenness Dasein has lost itself in that with which it concerns itself. In this lostness Dasein flees in the face of authentic eksistence; the latter was shown to be anticipatory resolve. This fleeing is one which at the same time covers up. For in this concernful fleeing we find also a fleeing in the face of death and, thus, a looking-away from the end. In its fallenness Dasein finds itself in the domain of the "they" which never dies and always has more time. Yet even though in the everyday conception of time the temporality in which world-time temporalizes itself is leveled-off, it does not mean that it has been completely closed off there. That this indeed is so becomes clear when one reflects on the expression that "time passes away," which is often used in our everyday way of speaking about time and temporality. The statement that time arises on the other hand, is seldom made. It becomes clear here that when Daseinspeaks of time's passing-away, it understands more of time than it wants to admit. This way of speaking about time gives expression to an experience we all have had: time cannot be halted, even though we often would like to do so. In the latter case our experience implies an inauthentic awaiting of "moments," an awaiting in which these moments are already forgotten as they glide by. The awaiting of inauthentic eksistence which forgets when it makes present, is the condition ofthe possibility ofthe ordinary experience of time's passing away. (SZ, 425) In the conception that time is just a pure sequence of nowmoments which passes away in itself, primordial time still somehow manifests itself notwithstanding the leveling-off and covering-up which we have mentioned. This is seen also in the fact that in the ordinary interpretation of time, the stream of time is defined as irreversible. Yet taken as a sequence of "nows" time ought to be
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reversible; there is no reason why it could not be reversible. The irreversibility has its basis in the way public time originated from temporality, the temporalizing of which is primarily futural and "goes" to its end ekstatically in such a way that it "is" already towards its end. (SZ, 426) Heidegger concludes these reflections by observing that the everyday and ordinary interpretation of time as an endless, irreversible, sequence of "nows" which passes away, arises from the temporality of Dasein in its fallen state. Thus the ordinary conception of time has its natural justification. It belongs to Dasein's average kind of Being and to the understanding of Being that prevails there. This conception is not "wrong"; yet it does not convey the "true" conception of time; nor can this conception be called the primordial one. (SZ, 426) In these reflections we have thus shown that the ordinary conception of time can be understood from the perspective of the temporality of Dasein's eksistence. The reverse of this is not possible: authentic temporality cannot be understood from the perspective of the ordinary conception of time. That is the reason why we call temporality the primordial time. (SZ, 426) Ekstatico-horizonal temporality temporalizes itself primarily in terms of the future; the ordinary conception of time is oriented primarily toward the now and the inauthentic present. There is no possibility of clarifying the authentic present (Augenblick) from the perspective of the nowmoment that is central in the ordinary conception of time. The same is true for authentic future and past. (SZ, 426-427) Finally, although in the ordinary conception of time one is concerned only with world-time, it is nonetheless also stressed there that there must be some distinctive relationship to the soul or the spirit. We find this conviction expressed also in the works of the leading philosophers. Heidegger quotes a brief statement of both Aristotle and St. Augustine. The first reads: "But if nothing but the souland the soul's nous are equipped by nature for numbering, then time would be impossible if there were no soul."6 St. Augustine says something similar: "Hence it seemed to me that time is nothing eise than some extendedness, but of what sort of thing it is an extendedness, I do not know; and it would be surprising if it were not an extendedness of the soul." 7 A similar notion, namely that there is a relation between time and spirit is found also in Regel. (SZ, 427-428) 6Aristotle, Physics, IV, 14, 223a25. 1St. Augustine, Confessions, XI, 26.
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V: On theIntriosie Limits of Being and Time's Conception ofTime8 In Heidegger's own view Being and Time (1927) was meant tobe a "fundamental ontology" which was to prepare the way for a "genuine ontology" whose main task it would be to focus on the question concerning the meaning of Being. Fundamental ontology, on the other hand, consists substantially in an analytic of Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world, to be developed by means of a hermeneutic phenomenology. In the first part of the book Heidegger conceives of Dasein in terms of care, whereas in the second part care is understood as temporality: the meaning of the Being of Dasein is temporality. All of this was to prepare the answer for a more basic question concerning the temporal character (Zeithaftigkeit) of the meaning of Being itself. In the last section of Being and Time Heidegger writes: In our considerations hitherto, our task has been to interpret the primordial whole of factical Dasein with regard to its possibilities of authentic and inauthentic Being, and to do so in an eksistential-ontological manner in terms of its very basis. Temporali~y has manifested itself as this basis and accordingly as the meaning of the Beingof care ... Nevertheless, our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's Being is only one way which we may take. Our aim is to work out the question of Being in general. (SZ, 436) In other words, once temporality is laid bare as the meaning of Dasein's Being, the decisive step is still to be taken: the step namely which leads from this kind of temporality to the temporality characteristic of the meaning of Being. This last step is not taken in Being and Time. Heidegger published the book in an incomplete form andin the last sentences of it pointed to the work that in his view remains tobe done: "The eksistential-ontological constitution of Dasein's totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ekstatic projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ekstatic temporality temporalizes. How is this mode of temporalizing temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way which BFor what follows see Otto Pöggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullingen: Neske, 1963, pp. 63-66; Marion Heinz, Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität, pp. 164-217.
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Ieads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon ofBeing"? (SZ, 437) By publishing the book in an ineomplete form in 1927 Heidegger admitted that he had not eompletely sueeeeded in the task he had set for himself. The basie question he eneountered was the following: Onee the temporality of Dasein is grasped in the unity of its three ekstases, how ean this temporality of Dasein be interpreted as the temporality of the understanding of Being, and how is the latter, in turn, related to the meaning of Being and the temporal charaeter of Being itself? Originally Heidegger thought he had found a way to answer this question, but it appeared almost immediately that this way led away from what he really wished to aeeomplish, namely to show that time is the transeendental horizon of the question of Being. (SZ, 39) For on the basis of the analyses as they are aetually found in Being and Time it is still not yet elear preeisely what is to be understood by "transeendenee" taken as the overeoming of beings in the direetion of Being. In addition there is the question of the exaet relationship between Dasein's temporality and time as the transeendental horizon for the question eoneerning the meaning of Being. Exactly what is meant here by "transeendental"? This much is clear: The term "transeendental" does not mean the objeetivity of an objeet of experienee as eonstituted by eonseiousness (Kant, Husserl), but rather refers to the projeet-domain for the ·determination of Being as seen from the viewpoint of Dasein's t here. 9 But even in this supposition it is still not yet clear what the precise relationship is between the temporality of Dasein and time as the transeendental horizon for the question of Being, beeause it is not clear how Dasein's understanding of Being is to be related to the meaning of Being. Heidegger says that meaning is that in whieh the intelligibility of something maintains itself. (SZ, 151) The meaning of Being then is that in whieh the intelligibility of Being maintains itself. But how ean temporalness (Temporalität) be the meaning of Being? Also, what is the preeise relationship between Being's intelligibility and Dasein's understanding of Being? In the introduction to the seeond part of the book Heidegger argued that "to lay bare the horizon within whieh something like Being in general becomes intelligible, is tantamount to elarifying the possibility of having any understanding of Being at all-an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution ofthe being called Dasein." (SZ, 231) But preeisely what is meant by "being tantamount to"? lf one takes this statement 9Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 27.
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literally, it would mean that Dasein has an absolute priority over the meaning of Being and then relativism seems to be the final outcome of the investigation. Heidegger saw this danger and it took him a number of years to find a way to avoid it without being forced into a position of having to appeal to a "God of the philosophers," regardless of the concrete form in which this "God" might be proposed. There are a number of other issues which did not receive final answers in Being and Time, problems such as the idea of phenomenology, the relationship between ontology and science, the relationship between time and space, a further determination of logos, the relationship between language and Being, the ontological difference, the relationship between Being and truth, etc.lO But rather than focusing on any one of these, let us turn attention again to the problern concerning the relationship between Dasein's temporality and time as the transeendental horizon for the question of Being, and this time let us look at it from a slightly different point ofview. In Being and Time Heidegger was guided by the idea that in the ontological tradition Being was understood mainly as presence-athand, (SZ, 19-27, 200-212) as continuous presence, and thus from one of the dimensions of time, namely the present. Heidegger wished to bring the onesidedly accentuated "continuous presence" back into the full, pluridimensional time, in order then to try to understand the meaning of Being from the originally experienced time, namely temporality. In his attempt to materialize this goal he was guided by a second basic idea, namely that each being can become manifest with regard to its Beingin many ways, so that one has to ask the question of just what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings. But this question raises others: What, then, does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings unfold in various modes? How can these various modes be brought into a comprehensible harmony? Whence does Being as such (not merely being as being) receive its ultimate determination?ll Heidegger had studied some of these modes of Being in the interpretive analyses of Being and Time and, thus, at the very end of the book, found hirnself led to consider the question of whether or not there is a basic meaning of Being from which all other meanings can 1osz, PP· wo-101, 160-161, 230, 333, 349-350, 357, 359-361, 371-372, 406, 436-437.
llHeidegger in a letter to Richardson, in William J. Richardson, Heidegger, p.
X.
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be derived by taking time (understood as temporality) as a guiding clue. In view of the fact that man's understanding is intrinsically historical, the further question must be asked of whether man's understanding of Being's meaning is intrinsically historical, also, or whether the understanding of Being can perhaps in some sense have a "supra-temporal" character. In Being and Time Heidegger was unable to answer the first question adequately because he had 'not been able to find a satisfactory solution for the second. For upon closer consideration his conception of historicity as found in Being and Time seems to be ambiguous. Historicity is described in the book first as the genuine temporalization of time and the principle of the distinction between Dasein's modes of Being, and then later it is said that historicity is the medium in which all ontological understanding must maintain itself. (SZ, 19-39, 372-377) It does not seem to be possible to defend both theses simultaneously; and even if there should be a position from which one could defend both, even then it would still not be clear in what sense the meaning of Being itself is affected by historicity. In the decade following the publication of Being and Time Heidegger eliminated part of the initial ambiguity by first examining more carefully how different significations of Being become differentiated in the fundamental meaning of Being and how temporality, indeed, is the principle of these distinctions. In so doing he could maintain his original view that the meaning of Being is the "Ground" in which all significations of Beingaretobe grounded and from which all understanding of Being nourishes itself. On the other hand, however, the meaning of Being cannot be understood in terms of an eternal standard being ("the God of the philosophers"); rather it must be conceived of as an abysmal, groundless "ground." For the fact that Being comes-ta-pass in the way it does, and for the fact that an understanding of Being emerges in the way we actually find it, no one can indicate a ground, because each process of grounding already presupposes the meaning of Being. When the meaning of Being Iets a determinate signification of Being become the standard signification, then it "groundlessly" bars other significations and even itself as the ground of the manifold possible other significations. It is in this sense that Being shows and hides itself at the same time, and why the meaning ofBeing is tobe called "truth," unconcealment, whose coming-to-pass is and remains a mystery and whose "happening" is historical in a sense which cannot be understood on the basis of what we usually call history.
