HELLENISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE SCIENCES PRACTICES AND CONCEPTS IN POLYBIUS’ HISTORIES
by Lucas Herchenroeder
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HELLENISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE SCIENCES PRACTICES AND CONCEPTS IN POLYBIUS’ HISTORIES
by Lucas Herchenroeder
A Dissertation Presented to the FACULTY OF THE USC GRADUATE SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (CLASSICS)
December 2010
Copyright 2010
Lucas Herchenroeder
DEDICATION
For Sigrid, Stephen, Adam, Jessica, Nathan, Emily, Timothy, Karl and Daniel
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dedication
ii
Abstract
iv
Chapter 1: Making sense of the past: Historical writing and the sciences
1
Chapter 2: Setting limits: PragµatikØ flstor€a and the order of political history
69
Chapter 3: “Nearly the whole inhabited world”: Revelations of unity and the universal historian
125
Chapter 4: On the origins of war: Causal explanation and the order of the world
193
References
246
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the relationship between Polybius’ Histories and the culture of the sciences in Hellenistic Greece. The period often is identified with noteworthy advances in scientific thought, not only in the extension of rational culture to broader and more diverse areas of inquiry, but also in the formalization of practices within and among fields of research. These include developments in medicine, physics, ethics, mathematics and many other fields of speculative thought as well. Historical writing may also be situated in this context, especially in light of comparable efforts to define and formalize study of the past as a more serious intellectual pursuit. With the great proliferation of historical texts at this time and especially the growth of concern for standards of historical method, the Hellenistic era is characterized by an increasingly stronger sense of history’s status as a formal discipline. Polybius’ role in this set of developments is substantial; his writing is distinguished throughout by special concerns for methodology, expressed in a variety of ways ranging from criticism of other writers to more substantive observations regarding the principles of historical knowledge. In particular, it is the framework constituted by other forms of science, understood as a set of concrete models of description and analysis, which forms the basis for his approach. In this dissertation, I explain the practical and conceptual framework of contemporary science as a source of structure for this attempt to innovate in the historical field. My approach is based on three considerations, of which the first concerns factors internal to the historical field itself. Given the basic problems with knowledge of the past and especially the lack of clear standards for historical method, the historical field is typically characterized by dispute and rivalry among writers. As Polybius’ own interest in methodology is based on this largely routine set of concerns, his relationship with the sciences is to be understood primarily
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from the perspective of competition with existing sources of historical authority, such as popular accounts of the past appearing in myth and poetry, and especially the work of other prose writers. Consideration of the Histories in relation to contemporary historical production thus reveals an effort to specialize study of the past on the basis of more stringent principles of historical reconstruction. Polybius’ approach is not arbitrary, but is based on formal approaches to inquiry employed elsewhere in the sciences, which, I argue, provide the basis for innovation in the historical field mainly due to the special cultural authority of such practices. Given the progress of Hellenistic science, technical adjustments in Polybius’ writing are to be understood in relation to current trends in the development of rational culture—the second main concern here. This detail not only clarifies the basis of Polybius’ critical engagement with the historical tradition, but also qualifies the relationship between history and the sciences in ancient Greece, a subject of controversy at least since Aristotle. The final part of my argument examines the consequences of this relationship for the production and organization of historical knowledge. Even as affiliations with the sciences provide the basis for a more serious approach to history (e.g., as opposed to accounts of the past appearing in myth or in aristocratic genealogies), the same affiliations introduce constraints for historical representation as well. Thus the practices and concepts relating history to the sciences are not merely formal, but constitute a productive influence on constructions of historical perception. Overall, this project aims to provide a framework, formed on the model of Polybius’ Histories, for clarifying the relationship between the pragmatics of disciplinary development in the historical field and the organization of historical understanding more generally. The dissertation is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, I provide an overview of ancient science by considering specific conditions governing the development of Classical and Hellenistic intellectual culture. Following modern theoretical approaches to the sociology of
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scientific knowledge, I examine the formation of certain research programs in this context as the expression of specific forms of social authority in intellectual culture. Ongoing regularization in the methods and categories of scientific thought may be identified with the emergence of a cultural regime, with implications for regulating intellectual production in a range of fields of inquiry, including history. I end the chapter by suggesting how efforts to implement rational models of description and analysis in the context of history are to be understood in terms of the influence of different kinds of cultural authority emergent in the context of scientific progress. In Chapters 2 and 3, I consider Polybius’ approach to history in relation to specific developments in contemporary rational culture. Chapter 2 examines Polybius’ concern for history as a source of technical instruction for the statesman. This aspect of his writing, denoted by the controversial expression pragmatikê historia, reveals an effort to subject study of the past to concepts of knowledge and explanation employed in the practical sciences, which thus provide the model for a more useful account of political and military affairs. I argue that this approach, while ostensibly providing a useful practical resource, ultimately encourages a narrower conception of the proper domain of history, and thus limited views of historical change in the long term. In Chapter 3, I extend a similar approach to Polybius’ concept of universal history. Polybius is well known for his attempt to provide an extensive account of Roman conquest, including coverage of affairs in many theaters of activity across the Mediterranean. This approach is based on systems of analysis employed in the natural sciences, which provide the model for organizing historical description of such a broad field. Ultimately the use of this framework introduces noteworthy constraints for understanding the effects of Roman conquest and corresponding convergence of world affairs. It is not necessarily observations about the concrete effects of Roman conquest that matter here, but rather how the formal components of Polybius’ approach provide the foundations for limited conceptions of historical change at the metahistorical level. Notably, the
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concept of universal history may be linked to the emergence of the notion of cultural integration as a dominant idiom of historical thought, an influential development not only in antiquity, but also in the formation of historical perceptions in many subsequent periods of Mediterranean history. In the final chapter, I examine Polybius’ approach to the study of historical causes, most notably in his accounts of the various wars described in the Histories. This aspect of his writing is based on deliberate attempts to adapt methods of explanation in the natural sciences. In particular, I consider how use of that model extends the discourse on the origins of wars beyond conventional frames of concern in practical political contexts. In seeking to elucidate war as a subject of rational explanation, Polybius alters conventional modes of understanding. Thinking about the origins of wars in terms of natural causal schemes, for example, involves disregard for the practical conventions of diplomatic discourse, which requires consideration of moral and legal criteria as a means of regulating interstate relations. While this adjustment renders explanations for war more attractive in contemporary scientific discourse, it alters how the origins of wars are to be understood in contemporary politics, and ultimately provides conditions for new conceptions of international political order. From this set of examinations, the project aims ultimately to clarify the link between Hellenistic rationalism and the construction of familiar features of the Mediterranean political and historiographical traditions.
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CHAPTER 1: MAKING SENSE OF THE PAST HISTORICAL WRITING AND THE SCIENCES
Polybius at the Black Sea: ancient science and the unseen In his account of the preliminaries of Rhodian-Byzantine War of 220, Polybius provides a brief digression on the geography of the Black Sea, taking time to describe the strategic position of Byzantium and other noteworthy topographical features.1 In particular, he focuses his attention on the current in the Bosporus strait, which appears to have formed a subject of some interest due to its unusual strength. Apart from merchants and other travelers familiar with the region, the problem attracted the attention of writers in the natural sciences too, whose descriptions doubtless formed an important source of knowledge about the Black Sea, as with all other peculiarities situated at the remote parts of the world. Aristotle and Strato of Lampascus both produced explanations for the current, for example, and Polybius’ accounts here is apparently meant to form a contribution to that tradition of research.2 In particular, he says that the current is caused by the constant silting of the Lake Maeotis (the outermost basin of the Black Sea system), and that as the area of the Maeotis is limited and the inflow of river silt constant, water is displaced at a continuous rate (iv.39.7-10). These are “the true causes” of the problem, he says, pointing out that this explanation is actually demonstrable from observation of large deposits already forming in the
iv.38.1-45.8; on the date of the war, see Walbank Comm. i, 486. Unless otherwise specified, all dates are B.C.E. 2 Arist. Mete. i.14 351a19, ii.1 353a12-b15.: the current is explained in terms of a combination of the rapid inflow of rivers leading into the Black Sea and the incline, created by gradually increasing depth in the basins of the Maeotis, the Pontus, the Mediterranean and finally the Atlantic, with the whole flow of water passing along as though down a series of steps. Strato’s theory, which is examined by in Strabo (i.4), appears to follow Aristotle in many essentials (e.g., the role attributed to inflow from the rivers, the system of increasingly deeper basins between the Maeotis and the Atlantic), though it includes the observation that the Black Sea was once self-contained and that a passage to the Aegean only appeared when the water build-up burst through the land mass later to become the Bosporus. Other possible sources for Polybius’ account include Diophantus or Demetrius of Callatis, who wrote on the Black Sea in the third century; see Walbank 1951, 474 n. 26. 1
1
sea. It is in fact this “proof”, he says, “established from reflection on the principles of nature” (p€stiw... §k t∞w katå fÊsin yevr€aw: 39.11) that separates the explanation from popular accounts of the region, such as in myth and song, and the “sensational stories of seafarers”, as he puts it.3 He thus insists that the naturalist explanation can be established more or less unequivocally in the face of all these (presumably) conflicting accounts. Finally, the passage ends with Polybius offering some projections regarding the future of the region, namely that soon the Maeotis will be completely silted, and that if conditions continue unchanged, the same will even go for the Black Sea itself (40.4-42.6). The passage provides a useful illustration of basic issues in ancient science regarding what must have been extreme difficulties of observation. The Black Sea of course lay well beyond the ordinary range of experience for Peloponnesian Greeks, and detailed knowledge of the place will thus have been difficult to attain, not only because of the problems associated with long-distance travel, but especially due to the many challenges of geographic research, including difficulties gathering and synthesizing data, obtaining measurements, etc. A reliable account of the Black Seas will thus have represented an extraordinary feat—even for writers already familiar with the region. It is therefore noteworthy that Polybius goes for such detail in his own account, especially since he does not seem to have been to the region himself.4 Now, while this perhaps suggests important deficiencies in his approach, that issue is to some extent beside the point, for what is interesting is that he actually proceeds even in spite of these limitations. It does not a deterrent, in other words, that Polybius lacks a stronger basis for his claims; indeed, he appears to regard his explanation as essentially unproblematic, both in its conclusions and methods of demonstration.
iv.42.7; all translations of Polybius’ Histories are from the Loeb edition of W.R. Paton 1922-27, except for modifications as noted. 4 For this view, see Walbank Comm. i, 487, who points out that had Polybius visited the site, he surely would have mentioned it (e.g., at 38.11-13, 40.1-3). 3
2
Viewed from this perspective, then, the issue is not necessarily the limitations of the approach, but rather on what basis it does rely. As for that issue, it is apparently a certain theoretical conception of the problem that makes the greatest difference, notably, a certain theory regarding the effects of silting, maintained by the Peripatetics, which though hardly justifiable from an empirical perspective (and essentially erroneous, as it turns out), nonetheless forms the basis for the account in all its essentials.5 Now, while it is not surprising that Polybius follows the authority of a prior tradition here—even less so perhaps that he follows the Peripatetics—what is remarkable is that it is this theoretical view, not any consideration of the problem itself, that most informs his treatment of this problem. Indeed, Polybius offers a number of more concrete observations (e.g., that silt deposits flow down from the rivers, that large deposits are already discernible, that the different basins of the system have limited capacities: 39.1-10), but it is only in relation to the theory of silting that these data form a coherent explanation. In fact the nature of Polybius’ claims is remarkable from just about any perspective, for when we consider the nature of the problem at hand—i.e. sea change, occurring over immense intervals of time and space—knowledge of such a thing is virtually unthinkable under strict empirical terms, even under the most ideal conditions of observation. In all, then, the passage illustrates the special influence exerted by certain traditions of research in the sciences, namely that of the Peripatetics, whose approach provides a useful resource to Polybius when more direct means are lacking. Consequently, however, the problem of the Bosporus current now becomes more intelligible in terms of the special authority of Peripatetic science than any other set of criteria. Indeed, Polybius insists on a strict distinction
Polybius’ view is perhaps better described as ‘incomplete’, than wholly erroneous. Like others in antiquity, he was in fact correct to attribute the current to the surrounding rivers, as well as to effects produced by river silting, which are in fact (indirectly) responsible for changes in current related to submerged channels in the sea, moving at greater velocity, but the upper current in the Bosporus cannot actually under by these terms alone. For discussion of the current of the Black Sea and evaluation of ancient views of the Bosporus current, see Thomson 1948, 155-56; see cf. King 2004, 12-14, 220-21. 5
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between his own and other accounts of the problem. Admittedly, it is only the many ‘sea-tales’ in circulation on the subject that he rejects, but even if that move appears to be automatic to a certain extent, it is important to observe that strictly speaking no account of the problem will have been genuinely verifiable.6 The difference between theories of silting and the doubtless equally imaginative accounts of poets and traders will have been arbitrary to an extent, and one’s sense of which to credit will have relied largely on external criteria—such as the prestige maintained by the Peripatetics. Now, the precise reasons for the influence of Peripatetic science surely form a subject unto themselves, but what I wish to call attention to in particular is that it is principally from engagement with that tradition that Polybius forms his account. Indeed, there seems to be no other basis, as I mentioned. Yet more importantly, what we see is that the influence of Peripatetic science extends not only to the point of providing special resources for the issue, but rather forms the condition for knowledge itself, in these sense that it is primarily from recognition of the authority of the Peripatetics that Polybius is able to make the distinctions he does. Indeed, to extend this point just a bit, given the intrinsic limitations on empirical observation, it is apparently due to the Peripatetic reputation that any knowledge of this kind is possible, for in the absence of institutions of this kind it is not clear how one might distinguish between a legitimate source and the spurious reports of poets and traders. Thus the passage illustrates the relative The charge of producing ‘sea tales’ is conventional in ancient geography, deriving from the fact that so much knowledge of the world at large depended on the accounts of traders and the like, and especially the nearly proverbial reputation of sources of this kind for sensationalism and mendacity. It thus provides a convenient epithet for the fanciful accounts of the world produced by geographic writers; see Romm 1992, 172-214, esp. 183-96. Admittedly, there is no way of telling in which sense the remark is meant by Polybius, i.e. whether it is directed at geographers or really does refer to the poets and traders, as he says. The distinction is irrelevant of course, but the ambiguity serves as a useful reminder of problems of credibility in ancient geography, not necessarily because of the difficulties of research, but rather because of the sheer overflow of information, and the lack of clear standards of validation. The notion of the sea tale, then, does not differ fundamentally from other categorizations appearing alongside the formalization of intellectual activity, such as appears in the myth-history divide, or that between sophistry and philosophy, or magic and medicine. This tendency towards adversative framing in the development of formal intellectual practices forms a major theme in this chapter, as will become clearer in what follows, though more generally, useful discussions of this issue appear in Detienne 1981; Lloyd 1979, 15-29; Nightingale 1995, esp. 13-60; Fowler 1996; Bravo and Wecowski 2004; Kurke 2006. 6
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importance of special disciplinary formations in ancient science, which go a long way to rank and organize the available information on the problems of ancient geography. Moreover, to the extent that the influence of the Peripatetics (or other groups) may be identified with more general effects on perception of the Black Sea, the passage suggests how geographic knowledge is even thoroughly determined by the influence of this kind. Efforts to explain the Bosporus current reflect a typical situation in ancient science, in which interpretation of the natural world is often formed under the influence of particular programs of study, many times in the face of insurmountable problems of observation. In the Ionian tradition, for example, we find detailed views of the form and composition of world, including not only regional conceptions of space, but even descriptions of continental divisions of the whole world. Similarly in Hippocratic medicine, we find special theories of the nature of disease, or in the Atomist tradition, special conceptions of the material elements underlying all reality. In cases of this kind, the development of explanatory theories for the inscrutable parts of the natural world does not generally depend on observation and analysis at the empirical level, but rather denotes the emergence of systems of thought associated with a special cultural setting, the function of which is essentially to provides the conditions, understood as set special techniques and concepts, for extending knowledge beyond the limits of direct empirical observation. Now, while this perhaps raises interesting questions regarding the relationship between empirical and theoretical forms of knowledge, the important point is that we thus see a close relationship between expressions of scientific knowledge and the external developments taking place in the culture of science itself, i.e. as a set of individual thinkers joined by a common set of practices and beliefs.7 This reflects a departure from traditional views of scientific knowledge of course, which is
On empirical knowledge in ancient science, see Lloyd 1979, 126-225; the problem of the relationship between theoretical and empirical forms of knowledge also underlies the discussion in id. 1987, esp. 109171, 285-336, which addresses the issue in relation to a range of different fields of inquiry. 7
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typically understood in more ideal terms, e.g., as the product of rigorous procedures of deduction and inference, or even as a form unmediated access to the external world. Yet an approach of that kind does little to explain many of the problems of science, such as how certain researchers persist in their efforts despite extreme limitations, or embrace views that turn out to be so patently wrong. Issues of this kind involve consideration of a broader set of factors, such as the cultural and setting of research, and especially the experiences of scientific thinkers themselves, whose own views and beliefs are often more indicative of the foundations of knowledge than any other considerations—especially in the case of problems like that posed by the Bosporus current, or by Black Sea geography in general, which lay beyond the scope of many empirical forms of investigation. Indeed on a certain view, the sciences are little more than this: a special institutional setting in which the limits of conventional forms of knowledge may be disregarded. In this case, science itself then denotes little more than the set of practices and conceptual standpoints for making sense of the unobservable, or bringing the unseen into view. This goes not only for geography and other areas of research in the natural sciences, but for a multitude of other fields of inquiry as well, including history. In this chapter, I examine the relationship between history and other forms of science in the Hellenistic era. Like other areas of speculative thought, historical writing too is based on an effort to comprehend situations laying beyond the limits of direct empirical consideration, and means produced by historians for addressing this task are to be understood in terms of similar developments in the cultural structure of the sciences. Thus while it would be incorrect to suggest that ancient historians reflect anything like a uniform sense of disciplinary identity, it is nonetheless clear that common ground is emergent, and that from efforts to establish standards of historical method, it is possible to speak of an institutional setting of at least some formality, even if the details vary from writer to writer. What is interesting is the role of other approaches to
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science in this process. In many cases, the development of formal standards of historical research is distinguished by direct influence of other traditions of research, notably in the field of rhetoric and in the natural sciences, which provide the model, expressed in the form of special techniques of description and analysis, for making sense of the past as a more serious subject of inquiry. The work of Herodotus and Thucydides reflects strong affiliations with contemporary science, for example, especially with specific trends in the development late fifth-century rationalist culture. Now though this fact is useful for situating the origins of the historical traditional more securely from a historical perspective, what is remarkable is the relationship of this set of developments with other cultural trends in the sciences, from which we observe not only the appearance of a more legitimate or more distinguished approach to study of the past, but especially the influence of particular, essentially normative conceptions of intellectual activity. Efforts to establish a more serious approach to history at this time are thus to be understood principally in terms of the emergent regime of intellectual culture in ancient Greece. Ultimately this point is of use for clarifying the basic dependency between history and other areas of intellectual life in antiquity. Yet in extending the implications of this observation here, I hope to explain the significance of this relationship in particular for the formation of historical perceptions, which are themselves, given the difficulty of the objectives of historical writing, subject to influence from the institutional formations making up the historical field. In what follows here I outline an approach for understanding ancient historiography in relation to the other structures forming the culture of the sciences. What follows here provides the foundations for examining Polybius’ own approach to history in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. Polybius’ engagement with contemporary science is of course apparent throughout his writing, which demonstrates familiarity with many subjects of scientific interest, including not
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only geography, but also medicine, epistemology, chronology, psychology and political theory.8 Yet though this set of interests forms an important backdrop to many parts of the Histories, the link with the sciences is in fact vital to understanding Polybius’ approach of history, which like that of Herodotus and Thucydides, is also based on an effort to integrate the methods and principles of contemporary science into description and explanation of the past. This chapter is divided into five sections. In Section I, I outline modern theoretical approaches to science, which situate scientific thought and the production of scientific knowledge in relation to the cultural and social dimensions of intellectual life. An important contribution to this area of study is Thomas Kuhn’s influential work on scientific revolutions, which continues to serve as a point of reference in many modern discussions of the sociology of scientific knowledge. Here I combine an outline some of the main features of Kuhn’s work with description of some of the theories of science developed since. The notion that intellectual production may be situated in relation to cultural and social factors is not Kuhn’s own of course, but his accounts of the development of scientific thought has useful implications for understanding the special cultural environment forming around the sciences, which include not only the basic contingency of all forms of scientific knowledge, but also the influence of social authority in shaping and regulating knowledge production. In Section II, I examine the function of scientific language. Generally speaking, the associations from which scientific communities are constituted depend on linguistic interaction, and in this respect the production of knowledge itself is to be understood in terms of fundamental links with language practices employed by scientific thinkers. In view of this Geography is the most prominent area of science to be addressed in the Histories, on which see Walbank 1948; 1972, 125-27; Pédech 1964, 515-97; and especially Clarke 1999, 77-128. Polybius’ interests in the sciences range broadly, however, and appear in his writing in variety of ways, ranging from passing reference to token ideas and concepts to the use of special formal terminology, to more thorough efforts to implement the formal practices of certain areas of research. A concise survey of Polybius’ affiliations with certain of the fields named here appears in Pédech 1974. On political theory in the Histories, see, e.g., Hahm 1995; Schubert 1995; Walbank 1998; on military science, Sacks 1981, 126-32. A good overview of Polybius’ relationship with scientific discourse is Meissner 1986; cf. Vegetti 1983, 163-65. For Polybius’ misuse of mathematics, see Netz 2002, 210-13. 8
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necessity, I consider the function of formal language in the sciences, drawing in particular on the work of Bruno Latour, whose efforts to theorize the productive role of scientific instruments has useful implications for how the use of linguistic tools centers and regulates scientific thought. In part, attention to formal language practice clarifies many aspects of the process of social formation. Yet given the dependency on linguistic interaction, this subject is especially important for assessing the extent to which perception of the external world is ordered through language in the sciences. The first two sections of this chapter thus provide a generic model for the interpretation of scientific cultures. In Section III, I combine historical and thematic survey to explain Hellenistic intellectual culture in terms of the influence of dominant practices governing the organization of the sciences. Regular features of Hellenistic science, I argue, are to be understood in mainly terms of normative tendencies emerging in the context of late fifth century rationalism. With continued advancement, this area of intellectual culture is to be associated with important developments in both the framing perspectives of scientific thought and in the disciplinary structure of intellectual life. In this context, I examine the impact of these developments upon intellectual activity in a range of fields, including history. In examining this process in closer detail in Section IV, I focus upon scientific notions of causality, which form a major aspect of scientific thought for the duration of antiquity. The final section of this chapter deals with historical writing more specifically, in which I trace historians’ use of certain techniques, such as causal analysis, modeled on other forms of science. I focus the argument here on Herodotus and Thucydides, whose similar approaches to study of the past form an important case for understanding the prospect of a more ‘scientific’ form of history, so to speak, in more pragmatic terms. While the developments exemplified by Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ writing may be attributed in some sense to simply elective decisions about historical method, given general tendencies in the development of intellectual culture at this
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time, their efforts to assimilate other scientific discourses are in some sense wholly necessary for the special claims distinguishing in their writing. Thus it is possible to situate the Greek historical tradition more clearly in relation to the current regime of the sciences. The notion of more scientific form of history is not a new idea incidentally, with efforts to address the problem going back at least to Aristotle, though these usually avoid questions concerning the positive aspects of the relationship. Here I hope to provide a context for reframing this problem in terms of the productive effects of the relation between history and the sciences.
Science as regime: the sociology of scientific knowledge We begin with modern approaches to the sciences based on the relationship between human knowledge and social and practical contexts of its production. This approach, typically known in the social sciences as constructivism, is based on the view that human knowledge represents the product of a range of factors related to the experiences of scientific thinkers themselves, especially the particular conditions constituting the social and cultural setting of inquiry, which form a decisive influence on the practices and beliefs of those involved, e.g., coordinating them in relation to one another, in relation to the external world, and so on. In the context of science, this means that all aspects of knowledge production, including not only the concrete practices of research and analysis, but also the standards of validity employed in implementing these practices, assume meaning largely in the context of different kinds of collective recognition. Certainly, in order to demonstrate validity scientific practices must achieve some success in providing solutions to the problems at hand, but the element of recognition is itself indispensable. Thus, while many of the activities of science involve consideration of naked facts, as it were (e.g., collection and interpretation of data, enlisting of findings in explanation or in critical assessment), it is important
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to recognize that the significance of these ‘facts’ is always established under description by individuals.9 Even on a thoroughly positivist view, the production of knowledge still depends upon the intercession of human agents in some way, whose role in this process (e.g., in forming interpretations, criticizing existing views, etc.) must still be described in terms the various relationships joining them together. Scientific knowledge is thus not only the product of a characteristically constructive process; it is fundamentally social as well. Even the mere act of scientific interpretation, for instance, generally presupposes a community of recipients. Whether one is engaged in acts of disclosure or in private contemplation, social engagement frames every stage of this process, including scrutiny of existing views, forming a defensible position, anticipation of objections, etc. Furthermore, at an even more basic level, it is clear that many forms of science also depend on language, and in particular, specific language practices that have been developed and endorsed by the scientific community (hereafter, often simply ‘community’). Description and analysis of explananda, dissemination of findings, transmission over time—all of these activities rely on linguistic representation. In an extreme view, the very existence of the sciences presupposes an important role for language, in the sense that it is only from linguistic interaction that participants acquire the ability to recognize and take part in scientific discourse. Thus, science is not only distinctively social, but from a purely pragmatic perspective, implies a dominant role for language as a means of mediating social engagement. The basis for this approach derives in part from the work of Thomas Kuhn, whose study of the subject of scientific revolutions has provided the important motivation for the formations of modern studies of social construction in the sciences, and it will thus be useful to outline here some of the primary features of Kuhn’s work, which will be of use not only in the present chapter, but also in later sections of this dissertation dealing with constructivism in the context of historical
9
See, e.g., Bazerman 1988, 3-17.
