History of the Balkans, Volume 1: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

H I S T O R Y OF T H E B A L K A N S EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES VOLUME I

H I S T O R Y OF T H E BALKANS Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

VOLUME I

B A R B AR A J E L A V I C H

CAM BRIDGE U N IV E R S IT Y P R E S S

Published by the Press Syndicate o f the University o f Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trum pington Street, Cam bridge CB2 IRP 40 W est 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 10 Stam ford Road, Oakleigh, M elbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge U niversity Press 1983 First published 1983 Reprinted 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993 (tw ice), 1994, 1995 Full term copyright is claimed. T hereafter all portions o f this work covered by this copyright will be in the public domain. This work has developed under a contract with the U.S. Office of Education, Departm ent o f Health, Education, and W elfare. However, the content docs not necessarily reflect the position or policy o f that Agency, and no official endorsem ent of these m aterials should be inferred. Printed in the U nited States of Am erica Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication D ata is available ISBN 0-521-25249-0 (vol. 1) hardback ISBN 0-521-27458-3 (vol. 1) paperback

Contents

page v ii

List of maps and illustrations Prefate

ix

In tro d u c tio n

1

T h e lan d

1

T h e h isto ric a l b a c k g ro u n d

4

P A R T I. T H E E I G H T E E N T H C E N T U R Y

C h a p te r i. B a lk a n C h ristia n s u n d e r O tto m a n ru le

39

T h e O tto m a n sy ste m

39

T h e B a lk a n C h ristia n s

+8

T h e w a rs o f th e e ig h te e n th century'

62

B a lk a n p e o p le u n d e r O tto m a n ru le

72

T h e a u to n o m o u s re g io n s: D u b r o v n ik , M o ld a v ia , an d

98

W allach ia T h e O tto m a n E m p ir e : p o litic a l e v o lu tio n in the eig h te e n th ce n tu ry

113

C h a p te r 2. B a lk a n n a tio n a litie s u n d e r H a b s b u r g ru le P o litic a l a n d so cia l c o n d itio n s in th e e m p ire H a b s b u r g fo re ig n re la tio n s in th e e ig h te e n th ce n tu ry T h e re fo rm p e rio d : M a r ia T h e re s a an d Jo s e p h

II

127 129 133

134

T h e re fo rm s in p ra c tic e : th e B a lk a n n a tio n a litie s in the e ig h te e n th ce n tu ry T h e F re n c h R e v o lu t io n an d N a p o le o n C h a p te r 3. B a lk a n p e o p le u n d e r O tto m a n an d H a b s b u r g ru le: a c o m p a riso n

V

139

161

165

Contents PART II. THE REVO LUTIO N ARY YEARS, 18 0 4 - 18 8 7

Chapter 4. T he first national revolutions Balkan nationalism: the background o f the revolutions T he Serbian revolution T he revolution in the Danubian Principalities T he Greek revolution Conclusion: The achievements o f the first revolutions Chapter 5. The form ation o f the national governments Serbia from M ilos to M ilan M ontenegro Greece under K in g O thon The D anubian Principalities under Russian protection O ttom an reform : the Crim ean War The form ation o f the Rom anian state Conclusion: The Balkan national regimes

171 171 193

204 214 229 235

238 247 254

264 274 287 298

Chapter 6. The national issue in the H absburg Em pire The H absburg Em pire after 1815: the Hungarian problem C roatia and Slavonia: the Illyrian movement The H absburg M onarchy, 1848-1867 C roatia, Slavonia, and the Vojvodina, 1848-1868 Transylvania Conclusion: The H absburg Em pire in 1867

300 300 304 308

Chapter 7. War and revolution, 1856-1887 Balkan cooperation The Bulgarian national movement Bosnia and H ercegovina The crisis o f 1875-1878 Albania: the League o f Prizren Bulgarian unification, 1878-1887 The Eastern Q uestion, 1887-1897: a decade o f relative quiet

329

315

321 327

332 335

348 352

361 366 373

Conclusion. The national movements: a century o f accomplishment

377

Bibliography

381

Index

393

VI

Maps and illustrations

MAPS

I. R e lie f map o f the Balkans 2. Ancient Greece and the Balkans 3· T he Danube lands under Rom an rule 4 - The Byzantine Em pire 5- Bulgaria in the M iddle Ages 6. Serbia under the Nem anja dynasty 7 - Croatia in 1070 8. M edieval Bosnia 9 - M edieval Balkan empires io. The Ottoman Em pire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries II. O ttom an territorial losses, 1683-1815 12. M oldavia and Wallachia 13· The H absburg Em pire in 1780 14 · The H absburg M ilitary Frontier 15· Transylvania 16. The O ttom an Balkans, 1815 17- Europe in 1815 18. The Straits 19 - The expansion o f Serbia, 1804-1913 20. The expansion o f Greece, 1821-1919 21. The expansion o f M ontenegro, 1859-1913 22. The expansion o f Rom ania, 1861-1920 23 - Austria-H ungary, 1867-1918 2 4 · T he Treaty o f San Stefano; the Treaty o f Berlin 25. Bulgarian territorial changes, 1878-1918

ILLUSTRATIONS

Serpent from Tomis (Constanja), second or third century A .D .

page 2 5

8 14 17

20 24 26 28 33 63 99

136 145

151 184 187 190 194

215 253

288 314 359

367

Maps and Illustrations An O rthodox priest’s house on the Bosphorus M ap o f the Balkans by H erm an M oll, 1717 The A cropolis o f A thens w ith O ttom an cavalry Castle o f Parga Albanians at Janina Pass th ro u g h the Balkan M ountains, Bulgaria The transportation o f goods The tom b o f Ali Pasha in Janina Pass and waterfall in the Balkan M ountains Pass in the Balkan M ountains C onstantinople Entrance to the governm ent buildings, C onstantinople The Sulina C hannel, the m outh o f the D anube Village near Adrianople

VUl

51

67 74 79

82 96 183 218 230 233

276 280 289 336

Preface

c o n c e r n s the history o f the people o f five m o d ­ ern Balkan states - Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, R om ania, and Y u go ­ slavia — over approxim ately three centuries. A lth ough the Balkan peninsula has played a m ajor role in history, the area has been subject to less intensive study than any other European region. To the outside observer the Balkans often appear to be a puzzle o f confusing complexity. A geographic region inhabited by seven m ajor nationalities, speaking different languages, it has usually im pinged on the Western consciousness only when it has be­ com e the scene o f wars o r acts o f violence. L o n g characterized as the “ pow derkeg o f Europe,” the peninsula has indeed lived up to its reputation. T he C rim ean War, the m ajor European engagem ent in the century after 1815, had its origins here; the assassination o f Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 191+ was the immediate cause o f World War I. A fter 1944 the Balkan events were a major factor in initiating the C old War; the Greek civil w ar was the occasion o f the reorientation o f American foreign policy w ith the Truman D octrine. A lth ough it is certainly true that crises such as these have received thorough study, particularly in their w orld significance, much less attention has been paid to the study o f the area on its ow n terms. Western historians, hindered by language difficulties and limited access to archival materials, have only recently begun to examine in detail the many aspects o f the Balkan experi­ ence. Yet this area, because o f both its past contributions and its present im por­ tance, certainly deserves a larger place in m odern historical studies. Part o f form er ancient Greek, Rom an, Byzantine, O ttom an, and H ab sbu rg lands, and situated at the convergence o f E urope, A frica, and A sia, the peninsula has felt the w eight o f the convergence o f alternate imperial drives and com ­ peting ideologies. H ere at various historical periods m ajor political and cul­ tural borderlines have intersected —for instance, the boundaries between the Eastern (Byzantine) and Western Rom an empires, between Islam and C h ris­ tianity, between O rthodoxy and Catholicism , and today between the military blocs o f the N orth Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact, alignments repre­ senting conflicting social, political, and econom ic systems. Subject to rival external influences, as well as internal pressures, the area is in a very real sense

T

H IS n a r r a t i v e

Preface a testing ground for alternative systems. Thus in the past tw o centuries the Balkans have been a laboratory in which som e o f the m ore elusive aspects o f national and liberal form s o f political organization and econom ic develop­ m ent could be observed; at present the socialist regimes offer similar oppo r­ tunities for investigation. In addition, for both the N orth and the South Am erican reader, an examination o f Balkan history has the added appeal o f dealing w ith the national hom eland o f m i l l i o n s o f emigrants to the N ew World. This survey is designed to introduce the reader to the dramatic and fateful history o f the Balkan peninsula in the years from the Treaty o f K arlow itz (Srem ski K arlovci) o f 1699 to the beginning o f the 1980s. Th e aim is to pre­ sent a balanced picture, based on recent research and on the standard histo­ ries and m onographs, o f the developm ent o f this region in the m odern era. T h e m ajor theme w ill be the process by which the Balkan nationalities broke away from im perial control, both O ttom an and H absburg, established inde­ pendent national states, and then em barked on the even m ore arduous road to econom ic and social m odernization. T he Treaty o f K arlow itz, w hose terms were a m ajor perm anent setback to O ttom an control, is a convenient land­ mark at which to begin our story. T h e subsequent period witnessed the com ­ mencement o f the m ovem ents that were to lead the Balkan people away from the imperial, ecclesiastical organization o f the O ttom an governm ent tow ard the national, secular, state system. T h e national revolutions, as w e shall see, were carried through on an individual basis w ith com paratively litde co o p­ eration am ong the Balkan nationalities. Nevertheless, the activities o f the separate groups shared certain com m on characteristics. F o r instance, each national m ovem ent w as associated w ith a cultural revival that involved the formulation o f a literary language and a renewal o f interest in the pre-Ottoman history o f the people. Similarly, all o f the national leaders organized and car­ ried through arm ed insurrections, w hether successful o r not, and they shared a similar vision o f the political and econom ic goals for the future. T h e road to political transform ation was to be long. T he slow pace o f the w eakening and gradual withdraw al o f O ttom an control made the process m ore difficult. U n d er the absolute rule o f the sultan, internal national and religious rivalries had been m uted, and European influences w ere confined to the periphery o f the peninsula. With the increasing inability o f the O tto ­ man governm ent to defend its possessions, the Balkan lands became prizes coveted by other great powers. In the eighteenth century the Russian and H ab sbu rg empires com peted both w ith the O ttom an Em pire and against each other fo r predominance. In the nineteenth century the region m oved to the center o f the diplom atic stage; the Eastern Q uestion, involving all o f the E uropean great pow ers, became the m ajor continuous diplom atic issue until the com mencement o f World War I, a conflict w hose immediate origins were deeply rooted in Balkan problems. U nfortunately for the Balkan people, du r­ ing the period o f the national liberation movements their lands thus became

x

Preface the focus o f international attention. H ere the increasingly dynamic imperial drives o f Britain, France, and Russia crossed and conflicted. Later the newly united G erm any and Italy joined in the battle. B y the beginning o f the tw en­ tieth century the H absburg Em pire, like the O ttom an, was faced w ith rising national antagonism s w ithin its ow n boundaries. Nevertheless, this state too attempted to carry through a strong Balkan policy. A lth ough the peninsula declined in significance as a center o f diplom atic conflict between the tw o w orld wars, its importance as an object o f international rivalry revived after 1945, w ith an altered list o f combatants. L iv in g in a region o f international tension, the Balkan people naturally found themselves under constant pressure from abroad. U n w illing to accept the substitution o f the rule o f other powers for that o f the O ttom an Em pire, the Balkan national leaderships fought against any outside attempts at annex­ ation o r dom ination. A t the same time they were enorm ously attracted by the material and cultural achievements o f the European states. Thus, despite the fact that the national movements were directed tow ard w hat was in fact the revival o f pre-O ttom an political organizations, their leaderships accepted European political institutions and often justified their actions on the basis o f contem porary Western ideologies o f liberalism and nationalism. In the nineteenth century the great powers determ ined the form o f governm ent, the person o f the ruler, and the boundaries o f m ost o f the new Balkan national states. H ow ever, their decisions, often based on progressive political con­ cepts, in general reflected the convictions o f the m ajority o f the Balkan lead­ ers. In the twentieth century socialist and communist political programs, drawn both from the Soviet U n ion and from Western E urope, have attracted similar support am ong some groups. U n til O ttom an control was rem oved and the national governm ents were form ed, internal political issues and foreign policy received the principal at­ tention o f the Balkan leaders. T h e parallel process o f social and econom ic change w ent forw ard at a much slow er pace until after 1945, w hen it became a predom inant consideration in Balkan affairs. U ntil very recent times the bulk o f the population has consisted o f an im poverished and largely illiterate peasantry living under extremely backward conditions. A lth ough some o f its members rose to form the political leadership o f the national governm ents, the greater num ber witnessed the gradual erosion o f their econom ic and so­ cial position under the pressure o f the new conditions. D espite their preoc­ cupation w ith political and diplom atic issues, the Balkan leaders were well aware o f the implications o f their weak econom ies, particularly in questions involving general state interests such as national defense. A m ajor aim o f all the national governm ents was thus m odernization — including the develop­ m ent o f industry, the im provem ent o f agriculture, the introduction o f an advanced educational system, and the acquisition o f the traits and amenities that w ere so admired in Western European societies. In this effort, too, the ambivalent attitude tow ard foreign influences was clearly show n. A lthough

XI

Preface the Balkan states, lacking the necessary capital, resources, expertise, and ex­ perience, needed assistance, they feared foreign exploitation o r imperial dom ­ ination. T h e theme o f the conflicting attraction to and rejection o f foreign political, ideological, and econom ic influence has thus been a constant element in B al­ kan history. H ow ever, although Balkan societies, either w illingly o r under duress, have accepted much from the outside w orld, it must be em phasized that even where foreign institutions and ideas were adopted, they w ere subsequendy m olded and changed to fit national traditions and prejudices. C er­ tainly, the m ajor element in Balkan life is that draw n from the lo n g historical experience o f the people and their ow n unique reactions to the outside inter­ ferences to which the peninsula has been so vulnerable.

Th is w o rk was prepared as part o f a program organized in 1972 b y the Jo in t Com m ittee on Eastern E urope o f the Am erican C ouncil o f Learned Societies and the Social Science Research C ouncil to provide histories o f Eastern E u ­ rope. Professor Peter E Sugar o f the U niversity o f W ashington was the chair­ man o f the special com mittee that prepared the original proposal; Professor M ichael B . Petrovich o f the U niversity o f W isconsin became chairman o f the supervising com mittee and was responsible for the subsequent organization. Th is Balkan history has received generous funding from the Office o f E d u ­ cation, including grants that allowed the author the free time necessary to com plete the w riting and funds to assist in the preparation o f the volum es fo r publication. Dr. G ord on B. Turner, Vice-President o f A C L S until 1980, and his successor, Dr. Jason H . Parker, contributed valuable suggestions and assistance. T h e author is also greatly indebted to Julia A . Petrov o f the Office o f Education fo r her advice and support. A s stated in the original project, this book is designed as an introduction to Balkan history; it assumes no prior knowledge. M ajo r European events and political, philosophical, and econom ic theories necessary to the narrative are also covered. Because o f the complexity o f the developments being treated, some subjects are touched on in m ore than one section. T h is area has played a m ajor role in w orld affairs. C onsequendy attention is directed not only to internal Balkan events, but also to the great international conflicts in this period. T h e book thus covers both Balkan developm ents and the place o f the peninsula in history. Because o f the dual aspect o f the text, numerous maps have been included to help clarify both the internal problems and the crises caused by the in­ volvem ent o f the great pow ers in the region. T h e illustrations are designed to cover these and other aspects o f Balkan history. A lm ost all are prints pre­ pared in the first h alf o f the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth and nine­ teenth centuries the Balkans and the O ttom an E m pire in general attracted the interest not only o f statesmen and generals, but also o f writers, poets,

xii

Preface and artists, w h o w ere draw n to the area by the extreme beauty o f the land­ scape and by w hat was to them an exotic and romantic atmosphere. Th e peninsula itself was litde known; there were many misconceptions. A s is shown in the map prepared in the early eighteenth century by one o f the best British cartographers, H erm an M oll, until the m iddle o f the nineteenth century it w as generally believed that a lofty and almost impenetrable east—w est m oun­ tain range crossed the entire peninsula. T h e illustrations make particularly clear the im pression left upon the artists by the w ild and m ountainous nature o f the lands. T h e narrative has been divided into tw o volum es, which, with som e lim i­ tations, can be read separately. T he first commences w ith a general introduc­ tion on the m ajor historical events through the seventeenth century, but dis­ cusses in detail the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. H ere the themes o f the nature o f O ttom an and H absburg rule and the subsequent national m ovem ents have been emphasized. T he volum e concludes w ith the achieve­ ment o f G reek, M ontenegrin, Rom anian, and Serbian independence and Bulgarian autonom y and the organization o f their new governm ents. In in­ ternational relations Volum e I covers the events from the conclusion o f the Treaty o f K arlow itz in 1699 to the signing o f an agreement on the Balkans between Russia and the H absbu rg Em pire in 1897Volum e II concerns principally the events o f the twentieth century to 1980, although some background on the political developments in the previous decades is included. T he m ajor themes are the com pletion o f the territorial unification o f the m odern states; the great wars and their consequences; and, in particular, the measures taken to meet the enorm ous political, social, and econom ic problem s faced by these nations in the m odern w orld. T he diffi­ culties caused by constant outside great-pow er interference and dom ination, issues that w ere very im portant in the previous centuries, also carry over into the recent period. T h e m ultiplicity o f languages and the varieties o f spelling used over the past centuries provide certain difficulties for the historian o f the area. In this book the attempt has been made to adopt in the spelling o f personal names and geographic points the form that is m ost com m only used and that w ill be m ost familiar to the reader. Standard systems o f transliteration have been used for G reek and Bulgarian; Serbian w ords and names appear in their Latin spelling. Com plete consistency has not been possible. In addition, names o f rulers and O ttom an statesmen and many first names have been anglicized. D ating also provides some problem s, since the Balkan people used three separate calendars until after World War I. T he M uslim s dated events from the H egira in A .D . 622. T he O rthodox used the Julian, or O ld Style, calen­ dar, whereas the Catholics and Protestants adopted the G regorian, o r N ew Style. In the eighteenth century the Julian calendar ran eleven days behind the G regorian; in the nineteenth century this num ber increased to twelve; and in the twentieth century it reached thirteen. A ll dates in this book are in

xiii

Preface the N ew Style. Th e difference in dating produces difficulties principally when a particular day or m onth is associated w ith an event. F o r example, the A pril U p risin g o f 1876 in Bulgaria occurred in M ay under the N ew Style. W hen these complications arise, they are explained in the text.

For the most pairt the footnotes have been limited to identifications o f the sources o f quotations and o f some o f the statistical information. The capital­ ization and spelling o f quotations from old sources have been changed to conform to the style o f the text. The bibliography is designed to provide the reader with a list o f books on various aspects o f Balkan history. Books in languages other than English and all articles are excluded, although, o f course, these have been used extensively in the preparation o f the book. The author is greatly indebted to her friends and colleagues, specialists in the field, who kindly consented to read the manuscript. Their expert com­ ments and criticisms greatly assisted in the preparation o f the final version o f the book. All or a major section o f the work was read by Professors Richard V Burks, Wayne State University; Dimitrije Djordjevic, University o f Cali­ fornia, Santa Barbara; Rufus Fears, Indiana University; John V A. Fine, Jr., University o f Michigan; Keith Hitchins, University o f Illinois; Halil Inalcik, University o f Chicago; John R. Lampe, University o f Maryland; Thomas A. Meininger, York University; John A. Petropulos, Amherst College; Michael B. Petrovich, University o f Wisconsin; Dennison I. Rusinow, American Uni­ versities Field Staff; Traian Stoianovich, Rutgers University; and Peter F. Sugar, University o f Washington. In addition, this work is in fact the product o f the collaboration o f the author with her husband, Charles Jelavich, who contributed not only suggestions and criticisms, but also the results o f his own research. The author would like to thank Debbie Chase, who typed the final copy, and Janis Bolster, whose excellent editorial reading and valuable suggestions added much to the manuscript in its final stages o f preparation. She also compiled the index. The maps were prepared by William Jaber.

xiv

Introduction

THE LAND c o n c e r n s primarily the history o f the peoples o f the Balkan peninsula, an area o f land surrounded by the Black, Ae­ gean, Ionian, and Adriatic seas. Although the line o f the Danube, Sava, and Kupa rivers has often been given as designating the northern pe­ rimeter o f the region, this account will also be concerned with the fate o f lands across the Danube inhabited by Romanian, Croatian, Slovene, and Hungarian populations. From a geographic point o f view, the outstanding feature o f the area under study is its mountainous character; Balkan comes from the Turkish word for a chain o f wooded mountains. The great ranges dividing the peninsula and the Carpathians to the north had the effect o f separating the peoples from each other; there is no natural center for the region. In order to understand much o f subsequent Balkan history the reader should first study Map i, giving particular attention to both the mountains and the river systems. To the north, in the territory o f present-day Romania, the sweep o f the Carpathian Mountains dominates the landscape. To the south, Bulgaria is divided by the Balkan Mountains and separated from Greece by the Rhodope chain. Turning to the northwest, a Slovenian and Croatian population is found in the Karawanken and Julian Alps. Continuing southward, the Dinaric Alps form a formidable barrier between the Adriatic coast and the hinterland o f Bosnia and Hercegovina. Further south, the Pindus Mountains run the length o f Greece. The major river system o f the region is formed by the Danube and its tributaries: the Drava, the Tisza (Theiss), the Sava, the Morava, the Isker, the Sereth, and the Pruth. Throughout history the Danube has been the principal route in this area for military invasion, trade, and travel. This great river highway provided obstacles to communication only at the Iron Gates, a nar­ row section with rocks and swift currents. The other important rivers —the Vardar, the Struma, and the Maritsa —flow into the Aegean Sea. Because o f the mountainous nature o f the Adriatic coastline, the rivers emptying into that sea are not o f a character to foster waterborne trade or travel. The Ne-

O

u r n a r r a tiv e

I

M a p i. R e lie f m ap o f the Balkans

Introduction retva, the Drin, and the Shkumbi, nevertheless, played an important part in the development o f the adjacent lands. Dominated by mountains and hills, the region has relatively few areas o f rich agricultural land. The exceptions are the Danube River valley, including sections o f present-day Romania and two areas o f Yugoslavia - Slavonia and the Vojvodina. The Maritsa and Shkumbi river valleys are also valuable agri­ cultural areas. The mountains, with their extensive forests and pastures, o f course also provide support for the population. The mineral wealth was ex­ ploited in Roman times, but not as much as at the present time. Situated strategically at the crossroads o f Asia, Africa, and Europe, the Balkan peninsula has proved both a tempting object o f conquest and a pas­ sageway to other regions. Although the mountains contributed to particular­ ism and isolation among the Balkan people, they did not provide a shield against outside invasion. The entire peninsula is cut through by major corri­ dors, which run chiefly through the great river valleys and the mountain passes. Along these relatively few great routes, invading forces could easily enter, whether they were nomadic tribes with their ponies and herds or mod­ ern great powers with railroads, cars, trucks, and tanks. Two principal doorways opened the peninsula to outside penetration. The Danube River valley was historically the major route by which people from the Asian steppelands entered not only the Balkans, but also Central Europe. No natural barriers hindered passage from the lands north o f the Black Sea, along the Danube valley, into the Pannonian Plain. Invading tribes could also proceed southward and either cross the Balkan Mountains at one o f the con­ venient passes or follow the coasdine. The second roadway commenced at Belgrade at the confluence o f the Danube and the Sava and proceded down the Morava valley. At Nis two branches formed, one leading through the Vardar valley to Thessaloniki (Salonika), the great Aegean port, and the other crossing over the Dragoman Pass to Sofia, Plovdiv (Philippopolis), Adrianople (Edirne), and finally Constantinople (Istanbul), the most important city o f the Balkans. In Roman times another road, the Via Egnatia, was o f prin­ cipal significance. This major line o f communication ran from Durres (Durazzo) on the Adriatic coast through the Shkumbi valley, by Lake Ohrid, to Thessaloniki, and from there either by sea or through Thrace to Constanti­ nople. Other river valleys were also o f significance. The Bulgarian region near the present capital o f Sofia is linked with the Danube through the Isker River valley and with the Aegean by the Struma valley. The Neretva River connects the Adriatic seacoast with the Bosnian interior. The long coastline to the east and south, with its convenient harbors and river oudets, was also conducive to the establishment o f influence and control by outside powers; the islands o f the Aegean, Ionian, and Adriatic seas were similarly open to attack by sea. Venice, for example, was able to build up an impressive imperial presence in the area because o f its commercial and naval supremacy. In more recent times, Britain’s naval power enabled that state to

3

Introduction exert great influence in the area, in particular in Greece and the entire eastern Mediterranean.

THE HISTORICAL BA CK G R O UN D

Ancient civilizations: Greece and Rome Although this account commences formally with the last decade o f the sev­ enteenth century, a brief survey o f the previous period is necessary because o f the important role o f history in the development o f the Balkan national states, the main theme o f this book. As will be demonstrated later, at each stage o f the formation o f the modern governments the leaders repeatedly recalled the past to explain or justify their policies. No attempt will be made here to present a detailed account o f Balkan history since the Iron Age; the intention is only to discuss briefly those events and individuals that exerted a direct influence on the later period. The first inhabitants o f the peninsula about whom a body o f information is available are the Illyrians, who lived in the region generally west o f the Morava valley to the Adriatic, and the Thracians, who settled east o f the river in lands stretching from the Aegean to north o f the Danube. Both o f these peoples, with Iron Age civilizations, had tribal organizations. The Thracians established an organized state in the fifth century B.C. The Dacians, a branch o f the Thracians, were to become a basic element in the formation o f the Romanian nationality. The Illyrians were the ancestors o f the modern Alba­ nians. The major political and cultural achievements o f the ancient period did not, however, take place in the central Balkan region, but to the south in the Greek lands (see Map 2). The shores and islands o f the Aegean Sea were to be the site o f the first great European civilization, that o f the Greeks, who at this time called themselves Hellenes and their land Hellas. An advanced Bronze Age civilization developed in Greece in the period 16 0 0 -12 0 0 B.C. Such sites as Mycenae, Tiryns, Pylos, Athens, and Thebes were centers o f a palace-based society marked by a relatively complex economic and social organization, literacy, and a refined art and architecture heavily influenced by the nonHellenic civilization o f Minoan Crete. By 1450 B.C. Greeks from the main­ land had occupied Crete and Rhodes, and extensive commercial relations existed with the lands o f the Near East and Egypt. Records o f the Hittite kingdom have been interpreted to indicate the political presence o f Greeks on the mainland o f Asia Minor. For reasons that are not fully understood, the sophisticated civilization o f Bronze Age Greece collapsed in the period after 1200 B.C. The invasion o f new groups o f Hellenes, speaking the Doric dialect o f the Greek language, was accompanied by a marked decline in ma­ terial civilization on the Greek mainland and by the migration o f large num­ bers o f Greeks to the shores o f Asia Minor.

4

Introduction

Map 2. Ancient Greece and the Balkans

Greek civilization subsequently developed around the city-states o f the mainland, particularly in Attica, the Peloponnesus, and Ionia in western An­ atolia. Each was composed o f the city with its surrounding territory, the most important being Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth. Some, in par­ ticular Athens, developed extensive maritime empires. Each had the attri­ butes o f a sovereign state; they conducted foreign relations and waged war independendy. They were able to cooperate when threatened by the Persian attacks in the fifth century B.C., but they engaged in the suicidal Peloponne­ sian Wars, which were waged between Athens and Sparta, each supported by its allies. Despite their political divisions and their willingness to war with

5

Introduction

Serpent from Tomis (Constança), second or third century A.D. (From V. Canarache, A. Aricescu, V. Barbu, and A. Râdulescu, Tezaurul de Sculpturi de la Tomis. Bucharest: Editura §tiinpficâ, 1963.)

each other, the Greeks were conscious o f their cultural unity and shared a strong feeling o f superiority to the “ barbarian” outside world. The great cultural heritage o f classical Greece, which so deeply affected later Western European patterns o f thought, is based chiefly on the civiliza­ tion o f the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. in Athens. The architecture o f fifthcentury Athens has deeply influenced styles o f building, especially o f public offices, to the present. Greek literature —for instance, the plays o f Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes; the histories o f Herodotus and

6

Introduction T hucydides; and the philosophy o f Plato and Aristotle - was to become an integral part o f the education o f the leaders o f m odern Europe. M oreover, although G reek society was based on slavery, m ost states developed represen­ tative institutions involving the direct participation o f free male citizens in the political guidance o f the state. T he achievements o f this age w ere to re­ main a unique and brilliant m em ory for the G reek people and to play a m ajor role in their later national revival. F o r Balkan history in general, G reek colonization was m ost important. T h e Ionian Greeks o f A sia M inor, in particular, were extrem ely active in fo un d ing cities along the seacoasts o f the peninsula. Exam ples o f G reek settlement are Istros (H istria), Tomis (C onstanja), Callatis, O dessos (Varna), and M esem bria (N esebur) along the Black Sea coast and Trogurium (Trogir), E petion (near Split), and Issa (on the island o f Vis) on the A driatic. These cities, prim arily com m ercial centers, reproduced the architecture and modes o f life and thought o f the G reek parent, and accordingly they had consider­ able influence on the people living near them. T h e G reek settlers themselves, how ever, w ere content to remain on the periphery o f the peninsula. T h ey did not attempt to penetrate into the interior o r to make w ide territorial con­ quests. A lth ou gh united in language, religion, and culture, the city-states dis­ persed much o f their strength in constant internal quarreling and warfare. T h ey w ere thus not prepared to meet the challenge o f the strong m ilitary pow er that arose in M acedonia beginning w ith the reign o f Philip o f M acedon (359-336 B .C .). T h e M acedonians w ere probably Illyrian in ethnic back­ ground, although by this time the upper class was under the strong cultural influence o f Greece. Philip’s son, Alexander the G reat (336-323 B .C .) , perhaps the m ost fam ous conqueror o f the ancient w orld , extended his dom ains as far as India. W hen he died at a you ng age, his vast em pire fell apart. M ace­ donia remained an im portant state, but it could not dom inate even the pen­ insula. M eanw hile, another imperial pow er was rising in Italy. Rom an forces first m oved across the A driatic in the third century B .C . T h eir aim w as to suppress the pirates w h o were operating from the eastern coast o f the A driatic, w hich was subsequently to becom e the R om an province o f Dalm atia. H avin g de­ feated Carthage and having become master o f the western M editerranean (201 B .C .) , R o m e em barked upon a generation o f warfare and political activ­ ity in the eastern M editerranean. B y 167 B .C ., R om an hegem ony over the eastern M editerranean area was an accom plished fact. In the year 148 B .C ., after fo u r victorious wars (215—205, 20 0 -19 7, 171—167, 149—148 B .C .) , the R o ­ mans acquired the territory o f M acedonia and declared it a R o m an province. Tw o years later R om an armies defeated the forces o f the Achaean League o f Greek cities, destroyed the city o f C orinth, and annexed Greece. B y the end o f the reign o f A ugustus (27 B .C .—A .D . 14 ), m ost o f the peninsula south o f the D anube had been secured (see M ap 3). U nlike the G reek colonists, the

I Map 3. The Danube lands under Roman rule

Introduction Roman rulers were not content with scattered settlements. They occupied the entire region, and they governed it direcdy. Intensely concerned with problems o f administration and defense, they established a network o f mili­ tary camps and roads. Roman settlements came into being along the great natural highways. Modern Belgrade (Singidunum), Edirne (Hadrianopolis, Adrianople), Nis (Naissus), and Sofia (Serdica), among other cities, were important centers in this period. The Roman cities, like the Greek, resembled their counterparts in the homeland, with temples, forums, baths, and ad­ vanced water and sewage systems. Roman influence was to be profound. Participation in the economic life o f a vast empire brought obvious advantages. Agricultural production rose; the gold, silver, iron, and lead mines were exploited. Illyrium, the western section, in particular, enjoyed a period o f real prosperity. During the centu­ ries o f Roman rule the population became largely Romanized. Some joined the army and the administration; Roman patterns o f life, including the lan­ guage, were accepted. Men born in the Balkans, for instance, the emperors Claudius, Aurelian, Probus, Diocletian, and Maximian, rose to high posts in the state. The entire region also enjoyed the advantages o f the Pax Romana; for a long period the population was spared from major outside invasions or disastrous wars. Defense, nevertheless, was a constant imperial problem. In general, Rome attempted to hold the line o f the Danube, but there were some exceptions. Among the barbarian tribes threatening the Roman outposts, a particular danger came from the Dacians. Their king, Burebista (ca. 7 0 - 4 4 B.C.), suc­ ceeded in uniting a number o f tribes, and he erected a stronghold at Sarmizegetusa in the Carpathian Mountains. Successful expeditions had been sent previously against the Dacians, but in A.D. 101 Trajan (98-117) determined to crush the independent kingdom. In A.D. 106 the Dacians, under their king Decebalus (87-106), were defeated, and their lands were brought directly under imperial rule. For the next 165 years the region was administered by Rome. Soldiers, administrators, and colonists were brought from all over the empire, many o f them from other Balkan regions. The native Dacians were also Romanized. This outpost o f empire, however, was difficult to defend. In order to shorten the lines o f the Roman frontier, Emperor A urelian (270 275) in 270 ordered the evacuation o f the province. The Roman soldiers and administrators, together with part o f the population, were then moved across the Danube. What happened to the rest o f the inhabitants during the subse­ quent turbulent centuries was to become a matter o f controversy. From this time the Roman Empire faced increasing difficulties in holding its frontiers and preventing the massive incursion o f outside tribes. For the Italian peninsula the chief danger came from the Germanic invaders, partic­ ularly the Goths. The Balkan lands suffered a millennium o f devastation at the hands o f succeeding waves o f invading tribes. The Goths o f the third, fourth, and fifth centuries and the Huns, also o f the fourth and fifth centu-

9

Introduction ries, w ere follow ed by the A vars, Slavs, and Bulgars in the sixth and seventh centuries, the M agyars, o r H ungarians, in the ninth and tenth, the Pechenegs in the tenth and eleventh, the Cum ans in the twelfth and thirteenth, and the M on gols in the thirteenth. M ost o f these people had been displaced from their original hom elands by stronger tribes; others were attracted by the relative wealth o f the R o m an lands. In general, they m oved w ith their flocks and families, fo llo w in g the grasslands that w ere necessary fo r the subsistence o f their horses and live­ stock. T h ey thus kept to the great highw ays that have already been described. M ovem ent was necessarily slow ; invasion and occupation could last decades. Som e o f the tribes, such as the H uns and M on gols, came as raiders; they conquered and looted large areas and then passed on. In contrast, the Slavs, M agyars, and Bulgars remained to settle the land. T h ey either conquered and absorbed the resident population o r lost their individual identities and amal­ gam ated w ith the local society. These invasions naturally caused a basic alter­ ation in the ethnic com position o f the Balkan people. M eanw hile, enorm ous changes had taken place in the organization and the influence o f the R om an Em pire.

Byzantium U n d er increasing pressure from the outside, and facing com plex internal problem s, the R om an governm ent had to meet the issue o f h ow best to ad­ minister its w ide dom ains in a time o f adversity. A lth ou gh m aintaining the theory o f a united em pire, D iocletian (284-305) was forced to create four administrative units. U n d er Constantine (306-337), a single em peror ruled direcdy over the entire dom ain, but the administrative separation was re­ stored after his death. In 395 a final division was made. T h e line, w hich was to be o f enorm ous historical significance, ran from the A driatic coast, along the D rin a R iver, and then to the Sava and the Danube. In the future the boundary between the Catholic and O rthodox churches and the western and eastern cultural zones was to be approxim ately this frontier. A language line was in existence, too. D espite the fact that they were the conquering power, the Rom ans had a deep respect fo r G reek civilization; they cultivated and preserved G reek art and learning. T h e R om an Em pire was officially bilingual, and Greek as well as Latin was a language o f imperial administration and the law courts. G reek was also the ch ief spoken language in the lands approxim ately south o f N is in the peninsula and, o f course, in all o f the areas o f G reek settlement in the islands and A sia M inor. T h e use o f G reek as the language o f the N ew Testament is an indication o f its im por­ tance as a m ajor lingua franca throughout the vast extent o f the R o m an E m ­ pire. F o r Balkan history the developm ent o f the Eastern R o m an E m pire was

10

Introduction decisive. Its center was to be at the site o f the form er G reek city o f B yzan ­ tium, w hose name was to becom e that o f the state itself. H ere in 330 C o n ­ stantine founded the city o f Constantinople, which w as to be the capital o f the Byzantine E m pire and to carry on the traditions o f R o m e for over a thousand years. Situated strategically at the crossroads between A sia and E u ­ rope, it lay at the junction o f the great trade routes running from north to south and east to west. T h e best natural harbor anywhere in the Balkans and M editerranean area, the city, surrounded on three sides by water, could be easily defended. D espite repeated attempts at conquest, it was captured only twice, in 1204 and 1453. T h e ethnic com position o f the em pire was com plex. In 212 E m peror Caracalla (211-217) granted R o m an citizenship to all freem en; the term Roman thus no longer represented a geographic o r national designation. T h e citizens o f B yzantium called themselves R om ans, even i f they w ere o f G reek o r an­ other background. M oreover, the principal language was Greek. A fter the division o f the entire em pire in 395, the position o f this language became naturally stronger, since the proportion o f G reek speakers to others was in ­ creased. Nevertheless, although G reek was the prim ary language o f govern ­ ment, com m erce, and the church, the Byzantine citizens did n ot regard them ­ selves as G reek in nationality in the m odern sense o f the w ord . It should be noted also that in this period mainland Greece, the center o f the classical civilization, receded drastically in im portance; the area became a provincial backwater. G reek life w as centered in the Byzantine capital. A lth ou gh the basis o f the Byzantine governm ent remained the R om an legal and political system, changes in the position o f the ruler, influenced by conditions in the neighboring eastern courts, were to be o f great significance. A n authority has described the em peror as transform ed into an O riental, divine, absolute monarch. D iocletian’s arrangements com pleted the transform ation. “ Proskynesis” o r “ adoratio” (the eastern cerem ony o f genuflection addressed to divin­ ity), purple robes, jew elled diadems, belts, and sceptres became per­ m anent parts o f the imperial tradition. T he em peror, ruler by divine grace, w as the sole fount o f law. Seclusion o f the m onarch, an O ri­ ental practice by w hich the person o f the ruler w as rem oved from contact w ith the profane, was carefully balanced by the splendid o f­ ficial cerem onials, at w hich his pow er and glory w ere displayed to the citizens and courtiers.1 T h is autocratic m onarch presided over a large bureaucratic governm ent, w hose efficiency and success varied through the centuries. Like every great 1

Speros V y ro n is, Jr., Byzantium and Europe (N ew York: H a rc o u rt, Brace & W orld, 1967), p p . 1S - 19.

