Heir to the Fathers: John Quincy Adams and the Spirit of Constitutional Government

Heir to the Fathers

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Heir to the Fathers John Quincy Adams and the Spirit of Constitutional Government

Gary V. Wood

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham

Boulder

New York

Toronto

Oxford

To my parents Esther J. Wood and Virchel E. Wood LEXINGTON BOOKS Published in the United States of America by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706

PO Box 3 17 Oxford OX2 9RU, UK Copyright 02004 by Lexington Books

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Wood, Gary V. Heir to the Fathers :John Quincy A d a m and the spirit of constitutional government / Gary V. Wood. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-7391-0601-5 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Adams, John Quincy, 1767-1848-Political and social views. 2. Adams, John Quincy, 1967-1848--Quotations. 3. United States-Politics and government-1815-1861.4. Constitutional history-United States. 5 . Amistad (Schooner) 6. Slave insurrections-United States. 7. Presidents-United States-Biography. I. Title. E377.W66 2003 320.5'0926~22 2003015800 Printed in the United States of America Ttvl

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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO 239.48-1992.

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Contents

vii

Acknowledgments

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Chapter I

Introduction

Chapter I1

Adams, the Constitution, and the Contemporary Scholarly Debate

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Chapter 111

John Quincy Adams, the Founders, and Slavery

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Chapter IV

Jubilee of the Constitution

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Chapter V

The Africans of the Amistad

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Chapter VI

The Amistad Case

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Chapter VII

The Legacy of John Quincy Adams

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Bibliography

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Index

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About the Author

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Acknowledgments

I could not have written this volume without the insights and contributions of many colleagues and friends. This book grew out of my doctoral dissertation at Claremont Graduate University, and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee: Harry V. Jaffa, Harry Neumann, Jean Schroedel, and Joseph Bessette. Each offered valuable suggestions that improved this work. Special thanks is owed to Harry V. Jaffa, who first encouraged me to study the subject of this book. His works provided the foundation upon which this project hopes to build. Two of my colleagues at t h e California State University, S a n Bernardino, took time from their own work t o read parts of mine. I am deeply grateful to Edward J. Erler, who first inspired my interest in political philosophy and whose editing skills and suggestions greatly improved the manuscript. Special thanks to Scot Zentner, who read and edited various drafts of the manuscript and provided illuminating insights. I would also like t o thank Brian Janiskee and Mark Clark for their encouragement and support. I am grateful to Daniel C. Palm of Azusa Pacific University, who read the entire manuscript and provided valuable editorial advice. I would like to thank all those at Lexington Books who made this project possible. Special mention must go to my production editor, Hedi Hong. Robert Carley, Serena L. Krombach, and Paul Mufarrij also provided valuable assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all the members of my family for their support and encouragement. I am especially indebted to my mother for giving so generously of her time in so many ways that it is impossible for me to fully express my thanks. I must express gratitude to my father for his generosity, his guidance, and his dedication to academic excellence. Thanks are owed to my sister Tamarin for her editing, typing, and computer skills. I would like to extend my appreciation t o my sisters Laurel and Victoria and my brother, Darrell, for making sure I took breaks from my studies to help balance my life. I also wish to thank MariAnne Van Eerden, who read and commented on portions of this work. Her patience, support, and understanding were indispensable to the book’s completion.

C H A P T E R

I

Introduction

And of these laws it must be noted that while they aim, as laws elsewhere, at the common weal, their guiding principle is far other than that which most nations follow. Xenophon‘

In a moving eulogy to John Quincy Adams, William H. Seward praised the American statesman for a lifetime spent in the service of his nation. In reflecting o n that public service, Seward remarked that A d a m could have echoed Cicero by stating, “I have rendered to my country all the great services which she was willing to receive at my hands, and I have never harbored a thought concerning her that was not divine.”z Adams’s remarkable life was indeed devoted to the service of his nation. His public life began in 1781, when at the age of fifteen, he assisted Francis Dana o n the first American mission to Russia. It ended sixty-seven years later when he collapsed on the floor of the House of Representatives. Adams received n o less than five diplomatic appointments. He served in the Netherlands, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and again Great Britain. He was elected to the U.S. Senate, where his independence antagonized political friends and foes alike. His tenure as secretary of state cemented his place as one of America’s greatest diplomats. He was the sixth president of the United States. Adams was also nominated for the position of associate justice of the Supreme Court. Although his nomination was unanimously ratified by the Senate, Adams declined the honor. He twice argued cases before the Supreme Court. During 1

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Chapter I

the final seventeen years of his life, Adams served in the U.S. Congress as the representative of the Plymouth District of Massachusetts. But Adams was not only a man of action. He was also a scholar who carefully studied both ancient and modern political philosophy. In fact, Adams was arguably the most erudite president in America’s history. Consequently, his long legacy of public service was informed by clearly articulated political ideas. Adams’s ideas, and more precisely his political thought, are the subject of this work. My primary emphasis is his understanding of the Constitution. Thus, this study carefully examines his extraordinary constitutional essay, Jubike of the Constitution. It will also explore his participation in a now celebrated Supreme Court case involving the capture of a group of Africans who mutinied onboard the Spanish schooner, Amistad. It will investigate the historical events surrounding the Amistad case and provide an in-depth analysis of Adams’s argument before the Supreme Court. By doing so, I hope to shed light on three questions: (1) What was the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution, and specifically, how did they understand the relationship between the principles articulated in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution? (2) How should one understand the relationship between the Constitution and slavery in light of the principles espoused by the Declaration? ( 3 ) How has our understanding of the Constitution and its principles changed and what precipitated these changes? It is hoped that in addressing these questions this book will contribute toward a clearer understanding of the Constitution and its principles.

***** A recent motion picture, loosely based on events surrounding the Amistad affair, has drawn new attention to this case. Indeed, over the years, the Amistad mutiny has not only been a subject of interest for historian^;^ it has also provided the inspiration for a number of historical novels and other works of f i ~ t i o nAny . ~ history of the Amistad case must recognize Adams as an important figure in this drama, and his conduct in the affair has, for the most part, been praised. In addition, there is no shortage of good biographies about John Quincy Adams, and most of these works allot some space to the role he played in the Amistad affair.s But this book differs in a variety of ways from the many others that recount the same events. Most important, following the lead of Harry Jaffa, I seek to make ideas, rather than events, the focus of my study. The particular historical circumstances are interesting and will certainly be examined. However, the ideas that guided the historical actors are more significant and will, therefore, be emphasized.

Introduction

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There have been works o n Adams that, at least to some degree, match this description. T h e finest of them is a book by political scientist Greg Russell, John Quincy Adam and the Public Virtues ofDiplomacy.6But, as the title of this excellent work indicates, Russell is primarily concerned with Adams’s views o n foreign policy. By contrast, the focus of this book is o n Adams’s political thought as it relates to constitutional interpretation. Another book worthy of mention is William Lee Miller’s Arguing About Miller writes an outstanding history of the fight to repeal the gag rule in the U.S. Congress. John Quincy Adams led this heroic battle and is the central figure in Miller’s book. But Miller spends very little time o n the Amistad case, which is a mere side note to his study. I also differ from Miller by providing a n extended analysis of some of Adams’s more important writings. As noted, this book provides an in-depth analysis of at least two documents written by John Quincy Adams: a speech published as Jubilee of the Constitution and his Argument before the Supreme Court. This allows us to present the ideas used by Adams to fight the gag rule in a more thorough and systematic fashion and also enables us to consider the continuing relevance of these ideas today. A general overview of the political thought of John Quincy Adams is presented by political scientist George A. Lipsky in John Quincy Adam, His Theory and Though perhaps somewhat wider in its scope, the purpose of his book is similar to the purpose of this book. However, I take a very different approach. Although Lipsky gives a very thorough and generally accurate account of Adams’s political thought, I believe his particular approach to the study of Adams’s thought leads him to some very misguided conclusions. I discuss some specific examples from his work in the pages that follow. In doing so, my distinct approach to Adams’s ideas are clarified. Throughout the book I quote liberally from Adams himself. This also distinguishes my work from other scholars. Rather than paraphrasing his thoughts, 1, where possible, seek to let Adams speak for himself. This is not due to laziness o n my part, but stems from my concern that the actual words of Adams be seen and read. Not only am I incapable of matching the strength and eloquence of his words, I believe it is my responsibility to leave no doubt that the ideas I attribute to Adams are indeed his own. I, of course, restate Adams’s ideas and arguments in my own words and provide my own commentary o n them. However, I will do so only after I have demonstrated that they are indeed his ideas and arguments. One of the more enlightening consequences of studying original sources is the discovery that ideas often attributed to men from the past are not their ideas but misinterpretations of scholars who write about them. This is compounded

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Chapter I

by the prominence of academic orthodoxies that encourage scholars to start with an understanding of the past that is different from the way the past understood itself. For example, many of today’s scholars would start from the premise that since the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence are eighteenth-century documents, their principles are merely the product of eighteenth-century ideas and prejudices. The problem with such an understanding is that the Founders themselves did not look at the Constitution in this way. They knew, of course, that the Constitution was written in the eighteenth century, but they did not believe it was founded on eighteenth-century principles. To the contrary, they believed it rested on the eremal pnciples of justice. The fact that many modem scholars do not believe that such timeless and transcendent principles exist, leads to their failure to take the thought of the Founders seriously. A case in point is George Lipsky’s study of Adam and his thought. Lipsky contends: “In company with other eighteenth-century rationalists Adam did not see that his moral system was largely his preferences dressed up in a philosophical garb.”’)He declares that Adams’s writing and pronouncements were not “clear to . . . himself, but may be more easily seen by those of a later day who can view a thinker in the whole perspective of his times.”I0Thus, he refers to the Declaration of Independence as a mere “instrument” whose principles, when used by Adams, became a “formidable political weapon.”” Lipsky does not stop to consider whether or not this document might have more than an instrumental purpose, that is, he never poses the question as to whether its principles might in fact be true. He does acknowledge that Adams considered the Declaration “as much a part of public law as the Constitution.” “The Declaration of Independence,” he writes, “looms especially large . . . on all appropriate occasions Adams asserted the principles of the Declaration in his contest with his political enemies.”” However, Lipsky dismisses the possibility of underlying universal principles. His historicist prejudices lead to an all too predictable conclusion. “Adams showed no suspicion,” argues Lipsky, “as did later, more sophisticated students, that the Declaration and Constitution represented different forces in American society, revolutionary, in the first instance, and conservative, in the second. To him, both documents reflected basic characteristics of republican virtue.”l I wish to go beyond Lipsky by taking Adams’s claims about the self-evident truths of the Declaration seriously. I believe that a serious pursuit of truth requires that one at least entertain the possibility that Adams’s conclusions about the relationship between the Constitution and the Declaration are simply true and that his opinions on constitutional law might be correct. It is, after all, conceivable that Adams was not merely “building an [inconsistent]

Introduction

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5

theoretical system” as he reacted to the changing politics of his day. Indeed, I believe it is only possible to understand Adams’s writings, pronouncements, and actions within the context of his desire to bring about a more consistent reconciliation between the principles and practices of his regime. Lipsky believed Adams viewed the principles of the Declaration as instrumental to achieving particular political goals. I, to the contrary, believe Adam’s particular political goals were instrumental to his more profound purpose of securing the political conditions most conducive to the principles on which the regime rested. It is instructive to note that Lipsky does not argue that Adams understood the relationship between the Declaration and the Constitution differently from the Founders. Rather, Lipsky faults Adams for failing to have the insights of “later, more sophisticated students” of the documents. We are led to presume that Adams and by implication the Founders themselves were unable to discern that the principles of the Declaration were inconsistent with those of the Constitution. But are the Revolutionary principles of the Declaration really inconsistent with the Constitution? One delights in imagining what Adams himself would have said of this critique of his thought. It would, no doubt, have seemed almost incomprehensible for him to believe that a “suspicious” and “sophisticated” mind could not perceive that the principles of the Declaration provide both a justification to overthrow tyrannical government and the foundations for a just and ordered society. Indeed, it would have seemed self-evident to Adams, or any of the Founders, that free government and just government are two sides of the same political coin. T h e Declaration’s clearest statement o n the right to revolution reads, “that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it.” But this statement is immediately followed with the words “and to institute new Government, laying its foundation o n such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” Adams believed the latter clause to be an apt description of the purpose for the American Constitution. It is perhaps sufficient to note that it seems not to have occurred to Lipsky that Adams may have written about the relationship between the principles of the Declaration and the Constitution precisely because he rightly feared that “later, more sophisticated” men would fail to understand the true relationship between these two documents. Modem scholarship notwithstanding, I believe an earlier biographer of Adams may have been closer to the mark when he declared that “John Quincy Adams studied justice . . . not by false standards of the age, but by [its] own true nature.”14 I start from a premise that such

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Chapter 1

pronouncements accurately reflect Adams’s understanding of justice, and that the principles espoused by him might not be the relics of a past age. Consequently, I attempt to understand the true nature of these principles. In order to do so, one must look to the sources of Adams’s thought and, as he read widely, we too must read widely. The classics, the Bible, and the first political philosophers of modernity all receive attention. Thus, I do not simply present the thought of Adam as a “useful paradigm” which might be instrumental in solving the problems confronted by political scientists, legal scholars, and judges as they grapple with the controversies of constitutional interpretation. I hope to demonstrate that Adams’s constitu. tional thought could, if embraced, provide solutions to virtually any constitutional controversies that might present themselves today or in the future. But Adams believed that the principles of the Declaration were also the principles of the Constitution. Hence, he understood them as transcendent moral truths that cannot possibly be understood correctly if they are understood within the wider context of a morally neutral political science which, as science, seeks to distinguish between facts and values. In other words, Adams holds that the principles of the Constitution are transcendent and cannot be incorporated into a political science that believes morality is relative and justice is a “value judgment.” Only by taking the thought of Adams as seriously as he himself took it, can it be truly instructive for us today. The task of this work then, is to understand the political thought of john Quincy Adam as he understood it himself before understanding it differently or better.

***** This work also addresses the question of how a Constitution founded on the rights of man could nonetheless have provisions that sanctioned the practice of slavery. It will be demonstrated that Adams, like the Founders, regarded the constitution’s slave provisions as necessary compromises for the sake of preserving the Union. Without compromises, the Union would not have survived. However, the compromises of the Constitution should never be confused with the principles of the Constitution. Adams, like Lincoln after him, did not support the abolitionist cause, at least not in the radical form the movement took in many of the northern states. Unlike the abolitionists of his day, A d a m was committed to preserving the Union. But it must be remembered that it was not just any union that Adams hoped to preserve; it was a Union whose founding principles were opposed to slavery. Adams believed that the preservation of the American Union would ultimately lead to the total extinction of slavery, as the principles of the American Founding came into harmony with the practices of American politics.

Introduction

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The book also explores the attempt by pro-slavery forces to undermine America’s allegiance to the principles of the Declaration. It traces the roots of modem constitutional interpretation to the pro-slavery movement of the 1830s and 1840s. A t the core of this new jurisprudence was a rejection of natural rights. I t is demonstrated that the constitutional arguments Adams directed against the pro-slavery forces in the 1830s and 1840s could just as easily have been directed against modern constitutional scholars.

***** The political battles Adams waged against pro-slavery forces also provide us with valuable lessons in the art of statesmanship. For Adams was a man of ideas and of action. He showed uncommon wisdom in his practical application of theoretical principles, and his life provided a priceless example for future generations of politicians and statesmen. We have already noted that Adams was probably the most well-read and well educated American president. Without question, he was the president with the greatest knowledge of, and appreciation for, classical political philosophy. Biblical religion also played a crucial part in the development of his political ideas, and he reflected upon the Bible daily. When Adams was in the midst of carrying out his public responsibilities he longed for the time to reflect quietly o n the wisdom of philosophers and prophets. “I cannot indulge myself the luxury,” wrote Adams while serving as secretary of state, “of giving myself two hours a day to these writers; but to live without having a Cicero and a Tacitus at hand seems to me as if it was a privation of one of my limbs.”I5 In his diaries Adams often voiced a desire to leave politics in order to pursue the intellectual pleasures of a contemplative life. But when, after his presidency, a life of quiet reflection was seen as all that would be left to him, he doggedly refused to leave the political arena. Even when his health had deteriorated to such a n extent that he considered himself “for every useful purpose . . . dead,”16he continued to make the tiresome trek from Quincy, Massachusetts, to Washington, D.C., in order to carry out his responsibilities in the House of Representatives. Old and ill, his speech impaired from the effects of a stroke, he nonetheless devoted himself to his public duties and told his wife that he would die the instant he retired from public life.I7 Adams was one of those rare individuals who demonstrated a n aptitude for both theoretical and practical virtue. It is no doubt true that “both kinds of virtue cannot coexist in their plenitude in one and the same human being.”18 But John Quincy Adams just might be the best example of an American statesman who, however imperfectly, brought these two qualities together in the service of his nation.

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Chapter I

Notes 1. Xenophon, The Education ofcyrus, trans. H. G. Dakyns (London: J. M. Dent Sons, Ltd., 1992), I, 2. 2. 2. William H. Seward, Life and Public Services ofJohn Quincy Adams, Sixth President of the United States With the Eulogy Delivered Before the Legislature of New York (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby, Miller, and Company, 1851), 399. 3 . Mary Cable, Black Odyssey (New York: Viking Press, 1971); Howard Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Iyunolu Folayan Osagie, The Amistad Revolt (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2000). 4. Emma Gleders Sterne, The Slave Ship (New York: Scholastic Book Services, 1973); original title: The Long Black Schooner (1953); William A. Owens, Slave Mutiny: The Revolt on the Schooner Amistad (London: Peter Davies, 1953); David Pesci, Amistad (New York: Marlowe and Company, 1996);Alex D. Pate, David Franzoni, Steven Zaillian, Amistad: A Novel (New York: Signet, 1997); Barbara Chase-Riboud, Echo of Lions (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1989), to name only a few. There is also an opera “Amistad” by Anthony Davis. 5 . The best biography of Adam remains the excellent two-volume work by Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundutions of American Foreign Policy, 1965, andJohnQuincy Adam and the Union, 1956 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). Other biographies of note include William H. Seward, Life and Public Services ofjohn Quincy Adams, Sixth President of the United States (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby, Miller, and Company, 1851); Bennett Champ Clark, John Quincy Adam: Old Man Eloquent (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1933); Marie B. Hecht,John Quincy Adams (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972); Paul C. Nagel, John Quincy Adam, A Public Life, A Private Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); Robert V. Remini,John Quincy Adams (New York: Times Books, 2002). Still other historical works are limited to specific periods of Adam’s long political career: Mary W. M. Hargreaves, The Presidency ofJohn Quincy Adams (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985); Leonard L. Richards, The Life and Times of Congressman John Quincy Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 6. Greg Russell, John Quincy Adams and the Public Virtues of Diplomacy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995). 7. William Lee Miller, Arguing About Slavery: The Great Battle in the United States Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). 8. George A. Lipsky, John Quincy Adams: His Theory and Ideas (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1950). 9. Ibid., 190. 10. Ibid., 209. 11. Ibid., 212. 12. Ibid., 212-13. 13. Ibid., 214. 14. Seward, Life and Public Services ofJohn Quincy Adams, 396. &a

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15. John Quincy Adams, LMemoirs of John Quincy Adams, Compnsing Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848. 12 vols, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1874-1877), vol. 9 (May 10, 1819), 361. 16. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 12 (March 14, 1847), 279. 17. Ekmis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 530. 18. Leo Strauss, “Xenophon’s Ambasis,” in Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 128.

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C H A P T E R

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Adams, the Constitution, and the Contemporary Scholarly Debate

In asking what were the original intentions of the Founding Fathers, we are asking what principles of moral and political philosophy guided them. . . . The crisis of American constitutionalism-the crisis of the West-lies precisely in the denial that there are any such principles or truths.

Harry V. Jaffa’

In the summer of 1839, a slave mutiny on board the Spanish schooner La Amisin Cuban territorial waters. By an unlikely turn of events, the

tad took place

Amistad found its way to the United States, where American courts would decide the fate of the Africans who had seized the ship. John Quincy Adams took an immediate interest in the case. But due to his advanced age and his many responsibilities in the House of Representatives, Adams had at first refused to take an active role in defense of the Amistad Africans. However, when the case eventually reached the Supreme Court, Adams, despite the opposition of his family, agreed to defend the Africans before his country’s highest tribunal. T h e American press had already dubbed Adams “old man eloquent,” and he lived up to his reputation as he argued before the Supreme Court. The case was decided in favor of the Africans, and Adams became a folk hero to many in the antislavery cause. But Adams’s argument before the Supreme Court deserves careful consideration today for reasons beyond mere historical curiosity. For Adams argued that the case must be decided on the principles articulated in the Declaration of Independence. In short, Adams contended that the principles of the Declaration were also the principles of the 11

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Constitution. “I know of no other law,” A d a m declared, “that reaches the case of my clients, but the law of Nature and Nature’s God o n which our fathers placed our own national existence. . . . That law, in its application to my clients, I trust will be the law o n which the case will be decided by this Court.”2 What is more, Justice Joseph Story, in rendering the opinion of the Court, agreed with Adams. Story stated that the case had been “decided upon the eternal principles of justice” and that there were not any grounds for denying the Africans “the just assertion of their right^."^ The Africans were not citizens of the United States or any civilized nation. The rights t o which Story was referring were clearly natural rights based o n the eternal principles of justice. What exactly are natural rights? Although a much more detailed explanation will be provided in subsequent chapters, a preliminary explanation is now in order. Natural rights rest o n the rational insight that no human being is so far superior to other human beings that he has a right to rule others without their consent. To use Thomas Jefferson’s celebrated example, “the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles o n their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God.”4This is what the Declaration means when it declares that all men are created equal. The Africans of the Amistud were released from bondage because it was a selfevident truth that they were human beings and nothing less. As such they were entitled to the same unalienable rights with which all men had been equally “endowed by their Creator” under “the law of Nature and Nature’s God.” W h y are the principles upon which this case was decided worthy of note? For more than a decade a remarkable debate has raged in academic and legal circles concerning the principles of constitutional interpretation. However, the most prominent legal scholars from both camps deny that the principles of the Declaration provide a source for interpreting the Constitution. O n one side of the debate are the defenders of judicial activism who favor a “living Constitution.” The espousers of this new jurisprudence seek to liberate the Constitution from its reactionary past, endowing it with new, more progressive principles. The Constitution is seen as a document that evolves over time, keeping pace with the progress of new ideas. We may point, for example, to former Justice William Brennan’s adherence to the principle of “human dignity.” We are still striving toward that goal, and doubtless it will be an eternal quest. For if the interaction of this Justice and the constitutional text over the years confirms any single proposition, it is that the demands of human dignity will never cease to evo1ve.j

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T h e problem with such an understanding of the Constitution is that it places no real restraints o n those who would interpret and apply its “overarching principles.” The intentions of the Founders can be completely disregarded as can the specific provisions of the text. For example, Justice Brennan could simply ignore specific references to capital punishment in the Fifth Amendment and still contend that capital punishment was unconstitutional by virtue of the provision against “cruel and unusual punishments” in the Eighth Amendment. He did so despite the fact that the Fifth and Eighth Amendments were passed and ratified at the same time.6 Brennan’s understanding of the Eighth Amendment is not unique. Decades earlier Chief Justice Earl Warren declared, “the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. . . . T h e Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing ~ o c i e t y . ”Warren ~ seems not to have questioned his basic premise that “evolving standards of decency” are a “mark of progress.” This optimism hardly seems warranted by the events Warren witnessed in his own lifetime. T h e examples of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia should have been enough to dispel the notion that changing standards of decency are indicative of progress. This point seems all the more cogent when one considers that both Fascists and Marxists considered themselves “progressive” in the decisive sense. Of course, I am not accusing Earl Warren, or any other defenders of a living Constitution, of being sympathetic with Nazis or Communists. I am simply using these examples of political extremism to expose the flawed foundations of this particular school of constitutional interpretation. Progress is not always synonymous with change; what is newer is not always what is better. Advances in science and technology are not necessarily indicative of moral progress. If the adherents of a living constitution reject eternal and timeless moral principles they are left with nothing but a rather naive faith that the future must necessarily be better than the past. A n unthinking commitment to “evolving standards of decency” has no ground other than unsupported faith. It should be noted, however, that the defenders of judicial activism are by no means a monolithic group. In recent years not only such notables as Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, but the vast majority of the law school professoriat, fall into this camp. With such widespread agreement for the notion of a living constitution, it is not surprising that there should be disagreements o n how best to interpret the evolving document. Paul Brest, for example, divides the proponents of the living constitution into two main schools.8 The first he identifies as the consensus or conventional morality theorists, among them Dean Harry Wellington of Yale and Michael Perry of

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Ohio State. Brest labels a second group of judicial activists as “rights” theorists and includes Laurence Tribe of Harvard, Kenneth Karst of UCLA, David Richards of New York University, and J. Harvey Wilkinson and G. Edward White of Virginia.’ Brest eventually includes himself in this group. Conventional morality theorists deny the existence of fundamental rights. There is only a conventional morality to be judicially ascertained and enforced. Wellington defines conventional morality as “standards of conduct which are widely shared in a particular society.”1oIt is possible to discern society’s conventional morality only by living in a society that allows one to “become sensitive to it, experience widely, read extensively, and ruminate, reflect, and analyze situations that seem to call moral obligations into play. This task may be called the method of philosophy”” which Wellington denies can be adequately performed by legislators. It is the duty of the court, therefore, to identih the shifts in contemporary moral culture. As moral conventions change, the principles used to interpret the Constitution will change. Judges must stay abreast of such changes and avoid the temptation to base their decisions on outdated principles. The proponents of this school do not believe this is difficult to do, for “Justices,after all, are not unfamiliar with conventional mores and attitudes; in truth it is unlikely that a very unconventional person would become a Justice of the Supreme Court. The collectivity which is the Supreme Court is, in this sense, a jury, and as a matter of political reality the Court is a jury that generally will reflect and mediate the temper of the dominant political and moral culture.”12Whether this confidence in a judge’s ability to tap into conventional morality is warranted or not is irrelevant to the premise of this book. For like most of the American Republic’s early statesmen, Adarns believed that only a demagogue would allow conventional morality to dictate his decisi~ns.’~ The belief that popular morality was synonymous with justice was for Adarns the perverse doctrine of what he contemptuously referred to as “quixoticdemocrac~.”~~ Ofcourse, public morality would act as a constraint on what statesmen could do, but judges and legislators were expected to be leaders rather than followers of public opinion. Adams argued that the leaders of this nation should look to the principles of the Declaration of Independence as their guide and, if need be, resist popular moral trends. Nonetheless, it may be worth noting that Wellington and Perry come to very different conclusions about the practical application of their theory. They agree that judges should base their decisions on conventional morality but they do not agree about the actual content of conventional morality. For example, Brest points out that Wellington would sustain antihomosexual legislation while Perry argues that the punishment of homosexual conduct is contrary to conventional morality.’j

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*****

Rights theorists make up a second branch of scholarship in support of the notion of a living constitution. They draw on a variety of sources to formulate a theory of fundamental rights that is independent of conventional moral views. Though they may differ widely about what constitutes fundamental rights, they do not believe a judge’s decision must necessarily be constrained by conventional morality. In fact, under some circumstances judges may have an obligation to enforce their moral principles even if their decision runs contrary to majority opinion. Such an understanding of the Constitution would not necessarily have been objectionable to John Quincy Adams. However, it is when looking to the source of these principles that we uncover the unbridgeable chasm that exists between the thought of Adams and the Founders on the one hand, and that of contemporary “rights” theorists on the other. For as Brest points out, “right theorists invoke many of the same sources of values that the consensus theorists employ to ascertain conventional morality.”’‘ The only difference is that rights theorists are less constrained by conventional morality.

A rights theorist looks to conventional morality as a nonexclusive guide to defining the breadth and contours of higher level moral principles. Once articulated, those principles operate independently of particular conventional views and may even invalidate laws that are supported by a strong contrary consensus.17 Conventional morality that changes or evolves over time is the primary source of constitutional interpretation for both “consensus theorists” and “rights theorists.” For rights theorists, judges may act “independently of particular conventional views” only because it is assumed they are a little farther along o n the “eternal quest” toward “human dignity.” In other words, they have reached the next stage of conventional morality before the rest of society. Their views are authoritative only because it is assumed they will eventually reflect a wider consensus o n conventional morality. Their differences are a matter of degree, not of kind. For both believe that conventional morality must ultimately provide the standard by which judges interpret the Constitution. Morality so understood is relative to its time and place. Moral principles used to interpret the Constitution in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries may not be valid today. Brest leaves no doubt about this assertion when he concedes that “the critics are, of course, right that fundamental rights adjudication is not guided by the text or original history of the Constitution.”18

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The advocates of the living constitution are thus a diverse group, and the quality of their scholarship runs a gamut from the shrill rhetoric of partisan politics19 to thoughtful academic scholarship of the highest quality.?O Proponents of a living constitution also differ o n the degree to which the constitutional text should be consulted. Leonard Levy, for example, is critical of judicial activists who believe that interpretation based on interpretivist values or norms is unrealistic in the sense of not accurately describing what the Supreme Court is doing. That is true. But noninterpretivists rely on values and norms that go quite beyond anything the text or history can provide; they tend to stress current values, usually their own, which they find in some philosophy or alleged consensus of which they approve, and they insist that judges ought to decide accordingly; or they complain that the Court decides on the basis of bias that is wrong because it is not their bias. The term “noninterpretivism”is silly because “noninterpretivism”is more interpretive than “interpretivism,”though it purports to interpret something other than the Constitution. Noninterpretivists are really saying, “The Constitution should be interpreted to enforce my policies rather than yours.”2’ Levy calls himself a “broad interpretivist.” He notes interpretivists are also called “originalists.” But Levy is also critical of originalists, and it soon becomes clear that he himself believes in a living constitution. The history of Magna Carta throws dazzling light on a jurisprudence of original intent. Magna Carta approaches its 800th anniversary. It was originally “reactionary as hell,” to quote the chief justice of West Virginia. But the feudal barons who framed it could not control its evolution. It eventually came to signify many things that are not in it and were not intended. Magna Carta is not remotely important for what it intended but for what it has become. It stands now for government by contract of the people, for fundamental law, for the rule of law, for no taxation without representation, for due process of law, for habeas corpus, for equality before the law, for representative government, and for a cluster of rights of the criminally accused. No one cares, or should, that the original document signifies none of this. The Constitution is comparably dynamic.!* We see that Levy’s sober appraisal of judicial activism does not lead him to denounce its underlying premises. The Constitution and Magna Carta are, according to Levy, “comparably dynamic.” Both documents change over time, and their meanings can evolve to the point that they would be unrecognizable to their original authors. What Levy says about Magna Carta is cer-

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tainly true. However, Magna Carta is part of the uncodified British Constitution that rests o n very different foundations from that of the American Constitution. It is thus a fallacy to use the British Constitution as a model for understanding the American Constitution. John Quincy Adams went to great lengths to distinguish the principles o n which the American Constitution rests from those of the British Constitution. The proponents of a living constitution may disagree on many things: Does their authority to interpret the Constitution rest o n conventional morality or some evolutionary understanding of fundamental rights? To what degree should the actual text of the Constitution guide interpretation? However, there is general agreement that the meaning of the actual text and the theoretical principles o n which the Constitution rests will change over time. Despite their diversity such scholars do not dispute whether or not the Constitution has changed over time. Rather, they disagree about the precise nature of the changes that have taken place and the best method of interpreting those changes. Such disputes may inspire differences of opinion but they will not inspire a return to first principles.

***** The idea of a living constitution in some form or another continues as the predominant opinion among legal scholars. However, in the mid- 1980s the Reagan administration’s justice department began actively promoting an argument in favor of “a jurisprudence of original intent” specifically designed ? ~ Attorney General Edwin Meese declared in to restrain judicial a c t i v i ~ m .As 1985, “it has been and will continue to be the policy of this administration to press for a Jurisprudence of Original Intention. In the cases we file and those we join as amicus, we will endeavor to resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes as the only reliable guide for judgment.”?’ Robert Bork asserts the same view, declaring, “only the approach of original understanding meets the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic l e g i t i m a ~ y . ” ~ ~ T h e notion of a living constitution is rejected in favor of a jurisprudence of original intent derived from a strict adherence to the text, history, traditions, and logical structure of the Constitution. T h e Constitution is understood to be a strictly positivist document which rests o n “neutral principles.” Questions of morality should be decided by democratic majorities, while a judge’s duty is limited to interpreting the Constitution as a procedural instrument indifferent to results. The proponents of this new understanding of original intent explicitly deny that a judge should have recourse to “abstract theories” such as the Declaration of Independence. As Bork once stated, “If

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a judge should claim . . . to possess a volume of annotated natural law, we would suspect that the source of revelation was really no more exalted than the judge’s viscera.”26 Bork concedes that “there may be a natural law, but we are not agreed upon what it is, and there is no such law that gives definite answers to a judge trying to decide a case.”27T h e fact that there will be disagreements o n what constitutes moral truth is regarded as legitimate grounds for rejecting moral truth altogether. Any appeal to moral principle-even to the moral principles of the Founders-will simply open the door to the dangerous practice of judicial activism. If one can speak of a liberal understanding of the Constitution in which “overarching principles” are uncontrolled by the actual text, one could also point t o a conservative understanding of the Constitution where there is a text with no overarching principles.2s For confirmation of our claim we turn to the words of Chief Justice of the United States William Rehnquist. In his influential essay, “The Notion of a Living Constitution,” Rehnquist attacks activist judges who ignore totally the nature of political value judgments in a democratic society. If such a society adopts a constitution and incorporates in that constitution safeguards for individual liberty, these safeguards do indeed take on a generalized moral rightness or goodness. They assume a general social acceptance neither because of any intrinsic worth nor because of any unique origins in someone’s idea of natural justice but instead simply because they have been incorporated in a constitution by a people.lY

Rehnquist denies that there is any “idea of natural justice” providing a foundation for the Constitution. Constitutional “safeguards for individual liberty” have a certain moral authority but “simply because they have been incorporated in a Constitution by a people.” For Rehnquist and likeminded conservatives, the entire moral foundation of the Constitution rests o n nothing more than the will of the people. But Rehnquist’s legal positivism is completely alien to the thought of the Founding generation. “If, therefore, a majority . . . ,” wrote A d a m in 1791, “have n o other rule but their sovereign rule and pleasure to direct them, what possible security can any citizen of the nation have for the protection of his unalienable rights.”30This is a question that apparently does not concern Rehnquist or his epigones. Most modem proponents of original intent’ believe that safeguards for individual liberty became just when they were made part of the law; they were not made part of the law because they were just. There could not be a

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clearer rejection of the principles of the Declaration. In accordance to these principles, Adams believed we have rights that exist by nature. These rights were not given to us because they had “been incorporated in a constitution by a people,” and they could not be taken from us if they were not recognized by our Constitution. For Adams, the first principles of the Constitution are principles that are recognized in (rather than created by) the document. For this reason, Congressman Adams denied that the right of petition was simply a political privilege granted by the constitution. “[Tjhis right,’’ he contended, “belongs to humanity . . . it is the right of the people over the government; it is their right and they may not be deprived of it. . . . Will any man say that the right of petition would not exist unless written down in the Con~titution?”~~ Adams also explicitly denied that the Constitution should be regarded as a procedural instrument indifferent to results. The text of the Constitution was irrevocably tied to the principles of the Constitution. For Adams, a properly constructed constitution must be “a Constitution of principles, not of (italics in the original). As with the defenders of the living Constitution, there is diversity of opinion among proponents of original intent. The disputes within the school tend to center on the question of whether or not interpreters of the Constitution must rely exclusively on the explicit language of the Constitution. Many originalists also look to the subjective purposes of identifiable historical actors as part of the arsenal from which interpreters can draw.34There is also some dispute among originalists about the sorts of sources they may use to discern the meaning of the Constitution. For example, Charles Lofgren criticizes fellow originalists for limiting their inquiry to the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution while ignoring the understandings and intentions of its ratifiers. A recent book by Jack N. Rakove criticizes originalists like Robert Bork for the poor quality of their historic scholarship.35Rakove nonetheless argues that James Madison defended a “neutral mode of interpretation” generally consistent with the views of modem originalists. He concludes, however, “that neutrality could rarely be attained when the Constitution was so highly politicized, or when politics was so highly constitutionalized. This was not what Madison had intended in 1787, nor what he desired a decade later; but he contributed as much to this result as any of his colleagues and contemporaries, and he lived long enough to foresee its most tragic irnplication~.”~~ The work of John H. Ely might be mentioned as well.37Ely’s theory of constitutional interpretation also aspires to judicial neutrality on moral questions, and Robert Bork draws heavily from Ely’s theory.38However, although Ely

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claims originalist support for his theory, even casual scrutiny reveals that it is unconstrained by the text and original understanding of the Constitution. Ely argues that the judiciary should actively review legislation. Any law which is based o n “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” is suspect and should be invalidated unless it can prove some legitimate governmental objective.j9 For Ely, judicial review has a limited objective of insuring the integrity and representativeness of the legislative process. Ely insists that judicial review “can appropriately concern itself only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice under attack.”40 Ely attacks all fundamental rights positions, as well as consensus-based theories; however, it appears that his own theory of constitutional adjudication is only a thinly disguised fundamental rights theory unanchored by either the text or original understanding of the Constitution. For Ely argues that judicial intervention can be legitimate if its purpose is to promote “participation.” But why participation? It seems Ely considers participation to be a privileged value for it is the one value judges may legitimately p r ~ m o t e . ~ ’ This much is certain: like the originalists, Ely denies the natural law tradition of the Founders. “Our society does not,” Ely writes, l1 rightly does not, accept the notion of a discoverable and objectively valid set of moral principles, at least not a set that could plausibly serve to overturn the decisions of our elected representative^."^^ This lack of recourse to moral principles does more than undermine the foundations of constitutional law. T h e moral relativism and philosophical nihilism at the core of legal positivism destroy the ability to understand the historical and moral significance of the nation. For originalists, the American founding is, in the most decisive sense, n o different from the founding of any other regime. Might, not right, is the basis of all political authority. This view is clearly articulated by Lino Graglia, a distinguished law professor at the University of Texas Law School and a prominent defender of the new jurisprudence of original intent. Graglia argues: ‘ T h e American colonists separated from Great Britain not because they had the ‘authority’ to do so-they were acting in defiance of authority-but simply because they had the power to do so, the capability of resisting British arms.”43 Graglia’s understanding of the American Revolution provides the basis for his understanding of the Constitution, but his views could not be further from those of the Founders. Adams, for his part, never tired of pointing to the moral character of the questions addressed and resolved in the American Revolution. “It was a question between right and might,” he writes, “between liberty and power: a question the most solemn and momentous of any that can be agitated among men.”44

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*****

Suffice it to say that both political conservatives and liberals, however profound their differences might at first seem, agree that the principles of the Declaration do “not provide a useful guide to constitutional interpretat i ~ n . Adams ” ~ ~ and the Founders had a very different understanding of the Constitution. It is true that the Constitution rests o n the consent of the people, but it is enlightened consent informed by the laws of nature and nature’s God. The people do not have a right to do what is wrong. The authority of the people is checked by a moral law that exists prior to, and independent of, the people and is not subject to their will. Our rights do not come from a democratic majority and cannot be taken away by a democratic majority. “In a free government” wrote Adams, “the minority never can be under an obligation to sacrifice their rights to the will of the majority, however expressed.”46It is impossible to uncover the original intent of the Founders if one ignores their commitment to the natural rights and natural law doctrine of the Declaration of Independence. “The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States,” stated Adams, “are parts of one consistent whole, founded upon one and the same theory of government.”” The centrality of the Declaration to Adams’s theory of government cannot be overstated. Even those scholars who would dismiss its contemporary importance emphasize this fact. For example George Lipsky notes that Adams held, in effect, that the Declaration was as much a part of the public law of the land as the Constitution, that it had established the proper relations among the states in the federal relationship, that the Constitution was the final fruition of the political evolution set in motion by the Declaration. In defense of his clients, the Africans, in the case of the Amistad, before the Supreme Court, he relied on the Declaration of Independence, in the absence of statutes, constitutions, codes, treaties relating to the case; in reality the Declaration was the “Law of Nature and Nature’s God” and had been imported into the Constitution.48 It is particularly important to emphasize that A d a m believed that America’s explicit adherence to these principles distinguished it from all other nations, including other republics. As a consequence, A d a m persistently contrasted the “inflammatory principles” of the French Revolution from the “sober and correct principles of our own declaration of i n d e p e n d e n ~ e . ”He ~ ~also argued that the American Revolution differed in nature from the revolts of Spanish America.

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It is crucial for our purposes to note that Adam denied that the principles of the Declaration were synonymous with the principles of democracy. Some form of democracy was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for just government. For without a commitment to the natural rights doctrine of the Declaration, popular forms of government would “still be the sport of arbitrary power, and the hideous form of despotism must lay aside the diadem and the scepter, only to assume the party-colored garments of democracy.”50As a careful reader of Aristotle and the writers of classical Rome, he believed in both good and bad forms of popular government. He explicitly rejected Rehnquist’s understanding of popular sovereignty. He denied that the will of the majority could ever be just, simply because it was the will of the majori t ~ . He ~ l also firmly maintained, in contrast to Brennan, Levy, and others, that the principles of the Declaration were eternal and immutable. They could not be changed or evolve over time. Adam’s understanding of the Constitution differs from today’s most prominent constitutional scholars, liberal and conservative alike. Yet it must be acknowledged that much more work will be required to establish that Adams’s view is not only different but also correct. In order to do this, it must be demonstrated that Adams understood the Constitution’s principles as the Framers understood those principles. In short, it must be proved that A d a m was the true expounder of what conservative commentators refer to as original intent. However, proving that Adam shared the same understanding of the Constitution as the Founders may still not be sufficient criteria for accepting his views on Constitutional interpretation. It is not sufficient to demonstrate that the Founders believed the Constitution rested on eternal and immutable principles. There must also be an explanation of what those principles are and why they should continue to be respected.

Notes 1. Harry V. Jaffa, original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1994), 41, 42. 2. John Quincy Adams, Argument in the Case of United States vs. Cinque (New York: Republished by Amo Press and New York Times, 1969), 3. 3. United States v. The Libellants B Claimants of the Schooner Amistad B c. and the Africans mentioned B described in the General Libels B claims, 40 U S . 5 18 (15 Peters), at 593 (1841). 4. Thomas Jefferson to Roger C. Weightman, Monticello (June 24, 1826), in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), 585.

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5. William J. Brennan, speech at Georgetown University (October 12, 1985); reprinted in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution (Washington, D.C.: Federalist Society, 1986). 6. Harry V. Jaffa, Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution, 17. 7. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958). 8. Paul Brest, “The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship,” Y& Law J o u d 90 ( 1981): 1063-96. 9. Ibid., 1067. 10. Harry Wellington, “Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication,” Yale Law J o u m l 9 0 (1973): 244. 11. Ibid., 246. 12. Michael Perry, “Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process,” UCLA Law Review 23 (1976): 689. 13. John Quincy Adams, Letter to Abigail Adams, The Hague (April 25, 1795), in The Writings ofJohn Quincy Adams, 7 vols., ed. Worthington Chauncy Ford (New York: Macmillan, 1913-1917), vol. 1,333; also to John Adams, The Hague (May 4, 1795), Writings, vol. 1, 344. 14. John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comp’sing Portions of His Diary fiom 1795-1848, 12 vols., ed. Charles Francis Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1874-1877), vol. 9 (July 10, 1835), 243. 15. Brest, “The Fundamental Rights Controversy,” 1072-73. 16. Ibid., 1079. 17. Ibid., 1079-80. 18. Ibid., 1088-89. 19. Barnard Schwartz, The New Right and the Constitution (Boston: Northwestern University Press, 1990). 20. William E Harris, The Interpretable Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), and Leonard Levy, original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1988). 21. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution (preface, xv). 22. Ibid., 395-96. 23. I t should be noted that the originalists’ critique of judicial activism had been around for some time, before the 1980s. See, for example, Robert Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” 47 Indiana Law Journal 1 (197 1); and also Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977). 24. Edwin Meese, “Address Before the American Bar Association” (July 9, 1985) in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution, 14. 25. Robert Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 143. 26. Robert Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” 30. 27. Bork, “The Struggle Over the Role of the Court,” National Review (September 17, 1982): 1138.

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28. Jaffa, Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution, 18. 29. William Rehnquist,“The Notion of a Living Constitution,” Texas Law Rewiew 54 (1976): 679. 30. Adams, “Publicola,” Writings, vol. 1, 71. 31. A few modem scholars continue to uphold the constitutional principles adhered to by Adams. Indeed, the works of Harry V. Jaffa, and his students, provided the inspiration for my argument. 32. A d a m quoted in Lipsky, John Quincy Adams, 177. 33. Adams, Publicola, Writings, vol 1, 75. 34. See, for example, the dispute between H. Jefferson Powell and Charles A. Lofgren. H. Jefferson Powell, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent,” Harward Law Rewiew 98 (1984-1985): 885; reprinted in Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution, 53-115; Charles A. Lofgren, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent?” 5 Constitutional Commentary 77 (1988) reprinted in Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution, 117-50. 35. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (New York Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 340. 36. Ibid., 365. 37. John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Rewiew (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). 38. Bork, The Tempting of America, 242. 39. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 147-48. 40. Ibid., 181. 41. Brest, “The Fundamental Rights Controversy,” 1094. 42. Ibid., 54. 43. Lino A. Graglia, “Jaffa’s Quarrel with Bork: Religious Belief Masquerading as Constitutional Argument,” in Harry V. Jaffa, Storm Over the Constitution (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 1999), 132. 44. John Quincy Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy on the Fourth ofJuly, 1831 (Boston: Richardson, Lord and Holbrook, 1831),9. 45. Graglia, “Jaffa’sQuarrel with Bork,” 132. 46. John Quincy Adams, Menander, Writings, vol.1 (December 1792), 127 (italics in the original). 47. John Quincy Adams, Jubilee of the Constitution: A Discourse (New York: Samuel Colman VIII, Astor House, 1839). 48. Lipsky, John Quincy Adams, 2 12-13. 49. Adams, to the Freeholders of Washington, With, Grason, Russell, Tazewell, Lee, and Scott Counties, Virginia (December 28, 1822), in Writings, vol. 7,337-38. See also letter to Friedrich Gentz, Berlin, June 16, 1800. Ibid., vol. 2, 463. 50. Adams, “Publicola,” Writings, vol. 1, 7 1. 51. Ibid., 70.

C H A P T E R

I 1 1



John Quincy Adams, the Founders, and Slavery

Slavery is the great and foul stain upon the North American Union. John Quincy Adams In the preceding chapter I contrasted Adams’s understanding of the Constitution and its principles with those of the most prominent constitutional scholars of today. Adams’s conviction that the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the principles of the Constitution are one and the same is denied by the most respected members of the legal and academic community. It is my purpose to revive an understanding of constitutional interpretation consistent with the principles of the Declaration. It has already been demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that Adams understood the Constitution very differently from such notables as Chief Justice Rehnquist, Robert Bork, and the late William Brennan. In the contemporary context this argument is neither conservative nor liberal. Many conservatives view any discussion of natural rights with suspicion, for they fear that reading such rights into the Constitution will encourage “activist” judges to legislate from the bench. Many liberals would be uncomfortable with the principles of the Declaration because they emphasize “individual” rather than “group” rights and because of the putative moral sanctions of the natural law. I focus o n the concerns of both of these groups, but I begin this chapter by addressing the “conservative” interpreters of the Constitution. In doing so, I hope to show that Adams had a much clearer understanding of original intent than either Bork or Rehnquist. The task is to demonstrate that Adams understood the 25

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Constitution as America’s Founding Fathers understood it. Put concisely, I believe the Founders would have endorsed Adams’s view that the principles of the Declaration provide a legitimate source for interpreting the Constitution, or to use Adams’s own words, that they are “based on the same theory of government.” In short, I make the case for Adams as a spokesman for the Founders. I foresee a number of objections to this argument. There are, for example, those who would contend that no one is qualified to speak authoritatively on the intent of the Founders because they had passionate disagreements among themselves.’ Others might contend that the principles of the Founders are unworthy of our respect because the Constitution sanctioned the immoral practice of slavery. Understanding the Founders’ views on slavery is thus crucial if one is to judge properly the merits of original intent jurisprudence. Consequently, in the second half of this chapter I address the issue of slavery.

***** It is first necessary to address the question of who might rightfully be considered to be among America’s Founding Fathers. Broad definitions have gone so far as to include the piratical Dey of Algiers, British mercantilists like Lord Sheffield, and the “mobocrat” Daniel Shays.? For the actions of these men helped drive the delegates of the Constitutional Convention to their work. However, the political and moral ideas that shaped a nation are the principal focus of my investigation. Hence, for the purposes of this work, such a broad interpretation of who could properly be considered a Founder would make little sense. Narrow definitions limit the Founding Fathers to the actual signers of the US. Constitution in 1787. While certainly the thirtynine delegates who signed the Constitution should be identified as Founders, so might many of the nation’s most notable leaders who, for one reason or another, were unable or unwilling to attend the convention. Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and Thomas Paine were in Europe. Neither Samuel Adams nor John.Hancock were elected as delegates by the state of Massachusetts. Patrick Henry was elected as delegate from Virginia but refused to attend. All of these men were revolutionary leaders of great importance, and for this reason can properly be considered among America’s Founding Fathers. Thus, my definition of the term “Founders”would be broad enough to include all “those who served in notable public offices from about 1765 to 1800, especially the authors of constitutions, laws, and other important documents.”) Such a definition allows us to include almost the entire spectrum of American political thought during this era. Men who were considered Federalists, Anti-Federalists, and Republicans are included among the

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Founding Fathers. Additionally, one might speak of “the leading Founders,” men whose position and prestige in the early republic were so great that even today they are familiar to most American schoolchildren. When I speak of America’s leading Founders I am referring to George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.

***** Having identified the Founders, it is now necessary to explicate the unifying threads of their political thought. What were the political ideas that united these men to the American Republic, and how does the thought of John Quincy Adams illuminate their thought? Before tackling these questions directly, I wish to establish the extent to which John Quincy Adams participated in the events that led to the American Founding. Although John Quincy Adams was not one of America’s Founding Fathers, his father was. John Quincy grew up in the founding generation. He witnessed the early battles of the Revolution and was always a close confidant to his father. He was also well acquainted with his father’s colleagues and continued his association with them as an adult. He enjoyed a good relationship with George Washington, whom he idolized. The esteem he held for America’s first president led him to name his firstborn son George Washington Adams. One of John Quincy Adams’s most distinguished works, Jubilee of the Constitution, was written as a tribute to George Washington. In this discourse,Adams gave his clearest and most extended account of the relationship between the Declaration and the Constitution. John Quincy was even better acquainted with Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, for he grew up in their company while living with his father in France. And although his relationship with Jefferson was strained in later years, a letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson on January 22, 1825, provides evidence that Jefferson was at one time very close to the younger Adams. John Adams referred to his son, John Quincy, as “our John” in the letter and stated that “he appeared to be as much your boy as mine.”4 John Adams’s recollections to his old friend are corroborated in the diary of the young John Quincy, which is sprinkled with references such as “Mr. Jefferson is a man of universal learning” and “spent an evening with Mr. Jefferson whom I love to be ~ i t h . ” ~ Another of the most prominent Founders, James Madison, also thought highly of John Quincy. He offered him a variety of diplomatic appointments and recommended him for the position of associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.6

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Adams also enjoyed a close relationship with Chief Justice John Marshall, one of the earliest and most authoritative interpreters of the Constitution. They corresponded regularly and, as we shall see, Marshall enthusiastically endorsed Adams’s understanding of the Constitution and the Declaration. Their respect for one another was mutual, and with Marshall’s death, Adams lamented the passing of “one of the most eminent men that this country has ever produced.” Marshall’s appointment, to the Supreme Court was the last act of John Adams’s administration and John Quincy called it “one of the most important services rendered by him to his country.” With customary discernment, Adams correctly “feared” that Marshall’ssuccessor would be “of a very different ~haracter.”~ There can be little doubt that Adams knew the major Founders intimately and personally and never broke with the principles of the American Revolution.

***** Of course, the fact that Adam knew the Founders does not by itself indicate that he was qualified to speak for them. This would be particularly true if, as is often argued, the Founders could not agree among themselves about the principles necessary for the foundations of good government. It is, after all, an indisputable fact that the Founders had fierce disagreements among themselves. The ratification of the Constitution inspired intense and rancorous debate. In the late 1790s the Founding Fathers divided along party lines and attacked each other with such hostility that civil war did not seem an improbable outcome. In all of American history only the political controversies which directly preceded the Civil War were as bitterly contested as the battles between Federalists and Republicans. This partisan rancor divided Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, the principal authors of the Federulist Pagers and arguably the two men most responsible for securing the adoption of the new Constitution. It divided old and intimate friends like John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, the principal authors of the Declaration of Independence. Yet it is a profound and inexcusable mistake to conclude that the Founders disagreed about the ultimate ends or purposes of the regime. For America’s first leaders had come to a consensus about the country’s first principles when they signed the Declaration of Independence. The American Revolution was waged for a purpose. It was fought on behalf of principles, and America’s leaders knew what those principles were and why they were worth fighting for. The Revolution was not a naked struggle for power in which might made right and justice was the rule of the stronger. Never before had a contest been so clearly drawn between right and power. America’s war for independence,

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like the Constitution which followed, was the product of “reflection and choice” and not simply a n outgrowth of “accident and force.” In this respect, the American Revolution was unique. As Adams noted, It has often been remarked that the distinction between rebellion and revolution consists only in the event, and is marked only by difference of success. But to a just estimate of human affairs there are other elementary materials of estimation. William Tell, Gustavus Vasa, William of Orange, had been the leaders of revolutions, the object of which had been the establishment or recovery of popular liberties. But in neither of those cases had the part performed by those individuals been the result of deliberation or design. The sphere of action in all those cases was incomparably more limited and confined, the geographical dimensions of the scene narrow and contracted-the political principles brought into collisions of small compass-no foundations of the social compact to be laid-no people to be formed-the popular movement of the American Revolution had been preceded by foreseeing and directing mind.s

Americans who fought in the War for Independence shared a common belief in the principles of the Declaration of Independence. These principles, sometimes referred to as Whig principles, are the first principles of the regime. Thus the disputes between the Founders might correctly be regarded as an intra-Whig debate.9 Their differences were not comparable t o the differences between Whigs and Tories after the Glorious Revolution in England. Because Whigs and Tories disagreed about first principles it could not be realistically expected that the victorious party would (or could) respect the principles of their defeated enemies. Their views o n government were mutually exclusive; the victory of one meant the defeat of the other. T h e differences that existed between Whigs and Tories in seventeenthcentury England could not be settled by political compromise or by a popular election. Consequently, they were settled o n the field of battle. By contrast, the Founders had differences of opinion, not differences of principle. The Federalists, in a n act unprecedented in the annals of recorded history, voluntarily gave up power after they were defeated in a popular election. The election of 1800 had been bitterly fought, with both parties accusing the other of antirepublican tendencies. But the outcome of this crucial election demonstrated that in the most decisive sense-with respect to first principles-Republicans and Federalists were unified. “Every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all republicans-we are all federalists.”l0

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In a commentary o n Jefferson’s inaugural address, Harry Jaffa writes that “party warfare divided men who had fought shoulder to shoulder in the Revolution, and it is essentially the principles of the Revolution . .. to which Jefferson appeals in arguing for the restoration of friendship. Their differences, he is saying, ought to be looked upon as arising within the boundaries of these common principles.”’ Stepping back a few years, i t might be noted that not even the AntiFederalist opponents of the Constitution disagreed with Federalists about the purposes for which all just government is instituted. While they disagreed with the Federalists about the institutional means that might best achieve the ends of government; there was n o disagreement about the proper ends of government. For example, many of the Anti-Federalists were opposed to the design of the new Constitution because they believed that the separation of powers made government too complex and too powerful. Their concern with the new government was that it might be oppressive to those natural rights it was designed to protect. But neither of the parties in America’s great constitutional debate assumed that governments should be formed for any purpose that might be contrary to the protection of natural rights. Similarly, the partisan debates of the 1790s did not concern the ends of government. They, too, centered o n alternative institutional means of achieving those ends. Jefferson was more democratic than the Federalists, though hardly a radical democrat, as he is often portrayed.’* That there were important and politically significant differences between Republicans and Federalists cannot be denied. The difference between Jefferson and the Federalists can, somewhat crudely, be described as a debate about whether it is the people or the formalism of the Constitution that provides the best safeguard for republican g 0 ~ e r n m e n t . lAgain, ~ their ends were the same. They merely disagreed about the means to those ends. John Quincy Adams said as much in a debate with Thomas Paine and his supporters in 1791. Paine was probably the most radical voice of the founding era. Some of his views were abhorred by Adams’s family and by members of the Federalist Party. Yet John Quincy stated in his Letters of Publicoh that his objection to Paine’s Rights of Man was not premised o n “the object which [Paine] promised himself,” that is, the defense of natural rights. Adams believed that Paine presented “a commentary upon the rights of man inferring questionable deductions from unquestionable principle^."'^ The principles espoused by Paine were to Adams, and indeed all of the major founders, unquestionable. It was the deductions Paine made from those principles that Adams regarded as unsound.

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I t should not be surprising that men who shared a strong belief in the principles of the Declaration of Independence might disagree o n how to convert those principles into political institutions, or how best to extend them to those in the regime who as yet did not enjoy the rights of man. Adams, for his part, did not always see eye to eye with his own father. Yet it would be absurd to suggest that their disagreements, and the disagreements between the Founding Fathers in general, had any bearing upon their shared understanding of America’s first principles. John Quincy Adams was not a man who easily forgave enemies. Unlike his father, he seems never to have fully reconciled himself with Thomas Jefferson. Long after Jefferson’s death, he continued to criticize the policies of the Jefferson administration in a manner that indicated the personal antagonism he still felt for the man he had once so admired. It is thus all the more significant that Adams’s attachment to the principles of the Declaration never faltered. It is an unquestionable fact the he remained as committed to them in old age as he had been in his youth. Adarns’s personal feelings about the primary author of the Declaration had nothing to do with his belief about the truthfulness of the principles enunciated in that document. W h y should they? The self-evident truths of the Declaration were not the creation of Thomas Jefferson; they had always existed as the inheritance of all mankind.

***** Adams, like the Founders, believed that the principles of the Declaration were the first principles of the regime. This fact in itself sufficiently demonstrates that he was qualified to speak for the Founders’ intentions. Yet we have not answered why we have chosen Adams and not someone else to be our expositor of original intent. “The history of John Quincy Adams is one that opens n o new truth in the philosophy of virtue,” wrote his eulogist, “for there is no undiscovered truth in that philosophy. But it is a history that shed marvelous confirmation o n the maxims which all mankind know, and yet are prone to undervalue and forget.”16Adams’s understanding of the Constitution was not original. He did not discover the moral philosophy informing the Declaration. But his life was devoted to confirming those self-evident truths that are so often ignored or forgotten. The reason for selecting Adams as the subject of this book is, in the end, quite simple. Adams, for whatever reason, wrote about the relationship between the Declaration and the Constitution more clearly and articulately than anybody before him. There might be a number of explanations for this. In the time in which he wrote, he faced challenges that members of his father’s generation did not. As we learn from Lincoln, perpetuating a regime is more difficult than founding. In facing

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these challenges Adams was required to do what would have seemed unnecessary to the Founders: defend the principles of the Declaration. O r Adams may simply have had greater vision than any of the Founders. Perhaps his insight into the challenges the regime would eventually face was just more perceptive. This much, however, is certain: members of the founding generation would not have disputed the core of his constitutional argument. I t was not until late in his life that Adams’s views o n the relationship between the Declaration and the Constitution came under attack. Even then, only the proslavery cause attempted to challenge him on the crucial question of first principles.