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Furthermore, the world taken as the building-structure of the truth of Being is that organized structure which is stratified in many ways and is constructed according to the manner in which time temporalizes itself. This temporalization of time itself is historical and thus the stratification of the organized structure of Being's truth is historical, too; as such it can be distinguished in various epochs. In each epoch we find in the world as the building-structure of the truth of Being manifold organized and systematized "layers" of meaning all of which refer to basic forms of "experience" between which there is a tension, and concerning which it is difficult to see how they could all belong together. Heidegger's main concern is to explain how in a certain epoch (particularly our own) all these "layers" can belong together in a whole, the world, and how in this world as the building-structure of Being's truth for this particular era the "courses of Being are already traced out," and how therefore Being can encounter us in these particular, different ways, and not in others; thus how in this world Being itself shows and hides itself at the same time.12 120tto Pöggeler, "Heideggers Topologie des Seins:' in Man and World, 2(1969) 331-357, pp. 337-345.
CONCLUSION ON THE ONI'OLOGICAL DIFFERENCE
Temporality and time are the last issues discussed in Being and Time. The work comes to a close with a reflection on temporality as the source of our ordinary conception of time. The book is incomplete. In the last section of the work Heidegger explains once more what the main task was which he had set for hirnself in writing this book and what has been accomplished thus far. The goal was to work out the question of Being in general. What was accomplished is a hermeneutic of Dasein which, as an analytic of eksistence, has seenred the guiding-clue for all philosophical inquiry at that point where it arises and to which it retums. (SZ, 38, 436) The analytic of the Being of Dasein has shown that a clear distinction must be made between the Being of eksisting Dasein and the Being of the beings within the world. This realization is important, but it still is only the point of departure for the true and genuine ontological problematic, namely the question concerning the meaning of Being and the distinction that is to be made between Being and being. (SZ, 436-437) I would like to conclude this book with a brief report on the manner in which in 1927 Heidegger conceived of the distinction between Being and being and its function in ontology. We have seen already in Chapter li, Section li that in Being and Time the term "ontological difference" does not occur; nor does Heidegger use any other technical term in this work to refer to what the expression "ontological difference" means in his opinion. It is true that Heidegger uses the expression "der ontologische Unterschied" but this expression is used there to refer to the distinction between Being-in and "insideness" ("lnwendigkeit"). (SZ, 56) Heidegger also often speaks about the difference between the various modes of Being that are discussed in Being and Time. (SZ, 92, 132, 436, 437) Finally, Heidegger speaks about the difference between the ontic and ontological meaning of substance (SZ, 94); although this expression, taken from the metaphysics of Aristotle, refers to what later will be called the ontological difference, it is nevertheless not stipulated in this instance that the ontological difference is the genuine and true matter of thought.
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Yet even though the ontological difference is not explicitly discussed in Being and Time, nonetheless a few words must be said about Being and Time in view of the fact that Heidegger's view on the ontological difference is to be located within the general perspective of its basic problematic. Heidegger's main concern in Being and Time was to lay the groundwork for metaphysics by trying to bring to light that ontological structure in man which is the source of his natural tendency to become involved in metaphysical speculation. Since metaphysics, historically seen, is concerned with beings as beings and, thus, also with Being, whereas man in all his aspects is finite, the main problern is one of how to explain the relationship between Being and finitude. Heidegger's investigations show that Being and finitude are related to one another in man's understanding of Being, which is intrinsically finite. This is the reason why first of all in a fundamental ontology, the ultimate meaning of the finite understanding of Being must be phenomenologically revealed. In this process of revelation it appears that man's finite understanding of Being materializes itself in his transcendence of beings toward Being, that is, in man's openness toward Being taken as a process that comes-to-pass in man. In Chapter II we have also seen that from a phenomenological point of view, the process of transcendence is man's Being-in-theworld, where world stands for the horizon projected by Dasein and within which Dasein dwells and encounters other beings, and Beingin means that in which this world becomes luminous insofar as Dasein, by virtue of its understanding eksistence, makes manifest the Being of beings. This correlation between world (or Being) and Dasein (Being's illumination) is so intimate that only insofar as Dasein is "is there Being."l (SZ, 212) The expression "ontological difference" appeared for the first time in Heidegger's published works in The Essence of Reasons (1929), and it was alluded to also in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). Yet Heidegger had explicitly used the expression already in 1927 in a lecture course entitled The Basic Problems of 1For what follows here see Chapter II, Section II above. Cf. also Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 103-104; John D. Caputo, "Fundamental Ontology and the Ontological Difference," in Proceedings of the Catholic Philosophical Association, 51(1977), 28-35; Wolfgang Marx, "Die ontologische Differenz in der Perspektive der regionalen Ontologie des Daseins," in Nachdenken über Heidegger, ed. Ute Guzzoni. Hildesheim: Gerstenberg Verlag, 1980, pp. 176-197.
CONCLUSION
3Z7
Phenomenology. Let us therefore first examine how Heidegger introduces the ontological difference in these works, beginning with the lecture course on phenomenology. In the last section of this course Heidegger describes the two types of sciences which man has been able to develop; the positive and the philosophical sciences. In that context Heidegger writes that obviously for man there can be no comportment to beings that would not imply some understanding of Being. On the other hand, no understanding of Being is possible that would not be rooted in a comportment toward beings. Furthermore, our understanding of Being and our comportment toward beings do not just join each other afterwards and as by chance. They are always already latently present in man's ek-sistence itself; they unfold because they are summoned from the ek-static and horizonal constitution of temporality; in their belonging together they are thus made possible by temporality. As long as this belonging together of our comportment toward beings on the one hand, and our understanding of Being on the other, is not conceived by means of temporality, philosophical inquiry remains exposed to two dangers to which it has succumbed time and again in its long history until now. Either philosophy dissolves everything that is ontical into the ontological (Regel), without a genuine insight into the ground of ontology's own possibility; or the ontological is simply reduced to the ontic, without any understanding of the ontological presuppositions which every ontical explanation already harbors in itself as such (positivism). This double uncertainty which in some form or other has pervaded the whole of our Western philosophical tradition until the present time, also has repeatedly impeded the development of an adequate method of ontology, or at least it has prematurely distorted any genuine approach to the method of ontology that was actually made here and there.2 In this passage in which he explains the importance of the distinction between Being and being for philosophy as a whole, Heidegger makes use of some ideas which he had explained a few pages earlier. There he had stated, summarizing part of the preceding argument, that temporality is the condition of the possibility of Dasein's transcendence. Thus it is also the condition of the possibility of an intentionality that is founded on transcendence. Because of its ekstatic character temporality makes possible the 2The Basic Problems, pp. 327-328.
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Beingof a being, namely Dasein, which, as a self, deals with others and with beings. Thus temporality makes possible Dasein's comportment as such toward beings, whether this be toward itself, toward others, or toward beings present-at-hand. Temporality "first" makes possible the comprehension of Being, so that it is only in light of this comprehension of Being that Dasein can comport itself toward its own self, toward others as beings, and toward all other beings. Temporality constitutes the basic structure of Dasein; the comprehension of Being belongs to Dasein as an essential determination of its eksistence. Now because temporality constitutes the essence of Dasein, and because time constitutes the original selfprojection pure and simple, Being is always already unveiled so that in every factical Dasein beings are either disclosed or uncovered. With the temporalizing of time's ekstases the pertinent horizonal schemata are always projected in such a way that Dasein's comportment toward something always comprehends this something as a being, and thus understands it in its Being.3 But it is not at all necessary that this comportment toward a being, even though it comprehends the Being of that being, must make an explicit distinction between the Being of the being that is so comprehended and the concrete being toward which Dasein comports itself. And it is even much less necessary that the distinction between Being and a being should be comprehended conceptually at all. On the contrary, Being itself is at first usually treated as a being and explained by means of determinations of beings. We can see this clearly at the beginning of ancient philosophy (Thales). In the entire philosophical tradition in the West, in the question about being as a being (on hei on), Being was always treated as a being. Yet it is still made a problern there, even though it was always unsuitably interpreted. Dasein appears to know about Being; in comporting itself towards beings, it understands Being. Thus the distinction between Being and being is always there, either latent in Dasein and its eksistence, or present in explicit awareness. The distinction is "there," and thus it has the mode of Being of Dasein itself; the distinction belongs to eksistence. To eksist means to execute this distinction. In other words, the distinction between Being and beings is temporalized in the temporalizing of temporality. Only because the distinction between Being and beings is always already temporalizing itself on the basis of Dasein's temporality, and 3Jbid., p. 318.
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conjointly with its temporality, and only because it is thus as such unveiled, can it be known expressly, and as known explicitly also interrogated, as interrogated also investigated, and thus conceptually comprehended. The distinction between beings and Being is preontological; it is latent in Dasein's eksistence without an explicit concept of Being. As such it can become an explicitly understood difference, and this understanding can take place in different ways. For when the distinction between Being and beings becomes explicit, the terms distinguished will contrast with each other so that Being thereby becomes a possible theme for conceptual comprehension or logos. For this reason we call the distinction between Being and beings, when it is carried out explicitly, the ontological difference. This explicit accomplishment and development of the ontological difference, since it is founded on Dasein's eksistence, is a basic comportment of Dasein in which ontology or philosophy constitutes itself as a science.4 Speaking about the manner in which the different sciences are constituted Heidegger stresses again that Being is indeed already unveiled in each understanding of beings. Beingis always given in some manner.5 With the factical eksistence of Dasein beings are always already unveiled or given; and in the understanding of Being that goes with them, Being is also already unveiled or given. Beings and Being are unveiled, although still without differentiation, nevertheless with equal originality. Being is always the Being of a being and a being as a being always is.6 As we mentioned earlier, the issue appears for the second time, two years later, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Heidegger states there that the analytic of Dasein has as its objective to show how all comportment to beings presupposes the transcendence of Dasein taken as Being-in-the-world. With this transcendence is 4Jbid., pp. 318-320. 5Jbid., p. 321. 6Jbid., pp. 320-321.