II

Introduction em pire, Byzantium was beset by constant rivalries between political factions and problem s concerning succession to the throne. M oreover, the church and doctrinal disputes played a m ajor and often disturbing part in state life. A fter the division o f the em pire, Constantinople became the center fo r the Eastern Christian, or O rthodox, church. T he conversion o f the em peror Constantine began the process by which Christianity became the official re­ ligion o f the R om an Em pire. Constantine’s sons prohibited sacrifice to the pagan go d s; and in 392 the em peror Theodosius (379-395) forbade pagan w orship under penalties o f treason and sacrilege. Earlier, in 380, Theodosius had decreed that all his subjects m ust accept the Christian faith as form ulated at the C ouncil o f Nicaea in 325. Th e language o f the Byzantine church was Greek, whereas that o f the Rom an remained Latin. M ost o f the Balkan people, the Serbs, Rom anians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, w ere to be influenced pri­ m arily by the ecclesiastical developm ents in Constantinople. Th e Russians w ere also to be converted from Byzantium and to becom e part o f the O rth o ­ dox w orld. A lth ou gh the Constantinople hierarchy at first recognized the prim acy o f R o m e, unity proved im possible to maintain. In 1054 the final break occurred, a division that was never to be healed. In doctrine and cere­ m ony the tw o organizations became increasingly separated. M ost im portant, the relationship between church and state was m arkedly different in E ast and West. In the O rthodox system the churches in general supported the pow er and authority o f the secular ruler; they did not directly challenge the state’s influence. Th u s the political and religious leadership tended to w ork together against com m on internal and external enemies. M oreover, the Eastern church did not develop a predominant central institution such as the Papacy in Rom e. T h e Patriarchate o f Constantinople had great prestige and influence, but the national patriarchates o r archbishoprics that were eventually established in the Balkan states and Russia exerted the prime influence over their members. A s the Italian peninsula was overwhelm ed by barbarian invaders and R o ­ m an authority in the West was broken, Byzantium became heir to the R om an imperial idea. L ike the Greeks and Rom ans before them, the Byzantine lead­ ers regarded their state as the forem ost civilization o f the time and the legit­ imate ruler o f the w orld. T he idea o f universal em pire was shared by the Byzantine enemies. A s w e shall see, Balkan Christian and M uslim rulers alike attempted to occupy the imperial city and to claim for themselves the prestige and position o f the Byzantine emperor. T h e idea o f a single legitim ate secular authority and one universal church was extremely beguiling. T he O rthodox view s also gave support to this conception. A s one historian has written: T h e essence o f O rthodox belief was that w ith the confluence at C o n ­ stantinople o f R om an and Christian theories o f terrestrial and celes­ tial em pire, the w orld had achieved its final order, o f which the E m ­ peror was the sym bol. N o t only were O rthodox Christians superior

12

Introduction to the rest o f m ankind; not only was all future im provem ent o r in­ novation im possible; but also error was unthinkable.2 A t its height Byzantium was the m ost pow erful em pire in the Western w orld (see M ap 4-)· Its wealth was based on trade and the prosperity o f its lands. Its m ilitary com m anders adopted the m ost advanced m ethods o f w ar­ fare, and they had the best w eapons. The bureaucracy carried ou t its respon­ sibilities well. In foreign affairs the state follow ed a system that made “ B yzan ­ tine diplom acy” proverbial for shrewd, clever, and not to o scrupulous negotiation. M ost im portant, the em pire’s high level o f civilization provided patterns fo r governm ent and culture for the Balkan O rthodox states and for Russia. Balkan rulers wished to be Byzantine autocrats. They copied the court cerem onial, and they used Byzantine architectural styles fo r their buildings and churches. M edieval Balkan civilization was thus in essence Byzantine. D espite the em pire’s great achievements, its long history w as marked by m any fluctuations o f fortune. O ne o f the m ost notable em perors, Justinian (527—565), attempted to restore the em pire after the devastation o f the bar­ barian invasions o f the fourth and fifth centuries. F o r the future his reign was o f significance fo r his administrative reform s and his codification o f the laws. H e also em barked on an ambitious building program in C onstantinople, o f which the great achievement was the construction o f H agia Sophia, the church o f the H o ly W isdom (called Sancta Sophia or St. Sophia in m ost Western w ritin g); it was to becom e the very sym bol o f O rthodox Christianity. Ju stin ­ ian w as not, how ever, able to find solutions to the great problem s that had previously beset the R o m an Em pire. Byzantium had great difficulty in de­ fending and adm inistering its w ide territories, w hich were once again faced with attack in both the Balkan peninsula and A sia M inor.

In the sixth and seventh centuries the chief danger came from the advance of the Persians and Arabs in Asia and the Avars and Slavs in Europe. The Persian threat was ended by a military victory in 627. Also in the seventh century, the empire simultaneously faced its first challenge from a Muslim people, the Arabs, and attacks from the Avars and Slavs to the north. This century proved to be a difficult period for Byzantium: Enemies pressed for­ ward on all sides. The Arabian invaders were eventually defeated, but the Slavic presence in the Balkans was permanently established. The Slavs: the Bulgarian and Serbian states

The Slavic invasion In the sixth and seventh centuries the Slavs, an IndoEuropean people, crossed the Danube frontier and occupied most of the 2.

C . M . W o o d h o u se, The Story o fModem Greece (L o n d o n : F aber & F aber, 1968), p. 30.

13

Map 4· The Byzantine Empire

Introduction Balkan peninsula. A t first they were closely associated w ith the Avars, w h o apparently held the dom inant position in the relationship. T h e Slavs m oved forw ard in small groups under their ow n leaders; there was no central o rga­ nization, although unions were form ed am ong the tribes. U nlike m any o f the previous invaders, the Slavs settled the land, which they occupied as peasant farmers. T h e basis was thus laid at this time for the future Bulgarian, C ro a­ tian, Serbian, and Slovenian medieval states. C om paratively little is know n about the early history o f the Slavic societies; the fate o f the indigenous population is also controversial. It is necessary here to deal w ith events for w hich there are no written records, so that archeolog­ ical o r anthropological evidence or that gained from the study o f language must be used. It is apparent that the Slavic tribes m oved th roughout the peninsula and penetrated as far south as the Peloponnesus and even the island o f Crete. In m any areas the original population was forced to retreat to the remote hills and m ountains. In the m ountainous areas o f Greece and Albania a people, know n variously as Vlachs, Arum anians, Kutsovlachs, o r Tsintsars, have remained until the present. T h ey speak a language related to Latin and close to m odern Rom anian. In the lands o f present-day Greece, A lbania, and Romania, the local population absorbed the Slavic setders, w ho came to speak the language o f the region. Slavic-speaking people w ere to settle perm a­ nently, how ever, in a w ide band o f territory stretching from the A driatic to the Black Sea. A lth ough the Slavs and Avars reached the gates o f Constantinople, they were not able to take the city. A fter the disasters o f the seventh century the Byzantine state recovered and regained some o f the lost territory. It n o w also had to deal w ith the strong Bulgarian pow er that had been established on the northern border.

Bulgaria T h e principal threat to Byzantium from the Balkans was to come in the future from the Bulgarians. T h eir name was derived from that o f the original B ulgars, a Turanian people w h o had once inhabited an area between the Sea o f A zov and Kuban. Defeated by the Khazars, the Bulgars were forced to m ove. A section under the leadership o f Asparukh m igrated to an area near the m outh o f the D anube. A fter suffering a defeat, the Byzantine g o v ­ ernment recognized this group as an independent pow er in 681, and Pliska became the capital o f the first Bulgarian state. U n d er K han K ru m (803—814) and later, the territory was considerably expanded. Th e Bulgars had taken possession o f land inhabited by Slavs, w h o considerably outnum bered the conquerors. A t first, the tw o people lived together; the prince and the nobil­ ity w ere Bulgar. B oth w ere pagan and worshiped their ow n gods. A process ° f assim ilation was accom plished in the ninth century; all o f the population became Slavic-speaking and Christian. C hristianity was accepted in 865 by the ruler B oris (852—889). A lth ough he at first briefly recognized the jurisdiction o f R om e fo r political reasons, he

15

Introduction subsequently changed the affiliation. The Bulgarian church thus became as­ sociated with the Patriarchate at Constantinople and the Orthodox world, but it kept its own ecclesiastical organization. Because of the favorable atti­ tude it adopted toward Christian scholarship, Bulgaria became in fact the first major center o f Slavic culture. At this time the Byzantine Empire dis­ patched the two brothers Cyril and Methodius to the Greater Moravian Kingdom in Central Europe to try to combat the activities of missionaries representing Rome. The brothers had devised a Slavic script, called Glago­ litic, and they and their assistants undertook the translation of religious works from Greek into Slavic, using the language spoken near their home in Thes­ saloniki. Their efforts in Moravia failed; the brothers died. Their disciples, forced to leave Moravia, were welcomed in Bulgaria in 885. Establishing their center in Preslav, which in 893 became the new capital, they continued their task of translating and copying religious texts. Old Bulgarian, or Church Slavic, became the language o f the Slavic Orthodox churches and Slavic scholarship for the next centuries. The original Glagolitic alphabet was mod­ ified to resemble the Greek more closely, and the subsequent Cyrillic alphabet was adopted by the Orthodox Slavs - the Bulgarians, the Serbs, and the Russians. The First Bulgarian Empire reached its height in the reign of Simeon (893927), the second son of Boris. The attraction of Byzantium and Constanti­ nople remained strong for the Bulgarian rulers. Krum had died trying to take the imperial city, and Simeon’s prime objective became the capture of the capital and with it the claim to supremacy in the universal empire o f the Christian world. In 925, after repeated failures to take the city, he proclaimed himself emperor o f the Romans and Bulgars. He also raised the Bulgarian ecclesiastical center at Preslav from an archbishopric to a patriarchate in order to give its head the same title as that held by the Constantinople church leader. The great extent of the Bulgarian lands under Simeon can best be appreciated by examining Map 5. Bulgaria had become the strongest Balkan power. These conquests had, however, strained the resources o f the country. In addition, the Bulgarian rulers faced internal problems. Some nobles chal­ lenged the central authority, and a period of religious controversy also en­ sued. The problem of heresy had always been a major issue for both the Eastern and the Western churches. The Bogomil heresy, which originated in Bulgaria, was to be particularly important. The Bogomils were dualists; they believed that man’s soul represented the principle of good, whereas the body and the material world were evil. Neither respecting the rituals nor accepting the sacraments, they leveled strong attacks on the established church. They rejected such religious symbols as the cross, the relics o f the saints, and the ikons. Their doctrines were a challenge to both the political and the religious authorities. At the same time, external threats to the state increased. The major Bul-

16

Introduction

garian opponent remained Byzantium, but the new invaders, the Hungarians and the Pechenegs, had to be dealt with. Moreover, the Byzantine Empire was in a period o f revival, and the Russians were taking an active part in Balkan events. In 969 the Russian ruler Sviatoslav (964—972) captured Preslav and took the Bulgarian emperor, Boris II (969-972), prisoner. In answer, the Byzantine emperor, John Tzimisces (969—976), sent an army to force the Russians out o f Bulgaria. After a military victory, Byzantium took these Bul­ garian lands. A center o f resistance, however, remained in the southwest. H ere Sam uel (991—10 14 ), the son o f a district governor, organized a new governm ent w ith !ts center at O hrid, and the struggle w ith Byzantium continued. A lthough the Bulgarian forces w on some victories, the Byzantine emperor Basil II (963—

17

Introduction 1025), who was also known as the “Bulgar Killer,” was in the end triumphant. In 10 14 , after a major victory, he took fourteen thousand Bulgarian prisoners. He then had them blinded, leaving one man in every hundred with one eye so that he could lead the defeated army back to its homeland. Samuel died at the sight of this atrocity. In 1018 the Byzantine army took Ohrid, and the region passed into Byzantine possession; there it would remain for a century and a half. Byzantium was now in its strongest position since the Slavic in­ vasions; it was, in fact, the greatest single power in existence at the time. T h e Byzantine E m pire could not, however, maintain its predominance. W ithin fifty years o f Basil’s death the state was again reduced in territory. Internal conflicts weakened the governm ent, and new enemies, in particular the Seljuk Turks and the H ungarians, threatened the borders. T h is situation allowed a Bulgarian revival. In 1186 tw o Bulgarian notables, Peter and Ivan A sen, organized a successful revolt. T h eir action marks the beginning o f the Second Bulgarian Em pire, w hose capital was established at T u rn ovo. B u l­ garian lands were considerably expanded under K aloian (119 7-1207), at a time w hen the Byzantine E m pire was in a desperate position. In 1204 C o n ­ stantinople was taken by the adventurers o f the Fourth Crusade, w h o divided those Byzantine possessions they conquered into small kingdom s fo r them­ selves.

As in the preceding period, the Bulgarian rulers, despite their military vic­ tories, had difficulty in controlling their nobles. Kaloian was possibly assas­ sinated by one of his own commanders. The revived empire reached its height in the reign o f John Asen II (1218 -124 1); once again the major Balkan power, the Bulgarian state held a wide block o f territory. The situation was not, however, stable. In succeeding reigns the kingdom fell apart; competing nobles controlled the regions that remained in Bulgarian hands. The strongest state in the Balkans was to become Serbia, which took possession of Macedonian lands that had formerly been part of the Bulgarian and Byzantine empires.

Serbia T h e Serbs, a Slavic people, arrived in the Balkans in the seventh cen­ tury. T h ey w ere converted to Christianity in the second h alf o f the ninth century and were subsequently to be Orthodox. From the eighth to the twelfth centuries the majority lived in lands under Bulgarian or Byzantine rule. When, after 1018, the Byzantine Em pire destroyed Bulgarian independence, the Ser­ bian leaders w ere in a better position. Tw o states w ere eventually organized: Zeta, in the m ountainous area that later became the site o f M ontenegro, and subsequently RaSka, to the east.

The rise of the Serbian kingdom is closely associated with the Nemanja dynasty. The first in this line, Stephen Nemanja I (ca. 1168 -119 6 ), became ruler, or grand zupan, o f Raska; his descendants were to hold power for two centuries. Stephen was able to obtain control of Zeta and to expand the Serbian territory to the Adriatic. His son, Stephen II (1196—1227), called the “first-crowned,” assumed the title o f king. At the same time a separate Ser­

18

Introduction bian archbishopric was established at Zifa under the authority of the young­ est son o f Stephen I, Sava, who was a monk. Serbia had become a kingdom with an autonomous Orthodox church. The conquests o f the Second Bulgarian Empire were naturally to the det­ riment o f Serbian interests. The state also had to deal with Hungarian ad­ vances to the north. The subsequent decline of both Bulgarian and Byzantine power, however, created the opportunity for Serbian expansion. Gains of territory were made in the reigns ofM iliutin (1282-1321) and Stephen Deianski (1321—1331), but the height o f the medieval state was reached under Ste­ phen Dusan (1331-1355). With aims o f conquest similar to those of the Bul­ garian emperors, this ambitious ruler concentrated on the acquisition of lands to the south. His control was to extend over Albanian lands, Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly, as well as the Serbian territory, which extended to the Adriatic (see Map 6). In 1346 he had himself crowned emperor o f the Serbs and Greeks, and later he added the Bulgars and Albanians to the title. Also in 1346 he raised the Archbishopric of Pec to a Patriarchate. The Serbian political center, too, had shifted southward - from RaS, to Pristina, to Prizren, and finally to Skopje (Skoplje, Uskiib). Under Dusan’s rule Serbia was the major power in the Balkans, with territory extending from the Adriatic to the Aegean. Although DuSan was able to assemble this impressive empire, his lands lacked inner cohesion. After his death in 1355, at the age of forty-six, the Serbian kingdom suffered the same fate as the Bulgarian and simply disinte­ grated. DuSan’s son, Stephen UroS V (1355-1371) succeeded, but he was un­ able to maintain central control against domestic intrigues and foreign pres­ sure. With his death in 1371 the Nemanja dynasty came to an end. The Serbian lands, like the Bulgarian, were fragmented among competing nobles.

North o f the Danube: Hungary, Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia While the Byzantine, Bulgarian, and Serbian rulers were contending for con­ trol of the major part of the Balkan peninsula, important developments were occurring north o f the Danube River. After the Roman evacuation o f Dacia in 270, that area and the Danube valley faced the full weight of successive invasions; Goths, Avars, Huns, Bulgars, Slavs, and Tartars moved through the region. For the future settlement o f the area, the arrival of the Hungari­ ans was to be of lasting significance. Defeated in their attempts to move further westward, these people settled in the Pannonian Plain at the end of the ninth century. Because they were converted to Christianity from Rome, their future religious and political ties were to be with the West. Their great­ est medieval ruler was Stephen (997—1038), who was crowned king in iooo and later canonized. As the patron saint of Hungary, his name was associated 19

Introduction

w ith H ungarian state territory, which came to be referred to regularly as “ the lands o f the crow n o f St. Stephen.” In the future the history o f H u ngary was to be closely associated w ith that o f C roatia and the R om anian principalities, in particular Transylvania. In 1102 the king o f H u n gary succeeded to the Croatian crow n under circumstances that w ill be described in a subsequent section. In the eleventh century H u n ­ gary took possession o f Transylvania, a territory that probably had a m ixed but basically R om anian population. A fter the occupation the H ungarian

20

Introduction governm ent encouraged im m igration in order to strengthen this border re­ gio n against outside invasion. M ost im portant was the settlement o f the Szeklers, w h o w ere closely related to the H ungarians, and o f the Germ ans, called Saxons, w h o came in the twelfth century. In the future the H ungarians, Szeklers, and Saxons w ere to be the privileged, governing section o f the p o p ­ ulation. A lth ou gh Transylvania was part o f the kingdom o f H ungary, it re­ tained w ide autonom ous privileges. In the meantim e, tw o R om anian principalities, Wallachia and M oldavia, w ere in the process o f form ation. Th e exact ethnic background o f the m odern Rom anians and the extent o f the territory that they occupied at different stages in their history have been a matter o f controversy, as have, indeed, similar questions associated w ith all o f the Balkan peoples. T h e question at issue here is w hat happened to the population after the w ithdraw al o f R om an adm inistration in 270. C ontem porary Rom anian historiography emphasizes the continuity in the settlement o f present-day R om anian lands, including Transylvania, arguing that the D aco-R om an population remained in occu­ pation o f this region and absorbed o r repelled the successive invaders. It is, in any case, likely that in the tenth century the m ajority o f the people living to the south and east o f the Carpathian M ountains were Rom anian: they spoke a Rom an ce language, closely related to Latin, but w ith a high pro po r­ tion o f Slavic w ord s; they w ere Christian, although the date o f conversion is not clear; they had also accepted the Slavonic religious service and the Cyrillic alphabet, w hich was used to w rite Rom anian until the nineteenth century. Like the ecclesiastical organizations in the Slavic kingdom s across the D an ­ ube, the Rom an ian church was to remain linked to C onstantinople, although with its ow n national and regional organizations. Rom anian political developm ent was to center around tw o principalities, M oldavia and Wallachia, which were not to be united until the m iddle o f the nineteenth century. B oth states were form ed in the fourteenth century when local territorial units under their ow n lords joined together. In Wallachia the nobility chose as their first prince Basarab (1310-1352). H is capital was at Cim pulung fo r a time, and then at Arge§. T h e first prince o f an independent M oldavian state was B ogdan I (1359—1365). T h e early Rom anian rulers had constantly to meet the threat o f H ungarian conquest; the Polish kingdom and the M on gols w ere also dangers. T he nobility, called boyars, w ere a serious problem fo r the central authority. H ere as elsewhere they form ed conspiracies am ong themselves and carried on intrigues w ith foreign powers. Byzantium and the West: Venice and the Fourth Crusade With the exception o f H ungary, the states that have been discussed so far — B ulgaria, Serbia, the R om anian principalities, and, o f course, the Byzantine E m pire — fell into the orbit o f the Eastern R o m an Em pire and the O rthodox church. C om m on adherence to the O rthodox creed had certainly not kept

21

Introduction these states from warfare. Serbia, Bulgaria, and Byzantium were at different periods responsible for one another’s destruction. In addition to the threat offered by the Slavic powers in the Balkans and the M uslim states to the east, the Byzantine governm ent had to meet a challenge from the West that was political and military as well as religious in character. The attempt o f the Byzantine em perors to maintain the claim to the uni­ versal authority associated w ith R om e did not succeed. In 8oo the Frankish king, Charlem agne (768-814), was crow ned by the pope in R o m e w ith the tide o f R om an emperor. D espite the implications o f this act, the Byzantine governm ent was forced to recognize the action in 812. The title o f R om an em peror w as to pass finally in the thirteenth century to the Germ an house o f H absbu rg, w hose members were regularly elected to w hat became in time a h ollow dignity. Ju st as there were tw o rival empires, there were soon to be tw o Christian churches w ith conflicting claims over jurisdiction. A t first the Constantinople patriarch had recognized the preeminence o f the bishop at R om e. D octrinal controversies soon, however, clouded the relations between the tw o capitals. In 1054 the tw o organizations excom municated each other. A lth ou gh the significance o f the action was not clear at the tim e, the breach was never healed despite numerous attempts. It was, in fact, an arm y repre­ senting Western and Catholic interests that was first to break C onstantino­ ple’s defenses. T h e threat to the em pire from the east, first from the Persians and then from the M uslim A rabs, has been m entioned previously. In the eleventh cen­ tury a m ore form idable M uslim force appeared. A t this time M u slim Turks, under the leadership o f members o f the Seljuk family, became the m ajor dan­ ger to the Byzantine state. In 1071 the Byzantine arm y was defeated in the decisive battle o f M anzikert. T he Turkish pow er took over Byzantine posses­ sions in the N ear East and, most im portant, m ost o f Anatolia. A process o f Turkish settlement, w hich was to be carried out over four hundred years, was thus com menced. T h e region, previously Byzantine and Christian fo r the m ost part, became Turkish and M uslim . Th e change drastically affected the pow er o f the empire, to which this area was im portant fo r m anpower, food, and taxes.

The conquest o f the Holy Lands by a Muslim state led to the organization o f crusades in the West. Although under papal sponsorship, these military campaigns were led by unruly, restless, and power-hungry Western knights, who soon proved themselves interested less in religion than in establishing kingdoms for themselves in the East. They certainly were not concerned with restoring to Byzantium its lost lands in Asia Minor. At this time the Byzantine Empire also came into conflict with Venice. By the twelfth century this enterprising city had built up a great maritime empire based on trade and sea power. It had acquired a chain of islands, ports, and points o f settlement throughout the Adriatic, Mediterranean, and Aegean seas. A rival of Constantinople, Venice found the opportunity during the 22

Introduction fo u r th Crusade to deal a deadly b low to its opponent. Th e crusaders, w h o needed Venetian transport but did not have the m oney to pay fo r it, were diverted by Venice to the capture o f the Dalm atian city o f Z adar (Zara) from the H ungarians. In return, the Venetians offered passage to E gyp t. T h ere­ after, instead o f fighting the M uslim Turks, the Venetians and the Christian knights together first proceeded to occupy and then in 120+ to plunder C o n ­ stantinople. T h ey then elected one o f their number, C oun t B aldw in o f Flan ­ ders, emperor. W ith the capital in their hands, the victors next partitioned the Byzantine lands that they had conquered into small principalities. Som e o f these lasted but a short time, whereas others, such as the Principality o f A chaia (12051432), founded by G eoffrey de Villehardouin, and the D uchy o f the A rch i­ pelago (1207-1566), had long life-spans. Venice too picked up valuable terri­ tory, including points on the D alm atian coast and the Peloponnesus, as well as the island o f C rete, w hich was held until 1669. In the Byzantine Balkans, only the state o f Epirus remained in O rthodox possession. The Western knights and Venetians n ow held lands that were G reek in language and O rthodox in religion. T h e subsequent policies o f the new rulers left a lasting hatred am ong the people for “ the Franks,” as the Western Europeans were to be designated. The C atholic church, despite immense efforts, could not w in converts. In 1261 the Byzantine Em pire was restored by the E m pire o f Nicaea, a Greek state established in Anatolia after the fall o f Constantinople. M ichael V I I I Palaeologus became emperor, foun ding a dynasty that w as to last until the final dow nfall o f the empire. A lth ough some Balkan territory was w on back, the state was basically weak. Th e old enemies, o f course, remained. The conflicts w ith the Second Bulgarian E m pire and Serbia have already been discussed. Byzantine interests were also affected by the events occurring along the coast o f the Adriatic Sea, where H ungary, Venice, Croatia, and Bosnia com peted for supremacy.

T h e Western Balkans and the Adriatic coast: Croatia, D alm atia, Bosnia, and Albania A fter their invasion o f the Balkans, the Slovenes and Croatians, both Slavic peoples, settled in the northwest section o f the area under study. T h e Slo ­ venes did not form an independent political entity. In 748 they became part o f the Frankish kingdom , and they w ere to be o f solidly C atholic faith. B y the end o f the fourteenth century the lands they inhabited had passed under die control o f the H ab sbu rg Em pire. In contrast, the C roats, w h o lived to the south, in lands north o f the Sava and west o f the U na, and along the A driatic coast, did establish an independent state (see M ap 7). T h e first ruler to take the tide o f king was Tom islav (910—928). T h e center was B iograd on the D alm atian coast. Situated near the line o f division between the Eastern and Western em-

23

Introduction

Map 7. Croatia in 1070

pires, and subject to influences from both Rome and Constantinople, Croatia was naturally the scene of religious controversy. Two parties existed, one sup­ porting association with Rome and a Latin liturgy, the other preferring the Slavonic service used in the Orthodox Slavic churches. The choice of Rome was finally accepted in the reign o f Zvonimir (1075-1089). After the conver­ sion of the people, the Croatian lands came under Catholic and Western in­ fluence. Croatian independence was not to last much longer. When the death of Zvonimir led to a disputed succession, the crown was claimed by Ladislas I (1077-1095), the king of Hungary. However, the first Hungarian monarch to be crowned king of Croatia was Koloman (1095-1116), a step taken with the consent of the majority of the Croatian nobility. Croatia was thus in 1102 united with Hungary through the person of the king, but the exact nature of this relationship was to be disputed throughout the next centuries. There­ after, the Croatian leadership was to claim that the union rested on an agree­ ment between equal partners who were joined primarily through the com­ mon monarch. Although the Hungarian government did not accept this interpretation o f the arrangement, Croatia did thereafter retain a special po­ sition within the Hungarian kingdom and did have wide rights of autonomy. Croatia was kept administratively apart from Hungary, and the Croatian as­ sembly of nobles had much authority.

24

Introduction It should be noted that the three areas populated by Croats and associated at times with the medieval Triune Kingdom, that is, Croatia, Dalmatia, and the land between the Sava and Danube known as Slavonia, were henceforth to be governed under separate systems even when they had the same ruler. Only Croatia proper retained a truly autonomous position; Slavonia was soon organized into the Hungarian system o f counties, and the subsequent history of Dalmatia was to be turbulent and complicated. The establishment o f the Hungarian Arpâd dynasty in Croatia did not settle the fate o f Dalmatia. The struggle for possession was waged chiefly between Hungary and Venice, but Serbia and Bosnia also sought a coastline. Although the majority of the inhabitants were Croatian, with a Serbian pop­ ulation concentrated south of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), the cities remained un­ der a strong Italian, primarily Venetian, influence. Most of these had auton­ omous institutions that were respected by successive occupying powers. The government was in the hands of councils of prominent citizens. The language of trade and administration, which was Latin in Roman times, now became Italian; the Italian language remained preeminent until the recent period. However, this situation did not hinder Croatian literary development, which had its center in fifteenth-century Dalmatia. The states that vied for dominance over Dalmatian territory also fought to control Bosnia. Situated between the competing Eastern and Western churches, this area was to have a separate religious movement. The Church of the Bos­ nian Christians, a part of neither the Orthodox nor the Catholic hierarchy, was the object o f strong attack from Rome.3 A Bosnian kingdom was also in existence for a short period (see Map 8). The outstanding leader was Stephen Tvrtko (1353-1391), the first ban, or governor, of Bosnia; the land was at that time under Hungarian suzerainty. In 1377 Tvrtko was crowned king of “the Serbs, Bosnia, and the Croats,” a title reflecting the considerable amount of territory that he was able to control. He was also able to add Dalmatia to his possessions. After his death, in the familiar pattern we have seen in other Balkan states, his kingdom fell apart under the pressures o f domestic conflict and foreign invasion. The last Balkan region that remains to be discussed, that inhabited by the Albanians, shared in the difficulties found elsewhere. The great prosperity experienced during Roman times came to an end with the invasions. The Slavic advance in particular deeply affected the Albanian lands. The native Illyrian population, however, was not Slavicized. Living in a mountainous area, organized into tribal associations, the people maintained their language and their separate existence. The name ultimately applied to the area and the populations was derived from a tribe called the Albanoi, who lived near Durrës. At this early period the people called themselves Arber or Arbereshe. 3

See John V. A. Fine, Jr., The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1975)·

25

Introduction

In the twelfth century a principality was organized with its center at Kruje, but it had a short existence. Throughout the medieval period the lands suf­ fered from repeated invasions. Normans, Venetians, and Byzantines raided from the sea; the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Byzantine empires held Albanianinhabited regions for long periods. Despite this foreign intervention, it should be emphasized that then, as later, it was difficult to control the area. The local notables and clan leaders ran their own districts and fought one another for local preeminence. Because of the difficult internal conditions, a large Alba­ nian migration southward occurred, with groups moving into Thessaly, the Peloponnesus, and the islands. Some islands - for instance, Hydra, Psara, and Spetsai - became primarily Albanian in ethnic character. The medieval states before the Ottoman conquest By the end o f the fourteenth century the basis had been set for the modem Balkan states, each o f which had a counterpart in this period: Romania in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania; Bulgaria in the medieval empires;. Yu­ goslavia in the Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian kingdoms; Albania in Illyria; and Greece in the Byzantine Empire. Although there were to be shifts o f population within the region and some immigration, there was no subse­ quent massive intrusion from without comparable to the barbarian invasions. It must be strongly emphasized that none of these early states were national

26

Introduction in the m odem sense. The governments represented primarily alliances o f strong nobles around a central leader. There were few autocratic rulers on the B y ­ zantine m odel. Feudal loyalties rested on the mutual interest o f the m ost pow erful men in the state in the protection and extension o f its frontiers. W hen his personal fortunes were better served by opposition to his ruler and alliance w ith an enemy pow er, a noble could easily shift his allegiance, as the fate o f the Bulgarian and Serbian states well illustrates. Th e Byzantine g o v ­ ernment, despite the strong position o f the em peror, suffered from similar problems. T h is section has been illustrated w ith numerous maps. Th e purpose has been not on ly to demonstrate the size o f the successive em pires, but to show the overlapping claims and conquests. In the nineteenth century the national leaders, looking back on this period, tended to consider the m axim um exten­ sion o f their medieval kingdom s as the natural historical boundaries fo r their nations (see M ap 9). H ow ever, as w e have seen, the areas occupied by the states fluctuated radically; there was also no set center o f national life - w ith the exception, o f course, o f Constantinople fo r Byzantium . F o r instance, w e have seen the Bulgarian capital shift from Pliska, to Preslav, to O hrid, and then to T u rn o vo. T he center o f Serbia m oved southw ard; D usan’s capital was finally Skopje, although the subsequent m ovem ent o f Serbian em igration was to be northward. C roatia, w ith the first center on the Dalm atian coast, was by the sixteenth century to have inland Zagreb (Agram ) as its m ajor city. In the future the ch ief area o f conflict was to be M acedonia. H ere Albanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, and B yzan tine-G reek claims were bound to overlap; all had held the area at some point in their history. A s there w ere few regions that had not known m any rulers, there w ere also no ethnically “ pure” people. O n the eve o f the O ttom an invasion, a band o f Slavic-speaking people separated the Romanians and Hungarians in the north from the Albanian- and G reek-language areas to the south. In each region the population represented a fusion o f original inhabitants w ith subsequent invaders, an am algam ation achieved through m ilitary conquest by a stronger group, the absorption o f one people by another o w in g to the w eigh t o f num ­ bers, o r the acceptance o f another language because o f the cultural attraction offered by a m ore advanced civilization. A s w e have seen, Slavic and Albanian settlers in the southern part o f the peninsula adopted the G reek language and culture; in the Albanian lands the Slavs, in contrast, were assimilated. In Bulgaria a fusion took place between the resident Slavs and the conquering Turanian Bulgars. T h e inhabitants o f the Rom anian principalities were the descendants o f Dacians, R om ans, Slavs, and other peoples. Similarly, the B y ­ zantine E m pire, w ith a G reek official language, was m ixed in population. B y the end o f the medieval period, not only had the foundations fo r the m odern nations been laid, but the area was divided by a long-lasting cultural cleavage, w hose boundaries approxim ated those o f the Eastern and Western Rom an em pires. Basic to this separation was the division between the tw o

27

28 Map 9. Medieval Balkan empires

Introduction Christian churches. The majority o f the people, the Bulgars, Greeks, Roma­ nians, Serbs, and many Albanians, became a part o f the Orthodox world, with its strong Byzantine influence. The Slavic population used their lan­ guages in church services, and Old Slavonic became their common literary language. They wrote in the Cyrillic script. Byzantine patterns were followed in art and architecture. In contrast, Catholic and Western influences predom­ inated in the northwestern Balkans among the Slovenes and Croats, and also among some Albanians and Bosnians. Latin was the language of the church; the Latin script was adopted. Western architectural styles, first romanesque and then gothic, were characteristic o f their building. O f the governments o f the time, the Byzantine was obviously the most successful. A series o f autocratic rulers in control o f a bureaucracy and a strong army was able to establish a great empire that lasted over a thousand years. Even in times o f extreme adversity, a nucleus o f power was maintained. The Byzantine court, with its magnificent ceremonies, was deeply admired by all the Balkan rulers, who attempted to emulate its practices. Few of these could attain the power of the Byzantine autocrat; the feudal nobility or tribal chieftains could usually join together and effectively challenge the central au­ thority. The ephemeral nature of many o f the Balkan political organizations is explained by the fact that political power lay in the hands of the local notables, who were in direct relationship with and had control over the ma­ jority of the people. During the long period that this brief survey has covered, the life and condition o f the mass of the people naturally changed considerably. In time of foreign invasion or barbarian attack, the peasant could find himself in a desperate position. Often large areas were depopulated, as their inhabitants were forced to flee or face massacre. However, even in times of peace, life was extremely difficult. The majority of the people supported themselves either by cultivating the land or as herdsmen; livestock raising was always a major occupation. Those living near the sea could become fisherman, sailors, or pirates. The prosperity and happiness of an individual largely depended on the conditions attached to landholding and on the political situation in the region. The more fortunate peasants were free farmers or shepherds holding their own plots or tending their flocks. In general, they lived in communities where the village held in common the forest, pasture, and water rights, but the individual families controlled their own land. In contrast, conditions might be much worse for those who cultivated the estates of the nobility or the church and were tied to the land under various conditions o f bondage. In its general attributes Balkan serfdom resembled its Western counterpart. Usually the lands o f an estate were divided, with one section worked by the peasants for the lord’s benefit and the other subdivided into individual plots for village use. As well as cultivating the lord’s land, the serf was obligated to pay a percentage of other products of his labor, including such items as wine, 29

Introduction honey, and livestock. Sim ilarly enserfed shepherds w ere expected to deliver part o f their flocks. T he local noble in m ost regions had full jurisdiction over his people. H e collected taxes for the governm ent, and he had com plete ad­ ministrative and judicial authority in his estate. H e kept order, judged crim ­ inal cases, and levied fines and punishments. In addition to the payments to the lord, the peasant ow ed state taxes and labor obligations. H e w as com ­ pelled to w ork on the roads, bridges, and fortifications. In wartim e he was expected not only to fight, but also to provide provisions and transportation. In contrast to the countryside, m ost cities enjoyed a w ide measure o f selfgovernm ent. T h ey were usually administered by councils o f prom inent citi­ zens. Situated on the great trade and com m unication routes, they were the centers for com merce and the crafts. Ports, such as C onstantinople, Thessa­ loniki, and D ubrovnik, played a m ajor role in the life o f the region at a time w hen w ater transport was far easier than land. T he cities w ere also, o f course, the administrative and m ilitary centers. W hen in the fourteenth century the Balkan peninsula faced the invasion o f the O ttom an Turks, certain o f the inherent weaknesses in the political and social system w ere to aid the conquerors. M ost im portant was the lack o f unity am ong the Christian princes. A lthough sharing a com m on religion, m any Balkan leaders in fact allied w ith the M uslim power. A s far as the peas­ antry was concerned, the heavy burden o f feudalism made them often w el­ com e new rulers w h o had another land system. T h e last ruler o f Bosnia told the pope that the Turkish authorities had w on over the peasants by promises o f better conditions.