***** In the following chapter I explore in detail the sources of America’s first principles. However, a preliminary explanation is now in order. The American regime was a novel experiment in politics, and its first principles were derived in large part from the works of modern political philosophers. Though many political theorists come to one’s mind,17 few people would deny that the thinker who exerted the greatest influence on the American founding was John Locke. Certainly, Adams believed this to be true.18 But if Americans benefited from the “great improvement” in “the new science of government,” they also benefited from the time-tested wisdom of the ancient writers of Greece and Rome. Adams drew his most profound political lessons from a variety of sources. His social and political thought “derived in great measure from eighteenth-century thinkers, in particular John Locke, but it constituted as well, a special synthesis of old ideas.”” Adams was fluent in Greek, Latin, French, Dutch, and German. By the age of ten h e had read and enjoyed much of Shakespeare.2o Indeed, his passion for Shakespeare never waned. “My admiration for Shakespeare,” Adams declared, “as a profound delineator of human nature and a sublime poet, is but little short of idolatry.’12’ By eighteen, Adams had read in the original, Suetonius, Livy, Herodotus, Caesar, Cicero, Cornelius Nepos, Juvenal, Ovid, Phaedrus, Virgil, Horace, Sallust, Tacitus, Tully, Aristotle, Plutarch, Xenophon, and Homer.22The correspondence between John Quincy Adams and his father frequently included reflections o n the classics, and John Quincy continued to read the classics his entire life. Adams was especially fond of Cicero, and perhaps the only book he held in greater esteem than the works of this noble Roman was the Bible. “I cannot indulge myself the luxury,” wrote Adams during one of the busiest periods of his life, “of giving two hours a day to these writers; but to live without having a Cicero and a Tacitus at hand seems to me as if it was a privation of one of my limbs.”13

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Adams was perhaps the most erudite of America’s presidents. But if the scope of his reading was somewhat wider and his grasp of foreign languages better, the sources of his reading were not, in essence, much different from many of America’s Founders, most of whom had some education in both classical and modem thought. It has been argued that the American founding, by following Locke, precipitated a radical break with the classics.24Certainly, Adams and the Founders were aware of the great novelty of the American experiment. Yet they did not believe the principles of their regime were inconsistent with the classics. Thomas Jefferson, for example, mentioned Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, and Sydney when listing the sources of the Declaration of Independence. Adams, for his part, explicitly linked the first principles of Locke to the “purer fountain of elementary principle” which characterized the thought of “Socrates and Plato.”25 In short, America’s Founders had the “prudence and moderation not to throw out the baby with the bath, that is, the prudence to conceive of the modem ideals as a reasonable adaptation of the old and eternal ideal of decency, of the rule of law, and of that liberty which is not license, to changed circumstances.”26

***** So at what point did America’s founding principles undergo their first significant challenge? The most obvious starting point would be the mid-1830s when southem spokesmen abandoned the idea that slavery was a “necessary evil” and began to adopt a new position which attempted to defend slavery as a positive civilizing force.27But Adams himself traced the first major assault on the principles of the Declaration to the slightly earlier and not unrelated issue of nullification. “The cause of State sovereignty and its logical corollaries of nullification and succession,” noted August Spain, “provided for Calhoun and other Southerners a first line of defense for the institution of slavery.”28Adams believed that the doctrine of nullification was opposed to the principles of the Declaration and should therefore be considered unconstitutional. He stated these views as early as 1831 during a public address in celebration of the Fourth of July.2yHe repeated and expanded upon these arguments in Jubilee of the Constitution ( 1839).30 It would be untrue to argue that Adams’s understanding of the relationship between the Declaration and the Constitution underwent any changes during the 1830s. As we will demonstrate, his political writings from as early as the 1790s are perfectly consistent with his constitutional commentaries of the 1830s, and he always held up the Declaration as an object of veneration. Yet this much is true: in the 1830s the Declaration came to represent more to Adams than the emblem of America’s principles; it became his indispensable weapon in what he regarded as a battle for America’s soul.

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Adams seemed never to have missed an opportunity to use the Declaration to clarify both his own intentions and those of his political enemies. By doing so he accomplished two things. First, he reminded Americans of what they already knew: that their regime rested on the self-evident truths of the Declaration. He was not preaching a new and novel doctrine. He was simply emphasizing what for most Americans was an indisputable fact. As a result, he accomplished a second task: he forced the enemies of these principles out into the open. By constantly focusing public attention on the principles of the Declaration, he left his political opponents no choice but to admit the obvious fact that they denied the self-evident truth that all men are created equal. Largely as a result of Adams’s statesmanship, the principles of the Declaration were never far from view during what is typically referred to as the era of Jacksonian democracy. It is noteworthy that Alexis de Tocqueville, who is generally believed to have provided the clearest and most profound critique of this period, never mentions the Declaration in his seven-hundred-page book. We believe this was a grave error on the part of Tocqueville, for it has led to important misunderstandings about the Constitution and American democracy. It is beyond the scope of this work to critique the manner in which Tocqueville misunderstands the American founding. This has been adequately done by others.31Rather it is simply my intention to demonstrate that the principles of the Declaration must be understood as central to American politics and society in the 1830s. The most significant political controversies of this decade, and of those that followed, centered on the principles of the Declaration. At the apex of the most important political and constitutional storms of this period stood John Quincy Adams. The one weapon he depended on in every appropriate situation was the Declaration of Independence.

***** Not surprisingly, various scholars interpret the significance of the Jacksonian era differently. Many have argued that America underwent a very important intellectual shift away from the principles of the founding and toward a new and more democratic form of popular government. This “shift” is most typically referred to in terms that are meant to distinguish between Jeffersonian or Madisonian democracy and Jacksonian democracy.32I do not dispute that important political changes occurred in the 1830s, and that these may have included changes in the way certain parts of the Constitution were interpreted. But it is crucial to recognize that the Constitution did not undergo an evolution in its first principles. It is generally concluded that the era of Jacksonian democracy was characterized by a more egalitarian brand of poli-

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tics which resulted, at least in part, from the significant expansion of the suffrage which took place in the first half of the nineteenth century. By 1828, during Jackson’s first successful run for president, presidential electors were selected by popular vote in virtually every state.j3 This led to profound changes in the structure of political parties that began to build support from the bottom up. Thus, the election year of 1828 also marked the rise of political parties as mass phen0men0n.j~And an increase of voter participation can be directly linked to the rise of party politics. In 1824, under 30 percent of the eligible electorate voted in the presidential election. By 1828, with only one mass party, the number had risen to over 50 percent. In 1840, with two mass parties firmly established, over 78 percent of eligible voters voted in the presidential election.35This development, which would not have been welcomed by most of the Founders, led to further democratic reform. Conscious that they must be more responsive to popular sentiment, parties adopted more democratic methods for selecting presidential candidates. The nominating convention replaced the old caucus system, and this allowed some local control over the selection of national candidates. Easing limitations o n the franchise was hardly inconsistent with the first principles of the regime. Indeed, the movement toward broadening the suffrage is most easily explained by the widespread belief that the principles of the Declaration required expanded suffrage. Again, there are those who argue that important constitutional changes took place as a result. For example, Robert Dahl believes that “Jackson developed . . . a new constitutional system, and since his day that system has largely prevailed, rather ~ ~ argues than the Jeffersonian, the Madisonian, or the R e v ~ l u t i o n a r y . ”Dahl that the core of this constitutional change was found in a new understanding of the presidency which replaced the legislature as the true representative of the majority. Certainly, Jackson’s election signaled the beginning of the “popularity principle” in electing presidents, and brought a n end to the practice of promoting Cabinet members through the caucus nominating method. But if presidential politics was now nationalized and popularized, it was not directed by a new understanding of first principles. While Jackson may have introduced a more energetic and democratic executive, his primary concern was still the protection of individual natural rights from an oppressive government. The means to this end may have been altered, but his ultimate purpose was shared by the Founders. Certain attitudes about American democracy may have changed, but it is incorrect to argue that by the 1830s the first principles of American democracy had undergone change. To the contrary, Jacksonian democracy is a variant of American democracy, which we define as democracy informed by the “higher law” principles of the Declaration.

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Even if Jacksonian democracy had represented a fundamental change in the way Americans understood their Constitution it would have little bearing on my argument. For it is my contention that Adams understood the Constitution as the Founders understood the Constitution, and his commentaries o n the Constitution were designed to bring Americans back to the first principles of the regime. Yet these principles, like Adams himself, were not necessarily opposed to democratic reform. It is important to emphasize this fact given the “aristocratic” reputation which is so often attached to the Adams name. Certainly Adam’s political opponents liked to portray him as a luxurious dandy bred by the courts of a n aristocratic vestige of the old Federalist Party with its “monarchial” tendencies.j8 Many historians, particularly from the progressive era, have concurred with this general critique, noting that Adams expressed a lack of faith in the wisdom of the people.39 Popular textbooks have tended to accept this accusation as if it were a n unquestionable fact. “An aristocratic Adams,” writes John D. Hicks, by way of example, “in a contest with a democratic Jackson had not the remotest chance to win.”4o The popular conception of Adams as a snobbish “aristocrat” is particularly misleading. Though somewhat aloof, he was unpretentious and shunned the trappings of wealth and power. Always sober in his manner and dress, he presented an unblemished portrait of republican austerity. He was the first president to wear long trousers rather than the kneelength pantaloons and white-topped boots favored by his predecessors. He developed close and lasting friendships with his servants and was famous for skinny-dipping in the Potomac with his valet.41 Far from corrupting his commitment to republican government, his time spent in Europe seemed only to fire his commitment to his country and its principles. “I feared that by having received so large a share of my education in Europe,” Adams wrote his mother in 1786, “my attachment to a republican government would not be sufficient for pleasing my countrytnen; but I find on the contrary that I am the best r e p ~ b l i c a n . ” ~ ~ Yet scholars have persistently questioned his commitment to democracy. Certainly A d a m never believed that political leaders should be expected to follow public opinion blindly. “There is, however, one fundamental political error from which France has not yet recovered,” wrote a young John Quincy Adams. “It is the unqualified submission and the unwise veneration for the opinion publique, which is in its nature inconsistent with any regular permanent system of government or policy.”43His opinion on such matters was not altered by age, and over the years he criticized both Jefferson44and Jackson for following rather than guiding the currents of democracy.45To many modern historians such views smack of an elitism which seems inconsistent with

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more modern conceptions of democracy. Consequently, there is a tendency on the part of modem scholars to dismiss the words written by Brooks Adams in tribute to his grandfather. This form of belief [democracy] was strong in my family a century ago, and found expression through my grandfather, John Quincy Adams, who made the realization thereof the work and ambition of his life and who, when he grew old, practically gave his life for the cause. As an apostle of this doctrine, I take it, he must always be one of the most commanding figures in our history when he comes to be fully understood.46

In referring to this passage, George Lipsky writes: “The record makes the unqualified assertion at least doubtful unless by democracy is meant a rather special A d a m variety of whiggery, much in contrast with the popular forces finding expression in the Jacksonian re~olution.”~’ I demonstrate that this “rather special Adams variety of whiggery” was simply a belief that the democratic will must always be in accordance with the principles of the Declaration, majority rule reconciled with minority rights. As Adams was fond of noting, the people of a democracy may have the power but they never have the right to do whatever is in accordance with their will.48 While A d a m understood that popular government must be responsive to the democratic will, he was adamant that political leaders should lead rather than follow public opinion. “In countries approaching so near a democracy as the United States,” wrote Adams, “it must ever be a primary object for leaders of the party to court the favor of the people. There are two modes of accomplishing this success; one of which consists in rendering real service to the public, and the other by professing extraordinary solicitude for the people, by flattering their prejudices, by ministering to their passions, and by humoring their transient and changeable opinions.”49Thus Adams very clearly distinguishes between “popular leadership,” or demagoguery, and what some scholars have referred to as “nonpartisan” statesmanship. “Under this form of leadership,” writes James Ceaser, “the elevation of individuals to office should be the result of their having achieved a widespread reputation based o n distinguished service to the Statesmanship combined with the institutions of government were the necessary safeguards to assure that the reason of the people ruled their passions. But this does not mean A d a m was hostile to the people. After all, he believed all just government rested on the consent of the governed. If statesmanship and a well constructed constitution were necessary to avoid what Adams called “perverted democracy,” he also acknowledged that the “honest

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and enlightened spirit of the people” provided the best safeguard against tyrannical g ~ v e r n r n e n tIndeed, .~~ he acknowledged that whenever a government failed to earn the attachment of its people it might be better for it to fall even if its constitutional principles were theoretically just.j2 Adams’s special variety of whiggery was perfectly consistent with the teachings of the Federalist Papers, which championed a system of self-government designed to avoid certain dangers inherent in democracy. Adams was critical of both Jefferson and Jackson, but all three men shared a common belief that the purpose of democracy was the protection of natural rights. They all understood that just government is derived from the consent of the governed but they all also understood democracy to be in the service of a n end. Democracy was not the goal of democracy. Protecting and extending the rights of man was the goal of democracy. Adams, Jefferson, and Jackson, despite their differences, shared a common understanding of first principles. Whatever differences of opinion they may have held with regards to the Constitution, we can be sure that all three men were closer to each other than they are to the adherents of either school of modem constitutional interpretation. The reverse is also true; Rehnquist and Brennan are closer to each other than either would be to anyone from Adams’s generation (with the possible exception of John C. Calhoun and his epigones). In truth, the supposedly profound contrasts between Adams and Jackson are in many respects superficial and have been greatly exaggerated by historians. Adams was deeply committed to a popular form of government, and while his public persona differed from Jackson’s he was not unresponsive to the democratic impulses of his day. Indeed, in a n excellent study of Adams’s congressional career, Leonard L. Richards points out that Adams was “the leading voice for the most powerful ‘democratic’ movement in his district and the state as a whole.”53 Richards is referring to Adams’s involvement with the Antimasonic Party. In the early 1830s, at the beginning of his congressional career, Adams became the nation’s most eminent spokesman on behalf of this controversial movement. It should be remembered that in many northern states the Antimasons were considered an antiestablishment party acting o n behalf of the common man. The Antimasons had been formed in popular response to the 1826 murder of William Morgan. Morgan was a former member of the Masons from Batavia, New York, who had threatened to reveal the fraternal order’s secrets. As his book, Illustrations of Masonry, was about to appear, he was arrested on a trumped-up charge and taken to Canandaigua, where he was released for lack of evidence. He was immediately rearrested for failing to pay an innkeeper a bill of $2.69. Someone paid Morgan’s debt, and he was released from jail, only to be abducted

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on the street and hustled into a yellow carriage. He was driven by relays of horses to the Niagara frontier, where all trace of him disappeared forever. The investigation of Morgan’s abduction excited great popular interest. When it became apparent that prominent Masons were using their influence to obstruct the inquiry into Morgan’s death, popular indignation was ignited. The protests grew into a political movement that championed the cause of the common man against the powers and privileges enjoyed by Masons in politics, business, and the courts. Membership in the Masons was, at least in the common belief, exclusive and open only to the “better sort” of men. By 1827 the Antimasons had organized into a political party which stood for the rights of the ordinary citizen against the immoral, aristocratic, oath-binding system of the Masonic order. Neither Adams nor his father had ever joined the Freemasons but many prominent American statesmen had been, or were, members of the craft. George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Henry Clay, and Andrew Jackson were some of the more prominent members of the Masons. Perhaps because so many of the nation’s leading men were members of the fraternity, few politicians with national reputations were prepared to speak out against the order. Adams himself was slow to show support for the Antimasons. In 1828 and 1829, as the movement gained strength, Adams was preoccupied by a multitude of distractions. He had been soundly defeated by Jackson in the presidential election of 1828, and this political catastrophe was followed by the death of his eldest son, George, who had apparently taken his own life. In addition, Adams was plagued by financial difficulties and a bitter dispute with Harrison Gray Otis and other prominent Boston Federalists. Nonetheless, Adams objected to the secrecy of this fraternal organization and to the undemocratic nature of its oaths and offices. More important, its repulsive conduct in the Morgan affair had demonstrated its willingness to flout the rule of law in order to protect the crimes of its brethren. Though Adams never officially joined any political party he frenquently referred to himself as “an Antimason” and eventually became the movement’s most distinguished ~ p 0 k e s m a n . He j ~ pugnaciously attacked Freemasonry in public letters and tracts, but Adams was always careful to distinguish between individual Masons, many of whom were the most upstanding of citizens, and the “institution” of Freemasonry. Additionally, the focus of his attacks was always directed toward demonstrating the fraternal organization’s incompatibility with democratic principles. How could a good republican possibly tolerate the elitism and favoritism of Masonry? Were not the “oaths and penalties’’ of this order “inconsistent with the duties of those who take and administer them to their country or their God?” Was it not shameful for the

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citizens of a democracy to refer to themselves as “High Priests, and Grand Kings, and most illustrious Knights of the Cross?”55As for the charge that Antimasons persecuted Masons, Adams countered that, to the contrary, the party had been formed in response to the widespread discrimination that non-Masons had endured at the hands of this secret brotherhood. “In accusing [Antimasons] of persecution,” wrote a scornful Adams, “you are yourself the persecutor.”j6 Twentieth-century historians have often portrayed the Antimasons as bigoted fanatics, sometimes comparing them to the followers of Joseph McCarthy.j7 Arthur Schlessinger Jr. referred to them as “that invaluable school for demagoguery.”j8Yet, some perceptive historians have noted that the Antimasonic Party was founded in response to a very real crime and cover-up committed by a politically powerful and influential organization. To allow this order to go unpunished would have undermined the rule of law and tarnished the character of American democracy. Adams’s response to the Antimasons was consistent with his response to other political and social movements which followed in their wake. Because he believed the cause to be fundamentally just, he supported it to the extent prudence permitted. His attacks on Masonry were directed against the order’s teachings and principles, not its members. Adams was not the blind follower of this powerful democratic impulse, for under his leadership it was directed by principle, not passion. He sought to lead the Antimasons in order to moderate the more extreme elements within the movement and to temper the more fanatical demands of its adherents.

***** Antimasonry is generally associated with the often fanatical social, political, and religious movements that swept New England and Western New York in the 1830s and 184Os.j9 Adams’s response to these reform movements varied to the extent he regarded their cause just and prudent. The justice of the cause depended on its compatibility with the principles of the Declaration, its prudence on whether or not it helped or harmed the promotion of these principles. A proud collector of fine wines, he opposed, but often seemed somewhat amused by, the temperance movement. On one occasion in 1835 he was confronted by a fervent disciple of the temperance movement, Mrs. Philadelphia Cook. Adams described Cook’s appearance as “face and form . . . well suited to perform the part of one of the weird sisters of Shakespeare.” She lectured Adams for more than an hour on the evils of alcohol but was unable to convince him not to continue to “pour poison down his throat.”6o

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However, Adams saw no humor in a prohibition measure which reached the legislature of Massachusetts. When asked his opinion, he stated: “This license law [15-gallon license law] is an ill-advised measure intended to promote the virtue of temperance, but infringing the personal freedom and habits of the people.’’61When the measure was eventually sanctioned by the state legislature, Adams frankly acknowledged that the laws’ sponsors acted with good intentions, “in the highest degree, pure patriotic and benevolent.” Yet Adams believed that the temperance movement was intemperate and declared that the law was dangerous for it promoted two great evils. The first, a spirit of concerted and determined resistance to its execution. The second, a concerted effort to turn the dissatisfaction of the people with the law into a political engine against the administration of the state. There is no duty more impressive upon the Legislature than that of accommodating the exercise of its power to the spirit of those ower whom it is to operate. Abstract right, deserving as it is of the profound reverence of every ruler over men, is yet not the principle which must guide and govern its conduct; and whoever undertakes to make it exclusively his guide will soon find in the community a resistance that will overrule him and his

Like the Founders, Adams understood that the Declaration’s pronouncement of the right to life should not be interpreted as a prohibition on capital punishment. When asked to sign a petition for the abolition of capital punishment, he flatly refused. “We have by the laws of the Commonwealth,” stated Adams, “only five crimes punishable with death-treason, murder, burglary, arson and rape. Now, a law to save the precious lives of men guilty of either of those crimes has, in my judgment, little claim to the merit of humanity. They are a class of people with whom humanity cannot sympathize. A law to prohibit the killing of rattlesnakes would be as rational and might be urged upon principles of humanity.”63 Adams also took a dim view of the more radical religious reforms and reformers of the era. He declared: It is the doom of the Christian church to be always distracted with controversy, and where religion is most in honor, there the perversity of the human heart breeds the sharpest conflicts of the brain. The sentiment of religion is at this time, perhaps more potent and prevailing in New England than in any other portion of the Christian world. . . . A young man, named Ralph Waldo Emerson, a son of my once-loved friend, William Emerson, and a classmate of my lamented son George, after failing in the every-day avocations of a Unitarian preacher and school-master, starts a new doctrine

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of transcendentalism, declares all the old revelations superannuated and wom out, and announces the approach of new revelations and prophecies. . . . The deadly sophistry of the transcendental school consists of the alliance of atheism with hypocrisy. . .. Garrison and the non-resistant abolitionists, Brownson and the Marat democrats, phrenology and animal magnetism, all come in, fumishing each some plausible rascality as an ingredient for the bubbling caldron of religion and Note that lumped into this “bubbling caldron of religion and politics” was the abolitionist cause. No reform movement was as controversial as this moral crusade. Adams’s response to this movement typifies his commitment to balance the demands of justice and prudence, which was the most characteristic feature of his statesmanship. Adams’s relationship to the abolitionist cause was complex. Despite his opposition to slavery, he never considered himself a spokesman for the abolitionists of his day. We have seen that he was often harsh in his criticism of the more radical elements of this movement, for he felt their political demands would tear the Union asunder. Because Adams believed the Union was fundamentally just, he also believed that the battle against slavery must be conducted within constitutional parameters, and he vehemently rejected the view that the Constitution lacked authority due to its compromises with slavery. Yet Adams’s willingness to fight what he contemptuously referred to as the “slavocracy” made him the most prominent, and in some quarters, the most feared and hated opponent of slavery in his day.

***** In the mid- to late 1830s a new political doctrine born out of a burgeoning pro-slavery movement, and contrary to the principles of the Declaration, had begun to make its mark in American politics. This new political doctrine could not be equated with Jacksonian democracy per se. Indeed, it was inspired by Andrew Jackson’s great political antagonist in the nullification crisis, John C. Calhoun. Yet within the spirit of the times part of the argument for slavery was founded o n Calhoun’s contention that black slavery led to a more perfect equality among whites. Nonetheless, it would seem more reasonable to conclude that this southern defense of slavery was a corruption of Jacksonian democracy. Indeed, the pro-slavery arguments of southern politicians were, in large part, a reaction against the spirit of the times. The American Revolution had brought about the novus ordo seclorum, and the fruits of this revolution were beginning to ripen in the 1830s. Certainly this is how Adams understood the era:

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There is a great fermentation upon this subject of slavery at this time in all parts of the Union. . . . The current of public opinion running everywhere stronger and stronger into democracy and popular supremacy, contribute all to shake the fetters of servitude. The theory of the rights of man has taken deep root in the soil of civil society. It has allied itself with the feelings of humanity and the precepts of Christian benevolence. It has armed itself with the strength of organized association. It has linked itself with religious doctrines and religious fervor.6i

Yet the fervor for democratic reform in the north was matched by an equally intense fervor for the protection of slavery in the south. For the first time in America’s history the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence were called into question by a large segment of American society. In his response to this pro-slavery argument, Adams pointed America to the Declaration and became what I have referred to as the spokesman for the Founders. Since the Founders were never faced by a n internal political challenge to the first principles of the regime, they apparently never felt it necessary to articulate clearly and systematically the relationship between the Declaration and the Constitution in the same manner as Adams. This unfortunate oversight on the part of the Founders was to have dire consequences. For by the 1830s, some of the more militant moral crusaders were directing their inflammatory attacks against the Founders themselves. Inspired by the rantings of these demagogues, some Americans began to argue that the Constitution was a pro-slavery document. Interestingly, it was not the more prominent Southern politicians who championed this new position (Calhoun, for example, argued that the Constitution was neutral on the morality of slavery),66but Northern abolitionists. William Lloyd Garrison was the recognized leader of one prominent group of abolitionists who referred to the Constitution as a “covenant with death and an agreement with hell.”67Indeed, Garrisonian abolitionists under the slogan “NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS!” were more open proponents of disunion than the early nullifiers of South Carolina. Unlike such prominent abolitionists as Lewis Tappan, Joshua Leavitt, and Theodore Weld-who as we shall see often found common cause with Adams-the Garrisonians failed to recognize a connection between the Declaration and the Constitution. Many modem scholars agree. “A careful reading of the Constitution,” writes Paul Finkelman, “reveals that the Garrisonians were right to believe that the national compact favored slavery.”68 Of course, Southerners had always found ways to protect and defend their peculiar institution, and some of the seeds from which their later pro-slavery argument would develop were evident before the 1830s. As early as 1820,

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Adams had come to believe that, despite their willingness to admit the abstract evils of slavery, Southerners “when probed to the quick . . . show at the bottom of their souls pride and vainglory in their condition of m a ~ t e r d o t n . ” ~ ~ And even at the Constitutional Convention the arguments of some of the most militant supporters of slavery indicate a sinister foreshadowing of the pro-slavery arguments of the late 1830s. Indeed, James Madison was moved to condemn forcefully some of the Southern representatives from Georgia and South Carolina who were “intemperate beyond all example and even all decorum. They are not content with palliating slavery as a deep-rooted abuse, but plead for the lawfulness of the African trade itself.”‘O T h e most militant and outspoken defenders of slavery at the Constitutional Convention were General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, his younger cousin Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler, and John Rutledge. Like the most prominent defenders of slavery in the 1830s, these delegates came from the state of South Carolina. John Rutledge warned the Constitutional Convention lest it think North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia “will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The people of those states will never be such fools as to give up so important an interest.”” Charles Cotesworth Pinckney expressed similar sentiments: “S. Carolina & Georgia cannot do without slaves . . . [Tlhe importation of slaves would be for the interest of the whole Union. The more slaves, the more produce to employ the carrying trade; The more consumption. . . a n d . . . the more revenue for the common treasury.” But it was his cousin Charles Pinckney who came closest to expressing an argument for slavery which sought to justify the morality of slavery. Citing the examples of “Greece Rome & other ancient States,” he proclaimed that slavery was “justified by the example of all the world.”72 Yet, as disturbing as these arguments were, they did not precipitate the same sort of crisis as Adams was to face in the 1830s. Southerners were not arguing-as they would later-that slavery was beneficial to the African race, that a slave-based economy was inorally superior to the developing capitalism of the North, or that slavery was a positive civilizing force that created an almost perfect equality among whites and inspired a virtuous citizenry. By the 1830s, apologists for slavery regarded the master class of the South as more noble, honorable, and chivalrous than the vulgar industrialists of the North. Indeed, slavery was believed to produce a sort of American democrat equivalent of the European aristocratic ideal of noblese oblige. But during the Founding era none of these more sophisticated arguments were introduced as a justification for slavery. Even harsh critics of the Founders concede this point. For example, the only “moral or philosophical” arguments-

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as opposed to “practical and political” arguments-which Finkelman referred to, were those of the Northern delegates opposed to slavery. Finkelman criticizes the delegates for making arguments based o n political and economic self-interest rather than o n moral prin~iple.‘~ But this is precisely the point; during the Founding era it was not thought that slavery could be justified on any grounds other than self-interest or necessity. It is true that a belief in the racial inferiority of blacks, though by no means universal, was widespread during the Founding era. It is also true that in the 1830s,and in the decades that followed, the supposed racial inferiority of blacks became a crucial element in the new positive good argument for slavery. However, it cannot be overemphasized that a belief in black inferiority should not necessarily be equated with a belief that slavery rested on a moral foundation. Indeed, as Jefferson, Adams, and later Lincoln were fond of pointing out, the question of racial inferiority has no bearing on one’s natural rights. The failure of modem scholarship to distinguish between racial arguments and pro-slavery arguments clouds modern perceptions of the original intent of the Founders.74 First, it should be noted that many of the leading Founders’ views on race were little different from our own. Alexander Hamilton said of blacks: “Their natural faculties are probably as good as ours. .. . The contempt we have been taught to entertain for the blacks, makes us fancy many things that are ~~ Franklin voiced simfounded neither in reason nor e ~ p e r i e n c e . ”Benjamin ilar views after a visit to a school for black children: “[I] have conceived a higher opinion of the natural capacities of the black race than I had ever before entertained. Their apprehension seems as quick, their memory as strong, and their docility in every respect equal to that of white children.”76 The Founders voiced different opinions on the question of race. But, as Thomas G. West points out, whatever their views, all of the leading Founders unequivocally admitted the fundamental injustice of slavery.77George Washington stated, “There is not a man living who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a plan adopted for the abolition of it.”78 John Adams declared: “Every measure of prudence, therefore ought t o be assumed for the eventual total extirpation of slavery from the United States. . . . I have through my whole Life, held the practice of slavery in . . . a b h ~ r r e n c e . Writing ”~~ in 1774, Thomas Jefferson called the “abolition of domestic slavery . . . the great object of desire in those colonies where it was unhappily introduced in their infant state.)’8oBenjamin Franklin argued: “Slavery is , . . a n atrocious debasement of human nature.)’*l Alexander Hamilton noted: “The laws of certain states . . . give an ownership in the service of Negroes as personal property. . . . But being men, by the laws of God and nature, they were capable of acquiring liberty-and when the captor in war . . . thought fit to give

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them liberty, the gift was not only valid, but irrevocable.”*2James Madison stated: “We have seen the mere distinction of colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man.”*j George Mason, who is not as well known today as the leading Founders but was an important figure in the founding era, echoed views expressed earlier in Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia. Slaves, he contended, “produced a pernicious effect on manners. Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant. They bring the judgment of Heaven on a country. As nations cannot be rewarded or punished in the next world, they must be in this. By a n inevitable chain of causes and effects, Providence punishes national sins by national calamities.”*4 When the Declaration proclaimed to the world that all men are created equal, it made any arguments based o n the superiority or inferiority of a race of human beings irrelevant to the question of slavery. Racism could only justify slavery if it were so extreme as to deny the humanity of another race. Such arguments were not being made by any of the Founders. Indeed, the pro-slavery delegates to the Constitutional Convention made emphatic demands for the humanity of blacks to be recognized by the Constitution. Pierce Butler and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney “insisted that blacks be included in the rule of Representation, equally with the Whites,” and proposed a resolution to delete the three-fifths clause.85 In fact, the three-fifths clause was initially defeated at the Convention by a vote of six states to four. Three Southem states, led by South Carolina, opposed the measure. For very different reasons three Northern states were opposed to the clause. Northern opposition to this clause was perhaps most eloquently articulated by Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania who, being “reduced to the dilemma of doing injustice to the Southern States or to human nature,” chose the former because he “could never agree to give such encouragement to the slave trade as would be given by allowing them a representation for their Negroes.”86 A t the Constitutional Convention and throughout the four decades that followed, the interests of slave owners were often protected but not in a manner that openly called into question the principles of the Declaration. But in the early 1830s a small but intluential group of Southern academics began publishing tracts expressing the idea that slavery was not a grave injustice but a positive civilizing force. Within a very short time of its introduction, the pro-slavery argument had become the accepted doctrine of many (though by no means all)*’ influential Southern politicians. Adams specifically referred to William and Mary professor Thomas Dew and South Carolina politicians George McDuffie and William Harper as the founders of this movement. “To the mind of Mr. Dew,” noted a sardonic Adams, “slavery

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is the source of all virtue and the heart of the master.” After reading Dew’s argument in 1833, Adams called it “a monument of the intellectual perversion produced by the existence of slavery in a free community.”88 It did take a few years, however, for these arguments to be felt in the political arena. Historian Drew Gilpin Faust notes that the first explicit defense of slavery as a positive good ever heard in Congress was delivered by South Carolina’s James Henry Hammond in 1836.89Hammond, possibly under instruction from John C. Calhoun,9Dboldly contended that slavery “is no evil. On the contrary, I believe it to be the greatest of all blessings which a kind providence has bestowed upon our glorious r e g i ~ n . ” ~But ’ it was Adams’s former cabinet colleague, John C. Calhoun, who became the most powerful and influential proponent of this new defense of slavery. In 1837 he unequivocally declared that slavery was “instead of an evil, a good-a positive g00d.”~*Calhoun’s defense of slavery forced him openly to reject the principles of the Declaration. As a twentieth-century apologist for Calhoun has poignantly noted, In his attack on the state of nature and on the natural liberty and equality of men, Calhoun was definitely making a break with his predecessors. Jefferson, Madison, and Taylor had all been adherents of the contract theory and the Lockeian tradition; and they had all appealed to the natural rights of man. Calhoun had some difficulty in erasing all traces of similar doctrine from his thinking, but, it is submitted, he s ~ c c e e d e d . ~ ~

Calhoun’s most explicit attack against these principles came years later in one of his final speeches in the Senate o n June 27, 1848. In this “Speech on the Oregon Bill,” Calhoun speculated o n how a future historian might record the cause of the destruction of the American Union.

If he should possess a philosophical turn of mind, and be disposed to look to more remote and recondite causes, he will trace it to a proposition which originated in a hypothetical truism, but which, as now expressed and now understood is the most false and dangerous of political errors. The proposition to which I allude, has become an axiom in the minds of the vast majority on both sides of the Atlantic, and is repeated from tongue to tongue, as an established and incontrovertible truth; it is, that “all men are born free and equal.” I am not afraid to attack error, however deeply it may be entrenched or however widely extended, whenever it becomes my duty to do so,as I believe it to be on this subject and occasion.94 The specific proposition Calhoun here addresses is not taken from the Declaration of Independence. It is instead taken from the Massachusetts Bill

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of Rights (1780) whose principle architect was none other than John Adams. Article I of this document states: All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.

It should be remembered that John Adams was part of the committee chosen by the Continental Congress to prepare the Declaration of Independence. This committee eventually chose Thomas Jefferson to draft the document, but the principles expressed in 1776 are n o different from those articulated in Massachusetts four years later. Only the manner in which these principles were verbally expressed has been somewhat a1tered. Calhoun admits as much later in the same speech. “If we trace it back, we shall find the proposition differently expressed in the Declaration of Independence. That asserts that “all men are created equal.” T h e form of expression, though less dangerous, is not less Caihoun thus explicitly denied the Founders’ proposition that all men are created equal. The core of the positive good argument for slavery was the inferiority of the Negro race. Blacks, it was charged, were so physically, mentally, and morally inferior to whites that they were regarded as creatures unfit for liberty. In 1836, James Henry Hammond stated,

1 feel firmly convinced that, under any circumstances, and by any means, emancipation, gradual or immediate, is impossible. We may be disturbed in our comforts, harassed, injured-perhaps some partial sufferings may be consequences of these mad and savage projects, but slavery can never be abolished. The doom of Ham has been branded on the form and features of his African descendents. The hand of fate has united his color and his destiny. Man cannot separate what God hath John C. Calhoun expressed similar sentiments. Ours is the government of white men . . . it is a remarkable fact in this connection, that in the whole history of men . . . there is not instance whatever of any civilized coloured race, of any shade, being found equal to the establishment and maintenance of free government, although by far the largest proportion of the human family is composed of them.y7

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As previously noted, there is a plethora of modem scholarship which contends that the Founding Fathers, and even Abraham Lincoln, adhered to this basic premise of racial i n f e r i ~ r i t y .Indeed, ~~ it is a charge that John Quincy Adams has not escaped. “Noting with disdain . . . a speech of Dr. Duncan of Cincinnati asserting the inferiority of Negroes,” writes George Lipsky, “[Adams] merely held the contention irrelevant to the question of slavery.”99 Lipsky points to this incident as evidence that Adams consigned certain races to “a permanently inferior position.”100But if Adams made n o effort to deny Duncan’s racist arguments, he did, as Lipsky concedes, believe them irrelevant to the question of the natural rights of man. As Lipsky also acknowledges, Adams did not “discriminate positively against groups on the basis of racial difference.”lo1Whatever concessions Adams may have made to the base prejudices of his time in no way affected his core conviction that all men are equally endowed with a right to life, liberty, and property. Adams’s response to Dr. Duncan brings to mind a letter written by Thomas Jefferson in which he expresses “doubts” about whether blacks “are on par with ourselves,” but immediately notes that “whatever be there degree of talent, it is no measure of their rights. Because Sir Isaac Newton was superior to others in understanding, he was not therefore lord of the person or property of others.”lo2 Adams’s views on blacks were not necessarily identical to those of Jefferson. Jefferson expressed his “doubts” about blacks, while Adams simply refused to deny assertions of racial inferiority made by others. But for our purposes it is enough to note that whatever differences the leading Founders may have had with regard to their views o n race, none denied the self-evident truth that, in the most decisive sense, “all men are created equal.” Thus, the positive good argument for slavery made a clear break with the thought of the Founders, not by matters of degree, but in kind. Not surprisingly, Calhoun’s rejection of the Declaration led him to embrace an interpretation of the Constitution that was much closer to most modern constitutional scholarship than it was to the Founders. It is true that Calhoun was not a moral relativist, for he believed slavery was a “positive good.” However, he argued that the Constitution was neutral on the question of the morality of slavery.lo3Thus, Calhoun interpreted the Constitution in a manner that was later adopted by Robert Bork and William Rehnquist.

***** As Adams grew older, his attacks o n slavery grew both harsher and more direct. For much of his political career, Adams, publicly at least, had maintained a respectful silence regarding slavery. His critics offered a variety of

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unflattering explanations for the change in his public stance toward slavery. The most common charge, often repeated by modem historians, is that Adams was merely motivated by a petty desire for revenge against Southern politicians who had ruined his presidency, thwarted his plans for internal improvements, traduced his reputation, and rejected all that he stood Russell Kirk argues that Adams’s stance on slavery in the latter years of his life indicated a rejection of the principles of his youth.lo5Yet the evidence does not point to any change in Adams’s principles, but rather reflects a change in Southern principles that forced Adam to become more strident in his opposition to slavery. Certainly, his stance on the Declaration of Independence never changed. One of the many examples that might be pointed to is his 1821 Fourth of July Address.lN This address was presented before Adams either won or lost his presidency, and well before Southern spokesmen had publicly presented any pro-slavery arguments. He explicitly declared that the American Constitution was founded upon the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence. The principles of the Declaration not only informed his understanding of the Constitution but his views on slavery throughout his life. Adams’s public and private record on slavery and race from the earliest days of his youth to his involvement in the Amistad case never waivered.

***** Adams always disapproved of slavery, but slavery was not always his primary political concern. A d a m showed his disapproval to the extent he felt prudence would permit but in his early years he was, for the most part, publicly silent. Like the Founding Fathers, Adams recognized that social and political injustices would not immediately be washed away the moment a people made a declaration of their principles. But no credible evidence has ever been presented to suggest that any of the major Founders of this nation believed blacks could not lay claim to the same rights all men are entitled to. Indeed, Adams claimed that “the great men of the Revolution were abolitionists.” He reminded his colleagues in the House that Washington emancipated his slaves in his last will and testament. “George Washington was an abolitionist in the most extensive sense of the term,” declared Adams, “and I defy any man in this House to the discussion, and to prove to the contrary if he can.” In this same debate A d a m called Thomas Jefferson a “high authority . . . for the principles of abo1ition.”ld7 In a 1791 letter from which I have already quoted, A d a m explicitly denied that human beings can ever be obligated to forfeit their natural rights: “In a free government, the minority can never be under an obligation to

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sacrifice their rights to the will of the majority, however expressed” (italics in the original). Jefferson, like many of the Founders, was a slave owner, but he never declared that blacks were by nature obligated to serve their masters. “Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just,” declared Jefferson when contemplating the possibility of a slave revolt. For like Adams, he believed “the Almighty has no attribute which can take side with us in such a contest.”lo8 In 1804, Adams was not afraid to echo these words publicly. While speaking against the injustices of slavery he contended that “the right of man to liberty is unalienable. That whenever they have it in their power, it is in their rights and their duty to cancel the bonds of their subjection, and break the chains upon the heads of their oppressors. That heaven and earth would concur to sanction their insurrection, and that in such a contest the Almighty has no attribute that could side with us in this cause.”lo9 Nor can there be much doubt that the Founders anticipated that the principles of the Declaration would provide the foundation for the eventual abolition of American slavery. In 1819, years before slavery became the most explosive issue in American politics, Adams wrote: Jefferson is one of the great men which this country has produced, one of the men who has contributed largely to the formation of our national character . . . his Declaration of Independence is an abridged Alcoran of political doctrine, laying open the first foundations of civil society. . .. It also laid open a precipice into which the slave-holding planters of his country sooner or later must fall. . . . Jeffersonhas been himself all his life a slave-holder,but he has published opinions . . . blasting to the very existence of slavery. . . . The seeds of the Declaration of Independence are yet maturing. The harvest will be what West, the painter, calls the terrible sublime.Ii0

Yet Adams was i n no hurry to harvest the fruits of this seed before they had ripened. A thoughtful reader of both Plato and Aristotle, he was careful not to separate justice from prudence. His unflinching commitment t o natural rights was tempered only by an equally unflinching commitment to something akin to classical natural right whose strongest and most important variant was the rule of the wise. Consequently, he could not support the radical abolitionist cause because of its categorical refusal to accept any political compromises with slavery. Unlike the abolitionists, Adams believed theoretic principles of government can never be carried into practice to their full extent. They must be modified and accommodated to the situations and circumstances of human events and human concerns. But between those allowances

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necessary, to reconcile the rigor of principle with the resistance of practice, and the total sacrifice of principle, there is a wide difference.”l While he was opposed to slavery, he understood that political life often requires one to choose between the lesser of two evils in the ultimate pursuit of some greater good. “There are exceptions to every rule of morality,” Adams noted in a letter to his mother, “and men may be in situations necessary to act upon such exceptions.”l’? The contemporary reader must be careful not to confuse Adams’s views with modern notions of moral relativism. Adams speaks of exceptions to the rules of morality, but this is not the same as denying that such rules of morality exist. Indeed, such exceptions must be made within the spirit of the rule. “Nothing but necessity,” stated Adams, can justify even a momentary departure from those principles which we hold as the most sacred laws of nature and of nations, so nothing can justify extending the departure beyond the bounds of necessity. From the instant when that ceases the principle returns in all its force, and every further violation of it is error and crime.”’ Slavery could be tolerated in the Constitution only because the Constitution was founded on principles opposed to slavery. Thus the exception, slavery, enabled the nation to be founded in accordance to the “rule”that would necessarily lead to the abolition of slavery. The immoral exception was implemented in the cause of the moral rule. If there were no protections for slavery in the Constitution the Founders could never have hoped t o form a Union based on principles opposed to slavery. I do not, however, wish to leave a misguided impression that political compromises are always, or even generally, praiseworthy. The end or purpose of the American regime is crucial to our defense of the Founders’ compromises with slavery. Political moderation can be manifested in a variety of ways. But a compromise that is intended to preserve the principles of a just regime is very different from a compromise that is simply intended to moderate the actions of an evil regime. Though it is at least possible that both may be acts of prudence, they are not of the same order. The former aims to perpetuate justice, the latter can only lessen the sting of injustice. In this way the American Founders can very clearly be distinguished from, for example, religious leaders who compromised with the Nazis. The case of recently beatified Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac clarifies this point. As archbishop of Zagreb, he was supportive of the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1949, a puppet Fascist regime which slaughtered tens of thousands of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and other targets of per-

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secution. Stepinac did use his considerable influence within the regime to save several hundred lives. To some extent Stepinac did moderate the evil of his regime but he never attacked Fascism, the way he later did Communism, as a great evil. Perhaps Stepinac’s actions are praiseworthy but they can hardly be compared to those of the American Founders. The Independent State of Croatia was a puppet of the Nazis. The regime was founded upon the principle that certain men were privileged to rule over (and even exterminate) other men without their consent. For the American Founders a regime based on such principles was unjust and could never be just so long as it continued to adhere to such principles. The end or purpose of such a regime is injustice, and as it matures and draws closer to its goal, injustice will most likely increase. The best that can be said of a man like Stepinac is that through political compromise he was able to make an evil regime slightly less evil. The American Founders, by contrast, founded a regime based on just principles in the hope that by doing so a good nation could eventually grow into a much better nation. It was with this in mind that Adams attacked the pro-slavery movement with such energy. If Americans were to adopt a pro-slavery interpretation of the Constitution then any appeal to Constitutional “principle” would be nothing but a hollow cry on behalf of injustice. If the American nation were to bow to the pro-slavery standard “of overseer, black, dueling, blood-red, and dirty, cadaverous, nullification, white,”l14 then the extremism of the radical abolitionist cause would have been justified. The call to preserve a Union based o n proslavery principles would be devoid of all moral authority and obligation.

***** In the early years of the American nation, the Adams family consistently demonstrated a firm commitment to racial equality. Slavery was legal and practiced in Massachusetts until the 1780s, but the Adams’s household never owned slaves. They did, however, hire black servants, and it is likely that as a boy John Quincy had black playmates.”‘ Abigail taught young black servants to read and write and in her later years took a leading role in desegregating the neighborhood schools. In 1797 she provided a local black child with lessons in her own parlor, and eventually put him in the local school. When neighbors protested, Abigail chastised them, questioning their patriotism and commitment to the sacred principles of the Revolution. To her delight, her neighbors backed down and the child continued his education.*l6 During his presidency, John Adams supported the independence of Saint Dominique/Haiti and actively helped Toussaint Louverture to resist the French. John Quincy spoke out in defense of his father, calling for a “free and

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independent” Saint Dominique “in close alliance and under the guarantee of the United States.””’ John Quincy Adam’s first public pronouncements on slavery occurred when he served as a U.S. senator from 1803 to 1808. While a senator, he was forced to make decisions where the issue of slavery was at least indirectly involved. Yet, because slavery was either a secondary or hidden consideration, there was in Adams’s early years no direct confrontation on this issue. But it is also important to emphasize that, at this time, no American politicians were arguing that slavery was a positive good. In 1804 Adams angered some Southern senators by voting against a bill, which eventually passed, excluding American ships from commerce with the revolted French colony of Saint Dominique. Interestingly, in one of Adams’s first public confrontations involving slavery, he voted against a provision in the Louisiana Territorial Bill of 1804 that prohibited the importation of slaves from abroad into the territory of Orleans. In the debates Adams argued, “Slavery in the moral sense is an evil but as connected with commerce it has its uses. The regulations added to prevent slavery are insufficient. I shall therefore vote against them.”l18 He also voted against an amendment to this same bill, carried by a vote of twenty-one to seven, which would have prohibited the importation of any slave who was not the property of a US.citizen going to the territory for actual settlement. “I am opposed to slavery,” he declared. “But I have in this bill voted against the provisions introduced to prohibit and lessen it. I have done this on two principles, (1) that I am opposed to legislating at all for that country. (2) I think we are proceeding with too much haste on such an important question.”’l9 Adams made clear that he did not vote against these provisions as a defender of slavery, but because he feared they violated the treaty that ceded the territory of Louisiana to the United States and, more important, the Constitution itself. Article 3 of the treaty stated, The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States and admitted as soon as possible according to the principles of the federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States, and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and the Religion which they profess.’20

Though, unlike his Federalist colleagues, Adam supported the Louisiana Purchase, he did join his Federalist colleagues in voting against all other Louisiana legislation. He felt that such legislation was opposed to the princi-

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pies of the Constitution because it violated the natural rights of the citizens of Louisiana. Adams noted that the treaty with France had given America

all the rights of sovereignty over the inhabitants of Louisiana which France could impart; but as, to use the language of our declaration of independence, the just powers of government can be derived only from the consent of the gouerned, the French Republic could not give us the right to make laws for the people of Louisiana, without their acquiescence in the transfer.’”

I t was not “practicable” to obtain the consent of the people of Louisiana prior to America’s treaty with France, but once America had acquired the territory of Louisiana the federal government was obligated by constitutional principle to obtain the consent of her inhabitants before legislating for them. If any gentleman controvert the principle that by the laws of nature, of nations and of God, no people has the right to make laws for another people without their consent unless it be by the right of conquest, I shall be glad to hear him . . . as to the right of conquest it must be out of the question. We have no right of conquest over a people who have never injured us. The law of conquest is a law of slavery, and the people of Louisiana whose liberty we are solemnly bound to protect are not slaves. In support of this principle I have already quoted the highest possible authority for an American citizen; I mean the Declaration of Independence.”’

So Adams’s opposition to any antislavery provisions must be seen within a broader context of his opposition to Congress legislating within the territory of Louisiana in general. Significantly, Adams rested his argument on “the highest authority for an American citizen.” In contrast to Meese, Rehnquist, Bork, Brennan, Warren, and the vast bulk of the contemporary law school professoriat, Adams declared this authority to be the Declaration of Independence. Thus, as early as 1804 Adams explicitly declared that the principles of the Declaration were identical to the principles of the Constitution. Adams’s principal grievance against slavery during his senate years was the famous three-fifths clause of the Constitution which had in fact cost his father the election of 1800. Writing under the pseudonym Publius Valerius, in November of 1804, Adams noted that “every planter south of the Potomac has three votes in effect for every five slaves he keeps in bondage; while a New England farmer, who contributes ten fold as much to the support of the The following month Adams wrote Government, has only a single a manuscript in defense of a proposal to amend the Constitution’s three-fifths clause. He attacked the constitutionally established ratio of representation on a variety of grounds, both practical and theoretical. He noted that the three-fifths clause was

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unjust inasmuch as it is unequal. It is unjust, because it establishes inequality of rights, and of the rights the most precious in the sight of freemen between fellow citizens of the same community. It is also an inequality in the highest degree immoral and impolitic. Its immorality is derived from its conferring the first political privileges upon the basis of the greatest outrage on the rights of mankind. The immorality of slavery itself has been clearly proved . . . that even though those who exercise that dominion over their fellowmen have themselves generally admitted that it is an offense against the laws of nature and of Adams intended to deliver these remarks to the Senate but it is doubtful that he was given the opportunity, as they were not recorded in the Annals of Congress for this session. Still, the manuscript reveals a great deal about Adams’s attitude toward slavery at this early stage of his political career. It should also be noted that Adam’s position on the right of petition taken years later while he served in the House was perfectly consistent with his position taken while he served in the Senate. As a young senator he argued that his chamber was, at the very least, obligated to hear the petition of a Quaker advocating legal restraints o n slavery to the extent the Constitution would permit.12’

***** Adams left the Senate in 1808, and from 1809 to 1817 h e served his nation o n a variety of diplomatic missions overseas. T h e domestic issue of slavery was rarely a topic of discussion as A d a m carried out his diplomatic duties. There were, however, some exceptions. In 1814 Adams was among the American delegation which helped to negotiate the Treaty of Ghent ending the War of 1812. Article I of that Treaty stated, All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of the Treaty, excepting only the Islands, hereafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay and without causing any destruction or carrying away any Artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places and which shall remain therein upon the Exchange of the Ratifications of this Treaty, or any Slaves or other private property.IJ6 While waiting for news of the final ratifications in Washington of the Treaty of Ghent, Adams was notified of his new commission as minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain. Part of Adams’s duties as minister to Great Britain involved negotiations with Britain over the treaty clause referring to escaped slaves. The British had encouraged slaves to escape, and large numbers found refuge with the British army. The British had interpreted the clause in the Treaty of Ghent to apply only to slaves who were actually within territory

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garrisoned by the British after the signing of the treaty but not to the hundreds who had found their way to British ships in American territorial waters, Following instructions from Washington, Adams protested the carrying away of these slaves and the refusal of the British government to return them or compensate their owners. American officials suspected that the fugitive slaves had been resold to West Indian planters. Despite the wording of the treaty, the British government refused indemnity for slaves. The British prime minister argued that slaves could not “be considered precisely under the general denominations of private property. A table or chair, for instance, might be taken and restored without changing its condition; but a living and human being is entitled to other considerations.” Adams felt duty-bound to argue the position of his government. “The treaty has made no such distinction,” Adams countered. The words implicitly recognized slaves as private property. They are in the article alluded to: ‘slaves or other private property.’ I did, however, readily admit the distinction suggested by him. Most certainly a living, sentient being, and still more a human being, is to be regarded in a different light from the inanimate matter of which other private property might consist, and if on the ground of that difference the British Plenipotentiaries had objected to restore the one, while they agreed to restore the other, we should have readily discussed the subject.’2i

Adams argued his case vehemently enough for the British government finally to agree to his suggestion that the issue be submitted to arbitration. The Russian czar agreed to settle the dispute, and the issue carried over into Adams’s tenure as secretary of state and president. On April 22, 1822, the czar’s opinion came down in favor of the United States, and Britain was ordered to pay indemnity for the slaves. T h e United States and Great Britain agreed to assemble two mixed commissions who would sit at Washington in order to fix the average value for each slave for which compensation could be collected and to determine the number of slaves for which indemnity was due. Because of disputes among members of the second commission, agreement between the two governments was not reached until 1826 when Great Britain agreed to pay the United States $1,204,960 in full satisfaction of all obligations. T h e U.S. Congress then set up a commission to distribute the money to the claimants, which was finally completed in 1828.’‘* Again, one should not conclude from this episode that Adams was unprincipled in his handling of his country’s demands for restitution. His actions took place within the constraints of legal necessity, and at the very time that he was demanding indemnity for slaves he also agreed in principle to work with the British for the abolition of the African slave trade.

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***** It was not until A d a m joined Monroe’s cabinet as secretary of state in 1817 that he was really forced to confront the issue of slavery. For much of his life he had been overseas and his diplomatic career had kept him somewhat isolated from domestic politics. Before his tenure as secretary of state there is little in his correspondence and diaries directly related to slavery. But with the crisis precipitated over the question of whether Missouri would be admitted into the Union as a slave state, Adams, for the first time, began to focus all his intellectual energies o n slavery. During the debates o n the Missouri Compromise Adams’s diary is filled with reflections on the issue of slavery. “I take it for granted,” Adams wrote, “that the present question is a mere preamble-a title page to a great tragic volume.”*29Adams believed that Congress had the constitutional power to regulate slavery in the territories but not the power to abolish slavery in states where it already existed.130His first inclination was to compromise o n the Missouri question. Adams hoped that in the future Congress could push through a provision “excluding the introduction of slaves into future territories.” But until this “great and important object” was secured, Adams believed Congress was without the power to place restrictions on slavery as a condition for statehood in territories where slavery already existed.I3l In February of 1820, while debates over Missouri were raging in Congress, A d a m talked with his cabinet colleague and, at the time, friend John C. Calhoun about the issue of slavery. Calhoun “did not think [slavery] would produce a dissolution of the Union, but, if it should, the South would be from necessity compelled to form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Great Britain.” Adams replied, “that would be returning to the colonial state.” “Yes, pretty much,” acknowledged Calhoun. “But it would be forced upon them.” Adams asked, “whether he thought, if by the effect of this alliance, offensive and defensive, the population of the North should be cut off by its natural outlet upon the ocean, it would fall back upon its rocks, bound hand and foot, to starve, or whether it would not retain its powers of locomotion to move southward by land.” “Then,” replied Calhoun, “[the South] would find it necessary t o make all their communities military.” Adams was alarmed by his conversation with Calhoun and confided in his diary that If the disillusion of the Union should result from the slave question, it is as obvious as anything that can be foreseen of futurity, that it must shortly afterwards be followed by the universal emancipation of the slaves. A more remote but perhaps not less certain consequence would be the extirpation of the African race on this continent by the gradually bleaching process of intermixture, where the

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white portion is already so predominant, and by the destructive progress of emancipation, which, like all great religious and political reformations, is terrible in its means, though happy and glorious in its end. Slavery is the great and foul stain upon the North American Union, and its contemplation is worthy of the most exalted soul whether its total abolition is or is not practicable if practicable, by what it may be effected, and if a choice of means be within the scope of the object, what means would accomplish it at the smallest cost of human suffering. A dissolution, at least temporarily, of the Union, as now constituted would certainly be necessary. . . .The Union might then be reorganized on the fundamental principle of emancipation. This object is vast in its compass, awful in its prospects, sublime and beautiful in its issue.’’2 Some days later Adams again found himself in the company of Calhoun, and their conversation turned once more to the issue of slavery. He again recorded the conversation in his diary.

I walked home with Calhoun who said that the principles which I had avowed were just and noble but in the Southern country, whenever they were mentioned, they were always understood as applying only to white men. Domestic labor was confined to the Blacks, and such was the prejudice that if he, who is the most popular man in his district were to keep a white servant in his house, his character and reputation would be irretrievably ruined.13’ Adams responded, “That this confounding of servitude and labor was one of the bad effects of slavery.” But Calhoun thought it attended with many excellent consequences. It did not apply to all kinds of labor-not, for example, to farming. He himself had often held the plow, so had his father. Manufacturing and mechanical labor was not degrading. It was only manual labor-the proper work of slaves. No white person could descend to that. And it was the best guarantee to equality among the whites. I t produced an unvarying level among them. It not only did not excite, but did not even admit any inequalities, by which one man might dominate over another.13’ Adams “could not see things i n the same light.” H e was even more trou-

bled by this conversation with Calhoun, for he had come to see that Southern attitudes toward slavery were beginning to change. Slaveholders were slowly moving toward a different sort of defense of their peculiar institution. Slavery was no longer defended by Southerners as a necessary evil but was now being championed for the benefits i t bestowed on both white m e n and enslaved blacks. T h o u g h a public defense of slavery was still years away, Adams lamented,

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I t is, in truth, all perverted sentiment-mistaking

labor for slavery and dominion for freedom. The discussion of this Missouri question has betrayed the secret in their souls. In the abstract, they admit that slavery is an evil, they disclaim all participation in the introduction of it, and cast it all upon the shoulders of our old Grandam Britain. But when probed to the quick upon it, they show at the bottom of their souls pride and vainglory in their condition of masterdom. They fancy themselves more generous and noble hearted than the plain freemen who labor for subsistence. They look down upon the simplicity of a Yankee’s manners, because he has no habits of overbearing like theirs and cannot treat negroes like dogs. It is among the evils of slavery that it taints the very sources of moral principle. It established false estimates of virtue and vice for what can be more false and heartless than this doctrine which makes the holiest rights of humanity depend upon the color of the skin?’’5

Adams’s tentative support for the Missouri Compromise now troubled him. His conscience was so bothered by the issue that he even contemplated if perhaps it would have been wiser as well as a bolder course to have persisted in the restriction upon Missouri, till it should have terminated in a convention of the States to revise and amend the Constitution. This would have produced a new Union of thirteen or fourteen States unpolluted with slavery, with a great and glorious object effect, namely, that of rallying to their standard the other states by the universal emancipation of their slaves. If the Union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely the question upon which it ought to break. For the present, however, this contest is laid to sleep.’

In the years immediately following the Missouri Compromise the question of slavery lay dormant as politicians from all sections of the country preferred to concentrate their attention on other matters. But Adams’s conversations with Calhoun indicated that by 1820 the basic postulates of the pro-slavery argument-not to be made public for another thirteen years-were beginning to germinate in the mind of the man who would become their most influential defender.