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writing.10 It should be acknowledged, however, that Kuhn’s interests are primarily historiographical, and that in general he does not concern himself with the task of providing a comprehensive theory of scientific knowledge. His point of departure, for example, is simply the observation that conventional perspectives, according to which the history of science (mainly in Europe and North America) denote an incremental, essentially progressive set of developments, stand in need of correction. Much better is the notion of ‘revolution’, for developments typically taken to denote the progress of scientific knowledge in fact reveal far less continuity than is assumed of them, but rather indicate abrupt transformations, which, initiated by momentous discovery or radical reassessment of existing data, bring about dramatic change in the ways of doing science of a given scientific community. (The so-called Copernican revolution is the signature example of this process.) In any event, though Kuhn’s work does not focus explicitly on the nature of scientific understanding, his efforts to explain the mechanisms underlying the process of scientific revolution provide important insights into the pragmatics of scientific communities. The most prominent feature of Kuhn’s work is his concept of the ‘paradigm’, which performs a variety of functions in his writing, but refers essentially to the common ground shared by the members of a given intellectual community with respect to a particular way of doing science. For Kuhn the paradigm explains how it is that the views maintained by individuals in situations of this kind may be said to constitute knowledge in the sense that they are held to be true more or less unproblematically. There are two ways in particular in which the notion of paradigm functions. First, it refers to the entire practical and intuitive system within which scientific thinkers form their views of the world. As such, the expression denotes the set of
Kuhn 19702. Important discussion of Kuhn in relation to the sociology of scientific knowledge appear in Barnes 1974, passim; 1982; cf. Bloor 19912, 55-62; cf. id. 1973, 142. See also the useful summaries in Barnes, Bloor and Henry 1996, 101-05; Golinski 1998, 13-27. 10
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common assumptions and beliefs that join a group of scientific thinkers together, and in this respect, it is in fact the formation of community itself that explains knowledge, which is thus to be understood as a common state maintained by all members of the group. Ptolemaic astronomy is perhaps the ideal example of this sense of the paradigm concept, which denotes a tradition held in place by continuous expression of commitment to the same basic ‘truth’ about the solar system. As for the second usage of the term, paradigm also refers to a single, concrete practice, incorporated as part of the paradigm-as-system described above, which, once recognized for its usefulness in solving particular problems, then serves as a model for extension to other sets of problems.11 While there are significant differences between these two senses of the term paradigm, what they share in common is the notion of community. Each implies the consolidation of scientific thinkers around a specific way of doing science, and thus also a specific way of perceiving the world. The notion of the paradigm is thus useful for clarifying how specific practices might be said to function as a source of knowledge just by virtue of their collective endorsement.12 Now, the latter issue is not actually worked out in detail by Kuhn, for he is more concerned with the (essentially historical) question of how certain practices earn recognition over
Kuhn describes the two, respectively, as the “sociological” and “philosophical” meanings of the term: “On the one hand, [the paradigm] stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given scientific community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions, which employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science” (19702, 175; cf. 182-91). 12 As has been observed, there is intrinsic circularity to the concept of the paradigm, which presupposes that the authority of the paradigm, i.e. in the second or ‘philosophical’ sense of the term (see n. 11 above), is determined by its adoption within a given scientific community, while at the same time the scientific community is defined as the group of individuals adopting the paradigm. The problem of circularity seems to depend on (incorrect) view that only unidirectional causal relations may underlie the formation of the scientific community, i.e. through its adoption of the paradigm. The insight of Kuhn’s work, however, seems to be the dynamic relationship he perceives between social interaction and the authority of practices embraced by the social group, which cannot in fact be explained in strictly empirical terms. For discussion, see Kuhn 19702, 176-81; cf. Barnes 1982, 35-39; Bloor 1983, 143. 11
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time.13 Yet the notion of the paradigm is still suggestive as to the foundations of scientific knowledge. Knowledge is formed and sustained in the context of group associations. In this respect, it is partly cognitive—Kuhn uses the term “psychological”—in the sense that it incorporates (and relies upon) the individual’s faculties of mental perception. Yet is it is also fundamentally social as well, in the sense that the cognitive resources of the individual are coordinated through group interaction. Now for Kuhn the relationship between knowledge and community structure plays an important role in accounting for specific historical situations in views about the world have persisted despite their patent limitations in retrospect (e.g., Ptolemaic astronomy). Yet here the notion of the paradigm is important for opening up the possibility of considering expressions of knowledge independently of concerns for veracity in the strict sense. Given the relationship to social configurations, knowledge in the sciences may now be understood in terms of largely local conditions, limited to specific historical or cultural situations, for example. In other words, what one knows, and the conditions for attaining knowledge are now to be understood as a matter of achieving consistency with the prevailing expectations of a particular group, or as a matter of doing justice to a specific set of beliefs, rather than meeting some objective standard of accuracy. In a local or practical epistemology of this kind, knowledge does not denote the product of logical deduction from unambiguous foundations, but rather simply a state of consensus. The mechanism of consensus may be clarified further in at least three ways in particular. First, the function of the paradigm may be described in more pragmatic terms. In the latter of the
Admittedly, though this approach helps to clarify how expressions of knowledge are formed in the sciences, it does not in fact explain how extension of the paradigm is itself constitutive of knowledge, for example. In other words, Kuhn does not address the more complicated issue of why collective practices might be said to cause knowledge, in the sense of actually inducing a cognitive state. See Bloor 19912, cited and discussed by Golinski 1998, 23-24. Kuhn’s view of knowledge is concerned with more pragmatics aspects of thought and cognition, such modeling and meeting standards involved in use of the paradigm; e.g., 19702, 43-46, 191-98, making reference (p. 44 n. 1) to the notion of “tacit knowledge” formulated by Polyani 1958, esp. 69-202. 13
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two definitions mentioned above, the term refers quite literally to a model, which though initially formulated for addressing a specific set of problems, acquires authority from extension to other contexts and recognition of its value in addressing new problems. The epistemic function of the paradigm is in fact activated by the process of extension itself.14 Though Kuhn is not himself explicitly concerned with epistemology, it is not difficult to see how extension of the model solution contributes to the epistemic process. Its very use implies a certain investment of belief. Yet as the model solution is replicated in the context of addressing new objects of concern, that investment becomes more broadly generalized. Thus the epistemic function of the paradigm is essentially a matter of progressive coordination in the beliefs of all members of the scientific community. Furthermore, this process may be clarified at the level of the individual as well, the second point mentioned above. At the level of the individual, knowledge is essentially a cognitive state, but in as such, has particular features of its own in the sense that, once attained, it is not worked out further in any great detail. In other words, as the attainment of knowledge derives from meeting certain minimum requirements established locally, it therefore represents a characteristically underdetermined process from the point of view of logic. Knowledge denotes a state at which it possible to move on, so to speak, giving up further active scrutiny. In this respect, scientific knowledge is to be understood largely in negative terms, in the sense that it does not necessarily denote a state formed from active application of cognitive faculties, but rather a form of perception determined by received limits.15 Thus the notion of consensus represents a state of collective disregard for other possibilities. The role of social grouping is of course vital to this view of scientific knowledge, but in particular, we observe that model may be clarified further with
Kuhn 19702 1, 187-91; cf. Barnes, Bloor and Henry 1996, 101-05. For Kuhn, knowledge is based upon attaining a particular kind of vision, formed from analogical imaging with other entities already regarded as known or understood; e.g., 19702, 200: “the ability to group objects and situations into similarity sets which are primitive in the sense that grouping is done without an answer to the question ‘Similar with respect to what?’”. A useful example of this concept of knowledge appears in a Kuhn’s account of 19th-century perspectives of the solar system (pp. 116-17). 14 15
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respect to the interdependency between social context and subject, in which case scientific knowledge is not just a matter of consensus, but rather denotes a state (at the level of the individual) of low resistance to convention. The metaphors of power and resistance are not accidental of course, for social authority plays a crucial role in Kuhn’s conception of the paradigm. The extension of the paradigm does not occur haphazardly, but is determined by relations of authority already in place among members of the community. In part, this is a matter of the formal institutional structure to be found in certain scientific communities, which entails controls for intellectual activity just by virtue of the various membership requirements associated with the universities, professional associations, and other institutions making up this environment. Here, standards of conduct are enforced in a variety of settings (e.g., classrooms, laboratories, professional journals, etc.) and by more or less formally recognized authorities (e.g., teachers, university admissions committees, mentors, peer-review boards, etc.). At this level, power is exercised in explicit forms, with conditions for participation established fairly concretely. Yet though the formal institutions of science play a substantial role in organizing intellectual activity, their influence is limited in comparison with that produced by the social network itself. Relations of authority are in fact intrinsic to the formation of the scientific community, which even without the formal institutional framework of many modern scientific disciplines, implies its own system of regulation in the form of emergent hierarchical structures. The task of advancing a given interpretation, for example, implies itself submission to some preexistent discursive framework; otherwise it would be less meaningful for its intended recipients. Even addressing specific problems of scientific interest implies recognition of some prior notion (maintained by a specific set of forebears) of where problems persist. In this case, consensus is perhaps not the most precise
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term for how the community functions, incidentally; the notion of the paradigm in fact implies a deeply normative conception of conduct.16 This brings us finally to Kuhn’ concept of ‘normal science’, which is useful for understanding the extent to which patterns of regulation in the sciences do affect thought and conduct. The expression refers in particular to the practices and beliefs taken for granted by the members of a given community. In terms of the paradigm, normal science may be understood as the most mature stage of the process of extension, at which point, certain activities have become routine for the community, and are thus now indispensable to its particular conceptions of knowledge and truth. At this stage, replication of the paradigm no longer represents a potential solution, in other words, but is simply taken for granted, in which case it is absorbed among all the other practices and conceptual standpoints intuitively understood as part of valid view of the world (or of a particular set of problems). In this case, the concept of normal science presupposes influence on thought and action at even the most basic levels of perception. The formation of the scientific community thus implies restrictive conceptions of knowledge not only in the respect of the practical means of inquiry, but also in respect of the concrete views of the world underlying their usage. Perhaps no instance of normal science illustrates this better than Ptolemaic astronomy: the long tenure of this system was apparently due to its regular success in predicting planetary and astral positions, but what is interesting is that with the accumulation of contradictory data, astronomers chose to revise their calculations rather than question their approach. Thus in seeking to resolve inconsistencies between the terracentric model and the new data through more complex mathematical support, they took on actions that were increasingly The notion of social discipline is not fully theorized in Kuhn’s system view, though it is implied throughout to play an important role (e.g., 19702, 80, 136-43). Like other aspects of his thought (e.g., epistemology), the role of social authority is conceived by him in predominately pragmatic terms, e.g., in the influence of pedagogy and other institutional features of scientific culture; see 176-81; cf. Barnes 1985, 8990. Here I rely primarily on Golinski 1998, 47-78, which synthesizes approaches to social authority in the science since Kuhn. Other important discussions of the subject are Polanyi 1958, 53-54, and especially Foucault 1971. 16
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more cumbersome and awkward. Of course, the problems with the Ptolemaic system would eventually lead to its rejection in the 16th century, but this revolutionary step was only taken after centuries of growing insecurity, and not to mention, increasingly greater labor as well.17 Two points in particular are worth noting: forms of regulation are not restricted to thought and cognition, but are extended to conduct as well. The two domains are inextricable of course, but on this view, it is possible the track the influence of normal science even to the level of embodied experience. Second, the example of Ptolemaic astronomy provides an important clarification: it is not that the normal research program determines thought and conduct; it is simply a framework for assigning value, and as such constitutes only a system of rewards and penalties. Thus it is worth emphasizing that the extension the paradigm and the formation of the normal research setting occur largely from voluntary commitments expressed from person to person. This of course provides for a more realistic view of the intellectual life as a whole, which is in any case characterized by greater diversity than is perhaps suggested by this view of the sciences as a system of regulation. Yet the implication of this point are worth pursuing further, for though diversity may be taken for granted, the appearance of the normal program ultimately entails strict hierarchical conceptions of intellectual activity. As a source of regulation for intellectual life the notion of normal science presupposes strict forms of differentiation between legitimate and spurious forms of sciences. By Kuhn’s view, the normal program inevitably separates practices into normal and anomalous categories. Boundaries created among scientific thinkers become more rigid with the continued success of a given paradigm and the corresponding growth in commitment to its use. In fact by definition, the notion of normal science implies the existence of an out-group. Such groups are not necessarily obscure; they are simply marginal. Despite the success of the Ptolemaic system, for example, that
17
Kuhn 19702, 68-69; cf. id. 1957, 135-43.
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tradition was always countered by active interest in heliocentrism. A similar case concerns the early days of electrical research, in which it is possible to observe inquiries drawing upon a range of different theoretical conceptions of electricity—was it a fluid? was it mechanical? What is remarkable, Kuhn observes, is that even when Benjamin Franklin had established what would soon become the paradigmatic view, few of the alternative traditions were discontinued (13-18). The anecdote illustrates that the primacy of a given way of conducting inquiry is not to be taken for granted, but simply indicates that certain values have won out over time. It is therefore important to observe that in any historical situation, the normal research program may be flanked a number of alternative forms of interpretation. In particular it is their status as ‘alternative’ or ‘spurious’ that demands our attention, for the implication of Kuhn’s view of normal science is that the establishment of scientific culture necessarily relies on ongoing practices of exclusion. Such are the stakes in fact in the use of terms like ‘science’, “knowledge’, ‘truth’ and so on. The notion of the sciences as a source of regulation is perhaps most poignantly described in the work of Michel Foucault, who discusses the appearance of scientific traditions from the perspective of the principle of exclusion implied by all claims to knowledge. In particular, Foucault says that the advance of scientific disciplines may be attributed to the authority of special discursive resources, which not only distinguish and validate certain ways of seeing the world, but at the same time establish limits for the kinds of things that may be said or thought.18 The appearance of the scientific disciplines thus effectively constitutes a system of discursive control. As in other areas of Foucault’s thought, the mechanism of control is based upon relations of power emerging routinely in the context of social interaction, and thus his view of the sciences is useful for understanding patterns of regulation even prior to emergence of more formal disciplinary structures. Foucault’ observations about ‘the order of discourse’ thus coincides neatly with Kuhn’s
18
Foucault 1971; for a summary, see McNay 1995, 86-88.
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view of the paradigm-community, which is also defined in terms the emergent structures of regulations coinciding with the appearance of scientific disciplines.19 Yet Foucault places greater emphasis on the exclusionary effects of disciplinary control, conceived of at levels of thought and language, which will be useful to examine briefly here.20 For Foucault, what is ultimately at stake is the ability to be generate meaning itself, in the sense that, as conditions for conduct are determined by mechanisms of authority intrinsic to the disciplinary setting, there emerge necessary constraints upon how meaning is constructed in this setting. This interpretation doubtless raises complex questions regarding the nature of language and its relation to expressions of social authority, but the aspect of this I would like to focus upon is the extreme intensity of this kind of exclusion. For Foucault, disciplinary control does not merely entail the invalidation of certain statements or modes of thought, or of certain concrete views of scientific interpretation (e.g., a terracentric theory of the solar system, or a mechanical model of electricity). That would imply a certain degree of intelligibility, and thus inevitably consistency with the order of discourse. On the contrary, what is entailed is exclusion of the very possibility of certain forms of thought and expression, which are not so much false or invalid, as wholly unthinkable on the terms provided by the discourse community.21 Foucault’s principle of exclusion thus implies the suppression of an entire range of discursive possibilities. Now, while this See Kuhn 1970, 182: “What do [the members of the community of specialists] share that accounts for the relative fullness of its their professional communication and the relative unanimity of their professional judgments?... I suggest ‘disciplinary matrix’: ‘disciplinary’ because it refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline; ‘matrix’ because it is composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring further specification.” 20 For Kuhn, the issue of exclusion is not central, but does appear occasionally; e.g., 1970, 19, emphasis mine: “But there are always some men who cling to the one or other of the older views, and they are simply read out of the profession, which thereafter ignores their work… Those unwilling or unable to accommodate their work to [new definitions of a field] must proceed in isolation or attach themselves to some other group.” 21 See Golinski 1998, 69-70. The issue is thus not a matter of truth and falsehood—the latter is in fact recognized within (and thus accommodated by) the order of discourse. The kind of exclusion Foucault has in mind is that of the purely anomalous: “Within its own limits, every discipline recognizes true and false propositions, but it repulses a whole teratology of learning. The exterior of science is both more, and less, populated than one might think” (1971, 16). 19
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standpoint is perhaps excessive in the way it idealizes the distinction between what can and cannot be said in the sciences, especially for cases in which a discipline is only partially formed (or not formed at all), his notion of the principle of exclusion is itself useful for clarifying the basic dependency of intellectual production on a socially-grounded framework, no matter what the institutional formality of the disciplinary setting. Given this view of discourse, it follows that all statements and modes of thought are the results of positive acts of construction. The point is not difficult to grasp for many concrete views produced in the sciences, such as theories of the solar system, which clearly derive from complex discursive operations. Yet Foucault’s notion of discourse goes even for those tendencies of perception that are most familiar or which seem most natural, that is to say, even the most routine features of certain belief systems in the sciences, such as ordinary views regarding the regularity of physical motion, the necessity of causation, or the strict disjuncture between truth and falsity. From this perspective, Foucault’s interpretation suggests the importance of regarding scientific thought as the product of discursive controls at even the most mundane levels of perception. To take all parts of the foregoing discussion together, it is thus possible to view scientific knowledge as the product of various factors involving tendencies mediated by social interaction, the influence of institutional structures, the nature of collective perception, the semantic function of language, etc. This interpretation is useful for addressing the particular dilemma with which this chapter began, the problem of knowledge of the Black Sea, which now, we see, is to be understood in terms of local conditions governing the structure of Hellenistic science, i.e. as a community of thinkers defined by a more or less common practical and intuitive standpoint. Knowledge of the Bosporus current, like that of any other issue in the natural sciences, is thus to be understood in terms of a range of conditions largely independent of tasks of observation and analysis themselves; indeed it should be clear that procedures of that kind are never
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straightforward, but are performed only in relation to a host of external mediating factors. In any event, of larger importance here is how this interpretation put forward here calls attention to new possibilities for understanding science as the product of a cultural system, which combines human behavior and environmental conditions within a common set of relationships. It should be clear that significant linkages exist among all components in the interpretation given above—e.g., between tendencies toward group formation and expressions of social authority, between subjective and collective forms of perception, etc. Yet the underlying theme is the regularity of these linkages, and especially the regularity with which they are expressed in the conduct of individuals. The notion of scientific knowledge itself presupposes a significant level of regularity on its own; otherwise it would be difficult to account for the remarkable fact that even the most erroneous views about the world have nonetheless succeeded in unifying large parts of intellectual culture. Yet the notion of regularity is also to be understood in terms of its manifestation in the normative tendencies holding intellectual culture together: it is built in to the very structure of the scientific community as a social formation, which is only constituted and maintained by regular expectations on the part of its individual members. The notion of the system is thus useful for grasping the complementary tendencies sustaining dynamic arrangements of this kind in which collective behavior is at once both the product and determining condition. There are some problems, however. As the scientific community is characterized by behavior that is only “more or less” regular, the notion of the system described here perhaps implies a higher degree of regularity than occurs in reality. Indeed the foregoing interpretation is not completely helpful for understanding the irregular or anomalous behavior appearing alongside all formal research programs, which would in principle also have to be accommodated by the system. For the same reason, the notion is unhelpful for understanding change over time in scientific communities, which necessarily presupposes that constraints governing behavior are
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occasionally relaxed or thrown off as discovery and innovation lead to new forms of intellectual life. In short, the problems described here may be condensed to the generic problem of all overly rigid models of social experience. Space is lacking to address each of the issues raised here individually, but a common solution lies in the way we understand the notion of system as a set of governing conditions. Instead of seeing behavior as thoroughly determined by social and institutional factors, a more appropriate view be to regard the influence of the latter as merely providing conditions for intellectual activity—strong conditions to be sure, given the intensity of conviction behind many claims to scientific knowledge, but nevertheless not unalterable under the right circumstances. Polybius’ explanation of the Bosporus current is not fixed, for example, neither for himself nor others, but at the same time, we must recognize that there are few other options for what he might have said without drawing strong resistance. The influence of the Peripatetic tradition, then, is thus largely reducible to a set of provisions for addressing the problem more meaningfully in relation to the expectations of a given audience. Peripatetic science does not determine knowledge of the problem, in other words—in fact it is clear that alternative views of the problem were in circulation—but rather simply provides conditions for a particular understanding of it. Viewed from this perspective, it is necessary to find a more versatile concept than is usually implied by the term system. Fulfilling this need surely represents a large problem, but for present purposes, the notion of ‘regimes’ is particularly helpful. This concept, employed with varying levels of explicitness in the social sciences, provides a useful framework for understanding conditions of regularity in social experience, while at the same time allowing for versatility in the way regularity is manifested over time.22 There is no need to go on at length here regarding the notion of regimes, but in particular, the it is the political overtones of the concept that are useful for clarifying how fluency is possible within a scheme defined by constraint and On the notion of ‘regimes’, see Spier 1996, 1-14, who provides a brief but informative account of how the concept may be used as an alternative to the more rigid notion of the system. 22
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order, for forms of regulations in science are primarily a system of rewards and punishments, as mentioned above, and do not necessarily eliminate all variation. From this perspective, while the notion of regime does not necessarily explain on its own how tendencies toward regularity and change may be harmonized in something as complex as social systems, it is at least useful for illustrating some of the nuances in assimilating the sciences to other cultural systems. Here the concept forms the basis for understanding how Greek historical sensibilities are shaped and ordered through developments in intellectual culture linking historical writers with other scientific thinkers. The notion that late-Classical and Hellenistic intellectual culture may be understood as an epistemic regime of this kind is particularly helpful for understanding developments in the notion of a more serious form to history, as exemplified by the work of Herodotus and Thucydides in particular, which denote tendencies toward both assimilation (of current conceptions of scientific activity) and rupture (with existing conceptions of historical writing). Before moving on to that set of issues, however, I would like to examine the function of language in the sciences, which is useful for understanding how the regime is administered at lower levels of analysis.
Language and other tools of scientific thought Formal language practices are emblematic of the kind of regularization implied by this view of science. So long as participation in the community is mediated through linguistic interaction, expressions of knowledge formed in this context depend significantly on linguistic representation. It is thus necessary to take closer inventory of special features of scientific language as the basis for this kind of intercourse. It goes without saying that the relation of language to the development of formal institutions of knowledge represents an immense subject and is well beyond the scope of
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this brief section, but in what follows I hope to outline some of the noteworthy features of scientific language relating it to the foregoing theoretical discussion.23 For Ludwik Fleck, language plays a crucial role in the way propositions formed in the course of inquiry are transformed into the accepted ‘facts’ of scientific knowledge. Expression in language adds certainty to propositions by creating distance from the particular conditions under which the referents are initially apprehended. Fleck is speaking in particular about the dissemination of findings to lay audiences (both popular audiences and experts operating in separate fields), in which the need for more accessible language situates propositions in less problematic relation to reality they are meant to signify. Language thus renders propositions “more dramatic”, so to speak.24 Now while this observation might be theorized in greater detail, the insight that language plays a unique role is an important one itself. In particular, the notion of dramatization clarifies how the complexities of reality, which are in fact never genuinely (or completely) served by attempts at symbolic representation, become less urgent in the course of linguistic interaction. The point is not necessarily that language obscures, or even that scientific facts possess only representational status—though these are themselves significant consequences of Bibliography on the epistemological significance of language in the sciences is immense. Generally speaking, treatments of the subject may be grouped under two categories: those that do attribute an epistemic function to language, and those that deny this function, maintaining that language only serves rhetorical (i.e. persuasive) purposes. Even this categorization is limited however, for aside from the most extreme expressions of the latter view, there are a range of ways of thinking about the productive significance of language that combine the epistemic and rhetorical aspects; a useful introduction to this set of problems, with numerous references, is Gross 2006, 1-19; cf. Golinski 1998, 103-32; Sarukhai 2002. As will become clear, though the view adopted here perhaps shares the most in common with the former of categories mentioned, the antithesis between, say, knowledge and rhetoric is only an incidental part of a problem, which may be understood better in terms of the fundamental relationship between linguistic expression and other aspects of the social structure of science. As scientific thinkers interact through the manufacture and exchange of discursive representations, in other words, language plays a crucial role in knowledge production. Moreover, to the extent that special forms of linguistic interaction actually contribute to the institutional framework of science, they surely are constitutive of knowledge. Indeed, on a strong view of the relationship between language and disciplinary identity, formal language practices in fact provide a necessary condition for knowledge; see pp. 32-33 below. The following discussion thus draws primarily on theoretical approaches focusing on the epistemic function of language in terms of the institutionalization of specific language practices; e.g., Fleck 1979; Shapin 1984; 1994; Foucault 1971; Latour 1987, 21-62; Bazerman 1988; Montgomery 1996. 24 1979, 113-15; further discussion in Collins 1985, 144-45; Golinski 1998, 34-35. 23
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the dependency upon language (see p. 32-33 below)—but rather that language plays a necessary role in smoothing over the complexities that inhibit the transmission of knowledge to a broader set of individuals. In this respect, language actually makes science possible to an extent. A similar approach is adopted by Bruno Latour, who also sees the function of language primarily as a matter of reducing complexity, though for him, the issue is not linguistic representation itself, but rather the entire set of discursive practices through which knowledge is disseminated to the community. In particular, Latour observes how in scientific literature, authors frame their interpretations by reference to consenting authorities, which enhance credibility by distributing responsibility for the claims across a broader section of the community. In the case, the establishment of a given interpretation is essentially a matter of reducing resistance by appealing to the general tendency to recognize a majority viewpoint, or “by raising the cost of dissent”, to put it another way.25 Now, while this approach notably accords with views of social construction outlined above, the important point concerns the extent of comprehension at the level of individual implied by this view of knowledge. In particular, as trust is placed in the authority of experts, there is a decreasing need for comprehensiveness in any given subject’s understanding of the problem. It is true that more thorough knowledge is to be expected in certain cases (e.g., on the part of the original exponent), but at a certain point, for an interpretation to acquire broad acceptance, comprehension from person to person will be largely imperfect. Thus the process of dissemination actually presupposes—even depends upon— representational practices that are only partial and selective. The point is comparable to Fleck’s notion of dramatization in the way it associates the validation of scientific ideas with a corresponding decrease in complexity.