T he O ttom an conquest A fter the seventh century, as w e have seen, the Byzantine Em pire had to meet challenges from M uslim pow ers, first from the A rabs and then from the Seljuk Turks. A t the end o f the thirteenth century a Turkish grou p o f warriors established itself in northwest A natolia, near the Sea o f M arm ora. T he name Ottoman which was to be given these people derives from that o f the prom ­ inent leader O sm an o r O thm an (1290-1326). T he expansion o f their pow er was rapid, w ith the initial great conquests made in the Balkans. G allipoli, taken in 1354, was the first urban center held by the Ottom ans in E urope. T he fourteenth century provided certain general conditions favorable to O ttom an interests. A t this time the plague spread through E u ro p e; the Black Death decim ated large sections o f the population and spread terror and panic. F rom 1338 to 1453 British and French energies were absorbed in the H un dred Years’ War. T h e church at R o m e was weakened by internal conflicts. Venice and G enoa, the rival com mercial giants, were engaged in m utually destructive conflict. U nder these conditions there was little likelihood that the West would be capable o f uniting to m ount a great crusade to aid the Christian East. T he

30

Introduction weakness and division in the West were reflected in the Balkans. T h e feudal states, each w ith m ajor problem s o f internal organization, were separated by their jealousies and hatreds. Byzantium , which had stood for centuries as a barrier to invasions from the East, never fully regained its pow er after the restoration in 1261. T he O ttom an advance was also immensely aided by the leadership o f a series o f extrem ely able sultans, each o f w hom added territory to the state. M urad I (1360-1389) first took A drianople (1360) and then, after a m ajor victory on the M aritsa R iv er (1371), was able to take control in the Bulgarian, M acedonian, and southern Serbian lands. Sofia was acquired in 1385, N is in 1386, and Thessaloniki in 1387. D u rin g this stage o f its advance the O ttom an governm ent left: som e o f the conquered native princes in power, but as vassals they w ere obligated to pay tribute and render m ilitary aid. In the campaigns the sultans thus were supported regularly by Balkan contingents. O ther areas and the m ajor urban centers were placed under direct O ttom an rule. A lth ough the O ttom an victory o f the M aritsa was the m ost decisive en­ gagem ent for the future o f the peninsula, the battle o f K o so vo Polje (Field o f the Blackbirds) in June 1389 was to be best remem bered in legend and epic poetry. H ere the O ttom an forces met an arm y o f Serbs, Bosnians, and A lb a­ nians. This event was to have a particular significance for Serbia, since it was later com m em orated as the sym bolic end o f the independent Serbian m edie­ val state. Its prince, Lazar (1371-1389), and Sultan M urad both died at K o ­ sovo. The next sultan, Bayezid the Thunderbolt (1389-1402), continued the pat­ tern o f conquest. Ttirnovo was taken in 1393; the ruler o f Wallachia, M ircea the O ld (1386—1418), also became a vassal. A t this point Western Christendom did make a weak attempt to organize a resistance. A nsw ering a call from Pope Boniface IX (138 9 -140 4), K in g Sigism und (1387-1437) o f H u n gary led a cru­ sade in w hich French, G erm an, and British knights participated. T h is army was defeated at N icopolis (N icop) in 1396 by Bayezid. The victorious O tto ­ man advance was tem porarily halted by the activities o f Tamerlane (136914 0 5 ), the last great conqueror to em erge from A sia. T he O ttom an forces were crushed at the battle o f A nkara in 1402, w here Bayezid was taken pris­ oner. A fter the collapse o f Tamerlane’s em pire follow in g his death, and after a civil w ar in the O ttom an state (14 0 3-14 13), M ehm ed I (1413-14 2 1) and the next sultan, M urad II (1421—1451), were able to resume the march forw ard. A new crusade was organized under the leadership o f V ladislav (1434—144 4), the king o f Poland and H ungary, w ith the support o f Wallachia and the S er­ bian noble, G eorge Brankovic. T he real direction o f the undertaking was, how ever, in the hands o f John H unyadi, known in Rom anian historiography as Iancu o f H unadoara, a R om anian in H ungarian service w h o was the g o v ­ ernor o f Transylvania. A lth ou gh the Christian forces w on som e early suc­

31

Introduction cesses, they were decisively defeated at Varna in 14 4 4 ; Vladislav was killed during the fighting. This campaign marked the last united Christian effort to halt the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. The next sultan, Mehmed the Conqueror ( 14 4 4 -14 4 6 and 1451-148 1), was able to take the single greatest prize on the peninsula. Despite the great O t­ toman victories in the Balkans and the loss of Anatolia, Constantinople had been able to remain free. With the Byzantine territories reduced to little more than the city and some surrounding land, the empire urgently needed outside assistance for its defense. The religious division with the West, however, was still in effect. In a desperate situation, the delegates of the Byzantine church at the Council of Florence, held in 1439, agreed to accept most o f the Roman terms for reunion, and a temporary union took place. The agreement met with strong resistance throughout the Orthodox world, however, and the empire did not secure Western support. When the Ottoman siege o f Con­ stantinople commenced in April 1453, only the king of Naples and some Gen­ oese were willing to send aid. F o r tw o months the O ttom an army invested the city. The advantage was com pletely on the side o f the besieging forces, w h o greatly outnum bered the defenders. Th e Byzantine com manders had about nine thousand soldiers, w ith a city population o f around fifty thousand. Th e O ttom an army, w ith eighty thousand troops, also had artillery and com m and o f the sea. T h e city finally fell on M ay 29. T h e collapse o f the Byzantine state and the taking o f the great imperial city was an event o f tremendous significance. T h e ch ief citadel o f Eastern Christianity and the heir to Rom an pow er and splendor was occupied by a M uslim Turkish conqueror. It was n o w to becom e the capital o f a new em pire, which was based on quite different principles.

Mehmed II was also able to extend the Ottoman boundaries in the Bal­ kans. In 1463 Bosnia was taken; neighboring Hercegovina fell in 1482. Most o f the Christian areas were subsequently to be governed under a system of administration that will be described in the next chapter. Conditions, how­ ever, differed in Bosnia, primarily because of the large-scale conversions to Islam that followed the Ottoman occupation. The subsequent islamization was gradual. The Bosnian towns and the country districts in their vicinity became centers o f Islamic culture. A nobility, Muslim in religion but Slavic in language and ethnic background, was in time to control the countryside. There were also conversions among the peasantry and the townspeople. Over the period of Ottoman rule, immigration of Ottoman administrators and military men into the area was, of course, constant. Although the Muslim element did not exceed in numbers the Christian population, its members held the predominant political, social, and economic power. The Ottoman Empire reached its height during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520—1566), who is also known as “the Law-Giver.” Its territories embraced great expanses o f Europe, Asia, and Africa (see Map 10). The ri­ valry o f the European great powers continued to benefit Ottoman interests. 32

Map 10. The Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

Introduction A lth ough certain states, such as Hungary, Poland, and Venice, had consist­ ently opposed the O ttom an advance, the Christian powers had not been able to organize an effective resistance. C onditions were to becom e even m ore favorable for the O ttom an governm ent when the king o f France, Francis I (1515—1547), urged Suleim an to attack his H absbu rg rival, Charles V (1519— 1556). C atholic France thus became one o f the first European allies o f the O ttom an state. T h e R eform ation in G erm any similarly created a diversion that was beneficial to the O ttom an governm ent. T he Lutheran princes hesi­ tated to join in a firm front against the M uslim forces, since such an action m ight aid the papacy and the Catholics. U n d er these favorable conditions Suleiman began a series o f cam paigns in the Balkans. In 1521 he captured the strategically im portant city o f Belgrade. H is greatest victory, how ever, was w on in 1526 when he defeated the H u n ­ garian king, Lou is II (1516-1526), at the battle o f M ohacs, which was the H ungarian equivalent o f K osovo. T he victory was to lead to m ajor political changes. In subsequent years, after further battles, the greater part o f the Hungarian lands, including Transylvania, passed under Ottoman control. The rem aining H ungarian possessions, am ong them some o f Croatia and Sla­ vonia, then became a part o f the H absbu rg Em pire. T h e death o f L o u is II on the battlefield at M ohacs led to a disputed succession. Part o f the H u n ­ garian nobility elected Ferdinand, the brother o f Charles V, as king, and from this time H ab sbu rg kings ruled the H ungarian lands that were not under O ttom an administration. F o r its part, the O ttom an governm ent organized m ost o f its H u n garian possessions into administrative districts called pashaliks. Transylvania, in contrast, kept a large measure o f autonom y and was to act in the future alm ost as an independent state. Suleim an’s career did not end in complete triumph. A lth ough great victo­ ries had been w on , the O ttom an armies could not advance further. In 1529, at the first siege o f Vienna, they failed to take this im portant city. A lth ough further conquests were to be made in the north and east o f the peninsula under other sultans, the expansion westward had been effectively halted.

Resistance to Ottoman rule A lth ou gh the O ttom an Em pire was in possession o f the Balkans, centers o f resistance continued to arise within the peninsula and on its northern fron­ tiers. Because o f the extremely com plicated nature o f these actions, only three are described here: the rebellion o f Skenderbeg in Albania, the events in the D anubian Principalities, and the establishment o f M ontenegro. O ne o f the m ajor revolts against O ttom an rule com menced in A lbania during the reign o f M urad II (1421-1451). It was led by G eorge K astrioti, w hose father was an O ttom an vassal. T he son had been taken to C onstanti­ nople as a hostage; there he converted to Islam, taking the name Skender. In the O ttom an service he rose to the m ilitary rank o f beg, and he is generally

34

Introduction know n by the name o f Skenderbeg, o r Scanderbeg. Sent back to his native land as an official, he soon organized a conspiracy. A fter negotiating for sup­ port w ith both Venice and H ungary, he began his rebellion in 1443. In M arch !444 he convened the notables and organized an Albanian League. Each leader kept control o f his ow n district; Skenderbeg had full pow er in only some regions. T h e governm ent that was thus created was bound to be unstable. A s in the rest o f the Balkans, the notables w ere reluctant to surrender pow er to one o f their num ber; som e cooperated w ith the O ttom an governm ent. Sken­ derbeg, w h o is the A lbanian national hero, died in 14 6 8 , but resistance con­ tinued. Its center was the Albanian highlands, and assistance was given by the Italian states and the papacy. Full O ttom an dom ination was achieved only in the next century. T h e A lbanian lands w ere at this point devastated. Because o f the bad in­ ternal conditions, thousands o f A lbanians em igrated. M o st im portant was the settlement o f large numbers in the K in gd o m o f Naples, w here they lived in their ow n villages and retained their language and customs. These Italian Albanians were to play a leading role in the national m ovem ent in the future. T h e O ttom an E m pire also continued to face intrigue and resistance in the R om anian principalities o f Wallachia and M oldavia. A lth ough O ttom an su­ zerainty w as first established over Wallachia at the end o f the fourteenth cen­ tury and over M oldavia at the end o f the fifteenth, this authority was fre­ quently challenged. T h e principalities had to meet not only the O ttom an threat, but also the am bitions o f neighboring H u n gary and Poland. Th e fore­ m ost Rom anian princes o f the medieval period, Stephen the G reat o f M o l­ davia ( 14 5 7 - 15 0 4 ) and M ichael the Brave o f Wallachia ( 15 9 3 - 16 0 1) , had to deal with a com plex political situation in this part o f E urope as well as w ith the O ttom an overlord. Nevertheless, for a b rie f period Stephen was able to gain control over both Wallachia and M oldavia; M ichael held Wallachia, M o ld a­ via, and Transylvania from 16 0 0 until he w as assassinated in 16 0 1. T h eir ac­ tions in join in g R om anian lands were to be an inspiration to later nationalist writers and political leaders. T he Rom anian princes also had difficulty con­ trolling the boyars, w h o w ere w illin g to join w ith H ungarian, H absbu rg, Polish, o r O ttom an allies to further their ow n interests. Like their contem ­ poraries elsewhere, these men feared the concentration o f too m uch pow er in the hands o f one o f their peers. D espite the unstable situation in these regions, the O ttom an E m pire did not attempt to incorporate Wallachia, M oldavia, o r Transylvania directly into the em pire. A ll three became vassal tributary principalities w ith their ow n princes, in theory elected by the local nobility. Th e ch ief pow er remained in the hands o f this grou p, w h o in turn held full authority over the peasants on their estates. M ost o f these had been reduced to the status o f serfs by the latter h alf o f the sixteenth century.

Despite the fact that control had been established over the peninsula, the Ottoman presence was not felt equally everywhere. Some regions were so 35

Introduction remote and poverty-stricken that they were not w orth the effort that it w ould have cost to administer them. A n example is show n in the history o f M o n ­ tenegro. T h e area had been part o f the Serbia o f D usan until the breakup o f that state. A t the time o f the O ttom an invasion many o f the inhabitants re­ treated further into the mountains to form a new center w ith C etinje as the capital. Th is city had a monastery, and in 1516 the bishops took over the g o v ­ ernment. A lth ough O ttom an troops did penetrate into the region and levy a tribute, they had constant problem s collecting the m oney and controlling the actions o f vassals w h o lived in such a w ild and inhospitable area as this.

Conclusion T h e reign o f Suleim an the M agnificent marked the culm ination o f O ttom an pow er and prestige. T he basic organization o f the em pire, w hich w ill be described in the next chapter, was also set at this time. A lth ou gh the state was to be hampered by grave internal problem s, the boundaries in E urope were held o r extended w ith only som e losses. T he conflicts and jealousies o f the Western governm ents were to the O ttom an advantage. It w as only at the end o f the seventeenth century that the situation changed. A fter that time, European coalitions, o f w hich R ussia and the H ab sbu rg E m pire w ere lead­ ing members, w ere able to deal severe blow s to O ttom an power. T h e long period o f O ttom an dom ination had, as could be expected, a de­ cisive influence o n the future course o f Balkan history and the developm ent o f Balkan society. Except for the m inority under H ab sbu rg rule, all o f the Balkan people w ere by this time subject to O ttom an authority. A m o n g the O rthodox Christians, only the Russians were independent. O rthodox Serbs and Rom anians in the Austrian state had severe restrictions placed on their activities. F o r the next centuries the Balkan people under O ttom an rule were to be administered under a system quite different from that in practice in Western Europe, but one that w ould allow them a great deal o f local selfgovernm ent. T h e m ost obvious immediate effect o f the O ttom an occupation on political life was the destruction o f the form er rulers, Byzantine em perors and Balkan kings alike, and m ost o f the Christian feudal nobility. O nly in areas like B o s­ nia, w here the local notables converted to Islam , or the outlying provinces, M oldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania, did the members o f the form er ruling class retain their privileges and their estates. It is im portant to emphasize here, how ever, that although the secular leadership was thus elim inated, the O rthodox church and its administrative hierarchy remained. In the future the Balkan population was to be directly controlled by the local community, which was left undisturbed, and by the church leadership. A s w ill be explained in detail in C hapter 1, they were to be integrated into the unique O ttom an system o f governm ent.

36

PART I

The eighteenth century

1 Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule B a l k a n C h r i s t i a n s l i v e d under O ttom an control until the end o f the Balkan Wars in 1913, an understanding o f the aims and prin­ ciples o f that governm ent are essential for ou r narrative. T he ideal and practice o f both the M uslim and the Christian institutions are discussed, as well as their decline in the eighteenth century. T he role o f the great powers in Balkan developm ents and the events in the European provinces and the O ttoman capital in that century are also treated in this chapter. T he period was one o f accelerating internal disintegration from the center and increasing foreign intervention in the affairs o f the Balkan lands. A t the same time, local centers o f power, both Christian and M uslim , assumed a stronger position in the political organization o f the state. These events form the background for the revolutionary m ovem ents o f the next century.

S

in c e

T H E O T T O M A N SYSTEM

The Ottoman government Although many changes had taken place by the beginning o f the eighteenth century, the Ottoman state as a whole retained much of the structure that it had attained at its height in the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent. At this time the empire was governed by a system that contrasted strongly with con­ temporary European regimes. The Ottoman state had been built up on the concept of Holy War; the aim was the extension and defense of Islam. The world was regarded as divided into two spheres, the domain of the faithful, the dariilislam, and the domain of war, the dariilharb. The duty o f the ruler Was to extend the rule o f Islam over as wide a territory as possible. Despite the emphasis on religious war the object was not the destruction ° f the dariilharb or its peoples, but their conquest and domination in a man­ ner of advantage to Islam. If a city or a region submitted without resistance, the population could, if it wished, retain its religion and a large measure of local autonomy; if it resisted, it could be enslaved or massacred, and its prop­ erty was taken as booty. Conversions to Islam were welcomed, but they were seldom forced. Conquered people of another religion were allowed a definite place under the direction of their own ecclesiastical authorities. There was, 39

The eighteenth century however, no question of equality. Non-Muslims paid extra taxes, they were subject to a large number of special restrictions, and they were treated as definitely inferior in status. The first great division in the state was thus along religious lines. A second separated the people by their social position and function within the com­ munity. Here in first place stood the members of the governing class, the askeri, the “military,” which included those who held high administrative po­ sitions, were in the armed forces, or were members of the ulema, the reli­ gious, educational, and legal authority of the empire. High officials in the Christian society, like the patriarchs of the Orthodox church, also belonged here. Below them were the reaya, the subject or “protected flock,” the great majority of the population. People in this group, which was both Muslim and non-Muslim, paid the taxes and were subject to restrictions on their mode of life and dress. Ottoman society was organized into a tight pattern o f estates. Movement between the levels was difficult. At the top o f the pyramid o f state power stood the sultan, an absolute divine-right ruler. Since in theory God gave authority only to him, he was considered the sole source of power and could demand absolute obedience from his subjects; he held complete control over their lives and possessions. He was the owner o f the state lands, and he could dispose o f them as he chose. O f course, in practice his power had real limitations. Obviously, he had to rule through subordinates, who could control his access to informa­ tion and his relations with the mass of the people. Moreover, he could not violate religious law or custom; Muslim public opinion, expressed through the ulema, could strongly influence the actions of the sultan. The faith also dictated the duties o f a ruler; he had been given his people by God in trust. He was responsible for their care and protection; he was to lead them in the proper direction and to realize the great objectives of Islam. One of the principal duties of the sultan was the maintenance o f religious and civil law. Since social justice and balance were theoretical foundations of the Ottoman system, laws and their enforcement were of prime importance. Two principal bodies of law were in effect. First in importance was the sheriat, the religious law o f Islam, based on ecclesiastical texts. The Koran, the basic source, was believed to record the word o f God. The faithful were convinced that it contained all that an individual needed to know for his own life and his government. The sheriat could apply only to Muslims. To supplement this religious law, which could not cover all of the details of the evolving political life of the state, the sultan could formulate laws, kanuns, on his own authority. In practice, these were drawn up by his assistants and then ap­ proved by him. They were then issued in the form of an imperial decree, a firman. Each sultan upon his accession had to reconfirm the actions of his predecessor. Holding absolute power from God, the sultan ruled through a governing class, to whom he delegated authority. At the height of Ottoman strength 40

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule the administration o f the country and the principal sections o f the arm y were staffed by members recruited through the kul, or slave system. O bviously an absolute ruler had to surround him self w ith men on w hom he could rely with absolute assurance. T h e allegiance o f the soldiers was o f particular im por­ tance. Previously, Islam ic rulers had regularly used slaves fo r administrative positions, and this system was adopted and extended by the O ttom an sultans. Slaves could be obtained by many means. Th e ruler was entitled to a fifth o f the prisoners o f war, w h o w ere enslaved. Slaves could also be purchased. The most notable means used, how ever, was the devshirme, m eaning “ to collect,” which was inaugurated sometime around the end o f the fourteenth century. It remained in effect until the end o f the seventeenth century, but some re­ cruitments w ere apparently made as late as the eighteenth century. A lthough conditions varied over this period, in general, every three to seven years O t­ toman officials w ent into the countryside to make their selections. Fathers were expected to present their unm arried male children between the ages o f eight and twenty. M u slim families w ere exempt, since their children could not be enslaved. T he children deem ed best in both intelligence and appear­ ance were taken and then sent in groups to Constantinople. There they were examined and separated. T h e m ost prom ising were kept in the capital, where they were given an extensive education that was designed to train them to be the future adm inistrators o f the state and the trusted members o f the sultan’s household. T h e others w ere sent to live w ith Turkish farmers in Anatolia, where they learned the language and received religious instruction. Both groups, o f course, w ere converted to Islam. M ost o f the second section be­ came mem bers o f the janissary corps, the m ost effective fighting force any­ where in this period. This body o f dedicated converts was responsible for the great victories o f the O ttom an armies up to the seventeenth century. T he figures given concerning the num ber o f boys recruited through the devshirme system varies sharply. T he num ber runs from 20 0,0 00 to m any times that num ber for the entire period when the practice was in force. Ju d g ­ ments differ w idely about the justice o f the system. R eports exist o f attempts o f families to buy their children both out o f the collections and into them. The M uslim s o f Bosnia in particular requested that they be included in the devshirme. In contrast, nationalist Balkan writers often stress the cruelty o f taking children by force from their families and converting them to a religion that, by Christian judgm ent, w ould lead only to eternal damnation. It must he remem bered that the religious issue was o f central importance in this time. Nevertheless, although the separation was undoubtedly painful fo r families, and did perhaps deprive the Balkan com munities o f their best talent, the children gained the possibility o f acquiring the most advanced education available and the opportunity to rise to the top o f the O ttom an state system. It should also be emphasized that the status o f slave was not necessarily de­ meaning. To be a slave o f the sultan was an honor that conferred high social position and material benefit. 41

The eighteenth century The Ottoman system of government was thus headed by an absolute m on­ arch. His first deputy was the grand vezir, and he was also assisted by an Imperial Council, or Divan. This body dealt with all questions o f state, but its legal functions were probably the most important. Its members included the grand vezir and the highest officials of the state and of the ulema. Below this body a vast bureaucracy, centralized in Constantinople, ran the empire and collected the taxes that were the source of so much resentment. Since Holy War was considered a main function of the empire, the military forces were o f major importance. The two most effective units were the jan­ issaries, the infantry recruited through the devshirme, and the sipahis, the cavalry based on the countryside. The janissaries, as we have seen, were part of the slave system and were directly under the sultan. Forbidden to marry, they were supposed to be ready to go to war at any time. When the country was at peace, they had police duties. The state was also directly served by an artillery corps and a cavalry. The janissary force became particularly signifi­ cant when the foot soldier carrying firearms proved more effective than the cavalry equipped with sword and spear. The original great Ottoman victories, however, were largely the accom­ plishment of the sipahis, who also provided important services in local gov­ ernment. The early Ottoman rulers were faced with the problem o f paying their forces. Since the sultan was considered the holder of all of the land, this question was solved by assigning to the members of the cavalry troops the usufruct of a grant of land, called a ziamet for a large estate, or a timar for the more normal size, from which they could collect certain definite pay­ ments. These funds were designed to support the holder, his family, and his retainers, and also to equip him for battle. The sipahi had to belong to the military class. Although a son could not inherit land directly from his father, as a member o f the governing class he could apply for and be granted a timar if he qualified. Slaves o f the sultan were also eligible to apply. Similar grants o f land were sometimes given to pay wages and provide pensions for officials, or awarded to favorites of the sultan or influential men. A timar was usually held by a Muslim, but sometimes in the early period also by a Christian. When the Ottoman army first occupied a territory, a careful register was made of the population and the resources of the area so that taxes could be properly assessed. At the height of the timar system, the sipahi was entitled only to collect certain specified taxes, usually in kind, and some labor dues. Because these payments were regulated, the peasant was usually better off than he had been under the lords o f the previous feudal regimes. Under the policy known as istimalet, meaning “to make use of,” the Ottoman conquer­ ors attempted to win the peasants’ support against their former masters. Most Balkan peasants cultivated the land of a timar, where they held hereditary rights. Their sons could continue to work the land, but this right could not be sold or transferred without permission. The sipahi usually lived in the village where his lands were located or in a 42

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule nearby provincial town. He thus was tied to his area, where he had important official duties. He was responsible for the maintenance o f order in his district and for the protection of his tenants. He was also the tax collector. Since his sUpp°rt came from his landholding, he was himself principally dependent on the production of his fields, a fact that limited his effectiveness as a fighter. He naturally wished to be home by fall when the crops were gathered in. The normal campaigning season was thus from March to September or Oc­ tober. The sipahi was also entitled to a proportion o f the booty obtained by victorious warfare. However, in the period covered by this narrative, the Ottoman troops, deprived of rewarding or spectacular achievements, could not gain much through looting. They fought chiefly, not in new or rich re­ gions, but in the impoverished and depopulated Balkan and Black Sea bor­ derlands, where the best that could perhaps be picked up was someone’s stray cow. In addition to the officials and the military, the ruling class included the members o f the ulema. Law, education, and the supervision of the Muslim community’s moral and religious life were in their care. Since the basis o f the state was religion, their duties gave them prestige and power. They were to apply the sheriat and to further the principles of Islam through their educa­ tional and religious institutions. They provided the members of the impor­ tant state office o f judge, or kadi. Judges were dispatched throughout the provincial administration to enforce both the sheriat and the sultan’s laws. They had jurisdiction over all Muslims and over Christians except in those sectors reserved for the Christian church authorities. In addition to the kadis, another group, the muftis, played an important role in the Ottoman system. They acted as interpreters of both the sheriat and the sultan’s decrees, and they were consulted when the meaning of a law was in dispute. At the head o f the ulema stood the seyhiilislam, who was appointed by the sultan, but who held in fact an independent position. He could issue a fetva, which was an opinion or interpretation dealing with the question whether acts performed by the government conformed to Muslim principles. He could not enforce his decisions, but his judgment had an im­ portant hold on public opinion. He could and sometimes did determine the fate of a sultan. The m oral basis o f this system has been described by num erous authors, both O ttom an and contemporary. Its purpose and ideal has perhaps been best expressed in the “ circle o f equity” stated in the eight follow in g principles, in which the last leads back to the first:

1 There can be no royal authority w ithout the military. 2 T h ere can be no m ilitary w ithout wealth. 1

The reaya produce the wealth. 43

The eighteenth century 4 T h e sultan keeps the reaya by m aking justice reign. 5 Justice requires harm ony in the world. 6 T h e w orld is a garden, its walls are the state. 7 T he state’s prop is the religious law. 8 There is no support fo r the religious law w ithout royal authority.1

T h e importance o f the concept o f justice in this theoretical fram ew ork has been emphasized: Justice, in this theory o f state, means the protection o f subjects against abuse from the representatives o f authority and in particular against illegal taxation. To ensure this protection was the sovereign’s m ost im portant duty. T he fundamental aim o f this policy was to maintain and strengthen the pow er and authority o f the sovereign, since royal authority was regarded as the corner-stone o f the w hole social struc­ ture.2 In the O ttom an concept, as we have seen, not only political and religious positions were regarded as fixed, but also social status. O ttom an theory, like medieval European, regarded society as divided into separate estates, each part serving a particular function in a divine order.3 M ovem ent between classes, o r occupations, was not approved because that w ould ultimately upset a bal­ ance ordained by G o d. A s w e have seen, the O ttom an scheme placed the “ M en o f the Sw ord,” the sultan w ith his bureaucracy and army, and the “ M en o f the Pen,” the religious leaders and the learned men, in the first, o r askeri, class. B elo w them, the reaya were divided into tw o general categories, first, the merchants and craftsmen, and second, the peasants. T h is social classifi­ cation cut across religious lines, although M uslim s and Christians w ere never considered equal at any level. T he aim and ideal was thus that o f social justice and balance; everything had its place and purpose as determ ined by G o d ’s will. A go o d Christian or M uslim fulfilled the role assigned to him. A reaya should not seek to become a general. These restrictions were reinforced by both M uslim and Christian church teachings. Society was static; there was no idea o f evolution, progress, 1 2 3

Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (New York: Knopf, 1972), p. 88 . Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300 - 1600, trans. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 6 6 . See the chart in Kemal Karpat, A n Inquiry into the Social Foundations c f Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, from Millets to Nations, Research Monograph no. 39 (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University, Center o f International Studies, 1973), P- 22-

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule or social and individual “ betterment” as positive aims to be achieved. In this respect, the assumptions o f the O ttom an w orld were not markedly different from those o f the West. T h e idea o f progress was an eighteenth-century West­ ern concept; that o f evolution belonged to the nineteenth century. The emphasis on religion and its political role was also com m on to both the O ttom an Em pire and the European states. W hen the O ttom an theocratic system was at its height, E urope was entering upon the age o f the R eform a­ tion, the Counter-Reformation, and the religious wars. Certainly, at this time, in com parison w ith the excesses o f both Catholic and Protestant, the M uslim Ottoman state showed itself as remarkedly tolerant. A s already noted, except in isolated and exceptional cases conversions were not forced. There was no equivalent o f the Inquisition. A s w e shall see, throughout the long years o f Ottoman dom ination the Christian and M uslim societies lived side by side in relative peace and understanding, although w ith considerable mutual ex­ clusion.

Th e breakdown o f the system The previous section described the O ttom an system as it should have func­ tioned. H ow ever, no political organization ever attains its stated goals; cer­ tainly the O ttom an governm ent, even at its height, never approached the high ideals expressed by its exponents and theoreticians. This intricate, inter­ related system was particularly vulnerable. B y the beginning o f the eigh ­ teenth century the em pire was in full decline, and the essential elements in the political order either had undergone alterations o r had ceased to function. Basic to the success o f the em pire was a strong, intelligent ruler and a victo­ rious army. In both respects the years after Suleiman’s reign witnessed dis­ appointments and disasters. O bviously, the functioning o f the O ttom an governm ent w as intimately tied to the abilities o f the sultan, w h o was expected to perform almost super­ human tasks. N o t only was he at the head o f the governm ent and the reli­ gious institutions, but he was also as supreme military com m ander supposed to lead armies into battle. T h e first ten sultans were all men o f unusual ability; thereafter a sw ift decline set in. A m ajor problem was the lack o f a satisfactory regulation o f the succession. O n the basis o f the assumption that the ultimate choice lay in the hands o f G o d , the requirement for a new sultan was m erely that he be an adult male o f sound mind and o f the royal house. T he lack o f a clear ruling m eant that a murderous com petition existed between the eligible Princes. T h e successful candidate usually ow ed his victory to luck, superior Military pow er, and court intrigue. T h e extreme rivalry between brothers or others eligible fo r the throne led to the custom by which the victor sultan executed his potentially dangerous relatives to protect himself. F o r instance, ehrned I I I (1595—1603) had his nineteen brothers and over twenty sisters

45

The eighteenth century killed.4 Changes were also made in the education of the princes. At first the sons of the reigning monarch were sent at the age of twelve to the provinces, where they received administrative training. There they were, o f course, in a position to organize political and military centers to support their own inter­ ests. To avoid this situation the princes were next confined in the harem in the kafes (cage) section. Completely excluded from the life of the country and secluded in a society of court intriguers, women, and eunuchs, these men could never be certain o f their ultimate fate. The atmosphere of fear and the lack o f employment produced weak and often mentally incompetent rulers. Suleiman II (1687—1691), when informed of his accession, told those who had come to take him from the cage: “If my death has been commanded, say so. Let me perform my prayers, then carry out your order. Since my childhood, I have suffered forty years o f imprisonment. It is better to die at once than to die a little every day. What terror we endure for a single breath.” 5 Although after Suleiman’s reign it became the practice to choose the senior male can­ didate, no fixed rule of succession was ever set. With the accession o f sultans who were not fit to rule, the power in the state passed to those closest to the throne: the royal household and the min­ isters. The reigning monarch’s mother, the valide sultan, became a person of considerable importance, as did the other women in the palace, the eunuchs, and the court servants. Fortunately for the empire, in the second half o f the seventeenth century the Albanian Kopriilu family provided four extremely able grand vezirs. Coming to office in 1656 at the age o f seventy, the first, Mehmed Kopriilu, sought to end the extreme corruption and to restore the government to the conditions o f the time o f Mehmed the Conqueror. In 1661 his son Fazil Ahmed became vezir and continued these policies. His achieve­ ments were reflected in the Ottoman military victories at this time. The Kopriilii interlude was an exception. By the end of the seventeenth century the classical administrative system had in fact broken down to a con­ siderable extent. The slave and devshirme organization, in which at least in theory advancement was based on training and merit, had ended. The gov­ ernment and military offices were no longer staffed by dedicated converts but by Muslims and some Christians, who had usually acquired their positions by purchase and who looked upon their privileges as sources primarily of private profit. The collapse at the top was thus reflected right down to tht bottom of the centralized bureaucracy. Most dangerous to the state, and typi­ cal of the collapse o f the system, was the disintegration of the army and the apparent inability of the empire to support a strong military establishment. Although the entire question o f the economic life o f the empire will be discussed in a later section, it is important to note here that one of the major 4 5

S tan fo rd J. Shaw an d Ezel K ural Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, * vols. (C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1976,1977), I, 184. Inalcik, Ottoman Empire, p. 60.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule causes o f the decline o f the state was its increasing impoverishment. Most apparent was the high rate of inflation that commenced at the end of the sixteenth century and continued into the seventeenth. With the sharp rise in prices and with the rising costs of the administration and the military forces of the empire, the Ottoman government was forced to increase the rates of taxation and to adopt new methods of collection. The economy also suffered to an extent from the fact that the great trade routes to Asia now shifted to the Atlantic, where the British and Dutch were the main beneficiaries. The relative poverty o f the state directly affected its military effectiveness. As we have seen, the initial great conquests were due primarily to the ability o f the sipahi cavalry, which had received its income from the timar and from booty won during the conquests. There had been no question o f a cash payment. Unfortunately, this group proved increasingly ineffective against trained infantry armed with guns. The janissaries, equipped with the new weapons, thus became the base of Ottoman fighting strength. These troops, however, had to be paid a salary, and their arms were expensive. The in­ creased costs had to be met at a time when the empire was no longer expand­ ing rapidly, when new sources of booty were not available, and when prices were rising steadily. The economic problems of the central government were directly reflected in the countryside. Since a cash income was urgently needed, some timar land was brought under the direct control o f the treasury and then farmed out for taxes. Courtiers also received land grants as gifts or in return for services. As will be explained later, some land became in fact the private prop­ erty of the man who held it. With the failure o f the empire to acquire new territory by conquest and with the withdrawal of areas from the timar system, the number o f sipahis equipped for battle naturally declined. These condi­ tions also affected the peasant population in the provinces. The new control­ lers of the land imposed harsher conditions, and frequent disorders soon characterized provincial life. Certainly, no “circle of justice” existed. In the seventeenth century the government sent janissaries into the provinces to try to control the situation and, incidentally, to remove some of these unruly dements from the capital. Once assigned to provincial centers, the janissaries tended to make the local conditions even worse. They often joined with the Ottoman officials, the tax collectors, the wealthy local merchants, and land­ owners and acted against the interests o f the peasants who worked the land and were the basic source o f the state’s tax income. Although some janissaries settled in the provinces, the center of their power remained Constantinople, where they became an important political force With the ability to depose vezirs and even sultans. Once an elite, dedicated f° rPs, chosen on the basis of ability and carefully trained, the janissaries had y the eighteenth century become something quite different. With the end ° f the devshirme system the recruits were usually Muslims by birth and not converts. They also had won the right to marry and to enroll their sons in 47

The eighteenth century the corps. O nce established w ith hom es and families, these soldiers became increasingly reluctant to fight in distant lands in what were seldom victorious campaigns. M oreover, the financial weakness o f the governm ent meant that their salaries were often far in arrears. Because o f this problem , and also because o f the opportunities offered, janissaries entered into trade o r crafts. T h ey became an im portant element in the guild system. T h eir new status meant that they could not be easily disciplined and they were financially in ­ dependent. B y the end o f the eighteenth century they had becom e a p rivi­ leged element in the state w ith a m ajor political role. T h eir strength as a fighting force was another matter. It has been estimated that o f the 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 enrolled janissaries, only 20,000 could be called upon in event o f war.6 T he fact that members o f the military class could so easily pass over into com ­ merce also show s h ow the system o f social classes had weakened.

T H E BA LK AN C H R IS T IA N S T h e Balkan Christian population was thus living w ithin a system that was rapidly declining at the center. In fact, i f w e examine the bleak history o f the O ttom an state in the eighteenth century, the question imm ediately arises w h y the entire structure did not sim ply collapse from pressures w ithin both the Christian and the M uslim sectors o f society. A n answer perhaps lies in the basic resilience o f the O ttom an administrative system and its ability to isolate its potential opponents. Th e Porte (or Sublim e P orte), a term com m only applied to the O ttom an governm ent, did not attempt to deal w ith the indi­ vidual citizen directly. It preferred to make use o f a chain o f intermediaries w hom it could control and w h o in turn could bear m uch o f the blame for disasters. F o r instance, the O ttom an governm ent did not concern itself w ith the daily life o r the beliefs o f its Christian population. T h e mass o f peasantry was controlled on the higher level by the O rthodox church through the millet system and on the lower, local basis by village authorities chosen on tradi­ tional bases. These tw o institutions w ere thus the essential element in the life o f the Balkan Christian.