***** As secretary of state, Adams was more directly involved with other issues concerning slavery, most notably the suppression of the Atlantic slave trade. A movement for abolition had been present in England since the eighteenth century, and by the early nineteenth century it had grown into a force powerful enough to influence that government’s policies o n the issue. British statesmen, including Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh, had by 1816 become enthusiastic advocates for the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. Af-

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ter agreeing to treaties with many of the continental powers, the British in 1818 made proposals for a reciprocal right to visit and search vessels for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. The attitude of the Monroe administration toward this proposal was cool. Secretary of State Adams, at the insistence of Monroe, gave a polite reply expressing his desire for the success of the European treaties and stating the United States’ “determination to cooperate to the utmost extent of our [constitutional] powers in this vindication of the sacred rights of h u r n a n i t ~ . ”American ~~~ cooperation consisted of little more than sending a few navy cruisers to the coast of Africa with instructions to patrol in the company of British ships against suspected slave traders. But they did not recognize the right of visit and search or of sending captured slave traders to any but American ports. T h e administration’s ambivalence toward such a treaty was inspired by a history of American sailors forced into the service of the British navy. The United States had been victimized by the British policy of impressment and was therefore unwilling to give British ships a right to search and seize American vessels. Adams, who had personally experienced the indignities of this British policy, was particularly opposed to any treaty for the suppression of the African slave trade without the inclusion of an “article, as strong and explicit as language can make it, never again in time of war to take a man from an American vessel.”138Even though the British government refused to make such an offer, Adams was persistently pressed on the issue of a treaty. In December of 1821, the House of Representatives began to push the executive branch to grant the right of visit and search. A special House committee was formed to investigate the history of the movement for abolishing the African slave trade. Adams promptly supplied the House with any relevant documents from the Department of State. In April of 1822, another House committee recommended new and more effective treaties with European maritime powers agreeing to a restricted right to reciprocal visits and searches for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade. This was precisely what Castlereagh had been urging Adams to consider.’39 The committee report argued that “the people of America have the intelligence to distinguish the right of searching a neutral on the high seas, in time of war, claimed by some belligerents, and that mutual, restricted, and peaceful concession by treaty, suggested by your committee, and which is de’~~ the House took no manded in the name of suffering h ~ m a n i t y . ” Although action o n these reports, it did encourage British efforts to continue to pressure the administration for a treaty. The suicide of Castlereagh briefly halted this pressure. However, his successor, George Canning, soon picked up the campaign with as much vigor as his predecessor. Then o n February 28, 1823,

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the House of Representatives voted 131 to 9 for a resolution calling on the president to negotiate the treaty “for the effectual abolition of the African slave trade, and its ultimate denunciation, as piracy, under the law of nations by the consent of the civilized The House report and resolution also encouraged Adams to rethink the issue. The Monroe administration, surprised by the reaction of Congress, sought to reclaim the moral high ground. Adams’s position toward Britain softened. Was this a simple act of unprincipled political expediency on the part of Adams? Do Adams’s actions in these negotiations reveal an unsavory side to his character?Was Adams simply bowing to the dictates of public opinion in the same manner that he so frequently criticized in his enemies? Samuel Flagg Bemis perceptively points to a letter Adams wrote while president, to his eldest son, George Washington Adams, shortly after George had taken his seat in the state legislature of Massachusetts: Your intention to act and vote according to your own sense of right, even at the hazard of losing your popularity, is right; but you must also be careful to avoid taking the side which is both unpopular and wrong; and if the popular sentiment be strong and urgent you should reconsider your own impressions, whether they may not be erroneous.‘42

The indignation Adams felt toward the British policy of impressment was undoubtedly justified, and his caution in considering any treaty which might provide a justification for such practices in the future was prudent. But an opportunity now presented itself to eliminate a great evil and, what is more, public opinion was favorable to this event. Adams recognized that his principled stand against the unjust practice of impressment must not be a stumbling block for the suppression of the slave trade. Consequently, he softened his stance toward Britain. But neither was Adams willing to forget his earlier objections to the British treaty. In reconsidering the issue, he realized he might find an alternative that satisfied his desire to suppress the slave trade while not conceding to the British a right to search and seize American vessels. American law had already abolished the slave trade, calling it piracy and making it punishable by death. The United States would be willing to join other nations in suppressing the slave trade if it could be agreed that such practices constituted piracy. If the slave trade was considered piracy under international law, and pirates are the enemies of, and therefore in a constant state of war with, all civilized nations, then there would be a belligerent right to visit and search vessels suspected of engaging in acts of piracy even where they flew the flags of civilized nations. Adams’s position continued to protect his long cherished

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commitment to the principle of the freedom of the seas while at the same time allowing him to come to terms with the British position for suppressing the slave trade. Adams wrote a proposal for a convention with Great Britain. His project of eleven articles was presented by Monroe to his cabinet. Although Adams’s proposal included a strong letter on the American principle of freedom of the seas, two Southern members of the cabinet, William Crawford and Calhoun, who not coincidentally had ambitions for the presidency, were critical of Adams’s proposal. His proposals were eventually approved and, interestingly enough, Monroe believed Adams’s letter to the British minister, Stratford Canning, brother to the foreign secretary, was too harsh and should be toned down. Richard Rush, the American minister to Britain, introduced Adams’s proposals to the British foreign office and a convention was subsequently held on March 13, 1824. Negotiators quickly concluded an agreement o n the slave trade which included all of the principal features of Adams’s proposal: ( 1) That the citizens and subjects of both countries participating in the African slave trade should be punishable as pirates; ( 2 ) That the two navies should join together in suppressing the slave trade, allowing a reciprocal right of visit and search of each other’s merchant ships, except under the presence of a public ship of war of their own nation; (3) That the captured ship be sent to its country of origin for trial, that n o individuals belonging to the crew of a captured vessel were to be taken from their ship, and that the officer of the capturing vessel be held to strict accountability to prevent any abuses of the stipulated right to visit and After the convention was signed, the British Parliament passed a law o n March 31, 1824, making the slave trade piracy. When President Monroe sent the treaty to the U.S. Senate it was expected that it would be ratified easily. The convention had been inspired by the actions of the House of Representatives, thus leading the administration to conclude that the mood of the nation supported such a treaty. But Southern politicians detected something sinister in the rapprochement with England. The antislavery movement in Britain would not rest satisfied with a victory merely suppressing the African slave trade. The complete abolition of slavery was its goal. Southerners rightly feared that such views would soon take hold in America’s Northern states. Prior to this, the many treaties Adams had negotiated, both as a diplomat and as secretary of state, were easily ratified. But 1824 was an election year and, as secretary of state, Adams was regarded as the front-runner for the presidency, both inside and outside Monroe’s cabinet. His chief rival in the cabinet, Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford, saw it in his interests, both as a

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presidential contender and a Southern man, to defeat Adams’s treaty. The Senate could not have defeated the treaty as a whole, but Crawford’s allies chipped away at it by attaching qualifying amendments. An amendment that passed easily changed the treaty from a perpetual obligation to one that could be terminated by either nation with six months’ notice. More important, Crawford supporters opposed Article I of the convention that would have allowed British ships the right to search for slave traders o n the coast of America as well as Africa. This article was rejected under the two-thirds rule, twenty-three yeas to twenty nays. Most of the Northern senators who voted against the treaty conspicuously supported Crawford for the presidency.’44 “Crawfordism has taken the alarm,” Adams wrote, “lest this concert between the United States and Great Britain for suppressing the slave trade should turn to a concert for the abolition of slavery.”145The British would certainly have accepted minor modifications to the convention, but they could not accept such a major alteration, and the treaty died. Adams’s years as secretary of state identified him as generally cautious but firm in his opposition to slavery. As secretary of state, Adams held the cabinet position widely regarded as the final step to the presidency. Realistically, no one could expect him to make a n issue of slavery. Consequently, Adams saved his harshest statements for his diary. Yet on occasion his public actions more than hinted at his true feelings. Adams spoke out against Washington police who had singled out black prisoners for abuse.’46 In 1822 he outraged many South Carolinians by standing up for the rights of black seamen. The laws of that state required black and mulatto sailors to be jailed as long as their boat was docked in Charleston Harbor. Adams vigorously protested these laws, which violated the rights of colored citizens from other states. He was even successful in getting these laws suspended for a short time.147

***** During his presidency, Adams did little to openly antagonize the growing but still somewhat muted pro-slavery sentiment in the South. Yet it is misleading to conclude, as some historians have, that Adams “took no action as president to uphold the antislavery views of his New England and Pennsylvania Quaker c o n ~ t i t u e n t s . ”But ~ ~neither ~ did Adams make any attempt to placate Southern suspicions that he disapproved of their peculiar institution. As president, he made it a point always to receive blacks and Indians and even noted that he much preferred hearing their grievances t o the requests of white office seekers.’q9 In one of the few policy issues related to slavery in March of 1825, the Senate unanimously rejected a treaty with the republic of Gran Columbia for the suppression of the slave trade. The treaty had been

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negotiated by President Adams, who had carefully removed the right to visit and search on the coast of America.ljo Slavery also became an issue when Adams sent the Senate nominations for U.S. ministers selected to attend a conference of newly independent Latin American republics to be held in Panama. Many Southern politicians objected to the Congress of Panama because they feared the mission might deal with such subjects as the abolition of the African slave trade and the status of the Republic of Haiti. With the encouragement of Calhoun, Senator Hayne of South Carolina passionately declared: “With nothing connected with slavery can we consent to treat with other nations, and, least of all, ought to touch the question of the independence of Hayti in conjunction with Revolutionary Governments, whose own history affords an example scarcely less fatal to our rep~se.”’~’ While the Senate ultimately confirmed the nominations, by the time the ministers arrived in Panama the Congress had adjourned and the Adams administration’sone and only policy victory proved Again, it should not be concluded that slavery was not an issue during Adams’s presidency or in his bid for reelection in 1828. Adams antagonized Southern slaveholders more from what he did not say than from what he actually said. His silence on slavery was viewed by Southerners with suspicion, and Calhoun who knew firsthand of Adams’s antislavery views was certain that the administration was subtly opposed to ~1avery.l~~ Andrew Jackson was also silent about slavery, but slaveholders knew where he stood on the issue. Certainly, it could not have gone unnoticed by anyone concerned with the issue that both Adams and his running mate, Richard Rush, were Northerners and non-slave holders and that both Jackson and Calhoun were Southern planters and slave owners. Adams, for his part, was certain that slavery was a crucial issue in his own bid for reelection, as it had been in his father’s reelection bid in 1800. In 1835, as a new presidential election approached, Adams wrote of thc Southern concern with “the question whether the President of the United States shall be a slave holder or not. They never fail to touch upon this key in the South, and it has never yet failed of success.”154 Adams’s silence on slavery could be seen as a principled stance against the institution. Unlike Van Buren in 1836 and many other Northern “dough faces,” Adams never offered the explicit assurances demanded by the Southern slaveocracy. Adams’s refusal to make the customary political gestures to Southern politicians speaks volumes about his political integrity. It was during Adams’s presidency that he penned one of his finest sonnets. He dabbled in poetry his entire life, and in 1826 on the anniversary of his father’s birth he wrote a secret sonnet in honor of the recently deceased John Adams.

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Day of my father’s birth, I hail thee yet. What though his body moulders in the grave, Yet shall not Death th’ immortal soul enslave; The sun is not extinct-his orb has set. And where on earth’s wide ball shall man be met, While time shall run, but from thy spirit brave Shall learn to grasp the boon his Maker gave, And spurn the terror of a tyrant’s threat? Who but shall learn that freedom is the prize Man still is bound to rescue or maintain; That nature’s God commands the slave to rise, And on the oppressor’s head to break his chain. Roll, years of promise, rapidly roll around, Till not a slave shall on this earth be found!’j5

***** A few years after he had departed the White House and just prior to the advent of his congressional career, Adams spoke about the social and political effects of slavery with a young Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville questioned Adams o n the differences between Southern and Northern Americans. Adams spoke frankly to Tocqueville about the same issues he had discussed with Calhoun years earlier. Adams told the Frenchman that there were “two facts which have a great influence on our character in the north, the religious and political doctrines of the first founders of New England; in the south, slavery.” “DO you regard slavery,” inquired Tocqueville “as a great evil for the United States?” “Yes, unquestionably,” Adams answered. “It’s in slavery that are to be found almost all the embarrassments of the present and the fears of the future.” “Are the inhabitants of the South, aware of this state of things?“ continued Tocqueville. “Yes,” answered the former president, “at the bottom of their hearts. . . . Slavery has modified the whole state of society in the south. . . . There the whites form a class which has all the ideas, all the passions, all the prejudices of a n aristocracy, but don’t deceive yourself. Nowhere is the equality among the whites greater than in the south. Here,” the New Englander noted, “we have a great equality before the law, but it ceases absolutely in the habits of life. There are upper classes and working classes. Every white man in the south is a being equally privileged, whose destiny is to make the negroes work without working himself. We can’t conceive,” Adams continued, “how far the idea that work is dishonorable has entered the spirit of the Americans of the south. N o enterprise in which Negroes cannot serve as the inferior agents can succeed in that part of the Union. All those who do a large trade in Charleston and in the cities have

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come from New England.” Adams recalled that “a representative from the south being at my table in Washington could not keep from expressing his astonishment at seeing white domestics occupied in serving us.” The Southerner found it “a degradation of the human race to use whites for domestics. When one of them comes to change my plate, I am always tempted to offer him my place at the table. From this laziness from which the southern whites live great differences in character result. They devote themselves,” Adams observed, “to bodily exercise, to hunting, to racing; they are vigorously constituted, brave, full of honour; what is called the point of honour is more delicate there than anywhere else; duels are frequent.” “DOyou think that it is really impossible to get o n without blacks in the south?” asked Tocqueville. “I am convinced of the contrary,” replied Adams. “The Europeans work in Greece and in Sicily, why should they not in Virginia and the Carolinas? It’s no hotter there.”lSh

***** In the years following his presidency Adams was to achieve enduring fame for his opposition to slavery, particularly during those years when he served his country as a member from Massachusetts in the U.S. House of Representatives. Adams served in the House from 1831 until his death in 1848. In 1835 radical abolitionists stepped up a campaign to end slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia where, they argued, in contrast to the Southern states, Congress had a right to legislate on the issue. By 1836 thousands of petitions had flooded Congress. In the House, Southern members and their Northern allies managed to pass a resolution in which all such petitions were laid o n the table but not read, thus imposing the first form of the so-called gag rule. From 1836 until 1844 Adams led the battle in the House for the repeal of the gag rule and, from 1836 until his death in 1848, Adams became more and more outspoken in his opposition to the institution of slavery. What began as a battle simply to assure that abolitionists would be granted their right of petition gradually led Adams to ever more and clearer indictments of the institution of slavery. Indeed, Adams saw the right of petition as closely related to slavery. He addressed both issues within the context of the natural rights doctrine of the Declaration. For Adams, the right of petition was a natural right. T h e government did not give this right to the people and therefore could not take it away or impair it. The Constitution confirmed this right but did not create it: “My doctrine is, that this right belongs to humanity-that the right of petition is the right of prayer, not depending on the condition of the petitioner; and I say if you attempt to fix any limit to it, you lay the foundation for the

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restriction to any extent that the madness of party spirit may carry it.”15’Because Adams understood that the Constitution rested on the principles of the Declaration, the right to petition remained constitutional even if the petition contained a prayer for an “unconstitutional re~ult.”’~* Adams was unquestionably the greatest defender of the right of petition in American history and his enemies in the House never tired of questioning his motives. They argued that presenting petitions was throwing a firebrand into the house but to throw firebrands suited [Adams’s] tastes. . . . He became the most enraged of abolitionists and waged unrelenting war on the South for the rest of his life. He was no friend of the Southern people before. They had defeated his reelection to the presidency. He was tenacious of public office. When driven from the chair of State he refused to observe the graceful custom established by Washington and followed by every other president. He was too much attached to honours, or emoluments, or contentions of office to betake himself to retirement. He subsided from the White House to the House of Representatives but not to play the part of the man conspicuous for virtue and venerable from age and wisdom, ready and vigilant to disarm the violence of party and calm the tempest of factious strife, by the interposition of temperate councils. N o man was more acrimonious, extreme, or uncompromising. With much learning and long experience, he had acquired neither taste nor

However, the reader should be reminded again that Adams was a passionate defender of the right of petition as a young senator in 1804. His willingness to defend the rights of abolitionists and others with whom he often strongly disagreed was nothing new. When it came to the practical application of his abstract principles Adam had always shown a willingness to defend groups for which he felt no affection. For example, while often critical of the Jesuits he declared it unjust for them to have “been expelled [from Russia], turned adrift upon the world, and deprived of their property without a trial, by the mere will of the emperor, upon secret investigations and accusation of enemies and rivals, to all appearance without having been allowed even a hearing to defend themse1ves.”l6@ Barred from presenting abolitionists’ petitions, Adams cleverly devised strategies enabling him to make slavery itself a subject of debate. Adams continued to present petitions not just for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia but also protestations against the annexation of Texas and the admission of the slave territory of Florida into the Union. He presented petitions for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade in the territories of the United States, for prohibition of the domestic slave trade between

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the states, and petitions for the U.S. recognition of Haiti. So long as he believed the petitions were sincere, and even in some instances when he doubted their good faith, Adams was willing to present petitions in the House. Finally, in 1844 his resolution to rescind the then standing twenty-first gag rule of the House was carried by a vote of 108 to 80. In the apt words of Virginia’s Henry Wise, Adams’s fight against the gag rule had forever marked him as “the acutest, the astutest, the archest enemy of Southern slavery that ever existed.”161 I t is beyond the scope of this work to elaborate at length on this important episode and Adams’s struggle against slavery. His heroic battle against the gag rule has been eloquently told by others.162In 1839, in the middle of this epic battle t o repeal the gag rule, A d a m was presented with a new and equally compelling challenge when he was persuaded by abolitionist leaders to argue the case of the Amistad Africans before the Supreme Court of the United States. The basis of his constitutional defense of these Africans was the Declaration of Independence. Modern constitutional scholarship, notwithstanding, Adams held the Declaration to be a legitimate source for interpreting constitutional law. Indeed, in Adams’s view the Constitution and the Declaration must be understood as complementary documents; they were parts of a single whole. A few months before the Amistad arrived o n American soil, Adams gave his clearest account of this relationship in a public address celebrating the American Constitution. This speech was later published under the title of jubilee of the Constitution.

Notes 1. This is a common argument used against the defenders of original intent. See, for example, Norman Dorsen, ed. The EvolvingConstitution: Essays on the Bill of Rights and the U.S. Constitution (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1987),xii. 2. Thomas A. Bailey and David M. Kennedy, The American Pageant (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Company, 1983), 132. 3 . Thomas G. West, Vindicating the Founders: Race, Sex, Class andlustice in the Origins of America (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), xii. 4. John Adams, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, Vol. 11, 1812-1826, ed. Lester J. Cappon (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 606-7. 5. Bemis, Foundations ofAmerican Foreign Policy, 14. 6. Adams, who was then serving as minister plenipotentiary to Russia, declined the appointment that had already been unanimously ratified by the Senate. Ibid, 165. 7. John Quincy Adams, Memoirs oflohn Quincy Adams, Compising Portions of His Diaryfrom 1795 to 1848. 12 vols., vol. 9 (July 10, 1835), 243. 8. John Quincy Adams, An Eulogy on the Life and Character oflames Madison (September 27, 1836) (Boston: American Stationer’s Company, 1836), 6.

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9. See Stephen A. Cambone, Noble Sentimentsand Manly Eloquence: The First Conunend congress and the Decision for Independence (doctoral dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1982). 10. Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 291-92. 11. Harry V.Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil War (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., ZOOO), 62. 12. See, for example, Conor Cruise O’Brien’s unbalanced attack on Jefferson. The Long Affuir, Thomas Jefferson and the French Revolution, J 775-1 800 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 13. Federalist49 probably provides the clearest account of the differences between Jefferson and the Federalists. Yet significantly this paper was written by Madison, Jefferson’s political ally in the partisan battle leading to the election of 1800. The Federalrst Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: A Mentor Book, 1961), 313-17. 14. Adams, “Publicola,” in The Writings of John Quincy Adams, ed. Washington Chauncy Ford, 7 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1913-1917, vol. 1, 69. 15. An in-depth discussion of Adams’s debate with Paine is presented in chapter 4. 16. Seward, Life and Public Services of John Quincy Adams: Sixth President of the United States (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby, Miller, and Company, 1851), 360. 17. Montesquieu, Sidney, Harrington, Hume, to name some of the more prominent. 18. John Quincy Adams, Memoirs ofJohn @ncy Adam, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 12 vols. (Philadelphia:J. B. Lippincott, 1874-1877),vol. 9 (March 28, 1835), 227. 19. Lipsky,]ohn Quincy Adams, 327. 20. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 9. 21. John Quincy Adams, “Misconceptions of Shakspeare [sic] Upon the Stage,” The New England Magazine 9 (December 1835): 435. 22. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 16. 23. John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, vol. 4 (May 10, 1819), 361. 24. Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of American Founders and the Philosophy ofhcke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 25. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 9 (March 28, 1835), 227. 26. Leo Strauss, “German Nihilism,” Interpretation: AJournal of Political Philosophy 26, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 372. 27. We will see that John C. Caihoun privately believed in the positive good of slavery years earlier. 28. August 0.Spain, The Political Theory ofJohn C . Calhoun (New York: Bookman Associates, 195l), 224. 29. John Quincy Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy on the Fourth ofJuly, 1831 (Boston: Richardson, Lord and Holbrook, 1831). 30. Adams’s views on nullification are addressed in the following chapter. 3 1. Thomas G. West, “Misunderstandingthe American Founding,”Interpreting Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, ed. Ken Masugi (Savage, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1991), 155-77.

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32. John William Ward, Andrew Jackson-Symbol for an Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), 49-51. Robert A. Dahl, A I’reface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 144. Dalh distinguished between “Madisonian and Jacksonian democracy” but he states, “Jefferson was . . . a ‘Madisonian.”’ 33. Only Delaware and South Carolina continued to choose electors in the legislature. John D. Hicks, A Short History of American Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 225. 34. “The birth of party politics in a form recognizable even today can fairly be dated to 1828.”John H. Aldridge, Why Parties? The Origin and Transfamution of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 97. 35. Ibid., 99. 36. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, 44. 37. The years Adams had spent in Europe provided the source for some outrageous political slander. For example, during the presidential campaign of 1828, Democratic newspapers circulated the absurd story that Adams had “pimped” his wife’s beautiful American maid to the lust of Czar Alexander I. 38. Senator John Randolph of Virginia referred to the Adams’s family as “the American House of Stuarts” and John Quincy, whom he particularly disliked, as “the cub” who “is a greater bear than the old one.” Jack Shepherd, The Adams Chronicles (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), 286. 39. This portrait of Adams was put forth in many of the works of Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles A. Beard. This stereotype was further popularized by Claude Bowers, The Party Battles of the Jackson Period (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922); Vernon L. Parrington, The Romantic Revolution in America, 1800-1860 (New York: Harvest, 1954);Marquis James, The Life of Andrew Jackson (Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, 1938); and Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947). 40. Hicks, A Short History of American Democracy, 225. 41. Leonard L. Richards, The Life and Times of Congressman John Quicncy Adams (New Yorh: Oxford University Press, 1986), 29. 42. John Quincy Adam, Letter to Abigail Adams, Cambridge (December 30, 1786); Writings, vol. 1, 29. 43. John Quincy Adams, Letter to Abigail Adams, The Hague (April 25, 1795), Writings, vol. 1,333. To John Adams, The Hague (May 4,1795), Writings, vol. 1,344. 44. John Quincy Adams, The Lives of James Madison and James Monroe (Buffalo: George Derby & Company, 1850), 65; see also Memoirs, vol. 9 (July 10, 1835), 243. 45. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 9 (April 13, 1836), 276. 46. Brooks Adams, “Introductory Note,” in Henry Adams, The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma (New York: Macmillan, 1920), vi. 47. Lipsky,John Quincy Adams, 172. 48. Adams, “Publicola,” Writings, vol. 1 70. 49. John Quincy Adams, Publius Valerius (November 6, 1804), Writings, vol. 3,69.

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50. James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 58. 51. Adams, “Publicola,” Writings, vol. 1 93. 52. John Quincy Adams to Joseph Pitcarin, The Hague (March 3, 1797), Writings, vol. 2, 133. 53. Richards, The Life and Times of Congressman John Quincy Adams, 26, 27-54. 54. John Quincy Adams, Letters of John Quincy Adams to Edward Livingston (Boston: Young Men’s Antimasonic Association for Diffusion of Truth, 1833). 55. Ibid., 14 56. Ibid., 2. 57. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Lorman Ratner, Antimasonry: The Crusade and the Party (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969); Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America, 1790-1 970 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). 58. Arthur ShlessingerJr., The Age ofJackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946), 284. 59. Whitney R. Cross, The Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York,1800-1850 (New York: Harper and Row, 1950). 60. Paul C. Nagel, John Quincy Adams, A Public Life, A Private Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 351. 61. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (June 27, 1839), 126. 62. John Quincy Adams, in Bennett Champ Clark, John Quincy Adams: “OldMan Eloquent” (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1933), 379-80. 63. Ibid., 380. 64. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (August 2, 1840),345, 350. 65. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 9 (August 11, 1835), 251. 66. John C. Calhoun. “Speech on the Oregon Bill” (June 27, 1848), in Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy ofJohn C . Calhoun, ed. Ross M. Lentz (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992), 541. 67. William Lloyd Garrison, quoted in Russel B. Nye, William Lloyd Garrison and the Humanitarian Reformers (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955), 143. 68. Paul Finkelman, “Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant with Death,” in Paul Finkelman, ed., Afncan Americans and the Law, vol. l(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992), 31-32. 69. John Quincy Adams, The Diary ofJohn Quincy Adams, 1794-1845 (March 3, 1820), ed. Allan Nivens (New York: Longman’s, Green and Company, 1929), 231-32. 70. Madison to Rush, March 10, 1790, in The Founder’s Constitution: Major Themes, vol. 1, ed. Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 555. 71. Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol.2 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966),373.

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72. Ibid., 2, 371. 73. Paul Finkelman, ed., Afncan Americans and the Law (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992,6647. 74. O’Brien, The Long Affair, 319. See also Samuel Eliot Morison, Oxford History of the American People (New York: Mentor Publisher, New American Library, 1972), 295; Gordon S. Wood, “Equality and Social Conflict in the American Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly 5 1 (1994): 707; Fritz Hirschfeld, George Washington and Slavery: A Documentary Portrayal (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997). For an outstanding critique of such scholarship, see West, Vindicating the Founders, 1-36. 75. Hamilton to Jay, March 14, 1779, in Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 2, ed. Harold C. Cyrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1987), 18. 76. Franklin to Waring, December 17, 1763, in Writings, ed. J. A. Leo Lemay (New York: Library of America, 1987), 800. 77. West, Vindicating rhe Founders, &lo. 78. George Washington to Morris, April 12, 1786, in George Washungton: A Collection, ed. W. B. Allen (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1989), 319. 79. John Adams to Evans, June 8, 1819, in Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams, ed. Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 209. 80. Thomas Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America,” in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, 14. 81. Benjamin Franklin, “An Address to the Public from the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery” (1789), in Writings, 1154. 82. Alexander Hamilton, Philo Camillus, No. 2 (1795), in Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 19, 101, 103. 83. Farrand, ed., vol. 1, Records 135. 84. George Mason, in Catherine Millard, Great American Statesmen and Heroes (Camp Hill, Pa.: Horizon Books, 1995), 134. 85. Farrand, ed., vol. 1, Records 580. 86. Ibid., vol. 1, 586-88. 87. One might point by way of example to a riveting debate on the subject of Slavery which took place in the Senate between John C. Calhoun and the courageous Virginian William C. Rives. Rives defended the sacred right of petition and objected to Calhoun’s “favor of slavery in the abstract.” When Calhoun asked the Virginian if he did not consider slavery “as good,” Rives cooly replied, “No.” Like the Founders before him, “he viewed it as a misfortune and an evil in all circumstances, though, in some, it might be the lesser evil.” From The Papers ofJohn C. Calhoun, vol. 13, 1835-1837, ed. Clyde N. Wilson (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1980), 389-90. 88. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 9 (October 14, 1833), 23. 89. Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Ofd South: A Design for Mastery (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University State Press, 1982), 176. 90. William Lee Miller, Arguing About Slavery: The Great Battle in the United States Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 34. Faust, however, doubts that Hammond ever took instruction from Calhoun. Faust, James Henry Hammond, 172-74.

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91. Congressional Globe, 24th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 3, appendix (February 1, 1836), 566. 92. John C. Calhoun, “Speech On the Reception of Abolitionist Petitions,” inJohn C. Calhoun, ed. Margaret L. Coit (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1970), 47. 93. Spain, The Political Theorty ofJohn C. Calhoun, 89. 94. John C. Calhoun. “Speech on the Oregon Bill,” in Union and Liberty, 565. 95. Ibid., 566. 96. Congressional Globe, 24th Cong., 1st sess. vol. 3, appendix (February 1, 1836), 566. 97. John C. Calhoun, “On His Resolutions in reference to the War with Mexico, Delivered in the Senate, January 4th 1848,” in The Works ofJohn C. Calhoun, vol. 4, ed. Richard K. Crall6 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), 410-11. 98. A recent and well publicized example of such scholarship is Lerone Bennett, Jr., Forced Into Glory: Abraham Lincoln’s White Dream (Chicago: Johnson Publishing Company, 2000). 99. Lipsky,John Quincy Adams, 123. 100. Ibid., 121. 101. Ibid., 123. 102. Merrill D. Peterson, ed., The Portable ThomasJefferson, 517. 103. Calhoun, Union and Liberty, 541. 104. William John Grayson, Witness To Sorrow; The Antebellum Autobiography of William]. Grayson, ed., Richard J. Calhoun (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), 153-54. Also Richards, The Life and Times ofJohn Quincy Adams, 122 and Nagel, John Quincy Adams, 355-56,419. 105. Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1995), 239. 106. John Quincy Adams, An Address Delivered at the Request of a Committee of Citizens of the City of Washington; O n the Occasion of Reading the Declaration of Independence, on the Fourth ofJuly, I821 (Washington, D.C.: Davis & Force, 1821). 107. John Quincy Adams, quoted in Seward Life and Public Services ofJohn Quincy Adams (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby, Miller, and Company, 1851), 292. 108. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia in The Portabk ThomasJefferson, ed. Merrill B. Peterson (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), 215. 109. Adams, “Proposed Amendment to the Constitution on Representation,” (December 1804), Writings, vol. 3,94. 110. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 4 (December 27, 1819), 492-93. 111. Adams, “Motion on Taxation of Louisana” (January 10, 1804), Writings, vol. 3, 28. 112. Adams to Abigail Adams, Writings, vol. 5 (May 12, 1814), 43. 113. Adams, “Motion on Taxation of Louisiana” (January 10, 1804), Writings, vol. 3, 28-29. 114. Fittingly, the colors for the Standard of Nazi Germany. John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (February 1, 1841), 413.

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115. William Jerry MacLean, “Othello Scorned: The Racial Thought of John Quincy Adams,” Journal of the Early Republic 4 (Summer 1984). 116. Paige Smith, John Adam (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 61 Company, 1962), 926. 117. Adams, quoted in Roger G. Kennedy, Orders from France (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 144; O’Brien, The Long Affair, 289. 118. “The Senate Debate in the Breckinridge Bill,” 346, quoted in Bemis, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 122. 119. Bemis, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 122. 120. Quoted in Bemis, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 120. 121. Adams, “Motion on Taxation of Louisiana” (January 10, 1804), Wriangs, vol. 3, 28. 122. Ibid., 29. 123. Adams, “Publius Valerius V,” Writings, vol. 3, 70. 124. Adams, “Proposed Amendment to the Constitution on Representation” (December 1804), Writings, vol. 3, YO. 125. Bemis, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 123. 126. Ibid., 231. 127. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 2 (August 16, 1815), 257. 128. Bemis, Foundations in American Foreign Policy, 293. 129. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 4 (January 10, 1820), 502. 130. Adams’s position on the congressional right to regulate slavery in the territories may seem contrary to his earlier views on Louisiana. To the best of my knowledge, Adams never addresses this apparent contradiction. One may surmise, however, that Adams was now satisfied that the people inhabiting the American territories acquired in the Louisiana Purchase had given their consent to he governed in accordance with the Constitution of the American Republic. 131. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 4 (February 23, 1820), 530. 132. John Quincy Adams, The Diaq ofJohn Quincy Adams, 1794-1845 (February 24, 1820), 228-29. 133. Adams, Diary (March 3, 1820), 231. 134. Ibid. (March 3, 1820), 231. 135. Ibid. (March 3, 1820), 231-32. 136. Ibid. (March 3, 1820), 232. 137. John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush and Albert Gallatin, Department of State (November 2, 1818), Writings, vol. 4,472. 138. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 5 (December 4, 1821), 448. 139. Bemis, Foundations of American Foreign Policy,426. 140. Quoted in Bemis, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 426. 141. Annals ofcongress, 17th Cong., Zd sess. (February 28, 1823), 1152. 142. John Quincy Adams to George Washington Adams, July 5, 1826. Quoted in Bemis, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 427. 143. Bemis, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 433.

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144. 145. 146. 147. 148.

Ibid., 435. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 6 (May 12, 1824), 328. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 5 (October 22, 1820), 191. Richards, The Life and Times of CongressmanJohn Quincy Adams, 104-5. Mary W. M. Hargreaves, The Presidency ofJohn Quincy Adams (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 156. 149. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 7 (March 7, 1828), 464. 150. Bemis, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 435. 151. Register of Debates in Congress, 1825, 1826, 19th Cong., 2nd sess., 165-66. 152. John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 113-15, 118; Bemis,John Quincy Adams and the Union,

77. 153. Calhoun’s contempt for the administration was not only directed toward Adams himself but also toward his secretary of state, Henry Clay. Clay was a prominent advocate of colonization, a policy Adams never supported and often, privately, attacked. Niven, 118; John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, vol. 4 (April 29,30; December 10, 1819), 354-56,475-77; Memoirs, vol. 8 (January 20, February 2, 1831), 286-87, 309; Memoirs, vol. 9 (November 20, 1837), 437-38. 154. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 9 (August 11, 1835), 252. 155. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 7 (October 30, 1826), 164. 156. George Wilson Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 418-19. 157. Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 1st sess. (January 18, 1844), 166-68. 158. Congressional Globe, 24th Cong., 1st sess. (January 1836), 137-38; 27th Cong., 2nd sess. (January 28, 1843), 192. 159. Grayson, Witness to Sorrow, 153-54. 160. Letter to John Adams, Ealing (February 29, 1816), Writings, vol. 5, 520-21. See also Publicola, Writings, vol. 1, 83. 161. Nagel, John Quincy Adams, 386. 162. The finest book on this subject is William Lee Miller’s Arguingabout Slavery.

C H A P T E R

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m

Jubilee of the Constitution

0 Lord, put forth thy might! 0 Lord, defend the right! Lord Macaulay’ Wisdom is a twin sister of the Law. Shem Tov ben Joseph Falaguera? Once one has granted that there is an intrabiblical process beyond the teaching of Moses, one will not be compelled to deny the possibility of a postbiblical progress of this description. Leo Strauss?

O n April 30, 1839, John Quincy Adams delivered the principal address to the New York Historical Society in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of George Washington’s inauguration as president of the United States. Adams’s speech, which lasted two hours, proved a great success. The oration was “well re~eivecl”~ by the large audience and was published shortly thereafter as Jubilee of the Constitution. Within a matter of weeks the society had sold eight thousand copies and could scarcely keep up with demand. Adams was flattered by the success of his address, for which he “could never be sufficiently grateful to His vanity was “wheedled by flattery” into the hope that the discourse would last.6 Yet he predicted that it would receive a few “puffs” of attention and then “be forgotten.” However, enthusiasm for Jubilee of the Constitution did not quickly diminish. For many years it was 77

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considered one of the most important statements ever written o n the American Constitution. Its influence continued after Adams’s death and was quoted o n the eve of the Civil War and for years after.7 Yet, in our own day, Jubilee of the Constitution is a largely forgotten document. A few historians have referred to it in passing but the principles enunciated in the speech are largely ignored; in Adams’s day, by comparison, they were considered by most Americans to be the lifeblood of their regime. Only a few months after the speech was delivered the Africans of the Anistad arrived o n American soil. Shortly thereafter, the theoretical principles articulated in Jubilee were practically applied in defense of the mutineer slaves. Jubilee of the Constitution gives an authoritative account of America’s first principles. It clearly delineates the relationship between the regime’s two most important Founding documents-the Declaration and the Constitution-and in so doing provides guidance to its citizens. Considered one of the greatest statements on the Constitution during a period of great crisis, it is worthy of careful consideration today. T h e remainder of this chapter provides a detailed examination of Adams’s penetrating discourse o n the American Constitution.

***** Adams begins Jubilee with a reference to the founding of a n ancient republic: When in the epic fable of the first of Roman Poets, the Goddess mother of Aeneas delivers to him the celestial armour, with which he is to triumph over his enemy, and to lay the foundations of Imperial Rome, he is represented as gazing with intense but confused delight on the crested helm that vomits golden fires“His hands the fatal sword and corslet hold, One keen with temper’d steel-one stiff with gold. He shakes the pointed spear, and longs to try The plated cuishes on his manly thigh; But most admires the shield’s mysterious mould, And Roman triumphs rising on the gold-

For on that shield the heavenly smith had wrought the anticipated history of Roman glory, from the days of Aeneas down to the reign of Augustus Caesar, contemporaneous with the Poet himself.s

Adams thus begins his discourse by quoting one of Rome’s great poets and one of the world’s great epic poems. This will not be Adams’s only reference

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to Virgil,9 for the Roman republic was an important model for Americans.’O But Adams does not begin his discourse by drawing attention t o the founding of Rome as an example for Americans. On the contrary, he immediately proceeds to highlight the distinctive characteristics of the two regimes. Adams himself proceeds in the manner of a poet,ll providing a gloss of myth and allegory to the life of George Washington on the fiftieth anniversary of his inauguration: Would i t be an unlicensed trespass of the imagination to conceive, that on the night preceding the day of which you now commemorate the fiftieth anniversary-on the night preceding the thirtieth of April, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-nine, when . . . the chancellor of the State of New York administered to George Washington the solemn oath, faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States, and to the best of his ability, to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States-that in the visions of the night, the guardian angel of the Father of our country had appeared before him, in the venerated form of his mother and, to cheer and encourage him in the performance of the momentous and solemn duties that he was about to assume, had delivered to him a suit of celestial armour-a helmet, consisting of the principles of piety, of justice, of honor, of benevolence, with which from his earliest infancy he had hitherto walked through life, in the presence of all his brethren-a spear, studded with the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence-a sword, the same with which he had led the armies of his country through the war of freedom to the summit of the triumphal arch of independence-a corslet and cuishes of long experience and habitual intercourse in peace and war with the world of mankind, his contemporaries of die human race, in all their stages of civilization-and last of all, the Constitution of the United States, a SHIELD embossed by heavenly hands, with the future history of his country. Yes, gentlemen! O n that shield, the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES was sculptured, (by forms’unseen, and in characters then invisible to the mortal eye), the predestined North American Union.’*

Adams thus cloaks “the Father of our country” in the poetic garb of a n ancient hero. In the past, poets were able to provide the basis for a moral horizon within which practical judgment and moral virtue might be exercised by statesmen and citizens. They did so through the heroic portrayal of the gods and godlike men of their city. In America that moral horizon is provided by the first principles of the regime. Thus it is that in Adams’s imaginary portrayal of Washington our divinely favored founder receives among his empyrean armor a “spear, studded with the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence” and the shield of the Constitution.

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We see, then, that the celestial armor delivered to Aeneas and Washington was analogous to those principles and qualities o n which they would found their respective regimes. Venus supplied the armor in order that Aeneas might “lay the foundations of Imperial Rome.” Adams implies that the principles that would transform republican Rome into Imperial Rome were present at Rome’s founding. Indeed, the love of honor that made republican Rome successful also made its eventual transformation under the Caesars virtually inevitable. Later inJubilee Adams returns to the subject of Aeneas and Washington and supplements his discussion with references to the founders of other ancient cities. When we reach that portion of the discourse, we explore at length the comparison between America and Rome. For the moment it is sufficient to note that a Roman conception of honor was not, and could not be, the leading principle of America. It would also be premature to address at length the significance of Washington’s celestial armor. The meaning of Adams’s opening vision unfolds as the discourse progresses. For now it is enough to mention that Adams saw America’s sovereignty as rooted in the power of moral restraint rather than the energies of imperial conquest. l 3

***** Adams magnifies and adorns the truths of the Founding in a poetic celebration of what he liked to refer to as “the heroic age of American hi~tory.”’~ Yet, the mythopoetic imagery which opensJubilee appears to serve as a mere introduction to the prosaic account of American history which follow^.'^ This historical narrative starts well before the birth of the new nation as Adams opens his account with a n examination of the thirteen English colonies. Legend tells us that the descendants of Aeneas migrated to Britain16 and the descendants of that island people immigrated to America. But the English colonies were “separate and distinct” and “variously diversified, including sectarians, religious and political, of all the classes which for the two preceding centuries had agitated and divided the people of the British islands-and with them were intermingled the descendants of Hollanders, Swedes, Germans, and French fugitives from the persecution of the revoker of the Edict of Nantes.”” This brings t o mind another comparison between Rome and America, the diversity of their people. Adams’s description of ethnic and religious diversity in early America might be compared with Fustel de Coulanges’s description of ancient Rome. The Roman population was then a mixture of several races, its worship was an assemblage of several worships and its national hearth an association of several hearths. I t was almost the only city whose municipal religion was not isolated from all others. . . . There was hardly a people it could not admit to its hearth.“

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But the reasons for diversity in America and in Rome were not the same and serve to underscore once more the profound differences between the two republics. Roman diversity was primarily the result of Roman conquests. By contrast, American diversity resulted mainly from voluntary immigration inspired by a desire for freedom.19 As Adams writes, “In the bosoms of this people, thus heterogeneously composed, there was burning, kindled at different furnaces, but all furnaces of affliction, one clear, steady flame of LIBERTY.”’’ The descendants of these early colonists increased and multiplied. In time Britain expelled most of her enemies from the Continent, leaving Spain as her only rival in the region. But Britain’s moment of splendor in North America was short-lived. “[Florgetting all the warnings of preceding agesforgetting the lessons written in the blood of her own children, through centuries of departed time, she undertook to tax the people of the colonies without their consent.”21 The response from the colonists was immediate and inflexible resistance. For the first time there were indications of North American union. But at this point the colonies were reluctant to break their bonds with England. “The struggle was for chartered rights-for English libertieswith the cause of Algernon Sydney and John Hambden [sic]-for trial by jury-the Habeas Corpus and Magna Charta.”22 Adams, with a not so subtle criticism of the English Constitution, noted that “English lawyers had decided that Parliament was ~ m n i p o t e n t . ”This ~~ omnipotent Parliament had disregarded the liberties that colonists had come to expect as Englishmen. English liberties had failed the colonists because they rested on the will of Parliament. Americans, therefore, “appealed to the rights of man and the omnipotence of the God of battle^."'^ Adams’s description of America’s Revolutionary appeal deserves careful attention. The precise meaning of his words become clearer as the discourse continues, but it is imperative to remember the basis of this Revolutionary petition. In the first place, it should be noted that Adams regarded the war for independence as a providential event. Divine favor was required for its success. But the dual nature of the colonists’ petition makes it necessary for us to examine Adams’s understanding of the connection between “the rights of man” and “the God of battles.” For, on the surface at least, it appears that Americans are entreating the service of two different gods: the American colonists appealed at the same time to right and might, justice and force. We recall that one of the principal elements comprising Washington’s celestial helmet is justice. Later in the discourse Adams defines justice as “the constant and perpetual will of securing to every one his right,” which “includes the whole duty of man in the social institutions of society, toward his neighbor.”25Justice, so understood, is identical with the rights of man, which for Americans were most clearly articulated in the Declaration of Independence. The rights of Englishmen were not

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consistent with Adams’s definition of justice because ultimately they were based on nothing more than the will of Parliament. At the close of his discourse Adams asks the American people to regard the Declaration of Independence as their “Ark of the Covenant.” This is not the place for an in-depth analysis of jubilee’s final paragraph. It is sufficient to note here that A d a m believed America’s appeal to the “rights of man” reflected a religious commitment to the transcendent natural-law principles of the Declaration and, by extension, to the Constitution. T h e Constitution becomes the object of religious devotion because, as Adams states, “the principles of the Declaration” are “practically interwoven in the Constitution of the United States.” Adams admonishes the people to cling to those principles “as to the issues of life-adhere to them as to the chords of your eternal salvation.” Through their devotion to the Constitution every citizen fulfills his “moral responsibility to the Supreme Ruler of the universe,” t o “secure to men and society” the possession of their rights.26 In this way the people voluntarily execute the natural law and through its observance participate in the divine law.27When republican citizens freely choose to adhere to the natural law, they are living in accordance with reason. As a consequence, they become fit to enforce the law for themselves and are not compelled to rely o n the dictates of an omnipotent enforcer as manifested by, for example, a divine-right monarch or a n unrepresentative parliament. Indeed, it is precisely such earthly agents of omnipotent enforcers which represent the most dangerous threat to “all lawful government on earth.” For when God’s will is closely tied to those things that are merely human the distinctions between positive law and natural law are obscured. Yet Adams’s words are clear. Americans could not simply rely o n the transcendent principles of justice; the “omnipotence of the God of battles” was also required. America required what necessity requires all regimes to have. T h e English Parliament had both power and legitimacy. T h e cause of the Americans was just, but establishing its legitimacy required the use of force.28 Returning once more to the poetic imagery which opens the discourse, we recall that Washington’s sword was the only piece of his armor not given a symbolic meaning. Adams simply writes: “a sword, the same with which he had led the armies of his country through the war of freedom, to the summit of the triumphal arch of independence.” There was no need for Adams to say more. The sword was not given a symbolic moral quality, but its force allowed the triumph of justice. T h e American cause was dictated by both justice and necessity and consequently required the use of force. Americans had legally and morally demonstrated their grievance against Great Britain, but independence could only be won by taking up arms against their oppressors. The

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helmet of justice gave Americans the authority to rule, but it was only by the might of the sword that Americans gained the capacity to rule. In order to understand what Adams means by “the God of battles” it is helpful to turn to the source which was most likely the inspiration for this curious phrase, Shakespeare’s Henry V. As previously noted, Adams’s passion for Shakespeare began in his youth, and his published articles marked him as a careful and profound reader of the great bard.29Indeed, Adams was perhaps more proud of his contribution to Shakespearean scholarship than anything else he had accomplished. On October 6, 1839, his diary entry reports o n his correspondence with James H. Hackett,jOone of the leading Shakespearean actors of the day. Hackett, writing from London, enthusiastically praised Adams for a letter he had written o n Hamlet.31T h e actor had circulated the letter to so many friends and acquaintances that he was forced to make a lithographic copy of it, the original being “nearly used up.” “Mr. Hackett, in his letter,” noted Adams, “mentions also that he has very recently heard of an analysis by me of the tragedy of ‘Othello,’ and enquires where he can procure it. This extension of my fame is more tickling to my vanity than it was to be elected president of the United States.”j2 It should be noted that Adams’s interest in Shakespeare was not purely academic in nature. He looked to Shakespeare’s plays as a source of guidance during political crises. For example, in 1841, during the peak of his congressional battle with the forces of slavery, he delivered a speech before the House wherein he “arraigned before the committee, the nation, and the world, the principles avowed by Henry A. Wise [one of the South’s most vociferous spokesmen], and his three colored standard of overseer, black, dueling, blood-red, and dirty, cadaverous, nullification, white.”33Adams’s speech precipitated a particularly angry response from Wise and “his gang of duelists.” There followed nearly a week of sleepless nights and troubled thoughts as Adams contemplated the dissolution of the Union and civil war. O n the following Sunday, as was his custom, Adams attended two church services, but his mind was too burdened by the troubles of this world to find peace in the contemplation of a world yet to come. “Throughout this day, as through many that had immediately preceded it,” he laments, “my mind has been in a state of fearful agitation and my health and spirits suffer with it. Neither of the preachers of this day had the power to call me from the world to God . . . this day my thoughts have been scattered and I have been looking into Shakspeare [sic], for Coriolanus and the Volscians, and for the plucking of the red and white roses and the Temple gardens in the days of the Plantagenets.”j4 The concern Adams felt for the fate of his young nation shackled the aging patriot in a fear that absorbed “all the faculties of [his] soul.”35But

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if celestial reflection provided no relief, the political lessons of Shakespeare’s tragedies at least provided instruction. Knowing what Shakespeare meant to Adams, and, one might add, his aud i e n ~ ewe , ~ would ~ be remiss not t o pay careful attention to even a passing reference to the great bard. Yet what lessons. if any, could the foreign conquest of an English monarch teach to American republican^?^^ In addition to the character of his rule, the victory granted Henry was short-lived. T h e final chorus at the end of the play reminds the audience that he died shortly after the events celebrated in the play. Henry V’s untimely death proved a disaster for England. Her forces went down to defeat in the final campaigns of the Hundred Years’ War while the factional struggles at home intensified. T h e civil wars that followed in the wake of Henry’s unsuccessful attempt to refound the English monarchy were more violent than any that preceded them. In these Wars of the Roses the Houses of Lancaster and York fought to establish their claim to the English throne, but the antagonists o n both sides were not motivated by any meaningful principles of justice. The quest for the English crown was nothing more than a naked struggle for power. Adams’s comments o n the Wars of the Roses are instructive.

If an historian or an orator should affirm, that one of the most spirited and intelligent nations upon the earth had inflicted upon itself, for a term little short of a century, all the horrors and desolations of civil war, to ascertain and settle which, of a white rose or a red rose, breathes the sweetest fragrance-the assertion might not be literally, but it would be more than figuratively true. The question between the Houses of York and Lancaster, was, whether upon the death of the King of England, childless, the right to his crown devolved upon the son of a brother, previously deceased, but who had been next to himself by birth, or to his one surviving younger brother. This is a question which could not possibly arise under any government, other than a hereditary monarchy, and in which the people who were the victims of the controversy, had, abstracted from the respective personal qualities of the pretenders to the crown, no more interest than in the dissensions in the kingdom of Lilliput on the question whether an egg should be broken at the big or the little end.js

The Wars of the Roses were the very antithesis of the American Revolution. T h e wars of England’s Plantagenet kings were not carried out in pursuance of the rights of man; they were fought to further the ambitions of competing despots. Henry V demonstrates that the foundations of divineright monarchy rest o n nothing more than force and fraud. Yet if Henry V is not the “mirror” of all republican statesmen, he is nonetheless capable of teaching potential founders important lessons about

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war and legitimacy. Indeed, success in war goes a long way toward establishing the legitimacy of any regime. Henry’s questionable claim to rule was dramatically enhanced at Agincourt. However just the grievance of the American colonists might be, public support for their cause, both domestic and foreign, depended t o a large degree on the performance of their army. Related to this is a more unsettling lesson of Henry V: the necessities of war often require statesmen to make difficult compromises with the very principles o n which the legitimacy of their regime rests. Consequently, it is unwise to demand the categorical prohibition of injustice. Such prohibitions could, in many circumstances, lead to the destruction of a decent regime and the ruin of moral men. This view is reflected in Adams’s view toward slavery, as noted in the preceding chapters. However, it is only through the recognition of Henry V’s failures that the play becomes truly instructive. T h e broad lessons of Shakespeare do not diminish the profound differences between the cause of Henry and that of the colonists. Adams explicitly addressed these differences by contrasting the American founding with the founding of the English monarchy under Henry V’s illustrious ancestor, William the Conqueror: In summing up the character of William the Conqueror, the Scottish historian, Hume, remarks, that “though he rendered himself infinitely odious to his English subjects, he transmitted his power to his posterity, and the throne is still filled by his descendents; a proof,” says the historian, “that the foundations which he laid were firm and solid and that amidst all his violence, while he seemed only to gratify the present passion, he had still an eye towards futurity.” The descendent from William the Conqueror who filled the throne of Britain when the Scottish historian made this remark, was the person whom his American subjects, to whom he had rendered himself odious, unseated from that portion of his throne which ruled over them; and in discarding him they had demolished the throne itself forever. They had resolved for themselves and their posterity, never again to be ruled by thrones. The Declaration of Independence had promulgated principles of government, subversive of all unlimited sovereignty and all hereditary power. Principles, in consistency with which no conqueror could establish by violence a throne to be trodden by himself and by his posterity, for a space of eight hundred years.I9

The cause of Henry V was, in essence, no different from that of William’s. He differed only to the extent that his effort to refound the English monarchy was far less successful than that of his ancestor. T h e wars of William the Conqueror and Henry V were ultimately as meaningless as “the dissensions in the kingdom of Lilliput.” Only when conflict hinges upon questions of both right

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and might, liberty and power, does “war become the most imperious of human obligations, and the field of battle the sublimest theatre of heroic martyrdom and patriotic achievement.”4O We recall that in the same prayer Henry called upon “the God of battles” to steel his soldiers’ hearts; he also asked the Lord to overlook the manner by which he attained his ill-gotten crown: Not today, 0 Lord 0,not to-day, think not upon the fault

My father made in compassing the crown!”

It is true that the Americans, like Henry V, had inherited certain sins from their fathers, yet if slavery was tolerated for the sake of union, it was not the principle on which the regime rested. Indeed, the very purpose of writing Jubilee was to fight against those theories of government, in all their various manifestations, which rested on the false and corrupting principles that justice is the will of the stronger. Adams’s immediate concerns were directed toward the protagonists of the positive good theory of slavery, which, like the divine right of kings, defended the idea that some men had the right to rule over others without their consent. Me see in the following chapters that the proponents of slavery justified their cause upon the basis of conquest and hereditary power. “The foundations of government laid by those who had burnt by fire and scattered to the winds of heaven, the ashes of [William] the conqueror’s throne,” Adams wrote, “were human rights, responsibility to God, and the consent of the people. Upon these principles, the Constitution of the United States had been formed.”42Thus, according to Adams, America is the first regime with the potential to endure, which was not founded upon “conquest and hereditary power.” The foundations of America rested on three sources: “human rights,” as dictated by the laws of nature or reason, “responsibility to God,” as dictated by both reason and revelation, and “consent of the people,” who, when properly educated, will act as the instrument or enforcers of both God and the Law. Adams, like Lincoln after him, recognized that political necessity required periodic appeals to the God of battles. Such appeals may be necessary, but they must never be regarded as sufficient in themselves for maintaining the conditions of freedom. Calling upon “the rights of man” at the same time that one calls upon “the God of battles” makes possible a certain reconciliation between wisdom and force. This is accomplished insofar as God becomes the omnipotent enforcer of the natural law. But the war for independence was noble insofar as what it enforced was the natural law, or reason,

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that is, justice. Adams noted that just “government is founded upon a covenant of mutual respect for the unalienable natural rights of man, and that however this covenant may be violated by power, the rights can never be extinguished, and may always by power be resumed.”43Rights can be violated by the use of force but they cannot be extinguished. Justice will continue to exist even when obfuscated by force. However, it is often the case that justice can only be brought into effect-or in the words of Adams, “be resumed’’-by the use of power. Adams recognized that had the colonists appealed only to the rights of man they would have created the appearance that there was no need for an omnipotent God of battles. The rights of man would become a n ineffectual theory without a living God to enforce it.

***** The colonists had broken their ties to England and united to battle their common enemy. America declared her independence and the colonies were transformed into the United States: Their inhabitants were proclaimed to be one people, renouncing all allegiance to the British crown; all co-patriotism with the British nation; all claims to chartered rights as Englishmen. Thenceforth their charter was the Declaration of Independence. Their rights, the natural rights of mankind. Their govemment, such as should be instituted by themselves, under the solemn mutual pledges of perpetual union, founded on the self-evident truths proclaimed in the De~laration.~~

Adams distinguishes clearly the rights of man from the rights of Englishmen. The rights of Americans were not bestowed by the will of Parliament; they were not the endowment of custom and history. They are, rather, the natural rights of all mankind. No government had granted these rights and no government could take them away. These rights were discovered, not created. While the ancient customs of a people might very well be consistent with these rights, nature, rather than tradition, is the source of their authority. Adams thus explicitly rejected a widely held misconception that Americans fought their revolution in defense of their rights as Englishmen under the positive law of the British Constitution. For example, prominent historian Daniel J. Boorstin contends: “The object of the struggle, as Thomas Jefferson expounded in his Summary View ofthe Rights of British America (1774), which first brought him wide notice, and then in the Declaration of Independence, was to vindicate the rights of Englishmen under the British Consti tution.”4j

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Other scholars, most notably Russell Kirk, acknowledged that the Declaration shifted the American cause from a defense of the rights of Englishmen “into the misty and debatable land of abstract liberty, equality and fratemity.”4G But Kirk contends that the Declaration was primarily “a successful instrument of diplomacy” written in order to convince the French to intervene on behalf of the American cause. “[Tlhe Declaration was meant, in large part, as a plea to France and other conceivable allies against the British government; and while a claim of natural rights might wake the sympathies of such potential enlightened friends, a claim upon the ‘chartered rights of Englishmen’ would have little meaning for E~ropeans.”‘~ Kirk downplayed the significance of the Declaration and maintained that most Americans continued to regard the war for independence as, in essence, a defense of their rights as Englishmen. “For novel abstract theories of human nature and society,” he wrote “most of the men who subscribed to the Declaration and the Constitution had no relish.”48 Incredibly, Kirk attributes this view to John Quincy Adams. Kirk justifies his contention by referring to a series of letters written by Adams in 1791 under the pseudonym of Publicola. The “Letters of Publicola,” which consisted of eleven essays, were written in response to the 1791 publication of Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man and appeared in Boston’s Columbian Seminal between June 8 and July 27, 1791.4yPaine had written Rights of Man as a response to Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, but it was not Publicola’s “intention to defend the principles of Mr. Burke.” Rather, Adams intended to illuminate those aspects of Paine’s radical doctrines inconsistent with the natural-law foundations of the American regime. “As his father had done in his writings,” notes one perceptive scholar, “Adams opposed the extreme views of Paine, while retaining faith in the American theory of natural rights.”jOThis observation is actually confirmed by the paragraph from “Publicola”which Kirk chose to quote: Happy, thrice happy the people of America! Whose gentleness of manners and habits of virtue are still sufficient to reconcile the enjoyment of their natural rights, with the peace and tranquillity of their country; whose principles of religious liberty did not result from an indiscriminate contempt of all religion whatever, and whose equal representation in their legislative councils was founded upon an equality really existing among them, and not upon the metaphysical speculations of fanciful politicians, vainly contending against the unalterable course of events, and the established order of n a t ~ r e . ~ ’

“SoAdams,” Kirk argues, “saw . . . the most succinct and forceful contrast between the moderate polity of the American colonies (founded upon a respect for prescriptive rights and customs), and the leveling theories of French radi-

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c a l i ~ m . ”In~this ~ passage Kirk‘s portrayal of Adams’s thought might accurately be described as promoting a half-truth. The American coloniesj3 did in fact have a healthy “respect for prescriptive rights and customs,” but it is completely untrue to argue that the American regime was “founded upon” such rights and custoins. Americans did, of course, continue to rely o n many of the legal customs they had inherited from Britain. “Many of the laws which are in use to this day in Great Britain,” Adams noted, “and from thence have been adopted by the American Republics, may be traced back to the remotest period of antiquity, and the origin even of the institution of juries, an institution so congenial to the genuine spirit of freedom, is lost in the obscurity of the fabulous ages.”54Many American states chose to incorporate the English common law into their constitutions as far as it was applicable to their particular situation. American courts would continue to refer to the common-law tradition, the Commentaries of Blackstone, and even the precedents of recent decisions by British courts. But such sources were authoritative only to the extent that they were consistent with “the established order of nature.” Americans did not simply identify the ancient with the good. Ultimately, the legal customs and traditions of England were respected because of their justice, not merely because they were old. In an 1831 Fourth of July address, Adams explicitly proclaimed the Declaration to be superior to Blackstone’s Commentaries or any other legal traditions that might be contrary to its principles.jj The Declaration was not the oldest legal document American jurists could appeal to, but it was the most authoritative because its principles were recognized as the foundation of legitimate government. Kirk portrays the young AdamsS6as a Burkean c ~ n s e r v a t i v ewho, ~ ~ “much to Thomas Jefferson’s vexation,” stood up for “inherited rights” against the ‘hovel abstract theories of human In this instance, Kirk’s analysis of Adams’s thought is blatantly false. Adams, in fact, had no patience for those who claimed that the Declaration “deals too much in abstractions.” Indeed, he believed this was the document’s greatest strength, “for upon those abstractions hinged the justice of the cause. Without them, our revolution would have been but successful rebellion. Right, truth, justice, are all abstra~tions.”‘~ In fact, Adams’s objection to Rights of Man was not premised on “the object which [Paine] promised to himself,” that is, the defense of natural rights. However, Adams did believe that Paine presented “a commentary upon the rights of man inferring questionable deductions from unquestionable principles.”60 The dispute between Adams and Paine, and, by extension, between Adams and Jefferson, was not a dispute over first principles. Their quarrel was over the form of government a constitution should promote in order to protect most effectively the natural rights of its citizens. This is not

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to minimize the importance of such disputes, for a defective form of govemment might be as destructive to liberty as a defect in first principles. Paine possessed an unusual talent to inspire men to action through the writing of his revolutionary pamphlets. However, his political ideas are racked with the kind of inconsistencies that would seem to indicate that he lacked the subtlety of mind necessary to distinguish clearly between the competing claims of justice that inspired the French and American revolutions. This confusion of thought led Paine to adopt ideas that were dangerous to the very rights he sought to defend. The people of England certainly maintained a right to revolution, as Paine suggested, but according to Adam this right can only be exercised if “the rights of the people are really oppressed, and unless they have attempted in vain every constitutional mode of obtaining redress.’”jlAfter forming a constitution, a people reserve for themselves only their unalienable right to resist tyranny. But contra Paine, Adam contended that the English people “have no right in their original character to change their form of Government unless it has become incompetent for the purposes for which all governments are instituted.”62Such a condition existed in America in 1776; it did not exist in England in 1791. Adams and Paine shared a commitment to the abstract truths of the Declaration, though they passionately disagreed about the conditions under which a people might justifiably overthrow their government in defense of their natural rights. Their debate was not as Kirk portrays, a battle between the defender of liberty as founded on the customs and traditions of England on the one hand, and the defender of abstract liberty on the other. Adams, as Publicola, did defend the British Constitution against Paine’s attacks, but not because of any particular respect for tradition as such. He “never had the intention to defend the corruptions of the Eng lish Constitution; nor even its principles in theory, except as were adopted in our Adams believed that the primary flaw in Paine’s reasoning could be traced to his “partial adoption of the principle on which Rousseau founds the social Rousseau’ssocial contract required the citizen to subordinate any claim of individual rights to the general will. Legislation by an all-inclusive citizen body would allow everyone to contribute to lawmaking. The source of the law is the general will from which there can be no appeal. The social contract requires “the total alienation of each associate, and all his rights, to the whole community.”65Paine, following Rousseau, contended that “that which a whole nation chooses to do, it has a right to do.” This is a clear example of the confused character of Paine’s thinking, which led to the partial adoption of a dangerous doctrine. “This principle,” countered Adams,

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that a whole nation has a right to do whatever it pleases, cannot in any sense whatever be admitted as true. The etemal and immutable laws of justice and of morality are paramount to all human legislation. The violation of those laws is certainly within the power, but it is not among the rights of nations. . . . If, therefore, a majority thus constituted are bound by no law human or divine, and have no other rule but their sovereign will and pleasure to direct them, what possible security can any citizen of the nation have for the protection of his unalienable rightsF6 Adams also rejected Rousseau’s contention that the social compact must be founded by the unanimous assent of an association of individuals “which cannot possibly be made by a representative body.’’ Adams considered this “neither practicable nor even metaphysically true.” Rousseau’s theory would “turn the whole body of American constitutions, the pride of man, the glory of human understanding, into a mass of tyrannical and unfounded usurpations.” Paine does not go as far as Rousseau but he does argue that once a constitutional government is established it has no right to alter itself. Adams believed this principle to be false. He noted that many states in the Union, including Massachusetts, had constitutions which could be altered by the power of ordinary legislatures. “In forming their Constitution,” Adams observed, the people of a nation may reserve to themselves such powers as they may think proper. They may reserve only the unalienable right of resistance against tyranny. The people of England have reserved only this right . . . as the English have delegated all their power . . . they have no right in their original character to

change their form of Government, unless it has become incompetent for the purposes for which all Governments are instituted.6i

Of course, the people themselves must be the ones to judge whether a government has become incompetent to fulfill the purposes for which it was instituted. However, if, in forming this judgment, and acting in pursuance of it, they proceed from passion, and not from principle; if they dissolve their compact, from an idea that ‘they have a right to do whatever they choose,’ and break the bands of society, in the forms of despotism, ‘because such is their pleasure,’ they may indeed go through the operation by the plenitude of their irresistible power; but the nation will meet with ample punishment in their own misery, and the leaders who delude them, in the detestation of their own

Any cogent examination of the argument made by Publicola must lead to the conclusion that Adams’s intention was nothing less than a defense of the abstract truths of the Declaration. His criticism of the French Constitution was inspired by the desire to preserve America from the corrupting

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influence of false doctrines. His defense of the English Constitution was limited to that portion of its principles consistent with the Declaration and consequently “adopted by the A m e r i c a n ~ . ”Indeed, ~~ Adams would have shown no interest in the debate between Paine and Burke “if the subject were to affect only the British nation.” He took up his pen in defense of America’s constitutional principles because the subject was “important to all mankind.”70His understanding of the American and British constitutions in “Publicola” was perfectly consistent with his understanding in

Jubilee.