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achieved the projection of the Being of being as such (der ...Entwurf des Seins des Seienden überhaupt). Through this projection the Being of beings becomes manifest at first only in a still unarticulated manner so that the distinction between Being and being as such itself remains hidden (der Unterscheid von Sein und Seiendem).1 In the same year Heidegger published Vom Wesen des Grundes. In this work Heidegger tried to show that the problern of ground is fundamentally a problern of truth and that, since truth is found primarily in Dasein's transcendence, the question is equally one of transcendence.a To explain this position Heidegger argued first that the access to Being's meaning is made possible by that being whose nature it is to transcend beings toward Being. One should realize further that the conception of propositional truth as conformity presupposes another conception of truth: truth as conformity presupposes that the being to be judged is already manifest on the basis of a preceding unveiling. Thus, propositional truth presupposes an ontic truth. This ontic truth, in turn, manifests itself only within the realm of Dasein's ontic concern with beings. In order for beings to manifest themselves for what they are in the ontic comportment of Dasein, Dasein itself must have an antecedent comprehension of their Being and, thus, of the Being of these beings. Thus the unveiledness of Being in Dasein's comprehension first makes possible the manifestation of beings as such. This unveiledness of Being itself is the truth of Being, the ontological truth. 9 Now the basicform of man's comprehension of Being, namely, that which from the beginning guides every form of concern with things, is neither an explicit grasping of Being as such, nor a conceptual comprehension ofthat which is grasped. It is to be called therefore a "preontological" understanding of Being. In order to comprehend Being conceptually, Dasein's investigation must make this preontological understanding of Being its theme of inquiry. This is the task of ontology. Between the preontological understanding of Being and the explicit ontological comprehension of Being there are other forms of understanding. These forms and the set of ontological truths which correspond to them reveal the depth of what, as primordial truth, is at the root of every ontic truth. Since there lies in 1Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, pp. 243-244. BThe Essence of Reasons, pp. 11-12. 9Jbid., pp. 12-21.
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the unveiledness of any being a prior unveiledness of its Being, and since ontical as weil as ontological truths concern beings in their Being and the Being af beings, ontical and ontological truths belang tagether essentially because of their relationship to the difference between Being and being, the ontological difference. Thus, the essence of truth and the essential distinction between ontical and ontological truths are possible only given this difference. Yet, if it is characteristic of man to behave toward things by understanding their Being, then the capacity to differentiate between being and Being must have the roots of its own possibility in the ground of Dasein's own Being. The ground of the ontological difference is the transcendence of Dasein.lO If we try to take all of these elements tagether we can perhaps express Heidegger's first conception of the ontological difference in the following theses: 1) In the works and lecture courses written between Being and Time and Vom Wesen des Grundes the Being question is formulated in terms of the ontological difference, and the identity of Being and truth as a process of unveilment is maintained. 2) The ontological difference comes about only by reason of Dasein's power to differentiate between Being and being; this power is to be found in Dasein's transcendence. 3) The final term toward which Dasein transcends beings is not the beingness of beings (Seiendheit), but rather Being itself taken as the emergence of the difference between Being and beings (das Sein).ll To understand the implications of the third thesis a few additional reflections will be necessary. In my opinion, it is undoubtedly true that in Being and Time and related works and lecture courses Heidegger was at least in part concerned with showing that the temporality of Dasein is the principle of the division of Dasein's own modes of Being, and that time as temporalized by Dasein is also the principle of the division of the meaning of Being into the possible significations of Being (eksistence, ready-to-hand, present-at-hand), so that the interplay of the three dimensions of temporality in its different modalities can be taken as the guidingclue for the division of the different significations of Being.12 Yet it is clear also that all of this does not constitute Heidegger's basic lOJbid., pp. 21-27. llJbid., pp. 27-29; cf. Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 174-175, 103-104, 163-164; Kockelmans, On Heidegger and Language, pp. 204-210. 12Sz, 350-366; Otto Pöggeler, "Heideggers Topologie des Seins," in Man and World, 2(1969), pp. 331-357.
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concern. Toward the end of Being and Time Heidegger explicitly says that the distinction between the various modes of Being is only the point of departure for the genuinely ontological problematic: the question concerning the meaning of Being and the question of whether primordial time indeed manifests itself as the transeendental horizon ofBeing. (SZ, 436-437)
BIBLIOGRAPHY In this bibliography only those publications are listed which actually have been quoted in this book. For a more complete bibliography see Hans-Martin Sass, Martin Heidegger: Bibliography and Glossary. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982.
L Publications by Heidegger Quoted in this Book "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers Psychologie der Weltanschauungen," in Wegmarken. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976, pp. 1-44. "A Recollection," in Thomas Sheehan, ed., Heidegger. The Man and the Thinker. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1981, pp. 2122.
Aristotles: Metaphysik IX, ed. Heinrich Hüni. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981. Basic Writing, ed. David Farren Krell. New York: Harper and Row, 1977. "Building Dwelling Thinking," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Rarper and Row, 1971, pp. 143-61. "Das Realitätsproblem in der modernen Philosophie," in Jahrbuch (Fulda), 25(1912), 353-363; also in Frühe Schriften, pp. 1-15.
Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart, ed. Ingtraut Görland. Frankfurt: Klostermann, (to appear). Die Frage nach dem Ding. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962; What Is A Thing?, trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch. Chicago: Regnery, 1967. Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927), ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975; The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus, in Frühe Schriften, pp. 131-353.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik. Leipzig: Barth, 1914; also in Frühe Schriften, pp. 59-188. Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität (1934). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983. Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1958: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959. Frühe Schriften, ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. mann, 1978. Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980.
Frankfurt:
Kloster-
Ingtraut Görland.
Heraklit, 2 vols., ed. Manfred S. Frings. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979. Identität und Differenz. Pfullingen: Neske, 1957; Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Rarper & Row, 1969. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951; Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969. "Le concept de temps (1924)," trans. Michel Haar and Mare B. de Launey, in Martin Heidegger, ed. Michel Haar. Paris: Editions de l'Herne, 1983, pp. 27-37. Letter to Richardson, in William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, pp. vii-xxiii.
Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, ed. Klaus Held. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978; The Metaphysical Foundations of Logik, trans. Michael Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. Nietzsche, 2 vols. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961; Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell Krell, 4 vols. New York: Rarper & row, 1979-1987. Parmenides, ed. Manfred S. Frings. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981. Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977.
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Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus." Bern: Francke Verlag, 1947; "Letter on Humanism," trans. Frank A. Capuzzo and J. Glenn Gray, in Basic Writings, pp. 193-242. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, ed. Petra Jaeger. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979; History of the Concept of Time. Prolegomena, trans. Theodore J. Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809), ed. Hildegard Feick. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971; Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan Stambaugh. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemyer, 196310 ; Being and Time, trans. J ohn Macquarrie and Edward Robinson: London: SCM Press, 1962. Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen: Neske, 1960. On the Way to Language, trans. P. Hertz. New York: Rarper and Row, 1971. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (1930, 1941). Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1961; "On the Essence of Truth," trans. John Sallis, in Basic Writings, pp. 117-141. Vom Wesen des Grundes. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1929; The Essence of Reasons, trans. Terence Malick. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969. Was heisst Denken? Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1961; What Is Called Thinking? trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. New York: Rarper & Row, 1968. Was ist Metaphysik? Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1955; "What is Metaphysics," trans. David Farrell Krell, in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, pp. 95-112. Zur Sache des Denkens. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969; On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Rarper and Row, 1972.
336
BIBLIOGRAPHY ll. Secondary Sources Quoted in this Book
Albert, Hans. Traktat über kritische Vernunft. Tübingen: Mohr, 1968. Aler, Jan. "Heidegger's Conception of Language in Being and Time," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., On Heidegger and Language. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 33-62.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Blaisdell, Ch., "Heidegger's Structure of Time and Temporality," in Dialogue, 18(1975-76), 44-53. Braig, Karl. Das Dogma des jüngsten Christentums. Herder: Freiburg, 1907. Braig, Karl. Vom Denken. Herder: Freiburg, 1897. Braig, Karl. Vom Sein. Abriss der Ontologie. Freiburg: Herder, 1896. Brelage, M. Transzendentalphilosophie und konkrete Subjektivität. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Erkenntnistheorie im 20. Jahrhundert. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965. Bretschneider, W. Sein und Wahrheit. Über die Zusammengehörigkeit von Sein und Wahrheit im Denken Martin Heideggers. Meisenheim: Hain, 1965. Camele, Anthony. "Time in Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger," in Philosophy Today, 19(1975), 256-268. Caputo, John D. "Fundamental Ontology and the Ontological Difference," in Proceedings of the Catholic Philosophical Association, 51(1977), 28-35. Caputo, John D. "Time and Beingin Heidegger," in The Modern Schoolman, 50(1973), 325-349. Couturier, Fernand. Monde et etre chez Heidegger. Montreal: Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1971. Demske, James N. Being, Man, and Death. A Key to Heidegger. Lexington: University ofKentucky Press, 1970. Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Works of Descartes; 2 vols., trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross. New York: Dover Publications, 1931. Diels, H. Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1954. Dumery, Henri. "Blonde! et la philosophie contemporaine," in Etudes blondeliennes, 2(1952), n. 1. K. Düsing. "Objektive und Subjektive Zeit. Untersuchungen zur Kants Zeittheorie und zu ihrer modernen kritischen Rezeption," in Kantstudien, 71(1980), 1-34.
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Fedier, F. Heidegger: Anatomie d'un scandale. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1988. Fink, Eugen. Sein, Wahrheit, Welt. Vor-Fragen zum Problem des Phänomen-Begriffs. The Rague: Nijhoff, 1958. Fürstenau, F. Heidegger. Das Gefüge seines Denkens. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1958. Fynsk, Christopher. Heidegger, Thought and Historicity. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. Gadamer, Rans-Georg. "Vom Zirkel des Verstehens," in Günther Neske, ed., Martin Heidegger zum siebstigsten Geburtstag. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959. Gelven, Michael A. A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time." New York: Rarper and Row, 1970. Gelven, Michael A. "Authenticity and Guilt," in Frederick Elliston, ed., Heidegger's Existential Analytic, pp. 233-46. Gethmann, C. F. Verstehen und Auslegung. Das Methodenproblem in der Philosophie Martin Heideggers. Bonn: Bouvier, 1974. Gethmann, Carl Friedrich. "Zur Reideggers Wahrheitsfrage," in Kantstudien, 65(1974), 186-200. Gillespie, Michael Allen. Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Grabman, Martin. "Thomas von Erfurt und die Sprachlogik des mittelalterlichen Aristotelismus," in Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Munich, 1943. Gray, Glenn J. "Martin Heidegger: On Anticipating My Own Death," in The Personalist, 46(1965), 439-58. Guitton, Jean. "Visite 1958.