The Orthodox millet T h e Balkan peasant, although w ell aware o f the pow er o f the central and provincial adm inistration, was m ost directly affected b y the actions o f officials o f his ow n religion, including his ecclesiastical authorities. W hen the M uslim armies took over new areas during the great period o f conquest, they usually found that the form er civil administrators had fled, had been killed, o r had 6 Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354 - 1804, vol. V o f Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold, eds., A History o f East Central Europe (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 1977), p. 193-

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule to be excluded from office because o f their resistance to Ottoman authority. Since the church hierarchy usually remained, the custom of using the leaders

0f the religious communities for government functions was established early. Although they maintained their superior position, the conquerors were wili­ n g to work with people of any monotheistic religion whose leaders submit­ ted to their authority. They respected in particular the Christians and Jews, the “people of the book,” that is, with a revealed scripture. The members of the accepted faiths were organized into communities, known as millets. By the eighteenth century there was a Gregorian Armenian, a Catholic, and a Jewish millet, but they were far smaller than the Orthodox. There was also a Muslim millet. For the Orthodox the most significant step was taken in 1454, immediately after the capture of Constantinople. After the fall of the imperial city, Mehmed the Conqueror considered himself the heir to the Byzantine emperors and the first ruler o f the world. He personally was extremely interested in Greek thought and theological doctrine; he held in great respect the civilization that he had subdued. Determined to assure a contented Christian population, he sought a suitable head for the Orthodox church and one with whom he could cooperate. At the time the Orthodox world was torn apart by ecclesiastical disputes, in particular over the question of reunion with the church of Rome. Mehmed chose as the new patriarch a respected scholar, George Scholarios, who as a monk had taken the name Gennadios. He had the advantage of being a firm opponent o f union. Together the two men supervised a new church organization, and in 1454 the sultan conferred upon the patriarch his insignia of office. As head of the Orthodox millet the patriarch o f Constantinople assumed heavy duties and responsibilities. Previously, the Byzantine emperors had played a major role in church affairs; like the sultans, they were regarded as God’s representatives on earth and responsible to him for the welfare o f their sub­ jects. Under the emperors, religious affairs were controlled by the patriarch and the Holy Synod; the patriarch was the highest state official after the emperor. When disputes arose over dogma, the emperor would summon a council o f representatives of the five patriarchs - from Constantinople, An­ tioch, Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Rome before the schism - over which he °ften presided. With the removal o f the emperor and his officials after the conquest, a major portion o f their former duties fell under the jurisdiction of die church. Although theoretically the four eastern patriarchs were equal, in Practice the Constantinople Patriarchate spoke for the Orthodox and gained a clearly superior position. In fact, by the eighteenth century the other churches ad become dependent upon it. Two other autocephalous churches were in existence: in Ohrid for the Bulgars and in Pec for the Serbs. N ot only were j^ey not equal to Constantinople, but by the middle of the century they had become so weakened that the Constantinople office was able to obtain their abolition. The Patriarchate then had jurisdiction over the entire Balkan pen­ 49

The eighteenth century insula and the Aegean and Ionian islands. Accordingly, it was the major cen­ ter for the Balkan Orthodox people. Although the sultan had agreed that the Orthodox establishment would be run by the patriarch with a Holy Synod composed of his metropolitans, he maintained a strong degree of control. The patriarch was in theory elected by the synod and then confirmed by the sultan. Although they had the power to dictate the choice, the sultans at first rarely interfered in the elections un­ less state interests were clearly at issue. The patriarchs, in turn, were seldom found in opposition to Ottoman policy. Other high church officials were chosen or dismissed by the action of the patriarch and the synod, but the sultan’s approval was necessary. The Patriarchate had full control of the O r­ thodox churches and their property. The clergy were under the jurisdiction o f their own courts, and they were free from taxation. The church was sup­ ported by fees, donations, and income from property. The patriarch’s temporal duties and his power had by the eighteenth cen­ tury become immense. He was the millet bashi (head o f the millet) and ethnarch (secular ruler) o f the Orthodox population. Since he was a high official in the Ottoman government and part of the askeri bureaucratic class, he was entided to a standard with two horsetails (an Ottoman governor or general had three, the sultan six). The patriarch was responsible to his ruler for the behavior and loyalty of his flock. He was also given important duties con­ nected with tax collecting and the maintenance of public order. His judicial functions were particularly significant for the Christian population. The church had full jurisdiction over a wide range o f affairs, including matters relating to marriage and the family and, in practice, commercial cases involving only Christians. Although criminal cases, such as murder and theft, were theoreti­ cally under the control o f the Muslim judicial system, the Orthodox courts often handled these as well, as long as no Muslim was involved. In adminis­ tering justice the church based its decisions on canon law, Byzantine statutory law, local customs, and church writings and traditions. Ecclesiastical courts could hand out penalties such as imprisonment, fines, and exile, along with the denial o f the sacraments and excommunication. The Christian population usually preferred to have recourse to these courts, where they were judged on an equal basis and their testimony had weight and significance. In integrating Orthodox institutions into their system, the Ottoman gov­ ernment had the advantage of being able to incorporate a complete admin­ istrative network. The church had already organized the lands under its juris­ diction into dioceses and subdioceses based on the number of their adherents in an area. A hierarchy from the lowest priest right through the patriarch existed throughout the Balkan lands. Moreover, the church and its officers were accustomed to working with, and not in opposition to, the civil au­ thority. Since the Patriarchate was so closely associated with the Ottoman state, its institutions were bound to reflect the gradual decline and disintegration of 50

CT

An Orthodox priest’s house on the Bosphorus

The eighteenth century the other governmental institutions. This condition was most apparent at the top and in the office of the patriarch itself. Like other high offices, this posi­ tion came to be awarded to the candidate who could pay the highest price. By the end o f the seventeenth century it has been estimated that the cost of an election was about 20,000 piastres, or 3,000 gold pounds, an amount that rose to 5,600 pounds in 1727 and then declined. With this source of revenue it was to the advantage o f the Porte for the position to change hands as often as possible. From 1595 to 1695 there were sixty-one separate nominations, but since one man could hold the office many times, only thirty-one individuals were involved. The situation subsequendy improved. In the eighteenth cen­ tury there were only thirty-one appointments, involving twenty-three candi­ dates.7 T h e costs o f purchasing the Patriarchate were added to the church budget until 1763. W ith these expenditures and the enorm ous losses o w in g to corrup­ tion w ithin the organization, the debt o f the Patriarchate reached 1.5 million Turkish piastres by around 1820. Other Orthodox establishments carried similar burdens. Since these charges were passed on dow n through the hierarchy, the costs ultimately had to be paid by the members o f the church on the lowest level, that is, the peasantry, o r from profits from ecclesiastical property. On the estates ow ned by the church this question concerned the dues and o b li­ gations o f the peasants w ho w orked the lands. In M oldavia and Wallachia the issue was to involve the use o f income from local monasteries to support outside institutions.

Nevertheless, despite its close connections with the Ottoman government and the corruption in its operation, the Orthodox church did provide im­ portant services for the Christian people. Most significant was the fact that it kept the Christian community almost unchanged in an ideological sense until the age o f the national movements. Certainly, the church preserved carefully the idea o f Christian exclusiveness. It taught that the Ottoman Empire had been victorious because the sins of the Christians had called down God’s punishment. Muslim rule was, however, ephemeral; a new age would soon arrive when the Christian people would again emerge triumphant. Although the Christian was a second-class citizen in the Muslim state, his religious leaders taught him that on a higher moral basis he was infinitely superior to his conquerors. In his personal, daily life the Balkan peasant was surrounded by Christian symbols, by crosses and ikons, and not by reminders o f O tto­ man domination. In addition, the civil jurisdiction of the church, particularly its control of family matters, assured that there would be little intermingling of religions or nationalities. All religious organizations forbade intermarriage. Christian girls of Balkan nationalities did indeed often become part of Muslim harems, 7

Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p p . 201- 203.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule but they thereby lost their national and religious identification and joined the Muslim society. There was little chance o f conversions from the Muslim com­ munity to Christianity, since this action was punishable by death. In general, both Christian and Muslim authorities acted to maintain the religious sta­ tus quo. The Patriarchate also preserved Orthodoxy against other sects. During the period of Ottoman domination the major opponent was considered to be the Catholic church. And indeed Catholicism was the main enemy: it was both crusading and intolerant of other beliefs. The Orthodox position was usually that Ottoman rule was preferable to that o f a Catholic power. In this matter the interests o f the patriarch coincided with those of the Porte, whose main enemies were at first the Catholic Habsburgs and Venice. Although Catholic France was an Ottoman ally, that state did not become a major instrument for Catholic penetration in the Balkans. In the eighteenth century the O rtho­ dox authorities were well aware that in the areas where their followers lived under the jurisdiction of a Catholic state, notably in Transylvania, their po­ sition was worse than in the Ottoman Empire. In one major respect the identification of the foreign interests of O rtho­ doxy and the Ottoman state was to be modified during the eighteenth cen­ tury. At that time, Russia, the only Orthodox great power, emerged as the major external threat to the empire. The patriarch and most of the Orthodox Balkan population looked to and expected assistance from this state. Con­ stant Orthodox missions went from Ottoman lands to Russia to seek mainly financial but sometimes military support. It should be strongly emphasized, however, that the Russian government never obtained a dominant influence in the Orthodox hierarchy. The church, like the Orthodox people, expected virtually limidess aid from the northern power, but there was no intention to establish anything like a dependent relationship. During the eighteenth cen­ tury the church was under one predominant national influence, but it was from the strongest Christian group within the empire. Greek influence: the Phanariots Over the centuries o f Ottoman rule it could be expected that some Christian nationalities would enjoy better conditions than others. By the eighteenth century certain Greeks had won a privileged status in comparison not only with other Christians, but also with most Muslims. The majority of the Greek people lived much like their Balkan neighbors; their fate will be discussed in a later section. A minority, however, had moved out o f the limited, parochial, peasant world and had won wealth and power through commercial ventures, finance, or close association with the Ottoman government. In comparison with other Balkan people, the Greeks were notable for their dispersion. In antiquity Greek communities were to be found around the shores o f the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and in Asia Minor. After the 53

The eighteenth century Ottoman conquest Greeks emigrated in particular to Italy, where the King­ dom of the Two Sicilies and Venice were to harbor large Greek colonies. For the future the Venetian center was to prove most important. With the expan­ sion o f European trade, and with the participation o f Greeks in it, Greek colonies appeared in the major European cities; London, Vienna, Marseilles, and later Odessa were to prove particularly influential. As at home, the Greek colonies were organized around the local Orthodox church; the members preserved their language and a strong awareness of religious and national identity. These emigrants were not a peasant population. Usually employed as shopkeepers or merchants, they were found at all economic levels. Some became extremely successful; others barely survived. Together they formed a tight, nationally conscious society whose members had opportunities for education and a vision far beyond that o f the inhabitant o f a Balkan village. Greek nationals also prospered from their predominance in the commercial life o f the empire. In the Balkan peninsula, Greeks formed an important ele­ ment o f the population of the major cities, especially those located on the trade routes. With their connections outside the empire, their strong eco­ nomic advantages, and their concern for education, they were the most pros­ perous and successful of the Balkan people. The really privileged position among the Christians was held, however, not by merchants or even by high church officials, but by another group, the Phanariot oligarchy with its center in Constantinople. Deriving its name from the Phanar, or lighthouse, district, where most of the Orthodox Christians lived and where the Patriarchate was located, this group was largely Greek in nationality, but its members included Hellenized Italian, Romanian, and Al­ banian families. The influence of the Phanariots was derived mainly from their great wealth, which was gained largely through the high offices they held in the state and the financial rewards that could be extracted from them. They thus profited exceedingly from Ottoman corruption. From the middle of the seventeenth century they enjoyed a unique position in the empire be­ cause o f both their wealth and their political influence. As the military power and prestige o f the empire declined, and the borders contracted, the Porte was forced to face the fact that it would have to meet the European powers on their terms. Since it could not overpower its adver­ saries on the battlefield, it would have to learn to deal with them through diplomacy and negotiation. Because Turkish officials did not easily learn other languages, they became dependent on intermediaries in their dealings with foreigners. As the best educated of the Balkan peoples, and the most closely connected with European countries, the Greeks were fully suited to this task. They thus usually filled the post of dragoman at all levels. Although this term is translated as “interpreter,” a dragoman was in fact an agent or an interme­ diary, rather than someone simply trained in languages. Through their skill in this occupation, Greeks came to control four major posts in the Ottoman administration: grand dragoman, who became something close to a perma­ 54

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule nent secretary for foreign affairs; dragom an o f the navy, w h o became the interm ediary between the grand admiral o f the navy and the G reek islands; and the governorships o f the tw o Rom anian provinces o f Wallachia and M o l­ davia. T h eir role as rulers o f the Principalities w ill be discussed in a fo llow in g section. H ere only the relationship o f the Phanariots to the O ttom an govern ­ ment and the Patriarchate is under consideration. Th e im portance o f the Balkan Christian element in O ttom an adm inistra­ tion has been emphasized. H ow ever, before the seventeenth century, high position in the bureaucracy w ent almost exclusively to converts. In contrast, the Phanariot officials retained their Christian faith and remained in close touch w ith the Patriarchate. T h e first Phanariot to w in a high post was Panagiotis N ikou sios, w hom A hm ed K opru lii made grand dragom an in 1669. With this office came significant privileges, such as gro w in g a beard and rid­ ing a horse w ith attendants, which previously had been accorded only to M uslim s. T h e m ost fam ous Phanariot statesman w as, however, Alexander M avrokordatos, w h o was grand dragom an from 1673 to 1709. L ik e m any Greeks o f the time he was educated in Italy at the U niversity o f Padua. H e then became a doctor. H is advancement was rapid; he became grand d rago ­ man in his thirties. H e was the ch ief O ttom an diplom at at the negotiations leading to the Treaty o f K arlow itz (Sremski K arlovci); his son Ioannis held a similar position in the discussions relating to the Treaty o f Passarowitz (Pozarevac). A s translators and mediators, the Phanariot diplomats were, o f course, able to learn m any o f the O ttom an state secrets, and they were directly in touch w ith foreign governm ents. T he Phanariots at this time w ere also deeply involved in the affairs o f the Patriarchate. T h rou gh their financial power, they w ere able to exert a large measure o f control over the church institutions. A lw ays in need o f money, the church naturally turned to the wealthy laymen. A great deal o f the in­ debtedness o f the Patriarchate was caused by the extreme corruption o f the empire and the necessity o f purchasing offices and m aking other payments. In the eighteenth century, for instance, the cost o f the Patriarchate was high. A lthough few candidates had the cash necessary, they could borrow from Phanariot sources at 10 percent. O nce a banker had invested in a successful candidate, he had a measure o f control over his debtor. T h e Phanariots also wielded influence by acquiring seats in the synod assigned to laymen and by assuring that vacant positions in the church administration were filled by com pliant candidates. T he period o f Phanariot control in O rthodox affairs coincided w ith a shift from a universalist to a Greek national emphasis, particularly in the top church hierarchy. G reek had always been the language o f the Patriarchate, but it had not been that o f the m ajority o f the Balkan churches. T h e Slavic churches, the Patriarchate o f Pec and the A rchbishopric o f O hrid, and the Rom anian institutions used prim arily C hurch Slavic. There was also an assumption that the Constantinople office represented O rthodox Christians in general and

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The eighteenth century certainly not Greeks in particular. T h is emphasis underwent a m ajor shift in the eighteenth century. T he m ost decided action taken was the abolition o f the organizations o f Pec in 1766 and O hrid in 1767. B oth institutions, which served Slavic peoples, were placed under an exarch appointed by the patri­ arch. T he results o f this m ove were to prove m ost dam aging to the cultural interests o f the Bulgarians. Their ecclesiastic and educational institutions were now Greek-dom inated. T he Serbs had an alternate religious center at Sremski K arlovci in the H absbu rg Monarchy. A G reek hierarchy also was in control in M oldavia and Wallachia. H ere Phanariot Greeks ran the political life o f the country. In the Balkans only the M ontenegrin church, under a hereditary prince-bishop, maintained a posi­ tion o f independence. A t the end o f the eighteenth century this organization had complete religious autonomy. H ow ever, the remoteness, backwardness, and poverty o f this area made it a matter o f little concern in the general O rthodox w orld. Th e center o f O rthodox prestige and pow er remained the Constantinople Patriarchate. A lthough it did not control the G eorgian or Russian churches, neither was a challenge to its position. T h e G eorgian in­ stitution was too weak, and Peter the Great abolished the Russian Patriarch­ ate. T h e Russian church and state w ere also regarded by the O rthodox as sources o f financial assistance and political support. A lthough there was much resistance within the church to the penetration o f the lay elements represented by the Phanariot interest, the outlook o f this grou p did profoundly influence the attitude o f the upper hierarchy o f the O rthodox church throughout the empire. D espite the fact that the Phanariots served and cooperated closely w ith the O ttom an governm ent, their aim w as not the welfare o r strengthening o f the empire. T he great Phanariot families felt themselves directly tied to the Byzantine E m pire.8 T h ey took great trouble in trying to discover o r fabricate genealogies that w ould link them to noble Byzantine dynasties. A lth ou gh these connections could sel­ dom be demonstrated w ithout fraud, individuals did adopt the names and titles o f their supposed ancestors. T h eir ultimate goal, an outlook that em ­ braced the entire O rthodox w orld, was nothing less than the recreation o f a triumphant Byzantine Empire, which they envisioned as a multinational state, governed by a Greek nobility, w ith Greek as the language o f governm ent. T h e O rthodox church was thus under the strong influence o f a class that intended to inherit the O ttom an Em pire and replace a M uslim w ith a Greek O rthodox regime. In the next century this concept was to be the basis o f the Megali Idea (Great Idea); it w ould play a m ajor role in shaping the G reek national outlook until 1922. Prom inent Phanariots, in particular those w h o became governors o f the D anubian Principalities, adopted what they re­ 8 See Cyril Mango, “The Phanariots and the Byzantine Tradition,” in Richard Clogg, ed., The Struggle far Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the isoth Anniversary o f the Greek War o f Independence (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973), pp. 41- 66.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule garded as Byzantine styles in their conduct of government and in the luxuri­ ous ordering of their lives. Phanariots looked to Russia, the only indepen­ dent Orthodox state, for assistance. Thus in the eighteenth century one national group, which had won wealth and high position, did assume a predominant position in the Orthodox mil­ let. This action was particularly significant because the church provided the sole means o f education for most Balkan Christians. The Greek imprint on ecclesiastical culture was not acceptable to most o f the non-Greek nationali­ ties. Among the first steps in the national movements of the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Romanians was the effort to throw off Greek influence and substitute their own national patterns. This reaction naturally affected the prestige of the Constantinople Patriarchate and limited its effectiveness in influencing all of the Balkan Orthodox people. National movements were to develop apart from, and sometimes in conflict with, the highest religious authority. Provincial government: village communities In the preceding sections the emphasis has been on the upper level of O tto­ man administration and on the corresponding Christian institutions. The Ottoman government also had a highly developed network of provincial gov­ ernment, which had a Christian counterpart in the village communities with their traditional organization. Many changes were made in the provincial institutions during the entire period of Ottoman rule; this matter will be discussed in greater detail in connection with specific historical issues. For the present it is sufficient to note that the Balkan peninsula, which was re­ garded as a single administrative unit, was divided into sections that were called at various times eyalets, vilayets, or pashaliks; these in turn had subor­ dinate jursidictions known as sanjaks or livas, which were further subdivided into kazas, then into nabiyes. The area was also organized into judicial dis­ tricts called kadiliks; treasury officials, defterdars, had a separate administra­ tive system. The local authorities worked in cooperation with the resident sipahis, who had definite duties and obligations. The provincial administra­ tion also controlled police forces. Janissaries, who were under the jurisdiction of the central and not the local government, were also supposed to perform police duties. The chief official at the local level, usually titled pasha, relied for advice on a council, a divan, in which Christian notables and guild offi­ cials might also sit. The vast majority o f Balkan Christians lived in the countryside in small villages organized on traditional and pre-Ottoman bases. Local variations will be discussed subsequently, but it is possible to make some wide general­ izations. The villages were usually run by officials known by various titles, according to the local language: archon, knez, chorbazhi, koca-ba$i, or hodzabashi, for example. Some were elected, according to local custom, by the male population of the village, usually from among the more prosperous or braver 57

The eighteenth century o f the men; others held office simply because they were members of a family or clan that traditionally held the position. They were assisted by, or they governed in cooperation with, the leading men of the community, whom we will refer to as notables or elders. Most communities were controlled by the leading notables. Great decisions, involving the life and fortunes o f the in­ habitants, were usually discussed by assemblies of all o f the male members of the group. Most villages also formed a part of a larger organization; repre­ sentatives from local communities met at a central location to discuss com­ mon problems. Village notables could form part of the local Ottoman offi­ cial’s council, or they could act as unofficial advisers on Christian affairs. The notables played certain essential roles in the Ottoman administration. Like the church officials they acted as intermediaries between the Ottoman government and the peasant. Their role in tax collecting and in the assess­ ment o f what each individual owed was particularly important. In return for their services, they received special privileges, for instance, exemption from the head tax. Over the years the notables won for themselves a generally bad reputation. The corruption o f the Ottoman system allowed many to profit at the expense o f those under their authority. Some held timars. Others gained wealth through the tax-farming system; that is, they held by agreement with the Ottoman government the right to collect taxes, and they fully exploited the opportunity to enrich themselves. The notable’s role in revenue collect­ ing, particularly where it was in kind, enabled him to influence the sale and distribution of local agricultural produce. He could use his advantage to en­ ter into trade in these commodities himself. He often lent money to the local peasants and thus won the traditional stigma attached to usurers in rural societies. Notables were also in a position to buy land, and they could come to control considerable estates. Their wealth naturally allowed them to live in a different manner from that of their poorer neighbors. Despite the many abuses, the local notables did provide Christian leader­ ship in the countryside. As the central government declined, their importance rose. They were to play a major role in the national movements of the next century. In provincial society they, together with the merchant and the guild members in the trading centers, formed a Christian elite that worked with its Ottoman counterparts. These people together made the Ottoman system work even at times when the centrd government was in disarray. At the bottom o f the social scale were, o f course, the peasants, who farmed the land and paid the taxes. They lived under a variety o f conditions. It must be first emphasized that in the eighteenth century the Balkan peninsula was covered by vast forests and great stretches of unused land. In the second half o f the century, war, banditry, and disease caused a depopulation of wide areas. The uncertain political situation, together with the existence o f more than adequate pastureland, caused the peasant in most areas to rely on animal husbandry as his main occupation. He raised cattle, sheep, and pigs. If local conditions became too bad or taxes were too high, peasant families could 58

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule move. Serfdom was not prevalent; the Balkan peasant usually was not tied to the soil. Moreover, Ottoman authorities never were able to control the entire peninsula. There were always remote regions o f hill and mountain country where the central government could not reach the individual. For the peasant who earned his living tilling the soil, conditions could differ widely. As previously explained, the agricultural land was regarded as fundamentally belonging to the sultan, who held it from God. All land was divided into three categories: miri, or state land; miilk, or private property; and vakif, which belonged to religious foundations. The timar system rested naturally on miri land. Immediately after the Ottoman conquest, the position o f the peasant at least in theory was not bad. Although he had to make certain definite payments, he had important rights. He was regarded as a hereditary tenant or sharecropper, and he could pass on his land to his heirs. Moreover, he could usually farm his holding as he saw fit. There were often no controls on his methods or over what he chose to produce. He could also sell the right to work his plot or transfer it, as long as he obtained permission from the sipahi and found someone who would assume his obligations. The peas­ ant also held some possessions as private property, whether by law or by tradition. In the villages the houses, gardens, and some communal pasture and forest land qualified as such. Most timar land was devoted to the upkeep of the sipahi. Some estates, however, were preserved for the public treasury and used to compensate high state officials or to support members of the sultan’s family or household. The vakif land also became o f great significance. It was possible for an individual to assure personal salvation by giving property or money to a Muslim chari­ table foundation with the intention of having the income used for a pious purpose. Since the Ottoman state did not provide social services, these insti­ tutions supported hospitals, orphanages, and similar public services. Al­ though the grants were primarily intended for religious and charitable pur­ poses, they could also serve individual interests. The donor could arrange for the position of supervisor, or miitevdli, to be permanendy assigned to a mem­ ber of his family; sometimes the income from the property sufficed only for this person’s support. Christian churches enjoyed similar privileges through foundations supported by bequests from their members. The peasant whose land formed part o f a timar or a vakif was obviously closely dependent on the man who held formal control. This situation be­ came more apparent as the central government weakened and proved unable to enforce its edicts in the provinces. Most detrimental to the position o f the peasant was to be the gradual conversion of some timar land into estates, called chifiliks, which were in operation controlled as the private property of their holders. These arose through various processes. Often a sipahi was able to obtain what were in fact hereditary rights over his territory; sometimes a family or an individual would receive the right o f tax farming on a perma­ nent, hereditary basis. On these lands the individual peasant was subject to 59

The eighteenth century much heavier obligations than before. On the timar he had had certain defi­ nite rights; the state determined his obligations and regulated his relations with the sipahi. The new owners were not similarly controlled, and they had great influence in local government. Although most chiftliks were organized on a sharecrop basis, the peasant had to surrender a much greater proportion of his produce than on the timar. His supplementary payments in kind, money, or labor were higher. In many places he was reduced to the position o f an agricultural laborer. In reviewing the position of peasants in the Balkans in the eighteenth cen­ tury, it should be emphasized that there was no single uniform system in effect. It is extremely difficult to make wide generalizations because the ques­ tion has not been studied in detail. Different areas obviously underwent vary­ ing developments. However, as far as landholding is concerned, it can be safely said that some peasants lived on timar land. Their obligations de­ pended on the individual situation, but they were in a better position than their counterparts working on chiftlik estates, where payments and obliga­ tions were higher. For all peasants the question of the control o f the local government was essential. Where the sipahi or chiftlik holder dominated the authorities and the police, the peasant was clearly in a worse position. There were, however, also wide areas where villages paid nothing for the use of the land. Privileged areas and remote villages paid state taxes, when they could be collected, and little else. When conditions became too bad, the peasant had the alternative of fleeing to the mountains, over the border into a neigh­ boring state, or to a large city, such as Thessaloniki or Constantinople. Since the preceding discussion has applied principally to the Christians, a word should be said about the Muslims, whether of Turkish or Balkan na­ tional background. Muslims were, o f course, to be found in the towns as government officials, military men, or members o f guilds. In the countryside there were Muslim landowners and also peasant villagers. Obviously the si­ pahi or the chiftlik owner was in a strong position and was part of the ruling establishment. The peasant, in contrast, was usually not in a favorable situa­ tion. Some peasants were converts from the Balkan nationalities; others were Turkish colonists brought from Anatolia. Many of the Muslim villages held their land from the state as virtual private property. However, despite the fact that in theory the Muslims held a superior place in Ottoman society, the Muslim peasant, on the bottom of the social ladder, was often little better off than his Christian neighbor. Although excused from some taxes, he still paid a large proportion o f his income to the state, and he suffered equally from extortionate local officials and the deprivations o f warfare. He was also sub­ ject to recruitment into the army, which the Christian was spared. For all o f the citizens of the empire, the single major common complaint concerned the tax system. At issue were not only the amounts demanded, but the methods of collection. The question will be discussed throughout this volume, since it remained the major source of controversy and grievance until

60

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule the fail o f the empire. As the Ottoman government became weaker and local revolt and national feelings grew stronger, resistance to tax payments to an unpopular regime naturally increased. The Christian inhabitant of the empire paid taxes to the state, to whoever held the land he worked, and to his church. The payments could be in kind, in money, or in labor dues. As far as state taxes were concerned, he paid one, the harag, a head tax, that was not levied on Muslims. This payment was regarded as a replacement for the obligation to serve in the army owed by the Muslim population. In addition to the regular taxes, the Christian could be assessed special amounts for particular purposes. Most burdensome once decline set in were the taxes extracted at time of war. We have seen that the Christian population had on the provincial level its own political organizations under local leaders. There were also Christian armed forces. When it early proved inexpedient or impossible to try to hold all o f the lands o f the Balkans with its own troops, the Ottoman government assigned either to villages or to groups of Christians the duty of garrisoning important points, such as bridges or passes, or of simply assuring peace and order in their districts. The Christian militia could be appointed by the local Muslim or Christian officials. Members, known usually as armatoles, received tax exemptions, land, or other payments. These men were armed and they were trained to fight. In practice, they proved difficult for the central govern­ ment to control. Despite its use of local militia, the Porte, especially during the period of decline, was unable to guarantee law and order throughout the Balkans. At all times certain areas were controlled by bands who defied state control. Individual voyagers and merchants had to travel in caravans protected by armed retainers, especially in the mountains. They particularly feared the bandits, known as klephts, haiduks, or haiduts, according to the local lan­ guage. These oudaws operated in bands o f up to a hundred men and often had the full cooperation o f the local inhabitants. In good weather they lived in the forests and hills; in winter they retreated to hide in friendly villages. Like the official militia, they were skilled in the use of firearms and in guerilla warfare. Often the link between bandit and armatole was close; they could interchange roles. Over the years the bandits came to enjoy a high reputation among the Christian peasantry, for some o f whom they became a symbol o f resistance to political and social repression. They in fact did offer an alternative to the individual who was under severe pressure from his landlord or the state. Although these men were treated as heroes in popular mythology, legend, and song, by the eighteenth century the armed outlaw had become a major problem throughout the Balkans. By that time a floating population o f mili­ tary men, both Christian and Muslim, inflicted continual terror on many Parts o f the countryside. Some of the bands were formed from deserters from the army or from men who had lost their lands and homes as the Ottoman

61

The eighteenth century forces retreated before the Habsburg and Russian attacks. These desperate men, along with the bandits, devastated defenseless villages. The failure to control these groups was another perfectly justified grievance o f the Chris­ tians against the Ottoman authorities, though the Muslim population, o f course, suffered equally. The city The major cities of the Balkan peninsula lay along the great military and trade routes to Europe. They were the administrative, military, and judicial centers for the Ottoman government.9 Here the same separation of people by na­ tionality and religion existed that has been seen in the countryside. The cities were divided into quarters, mahallas, each inhabited by a separate group o f the population. The national and religious composition could often contrast sharply with that of the countryside. The cities naturally held strong concen­ trations of the commercial people of the empire, the Jews, the Greeks, the Tsintsars, and the Armenians; the Muslim element, whether composed of administrators, military men, or holders of estates, usually preferred to live in urban centers. Within the city the activities of the artisans were strictly controlled through the guild system. These organizations could be Christian, Muslim, or mixed in membership. Like their equivalents in the West, their aim was to produce what was needed for the market and to assure a fair division of work and profit for the membership. They exerted a strict control over the price, qual­ ity, methods of production, and sources o f raw materials for their goods. Since their efforts were directed toward securing a stable market and a prod­ uct o f guaranteed quality, they tended to restrict the activities o f their mem­ bers and to oppose new methods. They were also under strong state super­ vision. At the head of the guilds stood the masters, followed by the journeymen and apprentices. In addition to their role in the production and distribution of goods, the organizations acted as charitable institutions for their members and cared for the sick, widows, and orphans. Most guilds, representing a conservative and traditional way of life, upheld a strict moral code. T H E W ARS OF TH E E IG H T E E N T H C E N T U R Y

During the eighteenth century the fate o f the Christian people was deter­ mined not only by the political and social structure of which they formed a part, but by the constant wars that ravaged a large part o f the Balkan lands. During this period the military weakness o f the empire was demonstrated by repeated defeats; the state was on the defensive in relation to the European great powers (see Map n). The Ottoman disasters had an extremely detri9

For the Ottoman city see Sugar, Southeastern Europe, p p. 72- 92.

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6? Map 11 Ottoman territorial losses, 1683-1815

The eighteenth century mental effect on the Balkan lands. The great battles took place deep within the peninsula. Balkan cities and villages were destroyed; populations were scattered. War taxes and army requisitions further impoverished the coun­ tryside. Before the end o f the seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire had been in the advantageous position o f seeing its potential opponents divided. Be­ ginning with the reign o f Francis I, the French government had attempted to bring the Porte into its system of alliances. Along with Sweden and Po­ land, the empire was to form a part o f the Eastern Barrier that France wished to use first against the Habsburg Empire and then against Russia. The rivalry between France and the Habsburg Empire was to prove of benefit right up to the eighteenth century. The great issues of the Reformation, the CounterReformation, and the Thirty Years’ War similarly distracted the European states. Although Ottoman military power in fact commenced to decline after the reign o f Suleiman the Magnificent, the rivalries among the European great powers made it impossible for them to organize a new crusade of Chris­ tian states. Because of this situation the Ottoman Empire was able to continue to make some territorial conquests. Two Venetian possessions, Cyprus and Crete, were taken in 1573 and 1669. Podolia was gained from Poland in 1676; this acquisition marked the furthest extension northward of Ottoman penetra­ tion, but also the beginning o f what was to be a bitter struggle for control o f the land north of the Black Sea. The Ottoman successes were largely due to the wise policies o f the one able sultan of the century, Murad IV (16231646), and of the Kopriilu family o f grand vezirs. The first, Mehmed (16561661), concentrated on internal reform; his son, Ahmed (1661-1678), recom­ menced a strong military program with the emphasis on Transylvania and the Ukraine. In 1678 Kara Mustafa Pasha, the brother-in-law of Ahmed, became grand vezir. His great ambition was to inflict a decisive defeat on the major Ottoman opponent, the Habsburg Empire. In 1683, with an army of ninety thousand, o f whom perhaps fifteen to twenty thousand were effective troops, he arrived before Vienna, which remained under siege from July to Septem­ ber. Faced by this formidable threat, the Austrian military commander, Charles of Lorraine, withdrew from the city and left it to be defended by a force of under twenty thousand. The siege was lifted in September by an allied force commanded by Charles and King John Sobieski of Poland. The sultan had Kara Mustafa strangled for his failure, and the empire thus lost its most able military commander. Encouraged by the victory, the Ottoman opponents banded together in a new Holy League, composed of Austria, the papacy, Venice, and Poland, to be joined later by Russia. Assaults were then launched on the major periph­ eral Ottoman military centers. Buda, the capital o f Ottoman Hungary, fell in 1686; Belgrade was taken in 1688. Venice enjoyed similar victories; a campaign was undertaken in the Peloponnesus, and Athens was occupied in 1687. The 64

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule forward movement o f the Western allies, however, was soon halted. A new Koprulii vczir, Mustafa, came to office in 1689 under Sultan Suleiman III (1687-1691). The War of the League of Augsburg with France forced Austria to withdraw troops to that front. In a counteroffensive of 1690 the Ottoman army was able to drive back the Habsburg army. In 1697, by which time Russia had joined the allies, the situation was again reversed. The end of the war in Western Europe released the imperial forces, who under the command of their brilliant general, Eugene of Savoy, were able to inflict a devastating defeat on their enemy at Senta. Faced with disaster, the Porte was forced to make peace. The Treaty o f Karlowitz of 1699, concluded with Austria, Venice, and Poland, marks a watershed in Ottoman history and is one of the major peace treaties of modern European history. In this agreement, for the first time, the Ottoman Empire ceded territory permanently to Christian powers. The peace was negotiated through British and Dutch mediation and involved much disagreement among the allies. The Habsburg Empire was most inter­ ested in ending the fighting, and it received the principal gains. In the treaty Austria annexed extensive and valuable territories: Transylvania and sections of Hungary, Croatia, and Slavonia that had been under Ottoman control. Venice took the Peloponnesus and most of Dalmatia, and Poland regained Podolia. In the agreement the Habsburg Empire secured important commercial and religious clauses, which were reconfirmed in later pacts. Article XIV stated: “Let there be free commerce for the subjects o f both parties according to earlier sacred treaties in all realms and subject territories of the emperors, so that it may be carried on in useful fashion without fraud and deceit for both parties.” Commercial relations were in fact to increase steadily throughout the next century. The provision in favor o f the Catholic religion, contained in article XIII, stated that the sultan reconfirmed previous privileges so that the adherents o f the aforementioned religion can restore and repair their churches and may carry on the customary rituals which have come down from earlier times. And let no one be permitted to establish any kind o f vexation or monetary demand on the religious people of any order or condition, against the sacred treaties and against the divine laws, to hinder the practice o f that religion, but rather let the adherents of it flourish and rejoice in the customary imperial sense o f duty.10 Russia, who had not joined in these negotiations, made a separate peace m 1700. The terms included the Russian acquisition of the port of Azov,

10

T h e text o f th e T reaty o f K arlow itz is in F red L. Israel, ed., M ajor Peace Treaties o fModem History, 164S -1967 (N ew York: C helsea H o u se, 1967), l i , 869- 882.