***** After clearly distinguishing the natural rights of mankind from the chartered rights of Englishmen, Adams noted inJubike that the assertion of these rights did not precipitate their immediate enjoyment. Americans were forced to endure the agonies of war for six long years. Justice or right was on their side, but, as noted earlier, they also required the help of the God of battles. “[Tlhe Union was yet no more than a mutual pledge of faith, and a mutual participation of common sufferings and common danger^."^' It was their faith in the justice of their cause that gave them the strength to persevere to victory. In time, America’s struggle for independence was a success and it broke the bonds of parliamentary omnipotence. “The independence of the United States of America, was not granted, but recognized. The nation had ‘assumed among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station, to which the laws of nature, and nature’s God, entitled it.’-But the one, united people, had yet NO GOVERNMENT.”72 The suffering that Americans endured during the revolution was caused by “the abuse of power-the power of g ~ v e r n m e n t . ”Americans ~~ understandably feared any new delegation of power, particularly if it was to include a grant of executive power. But with the Union languishing on the point of death, a convention was called with delegates from twelve74of the thirteen states. The people were asked to ratify the work of this convention and, thankfully for the young nation, they did. The American Constitution was born, and Adams declared it “a complement to the Declaration of Independence; founded upon the same principles, carrying them out into practical execution, and forming with it, one entire system of national g o ~ e r n m e n t . ” ~ ~ Adams’s pronouncement could not be clearer. His words are an indictment of those legal scholars and judges who today proclaim on their own authority that the principles of the Declaration are irrelevant to our understanding of the Constitution. Adams continues:

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The Declaration was a manifesto to the world of mankind, to justify the one Confederated people, for the violent and voluntary severance of the ties of their allegiance, for the renunciation of their country and for assuming a station themselves, among the potentates of the world-a self-constituted sovereign-a self-constituted country.’6

He goes on to proclaim the novelty of the Declaration. No nation had ever rested o n these principles. The rights of Englishmen were not inconsistent with the rights of man. But the English Constitution rested on the will of Parliament, and Americans had suffered from the unjust and arbitrary acts of that body. By contrast, the American Constitution rested o n the transcendent and nonarbitrary truths of the Declaration. In the history of the human race, this had never been done before. Monarchs had been dethroned for tyranny-kingdoms converted into republics, and revolted provinces had assumed the attributes of sovereign power. In the history of England itself, within one century and a half, before the day of the Declaration of Independence, one lawful king had been brought to the block, and another expelled with all his posterity, from his own kingdom, and a collateral dynasty had ascended his throne. But the former of these revolutions had by the deliberate and final sentence of the nation itself, been pronounced a rebellion, and the rightful heir of the executed king had been restored to the crown. In the latter, at the first onset, the royal recreant had fled-he was held to have abdicated the Crown, and it was placed upon the heads of his daughter and of her husband, the prime leader of the conspiracy against him. In these events, there had been much controversy upon the platform of English liberties-upon the customs of the ancient Britons; the laws of Alfred, the Witema gamote of the Anglo-Saxons and the great charter of Runnymeade with all its numberless confirmations. But the actions of those times never ascended to the first foundation of civil society among men, nor had any revolutionary system of government been rested upon them.77

No government had ever before rested on the doctrines proclaimed in the Declaration. The novelty of the American Founding, so clearly articulated by Adams, has been almost completely neglected by modern scholarship. It is instructive to compare the words of Adams to one of today’s most distinguished and prolific constitutional scholars. Leonard Levy writes: The history of Magna Carta throws dazzling light on a jurisprudence of original intent. Magna Carta approaches its 800th anniversary. It was originally “reactionary as hell,” to quote the chief justice of West Virginia. But the feudal barons who framed it could not control its evolution. It eventually came to signify many things that are not in it and were not intended. Magna Carta is not

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remotely important for what it intended but for what it has become. I t stands now for the rule of law, for no taxation without representation, for due process of law, for habeas corpus, for equality before the law, for representative government, and for a cluster of rights of the criminally accused. No one cares, or should, that the original document signifies none of this. The Constitution is comparably dynamic.7s

The Constitution and Magna Carta are to Levy “comparably dynamic.” Both documents change over time and their meanings can evolve to the point that they would be unrecognizable to their original authors. What Levy says about Magna Carta is certainly true. However, Magna Carta is part of the uncodified British Constitution which, as Adams notes, does not rest on a “revolutionary system of government.” Unlike the American Constitution, “the Great Charter of Runnymeade with all its numberless confirmations . . . never ascended to the first foundation of civil society among men.”

***** As the discourse continues, Adams gives a lengthy and detailed argument contending that the Articles of Confederation departed from the Declaration’s principles. He had first made this argument eight years earlier during the height of the nullification crisis.79 In the summer of 1831 Adams witnessed with alarm the growth of nullification sentiment in South Carolina and Georgia. He had been invited by the citizens of Quincy, Massachusetts, to give the annual Fourth of July address, and used the occasion as an opportunity to draw attention to the faults and unsound principles of nullification. A d a m found the refutation of this dangerous doctrine in the Declaration. He argued that just government can be founded only by the consent of the people and not through the power of sovereign states. His argument was not ignored. Both Joseph Story, who gave the Court’s opinion in the Arnistud case, and John Marshall praised Adams for his contribution to constitutional scholarship. Story had just completed eight lectures at Harvard, where he had spoken against the doctrine of nullification. He enthusiastically endorsed Adams’s contention that the doctrine of nullification was contrary to America’s founding document. Adams recorded their conversation in his diary; “from your 4th of July oration, I [Story] have gathered many useful hints for my own lectures upon constitutional law. I shall avail myself of some of your illustrations. . . . I propose to publish the lectures next year, and shall cite you as an authority for my doctrine.”*O Chief Justice John Marshall was also delighted by the suggestion that the Declaration of Independence was an affirmation of the previously existing union. “Your views o n the doctrine of nullification,” the chief justice wrote to Adams, “were not only very strong, but somewhat original, to me at

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least, it places that subject, odious as it has become, in a point of view too preposterous to be tolerated . . . that the independence of the States is a graft o n the stalk of the union of the States, and is nourished by that stock, I firmly believe, they exist, flourish and must perish together.”81 In Jubilee Adams made a similar argument. The Declaration states, “We . . . the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled . . . do, in the Name and by Authority of the good PEOPLE of these colonies, are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States.” All just government must be founded on the enlightened consent of the people. But under the Articles the sovereignty of the people had been replaced by the sovereignty of states. “The Declaration of Independence,” declared Adams, proclaims the natural rights of man, and the constituent power of the people to be the only sources of legitimate government. State sovereignty is a mere argument of power, without regard to right-a mere reproduction of the omnipotence of the British parliament in another form, and therefore not only inconsistent with, but directly in opposition to, the principles of the Declaration.s2 Adams articulates, now in a more systematic manner, the relationship between justice and power. The argument for parliamentary sovereignty in Britain and state sovereignty in the United States rests o n the same principle, the idea that might makes right. Under the Articles there could be no reconciliation-indeed one could not even speak of a tension-between justice and power. State sovereignty was simply “omnipotent.” As Adams poignantly noted, this princi.ple is not only inconsistent with, but directly opposed to, the principles of the Declaration. We remind the reader of our earlier contention: Adams’s understanding of the Constitution is an argument for justice, while those constitutional scholars who reject the Declaration as a source for interpreting the Constitution make an argument for force. Undoubtedly, some would find this claim simplistic and naive. It paints virtually all modem constitutional scholarship, despite its rich diversity, with a single broad brush and admits of no middle ground. Such critics would be well advised to pay careful attention to the words of Adams, for he contended that the principles of the Declaration are “the only sources of legitimate government” (italics in the original). Any government, any constitution, formed in opposition to these principles is unjust. As was previously noted, Adams was certainly aware of the complex relationship between power and justice. Yet he was persuaded that all just regimes will distinguish between political power and political authority, between force and right. There were, of course, profound differences between

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the way America was governed under the British Parliament and the way it was governed under the Articles of the Confederation. There are important differences between the advocates of judicial activism and the advocates of judicial restraint. Yet they are united in their rejection of natural rights and in their premise that might makes right. Adams also addresses the particular issues that led to “the collisions between the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the sovereignty of the separate These included disputes relating to the jurisdiction and property of crown lands, the power of regulating the commerce of the Union, and the power of taxation. Adams noted that at one point during the war, Congress had resolved that it be recommended “as indispensably necessary” that the states vest Congress with the power to levy taxes. His description of this episode reflects his indignation: Indispensably necessary! But according to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, the state legislatures themselves had no authority to confer this authority upon Congress. I t was taxation-one of the powers which the people alone are competent to bestow, and which their servants, the state legislatures, if they possessed it themselves, had no right to delegate to any other body.s4 Peace came to America, but the problems facing the government under the Articles only multiplied. Adams recounted the chaos of those troubled years: “the system itself was radically defective. Its incurable disease was a n apostasy from the principles of the Declaration of Independence.” Certainly, Adams’s view of the Articles was not shared by all of the Founders. Indeed, many of the Anti-Federalists-and I have already stated my belief that there were Anti-Federalists who could rightfully be included among America’s Fo~nders~~-believedthe Articles provided better safeguards for the protection of our natural rights than the Constitution that followed. Even those Founders who were harsh critics of the Articles stopped short of calling them “an apostasy from the principles of the Declaration.” In short, Adams appears to have taken his indictment of the Articles a step further than any of the Founders: the articles were not just ineffective; they were in principle tyrannical. As has been noted, Adams, and the Founders generally, agreed that the American Constitution should be consistent with the Declaration. But the Founders had disagreements about the best means to this end. Since it is possible to choose any number of wrong means in pursuit of a noble end, it is at least conceivable that the Articles were even worse than previously supposed. Adams, therefore, may have been correct in his belief that the Articles of Confederation represented a fundamental break with the natural-

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rights doctrine of the Declaration. If this is the case, then Adams’s view of the Articles may have been more consistent with the first principles of the regime then those of the leading Founders. T h e reader is free to judge this issue for himself. But it should not be forgotten that John Marshall, generally regarded as one of the greatest interpreters of the Constitution, was favorably disposed to Adams’s suggestion that the Declaration was an affirmation of the previously existing union. This, despite the fact that Marshall believed that Adams’s views were “somewhat original.” Adams goes o n to examine the manner by which Americans were reconciled to the principles of the Revolution. Yet he warned that the work was tar from finished and, in a clear reference to John C. Calhoun, noted that “even in our own country” there were “many speculative objections to this theory.”86 But the work of the Constitutional Convention had fortunately placed America on sound footing: In its construction the Convention immediately perceived that they must retrace their steps, and fall back from a league of friendship between sovereign states, to the Constituent sovereignty of the people; from power to right-from the irresponsible despotism of state sovereignty, to the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence. In that instrument, the right to institute and to alter governments among men was ascribed exclusively to the people-the ends of government were declared to be to secure the natural rights of man; and that when the government degenerates from the promotion to the destruction of that end, the right and the duty accrues to the people, to dissolve this degenerate government and to institute another.s’

With the ratification of the Constitution, and the inauguration of George Washington o n April 30, 1789, the American Revolution finally ended. The revolution itself was the work of thirteen years-it had never been completed until that day. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, are parts of one consistent whole, founded upon one and the same theory of government, then new, not as a theory, for it had been working itself into the mind of man for many ages, and been especially expounded in the writings of Locke, but had never before been adopted by a great nation in practice.”

Adams clearly identifies “the principles asserted in the Declaration.” They are “the natural equality and inalienable rights of m a n . . . the people are the only legitimate source of power” and “all just powers of government are derived from the consent of the government.”

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In the foregoing passages Adams again insists that the Constitution cannot be understood apart from the Declaration. They are, he asserts, “parts of one consistent whole, founded upon the same theory of government.” Though his audience was no doubt familiar with this theory, Adams nonetheless provides a clear outline of its history. Adams makes an explicit reference to John Locke, for it was in his writings that this theory had been “especially expounded.” But it is noteworthy that Adams insists this theory was not new, “for it had been working itself into the mind of man for many ages.” He thus contends that the principles of the Declaration did not originate with Locke. It is Locke who fully explicates this theory of government, but its inception goes back much farther. Later in this chapter it is demonstrated that Adams believed that the origins of the first principles of the American regime could be traced to two primary sources: biblical revelation and classical rationalism. However, it is necessary first to discuss some preliminary matter, specifically the principles themselves. We began with the most fundamental contention of Adams’s discourse: that the principles of the Declaration are based on justice rather than power. For this to be true, these principles must be eternal and immutable. For if they were human creations then they would rest on will or, as Adams would say, power. When he argues that the principles of the Declaration “had been working .. . into the mind of man for many ages,” he does not suggest that America was founded on historical rights which evolved over time. He simply suggests that the rights of man had to be discovered, that this discovery proceeded in stages, and the acceptance of these rights took time. In his 1831 address, Adams likened the discovery of natural rights to that of an astronomer, who, in his nightly visitation of the heavens, perceives a ray of light before unobserved, [yet he] discovers no new phenomena in nature. He is only the first to discern the beam which has glowed from the creation of the world. After observation and the calculations of science, will disclose whether it proceeded from a star fixed in the firmament from the birth of time, from a planet revolving around the central luminary of our own system, or from a comet, shaking from its horrid hair pestilence and war.“’

At some point in history, it could have been widely believed that this light emanated from a star. If a subsequent discovery determined that the source of this light was a planet, then sincerely held belief that it preceded from a star could not change what had always been a fact. The discovery of the “natural equality” of man was the ray of light which eventuated in the discovery of natural rights. Throughout human history few men were able to see what

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was self-evident. But the proposition “that all men are created equal” was always true. Human beings may of course be unequal in a multitude of ways, but man’s unalienable rights rest o n the indisputable fact that humans are all equally human and that man forms the middle link between the lower and higher beings. Adams believed that man’s rational faculty furnished him with “the peculiar and highest characteristic, which distinguishes man from the rest of animal creation.” I t is by the attribute of reason “that our species is constituted the great link between the physical and intellectual world.” Man’s passions and appetites place him “on a level with the herds of the forest; by our reason we participate of the Divine nature itself. Formed of clay, and compounded of dust, we are, in the scale of creation, little higher than the clod of the valley; endowed with reason, we are little lower than the angels.”9o Man’s capacity for reason raises him above the animals; his passions and appetites separate him from the divine. I t is precisely because men are neither beasts nor gods that they possess natural rights. If there were differences between man and man in the way that there are differences between God and man or man and beast, then some men could justifiably claim a right to rule others without their consent. It is only when we distinguish human from nonhuman beings that we are able to understand the manner in which men are all equally men. According to Adams, the quality that distinguishes man from the lower creatures is not a unique passion, nor his malleability, but his capacity for reason. For Adams, humans were the middle link in the “great chain of being,” because man was the only mortal creature in possession of a truly rational faculty. Adams, echoing A r i ~ t o t l e , ~ saw ’ man’s speech as the great outward manifestation of his reason, and of his obvious superiority to the lower orders of nature. “As the necessary adjunct and vehicle of reason,” he wrote, “the faculty of speech was also bestowed as an exclusive privilege upon man; not the mere utterance of articulate sounds; not the mere cries of passion, which he has in common with the lower order of animated nature; but as the conveyance of thought; as the means of rational intercourse with his fellow-creature, and In Adams’s thought ancient and of humble communion with his modern conceptions of human nature are consistently merged. Artistotle’s understanding of man as the in-between being works itself over “many ages” into the foundation for Locke’s doctrine of human equality. Again, humans are not all equally rational any more than they are equal in height, weight, or strength. T h a t all men are created equal” simply means that all human beings share in a common nature. Adams suggests that the most distinguishing characteristic of man’s nature is his reason. I t is because

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of reason that men know that they are not dogs; because humans know that they are not dogs, they can know that some men do not have a right to rule other men as they would dogs. Since all men share in a common nature “the people are the only legitimate source of power.” Power must therefore originate with the people in order to be consistent with the principles of justice. “All just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed.” In order to understand how to accomplish the task of carrying out justice Americans turned to “the writings of Locke.” For Locke provides an account of the original compact by which the peoph in a state of nature bring civil government into existence. In the state of nature all inen, as men, are free and equal. For no one can claim the authority to rule over others. The source of man’s freedom, like his equality, is his status as the in-between being, the species without natural rulers. But because man’s freedom is based on his equality it is not unlimited. Man in the state of nature is obliged to obey the law of nature which “teaches all mankind who will but consult it that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possession^."^^ We see that the laws of nature are derived from man’s natural rights to life, liberty, and property. But the rights men possess by virtue of their equality are fragile and can easily be violated by the stronger members of the species. Thus, in order to avoid the rule of force, individuals in the state of nature may voluntarily adopt a social contract so as t o achieve their “safety and happiness.” T h e Massachusetts Bill of Rights (1780), drafted by Adam’s father, states: “The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.” But such a compact can only be consistent with the principles of justice if every individual recognizes the equality of all those with whom he contracts t o form a civil society. Thus the social contract not only secures the rights of individuals, it imposes reciprocal duties on all members of civil society. These duties are perhaps best expressed in the Golden Rule: “So in everything, do to others what you have them do to you, for this sums up the law and the prophets” (Matthew 7:12). O n e can only expect to have his rights respected, if h e in turn respects the rights of others. This is what Adams meant when h e defined justice: “For justice, defined by the Institutes of Justinian, as the constant and perpetual will of securing to everyone his right, includes the whole duty of man in the social institutions of society, toward his neighbor.”94 If all just government is derived from the consent of the governed, we hasten to add that it must be en-

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lightened consent. T h e people cannot justifiably consent to despotic rule. As Adams noted in a passage to which we have already referred, the “principle that a whole nation has a right to do whatever it pleases, cannot in any sense whatever be admitted as truth. T h e eternal and immutable laws of justice and of morality are paramount to all human legislation. T h e violation of those laws is certainly within the power, but it is not among the rights of nation^."'^ It should also be noted that the state of nature is more than a theoretical description of man prior to the advent of civil society. T h e state of nature exists whenever men are subjected to arbitrary rule and denied the power of an appeal to justice. This was the condition of the American colonists with respect to the British Parliament. It was the position of Americans with respect to the various state governments under the Articles of Confederation. A state of nature recurs whenever people exercise their right to revolution in opposition to the oppressive measures of a tyrannical government. It can arise any time that groups or individuals meet one another and have n o access to a “common judge.” Yet the purpose of the idea of the state of nature is not limited to promoting revolutionary violence against tyrannical governments. Indeed, the most noble object of this analytical construct is in providing moral instruction o n the obligations of citizenship. For it is in considering man’s condition in the state of nature that we come to understand the manner in which all men are created equal. I t supplies the means by which we can discern the nature of government and educates us in the difference between power and justice. It allows us to reflect o n the rights we are entitled to as men and our corresponding duties to others. Perhaps, most important, it allows us to recognize man’s unique standing in the great chain of being.

***** The ratification of the Constitution had required a “Herculean” effort. Americans were finally given a constitution consistent with the principles by which they had declared their independence. The new nation had at long last adopted a form of government that allowed it to keep faith with its Revolutionary promise. Ofcourse, the regime was still far from perfect. Indeed, Adams doubted that America would ever progress to a stage where the nation became a perfect reflection of its principles. He acknowledged that in the course of ratifying the Constitution “great and dangerous errors [were] committed. . . . [Tlhis work was imperfect, candor will compel us all to admit, though in specifying its imperfections, the purist minds and most patriotic hearts differ widely from each other in their conclusions.”96Undoubtedly, as so many of Adam’s

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writings and speeches confirm, he considered the toleration of slavery to be the most serious of the Constitution’s “imperfections.” Still, the Declaration provided Americans with what Lincoln would call a “standard maxim,” a goal to be pursued, a guide for the nation. “Human excellence,” wrote Adams, “consists in approximation to perfection: and the only means of approaching to any term, is by endeavoring to obtain the term itself.”97Adams believed that nations, like individuals, must aspire to that which is most noble even if attaining such heights remains beyond their reach. However, it was crucial that the young regime’s imperfections did not become its principles, that its vices would not be looked upon as virtues. This required leadership. Republican principles and a republican form of government will be meaningless to a nation if its leaders and citizens are not committed to a popular form of government. America was founded o n the principles of the Declaration and the Constitution, but this did not guarantee a republican outcome. An additional element-statesmanship-was necessary to complete the American Founding. Every regime looks up to a certain sort of man, a man whose character and leadership embody the principles of the regime. America had such a man. “We may, without superstition or fanaticism,” stated Adams, “believe that a superintending Providence had adapted to the character and principles of this [Constitution], those of the man by whom it was first a d m i n i ~ t e r e d . ”It~is ~ worth noting that Adams once again links divine providence to the American Founding. Yet he is careful to do so in a manner which is neither superstitious nor fanatical. Significantly, “superintending Providence” is tied to America’s Constitution, or Law, and to that statesman who first “administered” it. Laws, however just, are ineffectual if left to themselves. Statesmanship was also required if the promise of the American regime was to manifest itself in practice as well as in speech.

***** After describing the American regime’s constitutional principles, Adams describes the man who embodied those principles. Adams speaks of two qualities “incidental to the character of man.” Both are “developed by his intercourse with his fellow creatures,” and both belong “to the immortal part of his nature.” These qualities are present in the very soul of man, but they also require cultivation, breeding, and education. T h e qualities Adams speaks of are made “of elements apparently so opposed and inconsistent with each other, as to be irreconcilable together.” But if unified they “constitute the highest excellence of the human character.” “They are,” he contends, “the spirit of command, and the spirit of meekness.” A character that could combine these qualities would indeed be rare. In fact, these two properties are

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representative of the profound differences between biblical and philosophical ethics. “They have been exemplified,” according to Adams, “in the purity of ideal perfection, only once in the history of mankind, and that was in the mortal life of the Savior of the world.”99This one instance of perfection provides mankind with a sublime example. The blending of these qualities reached perfection in Christ’s mortal life, but Christ was not a mere mortal and his kingdom was not of this world. So Adams next turns to the founders and lawgivers of worldly kingdoms. Less perfect blendings of these two properties, though rare, are not unknown to history. (‘They had been displayed,” notes Adams “by the preceding legislator of the children of Israel”: “That Shepherd, who first taught the chosen seed In the beginning, how the heavens and earth Rose out of Chaos.”

The legislator of the Israelites is, of course, Moses, that lawgiver from the ancient world, who embodied the conflicting qualities of humility and magnanimity. The Bible calls Moses the most humble man on earth. “Now the man Moses was very meek, above all the men which were upon the face of the earth” (Numbers 12:3). This spirit of meekness was clearly manifested when he “hid his face; for h e was afraid to look upon God” (Exodus 3:6). Yet God rewarded Moses for his humility by making him the leader of all Israel and bestowing on him alone the privilege of beholding His form. Unlike the heroes of pagan Greece and Rome, Moses did not thirst for public distinction and became the savior of his people only after being prodded by God. “Who am I, that I should go to Pharaoh and bring the Israelites out of Egypt” (Exodus 3: 11). But Moses was also a commanding figure who led the Children of Israel out of Egypt and brought them the laws of God. The passage Adams quotes is from Milton’s Paradise Lost, arguably the greatest epic poem written in the English language. It is significant that this quote includes one of Milton’s heresies. Christian orthodoxy teaches that God created all form and matter ex nihilo, and that before creation there was only “void.” Milton, by contrast, claimed that heaven and earth rose out of chaos.la7 God, so understood, merely transforms chaos into cosmos not unlike the Platonic demiurge who shaped the universe out of eternal matter into the likeness of eternal forms. This indicates limitation o n God’s omnipotence, for there are things that exist in the universe uncreated by Him.lol Adams was a careful reader of Platolo2and was familiar with Milton’s understanding of the universe, which he believed to be the apex of unaided human

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reason.’03 Although heresy to most Christians, such an understanding would not be inconsistent with what Leo Strauss described as “pharisaic rabbinical Judaism.”lo4This form of Judaism holds the Law in such esteem that it denies even God the power to change its eternal nature. Although Adams consistently refers to the omnipotence of there are also passages from his letters and diaries that seem to indicate that his understanding of God and God’s Law was similar to that of rabbinic Judaism.’@ We take note of these apparent ambiguities, but caution not to conclude that Adams was simply confused. Indeed, it is entirely possible that he believed it necessary to preserve both the authority of an omnipotent creator and the authority of a n eternal law.”’ The apparent inconsistencies in Adams’s thought bring to mind the contrast between Lincoln’s Lyceum Speech and his Second Inaugural. Lincoln’s Lyceum Speech teaches reverence for the natural-law foundations of the Declaration and Constitution. His Second Inaugural directs the people’s attention to a “living God” who brings to the nation “this terrible war” as a punishment for the sin of slavery.lo8 The primary purpose of Jubilee was to educate public opinion o n the principles informing the Constitution. Having thus been educated, the people are fit to participate in disseminating the wisdom of the law by bringing order and justice to civil society. But Adams, like Lincoln, was also acutely aware that reason could not always be relied upon as the sole guide for his nation. In a section of the country passions had been inflamed, and the people had turned away from the faith of their fathers. As we shall see, Adams believed that rebellion against the natural law would unleash divine retribution upon the nation. Milton’s understanding of the beginnings of the universe also bears a striking similarity t o Adams’s understanding of the beginnings of civil society. For Adams, civil society rises out of the chaos of the state of nature. In order t o protect their rights people form a compact under the laws of nature and nature’s God. This may none the less require the intervention of a godlike man. But such a founder cannot create a just regime ex nihilo, for he, like all men, is constrained by the natural law. Moses, the legislator of the Israelites, was subject t o the same constraints of the law as the lowliest member of his people. Moses manifested what Adams called the spirit of meekness when he piously subjected himself to God’s Law. Yet when that Law was placed in danger, when the morality of his people was challenged, Moses showed a spirit of command consistent with any ancient hero. He became as it were the instrument of the God of battles, the defender of his people. Combining the spirit of command with the spirit of meekness, however imperfectly, set Moses apart from all other ancient lawgivers.

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In certain respects, Israel did not differ from any other nation of the ancient world. The God of Israel did many of the same things as the gods of other ancient cities. He gave Israel their laws and acted as their defender. Israel was not unique in identifying piety with lawfulness and lawfulness with justice.lo9However, the Israelites alone were monotheists. Unlike the gods of other ancient cities, the God of Israel could not be defeated even when the Israelites were defeated. “The Assyrian, Babylonian, and Egyptian empires, Tyre and Sidon, Carthage, and all other nations of antiquity,” writes Adams, “rose and fell in their religious institutions at the same time as in their laws The God of Israel was indeed the God of battles, but unand like the gods of other nations, He was far more besides. Put differently, He was not only the God of might but also the God of right or justice. Though the Mosaic law was given to Israel as a particular people, it was also, at its core, unchanging and eternal;”’ its authority was not dependent on whether or not Israel was victorious in battle. Indeed, the Jews’ commitment to their laws only seemed to intensify when their nation suffered defeat. The justice of the Law transcended Israel itself, for its wisdom could be discerned by Gentiles. The Law “is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations, which shall hear all these statutes, and say, ‘Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people’. . . what other nation is so great, as to have such righteous decrees and laws as this body of laws” (Deuteronomy 4:6, 8). So righteous is the Law that it has, as noted, sometimes been interpreted as placing certain limits o n the omnipotence of God. God cannot change Himself because he is inherently just; His Law cannot be changed because it also is inherently just. The character of God is righteousness and truth, and such is the nature of His Law. “Thy righteousness is an everlasting righteousness, and thy law is the truth . . . all thy commandments are righteousness” (Psalm 119:142, 172). God, so understood, is essentially identical with the Law. The inherent justice of God and God’s Law led to the belief that obedience was its own reward. This in turn led to a spirit of meekness that was missing in the ancient world. Saint Augustine said of the Romans, “they did not love glory for the sake of justice, but seemed rather to have loved justice for the sake of glory.”’12Justice, so understood, was typical of the ancient world but, as we have demonstrated, was inconsistent with Jewish piety. The unique character of Jewish morality is recounted in the works of Flavius Josephus. In “Antiquities of the Jews” he describes Herod’s very Roman ambition for glory. But Herod was always at odds with his subjects because Jewish custom and law could not grant him the honor he so badly wanted. For “the Jewish nation is by their law a stranger to all such things, and accustomed to prefer righteousness to glory.”l l 3

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***** Adam goes on to compare Moses to the heroes of the great ancient poets. There were no figures similar to Moses among the ancient Greeks. Homer was the “unrivaled delineator of human character in the heroic ages.”“4 Homer’s heroes possessed a spirit of command whose majesty was unsurpassed in the annals of all the countless rivals who sought to equal the renown of “blind Maeonides.” Achilles, for example, is unabashedly ambitious for glory, and in this respect his contrast with Moses could not be greater. Achilles is not an impious man, he obeyed his gods, but his motives are easily discerned by his words “honor the gods’ will, they may honor ours.’’115It was Achilles’ will to cover his name in glory, even if in order to do so he must suffer an early death. His concern for the gods was prompted by the knowledge that the success or failure of his endeavors might depend o n their will. “In Homer, the will of a great man is his law. He does not so much do things because they are right. Rather . . . they are right because he does them.”’16 In this way the heroes of Greece imitated the actions of their gods. Piety was often rewarded, but piety was not its own reward. Indeed, the Greek gods were apparently unconcerned by the motives behind acts of piety. Prior to Socrates. Greek piety had no real relationship to justice. In Plato’s Republic, Glaucon and Adeimantus describe the traditional Greek view that divine favor could be bought by sacrifices and other acts of piety. King Menelaus observed that the “gods are always keen to see their rules obeyed.”l17 But the gods themselves lived without rules and were free to do whatever they wished. Justice, then, for the Greeks consisted first of all in doing what custom alone had established as being suitable for a particular station in life. . . . The gods, however, being the highest class, are also the most free. The slave does not dictate to his lord, nor a mortal to a god. . . . Hence Dike for us is what the gods will. It is right because they will it, not vice versa.”‘

And the will of the gods was often arbitrary and capricious. As Telemachus woefully laments, “He [Zeus] deals to each and every laborer o n this earth whatever doom he pleases.”119Another astute commentator, whose political reflections were markedly different from those of Adams, referred to Homer this way: “Always shalt thou be the foremost and prominent above others: no one shall thy jealous soul love except a friend that Made the soul of the Greek thrill: thereby went he his way to greatness.”1z0But Adams knew it was not possible for Americans to emulate the greatness of the Greeks. For despite his undeniable genius, Homer had been unable to conceive of a hero who combined both the spirit of command and the spirit of meekness.

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Virgil comes closer. “[A]feeble exemplification of them is shadowed forth in the inconsistent composition of the pious Aeneas.” We remember that Adams began his discourse by quoting from Virgil‘s Aeneid, and the pious Aeneas was contrasted with George Washington. We now learn that Aeneasthe founder of Rome-had only a “feeble exemplification” of the qualities possessed by the great founders of the Bible. The heroes of pagan Rome without question lacked the spirit of meekness characteristic of biblical ethics. The Romans were worldly men who pursued glory in this life “by which they wished even after death to live in the mouths of their admirers.”’2’ Roman virtue rested upon a foundation of personal honor that ultimately depended o n public opinion rather than divine or natural law. “Glory they most ardently loved: for it they wished to live, for it they did not hesitate to die. Every other desire was repressed by the strength of their passion for that one thing.”’*?Roman gods could contribute to one’s political success or failure but they did not burden men with transcendent moral sanctions. Adams’s reflections on Virgil’s contemporary and fellow poet, Horace, emphasize this point. “A remarkable difference between [Horace’s]Odes to the Gods,” writes Adams, “and the Psalms of David is, that his devotion never dwells upon any moral attribute in his deities.”lZ3Rather, the role of the gods was to inspire men to acts of glory. While there are many examples of Romans who willingly sacrificed themselves, or their loved ones, to the gods, such acts were always motivated by the desire to bring honor to one’s name.’24The competition for honor eventuated in the greatest of all Romans, Julius Caesar, capturing all honor for himself. Julius Caesar destroyed the Republic and with it republican honor. In the coming centuries Rome would continue to be ruled in his name, under the authority of the Caesars. Julius Caesar had paved the way for a Rome ruled by administrators rather than warriors, for an empire that sought the blessings of peace rather than the glories of conquest.’25 Significantly, Virgil wrote the Aeneid after the transformation of Rome under the first of the administrative Caesars, Augustus. It was the unquestionable purpose of the Aeneid to praise Augustus and his project of bringing peace to the Mediterranean world.Iz6It has long been argued that the Roman Empire made Christianity possible,’27and more narrowly, it is sometimes argued that the Roman Empire was the result of Augustus’s policy and Virgil’s poetry.’28Virgil, so understood, was instrumental to the advent of Christianity, and he has enjoyed a n exalted reputation in the Christian world. In the Middle Ages many considered Virgil a divinely inspired pre-Christian Christian. It is not by chance that Virgil is Dante’s guide and mentor in hell and purgatory.

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The two main bases for Virgil’s influence in the Christian Middle Ages were the fourth Eclogue, believed to be a prophecy of the birth of Christ, and the near Christian principles expressed in the Aeneid, especially in its hero, a man devoted to his divine mission. In the pious Aeneas, there were many who saw a synthesis of the ancient and the Christian worlds. Aeneas does not seek Italy by his own will: “Did the Fates but suffer me to shape my life after my own pleasure and order my sorrows at my own will, my first care, would be the city of Troy and the sweet relics of my kin.” “In all pre Christian literature,” Theodore Haecker states, “there are no more Christian lines than these.””O The pious Aeneas humbly subdues the passion for his homeland, submits his will to the gods, and travels to Italy, a land unknown to him. His wanderings are inspired by a divine mission to found a new city.131The wanderings of Odysseus, by contrast, were inspired by the desire to return to the city of his birth. Indeed, in order to return to his beloved Ithaca, Odysseus did not hesitate to reject a life of eternal youth and immortality on the luxurious island of the beautiful and voluptuous Calypso. In doing so, he turned his back on what many later men would have called heaven.13* When Adams refers to the “pious” Aeneas, he follows Virgil, who gave Aeneas this epithet. Homer also provided his heroes with recurrent epithets. Achilles was “swift of foot,” Hector, “horse-taming,” and Odysseus, “many wiled.” The difference between Aeneas and Homer’s heroes is that they were given epithets to describe their physical and intellectual achievements, while he was characterized by a moral q ~ a 1 i t y . lOne ~ ~ other contrast between Homer and Virgil might be noted. While Virgil used Homer’s gods, he significantly changed the divine character of those gods. In Homer, the immortal Olympian gods live lives that starkly contrast the tragic existence of mortal men who must suffer, struggle, and die on earth. Homer’s gods are amusing, even comic, figures who wrangle, lust, and scheme among themselves unhampered by the concerns of mortal life. The Olympian deities can laugh in the assurance that they will live happily ever after, not withstanding the fate of their favorite m0rta1s.l~~ This comic component of the gods is missing in Virgil. More often than not, Virgil’s gods are simply vindictive, cruel, and deceitful, though Aeneas does not see them this way. Like mortals, they are forced to endure sorrows. But more important, like Aeneas, the gods themselves are forced to change their ways. We think especially of the change which takes place in the goddess Juno in book 12 of the Aeneid. We might conclude, therefore, that the gods of Virgil come closer to the biblical God than do the gods of Homer. The God of the Old Testament is

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hardly a comic figure and has often been characterized as vengeful. Jesus, of course, was forced t o endure great suffering, and while it was recorded that he wept, the Bible provides n o account of him laughing. Likewise, Aeneas comes closer to a biblical figure than either Achilles or Odysseus. Yet little scrutiny is required to discern that the similarities between Aeneas and his gods and Moses and his God are superficial, their differences profound. Consequently, Adams is not satisfied with Aeneas. The composition of this hero is too “inconsistent.” The blending of those qualities most admired by Adams is discernible in some biblical figures, but the pious Aeneas bears only a shadowy resemblance to the heroes of the Bible. The works of Virgil differ markedly from those of the Greek poets and share some things in common with Christianity. Yet Virgil was a pagan poet, an imitator of Homer whose moral understanding was shaped by pagan antiquity rather than biblical ethics. Aeneas differed from Achilles and Odysseus but his differences with Moses were more profound. It is true that like Moses, Aeneas led a chosen people, o n a divine mission, to a promised land. But Aeneas was given his divine mission while he dwelt in a city; Moses, while he tended sheep in the desert. Aeneas at first resisted his divine commission because he wished to die an honorable death in defense of his As has already been noted, Moses was reluctant to accept God’s mission, because he lacked confidence in his ability to lead his people. These seemingly superficial differences underlay the profound differences in the character and piety of these two men. T h e piety of Moses rested on the revealed wisdom of the O n e God. Obedience to God’s transcendent moral law required that Moses be both humble and magnanimous. Virgil never clearly defined what he meant by “piety,” but its meaning was delineated by Cicero a generation earlier. Roman piety was to fulfill one’s duty to his gods, family, and ~ 0 u n t r y . If, l ~ as ~ is likely, Virgil shared similar sentiments, then the piety of Aeneas might most accurately be described as a duty to tradition rather than a duty to the law. “To respect tradition was, in Virgilian terms, to show p i e t a ~ . ’ ” ~Of ~ course, such piety would require obedience to the laws of one’s people but the justice of these laws rested o n nothing more than the fact that they were “old” and “one’s own.” The preservation of any regime requires that its citizens maintain a proper respect for its founding principles, and this requires an attachment t o the conventions of their ancestors. Adams approved of such sentiments. T h e purpose of Jubilee was after all to pay homage to America’s great ancestral founder. Elsewhere h e declared “veneration for our forefathers” and “love for our posterity” as “honorable to the human character.”138 But, as noted, a truly pious Jew does not stand

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by his faith simply because it is the long-lived religion of his forefathers. T h e pious Jew believes that the laws of Israel are a reflection of, or perhaps identical to, God’s absolute moral character. As such, these laws are rational, and obedience t o them is justice. Likewise, the patriotic American does not stand by the Constitution because it is old; h e stands by it because it is consistent with the eternal principles of justice. As has been noted, Roman tradition was informed by little more than the pursuit of glory. T h e duty to one’s gods, family, and country was to perform heroic deeds on their behalf. This indeed was the ultimate purpose of Aeneas’s divine mission. Aeneas is overcome by erotic desire for Dido, but h e quickly suppresses his private passions at the prompting of the god Mercury: “If such glory, such destiny does not move you, if you will not shoulder this burden for your own fame’s sake, have regard at least for Ascanius as h e rises hopefully to his i n h e r i t a n ~ e . ”Aeneas ~ ~ ~ must leave Dido in Carthage because it is his duty to bring glory to himself and his posterity by founding Rome. Virgil demonstrates that the pursuit of glory may require great sacrifices. Indeed, he makes clear that Aeneas’s descendents will endure even greater sacrifices for the sake of glory. Among those Romans who would come after Aeneas was Lucius Junius Brutus, who condemned his own sons to death when they joined in a conspiracy against the Republic: About these deeds in after times-that victory Is love’s-a patriot’s love and a measureless passion For acclamation.Iw

Perhaps it is the words of Jupiter, the father of the gods, which most clearly exposes the particular character of Aeneas’s divine mission: For every man is ordained His appointed day; for every man the sum Of his days is short and none can have them again. But to prolong your fame by mighty deedsThat is the task a true man takes

It is true that there is in Virgil’s “inconsistent composition” what would appear t o be a n attempt at directing Roman honor to some greater end. Virgil seems t o argue that the pursuit of glory will eventuate in Rome bestowing the great gift of world peace o n humanity, a new golden age of Kronos. Such a vision of Rome was presented to Aeneas while he journeyed through hell:

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But yours, my Roman, is the gift of government, That is your bent-to impose upon the nations The code of peace; to be clement to the conquered, But utterly to crush the intransigent! 14’

But this vision of Rome’s future is given to Aeneas just before he leaves the underworld. There are two gates Aeneas may pass through; one is made of horn, “And spirits of Truth find easy exit there.” The other gate is made of glistening ivory, “But from it the Shades send false dreams up to the ~ o r l d . ” ~Aeneas 4~ leaves through the latter. Is the pious Aeneas led on by divine truth or false dreams? This passage would, at the very least, seem to indicate that Virgil was not duped by the promise of a new golden age of peace under the aegis of Caesar Augustus and his successors. “[Plrophet that he was, he foresaw the future pax romana, the future Roman peace, more often than not, immersed in a sea of corruption of monstrous crimes and dismal anarchy.”’44 I t was the false dream, of false gods, which foresaw the iron age of Roman glory, giving way to a golden age of Roman peace. Saint Augustine noted that with the fall of the Roman Republic, the desire for glory gave way to a desire for domination. Seekers of glory craved public acclaim and thus feared to displease the judges of their conduct. But those who seek domination desire only power and openly commit the most grievous crimes to achieve their ends. “It was Nero Caesar,” Augustine writes, “who was the first to reach the summit, and, as it were, the citadel, of this vice; for so great was his luxuriousness, that one would have thought there was nothing manly to be dreaded in him, and such his cruelty, that, had not the contrary been known, no one would have thought there was anything effeminate in his character.”145T h e corrupt rule of tyrants was, more often than not, the true legacy of the “new” Roman age. We may surmise, therefore, that Virgil’s praise of Augustus’s Rome is somewhat disingenuous. The piety of Aeneas is, at any rate, rooted in the traditional understanding of Roman honor, and the pursuit of such honor was no longer possible in Virgil’s Rome. Perhaps Virgil understood that the post-Christian world would place new requirements on political men. One of the great lessons of republican Rome, clearly demonstrated in Shakespeare’s Roman plays, is that honor is too easily divorced from the city, thereby becoming exclusively selfish. When honor ceases to be moderated by love of country, it issues in civil war. The radical individualism of the postChristian world makes a resort to honor as the basis of republican government even more problematic. A nation devoted to the spirit of command, unchecked by a corresponding spirit of meekness before the moral law, will, as a matter of course, fall victim to “the family of the lion, or the tribe of the eagle.”146

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In Adams’s day republican Rome was held up as a model for all free peoples. We have already observed the extent to which Americans sought to emulate the example set by Rome. Roman honor has its basis in human praise, and consequently there is much that is praiseworthy in Roinan honor. Roman piety had its basis in respect for tradition, in honoring duties assigned by their fathers and in paying homage to the forms and corresponding formal requirements of one’s regime. Adams’s discourse celebrates the honorable actions of George Washington. Adams reminds Americans of the duties assigned them by the father of their nation and encourages them to respect the unique form of the American regime. But the Roman model was incomplete. Adarns was adamant that American patriotism must rest on an attachment to the Law rather than tradition. Indeed, this was behind his distinction between the British Constitution and the American Constitution. He hoped that with the passing of time Americans would form an ever-greater reverence for the Constitution. However, for A d a m the authority of the Constitution was not based on the fact that it was given to Americans by their forefathers. This after all could have been said of the Articles of Confederation. The authority of the Constitution ultimately rested on the fact that it had been formed in accordance with the eternal principles of justice. America must be grounded on an attachment to that which is just, the laws of nature and nature’s God, rather than by a simple reverence for that which is old. The realization of this vision for America required leadership of the highest sort, leadership that combined the spirit of command with the spirit of meekness. The history of Rome provided no examples of a statesman who combined such qualities. The spirit of command was considered a virtue by the poets, lawgivers, and philosophers of pagan antiquity. By contrast, the spirit of meekness was considered ~ h i 1 d i s h . lFortunately ~~ for America, a hero combining these qualities stepped forward during the dark hours of the revolution: [Hlistory ancient or modem, had never exhibited in the real life of man, an example in which those two properties were so happily blended together, as they were in the person of George Washington. These properties belong rather to the moral than the intellectual nature of man. They are not unfrequently found in minds little cultivated by science, but they require for the exercise of that mutual control which guards them from degenerating into arrogance or weakness, the guidance of a sound judgment, and the regulation of a profound sense of responsibility to a higher Power.’48

A union of the spirit of command and the spirit of meekness produced in Washington a rare form of virtue which, according to Adams, constitutes “the highest excellence of the human character.” Little need be said of Wash-

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ington’s ability to command. His feats o n the field of battle made him perhaps the only man who could unite all Americans behind the new and still precarious Union. However, Washington’s unquestionable ability to command was tempered by a sense of moral obligation that constituted the basis ~ ~ peculiar qualities he possessed were, acof his republican h ~ m i 1 i t y . lThe cording to Adams, linked to moral rather than intellectual virtues, and one need not be schooled in science to possess them. But a predisposition to virtue will not by itself lead to virtue. One must exercise self-control lest, rather than blending these properties into virtue, they degenerate into the extremes of arrogance or weakness. An excess of pride, even when it is justified, will not be tolerated by the people of a republic. Shakespeare’s Coriohnus demonstrated that this was true even of the ancient republic, with its community-based morality. In modem republics based on individual rights, the need for humility is necessary to prevent a regime from degenerating into anarchy or embracing something like the twentieth-century ideologies of Marxism or National Socialism. Yet an excess of humility can make men slavish and unfit for freedom. It was thus crucial for Adams to demonstrate that the virtue possessed by America’s founder was a mean between two potentially dangerous extremes. I t also bears repeating that the sort of virtue Adams so admired in Washington appeared to require a blending of biblical and classical ethics. So it should not be surprising that the statesman hoping to find a mean between extremes must seek the guidance of both reason and revelation. He must rely on “sound judgment,” what Aristotle would call practical wisdom or prudence. But reason alone is not a sufficient guide for the statesman and, by implication, for the people of a republic. Adams contends that “the regulation of a profound sense of responsibility to a higher power” is also required. Piety is also necessary for the statesman as was anticipated in Adams’s guarded praise of Aeneas. In this Adams differs from Aristotle, whom he elsewhere called “perhaps . . . the acutist intellect that ever appeared in the form of man. 150 But what is the “higher power” of which Adams speaks? Clearly, he does not believe all forms of piety to be acceptable. Adams’s brief critique of Homer and Virgil demonstrates that the revelation that must guide America’s statesmen could not be the product of pagan poets. By the end of the discourse he clarifies beyond any doubt what sort of piety he believes is required of Americans. But for the moment it is necessary to be reminded that the bonds of American union had been formed in the idea of religious liberty. “Religious liberty for ourselves, religious salvation for the opinions of others,” were the only religious doctrines Adams judged “essential to all, and ~~ was the only creed which I earnestly hope may become ~ n i v e r s a l . ” ’America ))

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not a sectarian theocracy. The principle of religious liberty encompassed and promoted moral law independently of any particular dogmas of revealed religion.15*Americans were not required to go beyond the law and beyond morality and declare their allegiance to a particular sectarian conception of God. “The only Importance of religion to my mind,” declared Adams, “consists in its influence upon conduct; and upon the conduct of mankind the question of Trinity or Unity, or of the single or double personal nature of Christ, has or ought to have no bearing whatsoever.”153 As Jeffersondeclared, the people “are inherently independent of all but moral law.”’54Jefferson’s words remind us that despite their religious liberty Americans are not independent of the moral law. It must also be noted that belief in the moral law cannot be separated from a belief in God. Adams explicitly declares that the law of nature “of course presupposes the existence of a God, the moral ruler of the universe, and a rule of right and wrong, of just and unjust, binding upon man, preceding all institutions of human society and of go~ernrnent.”’~~ The American regime was founded upon both reason and faith. Adams expressed these sentiments in Jubilee. The Constitution had provided that all the public functionaries of the Union, not only of the general but of all the state governments, should be under oath or affirmation for its support. The homage of religious faith was thus superadded to all the obligations of temporal law, to give it strength; and this confirmation of an appeal to the responsibilities of a future omnipotent judge, was in exact conformity with the whole tenor of the Declaration of Independence-guarded against abusive extension by a further provision, that no religious test should ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.’56

The principles of the Declaration removed theological differences from the political arena, but they did not remove religious faith. A belief in God was an inseparable part of the natural-law doctrine of the Declaration and Constitution. We might also note Adams’s praise of Moses and his use of the words “regulation” and “responsibility”when referring to Washington’s character. The word “regulation” implies that a statesman’s “sound judgment” must be exercised within certain constraints prescribed by a “higher power.” One is regulated by rules or, more to the point, by laws. The sort of piety that is required of Adams’s best statesman is a legalistic piety that requires the gentleman to be regulated by, and feel a responsibility to, a higher law. A statesman’s practical wisdom must be subordinated to the moral law, which, as we have seen, does allow one to act as necessity dictates.

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As the discourse progresses, Adams continues to remind his readers in almost mantra-like fashion that the Articles of Confederation represented a break with the principles of the Declaration. It was only with the ratification of the Constitution that America could once again pursue “those ends, which it is the object of government to promote.”157Moreover, Adams takes the opportunity to address a long-standing criticism of the American Founding. The Articles of Confederation, America’s first constitution, required the unanimous consent of all thirteen states for amendment. Some AntiFederalist opponents of the Constitution argued that its ratification was unlawful because it required the concurrence of majorities in only nine of thirteen states. Modem historians have made similar arguments. They contend that the American Founders had no authority to scrap the Articles of Cone federation in favor of a new constitution. The Articles were disregarded rather than amended. Consequently, some historians have seen in the ratification process a new revolution, a coup d’etat worthy of Nap01eon.l~~ But Adams points out that such an understanding fails to consider the principles upon which the American Revolution was fought. Americans could and did dissolve the Articles of Confederation on precisely the same authority that they dissolved their bonds with Great Britain: The confederation failed to answer the purposes for which governments are instituted among men. . . . The people, therefore-who had made it their own only by their acquiescence-acting under their responsibility to the Supreme Ruler of the universe, absolved themselves from the bonds of the old confederation, and bound themselves by the new and closer ties of the Constitution. In performing that act, they had felt the duty of obtaining the co-operation to it, of a majority of the whole people, by requiring the concurrence of majorities in nine of the thirteen states, and they had neither prepared nor proposed any measure of compulsion, to draw the people of any of the possible dissenting states into the new parmership, against their will. They passed upon the old confederation the same sentence, which they had pronounced in dissolving their connection with the British nation, and they pledged their faith to each other anew, to far closer and more intimate connection. I t is admitted, it was admitted then, that the people of Rhode Island, and of North Carolina were free to reject the new Constitution; but not that they could justly claim the continuance of the old Confederation. The law of political necessity, expounded by the judgment of the sovereign constituent people, responsible only to God, had abolished that. The people of Rhode Island, and of North Carolina, might dissent from the more perfect union, but they must acquiesce in the necessity of the ~ e p a r a t i 0 n . l ~ ~

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The people were free to dissolve their bonds of union under the Articles of Confederation because such a union did not rest on the eternal principles of justice. In scrapping the Articles, the Founders did not precipitate a break with the old revolution. Indeed, it was only by abolishing the Articles that America could form a government consistent with the principles of that revolution. According to Adams, the relationship between the American states under the Articles was, in principle, no different from the relationship between those states and Great Britain. Consequently, the states were free to dissolve their relationship with each other at any time. However, the new Constitution rested on the principles of the Declaration, and no state could justifiably claim a right to break away from a union so constituted.

***** Most of the remainder of Adams’s discourse is devoted to describing some of the specific accomplishments of the Washington presidency. It fell on Washington, as first president, to resolve the parameters of executive power not explicitly accounted for in the Constitution. Adams thus revisits the most conspicuous political controversies of Washington’s presidency. In particular, he defends Washington’s proclamation of neutrality and does not fail to take the opportunity to criticize some of his father’s old rivals, including Alexander Hamilton and especially Thomas Jefferson.160 His criticism of the latter, in particular, centered on the Virginian’s partisan defense of France, which, during Washington’s presidency, moved from “an arbitrary monarchy to a portentious [sic] and short-lived nominal democracy.”161This criticism of Jefferson led Adam to reflect on the different character of the French and American revolutions. Previously we noted a partial application of the Roman model in America. But Adams began his discourse by drawing our attention to the profound differences between America and Rome. In France, the imitation of Rome was taken far more seriously. Rousseau had called Rome “the model of all free peoples,”162and in France it was not enough to emulate Rome through the creation of republican institutions, ancient in name, but modem in their functions. French republicans also made an earnest attempt to instill the regime’s citizens with a sense of virtue worthy of the ancient Romans. This perverted endeavor was doomed to failure. Returning to ancient Rome by way of modern philosophy resulted in a new and particularly hideous form of tyranny. The French cult of Rome preceded Rousseau and goes back at least as far as the 1630s when the French playwright, Pierre Corneille, began teaching the French aristocracy to compare itself to the virtuous, modest, and patri-

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otic heroes and heroines of ancient Rome. Louis XIV fashioned himself after a Roman emperor, bringing a new sense of grandeur to France. However, it was not the grandeur of the worldwide empire of the Caesars, but the small and virtuous city of the early republic which was championed in the political writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the inspirational art of Jacques Louis David and his disciples. It was this model of Rome, characterized by the devotion to republican honor, which inspired Marat, Robespierre, and the French Jacobins to carry out the gruesome atrocities of the Revolution.’63 The sponsors of the reign of terror persuaded themselves that their severe measures were carried out in the spirit of republican Rome. The history of Rome also provided the inspiration for Napoleon bnaparte, who dissolved the revolutionary government and took power for himself in 1799. He initially ruled under the title of “consul.” By 1804 he had orchestrated his own crowning under the title of emperor of the French. Napoleon continued to stress Roman imagery, arguing that like Augustus he was emperor by popular will and acclamation, and also like Augustus had not actually ended the Republic but rather continued it in the only way p0ssib1e.l~~ Of course, the first French Republic differed immensely from republican Rome. The ancient city had been replaced by the modem state. The attempt to insist on the priority of the state (as the representative of the general will) to the individual resulted in tyranny. The Jacobins sought to preserve the classical understanding of Roman virtue on the basis of modem rationalism. In doing so, French republicans founded a regime hostile to both classical rationalism and biblical religion. In America republican virtue rested o n the Declaration of Independence, which supplied a moral foundation consistent with both Athens and Jerusalem. “A phantom of more than gigantic form had assumed the mask and garb of treedom,” said A d a m of republican France, “and substituted for the Declaration of Independence, anarchy within and conquest In France the basis for moral choice was supplied by modem philosophy, which believed itself to have transcended the difference between reason and revelation and in fact transformed philosophy into wisdom. One branch of the Jacobins,’66 following the legacy of certain enlightenment radicals,’67espoused “the atheism of the strumpet goddess of reason.” However, Robespierre, a disciple of Rousseau, disliked the cult of reason and on his behalf the National Convention acknowledged “in the name of the people of France . . . the existence of a God! A worm of the dust, recognizing as a co-ordinate power-the Creator of all worlds.”168But the acknowledgment of this deistic supreme being precipitated the beginning of a counterrevolution. “A constitutional republic, with a legislature and two branches, and a plural executive, had succeeded to the despotism of a single assembly,

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with a Jacobin club executive. France had now a five-headed executive Directory, and a new union of church and state, with a new theo-philanthropic religion.”169But there were other elements stirring in the mix. A young soldier with limitless ambition was positioning himself to seize power. Napoleon Bonaparte “expelled the two legislative councils from their halls, had turned out the theo-philanthropic Directory from their palace; and under the very republican name of the first of three consuls, was marching with fixed eye and steady step to the consulate for life, to the hereditary imperial throne, and to the kingdom of the iron crown.”17oNapoleon was a product of the French Rev~lution,’~’ and Adams points out that his ascension to the imperial throne had been sanctioned “by the election of the whole people of France.”’72 It cannot be doubted that Adams meant his audience to contemplate the very different characters of Napoleon and Washington. Napoleon was the French counterpart to George Washington, a man of genius who rose out of his country’s revolutionary wars, reflecting in his political leadership the true principles of the revolution. This was certainly how Napoleon portrayed himself. W h e n referring to the French Empire which had replaced the French Republic, he contended, “it was the same thing, only the name was changed.”173He was also candid about the source of authority in his regime: “It was necessary that [authority] should rest entirely upon fact, that is, upon force.”174As such, Napoleon’s empire simply made a n adjustment to the principles of the revolution. For what is Rousseau’s general will but a n attempt to reduce right to might? “The freedom of France,” stated Adams, “was not of the genuine breed.”17j T h e general will with its basis in human “freedom” sought to destroy any possibility of an appeal to a “higher law” based o n the transcendent principles of justice. The general will was good because it was rational and rational because it was general. “Rousseau’s concept of the general will which as such cannot err-which by merely being is what i t ought to be-showed how the gulf between the is and the ought can be overcome.”’76 It comes as no surprise that through his use of the plebiscite Napoleon claimed to embody the general will. A perceptive French novelist created his most famous character, Julien Sorel, as a young man who above all else desired to emulate his hero, Napoleon. While studying for the priesthood he learned the Latin Bible by heart, but his real Bible consisted of three very modern works: Rousseau’s Confessions was the only book through which his imagination pictured the world. The collection of Grande Armee reports and the Memoirs of Saint Helena completed his Bible. He would have died for those three books. He never believed in any others.’”

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Stendhal apparently perceived a connection between the radical freedom espoused by Rousseau and the modern despotism of Napoleon. As a young diplomat Adams spent many years in Europe at the height of Napoleon’s power. Consequently, he studied the Corsican’s meteoric rise and fall with great interest.178Always sober about the excesses of the Jacobins, Adams at first regarded Napoleon as a blessing to France, although his praise of him was always somewhat guarded: The Corsican ruffian is beyond all doubt a hero in the common acceptation of the word, and I suppose in other respects as good a man as the rest of his class. If you look at the twenty-first book of Livy at the fourth chapter, you will find the character of an ancient hero, and one of the greatest that ever lived. Buonaparte’s military excellence is in all probability equal to his, and the remainder of his character is perhaps not so bad.’79 But Adams eventually came to regard Napoleon less favorably, noting with alarm that the success of Napoleon represented a grave threat to republican government everywhere. 180 T h e ancient hero from Livy to whom Adams had initially compared Napoleon was Hannibal. This early comparison is reflected in Adams’s final appraisal of the Corsican eagle. For although Hannibal was a military genius of astounding ability, there was little else in his character-besides perhaps his legendary crueltylsl-that was worthy of posterity’s praise. Adams always contended that there was a little more than this to Napoleon, but alas, only a little. On June 22, 1826, as Adams’s presidency was coming to an end, he listened to a sermon at a Unitarian church in Washington comparing “the characters and historical fortunes of Bonaparte and of Washington.” After the sermon Adams offered his own judgment o n Napoleon: “Bonaparte was a man of great genius for military ,combinations and operations, whose head was turned by success, who had magnificent imaginations and some generous purposes, but was under no control of moral princip1e.”l8*Unlike Washington, Napoleon’s ambition was unrestrained by moral principle. Hence, Napoleon changed from a Corsican nationalist to a defender of French imperialism, from the patron of the Republic to the absolute emperor of France. Adams had referred to Napoleon, undoubtedly with a certain degree of irony, as “the Hero of the present age.”183 But he was convinced that Napoleon or any man like him would never be a hero for Americans. Indeed, Adams often used Napoleon as a symbol of despotism in order to provide a direct contrast to the principles of justice embodied in the Declaration. “Napoleon Bonaparte invested his brows with the iron crown of Lombardy,”

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he stated, “and declared himself King of Italy. The Declaration of Independence was the crown with which the people of United America, rising in gigantic stature as one man, encircled their brows, and there it remains; there, so long as this globe shall be inhabited by human beings, may it remain, a crown of imperishable glory!”184 Napoleon truly was the hero of his age. His successes helped bring about profound changes in European politics, philosophy, literature, and art. The combination of Rousseau’s philosophy and Napoleon’s victories ushered in a new modern age in Europe. Indeed, it was argued by one of Rousseau’s German disciples that Napoleon was “the World Spirit on horseback” who brought about the end of history.185Later moderns saw Napoleon as the ideal man able to mold the world around him in accordance to his will, a “synthesis of the inhuman and the superhuman.”ls6 It is worth remembering that this new era of modernity was brought in by an attempted return to antiquity. While striving to re-create ancient Rome, French revolutionaries precipitated modernity’s radical break with classical reason. Adams believed that the principles of the Declaration would insulate Americans from the perversions of European politics. America was a modern regime; her founders did not try to replicate the ancient city on the western shores of the Atlantic. But through the Declaration, America preserved a connection to the classical world. Let us return again to the beginning of this discourse and the celestial armor adorning the founder of the new republic. Among Washington’s armor was “a corslet and cuishes of long experience and habitual intercourse in peace and war with the world of mankind, his contemporaries of the human race, in all their stages of civilization.” America was a new and novel experiment but, as this passage suggests, it was also part of a civilization far older than itself. The American Founders were not breaking away from those principles at the core of western civilization. They were, to the contrary, reapplying those principles in new and radically altered circumstances. America, in contrast to France, was founded on a moral order supported by both classical reason and biblical revelation. Of course, the American regime was also an entirely new experiment and owed much to the writings of Locke, as Adams aptly pointed But Locke, as he was read by Adams, had not effected a radical break with biblical and classical ethics. Adams believed in the “genuine doctrines of Christianity in their application to the pursuit of happiness.” At the same time he championed “Socratic and Ciceronian moral philosophy as the most exalted system of human conduct ever presented to the world.” Adams believed a synthesis of

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biblical and classical ethics was broadly compatible with the Lockean precepts informing the Founders’ faith in a constitution grounded in principles of “higher law”: Its tenants were beyond the ordinary level of human infirmity; and so are those of Christianity. It made the essence of virtue to consist of self-subjugation; and so does Christianity. It gave out a theory of perfection to the aim of man, and made the endeavor to attain it duty; so does Christianity. The perfect example . . . was not given, as by Christ; not even Socrates. Yet he, and Cicero . . . did attain an eminence of practical virtue.’88

T h e American Founders were part of the first wave of modernity which had preserved this link to classical thought through the authority of reaT h e Founders in general and Adams in particular did not believe they had precipitated a radical break with classical political philosophy. Adams, for his part, was hostile t o the modem philosophy of his day, particularly as it was disseminated by the German disciples of Rousseau who believed that they had transcended the difference between revelation and reason. T h e defenders of these new doctrines had a n equal disdain for both the Bible and the classics. A year after Adams delivered his address, h e encountered a Princeton professor whom h e referred t o in his diary as “Mr. Jager.” In the course of their conversation, which “lasted upwards of an hour,” Professor Jager “expressed the opinion that too much time was devoted in colleges and universities to the study of Greek and Latin.” Both Jager and Adams had spent time in St. Petersburg, Russia, and their conversation turned t o their mutual friends and acquaintances from many years before. Jager proceeded to speak “rather slightingly” of Emperor Alexander, a man Adams had respected,lg0 “as infected with bigotry from excessive reverence for the Bible.” T h e conversation led Adams to “surmise that Mr. Jager was a free-thinker of the German school,” whose “negative quantity of reverence for the Bible” was matched with the superfluity h e saw in others. Adams went o n to note quite perceptively: “I have invariably found that a light estimate of the study of Greek and Latin and an irreverent estimate of the Bible are inseparable companions.” Adams had seen this trait in other university professors but that “Professor Jager should have got squeezed into the super-orthodox College at Princeton gives me p a ~ s e . ” ’ ~ Today, ’ it might give one pause to consider just how “orthodox” a man like Professor Jager would seem in a contemporary American university.