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Heinz, Marion. "The Concept of Time in Heidegger's Early Works," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., A Campanion to Heidegger's "Being and Time," pp. 183-207. Heinz, Marion. Zeitlichkeit und Temporalität. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982. Herrmann, F. W. von. Die Selbstinterpretation Martin Heideggers. Meisenheim: Hain, 1964. Herrmann, F. W. von. Zeitlichkeit des Daseins und Zeit des Seins. Grundsätzliches zu Heideggers Zeit-Analysen. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972. Hoy, David Couzens. "History, Historicity, and Historiography in 'Being and Time'," in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. Critical Essays, ed. Michael Murray. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978, 329-353. Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960. Husserl, Edmund. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982. Husserl, Edmund. Ideen, 3 vols. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950-1952. Husserl, Edmund. Logical Investigations, 2 vols., trans. J. N. Findlay. New York: Humanities Press, 1970. Husserl, Edmund. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston, eds., Husserl: Shorter Works. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, pp. 166-97; also in Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, ed. Quentin Lauer. New York: Rarper and Row, 1965. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. Kant, Immanuel. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1950. Kant, Immanuel. Werke, ed. Ernst Cassirer, 11 vols. Berlin: Cassirer, 1912-1923, vols. 2, 3, 5, and 8.
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A Guide to his Basic
Kisiel, Theodore, J. "Heidegger's Early Lecture Courses," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., A Campanion to Martin Heidegger's Being and Time, pp. 22-39. Kisiel, Theodore, J. "The Missing Link in the Early Heidegger," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays, pp. 1-40. Kockelmans, Joseph J. A First Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967. Kockelmans, Joseph J. ed. Hermeneutic Phenomenology: Lectures and Essays. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988. Kockelmans, Joseph J. ed. A Campanion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time." Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986. Kockelmans, Joseph J. "Being-True as the Basic Determination of Being," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, A Campanion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time." Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986, pp. 145-160. Kockelmans, Joseph J. Hague: Nijhoff, 1985.
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Kockelmans, Joseph J. "Heidegger on Metaphor and Metaphysics," in Tijdschrift voor Filoso{ie, 47(1985), 415-450. Kockelmans, Joseph J., ed. On Heidegger and Language. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972. Kockelmans, Joseph J. On the Truth of Being. Refiections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. Kockelmans, Joseph J. The World in Science and Philosophy. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1969.
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Kockelmans, Joseph J. "World-Constitution. Reflections on Husserl's Transeendental Idealism," in Analeeta Husserliana, 1(1971), 11-35. Landgrebe, Ludwig. Phänomenologie und Metaphysik. Hamburg: Schröder, 1949. Lask, Emil. Die Lehre vom Urteil, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Eugen HerrigeL Tübingen: Mohr, 1923. Lask, Emil. Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. Lehmann, K. "Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 74(1966-67), 126-53; also in Otto Pöggeler, ed., Heidegger. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969, pp.140-68. Lehmann, K. "Metaphysik, Transzendentalphilosophie und Phänomenologie in den ersten Schriften Martin Heideggers (19121916)," in Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 71(1963-64), 331-57. Lehmann, K. Vom Urpsrung und Sinn der Seinsfrage im Denken Martin Heideggers. Versuch einer Ortsbestimmung. Dissertation, Gregoriana, Rome, 1962. Löwith, Karl. Zu Heideggers Seinsfrage. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1969. Macquarrie, John. Heidegger. London: Lutterworth, 1968. Marx, Wolfgang. "Die ontologische Differenz in der Perspektive der regionalen Ontologie des Daseins," in Nachdenken über Heidegger, ed. Ute Guzzoni. Hildesheim: Gerstenberg Verlag, 1980, pp. 176-97. Mehta, J. L. The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Rarper and Row, 1971.
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Möller, Joseph. Existenzialphilosophie und katholische Theologie. Baden Baden: Verlag für Kunst und Wissenschaft, 1952. Müller-Lauter, Wolfgang. Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit bei Martin Heidegger. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968. Nicholson, Graeme. "The Politics of Heidegger's Reetoral Address," in Man and World, 20(1987), 171-87.
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O'Mahony, B. E. "Martin Heidegger's Existential Analysis of Death," in Philosophical Studies, 18(1969), 58-75. Otto, Rudolph. The Idea of the Holy, trans. John Harvey. London: Oxford University Press, 1923. Palmer, E. Hermeneutics. Press, 1969.
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Pascal, Blaise. Pensees et Opuscules. Paris: Flammarion, 1913. Plato, Timaeus, in The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Rarnilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 1151-1211. Pöggeler, Otto. Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullingen: Neske, 1963. Pöggeler, Otto. "Heideggers Topologie des Seins," in Man and World, 2(1969), 331-57. Pöggeler, Otto. "The Interpretation of Time and Hermeneutical Philosophy," in Delo, 23(1977), 85-109. Richardson, William J. Heidegger. Thought. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963.
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Ricoeur, Paul. Busserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967. Ricoeur, Paul. "Phenomenologie et hermeneutique," in Man and World, 7(1974), 235-55. Rollin, Bernard E. "Heidegger's Philosophy of History in Being and Time," in The Modern Schoolman, 49(1971-1972), 97-112. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes. N ew York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Schöfer, Erasmus. "Heidegger's Language: Metalogical Forms of Thought and Grammatical Specialties," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed. On Heidegger and Language. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 281-301. Schultz, Walter. "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers," in Otto Pöggeler, ed., Heidegger. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969, 95-139.
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Sefler, George F. "Heidegger's Philosophy of Space," in Philosophy Today, 17(1973), 246-54. Seibert, Ch. H. "On Being and Space in Heidegger's Thinking," Phil. Diss. Chicago: Depaul University, 1972. Sheehan, Thomas J.. "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Bibliography," in Th. Sheehan, ed. Heidegger. The Man and the Thinker, pp. 3-19. Sheehan, Thomas J. "Heidegger's 'Introduction to Phenomenology of Religion', 1920-21," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed. A Campanion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time," pp. 40-62. Sheehan, Thomas, ed. Heidegger. The Man and the Thinker. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1981. Sherover, Charles. Heidegger, Kant and Time. Bloomington: Indiana University Prss, 1971. Silva-Tarouca, A. Die Logik der Angst. Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1953. Stewart, Roderick M. "Signification and Radical Subjectivity in Heidegger's Habilitationsschrift," in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., A Campanion to Martin Heidegger's "Being and Time," pp. 1-21. Strasser, Stephen. "The Concept of Dread in the Philosohy of Heidegger," in The Modern Schoolman, 35(1957-58), 1-20. Thomas Aquinas, St. De Veritate, in Quaestiones Disputatae, ed. R. Spiazzi, 2 vols. Torino: Marietti, 1949. Thomas Aquinas, St. Summa Theologiae. in Opera Omnia (Leonine edition), vols. IV-XII. Rome: Garroni, 1896-1906. Tugendhat, E. Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967. Tugendhat, E. "Heidegger's Idee von Wahrheit," in Otto Pöggeler, ed., Heidegger. Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werkes. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969, pp. 286-97. Tweedy, Donald F. The Significance of Dread in the Thought of Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Boston: Roughton Mifflin Company, 1954.
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Ugazio, Ugo M. Il problema della morte nella filosofia di Heidegger. Milano: Murisia, 1976. Vietta, Eugon. "Being, World, and Understanding. A Commentary on He1degger," in The Review of Metaphysics, 5(1951-52), pp. 15772. Volpi, F. Heidegger e Brentano. Padova: Cedam, 1976. Weiss, Th. Angst vor dem Tode und Freiheit zum Tode in M. Heideggers "Sein und Zeit". Innsbruck: Rauch, 1947. Wiplinger, Fr. Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit. Eine Untersuchung über die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit. Freiburg: Alber, 1961. Wren, Thomas E. "Heidegger's Philosophy of History," in The Journal ofthe British Society for Phenomenology, 3(1972), 111-25.