Latour 1987, 42: “a fact is what is collectively stabilised from the midst of controversies when the activity of later papers does not consist only of criticism or deformation but also of confirmation”; cited by Golinski 1998, 38. 25
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Fleck’s and Latour’s views provide a good starting point for addressing the epistemic function of scientific language, though they must remain largely preliminary here, as they are restricted to literary activity. Yet the observation that imperfection plays a role in means by which knowledge is extended within a group is useful for grasping the function of scientific language more generally. In particular, this observation indicates the need for a more nuanced understanding of how knowledge is formed in group situations, in which levels of comprehension inevitably vary from person to person. There is a noteworthy problem, for instance, in attributing such an important role to discursive practices, when they are ultimately only partial in representational detail. The issue is resolved in part by the theory of social construction itself, which in fact presupposes that knowledge at the individual level is underdetermined from a logical point of view, but that solution remains incomplete (see p. 14 above), for it leaves out other mediating factors, in addition to social reinforcement, that appear to be required by the production of collective knowledge. In other words, it does not actually explain how theories of hydrological change or electricity catch on simply to adduce the influence of social authority. The channels through which that authority is expressed must play some role of their own. In this case, a separate function must be attributed to other external factors, such as the concrete language practices of the community, which in fact often form the most immediate focus for scientific thinkers. Moreover, as disclosure and dissemination of knowledge are based primarily on linguistic interaction, language is perhaps among the most significant external factors of this kind. The epistemic function of language thus goes beyond the notion of dramatization mentioned above, but is rather to be understood in terms of how specific linguistic and conceptual resources are developed for addressing the problems of the community. This perspective also draws upon the work of Latour, who sees an essential dependency between scientific knowledge and various material instruments upon which modern science depends (e.g., for measuring, imaging, etc.). To
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an extent, language practices are not fundamentally different from other tools employed by scientific thinkers, as all perform critical roles in the task of transferring knowledge, in representational form, from its point of origin in experiments and the like to a wider community. It is thus possible to speak of language and other scientific instruments as sharing a comparable productive role in the construction of knowledge.26 To begin, it is important to observe that this view actually derives from a standpoint conceived partly in opposition to social constructivism, which, for Latour at least, relies on too narrow a view of the foundations of knowledge by incorporating only interpersonal relationships. A more comprehensive theory would involve the various non-human agents enlisted in the course of routine practice, such as special devices for imaging and obtaining measurements. For Latour, scientific instruments form part of the heterogeneous network within which scientific thinkers operate in forming their views. Now, while the notion of agency for non-human entities has received much criticism,27 the impulse to enlarge the bases of knowledge-production contains an important insight, namely, that the production of knowledge is in fact shaped by conditions that precede the involvement of human participants. Many of the tasks of observation and disclosure in the laboratory setting (e.g., preparing experiments, recording data, forming interpretations) rely upon the use of special instruments, and are often even wholly unthinkable without the aid of the latter. In this respect, it is possible to speak of certain components of knowledge production as being outsourced, so to speak, as external devices are enlisted to perform operations human investigators do not. Here, the point is not so much that instruments perform tasks that elude human agents, but rather that the contribution of such instruments is taken for granted. Their constructive function goes largely unnoticed under routine conditions.28 It is thus possible to see Also on “literary technology” in the sciences, in regards to Robert Boyle’s reports on experiments with the air pump more specifically, see Shapin 1984. 27 For a brief summary of Latour’s critics see Golinski 1998, 40-43; cf. in particular Amsterdamska 1990. 28 Latour 1987, 30-44, 64-70; cf. Latour and Woolgar 19862. 26
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how scientific thinkers might be said to attain knowledge of phenomena for which they have no direct empirical acquaintance. While scientific inquiry proceeds at a certain remove from external reality, the observational distance may be closed by the use of special tools; in fact, it is only by the use of such tools that certain kinds of knowledge are attainable in the first place. Latour’s approach is relevant here for several reasons. First it reflects a view of knowledge as the product of distinctively social processes. Though the theory of heterogeneous association is intended to transcend a simple constructivist approach, it relies upon an implicitly social form of explanation. For an instrument to support knowledge about a given phenomenon, for example, there must first be some consensus over its value. The use of scientific instruments is thus not fundamentally different from other practical commitments characterizing the community. Moreover, the mechanism of consensus here depends on the same understanding of cognitive function assumed elsewhere by the social model—a crucial point, for the productive function of scientific instruments apparently depends on the fact that their purpose and function are taken for granted. Investigators deal only with the images produced by the electron microscope, for example; they do not continue to question the validity of such images, at least not beyond certain expectations. Finally, Latour’s approach is useful for clarifying other aspects of the constructivist model more definitively, such as the epistemological problem, noted above, regarding the limitations of a purely social perspective of knowledge production. By situating knowledge in relation to the material constituents of the research setting, Latour identifies key factors for knowledge beyond the context of social interaction. This insight supports an analytically more extensive view of the foundations for knowledge. Moreover, by the same token, Latour’s approach also clarifies an additional dimension of social interaction in the scientific community, which, we see, is now based also on coordination in the use of certain instruments, in addition to strict social
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associations. Indeed, on a strong reading of Latour, it appears that scientific communities are to some extent constituted even by consensus over the importance of certain instruments. Latour’s model is useful for understanding language in the sciences in terms of how certain practices provide special tools for tasks of description and explanation for which ordinary linguistic resources have proven inadequate or inconvenient. Special techniques of expression form a common feature of many fields of science, which, earmarked for their usefulness and routinely employed, not only contribute to the clarity and fluency of scientific discourse, but also provide the basis for the construction of disciplinary identity. The most obvious example of this phenomenon is of course the formal technical language that appears in many mature scientific fields, though considerations must be made also for the many figures of speech and metaphorical constructions that occur in informal situations as well. The latter are in fact especially noteworthy in this respect, as they illustrate the significance of scientific language in contexts of even relatively low institutional formality, such as in ancient science. In any case, language practices of this kind are vital to many forms of scientific activity, in which complex ideas and the difficulties of transmission and dissemination generally reveal ordinary language practices to be inadequate. Now, what is interesting is that with regular use such practices are institutionalized within practical repertory of a given field of inquiry and are thus absorbed among the other distinguishing practices of that community. As such, the semantic function of technical expressions is eventually taken for granted by their users. As usage becomes more regular, complexity and novelty are eroded, and in this respect, even extremely inventive figures of expression become routine in time. Now, this is not to say that they are emptied of meaning. On the contrary, conventional formal expressions in scientific language are full of meaning. Most language of this kind in fact functions by condensing the complexity of ideas and concepts that are otherwise unmanageable. Yet what is interesting is that in the process of regularization, i.e. as
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technical language and special metaphors become routine, their usage implies change in the intuitive commitments of individual users, whose engagement with them now no longer requires active consideration of their significance. In this respect, it is thus possible to speak of a certain autonomy for language practices in the sciences. As technical and figurative language is absorbed into regular profile of a discourse community, the tendency of subsequent users is that of increasing accommodation. In this case, the significance of formal language is actually epistemological. As the effects of this process include not only practical changes, but also proficiency with a certain ideas, premises or concrete views, the use of formal language implies a significant accumulation in the personal knowledge of the individual language user.29 It is superfluous to question the basis of certain metaphors and figurative expressions, for example, for their semantic value eventually becomes unproblematic. From this perspective, acclimation to the special language of a given community performs an important educative function. To clarify, as more or less formal institutions of practice, the distinctive language practices of a given scientific community perform a function in description and explanation that is not generally replicated by scientific thinkers themselves, whose agency in this set of activities is generally limited to those concerns that remain open to question. Viewed in this light, the function of linguistic institutionalization is essentially one of adding certainty to techniques of expression that for previous thinkers were merely tentative. The process may be likened to Latour’s concept of ‘modalities’, which refers to how knowledge is established in group settings as participants collectively advance towards higher-order (or merely different) concerns; as older problems are resolved, the solutions proposed for them are modulated or made more certain as they then form the foundations for further inquiries (1987, 22-29). The concept is especially useful for clarifying the epistemological significance of formal scientific language, which
29
On personal or ‘tacit’ knowledge, see Polanyi 1958, esp. 203-7.
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is to be associated with similar effects in the way certain ideas and beliefs are rendered more certain through regular usage. The relationship between language and other instruments in the sciences, then, is based largely upon the common function they share in directing and ordering intellectual activity. In purely practical terms, as the use of certain resources (linguistic or material) becomes more regular, the specific problems for which they have been developed become less urgent. Thus, as greater trust is placed in the use of these tools, the focus of inquiry becomes restricted to other domains of interest. The use of formal tools is thus to be understood in terms of its essentially deterrent effects on scientific thought. On the other hand, however, practical changes of this kind have epistemological implications as well, in the sense that as tools of this kind are employed more routinely, the foundations of knowledge are themselves changed. Now, from a certain perspective, the process outlined here is perhaps not greatly different that understood by ordinary conceptions of scientific progress, in which older problems are solved and exchanged out for new ones (with solutions to the former providing the starting point for addressing latter). Yet the point here is that in linking this process to the use of concrete tools, it is possible to analyze the constituents of knowledge-production in greater detail. The point goes back to the problem described at the outset of this section, i.e. regarding the need for a broader understanding of the foundations of knowledge beyond mechanisms of social authority alone. By including formal language practices within this equation, it is possible to clarify the productive nature of language more definitively. Of course, there remains controversy over the epistemological significance of scientific language (see n. 23 above), and though it is not the intent here to provide a comprehensive solution to that problem, it ought to be clear nonetheless that certain forms of knowledge are indeed indissociable from their construction in specially designated language practices. The point becomes more urgent as language becomes more formal, for as usage of certain language implies
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greater specialization, the conditions for knowledge are linked more stringently to discursive formations. In certain cases, knowledge has almost no other foundations, such as with the use of special metaphors, certain localized forms of discourse, and especially the technical language of many modern scientific disciplines. In cases of this kind, it is difficult to exclude the language itself, as medium for exchange, from the bases of knowledge production. That is an extreme example in respect of all kinds of scientific activity of course, but it is nonetheless useful establishing the dependency of knowledge on linguistic expression in at least a minimal range of cases. Thus scientific language does not always perform a merely communicative role, i.e. supporting exchange in observations and propositions already formed in the context of other procedures, but in certain cases, it is thoroughly responsible for expressions of knowledge, in the sense that in lieu of which, there is no other mode of construction. In short, we see that in certain settings in which language holds a prominent position among the other resources for producing claims to knowledge, special language practices are indispensable. Among the various ways propositions acquire status as knowledge, for example, certain practices play a special role in the dissemination, whereby their disclosure and extension within the scientific community perform a vital function in the process by reducing complexity. More importantly, however, in the context of that function, language also acquires a relatively autonomous role, in the sense that it forms a necessary condition for knowledge-production and thus an especially important factor in for the formation of scientific culture as well. In other words, as certain language practices are designated in this way, not only do they facilitate the kinds of interaction appearing in mature scientific communities, but they also contribute, through this function, to the formation disciplinary setting. In all, then, the subject of scientific language provides a useful illustration of many features of the constructivist model described above. Yet above all, this brief outline will be useful for considering knowledge-production in the sciences in
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antiquity, in which special language occupies a much larger role proportionally in relation to the other resources available to scientific thinkers.
Setting limits: form, regularity and the culture of learning in ancient Greece The foregoing portrait of intellectual regimes is extensible to understanding sciences in ancient Greece too, as in that context, we also find a more or less regular set of practices held in place by group commitments, governed by emergent mechanisms of cultural authority, etc. While it is important to observe that ancient science differs substantially from its modern counterpart in terms of the level of institutional formality appearing in the latter, it is nonetheless clear that systems of thought in antiquity follow similar mechanisms in the way individuals are coordinated in relation to the pursuit of knowledge. Thus ancient science is still characterized by high levels of regularity. Causal explanation is widely embraced, for example, not only in medicine and natural philosophy, but in many other fields as well, such as geometry, grammar and logic. Similarly, techniques of analysis and classification are also common, often in fields that might not immediately strike us as open to that approach. In addition, underlying these practices there are host of common assumptions directing inquiry, including widespread beliefs in an immanent order, or that order is characterized by complementary tendencies toward change and stability; moreover, it is also generally assumed that natural hierarchies persist through processes of change. Together these common practices and assumptions form a general framework for inquiry.30 It is thus possible, on the social constructivist view, to speak of the production of knowledge in terms of group commitments to this framework. This is not to say that the pursuit of
For general introductions to sciences in Classical and Hellenistic Greece, see Wasserstein 1962; Wartofksky 1968, 63-98; Lloyd 1970; 1973; Irby-Massie 2002, 1-17; Rihill 2002. Zhmud 2006 is also very useful; much more comprehensive and detailed is Neugebauer 1969. 30
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knowledge always proceeds unproblematically along clearly defined, well-coordinated lines of development; on the contrary, fierce dispute and controversy are typical. Yet important continuities are apparent over time. It is to this aspect of the sciences I turn here, discussing the formation of Classical and Hellenistic intellectual culture in terms of specific historical developments fostering regularization. In conjunction with themes introduced in the theoretical discussion above, I suggest that from extension of specific ways of doing science and the corresponding growth in commitment to their use, this setting too may be understood as an intellectual and cultural regime, involving the appearing discrete systems of regulation for intellectual production. Ultimately, this view forms the basis for the study of developments in the historical field, to which I turn in Section V. We begin with the rational interest in t°xnai (“arts”, “crafts”) over the course of the fifth century, which may be associated with the emergence of regular research programs exerting influence on intellectual activity well through the Hellenistic period. As for technê itself, the term is usually taken to refer to “arts” or “crafts”, and thus designates a variety of skilled occupations, such as agriculture, medicine or music, characterized by the production of specific goods or by the direction of specific practices.31 On its own, then, it must be noted that technê refers only to a concrete activity, and does not connote any special conceptualization of its functional properties. Technai are simply the occupations themselves, such as agriculture or medicine. With the advent of rational interest in the latter half of the fifth century, however, different forms of technê are subject to increasingly greater analysis and explanation. So the aim turns to understanding why given skills produce the results they do—e.g., why certain forms of treatment succeed or fail in producing states of health, or, in music, why given techniques produce specific tonal phenomena, Literature on technai represents a immense subject; for concise remarks on its translation, see Guthrie 1971, 115 n. 3; more detailed discussions of its usage in pre-Platonic sources and contexts, are Heinimann 1961; Isnardi Parente 1966; Roochnik 1996, 17-88; Balansard 2001, 13-45; Zhmud 2006, 45-81; Cuomo 2007, 1-40. 31
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such as harmony. From a methodological standpoint, this means clarifying the causal bases of phenomena and establishing general rules for their occurrence. The pursuit of ‘technical knowledge’, as it were, is in fact characterized specifically by concern for rules of this kind. In certain formulations, it is only through articulation of causal regularities that one might be said to attain genuine knowledge—it does not count as knowledge, in other words, when regular relationships cannot be adduced securely for a class of phenomena. The latter point relates to the principle goals of the rationalist program, incidentally, in which we find a high premium placed upon asserting control over the occupations that constitute technai.32 Moreover, accuracy and regularity are also crucial to the goal of transmission, and indeed we see in the sciences a strong concern also for the establishment and maintenance of instructional traditions. In any event, the important point is that from efforts to rationalize technai this way, we observe a transformation in the usage of the term, which now denotes an abstract concept, distinct from the practices that it ordinarily describes, and it is thus possible to speak of a distinction between loose and strong definitions of the term, where the latter denotes a special form of knowledge applied in the execution of a given set of tasks, rather than the tasks themselves.33
Indeed it is common theme in discourse on technê, that the influence of irrational factors, such as tÊxh (“chance”) may be eliminated or minimized, and that it is thus possible to fully systematize knowledge of practical occupations—even to the point of supporting predictive functions. Now the extent to which the influence of tychê or other ‘irrational’ factors might be eliminated by articulation of rational causes varies by context—it is not always imagined that the same degree of accuracy might be obtained in medicine as in the study of harmonics, for instance, and for the most part, investigators recognize distinctions between exact and non-exact forms of technical knowledge. Yet the limitations suggested by this distinction are not crucial here, as the merits of technical knowledge are not generally considered to be diminished by the occasional anomaly. In the main, a technê is directed mainly at minimizing the influence chance, and rarely presupposes that all variation may be eliminated. For sources and discussion, see Isnardi Parente 1967, 16777 (on Aristotle); Lloyd 1987, 114-31; Hutchinson 1988 (both on the Hippocratics); Cambiano 1991, 22829 (on Plato); Cuomo 2007, 18-22 (in general). 33 This kind of distinction is expressed in the persistent effort in the philosophical tradition to differentiate between genuine systems of practical knowledge and the more happenstance, less formally theorized skills of popular practitioners of technai or bãnausoi (“vulgar artisans”); e.g., Arist. Pol. 1258b2635, 1337b8-18. For views of the banausos, see Cuomo 2007, 9-10, with n. 13 for sources. 32
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From just this overview, it is clear how growth in scientific interest has a significant impact upon the organization of intellectual culture itself, for rationalization of technai provides the basis for new definitions of knowledge. From one perspective, technê-as-knowledge is little more than a cognitive state, and as such merely denotes a more conscious grasp of what is in many cases already understood tacitly in practice. It does not represent a considerable advance in knowledge of music, for instance, for one to be able to explain harmony in terms of numerical ratios; such knowledge is already regularly expressed in the context of performance. The same may be said of the navigational art, medicine and rhetoric. Yet the issue here is not essentially an epistemological one. What matters is how and by whom formal concepts of knowledge are deployed in intellectual production. As rationalization provides conditions for expert claims to knowledge, it fosters differentiation between rational models of technê and the applied knowledge produced in routine contexts, e.g., by farmers, carpenters, musicians and the like. In this case, the issue is one of legitimacy more than anything else. This point may be understood from a historical perspective in the way disciplinary formations provide the conditions for new forms of prestige. So much is exemplified by the sophistic movement in the fifth century, for example, and especially the development of Hippocratic medicine. In each case, we observe otherwise ordinary practical skills subject to closer rational scrutiny in the ways outlined here (i.e. through generalization of causal relationships, avoidance of explanations from chance, emphasis on teachability, etc.). Yet more importantly, with the production of rationalist models of technai in these traditions, we also observe a tendency toward strong distinctions based on intellectual merit. Both the sophists and Hippocratics go to great lengths to claim the status of technê, for example.34 Whatever the merits of
The question of rhetoric as a technê is well known from the familiar disputes of the late fifth and early fourth centuries; e.g., Isoc. 13, 15.197-214, Plt. Gorg. 447a-66a. Useful discussion of the history of views on the status of rhetoric as a technê is Roochnik 1996, 63-88, 179-232; Balansard 2001, 95-118. The status of medicine as a technê is addressed in the Hippocratic treatises On the Art (i.e. Per‹ t°xnhw) and On the Ancient Medicine in particular; cf. Joints and Fractures, On Breaths, Law, Diseases I and Regimen I. For technê in 34
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their claims—sophistic rhetoric is of course strongly repudiated by Plato—it is at least clear that the elaboration of technai at higher levels of rational detail ultimately translates to noteworthy changes in the disciplinary structure of science.35 Roughly the same tendency appears in a number of other areas of practical knowledge over the fifth and fourth centuries.36 Though space is lacking for a proper historical survey here, it is worth stressing the implication that growth of rational interest in technai is to some extent to be associated with the emergence of the scientific culture itself. In addition to efforts to subject existing traditions of practice to rational explanation, it is significant that scientific thinkers also try to extend the category of technê to domains of inquiry not ordinarily suggested by the term, such as mathematics and ethics.37 The tendency illustrates the high status interest in technê had achieved in time. Rationalization thus not only fosters deeper explanation of existing professional occupations; it actually provides a generalizable model for the pursuit of knowledge in other areas. In this respect, the significance of proliferation of rational interest in technai goes well beyond the emergence of specific research programs in the late fifth and fourth centuries. Rather, advances in Hippocratic writings, see also Vegetti 1963-4; Miller 1955; Jouanna 1992, 344-59; Schiefsky 2005, 5-24, 325-27; Cuomo 2007, 14-34. 35 Plato’s dispute with the sophists is best demonstrated in the Gorgias (see n. 34 above). Resolution of this issue is itself beside the point here of course. Clearly the characterization of rhetoric as a technê was a popular, even if controversial one; some version of this view surely underlies virtually all attempts to systematize rhetoric from the fifth century onwards; survey of important sources in Roochnik 1996, 63-88, On professionalization and proliferation of technical literature on rhetoric, see Lloyd 1979, 80-81; Furhman 1960, 122ff; Cole 1991, 71-114; ancient sources collected in Radermacher 1951. The point here concerns the persistence of a need to characterize rhetoric this way, which irrespective of opposition from critics like Plato, nonetheless attests to the important status of technê in ordering intellectual production. 36 On this trend, see (briefly) Zhmud 2006, 46-47 with nn. Apart from medicine and rhetoric, the notion of technê forms the basis for developments in many other fields of practical knowledge from the fifth century onward (e.g., mathematics, astronomy, architecture, harmonics, logic, politics), which form an important topic of discussion in the emerging intellectual tradition; e.g., Plt. Hipp Min. 368a-d; Xen. Mem. i.1.7; iv.2.811; Archyt. B 1-3 Diels. The Platonic program is itself the product of tension accompanying these developments, with scrutiny directed at so many generals, rhapsodes, and especially statesman and orators professing expertise; e.g., Men. 99d; Gorg. 462b-d; Ion; Lach.; Apol. 21c, 22b; cf. Woodruff 1990, 63-77. In the fourth century, the notion of technê appears to have formed the model for new research programs in many emerging fields of study, such as mechanics, statics and optics; for references, see Zhmud 2006, 47 with nn. 37 For mathematics as a form of practical knowledge, in particular in respect of Archytas, see Zhmud 2006, 60-76. Technê in the context of ethics: e.g., Zeno SVF i.323, FF 392-97 Hülser; Arist. NE 1139b; cf. Zhmud 2006, 287.
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technical knowledge at this time assure its continuation as a principal goal of speculative thought for subsequent generations as well. In the Hellenistic era, tendencies with regard to technê are little changed in fact, with inquiry still driven primarily by the ideal notion that practical occupations can be systematized in terms of causal regularities, and characterized by persistent intellectualism in creating distance from traditional or vulgar sources of authority. If anything, rational interest in technai only becomes further institutionalized, the result of combined tendencies, expressed variously, towards theoretical formalization, such as we find in Aristotle and Peripatetic tradition, and popularization, such as we see in the proliferation of technical works in the period after Aristotle.38 Equally important are developments in the theoretical sciences, such as geometry, natural philosophy, logic and the like, which reveal similar tendencies toward formalization in the conditions of knowledge, and consequent developments in disciplinary structure.39 In particular, we see important developments in the latter half of the fourth century, in which there are significant efforts to clarify the logical structure of scientific knowledge and to establish formal systems of proof and demonstration. Particularly important in this respect are Aristotle and his near-contemporary, Euclid, who though working under separate conditions, both developed theories of pure knowledge based upon axiomatic principles. Whatever the relationship between the two, it is clear that between them at least, much clarification is obtained in the conditions for
Technê in Aristotle: e.g., Met. 981a5-b7; NE 1139b14-40. On technical writing after Aristotle, see Fuhrman 1960; Kennedy 1963, 264-46. 39 By the distinction between the theoretical and practical sciences here and previously in this chapter, I refer to the divisions introduced by Aristotle, who separates all forms of knowledge (§pist∞µai) into three (sometimes two) branches: (i) the practical (praktikÆ), (ii) the productive (poihtikÆ) and (iii) the theoretical (yevrhtikÆ). Examples of which include: (i) non-productive fields of activity, such as ethics and politics; (ii) productive arts (or technai), such as sculpture, carpentry, poetry and the like; and lastly (iii) mathematics, natural philosophy (i.e. physics) and metaphysics (Met. 1025b-26a, 1063b36-64b6; cf. Top. 145a14-18, 157a10; EN 1094a1-7, 1178b20-21). This scheme is not consistently expressed in Aristotle’s writing; sometimes the distinction between the praktikê and poiêtikê epistêmai is collapsed to denote a single branch of poiêtikai epistêmai as opposed to the theorêtikai (Met. 982a1, b9-12, 1075a1-3; EE 1216b10-19, 1221b5-7). On Aristotle’s division of the sciences, see McKirahan 1978; Owens 1981; Zhmud 2006, 122-24. 38
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incontrovertible knowledge, ideally free of the contingencies of knowledge the non-theoretical branches.40 In geometry, for example, it is form this time possible to form expressions of knowledge established necessarily from indemonstrable first principles. Euclid’s work in the Elements goes a long way in establishing the bases for knowledge of this kind, providing a detailed treatment of many aspects of the axiomatic-deductive system.41 Aristotle too devotes serious attention to this subject, notably in the Posterior Analytics, which considers the implications of knowledge for the theoretical sciences in general, not just geometry. Admittedly, geometry is crucial to Aristotle’s efforts to conceptualize scientific knowledge, though in fact it principally serves as a model for thinking about possibilities in a range of scientific contexts. Especially important in this respect is the notion of §pistƵh, a term used regularly from the fifth century, like technê, to denote formally reasoned knowledge (e.g., as distinct from mere sensory perception or belief).42 Epistêmê in fact corresponds closely with technê in this respect, and usage of the two is frequently undifferentiated.43 They both refer to knowledge based on the apprehension of underlying reasons, expressed explicitly as general rules. In Aristotle, however, while the two are indeed often interchangeable, the former also refers to theoretical knowledge more specifically (e.g., in geometry, harmonics, etc.); it is this (the strict) sense of epistêmê, that embodies Aristotle’s view of incontrovertible knowledge.44 Admittedly, in practice, knowledge of
It is possible that Euclid was influenced by Aristotle’s work, though it remains uncertain. Amidst extensive discussion of the relationship between the two, useful introductions appear in Lee 1935 and Hintikka 1981; cf. Leszl 1981, for more detailed treatment of the technical issues. 41 While probably not the first work of its kind, Euclid’s Elements is the earliest and most coherent such treatise to have survived. On issues concerning interpretation of the Elements, such as its relationship to the mathematical tradition, the reliability of Proclus’ commentary on Euclid (5th cen. C.E.), and especially its many technical details, see Heath 19562; Fraser 1972 i, 388-96; Lloyd 1973, 34-40; Caveing 1990, 114-48. The antecedents of the Elements have formed a subject of much debate. For a comprehensive discussion, see Knorr 1975. 42 For a concise discussion of the concept, including a useful survey of sources, see Parry 2008; on epistêmê in Aristotle more specifically, see sources cited n. 44 below. 43 See Zhmud 2006, 47 n. 9, with sources; cf. Cambiano 1980. 44 On the concept of epistêmê in Aristotle: APo 71b10-25, 73a21ff, 74b5ff; EN 1139b19-40b6. The distinction between technê and epistêmê is not systematized until later (e.g., EN 1139b14-41b8; cf. Met. 981a26-b2), and 40
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this kind is not equally possible in all the theoretical branches,45 but the concept does provide a template for surer expressions of knowledge in principle. Under ideal conditions, one is able to know what constitutes successful treatment of a certain kind of illness no differently than what makes a given isosceles triangle an isosceles triangle, for example. Like technê, incidentally, epistêmê is concerned principally with rules that hold in general for a class of phenomena; I will return to the significance of this commonality shortly.46 Yet for the time being, what matters is that unlike technê, which involves practical application, epistêmê is purely cognitive. (Comprehension of harmonic proportion may be achieved through thought alone, for example, and does not depend upon producing tones on an instrument.) The distinction is not always a rigid one, as I mentioned, but where it does appear, it generally forms a source of hierarchical distinctions, such as in Aristotle’s division of the sciences, in which the different branches of knowledge are ordered chiefly in relation to this principle.47 This impulse to organize intellectual activities in terms of their relation to theoretical knowledge is in fact deeply expressed in intellectual culture.
Aristotle often uses the terms interchangeably (e.g., Met. 981b23; APo 46a-22); see Zhmud 2006, 125 with n. 27; cf. Parry 2008. For sources and discussion of epistêmê in Aristotle, see Burnyeat 1981; cf. Lloyd 1968, 122-23; Barnes 1975 [1969]; Taylor 1990; Frede 1996. 45 Aristotle makes a distinction, for example, between the kinds of knowledge attainable in the natural sciences, such as medicine and biology, and in other theoretical sciences, like geometry. While this difference might be understood in terms of the difference between natural and logical necessity, the distinction is best illustrated by the Aristotelian notion of “always or for the most part”, which expresses the provision that an epistêmê is possible, in the context of natural phenomena, for example, even despite the occasional anomaly or variation. Source and discussion in Mignucci 1981; Judson 1991; cf. Barnes 1975 [1969], 74-77; Lloyd 1987, 142-44; De Ste. Croix 1992. 46 Because of their logical structure, technê and epistêmê are by definition concerned with universals, in the sense that one cannot form deductions of particulars considered in isolation; e.g., APo 100a6-9; Met. 981a16; Rhet. 1356b29; EN 1138b2. 47 Apart from the issue of incontrovertibility, which affords an obvious qualitative distinction between epistêmê and technê, the former term is also used to denote the cognitive aspect of applied practical skills. In this respect, while epistêmê and technê are often interchangeable in reference to practical arts, the former actually refers to the governing component more specifically; see Zhmud 2006, 124-25. In Aristotle’s division of the sciences (see n. 39 above), forms of knowledge traditionally understood by the term technê form a class of epistêmai, the “productive sciences” (poihtika‹ §pist∞µai) in particular. It is thus possible, incidentally, to see the distinction between loose and strict senses of Aristotle’s use of the term epistêmê, which refers both to fields of intellectual activity as well as to a specific form of knowledge attainable in only one field appearing in that group.