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***** Adams closes his discourse by restating its purpose. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Jubilee is rarely read today and no summary can easily capture the essence of Adams’s conclusion. For this reason I have chosen to quote the final pages of the discourse at length:

It has been my purpose, Fellow-Citizens, in this discourse to show: That this Union was formed by a spontaneous movement of the people of thirteen English Colonies; all subjects of the King of Great Britain-bound to him in allegiance, and to the British empire as their country. That the first object of this Union, was united resistance against oppression, and to obtain from the government of their country redress of their wrongs. That failing in this object, their petitions having been spumed, and the OFpressions of which they complained, aggravated beyond endurance, their Delq their authority, issued the Declaration of egates in Congress, in their name and L Independence-proclaiming them to the world as one people, absolving them from their ties and oaths of allegiance to their king and country-renouncing that country; declaring the UNITED Colonies, Independent States, and announcing that this ONE PEOPLE of thirteen united independent states, by that act, assumed among the powers of the earth, that separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitled them. That in justification of themselves for this act of transcendent power, they proclaimed the principles upon which they held all lawful government upon earth to be founded-which principles were, the natural, unalienable, imprescriptible rights of man, specifying among them, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness-that the institution of government is to secure to men in society the possession of those rights: that the institution, dissolution, and reinstitution of government, belong exclusively to THE PEOPLE under a moral responsibility to the Supreme Ruler of the universe; and that all the just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed. That under this proclamation of principles, the dissolution or allegiance to the British king, and the compatriot connection with the people of the British Empire, were accomplished; and the one people of the United States of America, became one separate sovereign independent power, assuming an equal station among the nations of the earth. That this one people did not immediately institute a government for themselves. But instead of it, their delegates in Congress, by authority from their separate state legislatures, without voice or consultation of the people, instituted a mere confederacy. That this confederacy totally departed from the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and substituted instead of the constituent power of the people, an assumed sovereignty of each separate state, as the source of all its authority.

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That as a primitive source of power, this separate state sovereignty, was not only a departure from the principles of the Declaration of Independence, but directly contrary to, and utterly incompatible with them. That the tree was made known by its fruits. That after five years wasted in its preparation, the confederacy dragged out a miserable existence of eight years more, and expired like a candle in the socket, having brought the union itself to the verge of dissolution. That the Constitution of the United States was a return to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and the exclusive constituent power of the people. That it was the work of the ONE PEOPLE of the United States; and that those United States, though doubled in numbers, still constitute as a nation, but ONE PEOPLE. That this Constitution, making due allowance for the imperfections and errors incident to all human affairs, has under all the vicissitudes and changes of war and peace, been administered upon those same principles, during a career of fifty years. That its fruits have been, still making allowance for human imperfection, a more perfect union, established justice, domestic tranquility, provision for the common defense, promotion of the general welfare, and the enjoyment of the blessings of liberty by the constituent people, and their posterity to the present day. I 92

Adams numbered eleven purposes for writing Jubilee and then stopped. In doing so, he was merely repeating arguments he had made earlier in his speech. But eleven is an imperfect number and Adams had not yet finished his discourse. Thus Jubilee proceeded to a final climactic finish: And now the future is all before us, and Providence our guide. When the children of Israel, after forty years of wanderings in the wilderness, were about to enter upon the promised land, their leader, Moses, who was not permitted to cross the Jordan with them, just before his removal from among them, commanded that when the Lord their God should have brought them into the land, they should put the curse upon Mount Ebal, and the blessing upon Mount Gerizim. The injunction was faithfully fulfilled by his successor Joshua. Immediately after they had taken possession of the land, Joshua built an altar to the Lord, of whole stones, upon Mount Ebal. And there he wrote upon the stones a copy of the law of Moses, which he had written in the presence of the children of Israel: and all Israel, and their elders and officers, and their judges, stood on the two sides of the ark of the covenant, borne by the priests and Levites, six tribes over against Mount Gerizim, and six over against Mount Ebal. And he read all the words of the law, the blessings and cursings, according to all that was written in the book of the law.

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Fellow-citizens, the ark of your covenant is the Declaration of Independence. Your Mount Ebal, is the confederacy of separate state sovereignties, and your Mount Gerizim is the Constitution of the United States. In that scene of tremendous and awful solemnity, narrated in the Holy Scriptures, there is not a curse pronounced against the people, upon Mount Ebal, not a blessing promised them upon Mount Gerizim, which your posterity may not suffer or enjoy, from your and their adherence to, or departure from, the principles of the Declaration of Independence, practically interwoven in the Constitution of the United States. Lay up these principles, then in your hearts, and in your souls-bind them for signs upon your hands, that they may be as frontlets between your eyes-teach them to your children, speaking of them when sitting in your houses, when walking by the way, when lying down and when rising up-write them upon the doorplates of your houses, and upon your gates-cling to them as to the issues of life-adhere to them as to the cords of your eternal salvation. So may your children’schildren at the next return of this day of jubilee, after a full century of experience under your national Constitution, celebrate it again in the full enjoyment of all the blessings recognized by you in the commemoration of this day, and of all the blessings promised to the children of Israel upon Mount Gerizim, as the reward of obedience to the law of God.’93 Thus, A d a m ends his discourse o n the American Constitution. His closing paragraphs are rich with allegory and deserve our careful attention. To begin, let us remember that A d a m began Jubike by contrasting America and Rome but closes by comparing America with another ancient polity, Israel. We have already examined some of the reasons for this comparison, but it is important to clarify the precise character of Adams’s analogy. We have noted that Rome was a model for the emerging republican sentiment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Americans adopted some of these sentiments, but Rome did not tyrannize over America as she did over France. Adams was a great admirer of republican Rome, but he considered Israel “the most extraordinary nation that has ever appeared upon the earth.”194Yet the particular manner in which America identified herself with Israel was unique, and has distinguished the regime from any other republic before or since. Of course, it should be remembered that Israel had provided a political model for other republics,195beginning at least as early as the sixteenth century. Identity with Israel was particularly prevalent among European Calvinists. Examples include Calvin’s Geneva, the Dutch Republic,’96 the Dutch and Huguenot settlers of South Africa,”‘ Scottish Presbyterians and their descendents in Ulster, and English Puritans,’98many of whom immigrated to America and were the ancestors of John Quincy Adams. Adams felt a debt

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to his Puritan ancestors and eulogized them as “a conscientious, intrepid and persecuted race of men, whom David Hume, the Atheist Jacobite, at once their reviler and their eulogist, acknowledges to have been the sole and exclusive founders of all the freedom of the British islands. This record is true, and oceans of calumny will never wash it However, the American Founders were not fired by Calvinist republicanism. Unlike their Puritan ancestors, America’s identification with Israel did not lead to the mistaken belief that they must seek a return to something like the ancient city. T h e Mosaic laws regulated every aspect of human life, mental as well as physical, private as well as public.20oThis vision was mirrored in the intention of England’s and New England’s Puritan Fathers. Indeed, the tyranny of Rome over republican France was only nominally more severe than the tyranny of Israel over Cromwell’s England. Despite the admiration he felt for his Puritan ancestors, Adams did not hesitate to link the leader of England’s only republic with tyranny. In contemplating the possibility of a n American civil war, Adams voiced his fear of “a military and arbitrary” government under “a Jeroboam, Julius Caesar, a CromweU, or some such ferocious animal”2o’ (emphasis added). The Puritans did not engulf England in revolutionary bloodshed of guillotine, lynching, and judicial murder. Nevertheless, Charles I was beheaded; Strafford, Laud, and others suffered the death penalty; and royalists were deprived of their properties. Above all else, the Puritans, at the height of their power in the early 1650s, attempted to enforce the austere morality of an ancient city on the entire population. This enforcement took the form of “blue laws” which not only prohibited horse racing, gambling, cock fighting, and bear baiting, but such seemingly innocent activities as dancing o n the green, the theater, fancy dress, and a host of other ordinary activities.2o2 The English Reign of Terror and Virtue was short-lived; the nation was too large and the people too endowed with a spirit of liberty for England to resemble a seventeenth-century Geneva. But if nothing else, the Interregnum provided a profound lesson to American revolutionaries. Lord Macaulay, who wrote more sympathetically of the Puritans than most of the historians of his day, noted that the Puritans did not prohibit bear baiting because it gave pain to the bear, but rather because it gave pleasure to the spectators. T h e spirit of such prohibitions was inconsistent with the virtues of a free people and of a government founded o n the rights of liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The failure of the Puritan republic is rooted in the very essence of Christianity. As previously noted, the advent of Christianity followed the rise of the Roman Empire. By becoming the universal city, Rome destroyed the ancient city by destroying the authority of its gods and its laws. The only god

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capable of surviving these political changes was the God of Israel, the one universal God. When the God of Israel became the God of Christianity, the return to the ancient city became even more problematic.20’The God of the Old Testament, while universal, legislated for a particular people. The Christian God was not identified with any particular people or any particular city, and consequently was not a legislating God. The connection between the gods of the city and the law had been irreparably severed, and it was no longer possible for man’s highest end to be seen as identical with the common good of his city. Christians were left with a dual obligation to the city of God and the city of man. A Christian’s political obligations were distinguished from the obligations to his God. The fate of the individual was no longer connected to the fate of his community. The individual Christian can go to hell even if the cause of his city is triumphant; he can go to heaven even if it fails. Thus it is in the very foundations of Christianity that we see the roots of the individualism sometimes attributed to the liberal theories of Hobbes and Locke. No nation in the post-Christian world could hope to duplicate a citizen’s commitment to the ancient city so long as one’s salvation depended upon developing a personal relationship with his God. No work better illustrates the dilemma of the Puritan republic than that most Puritan of books, Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress. In the opening scene, Christian flees his family and cries out, “What must I do to be saved?”Bunyan illustrated that his salvation had nothing to do with the membership of his family or his community, and certainly not with his citizenship in Cromwell’s Commonwealth. Unlike the Calvinist polities of Europe, the American Republic did not embark on the quixotic quest of return to the ancient city. What, then, is the essence of Adams’s comparison of America and Israel?The answer is to be found first in America’s special attachment to the law and second in the unique character of that law. That is, Jubilee calls Americans to be a new people of the law. Many years earlier Adams had explained to his son what the law meant in ancient Israel: The law was given not merely in the form of a commandment from God, but in that of a covenant or compact between the Supreme Creator and the Jewish people; it was sanctioned by the blessing and the curse pronounced upon Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal, in the presence of the whole Jewish people and strangers, and by the solemn acceptance of the whole people responding amen to everyone of the curses denounced for violation on their part of the

We see these words echoed in Jubilee’s final paragraph. Americans had likewise made a covenant with the law: “the ark of your covenant is the Declaration of Independence,” its principles “practically interwoven in the Constitution of the United States.”

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While other nations were united by their allegiance to their king, their religion, or their national origins, Americans were united by the laws of nature and nature’s God. In Adams’s understanding of America, the Law was the very core of the regime. As h e noted at the beginning of his discourse, America lacked both ethnic and religious unity. The principles of the Declaration provided another source of unity for the nation. In Adams’s view America’s very survival depended upon the people’s reverence for, and attachment to, the Law. In n o other nation was the people’s relationship to the law so central to their national identity. The principles of the Declaration provided the adhesive to bond together English, French, Dutch, and German; protestant, Catholic, and Jew.

***** Yet it is only possible to understand the novelty of America’s relationship to the laws of nature and nature’s God if we understand the unique character of those laws. Let us begin by stating the obvious: America is a particular nation, with-despite its diversity-a particular people, founded at a particular time in history. However, the principles on which it was founded are universal; they are applicable to all men at all times. Indeed, its laws rest on the selfevident truth that all men are created equal. Again, when the God of Israel became the God of the Gentiles, He ceased to be a legislating God. The Mosaic laws were not and could not be the laws of every people. God might still be the source of legitimate authority, but he was only an indirect source of municipal law. The tenets of Christianity dissolve the traditional distinctions between tribes and classes of men. The glories of heaven could as easily be attained by a Thracian slave woman as by the emperor of Rome. Eternal salvation-the ultimate human concem-was equally available to all men. “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.”2o5Thus the ancient community of blood had been transformed into the community of faith. Adams believed that the political doctrines of the Declaration were the fulfillment of the moral doctrines of early Christianity. Yet human equality in the sight of God was not easily transformed into political equality. Indeed, it took eighteen centuries for the religious doctrine of equality to bear political fruit. “In the progressive revolutions effected by the Christian system of religion and morals,” wrote Adams, “it was in the order of Providence that its operation should be slow and gradual, embracing a period of many thousand years.”206 But in the years between the death of Jesus and the Founding of America the triumph of Christianity posed political problems unforeseen by classical political theorists who knew only the ancient city. I t is the character of

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America’s law-as described by Adams-that it provides the solution to the political dilemmas unique to the Christian world. I have already commented at length on one of these dilemmas, the relationship between a n Omnipotent Creator and His law or, put differently, the connection between force and justice, might and right. This fundamental tension has always been at the core of politics, but its post-Christian manifestation was unique. A second political quandary posed by Christianity was man’s dual obligation to both temporal and celestial kingdoms. Finally, the inoral doctrine of Christianity led to a disjunction between the equality all men had before God and the political inequalities of the world. Let us return once again to the specter of power and justice, the rights of man, and the omnipotent God of battles. As noted, this is a problem always central to politics. However, it was probably more acute after Christianity, because God could no longer legislate for a particular people. W h e n the emerging kingdoms of Western Europe accepted Christianity they adapted it to existing political institutions. Despite the equality of man before God, political authority continued to devolve from the top down. Might, not right, was the political doctrine o n which these kingdoms rested. T h e particular kingdoms of Western Europe had not been graced with particular divine laws from a particular god. Hence, the true source of authority was disputed between church and king. In time the temporal authorities gained a clear advantage over their spiritual counterparts. Paul’s letter to the Romans provided the spiritual authority for divine right monarchy: Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not terror to good works but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power?. . . For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil (Romans 13:14).

This passage could be interpreted as a justification for any sort of regime. A monarch’s right to rule was the fact that h e did rule. The legal position of a medieval sovereign was summarized in the oft-quoted words of Henry de Bracton: “The king himself ought not to be subject to any man but h e ought to be subject to God and the law.” T h e unsolved riddle of politics was how the monarch could be both limited and unrestrained, above man and under the lawzo7This dilemma would remain unsolved as long as political authority devolved downward from the king, rather than upward from the people.

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This was true notwithstanding the fact that sovereigns of Western Europe were often limited by local custom, which in time took on the force of law. A great deal has been written about those elements which make up western civilization. The West developed via the merger of Christianity and classical thought. The core of the West is best understood in relationship to the tension between biblical revelation and classical reason. But a third, less crucial, element has often been identified as contributing to the western synthesis: “Germanic freedom.” The most prominent proponents of this view were Montesquieu and David Hume.”’ Undoubtedly, there is a certain degree of merit to their oft-cited argument. For our purposes, it is enough to note that Magna Carta and the various rights of Englishmen have been identified as manifestations of Germanic freedom. W h o would argue that the evolution of the rights of Englishmen did not in any way contribute to the discovery of natural rights? The Founders were not oblivious to the contributions of their ancestors. John Adams praised “the teutonic institutions,” and Thomas Jefferson took pride in his “Saxon ancestors.”209Consequently, many scholars have concluded that American freedoms are rooted in the history and institutions of northern Europe. “During and after the Revolution,” writes David Cress, “Americans adopted the Germanic model of freedom because it seemed to suggest that their own claims to independence were rooted in history as their ethnic heritage.”21oSuch claims are, unfortunately, all too common and profoundly misinterpret the American Founding. I have already noted the fundamenta1 weakness of this brand of scholarship, which fails to comprehend properly the radical distinction between the rights of Englishmen and the rights of man. It is the latter which form the basis of the American Constitution.z11 While the ancient customs of the Germans did place limits o n their sovereign, they were not based o n the authority of his subjects. They were understood as self-limitations of a monarch‘s authority in the same sense that the God of the Bible was limited by his promises to, for example, Abraham or Moses. The fundamental principle that justice was a derivative of power, that the victorious king was God’s king, remained unaltered. This principle in various forms has remained the fundamental principle of most western regimes. Our analysis of Henry V has demonstrated that power, the power of the sovereign, remained the fundamental principle of divine-right monarchy. This principle was not altered in Calvinist republics despite their allegiance to God’s laws. The chosen man, the divinely ordained king, was simply replaced by a chosen people, the predestined elect of God. Their regimes differed only to the extent that the divine authority given to one man had now been given to a group, or faction, of men. These chosen people did not

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covenant with each other in accordance with the laws of nature and nature’s God; they covenanted directly with God. Their right to rule was founded in the belief that they had been divinely chosen to rule. Consequently, the justice of their cause was dependent upon the success of their cause.?12The Calvinist principle that might made right was, then, no different from the fundamental principle of the French Republic. Rousseau’s doctrine of the general will posited that this will could not be in error. It was just simply because it was general. What “ought” to be was reduced to what “is.” Only in America was the order between justice and power reversed. We have noted that the American cause depended on the omnipotence of the God of battles. The closing paragraph of the discourse affirms that America’s future success is in the hands of an omnipotent enforcer who may curse or bless the regime and its posterity. Yet the crucial distinction between America and all other regimes is that America’s access to the God of battles is through the Law. This distinguishes America from all those nations whose access to the law is through the God of battles. In other nations the law is just because the God of battles defends it. In America the God of battles is just because He defends the law. In other nations people fought for their king or their God; following the French Revolution and the rise of nationalism, they fought for volk and soil. In each of these instances, might made right. Americans, by contrast, fought for the laws of nature and nature’s God. The spirit of this fight was cogently pronounced by Lincoln on the eve of the Civil War:

“LET US HAVE FAITH THAT RIGHT MAKES MIGHT, AND IN THAT FAITH, LET US, TO THE END, DARE TO DO OUR DUTY AS WE UNDERSTAND IT.”213For Adams, as for Lincoln, the American nation could dissolve and pass away from the earth but, like the God of Israel, the laws of nature and nature’s God would remain. The principles of the Declaration will remain true, just, and eternal regardless of the fate suffered by America.

***** Still, a dilemma stems from the Christian belief that one God rules over all nations and all peoples. Because He is the God of all communities, He is the legislator of none. Consequently, man’s salvation is not tied to his community. He has dual obligations to both his city and to God. Indeed, because one can be a good citizen without being a good Christian, the City of Goda City not of this world-replaces the earthly city as the central human concern.?’?The Declaration provides the salve for this political wound. First, the laws of nature and nature’s God are transcendent and eternal. Unlike divine legislation in the ancient city, the principles of the Declaration could be conceived in universal terms. Politics had been changed by a universal God. In

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harmony with these changes, America had been founded on universal laws. They were adopted by a particular people in a particular way when they were “practically interwoven in the Constitution of the United States.” It was also in the character of these universal laws that they did not interfere with an individual’s personal pursuit of the City of God. The Declaration enjoined citizens to subordinate themselves to the moral law, while simultaneously removing sectarian religious questions from the political process. This, Adams believed, was consistent with the true spirit of Christianity. A t long last Christians were free to follow the dictates of their consciences unimpeded by the temptation of political rewards or punishments. Indeed, the success of America’s republican experiment depended o n the separation of church and state, for it is impossible for any regime to combine majority rule with minority rights without first removing theological differences from the political arena.?15 Yet liberating American politics from the dogmas of what A d a m contemptuously referred to as “controversial divinity”?I6did not release Americans from their obligations to the moral law. In fact, it was precisely because Americans were divided-not just by religion but ethnically, economically, and politically-that they must be united by their sense of duty to the law. The laws of nature and nature’s God provided Americans with a common morality that allowed them to transcend their theological differences.

***** Finally, let us remember that the teachings of Christianity proclaim that all are equal in the sight of God. God’s promises to His chosen people were now available to all mankind. The family of blood had been replaced by the family of faith.217As such, all men were, at least potentially, brothers. Adams believed that these doctrines properly understood would eventually bear political fruit:

It was not only over the false gods of paganism, that the religious and moral system of Christ was to prevail. . . . The Christian system, meddles not directly with the organization of government. It commands obedience to the laws. I t enjoins reverence to the powers that be-but it lays down first principles, before which, carried to their unavoidable conclusions, all oppression, tyranny and wrong must vanish from the face of the These “first principles” are found in the laws of nature and nature’s God, which have their foundation in the self-evident truth that all men are created equal. The political doctrines of the American regime were thus made consistent with the theological doctrines of Christianity. Both Christianity and the Declaration

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proclaim “that all mankind are one blood . . . that the rule of social intercourse between them is that each should do to all, as he would that all should do to him. This is Christianity-and this is the whole duty of man to We recall that the Declaration is a paraphrase of the Golden Rule. The laws of nature and nature’s God are the political manifestation of the Gospel’s spiritual teaching, political philosophy in the service of revelation. If all men are equal in the sight of God, then divine right ought to rest in the people and not with kings. This was the explicit teaching of the Declaration. But according to Adams, this doctrine is also implied in the “first principles of the Christian faith”: Its first great victory was over false religions. I n the progress of ages, its slow, gradual, and progressive advancement has been over tyrannical governments. It has weaned the human mind from the toleration of governments founded only upon conquests, and acting only by arbitrary will and physical force. I t has prompted the heart, and armed the hand of the Christian man to resist and overthrow them. It has taught him that the duty of obedience to government is founded upon a covenant of mutual respect for the unalienable natural rights of man: and that however this covenant may be violated by power, the rights can never be extinguished, and may always by power be resumed. It is the pride and glory of the confederated North American Republic, that in the instrument of their first association they solemnly declared and proclaimed these truths, derived by clear unequivocal deduction, from the first principles of the Christian faith, to be self-evident-and announced them as the first principles both of their Union and of their Independence. The second great victory of the Christian system of morals was over oppressive governments-and that victory has not yet been consummated. The absolute despotisms of antiquity, under which the lives, persons, and property of the subject were utterly unprotected from the will of the despot, vanished very early by the adoption of the Christian faith as the religion of the Roman empire. But that life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness were inextinguishable rights of all mankind, had never been proclaimed as the only rightful foundation of human association and government, until the Declaration of Independence, laid it down, as the comer stone of the North American Union.z2o Adams believed the United States provided the first example of a regime founded o n a political doctrine consistent with “the Christian system of morals.” T h e American regime, and the Law o n which it was founded, provided a solution to the political problems unique to the Christian West.

***** America could be a new Israel, a new people of the law, because America’s return to this biblical city was part of a political progression dictated by new and novel historical circumstances and necessities. Christianity had changed

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the political world; the principles of the Declaration reflected those changes. This does not mean that the eternal principles of justice, as articulated in the Declaration, are relative to the time and place in which they first found expression. Justice is eternal and unchanging, but the manner in which it is implemented will depend o n circumstances. Adams believed the laws of Israel were superior to those of any other ancient city. Yet he recognized that the political institutions existent in ancient Israel were as politically irrelevant for Americans as those of America would have been to the Israelites. Still, these two regimes were united in their commitment to laws whose justice transcended the city. But while justice is eternal, nations are not. T h e political institutions or forms necessary for the administration of justice will be reformed, altered, and extinguished. It has been cogently, and to my mind convincingly, argued that had Aristotle lived in seventeenth-century England “he would have written something very closely approximating, if not entirely identical with, Locke’s Second Treatise.”z21I t could be argued that in jubilee Adams was suggesting that had ancient Israel been miraculously transformed into the modern world, it would (after adapting itself to new political realities) have resembled America, or more to the point, that if Moses were living in eighteenth-century America, the law he would have given to his people would be something very closely approximating, if not entirely identical with, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The origin of the Jubilee can be traced to an ancient Hebrew institution, and Adams’s discourse undoubtedly attempted to capture some of the spirit of that ancient celebration. For h e had proclaimed that the biblical “Jubilee was an excellent institution” in part because it acted as “a law against slavery.”222 Consequently, Adams had celebrated the principles of the Declaration, which likewise operated as a law against slavery. In the manner of a prophet, he used the occasion to turn the eyes of his people back to the laws given them by their forefathers. Years earlier Adams had defined the role played by Israel’s prophets: “The Jewish prophets . . . are messengers, specifically commissioned of God, to warn the people of their duty, to foretell the punishments which awaited their transgression^."^^^ Adams became the American heir of this mantle as is evidenced in his dire warning at the close of Jubilee: in that scene of tremendous and awful solemnity narrated in the holy scriptures, there is not a curse pronounced against the people, upon Mount Ebal, not a blessing promised them upon Mount Gerizim, which your posterity may not suffer or enjoy, from your and their adherence to, or departure from, the principles of the Declaration of Independence, practically interwoven in the Constitution of the United States.

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Notes 1. Lord Macaulay, “Songs of the Civil War-I,” in The Works of Lord Macaulay (Ware, Hertfordshire, U.K.: Wordsworth Poetry Library, 1995), 82. 2 . Shem Tov ben Joseph Falaguera (ca. 1225-ca. 1295), Falapera’s Epistle of the Debate, ed. and trans. Steven Harvey in Harvard Jwlaic Texts and Studies, no. 8 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 14. 3. Leo Strauss, “How To Begin To Study The Guide of the Perplexed,” in Liberalism: Ancient and Modern (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 168. 4. John Quincy Adams, Memoirs ofJohn Quincy Adams, Cornpising Portions of His Diary from 1 795 to 1848, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 12 vols. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1874-1877). This passage is taken from volume 10 (April 30, 1839), 118. 5 . Paul C. Nagel, John Quincy Adams, A Public Life, A Private Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 372. 6. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (October 19, 1839), 138. 7. Nagel, John Quincy Adams, 372. 8. John Quincy Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution: A Discourse (New York: Samuel Colman VIII, Astor House, 1839), 5. 9. Adams’s familiarity with the poet Virgil goes back to his early youth. As a student he had written out careful translations of the Aeneid. Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 16. 10. Our capital, the Senate, and Publius’s authorship of the Federalist are but a few examples of this relationship. Indeed, there is probably not a notable political controversy from the Founding era that was not addressed in the form of public letters written under Roman pseudonyms. Adams himself often followed this convention. For example, he wrote under the name “Marcellus” in defense of Washington’s proclamation of neutrality in 1793. In 1804 he wrote under the pseudonym “Publius Valerius” in order to voice his grievance against the Constitution’s infamous three-fifths clause. 11. Adams was indeed a poet, though of somewhat modest ability. Throughout his life he read and wrote poetry with great passion. In 1832, Adams published an epic poem of his own, Dermot MacMowogh ur The Conquest of Ireland. Adams regarded this historical tale of more than two thousand lines as his best literary effort. Shortly after his death, many of his poems were gathered in a volume entitled Poems of Religion and Society. The book was edited by Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri and Senator John Davis of Massachusetts, who proclaimed the career of John Quincy Adams to be a public and private model for all future American generations. Perhaps his finest poem is quoted in the preceding chapter. However, his greatest accomplishment with respect to poetry was probably a translation of Christoph Martin Wieland’s Oberon. This translation, not published in Adams’s lifetime, has received the enthusiastic acclaim of modern scholars. The editor of Adams’s translation, A. B. Faust, proclaimed it “of unusual scholarly and literary merit, remarkable for its fidelity to the original and its genuine artistry. It takes rank with the few outstanding metrical translations done by American

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scholars.” Indeed, many specialists admired Adams’s work in German literature. The noted bibliographer Frederick H. Wilkins has called Adams “the father of German studies in America.” Christoph Martin Wieland, Oberon, trans. John Quincy Adams (New York: F. S. Croft & Company, 1940), v, xii. Nagel, John Quincy Adams, 119-20. 12. Adams,Jubilee, 6, 7. 13. This point is made very briefly but nonetheless accurately by Greg Russell. Russell, John Quincy Adams and the Public Virtues of Diplomacy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 175. 14. Adams, Jubilee, 128. 15. Adams lamented that “the heroic age of our revolutionary history has not yet been celebrated in poetry with a dignity suitable to the grandeur of the subject.” Jubilee, 128. 16. According to Geoffrey of Monmouth (the source of many of Shakespeare’s plays), Aeneas’s great grandson, Brutus, settled the island of Britain. Geoffrey of Monmouth, The History of the Kings of Britain, trans. Lewis Thorpe (London: Penguin Books, 1966), 53, 74. 17. Adams,Jubilee, 7. 18. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (La Cite Antique), published originally in 1864 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Paperback Edition, 19801,356. 19. Harry V. Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil War (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 136. 20. Adams, Jubilee, 7. 21. Ibid., 8 (italics in the original). 22. lbid., 8. 23. Ibid., 9. 24. Ibid., 9. 25. Ibid., 70. 26. Ibid., 119-20. 27. See Scott J. Zentner, “Caesarism and the American Presidency,” Southeastern Political Review 24, no. 4 (December 1996). 28. By legitimacy we mean “the legal or constitutional criteria according to which rulers are selected and power transmitted from sovereign to sovereign.” Marlo Lewis, “On War and Legitimacy in Shakespeare’sHenry V,” Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Sir Winston S. Churchill, ed. Harry V. Jaffa (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1981), 43. 29. “My enthusiastic admiration of the inspired (muse inspired) bard of Avon, commenced in childhood, before the down had darkened my lip, and continued through five of the seven ages of the drama of life, gaining upon the judgment, as it loses to the imagination.” John Quincy Adams, “On the Character of Hamlet,” National lntelligencer Washington (Sat., November 30, 1839). “My admiration of Shakespeare, as a profound delineator of human nature and a sublime poet, is but little short of idolatry.” John Quincy Adams, “Misconceptions of Shakspeare [sic] Upon the Stage,” The New England MagaSne (December 9, 1835): 435-40. See also John

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Quincy Adams, “The Character of Desdemona,” The American Monthly Magazine (March 1836): 209-17. 30. The same James H. Hackett who later corresponded with Abraham Lincoln. 3 1. Later published as “On the Character of Hamlet,” National lntelligencer Washington (Sat., November 30, 1839). 32. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (October 6, 1839), 137-138. 33. I t is fitting that black, red, and white would in later years become the colors for the standard of Nazi Germany. Memoirs, vol. 10 (February 1, 1841), 413. 34. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (February 7, 1841), 414-15. 35. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (February 5 , 1841), 413. 36. In an era without television, cinema, or organized sports, the sources of American entertainment were found primarily in the plays of Shakespeare, sermons, and political speeches. 37. My understanding of Shakespeare’sHenry V draws heavily from the work of Harry V. Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &a Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 128-31; and Marlo Lewis, Jr., “On War and Legitimacy in Shakespeare’s Henry V,” in Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Sir Winston Churchill, 41-61. 38. John Quincy Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town Quincy on the Fourth ofJuly, 1831; The Fifty-Fifth Anniversary of the Independence of the United States of America (Boston: Richardson, Lord and Holbrook, 1831), 8. 39. Adams, Jubilee, 50. 40. Adams, Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy, 9. 41. Henry V, act 4, scene 1. 42. Adams, Jubilee, 50, 5 1. 43. John Quincy Adams, introduction to Memoir of the Rev. Elijah P. Lovejoy (New York: John S. Taylor, 1838), 7 (emphasis in the original). 44. Adams, Jubilee, 9. 45. Daniel J. Boorstin, “When is a Civil War a Revolution?” U S . News B World Report, June 11, 1990,47. 46. Russell Kirk, “Burke and the United States Constitution,” The lntercollegiate Review (Winter 1985-1986): 6. 47. Russell Kirk, The Roots of American Order (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974), 413. 48. Ibid., 401. 49. A good analysis of “Publicola”is provided in Greg Russell, John Quincy Adams and the Public Virtues ofDiplomacy, 179-99. 50. Ibid., 179. 5 1. John Quincy Adams, “Letters of Publicola,” quoted in Russell Kirk, The Roots of American Order, 397. 52. Kirk, Roots of American Order, 397. 53. Kirk‘s reference to “American colonies” clearly refers to the United States after it had declared its independence. The next sentence reads, “only the word ‘Republic’ was common to the two new dominations” (France and the United States),

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397. I t would seem Kirk‘s life work was an attempt to return the United States to colonial status under Britain. 54. Adams, “Letters of Publicola, No. 6,” in The Writings ofJohn Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington Chauncy Ford, 7 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1913-1917), vol. 1, 87. 55. Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy, 35. 56. Kirk is not nearly as fond of the old John Quincy Adams. He objects to the Adams of later years principally because of his attacks on slavery. “In clothing himself with the bravery of the reformer, Adams forgot the prudence of the conservative. Reversing the ordinary process of nature, the youthful opponent of change had become the aged lieutenant of radical alteration.” Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1985), 239. 57. Harry Jaffa has pointed out that Kirk’s Burkean conservatism is not descended from Burke himself but from a highly selective reading of Burke. Jaffa, “The Decline and Fall of the American Idea: Reflections on the Failure of American Conservatism” (prepared for the 25th Anniversary Symposium of the Henry Salvatori Center for the Study of Individual Freedom, 1996), 24. 58. Kirk, Roots of American Order, 397-98,401. 59. Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy, 18. 60. Adams, “Letters of Publicola, No. 2,” 69-70. See also Russell. John Quincy Adam he Public Virtues of Diplomacy, 182 61. Adams, “Publicola, No. 4,” 79. 62. Adams, “Publicola, No. 3,” 76-77. 63. Adams, “Publicola, No. 11,” 108 64. Adams, “Publicola, No. 3,” 76. 65. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, anonymous translation revised and edited by Charles Frankel (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1949), book 1, chap. 6, 15. 66. Adams, “Publicola, No. 2,” 70-7 1. 67. Adams, “Publicola, No. 3,” 77. 68. Adams, “Publicola, No. 4,” 78. 69. Adams, “Publicola, No. 11,” 108. 70. Adams, “Publicola, No. 2,” 72. 7 1. Adams, Jubilee, 10. 72. Ibid., 10. 73. Ibid., 10. 74. Adams incorrectly writes that the convention was made up “of delegates from eleven of thirteen states.” Adams, Jubilee, 11. 75. Ibid., 11-12. 76. lbid., 12. 77. Ibid., 12-13. 78. Leonard Levy, Onginal Intent and the Framers’ Constitution (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1988), 395-96. 79. Adams, An oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy, 1831). 80. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 8 (July 25, 1831), 387.

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81. Quoted in Ekmis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 236. 82. Adams, Jubilee, 30. 83. Ibid., 31. 84. Ibid., 32. 85. See page 26. 86. Adams, Jubilee, 41. 87. Ibid., 37-38. 88. Ibid., 40-41. 89. Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy, 6. 90. John Quincy Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Hilliard and Metcalf, 1810), 13-14. 91. Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Cames Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), I:2, 1253”9. 92. Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, 2 vols. (New York: Russell 61Russell, 1962), 14. 93. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 11:2, sec. 6. 94. I t is instructive to note that Adams implies a certain affinity between Justinian and Locke. Adams, Jubilee, 70. 95. Adams, “Publicola, No. 2,” 70-71. 96. Adams, Jubilee, 42-45. 97. John Quincy Adams, Letters of John Quincy Adams, to His Son, on the Bible and Its Teachings (Auburn, N.Y.: James Alden, 1850), 100. 98. Adams, Jubilee, 5 1. 99. Ibid., 52. 100. Milton’s heresy also appears in the Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce: “the world first rose out of Chaos” (end of ch. 10). John Milton, Paradise Lost (New York: Mentor, 1981), 36, note 10. 101. Harry Neumann, “The Problem of Piety in Plato’s Euthyphro,” The Modern Schoolman, 43 (March 1966): 265-72. 102. Adams’s first acquaintance with the works of Plato appears to have been as a schoolboy in France. More than fifteen years later, during his diplomatic mission to Russia, he renewed his Platonic studies with great vigor. After finishing Plato’s Laws, Adams wrote: “As my acquaintance with Plato becomes more intimate, my admiration of his genius, and my regret for his errors, increase. I lament that I have not sought this intimacy sooner and more assiduously . . . I hope to be yet much better acquainted with Plato.” Adams, Memoirs, vol. 2 (October 10, 1811), 323-24. 103. Adams specifically comments on the writings of Ovid, which may have provided the source for Milton’s heresy. “Before the sea, and the earth, and the sky that surrounds all things (says Ovid), there was a thing called chaos, and some of the gods (he does not know which), separated from each other the elements of this chaos, and

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turned them into the world; thus far and no farther could human reason extend.” Adams, Letters ofJohn Quincy Adams, to His Son, 27. 104. Leo Strauss, “Perspectiveson the Good Society,”reprinted in Liberdsm: Ancient and Modern (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 272. 105. Adams was also critical of Unitarian, Deist and later transcendental theology. He believed liberal theology was destructive to morality and was particularly alarmed by New England transcendentalism which he called an “alliance of atheism and hypocracy.” But when his father warned him about becoming the “champion of orthodoxy,” A d a m responded: “I think I shall neither commence champion of orthodoxy, nor as your old friend Franklin used to say, of any man’s doxy.” John Quincy Adams, Letter to John Adams, January 3, 1817, in Writings of John Quincy Adams, vol. 6, 134-37; and Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (August 11, 25, 1840), 345, 350. 106. One might, for example, point to Adams’s critical assessment of Milman’s History of the Jews. Adams criticized Milman because his “narrative is always at war with physical nature, and the morality is all referable to the single principle of the will of God. Depart but one hair’s breadth from that, and all moral principle in the Bible is extinct. . . . The consequence of which is that we must approve of vicious actions as virtues, and censure good deeds as crimes. . . . The subversion of moral principle is admissible only so far as the divine will is clearly and distinctly ascertained.” Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (July 28, 1833), 10. 107. Adams was primarily concerned with providing the moral foundation for a decent regime; wrestling with the “metaphysics”of a reconciliation between an eternal nature and a created universe is not likely to have interested him. Adams considered the Bible to be a source for moral instruction, but he was “little versed in controversial divinity.” Letters ofJohn B i n c y Adam, to His Son, 48. For our purposes, perhaps, it is sufficient to note that the possibility of an eternal law does not necessarily contradict the action of an omnipotent creator, because the laws of contradiction cannot bind the creator of that law. 108. Zentner, “Caesarism and the American Presidency,” 636-42. 109. Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom, 139. 110. Adams, Letters ofJohn Quincy Adams, to His Son, 80, 81. 111. The ancient Hebrews did not ordinarily distinguish between moral, civil, ceremonial, and health regulations. Nonetheless, it is possible to differentiate between the moral Law and the various rules and regulations designed to enforce it. For example, we might distinguish between the command “Thou shalt not steal” and the rules and regulations that were prescribed to punish those who disobeyed this law. If asked to identify the unchanging and eternal core of the Mosaic Law, one could, at the very least, point to the second table of the Decalogue. 112. Saint Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), bk. 5, ch. 22, 176. 113. Flavius Josephus, “Antiquities of the Jews,” Josephw: Complete Works, trans. William Whiston (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel Publications, 1978),bk. 15, ch. 5,344.

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114. Adams, Jubilee, 52. 115. Homer, The Illiad, trans. Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Anchor Books, 1974), bk. 1, 256. 116. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), 123. 117. Homer, The Odyssey, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), bk. 4, 394. 118. Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods, 124. 119. Homer, The Odyssey, bk. 1, 402-3. 120. Friedrich Nietzsche, “Thus Spake Zarathustra,” trans. Thomas Common, The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: The Modern Library, Random House, Inc., n.d.), 60. 121. Saint Augustine, The City of God, bk. 5, ch. 14, 165. 122. Ibid., bk. 5, ch. 12, 159. 123. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 9 (April 6, 1835), 232. 124. Among the Romans who sacrificed themselves in this manner were Curtius, the Decii, and Marcus Pulvillus. Saint Augustine, The City ofGod, bk. 5, ch. 18, 169. 125. The preceding was a brief account of the theme of Shakespeare’s Roman plays. The secondary literature on this subject is vast. See, for example, Alan Bloom with Harry Jaffa, Shakespeare’s Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 75-112; also, John Alvis, Shakespeare’s Understanding of Honor (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1990), 33-ff. 126. Jacob Klein, Lectures and Essays (Annapolis, Md.: St. John’s College Press, 1985), 274. 127. Saint Augustine, Dante, and Shakespeare, to name some of the most prominent. 128. David Gress, From PLAT0 to NATO: The I&a of the West and Its Opponents (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 369. 129. Klein, Lectures and Essays, 277. 130. Theodore Haecker, “Odysseus and Aeneas,” in Virgil: A Collection of Crirical Essays, ed. Steele Commager (EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), 69. 131. It is not difficult to understand why Americans have always identified with Aeneas, a man forced to abandon his ancestral hearth for the promise of new beginnings in a New World. 132. In Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare provides a telling account of the first years of the new Rome of Virgil and Augustus. I t is highly instructive to contrast the relationship between Antony and Cleopatra to that of Odysseus and Calypso. 133. M. Owen Lee, Fathers and Sons in Virgil’s Aeneid: Tum Genitor Natum (Albany: State University Press, 1979), 18. 134. Ibid., 26. 135. Aeneas had been warned in a dream, by the ghost of Hector, that he must take his gods and his people and flee Troy. But when he awoke to find his city in flames he found himself:

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“Out of my mind, 1 sprang to arms-not stopping to reason whyMore than to muster to me a band of fighters And rally them to citadel. Rage, fury, mastered me; I ha thed in my mind No thought but death in battle and its glory!”

Virgil, The Aeneid, bk. 2, trans. Pauic Dickenson (New York: New American Library, 1961), 37. 136. Cicero was perhaps the one author most revered by Adams, and we can safely assume he understood Aeneas’s piety as Cicero’s. See Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, 1.41.115; Pro Plancio, and 35.80; De Repbulica 6.15.15; see also Lee, Fathers and Sons, 21-23. 137. Gress, From PLAT0 to NATO, 375. 138. John Quincy Adams, An Oration Delivered at Plymouth, December 2 2 , 1802, at the Anniversary Commemoration of the First Landing of Our Ancestors at That P k e , (Boston: Russell & Cutler, 1802), 5-6. 139. Virgil, Aeneid, bk. IV, 82. 140. Virgil, Aeneid, bk. VI, 143. 141. Virgil, Aeneid, bk. X, 230. 142. Virgil, Aeneid, bk. VI, 144. 143. Virgil, Aeneid, bk. VI, 145. 144. Klein, Lectures and Essays, 284. 145. Saint Augustine, The City of God, bk. 5, ch. 19, 172. 146. Abraham Lincoln, “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address Before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838,” in The Portable Abraham Lincoln, ed. Andrew Delbanco (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 24. 147. Aristotle, Nicomuchean Ethics, translation and notes by Martin Oswald (New York: Macmillan Company, 1962), IV: 1128b 10-15. 148. Adams, Jubilee,52-53. 149. Some excerpts from his Farewell Address may be sufficient to demonstrate the humility of a man who appeared as reluctant as Moses to command and as committed as Aeneas to patriotic duty. The acceptance of and continuance hitherto in the office to which your suffrages have twice called me have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty and to a deference for what appeared to be your desire. 1 constantly hoped that it would have been much earlier in my power, consistently with motives which I was not at liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement from which I had been reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this previous to the last election had even led to the preparation of an address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations and the unanimous advice of persons

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entitled to my confidence impelled me to abandon the idea. I rejoice that the state of your concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders the pursuit of inclination incompatible with the sentiment of duty or propriety, and am persuaded, whatever partiality may be retained for my services, that in the present circumstances of our country you will not disapprove my determination to retire. . . . Not unconscious in the outset of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience in my own eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to diffidence of myself; and everyday the increasing weight of years admonishes me more and more that the shade of retirement is as necessarv to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied that if any circumstances have given peculiar value to my services they were temporary. I have the consolation to believe that, while choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene, patriotism does not forbid it.

George Washington, “Farewell Address,” in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1 897, vol. l , ed. James D. Richardson (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), 213-14. 150. John Quincy Adams and Charles Francis Adams, The Life of John Adams (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1871), 18-19. 151. John Quincy Adams to George Sullivan, January 20, 1821, in Writings, vol. 7, 91. 152. Harry V. Jaffa,The American Founding as the Best Regime: The Bonding of Civil and Religious Liberty (Claremont, Calif.: Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy, 1990), 8. 153. John Quincy Adams to George Sullivan, January 20, 1821, in Writings, vol. 7, 90. 154. Letter to Spenser Roane, September 6, 1819, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, ed. Merrill Peterson (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), 563. 155. Adams, Jubilee, 14. 156. Ibid., 62. 157. Ibid., 65. 158. Leonard W. Levy, American Constitutional History: Selections fiom the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, ed. Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst, and Dennis J. Mahoney (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989), 34. 159. Adams, Jubilee, 65-66. 160. Ibid., 107-108, 111, 113. 161. Ibid., 80. 162. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, First and Second Discourses: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), 80. 163. The tyranny of Rome over France is discussed in Gress, From PLATO to NATO, 64-65, 107. See also Hugh Honour, Neo-Classicism (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), 72-80. 164. Gress, From PLATO to NATO, 65. 165. Adams, Jubilee, 86. 166. Led by Jacques-RenC HCbert.

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167. Diderot and Voltaire. 168. Adams, Jubilee, 98. 169. Ibid., 98-99. 170. Ibid., 99. 171. Adams, like most modem historians, looked upon Bonaparte as a unique product of the French Revolution, Writings, vol. 2, 169. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 222. 172. Adams, Jubilee, 99. 173. Napoleon Bonaparte, The Manuscrip of Saint Helena, trans. Willard Parker (New York: D. Appleton &a Company, 19241, 53. 174. Ibid., 56. 175. Adams, Jubilee, 86. 176. Leo Strauss, “Three Waves of Modernity,” in Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis: Pegasus, 1975), 91. 177. Stendhal, The Red and the Black, trans. Catherine Slater (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 22. 178. Adams never met Napoleon personally, but during the early weeks of The Hundred Days he observed him from a distance during a Mass attended by the emperor. “I had a full and steady view of the Emperor’s countenance.” Memoirs, vol. 3 (April 23, 1815), 185. 179. John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams (July 11, 1800), in Writings, vol. 2,467-68. 180. See, for example, John Quincy Adams to Thomas Bolston (Februav 14, 1810), in Writings, vol. 3, 397-98. 181. Niccolb Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield J . (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 67. 182. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 8 (June 22, 1826), 40. 183. John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Writings, vol. 4 (December 31, 1812), 423 (italics in Adams). 184. Adams, in An Oration Addressed to the Citixens of the Town of Quincy, 20. 185. G. W. E Hegel, Hegel: The Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 114. 186. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufman and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vantage Books, 1967), vol. 1, 3. 187. Adams, Jubilee, 41. 188. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 2 (April 17, 1813), 462. 189. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 252. 190. Adams praised the emperor for “his personal disposition, so congenial with everything equitable and humane, and so peculiarly friendly to the United States.” John Quincy Adams to Secretary of State, St. Petersburg 2 (September 5, 1810), Writings, vol. 3,489. 191. John Quincy Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (April 14, 1840), 260-61.

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192. Adams, Jubilee, 116-18. 193. Ibid., 118-20. 194. Adams, Letters ofJohn Quincy Adams, to His Son, 20. 195. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries any country not headed by a monarch was called a republic. Hence, Cromwell’s Commonwealth and the Dutch Federation, though far from democratic, were referred to as republics. 196. A great deal has been written about the “Hebraic self-image”of seventeenthcentury Dutch Republicans. Their leader, William of Orange, was portrayed in Dutch paintings as Moses and referred to as “Ons Moyses” in pamphlets. Jacobus Lydius, writing after the Dutch victory over England in 1588, proclaimed, “Above all else, I thank Him / Who made Holland Jerusalem.” Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 36,45, 110-13. 197. These settlers were known as the Boers and later the Afrikaners. 198. The Puritans assumed Jewish names and searched for the lost tribes. Edward I had expelled the Jews from England in 1290. Cromwell spoke out in tavor of a petition for their return. This decision was confirmed by Charles I1 following the Restoration. Andre Maurois, Disraeli, trans. Hamish Miles (New York: The Modem Library, 1928), 3-4. 199. Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy, 15. 200. Jaffa, The American Founding as the Best Regime, 20. 201. Adams, Writings, vol. 4, St. Petersburg (October 31, 1811), 266. 202. Crane Brinton, John B Christopher, and Robert Lee Wolff, A History of Civilization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), 413-14. 203. My understanding of Christianity’s transformation of the ancient world draws heavily from the works of Harry V. Jaffa. See especially A New Birth of Freedom, 127-5 2. 204. Adams, Letters ofJohn Quincy Adams, to His Son, 75. 205. Galatians 328; similarly states, “for by one spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we he Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one spirit” (1 Corinthians 12:13). 206. John Quincy Adams, introduction to Memoir of Rev. Elijah P. Lovejoy (New York: John S. Taylor, 1838), 4. 207. Lacy Baldwin Smith, This Realm of England, 1399-1688 (Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1966), 2. 208. Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, ed. David Wallace Carrithers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 213 and David Hume, History of England (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983), 160-85. 209. Adams and Jefferson, quoted in Gress, From PLATO to NATO, 185. 210. Gress, From PLATO to NATO, 184, 185. 2 11. See my earlier critique of Russell Kirk. 212. Our contention is demonstrated by a brief examination of the most enduring manifestation of political Calvinism, Afrikaner nationalism. Afrikaner nationalists,

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who dominated South African politics from 1948 to 1994, contended that their right to rule South Africa could be traced to their peoples nineteenth-century covenant with God. O n December 16, 1838, a group of Boer Trekkers-as Boers of the Great Trek were called-made a solemn oath that if God would give them victory that day, they would build a “church of the vow” and celebrate that day to His glory each year. The Boers’ prayer seemed to be answered, as five hundred Trekkers inside a circle of wagons defeated fifteen thousand Zulus. When the battle was over three thousand Zulus lay dead, and remarkably not a single Boer had been killed and only three had been wounded. In the aftermath of this momentous event-subsequently referred to as the Battle of Blood River-Afrikaners embraced the belief that they were the chosen people of South Africa with a God-given right to rule the land and its people. Consequently, Boer republicanism came to rest on the perverted conviction that power-as manifested through the divine favors of an omnipotent enforceraetermined right. Like the protagonists of the positive-good theory of slavery, or the defenders of the divine right of kings, Afrikaner nationalists ultimately posited the idea that some men had the right to rule over others without their consent. This view is not refuted by the Afrikaner’s later attempt to separate the races through their complex and impractical policy of apartheid. 213. Abraham Lincoln, “Address at the Cooper Union, 1860,” in The Political Thought of Ahahum Lincoln, ed. by Richard N. Current (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 162. 214. The political problems posed by man’s dual obligations is the basis of Machiavelli’s indictment of Christianity. “This mode of life,” he writes, “thus seems to have rendered the world weak and given it in prey to criminal men, who can manage it securely, seeing that the collectivity of men, so as to go to paradise, think more of enduring their beatings than of avenging them.” According to Machiavelli, the Christian preoccupation with heaven opens the door to U ~ S C I U ~ U ~ O Uleaders S who convince the faithful that “it is evil to say evil of evil,” making men both morally corrupt and weak. Niccolb Machiavelli, Discourses on Liuy, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield J . and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 11 2.2; 111 1.4. 215. Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom, 149. 216. Adams, Letters oflohn Quincy Adams, to His Son, 48. 217. Mark 3:31, 32. 2 18. Adams, introduction to Memoirs of the Rev. Elijah Louejoy, 6. 219. Ibid., 6. 220. Ibid., 7-8. 221. Harry V. Jaffa, Letter to Ernest Fortin, August 24, 1992. 222. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 2 (April 5 , 1812), 356. 223. Adams, Letters ofJohn Quincy Adams, to His Son, 77.

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To crush underfoot all prisoners in the land, to deny a man his rights before the Most High, to deprive a man of justice-would not the Lord see such things? Lamentations 3:34-36

In the summer of 1839, a slave mutiny on board the Spanish schooner La Amistad took place in Cuban territorial waters. By an unlikely turn of events, the Amistad found its way to the United States, where American courts would decide the fate of the Africans who had seized the ship. This event altered the way John Quincy Adams publicly confronted the issue of slavery. The widely held consensus that slavery was, at best, a necessary evil had dissolved. Slavery had provoked regional strife since the Founding of the Republic. But for the first time this division signified a dispute over first principles. While other politicians fought desperately to remove slavery as a question for public scrutiny, Adams had been searching for a way to make it an issue of national debate. Though still opposed to the abolitionist movement, he nevertheless engaged the defenders of slavery in a direct and public confrontation in order to focus public attention on the first principles of the regime. In the House of Representatives his efforts had been thwarted by the gag rule. However, the Amistad case provided Adams with the platform he needed to discuss the fundamental injustice of slavery. If the gag rule controversy had unleashed the ire of slaveholders and led the most powerful and eloquent representatives of the pro-slavery cause to deny the abstract truths of the Declaration of Independence, it was the Amistad case that allowed 147

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Adams to champion these principles, affirming their truth while exposing the evils of slavery and the slave trade. For much of his political career, Adams, publicly at least, had maintained a respectful silence regarding slavery. Even in the gag rule controversy, Adams had insisted that he did not support the content of abolitionist petitions, rather he was defending the right to have petitions heard in Congress. A detailed examination of Adam’s record on slavery prior to the Amistad case has already been provided. While Adam spoke openly and unambiguously about the inherent injustice of slavery, he generally did so in a manner that was not unconciliatory toward his Southern colleagues. His Argument on behalf of the Amistad Africans marks a new juncture in his defense of the abstract truths of the Declaration in which he felt less compelled to restrain himself from unleashing the full force of his rhetorical powers in a direct and venomous assault against the defenders of slavery. Beginning with the Amistad case, the slave power would not only be attacked for its attempts to violate the fundamental rights of nonslaves, it would be stung at its very core. Adams was bringing this battle to its final stage-a stage he himself would not live to see-where Americans would be forced to choose whether they would be a republic based on justice or force. When he agreed to defend the Amistad captives, Adams, in statesmanlike fashion, judged that the moment had come for him to use all his power, influence, and eloquence in a public indictment of slavery.

***** The events of the Amistad case had their origins on the island of Cuba. Because of the long and complex relations between the United States and Cuba, some historical background on Cuba, Cuban slavery, and Cuba’s relationship to the United States is explored. The possibility of annexing the island of Cuba to the United States had intrigued American statesmen from the very early days of the Republic. The island had been coveted by Presidents Jefferson and Madison, and during the years 1808-1812 many Cuban elites would have welcomed American annexation. The Cuban oligarchy was well known for its loyalty to Spain but with Napoleon’s invasion of the mother country and the dour prospect of the British gaining possession of the island, annexation to the United States seemed the best alternative to many Cubans. While the United States provided a natural outlet for Cuban produce, Cubans feared British annexation would mean preferential treatment for Britain’s own sugar islands and an end to the Atlantic slave trade.’ However, annexation to the United States would also have meant an end to the Atlantic slave trade, and any immedi-

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ate American designs o n the island were quickly destroyed after they suffered early setbacks in the War of 1812. There was a revival of annexationist sentiment in the early 1820s. The weakness of Spain had become obvious with the Latin American independence movement, and Cuban planters were increasingly alarmed by the possibility of a slave revolt.2 In Britain the abolitionist movement had become a powerful political force, and the opposition to slavery in Latin American republics made ties to the United States seem more and more auspicious. Slavery was still legally protected by the American Constitution, and annexation by the United States would have created the possibility of a domestic slave trade that was legally prohibited as foreign commerce. Consequently, there were adherents of annexation in both the United States and Cuba as America’s foreign policy was preoccupied with the island during Monroe’s tenure as president. In a cabinet meeting on December 30, 1822, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams contended “the Cuban question” was of “deeper importance and greater magnitude than had occurred since the establishment of our Independence.”j Adams’s colleague in the Monroe cabinet, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, spoke of two fears relating to Cuba which would be assuaged by annexation-“one, that the island should fall into the hands of Great Britain; two, that it should be revolutionized by Negroes.” When an agent for Cuban planters presented an annexation proposal in Washington, Calhoun urged the importance of this tie.j Yet he was eventually persuaded by Adains and Monroe that the more prudent course required an official rejection of the offer. A year later the Monroe cabinet once again addressed the situation. The fear of a British annexation of Cuba had been reawakened when the Holy Alliance sponsored the French occupation of Spain for the purpose of restoring Fernando VII to absolute power.6 What worried Adams and Calhoun was that the Spanish constitutionalists might cede Cuba to England as the price for an Anglo-Spanish alliance in a new peninsular war.’ Calhoun’s fear of a black revolution in Cuba was founded o n a number of factors. Spanish America was undergoing revolutionary changes in the 1820s, but the planters of Cuba were far more dependent o n slave labor and slave subordination than the propertied classes of mainland Spanish America. In 1817 the slave population of Cuba was 200,000, or 40 percent of Cuba’s population,8 while slaves comprised less than 10 percent of Spain’s mainland colonies. In 1776 the populations of Virginia and South Carolina had been of similar proportions, but at least two important differences made Cuban planters wary of following the revolutionary lead of the Southern states of America. In the first place, the intervening years had seen the slave

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revolt on Saint-Dominique, and revolutionary activity in Venezuela had also led to a black revolt in a colony whose African population was much smaller than Cuba's. Second, Cuba in the lt320s, unlike Virginia in 1776, lacked a sizable white majority. In fact, black slaves combined with free people of color constituted a majority on the i ~ l a n d . ~ American foreign policy had sought to thwart the Holy Alliance's attempt to bring Spanish America firmly under the control of monarchist Spain and her reactionary principles. The immediate inspiration for the Monroe Doctrine was the fear that if the Holy Alliancelo could successfully intervene in Spanish America, they might eventually attack the American Republic." John Quincy Adams was instrumental as secretary of state under Monroe in formulating America's response to the danger posed by the Holy Alliance. While less fearful of a direct attack on the United States than other cabinet members, Adams believed European intrigues in the New World would precipitate a contest of opposing principles. His concerns were well founded, for in the years to come the principles of the Holy Alliance-albeit in a modified form-found their way into the Southern United States. In the 1790s Adams had witnessed with alarm the sectional divisions in the United States between Federalist Anglophiles and Republican Francophiles.'? Yet, despite the rancorous nature of public debate, Americans did not divide on the issue of first principles. Adams had lived in Europe for many years and had witnessed firsthand the destructive consequences of such divisions. Thus, his greatest fear for the nation was the possibility that a contest of competing principles might lead to war and disunion. Europe and the United States were engaged in an indirect contest between republican principles based on reason and justice and despotic principles based on sentiment and passion. In a cabinet meeting Adams offered a policy proposal for his country in response to the threatening designs of the Holy Alliance upon Latin America. My purpose would be in a moderate and conciliatory manner, but with a firm and determined spirit, to declare our dissent from the principles avowed in those communications [of Count Nesselrode]; to assert those upon which our own Government is founded, and, while disclaiming all intention of attempting to propagate them by force, and all interference with the political affairs of Europe, to declare our expectation and hope that the European powers will equally abstain from the attempt to spread their principles in the American hemisphere, or to subjugate by force any part of these continents to their will.'3

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Four days later Adams presented a document of his observations and proposals to the cabinet that was meant also to be eventually an exposition of the principles of this Government, and a brief development of its political system as henceforth to be maintained: essentially republican-maintaining its own independence, and respecting that of others; essentially pacific-studiously avoiding all involvement in the combinations of European politics, cultivating peace and friendship with the most absolute monarchies, highly appreciating and anxiously desiring to retain that of the Emperor Alexander, but declaring that, having recognized that of the South American States, we could not see with indifference any attempt by European powers by forcible interposition either to restore the Spanish dominion on the American continents or to introduce monarchical principles into those countries, or to transfer any portion of the ancient or present American possessions of Spain to any other European power.I4

John Quincy Adams rightly recognized that European entanglements might corrupt America’s republican principles. It was always his desire to steer America on a course of neutrality, but he also believed that European interference in the western hemisphere must be resisted by force if necessary. So long as the revolutions to the south of the United States were limited to a contest between Spain and her former colonies, the United States would remain neutral. But the United States would resist any attempt by the Holy Alliance either to restore the newly independent states to colonial status under Spain, or to establish independent monarchies in the western hemisphere. American foreign policy with its firm basis in the Adams-inspired Monroe Doctrine was indirectly aided by British foreign policy. British Foreign Minister George Canning was able to obtain a formal pledge from the French in the Polignac Memorandum that assured Britain that the Holy Alliance would not interfere with the new South American republics. Thus, the United States was largely successful in achieving its foreign policy goals. The Holy Alliance did not use force to put down the revolutions to the south of the United States. Most of Latin America gained independence from Spain, and in most instances, independence also meant the abolition of chattel slavery shortly thereafter. The United States, along with Great Britain and the Netherlands, had taken a firm stand in open opposition to the reactionary principles of the Holy Alliance. Historical scholarship has recognized the central role played by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in formulating ~ and his colleagues had won the celebrated “Monroe D o ~ t r i n e . ” ’Adams

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their foreign policy battle; however, Adams was only partially successful in his ultimate goal of keeping the principles of the Holy Alliance out of the Western Hemisphere where they might do damage to the young republic.