INDEX INDEX OF NAMES
Aler, Jan, 37 Aristotle, 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 25,26,27,32,34,41,43,47,51,52,66, 67,75,77,81,82,83,104,118,169,172, 190,239,240,241,242,246,252,253, 315, 318,325 Augustine, Saint, 11, 32, 34, 42, 67, 100, 240, 241, 243, 318 Bergson, Henri, 66, 239, 240, 242, 253 Blonde!, Maurice, 3, 185 Boeckh, August, 27 Braig, Carl, 4 Brentano,Franz,2,3,47,245 Bultmann, Rudolf, 6, 11
75, 76,86,140,174,185,240,241,242, 318,327 Heraclitus, 99, 176 Herder, Johann, 166 Höderlin, Friedrich, 2, 10, 11 Hume, David, 51 Husserl, Edmund, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 15, 20,24,29,42,46,51,67,69,70,71,74, 75,76,77,78, 79,81,82,140,142,172, 173,174,175,224,239,243,246,320 Isaac Israeli, 172 Jaeger, Werner, 3, 67 Jaspers, Karl, 52, 214n John, Saint, 100
Cassirer, Ernst, 7 Democritus, 136 Descartes, Rene, 32, 45, 51, 70, 71, 74, 75,77,104,109,141,167,172,226 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 3, 4, 11, 12, 27, 32, 42,185,224,292 Dostoevsky, Fedor, 4, 11 Duns Scotus, John, 5, 32, 75 Eckhart, Meister, 12, 34 Fichte, Gottlob, 5, 46, 67, 77 George, Stephan, 11 Geyser, Joseph, 3 Grabmann, Martin, 5 Hartman, Nicolai, 6 Hegel, Georg, 4, 32, 34, 41, 70, 71, 74,
Karrt, Immanuel, 5, 7, 11, 26, 30, 32, 34, 41,43,45,46,48,49,51,67, 70, 74, 75, 77,80,81,82,98,101,102,103,104, 109,136,168,169,172,174,210,224, 226,227,228,229,230,233,240,241, 242,243,249,300,314,320 Kelkel, Arion, 161 Kierkegaard,S~ren,3,4, 11,32,42, 185,239 Kisiel, Theodore, 11, 12, 21 Külpe, Oswald, 3 Lask, Emil, 4, 12 Leibniz, Gottfried, 75 Luther, Martin, 11, 34, 42 Macquarrie,John, 111,244 Messer, August, 3 Misch, Georg, 5 Möller, Joseph, 152 Natorp, Paul, 5, 6
INDEX
346 Newton, Isaac, 244 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 3, 4 Otto, Rudolf, 11, 13, 17 Parmenides, 5, 67, 172 Paul, Saint, 6, 11, 13, 17, 18, 19, 42, 67, 100 Pindar, 11 Plato, 10,19,51,52, 70,75,81,190,316 Pre-Socratics, 99 Ravaisson, Felix, 4 Richardson, William, 76, 111, 152 Rickert, Heinrich, 4, 5, 11, 291 Rilke, Rainer, 4, 11 Robinson, Edward, 111, 244 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 52, 138, 139, 140 Scheler, Max, 52, 142, 209, 210, 214n Schelling, Friedrich, 4
Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 27, 222 Schneider, Arthur, 3, 4, Seneca, 166 Sheehan,Thomas, 13, 16,18,20,21 Simmel, Georg, 291 Sophocles, 11 Stifter, Adalbert, 2 Suarez, Francis, 75 Thales, 328 Thomas Aquinas, Saint, 32, 75 Thomas ofErfurt, 5, 32 Trakl, Georg, 4, 11 Vöge, Wilhelm, 4 Windelband, Wilhelm, 11 Wolff, Christian, 100, 101 Yorck von Wartenburg, Paul Graf, 292
INDEX INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Affective disposition (Befindlichkeit), 42, 147; see Ontological disposition Aisthesis, and truth, 27 Aletheia, non-concealment, unconcealment, unconcealedness, 12,26,27,34,39,77,82;centralissue ofphilosophy, 3 A-lethes, un-hidden, 82, 83 Aletheuein, tobring from concealment to non-concealment, 77; tobring something out ofits original hiddenness, 82 Ambiguity, and fallenness, 160-161 Analogy, classical doctrine of, 47 Analytic of Dasein, as a hermeneutic of facticity, 90; preparatory nature of, 65; task of, 63-67 Analytic of Dasein's Being, and other sciences of man, 95-96 Anticipation (Vorlaufen), 197; and resolve, 215; as authentic future, 259; meaning of, 218-219 Anticipatory resolve, and conscience and death, 219; and eksistentiell authenticity, 215-220 Antiquities, 293-294 Anxiety (Angst), 163-164; 183-185; and care, 163-164; 184; and Dasein's naked self that has been thrown in uncanniness, 263; and death, 193-196; and self, 184; and unity of Dasein's Being, 163-164; arises out of Dasein's Being-in-theworld as Being-thrown-towardsdeath, 264; discloses the nullity of the world, 263; grounded in havingbeen, 264; makes Dasein be anxious about itself, 263; shows the nothingness of Dasein's own
Being, 164; springs from the future of resolve, 264; the character of having-been is constitutive for it, 263
Appearance, 80 Apophainesthai, to make manifest, 81 Apophansis, and logos, 153 Apophantie as; 177 Apophantie logie, 80-83 Appresentatio, placing a thing before oneself, 175 Appropriateness, 126 A priori synthesis, 45-46; transcendental, 48 Arete, (excellence), 27 Aroundness (das Umhafte), 133; of our environmental world, 131 "As," (apophantic), 155 "As," (hermeneutie), 82-83, 150-151; constitutes the explietness of each thing, 150; it is a constitutive element of explanation, 150 Attending, as a mode oflogos, 158; its two types, listening to others and attending to one's ownself, 158-159 Attention (Rücksicht), 142 Authentie present, as moment of vision (Augenblick), 237-238; temporalizes itself in resolve, 263 Authentie resolve, 218 Authenticity, and eksistentiell situation, 185; of Dasein, 94 Average everydayness, 95, 96 Averageness, 23 Awaiting, and leaping-away, 265; constitutive for eoneern, 271; ofthe Parousia, 19
348 being (Seiendes), 43n Being (Sein), 43n; and Beingness (ousia), 16; and meaning as content, relation, and enactment, 16; and nothing, 16-17; and the beings (onta), 16; as eksistence, 48; .as ground, 322; as groundless ground, 322; as present-at-hand, 48; as ready-to-hand, 48; as selfevident concept, 54; as the most universal concept, 53, not a genus, 53; average understanding of, 56; Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of, 63; Dasein's radical comprehension of, 59-61; depends on Dasein's understanding, 170; for Dasein is becoming, 243; implicit understanding of, 55; indefinable, 54; its finite truth functions as the necessary synthesis a priori in all finite understanding, 71; its meaning and truth as unconcealment, 322; meaning and truth of, 51; meaning of, 6; never a ground, 50; pre-conceptual comprehension of, 59; preontological understanding of, 58; question of, 41-61; reveals and conceals itself, 49; shows and hides itself, 322-323; the question ofits meaning and the goal of the eksistential analytic, 289; the question of its meaning is the basic problern of ontology, 181; temporality of, 66, and the meaning or truth of Being, 66; the temporal determinateness of, 66; vs. Beingness and being, 113 Being-able-to-be (Seinkönnen), 148, 184; 211-214; and care, 164; and conscience, 211; and death, 193; and resolve, 212-214 Being-ahead-of-itself, and care, 189 Being-ahead, as to ek-sist, 165 Being-alone, 142 Being-at-an-end (Zu-Ende-Sein), 191; vs. Being-unto-its-end, 191 Being-guilty, not an abiding property but an eksistentiell possibility, 216;
INDEX as the mode of Being of care, 207 Being-in, 145-159 Being-in-the-world, 30; 104-106; as essence of Dasein, 96; can be authentic and inauthentic, 159; contains a plurality of constitutive, structural elements, 105; is Being with others, 138; the mode ofBeing (essence) of man, 29 Being-unto-its-end (Sein zum Ende), 191; vs. Being-at-an-end, 191 Beingness (Seiendheit, Wesenheit, Wesen, ousia), 34; as ground, 50 Being question, 2, 30; and beings, 2; and time as the horizon for any understanding of Being, 30; forgottenness of, 52; formal structure of, 55-57; ontological priority of, 57 -59; the basic problern ofphilosophy, 51-54; tobe studied in ontology, 29 Beings, are merely present at band, 94; as the norm that governs man's knowledge, 177 Beings-within-the-world, their mode ofBeing, 115-119 Being-towards-death, 196 Being-towards-the-end, 191, 194 Being-true, as Being as uncovering, 176 Being-with (Mitsein), 138, 141; 137142; as sharing one world, 140; not made possible by spatial proximity, 138 Bewilderment, as the eksistentialtemporal meaning of fear, 262 Birth, of Dasein, 290, 291; never something past, 291 Bringing-close, as removing distances (Entfernung), 134 Care (Sorge), 34; 31, 32, 164-166; and anxiety, 163; 184; and Dasein's Being-ahead-of-itself, 189; and factical life experience, 15; and selfhood, 234-235; 225-238; and time, 32; as the ''between" that lies between birth and death of Dasein,
INDEX 290; as the fundamental structure of Dasein's Being, 165; comprises eksistentiality, facticity, and fallenness, 163-164; definition of, 165, 166; essence of, 206; inherently permeated by nullity, 206; includes death and guilt, 217; meaning of, 184, 193, 225; meaning of, and death, 193; the ground of Dasein's historicity, 298 Categories, division of, 47 Category, vs. eksistential, 94, 95, 96 Certainty, and evidence, 195; and truth, 195 Chronos, Zeit, time, 19 Circumspection (Umsicht), 118, 150; as a way ofmaking present, 277; of concern, 22-23 Circumspective concern, temporality of, 270-273; its temporality a slight revision of the temporality of fallenness, 273 "Clearing'' of Being, 171 Closeness, and ready-to-hand, 132; of equipment, 132 Community, 138 Comprehension of Being, as the ontological structure of Dasein, 97 Concept of the a priori, as a regulative idea,89 Goneern (Besorgen), 35; 115; and care, 165; and factical life experience, 15; and theoretical knowledge, 117; an eksistential of Dasein's Being, 106; as the primordial mode of Being-in, 106110; its temporality has the mode of a making-present which retains and awaits, 311 Concernful preoccupation, 115-119, and passim Conformity, an analogaus notion, 174-175 Connectedness, of Dasein's life, 290291 Conscience, and anxiety, 203-208; and disclosedness, 201; and guilt, 205; 201-208; and "they," 201; as a
349 discourse (in terms of Dasein's disclosedness), 201; as an attestation of Dasein's ownmost Being-able-to-be, 204; as the social voice of the "they," 204; caller and called, 202-205; call of, 200; basic characteristics of, 202; calls Dasein to its ownmost potentiality for Being-its-own-self, 200; eksistential-ontological foundation of, 199-201; everyday conception of, 208-211; its call addresses the "theyself," 201; its call and silence, 202204; its call individualizes Dasein, 217; its call says nothing, 202, 205; summans Dasein out of its falling, 204; summans Dasein to its ownmost Being-guilty, 200; the fact a primordial phenomenon of Dasein, 200; voice of, 31-32; voice of,
wo Consciousness, as subjectivity, 233; and transcendence as selfhood, 233 Conspicuousness, 120; temporality of, 272
Construction, 68, 72n; 79 Construction, 78 Cura fable, 166 Curiousity, and fallenness, 160-161; constituted by a making present which is not held on to, 265; is a making present that gets entangled in itself, 264-265; makes present for the sake ofthe present, 265; seeks to extricate itself from awaiting, 265 Da, ofDasein, as openness, 145-146;
has nothing to do with a spatial here, 145 Dasein, accepts to be as finite transcendence, 207; all its ontological structures are modes of temporality, 65; always ahead of itself, 164; always is certain possibilities, 149; and life in its here and now facticity, 13; and reality, 166-169; as Being-in-theworld is self, transcending, 105; as lumen naturale, 146; 176; 269; as the
INDEX