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The eighteenth century which had been taken in 1696, and the right to send a resident Russian min­ ister to Constantinople. The Treaty o f Karlowitz was a major Habsburg victory; it marked the climax o f the monarchy’s successful resistance to the repeated Ottoman at­ tacks o f the past century. Although some changes were to be made in the Austrian—Ottoman boundary, this frontier was to remain relatively stable un­ til 1878. Only two permanent changes occurred. Austria took the Banat o f Temesvar (Timi§oara) in 1718 and the province o f Bukovina in 1775. Neverthe­ less, in the course o f the next century the Habsburg Empire was to fight three major wars with the Porte. The initiative for these actions, however, would lie more often in St. Petersburg than in Vienna. T he O ttom an Em pire at this point found itself perpetually on the defensive on the battlefields. In foreign affairs the m ost significant developm ent was the em ergence o f a new strong adversary. A s we have seen, in the past the ch ief opponent had been the H absburg Em pire; France had been a supporter and an ally. In 1682 Peter the Great ascended the Russian throne at the age o f ten. H e first ruled in conjunction w ith his h alf brother, but in 1696, at the latter’s death, Peter was free to em bark upon active policies. H e joined the H o ly League and launched an attack on A zov. A lthough he was involved in cam paigns against the O ttom an Em pire, his principal attention was directed tow ard the Baltic and against Sweden. H e made peace in 1700 so that he could join in a coalition w ith Poland, Saxony, and D enm ark to attack Sw e­ den, which was ruled by the young king Charles X II. A fter being defeated decisively at N arva in N ovem ber 1700, Peter turned to strengthening his m il­ itary forces and reform ing his state. In 1709 Charles XII, in alliance with the Ukrainian forces o f Mazeppa,

commenced an invasion o f Russia, which was halted at Poltava in July. After their crushing defeat, Charles and Mazeppa fled to Constantinople, where they intrigued to draw the Porte into war against Russia. Their efforts were aided by France and also by the leaders o f the Crimean Tartars, who feared Russian encroachment on their lands north o f the Black Sea and the Crimea. In 1710 the Ottoman Empire did declare war on Russia. In the same year Peter embarked upon an ambitious Balkan campaign. F or the first time in the m odern era Russian armies crossed into Balkan lands and advanced as far as Ia§i (Jassy). Peter then called upon the Balkan Christians to rise in aid o f his army. This appeal to the subject population was a new w eapon fo r Russia, although the H absbu rg M onarchy had used it during the invasion o f Serbian lands. T he policy was not a success. A lthough there was som e local action in southern H ercegovina and M ontenegro, there was cer­ tainly no mass uprising o f O rthodox peasants. In the D anubian Principali­ ties, the M oldavian hospodar (governor), Dim itrie Cantem ir, joined Peter, but Constantine Brincoveanu in Wallachia refused to act. In Ju ly 1711 Peter and his arm y were surrounded on the Pruth River. In an impossible m ilitary po ­ sition, the tsar signed a treaty surrendering A zov, which he had only recently

66

67 Map of the Balkans by Herman Moll, 1717

The eighteenth century acquired. Later controversy was to arise over the question w hether the O t­ toman government should not have used the opportunity to gain much more. It perhaps could even have destroyed the Russian army and taken Peter pris­ oner. Certainly the O ttom an Em pire was never again to have a similar o p ­ portunity o r to w in such a victory over Russia. H avin g defeated Russia, the Porte next turned to deal w ith Venice. In 1715 an army was sent to the Peloponnesus and attacks were made on the Ionian Islands and Dalmatia. In the G reek lands the O ttom an troops were w elcom ed by the local population, where the Venetian attempts to w in converts to C a ­ tholicism had aroused much enmity. In 1716 the H absbu rg Em pire joined Venice. Prince Eugene o f Savoy, again back from w ar against France, dem ­ onstrated his great military talents in another sweep through the Balkans. T h e Treaty o f Passarow itz o f 1718 gave the m onarchy new gains; A ustria ac­ quired the Banat o f Temesvar, northern Serbia including Belgrade, and Oltenia (Wallachia west o f the river O lt). T he O ttom an E m pire kept the P elo ­ ponnesus, but Venice retained the Ionian Islands and Dalm atia. B y 1736 all sides were ready to renew the contest. T he O ttom an E m pire had just fought an unsuccessful w ar w ith Persia, but the Porte was concerned about concurrent developments in Poland, w hich threatened to fall under Russian control. T he French governm ent, w ith similar apprehensions, also pressed for action. War began between the em pire and Russia in 1736; A ustria joined the next year. A gain a Russian offensive action was undertaken in M oldavia, this time under the leadership o f General M iinnich. A ppeals were addressed once m ore to the Christian people. T he Russian armies took A zo v and reached as far as Ia§i in the Principalities. Sim ilar successes w ere not, however, achieved by the H absburg forces. T he H ab sbu rg governm ent, alarmed at Russia’s progress, which could lead it to disproportionate gains, insisted upon peace. In the Treaty o f Belgrade o f 1739 the m onarchy surren­ dered m ost o f the acquisitions o f Passarowitz; the O ttom an Em pire thus regained northern Serbia and O ltenia, although the Banat had passed per­ manently to Austrian control. Forced to make peace also, R ussia received A zo v and certain com mercial privileges in the Black Sea. A lth ou gh another unsuccessful w ar w ith Persia was fought from 1743 to 1746, the O ttom an Em pire was to enjoy almost thirty years o f uninterrupted peace in its relations w ith Europe. T he War o f Austrian Succession (17 4 0 1748) and the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) absorbed the European energies. A t this time European politics were dom inated by the figures o f three ener­ getic rulers, Frederick the G reat o f Prussia, M aria Theresa o f A ustria and Catherine the G reat o f Russia. O ttom an interests came into conflict chiefly w ith those o f the am bitious and aggressive Russian empress. T h e true heir o f Peter the Great, Catherine embarked on large-scale plans to extend the Russian boundaries southward, to include the Black Sea coast and the C ri­ mea, and westw ard into Polish lands. T he interests o f the O ttom an vassals,

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule the C rim ean Tartars, w ere thus directly menaced, as were those o f Poland, a state that both the Porte and France wished to maintain. Russian and Prussian interference in Polish internal affairs resulted in the form ation o f the Confederation o f Bar, an association o f Polish nobles w h o led an uprising against the outside control. Russian troops in pursuit o f a group o f rebels crossed the O ttom an frontier and burned a tow n. U rged on by France and the C rim ean Tartars, the O ttom an Em pire declared w ar on Russia in 1768. T he Porte was Soon faced w ith an enemy offensive on tw o fronts. A Russian fleet was sent from the Baltic to the eastern M editerranean, with the aim o f destroying the Turkish naval forces and starting a revolt in Greece. T h e first objective was soon reached. T he Russian fleet under the com m and o f Adm iral Alexis O rlov successfully engaged the O ttom an navy near the island o f C hios and forced it to take shelter in the harbor o f Chesme. A fire ship sent into this port destroyed the fleet. T h e attempt to start a m ajor rebellion in Greece, however, failed. In 1770 Albanian troops crushed the revolt that had broken out. A t the same time a Russian army again advanced into the Principalities and took the O ttom an fortresses o f K ilia, Akkerm an, Ismail, Bender, and Braila. These Russian victories frightened the other E u ­ ropean pow ers, w h o feared a com plete upset o f the balance o f power. F red­ erick the G reat thus pressed for a moderate peace w ith the O ttom an Em pire, to be accom panied by a partition o f Poland. The Treaty o f Kuchuk Kainarji (K iiciik Kajnarca), signed in Ju ly 1774, was the equivalent fo r R ussia o f the Treaty o f K arlow itz for Austria. It was a major military and diplomatic disaster for the Ottoman Empire, since it marked a com plete change in the pow er balance in the Black Sea region. R ussia ac­ quired territory form erly belonging to the Khanate o f the Crim ea, including the fortresses o f K erch and Yenikale, and an area along the Black Sea between the B u g and D nieper rivers. T h e Khanate was declared independent, a status that left it open to Russian penetration and eventual annexation. Russia was also granted extensive commercial privileges - m ost im portant, the right o f free navigation for its merchant ships on the Black Sea and through the Straits. The Black Sea, w hich had previously been a closed O ttom an lake, was open thereafter to the great northern power. Russia, in addition, received the right to appoint consuls in O ttom an cities and to enjoy the same com mercial priv­ ileges as had been granted previously to Britain and France. T he Porte was also required to pay an indemnity.

For the future the most important provisions were to be those establishing what was to become a Russian foothold inside the empire. First, although Russian troops were evacuated from the Principalities, the Ottoman govern­ ment gave formal political and religious guarantees to the population, and Russia was expressly allowed the right to intervene with the Porte in their behalf. Second, in two articles o f the agreement the Porte gave assurances that were interpreted later by Russian diplomats as giving them the right to

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The eighteenth century speak in b eh alf o f the O rthodox Christian population o f the entire empire. A rticle X IV allowed R ussia to build in Constantinople “ a public church o f the G reek ritual, which shall always be under the protection o f the M inisters o f that Em pire, and secure from all coercion and outrage.” Article V I I , the m ost controversial, declared: T h e Sublim e Porte promises to protect constandy the Christian re­ ligion and its churches, and it also allows the M inisters o f the Im ­ perial C o u rt o f Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favor o f the new church at Constantinople, o f which m en­ tion w ill be m ade in Article XIV, as on behalf o f its officiating m in­ isters, prom ising to take such representations into due considera­ tion, as being made by a confidential functionary o f a neighboring and sincerely friendly pow er.11 B efore the signing o f this agreement, in A ugust 1772, Russia, A ustria, and Prussia participated in the first partition o f Poland, a state that had previously been a m ajor power. In 1774 Austria occupied the M oldavian province o f B ukovina, claim ing it as a reward fo r having aided in the achievement o f peace. U nable to resist this annexation, the Porte ceded the area form ally in 1775. D espite the gains in the Treaty o f Kuchuk K ainarji, Catherine had w ider plans em bracing nothing less than the destruction o f the O ttom an Em pire and the partition o f its European territories between Russia and Austria. H er m ost am bitious scheme was the so-called G reek Project, which involved the breakup o f the em pire and the restoration o f a revived Byzantine Em pire, w ith the capital at Constantinople and under Russian protection. T h e em­ press had her second grandson named Constantine w ith this dream in view. O bviously, such a large undertaking could not be accom plished alone, and neither Frederick nor M aria Theresa could be expected to be sympathetic. H ow ever, in 1780, at the death o f his mother, Joseph II ascended the Austrian throne. Weaker than M aria Theresa in dealing w ith Catherine, he allowed h im self to be drawn into the empress’s plans. In a series o f letters and in conversations during a visit made by Joseph to Russia, the partition o f the O ttom an Em pire was arranged. In the division Russia was to obtain the C rim ea, lands along the Black Sea to the Dniester R iver, and territory in the Caucasus. Austria was to receive O ltenia, part o f Serbia, Bosnia, H ercego­ vina, Istria, and Dalm atia. F o r her surrender o f these last tw o places, Venice was to be com pensated by the acquisition o f the Peloponnesus, C rete, and C ypru s, territories that she had once held. France w ould be allowed Syria and E gyp t. T he rem aining O ttom an territory in Europe was to be form ed n

T h e text o f th e Treaty o f K uchuk K ainarji m ay be fo u n d in T hom as E rskine H o llan d , A Lecture on the Treaty Relations o fRussia and Turkey from 1774-1853 (L o n d o n : M acm illan, 1877), PP· 36- 55·

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule into two states, both o f which would be under Russian control. The first, composed o f Moldavia and Wallachia, was to become the independent nation o f Dacia and to be ruled by a Russian prince. The second, a revived GreekByzantine Empire, would embrace Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Greece. Con­ stantine would rule, but his throne was never to be united with that o f Rus­ sia. This arrangement, which gave the major advantages to Russia, was only the first in a series o f schemes that the great powers were to discuss among themselves for the partition o f Ottoman territories. For states that were in the process o f dividing Poland, such a program appeared logical. With assurances o f support in Vienna, Catherine proceeded to move against her initial goal, the Crim ea. T he Russian governm ent first supported a pre­ tender to the throne; after he gained pow er and the population arose against this outside interference, Russian troops were ordered to march in on the pretext o f “ restoring order.” The territory was then annexed. The Porte, which had no practical alternative except acquiescence, agreed in 1783, since the O t­ toman governm ent could not resist Russia alone. Its single foreign supporter, France, was involved in a conflict w ith Britain in connection w ith the A m er­ ican War o f Independence. French leaders were also becom ing less enthusias­ tic about the O ttom an connection.

Once in possession o f the Black Sea and Crimean lands, Catherine and her ministers, in particular her favorite, Gregory Potemkin, launched a major effort to colonize and develop the newly acquired areas. Russian and German settlers were brought in; efforts were made to encourage the commercial development o f the region. Kherson was built up as a naval base, and the foundations were laid for a Black Sea fleet. These developments deeply af­ fected the military balance not only in the Black Sea area, but also in the Balkan peninsula. With a firm hold on the Black Sea coast and with control of the major port cities, the Russian fleet was only two to two and a half days sailing time from Constantinople. The Russian ability to transport by sea an expeditionary force whose aim was the conquest o f that capital was recog­ nized and feared by the other powers. Despite the Ottoman military weakness, war could not be avoided. Russia continued to press forward in the Caucasus. Problems were also encountered in the Principalities; in 1786 the Porte deposed a hospodar in violation o f previous agreements. In 1787 the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia; Austria joined its ally the next year. The Russian war aims were the conquest o f the fortresses o f Ochakov and Akkerman and the establishment o f an in­ dependent Dacian state that would serve as a buffer to protect the new Black Sea territories. At first, the Ottoman armies made advances. Russia was dis­ tracted by a concurrent war with Sweden, and the Austrian armies also suf­ fered defeats. The situation was then reversed. Russian armies again entered the Principalities, and there the great Russian general Alexander Suvorov Won impressive victories. Austrian troops advanced in Bosnia and Serbia. The Ottoman Empire was to be immensely aided by the problems that 71

The eighteenth century Joseph II was having in internal affairs and by the basic distrust between Austria and Russia. In 1790 Joseph died and was succeeded by the far more cautious Leopold II. Faced with a rising in the Netherlands and fearing what Prussia would do, the new emperor made a separate peace, the Treaty o f Sistova, on the basis o f the restoration o f the status quo before the war. In an additional agreement, Austria also received some territory to be added to the Banat. The Austrian withdrawal was naturally a blow to Russia, whose armies were win­ ning victories. Revolts had also broken out in Greece, and the Ottoman Empire was without allies. Other matters, however, had to be taken into consideration. In 1789 the revolution commenced in France; the international situation was not clear. Russia thus in 1792 concluded with the Porte the Treaty o f Jassy. Catherine obtained Ochakov and territory to the Dniester River, but the Prin­ cipalities were again returned to Ottoman rule. In 1793 and 1795 Russia joined with her neighbors in the final partitions o f Poland. By the last decade o f the eighteenth century it was clear that Russia was the predominant European power in the Near East and the principal threat to Ottoman survival. Austria had cooperated in Russian ventures, but its leaders, like Prussia’s, feared a rapid Russian advance. The single state that had shown support for the Ottoman government had been France, but that power had never sent military forces to the area. Although concerned about the mainte­ nance o f the Eastern Barrier states, the French government had not been able to prevent the division o f Poland, the defeat o f Sweden, or the continual Russian and Habsburg victories over the Porte. The French attitude determined at first the position o f a power about whom little has yet been said —Great Britain. Principally concerned with its world­ wide colonial contest with France, Britain tended to support its rival’s adver­ saries, including Russia, which was seen also as a valuable trading partner. When the Russian Baltic fleet sailed to the Mediterranean in 1769 it took on supplies at British ports, and British officers, notably Lord Elphinstone, ac­ companied the expedition. However, in the 1770s British opinion began to shift. Catherine’s policy o f armed neutrality during the American War o f In­ dependence was against British interests. Moreover, like Prussia, Britain saw the dangers o f too great an increase o f Russian power. The stage was thus set for a shift in alliances that would ultimately make Britain the chief supporter o f the Ottoman Empire against Russian pressure.

B ALK AN PEO PLE U N D E R O TTO M AN R U LE

The questions discussed in the preceding sections affected all o f the Balkan people: the Ottoman government, the Christian ecclesiastical and local admin­ istration, and the great wars o f the century. It is next necessary to examine in greater detail events in the lands inhabited by the Christian people under direct Ottoman rule: the Greeks, Albanians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Bulgarians. 72

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule H ere the general conditions in the areas are considered, as well as the specific effects o f the lessening o f O ttom an authority and the disastrous wars.

The Greeks As w e have seen, by the eighteenth century the most favorable position among the Christians was held by the Greeks, in particular by the merchants and those w h o w orked w ith the O ttom an governm ent. H ow ever, the peasant population o f Greece proper also had w ide rights o f self-administration. A l­ though a G reek population was to be found scattered throughout the empire, the concentration was in the islands o f the A egean, in the Peloponnesus, in Thessaly, and in Rum eli. Greeks also lived in large numbers in Thrace, E p i­ rus, and M acedonia. A n area w ith only a small percentage o f arable land, m ost o f continental Greece was not farmed. Because the land was unsuitable for widespread chiftlik agriculture, these estates were concentrated in certain areas, especially in Thessaly and the Peloponnesus. T he inhospitable hill and mountain land was better fo r animal husbandry, particularly for the raising o f sheep and goats. T h e go o d agricultural lands were generally part o f an estate belonging to a chiftlik, a religious foundation, or members o f the sul­ tan’s household. In the hill and mountain country agricultural land could be held in w hat amounted to private property by the cultivators.

Since the Ottoman government did not attempt to control closely areas remote from the major cities and lines o f communication, the villages o f herdsmen and small farmers in the mountains o f continental Greece usually were allowed to run their own affairs as long as they paid their taxes. Some regions, such as Mani in the Peloponnesus, Suli in Epirus, and Agrapha in the Pindus, were in practice almost independent in relation to the central authority. Other areas were granted special privileges in return for services, such as securing a pass or guarding and maintaining a bridge. The people received tax benefits, and they had the right to bear arms. In the rest o f mainland Greece and the islands a vigorous system o f local self-governm ent had developed. Since the O ttom an governm ent preferred to deal w ith organized Christian groups and not directly w ith individuals, these local systems, w hich predated the O ttom an conquest, had been supported and encouraged. A netw ork o f com munal governm ent thus paralleled the O ttom an administrative fram ework. These institutions took the responsibil­ ity fo r the assessment and collection o f taxes, and they assumed regular police duties. T h e villages w ere usually under the direction o f local notables, chosen from am ong the prom inent men. T he m ost complete system was developed in the Peloponnesus after the Venetian expulsion in 1715. H ere the elders o f each village form ed a council to decide local problem s; they also sent repre­ sentatives to the vilayet council. In turn, this body chose delegates to meet w ith representatives o f other vilayets in the Peloponnesian senate, w here mat­ ters o f administration and taxation were discussed. Two members o f this group,

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74 The Acropolis of Athens with Ottoman cavalry

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule together w ith tw o M uslim s, form ed the permanent council o f the vezir o f the Peloponnesus. T he Greeks o f the area also had the important privilege o f sending tw o representatives to Constantinople, where they could complain direcdy to the Porte, over the heads o f the local administrators, about con­ ditions o r about arbitrary acts o f the authorities. Communal government in Greece was conservative and traditional. It formed a support to O ttom an administration, and it paralleled in spirit and aim the ecclesiastical system. T he ch ief pow er was in the hands o f local notables, called archons, w h o were also the Christian large landowners or tax farmers. Th ey dom inated the assemblies and the Peloponnesian senate. Secure in their privileges, they did not challenge O ttom an rule. A s a group, they w ere to be severely criticized. Frequently unscrupulous and bent on profiting from the system, they often appeared in the role o f the oppressors o f the poorer and weaker members o f their ow n society. F ar from united as a class, they split into fam ily factions that fought for econom ic and political advantage. This division am ong the m ore pow erful families and their bitter feuds became clearly apparent in the G reek revolution o f the 1820s. T he G reek islands were in an even m ore favorable position. Since they were usually held by members o f the O ttom an royal family, they were under the control o f the kapudan-pasba, the grand admiral o f the O ttom an fleet. B y the eighteenth century their actual administration was in the hands o f the dragom an o f the fleet, w h o, as w e have seen, was a Phanariot Greek. In return for certain services, such as supplying sailors for the O ttom an navy, the islanders were freed from some taxes, and they governed themselves. N o ­ tables, chosen by popular assemblies, dom inated the political structure as they did on the mainland. T he com m unal system had an important judicial as well as political func­ tion. T h e local officials together w ith the church offered a preferred alterna­ tive to the O ttom an kadi. T he Greek authorities based their decisions on Rom an law, the principal source being the H exabilis o f Constantine Arm enopoulos o f the fourteenth century. O ver the years, however, m ore reliance began to be placed on custom ary or com m on law. T h e G reek com m unal organization, like that in other parts o f the Balkans, was extremely im portant for the preservation o f local separateness. T h e local governm ent did not becom e a center o f resistance to O ttom an rule, but it did protect the individual G reek from absorption into a larger unit. It also shielded the individual in w hat was a lawless and violent environm ent, par­ ticularly w hen the central governm ent broke dow n. Then the local authori­ ties with their armed auxiliaries could protect the average citizen. The Greeks, a seagoing people, also suffered from the dangerous conditions on the sur­ rounding waters. T h rou ghou t the O ttom an era the population o f the islands and the coastal towns faced threats from M uslim and enemy attacks and from the depredations o f pirates. Life was often unsafe near the seashores fo r the peasant population. Just as, in the mountains, the relationship between klepht

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The eighteenth century and armatole was often close, so the pirate was often interchangeable with the sailor, the fisherman, and the commercial shipper. Because o f the mountainous and inaccessible nature o f much o f the Greek mainland, the Christian armed forces always played an important role in local life. In order to control these areas and to combat the klephts, the Ottoman government organized the remote districts into armatoliL· , or kapitanates. Armatole bands were given jurisdiction over a definite assembly o f villages and the responsibility for maintaining law and order and for collecting taxes. They were paid by the district that they were supposed to protect. The lead­ ers were known as kapitanios, their followers as pallikaria. The position o f captain could be hereditary in a family, or he could be chosen by the village elders. Although recognized and authorized by the Porte, these bands were closely attached to their areas. There were also police, kapoi, hired by the local government or the notables. The activities o f the armatoles were greatly ad­ mired, and they did indeed act as a protection in times o f disorder. The klephts, whom the armatoles were supposed to be opposing, won even greater fame. Operating in bands o f about forty or fifty, they gained the romantic reputation o f embodying all the ideals that this mountain society admired. They were known for their “ extraordinary imperviousness to fa­ tigue, hunger and thirst” ; they were extremely strong and believed to be great athletes. Their shooting ability was legendary. They specialized in guerilla warfare and “in ambushing enemies in the dark.” 12 The intense admiration that their activities aroused is reflected in modern Greek historical writing: When captured, they displayed great stoicism in the hands o f Turk­ ish torturers. It was a question o f honor with them to endure all suffering in silence. There is not a single known case o f a klepht whose courage failed him or who surrendered his faith in order to save himself from death by torture. The prospect o f such a lingering death made them salute their fellows with the words “May the bullet be sure!” I f a klepht was so badly wounded that he could not be saved, he implored his comrades - and the request was always hon­ ored as though it were sacrosanct - to cut off his head and take it with them so that the enemy could not impale it on a spike and subsequently parade it through the towns and villages.13 The Greeks and other inhabitants o f the Balkans found that the wars in­ volving the European powers had a deep effect on their own development. Prior to the eighteenth century the influence o f Venice, which held Crete, 12

13

A p o sto lo s E. V acalopoulos, The Greek Nation, 1453-1669: The Cultural and Economic Back­ ground o fModem Greek Society, trans. Ian M oles and P hania M oles (N ew B runsw ick, N .J.: R u tg ers U n iversity Press, 1976), p. 222. Vacalopoulos, The Greek Nation , p. 222.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Cyprus, and points in the Peloponnesus and in the islands, had been most directly felt in the Greek lands. During the seventeenth century, however, its power began to wane. Fighting raged over Crete from 1645 to 1669, resulting in the loss o f the island to the Ottoman Empire. This extended conflict drained the resources o f the merchant city and marked its decline as a Mediterranean power. Despite the fact that Venetian rule represented a European and a Christian control, it did not win the support o f the Greek population. The friction was chiefly due to religious conflict. Unlike the Islamic, the Catholic faith was militant and it did seek converts. As we have seen, the chief enemy o f the Patriarchate was Catholicism, largely because the main danger to the Orthodox establishment lay in this direction. The principle that “the turban o f the prophet is preferable to the cardinal’s hat” was to dominate GreekVenetian relations. In addition, Venetian administration, more efficient than the Ottoman, proved more effective in the collection o f taxes and allowed less participation in government by the local Greek population. Venetian merchants were also in competition with Greeks. Although many Greeks did indeed cooperate with the Venetians against Ottoman rule, in the long run little regret was felt when they lost their strongholds in Greek lands. At the end o f the seventeenth century Venetian power in the Aegean had one final period o f upsurge. After the formation o f the Holy League, the main Ottoman forces were drawn into the northern Balkans to defend the empire against the chief threat, the Habsburg Empire. Venetian forces under Francesco Morosini used the opportunity to launch an expedition in the Pel­ oponnesus. With local support they were able to establish a firm position and to advance as far as Athens in 1687. While attacking the Turkish positions there, they shelled the Parthenon, the most noble monument o f the Greek classical past. Although Venetian possession o f the Peloponnesus was con­ firmed in the Treaty o f Karlowitz, this acquisition could not be held long. By this time Venice did not have the resources to maintain a great empire. Since it was expensive to fortify, defend, and administer the new territory, the Vene­ tian authorities attempted to raise taxes and to conscript local labor for civil needs and to build fortifications. These actions proved most unpopular. The presence o f foreign soldiers and the strong proselytizing activities o f the Catholic church caused further deep antagonism. In 1714, when Turkish troops again appeared, they met little resistance among the local population, who apparendy preferred a reestablishment o f the former regime. In the Treaty o f Passarowitz the area was returned to the Ottoman Empire; Venice was re­ duced to holding the Dalmatian coast and the Ionian Islands, which still left her the strongest power in the Adriatic. Once again in possession o f the area, the Ottoman government made an effort to improve conditions in the Pelo­ ponnesus and to attract new settlers. As we have seen, Greek local govern­ ment again assumed great significance. Although the Ottoman Empire was at war with Austria and Russia in the 1730s, the hostilities did not extend into the Greek lands. Naturally, during

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The eighteenth century the long period o f peace follow ing the Treaty o f Belgrade o f 1739, interna­ tional problem s did not involve the area. H ow ever, beginning in the 1760s another external factor began increasingly to influence the G reek position. A t this time the Russian interest in the O rthodox church and in general Greek affairs was extended to the mainland. In preparation for w ar w ith the O ttom an Em pire, agents from the Russian governm ent were sent into G reek territory to attempt to prom ote an uprising to back the Russian military actions to the north. A G reek captain o f the artillery, G rigorios Papadopoulos, was dispatched to M ani, and the organization o f a G reek revolt was placed in the hands o f the brothers G regory and Alexis O rlov. T h e Russian agents were indeed able to interest some notables in their enterprise; they received promises o f men and supplies. H ow ever, in return the G reek partisans expected massive Russian assistance - som ething like ten thousand troops and extensive military equipment. W hen in 1769 a Russian expedition did indeed arrive, the Greeks were profoundly disappointed to find that it consisted o f four ships, a few hundred soldiers, and entirely in­ adequate supplies o f arms and ammunition. D espite the fact that no great G reek uprising occurred and the Russian contribution was totally insuffi­ cient, G reek and Russian forces did attempt a cam paign; N avarino was taken in A p ril 1770. T he O ttom an governm ent, pressed by the necessity o f fighting a major war on its northern boundary, called in Albanian troops, w h o crushed the expedition at Tripolitza (Tripolis). D uring the campaign the Christian forces had massacred M uslim civilians and destroyed their property; the A l­ banians now took a fearful revenge. T h e dam age was so extensive and the troops so out o f control that in 1779 the Porte finally had to send a Turkish force to suppress the Albanians. The first Greek-Russian endeavor thus proved a total disaster and brought considerable suffering to G reek lands. A lth ou gh the Peloponnesian undertaking failed, Russia’s victories in the Principalities and in the eastern M editerranean allowed that governm ent to im pose a m ajor peace. In the clauses affecting the A rchipelago, the Treaty o f Kuchuk Kainarji required the Porte to grant a general amnesty and tax relief and to allow the em igration o f those w ho wished. In addition the treaty stated “ that the Christian religion shall not be exposed to the least oppression any m ore than its churches, and that no obstacle shall be opposed to the erection o r repair o f them; and also that the officiating ministers shall neither be oppressed nor insulted.” 14 In the later Treaty o f A inali K avak o f 1779 the Porte agreed to make payment for G reek lands that had been confiscated during the war. Interest in Greece continued to m ount in Russia after the war, despite the failure in the Peloponnesus. Catherine’s Greek Project was no secret. Such plans were discussed in diplom atic circles. Russian agents continued to cir­ culate in Greece, and G reek students were brought to Russia for their edu1+

Q u o te d in H o llan d , Treaty Relations o fRussia and Turkey, p. 47·

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79 Castle of Parga

The eighteenth century cation. When war with the Porte broke out again in 1787, Russian manifestos calling again for Christian rebellion were distributed. Thoroughly discour­ aged by the failure o f the previous action, most Greeks did not move. How­ ever, the Christian Albanians o f remote Suli took advantage o f the situation. They were later defeated by the pasha o f Janina (Ioannina), Ali, in an early episode in the career o f that remarkable adventurer. Not only did the Chris­ tian people not respond to the Russian appeal, but it was not even found possible, as it had been in the previous war, to launch a Russian naval action in the Mediterranean. The declaration o f war by Sweden in 1788 confined the Russian navy to the Baltic. The Treaty o f Jassy o f 1792, ending the conflict, had no specific provisions in regard to Greece. During the next few years the Russian government retained its interest in the Greek lands and, largely because o f the common Orthodox religion, was the most influential foreign power. In the previous peace treaties and in the associated commercial agreements, Russia had gained important rights within the empire. The provision concerning the appointment o f consuls was to be particularly significant. These men, usually Greek nationals, had offices in the major cities throughout the Greek provinces. Like the consulates o f the other powers, they became centers for intrigue against the Ottoman Empire and for the organization o f local Russian partisans. The treaties with the Porte also made the provision that Greek merchant ships could fly the Russian flag and thus enjoy Russia’s protection as well as share its commercial privileges. During the wars o f the first decade o f the nineteenth century, these Greek ships came to dominate Mediterranean trade as French shipping was driven from the seas. The new Russian port o f Odessa became a major Greek center with an influential merchant population. The Russian ties with the Constan­ tinople Patriarchate, o f course, continued. The church leaders, the Phanariots, and the merchants all expected support from St. Petersburg. Russia was, in fact, the only great power that remained consistendy interested in a partition o f Ottoman territory. The Albanians Although the Albanians shared with the Greeks many o f the problems o f a people endowed with a rocky, mountainous land, they marked a strong con­ trast in other respects. Whereas the Greeks had acquired a wealthy, educated merchant and Phanariot class and had won a position o f dominance in the Orthodox church organization, the Albanians remained among the most backward people in the Balkans. They also had the largest numbers o f con­ versions to Islam. This second condition was to have perhaps the greatest effect on the course o f their history. When the Ottoman armies arrived in Albania, they found the country divided between an Orthodox south and a Catholic north. Although there were at first few conversions, conditions changed in the seventeenth century. Current Albanian historiography ex­

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule plains this occurrence as chiefly the result o f the sharp rise in taxes, in partic­ ular in the poll tax paid by the Christian but not the M uslim . In the sixteenth century the tax, the djizia , was 45 akches; in the beginning o f the seventeenth century it was 305 akches, a figure that rose precipitately in the next h alf century to 789 akches.15 A lthough this rise to an extent reflected the increase in general prices, the fiscal pressure on the individual made conversion to Islam a great tem ptation. In addition, though this was usually not the case elsewhere, in Albania some measure o f force appears to have been used.

The main target was the Catholic population, which declined notably in the seventeenth century. Like the Orthodox church, the Porte saw the Catholic church as a major enemy. Catholic Venice was entrenched in the Adriatic Sea; the Habsburg Empire was a frequent problem. During the war that broke out with Venice in 1645, Catholic Albanians hoped for a Venetian victory. In 1689, during the war o f the Holy League, they revolted. Most o f the forced conver­ sions occurred at this time; many former Catholics were resettled in the Kosovo area, which thereafter became a center o f strong Albanian and Muslim feeling. Most o f the conversions took place in the lowlands around the Shkumbi River, where direct Ottoman pressure could most easily be exerted. In the eighteenth century Albania thus presented a complex religious pic­ ture. The Catholics, by then the weakest group, were concentrated in an enclave in the north with Shkoder (Skadar, Scutari) as the center. The Ortho­ dox were to be found principally south o f the Shkumbi and in the districts o f Kor^e (Koritsa) and Gjirokaster. Muslims lived throughout the country, but chiefly in the center and in Kosovo. The Catholics looked for support primarily to the Habsburg Empire, which claimed a right o f protection. The Orthodox were part o f the Ohrid Archbishopric until its abolition; thereafter they were under a strong Greek cultural influence. What education was avail­ able to them was in the Greek language, as was the church liturgy. The Albanian Muslims enjoyed a privileged position not only in their own lands, but throughout the entire empire. A warlike people, they had many opportunities to serve the state. The best o f the janissaries recruited through the devshirme system came from the Albanian Christian families. The Alba­ nian sipahis and the mercenary troops were renowned for their effectiveness. Albanian guards served high officials throughout the Balkans. As Muslims Albanians had many opportunities to win influential administrative posi­ tions. The four Koprulii grand vezirs were the most successful, but it has been estimated that at least thirty men o f Albanian background held this high post.16 The Albanian Muslim, who had no reason to dislike the privileges accorded his faith, was usually one o f the strong foundations o f the state. In addition to the three-way division in religion, the Albanians form ed ■5 ■6

K risto Frasheri, The History ofAlbania (Tirana: n. p., 1964), P· 95· S tavro S kendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 (P rinceton, N .J.: P rin c eto n U n i­ versity Press, 1967), p. 21.

8l

82 Albanians at Janina

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule two other groups, the Ghegs and the Tosks. The Ghegs, inhabiting the rug­ ged northern mountain areas, had developed a self-governing tribal organi­ zation similar to that o f the neighboring Montenegrins, and one that lasted until recent times. The basic unit was the clan, called afis, which was headed by the oldest male. Associated with the fis was a territorial and political coun­ terpart, called a bajmk (standard), which was composed o f one or more clans. The position o f leader, or bajraktar (standard-bearer), was hereditary. The bajrak has been described as “ an autonomous state governed by customs and other juridical regulations basically common to all the other bajraks.” 17 A tribe was formed o f a group o f bajraks led by a man from a prominent family. Major matters were settled by assemblies o f the male members o f the tribe, and judgments were made on the basis o f unwritten customary law. Although mountain tribes were supposed to pay taxes, they were very difficult to col­ lect. In fact, the central government could not really control the actions o f men living in these inaccessible areas. It repeatedly had to send troops against them. The Tosks, who had no tribal system, lived in villages under their own elected notables. They were to be found mostly in the southern lowland areas that had early been subject to the timar system. By the eighteenth century large estates, particularly in the central regions, had come under the control o f strong families who had both economic and political power. Here the conditions for the peasants were very hard, even though both peasant and landowner might be Muslim. The flat areas o f the country were easier for the government to control, but some Tosk Orthodox villages, situated in remote mountain areas, like Suli in Epirus, had won an independent position similar to that o f the Gheg tribes. In return for payment o f taxes, whose collection was often resisted, the villages were granted an autonomous administration. Although Albania was not a theater o f war in the eighteenth century, con­ ditions were anything but peaceful. Like the other Muslim lands, the Alba­ nian lands contributed many soldiers to the Ottoman campaigns; losses were high. Even worse were the struggles for power among the local Muslim no­ tables. Weighed down with foreign war and internal political problems, the Porte was increasingly unable to control its provincial officials. In Albania the owners o f the large estates and the wealthy naturally sought political power, which was to be gained by securing appointments to official positions from the central government. Once in office they could refuse to follow or­ ders unless it suited their personal interests. They were Muslims, and they had bands o f armed retainers. These men, known as beys, not only were com­ pletely out o f the control o f Constantinople, but fought frequently among themselves for power, position, and extensions o f their political jurisdiction. In the mountain areas, similar conflicts raged among the tribal chieftains, each o f whom sought to expand the area under his domination. Helpless to 17

Skendi, Albanian National Awakening, pp. i+, 15.

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The eighteenth century enforce order directly, the Porte attempted a policy o f divide and rule, but that tactic also failed. A s a result o f these circumstances, by the end o f the eighteenth century tw o centers o f pow er had emerged. In the north, around the city o f Shkoder, the Bushati fam ily gained a dom inating position; to the south a second stronghold was established at Janina under A li Pasha. A li’s career was to in­ fluence O ttom an policy until the 1820s; the Bushati fam ily had a shorter pe­ riod in power. The Bushatis’ prime influence in northern Albania was estab­ lished by Mehmet Pasha in the years between 1757 and 1775. Aided by highland tribes, he was able to extend his area o f control, and he received official ap­ pointments from the Porte. W hen he attempted to widen his political ju ris­ diction further and refused to forw ard the taxes he had collected, the O tto ­ man governm ent had him poisoned. A lthough a conflict over succession follow ed, his son, Kara M ahm ud, took his place. The Porte then unsuccess­ fully tried to organize a rival coalition o f families. T he career o f K ara M ah ­ m ud, w h o was to exert a m ajor influence on the history o f the entire western Balkan area, merges w ith the progress o f events that were sim ultaneously taking place in neighboring M ontenegro. T he M ontenegrins A fter its conquest in 1499 the O ttom an governm ent made little effort to control the remote mountain land o f M ontenegro. The timar system was never applied, and in return for the payment o f the poll tax, which was not heavy, the region was in general left to itself. T he only O ttom an official w h o appeared was the representative from the central governm ent w ho attempted, usually in vain, to collect the tax. Th e M ontenegrins, like the armatoles in Greece, were also expected to perform a military function. Because their lands after 1699 were close to Venetian possessions in Dalm atia, they were expected to help defend that frontier, but they were m ore often found fighting on the opposin g side. Th e m ajority o f M ontenegrins inhabited the m ountain areas, where they led a life very much like that o f Albanians and Greeks in similar circumstances. T h eir main occupations were cattle and sheep raising, hunting, and banditry w here that proved profitable. T he basic social and political unit w as the tribe, which in turn was made up o f clans. Th e tribe, held together by ties o f fam ily and by the constant quarrels conducted with neighbors, controlled the pasture and w oodland communally. M ontenegro, together w ith the adjacent Albanian highlands, w as probably the m ost prim itive area in the Balkans, i f not in E urope. It has been estimated that in the first h alf o f the nineteenth century the population numbered only about 120,000, from which 20,000 fighting men could be d raw n .18 Nevertheless, as a political unit this country was to play a role far outw eighing its poverty, small size, and backward condition. 18

Vladim ir Dedijer et al., History of Yugoslavia, trans. Kordija Kveder (N ew York: M cGraw H ill, 1974), p· 291.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Since the land was torn apart by the quarreling tribes, the single element o f unity was at first the church. Montenegro was both Serb in nationality and Orthodox in religion. The center was the Cetinje monastery, whose bishops had jurisdiction over the entire territory. They were usually elected by a synod, and before 1766 they were confirmed by the patriarch o f Pec. From the eigh­ teenth century the position was always held by a member o f the Petrovic family from the NjeguS tribe; the first bishop was Danilo (1696-1737). The family came from the district o f Katuni, near Mt. Lovccn, the area that was the stronghold o f Montenegrin resistance to Ottoman authority and to the inva­ sion o f the neighboring Muslim provincial armies. Not only did the church serve as an instrument o f unity, but its leaders established relations with other countries. Thus the bishop functioned as a head o f state and allowed Montenengro to play at least a small role in international affairs. The first close relations with an outside state were with neighboring Ven­ ice, which made payments to Montenegrin tribal leaders to gain their sup­ port. In the war o f the Holy League some tribes fought for Venice, an action that led to an occupation by a Turkish force. Uprisings also occurred when Peter the Great called for Christian support for his invasion o f the Principal­ ities. Venice, however, remained the most important center o f possible assist­ ance. When in the Treaty o f Karlowitz Venice extended its possessions to include the whole o f Dalmatia, it became a direct neighbor. From 1714 to 1718 Venice was again at war with the Porte. Since it desired Montenegrin assist­ ance, ties between the countries were strengthened. In 1717 the doge o f Ven­ ice, Cornaro, issued a decree establishing a political officer, called a guvemadur (civil governor), for Montenegro. There were now two officials, the bishop and the governor, with political roles. The Venetian appointee at first lived in Kotor, on Venetian territory, on a subsidy. The position was thereafter regularly held by a member o f the Radonjic clan, which was also part o f the Njegus tribe. Although both the bishop and the governor were supposed to be elected by an assembly o f the heads o f the tribes, both positions became in fact hereditary in the two families. Initially the two officials appear to have cooperated well. The first major quarrel came in 1802 over the question o f the appointment to the secular office. After 1718 the link with Venice weakened. Montenegro received no gains in the Treaty o f Passarowitz. Although closer relations were sought with Austria, Russia became henceforth the main focus o f Montenegrin attention. Already in 1710, it will be remembered, the Montenegrins, supported by tribes in Brda and Hercegovina, had revolted when Peter called for Christian assistance. The uprising had been suppressed with great losses. Thereafter, the major connec­ tion was between the church authorities in both countries. In 1716 Danilo went to Russia, where he received gifts o f money, books, and equipment for the church. One o f the foremost Montenegrin supporters o f reliance on Russia was Bishop Vasilije Petrovic, who made three visits to St. Petersburg. He hoped that Empress Elizabeth would assume a protectorate over his country.