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As with rationalization of technai, interest in the principles of theoretical knowledge forms the basis for new definitions of legitimacy. In particular, we see not only the maturation of the specific disciplines, such as geometry (in which the axiomatic approach originates), but also significant developments elsewhere in the sciences, where value of this model is recognized and endorsed fervently. From a historical perspective, we see broad coordination in efforts to adopt axiomatic models in a multitude of fields from the late-fourth century, especially in astronomy, statics, mechanics, harmonics, optics and geography. In each case, models of knowledge derived from the Aristotelian and Euclidean traditions provide conditions for new claims of expertise, and thus consequently the development of formal research programs as well. At the same time however, while developments of this kind foster positive gains in the scope and reliability of certain practices, they denote conflict too, and the erection of more rigid distinctions between competing discourses.48 Thus appearance of formal theories of knowledge is to be associated with new forms of disciplinary regulation as well, such that the extension of the axiomatic model implies a corresponding tendency toward exclusion of its alternatives. The field of astronomy perhaps provides the best indication of this principle, for there we observe that geometrization acquires such a high status that it induces disregard much empirical data.49 The case is similar in
For disputes related to the introduction of theoretical models in harmonics, optics, statics, and astronomy, see Lloyd 1987, 293-306. 49 There are two issues underlying this aspect of ancient astronomy: first, we often find investigators willing to disregard data that does not fit the theoretical assumptions framing their research (e.g., data inconsistent with terracentrism); second, it is apparent also that certain thinkers view astronomy as simply an instrument for the more important project of the study of mathematics, in which case anomalies posed by empirical data are insignificant; on Aristarchus in this regard, see Lloyd 1979, 121 with bibliography n. 328. Associated with both trends is the familiar expression “saving the phenomena”, which refers to the practice of applying only a minimum standard of comprehensiveness in integrating difficult empirical data: i.e. in describing the movement of heavenly bodies one need only produce a model minimally consistent with observable phenomena; incompatible data may be disregarded. This practice has caused considerable dispute among modern scholars over whether astronomers actually regarded their explanations as reflections of reality or simply held them to be concrete models for thinking about otherwise abstract mathematical formulae. Though it is impossible to address this issue in any detail here, a useful approach is Smith 1981, which examines validity of both the so-called ‘realist’ and ‘instrumentalist’ interpretations from the perspective of different conceptions of knowledge governing research in separate localized contexts. For discussion and bibliography on “saving the phenomena” and the instrumentalist-realist debate, in addition 48
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optics, statics and harmonics, in which development of axiomatic models also reveals trends toward regularization.50 The significance of this fact is perhaps a bit obscure, incidentally, as axiomatic models of knowledge have remained dominant in many traditions of science.51 Yet it is important to recognize that in antiquity, practices more geometrico existed alongside vigorous alternative traditions in many fields of inquiry. In harmonics, for example, such techniques continued to be rejected by certain thinkers, even despite the success of numerical conceptions of tone and harmony.52 A similar case is geography, which remained a task of ‘mere’ inventory and description well after the advent of mathematization with thinkers like Eratosthenes.53 What is more, theories of demonstration are in fact wholly rejected in certain philosophical traditions, in which axiomatic approach and the notion of pure knowledge itself are subject to serious scrutiny.54 Thus, it should not be regarded as inevitable, and therefore beyond explanation, that certain approaches became routine. They did do so only on a limited basis, and this fact is useful for clarifying the sources of authority governing Hellenistic intellectual culture. To an extent, it is a much larger question than there is space to examine here, but it is apparently due to developments in the parameters of theoretical knowledge that we are able to speak of a special category of intellectual activity at this time. The difficulty lies in grasping the contingency of this fact.
to Smith, see Lloyd 1973, 57-61 and especially 1991a [1978], which argues against the instrumentalist views of Duhem 1908 and Wasserstein 1962. 50 Brief but detailed coverage of these issues appears in Lloyd 1979, 120-22; cf. id. 1987, 146-47; 1990, 9092. On the geometry of Archimedes’ statics more specifically, see Cambiano 1984; for geometrization in the field of optics, see Smith 1981. 51 On the influence of the geometric method in Roman thought, see Moatti 1999, 233-4, with sources cited 388-89 nn. 32-33. 52 For sources and discussion, See Gibson 2005, 17-20; cf. Barker 1989 ii, 124-25. 53 On Eratosthenes’ geography, see Pfeiffer 1968, 163-4; Fraser 1970 and 1972, i, 456-7. 54 The challenge to systems of proof and deduction is made most forcefully by the Epicureans and Sceptics, whose objections are generally characterized as an empiricist counter-point to the traditional of rational philosophy represented by Plato, Aristotle, and later, the Stoics; useful discussions include Barnes 1980 and Mueller 1982.
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In all, then, we see that intellectual practices are characterized by complementary tendencies towards formalization in the conditions for knowledge, on the one hand, and disciplinary formation, on the other. To recapitulate, inquiry into technai, initiated in specific areas of interest over the course of the fifth century, provides opportunities for systematizing practical knowledge on a general basis, and thus a valuable model for extension to other areas of thought as well. Rational interest in technai thus not only shapes the development of specific research traditions, but constitutes a noteworthy influence on the organization of intellectual life as a whole. Furthermore, in a related set of developments, efforts to establish theories of pure knowledge also provide the basis for new claims to intellectual authority, and extend and intensify this process of disciplinary transformation. Notably, it is from the articulation of conditions for knowledge by specially authoritative groups that change is realized over time. The developments described here thus neatly exemplify the principle of exclusion appearing in Foucault’s notion of the order of discourse (see pp. 19-21 above). For example, as regards the issue of technê, from tracing change in the use of the term over the fourth century, first from the intercession of sophistic thinkers, then by Plato and Aristotle, we observe progressive restriction in its field of signification, and thus a fundamental redistribution of power in cultural discourse. The case is the same with regards to Aristotelian and Euclidean conceptions of exact knowledge, which similarly provide the basis for new notions of legitimacy. In this case, incidentally, it is perhaps not necessarily the appearance of certain research programs that requires explanation after all, but rather the persistence of various traditions of thought outside the domain of this regime, such as non-Hippocratic approaches to medicine and ethnography, the monist tradition in natural philosophy, or Epicurean and Stoic theories of knowledge. Each denotes the entrenchment of views deeply out of sync with prevailing practice. In any event, it should be from the foregoing that specific developments in somewhat limited areas of research form the basis for a system of
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regulation for a much broader field of intellectual production in the sciences as a whole. Ultimately, this view will be useful for understanding the development of rational conceptions of history, which is itself to be understood in terms of a similar process of regulation. Before moving on to history, however, I would like to examine the function of the discourse on causes in driving developments described here.
The discourse on causes and the structure of ancient science The principle component of the changes described above is the study of causes. I have already referred in passing to the function of causal analysis in formal conceptions of practical and theoretical knowledge. In these contexts, the notion of cause, commonly denoted by the term afit€a (and its cognates), forms the basis of efforts to distinguish special claims to knowledge. In
part this perspective simply reflects the commonsensical view that a fuller understanding of phenomena like illness, tonal harmony, or the motion of celestial bodies relies upon knowledge of causal foundations, but as a focus of research, this perspective is subject to conceptual elaboration in increasingly greater detail over time. The concepts of technê and epistêmê are in fact partly to be explained in terms of this process, incidentally. In any event, the relationship of the discourse on causes to broader developments in the sciences may be qualified in terms of at least two issues in particular. First, we observe the priority of causes themselves, in the sense that rational inquiry is driven primarily by the view that natural (as well as metaphysical) phenomena are determined by underlying factors more or less intelligible to the careful observer. Secondly, claims to knowledge are expressed in the form of generalizations, which is to say, as holding for a class of phenomena, rather than only for particular instances. The latter aspect, incidentally, is significant not only for extending the scope of knowledge, but also for providing the logical structure for truth-claims,
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which proceed on the basis of complementary deductive and induction operations between the general and the particular. In this case, though the specificity with which these issues are ascertained varies by context, causation is itself an indispensable feature of scientific discourse. Here, drawing upon theoretical perspectives discussed above, I suggest that the discourse of causes may be understood as part of the instrumental framework of science, providing scientific thinkers with vital conceptual tools for understanding the external world. In this respect, the discourse on causes performs the complex function of both framing problems and creating solutions, and fostering the development of a generalizable mode of inquiry. In particular, I consider this issue in terms of the constructive function of special language practices in the sciences, calling attention to the notorious flexibility of Greek concepts of cause, which provide the basis for conceptualizing natural (and metaphysical) phenomena in a range of different areas of thought. Thus it is in particular the prolific nature of the notion of cause that most facilitates the developments described in the foregoing section.55 Beginning with the issue of flexibility, it is clear that Greek concepts of cause embrace a much wider range relationships than is typically denoted by the English term “cause”, which in fact typically only refers only to what might be called the active or efficient cause, i.e. denoting a cause-effect relationship in which an entity (e.g., an event, or a state) is said to be produced by an
Modern discussion of ancient notions of cause is immense, and here I only address select aspects of the subject, notably those issues related to the establishment of formal models of causal explanation. In particular I examine the notion of causal explanation from the perspective of the constructive function of special language practices in the sciences, as already outlined in Section II above. As will become clear in what follows, my approach is based on the view that developments in ways of speaking about causes over time are to be linked with specific disciplinary developments, and thus also with special conditions for new claims to knowledge. In general, I have relied upon the surveys of Frede 1980; Vegetti 1999; and especially Hankinson 1998, who provides the most comprehensive survey of the subject to my knowledge; cf. Sorabji 1980a and Duhot 1988, on Stoic views of causality more specifically; and Annas 1982 and Fine 1987, for specific issues related to Plato and Aristotle. Detailed treatment of ancient views of causality appears in Sorabji 1980b. For a useful summary of developments in the philosophical tradition after Aristotle, including the legacy of Humean notions of cause in modern science and philosophy, see Kurki 2008, 30-59. 55
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antecedent condition through some kind of active agency.56 In contrast, ancient conceptions of cause allow for a broader set of factors taken to be responsible for an entity. These include not only what we mean by the efficient cause, but also an array of conditions that do not easily fit within the category of efficiency. Aristotle’s theory of cause is a fitting example, in which causal factors are analyzed into material, efficient, formal and final causes.57 The cause of a person’s death might thus be identified just as easily with his or her mortal status (the final cause), for example, as with a lethal disease (the efficient cause). Each may equally be said to be the aitia of the state of death. The same may be said of bronze in respect of the statue, or wood in the respect of the house (material causes). Even formal qualities count as causes too, such as the plan of the statue conceived by the sculptor, or that maintained by the carpenter with respect to the house; similarly, in the context of geometry, the ‘three-sidedness’ of the triangle may be said to constitute the final cause of that entity. Ancient conceptions of cause are thus analytically extensive. Now, this is not to say that explanations always exhibit the complexity of the Aristotelian model, for surely the complexity of that scheme is partly due to the fact that many did not regard causation under the same terms. On the other hand, however, it is significant that Aristotle was able to conceive of causation in such broad terms, for the point here is simply that in the task of explanation, one is free to pick out a wide array of causal factors. This flexibility is crucial to understanding the extension of uniform models of explanation across disciplines. Before moving on to this matter, there is a second aspect of the ancient concepts of cause worth noting, namely, the notion of explanation. Generally speaking, knowledge in the sciences,
See Frede 1980 on the later philosophical tradition and the preoccupation with efficient, moving or active causes. 57 E.g., Phys. 194b23-35; cf. Metaph. 5.1.1013a24-14a25: causes include (i) the substance out of (§j o) which something comes to be, (ii) its form or plan (tÚ e‰dow ka‹ tÚ parãdeigµa), (iii) the origin (≤ érxÆ) of change (or its cessation), and (iv) the end (t°low) towards which it moves, i.e., “that for the sake of which” (o ßneka). For discussions of the Aristotelian theory of causality, its presentation and the philosophical issues raised by it, see Ross 19495, 62-83; Wieland 1975 [1962]; Annas 1982; Hankinson 1998, 125-59. 56
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ancient and modern, is expressed in terms of causal structure, and in this respect, true understanding is a matter of articulating general rules governing the occurrence of given phenomena, which not only denote deeper comprehension of a subject, but also provide the basis for directing present and future activities through diagnosis and prediction. Ancient conceptions of cause, however, do not generally employ the same notion of necessity that appears in modern views of explanation. That is to say, in most contexts in antiquity, it is not critically important that causal relationships hold necessarily, in the sense that where they do not, knowledge is somehow deficient or incomplete. In the Aristotelian tradition, for example, even sure knowledge of how things work is understood to hold only “always or for the most part”, which is to say that it is not a fundamental problem that at times certain occurrences remain unexplained or that expected outcomes fail of realization.58 In fact anomalous or ‘non-causal’ sources of change (e.g., fortune, chance) are incorporated by Aristotle’s concept of explanation.59 In any event, ancient notions of cause do not imply necessity in the way modern approaches often do. Generally speaking, necessity represents a separate variable and is not implied by every inference of a causal relationship.60 This aspect also indicates the general flexibility of the concept. Historically it is perhaps the flexibility of the Greek conception of cause that most explains the formation of a general scientific discourse. On a closer view, interest in causes in the natural sciences is actually an extension of traditional moral discourse, which provides the conceptual and terminological resources for rational explanation through concepts of blame and
See n. 45 above. Aristotle distinguishes between “fortune” (tÊxh) and “chance” (tÚ aÈtÒµaton) in identifying determining factors apart from causes properly understood. These categories are incorporated by the notion of causal explanation, incidentally, for though they denote factors held to be external to the explanatory causes, i.e. which operate on principles of regularity, they are formally included by Aristotle’s system of knowledge just by virtue of the fact that concessions are made for variation. For Aristotle’s presentation of these ideas, see Phys. ii.4-6; cf. n. 45 above. 60 Developments in the notion of cause to include necessity are discussed, in regards to the Stoics, in Sorabji 1980a; cf. id. 1980b, 143-74, for discussion of necessity in the Aristotelian system, see Balme 1987; Hankinson 1998, 39, discussing Met. 1027a29-b14. 58 59
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culpability. Take developments in use of the term aitia for example, which becomes more common in the natural sciences over the course of the late fifth and fourth centuries. From initial associations with the moral dimensions of human action, aitia and its cognates bear the primary meanings of “accusation” or “grievance” (in an active sense), and “blame” or “responsibility” (in a passive sense).61 As may be expected, the expression is used frequently with this sense in forensic oratory,62 as well as in poetry and other religious contexts, where issues of moral culpability are at stake.63 With the growth of research in the natural sciences, however, we find the expression aitia co-opted by naturalist and medical writers to describe regularities in the natural domain. In the Hippocratic and Aristotelian traditions, for example, aitia appears in the context of describing cause-effect relationships that hold regularly for a given class of phenomena, such as the conditions for health or illness, for example, or the factors determining particular ethnic group characteristics.64 In this case, aitia ceases to concern blame in the traditional sense, but rather signifies underlying mechanisms of change (or continuity) in the natural world. This represents a significant shift in usage. There are several points worth mentioning here. First, it is perhaps clearer how ancient notions of cause are capable of such breadth. Given the extension of the concept beyond its It is only later that it acquires a meaning sufficient for being rendered with the English “cause”; see, e.g., Pearson 1952, 205. It is worth noting also that aitia may mean “motive” as well, in which case it functions, in its passive sense, as a volitional cause, i.e. “the motive responsible”. 62 Well-known examples are the anecdote depicting Pericles’ debate with Protagoras over “those responsible” (a‡tioi) for the death of a boy struck by a misthrown javelin (Plut. Per. 36; the same issue appears in a slightly different form in Antiphon’s Second Tetralogy); or the famous inquiry opening Herodotus’ Histories regarding those “responsible” (a‡tioi) for Greek-Persian conflict, an account framed mainly by the question of “wrong-doing” (édikƵata, édik€a: i.1, 4). Other examples of the use of aitia and its cognates in moral and juridical contexts collected in Lloyd 1966, 230-31; Vegetti 1999, 275-77; cf. Hankinson 1998, 69-76. 63 E.g., Hom. Il. xix.86; Od. xxii.44, 153; cf. Pin. O. i.35; Soph. OT 109. 64 Though it is important not to overstate the level of uniformity, Hippocratic medicine is often based on the view that health and disease are comprehensible in terms of regular causal mechanisms. The best brief discussion is Lloyd 1979, 52-55; here I also follow Vegetti 1999, 279-86, in particular on the historical development of the use of aitia. More generally on Hippocratic notions of cause, see Rawlings 1975; Longrigg 1989; Jouanna 1992; Hankinson 1998, 51-83. For the Aristotelian system, see sources cited n. 57 above. 61
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primitive function in denoting blame, aitia apparently signifies dependencies understood at a certain minimum level of specificity. In particular, we observe the coexistence of (at least) two distinct ways of speaking about cause: in the first case, one that is attributive in function, in the sense that it involves affixing blame; and in the second, one that is functionally explanatory, in the sense that it signifies mechanistic relationships of cause and effect, which presuppose the regularity of that relationship in some form or other. The difference is essentially an ontological one, incidentally, as explanation entails assumptions about the existence of the causal relationship independent of the explanatory act, while attribution does not (necessarily), but rather relies upon external criteria of valuation (e.g., principles of morality or law).65 At any rate, from this perspective it is perhaps less problematic that the notion of explanation is able to accommodate so many functions beyond the notion of active-efficiency, as mentioned above. In all, the aitia of something represents little more than an answer to the question “What is responsible?” Given the range of possibilities possible in answering this radically open question, explanation would conceivably include just about any condition, which, if removed, would then entail the suspension or non-occurrence of the phenomenon. Thus, it is not problematic to say that the statue or triangle is caused by conditions of bronzeness or three-sidedness, as the case may be, for with their removal and all other conditions remained the same, those entities would then cease to be—or would at least cease to be in the same way. Moreover, it is presumably this analytical breadth that accounts for the establishment of causal explanation as a more or less formal component in so many different areas of science, including geography, biology, mathematics, ontology, ethics, and of course, history, to which I turn in the next section. The extension of the concept to these fields relies to some extent on the fact that its application in producing description and explanation of
65
On the distinction between explanatory and attributive forms of explanation, see Honoré 2008.
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target phenomena is essentially unproblematic. This brings me to a final set of points for this section. Above all, it is important to bear in mind that it is the explanatory function (not the attributive) that is associated with these particular developments. In this case, the former is not actually intrinsic to the concept, but represents the product of specific historical developments. From this perspective, the notion of cause is to be understood as a specialized usage in any of its different explanatory functions (efficient, material, etc.). In the Hippocratic tradition, for example, as the notion of cause is clarified as part of the practice of diagnosis, it becomes associated increasingly with the formal practices that distinguish that tradition.66 Similar developments appear in Plato, Aristotle, and later, the Stoics, all of whom elaborate more fully on the principle of explanation, but in doing so associate the notion of cause more firmly with the specific concerns of natural philosophy and metaphysics.67 From this perspective, the discourse on causes represents a manifestation of more or less formal concerns characterizing specific disciplines of study. The point is noteworthy because it illustrates how something as apparently mundane as speaking about cause-effect relationships may be understood as the product of disciplinary development. Indeed, the view that the articulations of cause-effect relationships is somehow epistemically significant is to be attributed specifically to developments of this kind. Ordinary ways of speaking about causality (if in fact they may be called that) do not actually accommodate the notions of mechanism and regularity, in other words, but merely provide the basis for attributing blame. Now, this observation is surely helpful for making sense of developments such as those described
On a broader definition of cause, in other words, diagnosis cannot be expressed with the same degree of assurance; e.g., in addressing the inferiority of analytically vague notions of the cause, one Hippocratic writer underscores the importance of viewing the aitia of the illness as “those things the presence of which of necessity produces a complaint of a specific kind, which ceases when they change into another combination” (VM 19.3; trans. Jones, italics mine). Other sources appear in Vegetti 1999, 282-84. 67 See Plt. Phd. 96a9-10, c7-8, and explicit links with the Hippocratic VM 20.2-3 cited by Vegetti 1999, 288 n. 20. For Stoic sources, see Sorabji 1980a; 1980b, 64-68; Duhot 1988. Other summaries of this set of issues appear in Frede 1980, and Vegetti 1999, 284-86. 66
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above, in which causal explanation forms the basis for emerging research traditions in so many different areas of study: the specific advances appearing in the fields of medicine and natural philosophy provide the model for emerging traditions in need of special resources for speaking of ‘responsibility’ as a form of regular mechanism. More importantly, however, this set of observations about the semantics of causal explanation is of use for addressing its application in other discourse where it may appear frivolous, such as history. To clarify the latter point, it is worth recognizing that as an essentially metaphorical form of reasoning,68 the notion of causal explanation generally relies on a specialized understanding of the relevant terminology, such as aitia, which does not of itself denote the kind of relationship (i.e. regularity) required of rational explanation. Thus even efforts to form explanations in areas it appears unproblematic (e.g., in the natural sciences, in logic), are to be regarded as part of a special discursive program. To name the aitia of something with the intent that now the relationship between the predicate and explanandum denotes a regular occurrence for the entire class of the explanandum implies a usage maintained only in the context of special discourses, such as medicine. Now, the issue here is not that use of aitia in this way is uncommon or irregular; on the contrary, over time causal explanation becomes wholly routine. What is noteworthy, however, is that routineness of this kind signifies an important pair of transitions. On the one hand, there is change from a practical standpoint, as now investigators in a broader field of activity make use of, and even thoroughly rely upon, the metaphor of causation. (This is perhaps the more transparent of the two shifts.) On the other hand, this set of developments also signals
Frede 1980, 226, puts it best: “When the use of ‘aition’ was extended such that we could ask of anything ‘What is the aition?’ this extension of the use of ‘aition’ must have taken place on the assumption that for everything to be explained there is something which plays reference to what has gone wrong; i.e. the extension of the use of ‘aition’ across the board is only intelligible on the assumption that with reference to everything there is something which by doing something or other is responsible for it.” 68
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change in the forms of comprehension governing use of this tool.69 In this respect, at the conjunction of these changes, ongoing development in causal explanation is to be associated with change in the governing principles of intellectual life, as now it is possible to perceive the articulation of regularities in the external world (e.g., in nature, in metaphysics) as constitutive of a higher order of knowledge. In terms of the theoretical discussion given above, changes in the use of causal explanation imply a noteworthy redistribution in the sources of intellectual authority. The point is perhaps obscure due to our own tendency to take for granted the relationship between causal mechanisms (i.e. where they imply regularity and explicit explanatory functional) and scientific discourse, but it should be clear that given its historical contingency, use of this approach will always imply some degree of inventiveness. This is not to say that attempts at causal explanation in ancient science denote only a discursive construction (i.e. with little genuine merit in describing external reality); rather the issue is that as a construct, the notion of causal explanation is to be understood in terms of the particular conditions assembling to justify such inventive use of traditional language of moral responsibility. From this perspective, incidentally, it is less problematic to find efforts to implement causal explanation in contexts outside the natural sciences and metaphysics, such as in history, for its usage in former in fact already reflects a significant degree of constructedness. The relationship of causal analysis to historical writing is of course a crucial one here, due to the fact the notion of causal explanation, derived in particular from medical writers, has provided such a useful resource for Greek historians, both in developing more detailed forms of analysis and ways of speaking about historical processes, but also for the purpose of validating study of the past as a more serious institution of knowledge. The historian’s use of causal explanation, which I turn to in some part in the next section and in greater detail The extension of formal models of explanation is not simply an issue of practice, in other words, but rather presupposes transformation in the intuitive standpoints underwriting the use of that practice. At the level of the individual subject, changes of this kind denotes a shift in tacit knowledge, to a borrow Polyani’s expression; see n. 13 above. 69
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with respect to Polybius in Chapter 4, therefore forms a useful model, or test case, for understanding the relation between history and other forms of science in Classical and Hellenistic intellectual culture. The fate of causal analysis is one of continued extension in the sciences, with recognition of its value in resolving the concerns of new and existing research traditions creating an increasingly larger base of approval among scientific thinkers. In particular, we observe how disciplinary developments described in the previous section may be understood, at a lower level of analysis, in terms of the mechanisms governing individuals’ participation in this process, and it is thus possible to form a more concrete picture of the sciences in antiquity in accordance with the theoretical principles outlined above. The discourse on causes reveals many aspects of the constructivist viewpoint: the importance of social consensus, the relatively underdetermined nature of knowledge from the perspective of logic, the role of specially designated resources, etc. Described thus, it is possible to see not only the basic contingency of interest in causality in the sciences, but also, more importantly, the nature of this orientation as an expression of the prevailing discursive authority. Above all, then, there is thus a stronger basis for understanding the regular features of ancient science that perhaps appear too familiar or above explanation. This approach has intrinsic value of course, as far there is need to clarify the relationship between knowledge in the sciences and the practical and social contexts of its production, but more importantly, it provides the basis for clarifying the relationship between the sciences and historical writing, where causal analysis also plays an important role, particularly in underwriting efforts to define study of the past as a more serious institution of knowledge. It is that subject that I now turn.