350 irruption into the totality ofbeings, 60-61; as the negative ground ofits own negativity, 217; as the ontological structure of man taken in its intrinsic finitude, 61; as the place where Being manifests itself and lets beings be, 60; as the place where "language" speaks, 162; as the "there" of Being, 60; assigns places, 133, discovers places, 133; beginning of, 184, end of, 184; can be in an authentic and an inauthentic way, 163; comes to authenticity only by way of inuathentic Being, 160, relapses again in inauthenticity, 160; constantly comes toward itself (Zukunft), 243; continuously eksists finitely, 238; eksists historically because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being, 292; factically has its history, 295; formal meaning of its eksistential constitution, 94-95; gives time, 28; guilty in the very ground of its Being, 207; has an essential tendency to closeness, 134; inclined to fall prey to the tradition, 73; is essentially a Being-able-to-be, 149; is in the truth, 180, can be untruth, 177; is its past, 73; is its possibilities, 94; is time, 28, 65; its Being constituted by historicity, 295; its Beingis already understood and yet still to be mediated by explanation and interpretation, 72; its Being refers to and depends on world, 128; its categorial structure still concealed, 72; its mode of Being is Being-able-to-be-guilty, 216; its understanding of Beingis intrinsically historical, 73; lets time be, 243; makes place and space be, 133-134; ontic and ontological priority of, 63; primarily historical, 294-295; spatializes, 133-136; stretches along between birth and death, 290-291; temporality of, 23; temporalizes its own Being as time, 243; temporalizes itself as a self, 231; temporalizes time, 243; what no Ionger eksists is not past but is as
having-been-there, 294 Dasein-with-others (Mitdasein), 137142
Datability, 311-312; 315-317 Death, and anxiety, 193-196; and Being-able-to-be, 193; and care, 193; and conscience, 198-199; and Dasein's possibility of being a whole, 189-192; and the possibility of authentic eksistence, 197; and "they," 194-196; anticipation of, 21, 23, 31; as Dasein's ownmost possibility, 197; as the possibility we anticipate, 196; as the possibility we expect, 196; as the possibility ofthe impossibility of any eksistence, 196; authentic being towards, 196199; basic characteristics of 193 196-198; certainty of, 195, 197; ' eksistential structure of 192-193· everyday conception of,' ' 193-196; indefinite, 197-198; nonrelative, 197; not something that is still outstanding, 290; not to be outstripped, 197; three basic theses about, 191; various interpretations of, 192-193 De-construction, of the tradition, 14 Demundanization, 278 Destination, 126-127; and meainingfulness, 125-129 Destiny (Geschick), 297; 305; and Dasein's authentic coming-to-pass, 297-298; designates the coming-topass ofthe community, 297 Destruction, 25-28; 68, 72n; ofthe history of metaphysics, 21; see Destructive retrieve Destructive retrieve, 73-75; and hermeneutic phenomenology, 70, 72-90; and phenomenology closely related, 71-72; implies a critical attitude to the tradition but is not its rejection, 71; meaning of, 74 Diaphora (Austrag), issue, 34 Difference, 83 Directionality, 135 Disclosedness (Erschlossenheit), 176;
INDEX 188; as the Being of Dasein's "there," 258; of Dasein, 145-146 Distance, 133; lived estimate vs. measurement, 134-135 Ego, Kant's conception of, 226-230 Eidos (Aussehen, essence), as Iook of things, as the way they Iook, 108 Eksistence, and eksistentiality, 165; and life in its here and now facticity, 13; and the ''how" ofthe enactment of the factical lifeexperience, 17-18; and the ontological difference, 328-329; and transcendence,94,96,97;asthe essence of Dasein, 94, 96; as the essence of Man as Dasein, 30; as the genuine mode of Being of Dasein, 23; as lumen naturale, 179; as openness and light, 179; as standing-out-toward, 104-105; means to be in a comprehending relation to Being, 97; presupposes facticity, 165; transcendence, and world, 96-104 Eksistential, 23n; vs. category, 94, 95, 96 Eksistential analytic, meaning of, 220-221 Eksistentiality, as freedom, 165; of eksistence, 95, 96 Eksistentiell, 23, and 23n; ontological examination of, 139-140 Eksisting, meaning of, 328 Ekstasis, its wither is a horizonal schema, 283; meaning of, 283-284 Emotions, 146 Enunciation (Aussage), 150; a derivative mode of explanation, 154; is pointing-out, attributing, and communicating, 153-154; Ievels the primordial (hermeneutic) as to the (apophantic) as in which something is determined in its presence-athand, 155 Environing world (Umwelt), 12 Environmental world, the worldly
351 character of, 119-122 Episteme, 27 Epistemological problem, 167 Equipment, and place, 132; Being of, 116-119; closeness of, 132; has meaning only within a totality of references and the world, 122; its mode of Being in involvement, 270; mode of Being of, 116-119; referential character of, 121-125 Eschatology, 18-19 Essence, meaning of, 178 Etymology, scientific vs. philosophical, 33-34 Everyday experiences, 12 Everyday life, 6 Everydayness, 65; indicates a definite ''how" of ekistence, 286; is for Dasein a way to be, 286; temporal meaning of, 286-287 Existence, ambiguity of term, 93-94 Expecting, 260 Experience, 15, and self, 15; must be mediated in philosophy from the perspective ofthe truth ofBeing, 75 Explanation (Auslegung), 150, 88, 89; and hermeneutic, 88; concerned ultimately with the meaning of Being, 88; constitutes a form of Dasein's hermeneutictranscendental questioning, 89; is not necessarily enunciation, 150; is the development ofthe possibilities projected in understanding, 150 Facticallife experience, 13-15, 17; and awaiting of the Parousia, 19; and care, 15; and concern, 15; and falling, 15; and meaning, 15; and self, 15; and subject-object-relation, 14; and temporality, 14-15, 19-20; and the primordial historical, 15; and truth, 14; and waiting for, 19; and world, 14-15; as affiiction, 22, 24; ''how" of, 19; historicity of, 17; questionability of, 22; temporality of, 17; uncertainty of, 19 Facticity, 164-165; and temporality,
INDEX
352 20-21; as the relation between world and life, 26; as thrownness, 165, and care, 166 Facts, in historiology, 305-306 Fallenness (Verfallen), 31, 32, 106; 159-161; and being in untruth, 176177; and idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, 160; has two aspects, 160; implies that Dasein falls away from itself as an authentic Being able to be its own self and falls to the world, 159; three dimensions of, 2223
Falling, 21, 22, 23; and facticallife experience, 15; has its eksistential meaning in the present, 264; temporality of, 264-266 Fate, 297, 305 Fear, and inauthentic awaiting, 262; as an inauthentic ontological disposition, 262; defined as malum futurum, 262; eksistential-temporal meaning of, 262; its temporality is a forgetting which awaits and makes present, 263; springs from the lost present, 264 Freedom, and absence of necessity, 179; and autonomy, 179, 178-179, 232, passim; and transcendence, 232; as the Being of man, 179; as the essence oftruth, 178-179; negative aspect of, 179 Fore-conception, 220, 223 Fore-having, 22, 24; 220, 223 Fore-sight, 220, 223 Forgetting, 261; and concern, 271 Forma etymologica, 35 Fundamental ontology, 6, 21; 24; 43; and existentialism, 52; and genuine ontology, 6; and hermeneutic phenomenology, 51; and philosophical anthropology, 52; and regional ontologies, 24, 58; and the Beingof man, 6; and the history of ontology, 66-67; and transeendental phenomenology, 51; as an analytic of Dasein's Being, 72; as an
analytic of Dasein's mode of Being, 38; as eksistential analytic of Dasein, 87; as eksistential analytic of Dasein's mode of Being, 58-59; as phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity, 24; as unity of ontology and logic, 24; method of, 21; must take the form of an analytic of man's Being, 29 Future, 236ff; 238, 259, passim; as authentic it is anticipation, 259; as inauthentic it is awaiting, 260; as coming-toward (Zu-Kunft), 236; as the privileged ekstasis of time, 238
Genesthai, already having become, 18
Ground, as identity of difference, 48 Guilt, and conscience, 201-208; as the ground ofthe negativity in all the modalities of Dasein's Being, 31; eksistential definition of, 205, and the not, 205-206 Having-been (gewesen), 236; and being guilty, 243; and ontological disposition, 261-262; 261-262; and wanting-to-have-a-conscience, 243; characteristic of anxiety brings one face to face with retrievability, 263; makes it possible to find oneself in a disposition, 261 Here, as the where-at of Dasein's present occupation, 135 Heritage, 296-297 Hermeneutic, 88; characterizes the regulative conception of the a priori, 89; the business of explanation (Auslegung), 88; the methodological, fundamental concept offundamental ontology, 89 Hermeneutic as, 177 Hermeneutic circle, 221-224 Hermeneutic phenomenology, 86-90; and Husserl's transeendental phenomenology, 29-30; and the analytic of man's Being, 29; as the method of fundamental ontology,
INDEX 38; is "founded" upon ontology, 90 Hermeneutic situation, 21; 151; 188, 220; and hermeneutic circle, 221224; implies an earlier ''having," an earlier "sighting," and a "preconception," 151 Hermeneutico-phenomenological method, 21 Hermeneutics of facticity, 27-8 Historical, everyday meaning of, 294 Historical consciousness, 27 Historicity (Geschichtlichkeit), 291; and temporality, 289-307; and world-history, 300-303; as the state of Beingwhich is constitutive for Dasein's coming-to-pass, 254; authentic and inauthentic, 299, 300303; authentic and resolve, 302; of Dasein, basic constitution of, 295299
Historiology, 303-307; eksistential source of, 303-307; has many relatively independent branches, 306-307; idea of, 303; is critique of the inauthentic present, 307; its disclosure must temporalize itself in terms ofthe future, 306; its theme is the possibility that has been factically eksistent, 305; must contribute to the authentic historicity of the historian and bis contemporaries, 307; projects the Dasein that has-been-there upon its ownmost possibility of Being, 305; thematization of, 303-306; the science of Dasein's history, 303; the source of, 303 Historizing, as the movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, 291; ordinary understanding of, 292-295 History (Geschichte), 292; everyday meaning of, 292-293; its problern to be studied in ontology, 291; meaning of, 300-301; ordinary understanding of, 292-295; the term is ambiguous, 292 Holos, whole, 190
353 Horizonal schema, of future, havingbeen, and present, 283-284; their unity grounded in the ekstatic unity of temporality, 284 Hou heneka, for the sake of which, 118 "How" 15, 16; and method, 16; and met-hodos, 16 "How" of man's Being, 17 Human subject, misunderstood in modern philosophy, 141 Idealism, 169 Identity, categorial vs. transcendental, 5o Idle talk, and fallenness, 160-161 Immanence, 98; 107 "In," meaning of, 105, 106 Inauthenticity, of Dasein, 94 In-order-to, 116-119 Insideness (lnwendigkeit), 325 Inspection, of science and research, 22-23 Intentionality, 22; 24-25 Interpretation, 87; eksistential vs. eksistentiell, 64; implies presuppositions, 223 Intuition, phenomenological, 13; hermeneutical, 13 Involvement (Bewandtnis), 270 Issue (Austrag, diaphora), 34