***** Cuba evinced the most conspicuous triumph for the Holy Alliance in the New World. The island proved to be a notable exception to the revolutionary trend then taking place in most of Spanish America. Cuba did not become independent from Spain, or abolish slavery or even the slave trade. Spain’s “ever-faithful island,” as Cuba was called in the 1820s and 183Os,l6 became the New World’s most reactionary enclave. On the island of Cuba the principles of the Holy Alliance ruled and were most clearly manifested in that New World adaptation of Old World principles-the romanticization and defense of slavery. Though certainly there were many Cubans who objected to Spain’s mercantilist policies, insurgency movements developed much later in Cuba than in Spain’s other American possessions. The desire for Cuban independence was, for the most part, limited to small planters, intellectuals, free blacks, and ~1aves.l~ The desire for U.S. annexation initiated in Cuba by the large planter and mercantile interests seems to have cooled by the beginning of Adams’s presidency in 1825. Despite significant divisions between Spanish and Creole populations, Cuban planters were characterized by their loyalty to the Spanish monarchy. Any liberal tendencies that might have existed among the whites of Cuba were immediately muted by the fear of a racially motivated civil war reminiscent of the violence that had driven the French from Haiti. The very genuine concern about the likelihood of a slave revolt discouraged any serious bid for Cuban independence. Thus race and slavery, above all else, shaped the politics of the island. Spain had outlawed the slave trade, but not slavery, in her colonies prior to their independence. By 1839 slavery had been abolished in many of the independent nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. Haiti abolished slavery in 1804. Argentina and New Granada (Columbia) adopted a program of gradual emancipation in 1813 and 1814; Venezuela and Chile abolished slavery in 1821; Central America followed in 1824; Mexico in 1829; and Bolivia in 1831. In a move that provided momentum to the abolitionist movement in America’s Northern states, the British Parliament abolished slavery in the British West Indies in 1833.l8However, British emancipation actually gave greater impetus to the illegal but officially sanctioned Cuban slave trade. In Cuba slavery was firmly entrenched. The island was the last stronghold of slavery in the Northern Hemisphere, not emancipating her slaves un-

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ti1 1886.19 As noted, in an era of revolution in Latin America, Cuba was a royalist enclave in the New World mirroring the reaction and counter-revolution taking place in the Old World. Unlike the American South, slavery in Cuba was not in the uncomfortable position of being contrary to the very principles on which the regime was founded. Aiding the colony’s royalist tendencies was a n influx of twenty thousand to thirty thousand refugees20from the conservative planter class of Saint-Dominique. These Creole planters had hoped at the time of the French Revolution that Saint-Dominique would become a royalist refuge but when Haiti itself underwent revolution, the planter class took refuge o n the island of Cuba. These French immigrants were able to transfer a considerable amount of their assets to Cuba, where they maintained firm attachments to the customs of the ancien rkgime, including powdered wigs and contredanses, white cockades to adorn their hats,2’ the practice of naming one’s self after one’s plantation, and, of course, slavery.22These immigrants were also to help Cuba replace Saint-Dominique as the world’s largest producer of cane sugar. Before the revolt in August 1791, Saint-Dominique had been the world’s largest sugar producer, producing twice as much as its nearest rival. But at the time of the Amistad mutiny, Cuba had become the world’s largest producer of cane sugar.23French refugees also lent their capital and technical knowledge to the growth of a n entirely new slave-based Cuban industry, that of coffee. By the late 1830s Cuba’s coffee plantations numbered over two thousand units and employed around fifty thousand slaves, which roughly equaled the number of slaves employed on sugar ~ 1 a n t a t i o n s .The l ~ growth of both sugar and coffee production in Cuba led to a dramatic increase in both slave immigrants and the total slave population. T h e island of Cuba was highly profitable to mercantilist Spain; hence, it is not surprising that Spain saw it in her interests not to strictly enforce its laws against the African slave trade. Spain winked at the outlaws, and a brisk trade in African slaves continued into Cuban ports until 1864, the latest date for any region in the Western Hemisphere. The impact of the Saint-Dominique slave rebellion o n Cuba was not only economic. It also led to the tightening of slave laws and slave control mechanisms o n the island. In much of Latin America, Spanish colonials seeking to achieve an outcome similar to that secured by the masters of slaves in the Southern colonies of the United States discovered that independence could not be gained without the destruction of slavery. Indeed, in some instances independence was followed by dangerous slave revolts.l6 In Cuba, where so many had experienced firsthand the lessons learned in Haiti, the planter class chose to remain loyal for fear of arousing their slaves while the colonials

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in other parts of the Spanish empire revolted.*’ As one Cuban reformer of the time declared, “the political revolution is necessarily accompanied by a social revolution and the social revolution is the complete ruin of the Cuban race.)’** The economic boom experienced in Cuba had a wide range of ramifications. Cuba was not only the largest slave colony ever created in Spanish Americaz9but possibly the most brutal. The French immigrants had not only introduced the latest modern techniques to a totally backward sugar industry, but also some of their legendary cruelty. Increased productivity led to new experiments in slave organization. Among the experiments was the creation of a distorted labor force of predominantly younger males with very few female slaves and virtually no children in the belief that this would lead to a maximum output per worker. Cuban slavery was unique, distinguished by a new system of slave plantation labor that resulted in a particularly brutish existence for the slaves.30The outspoken British consul David Turnbull called Cuban plantation slavery “the worst sort of slavery I have seen anywhere.”)’ Nowhere was the synthesis of the ancien rigime with the defense of slavery stronger than in Cuba of the 1830s and 1840s. Cuba became the New World’s prototype for the principles of the Holy Alliance. What is more, Cuba continued to traffic in the African slave trade, and by way of Cuba the illegal importation of slaves continued into the United States, principally through the territory of Florida. Like the steady flow of fresh slaves, the principles of the Holy Alliance also found their way to the Southern United States.

***** Let us, for the moment, divert our attention from the victory of the Holy Alliance in Cuba in order to explore its more subtle victory in the Southern United States. In a previous chapter we examined the advent of a new defense of slavery which began in the 1830s. Southerners, who had previously justified slavery as a necessary evil, now proclaimed it a positive good and boasted of its civilizing benefits. As noted earlier, the positive good argument for slavery paradoxically emerged in the era of Jacksonian democracy, a period typified by egalitarian reformers who sought to rescue mankind from the injustices of a reactionary past. Consistent with the spirit of the times, part of the slaveocracy’s argument rested on the contention that Negro slavery produced a greater equality among whites than existed in the North, yet the rising tide of social reform was motivated by the belief that the principles of the Declaration most be fully instilled into American society. It was impossible to champion slavery as a positive good while at the same time defend-

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ing the principles of universal natural rights. Thus, it is not surprising that so many Southerners abandoned the principles of the Declaration to embrace the principles of European reactionaries. In Europe, the romantic movement is perhaps best understood as a protest against the rationalism and classicism which was characteristic of the natural-law doctrines of the American Founding. Although the romantic protest had its roots in the thought of Rousseau-whose theories had inspired the Jacobins-this movement came of age through the political counterrevolution which began at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. It was here that the Holy Alliance repudiated revolutionary principles in the name of a past characterized by faith, emotion, tradition, and community. Harry Jaffa has written that the (‘romanticizing of slavery in the New World paralleled the romanticizing of Europe’s pre-revolutionary monarchies and a r i s t o c r a c i e ~ . ”Thus, ~ ~ the principles of the Holy Alliance became the foundation for the South‘s attack o n the principles of the Declaration. Southern intellectuals and writers appealed to a sentimental image of plantation life while exhorting the backsliding South to return to the alters of ancestral and racial piety.j3 The character traits of the Southern gentlemen closely resembled the aristocratic “virtues” of the ancien rdgime. We recall again Adams’s description of the Southern character given to Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831: “Southerners devote themselves to bodily exercise, to hunting, to racing; they are vigorously constituted, brave, full of honour; what is called the point of honour is more delicate there than anywhere else; duels are frequent.”j4 Thus, the Southern character was especially susceptible to the alluring sway of the seductive doctrines of the Holy Alliance. Inspired, in large measure, by the novels of Sir Walter Scott, the principles of the romantic movement took deep root in the American South. Stories abound of the unparalleled vogue this Scottish novelist enjoyed below the Potomac. Northern booksellers remarked o n the trainloads of Scott novels sent while prominent Southern politicians, among them James Henry Hammond, made pilgrimages to Scotland in order to visit the grave of their literary hero.36 With the publication of Waverley in 1814 Scott established a n entirely new literary genre-the historical n0ve1.j~However, Scott’s return to the past meant veneration of the Middle Ages rather than classical antiquity. Scott emphasized fidelity to soil, family, and clan. Above all else, he championed an unquestioning loyalty to the feudal past and all the primary virtues of hierarchical order. Jefferson had despised Scott precisely because of his feudal predilections. It is said that the only novel Jefferson ever read twice was Don Quixote-because it satirized feudalism.38Jefferson’s low opinion of Scott was

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shared by John Quincy Adams.j9 But by the 18.30s Southerners had begun to take great pride in their semifeudal society that they imagined to be graced by brave knights and fair ladies. Coats of arms, often spurious, were proudly displayed, and, like their Cuban counterparts, Southern planters were fond of naming their plantation mansions, some of which were called Melrose or Kenilworth in honor of S ~ o t t . ~ In” their desire to perpetuate their unique brand of medievalism Southern aristocrats would stage jousting tournaments to supplement the Southern gentleman’s perpetual passion for racing, fishing, ponies, and h o r t i ~ u l t u r e . ~ ~ The South‘s fascination with Scott inspired a plethora of Southern imitators. Mark Twain believed that Scott played a crucial role in starting the Civil War. “He did measureless harm,” Twain contended, “more real and lasting harm, perhaps, than any other individual that ever wrote.” southerners could not embrace the “Middle-Age sham civilization” of the Holy Alliance without rejecting the principles of the American Revolution. “The Southerner of the American Revolution owned slaves,” noted Twain, “so did the Southerner of the Civil War: but the former resembles the latter as an Englishman resembles a Frenchman. The change of character can be traced more easily to Sir Walter’s influence than to that of any other thing or While Scott romanticized the Jacobite supporters of the Stuart monarchy, Southern writers celebrated Virginia’s royalist past. This somewhat exaggerated “Cavalier” tradition of early Virginia provided writers o n both sides of the Atlantic with a n ideal setting for romance novels. Colonial Cavaliers became the subject of novels by such American writers as William Gilmore Simms, William Alexander Caruthers, John P. Kennedy, Beverley Tucker, and John Esten Cooke. In the seventeenth century the colony of Virginia was distinguished from her sister colonies (particularly puritan New England) as a royalist settlement that maintained a loyalty to the Stuart monarchy that surpassed the English Cavaliers in fervor.” “Virginians boasted that King Charles the Second had been King of Virginia before he had been King of England.”44W h e n Charles I1 was a fugitive in England the colony of Virginia still issued decrees in his name, and Colonel Richard Lee was dispatched to Holland to invite Charles to set up his throne in the most loyal of his c0lonies.4~ Even while romanticizing Virginia’s loyalist past, American writers were, for obvious reasons, unlikely to directly champion the cause of monarchy. But many of the South’s antebellum novelists were vociferous defenders of slavery. Perhaps the most notable of them was William Gilmore Simms, a close friend of James Henry Hammond who used his literary renown to preach the virtues of slavery in the North. 46

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Thus, the cause of the South-the defense of slavery-came to mirror the cause of the Holy Alliance. The principles of the Founders were rejected by a new generation of Southerners who denounced the proposition “that all men are created equal.” In an earlier chapter it is noted that John C. Calhoun was the leading voice in the pro-slavery cause. In at least some respects, Calhoun’s defense of slavery was far more sophisticated than those of his less intelligent colleagues. He did not simply cherish the romantic illusion that the age of chivalry was not gone and that the South could continue to perpetuate its unique brand of feudalism in a technologically changing world. Unlike other champions of the “peculiar institution,” Calhoun’s defense of slavery did not rest o n appeals to sentiment or tradition but rather o n what he claimed were verifiable scientific laws. Calhoun sought to lay a “solid foundation for the science of government” that was modeled after astronmy.^^ Indeed, Calhoun has been aptly described as “the Marx of the Master Class.”4* Still, Calhoun shared much in common with the reactionaries of the Holy Alliance. Above all else, he shared their belief that any movement based o n the natural equality of man must necessarily lead to the anarchy of the reign of terror or the despotism of a Napoleon. Calhoun saw Europe as a sort of laboratory in which the principles of his political science were being tested. Shortly after the political upheavals of 1848, Calhoun wrote his daughter, Anna Maria Clemson, that America could see the consequences of majority rule in French politics which had not progressed beyond “Dorrism.” He went on to express his fear of “a great retrograde movement in the most advanced and civilized portion of the Still more important, Calhoun’s thought has been enveloped by the romantic movement both in his day and in our own. Calhoun’s political science became the chief support to the Rousseauian sentiment which informed the Southern defense of slavery. Indeed, these two strands of thought are more complementary than they might at first seem. I t should be remembered that Marx’s “scientific socialism” ultimately rested on a particular concept of history first introduced by Rousseau. T h e thought of both Calhoun , ~ ~ Hegel was and Marx has been accurately described as n e ~ - H e g e l i a n and perhaps the most profound of Rousseau’s many disciples.51This balancing of Calhoun’s rationalism with romantic sentiment was, in the antebellum South, exemplified by the writings of Beverley Tucker. Tucker was a William and Mary professor and an outspoken defender of slavery, which he argued was based o n the Mosaic Law. He openly embraced the principles of the Holy Alliance as they were manifested o n both sides of the Atlantic. Tucker very candidly supported the activities of European reactionaries and looked to Czar Nicholas, who had suppressed a revolution in Hungary, as the hope of

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civilization. In a letter to William Gilmore Simms, Tucker wrote that he feared the tyranny of “numbers” and claimed that if it were not for the infirmity of age, he would go to Russia and request the protection of “the Emperor Nicholas.”52Yet, in is own day, Tucker was not dismissed as a disillusioned crank and has been described as “immensely influential in provoking the South to rebellion.”53 Tucker wrote two novels, George Balcombe and The Purtisun Leader. These works clearly demonstrate the way in which the scientific rationalism of Calhoun was attached to the sentimental defense of plantation life. In George Bakombe, Tucker attempts to restate and dramatize his sentimental defense of slavery. Tucker’s theory of social hierarchy has been aptly described as a “CUrious brand of neo-medievalism” in which “the cavalier gentleman of English ancestry and unmixed blood” rules his social inferiors by virtue of his racial Balcombe believes there can be no higher honor than “to be sprung from a race of men without fear and without reproach-the ancient cavaliers of Virginia . . . men in whom the spirit of freedom was so blended with loyalty as to render them alike incapable of servility and selfishness.”jj Such men have a divine right to rule over others and Balcombe, for his part, is “well pleased with the established order of the universe. I see gradations in everything. I see subordination everywhere. And when I find the subordinate content with his actual conditions, and recognizing his place in the scale of being as that to which he properly belongs, I am content to leave him there.”56 When the narrator speaks of educating blacks, Balcombe indignantly chastises him to let “negroes alone, and instead of quacking with them, physic your own diseases. Leave them in their humility, their grateful affection, their self-renouncing loyalty, their subordination of the heart, and let it be your study to become worthy to be the objects of these sentiment^."^^ In his second novel, The Partisan Leader, Tucker dramatizes the ideas of John C. Calhoun. Its hero, Edward William Sidney, is “a zealous advocate for the rights of states”5swho preaches the gospel according to Calhoun in scene after scene. The principles of the pro-slavery cause were not destroyed when Lee surrendered to Grant at an Appomattox farmhouse in 1865. At least one thread in American conservatism still embraces these principles and in recent years has been associated with what is often referred to as Paleo-Conservatism.At the heart of Paleo-Conservatism is its identification with the state’s rights tradition of John C. Calhoun. For many years its leading spokesman was Russell Kirk, whose misguided understanding of the American Revolution was exposed in a previous chapter. Kirk wrote many articles in praise of Calhoun and, like Tucker before him, synthesized the modern rationalism informing the Disquisition on Government with the sentimental yearning for a feudal

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past. Indeed, Kirk calls Sir Walter Scott his “literary mentor,” praising the novelist for recognizing that the world is governed “not by rationality but by faith: by love, loyalty, and imagination.”j9 A still more direct heir to the cause of the Old South can be found in the Southern League, a n organization devoted to “the cultural, social, economic, and political independence and well-being of the Southern people.”6” One prominent member of the Southern League is Professor Clyde Wilson, a historian at the University of South Carolina and editor of The Papers ofJohn C. Calhoun. Interestingly, Wilson and the Southern League have indentified one man above all others as a symbol for their hatred-that man is John Quincy Adams.61 I t would be altogether fitting to return to the words of Virginia Congressman Henry A. Wise-a notorious duelist who aptly symbolized the true character of the chivalrous South-who referred to John Quincy Adams as “the acutest, the astutest, the archest enemy of Southern slavery that ever existed.”62 Adams was an object of hatred to many Southerners in his day, and in our own, for one primary reason-his lifelong and unbending commitment to the principles of the Declaration of Independence. His fight to keep the principles of the Holy Alliance from corrupting American democracy was, alas, only temporarily successful. The battle he had waged against these principles as secretary of state was continued during his presidency and culminated with his congressional career. Despite the ill will harbored against him in the South, Adams was something of a mentor to many young Northern politicians. Among his admirers were Charles S ~ m n e and r ~ ~Abraham Lincoln, who carried his legacy to a completion. We have now examined, at some length, the manner in which the principles of the Holy Alliance were preserved in Cuba and adopted in the American South. It is not without purpose that we have done so. The Amistad case is best understood within the broad context of a complex battle between competing principles. This battle took place in America but must be understood within the broader context of western civilization. It is worth remembering that the abolitionist movement in America was in large measure an offshoot of a similar movement that had begun in England. Great Britain, inspired by a fervent evangelical movement, had embarked on an international crusade to end the slave trade. This crusade was itself only the initial phase of a more ambitious project to end slavery. It is not surprising, then, that Britain took a very active interest in the Amistad case. Thus, the arrival of the Amistad Africans o n American soil set in motion a complex chain of events involving a wide spectrum of political interests. Domestic and international politics were merged in a tangled web of high and low motives as representatives of

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the British government allied themselves with American abolitionists and Southern politicians plotted with Spanish diplomats. There were complicated legal maneuvers and bitter disputes over abstruse points of law. Yet, in sorting through the many strands of this perplexing story, we find the case to be, at bottom, quite simple. The Amistad case is best understood in light of an ongoing battle between truth and will. It was a battle between the principles of the Declaration and the principles of the Holy Alliance, between reason and sentiment. Or, as Adams argued before the Supreme Court, the Amistad case was a battle between “JUSTICE”and “the impulses of sympathy.”64

***** In the spring of 1839, the Portuguese schooner Tecora came to port in Lomboko on the Guinea coast, purchased a cargo of native Africans, and transported them to Cuba. As has been noted, the importation of slaves into Cuba was prohibited by both Spanish law and treaty although slavery itself was still legal on the island. In 1817 Spain had signed a treaty with Great Britain to abolish the slave trade. The Spanish king had issued an ordinance which declared that African slaves imported into a Spanish colony after May of 1820 would be free upon arrival in any Spanish port. The Anglo-Spanish treaty was renewed in 1835 and an even stricter royal decree against the slave trade followed on November 2, 1838. However, there was never any real attempt by Spanish officials to enforce the law against the slave trade. Public officials in Cuba feared that compliance with such laws would lead to political instability and slave revolts. The laws and treaty stipulations regarding the slave trade were ignored and apparently had the “official sanction” of the mother country.65 The renewal of the Anglo-Spanish treaty had also established a joint AngloSpanish commission in Havana to deal with violations of the agreement. Under stipulations of the new treaty, British naval vessels were allowed to search suspected slavers on prima facie evidence. However, slave traders understood that the Anglo-Spanish agreement applied only to slaves purchased outside of Cuba. Slave ships replaced Spanish colors with American or Portuguese flags and under the cover of night delivered their illicit cargo to isolated inlets on Cuba’s coastline.66This potentially dangerous enterprise was described by the slave trader Theodore Canot:

A wild, uninhabited portion of the coast, where some little bay or sheltering nook exists, is commonly selected by the captain and his confederates. As soon as the vessel is driven close to the beach and anchored, her boats are packed with slaves, while the craft is quickly dismantled to avoid detection from sea

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or land. The busy skiffs are hurried to and fro incessantly till the cargo is en-

tirely ashore, when the secured gang, led by the captain, and escorted by armed sailors, is rapidly marched to the nearest plantation. There it is safe from the rapacity of the local magistrates, who, if they have a chance, imitate their superiors by exacting gratification^."^^ Once the slaves reached the island the British were powerless to stop the trade which was unofficially sanctioned by Cuban authorities. “Things are managed very cleverly in Havana,” boasted Canot, “when you know how!”68 T h e crew of the Tecora were experienced slave traders and slipped into a deserted Cuban cove in the dead of night. T h e ship was anchored and the African captives were taken ashore o n small boats and subsequently marched several miles into the jungle, where they were crammed into crude warehouses for almost two weeks. T h e n in mid-June they were marched just outside of Havana and imprisoned in a huge baracoon that during daylight hours served as a slave market. Shortly thereafter, two Cubans, twenty-four-year-old Jose Ruiz and fifty-eight-year-old Pedro Montes, bought fifty-three of the blacks. Ruiz bought forty-nine adult males at $450 apiece. Montes purchased four children, three young girls and a boy, all under the age of twelve.69They planned t o transport them by sea to the province of Puerto Principe. In order to do so, a license from the authorities was necessary, and o n June 22 Montes secured a n official passport authorizing the transport of the newly purchased slaves. Africans brought illegally t o Cuba and unable to speak the Spanish language were called botales. But the papers purchased by Montes referred to the blacks as Eadinos, or domesticated Spanish-speaking slaves, and each of the Africans was also given a false Spanish name. I t would have required little investigation o n the part of Spanish officials to determine that the blacks purchased by Montes and Ruiz were bozaks, since they spoke only languages native to Africa and could not answer to their Spanish names. On June 27, Ruiz and Montes chartered the A m i d , a schooner built in Baltimore,70for the coastal slave trade. In spite of the passports they had purchased, which included not only Spanish names but also physical descriptions of each black, Ruiz and Montes, fearing British cruisers on antislave patrols, loaded their human cargo at night. In the early hours of June 28 the Amistud set sail for Puerto Principe. On board were the ship’s captain and owner, Ramon Ferrer, two Spanish crewmembers, a slave named Antonio who served as the captain’s cabin boy, a mulatto cook named Celestino, and of course Ruiz, Montes, and the fifty-three Africans who were kept in irons in the ship’s hold.“ The Africans were poorly fed, given little to drink, and frequently

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whipped. In addition, Celestino, the cook, had indicated to the Africans through sign language that the Spaniards were planning to kill and eat them. This “made their hearts burn.”72 The journey should have taken no more than three days but adverse winds delayed their progress, and on the third night the Africans, led by a Mende named Cinque, managed to free themselves from their irons and take control of the ship. Captain Ferrer and Celestino were killed. The two white crewmen went overboard, where they presumably met their deaths. But Ruiz and Montes were spared when they managed to persuade the Africans that they could navigate the ship back to Africa. The captain’s slave, Antonio, was also spared by the Africans. The Spaniards steered the ship east by day and west at night hoping they might run into a British slave patrol or find refuge in a friendly port in the Southern United States. As fortune would have it, the schooner eventually reached Long Island, where some of the Africans, desperate for food and water, went ashore to look for provisions. On August 26, the Washington, a brig of the US. Coast Guard, commanded by Lieutenant Thomas Gedney, seized the Amistad, which was taken with its passengers to New London, Connecticut, where, unlike the state of New York, slavery was still legal. 73 In Connecticut, Gedney could seek salvage on the Amistad and its cargo, including the blacks.74Ruiz and Montes immediately claimed the Africans as their property. On the morning of August 29 Judge Andrew T. Judson of the District Court of Connecticut held a hearing on board the ship. Had it not been for the salvage claims of Lieutenant Gedney and his fellow officer, Lieutenant Mead, Judge Judson might simply have ordered the Spanish ship to be handed over to the Spanish Consul in Boston.75But putting the salvage question aside, there were immediate indications that the case was more complicated than the two Cubans would have liked American authorities to believe. None of the forty-three surviving Africans answered to the Spanish names listed on the ship’s passports, and it was clear that most of the blacks were unable to speak any European language. Judge Judson decided to refer the case to the Circuit Court. In the meantime the thirty nine African adult males would be held in the county jail at New Haven while the court decided if they should stand trial for murder and mutiny. Their leader, Cinque, would be held in irons separated from his comrades. The four black children and Antonio were not involved in the mutiny but were also kept in the New Haven jail as witnesses. Almost immediately abolitionists jumped to the defense of the Africans. They recognized at once that this case, and the public sympathy it might

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arouse, could provide them with an ideal platform to promote their cause in the Northern states. At the very least, the Amistad affair would very likely inspire a heated debate over slavery. But it was precisely this sort of emotional debate over slavery that the administration of Martin Van Buren most hoped to avoid, especially with a presidential election only a year away. T h e administration, facing domestic demands from Southern slave states and foreign pressure from the nation of Spain, was hopeful the case would not become tied up in American courts where it could become an embarrassment to Van Buren and his party. For this reason the administration put enormous pressure o n the courts to decide the case quickly and with as little controversy as possible. The abolitionist Dwight P. Jones had been aboard the Washington during Judge Judson’s hearing, and he promptly informed prominent abolitionist leaders that none of the African captives on board were legally slaves.i6 By early September a n “Amistad Committee” had been appointed for the legal and financial defense of the African captives. The committee was made up of Joshua Leavitt, a minister, lawyer, and editor of the abolitionist journal Emancipator; Lewis Tappan, a wealthy New York merchant and longtime abolitionist; and Simeon Jocelyn, a n abolitionist minister who had formerly pastored a colored church and had unsuccessfully attempted to establish a Negro college in New Haven. All three had exchanged letters with Adams, and Tappan had even tried to persuade Adams to embrace the abolitionist cause.77A t this time most Americans regarded abolitionists as, at best, misguided and bothersome agitators, while many more considered them dangerous extremists bent on destroying the Union. The more prudent abolitionists, among them Tappan, recognized that the long-term success of their cause depended o n gaining the vocal support of some prominent national figure or statesman. Adams, though not an abolitionist, had at least shown a willingness to join them in common cause against mutual enemies and had enthusiastically defended their right to petition Congress. As we shall see, however, Adams was not the first prominent statesman approached by the abolitionists, nor did he come to their aid immediately and without hesitation. But Adams did take an intense interest in the case from the moment he became aware of the unique circumstances surrounding the seizure of the Amistad. His diary entry for September 23, 1839, records his first contact with abolitionists regarding the case. Ellis Gray Loring, a Boston attorney and Garrisonian abolitionist, requested Adams’s “opinion upon the knotty questions involved in the case.”i8 Adams delayed giving his opinion, but by October 1 he noted that the Amistad case “now absorbs a great part of my time and all my good feelings.” With “extraordinary exertion” Adams

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carefully studied the legal and moral questions surrounding the case. “I examined Blackstone, iv. 7 11; Bacon’s Abridgment, v. 3 10-1 1; Valin, book 3, title 9, article 3; Emerigon, chap. xii. P. 529, punishment of piracy; Wheeler’s Law of Slavery, p. 267, from 3 Sergeant and Rawle’s Reports; 4 Peters, Condensed Reports, iv. 392; Palmer’s case, vi. 30; case of the Antelope, and Mason’s Reports, p. 360; case of the sloop Abby; and all the published accounts of the proceedings in the Circuit and District Courts in the case of the Amistad.”79Only then, and still “in too much haste,” did Adams reply to Loring’s inquiries regarding the case. Adams’s ideas were then forwarded to Tappan, who was given permission to turn them over to the defense attorneys for the Africans. In the early stages of the case the committee was able to assemble a talented and respectable legal team: Roger Baldwin, a prominent New Haven lawyer, and a pair of New York City lawyers, Seth Staples and Theodore Sedgwick. Baldwin took on the responsibilities of lead attorney.80 As noted, Ruiz and Montes had filed claims on portions of the cargo including the blacks that they claimed as slaves. They also denied Lieutenant Gedney’s right to salvage. In the meantime, the Spanish minister to the United States, Angel Calder6n de la Barca, had been appraised of the situation on September 6. Calder6n sent a long letter to Secretary of State John Forsyth, claiming that the vessel, cargo, and slaves should be restored under a 1795 treaty provision between the United States and Spain8’ Van Buren was not in Washington but Forsyth consulted on the matter with Attorney General Felix Grundy, Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury, and Postmaster General Amos Kendall. The cabinet members agreed that Calderbn’s request was warranted under the terms of the 1795 treaty,82and Forsyth sent a dispatch to Van Buren informing him of their decision. Attorney General Grundy had subsequently conducted a careful investigation of the matter in which he confirmed Forsyth’s initial opinion that the case would be decided quickly. A confident secretary of state wrote Calder6n and U.S. Attorney for the District of Connecticut William S. Holabird for evidence which could hasten compliance with the Spanish p e t i t i ~ n . ~ ’ In 1839 cases involving criminal acts such as murder and piracy went directly to the Circuit Court while the District Court handled salvage and property claims. The Amistad case was heard first in the Circuit Court on September 19, 1839. Supreme Court Justice Smith Thompson was the presiding judge. District Attorney William S. Holabird, arguing on behalf of his government, explained the request of the Spanish minister and asked Judge Thompson to issue a mandate placing the matter under the control of the

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executive. In this way the president could decide whether the Amistad and its cargo should be delivered to Spanish officials under the Pinckney Treaty of 1795 or whether the blacks should be returned to Africa.84 The attorneys for the Africans argued for a writ of a habeas corpus first for the three girls and then for all the Africans. The abolitionists believed that if the case were dismissed o n a writ of the habeas corpus they would achieve their most important objective by forcing an admission that natural rights superseded positive law and guaranteed blacks the same liberties inherent to all mankind.85 O n September 23, Judge Thompson stated the court’s opinion. While Thompson did not deny the defense’s motion for a writ of habeas corpus, he did rule that such questions involved property claims and would have to be decided by the District Court. He also ruled that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the charges of murder and mutiny. The abolitionists were pleased that the case would be decided by the District Court, but they were disappointed that Thompson did not base his decision on principles of natural law. In fact, he had insisted that such question were not germane to the case.86T h e Africans had taken possession of a Spanish ship in Spanish territorial waters. Consequently, the alleged crimes were not covered by American law, which lacked authority for vessels which were not either American or within American waters. Immediately after Judge Thompson adjourned the Circuit Court, Judge Andrew Judson convened the District Court in the same room. However, more time was needed to investigate whether the Negroes should be turned over to their Spanish claimants as property, and Judson adjourned the court until November 19. He was willing to release the Africans on bail, but because this required a n “appraisement” tacitly admitting their status as property, the attorneys for the captives refused the court’s offer and the Africans were returned to the New Haven jail, although no longer under the status of criminal^.^' The second phase of the legal process determining the fate of the Amistad blacks had now begun. The District Court would determine whether the Africans were slaves, and therefore the property of Montes and Ruiz, or free men. It was up to the abolitionists to demonstrate that the Africans had never been slaves under the laws and treaties of any nation and certainly could not have been considered slaves at the time of their capture in American waters.

***** In the interval before the court again convened, a great deal of activity took place among the interested parties on all sides. By a stroke of good fortune the abolitionists had managed to find an interpreter for the African captives. After scouring northern waterfronts Dr. Josiah Gibbs, a scholar of languages at

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Yale College, at long last found a Mende-speaking sailor in New York harbor. James Covey was a former slave and now a seaman on board the British warship Buzzard. Born in Sierra Leone, he spoke enough of his native language to act as a translator for the captives. The Africans of the Amistad were at long last able to tell their side of the story. The abolitionists also procured the services of Dr. Robert Madden, who had recently headed the British Anti-Slavery Commission in Havana. Upon hearing of the case, Madden offered to come to Connecticut to give testimony concerning the African slave trade on the island of Cuba. Madden was a committed abolitionist who had grown frustrated by his inability to make any real impact in Cuba, despite holding a position designed to oversee that the laws outlawing the Atlantic slave trade were enforced. He stated that twenty to twenty-five thousand African slaves were annually introduced onto the island of Cuba, although this had been a violation of Spanish law since 1820.@Madden had recently published a tract in Boston entitled “Regarding the Slave Trade in Cuba,” which, among other things, attacked Nicholas P. Trist, the U.S. consul to Havana, for conniving to “give a new impetus to illegal traffic in human beings” and to “render it impossible” for the British to stop the trade.89Madden contended that Trist helped to falsify documents allowing American ships to carry African slaves to Cuba under the colors of foreign nations. The pamphlet also accused Trist of abetting the slave trade between Cuba and the Independent Republic of Texas. Trist had married the granddaughter of Thomas Jefferson and acted as a private secretary to Andrew Jackson. He was, to say the least, a man with important political connections. Trist denied the charges of corruption and received the unflinching support of Secretary of State F ~ r s y t hThe . ~ ~ British minister to Washington, Henry S. Fox, provided Forsyth with a detailed letter outlining the case against Trist, but the secretary of state did not take any action. Adams’s appraisal of Forsyth‘s actions was understandably harsh. “Cicero’s divination against Caecilus,” he wrote, “presents the most parallel case to this that I have met with in history-the prosecutor in concert with the criminal.”” Eventually, a congressional investigation did clear Trist of charges that he abetted the slave trade. Nevertheless, rumors of his guilt persisted, and there was widespread speculation that Trist had only escaped prosecution because Andrew Jackson had intervened on his behalf.92Adams, for his part, was completely convinced of Trist’s guilt and continued to pursue the matter long after the Amistad case had been decided. Initially, A d a m believed Trist to be guilty of “either the vilest treachery or the most culpable indifference to his duties.”93Later, after reading through a report on Trist’s official conduct in Havana, Adam rejected the possibility that Trist might merely have been in-

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competent and declared the report “perfectly conclusive of the guilt of Trist in conniving at, aiding and abetting, by all means in his power the African slave trade by Americans, Portuguese, and Spaniards.”94Adams described Trist’s conduct as consul in Havana as “among the most remarkable phenomena of the death-struggle now in continual operation between the spirit of liberty and the spirit of bondage on this continent of North Ameri~a.”’~ Dr. Madden welcomed the opportunity to expose the cruelty of the Cuban slave trade to the American public. He visited the Africans in New Haven and gave a deposition in Hartford stating that the Amistad blacks were without question recently imported from Africa, citing as evidence his long experience in observing the illicit slave trade on the island. Madden also went to Washington to consort with Henry Fox. He gave the British minister a detailed account of the case, and Fox then paid the first of several visits to Adams, who “advised him to address a note to the Secretary of State concerning [the Amistad case], immediatel~.”~~ Fox did deliver a report to Secretary of State Forsyth that offered a full account of the illicit slave trade in Cuba which went on with the full compliance of Spanish authorities. The British diplomat noted his own government’s interest in the case and stated his hope that the president would help the Africans to attain their lawful right to liberty. Forsyth responded by delivering a curt reply to Fox, warning Britain not to interfere in the case. Forsyth‘s cold reply was in direct contrast to the conciliatory tone he took when responding to what, Adams noted, were the far more “insolent” demands of the Spanish minister. Forsyth‘s reply was undoubtedly motivated to some degree by America’s suspicion of British involvement in Cuba, which was quite naturally viewed as injurious to American interests. But Forsyth was also a Southern slaveholder committed to preserving the institution of slavery. As noted earlier in this chapter the abolitionists worked in close concert with representatives of the British government while Southern politicians did all in their power to cooperate with the representatives of reactionary Spain.

***** The abolitionists received more good news when parts of a letter Adams had sent to William Jay stating his opinions on the Amistad case were published in a number of newspapers, adding prestige to the abolitionist cause. For Adams, however, involving himself in this case only added to his already villainous reputation in the South. The abolitionists probably hurt themselves in the battle for public opinion when the lawyers for the Amistad committee filed affidavits on behalf of their clients calling for the arrest of Ruiz and Montes. Both Spaniards were

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now staying in New York City, where they were arrested and jailed in civil suits alleging that they committed assault and battery and falsely imprisoned the Africans of the Amistad. Their arrest precipitated a storm of unfavorable press from both Northern and Southern newspapers who denounced the tactics of the abolitionist “fanatics.” In the meantime the Van Buren administration was hopeful that Spanish authorities could provide documents or other evidence to help their side of the case. Angel Calder6n de la Batca had been replaced by the new Spanish minister, Caballero Pedro AlcAntara Argaiz, who continued a steady exchange of letters with Forsyth. Argaiz was more flamboyant than Calderbn, but his understanding of American political institutions appeared no better than that of his predecessor. It seemed inconceivable to Argaiz that the executive branch could not use the power of what he called the gubernativamente to enforce its will. The idea that other branches of the government might provide a check on executive power was apparently beyond his comprehension. Consequently, he continued to make unreasonable demands that were patiently answered by For~yth.~’ Forsyth confidently assured Argaiz that the eventual outcome would favor the Spaniards. In fact, strangely enough, Forsyth seemed to agree in principle with the Spanish minister. Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury had suggested to Van Buren that “perhaps nothing is lost in point of public policy by letting the judiciary take all the responsibility in respect to [the Amistud case], which they may choose to exercise.”98Forsyth‘s position was very different, and he fervently contended that treaty obligations placed settlement of the Amistad affair firmly in the hands of the president.99 Forsyth was a former congressman from Georgia who had been appointed minister to Spain in 1819, although “strongly against [the] inclination” of then-Secretary of State John Quincy Adams.loOAdams had attributed the appointment of Forsyth to his rival in the cabinet, Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford, who was at that time perhaps the most powerful member of what Adams called the slaveocracy. In 1819 Adams spoke of Forsyth as “a man of some talent but very indolent. . . . I have not formed a very exalted opinion of Forsyth‘s principles,” Adams added, “or of the loftiness or delicacy of his character.”lo’Upon returning from Spain in 1823, Forsyth‘s political star continued to rise. He was elected governor of Georgia in 1827. Under both Jackson and Van Buren he served as secretary of state, the cabinet position still widely regarded as the last step before the presidency. But A d a m had now come to believe that this Georgia slaveholder was using his position as secretary of state to interfere in the case in a manner that made a mockery of American principles of justice.

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Forsyth and his colleagues had some reason for their optimism. The presiding judge, Andrew Judson, was a Jacksonian Democrat considered friendly to the Van Buren administration. Judson had previously sparked the ire of abolitionists with his opposition to a girl’s school that admitted black students. The school had been founded by Prudence Crandel in the town of Canterbury, Connecticut. Judson, who was a town selectman for Canterbury, wanted the school shut down, claiming Crandel was promoting the amalgamation of the races. Judson was denounced by the abolitionist press, the most virulent attack against him coming from the pages of William Lloyd Garrison’s Liberator. Due to the furor created by this episode, Judson was suddenly a public figure, and many surmised that he owed his appointment as district judge to the role he played in the Crandel affair. However, when the trial was postponed until January 7, Argaiz, sensing the prospect of a n unfavorable court decision, shifted the emphasis of his demands. The Spanish minister was no longer dwelling o n his demand that the Negroes be returned as property under the stipulations of the treaty of 1795; the emphasis was now based on the proposition that “public vengeance had not been satisfied” because “the legation of Spain does not demand the delivery of slaves but of assassins.”’02 In the meantime, Forsyth agreed to a request by the Spanish minister for an American ship to transport the captives back to Cuba.lo3 Still confident of the trial’s outcome, Forsyth and Van Buren made arrangements with the Department of Navy to send a vessel to New Haven in the dead of winter in order to transport the blacks back to Cuba as soon as the trial ended. The USS Grampus under the command of Lieutenant John S. Paine was chosen for the unpleasant task. T h e Grampus was one of the smallest vessels in the US. Navy, and Paine pointed out to his superiors that it would be impossible to accommodate all the blacks below deck. They would be sailing in and out of an icy port in January during one of the coldest winters in memory. The prisoners would have to be kept on deck in irons which would mean exposure to freezing temperatures and the constant danger of being swept overboard in a storm. Despite the risk, Paine was told to proceed as planned. If the court’s decision was to go as the White House anticipated, the President’s order was to remove the prisoners to Cuba “unless an appeal shall actually have been interposed.”lo4 It was not to be taken for granted that such an appeal would be forthcoming. This order implied that the Navy should move quickly in order to get the Africans out of the country before their lawyers could appeal or initiate more legal maneuvers to keep the case alive. If the decision of the court should go contrary to the administration’s expectations District Attorney Holabird was told to immediately appeal the case.

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Before a packed courtroom, the District Court resumed proceedings on January 7. Once again the Africans were defended by the team of Staples, Sedgwick, and Baldwin. The Spanish crown was represented by District Attorney Holabird. There were also lawyers to represent the Spanish owners of the Amistad, the officers of the Washington, and an additional salvage claimant, Captain Henry Green, who had come upon the Africans when they went ashore off Long Island to hunt for provisions. The defense introduced evidence from Dr. Josiah Gibbs, James Covey, and a deposition from Dr. Madden, all of whom testified that the blacks had undoubtedly only recently arrived from Africa. A number of the Africans, including Cinque, with Covey acting as their interpreter, took the stand and testified in their own defense. The evidence supporting the defense’s contention that the blacks were never legally slaves, was overwhelming. The statement presented by the Spanish consul in Boston, Antonio Vega, actually confirmed the abolitionists’argument. Holabird introduced Vega’s statement because it argued that in Cuba, there were in effect, no laws against the slave trade. Such laws as may have been on the books were not enforced and therefore should not be considered binding. According to Vega the treaties with England “were of no avail, & being of no effect they were invalid.”105 Judge Judson handed down his decision on January 13. He began by affirming the District Court’s jurisdiction in the case. Both the mutiny and Gedney’s seizure had all taken place on the high seas, making the District Court nearest to where the vessel had first been brought in, the proper venue for trial. Then turning to questions of salvage, Judson denied the claim of Captain Green and his companions because they had never been on board the Amistad. Jusdon did, however, declare that Lieutenant Gedney and his officers were entitled to salvage one-third of the appraised value of the vessel and its cargo. After payment had been made to the officers of the Washington, the Spanish owners were entitled to the remaining property. The judge ruled, however, that there could be no salvage rights on the Africans, who were neither slaves nor Spanish subjects. The slave Antonio, who was born in Cuba, was to be restored to the representatives of Captain Ferrer. But Judson declared that no salvage could be collected on Antonio, because slaves could not be sold in Connecticut and therefore had no value. Finally, Judson decreed that the Africans should be delivered to the president in order to be transported back to Africa under the Act of 1819 outlawing the importation of slaves into the United States. Following his instructions from the White House, Holabird immediately appealed the case to the Circuit Court, excepting that part of the decision involving the slave Antonio. The Spanish owners also appealed that part of

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the decree that allowed salvage to American officers. When the appeal came to the Circuit Court in April of 1840,Judge Thompson affirmed the decision of the District Court by a pro forma decree.’@6

***** The case was now appealed to the highest court in the land. With the Supreme Court scheduled to hear the case the following January, a flurry of political activity followed the District Court’s decision. Newspapers throughout the country fumed or rejoiced at the decision. The suspicious conduct of the Van Buren administration became another topic of speculation as revelations of their behavior were uncovered by the press. Whig papers were quick to charge the president with executive interference more suitable to “Turkish d e m o c r a ~ y . ” ’ ~ ~ T h e Amistad controversy also found its way into the halls of Congress, and not surprisingly, Adams placed himself at the forefront of the fray. In the midst of charges of executive misconduct, Adams wanted all official correspondence to the case published as a House Document. Attorneys for the Africans had complained that they had been denied access to official documents relating to the case. Abolitionists charged the White House with suppressing evidence and enlisted the help of representatives John Quincy Adams and William L. Storrs. Once the documents were received by Congress a new controversy immediately erupted. House Document 185 had an important mistranslation which weakened the Africans’ case. The Spanish document had referred t o the blacks as ladinos, Negroes born either in Cuba or imported before 1820; the District Court had, however, clearly found the Africans to be bozales. But in the translation of the House Document the word ladinos had been rendered “sound Negroes,” entirely changing the meaning of the word. Adams demanded an investigation and introduced a motion to form a fiveman committee in order to look into whether House Document 185 had been “falsified, and, if so by whom.”lo8Adams himself headed the investigation but no evidence of presidential misconduct could be established. A clerk for the printing house of Blair and Rivers took the blame, and there was no proof that anyone else was involved. Adams himself appeared puzzled by the episode. He conceded in his journal that clerical errors could be made but he was certain that the Van Buren administration had interfered in the case. Although the congressional inquiry had not proved anything, Adams believed the official explanation for the mistranslation was a little too neat to be above suspicion. T h e committee hearing kept the case before the public, and the actions of pro-slavery forces also publicized the upcoming trial in the months preceding

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the next term of the Supreme Court. In the Senate the Amistud case inspired John C. Calhoun to propose two carefully worded resolutions in support of the position taken by the White House. The resolutions were unanimously passed in the Senate. In the House, Adams immediately countered by proposing four resolutions which declared that the Africans were unlawfully detained. The House refused even to receive his motion, but A d a m used his matchless mastery of parliamentary procedure to make sure that he was at least able to read his resolutions before the Chamber. Nor had Adams finished with this matter. W h e n he argued before the Supreme Court o n behalf of the Amistad Africans, he used the opportunity to publicly attack Calhoun’s resolutions in a manner which had been denied him in the House. Thus, in the following chapter we examine Calhoun’s resolutions and Adams’s statement on them in some detail. The documents released to the House of Representatives brought more examples of the Van Buren administration’s very questionable involvement in the case. In May of 1840 the abolitionist and Whig press began to publish stories about executive involvement in the Grumpus affair. By October more details about the Grumpus affair were uncovered, including the executive order commanding Lieutenant John Paine to take the captive Africans back to Cuba “before an appeal could be interposed.”lm As abolitionist suspicions regarding executive interference in the case were confirmed, the Amistud committee became more concerned about the possible outcome of the Supreme Court decision. Exposing Van Buren’s conduct in the case had made little impact o n public opinion. The American public was far more suspicious of abolitionist intentions than they were of the president of the United States. Furthermore, the abolitionists believed that seven of the nine Supreme Court justices, including Chief Justice Roger B. Taney of Maryland, were hostile to their cause. Consequently, the Amistad committee felt it necessary to rearrange their defense team. Of the three defense lawyers, only Baldwin had impressed Tappan. Staples was removed from the case. Sedgwick would stay on but was not allowed to play a significant role. Although Baldwin was a highly competent attorney, the committee felt that he lacked the national prominence that a case of this magnitude required. The abolitionists’ first choice was to request the services of the attorney and statesman most renowned for his logic, eloquence, and powers of persuasion, Daniel Webster. But Webster, who still had presidential aspirations, declined. The Amistad committee next requested the aid of Boston attorney, Rufus Choate, one of New England’s leading trial lawyers, but he also declined to take the case due to his opposition to the abolitionist cause.

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T h e Amistad committee now turned to John Quincy Adams. Years earlier the press had dubbed Adams “old man eloquent,” a nickname drawn from Milton’s tenth sonnet,’l0 and Adams had already shown his public support for the Africans of the Amistad. But, as noted, Adams’s relationship with abolitionists had sometimes been strained and he was reluctant to take the case. As we have seen, Adams followed the legal proceedings carefully from the beginning, and his diary and private correspondence indicate that the outcome of the case was of great concern t o him. We have seen that h e fought hard in Congress to keep the case before the public, but Adams was seventy-four years old. He had not argued a court case in thirtyone years, and his congressional duties allowed little time to prepare for the case. “I am too old,” he stated, “too oppressed in my duties in the House of Representatives, too inexperienced after a lapse of thirty years in the forms and technicalities of arguments before the Supreme Court. But I will cheerfully do what I have hitherto offered, that is, to give any assistance with counsel and advice to Mr. Baldwin.””’ But the persistent appeals of the abolitionists convinced Adams to do more. It was, they pleaded, “a case of life and death for these unfortunate men.” Never one to shy away when duty called, Adams finally consented to argue the case before the Supreme Court. He replaced Baldwin as lead counsel, but no jealousy or animosity was evident between the two men. Adams and Baldwin met to discuss the case o n November 17, and Adams was supplied with a brief and other materials relevant to the case. The abolitionists, who had had difficulty finding funds for the defense of the Africans, never mentioned a fee nor did Adams ever ask for one. Contrary to the conventions of most lawyers, money was not a factor in Adams’s decision to represent the captives. Throughout his long political career, Adams had always regarded financial considerations as secondary to public duty. T h e night he accepted the case, Adams wrote in his diary, “I implore the mercy of God so to control my temper, to enlighten my soul, and to give me utterance, that I may prove myself in every respect equal to the task.”l12 If Adams had doubts about his ability t o represent his clients, he received no encouragement from his family, who objected to his involvement in the case. His son Charles, who was running for a seat in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, was particularly opposed to his father’s deci~ i 0 n . l But ’ ~ once convinced of the rightness of his cause, Adams could not be swayed from his decision. He was determined to strike a blow for the cause of liberty.

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Notes 1. Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery: 1 776-1848 (London: Verso, 1990), 388. 2. Mary Hargreaves, The Presidency of John Quincy Adams (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 137. 3. John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, ed. Charles Francis adams. 12 vols. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1874-1877), vol. 6 (December 30, 1822), 72-73. 4. Quoted in Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 396. 5 . Hargreaves, The Presidency ofJohn Quincy Adams, 137. 6. Jacques Droz, Europe Between Revolutions, 1815-1848 (Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Company, 1981), 220. 7. Bemis, John Quincy Adam and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 372. 8. Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 636. 9. Blackbum, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 383, 390-91. 10. The Holy Alliance was originally formed in 1815 by the monarchs of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. This loose organization eventually included most European sovereigns. Its purported goal was to promote the influence of Christian principles in the affairs of nations. I t quickly became a lasting symbol of the ancien regime and the effort of Europe’s former governing classes to stamp out revolutionary and liberal ideas. Droz, Europe Between Revolutions, 2 17-22. 11. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 383. 12. Adams always claimed to despise party politics, in part because he feared the competing parties might become the pawns of foreign powers. Adams counseled independence for politicians, for much the same reason he counseled independence for the nation; he was fearful that factional or foreign entanglements would lead to unprincipled decisions and the corruption of America’s republican principles. Many historians have pointed out that pamphlets and letters written by the young John Quincy Adams probably influenced those passages of Washington’s Farewell Address which champion the merits of neutrality. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy 62-65; Paul Nagel, John Quincy Adams, A Public Life, A Private Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 86. 13. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 6 (November 21, 1823), 194. 14. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 6 (November 24, 1823), 199. 15. Bemis, john Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 382-408. Also see Greg Russell, John Quincy Adam and the Public Virtues of Diplomacy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press), 1995, 199. 16. Blackbum, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 383. 17. Hargreaves, The Presidency ofJohn Quincy Adams, 140. 18. Leonard Richards, The Life and Times of Congressmen John Quincy Adams, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 91; Thomas, The Slave Trade, 598.

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19. Roger G. Kennedy, Orders from France (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 158. 20. Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 387. 2 1. In France wearing a white cockade signified loyalty to the ancien rigime while wearing a red cockade distinguished one as a lacobin. In the war for independence, American revolutionaries wore blue cockades. This practice was later adopted by nullifiers in South Carolina. 22. Kennedy, Orders from France, 158. 23. Herbert S. Klein, Afncan Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 93. 24. Ibid., 93. 25. Ibid., 95. 26. This had been the case in Venezuela, for example. 27. Klein, Afncan Slavery in Latin Amm’ca and the Caribbean, 91. 28. Howard Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 19. 29. Klein, Afncan Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean, 83. 30. Ibid., 97. 3 1. Thomas, The Slave Trade, 637. 32. Harry V. laffa, “The Decline and Fall of the American Idea: Reflections on the Failure of American Conservatism” (unpublished seminar paper, April 1996), 25. 33. William R. Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and American National Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 204. 34. George Wilson Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938), 418-19. 35. Van Wyck Brooks, The World of Washington Irving (New York: E. P. Dutton &a Company, 1944), 224. 36. Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 201. Jefferson Davis made a similar trek in the summer of 1869. William J. Cooper ]r., Jefferson Davis, American (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 583-84. 37. Andrew Hook, introduction to Sir Walter Scott’s Waverley (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 9-10. 38. Brooks, The World of Washington Irving, 224-25. 39. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 11, (January 23, 1842), 69. 40. Brooks, The World of Washington Irving, 237-38. 41. Thomas A. Bailey and David M. Kennedy, The American Pageant (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1983), 331. 42. Mark Twain, The Mississippi Writings of Mark Twain (Ann Arbor, Mich.: State Street Press, 2001), 485-86. 43. Philip Alexander Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century, vol. 2 (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), 274-86. 44. William Makepeace Thackeray, The Virginians (London: The Caxton Publishing Company, n.d.), 18.

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45. Brooks, The World of Washington Irving, 225-26. 46. Carol Blesor, The Hammonds of Redcliffe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 23. 47. John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government in Union and Liberty, 5 . 48. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Trudition (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 68-92. 49. Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee, 276. 50. Jaffa, “The Decline and Fall of the American Idea; Reflections on the Failure of American Conservatism,” 23-24. 51. For a description of the relationship between the thought of Rousseau and Germanic idealistic philosophy see Leo Strauss, “The Three Waves of Modernity,” 91-93. 52. Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee, 276, 369. 53. Brooks, The World of Washington Irving, 224. 54. Taylor, Cavalier and Yankee, 173. 5 5 . Ibid., 321. 56. Ibid., 174. 57. Ibid., 174. 58. Ibid., 323. 59. Russell Kirk, The Sword of Imagination (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 434, 199. 60. George E Will, “The Agrarian Movement Against Modernity,” in The Woven Figure: Conservatism and America’s Fabric, 1994-1997 (New York: Scribner, 1997),94. 61. Ibid., 94-95. 62. Nagel, John Quincy Adams, 386. 63. Charles Sumner delivered what was perhaps the most scathing attack against the sentimental defense of slavery in his famous “The Crime Against Kansas” speech. In it Sumner compares South Carolina Senator Andrew Butler to Don Quixote. The senator from South Carolina has read many books on chivalry, and believes himself a chivalrous knight, with sentiments of honor and courage. Of course, he has chosen a mistress to whom he has made his vows, and who, though ugly to others, is always lovely to him; though polluted in the sight of the world, is chaste in his sight: I mean the harlot Slavery. . . . Let her be impeached in character, or any proposition be made to shut her out from the extension of her wantonness, and no extravagance of manner or hardihood of assertion is then too great for this senator. The frenzy of Don Quixote in behalf of his wench Dukinea del Toboso is all surpassed. . . . If the slave States cannot enjoy what, in mockery of the great fathers of the Republic, he misnames Equality under the Constitution,-in other words, the full power in the national territories to compel fellowmen to unpaid toil, to separate husband and wife, and to sell little children at the auction block,-then, sir, the chivalric senator will conduct the State of South Carolina out of the Union! Heroic knight! Exalted senator! A second Moses come for a second exodus!

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Charles Sumner, “The Crime Against Kansas, the Apologies for the Crime” (Washtngton, D.C.: Buell & Blanchard, 1856), 5 . 64. John Quincy Adams, “The Argument of John Quincy Adams Before the Supreme Court of the United States,” 1841. Reproduced in The Basic AfroAmerican Reprint Library: The Amistad Case (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1968), 7. 65. Howard Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 21. 66. Ibid., 20. 67. Theodore Canot, Memoirs ofa Slave-Trader (London: The Saint Giles Library, 1854; reprint, 1940), 94. 68. Ibid., 177. 69. Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 23. Iyunolu Folayan Osagie, The Amistad Revolt (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2000), 4. 70. Cuban slave dealers had cultivated a long and close relationship with American ship builders and merchants in Baltimore. Thomas, The Slave Trade, 578. 7 1. Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 23. 72. Grabeau, one of the Africans quoted in John W. Barber, History of the Amistad Captives (New Haven, Conn.: E. L. And J. W. Barber, 1840), 19. 73. Connecticut had abolished the right to trade in slaves or bring them into the state in 1784. The 1830 census showed that twenty-five old slaves still remained in the state. When these slaves died, Connecticut would finally rid itself of the institution. Mary Cable, Black Odyssey (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 38. See also Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 28-29. 74. Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 29. 75. Mary Cable, Black Odyssey, (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 16. 76. Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 35. 77. Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 389. 78. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (September 23, 1839), 132. 79. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (October 2, 1839), 134-35. 80. Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 40. 81. United States v . The Libellants B Claimants ofthe Schooner Amistad B c. and the Afiicans Mentioned B Discribed in the General Libels B Claims, 15 Peters U.S. Reports, (18411, 517. 82. John Forsyth to Martin Van Buren (September 18, 1839), Van Buren Papers, vol. 36 (available on microfilm). 83. Alvin Laroy Duckett, john Forsyth, Political Tactician (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1962). 84. Cable, Black Odyssey, 40. 85. Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 64. 86. Ibid., 77. 87. Cable, Black Odyssey, 43.

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88. Barber, History of the Amistad Captives, 18, 89. Quoted in Cable, Black Odyssey, 61. 90. Duckett, John Forsyth, 184. 91. Adams, Memoirs X (April 6, 1840), 255. 92. Cable, Black Odyssey, 62-63. 93. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (April 6, 1840), 255. 94. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (March 5 , 1841), 440. 95. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (March 27, 1841), 453. 96. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (January 18, 1841), 400. 97. Afncans Taken in the Amistad (U.S. 26th Congress, 1st sess., H. Exec. Doc. 185) New York, 1840; reproduced in The Basic Afio-American Repint Library (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1968), 20-22. 98. Levi Woodbury to Martin Van Buren (September 22, 1839), Van Buren Papers, vol. 36. 99. Duckett, John Forsyth, 186. 100. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 4 (February 10, 1820), 521. 101. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 4 (February 16, 1819), 263. 102. Exec. Doc. 185, 21. 103. Ibid., 37. 104. Cable, Black Odyssey, 68. 105. Quoted in Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 139. 106. 15 Peters, U.S. Reports, 519. 107. Jones, Mutiny on the Amisrad, 137. 108. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (December 10, 1840), 370. 109. Quoted in Jones, Mutiny on the Amistud, 151. 110. Nagel, John Quincy Adams, 393. 111. Quoted in Bemis, Adams and the Union, 399-400. 112. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (October 27, 1840), 358. 113. Bemis, Adams and the Union, 400401.