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Scientific history To an extent the question of the relationship between history and the sciences is fitting one simply due to the common ground maintained even in antiquity between study of the past and other forms of speculative thought. This includes certain practical considerations, such as the common focus upon explanation as a goal of discourse, the use of causal structure for this task, and importance of standards of proof and demonstration, but also those of a more sociological kind as well, such as ongoing competition with traditional sources of authority, a clear rhetoric of expertise, and cultivation of affiliations across disciplinary boundaries. Above all, however, it is helpful to recognize that like other forms of science, history represents an institution developed for the purpose of extending knowledge beyond the boundaries of direct empirical observation, and that in the context of the historical field, there will have been neither abundant resources for this task nor a perfectly clear understanding of how to proceed in spite of this set of limitations. From this perspective, it is possible to make meaningful observations about the relationship between history and the other sciences just on the basis of this critical deficiency. In this section, I consider how historians developed their approach to the problem of the past on the model of other forms of scientific practice. In particular, I examine the methodological adjustments made by specific writers, Herodotus and Thucydides in particular, which reflect the influence of developments taking place in contemporary intellectual culture, as discussed above. Now, their efforts in this respect may be identified with advancement in the notion of a more scientific or more rational form of history, as is often observed, and from this perspective, Herodotus and Thucydides often form the focus of questions regarding the proper significance of history’s relationship with the sciences and the validity of the notion ‘scientific history’, as it were, itself.70 Here I wish to provide
Discussion of Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ relationship with the sciences and with formal developments more generally is extensive in modern scholarship. Among vast bibliography, see Cochrane 1929; Hunter 1982; Hornblower 1987, 110; Lateiner 1989; Thomas 2000. 70
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a more productive approach to this set of issues by considering history’s relationship with the sciences in terms of wholly practical contingencies, first as regards the basic limitations upon empirical knowledge of the past, but also as concerns influences formed in the context of science as a set of cultural formations. By this approach, I hope to provide more realistic model for history’s relationship with science in terms of the technical foundations of study of the past. First of all, the relationship between history and the sciences is in fact already suggested by ancient writers themselves. As is often observed, the word regularly used to refer to the historian’s task, flstor€a (“inquiry”, “investigation”, “research”), is not by definition associated with this usage, but is more often used in reference to other forms of science, particularly the natural sciences. From the end of the fifth century, historia appears regularly in the expression per‹ fÊsevw flstor€a (“inquiry into nature”), which like the rough equivalent fusiolog€a (“account of
nature”) designates study of natural phenomena of all kinds, such as the conditions for growth and decay in humans and the other animals, the nature of the cosmos, or meteorological phenomena, as well as geography, ethnography and survey of the various natural wonders throughout the world.71 Here the concept of historia originates in the tradition of Ionian rationalism, represented by naturalist thinkers such as Xenophanes or Anaximander, but also the historian Herodotus, who devotes considerable space in his Histories to what might be more properly considered issues of natural scientific interest. It is the proem to that work that we find the first occurrence of the For the expressions peri physeôs historia and physiologia in the sixth and fifth centuries, see Thomas 2000, 161-7 with nn. The term historia is itself the subject of many important studies, which for the most part may be grouped under two categories: those addressing the term’s function in the Ionian naturalist tradition (e.g., sources cited nn. 72, 74 below, in addition to Thomas cited here), and those examining the older etymology of the term in the archaic ·stvr (“judge”, “arbiter”): e.g., Darbo-Peschanski 2007a; 2007b; cf. also the concise survey in Press 1982, 23-34. For the latter, the etymology of historia suggests a slightly different reading of the term than is suggested by its usage the expression “inquiry into nature”, in which case it related to the critical faculty employed in the context of judicial arbitration. Though there is surely an overlap between the two areas, this distinction between what may be called the juridical and scientific senses of the term historia illuminates an important tension regarding the kind of discourse historical knowledge is supposed to be; that is to say, whether it articulates a moral or juridical order among the subjects described (e.g., in the context of interstate relations), or is simply meant to explain why things turned out as they have. I examine one aspect of this tension in Chapter 4 below. 71
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term historia in Greek writing—“This is a demonstration of the flstor€h of Herodotus of Halicarnassus”—a passage that doubtless refers to the broad intellectual scope of the work, rather than the comparatively narrower issue of past events.72 In any event, in this context, historia is associated with an incipient rationalist tradition, distinguished by special emphasis on critical judgment and careful use of evidence, but also an essential intellectual positivism.73 The same conception of historia appears in the Aristotelian tradition, where it is developed and rendered more definitive, not simply for the natural sciences, however, but rather as part of a generalized scientific research program.74 Historians’ own usage of the term historia, then, puts them in direct relation with the other sciences. However, though many works of history are referred to by the title ÑIstor€a or ÑIstor€ai (including that of Polybius), the etymological link is only so revealing on its own. In turning our attention to actual practice, we observe more direct attempts to assimilate the scientific tradition. The point is made easily of Herodotus, whose Histories have just described in the context of Ionian rationalism. In terms of the content, the work incorporates a huge field of natural scientific subjects, including geography, botany and zoology, as well as ethnographic studies of the customs and group characteristics of foreign peoples, and even discussions of medicine.75 With this set of
i.1; on Herodotus’ use of the word historiê, bibliography is extensive; see, e.g., Jacoby 1913; Immerwahr 1966, 315; Lateiner 1989, 84; Thomas 2000, 161-67. 73 E.g., Gould 1989, 11 (“a tradition of positivist thinking and rational analysis of available data”); Lloyd 1975, 215-16 (“a scientific enquiry with a clear awareness of problems of evidence and determination, where possible, to solve them”); both cited by Thomas 2000, 165 n. 99. Useful discussion in Luce 1997, 7-8. 74 A good short account is Zhmud 2006, 136-37, who discusses Aristotle’ distinction between the empirical and theoretical components of a field; historia refers both to the preliminary collection of all the data in a given domain, and to the analytical component, whereby the data are systematized and employed in constructing explanations. This distinction appears in the separation between empirical research involved by creating the many political Constitutions written by Aristotle and the Politics, a theoretical treatise, apparently formed in part from those investigations. Aristotle’s gripe against scientific or “philosophical” forms of history (see p. 62 below) is based mainly on the problems with systematizing knowledge of past events on the model of other theoretical sciences—though he does not deny that historical data may be used for other sciences, such as politics. On Aristotle’s approach to history, see Robert 1955; von Fritz 1958; Huxley 1972; Weil 1960, 87-178; 1970. 75 The best introduction to these issues is Thomas 2000. 72
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concerns, the Histories is not only affiliated with Ionian natural philosophy, as I mentioned above, but is linked to concerns in the Hippocratic traditions as well. What is interesting, however, is that these traditions provide a model for study of the past as well. In his treatment of the political history of Greece and Asia, Herodotus draws upon an array of methods and concepts employed by naturalist thinkers, especially techniques of demonstration and more explicit approaches to epistemological problems.76 It is this aspect of the Histories that most illustrates the implications of the title, for to Herodotus, there is apparently no substantial difference between explanation of natural phenomena and events in the social world, such as the conflict with the Persians. A similar perspective is developed in Thucydides’ writing. With Thucydides the link with formal research traditions in the sciences is made both more substantial and more explicit. First there is the claim that his writing is free of tÚ µuy«dew (i.e. the story-like appeal one finds in other narrative histories) and thus provides a lasting resource for the future. While this sentiment demonstrates the intention to formalize study of the past, more importantly, it reveals significant assumptions regarding the nature of historical understanding itself. For Thucydides, historical study renders basic regularities in human affairs more accessible, and proper historical knowledge thus has a predictive, or at least cautionary function. His writing, he says, is intended especially for those “who seek a clear picture of the things that have happened and those which, the human condition being what it is, will occur again in the same way or very nearly so sometime in the future”.77 The model for this view comes in part from formal conceptions of knowledge discussed above (see pp. 35-39), especially those in the Hippocratic tradition, which appear to have furnished Thucydides with the conceptual and
On Herodotean methods broadly, see Lateiner 1989; cf. Marincola 2001, 31-39. Important studies of his links with the medical writers are Lateiner 1986, and especially Thomas 2000, which provides a useful account of Herodotus’ relationships within the intellectual milieu of the late-fifth century. These studies of course follow observations made long ago by Jacoby 1909, 40, who emphasizes the importance of Herodotus’ innovations in turning historical description into an analytical practice; cf. Fornara 1983, 30. 77 i.22.4; on the translation here, Hornblower 1991, 61; Moles 2001, 199. 76
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terminological resources for thinking about human affairs as a system, governed by basic regularities that in principle even support future predictions.78 Thucydides’ own interests in medicine are clear from his account of the plague in Book 2, in which he makes considerable use of Hippocratic concepts and terminology.79 Yet that he understood history in essentially the same terms is clear from his well-known interest in causation.80 Whatever the ambiguities in Thucydides’ terminology for causes (e.g., the key term prÒfasiw at i.23.6), it is sufficiently clear that he connects causal analysis to the practical function of historical knowledge. In this regard, following Hippocratic conceptions of cause, his interest in the origins of the war is oriented more toward explanation properly speaking than toward culpability.81 This aspect of his approach, also typical of Polybius’ interest in causality, as we shall see, is perhaps sufficient on its own to demonstrate the influence of scientific thought. Yet the emphasis upon didactic function also demonstrates this set of intellectual goals. From this perspective, Thucydides’ approach to historia may be linked to the technical tradition in the sciences, as I have described above, in which the emphasis on causal relations forms part of a effort to systematize knowledge of human affairs. On the examples of Herodotus and Thucydides, then, it is possible to observe substantial links between history and the other sciences—much more so than are implied by the merely On Thucydides and the Hippocratics in general, Ste. Croix 1972, 29-32; Rawlings 1975; Hornblower 1991, 61, 320-21; Swain 1994. 79 E.g., Page 1953; Parry 1969. Interestingly Thucydides passes over the causes of the plague, which he says he leaves to others, though with the implication that they are essentially inscrutable (ii.48.4). Introductory remarks on the plague reveal an important relationship with approaches to diagnosis in the medical field: “I will describe the course [of the plague] and how one might recognize it, if there should ever be another outbreak”; cf. i.22.3, cited above. 80 The most detailed study of this link is Rawlings 1975; cf. Moles 2001, 210 n. 57. 81 Thucydides clearly approaches the subject from an interest in joining contemporary political debates on the subject, which were doubtless focused on the moral-juridical discussions of the conflicts origins; see Richardson 1990. Yet with the famous programmatic remarks at i.22, it is clear that he also regarded the subject as a matter of explanation as well, in the sense of it is comprehensible in terms of more or less regular mechanisms of cause and effect; for differences between explanatory and attributive notions of cause, see pp. 49-51 above. On Thucydides’ statements regarding the cause of the Peloponnesian War, I follow the interpretation of Hornblower 1991, 64-65, namely that for the phrase tØn µ¢n går élhyestãthn prÒfasin, éfanestãthn d¢ lÒgƒ (i.23.6) must refer to “the truest but unavowed cause”, rather that precipitating sign or symptom (e.g., Rawlings 1975, 76-81). 78
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nominal associations of the term historia (or historiê). These take the form of special techniques of description and explanation, derived from specific areas of research, which then provide the basis for innovation in developing a more serious approach of history. Now, the degree of originality in Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ approach to study of the past must to some extent remain an open question, as the loss of so much evidence for contemporary historical writing prevents a thorough comparison, but at the same time, it is clear that under the conditions, Herodotus and Thucydides are working within a context of growing interest for new approaches to history. From their own writing, we can observe anxiety over the inadequacy of existing approaches to study of the past, and from this perspective at least, the use of certain techniques in their writing surely signifies an effort to define (or redefine) the notion of historical inquiry. Thucydides, for example, draws an explicit distinction between his own work and the many popular forms of history appearing in his contemporary context, such as the display pieces of rhetorical competition (ég≈nisµa §w tÚ paraxr∞µa). While the famous remark that his account of the Peloponnesian conflict provides a kt∞µa §w afie€ (“a resource for all time”) is to some extent rhetorical, it is thus also meant to signal a new understanding of history, characterized by the potential for surer and more technically proficient knowledge of human affairs. The same goes for his rejections of certain poetic accounts for the early history of Greece, which fail a certain minimum standard of credibility in Thucydides’ view.82 The same kind of approach to other historical sources appears in Herodotus as well, who makes it his first order of business to discredit traditional accounts for the origins of the Persian conflict.83 In all of these cases, we find conditions outlined for a new
i.1.3, 21.1; see further n. 88 below. i.5.3, trans. Rawlinson: “Whether this latter account be true, or whether the matter happened otherwise, I shall not discuss further. I shall proceed at once to point out the person who first within my own knowledge inflicted injury on the Greeks, after which I shall go forward with my historia.” On Herodotus’ disputes with prior sources of historical knowledge, see Lateiner 1989, 91-103, with the useful “Inventory” enumerating all Herodotus’ disputes with his sources pp. 104-8; cf. the qualifying remarks of Walbank 1962, 2-3, and West 1991. 82 83
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vision of history. Surely there are key differences between Herodotus and Thucydides,84 but the tendencies revealed by their overall approach to history are roughly the same: in each case, we observe the effort to made use of special techniques of description and explanation, which distinguished for their usefulness and broad endorsement in the sciences, then form the basis for a new approach to historical reconstruction. It is in this sense essentially that we may speak of a proper relationship between history and the sciences. Indeed, from a certain perspective, to the extent that we equate Herodotus and Thucydides with the emergence of the historical discipline in ancient Greece, it is to relationships with contemporary science that we must look to find the basis for a formal historiographical tradition of any kind. With the latter observation, incidentally, we have the one of the central parts of the argument in this section, which is essentially that on a view of the sciences as part of broader cultural regime, there would then be a limited, even if more or less clearly defined, number of ways in which historical writing might develop as a serious intellectual pursuit, and that thus, from this perspective, adjustment made by Herodotus and Thucydides (and later by Polybius) are in some sense to be expected from a historical perspective, especially in light of how conditions for knowledge are formed in relation to such specific trends in the cultural regime. Yet this fact this does not alleviate the need to explain how adjustments of this kind productively shape perception of the past. Even if inevitable, in other words, the influence of scientific rationalism is yet to be understood for its own set of limits for historical understanding. This goes not only for the most ostensibly arbitrary aspects of historical interpretation (e.g., the Persian was caused by the Greeks), but also for the features of past knowledge that appear most familiar or are most taken
On significant difference concerns Herodotus’ focus on the epistemological issues related to study of past, while Thucydides, though concerned with that problem too, directs his approach at the instructional benefit of history in the context of political affairs. 84
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for granted (e.g., the causes of war are sufficiently distinguishable). Before getting on to that matter, however, I would like to address some of the problems involved in this view of history. The suggestion, such as we find in ancient authors, that history may be likened to other ‘hard’ scientific fields like medicine or biology raises a number of significant questions. There are clear evidentiary limitations for history, for example, as well as significant differences between causal explanation in the natural and social realms. Moreover, there is a fundamental problem with the notion that knowledge of something as transitory as human affairs might actually be systematized fairly or comprehensively. In all, these objections are difficult to reconcile with the notion of ‘scientific history’, as it is often attributed to, say, Thucydides, and it thus appears best to disregard it as a flawed concept. This position is adopted even in antiquity in fact, by Aristotle in particular, who openly questioned the status of history as a science. For him history deals only with “particular facts” (tå kay' ßkaston), “such as what Alcibiades did or suffered”, and thus by definition does not provide a source of genuine knowledge. Such a thing would in fact depend, as we have seen, upon clarification of rules that hold generally for a class of entities (tå kayÒlou). This is the sense presumably of the well-known remark that poetry is “more philosophical and more serious” (filosof≈teron ka‹ spoudaiÒteron) than history; whatever the significance of that observation for Aristotle’s conception of tragedy, it is clear at least that it places significant limits upon history.85 Admittedly, Aristotle does make some concessions. He acknowledges that knowledge of the past is useful for informing certain tasks political administration, and thus apparently shares some affinity with Thucydides’ (and Polybius’) conception of historical
Poet. 1451b5-7. Given the explicit reference to Alcibiades here, these remarks are often taken to refer to Thucydides; for a good introduction to this passage, see Walbank 1960; de Ste. Croix 1992. Accordingly historia here refers to the practice of political history rather than the collection of empirical data for subsequent theoretical analyses (see n. 74 above), as is observed by Zhmud 2006, 137. 85
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knowledge, but in all, historia is never attributed the status of a technê or epistêmê by him.86 This is an important distinction, for while Aristotle perhaps recognizes that knowledge of the past might support predictive functions in a loose sense, he does not allow it the same degree of formal systematization as other branches of knowledge, practical or theoretical. In fact, Aristotle rejects the possibility that regularities exhibited by historical events possess any genuine scientific significance. Affairs in the social world are simply not joined by essential or necessary relationships, and appearances to the contrary are in fact purely coincidental.87 As a rule, then, human affairs simply lack the intrinsic order that is necessary for systematic knowledge. Aristotle’s critique is surely reasonable, for it is difficult to accept that there is no significant difference between scientific knowledge as he defines it (i.e. epistêmê) and historical knowledge based on its model. Indeed, one might say that it is difficult to take seriously the suggestion that causal explanations of the past have any scientific value at all, or that predictive knowledge is possible in even a loose sense (see pp. 214-15 below). However, objections of this kind are beside the point here. First of all, it is clear that ancient historians did consider a more scientific or more rational form of history a realistic possibility. If the practices of Herodotus, Thucydides and, later, Polybius are no indication, Aristotle’s critique is itself a clear reminder that contemporary historians were in fact disposed to see history on the model of the other sciences. This is crucial, for it is clear that historians adopted and endorsed certain approaches to study of
E.g., Rhet. 1360a9-21, trans. Freese: “With reference to [matters of war and peace] he must also have examined the results, not only of the wars carried on by his own State, but also of those carried on by others; for similar results naturally arise from similar causes.” Cf. 1394a11-12, trans. Freese, slightly modified: “as a general rule (i.e., for the most part [§p‹ tÚ polÊ]) the future resembles the past.” Also relevant is 1360a36-37, which emphasizes the importance of “historical accounts of political affairs” (afl t«n per‹ tåw prãjeiw grafÒntvn flstor€ai) in deliberative oratory, though here historia appears to refer to the empirical component of science, i.e. data collection (see n. 74 above). 87 See Poet. 1459a17-29, where Aristotle observes that apparent coincidences among past events are only circumstantial (…w ¶tuxen) and do not denote the kind of relationships that enable systematic knowledge of them. In other words, the perception of links among past events is due to the subjective position of the observer, rather to anything intrinsic about the events themselves. On this passage, see Fornara 1983, 9394, esp. n. 93 on an important emendation; an alternate reading is discussed by Weil 1960, 1963-73. 86
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the past and not others. In terms of the theoretical discussion above, this fact alone suggests the need to consider the function of these practices and concepts as a source of knowledge. In this case, incidentally, the question is perhaps not so much whether an affiliation with the sciences is appropriate or justifiable at all, but rather, on what other conditions historical writers might have established study of the past as a formal discipline. Given the direction of developments in lateClassical and Hellenistic intellectual culture, it is difficult to see how historians might have actually avoided the use of given methods. Aristotle’s critique, then, is to some extent to be set aside here because it represents such a minority view of what counts as history, to put it bluntly. We must still account for the fact, for example, that historians from Herodotus to Polybius continued to regard the past as a source of knowledge about human affairs of more or less universal applications, no matter at what level of theoretical detail they had worked this notion out. However, even accepting the reality of certain practices—i.e. that ancient historians make no fast distinction between history and other forms of science—there remains uncertainty over the nature and status of knowledge produced under these conditions. It is difficult to say, in other words, that fashioning historical inquiry on the model of other sciences may be identified with any real gains in knowledge of the past. This objection too, however, is largely irrelevant here—and even unfounded in certain respects. As for the question regarding whether the sciences actually aided more truthful representation of the past, of course they did not. Yet leaving that issue aside, it is helpful to recognize that as a set of activities for providing access to an essentially irretrievable past, formal study of history is necessarily constrained by the need to accomplish this task as a matter of discursive reconstruction. As I have discussed in the Introduction, prose histories are thus not fundamentally different from the various other discursive activities through which the Greeks made sense of their historical traditions, such as in myth or song, or in other public and sacred contexts. In this case, the significance of affiliations with the sciences is essentially a matter
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of distinguishing prose history from these various other sources of historical knowledge. At the same time, however, the techniques and conceptual points employed in enforcing this distinction will have disposed representation of the past in specific ways. Thus, though there is little reason to regard the methodological adjustments in Herodotus’ or Thucydides’ work as components in a more objectively valid approach to the past, it is important to recognize that they will have created noteworthy formal provisions for the reconstruction of past evens. For example, whatever we might think of Thucydides’ use of logical proof and arguments from probability in his account of early Greece, it is clear that the availability of such resources, and especially their great currency in the context of fifth-century Athenian intellectual culture, will entailed new conditions for the interpretation of traditional material.88 Similar observations may be made of use of generational reckoning to configure the chronology of the remote past, or rational methods of calibrating genealogical data to resolve inconsistencies in the Greeks’ diverse (and confusing) mythic traditions. All of these cases exemplify how representation of the shaped and ordered through the intercession of specific technical innovations. In so far as this framework is associated with general developments in scientific rationalism, practical affiliations with the sciences are epistemologically significant themselves, as knowledge of the past comes to be defined in relation to the technical or discursive resources generated in the context of scientific culture as a whole. Viewed from this perspective, the relevant question then concerns not whether the sciences aid
Thucydides’ account of the early history of Greece, often referred to as the ‘archaeologia’, is based largely on the notion that “demonstrative proofs” (tekµÆria) and “indications” (shµe€a) may be adduced to endow representations of the past with greater authority, i.e. than accounts appearing in sources like poetry, for example (i.3.1, 3, 6.2, 9.4, 10.1, 20.1, 21.1; cf. ii.1.2, 15.4); also used this way in the archaeologia is µartÊrion (“testimony”, “proof”) (i.8.1). None of these terms denotes proof in the rigorous sense, incidentally, but rather refer to the indications on which a reasonable account of the past may be based. The language is drawn directly from forensic discourse, but more importantly, what we see is that engagement with this set of techniques provides a more concrete basis for distinguishing the account from traditional perspectives of early Greece, which do not meet the same standard of reliability. On Thucydides’ use of tekmêria and formal demonstrative features in the archaeologia, see Gomme 1945, 13536; Connor 1987, 27-28; Nicolai 2001; and especially Ginzburg 1999, 38-53, esp. 44-47, who discusses the impact of forensic concepts in constructions of historical knowledge. 88
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historians in this pursuit or whether the latter are thus afforded a better understanding of things as they actually were, so to speak, but rather what image of the past is reinforced by investments in the principles of scientific rationalism. It would not disqualify historical writing as a source of knowledge about the past, in other words, simply because it did not meet certain standards of legitimacy (whether Aristotle’s or our own). In more pragmatic terms, the distinctions enforced by certain prose writers with traditional sources of historical knowledge will in certain cases have had significant effects upon perception of the past. What I wish to suggest then is that developments in the concept of a more scientific form of history are to be associated with the appearance of special conditions for historical knowledge. There are two parts to this proposal. On the one hand, rationalism imposes special constraints upon representation of the past, which are enforced through accommodation of its core principles on the part of historical thinkers themselves. Henceforth, the authority of literary reconstructions of the past comes to be defined increasingly in terms of discursive tendencies already recognized in the scientific tradition, such as through the adoption of causal structure, for example, or maintaining goals technical instruction for present and future endeavors. On the other hand, new conditions for knowledge are also expressed in terms of adversative framing with other forms of engagement with the past. The development of history as a discipline necessarily entails the invalidation of alternate sources of historical knowledge, such as in poetry, ritual, etc., which are not so much less truthful in relation to the new disciplinary context, as they are simply less legitimate. The fringe status attributed to these discourses signifies important shifts in the sources of authority for historical knowledge, but their exclusion in this way also reflects an important part of how legitimacy in constructed in the historical field, in which status must be maintained through ongoing strategies of differentiation.
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In all, the notion ‘scientific history’ apparently requires redefinition, as it must be possible to accept practical affiliations between history and the sciences in accordance with a fairer understanding of what it means to be scientific. As is hopefully clear by now, since there is little use in enforcing a view of science as a set of institutions providing unmediated access to the reality of the external world, it is equally unnecessary to enforce the same view upon the historical discipline in respect of knowledge of the past. Like other forms of scientific inquiry, it too is to be understood primarily as an institutional context for producing knowledge under characteristically local conditions. It is perhaps in this respect the category of science most applies to formal study of the past. What I wish to suggest is that we may understand history in relation to the sciences without exaggerating the function of historical writing as a source of knowledge about the past, while at the same time avoiding emptying the category of science of relevant meaning. It is from this perspective I examine Polybius’ writing, which is itself, as I mentioned, characterized by concern for what might be called a more scientific form of historical reporting. While this aspect of Polybius’ writing might signify many things, such as matters of intellectual taste or the rhetorical nature of ancient literary practices in general, what I hope is clear by this point, the effort to assimilate current approaches to science is also to be understood in more substantial relation to the foundations of historical understanding.89 To an extent, this is no more
See, e.g., Vercruysse 1990, 34-35, who describes features of Polybius’ writing largely as an effort to obtain prestige in the eyes of a particular readership. This assessment of Polybius’ writing of course links it to broader issues regarding the relation between history and rhetoric. Now whatever the resolution for that set of problems, it should be clear that even if affiliations with the sciences do play a largely (merely?) rhetorical function in historical writing, it is still possible to see that adjustments to historical representation made only for rhetorical purposes still entail change in the way the past is perceived. On this view of the productive function of rhetoric in the sciences, see n. 23 above. Needless to say, the relationship between rhetoric and history in antiquity forms a large subject. Critiques of ancient historiography’s rhetorical dimensions usually follow Woodman 1988, though more recent work, following Momigliano 1981, focuses on the productive aspects of this relationship, including the epistemic function of rhetoric, and especially the openness of ancient historians in general to the use of rhetorical techniques; cf. Ginsburg 1999, 38-53; Fox and Livingston 2010; for a useful summary of these issues, see Marincola 2000, 3-8. 89
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than a matter of how affiliations with the sciences form the basis for more general efforts to distinguish historical writing as a special source of knowledge about the past, such as are exemplified in Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ writing. Yet in Polybius, affiliations of this kind are expressed much more formally, and in this respect, the use of certain models of scientific description and explanation in the context of history forms a source of even more rigid separation from other sources of historical knowledge. Yet this means more stringent limitations for how historical events are understood well. In the discussion ahead, I address this subject in the terms of how Polybius constructs his approach on the basis of fairly explicit links with contemporary science, which provide the framework, understood as a set of distinctive practical and conceptual models, for aligning history more closely with the ideals and expectations of Hellenistic intellectual culture. Of course this aspect of the Histories may be understood in relation to ordinary concerns for intellectual authority in the historical field, and in this respect, the work reflects basic concerns for methodological issues that appear throughout the development ancient historical writing, but this set of concerns is itself to be understood in relation to the influence of certain cultural factors governing the formation of Hellenistic intellectual life. On this view, the Histories thus provides a important example of how historical thinking is shaped by regulating influences expressed more broadly in the context of Hellenistic rationalism. Ultimately, in their extended implications, affiliations with the science are especially important for understanding the role of rationalist thought in shaping the certain dominant views of the Hellenistic and Mediterranean historiographical traditions.