Kairos, Augenblick, critical moment, 19 Kath-o, according as, 118 Keeping silent, as a mode oflogos, 158 Knowing, as a mode of Being-in-theworld, 168 Knowing subject, unexamined in traditional epistemology, 107 Language, and speech, 156-159; as the "enunciatedness" of logos, 156, 157; as the language of Being, 162; as the totality of all word-things, 157; as the totality of meaning in which
INDEX
354 logos has a worldly Being of its own, after it has been put into words, 162; contradiction in Heidegger's conception of, 161-162; is ultimately rooted in the essential openness of Dasein's Being, 156; its essence is the langnage ofBeing, 162; the totality of meaning lies in Being and Time still outside its domain, 162; various interpretations of, 158 Laws, in historiology, 305 Legein, to make manifest, 81 Legein (=apophainesthai) ta phenomena, 83 Legein ta phenomena, 31 Letting-be, 127; 180-181 Letting-beings-be (Bewendenlassen), 135-136 Letting something be involved, constituted in the unity of a retention that awaits, 271; grounded in the ekstatic unity of the makingpresent which awaits and retains, 272
Leveling-off, and world-time, 317 Life, in its here and now facticity, 13; and Being-in-the-world, 13; and eksistence, 13; and Dasein, 13 Life, zoe, is Da-sein in its world, 26 Limit-situation, 218 Listening to others, as a form of attending, 158-159 Lived experiences, 13 Logic, and ontology, 21 Logos (Rede), 152-159; and makingpresent, 266; and to make manifest, 77; as apophansis, 153, has the structural form of a synthesis, 8282; as articulatedness, 152; as articulating discourse, 81-82; as assertion, command, and wish, 157; as discourse (apophansis), 81; as discursive and articulating, 156; as discursive constitutes the fundament of explanation and enunciation, 156; as discursive is the "signifying'' articulation of the intelligibility of man's Being-in-
the-world, 157; as judgment, and truth, 27; as the act ofletting be seen, 82; as the capacity of letting be seen what understanding projects, 158; as the process that makes explicitly manifest, 152; attributes words to significations, 156; expresses itself for the most part in langnage, 266; has many significations, 81; in the strict sense is that which renders spoken langnage possible, 152; is speech, langnage, and discourse, 152; lets the total meaningfulness come to word, 158; temporality of, 266 Lumen naturale, and Dasein, 146; and eksistence, 179; as natural light, 176 Making-present (gegenwärtigen), 237 Manipulability (Handlichkeit), 117 Mathematical physics, 282-283 Meaning, as content, relation, and enactment (Gehaltssinn, Bezugssinn, and Volzugssinn), 16, 24; as that in which the intelligibility of something maintains itself, 151; as the intentional correlate of Dasein's understanding, 152; definition of, 151-152; as what can be articulated in and through logos, 156; is articulated in explanation and expressed in enunciation, 152-153 Meaningfulness (Bedeutsamkeit), 142 Metaphysics, laying the groundwork of, 326; onto-theological structure of, 4
Method, as met-hodos, 16; and temporality, 16; of fundamental ontology, 67-90 Met-hodos, 16; and the enactment of the event of meaning, 16; and temporality, 16 Mineness, 93-94 Mnaomai, to remember, 18
INDEX Modern science, essence of, 279-283 Mood, and ontological disposition, 146 Nature, as theme of a special consideration (in physics), 115, 119; different meanings of, 115; discovered primordially in a piece of work, 119; is historical, 300 Negativity, 16 Non-concealment, and hiddenness, 177 Nothing, 16-17 Nous, 27 Now, structure of, 315 Now-time, 315 Nullity, eksistential meaning of, 206-207 Objectivity, in historiology, 306 Obstinacy, 120 Obtrusiveness, 120; temporality of, 272-273 Oida, I know, 18 "One," 21. See "They" On hei on, being as a being, 328 Ontic, vs. ontological, 23n, 96, 139 Ontologie, vs. ontic. 23, 96, 139 Ontological difference, 52, 104, 325332; as the difference between a being and its Being, 49; and Kant's distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, 49-50 Ontological disposition (Befindlichkeit), 146-148; and temporality, 261-264; as an implicit, continuous "judgment" regarding man's self-realization, 14 7; constitutes the disclosedness ofthe world, 148; depends concretely on the modalities of the involvement, 147; informs man about his position in the midst ofthe things in the world, 147; makes man aware ofthe fact that he is, that his Beingis thrown, and that he has tobe, 147;
355 temporalizes itself primarily in having-been, 262 Ontological interpretation, 30 Ontology, and fundamental ontology, 43; and logic, 21; and the preontological understanding of Being, 330-332; as phenomenology, 43; as the attempt to think the happening ofthe truth ofBeing, 8; concerned with the Being question, 29; its phenomenological method is both transeendental and hermeneutic, 71; its subject matter and its method are intimately related, 71; method of, 43; scientificity of, 43, 70, 71; task of, 330; to be prepared by a fundamental ontology, 29 Open, of non-concealment, 177; and world, 177-178 Openness, eksistence, and Being-inthe-world, 175; its three constitutive components are understanding, ontological disposition, and Iogos, 146; ofDasein, 145-146 Others, equiprimordially present to Dasein as equipment, 138 Ousia (Seiendheit), Beingness, 34; as that which is present, 178; essence, 16, 113, as presentness, 16
Pan, sum, 190 Past, authentic and inauthentic, 261; as authentic, it is retrive, 261; as inauthentic, it has the form of having-been, 261 Perception, 108; as making determinate, 275; is already interpretation, 108 Phainesthai, to show oneself, 77 Phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity, 24-28; begins inauthentically, 25; implies deconstructive regression, 25; implies destruction of the tradition, 25-26; includes both logic and ontology, 24-25 Phenomenological method, 6
356 Phenomenology, 7, 31; and the analysis of the factical life experience, 15; as Dasein's way of access to the theme of ontology, 84; as radical philosophical research, 24, is not just a propaedeutic science, 24-25; as the method of ontology, 70, 75-79, 76; as the method of scientific philosophy, 44; as the methodical mediation of the immediacy ofthe truth ofthe phenomena, 84; as the science of the Being ofbeings, 86; as used in fundamental ontology, is inherently hermeneutic, 87; definition of, 83; hermeneutic vs. transcendental, 78; implies destructive retrieve, 78; in Husserl, 67, and Heidegger's criticism of, 67-69; in Husserl and Heidegger, 78; may be called ontology, 86; must thematize the temporal enactment of the event of meaning that comesto-pass in each concrete experience of Iife, 16; possible only as ontology, 85; preliminary conception of, 8386; scientificity of, 80-81; three essential ideas of, 69; used in fundamental ontology, is interpretation, 87 Phenomenon, 15, 16, 79; and event, 16; and time, 16; in the ordinary sense ofthe term, 80, 85; in the phenomenological sense of the term, 80, 85, 88; needs the mediation by phenomenology, 85-86; proximally something that lies hidden, 83; Philosophy, a supra-theoretical science, 12; and criticism of its own past, 74-75; and factical Iife experience, 21-22, 23-24; and the history ofphilosophy, 21-22, 51; and theology, 21; as a science, 11; as a system ofvalues, 11; as doctrine of world views, 11; cannot deny its presuppositions, it cannot simply accept them either, 220; concerned with the question concerning the meaning of Being, 29; criticism of its own past aims at critical
INDEX adoption, not at a break or a repudiation, 74; definition of, 23-24; essence of, 11-13; method of, 44; essentially different from the methods of the formal and empirical sciences, 45; scientificity of, 327, 329; subject and method intimately related, 44 Phrason hopos echei, to say how things in fact are, 176 Phronesis, 27 Place, and equipment, 132; and space, 132-133 Possibilities, logical vs. eksistential, 148-149 Pragmata, 116 Praxis, 116 Preparatory analysis of Dasein's mode of Being, 30; task of, 93-96 Pre-predicative experience, 172 Pre-questions (Vorfragen), 14 Presence-at-hand, 124; and enunciation, 155; and scientific thematization, 280; vs. readinessto-hand, 155 Present, as authentic it is the moment of vision, 260; as inauthentic it is a waiting-towards and a making present, 260-261; as the possibilities of the future opened up by what has been, 243 Present-at-hand, 128-129; 169 Presentation, ofthing in judgment as repraesentatio and as appraesentatio, 175 Primordial praxis, 153-155 Primordial understanding (Verstehen), 148-152 Problem of knowledge, in classical metaphysics, 167-169 Problematic, categorial-ontological vs. transcendental, 46 Properties, 126 Pros ti, to what end?, 118 Public time, 312-314
INDEX Question, as a looking for, 55; may Iead to investigation, 55; three essential elements of, 55 Readiness-to-hand, 117-119; 124, 125 Ready-to-hand (zuhanden), 117-119, 129, 149, 169; and being destined for, 127; vs. present-at-hand, 155 Realism, 169 Reality, as the Being ofthe innerworldly beings, 169; depends on care, 170; objective vs. perceived, 281; refers to care, 170; sense of, 166169 Recepts (Rückgriffe), 13 Reduction, 68, 72n, 79 Reference, 122-125 Referring, vs. relating and indicating, 122 Region (Gegend), 132-133; made visible only in the deficient modes of concern, 133; the .necessary condition for the assignment of places, 133 Regional ontologies, 58; and fundamental ontology, 58-59 Remembering, 261 Remoteness, is not sheer distance, 134 Repetition (Wiederholung), 298; a mode of resolve by which Dasein eksists as fate, 299 Resolve (Entschlossenheit), 32, 201, 211-214; and anticipation, 215; and anxiety and guilt, 216; and authentic self, 212-213, authentic mode implies guilt and death, 296; and situation, 213; and truth and untruth, 213; as Dasein's authentic truth, 215-216; as the authenticity of Dasein's care, 214; as the loyalty of eksistence to its own self, 302; brings Dasein before the primordial truth of eksistence, 217; discloses actual and factical possibilities of authentic eksisting in terms of Dasein's heritage, 296 Restlessness, and inauthenticity, 161
357 Reticence (Verschw'iegenheit), 203204