C H A P T E R

VI

The Amistud Case

I know of no other law that reaches the case of my clients, but the law of Nature and of Nature’s God on which our fathers placed our own national existence. . . . That law, in its application to my clients, I trust will be the law on which the case will be decided by this Court. John Quincy Adams’ In November 1840, Van Buren lost his bid for reelection, but the lame duck administration did not change its position on the Amistad case. After additional delays the trial finally began February 22, 1841, the birthday of Adams’s idol and patron, George Washington. Due to the death of Felix Grundy, a new attorney general, Henry D. Gilpin of Pennsylvania opened the case for the government. Gilpin argued that the Supreme Court must confine itself to two inquiries:

1. Has “due and sufficient proof concerning the property thereof’ been made?

2. If so, have the United States a right to interpose in the manner they have done, to obtain its restoration to the Spanish owners?’ Gilpin argued that the ship’s papers were the most important evidence in establishing ownership of property. These papers were issued by Spanish officials and were regarded as authoritative o n the island of Cuba. “The question is not whether the act is right or wrong,” he argued, “it is whether the act has been done, and whether it is an act within the scope of the a ~ t h o r i t y . ”In~ 179

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short, Gilpin contended that the courts had no authority to “go behind” the certificates issued by the governor-general of Cuba.4 The ship’s papers were official and in order, and American courts had no right to question the authority of local laws and public officers of another nation. He noted that Calhoun’s Senate resolutions had said as much. For the rest of that day and all of the next, Baldwin spoke for the defense. Baldwin pointed out that the Spanish claimants were never in possession of the Africans within American jurisdiction. Consequently, “neither by the law of comity, or by force of the treaty, are the officers or courts of the United States required, or by the principles of our government permitted to become actors in reducing them to slavery.”5The Africans were entitled to the same rights as Spaniards or any other human beings. “[Iln a case like this,” Baldwin argued, “it is admitted that the Africans were recently imported, and consequently never domiciled in Cuba, and owe no allegiance to its laws, their rights are to be determined by that law which is of universal obligation-the law of nature.”6In contrast to Gilpin, Baldwin argued that American courts were obliged to place themselves in the position of judging Spanish laws. “How can our court do otherwise, when Spanish subjects call upon them to enforce rights which, if they exist at all must exist by force of Spanish laws . . . neither the law of nature nor the law of nations authorizes the slave trade. . . . If they are slaves then it must be by some positive law of Spain, existing at the time of their recent importati01-1.”~Since it was clear that no such law existed, Baldwin believed the Court should look to the law of nature as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence to decide the case. To do otherwise “would be to violate the natural rights of man.’@ Adams referred to Baldwin’s argument as “sound and eloquent but exceedingly mild and moderate in arg~ment.”~ On February 24, it was Adams’s turn to argue the case before the Supreme Court.

***** Adams began his Argument by stating that “an apology might well be expected,” for he feared he would be unable to render the kind of service to his clients that he “earnestly desire[d] to render”1° because his congressional duties had allowed him little time to prepare for the case. But Adams refused to waste the Court’s time with apologies, taking “consolation from two sources”: first, his clients had previously been ably defended by his colleague and, second, he found comfort from the knowledge that the Supreme Court was “a Court of JUSTICE.” The latter conviction was the foundation of his entire argument. Thus, however trivial it might have seemed, Adams felt compelled to ask “the court to consider what justice is.”” Adams understood jus-

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tice to be eternal and timeless. Justice had been defined nearly 1,500 years ago in the institutes of Justinian, and justice is “understood by all who understand human relations and human rights‘Constans et perpetua voluntas, jus SUUM cuique tribuendi.’ ‘The constant and perpetual will to secure to every one HIS OWN right.””’

According to Adams, justice is based o n right. Justice, discernible 1,500years ago, can be “understood today” because “human relations and human rights” can be understood. Of course, such a n understanding presupposes that humans are rational, and that through the exercise of reason human beings are capable of distinguishing between justice and injustice. Indeed, the duty of the Supreme Court as “a Court of Justice” required that, where there are two parties present, justice demands that the rights of each party should be allowed to himself, as well as that each party has a right, to be secured and protected by the Court. This observation is important, because I [Adams] appear here on the behalf of thirty-six individuals, the life and liberty of every one of them depend on the decision of this Court. The Court, therefore, I trust, in deciding this case, will form no lumping judgment on these thirty-six individuals, but will act on the consideration that the life and the liberty of every one of them must be determined by its decision for himself alone.”

For Adams, a rational understanding justice was directly tied to a rational understanding of individual rights. He did not speak of collective rights or defend his clients as a group, race, or social class. Rather, he explicitly emphasized that he was defending thirty-six individuals. He believed this doctrine of individual rights provided the only rational foundation for justice and the basis of sound jurisprudence for the Court. Adams felt compelled to remind the Court about the meaning of justice for a reason. He believed that the executive branch had “taken, with reference to this case, the ground of utter injustice.”14 In all their proceedings in the case, the executive had substituted sympathy for justice: “Sympathy with one of the parties in this conflict of justice and antipathy to the other.”’j Thus, Adams distinguished between justice based on reason and injustice based on passion, between objective rights and subjective sympathies. Adams’s plea that the Court judge his clients as “thirty-six individuals” is also instructive. The idea of group rights dominates the contemporary “civil rights” movement. What is more, the modern Supreme Court has come perilously close to rejecting the doctrine of individual rights-which provides

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the very basis for the idea of liberal jurisprudence-in favor of a doctrine of group rightsL6As noted, the Founders’ conception of individual rights presupposes the natural equality of all humanity. The principles of the Declaration point us back to a theoretical construct-the state of nature-where man exists prior to the formation of political communities. The equal natural rights mankind possessed in the state of nature provides the basis for equal civil and political rights within civil society. It bears repeating that the political community, seen from the perspective of Adams, is a voluntary community. It is formed by the unanimous consent of the people, though it is implied in the original compact that the majority will act as a practical surrogate for the whole. Yet the people remain united by their adherence to “the laws of nature and nature’s God,” and the majority can only act as a substitute for the whole because it represents the minority as well as itself. So for Adams, just government must be founded by a people in accordance with the principles of the Declaration. It should be reiterated that there could be disputes within the political process o n how to convert these principles into political institutions and how to extend and secure them for all those who might rightfully claim their blessing. But in a regime founded o n the principles of the Declaration there could be no dispute about whether the natural rights of man ought to be extended and secured. Nor could there be disputes about whose natural rights should be extended and secured. In this respect, every single individual-regardless of race, caste, or class-stood on the same footing. Thus A d a m was confident that a court of justice would judge his clients as thirty-six individuals and recognize its duty t o protect their rights without regard to their place of origin or the color of their skin. For justice is “the constant and perpetual will to secure to everyone HIS OWN right.” Only a court which disallowed any consideration of class or group rights would be consistent with the dictates of principled constitutional government. For the very foundation of liberal jurisprudence rests in the moral obligations of individual human beings. In fact, if human beings did not possess the attributes of individual moral responsibility the entire premise of law itself would become essentially meaningless. Jurisprudence, and indeed citizenship in a political community, must assume that individuals can be held responsible for their own acts. This assumption would be undermined if standards of right and wrong varied in accordance to one’s class or group status. As Edward J. Erler points out, one of the most important principles of liberal jurisprudence contends that where the law creates an injury it must also provide a remedy.17 This rule is the acknowledged maxim that “the one whose primary right has been violated immediately acquires a secondary right to obtain an appropriate remedy from the wrongdoer, while the wrongdoer him-

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self becomes the subject to the secondary duty of giving or suffering such remedy.”lRThe inevitable corollary to this formula is that no one could be made part of the remedy who has not been part of the injury. But both of these dictums assume that the individual is the recipient of these rights. Group rights, of the sort advocated by John C. Calhoun, or by many in the modern civil rights movement, give remedies to individuals who have not necessarily been injured and injure other individuals who have not violated the rights of others. Consequently, the correlation between injury and remedy, essential to a liberal jurisprudence, becomes completely arbitrary.19 For Adams, this could only be seen as a dismal return to the gloomy age of ignorance and superstition where might made right and justice was nothing more than the will of the stronger.

***** In an effort to prove that his clients had “been wronged by the course pursued by the excutive,” Adams offered as evidence a letter from Secretary of State Forsyth to the Spanish minister, Argaiz, describing how Ruiz and Montes were found off the coast of the United States. They were found in this distressing and perilous situation by officers of the United States, who, moved toward them bj sympathetic feeling which subsequently became as it were national, immediately rescued them from personal danger, restored them to freedom, secured their oppressors, that they might abide the consequences of the acts of violence perpetrated upon them, and placed under the safeguard of the laws all the property which they claimed as their own, to remain in safety until the competent authority could examine their title to it, and pronounce upon the question of ownership agreeable to the provisions of the 9th article of the treaty of 1795.?@ Adams did not place blame on Lieutenant Gedney for his first sympathies, nor did he find fault with the first actions of the District and Circuit Courts in the Amistad case. After all, in order to hold an inquiry which might determine “the rights of all parties,” the seizures and arrests had to be made. However, the decision of the District Court found in favor of the Africans, thus proving “that the decisions of JUSTICE were not in accordance with the impulses of sympathy, and that consequently the sympathy was wrong before.”2’ As Adams expanded his argument, he continually chastised the Van Buren administration for meddling in the case. For if there was to be any executive interference “the duty incumbent upon this intervention was not a favor, but impartiality-not of sympathy, but of JUSTICE, dispensing to every individual his own right.”22Adams contended that a spirit of sympathy toward

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the Spaniards and antipathy toward the Africans pervaded the entire nation. But he pleaded with the judges to resist the temptation to base their decision on “sympathies” or “feelings.” He was “duty-bound to call upon [the] Court to restrain itself in the sacred name of JUSTICE.”’3

***** Adams argued that United States vs. Cinque was anomalous and without precedent. Indeed, he believed that no law, statute, constitution, code, or treaty was applicable to the case except that law (pointing to the copy of the Declaration of Independence hanging against one of the pillars of the Court), that law, two copies of which are ever before the eyes of your Honors. I know of no other law that reaches the case of my clients, but the law of Nature and Nature’s God on which our fathers placed our own national existence. The circumstances are so peculiar, that no code or treaty has provided for such a case. That law, in its application to my clients, I trust will be the law on which the case will be decided bv this Court.*J

Previous chapters examined Adams’s understanding of the relationship between the Constitution and the Declaration. In Jubilee, he contended that the Constitution was “a compliment to the Declaration of Independence; founded upon the same principles, carrying them out into practical execution, and forming with it, one entire system of national govemment.”lj We might also recall his words in an 1804 Senate debate on the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase in which he “quoted the highest possible authority for an American citizen; I mean the Declaration of Independence.”26But Adams now was contending for the lives of thirty-six human beings, and the Court’s proceedings were not only being scrutinized by the American public, but by a large and attentive international audience. With the eyes of much of the world focused upon him, Adams pointed to the law on which the case should be decided. The fact that thirty-six lives hung in the balance added an element of drama that served to magnify the importance of the issues to be decided. It was now up to the Court to decide whether to retum the Africans to Cuba, and almost certain death, or to grant them their freedom in accordance with the laws of nature. With a nation more and more divided by the issue of slavery, the Court was faced with the even more important duty of proclaiming to the world the foundations of American law. Given the gravity of the case, it would be difficult to be unmoved by Adams’s simple appeal to the principles of the Declaration. His words should elicit a profound sense of pride in the law “on which our Fathers placed our national existence.” Yet, as noted in a previous chapter, most of America’s

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political leaders, Supreme Court justices, and legal scholars deny that the principles of the Declaration are relevant t o constitutional interpretation. If it is still possible to find wisdom and truth in ideas embraced by thinkers from the past, then perhaps a sober appraisal of contemporary American jurisprudence is in order. It might, however, be argued that an appeal to the principles of the Declaration merely demonstrated that there was no constitutional issue to be decided in this case. As Adams could not point to any part of the Constitution on which the Court might decide the case, perhaps his argument was irrelevant for issues relating to constitutional interpretation. Yet, such an argument would require that one understand the Constitution differently than A d a m understood it. It has been unequivocally demonstrated that Adams believed the principles of the Declaration were the principles of the Constitution. If Adams were asked what part of the Constitution his Argument was referring to, it is likely he would say its underlying principles. As he was fond of noting, the Declaration predates the Constitution and supplies its principles. For Adams, and the Founders, the Declaration could not be divorced from the Constitution. One could speak of the Declaration as a special provision of the Constitution-the foundational provision. “The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States,” Adams declared, “are parts of one consistent whole, founded upon one and the same theory of g o ~ e m m e n t . ” ~ ~

***** Immediately after invoking the Declaration of Independence, Adams turned the attention of the Court to the Senate resolutions first proposed by John C. Calhoun, perhaps the most notorious critic of the Declaration. Adams did not take issue with the “correctness” of the principles of Calhoun’s Senate resolutions. Months earlier he had taken up that particular challenge in his capacity as a member of the House of Representatives.2s At this point, Adams was content to demonstrate that had Calhoun’s resolutions been followed, the Africans should never have been seized. The resolutions read as follows:

1. Resolved-That

a ship or vessel o n the high seas, in time of peace, engaged in a lawful voyage, is according to the laws of nations under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state to which her flag belongs as much as if constituting a part of its own domain. 2. Resolved-That if such ship or vessel should be forced, by stress of weather, or other unavoidable cause into the port, and under the jurisdiction of a friendly power, she and her cargo, and persons o n board,

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with their property, and all the rights belonging to their personal relations, as established by the laws of the state to which they belong, would be placed under the protection which the laws of nations extend to the unfortunate under such circu~nstances.~~ Adams noted that had Calhoun’s resolutions been followed, the Africans should never have been seized, nor Ruiz and Montes treed. According to the first resolution, Lieutenants Gedney and Meade had no right to board the Amistud. If the second resolution had been followed, the Africans in charge of the vessel should have been treated kindly and with the due respect accorded to officers of a friendly power. Clearly, the Africans were in possession of the Amistad. The vessel was not under the Spanish flag, and the Africans were actually masters over the captive Spaniards. Perhaps under the laws of their tribe the Spaniards were slaves.j0

***** Adams’s Argument continued its condemnation of the conduct of the Van Buren administration throughout the entire affair. Some of Adams’s accusations included intimations that the executive branch suppressed important information that was requested by Congress, and that the administration also tried inappropriately to influence and even usurp judicial authority. Adams also criticized executive officials for not appropriately answering the insolent and sometimes outrageous demands of the Spanish minister. After concluding his review of executive involvement in the case, Adams turned his attention to an article that had been recently published in the Official Journal of the Executive Administration which was purported by the editor to be “the production of one of the brightest intellects of the He did not know who the author was, but he noted that the article seemed to appear with “almost official sanction” on the day the Court opened. The article’s author began with the claim that the District Court decision was “one of the deepest importance to the southern states.” Adams believed such words could only obfuscate the issue before the Court. His response was to ask, “Is that an appeal to JUSTICE?”32 Adams contended that when properly considered, the case had nothing whatsoever to do with the Southern states and Southern issues. Again, individual rights and not group interests were at issue. Adams speculated that the purpose of the letter had been to “excite prejudice” and “arouse all the acerbates of feeling” between the different sections of the Union in order to influence the outcome of the Court’s decision “in favor of the alleged interests of the southern states and against the suppression of the African slave

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trade.”j3 It was not Adams’s purpose to review the entire essay before the Court. But he did wish to call the Court’s attention to “the original principle of slavery, as laid down by this champion of the i n ~ t i t u t i o n . ”Slavery ~~ had been espoused by the author as a great principle of national law, and Adams sought to demonstrate that such a principle is diametrically opposed to the nation’s founding principles and as such provided no ground by which a court might decide cases. Adams then read a paragraph of this article to the Court. The truth is, that property in man has existed in all ages of the world, and results from the natural state of man, which is war. When God created the first family and gave them the fields of the earth as an inheritance, one of the number, in obedience to the impulses and passions that had been implanted in the human heart, rose and slew his brother. This universal nature of man is alone modified by civilization and law. War, conquest, and force, have produced slavery, and it is state necessity and the internal law of self preservation, that will ever perpetuate and defend it.j5

Adams responded to this statement by asking, “Is this the principle recog nized by this court? Is this the principle of that DECLARATION?”36His published Argument then reports that he pointed again to the two copies of the Declaration of Independence hanging on the wall of the Court. Once again, Adams seized the opportunity to contrast the principles of the Declaration with those principles which sought to justify slavery. He noted that, according to the OfficialJournal, war gives the right to take the life of one’s enemy, and this in turn gives a right to make one’s enemy a slave because his life was spared. Adams’s response to this claim was to ask; “Is that the principle on which these United States stand before the Still pointing to the Declaration, he reminded the Court that every man is “endowed by his creator with certain inalienable rights,” and that “among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” If these rights are inalienable they are incompatible with the rights of the victor to take the life of his enemy in war, or to spare his life and make him a slave. If this principle is sound, it reduces to brute force all the rights of man. It places all the sacred relations of life at the power of the strongest. No man has a right to life or liberty, if he has an enemy able to take them from him. There is the principle. There is the whole argument of this paper.jY

The theme of Jubilee is revisited as Adams uncovers the foundations of two competing notions of justice. For the defender of slavery, justice is merely the interest of the stronger, but for Adams justice must be consistent with the “laws of nature and of nature’s God.”

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Adams recognized that the principles espoused by the “bright intellect of the South” had their foundation in the philosophy of Hobbes. Many Southern writers, including the South‘s greatest mind, John C . Calhoun, used the writings of Hobbes t o provide justification for their political int e r e s t ~ Calhoun’s .~~ Hobbesianism was, to be certain, highly unorthodox, for he rejected the Hobbesian idea of man’s equality in the state of nature.40 Yet Hobbes was nonetheless a valuable source in Calhoun’s effort to replace the doctrines of the Declaration. For his part, Adams regarded Hobbes’s Leviathan as “exceedingly obnoxious-more, however for its anti-religious than for its monarchical principles. . . . It seems to me there is nothing in the book worth retaining.”41 Like Alexander Hamilton,42 what Adams found most objectionable in Hobbes was his moral relativism and atheism. He correctly recognized that without God morality was simply the will of the stronger. Adams’s argument before the Court continued, he assumes it therefore without a blush, as Hobbes assumed it to prove that government and despotism are synonymous words. I will not here discuss the right or the rights of slavery but I say that the doctrine of Hobbes, that War is the natural state of man, has for ages been exploded, as equally disclaimed and rejected by the philosopher and the Christian. That it is utterly incompatible with any theory of human rights, and especially with the rights which the Declaration of Independence proclaims as self-evident truths. The moment you come, to the Declaration of Independence, that every man has a right to life and liberty, an inalienable right, this case is decided. I ask nothing more in behalf of these unfortunate men, than this declaration. The opposite principle is laid down, not by an unintelligent or unthinking man, but is given to the public and to this court as coming from one of the brightest intellects of the South. Your Honors, see what it comes to when carried Adams was adamant, contrary to “the brightest intellects of the South,” nothing could be more foreign to the thought of the American Founding than to identify it with the “exceedingly obnoxious” doctrines of Hobbes. Adams’s view of Hobbes is worthy of some additional scrutiny if only because there are many today who identify the American Founding as essentially Hobbesian. Indeed, this position is held by some of the most prestigious and justifiably respected scholars in America. Perhaps the most notable proponent of this view of the Founding is Professor Harvey Mansfield Jr. of Harvard University. Mansfield argues that it is only possible to understand the American Founding if we return

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to a beginning long before the Constitution in modem political philosophy. That beginning is none other than the “state of nature” described by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, a concept that has lost most of its force today but that still had currency among the F0unders.4~ Mansfield then contrasts the “modern philosophy” which informs the American Founding with classical political philosophy as it “is conveniently found in Aristotle.” The crux of his contention is that “a regime based upon the self-evident half-truth that all men are created equal will eventually founder because of its disregard of the many ways in which men are created unequal.”)j T h e unhappy source of this regime’s inevitable demise may be found in the “fateful conception” of the state of nature. A lengthy analysis of Locke’s state of nature and of its importance to the Founding has already been provided. Mansfield apparently sees no significant difference between the state of nature as it was understood by Locke and the state of nature as it was understood by Hobbes. But for Adams, and the Founders, the Hobbesian concept of the “natural state of man . . . is utterly incompatible with any theory of human rights, and especially with the rights which the Declaration of Independence proclaims as self-evident truths.” The Hobbesian state of nature provided the justification for absolute monarchy and for slavery. Consequently, it was “equally disclaimed and rejected by the philosopher and the Christian.” The Hobbesian version of the state of nature constructs an argument that is based o n the “opposite principle” laid down in the Declaration. In previous chapters it is demonstrated that Adams and the Founders did not believe the doctrines of the American Founding represented a break with classical political philosophy. To be sure, they understood that the doctrines of the Declaration relied heavily on the teachings of John Locke, and without doubt they believed the American Founding represented a great improvement in the “science of politics.” As Adams stated in a passage referred to earlier, the principles of the Declaration had been working themselves “into the mind of man for many ages.” In the minds of the Founders the political philosophy of Locke was building upon (rather than replacing) the time-honored foundations of classical political philosophy. Adams believed that the political doctrines of Locke were central to the Founding, but he read Locke through the lenses of classical political philosophy. It is entirely possible that Locke believed he was precipitating a radical break with the classics, but this is not how the Founding Fathers read him. As Harry Jaffa has pointedly noted, the history of political philosophy is not synonymous with the history of political thought.46 In our analysis of Jubilee it was

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demonstrated that the advent of Christianity profoundly changed the politics of the western Without due attention to the unique political conditions of the postChristian world, any attempt to utilize the principles of classical political philosophy would be futile. It was shown earlier that the principles of the Declaration did not precipitate a radical break with the classics. To the contrary, the American Founding can be justifiably understood as the reapplication of Aristotilian principles in radically altered circumstances.

***** Adams then proceeded to point to inconsistencies in demands made by the Spanish government. For example, he noted that the permit for the slaves which Spanish officials claimed as authority for their demands was invalid, for it left blank the description of the persons named, making it impossible for a court to ascertain whether these persons were the same as those taken on the Amistad. In the final section of his Argument, Adams presented an extended analysis of the Antelope case, a Supreme Court decision often referred to by prosecutors and Spanish officials as a precedent for the Court to deliver the Africans of the Amistad to Spanish authorities in Havana. The late Attorney General Felix Grundy had made the Antelope case the foundation of the report he delivered to President Van Buren in 1839. Citing this case, Grundy’s report argued that the Africans of the Amistad should be surrendered in mass to Spanish authorities. The Antelope was a Spanish slave ship captured by American privateers commissioned by Jose Gervasio Artigas, then the ruler of the Oriental Republic of La Plata. In June of 1820, the privateers were captured off the coast of Florida, suspected of illegally introducing Negroes for sale within the United States. This event precipitated lengthy and complicated Court proceedings that eventuated in the decision of the Supreme Court to return a small number of the slaves to Spanish authorities. Both the Spanish minister and prosecutors in the Amistad case had pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision as a precedent for returning the Africans of the Amistad to their Spanish owners. But Adams pointed out repeatedly in his forty-page analysis of the Antelope case that, according to the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, “NO PRINCIPLE WAS SETTLED.” This phrase becomes a sort of mantra for Adams, but his analysis goes much deeper. To begin with, he points out that the Amistad and the Antelope cases bear very few similarities. In fact, so dissimilar were the two cases, that a close examination of the Antelope should have led to the opposite conclusion of that reached by prosecutors in the Amistad case.

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Like the Amsitad case, the Antelope was heard before the District and Circuit Courts of the United States before it reached the Supreme Court. Although the decisions of the three courts varied widely, as did opinions among the justices of the Supreme Court, all were agreed o n one important point: if the case had occurred after the abolition of the slave trade by Spain, the judgment would have been different. The Antelope had left Havana o n her slave trading expedition and been captured by the pirates before May 20, 1820, and consequently before the legal prohibition of the slave trade by Spanish law had taken effect. The Amistad captives had by contrast been imported to Cuba in open defiance of Spanish law that prohibited the African slave trade. Furthermore, the Africans of the Amistud, when captured off the coast of New York, were not even in the condition of slaves. The Africans were free men, and in possession of the schooner and all the cargo o n the vessel. In fact, it was Ruiz and Montes who could more rightly have been considered slaves at the time of Lieutenant Gedney’s intervention. But Adams’s discussion of the Antelope case was not simply to show that it did not provide a precedent for returning his clients to Havana. His analysis also criticized the decisions rendered by all the courts involved in the case, and even the opinion of his old friend, Chief Justice John Marshall, did not go entirely unscathed. The focus of Adams’s criticism of the Court was its failure to recognize the authority of the principles of the Declaration of Independence when rendering their decision. Marshall stated, “that [the slave trade] is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied. That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor, is generally admitted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will seem to be the necessary result of this a d m i ~ s i o n . ”But ~~ although the slave trade was contrary to the law of nature, Marshall noted that at the time of his decision it was not contrary to the law of nations. Adams criticized Marshall for the very cautious and wary manner in which he stated the moral principles proclaimed in the Declaration as self-evident truths. Because these truths were confronted with a matter of fact-the fact of the slave trade-Marshall was apparently reluctant to use the Court’s power to secure the unalienable rights of the unfortunate captives aboard the Antelope. Adams responded by stating “with all possible reverence for the memory of Chief Justice Marshall, and with all due respect for his argument in this case, I must here be permitted to say, that here begins its fallacy.”49Adams did not deny what his entire career had demonstrated; that necessity may require compromises with the goal of realizing the full attainment of the principles espoused in the Declaration. His criticism of Marshall rested on his belief that necessity did not dictate such a compromise in the Antelope case. The slave

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trade had already been abolished by nearly all Christian nations, and the vital spirit of the laws of this nation should have taken precedence against the proprietary rights of Spanish slave traders. A vessel had been captured off the coast of the United States engaged in the illegal slave trade. By law, slaves taken in this condition were immediately to gain their freedom. Surely the spirit of this law would give precedence to the natural rights of slaves instead of the legal rights of Spanish slave traders who were not even in possession of their property. Marshall’s decision relied heavily on the opinion of the British judge, Sir William Scott. In the Louis case, Scott, referring to the slave trade, stated,

A court, in the administration of law, cannot attribute criminality to an act where the law imputes none. I t must look to the legal standard of morality; and upon a question of this nature, that standard must be found in the law of nations, as fixed and evidenced by general and ancient and admitted practice, by treaties, and by the general tenor of the laws and ordinances, and the formal transactions of civilized states: and looking to these authorities, he found a difficulty in maintaining that the transaction was legally criminal.50

Adams understood the matter differently, In the Declaration of Independence the laws of Nature are announced and appealed to as identical with the laws of nature’s God, and as the foundation of all obligatory human laws. But here Sir William Scott proclaims a legal standard of morality, differing from, opposed to, and transcending the standard of nature and of nature’s God. This legal standard of morality must, he says, in the administration of law, be held, by a Court, to supersede the laws of God, and justify, before the tribunals of man, the most atrocious of crimes in the eyes of God. With such a principle it is not surprising that Sir William Scott should have found a difficulty in maintaining that the African slave trade was legally criminal, nor that one half the Supreme Court of the United States should have adopted his conclusions. I t is consolatory to the friends of human virtue and of human freedom to know, that this error of the first concoction, in the moral principle of a British judge, has been, so far as relates to the African slave trade, laid prostrate by the moral sense of his own country, which has overcome the difficulty of finding the slave trade criminal, by the legal and national abolition of slavery itself.51

Sir William Scott presented a legal argument, the likes of which we have now seen many times before. Scott’s jurisprudence was not inconsistent with the principles of the British Constitution. However, as we have seen inlubike,

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Adams clearly distinguished the principles of the British and American Constitutions and the prescriptive or historical rights of Englishmen and the natural rights of man. While the rights of Englishmen might, in many instances, be consistent with the rights of man, they were based in the particular history, traditions, and customs of England and not on an explicit appeal to nature. Consequently, one should not be surprised that Scott’s Yegd standard ofmmulity” is based o n (‘general and ancient admitted practice” rather than (‘the standard of nature and nature’s God.” It has been noted that the British Constitution has provided something of a model for the American proponents of a “living constitution.” Yet Scott’s decision is perfectly consistent with the legal positivism endorsed by the “conservative” defenders of the new jurisprudence of original intent. This should not be surprising, as we have already demonstrated that the two major schools of modern constitutional interpretation are not as different as they might first appear. In Adams’s critique of Scott we see the fundamental weaknesses intrinsic to both perspectives. Judge Scott, like Judge Bork and Justice Rehnquist, believed the morality of the law was derived simply from the fact that it was enacted. Scott’s legal standard of morality was gleaned from “the law of nations, as fixed and evidenced by general and ancient and admitted practice, and by the general tenure of laws and ordinances, and the formal transactions of civilized states.” From these sources he found nothing by which he might condemn the slave trade. Like Bork, Scott did not believe a judge could go beyond “the text, history, and logical structure” of a legal document in order to judge the morality of an act. And like Justice Rehnquist, Scott did not believe that legal standards of morality could have any ground in any “idea of natural justice.” By contrast, Adams contended that there is a “foundation of all obligatory human laws.” The foundation he speaks of is the “laws of nature” which are “identical with the laws of nature’s God.” For this reason Adams condemns Scott in language which today could as easily be directed to the likes of Rehnquist, Bork, and Meese, for they all profess a legal positivism which proclaims ‘(a legal standard of morality, differing from, opposed to, and transcending the standard of nature and of nature’s God.” Legal positivism differs from, and is opposed to, the principles of the Declaration because the only standard of morality it can recognize is based o n power and not on right. We might perhaps excuse Sir William Scott his error since, as a British judge, he would certainly have recognized what was already the most important provision of the British Constitution-parliamentary sovereignty. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty was established as a judicial rule following the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the ensuing Bill of Rights, which established the relationship between Crown and Parliament.5z Writing in the nineteenth century, the great

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constitutional lawyer, A.V. Dicey, stated that parliamentary sovereignty gave Parliament “the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”53 This is a principle of power, not of justice, and as Adams noted in Jubilee it was a principle that forced the American colonies into revolt. Yet it is a principle that is, in the most decisive sense, embraced by the contemporary American defenders of a jurisprudence of original intent. Of course, the United States has a written Constitution that cannot be amended by a simple act of legislation. But the jurisprudence of Bork and Rehnquist does little more than replace the will of Parliament with the will of a democratic majority.54 Let us return once again to Justice Rehnquist’s classic statement of legal positivism.

I f . . , a society adopts a constitution and incorporates in that constitution safeguards for individual liberty, these safeguards do indeed take on a generalized moral rightness or goodness. They assume a general social acceptance neither because of any intrinsic worth nor because of any unique origins in someone’s idea of natural justice but instead simply because they have been incorporated in the constitution by the people.5i Rehnquist’s legal standard of morality is in principle n o different from Scott’s. Had Rehnquist written in Scott’s day he would have been just as powerless to attribute criminality to the slave trade. Whatever his personal feelings o n the slave trade might be, legal positivism binds one to the positive law. T h e consequences of what Adams called “this error of the first concoction” would be even more sinister if a judge found himself in Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia. Scott’s legal standard of morality becomes a substitute for any rational ground or basis that might provide a moral foundation for legal standards. T h e law is moral simply because it is the law. According to Adams such a view of morality seeks to render superfluous the laws of nature and nature’s God. All law and hence all morality is ultimately nothing more than the product of human will. As such, it can “supersede the laws of God, and justify, before the tribunals of man, the most atrocious of crimes in the eyes of God.” Thus Adams pointed the Court to the authority of God, which is at the same time the authority of right reason. Once again, he brought reason and revelation together as partners in the battle against arbitrary power.

***** In the Antelope case Chief Justice Marshall declared that “the legality of the capture of a vessel engaged in the slave-trade depends o n the law of the

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country to which the vessel belongs. If that law gives its sanction to the trade, restitution will be decreed: if that law prohibits it, the vessel and cargo will be condemned as good prize.” Even if this principle was sound, it would not have justified returning the Amistad Africans to Havana. As noted, it was the Africans who were in possession of the vessel and the Spaniards who were their captives. If the situation had been reversed and the Spaniards had been in possession of the Amistad, they still would have been in violation of the laws of Spain. Thus, Adams ended his analysis of the Antelope case by pointing out that the principle on which the case was decided, if applied to the Amistad, would have required the freedom of his clients.

***** Finally, Adams reminded the Court that he began his argument with a plea for justice from a court of justice. In the final paragraph of his Argument he noted that it had been more than thirty-seven years since he had last appeared before the Supreme Court. “I appear again to plead the cause of justice,’’ Adams stated, “and now of liberty and life, in behalf of many of my fellow men, before the same Court which in a former age I had addressed in support of the rights of pro pert^."'^ Throughout his entire public life Adams defended and championed the natural rights of the Declaration. Characteristic of his career, as his public life came to a close, he advanced from the defense of property rights to the more crucial rights of liberty and life. Adams brought his argument to a close on March 1, 1841, and when he had finished his argument, the Court’s large audience sat silent, only stirring when the justices rose to leave. Samuel Flagg Bemis describes Adams’s courtroom performance this way, As the old man spoke, his years seemed to drop away. Infirmities fell from him as always they did in combat. His aged voice took on the spirit of youth. His watery eyes grew strong with a blaze of righteous scorn. He was bitter in his sarcasm at those who would make slaves out of resolute free men, damning in his strictures on an executive power that would deliver them over to the vengeance of foreign slave holders-expanding his arguments to general principles of human morality. From the bench the Justices fixed their eyes on him hour after hour.j7

More than 160 years have gone by and the substance of Adams’s Argument has been largely forgotten. Yet his words have not lost their capacity t o stir the soul. His sense of duty to the cause of justice and his perpetual desire to elevate public debate are captured in the final sentences of his Argwnen t.

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In taking, then, my final leave of this Bar, and of this Honorable Court, 1can only ejaculate a fervent petition to Heaven, that every member of it may go to his final account with as little of earthly frailty to answer for as those illustrious dead, and that you may, every one, after the close of a long and virtuous career in this world, be received at the portals of the next with the approving sentence-Well done, good and faithful servant; enter thou into the joy of the Lord.jh

***** The next day, Henry D. Gilpin made closing arguments for the govemment. The attorney general carefully addressed the technical legal points presented by Adams’s colleague Roger Baldwin, but paid little attention to the points raised by Adams. Adams’s argument did not go unnoticed by the justices of the Court, however. The Court’s decision was announced o n March 9 before a packed courtroom. Adams’s old friend Joseph Story delivered the opinion of the Court. Story declared that “the main controversy is, whether these Negroes are the property of Ruiz and Montes, and ought to be delivered up; and to this, accordingly, we shall first direct our attention.”59 But Story went on to note that it is “plain beyond controversy, if we examine the evidence, that these Negroes never were the lawful slaves of Ruiz or Montes, or of any other Spanish subjects.”@ The treaty of 1795 explicitly stated in the ninth article that sufficient proof of property was necessary. This would obligate U.S. courts to examine official documents for evidence of fraud. If it could be satisfactorily established that the official documents were fraudulent, any asserted title to property founded upon them would be voided. This is not a mere rule of municipal jurisprudence. Nothing is more clear in the law of nations, as an established rule to regulate their rights, and duties, and intercourse, than the doctrine that the ship’s papers are but prima facie evidence, and that, if they are shown to be fraudulent, they are not to be held proof of any valid title.61

In short, treaties between nations were not intended to provide a means for perpetrating and protecting frauds. Although Justice Story’s opinion did avoid addressing charges that the executive branch had obstructed the judicial process, it did bear evidence to the fact that Adams’s argument was not without influence. I t is also a most important consideration in the present case, which ought not to be lost sight of, that, supposing these African Negroes not to be slaves, but kidnapped and free Negroes, the treaty with Spain cannot be obligatory upon them; and the United States are bound to respect their rights as much as those

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of Spanish subjects. The conflict of rights between the parties under such circumstances, becomes positive and inevitable, and must be decided upon the eterwl principles of justice and international law. . . . Upon the merits of the case, then, there does not seem to us to be any ground for doubt that these Negroes ought to be deemed free; and that the Spanish Treaty interposes no obstacle to the just assertion of their rights.62 Story thus acknowledges that the eternal principles of justice were relevant to this case. When he speaks of the rights of the Africans, he is speaking of their natural rights. Story could not have been referring to rights that are bestowed upon a people by virtue of their citizenship or the constitution they lived under; they could only be rights the Africans are entitled to as human beings. The Supreme Court was also in agreement with the lower courts that Lieutenant Gedney had performed a useful service and was entitled to salvage rights. Because the Africans of the Amistad had clearly not imported themselves to the United States as slaves, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s decision to return them to Africa in accordance with the antislave trade law of 1808. Rather, the Africans were entitled to their liberty, just as any other free born men, and were to be discharged at once. Henry Baldwin was the only justice to dissent, but Adams had already left the courtroom in jubilation without waiting to hear the lone dissenter.

***** Modern historians have tended to place little relevance o n Adams’s argument before the Supreme Court either for its influence o n the Court’s decision or for the soundness of the principles articulated in the Argument. T h e most frequent criticism of Adams’s legal argument before the Court is that his appeals to justice based o n the abstract principles of the Declaration lacked legal substance. Leonard L. Richards says that Adams’s argument was not nearly as impressive as the more “systematic” argument of his colleague, who focused o n the flaws and inconsistencies of the government’s case.63 Richards quotes a letter written by Justice Story to his wife where the argument of Adams was described as “extraordinary, for its power, for its bitter sarcasm, and its dealing with topics far beyond the record and points of Howard Jones, like Richards, downplays Adams’s contribution to the case, claiming “his long perorations o n justice and liberty were somewhat airy.”65 What is more, Jones claims [a] major point in the Supreme Court’s decision was that slaves were property When Story declared that in the absence of positive law the eternal principles of

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justice had to prevail, he had implicitly legitimized that principle’s corollarynamely, that with the existence of positive law, the same eternal principles became secondary.66 For Jones, the fact that Adams insisted that the guiding principle of the case was the Declaration of Independence muted the effectiveness of his arg ~ m e n t . ~Jones ’ claims that Story’s decision underlines “the supremacy of Natural law is authoritative only when no positive law over natural positive law exists. If slavery was illegal, then individuals maintained their natural rights, including their right to revolution. But, “if slavery was legal, there could be no right to r e v o l ~ t i o n . ” ~ ~ In short, the significance of Adams’s Argument has been called into question by a variety of scholars for a variety of reasons. Yet it is also possible to assess the contemporary historical literature from the perspective of Adams. The criticism directed toward his Argument rests largely o n a modem prejudice which uncritically dismisses what it regards as “value laden” appeals to justice. The fact that in respectable academic circles today a professed belief in the “self-evident truths” of the Declaration would be sure to elicit scom and derision does not eradicate the reality of a time in America’s history when the existence of natural law and natural rights was regarded by most Americans-including the most erudite-as self-evident. Nor, one must add, is the ridicule of modem academics accompanied by an appeal to reason, nor is it able to offer any proof demonstrating the propositions outlined in the Declaration to be false. Adam’s appeal to the abstract truths of the Declaration were certainly not irrelevant to the case. Baldwin, no less than Adam, regarded the Declaration of Independence as central to his address. Baldwin argued that the case presents, for the first time, the question whether that government, which was founded on the great principles of the Revolution, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, can, consistently with the genius of our institutions, become a party for the proceedings of human beings cast upon our shores, and found in the condition of free men within the territorial limits of a free and sovereign state.’O

And as has been noted, Story’s opinion was explicitly grounded o n “the eternal principles of justice” and the individual natural rights of the Africans. Story’s letter to his wife most likely made reference to Adams’s charges of executive interference rather than his appeal to the principles of the Declaration. For this was the one part of Adams’s Argument that was not taken up by Baldwin nor addressed by Story in his opinion. If Story believed that the charges of executive misconduct introduced topics which wandered beyond

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the purview of the case, Adams might still be forgiven for raising them. Van Buren’s actions had failed to excite national indignation, and Adams apparently felt obliged to use his position to educate public opinion. The charges were serious enough to warrant a congressional investigation and, had they not been associated with the cause of radical abolitionism, might have received the scrutiny they undoubtedly deserved. The somewhat flippant assertion that Adams’s “long perorations o n justice and liberty were somewhat airy” seems like a rather inane dismissal of an argument from a man of proven learning, experience, and wisdom. I t might provide some perspective to remember the words another president spoke while dedicating a cemetery at Gettysburg. His two-minute address was blasted by the London Tmes as “ludicrous” and by Democratic journalists who scornfully called it “dishwatery” and “silly.”71I do not suggest that Adams’s Argument in the Amistad case is of equal importance to the Gettysburg Address. But while his Argument has received comparatively little attention, it might nonetheless be argued that Adams was speaking for the ages. As previously noted, Jones also contended that the decision in the Amistad case ultimately demonstrated “the supremacy of positive law over natural law.” From a practical standpoint there is a degree of truth in this statement. Yet the relationship between natural and positive law is far more complex than Jones believes. Certainly one must apply natural law within the bounds of prudence, and this often requires a choice between the lesser of two evils or the greater of two goods. The discovery of the laws of nature and of nature’s God allows one to recognize what justice is; it does not necessarily give the power to enforce it. The cause of hares, however just, will seldom, if ever, be recognized by We recall again that the American colonists called upon “the rights of man and the omnipotence of the God of battles.” The laws of nature or justice would be ineffectual without some means of enforcement. Thus, when confronting the power of the British Lion, Americans found it necessary to demonstrate that they, too, had claws and teeth. Likewise, for the laws of nature and nature’s God to be effective they, too, must be backed by force. If the Constitution of the United States had sought to enforce the laws of nature against slavery, it would have become an ineffectual scrap of paper, for it never would have been accepted by slave states south of the Potomac. For this reason American courts were obligated to enforce the positive law which sanctioned a practice opposed to the natural law. But, does this really demonstrate the superiority of positive law over natural law? It might be asked if a British victory in the American war for independence would have demonstrated the superiority of the British cause and the corresponding superiority of the laws of Parliament over the laws of nature and nature’s God.

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T h e superiority of a cause ultimately depends o n whether victory is deserved, not o n whether it is achieved. Yet the justice of a cause cannot be divorced from the means by which that cause is pursued. T h e principles of the American Constitution established a goal to be pursued; the compromises of the Constitution made it possible to achieve that goal. But the compromises of a principle should never be confused with the principle itself. An exception should never by regarded as the rule. It should also be recognized that compromises and exceptions should not be regarded as superior to the principles and rules from whence they are derived. To argue as Jones does, that Story’s decision underscores “the supremacy of positive law over natural law” is to claim compromises are superior to the principles from which they arose. Natural law set up what Lincoln referred to as a “standard maxim”-a goal to be pursued in the cause of justice. Positive law is a means to this end. In this sense positive law is in the service of natural law. Rather than concluding that positive law is always superior to natural law, one might more accurately argue that natural law provides a standard by which to judge the justice of positive law. It is positive law that must be brought into conformity with natural law and not the reverse. As Adams succinctly stated the matter, [nlothing but necessity can justify even a momentary departure from those principles which we hold as the most sacred laws of nature and of nations, so nothing can justify extending the departure beyond the bounds of necessity. From the instant when that ceases the principle returns in all its force, and every further violation of it is error and crime.“ Adams’s critique of Sir William Scott’s opinion in the Louis case explicitly proclaimed natural-law principles as “the foundation of all obligatory human laws.” Contrary t o Jones, he denied that the positive law, or as Scott would say, a “kgul standard of morality,” was capable of “transcending the standard of nature and nature’s God.” Those who would champion the superiority of positive law over natural law would seem to believe that if the law “is,” it “ought” to be. T h e laws of nature and nature’s God are eternal and unchanging. Positive law is transitory and, if unanchored in the natural law, subject to the whims of convention. Natural law furnishes the model t o be imitated, the goal to be pursued-it tells us what the law “ought” to be. Positive law can be consistent with natural law, deviate from it, possibly even complete it. But positive law necessarily follows natural law in the order of final causality. The former is temporal, the latter eternal. Thus positive law can never lead or direct natural law but must always follow.

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In this respect the complex relationship between natural and positive law bears at least some similarity to Aristotle’s discussion of the city or polis and man. Aristotle argues that the polis exists prior to the village, the family, and indeed, individual human beings, in the order of final causality. This is because Aristotle believed humans have an end or purpose which cannot be realized outside the political community. The polis then, is necessary for a human being to live a life worthy of the name. Yet the political community must also have an end or purpose, and in America this is supplied by the principles of the Declaration. The American regime cannot fulfill its ultimate purpose until its positive laws are a perfect reflection of the natural law. This of course might never be accomplished, but as Adams stated, “excellence consists in approximation to perfection: and the only means of approaching to any term, is by endeavoring to obtain the term itself.”74But if the natural law is the end of the regime, the positive law is a means to that end. As such, the positive law will at times take precedence over the natural law. To clarify what is meant by this, let us go back to our analogy of the city and man. Individuals, families, and villages come first in the order of becoming (chronologically), the polis comes first in the order of being-that is ontologically. A t certain times, and in certain respects, it might be possible to speak of the superiority of individuals, families, or villages to the city. If the formation of families is a necessary condition for the existence of the polis then at some point in time the formation of families must take precedence over a polis that does not yet exist.75If respect for the positive law is a necessary condition to the formation of a regime based on the natural law, then the positive law must at times take precedence over the natural law. If we focus solely on the regime’s historical development without consideration of its end or purpose, we might very well conclude that positive law is superior to natural law. If, on the other hand, we understand the American regime teleologically, we must acknowledge the ultimate superiority of natural law to positive law.

***** Finally, let us examine Jones’s assertion that Story’s decision denied slaves the right to revolution so long as slavery is legally sanctioned. There is nothing in Story’s decision that should lead to this conclusion. The right to revolution is not mentioned in his opinion, and there is no reason to believe that Story’s views o n this matter differed in any significant way from those of Adams and the Founders. Joseph Story was born in Adams’s home state of Massachusetts during the early years of the American Revolution. By 1800 he was perhaps the most prominent Jeffersonian Republican in his state. In November of 1811, Story

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left his office as Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives when President James Madison appointed him to the Supreme Court. Story served as an associate justice of the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845, during which time he wrote the majority of that tribunal’s decisions including many that were justifiably associated with the name of John Marshall.76 Like A d a m and Marshall, Story believed the Declaration of Independence provided the fundamental principles by which the Constitution must be interpreted. The evidence for this claim is overwhelming. His commitment to the natural-rights doctrine of the Declaration is clearly illustrated by his conduct in an episode that took place in 1819. The young Justice Story denounced the clandestine continuation of the slave trade before a Boston grand jury. He noted that slaves could not be excluded from the passage of the Declaration that refers to man’s unalienable rights and urged America’s cooperation in ending the Atlantic slave trade.77 We noted in chapter 4 of this work that both Joseph Story and John Marshall enthusiastically endorsed Adams’s contention that nullification was contrary to the principles of the Declaration and thus unconstitutional. That John Marshall, for his part, recognized the relationship between the Declaration and the Constitution in the reasoning of his most important decisions has been persuasively argued.78And certainly Story’s appeal to the “eternal principles of justice” in his Amistad opinion must be understood as the principles elucidated in the Declaration. The Declaration of Independence was a document constantly referred to in the process of addressing a wide variety of constitutional disputes. Its principles were considered authoritative in those controversies most critical to the young republic. I t is, of course, true, however, that the Constitution of 1787 made certain concessions to slavery, an institution completely contrary to the principles of the Declaration. O n e can cite as many as ten clauses in the Constitution that directly or indirectly accommodate slavery.79 And Justice Story’s decision in the Amistad case explicitly stated that if these Negroes were, at the time, lawfully held as slaves under the laws of Spain, and recognized by those laws as property, capable of being lawfully bought and sold, we see no reason why they may not justly be deemed within the intent of the treaty to be included under the denomination of merchandise, and, as such, ought to be restored to the claimantss0

In fact, the District Court had already ruled with little controversy that the slave Antonio was property and should be returned to the representatives of Captain Ferrer.81 Such facts have apparently led historians like Howard Jones to the fallacious conclusion that positive law is superior to natural law and that men who found themselves under the yoke of the legally sanctioned

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institution of chattel slavery were not believed to possess a right to revolution or, by implication, even a right to self-preservation. Such reasoning is patently flawed. As noted, the Founding Fathers compromised o n the issue of slavery in order t o found a Union based on principles opposed to slavery. In the words of Abraham Lincoln, the Founders meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked up to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere.s2

The “standard maxim” was, of course, enshrined in the words of the Declaration. Included in that document were the words, “to secure these rights, Governments were instituted among Men,” so “that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends [namely securing the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness] it is the Right of the People to alter and abolish it.” This is a clear and indisputable mandate for the right to revolution. The Founders recognized that it was impossible for any government to take that right away from enslaved men. Slaves who found themselves in their unfortunate condition were no less men and no less endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights than were their masters. Joseph Story was a prudent man, sensitive to the political necessity of holding the slave states within the Union and the diplomatic need to honor the claims of a sovereign nation. Had the Spanish claimants proved that the Africans were legally their slaves, he would have ordered them returned as property. It certainly would be legitimate to question the morality of such a decision, but in no way should Story’s opinion lead to the conclusion that he denied that legal slaves had a right to revolution. The right to revolution is endowed by nature, not by any government, and there is no legislation or court decision capable of depriving men of that right. Story, who professed a belief in the self-evident truths of the Declaration, would certainly have understood this. There is no reason to believe Story would have disagreed with his political mentor, Thomas Jefferson, who, when writing about the possibility of a slave revolt, candidly stated, “indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that is justice cannot sleep forever. . . the Almighty has n o attributes which can take side with us in such a contest.’’83 Not only does Jefferson refuse to deny slaves their God-given right to revolution, he acknowledges with clarity and profundity that they would have justice on their side. John Quincy Adams was in complete agreement with Jefferson o n this point. As early as 1804 he unambiguously stated that

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the right of man to liberty is unalienable. That whenever they have it in their power, it is in their rights and their duty to cancel the bonds of their subjection, and break the chains upon the heads of their oppressors. That heaven and earth would concur to sanction their insurrection, and that in such a contest, the Almighty has no attribute that could side with us in this cause.'+ For this reason thirty-seven years later Adams defended the Africans of the

Amistad, and in the remaining years of his life he was to take up the antislavery crusade in Congress with a vigor that seemed to increase as his physical health declined. Destiny had called and Adam stubbornly refused to leave this earth until slavery itself became an issue for public debate, where its injustice could be exposed for all to see. Adams, in taking on the Amistad case, had struck a blow for freedom. He had won a battle in the war against the slave power, but more battles remained to be fought. The gag rule had not yet been repealed, and in the few remaining years of his life, Adams continued to advance the cause that he knew must be taken up by men worthy to be his successors. What had started as a small cloud on a distant horizon was beginning to grow. The sky was darkening as Adams prepared the nation for the storm to come.

Notes 1. John Quincy Adams, Argument in the Case of United States vs. Cinque (New York: Am0 Press & The New York Times, 1969), 3. 2. United States v. The Libellants B Claimants of the Schooner Amistad B c. and the Afncans Mentioned B Described in the General Libels B Claims, 15 Peters, U.S. Reports (1841), 538. 3 . Ibid., 541. 4. Ibid., 547. 5. Ibid., 560. 6. Ibid., 558. 7. Ibid., 563, 560. 8. Ibid., 552. 9. Quoted in Howard Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 172. 10. Adams, Argument, 3 . 11. Ibid., 4. 12. Ibid., 4. 13. Ibid., 4. 14. Ibid., 4. 15. Ibid., 6. 16. The Court's confusion on the issue of group rights was evident in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, United States v. Paradise, and Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. F.C.C.

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For an in-depth analysis of this issue see Edward J. Erler, The American Polity: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Constitutional Government (New York: Crane Russak, 1991),

91-122. 17. Erler, The American Polity, 102. 18. Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, par. 93, at 122 (5th ed., S. Symons, 1941). 19. Erler, The American Polity, 102-3. 20. Adams, Argument. 7. 21. Ibid., 7. 22. Ibid., 8. 23. Ibid., 8. 24. Ibid., 9. 25. Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution: A Discourse Delivered at the Request of the New York Historical Society, in the City of New York, on Tuesday, the 30th of April, 1839 (New York: Samuel Colman VIII, Aston House, 1839), 11-12. 26. Adams, “Motion on Taxation of Louisiana” (January 10, 1804) in The Writings ofJohn Quincy Adams, ed. Worthington Chauncy Ford. 7 vols. (New York: MacmilIan, 1913), vol. 3, 29. 2 7. Adams, Jubilee, 40, 4 1. 28. As previously noted, Calhoun’s resolutions had been unanimously adopted by the Senate on April 15, 1840. Adams responded by preparing four counterresolutions in the House. Adams’s proposals denounced the detention and impressment of the Amistad’s blacks as unlawful. The House would not even receive his motion, but Adams did succeed in reading it before the chamber. Samuel F l a g Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 399. 29. Adams, Argument, 9. 30. Ibid., 9-10, 91-92. 31. Ibid., 87. 32. Ibid., 87. 33. Ibid., 88. 34. Ibid., 88. 35. Ibid., 88. 36. Ibid., 88. 37. Ibid., 88. 38. Ibid., 88-89. 39. John Niven, John C . Calhoun and the Price of Union (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 136, 332. 40. Jaffa, A New Birth of Freedom, 448,449. 41. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 9, 225. 42. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1885), vol. 1, 61-62. 43. Adams, Argument, 89. 44. Harvey C. Mansfield Jr., “Returning to the Founders: The Debates on the Constitution,” The New Criterion 12, no. 1 (September 1993): 50. 45. Mansfield, “Returning to the Founders,” 50.

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46. Harry Jaffa, “The Decline and Fall of the American Idea: Reflections on the Failure of American Conservatism” (unpublished seminar paper, April 1996), 83. 47. See pages 184-98. 48. Adams, Argument, 117. 49. Ibid., 118. 50. Adams, Argument, 126. 51. Ibid. 52. Philip Norton, The British Polity (New York: Longman, 2001), 70. 53. A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1959), 39-40. 54. Bork, The Tempting of America (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 257-59. 55. William H. Rehnquist, in the 9th annual Will E. Orgain Lecture, delivered at the University of Texas School of Law, March 12, 1976. Reprinted in Taking the Constitution Seriously, ed. Gary L. McDowell, (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendal/Hunt, 1981), 77. 56. Adams, Argument, 135. 57. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 408. 58. Adams, Argument, 135. 59. 15 Peters, U . S . Reports, 591. 60. Ibid., 591. 61. Ibid., 593. 62. Ibid. (emphasis added). 63. Leonard Richards, The Life and Times of Congressman John Quincy Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 137. 64. lbid., 137. 65. Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 192. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid., 176. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid., 193. 70. 15 Peters, U.S. Reports, 547-49. 71. Bailey and Kennedy, The American Pageant, 408. 72. Aristotle, The Politics, 111:13, 1284a16,17. 73. Adams, “Motion on Taxation of Louisiana” (January 10, 1804), in Writings, vol. 3, 28, 298. 74. Adams, Letters of John Quincy Adams, to His Son, on the Bible and Its Teachings (Auburn, N.Y.: James Alden, 1850), 100. 75. Of course, we could also speak of the philosopher and the city. The existence of a political community is a necessary condition for philosophy. Aristotle even speaks of politics as “the most sovereign and most comprehensive master science” (Ethics, I:2, 1094a 27-28). Yet, ultimately, Aristotle does subordinate the apparent superiority of politics to philosophy (X:7, 1177b 26-27). 76. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 23 1.

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77. William Wetmore Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Dane Professor of Law at Harvard University, 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1851), vol. 1, 336-47. 78. Lewis E. Lehrman, “On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, and Original Intent,” in Harry V. Jaffa, Onginal Intent and the Framers of the Constitution; A Disputed Question. (Washington D.C.: Regency Publishing, 1994), 3-8. 79. William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Anti-Slavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 (London: Cornell University Press, 1977), 62-63. 80. 15 Peters, U.S. Reports, 591. 81. Despite the Court order, Antonio did not return to Cuba. He disappeared and was last reported living and working in Montreal. Mary Cable, Black Odyssey (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 115; Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 199-200. 82. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, June 26, 1857, in The Political Thought of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Richard N. Current (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1967), 89. 83. Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the State of Virginia,” in The Portable ThomusJefferson, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), 215. 84. Adams, “Proposed Amendment to the Constitution on Representation” (December 1804), in Writings, vol. 3,94.

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C H A P T E R

V I I



The Legacy of John Quincy Adams

It is noble as well as just and pious and more pleasant to remember the good things rather than the bad ones.

Xenophon’ In 1950, during one of his last visits to the United States, Winston Churchill was asked by a reporter why he had chosen a career in politics. “Ambition!” the elderly statesman replied. “And why have you stayed in politics all these years?” continued the reporter. “Anger!” answered Churchill.z Bald, stout, and of stem countenance, it is not hard to imagine that portraits of John Quincy Adams have been confused with those of Winston Churchill. But putting aside any physical resemblance, Churchill’s answer to the American reporter provides a perfect description of Adams’s own political career. To be sure, it is unlikely that Adams would have answered the reporter’s question in quite the same way. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a man more driven by ambition than Adams, unless that man were Churchill himself. However, the ambition of both men was bonded to a righteous anger and subordinated to moral principle. This principled brand of ambition was inspired by anger toward injustice and allowed both men to rise from the ashes of political defeat to perform great acts of service to their nations, and to the world. Adams’s presidency is generally regarded as the low point of his political career. This conspicuous failure threatened to overshadow his distinguished diplomatic career with all its notable accomplishments. With his defeat in the presidential election of 1828, his great chance to leave his nation a notable 209

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legacy had apparently passed him by. But to the consternation of his enemies, Adams refused to leave public life, and it was as a member of the House of Representatives that he made his greatest contributions to American democracy. As a congressman from the Plymouth District of Massachusetts he became the greatest voice and acknowledged leader in the battle against the Southern slaveocracy.

***** The decision in the Arnistad case signified Adams’s first clear victory over the slave power. He played a decisive role in the case, but seems to have taken little comfort in this triumph. Only a few weeks after the case was decided, he wrote that the world, the flesh, and all the devils in hell are arrayed against any man who now in this North American Union shall dare to join the standard of Almighty God to put down the African slave-trade; and what can I, upon the verge of my seventy-fourth birthday, with a shaking hand, a darkening eye, a drowsy brain, and with all my faculties dropping from me one by one, as the teeth are dropping from my head-what can I do for the cause of God and man, for the progress of human emancipation, for the suppression of African slave-trade? Yet my conscience presses me on; let me die upon the breach.’

For Adams, the remaining years of his life were spent in a perpetual battle which h e knew he would not live to see completed. Yet, along the way his disappointments, and even despair, were tempered by some significant victories over pro-slavery forces. In 1844, after nine years of constant struggle, the gag rule was finally rescinded and never again revived. This remarkable political battle was one of the greatest in America’s history, and Adams was unquestionably the single most important figure in the epic struggle. I t is beyond the scope of this work to provide a detailed account of Adams’s heroic defense of the right of petition. But his leadership in this battle not only marked him as a n heir t o the Founding Fathers, but as the spiritual father to the Republican Party founded some six years after his death. In the remainder of this chapter we highlight some of the major accomplishments of Adams’s final years of public service and, finally, close this work by offering a n assessment of his legacy. Perhaps the most memorable episode in Adams’s resistance to the gag rule occurred after the House attempted to bring a formal censure upon him. Indeed, for two weeks in January and February of 1842, he was put o n “trial” for reading a petition from forty-six abolitionists (all of them from Haverhill, Massachusetts) which contained a prayer that the Union be dissolved.‘ Un-

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doubtedly, the proposal was motivated by the issue of slavery. But the petitioners did not explicitly mention this subject. Instead, they offered three somewhat ambiguous reasons for their petition to dissolve the Union. First: Because no Union can be agreeable or permanent which does not present prospects of reciprocal benefits. Second: Because a vast proportion of resources of one section of the Union is annually drained to sustain the views and course of another section without any adequate return. Third: Because (judging from the history of past nations) that Union, if persisted in the present course of things, will certainly overwhelm the whole nation in utter destructi0n.j

After reading the petition, Adams suggested that the document should be referred “to a select committee, with instructions to report and answer to the petitioners, showing the reasons why the prayer of it ought not to be granted.” Southern congressmen immediately demanded that Adams be censured for reading such a treasonous petition. Adams, in a clear reference to Southern nullifiers, dryly noted his surprise that such impassioned objections “should come from a quarter where there had been so many calculations of the value of the Union.”6 That evening nearly all the slaveholding members of the House met to consult o n a strategy to defeat and humiliate their aging nemesis. In order to avoid the impression that the upcoming trial “constituted a partisan persecution rather than a patriotic effort to ‘save the Union,”’ a slaveholding Whig (Thomas L. Marshall of Kentucky), rather than a Democrat, was chosen as p r o s e ~ u t o r . ~ Adams’s closest ally in the battle to end the gag rule, Ohio Congressman Joshua R. Giddings, described Marshall in impressive terms: He was comparatively a young man, a nephew of the late John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. He seemed to have inherited the genius and ability of his ancestors, had already distinguished himself in the legislature of his own State, and had now come to Congress under more favorable auspices than any other member west of the Alleghany [sic] Mountains. He was anxious to distinguish himself upon the new theatre on which he had just entered.s

Giddings then described the scene in the House the following morning: The spacious galleries were filled to their utmost capacity and all approaches to the hall were crowded with anxious men and women endeavoring to get where

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they could hear the proceedings. Foreign ministers, “attach&” and privileged persons filled the lobbies in the outer space within the hall and outside the bar.