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CHAPTER 2: SETTING LIMITS PragµatikØ flstor€a AND THE ORDER OF POLITICAL HISTORY
In the previous chapter I considered the relationship between historical writing and other forms of science in Classical period, pointing out that despite problems associated with the notion of scientific history, links with the sciences form an important part of the development of the historical field in Greek culture. In particular, we observe the influence of specific trends in the emergence of scientific rationalism, notably in the natural sciences, in which specific practices and concepts provide the basis for a more serious approach to history. The work of Herodotus and Thucydides reveals efforts to incorporate more stringent standards of proof and demonstration, for example, or rational models of causal explanation, which thus allows for a more concrete distinction from traditional sources of historical knowledge, such as myth, poetry and similar discourses. More specifically, this set of developments is to be understood in relation to social and cultural factors governing the formation of intellectual culture, which denote a more or less steady process of regularization in the practical and conceptual framework of science. Progress in the notion of a more serious form of history is thus to be understood largely as an expression of the authority of that particular cultural regime. Consequently, while on one view affiliations with the sciences reflect the elective use of certain tools of description and analysis (e.g., for the purposes of acquiring prestige for study of the past), it is necessary to recognize that there exists a more basic dependency between history and contemporary science, in the sense that is in principle only from the authority of the rational tradition that innovation in the historical field at this time acquires the meaning and importance for the subsequent historiographical tradition that it does. In this chapter and the next, I examine Polybius’ own relationship with the sciences, considering how the methods and principles employed in his own approach to history are be
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linked with conceptions of knowledge in other areas of rational inquiry. Here I begin with the concept of pragµatikØ flstor€a, which denotes a formal approach to study of the past based on current methods in the practical sciences. In particular, this aspect of the Histories is directed at elucidating the workings of the political and military sphere, and involves the use special techniques and standards of interpretation, derived from the practical sciences, for providing a useful resource for the statesman and general. Chapter 3 examines the notion of universal history, which also forms part of Polybius’ concern for practical knowledge, though more specifically, the concept involve the historian’s attempt to organize a comprehensive description of the events leading up Roman domination of the Mediterranean in the middle of the second century. As is well known, the Histories extends coverage to an immense field of developments, which despite being limited to the central theme of Roman expansion, nonetheless incorporates description of events over “nearly the whole inhabited world”, as it is put in the main Preface to the work (i.1.5). The basis for this scheme is also derived from other areas of scientific discourse, notably certain models of rational analysis employed in the natural sciences. Taken together, the concepts of pragmatikê historia and universal history form the basis for a special technical approach to study of the past, which is not only conducive to making formal distinctions from other prose histories, but also denotes a view of history, both in underlying methods and conceptual orientation, that is more consistent with prevailing conceptions of the nature and scope of speculative thought. Adjustments signaled by this pair of concepts thus provide the foundations for enlarging the status of the historical field in a number of significant ways. Yet at the same, though pragmatikê historia and universal history are ostensibly associated with progress, each entails noteworthy constraints for the perception of past events. Efforts to assimilate other scientific discourse introduce special formal requirements for interpretation of the past events, for example, and in this case, though rational models of description and analysis render history more consistent with the sciences, they
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inevitably entail new provisions for what it means to know past, for example, or what kinds of historical understanding are worthwhile. Thus in what is surely an interesting paradox in Polybius’ approach, adjustments meant to enlarge the explanatory capacities of historical writing, actually entail a narrower conception of historical understanding, and ultimately place significant restrictions on the field as a institution of knowledge. As for pragmatikê historia more specifically, the concepts denotes restrictions in content primarily. While a precise meaning for the expression has been a subject of debate, it is clear that it refers on a literal level at least to the content of the Histories, “a history of prãgµata”, as it were, or a history of “issues”, “affairs”, or “facts” on the most literal meaning of pragmata.90 While this rendering is not illuminating on its own, by extension, we arrive at something like “a history of political affairs”, and hence, the popular translation “political and military history”.91 In this respect, pragmatikê historia denotes an effort to distinguish the Histories from the other accounts not expressly devoted to that sphere of activity, such surveys of genealogical material or accounts of colonial activity, both of which represent popular forms of history in the Hellenistic era. Yet in practice, the concept also involves special standards of historical interpretation, which are oriented, as I mentioned, around the objective of providing practical instruction for the statesman. Limits on content denoted by the expression thus also imply a more or less formal understanding of kinds of coverage appropriate to making sense of the political and military sphere, and especially the appropriate means of interpretation. This of course represents a
The expression is unusual for the second century, perhaps Polybius’ own coinage; see Gelzer 1982 [1955], 280; cf. Pédech 1964, 23; Walbank 2002, 6. Literally, the adjective pragµatikÒw must denote the content of flstor€a, where -ik suffix of the modifier limits in the sense of “pertaining to” or “having to with”. For the interpretation of pragmatikê historia as referring to the contents of the work, see Walbank inter alia 1945, 15-17; Pédech 1964, 25-26, Mohm 1977, 22; the view goes back originally to Scheighäuser 1792 v, 127, who discusses the adjective pragµatikÒw in other contexts where it refers to subject matter, and later, Strachan-Davidson 1888, 1-5. Except where indicated otherwise, all translations of Polybius in this chapter are those of Paton’s Loeb edition (1922-27); all other translations are indicated as appropriate. 91 For “political and military history”, also a long-standing view, see, e.g., Walbank 1945, 16; Comm. i, 8 n. 6, 42; 1972, 56 n. 148; 2002, 7; Pédech 1964, 26; Petzold 1969, 2-3; Sacks 1981, 180; Weil 1982, a1. 90
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significant restriction on the subjects of interest appearing in conventional histories, which typically cover a multitude of concerns, such as ethnography, geography and many other matters not directly related to the domain of politics. Viewed from this perspective, Polybius’ emphasis on the importance of pragmatikê historia implies at best a selective understanding of the historical field. Yet at worst it indicates an inherently normative view of historical knowledge, which is to be associated ultimately with significant limits for history’s function as an institution of learning.92 The difficulty with this point perhaps lies in the fact that the unique importance of political historiography is often taken for granted, both in ancient and modern perspectives, but on an absolute view of what study of the past might entail, it is necessary to recognize that pragmatikê historia involves an especially restrictive view of the means and form of understanding the past, especially in relation to other conventions in the historical field, which seem to have regarded the prospect of knowledge of the past from the perspective of a much more inclusive understanding of the social world. Thus, even if it appears conventional by some standards, the notion of political history is in a sense already invested, so to speak, in a given way of ordering historical experience. Here I examine how Polybius validates this view of history in relation to similar hierarchies in the sciences. This task involves four sets of considerations. In Section I of this chapter, I consider the notion of pragmatikê historia in relation the general patterns of intellectual rivalry in the historical field, suggesting that the effort to distinguish political history is grounded in largely routine concerns for enhancing prestige and intellectual
In short, despite efforts to see a dominant role for the influence of Thucydides upon subsequent generations (e.g., Strasburger 1966, 57-58), the Athenian historian was something of an eccentric figure in a Hellenistic tradition characterized by broad interests in ethnography, geography, mythography, et al.; see Murray 1972; cf. 1968. Important qualifications to this view appear in Hornblower 1995, with useful bibliography; cf. sources cited by Marincola 2001, 103 n. 194. On a related note, links between Polybius and Thucydides are therefore not a strong indication of mainstream interests in historical practices; if anything the forcefulness of Polybius’ insistence on the importance of political history (e.g., ix.1-2; discussed further below) is itself an indication that such closely focused work of this kind was not the common practice. On Polybius’ links with Thucydides, see Walbank 1972, 40-43; Sacks 1981, 186 n. 35; Hornblower 1994b, 60-61. 92
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authority. This set of factors underlies more or less the entire approach in the Histories, and I shall be referring back to it frequently in subsequent parts of this dissertation. In regard to the notion of pragmatikê historia, Polybius’ contentiousness is directed primarily at traditional sources of historical authority, such as genealogical writing and colonial histories, which are both known to have occupied an important place in the Hellenistic historical tradition, both in public and private contexts. In Section II, I consider Polybius’ efforts to discredit and supplant these competing discourses from specifying more stringent standards of historical method, notably based on models of knowledge and explanation employed in the practical sciences. As mentioned, this involves articulation of special frames for analysis denote the restrictions in content that characterize pragmatikê historia, as well as the special interpretive procedures for making sense of this subject matter. In particular, this set of specifications relies on provisions for knowledge formulated in contemporary epistemological debates, which from application in the context of history, provide narrower conditions for legitimacy for the different ways of describing the past. The point is especially noteworthy in view of how the historical knowledge, and especially the knowability of the remote past, are already significantly problematized by ancient writers. Thus though pragmatikê historia may be aligned neatly with traditional distinctions between, say, history and myth—i.e. in the way the concept is opposed to the genealogical and colonial traditions, which are among the most prominent exponents of myth in the Hellenistic tradition—given its relationship to the specialized interests of contemporary science, the concept implies an even more stringent view of the proper domain of history. In all, pragmatikê historia denotes an attempt to specialize history in relation to the special interests of cultural elites, for whom greater political involvement and greater access to the resources made available by the current intellectual regime imply special expectations for history as well. In Section III, I extend this interpretation by considering the means of validation for
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Polybius’ approach. Though pragmatikê historia involves an unconventionally narrow view of the historical domain, support comes in the way Polybius situates his approach in relation to the special claims to expertise characterizing contemporary elite culture. By formulating a special methodology based on skills acquired the context of political leadership, Polybius establishes a new definition of history that not only validates normative views regarding the unique importance of political history—along with the positive exclusion other forms of historical understanding incidentally—but provides the basis for extending and reinforcing elite claims to knowledge of the past. The significance of pragmatikê historia thus far exceeds the mere distinction in content, but denotes an effort to substantiate proprietary concerns for the past that generally characterize elite culture in ancient Greece. In Section IV, I consider the ramifications of this approach for the production and organization of historical knowledge. As restrictions implied by pragmatikê historia exceed merely arbitrary limits in content, and involve normative views of the nature and scope of historical understanding, the concept of pragmatikê historia is ultimately to be associated with significant constraints for perception of the past. That study of the past might be based on such a narrow view of the domain of inquiry implies obvious limitations on its own of course. Yet in the specific terms in which Polybius formulates his approach, we observe the basis for even more stringent limitations on perception of the past. In particular, it is the use of certain fixed analytical categories, which though useful for understanding the particular events of history, form an impediment to understanding of the political domain in a genuinely historical framework. In this respect, the notion of pragmatikê historia ultimately fosters essentializing views of Mediterranean political culture, an issue that is useful for understanding not only particular conditions for the formation of Hellenistic political ideology, but also, in a generic sense, the relationship between the institutions of Hellenistic intellectual culture and the construction of conditions for political
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community in the Mediterranean world. The nature of this relationship in fact represents a major theme of this dissertation, and here I lay the groundwork for the subsequent discussions of the link between intellectual production and political subjectivity in the remaining two chapters. Before going on it is necessary to address an important terminological issue. While the expression pragmatikê historia has been the subject of considerable discussion in modern accounts, establishing a precise definition has been difficult.93 Polybius himself nowhere attempts to provide such a thing, and references in the Histories are generally circumstantial or occur in fragmentary passages. Each of the various modern translations one finds (e.g., “serious history”, “systematic history”, “contemporary history”) surely conveys part of Polybius’ intended meaning, but is also ultimately incomplete. The most convenient (and perhaps most common) translation, ‘pragmatic history’ (cf. histoire pragmatique, pragmatische Geschichte) is especially problematic, as it focused too narrowly on the didactic function of history, without incorporating the specifications in content and method also implied by the expression.94 It is true that Polybius’ standpoint as a historian might be described as ‘pragmatic’, but it is clear that ancient historians typically viewed their work as a source of lessons, and in this case, it is not clear what additional qualification the adjective
Here I do not attempt to treat the range of scholarship on the subject. Useful surveys appear in Pédech 1964, 1-32 (major interpretations from Casaubon 1609 to Gelzer 1982 [1955]) and Walbank 2002, 6-7; for a consolidated bibliography see Beister 1995, 329 n. 1. 94 The translation “pragmatic history” appears frequently, both in the works devoted to Polybius exclusively (e.g., Ziegler 1952, coll. 1519-21; Gelzer 1982 [1955]; Petzold 1969; Pédech 1964; Meister 1975; Sacks 1981; Meissner 1986; Beister 1995), and in studies devoted to history and historiography more generally (e.g., Fornara 1983, 112 n. 31; Meister 1990, 160-1; Luce 1997, 128; Marincola 2001, 122-6; AlonsoNúñez 2002, 80). Even Walbank, who avoids its usage (see n. 3 above), has adopted the translation in at least one recent publication (2002, 6-7), a bibliographical essay, which is perhaps an important indication of its currency. (Incidentally, the phrase appears in the glossary of the volume in which that essay appears as well.) The view that pragmatikê historia literally denotes a history aimed at practical instruction (e.g., i.35.9; ix.2.4) goes back at least to Isaac Casaubon’s 1609 edition the Histories and has been followed in some form or other by many (e.g., Reiske 1763; de Vries 1843; Gelzer 1982 [1955]; Petzold 1969; Beister 1995), each differing in his understanding of the didactic element implied by the expression. References to the usefulness of history are ubiquitous in Polybius’ writing: e.g., i.1.2; ii.35.5-10; iii.21.9-10, 118.12; vii.2.2; cf. ii.56.10, v.75.1-6, xii.25g; xv.21.3-8; xviii.15.15-7, xxxix.8.7; cf. Walbank Comm. i, 7; Sacks 1981, 122-43. A comprehensive treatment of the didactic element of Polybius’ historical writing is Meissner 1986. 93
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pragmatikos might add.95 I have therefore deliberately left pragmatikê historia in the Greek in order to the avoid difficulties posed by any of its individual English translations. It is best to take pragmatikê historia on its literal meaning, as a set of restrictions in content, though this meaning is ultimately to be qualified in respect of Polybius’ view of history as a source of technical instruction.
Knowledge or entertainment: historical writing and the contest over knowledge of the past The clearest description of pragmatikê historia in the Histories comes in a fragment from the preface to Book 9, in which Polybius identifies the work as an account of “the affairs of peoples, cities and monarchs” (tåw prãjeiw t«n §yn«n ka‹ pÒlevn ka‹ dunast«n).96 Now the latter expression is significant in its own right, as it denotes important assumptions regarding the political topography of the Mediterranean, and I will come back to that subject in Section IV.97 Yet of more immediate concern is how this definition supports generic distinctions introduced in association with pragmatikê historia. The fragment in question in fact comes from a discussion in the Histories concerning the objectives of historical research and writing, which Polybius defines in terms of the interests of different kinds of readership (ix.1-2). His own writing, he says, will be of limited interest to the general audience, for its subject matter is highly selective, and the work in fact excludes much of the material to be found in other kinds of history, such as stories of heroes, epic journeys, and city foundations, and all the other things that typically appear in popular accounts
As Walbank 1945, 15-17, has pointed out, though the Histories is patently didactic in purpose, didacticism is not actually fundamental to Polybius’ conception of pragmatikê historia; cf. id. 1972, 56 n. 148. It is to be taken for granted, for example, that ancient authors and audiences viewed their literature, and history in particular, as a source of lessons. Interpretations of pragmatikê historia concentrating upon a didactic element do not really explain why Polybius would have considered the category so distinctive. See Pédech 1964, 301, who discusses didacticism in historical writing in authors from Thucydides to Theophylactus in the seventh century C.E. 96 ix.1.4; more specifically, this content area constitutes the pragµatikÚw trÒpow or ‘pragmatic’ branch of historical writing (2.4). On the position of this fragment from Book 9, see Walbank Comm. ii, 8, 261. 97 On the phrase ¶ynh ka‹ pÒleiw ka‹ dunãstai in official contexts, see further discussion pp. 47-50 below. 95
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of the past. In making this point, Polybius formulates a three-way distinction, separating the historical field into: (i) “the genealogical branch” (ı genealogikÚw trÒpow) focused on the study of heroic and aristocratic lineages; (ii) “the branch concerning colonies, city foundations and ties of kinship” (ı [trÒpow] per‹ tåw époik€aw ka‹ kt€seiw ka‹ suggene€aw), which examines colonial activity going back as far as the Trojan-War era (henceforth simply ‘colonial history’ or ktiseis, to use the customary ancient term): and lastly, (iii) the historian’s own area of historical research, pragmatikê historia, which concerns political and military affairs. Each genre, he says, attracts a different kind of reader (ix.1.3-5). For genealogies, it is only the “casual reader” (filÆkoow) or the reader seeking simple entertainment that seeks out this kind of writing.98 Yet on the other hand, accounts of colonization attract a reader of more serious intellectual concern, ı poluprãgµvn ka‹ perittÒw, as Polybius says, which appears to denote something like the antiquarian scholar.99
Finally, pragmatikê historia appeals to the politikÒw, which refers to the “statesman” essentially, though this apparently includes the lay student of politics as well.100 Whichever the case, by this
ix.2.1; for the translation “casual reader”, see Walbank Comm. ii, 116, citing LSJ s.v. (“fond of hearing”), and Paton rendering “fond of a story”. In Polybius, the philêkoos is distinguishable primarily for deriving pleasure (≤dÊ) from historical writing; e.g., vii.7.8, with Walbank Comm. ii, 41; cf. xi.19a.2 (toÁw ékoÊontaw). For the association of genealogical writing with pleasure and entertainment, see Plat. Hp. Ma. 285d, discussed p. 22 below. 99 While the expression does not lend itself to a single, convenient translation, it must refer, by hendiadys, to a reader characterized by a more studiousness and concern for obscure facts about the past, “the curious lover of recondite lore” (Paton) or the antiquarian scholar, in the modern sense of the expression, where it is opposed to the historian proper. On the translation of poluprãgµvn ka‹ perittÒw, see Walbank Comm. ii, 117 (“the man with antiquarian interests”) and especially Beister 1995, 340-1 with nn. (“Forscher und Gelehrter”, i.e. “researcher and scholar”). On the distinctions between the antiquarian and the historian proper, ancient and modern, see Momigliano 1950. 100 For politikos as student of history in addition to the statesman proper, see Ziegler 1952, col. 1519; Beister 1995, 341-42; contra Walbank 1972, 56 n. 146. The distinction is minor here; Polybius saw his work as contributing to body of practical knowledge for use in political and military applications, which I discuss pp. 27-28 below. Often linked to the politikos as part of the readership of pragmatikê historia is the filoµay≈n, the lay student of history essentially, who is also distinguishable for a more serious interest in historical knowledge, in particular for its practical applications (e.g., i.13.9, 65.9; xi.19a.2; vii.7.8). Terminology Polybius uses for the readership of pragmatikê historia is often varied: e.g., politeuÒµenoi, praktiko€, pragµatiko€, as well as serious students (filoµayoËntew), interested in the practical uses of history (e.g., iii.21.9-10, 118.12; with Walbank Comm. i, 337). On Polybius’ understanding of readership of pragmatikê 98
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scheme the typical reader of pragmatikê historia is defined in terms of a specitic set of activities: direction and administration of the state. These distinctions are not merely descriptive, but in fact indicate a thoroughly hierarchical view of historical research. Genealogies and colonial histories, for instance, are distinguishable in terms of the intellectual seriousness of their respective readers. While the former are described primarily as a source of entertainment, the latter are associated with more serious objectives of historical learning. Elsewhere Polybius praises writers of ktiseis for their erudition, for example, and says that these works often show great precision and rigor in reconstruction of past events.101 The colonial genre is thus defined by a higher order of concern than may be attributed to genealogies. Yet the meticulousness of such works had its limits, and Polybius in fact observes a fine line between concern for detail and mere pedantry.102 The expression polypragmôn kai perittos thus functions primarily in a pejorative sense, suggesting the tediousness and immoderate concern for detail that accompanies accounts of this kind, rather than genuine concern for historical understanding.103 As for pragmatikê historia, the operative distinction does not reflect these considerations, but rather the application of knowledge of the past in specific practical functions, notably in the context of directing political and military affairs. For Polybius this branch of history is “the most useful of all” (pãntvn »feliµ≈taton: ix.2.5) and is on its own the only source of any genuine practical
historia and of the various kinds of readers of history more generally, see Walbank, Comm. i, 6-8; Petzold 1969, 4-5; Mohm 1977, 161-67; and especially the illuminating discussion of Beister 1995, 339-43. 101 x.21.3, referring the technique of épÒdeijiw (“deductive proof”), employed in establishing incontrovertibility in a formal logical sense. A useful discussion of the apodeixis in the scientific-philosophical tradition and its function in the Histories, including the expression épodeiktikØ flstor€a (“apodeictic history”), is Pédech 1964, 43-53, with important qualifications in Sacks 1981, 171-76. 102 In other passages, ktiseis are associated with excessive displays of learning. While authors of ktiseis were admirable for their use of formal techniques, such as in apodeixis (see n. 13 above on x.21.3), Polybius says they go overboard at times, as in the case of Timaeus of Tauromenium (see pp. 33-43 below), whose writing, he says, is often overzealous and misconceived in the use of special concepts (xii.26d.1-3); see further Beister 1995, 341. 103 LSJ s.v. poluprãgµvn 2; it is in this sense that ktiseis might be regarded more along the lines of antiquarianism in the modern sense of the term; see n. 11 above.
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benefit (»f°leia); the other two provide only enjoyment (t°rciw).104 Ultimately this characterization expresses an attempt to situate pragmatikê historia among certain technical interests in the sciences, and I will return to this issue more specifically below. Yet what matters for the moment, is that whereas pragmatikê historia is distinguished by practical function, Polybius seems to take for granted that genealogies and colonial histories have none—or at least none comparable. In this case, we see that observations concerning the different appeal of genealogies, ktiseis and pragmatikê historia are not exactly parallel, for while the first two are related to intellectual merit (or lack thereof rather), the last concerns applied use. Consequently, the scheme separates genealogies and ktiseis as a single category, which produces a dichotomous order, rather than one that is more broadly hierarchical.105 Yet more to point, the tripartite division does not simply provide justification for the content for the Histories, but rather involves a claim concerning the historical discipline itself, namely, that its essential function is to provide practical knowledge for political and military leadership. There are surely a number of problems with the scheme as a whole. There is the obvious tautology in Polybius’ notion of ‘practical benefit’, for example, as this value is apparently already defined in relation to the concerns of political administration. Moreover, it is not clear why accounts of colonization and the like are excluded from the domain of political affairs. Nor is it clear why genealogies and colonial histories are reduced so categorically to the status of mere entertainment. Now the last consideration is perhaps less problematic, as heroic journeys and the foundation of cities indeed form common themes in popular performance contexts.106 Yet this characterization need not apply to all accounts of this kind, for in fact, as we shall see below, ix.2.6. Polybius appears to be expressing himself elliptically here, as he has now lumped colonial histories along with genealogies as merely a form of entertainment, but the point is clear enough: pragmatikê historia has unique practical applications. 105 Beister 1995, 344-45, goes as far as to call pragmatikê historia an ideal (“Idealtyp”) against which all other forms may be considered deviations. 106 This is presumably what Polybius has in mind in referring to genealogies and ktiseis as simply µÊyoi (“stories”) in this passage; ix.2.1. 104
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genealogies and ktiseis form a subject of serious study in their own right. If anything, the level of insistence in Polybius’ remarks here suggests that genealogies and ktiseis are not in fact such marginal pursuits. In this case, the tripartite division of the genres denotes what is essentially a rhetorical construction, and as such apparently corresponds with existing social hierarchies, in which the superiority of political affairs is defined principally in relation to the special interests of a particular group of stakeholders, namely, the political leadership of Greek cities. What is interesting is how Polybius validates this view by situating pragmatikê historia in relation to other, more authoritative practices in the sciences, and in this respect, the main concern is not really the validity of this characterization itself, but rather the means by which Polybius formulates this set of relationships. As already suggested, legitimacy in the sciences is frequently a matter of establishing a niche rhetorically, particularly separating one’s work from competing sources of authority. Pragmatikê historia is essentially an institution of this kind. The same maneuver appears in Thucydides, who famously distinguished his writing from the ég≈nisµa or entertaining displays of rhetorical competitions.107 As I discussed in Chapter 1, distinctions of this kind are not restricted to history, but may be observed broadly among scientific thinkers in antiquity.108 They are not for this reason to be taken for granted as essential features of intellectual institutions. On the contrary, the boundaries separating different areas of intellectual activity are often the result of deliberate efforts to demarcate and establish order. With that in mind, let us consider Polybius’ engagement with the genealogical and colonial branches of history in greater detail, concentrating in particular on the way representation of this pair of activities effectively conceals their common function in conventional representations of the past.