Retrieve (Wiederholung), 6, 32, 43, 251-252; and the unthought, 6; as the achieving of Dasein's authentic past, 236 Science, and basic crisis in the basic concepts, 57-58; genesis of, 281-283 Self, 31-32; and historicity, 302; and resolve, 230-231; as the coming-topass of transcendence, 184; as transcendence, 230-232; authentic and inauthentic, 183, 199, 202; eksistential intepretation of, 235236; is authentic in the primordial individuation of the silent resolve which yields to anxiety, 236; meaning of, 142-143; ontic characteristics of, 225-226, 230; Self-alienation, and falleness, 22-23 Selfhood, 143; and care, 225-238; to be derived eksistentially from the authenticity of Dasein's Being as care, 235 Semblance, 79-80 Sentiment, 146 Serviceability, of equipment, 123-125 Serving-to, 116-118 Showing itself, may apply to Being and to beings, 84-85 Sign, 122-125; reference structure of, 122-125; types of, 123 Signification, 156 Situation, and authenticity, 185; and resolve, 213; and temporality, 17-18; as openness, 17 Situating (Ausrichtung), as giving directions, 134-135 Solicitude (Fürsorge), 141-142; and care, 165 Sophia, 27 Spannedness, of time, 316-317 Space, and Dasein's spatiality, 135; empty, 133; geometric, 132; gets its meaning from the places of the beings of Dasein's concern, 133; it
358 is "in" the world, 136; neither subjective nor objective, 136; of everyday concern neither homogeneous, nor isotropic, nor isometric, 132; scientific conception of, 137; tobe related to time and Being, 137n Spatiality, and scientific space, 135; 132-137; ofbeings within the world, 132-133; ofDasein, 133-137; of Dasein, and temporality, 285 Spatialization, an eksistential of Dasein, 136 Speech, and language, 156-159 Subject, concept of, 230; of classical metaphysics is world-less, 168 Subject-object-opposition, 228; in traditional metaphysics of knowledge, 107; not a fundamental datum, 109 Subject-object-relation, and factical life experience, 14 Subject-predicate structure, 153-154 Suitability, 126 Synthesis, as letting something be seen as something, 82-83, 84
Techne, 27 Technical vocabulary, derived from Latin words, 34; Greek words, 34; German words, 34-35 Temporal character (Zeithaftigkeit), ofthe meaning ofBeing, 319 Temporality (Zeitlichkeit), 20, 21, 244; and histority, 289-297; and time, 239-267; and within-timeness, 309-323; as authentic makes possible authentic historicity, 298; as the condition ofhistoricity, 73, 254; as the meaning of Dasein's Being, 65, 73; as the ontological meaning of care, 283; as the primordial outside-of-itself, 238; as the principle of the division of Dasein's modes of Being, 48; constitutes the totality of the structure of care, 238; ekstases of, 17; essentially ekstatic, 238; founds
INDEX both authenticity and inauthenticity as eksistentiell possibilities, 267; has three ekstases, 238; lightsthe "there" of Dasein, ·269; makes the unity of eksistence, facticity, and falling possible, 238; of circumspective concern, 270-273; of Dasein and time as the horizon of Being, 320; of disclosedness as such, 258-267; of ontological disposition, 261-264; of understanding, 259-261; temporalizes itself as a future which is both present and havingbeen, 267; temporalizes itself in every ekstasis as a whole, 267; temporalizes itself primordially out of the future, 238 Temporalness (Temporalität), as the horizon of Being, 320-321 Temporalization (Zeitigung), 244 Temporalize (zeitigen), 244 Temptation, and fallenness, 22-23 That-from-which, 118 That-in-virtue-of-which, 118 Thematization, 279-283; and objectivation, 280,282; and projection, 279-280; as a form of making-present, 280, 283; definition of, 279-281 Theoretical attitude, origin of, 274-279 Theoretical knowledge, a derivative mode of Being-in-the-world, 115; a derivative mode of Dasein's Being, 115; a form ofinterpretation, 275; a founded mode of Being-in, 106-110, and projection, 275; its subject is also a Being-in-the-world, 280; not a primary mode of Being of Dasein, 274, 276; temporal meaning ofits origin from the praxis, 276 Theory, and praxis, 274-275 There is (Es gibt) Being, only as lang as Dasein is, 170 They (das Man), 23, 143; 160; see also One; and death, 194-196; and inauthentic eksistence, 199; and inauthenticity, 144; an eksistential of Dasein's Being, 144; as nobody,
INDEX 144; is an impersonal subjeet, 143; is souree of seeurity, tranquillity, and guarantee, 143-144; it cultivates averageness as the norm of everything, 143 They-self, as the primordial mode of Being ofDasein, 144; tobe distinguished from Dasein's authentie self, 144 Thing, and world, 118n; innerworldly eharaeter of, 120; revealed in three ways, 120-121; thinghood of, 116 Thinghood of thing, vs. Being of equipment, 116, 118 Thinker, vs. scientist, 51 Thrownness, 31, 32; a basie eonstitutive of eare, 296 Time, as an endless succession of "nows," 253, as now-time, 315; and world-time, 315; as stream, 317, irreversibility of, 317-318; as temporalized by Dasein, 48; as the horizon for all understanding of Being, 65, 253; as the horizon of Being, 320; as the how of Dasein's own Being, 252; as the meaning of the Beingof Dasein, 253; as the measure of ehange, 244; as the principle of individuation, 251; as the transeendental horizon for the question eoncerning the meaning ofBeing, 104, 320; as the transeendental horizon of Dasein's comprehension of Being, 48; as the temporalizing of temporality, 238; as the ultimate meaning of transeendenee, 31; elassical theories of, 239-243, their eommon eharaeteristies, 239-240; eonstitutes the Beingof eare, 243; Dasein's everyday concern with, 310-312; everyday and seientifie eoneeption of, 244; everyday understanding of, 65-66; historieal origin of Heidegger's coneeption, 245-252; infinity of "ordinary" time, 316317; inherently finite, 238; in the sense of "Being in time," 66; intrinsie limits of the eksistential-
359 ontologieal interpretation, 319-323; is Dasein, 251; is not, 243; "is" only as long as Dasein is, 244; its ordinary everyday eoneeption has its justifieation, 378; its plaee in Being and Time, 252-258; ontologieal understanding of, 6566; ordinary coneeption of defined, 314-315; origin of ordinary eoneeption of, 309-323; philosophieal understanding of, 66; spannedness of, 316; the central problematie of ontology, 66; the interpretation of time as the horizon for the understanding of Being, 30; three ekstases of, 32 to ek tinos, that from whieh, 118 "To the things themselves," 76, 77, 83 Tool, see Equipment Tradition, meaning of, 73; to be examined critically, not to be rejected, 71 Tranquillity (Beruhigung), 160 Transcendence, 31, 97-99; and freedom, 232; and resolve, 232; and temporality, 234-238; and the ontologieal differenee, 330-331; and the projeetion ofthe Beingof a being, 329-330; as Dasein's Beingin-the-world, 99; as eksistenee in its authentic mode as disclosedness in resolve, 230-231; as the basic eharacteristie of human Dasein, 97; eannot be defined in terms of a subjeet-object-relation, 98; eonstitutes selfhood, 98; inherently finite, 31; meaning of, 231-232; of the world and temporality, 283-285 Transeendent, 97 Transeendental, 98-99 Transeendental ego, 226-228 Transeendental idealism, of Husserl's phenomenology, 77 Transeendental imagination, 232233
Transeendental logie, 45; vs. transeendental ontology, 48 Transeendental method, 45
INDEX
360 Transeendental ontology, 48 Transeendental philosophy, various forms of, 46 Transeendental problematie, 46; and the question of the meaning of Being, 46-4 7 Transeendental reduetion, 6, 29 Transeendental subjeet, 6 Transeendental subjeetivity, 3, 30, 78 Transcendentalia, 49 True statement, eonfirmation of, 17 5176; Iets the thing be seen (apophansis) in its uneoveredness, 176 Truth, 170-181; and eertainty, 196; and evidenee, 195; and freedom, 178-179; and resolve, 213; as diselosure, 3, as an eksistential of Dasein's Being, 180; as the eonformity between intelleet and thing (adaequatio rei et intellectus), 171; as uneoveredness, 176; as uneovering, 176; as unhiddenness, 81; eonstitutes Dasein as Dasein, 171; Husserl's eonception of, 172175; its essenee lies in freedom as openness, 180; its nature to be determined by ontology, 173; logieal vs. ontologieal, 173; neither judgment nor statement is its locus, 178, 181; ofthe judgment and the uneoneealedness of beings and the uneovering of Dasein, 180; ontie and ontologie, 330-331; taken in its essenee explains Dasein's mode of Being, 171; the two basic theses of elassieal metaphysies, 172; to be defined as truth, 173; traditional definition of, 171-175; untruth, and error, 174 Truth of Being, as synthesis a priori, 83; as the transeendental synthesis a priori, 84-85; as the universal horizon of explanation, 89; as transeendental a priori synthesis, 79; as universal eonstituting foree, 78 Turn, (Kehre), 8 Turn-signal, 123-124
Uneanniness (Unheimlichkeit), 203, 207
Uneoneealment (aletheia), 34 Uneoveredness (Entdecktheit), 176 Uneovering, a mode of Being for Dasein as Being-in-the-world, 176 Understanding (Verstehen), 42; brings to light man's Being-able-tobe, the world as a referential totality, and what at first was ready-to-hand in its servieeability, usability, ete., 149; has the eharaeter of an interpretive eoneeption whieh is not explieitly articulated, 149-150; has the eksistential strueture of a "projeet," 149; hermeneutie eharacter of, 44; is inseparably eonneeted with affeetive disposition, 149; it projects both Dasein itself and world, 149; of Being in elassieal metaphysies, 166-170; temporality of, 259-261 Universal, in historiology, 305-306 Unthought, 6; and retrieve, 6 Usability, ofequipment, 118-119 Waiting, for the Parousia, 19 Wakefulness, and that faetieal experienee of life, 19 Wanting-to-have-a-eonscienee, 188, 201; and thinking about death, 219; meaning of, 211 What-for, 126 What-it-is (Wassein, essential, 93 Wherein, 128 Whirl (Wirbel), alienation of, 161 "With"-like (mithaft), 141 Who, of Dasein in its everyday coneern, 142-144 World, and things, 109; as a eharacteristie of Dasein's own mode of Being, 112; as eksistential of Dasein's Being, 112; as the building-strueture of Being, 323; as the totality of all mutual refereneesystems, 129; as the totality of all
361
INDEX mutual reference-systems within which everything is capable of appearing to man as Dasein, 110; as total meaningfulness, 128; as transcendent, 284; as Umwelt, surrounding world in which we find ourselves, Mitwelt, as the world we share, and Selbstwelt, each individual's own world, 14-15; Being of, 127-129; co-constitutes the unified structure of transcendence, 98; does not mean the totality of all natural things, 103; historical character of, 294-295; is there as long as Dasein is there, 284; its Being, 111-129; its structure is determined by the total meaningfulness, 284; meaning of, 229; meaning of in our Western tradition, 99-103; ontic, ontological, eksistentiell, and eksistential meaning of, 114-115; ontological conception of, 112; ontologicoeksistential meaning of, 113; taken
as total meaningfulness is grounded in temporality, 283; temporalized in temporality, 284; the horizon of a present that temporalizes itself equiprimordially with those of the future and the having-been, 284; worldhood of, 128 World-conscience, 204 World-historical, 295, 300-301 World-history, 292 Worldhood, 111 World-time, and leveling-off, 317; and public time, 313-314 Within-time-ness, and temporality, 309-323; and the genesis ofthe ordinary conception of time, 314318; and time of everyday concern, 312-314; meaning of, 309, 312-314
Zoion logon echon, 26