The Speaker called the House to order and, following some brief preliminaries, Marshall read the resolutions of indictment against Adams. He contended that in presenting a petition to dissolve the Union, Adams had “offered to this House, a direct proposition to the Legislature and each member of it, to commit perjury; and involve necessarily, in its execution and its consequences, the destruction of our country and the crime of high treason.” Marshall then presented his resolutions:

Resolved therefore, That the Hon. JOHN Q. ADAMS, a member from Massachusetts, in presenting for the consideration of the House of Representatives of the United States, a petition praying for the dissolution of the Union, has offered the deepest indignity to the House of which he is a member; an insult to the people of the United States, of which that House is the Legislative organ; and will, if this outrage be permitted to pass unrebuked and unpunished, have disgraced his country, through their representatives, in the eyes of the whole world. Further resolved, That the aforesaid, JOHN Q. ADAMS, for this insult, the first of the kind ever offered to the Government, and for the wound which he has permitted to be aimed, through his instrumentality, at the Constitution and existence of his country, the peace, the security, and liberty of the people of these States, might well be held to merit expulsion from the National Councils; and the House deem it an act of grace and mercy, when they only inflict upon him their severest censure for conduct so utterly unworthy of his past relations to the State, and his present position. This they hereby do for the maintenance of their own purity and dignity; for the rest, they turn him over to his own conscience and the indignation of all true American citizensv After some additional remarks from Marshall, Adams was permitted to respond. His words were recorded for posterity in the Congressional Globe. Sir, if the gentleman has been surprised, as he affects to be, at my having brought forward this proposition, I am not the less surprised at the language he has used and the charge he has brought against me, of being guilty of high treason. What is high treason? The Constitution of the United States says what high treason is, and it is not for him, or his puny mind, to define what high treason is, and confound it with what I have done. Sir, the first volume of the laws of the United States will show what it is. I desire the Clerk to read the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. [Raising his voice.] The first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence! [Raising his voice to a still higher pitch.] The first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence.

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The clerk proceeded to read the first paragraph of the Declaration. When he had finished, Adams shouted: “Proceed, proceed, proceed, down to the ‘right and duty.’” The clerk then read the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. A d a m was particularly keen that his audience pay attention to that part of the Declaration which stated “that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends [the protection of the people’s natural rights], it is the right and duty of the people to alter and abolish it . . . it is their right, it is their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. . . . If there is a principle sacred on earth,” Adams argued, and established by the instrument just read, it is the right of the people to alter, to change, to destroy, the government, if it becomes oppressive to them . . . I rest that petition on the Declaration of Independence. I present it as the sentiments of the constituentsof one of my colleagues; and let me tell the gentleman, and tell this House, that they are not the only persons in the section of country to which they belong to whom these sentiments are familiar. Adams then went on to state why he believed that it was, of course, “not yet time” for revolution. He elaborated upon the principles that informed his decision to read the petition. Now, it is a matter, to be sure, of some importance to me, what the decision of the House may be; but it is infinitely of more importance to the section of country from which 1 come-to the free men of this Union-to force the spirit of slavery on them. This is the state of things that exist, and it is provided for in the Declaration of Independence; and if there is no other remedy for it, it is the right and duty of the people of that portion of the Union to take that remedy, if the right of Habeas Corpus and the right of trial by jury are to be taken away by this coalition of Southern slaveholders and the Northern Democracy, it is time for the Northern people to see if they can’t shake it off, and it is time to present petitions such as this, I say that it is not yet time to do this, till other means have been tried. 1 say that if the petition is referred and answered, it will satisfy the petitioners. I say a large number of people will be propitiated. They will see that there are other measures to be pursued; and first of all to restore the right of petition, for which we have been struggling for years-this same principle which the gentleman makes high treason, and the violation of which first began when petitions were excluded praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, which Congress has the undoubted right to do, as well as the suppression of the infamous slave trade, for the protection of which we are to go to war with England.’O Thus Adams presented the principles at stake in his battle with the Southe m slaveocracy. The soul of the nation had been endangered by the introduction of the principles now advocated by the South’s most prominent

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statesmen. The embattled congressman used his trial to educate a large and diverse audience on the first principles of the American Revolution and in particular the “sacred))right to revolution. He believed that Americans must periodically be reminded of this right and of the revolutionary foundations of the American regime. In the weeks to come, Adams defended himself with such brilliance that his enemies thought it wiser to table their resolution for censure rather than allow the aged representative a platform to continue his indictment of the slave power. The motion to table passed by a wide margin, in effect, affirming the right of revolution. In the previous chapter it is noted that historian Howard Jones mistakenly argued that “if slavery was legal, there could be no right to revolution.”” Jones is not alone in this belief. Robert Bork expounded a similar view when responding to a critic of his view of the First Amendment. The critic believed that the Declaration of Independence justified a broader interpretation of freedom than Bork’s. Bork responded by asserting: It is particularly nonsensical to quote the Declaration of Independence’s enunciation of a right to alter or abolish government. That right was asserted against an English government in which Americans had no say and which they regarded as tyrannical. Having established a representative government here, the Founders proceeded to enact laws that denied any right of revolution on these shores.’?

According to Adams, what is truly “nonsensical” is to argue that the Founders enacted laws that deny a right to revolution. For Adams, only a “puny mind” or a mind unversed in “the first volume of the laws of the United States,” that is, the Declaration of Independence, would conclude that the Constitution denies that the people maintain a right to revolution. Whenever a government becomes tyrannical, the people have a “right and duty to alter and abolish it . . . if there is a principle sacred in the earth, and established in the instrument just read, it is the right of the people to alter, to change, to destroy the Government if it becomes oppressive to them.” Of course, Adams was not someone who would recommend that citizens exercise their right to revolution unless every other means of redress had been exhausted. This had been his argument in 1791 when he wrote the “Letters of Publicola.” Now, some fifty-one years later, this heir to the Founders was making it again. Adams acknowledged that the petitioners had ample evidence for their grievances, for when Congress denied them their right to petition it had violated their most sacred natural rights. But he also emphatically declared that it was “not yet time” for Americans to fight a war in order to settle their differences. However, Adams was very clear that these differences, if not redressed, were dangerous enough to destroy the Union.

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*****

The final years of Congressman Adams were spent in a relentless battle against Texas annexation. His position o n Texas was lambasted by his enemies who accused the elderly statesman of hypocrisy. This view has found support among modern scholars, for during his presidency Adams had been an outspoken supporter of Texas annexation, and he had always looked favorably upon American territorial expansion. Indeed, Hans J. Morgenthau has argued that one of Adams’s many noteworthy contributions to the American diplomatic tradition was the idea of Manifest Destiny.’ According to his biographer, Samuel Flagg Bemis, Adams “had all but coined the magicmaking phrase Manifest Destiny” during his years as secretary of state.I4 The phrase “Manifest Destiny” did not become a part of American vernacular until it was introduced by John L. O’Sullivan in 1845, but Bemis traces the idea itself back to American independence. It is true that Bemis does not distinguish, as he should have, between American expansionism as envisioned by the old Federalist Party o n the one hand, and Jacksonian expansionism, o n the other. The latter has generally been identified with the phrase “Manifest Destiny” and was, for the most part, opposed by Adams. Yet, certainly Adams believed America was a nation of destiny and that part of that destiny was to extend her borders from one end of the continent to the other. Indeed, at the very time he was fighting against Texas annexation he became one of the most outspoken defenders of America’s right to annex the Oregon Territory. It is instructive to explore Adams’s differing views on Oregon and Texas. Adams was more than willing to risk war with Great Britain o n the Oregon question and aggressively defended America’s right to the territory. In a speech before Congress, he contended that America had ‘la perfect, clear, indisputable, and undoubted right to the territory of Oregon.” Though he did offer some “technical arguments” for annexation, his speech was most noteworthy for its appeal to the Bible. He believed America had a God-given right to Oregon and called upon the clerk to read Genesis 1:26-28. These verses end with the admonition to “Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.” Adams then asked the clerk to read Psalms 2:6-8, which close with the promise: “Ask of Me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession.” As previously noted, Adams did not believe the relationship between reason and revelation was one of perpetual conflict; the divine law could be brought in to support the natural law or the natural law brought in to support the divine law. His beliefs about America’s right to expand were essentially Lockean.’; Indeed,

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they could perhaps be understood as a distant echo of ideas that were articulated by Jeffersonin his Summary View of the Rights of British America. Jefferson reminded the British king that American colonists, like the Saxon invaders of Britain, “possessed a right, which nature has given to all men . . . of going in quest of new habitations.”16To be sure, Jefferson was arguing on behalf of a “universal law” derived from the universal right of a people to leave their country of origin and, if need be, declare their independence. Jefferson’s argument was on behalf of the right of Americans to declare their independence in a land claimed by Britain, while Adams argued on behalf of America’s right to settle or occupy lands claimed by Britain. However, the justification for a people to inhabit new territory was essentially the same for both men. The crucial difference was Adams’s biblical justification, particularly his reference to Psalms 2:8. By appealing to the Bible, Adams-following the argument of Jubilee-cultivates the idea that Americans are a chosen people with a God-given mission to the world.” Nonetheless, Adams’s aggressive defense of America’s right to Oregon not only outraged the British government, it deeply offended many American pacifists who had joined him in his opposition to Texas annexation. Why did Adams believe America had a God-given right to the Pacific Northwest but not to Texas?And why was Adam willing to acquire Texas from Mexico but not to annex the new republic after it had won independence from Mexico? Of course the issue of slavery must be figured into this equation. But even a sympathetic biographer like Bemis contended that in taking his stand on Texas, Adam “was utterly oblivious of its inconsistency with his former support of the Louisiana Purchase by Treaty in 1803 and of his own treaty with Spain in 1819 which annexed the foreign territory of Florida and its foreign people, in both instances including slaves.”18 It is in fact true that, as president, Adams supported the idea of Texas annexation. Since slavery was legal in Texas at that time, it is at least conceivable that annexation would have led to the incorporation of a new slave state or states. Yet there was a very important difference between the annexations of the Louisiana and Florida Territories on the one hand, and the annexation of Texas on the other. For, in 1829, Mexico had abolished slavery. When Texas won its independence from Mexico in 1836, it legally reinstituted slavery where it had been abolished. This is very different from tolerating slavery where it already exists and, consequently, was unacceptable to Adams. His views on this subject are similar to the later free-soiler arguments. Adam understood that reintroducing slavery into a territory was completely opposed to the Founders’ intentions of putting slavery on a road to ultimate extinction. Thus, Adams repeatedly stated that “if slavery were

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totally abolished forever from Texas, and the voluntary consent from Mexico could be obtained, I would vote for the annexation of Texas t o - m o r r ~ w . ” ’ ~ Earlier in this work the reasons for Adams’s principled support of the Louisiana Purchase are elaborated o n in some detail.I0 A t this point it is enough to remind the reader that Adams argued that the Louisiana Purchase was consistent with the principles articulated in the Declaration and in so doing gave a masterful discourse o n the ticklish relationship between justice and necessity. It should also be noted that although Adams negotiated the 1819 Florida treaty, h e had “very little attachment to the treaty” and had been “very ready to abandon the treaty if the opinion of an adequate portion in either House of Congress” had been opposed to it. Privately, he acknowledged his disappointment that “Northern and Eastern” congressmen did not offer resolutions “prohibiting and excluding slavery from the territory to be acquired.” Indeed, h e told Ninian Edwards, a senator from Illinois, that were he “now a member of either House of Congress” he “should be disinclined to have either Texas or Florida without a restriction excluding slavery from them.” At that time, however, Adams was secretary of state and not a member of Congress. As such he felt duty-bound as “a servant of the whole Union” to remain publicly silent and not make trouble for his own treaty or the administration he served.?’ A d a m was not opposed to American territorial expansion; he was opposed to the expansion of slave territory. Using the language of Jubilee, he was opposed to expansion based o n power rather than right. His great fear was that Southern supporters of Manifest Destiny were conspiring to create a gigantic slave-based empire encompassing all of present-day Mexico and most of Central America and the Caribbean. His opposition to the extension of slavery was a position he held throughout his life and was evident at the very beginning of his congressional career. Upon taking his seat in the House in 1831, Adams immediately attacked Jackson’s policy of Indian removal. His battle against this long-standing program is less well known today than his storied opposition to the gag rule. Yet his struggle against Indian removal was every bit as fierce and, in his own day, probably brought him more prestige if only because it was not easily associated with the disreputable cause of abolition. Jackson’s program, based on the Indian Removal Act, was never popular in the Northern states. The original bill faced considerable opposition in Congress but, after failing several test votes, eventually passed in the House by a slim margin of 102 to 97. The vote was largely sectional, as two out of three Northerners opposed the bill while four out of five Southerners supported it.?? In carrying out the policy of Indian removal, the Jackson and Van Buren administrations were responsible for one

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national disgrace after another. Among the many examples that one might point to was the forced removal of nineteen thousand Cherokees from Georgia to Oklahoma. This famous “trail of tears” resulted in the deaths of nearly one-fourth of the Cherokee nation.23 Adams savaged the Democrats’ Indian policy calling it “among the most heinous sins of this nation, for which I believe God will one day bring Uackson and the Southern states] to judgment-but at His own time and by His own means.”24He carried the fight to the floor of the House, and as a consequence, many Indian leaders came directly to A d a m to seek help for their cause.25Yet Southerners were quick to dismiss him as a hypocrite. Were not the Pilgrims of New England every bit as guilty as Southern slaveholders of dispossessing the Indians of their land? And A d a m was forever praising his Puritan forefathers. Furthermore, we have seen that his Oregon speech seemed to imply that the land of “the heathen” was there for the taking. Indeed, Adams had explicitly argued this point. “I want this country [Oregon],” he had stated, “for our western pioneers . . . to go out and make a great nation that is to arise there, and which must come from us as a fountain comes from its source, of free, independent sovereign republics, instead of hunting grounds for the buffalo, braves, and savages of the desert.”26 Leonard Richards, commenting on Adams’s record on Indian affairs, stated that the ‘South’s charge was powerful and perhaps irref~table.”~~ Yet, it should not be forgotten that Adams believed that there was a fundamental difference between a land policy designed to extend a nation dedicated to the principles of the Declaration, and expansionism which sought to extend the territory of the slave power. “The policy, from Washington to myself, of all the Presidents of the United States,”noted Adam “has been justice and kindness to the Indian tribes-to civilize and preserve them.”28Adams believed the laws of nature and nature’s God were a positive civilizing force. As previously noted, he believed that humankind has an end or purpose. But this end would remain unattainable without a proper knowledge of moral truth. In a civilized society, that is, a society devoted to the laws of justice, mankind, according to Adams, has the greatest opportunity to attain human excellence or moral perfection. Thus, extending American territory coincided with extending knowledge of the eternal principles of justice. Man’s perfection required the dissemination of these principles. As Adams noted, this perfection might “not absolutely be obtained” but knowledge of the truth could direct men toward achieving that degree of excellence of which they are capable. However, if America’s expansion was carried out under the auspices of the slave power, then justice would be reduced to nothing more than the will of the stronger. According to Adams, the Indian policy of Andrew Jackson and the Southern

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states was based o n the “utter prostration of faith and justice” and “the simultaneous operation of fraudulent treaties and brutal force.”2YAdams was not opposed to an extension of America’s borders, but he did not believe in expansion for the sake of expansion. The spread of American territory, he thought, could only be justified if it coincided with the spread of republican principles. American expansion must be subordinated to the laws of justice. For this reason, Adams-the true author of the Monroe Doctrine-was opposed to European colonization in the Western H e m i ~ p h e r eWhen . ~ ~ a new state was formed out of American territory it would join the American Union of states as an equal partner in a nation dedicated to universal laws of justice. In chapter 4,we examine the profound differences between the Roman and American republics. While both republics sought to extend their territory, the political foundations for their expansion were very different. For Rome the glory and honor which followed in the wake of imperial conquest was reason enough to expand the empire. But Adams was adamant that American expansion must be harnessed by the power of moral restraint. His positions on Indian land policy and Texas annexation were consistent with the principles he expressed in Jubilee. Yet one of the most important arguments of that discourse contended that the rights of man would be ineffectual truths without the God of battles. Americans had been privileged enough to establish good government from “reflection and choice,” but this did not, and could not, abolish all dependence o n “accident and force.” Politics is never free of necessity, and a people’s choice often robs others of their choice. But Adams was never one to make a virtue out of the unsavory side of political necessity. The march of civilization sometimes justified the use of force, but civilization itself must rest o n something greater than force. Adams opposed Jacksonian Democratic expansionism because he firmly believed that it was motivated by a desire to extend the institution of slavery. Again, such acquisitions would be based solely o n power without regard to right. Still, it could hardly be doubted that many today would regard Adams’s position as little more than high-minded bigotry. W h y should his ideas about justice be regarded as superior to anyone else’s?Is not his claim that Americans had a God-given right to settle the Oregon Territory the very epitome of western arrogance and cultural imperialism? Before answering such questions directly, it might first be noted that such a view of Adams is distinctly western and is hardly immune from the charge of prejudice, for it rests o n a peculiar academic orthodoxy which we have already examined in various writers. This contemporary orthodoxy holds that there are no universal moral truths and that, consequently, we cannot know what is good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust. A belief that there

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are no nonarbitrary moral standards has become the basis for the notion that we should be tolerant of all “value judgments” which differ from our own. Because the moral beliefs of different individuals and the collective beliefs of different cultures vary, it is necessary for us t o respect diversity. In the absence of moral absolutes we are encouraged t o accept the validity and dignity of all lifestyle choices made by autonomous individuals. A t the same time, and apparently without any awareness of the potential consequences to individual autonomy, we are taught to accept all lifestyles encouraged by the customs and habits of various peoples. While not discounting the need for tolerance and a proper respect for diversity, this argument, as it is presented by so many modern intellectuals, is confused and contradictory when judged from a more theoretical perspective. I t might first be noted that if, in fact, all morality is relative, then there would not appear to be any nonarbitrary reason to be tolerant of other cultures. Why should one choose tolerance over intolerance in a world where universal standards of morality do not exist? It should also be noted that the claim that truth does not exist-or cannot be known-is itself a claim t o have knowledge of eternal truths. This profession of truth-the truth that there is no truth-is a western idea, some would say a western prejudice, and has precipitated what Leo Strauss called the “crisis of the West.” For any time a new idea or theory insinuates itself into a given society, consequences must follow. Over time, new ideas will form opinions, give birth t o sentiments, establish mores, frame laws, ingrain habits, and inspire deep-seated prejudices. T h e denial of eternal nonarbitrary moral standards is not merely t h e subject of some dry and obscure academic debate. T h e belief in moral relativism is now regarded by many as a self-evident truth. Its consequence is nihilism.31 Adams did not directly confront the issue of moral relativism, at least not as it has manifested itself in its peculiarly modem guise. Modem philosophy had not yet proclaimed that “God is dead.” To be sure, Rousseau’s concept of the general will had attempted to dissolve the difference between the “is” and the “ought.” Yet it did not claim that there is no “is” and no “ought.” The disciples of Rousseau understood the general will to be good or just. The slave power justified slavery as a “positive good,” and the Holy Alliance claimed that it ruled in accordance with a divinely sanctioned order. Yet Adams repeatedly addressed the argument that justice is the will of the stronger, which is little different from the argument that all morality is relative. Similar beliefs have existed since the advent of philosophy. The philosophic quest began as a n effort to distinguish that which exists by nature from that which is merely conventional. Soon such inquiries led to investi-

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gations aimed at distinguishing natural and conventional standards of justice. Once it was recognized that there were standards of justice which were merely conventional, there were those who argued that all justice was conventional, or, stated differently, that justice is merely the will of the stronger.32Adams was very much aware of such arguments and thus went to great lengths to distinguish between false standards of justice, which were based o n the will of the stronger, and justice which is founded o n nature and nature’s God. Consequently, he anticipated his modem critics. For Adams, all moral arguments that reject the principles of the Declaration rest o n might, rather than right. Adams thus sought to expose such arguments. He did so by demonstrating the arbitrary foundation of those arguments which claimed that ( 1) kings have a divine right to rule over their subjects, (2) a democratic majority has a right to do whatever it pleases, or (3) that slavery is a positive good. The proposition that all men are created equal was by contrast a self-evident truth, a verifiable fact that could be grasped by any rational human being. Adams believed in the superiority of America’s republican principles and he proclaimed them without hesitation. He did so because he did not believe they were merely his principles, or the Founders’ principles, or the “values” of eighteenth-century white Anglo-Saxon Protestant males; according to Adams, they were the eternal principles of justice. Thus, he did believe that the principles of the American Founding were superior to the principles of any people who did not live in accordance with the laws of nature. He also believed that if the territorial expansion of America could be carried out in accordance with these principles, then such expansion was justifiable. Alternately, if America’s expansion could not be consistent with these principles, he believed that it must be stopped. For Adams was certain that if the slave power continued to grow, it would either destroy the Union or irrevocably corrupt the republic. “A house divided against itself,” noted one prominent admirer of Adams, “cannot stand.”

***** The question of Texas annexation and the subsequent war with Mexico were the last great issues Adams would confront. His opposition to the war with Mexico was passionate, but he was nearly eighty years old by the time it started and was too exhausted in mind and body to protest it vigorously in the pubic arena. Adams was, however, one of just fourteen congressmenthe so-called “Conscience Whigs”-who voted against the resolution of war with Mexico.j3 Once Congress approved the war, Adams did vote for the necessary military appropriations, but he made his continued opposition to

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the conflict clear by voting in favor of resolutions for an immediate end to the war without indemnity and without territorial cessions. Such resolutions were not popular in the House, and in many instances Adams was virtually alone in voting for them.34 Yet, despite his unpopular positions, A d a m had, to his own great surprise, become the most revered member of the House. Since his victory over the gag rule, h e had enjoyed unprecedented popularity in the North and great throngs of people gathered wherever he went, if only to catch a glimpse of the Old Man Eloquent. In Congress, even Southern members seemed in awe of the former president. Adams’s biographer, Samuel Flagg Bemis, described his reception as he returned to his seat in the House after suffering a wellpublicized stroke in 1847. When the ancient Plymouth member walked into the House for the first time after his illness, the members rose as one man to greet him. Proceedings were interrupted as two of his colleagues informally conducted him to his place. His adversaries no longer attacked him and bated him as a firebrand and a madman. No one else enjoyed as much prestige and respect in either house of Congress. He had become a patriarch, personifying the nation’s history, venerated on both sides of the aisle by members from all sections, North, South, East, and West, a last personal link between George Washington and their own day, a son of the American Revolution mingling, as it were, among his ~0sterity.j~

In Adam’s final years, Americans everywhere had come to recognize him as a n heir to the Founders, the last living link to what he himself had once called “the heroic age of American Adams spent the final years of his life in opposition to a war whose consequences h e may ultimately have been wrong about. Certainly, his dire predictions of a menacing slave empire did not come to pass. Yet if A d a m was sometimes wrong in the positions he took-and h e would be the first to admit that he had often been wrong-then he had been wrong for all the right r e a ~ 0 n s . jHis ~ fears that a great slave power conspiracy would build an extensive empire in Latin America and the Caribbean may not have been as far-fetched as they appear to many modem historians. Had Adams and some like-minded colleagues not taken a stand against Texas annexation he might very well have been right about its consequences. It was perhaps only because men like Adams were able to thwart the ambitions of the most militant proponents of Manifest Destiny that the fear of a great slaveocracy did not come to pass. If Texas had been annexed without opposition, Cuba was waiting and then, perhaps, all of Mexico.

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*****

Old and ill, his speech impaired from the effects of his illness, Adams was relieved from all committee duties save that of the Library of Congress. Yet, he passionately devoted himself to the few duties he could still perform and told his wife that he would die the instant h e retired from public life.38He continued to respond to roll calls and never failed to cast his vote on issues he considered to be of importance to the nation’s interests. One of the last times that he attempted anything like a speech before the House, he voiced his opposition to a proposal to pay an indemnity of $50,000 to the Spanish owners of the Amistad.j9 The Congressional Globe reports that as Adams stood to speak, “there was a general forsaking of the more distant seats of the Hall, and the members came flocking from all sides to listen to the only speech made by Mr. A. this session.”40Adams went o n to give a clear and salient account of the events surrounding the Amistad case, and the proposal was easily defeated. Adams lived to see the beginning of just one more session of Congress. As he prepared to return to Washington for the final time he wrote a letter to a friend in which he voiced his desire to resume an active role in congressional debates. He longed for the abolition of slavery but feared “the consummation is not to bless my eyes nor to delight my years in my present state of e x i ~ t e n c e . ” ~ ~ Adams returned to his seat in Congress in December of 1847. The health and spirits of the eighty-one-year-old representative seemed somewhat improved. In January of 1848, he engaged in a brief but heated debate on presidential powers. On February 21, 1848, he took his seat in the House of Representatives for the final time. As usual, he arrived early and was observed conversing with various members before the day’s session began. Several hours later, Adams’s right hand convulsively clutched the comer of his desk in an apparent effort to rise and speak. He never made it to his feet, and as he slumped to his left a colleague caught him before he hit the floor. “Stricken in the midst of service, in the very act of rising to debate,” wrote William H. Seward, “he fell into the arms of conscript fathers of the Republic.”42 Adams was carried by his colleagues into the Speaker’s room, where he revived enough to call for his old friend and sometimes rival Henry Clay. A weeping Clay clasped hands with Adams before departing to fulfill political engagements in Philadelphia and New York. A short time later Adams uttered his final words. What he said is a matter of some dispute. Some witnesses claimed he murmured: “This is the end of the earth but I am content.” Others claimed to hear him say: “This is the last of earth-I am composed.” Adams then slipped into a coma, and by the time his wife arrived he was unable to recognize her. He clung to life for two more days. At twenty minutes

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after seven o’clock on the evening of February 23, the aged patriot breathed his last and America lost its last great living link to its Founding Fathers. William Lee Miller describes the significance of Adams’s final day of public service in the final paragraph of his very fine book: It is altogether fitting and proper, for the purposes of the inner history and collective memory of the American people, that on the day that Adams fell there was seated, in a not very good seat in the back row of the House chamber, a young Whig congressman from Illinois serving his first and only term, a mess mate of Joshua Giddings at Mrs. Sprigg’s lodging house, Abraham Lincoln.”

Disappointingly, Adams left no direct evidence from his diary or papers indicating any personal contact between him and Lincoln.44Yet given the political obscurity of the young Abraham Lincoln, it is perhaps all the more significant that, despite the brevity of his congressional career, he was on hand to witness the passing of the man whose mantle he would one day claim. It was one of those uncanny events in American history, like John A d a m and Thomas Jefferson dying hours apart on the Fourth of July, the fiftieth anniversary of American independence.

****? Adams’s life was marked by his unbending commitment to the moral principles of the Declaration of Independence. His public service was devoted to the purpose of carrying on the legacy of the Founding Fathers. With his passing, America lost its direct connection to the great men of the American Revolution. But the American Founding was still incomplete. Slavery remained “the great and foul stain upon the North American Union.” Adams, as an heir to the Founding Fathers, had devoted the final years of his life to the antislavery cause. He was determined to put slavery on the road to its ultimate extinction, but he would not live to see this end accomplished. Thus, it was the legacy of Adam to keep the legacy of the American Revolution alive. He had been too young to play a major role in the nation’s Founding and would die before the political divisions between the North and South resulted in the Civil War. For this reason he is perhaps a less glorious figure than the demigods of the Revolutionary era or the majestic personage of Lincoln. Yet, if fortune, or providence, did not force Adams to confront the weightiest crises in his nation’s history, he, more than any other man, prepared the ground for the men who would. However, the connection between Adams and Lincoln has not always been recognized. This can be explained, at least in part, by the very different

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circumstances of their births and upbringing. As noted, Adams was born into one of the first families of American politics and was privileged to grow up surrounded by the great personages of the Founding era. In his youth he had attended some of the finest schools in Europe and eventually graduated from Harvard before setting out o n a distinguished diplomatic career. It has been demonstrated that Adams was hardly the aristocrat that he has often been portrayed as, and, in fact, his family was never well accepted by Boston’s social elite.45Yet, the perception that Adams was a n aristocrat, aloof from the people, was strong in his own day and has persisted into ours. Lincoln, by contrast, was born to the poverty and obscurity of the American frontier and epitomized the American ideal of the uncommon common man. Within the context of American democracy, it is perhaps to be expected that Adams’s reputation would not be enhanced by the privileged circumstances of his birth and family connections. His contributions to the American republic have gone largely unnoticed. His face does not adorn our currency, and few Americans can distinguish him from his father. David McCullough‘s best-selling biography of John Adams has perhaps restored a degree of luster to the long tarnished Adams name.46 But the arguably greater accomplishments of John Quincy Adams have not received the sort of attention they deserve. To be sure, over the years his legacy has been defended by a number of able scholars. Most recently, William Lee Miller’s brilliant history of the gag rule demonstrated why Adams must be considered one of America’s great statesmen. But generations of indifference and slander have made it difficult to vindicate his name. “Not o n his death,” writes Miller, “nor later either, would John Quincy, as with the male Adamses generally, be much appreciated or favored by the great public.”47Miller’s words followed his account of the poet Walt Whitman’s scathing assessment of John Quincy Adams. Whitman, the “poet of demo~racy,”4~ referred to Adams’s great rival, Andrew Jackson, as a “hero and.sage,”q9 and he idolized Lincoln, writing both prose and poetry in honor of this great American statesman. Yet Whitman heaped scorn o n Adams. He repeated the old charge that Adams came from a background that “had its source too near monarchy and nobility to be entirely free of their influences.” Thus, he was ‘hot a man of the people.” “Never at any time,” wrote Whitman “did Adams heartily espouse the side of any of those hot struggles of the rights of man, as opposed to wealth and conservatism. . . . Is it wonderful then, that he was never a popular man?“5a Given even our somewhat cursory examination of Adams’s political career, Whitman’s charge seems incomprehensible. Was it the cause of wealth and conservatism that prompted Adams as a young senator to challenge the leadership of the Federalist Party? Was Adams the “zealous Antimason” acting o n

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behalf of the privileged few? How many of the nation’s leading political figures responded when called upon to defend the Africans of the Amistad? On which side of this struggle were the Jacksonian Democrats? Can it really be said that the Amistad case, Indian land policy, and the gag rule were not among the “hot struggles of the rights of man”? Still, even Adams seems to have recognized that all his toils o n behalf of justice were but preludes to a future struggle which would-in violence and intensity-surpass anything Americans had previously witnessed. On many occasions, Adams reflected o n the possibility of ending slavery through civil war. In a passage previously cited he stated, Slavery is the great and foul stain upon the North American Union, and its contemplation is worthy of the most exalted soul whether its total abolition is or is not practicable. , . . A dissolution, at least temporarily, of the Union, as now constituted would certainly be necessary. . . . The Union might then be reorganized on the fundamental principle of emancipation. This object is vast in its compass, awful in its prospects, sublime and beautiful in its issue.j’

Many years later, in early 1844, shortly before the final repeal of the gag rule, Adams was confronted by an Alabama congressman named Dillet. Adams’s congressional colleague Joshua R. Giddings described the incident in his History ofthe Rebellion. Dillet, “a man of age and of talents above the mediocrity of members,” was “anxious to assail Mr. Adams” for a speech he had given to “the Colored people of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.” The Alabama representative read the offensive portion of the speech before the House: “We know that the day of your redemption must come. The time and manner of its coming we know not: It may come in peace, or it may come in blood; but whether in peace or in blood, LET IT COME.” In order to emphasize the astonishing nature of this speech, Dillet read the passage a second time. As he was finishing, Adams responded from his seat, “I say now let it come.” Dillet, apparently shocked by “the audacity of Mr. Adams,” indignantly replied: “Yes, the gentleman now says let it come, though it cost the blood of thousands of white men.” Adams continued with unshakable resolve: “though it cost the blood of MILLIONS OF WHITE MEN, LET IT COME. Let justice be done, though the heavens fall.” Giddings then described the reaction of the House. These words rose from the lips of the aged patriot like the prayer of faith from one of heaven’s annointed prophets: A sensation of horror ran through the ranks of the slaveholders: Dillet stood apparently lost in astonishment, and all were silent and solemn until the Speaker awoke members to the subject before them by declaring the gentleman from Massachusetts was out of order.52

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With both insight and resolve, Adams demonstrated that he understood what was ultimately necessary to preserve the Union and the principles on which it was founded. His words are a distant echo of Patrick Henry’s immortal speech on the eve of America’s War for Independence. For my own part, I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery. . . . A n appeal to arms, and to the God of hosts, is all that is left us . . . make a proper use of those means which the God of nature hath placed in our power. . . . The war is inevitable. And let it come! I repeat it, sir, let it come! [emphasis added]

Henry, of course, closed his speech with the words heard round the world, Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! 1know not what course others may take, but as for me, give me liberty or give me death.j’

Adams’s words also bring to mind a future speech not to be heard for another twenty-one years. Like Henry’s speech before the second Virginia Convention, the timeless eloquence of Lincoln’s Second Inaugural has made an indelible impression o n the collective memory of the American people. William Lee Miller points out that the oft-forgotten penultimate paragraph of Lincoln’s address perfectly captures the spirit of Adams’s dour assertion.54

If we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offences which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South, this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offence came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attrihutes which the believers in a Living God always ascribed to Him? Fondly do we hope-fervently do we pray-that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue, until the wealth piled by the bondman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn by the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said “the judgements of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether.”j’ Perhaps Adams’s life and political service can be seen as the penultimate paragraph in a crucial chapter of America’s history. It bears repeating that Adams was a link-perhaps the greatest and most insightful link-in an unbroken chain that goes back to the Founding and ahead to Lincoln.

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Adams’s belief that he would not live to see an end to the slave crisis-for years he doubted he would live to see an end to the gag rule-made him everconscious of his need for an heir to carry on in pursuit of the goals first defined at America’s Founding. In 1836, Adams supplied his descendents in the Republican Party with a constitutional argument for ending slavery. “From the instant that your slave-holding states become the theater of war, civil, servile, or foreign,” stated Adams, “from that instant the war powers of Congress extend to interference with the institution of slavery in every way by which it can be interfered with, from a claim of indemnity for slaves taken or destroyed, to the cession of the State burdened with slavery to a foreign Many scholars have seen in this argument the seed from which Lincoln’s emancipation proclamation would develop.57But in 1836 the time was not ripe to call the North to arms. Indeed, his duty to the Union and the antislavery cause was to delay, rather than hasten, the coming conflict. Adams was never more aware of the role he was fated to play than when he contemplated his involvement with the Amistad case: When I find my opinions, in the formation of which my will has no dispensing power, conflicting with the deliberate judgment and purposes of both parties of this great controversy, I feel the finger of Heaven pressing upon my lips, and dooming me to silence and inaction. I consult the sortes biblicae, and read that when David promised to build a temple to the Lord, the prophet, speaking from the inspiration of his own mind, approved his design and exhorted him to carry it into execution. But when reposing upon his pillow, the Lord appeared to him in visions, and commanded him to go to David and tell him that he did well, and that it was in his heart, to build a temple to the Lord but that he was not the chosen instrument to accomplish that great undertaking, but that it was to await the halcyon age reserved for the wisest of mankind, Solomon his

Certainly the desire to end slavery was in Adams’s heart. But it was clear to him “that he was not the chosen instrument to accomplish that great undertaking.” In his final years, Adams looked to such men as William H. Seward, Charles Sumner, Joshua Giddings, and his son Charles Francis Adams. “It belongs to you to lead the way,” Seward wrote to Adams, “there are enough to follow as fast as time and circumstances will Seward did follow Adam to the extent his talents would permit. In the 1850s he was generally regarded as the leader of the new Republican Party. He went on to play an important role as secretary of state under Lincoln, where on most issues he was the president’s closest and most influential adviser. Seward survived a

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stab to the throat by a would-be assassin on April 14, 1865, the same night that John Wilkes Booth took Lincoln’s life. Adams counseled Sumner, who had just begun his entrance into public life: “I see you have a mission to perform. I look from Pisgah to the promised Land. You must enter upon it,” and with a call to prudence, “but you will be compelled to modify your theory of non-resistance and resort to the Labarum of Constantine.”6o Though Sumner did not become the “Joshua” Adams had hoped for, he did go o n to play the crucial role in bringing about an end to the slave power. His deep hatred of slavery was so powerful that at times it appeared to cloud his judgment. But the brutality of the Brook’s assault shocked the North and perhaps hardened the resolve of many whose inclinations toward the South had once been conciliatory. To his own son Adams wrote: T‘roceed-Persevere-never despair, don’t give up the ship! T h e Mexican War and the free trade Tariff will in time give you topics to handle not yet disclosed.”61In 1848, shortly after the death of Adams, a coalition of disgruntled Whigs, Democrats, “Bambumers,” and abolitionist Liberty members nominated Charles Francis as the vice presidential candidate of the Free Soil Party.62T h e new party had hoped to topple Whigs and Democrats but failed to win office in any state. The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 was the catalyst for the emergence of the Republican Party that offered Charles Francis a permanent political affiliation and revived his waning political fortunes. In 1858, he was elected to the House from his father’s old district. Two years later he was named the ambassador to Great Britain by Secretary of State Seward. Demonstrating his father’s talent for diplomacy, Charles Francis is credited with playing a crucial role in keeping Great Britain neutral during the Civil War. Seward, Sumner, and Charles Francis Adams all played important future roles in the cause of freedom and the preservation of the Union. But despite their considerable abilities, none of these men was the Joshua that would Providence-would aslead their nation to the Promised Land. History-r sign this role to that ablest of statesmen, Abraham Lincoln. Although Lincoln was not a handpicked successor, Adams had, nonetheless, paved the way for him by his unfaltering commitment to the principles of the Declaration. These same principles were embraced with equal fervor and eloquence by Lincoln. T h e mythopoetic armor Adams had assigned to Washington in Jubilee could as easily be imagined o n Lincoln: “a helmet consisting of the principles of piety, of justice, of honour, of benevolence, with which from his earliest infancy he had hitherto walked through life, in the presence of all his brethren-a spear studded with the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence-a sword, the same with which he had led the armies of his

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country through the war of freedom.” Lincoln also embodied “the spirit of command and the spirit of meekness” as described by Adams in that same work. Lincoln was that modern “Joshua” Adams had hoped would follow him. He was, in short, a living legacy of John Quincy Adams. In the final paragraph of what remains the best biography of John Quincy Adams, Samuel Flagg Bemis argued this very point: The historical figure of John Quincy Adams stands behind that of Abraham Lincoln in this Union. Both men were abolitionists at heart. Both believed that the Union could not long live half slave and half free. Both men were practical statesmen. Both stood as long as they could by the bargain of the Constitution. Neither would propose to abolish slavery in any state where it was protected constitutionally, or in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the people thereof. But both were set against the expansion of slavery in the territories and against the acquisition of more territories into which slavery might extend and perpetuate its power and interest within the Union. Both opposed the war with Mexico. Both looked forward to the ultimate extinction of slavery through the democratic process of constitutional amendment. If the people of the South, bowing to the peculiar and powerful interest of slavery, should resist that process, both Adams and Lincoln were prepared to use force to break down that resistance, to go to war if necessary. Adams took his followers to Mount Pisgah and showed them the Promised Land. Lincoln led them through the valley of the shadow into the sunlight of freedom for the continent where still dwells national unity the government of the people by the people and for the people.h3

***** The legacy of John Quincy Adam is the legacy of prudent statesmanship informed by a commitment to the principles of the Declaration. The example of Adam provided guidance to other statesmen who came after him, the greatest of whom was Abraham Lincoln. Under Lincoln, the continuing conflict between the forces of slavery and liberty came to a climax that resulted in a victory for the cause Adams had championed throughout his public life. Alas, this victory was short-lived. Today America is the richest, most influential, and most powerful nation on the globe. But America is once again in the midst of crisis. On the surface, this crisis seems very distant from the volatile struggles which divided the nation from the 1830s to the 1860s. Yet the situation today is, if anything, even more dangerous than that faced by Adams. For in Adams’s day the injustices of chattel slavery could not so easily be obfuscated by claims of tolerance and freedom. I t is thus of paramount importance to ask if the legacy of Adam can be passed on to a successor in contemporary America.

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A d a m believed the principles of the Declaration were eternal truths that exist independent of human will. The majority of Americans in his time embraced these principles, but their justice has never been universally recognized. In fact, Adams acknowledged that the discovery of these truths took thousands of years. Today these principles have been forgotten or openly rejected, but they have not been disproved. If Adams was correct in his belief that the principles of the Declaration are in fact self-evident truths, then his legacy may endure. Forgotten truth, if indeed it is truth, can be rediscovered. As long as some men believe that truth exists-and that the pursuit of, or duty to, truth is a worthy human endeavor-the legacy of John Quincy Adams may yet survive. This is something for which we can still hope.

***** In a moving eulogy to John Quincy Adams, William H. Seward reflected upon the salutary effects of public mourning. Remembering the achievements of great men, h e noted, was beneficial “because it is by such exercises that nations regenerate their early virtues and renew their constitutions. All nations must perpetually renovate their virtues and their constitutions, or perish. Never was there more need to renovate ours than

Notes 1. Xenophon, Anabasis, trans. by Carleton L. Brownson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), vol. 8, 26-28. 2. This encounter is recounted by Harry V. Jaffa in “Can There Be Another Winston Churchill?” in Statesmanship: Essays in Honor of Sir Winston S. Churchill, ed. Harry V. Joffa (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1981), 28. 3. John Quincy Adams, Memoirs ofJohn Quincy Adam, ed. Charles Francis Adams, 12 vols. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1874-1877), vol. 10 (March 29, 1841), 454. 4. Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 11 (January 24, 1842), 168. 5 . Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 11 (January 24, 1842), 168. 6. Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 11 (January 24, 1842), 168. 7. Joshua Giddings, History of the Rebellion: It’s Authors and Causes (New York: Follett, Foster & Company, 1864), 162. 8. Giddings, History of the Rebellion, 162. 9. Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 11 (January 25, 1842), 169-70. 10. Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 11 ( January 25, 1842), 170. 11. Howard Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 193. 12. Bork,quoted in Harry V. Jaffa, Storm Over the Constitution (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 1999), 112.

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13. Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 19, 22. 14. Bemis,John Quincv Adams and the Union (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 481. 15. For Locke’s extended commentary of Genesis 1:28, see John Locke, Two Treatises ofGovemment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963),bk. 1 (chap. 4) 22-43. 16. Merrill D. Peterson, ed., The Portable T h o r n Jefferson (New York: Penguin Books, 1975), 4. 17. Jefferson’s declarations do refer to the “Creator” and “divine providence” but he does not explicitly appeal to the God of the Bible. 18. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 368-69. 19. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (January 25, 1845), 152. See also Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 14 (January 24, 25, 1845), 188-90. 20. See pages 54-55. 21. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 5 (March 31, 1820), 54. 22. Leonard Richards, The Life and Times of Congressman John Quincy Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 149.

23. Ibid., 148. 24. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (June 30, 1841),492. 25. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 9 ( June 27, 1836; December 29, 1837; May 21, 1838), 299,460, 536; Memoirs, vol. 10 (June 1841), 491-92. 26. Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 15 (February 9, 18461, 342. 27. Richards, The Life and Times of CongressmanJohn Quincy Adams, 150. 28. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (June 30, 1841), 492. 29. Adams, Memoirs, vol. 10 (June 30, 1842), 492. 30. Adams, however, was not necessarily opposed to European, and particularly British, influence in other regions of the world. For example, he differed from his friend Peter Parker, a medical missionary to China, on the Anglo-Chinese War. The war of Great Britain with China is a branch of that against sluvery, which she has undertaken, and is now waging throughout the globe. It is the war of Her Democracy, most reluctantly waged by her rulers, but stimulated and impelled by that public opinion which combines the power of the thunderbolt and the hurricane. Her people have made it the hinge upon which the whole system of her intercourse with the other nations of the earth revolves. It is the cause of human freedom, a glorious and blessed cause. Adams to Richard Rush, Washington, December 30, 1842. Quoted in Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 485. 3 1. Harry Neumann, “Eternal and Temporal Enemies: Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology” Political Communication, 9 ( 1992): 279-84. 32. Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), 1:338~-339a. 33. As previously noted, throughout his long political career Adams had refused to identify himself with any particular political party. As a matter of principle he had

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declared himself a no-party man, yet at the end of his life, Adams took great pride in being a “Conscience Whig.” “The Slave power,” he wrote, and the puritan spirit are coming to close quarters. The slave power sneers at Conscknce, as in the days of yore our pilgrim forefathers were called puritans in derision. Let us not be ashamed of the name of Conscience Whigs but inscribe it on our banners and deserve it if need be with martyrdom and the cause of human Liberty. What say the Sons of Pilgrims? Will they answer Conscience with a sneer?

Adams to the Hon. John G. Palfrey of Boston. Quincy, November 4, 1846. Quoted in Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 527. See also Marie Hecht John Quinc?; Adams (New York: Macmillan Company, 1972), 621. 34. For example, he voted for a peace resolution introduced by his Massachusetts colleague Charles Hudson that called for an end to the war without indemnity or territorial cessions. The resolution was defeated 4 to 137. Not even such an outspoken critic of the war as Abraham Lincoln, then serving his only term in Congress, would vote for such a resolution. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 530. 35. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 529. 36. Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution: A Discourse Delivered at the Request of the New York Historical Society, in the City of New York, on Tuesday the 30th of Apn’l, 1839 (New York: Samuel Colman VIII, Astor House, 1839), 128. 37. One of many errors he came to regret was his initial support for the Missouri Compromise. See The Diary ofJohn Quincy Adams, 1794-1845 (March 3, 1820), 232. 38. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 530. 39. Under prodding from the Spanish government Southern politicians continued to make such proposals until the eve of the Civil War. 40. Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 16 (March 2, 1847), 437. 41. Adams to Julius Rockwell, June 13, 1847, quoted in Hecht, John Quincy Adams, 624. 42. Seward, Life and Public Services ofJohn Quincy Adams (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby, Miller, and Company, 1851), 400. 43. Miller, Arguing About Slavery (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), 514. 44. Bemis, John Quincy Adam and the Union, 530. 45. Richards, The Life and Times of Congressman John Quincy Adams, 32. 46. David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon &a Schuster, 2001). 47. Miller, Arguing About Slavery, 462. 48. Hugh 1’AnsonFausset, Walt Whitman, Poet ofDemocracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1942). 49. Emory Holloway, ed. “Andrew Jackson,” in The Uncollected Poetry and Prose of Walt Whitman, vol. 1 (Toronto: Doubleday, Page &a Company, 1921), 118. 50. Quoted in Miller, Arguing About Slavery, 461-62. 51. Adams, The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845 (February 24, 1820), 228-29.

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52. Giddings, History of the Rebellion (New York: Follett, Foster & Company, 1864), 217-18. 53. Patrick Henry, quoted in David J. Vaughn, Give Me Liberty: The Uncompromising Statesmanship of Pam’ck Henry (Nashville: Cumberland House, 1997), 81-45. 54. Miller, Arguing About Slavery, 470. 5 5 . Richard Current, The Political Thought of Abraham Lincoln, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1967), 3 16. 56. Register of Debates,24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1835-1836) 4046, 4047 (May 25, 1836). 57. Greg Russell, John Quincy Adams and the Public Virtues of Diplomacy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995), 60-61; Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 338-39; Miller, Arguing About Slavery, 208. 58. Adams to Lewis Tappan, New York. Washington, July 15, 1841. Quoted in Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 415. 59. Seward to Adams, Auburn, May 4, 1844. Quoted in Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 498. 60. Adams to Charles Sumner, Quincy, August 29, 1846. Quoted in Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 498. 61. John Quincy Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Washington, June 29, 1846. Quoted in Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, 498-99. 62. Martin Van Buren received the presidential nomination of the new party. 63. Bemis, john Quincy Adams and the Union, 54546. 64. Seward, Life and Public Services of John Quincy Adams, 360.

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Index

122-24; on Cuba, 149-51; on the Declaration of Independence, 98-101, 122-24, 184-85, 187-88, 192-94, 197-213; on Forsyth, 168; and the Founders, 26-33,9647, 224, 227; and the “gag rule,” 67-69, 210-14, 226; historians on, 2-6, 36-40, 197-203; on Hobbes, 188-89; on the Holy Alliance, 150-52; and the Indian Removal Act, 217-19, on ancient Israel, 103-5, 123-24, 133; and Jacksonian democracy, 34-42; and Jubilee of the Constitution, 2, 3, 21, 27, 33, 69, 77-133, 184, 187, 189, 192, 194, 217, 219, 229; legacy of, 224-31; and Lincoln, 224-25, 227-30; and Manifest Destiny, 215-21; on the Mexican War, 22 1-22; on Napoleon, 118-20; on nullification, 33, 53, 83, 94, 202; as President, 64-66, 209-10; on the Puritans, 125; and race, 49; and the Republican Party, 228-29; on the right to revolution, 201-3, 213-14; on Shakespeare,

Abolitionists, 6, 42,43,44, 50, 51, 67-69; and the Amiscad case, 160, 162, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 172, 173; and gag rule, 210 Abraham, 129 Adams, Brooks, 37 Adams, Charles Francis, 173, 228-29 Adams, George Washington, 27, 39, 41, 62 Adams, John, 26, 27, 28, 31, 39, 45, 48, 53,65, 100, 129, 139n105,224 Adams, John Quincy: on the American Revolution, 81-102; and the Amistad case, 2, 11-12, 147-48, 163-64, 166-67, 171-73, 179-204, 210,223, 226; and annexation of Texas, 215-17,221-22; on the Antelope case, 190-95; and Antimasons, 38-40, 225-26; on the Articles of Confederation, 94-97, 115-16; on the British Constitution, 87-94; and Calhoun 47-48, 58-60,63, 65, 149, 185-86; censure trial, 2 10-14; on Christianity, 120-21, 131-32; on the Constitution, 11-22, 101-2,9+97,

245

246

-

Index

83-87; on slavery, 49-69, 147-48; on statesmanship, 101-14, 118-20; on Virgil, 78-79, 107-13; on Washington, 79-80, 112-14, 116, 118-20 Adams, Samuel, 26 Aeneid (Virgil), 78-79, 107-1 1, 134n9, 140-41n 135 Alexander I, 71n36, 151 American Revolution (war for independence), 20-21, 28-29,42, 81, 84, 86, 88, 90, 97, 115, 116, 156, 158, 174-751121, 199, 201, 214,222, 224,227 Amistad case, 2-3, 11-12, 50, 69, 78, 94, 147-48, 159-73, 179-204,210, 223,226,228 Anti-Federalists, 26, 30,96 Antelope case, 164, 190-95 Antimasons, 38-40, 225 Antonio (Cuban slave), 161-62, 170, 202,207n81 Argaiz, Caballero Pedro Alcfmtara, 167-69, 183 Aristotle, 22, 32, 33, 51, 99, 113, 133, 189, 201,206n75 Articles of Confederation, 94-97, 101, 112, 115-16 Augustine, 105, 111, 140n127 Baldwin, Henry, 197 Baldwin, Roger, 164, 170, 172-73, 180, 196, 198 Bemis, Samuel Flagg, 8x15, 195, 215, 216,222,230 Blackstone, William, 89, 164 Boorstin, Daniel J., 87 Bork, Robert, 17-19, 23n23, 25, 49, 5 5 , 193-94, 214 Brennan, William, 12-13, 22, 25, 38, 55 Brest, Paul, 13-15 British Constitution, 17, 87, 94, 112, 192, 193

Bunyan, John, 126 Burke, Edmund, 88-89,02 Butler, Pierce, 44,46 Caesar, Augustus, 78, 107, 111, 117, 140n132 Caesar, Julius, 32, 107, 125 Calderbn, Angel de la Barca, 164, 168 Calhoun, John C., 33, 38, 42,43, 47-49, 58-60, 63, 6 5 6 6 , 70, 73n85n88, 76n151,97, 149, 157-59, 172, 180, 183, 185-86, 188-89, 2051128 Calvin, John, 124 Canning, George, 61, 63, 121, 151 Canning, Stratford, 63 Caruthers, William Alexander, 156 Castlereagh, Lord (Robert Stewart, Viscount), 60-61 Ceaser, James, 37 Charles I, 125 Charles 11, 14411198, 156 Choate, Rufus, 172 Christianity, 107, 109, 120-21, 125-32, 144n203, 145n214, 188-90 Churchill, Winston S., 209 Cicero, 1, 7, 32, 33, 109, 120-21, 141n136, 166 Cinque (African slave), 162, 170, 184 Civil War, 28, 78, 130, 156, 224, 229, Clay, Henry, 39, 76n151,223 Clemson, Anna Maria, 157 Cooke, John Esten, 156 Coriolanw (Shakespeare), 83, 113 Comeille, Pierre, 116 Covey, James, 166, 170 Crandel, Prudence, 169 Crawford, William, 63-64, 168 Cromwell, Oliver, 125, 14411198 Cuba, 147, 148-50, 152-54, 156, 159, 160-62, 166-67, 169-72, 177n70, 179-80, 184, 191, 207n81, 222

Index

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247

Falaquera, Shem Tov ben Joseph, 77 Faust, Drew Gilpin, 47 Federalist Papers, 28, 38, 70n12, 1341110 Fernando VII, 149 Finkelman, Paul, 43, 45 Forsyth, John, 164, 166-69, 183 Fox, Henry S., 166-67 Franklin, Benjamin, 27,39,45, 139n105

Hamilton, Alexander, 27, 28, 45, 116, 188 Hamlet (Shakespeare), 83, 135n29 Hammond, James Henry, 47-48,73n88, 155-56 Hancock, John, 26 Hannibal, 119 Harper, William, 46 Hayne, Robert Young, 65 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 157 Henry V (Shakespeare), 83-87, 129, 135n28, 136n37 Henry, Patrick, 26, 27, 227 Herod the Great, 105 Herodotus, 32 Hobbes, Thomas, 126, 188-89 Holabird, William S., 164, 169-70 Holy Alliance, 149-60, 174n10 Homer, 32, 106, 108-9, 113 Horace, 32, 107 Hume, David, 85, 125, 129

gag rule, 3, 19, 67,69, 147-48, 204,

Israel (Ancient), 103-5, 110, 123-33

Dahl, Robert, 35, 71n31 Dana, Francis, 1 L>ante, 107, 140n127 David, (King of Israel), 107, 228 David, Jacques Louis, 117 de Coulanges, Fustel, 80 Dew, Thomas, 46-47 Dicey, A.V., 194 Ely, John, 19-20 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 41-42 English Bill of Rights, 193 Erler, Edward J., 182, 2041116

210-14,217,222,225,226, 228 Garrison, William Lloyd, 42, 43, 169 Gedney, Thomas, 162, 164, 170, 183, 186, 191, 197 Gettysburg Address, 199 Ghent, Treaty of, 56-57 Gibbs, Josiah, 165, 170 Giddings, Joshua R., 211, 224, 226, 228 Gilpin, Henry D., 179-80, 196 Glorious Revolution, 29, 193 Graglia, Lino, 20 Grant, Ulysses S., 158 Gress, David, 129 Grundy, Felix, 164, 179, 190 Hackett, James H., 83, 136n30 Haecker, Theodore, 108 Haiti/Saint Dominique, 53, 54,65, 69, 150, 152-54

Jackson, Andrew, 34-36, 38,39,42, 65, 166, 168,217-19,225 Jacobins, 117-18 Jaffa, Harry V., 2, 11, 24n31, 30, 136n37, 137n57, 144n203, 155, 189 Jay, John, 27 Jefferson, Thomas, 12, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36, 38,45,46,47, 48,49, 50-51, 70n12,71n31,87,89,114, 116, 129, 148, 155, 166, 203, 216, 224,232n17 Jesus Christ, 103, 106, 108, 109, 114, 121, 127, 131 Jones, Howard, 197-203, 214 Josephus, Flavius, 105 Jubilee of the Constitution, see J.Q.A. and Jubilee of the Constitution

248

-

lndex

Judson, Andrew T., 162-63, 165, 169, 170 Justinian, 100, 138n94, 181 Kirk, Russell, 50, 88-92, 136-37n53n56n57,158-59 Leavitt, Joshua, 43, 163 Lee, Richard, 156 Lee, Robert E., 158 Levy, Leonard, 16, 22, 93-94 Lipsky, George A., 3-5, 21, 37, 49 Lincoln, Abraham,'31, 45, 49, 86, 102, 104, 130, 136n30,159,200,203, 224-25, 227-30, 233n34 Livy, 32, 119 Locke, John, 32,33,97-101, 120-21, 126, 133, 189,232n15 Loring, Ellis Gray, 163-64 Louis XIV, 117 Louisiana Purchase, 54-55, 75n128, 184,216-17 Louverture, Toussaint, 53 Macaulay, Thomas, 77, 125 Machiavelli, Niccolb, 145x1214 Madden, Robert, 166-67, 170 Madison, James, 19, 27, 28, 44,46,47, 70n12, 148,202 Magna Carta, 16-17, 81, 93-94, 129 Manifest Destiny, 215-22 Mansfield, Harvey Jr., 188-89 Marat, Jean-Paul, 42, 117 Marshall, John, 28, 94-95,97, 190-95, 202,211 Marshall, Thomas L., 2 11-12 Marshall, Thurgood, 13 Marx, Karl, 157 Mason, George, 46 Masons, 38-40 McCullough, David, 225 McDuffie, George, 46 Meese, Edwin, 17, 55, 193

Mexico, 152, 216, 217,221-22,230 Miller, William Lee, 3, 701i160,224, 225,227 Milton, John, 103-4, 138-39n 1OOn 103, 173 Missouri Compromise, 58-60, 233n37 Monroe, James, 58,61, 62, 63, 149-51, Monroe Doctrine, 150-5 1,219 Montes, Pedro, 161-62, 164-65, 167, 183, 186, 191, 196 Montesquieu, 129 Morgenthau , Hans J., 215 Morgan, William, 38-39 Morris. Gouverneur, 46 Moses, 77, 03-6, 109, 114, 123, 129, 133 Napoleon, 15, 117-20, 143n178, 148, 157 Nero, 111 Nicholas I, 157-58 nullification, 33, 42, 53, 83, 94, 202

Othello (Shakespeare), 83 Otis, Harrison Gray, 39 Ovid, 32, 138-39n103 Paine, Thomas, 26, 30, 70n14, 88-92 Paul, Saint, 128 Perry, Michael, 13-14 Pinckney, Charles, 44 Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth, 44, 46 Plato, 33, 51, 103, 106, 138n102 Rakove, Jack, 19 Rehnquist, William, 18, 22, 25, 38, 49, 55, 193-94 Republican Party, 210, 228-29 Richards, Leonard L., 38, 197, 218 Robespierre, 117 Rome (Ancient), 22, 32, 44, 78-81, 103, 105, 107-12, 116-17, 120, 124,

Index

125, 127, 132, 140n124n125n132, 142n163,219 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 90-91, 116-2 1, 130, 155, 157, 220 Ruiz, Jose, 161-62, 164-65, 167, 183, 186, 191, 196 Russell, Greg, 3, 1351113, 1 3 6 4 9 Rush, Richard, 63, 65 Rutledge, John, 44 Schlessinger, Arthur, Jr., 40 Scott, Sir Walter, 155-56, 159 Scott, William, 192-94, 200 Seward, William H., 1, 223, 228-29, 23 1 Shakespeare, 32, 40, 83-86, 111, 113, 135n29, 136n37,140n 125nl27n 132 Shavs, Daniel, 26 Sidney, Algeron, 33, 70n16, 81 Simms, William Gilmore, 156, 158 Slavery, Adams on: 3, 25,42,43,44, 47,49-69,83,85-86, 102, 133, 1371156, 147-48, 186-88, 191-95, 2 10, 226, 228-30; and Amistad case, 162-73, 179-204; Calhoun on, 33, 42,4748, 5840, 157-58; and Constitution, 2, 3, 6-7, 43,4446, 52-53, 55-56, 102; in Connecticut, 162; in Cuba, 148-49, 152-54, 159, 160-61; Dew on, 46-47; Founders on, 3, 26,4446, 50-51; Garrison on, 43; in Latin America, 65, 149, 151-52; Lincoln on, 104, 227; and Manifest Destiny, 215-19; and nullification, 33; and race, 42, 45, 48-49; and the right to revolution, 2014; Southern romanticizing of, 154-60 Socrates, 33, 106, 120-21 Staples, Seth, 164, 170, 172 Stendhal, 118-19

-

249

Stepinac, Aloysius, 52-53 Story, Joseph, 12,94, 196-98,200,201-3

Strauss, Leo, 77, 104,220 Sumner, Charles, 159, 176n63, 228, 229 Tacitus, 32 Taney, Roger B., 172 Tappan, Lewis, 43, 163-64, 172 Tell, William, 29 Thompson, Smith, 164-65, 171 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 34, 66-67, 155 Tribe, Laurence, 14 Trist, Nicolas I?, 166-67 Tucker, Beverly, 156-58 Twain, Mark, 156 Van Buren, Martin, 65, 163-64, 168-69, 171-72, 179, 183, 186, 190, 199, 217, 2341162 Virgil, 32, 78-79, 107-1 1, 113, 134n9, 14041n132n135 War of 1812,56-57, 149 Warren, Earl, 13, 55 Washington, George, 27, 39, 45, 50, 68, 77-80,81,82,97, 107, 112-14, 116, 118-20, 134n10, 141-42n149, 174n12, 179,218,222,229 Webster, Daniel, 172 Weld, Theodore, 43 Wellington, Dean Harry, 13-14 West, Thomas G. 45, 73n73 Whitman, Walt, 225 William the Conqueror (William I), 85-86 William of Orange (William 111) 29 Wilson, Clyde, 159 Wise, Henry, 159 Woodbury, Levi, 164, 168 Xenophon, 1,32, 209

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About the Author

Gary V. Wood is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Eastern Africa-Baraton in Eldoret, Kenya. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Claremont Graduate University.