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The eighteenth century In order to instruct the Russians about his country, he published in M o sco w in 1754 a book entitled History o f Montenegro, in which, needless to say, M o n ­ tenegrin exploits were not slighted. Meanwhile, throughout the century, relations with the Porte remained tense. M ontenegrin tribes repeatedly raided over their borders, and they w ere a nuisance and a danger to their neighbors. In 1756 Bosnian troops, aided by Venice, w hose subjects w ere similarly injured by M ontenegrin actions, at­ tacked the area. A fter an O ttom an force invaded their land, the M ontenegrins gave assurances that they w ou ld pay their taxes and that the raids w ou ld cease. In 1766 a m ost bizarre episode occurred w hen an im postor arrived in the country claim ing to be Peter III, Catherine the G reat’s husband, w h o had actually been m urdered in 1762. A n educated m an o f com pelling pow ers, even though o f slight stature, this pretender was able to convince m any o f the prim itive and naive tribesm en o f his true royalty. H e w as to rule under the name o f Stephen the Small. H e could not convince the bishop, Sava, w h o had received his office in 1735 and had met the real tsar. Nevertheless, Stephen was able to push the bishop aside and assume the pow er in the state. D espite his dubious background, the new ruler did attempt to introduce some muchneeded measures. H e tried to establish som ething like a form al civil go vern ­ ment and to end the constant feuding between the rival tribes. Stephen’s actions caused concern to the great powers. Russian subsidies w ere stopped. M ontenegrins also resumed raiding into Turkish and Venetian territory. In 1768 the Porte dispatched an arm y against Stephen, but could do little since w ar had also broken out w ith Russia. Concerned about develop­ ments in M onten egro, Catherine sent Prince Iu rii D olgorukii in 1769. A l­ though the envoy recognized that Stephen was an im postor, he did n ot at­ tempt to secure his removal. O n his departure, D olgorukii left some munitions and money, but M ontenegro at this time did nothing to aid R ussia in the war. Stephen was finally poisoned in 1773 by a G reek servant in the pay o f the Porte. Relations w ith R ussia then deteriorated. In 1777 a M ontenegrin m ission was sent to St. Petersburg, but it was not received by Catherine. T h e Russian governm ent was follo w in g a policy o f cooperation w ith Vienna, and it hesi­ tated to interfere in the western Balkans. M ontenegro also made approaches to the H ab sbu rg Em pire. In 1777 a M ontenegrin, Nicholas M arkovic, offered to form a com pany to fight for Austria. N oth in g was done, since the Austrian governm ent knew little about conditions in M ontenegro. In 1781 an Austrian officer, C olonel Paulic, was dispatched to report on the country. H is opinion was negative: the hostile factions, Bishop Sava’s lack o f control over the tribes, and the Venetian and O ttom an opposition to an increase o f H ab sbu rg involve­ ment all influenced his judgm ent. A fter Sava’s death in 1782, the next leader o f importance was Peter I, w h o became bishop in 1784· H e had been part o f the unsuccessful m ission to

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule R ussia in 1777, but he still wished to be consecrated there. W hen he was unable to get a passport, he went to Srem ski Karlovci instead. Thereafter, he turned to A ustria to try to get m ilitary supplies and assistance; the governor, Jo van R adonjic, also supported a close H ab sbu rg orientation. F o r the rest o f the century the main threat to M ontenegro came from n eighboring A lbania and from the w ide ambitions o f K ara M ahm ud, w h o attem pted to set up an autonom ous principality in defiance o f Constantino­ ple. H is first attack on M ontenegrin territory took place in 1785. A t this time he w as able to gain the support o f some o f the tribes. H is victories and his attitude o f resistance tow ard the Porte attracted the attention o f both A ustria and R u ssia, w h o w ished to make use o f him in their ow n plans against the empire. It w ill be rem em bered that this w as the period o f Catherine’s Greek Project. T h e H ab sbu rg governm ent was w illin g to recognize K ara M ahm ud as the independent ruler o f Albania i f he assisted A ustria against the Porte. In these circumstances the sultan was forced to offer him a full pardon in return fo r his allegiance.

Russian policy toward Montenegro also changed, since once again war with the Ottoman Empire was contemplated. When fighting broke out in 1787, the government issued another proclamation calling for the support o f the Balkan Christians. Montenegro thus found itself in the pleasant position o f being courted by both Austria and Russia, who sent military advisers and gifts. Austrian soldiers and Hercegovinian volunteers began to arrive in the country. A t the same time, the H ab sbu rg governm ent made an effort to make con­ tact w ith K ara M ahm ud, w h o, it was judged, could be o f great assistance in the war. In Ju n e 1788 an Austrian delegation w ent to Shkoder to negotiate w ith him . T h e A lbanian pasha, influenced by the fact that the Turkish armies were w in nin g at the time, massacred the agents and sent their heads to the sultan. Back in favor in Constantinople, K ara M ahm ud was appointed g o v ­ ernor o f Shkoder. H e subsequendy fought fo r the em pire in M ontenegro and Bosnia. A lth ou gh w arfare in the region should have ceased when A ustria made peace in 1791, the fighting continued in M ontenegro. K ara M ahm ud, unsatis­ fied, w ished to w iden his territorial control; his actions brought on another clash w ith the Porte, follow ed by another reconciliation in 1794. In 1796 the pasha thought that he had a fine opportunity to settle his controversies w ith M ontenegro and to gain m ore land. A t this time both Venice and Austria had been defeated in the w ar that was goin g on w ith France. M ontenegro was isolated and could not expect outside assistance. K ara M ahm ud thus began an invasion. H ow ever, at the battle o f K ru si he was defeated and be­ headed. Th is event was to be extremely significant in M ontenegrin history. It ended fo r a period the attempts o f the O ttom an Em pire or its agents to conquer and control the country. Furtherm ore, M ontenegro was able to an­ nex the n eighboring region, Brda, w hich was controlled by the Piperi and

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The eighteenth century Bjelopavlic tribes, an addition that significantly enlarged its territory. The state at this point had a firm territorial base, and the central government had a stronger position than before against the tribal leadership. Bosnia and Hercegovina In Bosnia and H ercegovina, as in Albania, large-scale conversions occurred after the O ttom an occupation; in time many am ong both the old nobility and the peasants accepted Islam. M oreover, in the subsequent years Bosnia attracted M uslim refugees from the lands that passed under the control o f the Christian powers. Peasants, soldiers, craftsmen, and merchants came from C roatia, Slavonia, and H u n gary and settled south o f the Sava River. Refugees also arrived from Dalm atia. T he country thus became a center o f strong re­ ligious feeling and o f local patriotism. T he political situation was extremely favorable for the M uslim s. T he conversions had created a situation in which the political and econom ic pow er was held by a M uslim ruling class that was nevertheless o f a predom inantly local Slavic origin. A fter the conquest this grou p had preserved its hold over the land and thereby also over the peasants w h o w orked the estates. In addition to the native aristocracy, other m ilitary elements became a part o f Bosnian society. In the eighteenth century sipahis held 14 4 ziamets (large estates) and 3,617 timars. U sually these men lived on their o w n lands unless they were away at war. T h ey form ed an im portant element in the O ttom an armed forces. It has been estimated that 1,553 sipahis from Bosnia fought in the battle o f the Pruth against Peter the G reat.19 M oreover, large num bers o f janissaries settled in the land in the course o f the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A lth ough m any lived in villages, the largest num ber chose to stay in Sarajevo. Since their pay could be as much as a year in arrears, they were virtually com pelled to find alternate occupations. T h ey thus became m er­ chants and craftsmen and played a m ajor role in the guilds. In the eighteenth century they were the m ost influential political element in the three largest cities, Sarajevo, M ostar, and Travnik.

Among the ruling military there was also an important additional group, the captains, who had functions similar to those o f their Christian equivalent in Greece. Since Bosnia was a border province, both with the Habsburg Empire and with Venetian Dalmatia, particular care had to be taken in its defense. The captains were in charge o f hereditary military fiefs, the kapitanates, o f which there were thirty-eight, including sixty-four towns, after the Treaty o f Belgrade in 1739. At the end o f the century there were about 24,000 soldiers attached to them. The captains’ chief duties were to guard the fron­ tiers and the lines o f communication, but some were also called to serve outside the country. They and their retainers were sometimes salaried. 19

Branislav D jurdjev, B ogo G rafenauer, and Jorjo Tadic, Historija Naroda Jugoslavije [H isto ry o f th e peoples o f Yugoslavia], 2 vols. (Z agreb: Skolska K njiga, 1953, 1959), II, 1321·

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule T h e old Slavic nobility holding large estates, together w ith the high g o v ­ ernment and m ilitary officials, form ed the dom inant class. This grou p, known as begs o r beys, numbered a few hundred. Below, but still in a privileged position, w as a low er nobility called the ago.s, com prised o f smaller landow n­ ers, sipahis, and janissaries. T h is group in the course o f the eighteenth cen­ tury was able to tighten its control o f the land. Its political and military pow er allowed it to infringe on form erly peasant land, exploit the unused or deserted areas, and use the tax-farm ing system to acquire property. Tw o types o f estates developed. O n the agalik s the peasants retained their traditional rights concerning the use o f the land and the payments required. In contrast, on the begliks the land was regarded as the property o f the noble, w h o either w orked the estate h im self o r let it to tenants. H ere the condition o f the peas­ ant depended on the arrangements he could make w ith the owner. Naturally, he was in a much weaker position than the peasant on an agalik, and his payments and labor obligations were higher. T h e unrest am ong these peas­ ants, w h o resented the constandy rising obligations, increased the instability in the country, which was im poverished by the wars o f the century. T h e social situation in both Bosnia and H ercegovina was made m ore tense by the fact that although M uslim s predom inated am ong the ruling group, they constituted only about 33 percent o f the population. T he O rthodox had a plurality o f about 43 percent, w ith the Catholics in a m inority o f 20 percent. O n both the begliks and the agaliks a Christian Slavic peasantry was thus likely to be subordinate to M uslim Slavic landlords. A s far as their loyalties were concerned, the Muslims naturally favored Ottoman rule, but with strong provincial self-rule, whereas the O rthodox felt drawn to their neighboring Serbs and Montenegrins - a situation that caused difficulties when these people were in conflict w ith the Porte. T he Catholics were attracted to the H absbu rg lands and to Catholic C roatia. T he m onarchy claimed the right o f religious protection over them. A s a border province o f a steadily w eakening em pire, Bosnia bore a heavy share o f the m ilitary burden and was the scene o f much fighting. In the Treaty o f K arlow itz a border was established that w ith som e readjustments was to last until 1908, but the w ar left the country in a chaotic state. N o t only did M uslim refugees arrive from the lands lost to the H ab sbu rg E m pire, but Catholics em igrated from Bosnia, particularly into Slavonia. In 1703 the cap­ ital was m oved from Sarajevo to Travnik, which became a m ajor craft and trading center as well as a m ilitary stronghold. Special attention was given to the question o f the defense o f the entire province. G uns and m unitions were both m anufactured locally and im ported from Constantinople. The wars o f 1714 to 1718 and 1736 to 1739, involving Austria, Venice, and

Russia, were naturally extremely damaging to Bosnian development. Terri­ tory was lost to both Venice and the Habsburg Empire in the Treaty o f Passarowitz. In addition, Bosnia, like other parts o f the empire, suffered severely from the plague and other epidemic diseases. Agriculture was repeatedly dis­

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The eighteenth century rupted by the Austrian invasions. The Muslims in particular were affected by the wars, since they were called up to fight not only against the European powers, but also against Persia. They had heavy casualties. For instance, o f 5,200 men sent to Persia, only 500 returned after peace was made in 1727. A t this time Bosnia had one able administrator, A li Pasha H ekim O glu, w h o was vezir o f Bosnia from 1735 to 1740, w hen he was sent to E gyp t. H e governed w ith the assistance o f a council com posed o f the prom inent men o f the province and representatives o f the central governm ent. A fter his depar­ ture, the political situation disintegrated. A lth ough the country did not suffer from an outside invasion fo r almost five decades, the m ilitary elements within turned against each other. A long period o f civil turm oil follow ed, which the Porte could not master. T h e struggle fo r pow er am ong the M uslim m ilitary involved in particular the captains and the janissaries. T h e captains used their m ilitary strength to acquire chiftdik estates, and they sought political control. T h e janissaries too became m ore involved in local affairs. In this situation the provincial adm in­ istration grew weaker. A s the authority o f the Bosnian vezir dim inished, that o f the notables and the captains increased. In 1745 A li Pasha H ekim O glu returned, but w ith the m ission from the central governm ent to im pose heavy taxes. O pposition from the Bosnian notables caused him to leave the same year. H e returned again in 1747 for the same purpose, but since he had alien­ ated his form er supporters, he was forced out within a year. From 1747 to 1756 Bosnia was in a condition o f anarchy involving both the

cities and the countryside. During this decade the local notables collected the taxes and waged war on each other. Captains fought janissaries, who fought other janissaries. In 1752 another able vezir, Mehmed Pasha Kukavica, was sent to handle the situation. He was able to pacify the province by 1756. He returned for a second term between 1757 and 1760, but he was removed after complaints were made against his administration. Nevertheless, the former disorders did not recur. T h e H ab sbu rg Em pire, meanwhile, retained its interest in Bosnia. In the discussions between Joseph II and Catherine, this region was designated as part o f A ustria’s share in the division o f the O ttom an Em pire. E ven before w ar started again, the Austrian governm ent made efforts to increase its influ­ ence. Support was expected particularly am ong the C atholic C roatian popu­ lation. Bosnian students w ere brought to study in Zagreb. W hen w ar broke ou t in 1788 the H ab sbu rg governm ent issued proclamations calling upon the Christians to support their armies and the M uslim s to remain passive. A n arm y o f 51,000, accom panied by some Serbian volunteers, invaded Bosnia. Since the main O ttom an arm y was engaged elsewhere, only a small force was left to defend the Bosnian frontiers. Local M uslim s thus joined to repel the invaders. T he conflict is know n as the D ubica War, since the main fighting was around the city o f D ubica, where the M uslim s were defeated. B y the Treaty o f Sistova some Bosnian land was ceded to Austria.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule The Serbs Although the Serbs lived in wide areas in the western Balkans, the national movement was to have its center in the Smederevo sanjak, to become the pashalik o f Belgrade. This area, like Bosnia, was a border district, but unlike that province it had no notable Muslim population outside the cities. More­ over, there had been no widespread movement, as there had been in some parts o f the Balkans, to transform sipahi and other land into chiftlik estates. The average Serbian peasant retained certain traditional rights over the land he worked. He was technically a sharecropper, and thus usually liable for payments, some o f which increased at the end o f the eighteenth century, but he had in practice virtually free use o f his plot. He could dispose o f it more or less as he wished. He could pass it on to his heirs, and he could sell it if he could find someone to assume his liabilities. He could grow what he chose and sell his produce at his convenience. He was not a serf; he was personally a free man. The large landholder could live in the country, but he usually stayed in one o f the larger cities. Like other Balkan people the Serbian peasant had the advantages o f a tight local administrative system. The basic unit was the knezina (district). The knezinas were composed o f villages, which in turn were made up o f zadrugas (extended family organizations). Each knezina had a council o f notables that elected the knez. As elsewhere, this official represented his district before the Ottoman authorities and was responsible for the assessing and collecting o f taxes as well as general police duties. The local government also provided judicial services, using customary law as the basis. The Orthodox church was to play a particularly important role in Serbian history. At the beginning o f the eighteenth century the Serbian lands were still under the Patriarchate o f Pec, which was an autocephalous organization under the general jurisdiction o f the Patriarchate o f Constantinople. The church governed itself through the synods and kept in touch with other Orthodox institutions, including those in Russia. The jurisdiction o f the Patriarchate extended over a wide range, including the Orthodox o f Buda, Arad, Komarom, and Dalmatia, as well as Bosnia, Hercegovina, and lands with a Serbian majority. When Ottoman power was at its height, these territories had, o f course, been under one political jurisdiction. The Habsburg and Venetian victories split the area politically, but the ecclesiastical boundaries remained. The majority o f the population in the ceded territories was Catholic and not subject to Orthodox authority. During the period o f Ottoman rule the Patriarchate o f Pec felt itself the heir to the medieval Serbian kingdom and was well aware o f its national mission. The lands under its ecclesiastical jurisdiction were referred to as “Serbian lands” despite their varying religious and ethnic character. The church carried the national idea and kept alive in the minds o f the faithful the inde­ pendent and glorious past. There are

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The eighteenth century in the Serbian church calendar some fifty-eight Serbian saints, in­ cluding eighteen tsars, kings and queens, princes, and lords, begin­ ning with St. Sava and his father, Nemanja. The cult o f Serbian royal saints — “the sacred stock o f Nemanja” — constandy reminded the Serbian people, with all o f the awesome pomp and artistry o f the Byzantine ritual, that the Serbs had once had an independent king­ dom, indeed, an empire, blessed by God through His wonder-working saints.20 Like the Patriarchate at Constantinople, the Serbian church held fast to the idea that Ottoman domination was a temporary phenomenon and would pass, and it too looked upon the Catholic church as the most serious rival, which undoubtedly it was. The two religions conflicted in Bosnia, and within the Habsburg Empire Catholic pressure on the Orthodox population was constant and strong. Despite the religious differences, geography dictated cooperation with the Habsburg Empire. The Serbs who subsequendy fought with the Austrian troops expected to establish at least an autonomous political unit, not to submit to direct Habsburg rule. During the war o f the Holy League, Serbian units participated in the fighting. The most significant action came in 1688, when Habsburg troops had been uniformly successful and were in occupa­ tion o f Belgrade. At that time the patriarch o f Pec, Arsenije III Crnojevic, who was in touch with the Habsburg government, called upon his followers to rise against the Ottoman domination. At first, the Austrian army remained victorious; in 1689 NiS, Skopje, Prizren, and Stip were occupied. The next year marked a reversal, however, and the allied forces were pushed back to the former border. Fearing massacre if they remained, Arsenije and some thirty thousand families migrated with the retreating army. This group was joined by others from the Ottoman lands who had compromised themselves by supporting the invader and who feared Ottoman revenge. In Belgrade the Serbian leaders held an assembly and sent an emissary, Bishop Isaija Djakovic, to the Habsburg emperor, Leopold I, to discuss their position. They agreed to accept him as their hereditary ruler if he, in exchange, assured them o f religious freedom and recognized their autonomous church administration. In 1690 Leopold issued a proclamation in which he called on the Balkan people to rise and support his armies. He promised in return religious liberty, lower taxes, and the free election o f the Serbian leaders. With these assur­ ances, a large number o f families crossed the border to settle in Habsburg lands. The emigration created a difficult condition. Both the Habsburg govern­ ment and the Orthodox authorities expected the situation to be temporary; 20

M ichael B o ro P etrovich, A History o fModem Serbia, 1804-1918, 2 vols. (N ew York: H a rc o u rt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 1, 13.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule both awaited a great trium ph o f Austria over the O ttom an Em pire and the return o f the Serbs to their form er homes. U ntil then, the Serbian leaders wished to have som ething like the millet system, which w ould give the O r­ thodox church a large measure o f political control over its follow ers, intro­ duced into the H ab sbu rg M onarchy. A lth ough the question caused constant controversy, the Serbs did receive special privileges. A religious and cultural center was established at Srem ski Karlovci. Th e tie with Pec was kept; the m etropolitan at Srem ski K arlovci swore obedience to the patriarch o f Pec and m entioned his name in the liturgy. T he great em igration had unfortunate consequences for the Pec Patriarch­ ate, and it contributed to the alteration o f the ethnic com position o f the K o so vo area. T he m ovem ent o f Albanians into the region has been m en­ tioned previously; the large em igration o f Serbs was to have a lasting effect on the national com position o f what had form erly been the heart o f the Ser­ bian m edieval kingdom . W ith the departure o f the Serbs and the large-scale im m igration o f A lbanians, the region acquired an Albanian majority. The apparent treason o f the patriarch naturally affected the attitude o f the Porte tow ard the Pec establishment. Thereafter, it preferred to name Phanariot can­ didates rather than Serbs. Th u s a G reek w as chosen to succeed A rsenije, al­ though a Serb held the post next, from 1713 to 1725. H ab sbu rg incursions into O ttom an territory w ere renewed in 1716, this time w ith m ore success. In the Treaty o f Passarowitz o f 1718 the m onarchy gained control o f m ajor Serbian lands. H ab sbu rg administration, although neither particularly popular n or especially successful, was im portant fo r the future developm ent o f the area. T he new arrangements, w hich w ere both military and civilian in nature, placed the new ly annexed territory, including O ltenia, under a C o u rt Cham ber C ouncil w ith its headquarters at Belgrade and Temesvar. T h e Serbian section was divided into fifteen districts in which the upper level o f adm inistration was in the hands o f H absbu rg officials, but the low er consisted o f a strengthened Serbian local governm ent network. The m ajor unit o f administration was the nahije, which was placed under the direction o f an official called an oborknez. Th e knezinas headed by the knez remained as before. T h e duties o f the local authorities, as under O ttom an nile, w ere prim arily the collection o f taxes, local police functions, and the administration o f justice. Belgrade was also affected by the changes. Germ an craftsmen w ere brought in to replace the Turkish, and the C atholic church made this city the center o f its attempts to obtain conversions. 1737, it w ill be remem bered, the m onarchy was drawn into w ar through Ks alliance w ith Russia. T h is cam paign, w hich was characterized by inept Austrian m ilitary leadership, nevertheless started out on a victorious note. NiS again fell into H ab sbu rg hands. Once m ore the invading arm y called for Serbian support. T h e patriarch o f Pec, n ow Arsenije IV, follow ed the example o f his predecessor and gave assistance. W hen the O ttom an arm y reversed the batdefield situation and, recapturing NiS, drove northward, the patriarch and

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The eighteenth century his followers, numbering about two thousand, were forced to withdraw to Belgrade and then across the border. In the disastrous peace that followed, the Habsburg Empire lost its Serbian and Romanian territory, but kept the Banat. A frontier was now established that was to last about a century and a half. The second treason, in Ottoman eyes, associated with the Patriarchate o f Pec was another blow to an organization that was already deeply troubled with maladministration and corruption. After the departure o f Arsenije IV, a Greek candidate was chosen, and a swift succession o f appointments fol­ lowed. Since the Habsburg center, Sremski Karlovci, was in a much better economic position than Pec, numerous appeals for financial assistance were directed toward it. Nevertheless, the combination o f circumstances, includ­ ing the pressure o f Greek nationalism within the church, its weak financial basis, and its association with the treasonous activities o f the two patriarchs, proved too much. In 1766 the Porte abolished the Patriarchate o f Pec and transferred its jurisdiction to the Patriarchate o f Constantinople. The move had particular significance for the Serbian church. The Metropolitanate at Sremski Karlovci became the main Serbian ecclesiastical center. It was hence­ forth to have the major cultural and educational influence on the Serbs. After the conclusion o f the peace in 1739, the Turkish administration, to­ gether with the sipahis and janissaries, returned to the region. Serbian con­ ditions, however, remained much as before. The Austrian administrative sys­ tem, which had been based on local tradition, was still used. The village was relatively autonomous, and it was the focus o f Serbian life. The Muslim pop­ ulation remained concentrated in Belgrade and the cities. A long period o f peace followed. The region was not a scene o f battle in the war between Russia and the Porte from 1768 to 1774, but in 1788, when Austria joined Russia in a new conflict, the situation changed and another invasion oc­ curred. As usual, the Habsburg government commenced the campaign with an appeal for aid from the Balkan Christians. Special Serbian detachments, Frei corps, were established, which operated in Serbia, Bosnia, and the Banat. The most important Serbian action, however, was conducted by K oia Andjelkovic and his followers. In fact, this episode is known in Serbian history as K oia’s War. This local leader at the head o f a group o f about three thousand men endeavored to interrupt the Ottoman lines o f communication, particu­ larly in the Sumadija, an area lying between Belgrade and Ni§. Despite the fact that they were at first very successful, they could not withstand an attack from the better-organized and more-disciplined Ottoman army. T h is w ar was a disaster not only for the Serbian volunteers, but also for the H ab sbu rg Em pire. A lth ough the Austrian arm y took Belgrade in 1789, it was forced to evacuate the conquered land the next year, o w in g chiefly to the pressure o f events w ithin the m onarchy and in the rest o f E urope. T h e Treaty o f Sistova o f 1791 left the situation much as it had been before the war. T he

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Ottoman Empire promised amnesty for those who had joined the Habsburg army, and about fifty thousand refugees did return. A century o f experience of cooperation with Austria had discouraged the Serbian leaders in their hopes o f Habsburg assistance. They felt that once more they had been sacrificed and abandoned. The war did have one important consequence: large num­ bers o f Serbs had received experience in fighting in conjunction with the Habsburg army and in their own volunteer bands. The stage was thus set for them to take further action on their own initiative.

Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Thrace The regions that have been discussed so far - mainland and island Greece, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbia - had the opportunity to control their own local affairs and often to conduct independent policies. The re­ moteness o f their mountain homes gave much independence to some Greeks, Albanians, and Montenegrins. The closeness to the land frontiers and the seas allowed all o f these areas to maintain some sort o f contact with foreign pow­ ers. In contrast, Bulgaria, Thrace, and Macedonia, which will be treated here together, because o f their geographical position remained under a tighter control by the Muslim authorities. Nevertheless, they shared many o f the experiences o f their neighbors. They had the pattern o f local administration that has been discussed elsewhere; their village notables collected taxes and had the same opportunity to become wealthy and influential within the Ot­ toman system. A local judicial system based on customary law existed. How­ ever, the area was more affected by the changes in the landholding system. Chiftlik estates arose particularly in the advantageous locations, such as the Maritsa Valley and north o f Thessaloniki. Small farms remained common in the hill and mountain regions. Unlike most o f the rest o f the Balkans, this area had a large Muslim and Turkish presence. Turkish peasants had emigrated particularly to Thrace and Macedonia, where they lived in conditions not much different from those o f their Christian counterparts. The Muslim farmers, however, paid smaller taxes, and they held their land under conditions o f virtually private ownership. This area also had one region in which there had been mass conversions. The Pomaks, living mainly in the Rhodope Mountains but also in the Danubian plain north o f the Stara Planina, were both Bulgarian and Muslim. They lived apart in their mountain communities and remained a primitive, backward society. For the Christians, as in other areas, the Orthodox church was the major element o f unity. The Bulgarian people were under the jurisdiction o f the Archbishopric o f Ohrid, whose fate was much like that o f Pec. Although it did not blatantly collaborate with an enemy power, it did suffer from the same problems o f corruption and debt as did the other Slavic institution. The Greek cultural pressure was also stronger here. When in 1767 the Archbishop-

Pass through the Balkan Mountains, Bulgaria

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule ric was abolished and the church placed under the jurisdiction o f C onstanti­ n o p le , the consequences fo r the Slavic population were m ore serious than they were for the Serbs. T he latter always had an alternate authority in Sremski K arlovci, w hich remained a strong center o f Serbian influence. F o r the Bulgarians the loss o f the Slavic Archbishopric gave rise to a period o f Greek cultural dom ination. G reek became the language o f the services in even sol­ idly Slavic areas. W hat education was available was also in this language. W hen it is considered that G reek was also the language o f com merce, the cultural dom inance o f the G reek civilization can well be understood. A lthough this area was not the scene o f m ajor battles in the eighteenth century, it was not spared from the consequences o f w ar and political anarchy. Banditry was widespread. A particularly serious problem was the devastation caused by bands o f deserting or returning soldiers. Repeated waves o f epi­ demic diseases and the plague w ent through the lands. Th e extra w ar taxes also contributed to the general impoverishment. M oreover, as the O ttom an central authority weakened, M acedonia, like Bosnia and Albania, became the scene o f struggles fo r pow er am ong local officials, military men, and M uslim notables. T h e A lbanian rivalries involved M acedonia too. T he m ost secure conditions w ere to be found in the villages o f the Balkan M ountains. The worst situation arose in the eighteenth century in the area between the D an ­ ube and the Balkan M ountains that was depopulated and ravaged by armed bands, know n as kirdjalis, and by the supporters o f the rebellious pasha, Pasvanoglu. D espite these unfavorable conditions, the century did witness an increase in trade, in particular w ith the H absburg Em pire, and a grow th in the size and prosperity o f Thessaloniki, which was the m ajor port for the entire area. A fter the signing o f the Treaty o f K arlow itz, w hich gave A ustria trading privileges, com merce increased, reaching a height in the last quarter o f the century. T h e French had been the first to establish themselves in Thessaloniki, followed by British, D utch, and Venetian merchants. Regular caravan routes connected the city w ith the Balkan trading centers, such as Sofia, Skopje, and Bitola (Bitolj, M onastir), and ran northward through Belgrade to Austria and westw ard tow ard the A driatic ports. T h e carrying trade was in the hands ° f O rthodox merchants, especially Greeks.

A survey o f conditions in the lands under direct O ttom an rule thus shows similarities as w ell as variations in development. A ll o f the regions w ere af­ fected by the consequences o f the wars o f the century, both the occupation by O ttom an and foreign soldiers and the fiscal pressures o f th i taxation sys­ tem. In general, the inhabitants were under the dual governorship o f the O ttom an administrative fram ew ork and their ow n village organizations. The O rthodox church form ed a third element not only in the m oral and spiritual

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The eighteenth century life o f the Christians, but also in the political control o f the region. Som e church authorities acted as a support o f the system; others, notably some Serbian patriarchs and the M ontenegrin bishops, led in the fight to under­ mine O ttom an rule. In the same manner, some local notables, particularly those w h o benefited financially from the conditions o r w ho saw no practical alternative, cooperated w ell with the O ttom an authority; others strongly re­ sisted. It should also be emphasized that even though the O ttom an E m pire was in theory a centralized absolutist state, the authorities in Constantinople had little direct control over the life o f the individual Balkan Christian. T h ey always preferred to govern through intermediaries, either the church or the elected chiefs o f the villages. A s the eighteenth century progressed they also increasingly lost control over their ow n provincial authorities.

THE AUTONOMOUS REGIONS: DUBROVNIK MOLDAVIA, AND W ALLACHIA T h e lands w hose histories have just been discussed w ere regarded as integral parts o f the empire. F o u r other Balkan areas, Transylvania, M oldavia, Walla­ chia, and the city o f D ubrovnik, were linked by special arrangements. B e­ cause Transylvania was transferred to H absbu rg control in the Treaty o f Karlow itz, it w ill be discussed in another section. A b rief com m ent about D ub rovnik is in order, however, before w e proceed to the D anubian Princi­ palities.

D ubrovnik T h e city o f D ubrovnik, previously a possession o f Venice, was placed under O ttom an protection in 1458. A tribute, which was set at 12,500 ducats in 1481, was paid; but aside from this, and the recognition o f O ttom an suzerainty, D ubrovnik was for all practical purposes independent. It entered into rela­ tions w ith foreign powers and made treaties w ith them. Its ow n flag flew over its ships. T he O ttom an vassalage had the im portant result o f givin g the city special rights in trade w ithin the empire. It was obviously to O ttom an advantage to have one o f its dependents, rather than the Venetians, handle the Adriatic trade. D ubrovn ik was in a position to make full use o f the priv­ ileges that it was given. Its traders received from the Porte special tax exem p­ tions and trading benefits. T h ey w ere also allowed to set up, in m ajor O tto­ man cities, colonies that had extraterritorial rights; that is, the members governed themselves according to their ow n laws rather than those o f the locality. Since this was a Catholic city, religious jurisdiction was also involved. Like the Italian city-states, D ubrovnik was a republic controlled by its pa­ trician class. T he main organ o f governm ent was the senate, which repre­ sented the interests o f this group. T he city was both a m anufacturing and a trade center and thus had a population o f merchants, seamen, and craftsmen.

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The patricians controlled the surrounding agricultural lands. D ubrovn ik re­ tained its autonom ous position until 1806, when French troops occupied the city.

M oldavia and Wallachia A fter M oldavia and Wallachia fell under the control o f the O ttom an Em pire in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, they, like Transylvania, were not incorporated into the imperial system, but became instead autonom ous pro v­ inces w ith their ow n institutions (see M ap 12). Th e native aristocracy, the boyars, was thus left intact and retained its form er social and econom ic, and to a large extent its political, privileges. T he relations o f the provinces w ith the O ttom an Em pire were determined by a series o f treaties w hose provisions at first allow ed the Principalities a large measure o f autonomy. O n ly in the eighteenth century did this situation change to the great disadvantage o f the Rom anian population. T h e O ttom an Em pire did not w ant to incorporate these lands direcdy; it needed buffer provinces. Its aim was to assure that the Principalities did not

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The eighteenth century becom e centers o f intrigue, that they form ed an adequate defense against the neighboring pow ers, and that they contributed m oney and agricultural sup­ plies. T he tribute im posed on the provinces was first set at a lo w level, but it soon rose precipitously. T he payments made by Wallachia at the beginning o f the eighteenth century have been described as follows: In 1709, the total tax receipts o f the Wallachian governm ent were 649.000 thalers, and o f these, 514,000 w ere sent in one w ay o r an­ other to the Turks. In 1710, o f the total receipts o f 547,000 thalers, 430.00 0 w ent to the Turks. In terms o f gold, this am ounted to be­ tween 180,ooo and 220,000 gold ducats a year fo r tribute. T h is was twice as much as the official tribute, and one-third to on e-h alf again as much as the tribute paid in the 1590s.21 T he Porte also saw the Principalities as a m ajor source o f supplies for the military and, in particular, for the city o f Constantinople. It thus maintained the right o f preem ption on agricultural products. Imperial agents, w h o were chiefly interested in buying sheep, cattle, and grain, could make the first pur­ chases, and they also determined the prices to be paid. T he pow er entrusted to these agents gave them in many cases w hat am ounted to a right o f confis­ cation. Since price and trading conditions were thus severely circumscribed, the agricultural developm ent o f the provinces was hampered. In the eigh­ teenth century the ch ief activity was animal husbandry; grain production was to predom inate only in the second h alf o f the next century. In addition to the tribute and the delivery o f food supplies, the Principal­ ities w ere liable for a long list o f other payments, including gifts due at the accession o f each new sultan and bribes to maintain the favor o f influential officials. T he native princes had to make payments, both at their appointment and at periodic intervals during their reigns. In return fo r these heavy contri­ butions, the provinces enjoyed m any privileges not shared by areas direcdy incorporated into the empire. Th e council o f boyars, which consisted o f the richest and m ost pow erful o f the native aristocracy, named from am ong their num ber the princes, sometimes called hospodars, w h o then had to be ap­ proved by the sultan. Once elected, the prince had im portant powers, but he ruled in conjunction w ith the boyars’ council. T he Turkish troops were con­ fined to the great fortified centers such as K ilia, Akkerm an, and Bender. M u s­ lims did not ow n estates in either principality, nor were there m osques and other M uslim religious establishments. In practice, the political system did not function smoothly. Th e pow er in the country lay in three centers: the prince, the boyars, and the Porte. The fact that the prince was an elected official and not a hereditary ruler made 21

D an iel C h iro t, Social Change in a Peripheral Society: The Creation o f a Balkan Colony (N ew York, A cadem ic Press, 1976), p. 64· IO O

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule possible innum erable intrigues am ong the three groups. Th e Porte also reg­ ularly intervened in the elections and named the candidates. T h rou ghou t the seventeenth century, the boyars, not the prince, were in the strongest posi­ tion. D espite these problem s both principalities did effectively control the running o f their internal administrations, and they had direct relations with foreign governm ents. A s border regions, they were involved in the wars o f the suzerain pow er w ith its neighbors. As Ottoman pow er waned, and as pressure from the outside became stronger, the R om anian princes and boyars w ere naturally tem pted to use the situation to their o w n advantage. A lth ough they always kept links w ith both the H ab s­ burg M onarchy and Poland, in the eighteenth century Russia, the great O r­ thodox power, seemed to offer the best hope o f assistance. As that state pressed toward the Black Sea, the tem ptation to act w ith the Russian leaders to throw o ff the O ttom an suzerainty became increasingly stronger. T h e first practical opportunity fo r cooperation came from the endeavors o f Peter the G reat to move southw ard and his conflicts w ith Charles X II o f Sweden. T he R o m a ­ nian leaders w ere gready impressed by the Russian victory over the Swedish king at Poltava in 1709. W elcoming R om anian support, the Russian governm ent at this time en­ tered into negotiations w ith Constantine Brincoveanu, the prince o f Walla­ chia (1688-1714), and D im itrie Cantem ir, the ruler o f M oldavia (17 10 -1711). A lthough an agreem ent was also reached w ith Brincoveanu, the m ajor R u s ­ sian achievement w as the conclusion o f the Treaty o f Lu ck w ith Cantem ir in April 1711. H ere the M oldavian prince secured not only advantages fo r his principality, but also his ow n personal position. It was agreed that M oldavia would becom e an independent state under the protection o f the tsar. C ante­ mir was to be prince, and the rule was to be hereditary in his family. In internal affairs the prince was to have m ore pow er than the boyars. U n fo r­ tunately for Cantem ir, the Russian cam paign was a disaster; Brincoveanu took no action. A fter the Russian arm y was defeated in Ju ly 1711, Cantem ir fled to Russia, w here he lived a highly productive literary life. A s a reward he received from the Russian governm ent fifty villages and fifty thousand serfs, together w ith tw o houses in St. Petersburg.22 Brincoveanu remained in office until 1714, w hen he and his four sons were beheaded by the O ttom an authorities on suspicion o f treason for their relations w ith Austria.