i.22.4; the Athenian historian’s insistence that he had produced “a possession for all time” (kt∞µa §w afie€) is thus analogous to Polybius’ own emphasis on “practical usefulness” (»f°leia: e.g., ix.2.6). Polybius actually introduces the same distinction with agônisma iii.31.12-13, a passage taken by Walbank Comm. i, 359, to refer directly to Thucydides. 108 See sources cited n. 6 above. 107
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By the phrase genealogikos tropos Polybius refers to the many studies of heroic lineages popular in the historical tradition more or less since the advent of historical prose. For writers of genealogiai (to use the common ancient term) study of the past is directed at understanding the nexus of family relations linking the figures of song and legend, especially those appearing in the Homeric epics.109 In some cases, the genealogical tradition is distinguished by concerns for rationalizing the stories appearing in this set of traditions, in particular by explaining or eliminating their many fantastic and incredible features.110 Yet this view reflects a narrow understanding of the notion of rationalism governing this area of study, for from what can be told from surviving parts of ancient genealogies, the main concern of writers in this field was with problems of inconsistency, notably stemming from the project of integrating data obtained from diverse and highly localized mythic traditions. Such is the case with the genealogist Hecataeus of Miletus, whose signature observation that “the stories of the Greeks are many and ridiculous (pollo€ te ka‹ gelo›oi)” provides the perfect illustration of this issue. The operative word is pollo€, in the sense of ‘inconsistent’, or by hendiadys with gelo›oi, “ridiculously inconsistent”.111
The same perspective shows up in the first-century writer Diodorus of Siculus, who regards the In addition to the Genealogiai of Hecataeus of Miletus (FGH 1), we know of at least two others those of Acusilaus of Argos (FGH 2) and Simonides of Ceos (FGH 8). Other comparable titles are known: e.g., Genealogy of the Greeks and Barbarians who Fought at Troy (Polus, FGH 7 T1), perhaps confused with Damastes’ On the ancestors of those who fought at Troy (FGH 5 T1, with Komm., 476); Herologia (Anaximander FGH 9 F1). On the historical development of genealogical writing, see Jacoby 1912; 1947; Pearson 1939, 96-106; Bickerman 1952; Fornara 1983, 4-12; Thomas 1989, 155-95; Hartog 1990; Hall 1997, 40-65; Bertelli 2001. The present discussion owes much to these accounts. 110 It is an older view of that the genealogist Hecataeus’ was characteristically rationalist in the sense that it was aimed at eradicating the miraculous elements from myth; e.g., Bury 1909, 13-8; Jacoby 1912, 2667ff; Momigliano 1931b. The position is not widely accepted now; see further below. So Jacoby saw genealogy, along with mythography, as the initial stage in the development of a historiographical tradition. The pair constituted the first ‘sub-genre’ of historical writing and fragments from genealogical writers therefore occupy the first section of his Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. For Jacoby’s conception of the generic development of Greek historiography, see especially his 1909 article. Recent discussion of Jacoby, along with important criticisms are Fornara 1983, 1-4; Murray 1996; Schepens 1997; Clarke 1999a, 59-65; Luraghi 2001a; Marincola 2001, 1-3. 111 FGH 1, F1a; on the meaning of pollo€ see Nenci 1954, xxv; cf. Fornara 1983, 5 n. 10. For this interpretation of Hecataeus, see Pearson 1939, 96-106; cf. Fornara 1983, 5-6; Fowler 1996, 71-2, and especially Bertelli 2001, 76-89, with nn. 24-5 for bibliographical references going back to Meyer 1892 i, 153-88. 109
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problem of genealogy similarly as one of consistency—he does not mention fantastic or incredible events at all.112 This is important because of the tendency to link genealogical writing to myth, in the sense that the former consists mainly of fantastic stories about the past, which are then not difficult to dismiss as a spurious form of history. In fact, the fantastic components of Greek myths do not seem to have bothered genealogical writers, who continued to include them, even as they sought to situate the stories within a more rational context.113 It was only later writers, like Polybius, who describe genealogies as mythoi in a pejorative sense.114 Surely genealogists did not regard themselves as writers of myth. In fact, they presumably considered their writing to be a legitimate source of knowledge about the past, especially by comparison with the raw data they derived from the poetic tradition. By integrating separate traditions and removing inconsistencies, genealogists were able to produce a historical framework of considerably greater rational merit.115 Genealogiai thus presumably indicated substantial progress beyond representations of the past in
iv.1.1, trans. Oldfather: “the variety and multitude of the heroes, demi-gods, and men in general whose genealogies must be set down make their recital a difficult thing to achieve”. 113 Fowler 1999, 71-2. 114 For Asclepiades of Myrleia (2nd /1st cen.) genealogy is no more than false (ceudÆw) or mythical (µuyikÆ) history (S.E., M. 1.252-3). With him mythos takes on the sense of concerning the impossible more formally, in the sense of contrary to nature, a more typical meaning for Hellenistic writers and certainly closer to modern usages of the term ‘myth’: Blank 1998, 269; cf. Walbank 1960, 226: mythic aspects in the looser sense of the world might be considered genuinely historical so long as they were physically possible. Most important here, this represents a marked change from the classical period—e.g., Thucydides’ tÚ µuy«dew (i.22.4), which refers to sensationalism and patriotic bias (Flory 1990, 193-94; Hornblower 1991 i, 61)—as we are able to see the role of formal specifications in establishing a new concept of mythos (i.e. in the modern sense). I discuss the discursive bases of the category of mythos pp. 21-22 below. 115 The rationalism of Hecataeus and his relationship the Ionian tradition, has been much discussed (e.g., Bury 1909, 13-8; Jacoby 1912, 267-67; Momigliano 1931b), though see especially sources cited n. 111 above, which emphasis the historian’ engagement with the material as a means of constructing sounder accounts of the past, where ‘sounder’ does not imply simply the elimination of the fantastic elements of myths and oral tradition, but rather the articulation of systemic accounts of the past, free of incongruities, capable of plotting chronology, etc.; see, e.g., the depiction of Hecataeus appearing in Herodotus (ii.143=F300). The use of this material for constructing more rigorous chronologies represents a major part of the genealogical tradition; see Mazzarino 1966, ii, 412-61. Though many scholars focus on the problems with this technique of chronology (e.g., Pearson 1942, 9-12; Prakken 1943; de Boer 1954; Miller 1955; Henige 1974), it is clear that this practice represents a major development in terms what can be done with the abundance of data available to ancient historical thinkers; cf. Mosshammer 1979, 101-11 who emphasizes the importance of not imposing modern standards of accuracy in interpreting this set of practices. 112
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the traditional venues of poetry and song. In any event, the relevant point is that while this area of history enjoyed considerable popularity as a form of entertainment, it is difficult to see it as merely that. As is well known, genealogical accounts played an important role in supporting aristocratic claims of legitimacy, and thus provided an important source of social order for Greek communities at the local and regional levels alike.116 Through this function, then, heroic and divine lineages apparently played a crucial role in shaping historical sensibilities, especially in certain public contexts, where on occasion they surely provided the only source of knowledge about the past. As writers improved technical control and gained awareness of the social and cultural applications of their field, this meant the possibility of stronger differentiation from myth and song, and for Greek aristocracies, access to more effective tools for asserting control over knowledge of the past.117 Accounts of ktiseis may be considered from a similar perspective. The second branch of history identified by Polybius is that concerning “colonies, the foundations of cities and kin relations”, which refers to the body of writing focusing on the Greeks’ long history of colonial settlement, located mainly in the eighth through sixth centuries, but continuing in later periods as well, such as in the late third century, after the extensive conquests of Alexander. Prior to the accounts in prose histories, colonization was a regular theme in epic and lyric poetry, which formed an important source of knowledge of the past from
The tradition of heroic genealogies goes back at least to boasts of the Homeric Glaucus, Diomedes and Aeneas (Il. vi.152-211; xiv.113-27; xx.213-41); The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women is an important example of the function of genealogy in organizing regional identities within a scheme of broader Hellenic identity; see West 1985; Bertelli 2001, 73-6. In the context of colonialism and increased contact with foreign populations, genealogy, like colonial historiography (see pp. 15-17 below), became an ever more vital instrument for supporting notions of collectivity or ‘imagined community’, to use Benedict Anderson’s influential expression (1983). 117 Thomas 1989, 158-60, 181-95 discusses the breadth and thoroughness, as well as the greater tendency towards distortion that distinguished literary genealogies from their oral predecessors. She argues that ‘full genealogies’, connecting an individual to a heroic or divine ancestor in an unbroken lineage, only appeared with the advent of literacy; evidence for this view is not extensive, but it is precise. On the social effects of literacy see Henige 1974 and Goody 1977, both cited by Thomas. 116
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performance at festivals and in other public contexts.118 Ktiseis, as such stories they were called, describe the migrations and settlements imagined to have taken place in the distant past, particularly in the period following the Trojan War, though they deal with other legendary traditions well (e.g., stories associated with Heracles or Jason). The function of such stories was generally etiological, and they thus filled an important demand in providing explanation for the many curiosities associated with colonial exploits, such as the names of places, the origins of rituals, the reasons for certain ethnic and civic affiliations, etc. The appearance of ktiseis in prose histories does not appear to have involved any great departure from these conventions, though it surely entailed some shift in the way such accounts were authorized. Monograph ktiseis are well attested, often with titles corresponding directly with Polybius’ own terminology (e.g., Apoikiai, Ktiseis, Syngeneiai).119 Yet they also appear in broader works, such as the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides and Theopompus,120 as well as those of Ephorus and Timaeus, to which Polybius refers directly.121 In works of this kind, the importance of the colonial tradition is attested by persistent interest in the subject even alongside the cultivation of other, more dominant intellectual concerns, such as political history.
Examples of verse ktiseis: Semonides’ “archaiologia of the Samians” (TT1-3 West), Mimnermus on Smyrna (T1 West), Xenophanes on Colophon and Elea (F21 A1 D-K; cf. doubts from Kirk et al. 19832, 166), Panyassis on Ionia (T1 Davies), and Pindar on Cyrene (Pyth. 9). The genre remained popular well through the Hellenistic era (e.g., Apollodorus’ ktisis of Lesbos [=Parthenius 21 Lightfoot]); see Dougherty 1993; Fowler 1996, 65; Marincola 2001, 11-12. 119 Attested titles: a Kt€seiw by Hellanicus of Lesbos (FGH 4 F66); a Sugg°neiai or Suggenikã by Andron of Halicarnassus (10 FF 1, 3; F4 has ÑIstor€ai); a Kt€seiw §yn«n ka‹ pÒlevn by Charon of Lampascus (262); an ÉAigut€vn époik€ai (?) by Ister 334 FF 43-46); an ÉAyha€vn époik€a (?) by Ariston of Chios, 337 T1); a X€ou kt€siw, perhaps a poem, by Ion of Chios (392 F3); a Kt€siw ÉItal€hw by Hippys (554 T1). As is prudent with the use of fragments, caution must be exercised in attributing titles; I have indicated uncertainties in Jacoby’s editions with a question (?). In general on writers referred to here, see Pearson 1939, 139-234; 1942, passim; Fowler 1996, 62-9. 120 Herodotus: colonization of Lycia (i.173) and of Cyrene (iv.155-65). Thucydides: early histories of Greece broadly and of Athens and Sicily in particular (i.1-22; ii.12-17; vi.1-5); cf. ii.99; iii.92.5; iv.120.1; see Pearson 1942, 32-4. Theopompus: on the founding of Cilla (FGH 115 F350). 121 Ephorus: FGH 70, FF 11, 18b, 21, 24, 31b, 39, 40, 44, 56, 78, 89, 115, 126-27, 136-37, 146, 164, 216. Timaeus: FGH 566 F 11a, 12, 45, 80; cf. Plb. ix. 1.4; xii.26d2-3, 5.1-10.7; xxxiv.1.3-4. 118
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As with genealogical accounts, continued interest in ktiseis implies a substance and function far in excess of what Polybius allows. As is well known, the migrations and settlements thought to taken place in the distant past always held great political significance. Above all, accounts of ktiseis played an important role in grounding expressions of cultural identity, and provided a meaningful context for justifying claims of kinship and civic identity in a range of contexts.122 A case in point is the foundation of Rome, which formed the subject of ktisis-accounts going back to at least the fifth century. By Polybius’ time, interest in the city’s origins and especially the prospect of links with Greece were far more pronounced, and continued well through the first century, for obvious reasons perhaps, when Dionysius of Halicarnassus saw the need to catalogue the many versions in circulation.123 Moreover, as the evidence of a multitude of inscriptions suggests, reference to ktiseis in official diplomatic contexts suggests an importance considerably greater than the subject of mere antiquarianism.124 Colonial history remained a serious concern for Greek writers, more so than genealogiai, and had a practical extensibility and significance that relented very little with the advent of self-styled more serious forms of history. Polybius himself clearly understood the political importance of colonial historiography, and despite the explicit provision that such matters fell outside the frames of pragmatikê historia, he even took up colonial themes in his own writing on occasion.125 An immense subject, but see especially Bickerman 1952; cf. Dougherty 1993; Malkin 1998, 5-9; Gruen 1993, 6-51. On colonial historiography in the first century C.E., in Strabo’s Geography in particular, see Clarke 1999, 264-74. 123 Greek accounts of Rome’s origins: e.g., Hellanicus (FGH 4 FF 31, 84); Damastes (5 T1); Callias (564 F5a); Alcimus (560 F4); D.H. AR i.47-49, 72; cf. Pearson 1939, 188-92; Bickerman 1952; Momigliano 1984.On early Greek traditions about nostoi in the West and Homeric oikists of Rome, see Malkin 1998, 178-205. 124 Relevant inscriptions collected in Curty 1995. 125 Polybius devotes attention to the controversy surrounding the origins of the Locri in southern Italy. By a certain tradition, endorsed by Aristotle but rejected by Timaeus, the community was settled by slaves from Locris (xii.5.1-10.7). Aristotle’s account is now lost, but presumably appeared in his collection of politeiai; apart from the Polybian passage (=FGH 566 F12), it is also mentioned by Athenaeus (vi.624c-d= F11a). See Walbank Comm. ii, 330-31, and especially now id. 2005. Apart from this example, Polybius considers colonial foundations elsewhere at x.21.8 and xvi.12.3. 122
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On the whole then, despite the negative characterization that we find in Polybius, it is clear that genealogies and ktiseis held considerable importance in the way the Greeks made sense of the past. From application in a range of official and semi-official contexts, these discourses provided a source of engagement with the past that in many cases had no alternative in Greek culture, often even providing the only access to certain historical situations. The appearance of genealogies and ktiseis in prose histories signaled a form of expression for these discourses— presumably with new claims of expertise as well—but we ought not to expect any radical change in social function. Thus the critique that we find in Polybius is to be understood mainly as an effort to discredit and supplant established sources of historical authority. This is important for three reasons in particular. First, as I already suggested, boundaries taking shaping around intellectual institutions are to be understood primarily as a matter of intellectual rivalry. Given the great competition among different forms of historical thought and representation, the need to distinguish one’s work represents a crucial motivation for innovation—hence the stringent restrictions in scope involved by Polybius’ concept of pragmatikê historia. Second—on a closely related point—we see just how radical this set of restrictions is, for given the range of resources available for making sense of the past, a comprehensive understanding of history apparently goes well beyond the domain of political and military affairs alone, but would in fact incorporate a much more inclusive view of the social world. I shall return to this point in particular in the final section of this chapter. Finally, the polemical nature of Polybius’ approach here calls attention to the need to identify the sources of justification for this view of history—a third point. Of course the critique of the genealogical and colonial traditions is arbitrary to an extent, and as such relies on a somewhat schematic understanding of the difference between genuine institutions of learning and mere entertainment. The distinction is not inconsequential however. As we shall see in the next section, the concept pragmatikê historia is to be understood in relation to more conventional
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concerns for the proper scope of historical knowledge. It foundations thus exceed the typical polemics found in ancient historiography, which are only of nominal significance on their own. In fact, the critique of genealogies and ktiseis is itself to be aligned with established perceptions of the historical domain. It cannot be, in other words, that boundaries between history and entertainment are merely rhetorical; the notion that pragmatikê historia represents a more serious pursuit must correspond with views regarding the nature and scope of historical research that are to some extent already taken for granted. In what follows here I turn to the standard epistemological debate in the historical field and especially the familiar distinction between history and myth. I suggest that given the prominent position of genealogies and ktiseis in the historical tradition, the (essentially) idiosyncratic view implied by pragmatikê historia is to be understood in terms of Polybius’ manipulation of familiar oppositions in making sense of the past.
Defining the historical domain: political history and the technical tradition in the sciences At a superficial level, a special epistemological distinction is conveyed by the expression pragmatikê historia itself, which, while denoting political and military history, implies also, through the modifier pragmatikos, a history limited in content to subjects meeting a certain standard of knowability. The key lies in the term prãgµata (sing., prçgµa) which translates literally to “deeds”, “actions”, or “events”; yet it also conveys the sense of a concrete actions or events, and by further extension, actual actions (or events), as opposed, for example, to those of some other status (e.g., imaginary, fictive, hypothetical, etc.)126 The last of these senses appears regularly in certain technical contexts, in rhetoric and philosophy in particular, where pragma and related terms are used in making various theoretical distinctions regarding matters of factuality, materiality and the
126
On the translation of prçgµa, see LSJ s.v. II2.
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like.127 The noun pragma is frequently employed in this way by Polybius, who uses it in statements concerning the veracity of certain historical claims, as in “as is confirmed by the pragmata themselves” or “as the pragmata themselves attest”.128 In this sense, the expression pragmatikos would indicate concern for a more truthful historical account, “a history of actual events”, as it were, where conveyed alongside is apparently the notion that historia might in fact be otherwise, i.e. based on coverage of events that is not factual or not entirely seriousness.129 This is surely close to Polybius’ intended meaning, and in this case, pragmatikos evidently implies a distinction with the mythical content of genealogies and colonial accounts. Polybius certainly makes this association on at least one occasion (ix.2.1), and on this view, the adjective pragmatikos would call to mind the familiar antitheses between myth and history or myth and truth. Other writers use the term with this meaning,130 as does Polybius on at least one occasion.131 On the other hand, however, that
Cf. Arist. Top. 146a3, SE 175a8, where the term is opposed with lÒgow and ˆnoµa. For pragmatikos in the sense of “factual” see Epic. Nat. xxviii, F 4 (p. 5 V); Ael. Theon Prog. 2 Spengel ii, 66-67; Demetr. Lac. Herc. 1014.62; Syrian. in Hermog i, p. 57 Rabe (cf. also p. 162). Dubuisson 1999, 96 stresses the post-classical origin of the word pragµatikÒw, equivalent to the classical praktikÒw (“relatif aux faits”). In the rhetorical schools, whence Polybius presumably adopted the term (see Pédech 1964, 32), pragmatikos functions in various ways to separate the subject-matter of a speech or the set of substantive issues it addresses from other concerns in speech-preparation, e.g., style and demonstration; e.g., Phld. Rhet. i, p. 155 Longo Auricchio (with Blank 2003, 71-2); Aristonicus of Rhodes, De affect. p. 574; Aps. Ars rhet. 12, [=i, 384 Spengel]); D.L. Comp. 1; Hermog. Stat.; cf. Inv. 1.1. 128 For Polybius: iii.12.2: …w ka‹ di' aÈt«n fanerÚn §g°neto t«n pragµãtvn; ix.33.6: …w aÈta tå prãgµata µeµartÊrhke; cf. ii.42.2, 53.3; iii.9.5, 31.8, 117.2; vi.50.1, 50.5; vii.13.2; xi.4.1; xvi.8.7; xxx.13.11. See also others collected by Mauersberger 1956-66, ii.b, s.v. prçgµa B4.2a. 129 Many translators have followed this path, offering “serious history”, “factual history” and the like: e.g., Paton 1922-27 i, 99; ii, 113; iv, 5; vi, 383, 441; Scott-Kilvert 1979, 43, 80, 220 and 387; as well as Walbank (cited n. 3 above). 130 A near contemporary of Polybius, Agatharcides of Cnidus, uses the term to refer to a particular kind of painting (pragµatikØ §nãrgeia), in which figures portrayed in mythoi (e.g., the gods, as they are depicted by Homer or Hesiod) are inappropriate (De mari Eryth. i.8 [GGM i, 117], cited by Pédech 1964, 28); on Agatharcides, see Fraser 1972 i, 539-50; Verdin 1990a. Similar, though much later, is a passage in Aelius Theon (1st/2nd cen. C.E.), in which pragmatikos designates a specific mode of narration, distinguishable for its treatment of factual, as opposed to mythical, content (e.g., the distinction between µÊyoi and afl pragµatika‹ dihgÆseiw: Prog. 2 Spengel ii, 66-67). While from a later source, distinctions of this kind probably belong to systems of classification developed in the rhetorical discipline going back at least to the Hellenistic period. See n. 45 below. 131 In xxxviii.6.1, Polybius criticizes writers “digress on myths and stories” (µuyika›w ka‹ dihghµatika›w kexrƵenoi parekbãsesi), rather than on “matters of fact” (pragµatika›w). It is thought that Polybius is 127
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pragmatikos operates a distinction between myth and history is not itself a terribly meaningful observation, partly for the reason that Polybius does not himself exclude what might be called mythical elements from his writing.132 More importantly, however, the distinction between myth and history is never entirely fixed in antiquity, and in fact seldom denotes a same rigid view of veracity that we are might expect (or demand) as moderns. For the ancient historian, the mythhistory divide is the result of a more nuanced set of considerations, and it will therefore be useful to consider this aspect of historical thought briefly before continuing. As a technical term, pragmatikos conveys an essentially relational notion of factuality, and its use, in Polybius or elsewhere, thus depends upon factors largely external to its literal meaning. The term does not signify factuality unconditionally, in other words, but rather only in relation to given alternatives. In this respect, the notion of truthfulness in the context of history is to be understood largely in terms of comparison with alternative ways of perceiving the past—such as stories that are patently false for example. The same is the case with the category commonly referred to as ‘myth’; that area of discourse is ever fully comprehensible on its own terms, but rather represents a domain that is defined largely in terms of oppositional constructions. The term mythos does not denote untruth of itself, in other words, in the sense that it always denotes events and subject matter that are patently fictive.133 In fact, many Greeks viewed their mythoi as a legitimate source of knowledge about the past.134 If the events and characters portrayed in mythoi were held consciously to be untrue or fictive, that would be depend upon the intervention of some special standard of truthfulness, in accordance with which their veracity was now disallowed. To
referring to the writer Theopompus in this passage, whose writing does in fact contain many mythical digressions; e.g., FGH 115 FF 74, 296; cf. Wardman 1960, 406-7; Walbank Comm. iii, 692. 132 He seems to have regarded Odysseus as a historical figure and went to great effort to defend the historicity of Homer’s depiction of the hero’s journey (xxxiv.2-4); cf. ii.41.4, 56.10; iv.39.6, 43.6, 59.5, cf. Walbank 1993, 15-6. 133 For ancient discussions and collected bibliography, see Walbank 1960, 225-28; cf. Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, 78-79. 134 E.g., Bickerman 1952; Veyne 1988, 67-78; Gabba 1981; Saïd 2007.