The Phanariot regim e T he defeat o f Peter and the defection o f Cantem ir had enormous political consequences for the Principalities. A fter the Treaty o f K arlow itz, in w hich Transylvania had been ceded, the Porte was naturally concerned about the political stability o f the frontier provinces. In a period ° f retreat before the European great pow ers, it needed princes w hom it could trust and w h o w ou ld not conspire w ith the enemy. T he native princes no 22

N icolac Io rg a, Histoire des relations russo-roumaines (Ia§i: N eam ul Rom Snesc, 1917), p. 128.

IOI

The eighteenth century longer appeared trustworthy. Since Phanariot Greeks had proven able ser­ vants in other areas o f administration, their appointm ent to the highest p o ­ sitions in the Principalities n ow seemed advisable. T h ere were already m any Greeks in both principalities. T h e attraction o f the Rom anian provinces for them was great. In Constantinople they could not display their new wealth and prestige conspicuously. M oreover, other areas did not offer the same opportunities for enrichment. F o r reasons o f personal security, individual preference, and safe investment o f funds, so many Greeks entered the Principalities in the seventeenth century that the boyar class felt threatened in its control o f landholding, public office, and the eccle­ siastical establishments. Despite much opposition, the Greek influence steadily increased. M an y wealthy Greeks married into the great boyar families. Som e became prosperous merchants, whereas others w on m any o f the high posi­ tions w ithin the O rthodox church hierarchy. T h e O ttom an appointm ent o f Phanariot princes introduced w hat is gen ­ erally regarded as the w orst period in m odern Rom anian history, not only because o f the corruption o f the system, but also because o f the uncontrolled fiscal exactions made by the Porte in the provinces. The choice o f Greek princes marked a fundamental change in the political position o f the prov­ inces. The new rulers were not representatives o f the Principalities, but agents o f the O ttom an governm ent sent to guard the interests o f the suzerain. They ranked as pashas o f tw o horsetails. From the O ttom an point o f view their function was to assure control o f the area against foreign intrigue and inter­ vention and to deliver huge sums o f m oney back to the Porte fo r its military and civilian needs. Th e securing o f food supplies was also necessary, both for the arm y and for the capital city. It w ill be noted that the Porte still did not turn the area into a pashalik, nor was it occupied by the O ttom an army. The provinces retained m ajor autonom ous rights, but the rulers were under direct O ttom an control. W ith the appointm ent o f Phanariot princes, the O ttom an governm ent did succeed in breaking the control o f the R om anian boyars over their country. A council o f great boyars still took part in the adm inistration; a larger coun­ cil, w hich included representatives from all the landow ning classes and the church, could be convened on certain occasions. H ow ever, the pow er in the governm ent remained firmly in the hands o f the ruler, w ith his retainers, appointees, and fam ily supporters. The boyars were left w ith relatively little political influence, although naturally the prince and his G reek contingent could not com pletely alienate the native aristocracy. Th e Phanariots had to w ork w ith them and through them; they could always find some w ith w hom they could cooperate. N ative boyar factions could also intrigue in C onstan­ tinople against the prince in office. D espite this loss o f political power, the native boyar still maintained his privileged position in relation to the rest o f the population, and despite the reform s o f die period, his hold over the land and the peasant was not significantly weakened. H e also paid few i f any taxes.

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Nevertheless, th roughout the period he remained discontented w ith the po ­ litical conditions. B oyar opposition to Phanariot rule was constant; individ­ uals and groups repeatedly sought outside assistance from both Vienna and St. Petersburg. C ertainly the boyar had much to com plain about. T he prince was n ow an agent o f the Porte. T h e provinces no longer had anything like an indepen­ dent o r separate stance in regard to foreign powers. T he Phanariots did con­ duct diplom atic negotiations, but as representatives o f Constantinople. The provinces had also no independent military forces. T he prince had a personal guard, and som e troops w ere available for the maintenance o f public order, but the country did not have the corps o f armed men that existed even in regions under direct O ttom an administration. B oth provinces gave the ap­ pearance o f being integral parts o f the em pire, and not self-governing depen­ dencies. M ost im portant, how ever, was the fact that the new rulers brought neither order nor prosperity, but instead increasing turm oil and internal anarchy. In the period o f Phanariot rule, from 1711 to 1821, eleven families provided can­ didates fo r seventy-four different reigns. T he average period in office fo r a prince was 2.5 years. Like the Patriarchates and the other high offices in C o n ­ stantinople, the H ospodarships in the Principalities were sold to the highest bidder. T h e com petition am ong the Phanariot families was intense. M ost offices w ere purchased on borrow ed money. Once in power, the successful candidate had to assure that he made a profit. H e sold low er offices and resorted to measures o f outright extortion. T he position o f Rom anian prince was thus expensive, and it was also dangerous. A s w e have seen, the Porte had a propensity for abrupt execution o f those w hose policies w ere displeas­ ing or unsuccessful. T h e question thus remains w h y Greek families com peted so strongly for w hat seems a dubious honor. Q uestions o f prestige w ere, o f course, im portant, but so was the fact that enorm ous profits could be made from the office. O ne authority has estimated that around the m iddle o f the eighteenth century the cost o f the Moldavian throne was 30,000 gold pounds; that o f Wallachia, 45,000. H ow ever, the annual tax income o f M oldavia was 180,oo o go ld pounds; that o f Wallachia, 300,o o o .23 Even after heavy tribute payments to Constantinople, these provinces remained rich sources o f private profit. T he Phanariot system was attacked not only for its fiscal and political cor­ ruption, but fo r its style and its G reek coloration. T he Phanariot ideal was the Byzantine Em pire. T h e princes could not be Byzantine despots in C o n ­ stantinople, but they could be in Bucharest and Ia§i. T h ey thus adopted an elaborate court cerem onial, surrounded themselves w ith articles o f great lux­ ury, and treated those beneath them, including often the native boyars, w ith contem pt and indifference in accordance w ith w hat they considered an im23

R u n cim an , The Great Church, p p. 374, 375·

1 03

The eighteenth century perial manner. T h ey w ere, nevertheless, always conscious o f the instability o f their power. A contem porary observer w rote: “ W hat is remarkable about these despots . . . is that all their riches, money, jewels, hordes and furnish­ ings, are always in trunks and traveling coffers, as i f they had to leave at any moment.” 24 A lthough it is possible to overestimate the damage caused by Phanariot rule, it is true that the princes did represent an influence that was foreign to the provinces over w hich they ruled. T h e restored Byzantium o f the Phan­ ariot dream w as indeed O rthodox, but it was not Rom anian. W hat the Phan­ ariot rulers accom plished was the establishment o f a Byzantine island within the O ttom an Em pire. G reek dom inance o f the Rom anian church has already been m entioned. Phanariots controlled the high offices and the synods. The rulers o f the Principalities in the past had always been generous in their do­ nations to O rthodox institutions and causes. T he gifts from the Phanariots tended to strengthen Greek influence. M ost im portant was the question o f the D edicated M onasteries. B oth G reek and Rom anian boyars increasingly gave land to certain monasteries, w hose incom e was devoted to the support o f H o ly Places, such as the H o ly Sepulchre, M t. Sinai, M t. A thos, o r a Pa­ triarchate. T h e direction o f the establishments was G reek; the heads, or hegum ens, w ere appointed by the H o ly Place in question. In time an eleventh o f the arable land o f the Principalities fell under the control o f these estab­ lishments, which not only were under foreign dom ination, but sent their profits out o f the country. Th e m ajor factor in the Principalities, that which determ ined the fate o f both the governm ent and the individual, was the enorm ous fiscal pressure o f the political regim e in power. H avin g purchased their offices, the rulers had to repay the loans, and they expected to make large personal profits. They had to support a luxurious court and make frequent payments to the right officials in Constantinople to assure that they stayed in favor w ith the Porte. T h ey also had to give regular contributions, outside o f the tribute and private bribes, to the O ttom an governm ent. T h ey recouped their m oney by selling the offices under their control and by the fraudulent handling o f state fi­ nances. H u g e sums o f m oney thus found their w ay to Constantinople and into the pockets o f the Phanariot supporters. Aside from the costs o f corruption, the Ottoman government was in des­ perate need o f money. Throughout the century pressure was put on the Prin­ cipalities to increase the money payments and the delivery o f food. The chief drain was the military and the high cost o f the wars. Moldavia and Wallachia not only paid for war expenses, but, as frontier provinces, suffered exceed­ ingly from the fact that much o f the fighting was on their territory. It will be remembered that between 1711 and 1812 the empire was engaged in six wars. 24

Q u o te d in R o b e rt W. S eton-W atson, A History
Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Both principalities, in addition to being the scene o f com bat, had to support the O ttom an o r foreign armies while they were on their territory. Because o f the Phanariot regime and the grow in g w eight o f financial pres­ sure from the Porte, in every international crisis native Rom anian boyars sought assistance in both Russia and Austria. T h eir goal was separation from the O ttom an Em pire and the establishment o f an independent or autono­ mous regim e, under the protection o f one o r both o f these states, in which the political pow er w ould return to their control. A fter the defeat o f Peter, the H ab sbu rg Em pire was in the forefront o f the powers in opposition to the Porte. In the w ar that lasted from 1716 to 1718, some boyars favored in­ corporation into the monarchy, but with the preservation o f R om anian au­ tonom ous institutions and a regime dom inated by the great boyars. W hen in the Treaty o f Passarowitz Austria annexed Oltenia, such a regime was indeed inaugurated. H ow ever, like Venetian administration in the Pelo­ ponnesus, H absbu rg rule in the Wallachian region managed to antagonize most o f the social classes. Bent on turning the area into a source o f food supplies fo r its army, the Austrian administration introduced fiscal, judicial, and adm inistrative reform s. A t first, the m onarchy relied on the boyars. O l­ tenia was governed through a council under the presidency o f the ban (gov­ ernor), G eorge Cantacuzino. Tw o officials were placed at the head o f each district. In 1726 any vestige o f real autonom y was ended w ith the abolition o f the office o f ban. T h e area remained under the imperial military command. A lthough the country was m ore efficiently run, taxation increased and, o f course, the pow er o f the local nobility was not restored. T he A ustrian officials also interfered in the agrarian relationships between the landholders and the peasants. T he labor obligations were brought in line w ith the m ore severe ones o f the rest o f the monarchy. T he peasant was now subject to fifty-tw o days o f service a year, that is, one day a w eek, a figure many times higher than that in force in either M oldavia or Wallachia. In 1736 R ussia was again at w ar with the Porte; Austria joined in 1737. While the H ab sbu rg forces fought in the western Balkans, the Russians in 1739 launched a cam paign in the Principalities under the direction o f General M unnich. A fter capturing the stronghold o f K hotin, the Russian arm y en­ tered Ia§i in A ugust. There it was greeted by the boyars, the O rthodox clergy, and all those w h o hoped for a liberation from both O ttom an and Phanariot rule. In their discussions o f w ar aims, both the Russian and the Austrian governm ents had indicated their desires in the Principalities. T he m onarchy had considered an extension o f its hold in O ltenia to Braila; Russia had pro­ posed the maintenance o f O ttom an control, but under Russian protection. A ll hopes w ere, however, disappointed. T he failure to make decisive m ili­ tary gains, in particular the Austrian setbacks, forced the allies to sign the Peace o f Belgrade o f Septem ber 1739, which reunited Oltenia with Wallachia. The treaty also inaugurated a period o f almost thirty years o f peace. In this time the Phanariot rulers, in particular Constantine M avrocordat, made an

105

The eighteenth century effort to remedy the grave m isfortunes that had descended upon the country as the result o f m isgovem m ent and war.

Phanariot reform

A fter the conclusion o f the peace both principalities were in a chaotic state. M ost desperate was the condition in the countryside, where the mass flight o f the peasantry had rem oved the foundation from under the entire fiscal system. Since direct O ttom an administration had never been es­ tablished there, Rom anian lands had not been assigned as timars. Instead, the land had remained under the control o f the native aristocracy. T he boyars had retained their estates and political pow er w ithout having to convert to Islam. A true feudal system was in effect. T he peasant, w h o was usually a serf, was liable to heavy payments both to the state and to the landholder. T he entire w eigh t o f the corrupt system came to rest on this low est unit in the social scale. B y the m iddle o f the century the burdens had become so over­ w helm ing that large regions were depopulated. Individuals or w hole villages found it better to desert to the mountains or to leave the Principalities; they could cross the Carpathians into Transylvania o r the D anube to the lands south o f the river. T h ey also sometimes em igrated into the territory north o f the Black Sea, particularly as it passed into Russian hands. T h is mass flight o f taxpayers ruined the governm ent finances. It has been estimated that in Wallachia 90 percent o f the state revenue came from the peasants. Som ething obviously had to be done to keep them on the land. T h e reform s, w hich were to cover m any aspects o f life, w ere prim arily the w ork o f Constantine M avrocordat, the greatest Phanariot prince. R u lin g al­ ternatively fo r ten separate periods, six in Wallachia and four in M oldavia, he supervised the reorganization o f the fiscal, social, and administrative systems o f the Principalities. H is reform s o f necessity had to concern m ore than the outer form s o f governm ent and adm inistration; he had to interfere w ith the traditional relationship o f the peasant and the boyar. T h e reform s o f M avrocordat had m any points in com m on w ith similar changes being introduced in the H absbu rg M onarchy in the period o f en­ lightened despotism . O ne problem facing the prince was the reincorporation o f O ltenia, w hose administration had been fundam entally changed. H e ac­ com plished this by in effect transferring much o f the system in practice in O ltenia to the rest o f the country. M avrocordat’s objective was similar to the aims o f the H ab sbu rg governm ent: he wished to centralize the administra­ tion and b ring it into direct contact w ith the mass o f the population. This action w ou ld be at the expense o f the pow er o f the boyars and w ou ld severely check and dim inish their influence. A lthough the prince was able to accom­ plish m uch, he was in a weaker position than the H ab sbu rg rulers, although they had similar problem s w ith their nobility. M avrocordat had no arm y be­ hind him , and he could not rely on steady support from Constantinople, although the Porte had an even greater interest in assuring the fiscal stability o f the vassal provinces.

106

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule T h e first reform came in 17+0 in Wallachia and dealt with the m ajor issue, the collection o f taxes. Since the aim was to end the mass flight o f the peas­ ants and to increase i f possible the state revenues, the taxes had to be kept at a level that w ou ld not force the local population to resort to extreme mea­ sures such as flight. E fforts had already been made tow ard tax reform , and there w ere im provem ents in the methods o f collection in the reigns o f Nicolae M avrocordat in Wallachia (1719-1730) and o f G rigore Ghica in M o ld a­ via (1726-1733). T hen it was decided that a single fixed tax should be levied four times a year to replace the unregulated, haphazard system that had ex­ isted before. War pressures ended this attempt at change. Constantine M avrocordat’s reform provided for the registration o f the population so that the state could accurately assess taxes. Previously, some individuals and villages had held a full im m unity from taxation even though they did not have boyar status. T h e census was strongly resisted by the boyars. N o t on ly did it intro­ duce the central authority into the relationship between the lord and peasant, but m any boyars had the services o f peasants w h o paid no state taxes and w ho w ere thus a better source o f profit fo r their masters. T h e registration signified that all o f the nonnoble population w ould contribute to the governm ent. Since m ost nobles w ere still free from much o f the tax burden, it was to the interest o f the central governm ent to regulate and reduce the numbers o f boyars. F o r this purpose a new statute o f nobility was issued. H enceforth rank w o u ld depend not only on the status and antiquity o f the family, but also on the holding o f public office. T he boyars in both principalities were divided into tw o categories. T h e great boyars and their descendants were declared free from all taxation; the small boyars, the m azili, were to pay a personal tax, but were largely exempt from other state contributions. In order to enforce the changes, the central governm ent needed m ore effi­ cient local administrative control. Tw o officials, called ispravniks, w ere as­ signed to each district. M o st im portant, they w ere to receive regular salaries; thus the old system w here such officials sim ply collected w hat they could from the local population was ended. This aspect o f the reform soon proved unworkable, and the old abuses returned. W hen he was hospodar o f Walla­ chia, how ever, G rigore G hika sought to reintroduce the payment o f civil servants. A ttem pts were also made to im prove the judicial system. A gain , such ac­ tions interfered w ith the previous rights o f the boyars and the church. M ore emphasis was now placed on written court records and on state control o f the proceedings. L egal reform was continued in particular in the reign o f A lexander Ypsilanti in Wallachia (1774-1782). A C ode o f L aw s was issued in 1780. In 1741 Constantine Mavrocordat was transferred to Moldavia. He was replaced in Wallachia by Mihai Racovi^i (1741—1744), who reintroduced the old methods o f extreme fiscal exploitation. The peasants responded with a

107

The eighteenth century resumption o f mass em igration from their land. Since its income was af­ fected, the Porte reappointed M avrocordat for the years 1744 to 1748. In this period social reform measures were introduced, and the state directly inter­ vened in the delicate question o f the relations o f the boyar and the peasant in regard to the land. T h e basic issue —that is, w ho owned o r controlled the land —w as not easy to resolve. In the O ttom an Em pire, in theory, the sultan held the land from G o d ; it was granted to others in return for state service or for religious pur­ poses. In Wallachia and M oldavia the problem o f land ow nership and peasant obligations had not been met clearly. The Principalities had a native aristoc­ racy, but its origins and rights were controversial. B y the eighteenth century, nevertheless, a situation had developed in which the boyars controlled the land, w hich was w orked by dependent or enserfed peasants from w hom the landholders could extract a large number o f unregulated payments. Exactly how this situation developed is not clear. H ow ever, from the sixteenth cen­ tury on, the nobles and the monasteries were able to increase their position at the expense o f both the central authority and the peasantry. B oyar families gained control over villages by receiving them as gifts from the state o r the monasteries. Som e villages sold themselves in return for protection o r tax exemptions. N oble families could buy into village lands, o r seize them, and thus gain a predom inant influence. The tax-farming system also was a means o f gaining estates. In the early period the boyars did not usually engage in agricultural w ork themselves. T h e control o f villages signified the right to collect certain pay­ ments; it did not involve the use o f the land. I f the burden was too heavy, the peasants could desert their plots. Land was plentiful in the Principalities, and animal husbandry, not agriculture, was the principal occupation. Ob­ viously, dom ination o f an area was o f no advantage to a landholder unless it contained a w orking population, so efforts were made to assure that the peas­ ant w ou ld not leave. A lthough serfdom in Wallachia officially dates from the reign o f M ichael the Brave and measures taken at the end o f the sixteenth century, the institution was probably in effect before then. In the subsequent period, the boyars were often able to break the relationship o f the serf and his land. T h ey often bought serfs to settle in uncultivated or deserted lands; they could also free the serfs, but keep the plots they worked. A t the time o f the reform s there were fo u r categories o f peasants. First were the free villagers w h o held their lands, often in hill o r mountain areas, on the basis o f traditional rights accepted by the state. Second w ere the free peasants w ithout land w h o worked for a noble on an agreed basis. T he third group consisted o f serfs w h o were tied to their villages and lands and were under the jurisdiction o f a boyar. Fourth, some serfs, scutelnici, had no land but served the boyar directly. T he peasantry bore almost the entire burden o f the state taxes. T h ey also had to make payments for the use o f the land, either to a boyar o r to a

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule monastery. In addition, the peasant ow ed corvee, o r labor obligations, called clacâ. In the eighteenth century the labor dues were not high when com pared

to those o f the neighboring H absburg Em pire. T h e noble, particularly in Wallachia, seldom was concerned in the actual running o f his estate; he wanted an assured income. H e thus accepted the conversion o f labor dues into pay­ ments in kind. T he first reform s dealt w ith this problem o f the corvée. In the 1740s it w as set at twelve days in Wallachia and twenty-four in M oldavia. L ab o r obligations w ere consistently higher in M oldavia because the boyar was m ore likely to be directly concerned w ith the w orking o f his estate. Th roughout the reform period no attempt was made to define land ow ner­ ship. T he boyar was referred to as “ the master o f the dom ain” o r “ o f the village.” In 1746 a boyar assembly was held in Wallachia to deal w ith the fiscal crisis and the problem o f the fleeing peasantry. It was decided that any se rf w h o returned voluntarily to his village w ould be freed. Since this measure o b ­ viously put a prem ium on flight, the assembly was forced to adopt the next logical step o f sim ply ending serfdom . I f the lord did not agree, the peasant was to receive his freedom w ith the payment o f ten thalers. In 1749, when M avrocordat w as again prince o f M oldavia, similar measures, but on more stringent conditions, were introduced into M oldavia. Personal bondage was now ended. The reform s placed in the same cate­ gory the form er se rf and the free peasant w ho had w orked land belonging to a boyar o n an agreed basis. B oth w ere clàcaçi, peasants w h o made payments for the use o f the land. T h e great weakness o f the peasant reform , o f course, was the question o f enforcement. T he boyars controlled the countryside. F o r reform to w ork, the central governm ent had to continue to oversee the rela­ tions o f the lord and peasant and to rely on its ow n officials. Unfortunately, the Principalities were not to be governed by princes o f M avrocordat’s caliber in the future. M oreover, the renewal o f a period o f protracted warfare forced the Porte to resort to further fiscal pressure. O nce again taxes were levied at repeated intervals during the year, and old taxes that had been abolished were reimposed. M ass peasant flights recurred. The reform s and the state interference remained under attack from the boyars. T h e native aristocracy saw in these measures just another reason to justify its dislike o f Phanariot and O ttom an rule. W here possible, the boyars sought to return to the form er system and to increase peasant payments. In !766 the labor obligations w ere increased in M oldavia, and a new system o f assessing these dues was also introduced. A w ork quota, the nart, was set regulating w h at a peasant was supposed to accomplish in a day, but it was so high that it could not be fulfilled in that limited a time. In addition to the payments to the state and to the landholder, the peasant Paid taxes on his produce, his animals, and just about everything else he ow ned o r used. A n example o f the heavy burden thus im posed can be found 111 the fo llow in g description o f conditions in Wallachia:

109

The eighteenth century B y the end o f the eighteenth century, the taxes levied on the ordinary villager included: a head tax, levied 4 times a year (but up to 12 times a year w hen the treasury needed it); a hearth tax, levied twice a year; a tax on cattle, sheep, pigs, vines; a tax on smoke (from the house­ hold fireplace), and on cellars; a sales tax on cattle; a tax on pasture grass; a “ flag tax” upon the accession to the throne o f a new prince, and another tax 3 years later i f the same prince was still on the throne (presum ably to pay o ff the bribe debts he ow ed in order to rule for so lo n g); a tax on soap, on all goods sold in a marketplace, and on bridge tolls; a salt tax; and a tavern tax. N um erous others have not even been recorded because taxes were farmed ou t and the tax farm ­ ers collected what they could w ithout always keeping careful re­ ceipts.25

The establishment o f Russian influence

In 1768 the long period o f peace came to an end w ith the O ttom an declaration o f w ar on Russia. T he great R ussian victories and the subsequent Treaty o f Kuchuk Kainarji were extrem ely sig ­ nificant fo r the R om anian lands in that they marked the beginning o f a pe­ riod w hen, w ith Russian backing, the provinces w ere able to gain from the Porte a closer definition o f their position and o f their obligations in tribute and supplies. A t the same time Russia became the pow er w ith the principal influence in the area. Russian intervention in the Principalities had, as w e have seen, com ­ menced at the beginning o f the century. R ussia’s interest was first and fore­ m ost m ilitary and strategic. Th e provinces were on the road to C onstanti­ nople; they were also the gatew ay for the march o f the O ttom an armies into lands o f interest to Russia, such as Poland, the U kraine, and the territory o f the C rim ean Tatars. A s the Russian borders approached those o f M oldavia, other problem s arose. A grarian relations were bad in both the Principalities and Russia. G rou ps o f peasants m oved in either direction to escape the ex­ actions o f their nobility and governm ents. Fugitives from justice, bandits, and deserting soldiers also form ed part o f this transient population. W ith these considerations in m ind, the Russian governm ent was con­ cerned about the political conditions in Bucharest and Ia§i. Because o f its geographic position, M oldavia was always o f m ore immediate interest. W hat w ou ld have best served R ussian plans at this time w ou ld have been the estab­ lishment o f a buffer state that w ould cover the Russian conquest and devel­ opm ent o f the lands north o f the Black Sea. This aim could be achieved by the conversion o f the Principalities into autonom ous regions under Russian protection, even i f the area remained technically under O ttom an suzerainty. T h e direct annexation o f the country could not so easily be accom plished. In 25

Chirot, Social Change, p. 65.

IIO

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule 1774 all o f the great powers were opposed to a peace that would radically

alter the balance of power in southeastern Europe. The Russian government thus concentrated on gaining from the Porte concessions that would strengthen both the autonomous position o f the Principalities and the Russian influence over their development. Support for the Russian position could always be found within the prov­ inces. Throughout the century the native boyars continued to appeal to both Austria and Russia against the Ottoman and Phanariot rule. They too wanted an autonomous system under some sort o f foreign protection, and one that would return the political power to their hands. The Russian government, of course, was also on good terms with the Phanariots, who were Orthodox and conservative and who held influential offices. In turn, the Phanariot circles expected much from St. Petersburg. The goal o f the reestablishment o f By­ zantium could only be reached through Russian military victories. The Treaty o f Kuchuk Kainarji contained important provisions concerning the Principalities and Russia’s relations with them. Article XVI, which con­ sisted o f ten points, was devoted to the provinces. Here the Russian right of intervention was given concrete recognition: “The Porte likewise permits that, according as the circumstances of these two Principalities may require, the Ministers o f the Imperial Court o f Russia resident at Constantinople may remonstrate in their favor; and promises to listen to them with all the atten­ tion which is due to friendly and respected powers.”26 In other sections o f the treaty the Principalities were given tax relief and allowed to send official representatives to Constantinople to speak for their interests. In the same year the Ottoman government issued a decree regulat­ ing the amount that the provinces were to pay. They still were subject to the tribute, to certain gifts, and to assessments whenever a new prince took of­ fice, but some taxes were suppressed. It was also agreed that the Porte would pay the market price for supplies obtained in the Principalities. Turkish offi­ cials and merchants were to enter the country only with special permission and with official firmans. Muslims were forbidden to buy estates or establish permanent residence. In the years between 1783 and 1802 the Porte made further concessions. The exact amount o f the payments was set, and the de­ liveries o f supplies were specified. The prince was not to be deposed unless he committed a crime, and then only with the consent o f Russia. These arrangements naturally greatly increased Russian influence. Russia’s position became even stronger with the appointment of consuls, a matter also provided for by the treaty. In 1782, after strong Ottoman resistance, the first consul, S. L. Lashkarev, arrived in Bucharest. Vice-consuls were subse­ quently sent to Ia§i and Kilia. As in Greece, the offices became centers of political intrigue. In 1783 the Habsburg Empire established a similar consu26

Q u o te d in H o llan d , Treaty Relations o fRussia and Turkey, p. 47.

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The eighteenth century late, as did the French in 1796 and the British in 1803. Thereafter the M o ld a­ vian and Wallachian capitals reflected the conflicts am ong the great powers in Constantinople. Meanwhile, Catherine the Great and Joseph II were corresponding on their extensive proposals for the partition o f the O ttom an Em pire, plans that in ­ cluded the establishment o f a Rom anian buffer state o f D acia, presum ably under Russian prim ary influence. Already, in 1775, A ustria had com pelled the Porte to recognize its annexation o f Bukovina, which was an integral part o f Moldavia. In Septem ber 1787 Russia was again at w ar w ith the Porte; A ustria joined in the follow in g February. F o r the fourth time in the century, Russian troops appeared in the Principalities, this time at the behest o f Catherine’s favorite, Prince G . Potem kin, w h o apparently considered h im self a possible candidate for the office o f prince o f Dacia. Russian aims, as defined at the beginning o f the war, called for the establishment o f a buffer state w ith its boundary on the D niester River. T he principal Russian objective w as, h o w ­ ever, the annexation o f the lands between the B u g and D niester rivers. Under the leadership o f the brilliant general Alexander Suvorov, R ussian troops w on significant victories, but the international situation was not fa­ vorable to Russian interests. Sw eden’s declaration o f w ar made an expedition to the M editerranean by the Baltic fleet impossible. Austria was forced to withdraw from the w ar in 1791. Faced w ith these problem s, Russia concluded the Treaty o f Jassy in 1792. H ere the principal gain was the acquisition o f lands to the D niester; Russia became the immediate neighbor o f M oldavia. In Article I V the Porte declared that it w ou ld abide by the previous arrange­ ments concerning the Principalities. In the 1790s both provinces, like all o f the powers, were increasingly af­ fected by the repercussions o f the revolution in France. H enceforth, until after the Congress o f Vienna in 1815, Balkan problem s were to remain subor­ dinate to the great issue o f the dom ination o f the European continent. B y this time, however, the Principalities had at least begun to advance along the road o f internal reform and national autonomy. T h e Phanariot regim e re­ mained, but the reform s o f M avrocordat, even i f some were later reversed or changed, marked at least the recognition o f the m ajor social and political problems. Russian predominance was to stay, in fact to increase, over the next years. Th e intervention o f this governm ent had forced the Porte to fix the Romanian payments and obligations and to give assurances concerning the tenure o f the princes. W hether these w ould be honored depended on the future evolution o f events, not only in E urope but in the O ttom an capital.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule TH E OTTOMAN e m p i r e : p o l i t i c a l EV O L U T I O N IN TH E E I G H T E E N T H C E N T U R Y R eform and revolution In the previous pages a century o f O ttom an history has been discussed from the view point o f the Balkan provinces. It was characterized, as w e have seen, by a succession o f m ilitary defeats that resulted in O ttom an territorial losses, principally in the lands north o f the Danube and the Black Sea. This weakness was reflected in the internal situation and the discontent w ith rising taxes and ineffective governm ent. C onditions o f local anarchy arose w ith the failure o f the authorities to keep order and the existence o f bands o f robbers o r o f disgrunded and unpaid soldiers. T he breakdown o f the central authority was paralleled by the rise in prestige and pow er o f local authorities w h o gained effective control o f their regions and rem oved themselves from the supervi­ sion o f the center. T he situation was to deteriorate even further at the end o f the century. Since the central governm ent proved ineffective, the local popu ­ lation turned increasingly to its ow n leaders and its military bands, both Christian and M uslim , which offered a better source o f protection and gu id ­ ance. T h e existence o f strong provincial authorities naturally deprived the central governm ent o f much o f its income. Taxes collected locally remained in the hands o f these officials. A circle o f difficulties was thus created. W ithout m oney the governm ent could not maintain a strong military establishment; the result was continuing defeat in war, which in turn led to an increase in the prestige and position o f the local authorities, w h o in turn kept their hands on the public revenues that should have gon e to Constantinople to provide for the arm y and other public needs. T h e sultan and his advisers were w ell aware o f the problem , but it was difficult to decide what should be done about it. Severe limitations hampered the efforts o f the O ttom an leaders to meet the situation. A principal hin­ drance throughout both the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries was the strength o f conservative religious tradition and the political influence o f the ulema. U nfortunately for those w h o saw the necessity o f radical reform , the O ttom an Em pire had enjoyed a glorious past history. It was difficult for m any to believe that there w as anything fundam entally w ron g w ith the basic prin­ ciples on w hich their governm ent rested. T h e fact that these w ere derived from a strong and living religious tradition com plicated the matter further. To be acceptable, reform had to be based on the conception that the new measures were in fact a return to an older and purer society. O nly in that manner could a sufficient number o f people be convinced o f their necessity. R efo rm also ran against entrenched interests. M any in pow er saw no reason to alter the existing institutions, w hich gave them pow er and wealth, and feared any change that threatened their personal interests. T h e clear and obvious need throughout the century was military reform. 113

The eighteenth century The ambitious plans o f other states for the partition o f the empire were known in Constantinople. It was apparent that an im provem ent in the m ilitary was a question o f life o r death for the state. M oreover, som ething had to be done about the em pire’s financial condition. W ithout increased sources o f incom e, a radical im provem ent in the army w ould not be possible. Basic to a change here was a reform o f the tax-collecting system; administrative reorganization was thus also essential. In the eighteenth century, although the m ilitary issue was met, few attempts were made to im prove the tax and administrative structure. T he sultans and vezirs continued to raise m oney by their old m eth­ ods o f increasing taxes, adding new ones, and debasing the coinage. Ineffi­ cient and oppressive tax-farm ing systems continued to be em ployed. T he corruption in the administration resulted in the diversion o f tax income into private hands, rather than its em ploym ent to strengthen the country. T h e m ajor military problem was the janissary corps, the form er basis o f O ttom an power. A s w e have seen, its members, dispersed throughout the em pire, had become an element o f political disorder and intrigue. T h ey were the m ost effectively organized and armed grou p in Constantinople and in the provincial cities, but they did not show a corresponding ability to defeat invading armies. C losely tied to the guilds and the ulema, they did not prove a firm support o f the central authority. Throu ghou t the eighteenth century, in fact until their disbanding in 1826, they were a m ajor cause o f political instability; they repeatedly demonstrated their ability to control o r overthrow successive sultans and vezirs. It w as, in fact, a janissary rebellion in A drianople in 1703 that led to the accession to pow er o f A hm ed III, w h o was to enjoy a relatively lon g reign, until 1730. H is arm y was able to defeat Peter the G reat at the battle o f the Pruth, but subsequent unsuccessful campaigns against the H ab sbu rg Em pire forced him to sign the highly unfavorable Treaty o f Passarowitz. D u rin g a large part o f his reign he was served by an able vezir, D am ad Ibrahim Pasha, w h o was in office from 1718 to 1730. B oth the sultan and his advisers showed a keen interest in concurrent developments in Europe. Representatives were sent to V ienna and Paris to study Western ways and to select those that w ould be o f use to the empire. A hm ed’s reign covered the Tulip Period in O ttom an culture, a time char­ acterized not only by the fad o f acquiring and gro w in g these flow ers, but also by the adoption o f Western, in particular French, styles. French decor, fur­ niture, and gardens w ere copied. L ivin g in an era o f extravagance and luxury, the wealthy devoted much attention to architecture; new palaces, pavilions, m osques, fountains, and elaborate form al gardens were a result o f this enthu­ siasm. T h e era was characterized by an emphasis on pleasure and a great interest in poetry. A s far as achievements in the cultural field are concerned, the introduction o f printing in the Turkish language was perhaps the m ost significant. Previously, Arm enian, G reek, Jew ish, and Latin books had been printed, but not Turkish. T he man responsible fo r the new developm ent was

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule Ibrahim M iiteferrika, a H ungarian born in C luj. Taken prisoner o f w ar and sold as a slave, he converted to Islam. H e was able to gain the agreement o f the seyhulislam to print in Turkish as long as he did not handle religious works. T h e first book appeared in 1728. B y the time o f M iiteferrika’s death in 1745, his press had produced sixteen books. T h e extravagant spending o f the Tulip Period produced an inevitable re­ action. T h e luxurious living had to be paid for, and the basis remained the im poverished countryside. T h e contrast between the opulence at the top and the m isery at the bottom intensified. A s vezir, Ibrahim made some attempt to introduce measures for a m ore efficient governm ent and a better collection o f taxes, but basically the system remained unchanged. A period o f inflation, fam ine, plague, and rural unrest was inevitable. T he unsuccessful and contro­ versial campaigns in Persia further inflamed the situation until finally a m ajor revolt broke out. U n d er these circumstances the city o f Constantinople seethed w ith discon­ tent. T h e problem o f the unpaid soldiers was even m ore serious in the capital than in the provinces. M oreover, Constantinople, like other m ajor cities in the em pire, was suffering from a mass influx o f the rural population, which was tryin g to escape the intolerable conditions in the countryside. Anarchy and banditry led m any to abandon their lands and flee into cities, which seemed a relative haven o f security. A m o n g these newcomers w ere m any ar­ tisans w h o sought to continue their trades, an attempt that brought them into conflict w ith the local guild organizations. Th e guilds themselves had ample reason to be extremely discontented w ith the entire econom ic situation in the em pire, including the tax system, the extra w ar payments, the debase­ ment o f the currency, and the lack o f civic stability. T he unrest was show n by, am ong other signs, the increasing num ber o f fires in Constantinople result­ ing from arson. In 1729 a conflagration destroyed approximately 4,000 houses and 130 mosques w ith a great loss o f life.27 Repeated outbreaks o f plague and cholera in the 1720s made the situation even worse. T he rebellion involved first the low er social classes and was initiated by guild mem bers disgruntled with conditions arising from the commencement o f a cam paign against Persia. T he leader was Patrona H alil, “ an ex-second hand clothes dealer and masseur in a Turkish bath” ; others prom inent in the revolt w ere “junk dealers, sellers o f vegetables, and coffeehouse attendants.” 28 The m ovem ent, however, soon w on the cooperation of, and was in fact taken over by, members o f the governing class w h o were in opposition to Ibrahim and his supporters. M an y o f these were members o f the ulema and discon­ tented janissaries and other m ilitary men. T h e sultan and his vezir w ere in U skiidar w ith the army w hen the revolt broke out in Septem ber 1730. The 27 28

Robert W. Olson, The Siege ofMosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, m 8-i 743 (Bloom ington: Indiana University publications, 1975), P· 7i· O lson, Siege ofMosul, pp. 56, 77.