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put it another way, any formal conception of myth in the modern sense of the term, in which the contents are consciously regarded as untrue, relies upon the establishment of a complementary set of conditions regarding the parameters of historical knowledge, and is in some sense not intelligible otherwise. The appearance of such conditions is owed largely to the efforts of historical writers, like Polybius and many others before him, to formalize the distinction between historical writing properly understood and the range of spurious or non-historical ways of thinking about the past. It is primarily in the context of distinctions of this kind that pragmatikê historia is to be understood, and indeed the concept may be said to relate loosely to the myth-history divide. Yet we may clarify its function in this respect more precisely, in particular by specifying Polybius’ relationship to other efforts to clarify the historical domain. The unfavorable treatment of genealogies and ktiseis that we find in Polybius in fact forms part of longer tradition of rational critique going back to at least the fifth century. For Plato, for example, genealogies and ktiseis belong to the category of historical description known simply as érxaiolog€a (“accounts of ancient times”), which he uses to dismiss the two genres as simply
forms of entertainment—just as we find in Polybius incidentally (see pp. 76-79 above)—and in his respect, the notion of archaiologia apparently functions to create the boundary between the genealogical and colonial traditions and other, ideally more serious forms of historical research.135 Now the term does not quite possess this significance explicitly in Plato, but it is used this way later, in the first century, by the historian Diodorus of Sicily, who discusses archaiologia, including genealogies in particular, as an area of historical study impeded by serious evidentiary problems (iv.1-4; discussed further below). The term archaiologia thus reflects an epistemological problem essentially, denoting the influence of rational concerns upon popular ways of making sense of the
Hp. Ma. 285d, trans. Fowler, slightly modified: “[The Spartans] are very fond of hearing about the genealogies of heroes and men… and the foundations of cities in ancient times and, in short, archaiologia in general…” 135
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events known from mythoi. Among other historical writers, this problem is addressed as early as Herodotus, who refers on several occasions to the limits of historical knowledge by pointing out boundaries in the past beyond which secure knowledge is no longer possible.136 His understanding of this set of limits is often interpreted as denoting awareness of a special boundary between ‘historical time’ and a preceding period that is not reliably knowable.137 There are certain problems with this perspective as a distinctively temporal conception, but the basic point is clear: rational skepticism leads to a more concrete notion of the proper domain of history. Boundaries for this category are never fixed, but always change by context.138 For Diodorus of Sicily, mentioned above, the notion of historical time depends upon much more formal criteria. He considers attempts to describe the remote past as little more than “collections of ancient stories” (palaiåw µuyolog€aw: iv.1.1), an expression which even on its own conveys a sense of the operative factors in excluding historical material: remoteness in time and association with popular story-traditions.139 Diodorus does go on to clarify his concerns, however: writing about the distant past is made difficult by its basic “unknowability” (érxaiÒthw duseÊretow E.g., i.5.3 (trans. Rawlinson; emphasis mine), on the origins of the Persian-Phoenician conflict: “Whether this latter account be true, or whether the matter happened otherwise, I shall not discuss further. I shall proceed at once to point out the person who first within my own knowledge (o‰da aÈtÚw) inflicted injury on the Greeks, after which I shall go forward with my history.” Herodotus speaks of the Samian tyrant Polycrates in similar terms, whom he called “first of whom we have knowledge” (pr«tow t«n ≤µe›w ‡dµen), to establish control over the sea, or at least “the first of so-called human generation”, as he says (t∞w d¢ ényrvph€hw legoµ°nhw gene∞w... pr«tow), drawing a distinction with the legendary figure, Minos of Cnossus, who was held to have achieved a broad maritime empire as well (iii.122.2); cf. vii.21.2, on the unparalleled size of Xerxes’ army, “among those armies, for which he have knowledge (stÒlvn... t«n ≤µe›w ‡dµen). In the case of Polycrates in particular, moreover, we observe a tendency to conflate the latter category with that of myth; for discussion of this issue, see Williams 2002, 155-61; see Feeney 2007, 72-76, for recent discussion and bibliography. 137 E.g., Shimron 1973; Fornara 1981, 7-8; cf. sources cited by Feeney 2007, 242 n. 15. 138 Ephorus chose the return of the Heraclidae as the boundary between the knowable and unknowable, a point just a few generations after the Trojan War (FGH 70 T8=D.S. iv.1.3), though before him Thucydides saw precise knowledge no further back than just before the Peloponnesian War (i.1.3; cf. i.22.1). On variation in chronological boundaries, see n. 54 below. 139 iv.1-4; the same is conveyed by his numerous other references to accounts of the remote past: érxa›a µuyolog€a and érxaiÒtatai prãjeiw te ka‹ µuyolog€ai, in addition to érxaiolog€a. As with Herodotus’ concern for the remote past (see n. 48 above), there is a similar tendency to conflate the mythical and ancient within the same category. 136
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oÔsa), he says, as well as by the instability of dates and by the breadth and confusion of literary
sources (ibid.). These remarks are noteworthy because they reflect specific conditions for historical knowledge: datability and consistency in documentary sources. While Diodorus is surely expressing himself informally, the technical nature of these specifications is clear enough: he is referring, on the issue of dating at least, to formal chronological techniques such as Olympiadic dating systems, which he made use of himself.140 The emergence of scientific chronography represents a huge subject of course, and I do not intend to treat it here.141 I just wish to point out its impact for historical awareness. The institution permits clearer recognition of a genuine historical period by providing a technical basis—here, an explicit numerical system of chronological reckoning—for perceiving concrete relations among events as a system. The same is the case with the remote past, which is actually rendered intelligible by the same process—though it represents a purely negative phenomenon, i.e. the domain that cannot be accounted for by the system. At any rate, the point here is not necessarily the individual significance of Diodorus’ or Herodotus’ views of the remote past; nor is it the special impact of innovative chronological techniques for that matter. What matters is the basic mechanism of change. Changes in method entail change also in the categories giving meaning to historical speculation. In respect of chronology in particular, the emergence of formal notions of historical time will have meant significant change in the practical epistemology of historical knowledge, and ultimately new frames of understanding as well. Such changes do not necessarily signal
In addition to the Olympiadic system, Diodorus also made extensive use of local king lists; on the chronological features of Diodorus’ writing, see Clarke 2008, 122-139. On the development of the Olympiadic dating system, see Bickerman 1968, 75-6, and especially on the role of the third-century writer Timaeus, Jacoby FGH i, p. 382, 566, with Komm., 538; Jacoby 1949, 58; Brown 1958, 10; Walbank Comm. ii, 347-8; Asheri 1991/2; Feeney 2007 53, 84-5. Further on the emergence of scientific chronography, see n. 53 below. 141 Bibliography on the development of scientific chronography is immense. For a good introduction, see Pfeiffer 1968, 163-4, 255-57; Wachholder 1968; Fraser 1970; 1972 i, 456-67; Mosshammer 1979; Moatti 1997, 76-8; Shaw 2003, 19-46; Feeney 2007, 68-107. On pre-Hellenistic chronography, see Millar 1955 and 1965; Mitchel 1956; Möller 2001; 2004; Hedrick 2002. 140
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progressive development incidentally. There is in fact no assurance that chronological innovation, for example, actually brought historians closer to more accurate knowledge of the past. If anything, formal chronological organization placed new constraints upon historical speculation, providing form and structure where there had been none, or where they had been otherwise. Any number of factors will have been responsible for authorizing new interpretive techniques (e.g., perceived rigor and technical sophistication, consistency with other forms of rational conduct, and approval by an authoritative group). Arguments from probability too might considered technical advancements, for example, and were perhaps equally effective in extending the reach of historical understanding, but such techniques hardly brought historians closer to something like the objective truth about the past.142 At any rate, technical adjustments would simply represent reorientation in the possibilities of historical understanding, rather than progress in the strict sense.143 Pragmatikê historia represents an intervention of this kind. I will return below to the notion of progress. For the moment let us consider the function of this concept as a source of formal parameters for historical understanding. In principle, limits implied by pragmatikê historia correspond roughly with other efforts to rationalize the historical domain: the adjective pragmatikos bears connotations with a special ideal of truthfulness; it suggests a formal opposition with myth. Viewed from this perspective, pragmatikê historia is often taken to involve a special distinction in time; it is assumed that the expression refers
If anything, the advent of formal methods fostered greater dispute, as chronographers and historians hardly achieved consensus on their use; on error and variation on the use of dating systems, see Plut. Sol. 27.1. Even with the use more sophisticated technical frameworks, practical questions always remained; e.g., where historical time might be said to commence (the Trojan War? the first Olympiad? the founding of Rome?), what it actually demarcated (an unknowable past? a different mode of knowing the past?) and what cultural and social contingencies gave it meaning. On these matters, and especially the fundamental problem of whether categories of ‘mythical’ and ‘historical’ time actually reflected ancient perceptions, see Wachholder 1968; Mosshammer 1979, 84-100; Moatti 1997, 76-8; Feeney 2007, 68-107. 143 They might denote the latter, but this point is of little concern here, in which we are considering the significance in context of given forms of technical innovation, and in which there might be little discernible difference between spurious and genuine progress in the acquisition of knowledge. 142
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to strictly contemporary history, for instance, as opposed to accounts of the remote past.144 Certainly Polybius lays great emphasis on the novelty of his subject matter,145 and the chronological frames chosen for the Histories do in fact suggest a clear concern for boundaries. The main narrative commences with 220/19, the first year of the 140th Olympiad, extending only five decades back from the time Polybius began composition ca. 167.146 Moreover, this terminus is based explicitly on evidentiary concerns—the 140th Olympiad represents the earliest point for which eyewitness accounts were available (iv.2.3)—and in this case, Polybius does show concern for issues of historical epistemology. In addition, he justifies his starting point with the view that he work continues the accounts of his predecessor, Aratus, whose Memoirs covered Greek affairs down to 220.147 On the other hand, however, this hardly amounts a set of formal epistemological concerns; nor are these boundaries even consistently observed in the Histories.148 Moreover, the chronological frames for the work are actually based on the historical subject itself, integration of the oikoumenê under Roman conquest, which already suggested to Polybius the importance of the Pédech 1964, 27-32: e.g., “l’histoire moderne par opposition aux généalogies fabuleuses et à l’histoire des kt€seiw”; cf. Petzold 1969, 4-6 (e.g., “Zeitgeschichte”); Walbank 1972, 56 (e.g., “contemporary history”); cf. Mohm 1977, 17-22; Gelzer 1982 [1955], 277-80. In an extreme version of the view, it has been argued that pragmatikê historia denotes a specific historical period, say, spanning from the end of the sixth century, when intensive Greek colonization came to an end, to Polybius’ present time; see Meister 1990, 153-60; cf. 1975, 45 n. 173; cf. Mohm 1977, 22; refuted by Beister 1995. 145 ix.2.4: “I decided on writing pragmatikê historia… because there is always some novelty [in its content] which demands novel treatment (diå tÚ kainopoie›syai sunex«w ka‹ kain∞w §jhgÆsevw de›syai)”; cf. the similar sentiment expressed at iv.2.4, referring to the era covered by the Histories, though not related to specifically to pragmatikê historia: it was as if Fortune had made the entire world anew (kekainopoihk°nai). 146 i.3.2; iv.2.1; for the 53-year period: i.1.5-6 and other passages cited by Walbank Comm. i, 40. The 53year period of course only reflects the main narrative in the initial plan of the Histories (Books 3-29 essentially). It does not include the two-book introductory background to the work, the prokataskeÊh, which provides coverage of events going back to as early fourth century, when the Romans concluded a settlement with the Gauls (i.6.1-3). Also, Polybius later extended the Histories by 10 books to bring coverage down to 145 (iii.4.1-6). It is not certain that Polybius started writing only after 168, but the overall plan, excepting the ten-book extension, seems to been conceived about this time. For a summary of the issues, see Walbank 1972, 13-19; cf. id. 1977a, for the circumstances governing the extension of the Histories. 147 i.3.2; iv.2.1. This does explain, however, why the main narrative begins 220/19 for events outside Greece, and we therefore assume that chronological frames are based on a more schematic understanding of the historical subject. 148 The principle concerning the importance of eyewitness accounts is hardly observed consistently in the Histories, not even for the 53-year period of the narrative proper, for which Polybius doubtless lacked eyewitness accounts for some coverage. 144
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53-year scheme.149 It is thus difficult to see the plan of the work as based exclusively on epistemological concerns. In fact, such considerations play no substantial role in Polybius’ critique of genealogies and ktiseis—the latter he actually credits for accuracy, as I observed above.150 Thus, while the term pragmatikos denotes important limits for historical inquiry, it does not appear to rely on the standard concerns that preoccupy other historical writers.151 It is therefore necessary to construe its significance in some other way. I have already mentioned the superficial connotations of the term pragmatikos. While there is little reason to associate pragmatikê historia with the standard concerns for historical epistemology, the concept does involve formal concerns of another kind. As a resource for the politikos, pragmatikê historia is understood primarily as a source of practical instruction in the direction of political and military affairs. This means that in coverage of all affairs described in the Histories, the principle aim is with providing models that are of use for guiding similar activities in the present, such as for delivering political speeches or determining a strategy for battle. On the assumption that human affairs are essentially regular in their occurrence, and that regularities are more or less rationally discernible, the statesman is thus aided greatly by considering the reasons for success or failure for
i.3.3-4. For the theme of the Histories, see i.1.5; iii.1.4-9; vi.2.3; viii.2.3; xxxix.8.7. The convergence of the oikoumenê is frequently understood by Polybius in terms of the figurative suµplokÆ (“weaving together”), which denotes a process apparently taking place over the course of the 140th Olympiad as a whole, but reaching a climactic point in 217 in particular (iv.28.5). The significance of the latter date is tied to the conference of Naupactus, at which point Polybius says that the affairs of the oikoumenê were “first interwoven” (sun°pleje pr«ton: v.105.4), the affairs of Greece, Italy and Africa at least—he says that the inhabitants of Asia became involved “soon after” (tax°vw: 105.6), though it is unclear what this means. On these issues, see Pédech 1964, 506-7; Walbank 1972, 68-7; 1975; Sacks 1981, 116-21. 150 The closest comes to such a thing is his remark about the use of evidence from eyewitnesses, but, as mentioned, such evidence as used inconsistently in the Histories, and as I show below, in fact represents only part of what Polybius’ considered appropriate for pragmatikê historia. For the accuracy of ktiseis, see x.21.3-5, cited n. 69 below. 151 As we shall see, some kind of distinction in time seems to have been least incidentally related, and I will return to this in the final section of this chapter, but as a formal concept pragmatikê historia is not based upon chronology. The best discussion of this issue is Beister 1995, which fairly rejects the idea that Polybius formulated his conception of pragmatikê historia on the basis of conscious chronological divisions; cf. Walbank 1989/90, 45-7; 1993, 18-9; 2002, 7. 149
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similar situations in the past.152 The conceptual model for this perspective derives from the notion of t°xnh (“art”, “craft”) incidentally, which refers to formal systems of knowledge in the sciences aimed improving and regulating specific practical occupations.153 This rubric embraces a range of activities (e.g., medicine, carpentry, rhetoric), all framed by the view that essential regularities determine any given sphere of practical skills, and that these may thus be systematized to provide the guidelines for improving efficacy and achieving specific results (e.g., health, buildings, persuasion). From assimilation of this conceptual framework, knowledge of the past thus, at least in principle, provided the foundations for predictive assessments of urgent political situations. Now, I leave the details of this viewpoint until Chapter 4.154 What matters for the moment is how this technical approach creates special provisions for the scope of historical inquiry. Polybius’ notion of the usefulness of pragmatikê historia is not arbitrary; it aligns the Histories with the discourse on technê in the sciences. Indeed for Polybius, the benefit of history is associated specifically with knowledge of causal relationships, and it is described this way explicitly on several occasions.155 So when Polybius mentions the “extreme usefulness” (tÚ »fel≈taton: ix.2.5; cited p. 10 above) of pragmatikê historia, we are to understand a view of history formed mainly on the model of current conceptions of formal practical knowledge. This is not to say that pragmatikê historia denotes literally an interest in causation or didactic instruction; we ought to continue to understand the expression as a “history of pragmata”. Yet it is perhaps possible to grasp the special significance of the modifier pragmatikos beyond its literal meaning. I have mentioned the term’s affiliations with special practices distinguished by technical sophistication, analytical rigor, etc. In application, then, pragmatikos must parallel and reinforce claims concerning the Histories’ status as a E.g., vi.3.1-2, 4.11-13, ix.10-13, 57.1-13; ix.12.6-12; xii.25b.1-3, 25i.8; See pp. 204-5 below. A good discussion of this is Meissner 1986, 325-32, with citations; cf. Sacks 1981, 124-26, who discusses the technical aspect of Polybius’ writing more closely in association with military leadership. See also pp. 27-29 above. 154 See pp. 203-15 below. 155 iii.7.5-7, cited p. 204 below; cf. iii.31.1-2, xi.19a.1-3, xii.25b.2, xxxviii.4.5-8. 152 153
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source of practical knowledge, in which case the adjective denotes restrictions in content determined by the model of other technai, such as medicine.156 Boundaries denoted by the term pragmatikos thus correspond with conditions imposed on other domains of technical knowledge, that the contents are intelligible in terms of causes, possess some practical application, are teachable as such, etc.). In this case, while pragmatikê historia may indeed be distinguishable from genealogies and ktiseis on the basis of the knowability of its contents, more importantly, we see that limits are set by a specific set of requisites for the kind of contents included, i.e. that they relate to a specific practical occupations of political and military leadership. In fact, by this view, the genealogical
and colonial traditions are not necessarily
defective; they are
simply
inconsequential.157 It is this distinction that underlies the view of them as simply entertainment (e.g., ix.2.6). Of course, none of these associations are denoted literally by pragmata; the term refers simply to “affairs” or “events”. Yet it is difficult to see how Polybius regarded pragmata as a special category without taking into consideration the special interpretive framework governing his approach. Content and form are thus fundamentally inseparable in Polybius’ conception of pragmatikê historia. Surely this approach to history has many problems associated with it, especially the suggestion that something as unstable as human affairs may be understood in terms of causal
Polybius compares historical knowledge specifically to the medical technê at iii.7.5-7: “What use (ˆfelow) to the sick is a physician who is ignorant of the causes of certain conditions of the body? And of what use is a statesman who cannot reckon how, why, and whence each event has originated? The former will scarcely be likely to recommend proper treatment for the body and it will be impossible for the latter without such knowledge to deal properly with circumstances. Nothing, therefore, should be more carefully guarded against and more diligently sought out than the first causes of each event, since matters of the greatest moment often originate from trifles, and it is the initial impulses and conceptions in every matter which are most easily remedied.” 157 x.21.3-5: “It is indeed a strange thing that authors should narrate circumstantially the foundations of cities, telling us when, how, and by whom they were founded, and detailing the precise conditions and difficulties of the undertaking, while they pass over in silence the previous training and the objects of the men who directed the whole matter, and those for which there is eminent need to know. For inasmuch as it is more possible to emulate and to imitate living men than lifeless buildings, so much more important for the improvement of a reader is it to learn about the former.” 156
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regularities. Yet it is the principle itself that matters most here: by assimilating history to systems of practical knowledge Polybius is able to formulate more stringent provisions regarding the kinds of things that may be known about the past, and the ways in which they may be known. In this respect, the Histories may be aligned more closely with higher order practices in the sciences. This point is significant in part for the reasons I have been mentioning above, i.e. that Polybius differentiates his writing on the basis of a more formal or more concrete set of distinctions. Yet it is important to see also that the distinction itself is thoroughly hierarchical, in the sense that now the Histories may be associated more firmly with the dominant regime of practice in the sciences. This point is made explicitly in one passage already cited, in which Polybius describes “the extreme usefulness” (tÚ Ùfeliµ≈taton) of his writing in terms of contemporary practices in the arts and sciences (tåw §µpeir€aw ka‹ t°xnaw), which have advanced rapidly, he says, “that those who study history are, we may almost say, provided with a method (…w ín efi µeyodik«w) for dealing with any contingency that may arise” (ix.2.5). The same point is repeated in another passage, which also links practical benefit (again, tÚ Ùfeliµ≈taton) to current practices in the science, i.e. “theoretical techniques” (tå yevrƵata), as Polybius puts it, which have advanced to the point that they “are effectively reduced to a system” (µeyodikåw e‰nai tåw §pistƵaw: x.47.12, slightly modified). Together the passages refer to the contents of Books 9-10, which appear to have formed a unity devoted specifically to matters of military science.158 As such they employ an array of technical language (e.g., t°xnh, §pistƵh, µeyodikÒw et al.) aimed at establishing the kinds of affiliation I have been describing here,159 but the relevant point concerns the hierarchy suggested by this conception of intellectual activity. Pragmatikê historia is distinguished by associations with On the position of ix.2 and x.47 in the Histories, see Walbank Comm. ii, 8, 116, 261; on the contents of Books 9-10, see Sacks 1981, 125-32. 159 I discuss the theoretical affiliations in Polybius’ view of historical explanation as a source of technical knowledge in Chapter 4; in addition to pp. 27-29 above, see pp. 203-15 below. 158
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dominant practices in the sciences. The invocation of technical, or here “systematic” (µeyodikÒw), models of knowledge is meant to align the Histories with prevailing conceptions of the nature and scope of rational inquiry in Hellenistic Greece. On this view, pragmatikê historia would represent a form of expert inquiry, where ‘expert’ functions in its connotations with proprietary claims to knowledge, rather than its acquisition on objective grounds. Consequently, while the category pragmata may bear nominal associations with formal practices in the sciences, its main significance in Polybius really concerns their use and endorsement by a given, more authoritative stratum of intellectual culture. It is not the precise literal meaning of pragmatikos that matters, in other words, but rather its function in conferring legitimacy. A history of pragmata, then, is to be understood as a special resource shaped by the interests of a clear group of experts, those at the institutional center of the sciences, so to speak.160 Factuality or veracity matters little, moreover, and imply only the distinctions that matter in a given context in fact; what does matter is the set of cultural affiliations evoked by the category pragmata: “facts” as the special concern for higher order intellectual practices.161 To return to the issue from which we started, pragmatikê historia is thus a
While pragmatikos literally means no more than “concerning the facts”, by extension it must also bear associations of expertise, in the sense of “knowledgeable/experienced in political and military affairs” (when used of individuals) or “done from an expert point of view” (as an adverb, e.g, pragµatik«w). Apart from its use in the expression pragmatikê historia, the term frequently has this meaning in Polybius (e.g., iii.116.7, 118.12; xii.28.3; xxxii.2.7). Additional evidence comes from the Latin tradition, in which pragmatikos refers to juridical expertise, similar to peritus (“knowledgeable/experienced”) (Cic. de Or. i.198, 253; Quint. Inst. iii.6.59; xii .3.4); see Dubuisson 1999. 161 In reference to “facts”, the significance of pragmata must resemble certain technical usages in English, such as ‘hypothesis’ in formal academic discourse, which denotes more than a statement of potential veracity, but must indicate a special kind of proposition, reference to which invokes the activities of a certain expert group; or ‘deposition’ in formal legal contexts, which goes beyond the mere disclosure of information, but implies consideration by a special group. The same may be said of the many references to the subject matter of history of the Histories as prãjeiw (“actions”), which as a technical term also denotes higher order intellectual practices. In forensic and philosophical contexts, the terms related to the verb prãttein (“to do/act”) form the basis of attempts to achieve more objective description of conduct by analyzing actions independently of other external, largely subjective conditions, such as intent by the agent, or moral value (e.g., Pl. Euth. 38e6-8; Antiphon Tetr. 2.3; Arist. Rhet. i.9-10 1373b38-74a17; cf. Belfiore 1984, 121; Sorabji 2006, 279). The noun prçjiw possesses great significance of this kind in the philosophical system of Aristotle: e.g., NE 1094a5, 1114b30-15a3, 1132a9; Pol. 1269a12, 1325a32; Poet. passim. On the relationship between “writing praxeis” and the forensic and philosophical traditions, see Fornara 1983, 93-8; Mortley 1996, 38-42. 160
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history of subjects of limited interest—where ‘limited’ refers to the contents’ exclusive nature, rather than limitations more narrowly understood. In a broad view, pragmatikê historia in fact reflects a nuanced attempt to reconceive speculative interest in the past. I have mentioned the role of intellectual rivalry in motivating proprietary claims to knowledge, but it is clear that disciplinary boundaries are conceived here on the basis of more positive considerations as well. Whatever the ultimate merits of these considerations, it is important to see that in taking historia on the model of technê, Polybius is able to justify distinctions between pragmatikê historia and other forms of history more tangibly, partly from formal features imposed on the Histories, but also from an appeal to preferential views regarding the nature and scope of speculative practices more generally. Ultimately it is less important that this approach to history does not actually improve the merit of Polybius’ writing in a strict sense. As an issue of legitimacy properly speaking, pragmatikê historia simply locates new sources of authority for historical writing. However, even if the concept does not objectively aid historical understanding, it does have important implications for how the past is understood on this model. I come back to this point in the final section of this chapter. More to the point here, however, we see that boundaries implied by pragmatikê historia thus operate on an even more stringent principle of exclusion than appears in prior attempts to define the historical domain. In making more of the association with the sciences, in other words, Polybius actually makes less of many standards concerns for historical writers, and thus reconfigures the discipline on narrower terms. In the next section, I elaborate on this interpretation by examining Polybius’ observations on method, which appear in his well-known critique of the Sicilian writer, Timaeus of Tauromenium, in Book 12.162
162
On the structure and organization of the fragments of Book 12, see Pédech 1961; Schepens 1990.
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Knowledge and expertise in political history Polybius devotes a great deal of space to criticizing Timaeus, whose voluminous history of the western Mediterranean, also called the Histories,163 seems to have acquired great authority by the second century, especially at Rome where interest in Greek sources of knowledge was growing at this time. Roman literary preferences were surely a source of concern for Polybius, and his polemics against the Sicilian writer, well known for their extensiveness and ferocity, are surely motivated by intellectual rivalry over knowledge of the western Mediterranean, on which he presumably wished to regard himself as the authority.164 Even so, Polybius has more substantial reasons in addition. He criticizes Timaeus’ Histories for a range of problems, including factual error, rhetorical indulgence, excessive hostility toward other writers, and even deliberate deception, and in this sense, does seem to have been operating from a concern for method, even if this is not always made explicitly clear.165 In particular, he faults Timaeus for a lack of practical experience (§µpeir€a), a crucial prerequisite for writing political history. It is the notion of empeiria on which I would like to focus momentarily. Embracing not only political expertise, but also military experience and even geographical exploration, the concept empeiria is central to Polybius’ thinking about the
Histories is a regularly attested title (FF 1a, 5, 11a, 16, 17, 23, 26b, 28a, 32, 33, 153), though there are others (cf. T1; FF 43a, 83, 42a); cf. Jacoby FGH iiib, suppl. 1, 539; Brown 1958, 112 n. 55. 164 On Polybius’ criticism of Timaeus, see Walbank 1962; 1972, 48-55; Schepens 1974. Especially important is Momigliano 1977a [1956], who discusses Timaeus’ recognition of the importance of Rome and in turn the Romans’ reliance upon him for affairs of the West. Apart from Timaeus’ literary reputation at Rome, we should not leave out his political sympathies, and in particular his tendencies to aggrandize Timoleon and Syracusan politics (e.g., xii.25.5-9, 26b.1-c.4). 165 Most of Polybius’ remarks on methodology occur piecemeal in the forms of polemics against Timaeus and others. On polemical passages as a source for understanding Polybius’ methodological views, see Sacks 1981, 26 n. 10; Schepens 1990, 50 n. 39; Walbank 2002, 10; cf. Lehmann 1974; Meister 1975. On polemic in general in Polybius, in addition to sources cited in n. 77 above, see Sacks 1981, 66-78; Boncquet 1982-3; Verdin 1990a; Marincola 1997, 222-34. 163
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prerequisites for historical writing.166 It is therefore a serious shortcoming that Timaeus had such little experience in these areas himself. On the contrary, he seems to have based his writing for the most part on the study of documents—nearly 50 years in the libraries of Athens!—and he appears to have been well known for his talents in this area besides.167 Now in considering this, we should recognize that Polybius does not exclude written sources as a vital part of historical research, even in spite of what he says elsewhere about the unique value of living testimony (iv.2.3; see p. 26 above.). The collection and interpretation of written documents, or polupragµosÊnh (“industriousness” in the care of documents essentially) is included specifically among the three essential “parts” (µ°rh) of pragmatikê historia—the other two being political experience and geographical survey (xii.25e.1). Admittedly, polypragmosynê represents the least important component of this scheme—it is least constituted by direct experiences—but it is nonetheless recognized for its importance.168 Polybius even expresses admiration for Timaeus’ talents with written sources himself on certain occasions.169 However, while he does not disqualify library and archival research as a legitimate area of research, such materials were inadequate on their own. Polybius illustrates the point with an analogy with medicine: Timaeus’ methods are like those of the physician who relies only on theory and documentary research, when empirically-based
E.g., xii.28.6, a criticism of Timaeus: he “denied himself any active part in war and politics, or personal experience from travel and observation (tØn §nerghtikØn tØn per‹ tåw poleµikåw ka‹ politikåw prãjeiw ka‹ tØn §k t∞w plãnhw ka‹ y°aw aÈtopãyeian)”. 167 xii.25d.1; cf. 25h.1, perhaps a fragment from Timaeus’ Histories (=FGH 566 F34); see Walbank Comm. ii, 395. 168 See 25h.1-25i.2. On the distinction between polypragmosynê and empeiria, see Schepens 1975, 269-72. 169 Polybius even expresses admiration for Timaeus’ polypragmosynê on certain occasions: e.g., xii.7.1 (treatment of migrations and colonial foundations), 10.4, 11.1-2 (meticulousness in chronological research), 27a.3-4, 28a.3-4, the last with important manuscript readings discussed by Walbank Comm. ii, 411-12. The expression polypragmosynê also refers to examination of eye-witnesses, and Polybius criticizes Timaeus on this point as well, both for the reason that he traveled so little and was therefore often unable to question witnesses (27.1-7), and for the reason that a lack of practical experience hindered his ability to make sense of testimony he received (28a.8-10); cf. 25h.1-i.2, 27a.1-4, 28a.1-7. 166
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treatments are available.170 Whatever the merits of the analogy, the point about historical writing is clear: though polypragmosynê has some role, a lack of empeiria was irremediable.171 Polybius goes on to formulate this view as a general principle (25g.1-4): It is neither possible for a man with no experience (µhdeµ€an §µpeir€an) of warlike operations to write well about what happens in war, nor for one unversed in the practice and circumstances of politics to write well on that subject. So that as nothing written by mere students of books is written with experience (§µpe€rvw) or vividness, their works are of no practical utility to readers… and when they attempt to write in detail about cities and places the result must be very similar, many things worthy of mention being omitted and many things not worth speaking of being treated at great length. It should be clear from that Polybius considers the ideal historian to be the statesman, who, like himself, obtained practical knowledge from direct political participation, military leadership and extensive travel (cf. xii.28.1-6). The critique of Timaeus reveals a special notion of the conditions for historical knowledge. The validity of historical representation depends upon authorization by a specific group, the political leadership of Greek cities. Such claims here are not really empirically demonstrable, but depend rather upon the commonsensical, and essentially tautological, notion that the political expert is better suited to write history, where ‘history’ is already essentialized as a narrative of political affairs. The plainness of this viewpoint is perhaps its most important part, for it attests to deeper assumptions concerning the political domain as a primary source of historical
xii.25d.1-e.7, esp. 25e.4-7, slightly modified: “just like the theoretical doctors (ofl logiko€), after spending a long time in libraries and becoming deeply learned in memoirs and records, [writers like Timaeus] persuade themselves that they are adequately qualified for the task, seeming indeed to outsiders to contribute sufficient for historical inquiry, but, in my own opinion, contributing only a part… And to believe, as Timaeus did, that relying upon the mastery of material alone one can write well the history of subsequent events is absolutely foolish”. See Walbank Comm. ii, 388-89, for context and problems. 171 ÉEµpeir€a is the central term in the critique, but it is combined elsewhere with the rough equivalents aÈtourg€a and aÈtopãyeia: e.g., 25h.5-6 (pepol€teutai ka‹ peirçn) 27a.2-4 (tØn §µpeirikØn per‹ ßkasta dÊnaµin [contra Pédech 1964, 21; Walbank Comm. ii, 408]); 27.7-28.6 (implied, with autopatheia), 28a (autourgia). On empeiria, see Schepens 1970, 173-75; Sacks 1981, 50-59; in reference to Timaeus, it has a narrower significance than elsewhere in the Histories (e.g., ix.2.5: §µpeir€ai ka‹ t°xnai), on which see Meissner 1986, 317-24; and especially Beister 1995, 336-37 with nn. 170
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meaning. I will come back to the ramifications of this point in the next section. As for the basis of this view, we have already seen that Polybius’ situates generic distinctions in the historical discipline within a hierarchical order privileging the political domain. His understanding of the importance of political experience as an interpretive foundation for writing history coincides with the same valuative orientation. However, the point here is not simply that Polybius reconciles his views with prevailing beliefs regarding the importance of politics, but rather that he conceives of historical interpretation as the concern of an exclusive group. In other words, by specifying the vital role of empeiria, Polybius does more than state the obvious, i.e. that first-hand experience leaves the historian better able to produce a truthful historical account; he takes empeiria as preparation for a specific way of thinking about historical content. This would represent an even narrower view of the sources of authority for historical knowledge, a point which is perhaps clearer in respect of the concept of énãkrisiw (“examination”, “inquiry”), which Polybius introduces in connection with empeiria as a critical faculty for treating historical data. In general, anakrisis refers to both the task of collecting eyewitness accounts and the faculty of critical judgment in assessing them. It is linked closely with empeiria in the sense that only practical experience in political affairs affords the necessary preparation for selecting, conducting and interpreting interviews.172 Technically speaking, however, anakrisis also falls under the broader category of polypragmosynê, as it concerns the collection and interpretation of narrative accounts. In this respect, anakrisis forms a kind of bridge between the somewhat rigidly separated categories of practical experience and textual interpretation, and it allows Polybius to address the inevitable problem posed by a strict view of the importance of empeiria, namely how one might
xii.4c.3-5, 28a.7-10 (expressed with énakr€nein, cited n. 87 below); cf. 24.6, 27.3-6; for interpretation of anakrisis, see Pédech 1961, 68-69; Walbank Comm. ii, 329; Schepens 1975, 268-72; and especially the observations of Sacks 1981, 63-66, 203-9; cf. Mauersb