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The eighteenth century city was soon in the hands o f the revolutionaries; the sultan was com pelled to surrender Ibrahim , w h o was executed along w ith tw o o f his nephews. A hm ed was then forced to abdicate in favor o f his nephew, M ahm ud I (1730 -

1754). A lth ough the new sultan had to promise the revolutionaries w hat they wanted, he was able to gain control o f the situation. A t the end o f N ovem ber Patrona H alil, the leader o f the lower-class forces, was murdered. In the end the governm ent was reestablished on much the old basis. A ll o f those w h o had participated in the original movement were hunted dow n and executed. Th e revolt, however, had show n not only the unrest am ong the poorer ele­ ments o f society, but also the discontent o f the conservatives in the ulema and the m ilitary w ith the Tulip Period and French cultural influence. D u rin g the reign o f M ahm ud I some effort at m ilitary reform was made. T h e use o f foreign advisers, particularly French, characterized the further attempts to m odernize the army. T he chief figure at this time was Claude Alexander, C ount o f Bonneval, an officer w h o had served both w ith Lou is X I V and w ith Eugene o f Savoy. H e arrived in Constantinople in 1729 and converted to Islam. Since sipahi and janissary opposition made changes in these organizations im possible, he concentrated on the bom bardier corps, which he trained according to Austrian and French methods. H e established a training center, w hich the janissaries closed prom pdy after his death in 1747. Bonneval was also concerned with military technology, and he constructed cannon, powder, and musket factories. There was always less resistance in the em pire to the introduction o f superior European military equipm ent then to attempts at military reorganization o r interference w ith profits o r traditional privileges. A lth ough the w ar w aged between 1736 and 1739 was concluded by a favor­ able peace that returned northern Serbia and O ltenia to the em pire, the con­ flict contributed to the intensification o f the difficulties in the countryside. T he concentration o f military force against the foreign invader left the central governm ent weaker in its relations w ith the provincial authorities. C o n d i­ tions w ere bad in the Balkans, but w orse elsewhere. T h e em pire lost practical control over E gyp t, Syria, Iraq, and N orth Africa. T he period o f peace that follow ed, w hich covered the reigns o f tw o sultans, Osman III (1754-1757) and M ustafa I I I (1757-1774), was not used as an opportunity to reform the g o v ­ ernment o r strengthen the state. T h e old abuses flourished. T he sultans and vezirs kept control by the regular method o f maintaining the balance o f power between rival factions and pitting strong individuals against each other. B rib ­ ery, nepotism , and the sale o f offices remained constant attributes o f the system. In 1774 A bd u l H am id I came to the throne. T he same year saw the signing o f the Treaty o f K uchuk Kainarji, which not only marked a great defeat but identified Russia as the m ost form idable foreign adversary. T he absolute ne­ cessity o f m ilitary reform was clearly demonstrated. T h e em pire had suffered

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule a m ilitary disaster, and, w orse, provinces under local m ilitary leaders were ' the process o f detaching themselves from the state. Since it was a situation o f crisis, even the conservative elements could be convinced o f the necessity for change. Foreign military advisers were still needed. O f the powers, France continued to be the main supporter o f reform s that w ould prevent the col­ lapse o f its O ttom an ally. Britain and H olland, w ith large com mercial stakes in the area, had similar interests. In contrast, Russia and A ustria, both o f w hich sought a partition o f die empire, opposed any measures to strengthen their intended victim. A m o n g the vezirs o f A bd u l H am id I, one, H alil H am id, stands out as a reform er despite his short period in office (1781-1785). H e too used French experts, and he devoted much attention to strengthening the O ttom an bor­ der fortifications. R ecogn izing that the great weakness in the m ilitary was still the janissary corps, he dismissed a large num ber o f members and raised the pay o f those w h o were left in an attempt to im prove the quality o f the organization. H e also wished the army to be trained by new m ethods with m odern weapons. H is reform s, however, caused too much opposition, and he w as executed in 1785. A m o n g the foreign advisers, Baron de Tott was particularly influential. A H ungarian noble, he first w ent to France and then in 1755 arrived in C onstan­ tinople. U nlike previous advisers, he did not convert to Islam. H is w ork was chiefly w ith the artillery and the engineers. N aval reform was also under­ taken, under the direction principally o f G azi H asan Pasha. T h e O ttom an fleet had been totally destroyed at Chesm e in 1770; since a com pletely new force was necessary, there was less opposition to change than m ight other­ w ise have been expected. H asan too used French assistance, and he took as his m odel the French and British navies. B y 1784 the O ttom an E m pire had an entirely reconstructed navy. H asan was also concerned about the training o f the officers and men, but here he could not make any fundamental changes; officer ranks were still purchased. T h e great reform er o f the century was the next sultan, Selim I I I, w ho reigned from 1789 to 1807. Involved in yet another w ar w ith Russia, he was at first not free to devote his attention to dom estic problem s. T h e final loss o f the C rim ea in 1783, w ith its population o f 2 m illion M uslim s, had been a particularly bitter b low to M uslim pride, as had been similar cessions involv­ ing Caucasian lands and areas north o f the Black Sea. There was n ow general agreement that radical measures w ould have to be taken, but again the direc­ tion and methods could not be agreed upon. A fter 1792 Selim had a period o f peace before the em pire was again involved in w ar in 1798. In dealing with the question o f administrative reform , he used only traditional means. H is aim w as sim ply to im prove the existing structure and to eliminate the m ost flagrant abuses. H e had no grou p on which he could count fo r support for radical measures dealing w ith the governm ent itself, and there w ere thus no fundam ental administrative changes.

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The eighteenth century T h e sultan was, however, freer in dealing w ith m ilitary matters, although he still could not m ove decisively against either the sipahis o r the janissaries. Since he could not reform the old corps, he attempted instead to create an entirely new unit, call N izam -i Cedid, o r N ew M odel, w hich was set up apart from the regular military forces and trained by European m ethods under the direction o f European advisers. T h is organization was form ed prim arily o f Turkish peasant boys from Anatolia, and by 1806 it contained 22,685 men and 1,590 officers.29 A m ajor role was again taken by French advisers, except for the years from 1798 to 1802, w hen the Porte was at w ar w ith France. Som e naval reform s were also undertaken. Selim ’s reign covered the period o f the French R evolution and the rise o f N apoleon, which was a time o f intense activity in international relations. T he French preeminence in Constantinople was at this time challenged by both Russia and Britain. T he O ttom an governm ent, too, became m ore concerned w ith its relationship w ith the European powers. R egu lar embassies, new ly established in Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, sent back reports on the events in these capitals. T h e Porte was at w ar during tw o periods, w ith France from 1798 to 1802 and w ith Russia from 1806 to 1812. A t the same time, the govern­ ment had to deal w ith the problem o f internal anarchy and the insub­ ordination o f the provincial pashas. Th e foreign situation form ed an ex­ tremely unfavorable background for any attempts at reform . O f necessity, the w ar involvem ents dom inated the concerns o f the governm ent.

T h e wars o f N apoleon F rom the invasion o f E g y p t by N apoleon’s armies in 1798 until the signing o f the Treaty o f Bucharest w ith R ussia in 1812, the O ttom an lands felt the full effects o f the great struggle being w aged between France and m ost o f the pow ers o f the C ontinent. A lth ough the m ajor battles were fought in Central Europe o r in Russia, the M editerranean played an im portant role in the plans o f the w arring states. O f the O ttom an territories, E gyp t, Syria, the D alm a­ tian coast, and the D anubian Principalities were prim arily affected by the fighting. These conflicts not only placed a great burden on O ttom an re- j sources, but also form ed the background for the rise o f the m ost pow erful o f the provincial notables, A li Pasha o f Janina and Pasvanoglu O sm an Pasha o f V id in, w h o w ere able to challenge the O ttom an state directly. In the eighteenth century, as w e have seen, France remained the European pow er w ith the closest relations w ith the Porte. Since the O ttom an Em pire was part o f its Eastern Barrier system, which included Sw eden and Poland, the French governm ent had every interest in preserving and defending O t­ tom an territorial integrity. France also supported reform s that m ight make the Porte better able to resist foreign encroachments. A t the end o f the cen­ 29

Shaw, History o f the Ottoman Empire, p. 262.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule tury, how ever, France fo r a short period adopted the unaccustomed role o f providing the ch ief threat to O ttom an domains. In 1797 N apoleon undertook an aggressive cam paign in the M editerranean. In M ay the French navy o c­ cupied the Venetian-owned Ionian Islands. A t the same time agents w ere sent into G reek lands to prom ote French influence and prepare the w ay fo r a revolt in support o f France. In O ctober the H ab sbu rg governm ent, after m ajor m ilitary defeats, was forced to sign the Treaty o f C am po Form io. In this agreem ent the Venetian possessions were divided between the tw o states. France annexed the Ionian Islands, including the associated coastal tow ns o f Parga and Prevesa, an action that brought the French boundaries adjacent to those o f the O ttom an Em pire. A ustria, for its share, took possession o f the city o f Venice and its lands in Istria and Dalmatia. T h e form er O ttom an adversary, Venice, was thus destroyed, but a greater danger had arisen in­ stead. T h e real shock to the Porte was N apoleon’s occupation o f E g y p t in July 1798. A lth ough E g y p t under the M am luke leaders had acted independendy in the past, the country was technically under O ttom an suzerainty. Constantinople was also dependent on E gyp t for fo od supplies. T he Porte thus declared w ar on France. The alliance pattern in the N ear E ast at this point underwent a radical change. T h e O ttom an E m pire was in agreement not only w ith Britain, but also w ith the form er opponent, Russia. Catherine the G reat had died in 1796 and had been succeeded by her son Paul. A strong critic o f his m other’s aggressive policies, in particular o f her aims at O ttom an partition, the new tsar wished to maintain go o d relations w ith the Porte. H e also became in­ volved in the affairs o f the Catholic religious order o f St. John o f Jerusalem , which had its headquarters in M alta, and felt personally affronted w hen the French picked up the island on their w ay to E gypt. A fter the w ar started, the Russian governm ent thus responded to O ttom an and B ritish approaches. In Septem ber 1798 a Russian Black Sea fleet for the first time passed through the Straits and into the M editerranean. A form al alliance, to which B ritain ad­ hered, w as signed in January 1799; it included a secret article allow ing the Russian ships to pass freely in and out o f the Straits. In the next year the British, Russian, and O ttom an fleets cooperated in actions in the M editerranean. A lready in A ugu st 1798, at the battle o f the Nile, the British had destroyed the French fleet, and thus the French forces Were cut o ff from their hom eland. D eprived o f needed supplies and reinforce­ ments, the cam paign in E g y p t soon collapsed. N apoleon him self abandoned his arm y in A u gu st 1799. A lexandria fell to the British expeditionary force in 1801, and the French troops soon surrendered. A lth ough the Russian and Turkish fleets did not participate in this action, they did launch a join t o per­ ation to take control o f the Ionian Islands. These were occupied in 1799 and subsequently organized as the Septinsular R epublic, w hose governm ent was Modeled on that o f D ubrovnik. T h e islands were placed under O ttom an sov­ ereignty, but Russian protection.

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The eighteenth century T he tsar, how ever, had become m ost unhappy with the actions o f his allies. Russia was part o f the second coalition against N apoleon and thus fought alongside A ustria, N aples, and Britain on the Continent. In O ctober 1799, angered by what he considered an Austrian betrayal in the cam paign in Switzerland, Paul w ithdrew his troops from the battlefield and recalled his M editerranean fleet. H e subsequently indicated his intention o f reestablish­ ing relations w ith France. In M arch 1801 he was assassinated and succeeded by his son, Alexander I. T he new tsar, determined to maintain a policy o f neutrality, made a peace w ith France; Britain and the O ttom an E m pire con­ cluded similar agreements in 1802. T h e general peace lasted scarcely a year. France and Britain resumed fight­ in g in M ay 1803. B y 1805 the third coalition including Britain, Russia, and A ustria had been form ed. Once again a Russian fleet, this time under A d ­ miral D . N . Seniavin, was active in the M editerranean; Russian forces were also sent to Naples. A lthough the Porte was not at war, its support was vital to both sides. To try to gain assistance, the French governm ent, desiring particularly the closure o f the Straits to Russian warships, sent an extremely clever diplom at, General H orace Sebastiani, to Constantinople. A t the same time French consuls and agents were active in the western Balkans and Greece. T he O ttom an attitude was to be chiefly influenced by the apparendy irresist­ ible French m ilitary pow er and the great victories at U lm and Austerlitz.

The battle of the great powers for supremacy in the Mediterranean had direct effects on Ottoman lands adjacent to the Adriatic Sea and on the Danubian Principalities. Although the main Russian attention centered on the Ionian Islands and the Italian peninsula, the occupation o f the islands and the interest shown in French actions in Dalmatia inevitably involved Russia in the affairs of Montenegro, Albania, and northern Greece. Both Russia and France competed for influence in the Greek lands and with the leading pro­ vincial notable, Ali Pasha of Janina. France, like Russia, was also concerned with events in Montenegro. In Cetinje B ish op Peter, despite his uneven relationship w ith Russia in the past, still wished to w in the support o f that pow er because he feared the possible encroachm ent o f his ambitious neighbors, in particular A li Pasha. H e thus made continual efforts to gain assistance from St. Petersburg. In 1799 Paul sent assurances that the Russian fleet w ould protect the Christians in the area and offered a subsidy o f three thousand rubles. Peter also had territorial objectives. H e wished to acquire a seaport, in particular K otor, which had an O rthodox population. W hen the H absbu rg Em pire gained the area in 1797, he was extremely disappointed. A political realist, Peter m ain­ tained contact w ith French agents as well as w ith St. Petersburg. In 1801, in an effort to maintain good relations and to assure a continuation o f the subsidy, Peter sent a representative, V u kotic, to Russia to greet the tsar. O nce there, V u kotic instead denounced the bishop. T he Russian synod and the governm ent condemned Peter and dispatched a Serbian in Russian

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule service, C olonel M arko Ivelic, to M ontenegro. H e joined in a plot to remove Peter and to replace him w ith a mem ber o f V u kotic’s family. Peter w as, never­ theless, able to rally a sufficient number o f supporters to keep his position. A declaration was sent to R ussia that the country was not under the jurisdiction o f the R ussian church. D espite this episode, good relations were subsequendy restored, because the Russian governm ent and the M ontenegrins needed each other’s support. In 1805 in the Treaty o f Pressburg the H ab sbu rg M onarchy ceded to France the D alm atian coast. In O ctober 1805 Russia, it w ill be remem bered, was back at w ar w ith France and had a fleet operating in the Adriatic. B oth the French and Russian forces at this time m oved to seize strategic points. In M ay 1806 a French unit was able to occupy D ubrovnik, a Catholic city that did not offer much resistance. R ussian and M ontenegrin troops then laid siege to the city and bom barded it heavily, but they w ere not able to oust the French garrison. Russian troops, how ever, did hold K o to r and the surrounding area, and the Russian fleet also took the islands o f H var and Bra£. D u rin g the war the M ontenegrins m ade use o f the ports o f K o to r and Budva. Th is period marked the height o f R u ssian -M on ten egrin collaboration. Peter sent A lex­ ander I a letter proposing the establishment o f a large state, including M o n ­ tenegro, H ercegovina, D alm atia, a part o f A lbania, and D ubrovnik, which w ould be the capital. Peter w ould be the prince, w ith Russia the protecting power. A lth ou gh the Russian governm ent w as happy to make use o f M ontenegrin fighters, the fate o f the country w eighed litde against general Russian inter­ ests in the w ider European field. In 1807 Russia made an agreement w ith France, the Treaty o f Tilsit, in which K o to r was assigned to the Western pow er; the M ontenegrins w ere told to evacuate the area. In the next years the small state continued its perpetual conflicts w ith its Albanian and O tto­ man neighbors. In 1813, w ith British assistance, M ontenegrin troops again occupied Kotor. A t the end o f the w ar there was hope that the port m ight be kept, but Russia supported the H absburg claims. B y this time the Russian governm ent had also stopped the subsidies and had sent no arms. T h us, de­ spite alm ost continual fighting, M ontenegro made no further gains beyond those acquired in 1796. T he Russian friendship had w on no concrete advan­ tages. N o t only the A driatic coastal areas, but also the Principalities felt the effects o f the Russian—French—O ttom an entanglements. H ere, however, R u ssia was clearly dom inant. A fter the peace o f 1792 Russian agents returned to the tw o provinces, but Ia§i rather than Bucharest became the principal center o f R u s­ sian activities. In the years before her death in 1796, Catherine show ed a renewed interest in acquiring the Principalities. Paul, however, on his acces­ sion, preferred to follow a policy o f cooperation w ith the Porte and o f m ain­ taining its territorial integrity. H e had nevertheless no intention o f surren­ dering the Russian prime influence in the Principalities. Alexander I continued

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The eighteenth century this policy, but his government did use pressure on the Porte to gain some concessions. At this time Wallachia was suffering from the devastation wrought by the provincial notable Pasvanoglu, who from his center in Vidin and northern Bulgaria launched repeated raids into the Romanian lands. In 1802, in an official act, the Ottoman government set the terms o f the hospodars at seven years; they were not to be removed except for proven crimes. This decree considerably increased Russian influence by specifying that the Rus­ sian government had the right to approve the Ottoman candidates for prince. This measure gave St. Petersburg a weapon that could be used against the Porte and also to control the princes. Two Russian candidates, Constantine Ypsilanti and Alexander Moruzzi, then held office. In this period the Russian representatives continued to involve themselves in the internal affairs o f the Principalities and to build up their own party among the boyars. Meanwhile, French influence was increasing in Constantinople, a change that was re­ flected in the Principalities. In August 1806, on French urging, the Porte deposed the two princes without consulting Russia. Although it soon changed its mind and reinstated the former rulers, the action was in violation of the agreement of 1802. In November Russian troops occupied the Principalities; the Porte declared war in December. This conflict was in the interest of neither power. Russia could not afford to send a large military force into the area; France was the major concern. The Ottoman Empire was in an even weaker position. In 1804 an uprising had commenced in Serbia that had not yet been suppressed; all over the empire the provincial authorities were asserting their independence. War with Russia also involved Russia’s ally, Britain. In February 1807 a British fleet entered the Dardanelles and sailed within eight miles o f Constantinople be­ fore it withdrew. British forces were at that point firmly entrenched in Egypt. The greatest blow to the Ottoman interests was the reconciliation o f Rus­ sia and France in the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807. Meeting together, the two rulers, Napoleon and Alexander I, settled the affairs o f Europe. In addition to regulating their Continental differences, they prepared for a possible par­ tition of the Ottoman Empire. It was agreed that France would attempt to mediate a peace between Russia and the Porte. Should these efforts fail, then a division o f Ottoman territory would be made. The details were never made clear, and the suspicion and distrust between the partners was strong. Na­ poleon under no circumstances would allow Russia the possession o f Con­ stantinople and the Straits. At the next meeting o f the tsar and the French emperor, at Erfurt in September 1808, the question o f partition was aban­ doned. Previously, at Tilsit, Russia had agreed that France could take Dal­ matia and the Ionian Islands. Now Moldavia and Wallachia were assigned to Russia. The rest of the Ottoman lands remained intact. Although the Porte and Russia were still at war, neither could mount a major offensive. The Ottoman Empire was undergoing another internal cri­ sis. Both the negotiations and the fighting dragged on. In 1809 Britain made

Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule peace w ith the O ttom an Em pire, and the tw o powers in a join t naval expe­ dition took the Ionian Islands from France. M eanwhile, relations between Russia and France declined. T h e Russian governm ent thus had a pressing need to conclude the conflict in the Balkans. T he main obstacle to peace was the question o f the O ttom an cession o f M oldavia and Wallachia. In an effort to facilitate the negotiations, R ussia limited its claim to M oldavia. W hen the tension w ith France became stronger, the Russian governm ent further re­ treated and agreed to draw the boundary at the Pruth rather than the Sereth River. Peace could be made on this basis. In the Treaty o f Bucharest o f 1812 the m ajor Russian gain was the acquisition o f the area to be known as B es­ sarabia, w ith the boundary at the Pruth R iv er and w ith the inclusion o f the K ilia canal o f the D anube. Russia thus became a D anubian as well as a Black Sea power. H avin g concluded the conflict w ith the O ttom an Em pire, Russia could direct its full attention to defeating the invading French army. The Ottom an governm ent, although it, too, desperately needed peace, was not satisfied w ith the terms. T he negotiators were subsequendy beheaded.

T h e threat o f the provincial notables: the fall o f Selim III N o t only did the years from 1798 to 1812 bring external dangers to the empire, but, m ore im portant, the central governm ent was faced w ith the constant resistance o f its M uslim and Christian subjects. T h e M ontenegrin actions have been discussed, and as noted previously, the Serbs rose in a m ajor revolt in 1804. W hat was particularly dangerous for the empire, however, was the inability o f the central governm ent to deal w ith M uslim notables, w h o often both defied the Porte and oppressed the people under their jurisdiction, Christian and M uslim alike. Th is situation arose in various regions o f the empire, but the events in A sia M in or and N orth A frica are out o f the scope o f this discussion. T h e existence o f strong local centers has been noted pre­ viously. T h e tendency o f local notables, called ayans, to defy the central au­ thority became stronger tow ard the end o f the century, when the wars with Russia left the Porte w ith no spare troops to deal w ith internal subversion. The em pire attempted to meet the problem by playing one ayan against an­ other. Since these men were also in com petition w ith each other and often quarreled over the control o f an area, this policy often proved successful. T he local notables w ere able to w in and hold pow er not only because they could m uster sufficient m ilitary force, but also because they did fulfill a real need in m any areas. W ith the disruption o f the authority o f the central g o v ­ ernment and its inability to control the countryside, many areas were taken over by bandit groups. These fought with each other, but cooperated against outside interference. The strong leaders, such as Kara Mahmud and All Pasha, could at least assure a maintainance o f basic order in their region, and they could provide certain governm ental services, like police protection and some sort o f a judicial system. T h ey also took care o f tax collection and could serve

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The eighteenth century as a protection against unjust exactions from the central governm ent. Som e were outright tyrants, whereas others were seen as a shield between the people and the bandits, on the one hand, and rapacious officials, on the other. O f course, the notables often w orked in cooperation w ith the bandits, the offi­ cials, o r other elements. Th ey kept their pow er because o f their m ilitary sup­ port, an im portant part o f which often came from local janissaries. Since the Porte could not defeat the janissaries by m ilitary force, other means had to be used. U nable to deprive them o f their positions, the O tto­ man governm ent was often com pelled to give them official appointments as the heads o f their districts. T he policy o f divide and rule was also attempted: one notable was incited against another, and efforts were made to w in away their followers. Som e notables, for example, A li Pasha o f Janina, alternated between serving the governm ent in official capacities and openly defying its com mands. Others, like Pasvanoglu, sim ply refused to recognize the control o f Constantinople in any form . A good example o f the activities o f these men has already been show n in the career o f K ara M ahm ud Bushati. F o r later Balkan events the actions o f Pasvanoglu and A li Pasha w ere m ost influential. Pasvanoglu became one o f the m ost destructive o f the strong local leaders. H e had an adventurous youth. W hen his father was executed by the Porte, he fled and joined a group o f bandits. Subsequently, how ever, from 1787 to 1792, he served in the O ttom an army. H e then returned to an outlaw life. F rom his center at V idin, he was able to organize the bands o f renegades and bandits w h o infested the area, and turbulent janissary contingents also joined him. In particular, he established ties w ith a group o f janissaries w h o desired to take control o f Belgrade. In 1795 he declared him self independent o f the Porte. H is men cooperated with lawless Serbian janissaries and w ith Bosnian beys w ho similarly resisted control from Constantinople, and his forces raided deep into Serbian and Rom anian territory. T he expeditions into Wallachia frightened m any residents into fleeing to Transylvania. Pasvanoglu was able to control com pletely the stretch o f Bulgarian territory between the Danube and the Balkan M ountains. A lthough at times he declared his loyalty to the sultan, he never in fact subm itted to his authority. T h e raids o f these oudaws caused tremendous dam age and loss o f life. In an effort to defeat him , the Porte called on A li Pasha, w h o did succeed in driving him back to his fortress at Vidin. T he outbreak o f w ar w ith France, how ever, forced Selim III to make peace w ith the notables so that he could defend his lands against the foreign invasion. Pasvanoglu remained a defiant element in the state; he continued his attacks on Wallachian and Serbian ter­ ritory, and he was in touch w ith French agents. H is activities ended only w ith his death in 1807. A li Pasha had an even longer and m ore successful career. Like Pasvanoglu he spent part o f his youth as a bandit, although he was a mem ber o f a prom ­ inent A lbanian family. H e alternated between legal and illegal activities until 1799, w hen he became governor o f Rum elia, the highest Balkan post.

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Balkan Christians under Ottoman rule T h rou ghou t this period he was guided by pure self-interest. W hen it suited his purposes, he cooperated w ith Constantinople; w hen it was to his advan­ tage to defy the central authority, he acted independendy. H is aim was to construct a kingdom from Albanian and G reek land that w ou ld be under his personal rule. Th e instability o f the political situation along the A driatic coast and in A lbania gave him the opportunity to realize a great part o f his am bi­ tions. H e did establish him self as an independent authority at Janina, and he entered into relations with foreign powers. T he O ttom an governm ent could not m ove against him in a serious and determined m anner until 1820. A lth ough some o f the unruly M uslim leaders w on strong local support, their activities w ere a threat to the lives and possessions o f much o f the O t­ toman population. We have already seen the effects in some places. T h e at­ tacks o f K ara M ahm ud, for instance, forced the M ontenegrin tribesm en to limit their internal feuding and delegate at least some authority to one leader. They also appealed to outside pow ers: Russia, France, and Austria. T he R o ­ manian reaction was similar. T he raids o f Pasvanoglu into Wallachia caused one hospodar, Constantine Ypsilanti, to call on Russia to send in an occu­ pying army. T h e strongest reaction to janissary unrest and bandit oppression occurred in the pashalik o f Belgrade. Th e Serbian revolt, the first o f the m ajor national liberation movements, w ill be discussed in detail later. H ere it is sufficient to say that the Serbs, caught between a powerless central govern ­ ment and rebellious military groups, particularly the janissaries, rose in 1804 not against the O ttom an governm ent itself, but against the control o f the local m ilitary regim e, which had links w ith Pasvanoglu and the Bosnian beys. A t first, the rebels sought only a restoration o f order and the rule o f law, not an independent o r autonom ous political organization. A s the Balkan provinces fell into anarchy and civil war, the situation in Constantinople similarly worsened. Selim ’s reform s, conservative and limited as they w ere, raised considerable opposition. T he policy o f cooperation w ith France and defiance o f R ussia, adopted in 1806, had been unsuccessful. The familiar problem s o f econom ic distress and m ilitary failure were again pres­ ent. In M ay 1807 the conservative coalition o f janissaries, ulema, and students again form ed, and Selim was forced to abdicate. T h e new ruler, M ustafa IV, did not have a firm base o f support. Selim ’s adherents and others w h o were against the new regim e gathered around a provincial notable, M ustafa Bayraktar Pasha, w hose center was R u se (Ruschuk). A lthough a representative ° f the ayan class that was causing such havoc in the em pire, M ustafa Bayraktar was a supporter o f reform , and he did have an arm y at his com mand. T he group that backed him was know n as the Ruschuk Friends. T he O ttom an position became m ore dangerous when the Treaty o f Tilsit was signed and fhe Porte lost French support. It found itself at w ar w ith both R ussia and Britain. In Ju ly 1808 M ustafa Bayraktar m oved his forces against C onstanti­ nople. In the ensuing struggle Selim III was killed, but his nephew M ahm ud J l escaped to join the rebels. O nce M ustafa took control o f the city, M ahm ud

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The eighteenth century was placed on1 the throne. As grand vezir in the new regime, Mustafa sought to strengthen the central government, control the defiant notables, and revive military refon^11· O nce m ore the opposition was too strong. T he janissaries and their friends gathered theii'" forces and in N ovem ber 1808 defeated the vezir and the R u s­ chuk Friends Mahmud II, however, remained sultan. H e w as to prove a strong ruler. i n order to limit possible intrigues, he had M ustafa IV, w h o had ruled only a slhort time, killed. It was clear to M ahm ud II that m ilitary reform was essential;, the janissaries in particular were a mortal danger to the state both in the cap ital and in the provinces. A lthough the sultan had to w ait m any years b,ef ° re he could deal with his internal problem s, he did succeed in n eg o tiatin g a peace. Bessarabia was lost, but this region had been a part o f M oldavia, w hich was already under Russian influence. M oreover, the end o f the w ar alH°wed the Ottoman governm ent to turn its attention to Serbia and to suppre‘ss the revolt there.

Nevertheless^ despite the accession o f a capable ruler, conditions within the empire, particularly the continuing relative weakness o f the central gov­ ernment, set the stage for the national revolts of the century. The imperial administration was to face increasing difficulties in maintaining control over the provinces and in resisting the intrusion of the great powers. One of these, the Habsburg Empire, was to be involved in Ottoman affairs, not only as a neighboring «state, but also because many o f its inhabitants shared a common national b a c k g r o u n d with some of the Ottoman-ruled Balkan people.

2 Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r the political problems o f the Ottoman Empire were discussed. At its height the state was a centralized, divineright monarchy that was served by a bureaucracy and a military estab­ lishment without being limited by checks from any competing local or pro­ vincial authorities. Taxes were levied and soldiers were recruited direcdy by the state. Whether the soldier was paid by timar land grants or by a salary, he was under the control of Constantinople. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this situation was modified. A series o f weak rulers after Suleiman, combined with defeats in war, allowed provincial centers to escape from the central authority. By the end o f the eighteenth century, in many regions the local ayans had organized their own military forces and had usurped the taxgathering functions for their own benefit. The Habsburg government, in contrast, evolved along another path. This empire was a collection o f disparate lands united principally through the house of Habsburg. The local nobility, not the ruler, had direct control over the mass o f the population. The power to levy taxes and recruit soldiers was in the hands of the provincial estates. The aim of the government in the eigh­ teenth century was to establish a system of royal absolutism that would bring the average citizen under the direct jurisdiction of the ruler and his bureauc­ racy. The central state authority was to extend to all the community. The difference in development between the Ottoman and Habsburg em­ pires can be largely explained by their contrasting past histories. The O tto­ man lands had been collected by victorious sultans at the head of conquering armies. It had not been necessary to make concessions to the local nobility; they were annihilated unless they surrendered and converted to Islam. They were then the subjects o f the sultan. In contrast, the Habsburg territories were assembled primarily through alliances and marriages; guarantees often had to be given to the local estates that their historic rights and individuality would be protected. Although the original lands of the Habsburg family were in Switzerland, the Upper Rhine, and Alsace, the core Austrian prov­ inces were Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Tirol, and Vorarlberg. Dynastic alliances brought in the vast territories o f Spain and her overseas empire, the Netherlands, and part of Italy. At the death o f the Hunn th e

I

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The eighteenth century garian K in g Lou is II at the battle o f M ohacs in 1526, the Bohem ian and H ungarian inheritance was acquired. E ven though the em pire was subsequently divided, w ith Spain and other regions assigned to another member o f the H absburg family, the differences am ong the provinces under the control o f Vienna was great enough to make the application o f any uniform system difficult to contemplate. In the seven­ teenth century the H absburg Austrian lands consisted o f U p p er and L o w e r A ustria, Styria, Salzburg, Carinthia, Tirol, Vorarlberg, C arniola, the N ether­ lands, Bohem ia, M oravia, and Silesia, together w ith the possessions o f the H ungarian crow n not under O ttom an occupation. In the Treaty o f Karlow itz, Transylvania, Slavonia, and additional Croatian territory were annexed. T h e Banat was added in 1718. These acquisitions added to the ethnic and political com plexity o f the monarchy. In the O ttom an Em pire relations between church and state did not be­ com e a m ajor problem from a theoretical standpoint. T h e sultan was the religious as well as the political leader o f the state, despite the conflicts w ith the ulema that w e have seen. Similarly, the O rthodox church com bined spiri­ tual and secular duties. M oreover, the Christian and M uslim establishments had com e to an understanding; they did not w age outright religious w ar against each other. O rthodox hatred was usually directed outw ard against C atholic encroachm ent rather than inward against the M uslim s. In contrast, religion was a divisive influence in the H absbu rg E m pire despite the fact that Catholicism was the state religion. A t the top there was perpetual tension between church and state authorities over their areas o f jurisdiction, a conflict that w orsened in the eighteenth century. E ven m ore difficult was the rivalry am ong the m ajor churches, the Catholic, the Protestant, and the O rthodox, particularly in the eastern lands o f the monarchy. The Reform ation had achieved m ajor successes in the form er H ungarian regions, including Transylvania. A fter the reconquest o f these areas the Catholic church, w ith continuing C ounter-R eform ation zeal, tried to w in back the population. T he O rthodox Rom anians and Serbs also became targets for conversion. R eligio n thus did not contribute to state strength o r the union o f the people. N o t only was the H absburg Em pire an assemblage o f political units o f varying character, but it also had an unfortunate geographic position. U n til the failure o f the second siege o f Vienna, the Austrian rulers had to fear the activities o f tw o expansionist pow ers, France and the O ttom an Em pire, w h o w ere often cooperating. Thereafter, France remained a probable opponent. T h e H ab sbu rg monarchs w ere also drawn deeply into Germ an affairs. T h e Austrian rulers, in addition to their other titles, also held that o f H o ly Rom an Em peror. This designation, w hich, it w ill be remembered, had its origins in the crow ning o f Charlem agne by the pope in 800, signified that the holder was the ch ief tem poral ruler o f Western Christendom . B y the eighteenth cen­ tury it meant little m ore than that the em peror was the first Germ an prince. Vague as this position w as, H ab sbu rg interests until at least 1871 w ere in­

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule volved primarily in Western and Central Europe, including Italy. Once the major Ottoman thrust had been blunted and that empire forced on the de­ fensive, Austrian interest in the Eastern borderlands became secondary. The wars of the eighteenth century in the area were embarked upon with consid­ erable reluctance. The government wished an equilibrium in the Balkans, rather than the acquisition of further territory. PO L IT IC A L A N D S O C IA L C O N D IT IO N S IN TH E EMPIRE

During the seventeenth century the major South Slavic populations o f the Habsburg Monarchy were the Croats and Slovenes. As a result o f the wars at the end o f the century and, in particular, o f the Treaty o f Karlowitz, their number was considerably increased by the addition o f the non-Slavic Ro­ manians and of the Croats and Serbs of Slavonia. In 1718, with the annexation of the Banat, more Romanians and Serbs were added. In addition, refugee Serbs who fled in the course o f the wars, including those who left: with Arsenije III, and Croatian Catholics, principally from Bosnia and Dalmatia, had settled in the empire. All of the new territories had formerly been a part of the Kingdom of Hungary. They were now incorporated into an empire with a political and social system which offered the population certain advantages, but in which the position o f some sections o f society, particularly the enserfed peasant, might in fact be worse than in the Ottoman lands. In the eighteenth century the Habsburg Empire was ruled by four able monarchs: Charles VI (1711-1740), Maria Theresa (1740-1780), Joseph II (17801790), and Leopold II (1790-1792). All attempted with varying degrees of success to deal with what was to be the major problem of their state until its demise in 1918: establishing and maintaining the central power in the govern­ ment and finding a basis on which to unite the diverse lands and people. This task was to prove difficult. Whereas, at least at the height o f the empire, the Ottoman sultan in theory held absolute power from God over the land and the people o f his domains, the Habsburg rulers had to deal with a nobility with strong traditional rights, who in turn dominated the rest of the popu­ lation, which was largely an enserfed peasantry. The nobility thus undertook the tasks handled in the Ottoman Empire by the imperial bureaucracy, the Orthodox millet, and the village communities. They dominated local admin­ istration and justice, and they collected the taxes. The central government’s field of activity was chiefly matters connected with foreign policy, the armed forces, and the collection o f a certain number of clearly defined state taxes. The goal o f the monarchs o f the eighteenth century, particularly Maria The­ resa and Joseph II, was to widen the powers o f the central administration and to intervene direcdy in the affairs of the lower social classes, especially the peasantry. The attempt to establish a type of royal absolutism, similar to that of France and Prussia, was to fail largely because o f the strength o f the

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The eighteenth century local estates, particularly in Hungary. Since most of the people with whom we are concerned, that is, the Croats, the Serbs, and the Romanians, lived in lands that belonged to the Hungarian crown, this resistance was especially significant. Although limited in the control o f internal affairs, the Habsburg monarchs had complete authority in foreign policy, including commercial relations with other countries. The emperor had full charge of negotiations with other na­ tions: he appointed and received ambassadors; he declared war, made peace, and concluded alliances. These powers, of course, did not prevent enemy states from attempting to ally with opposition elements to subvert his rule. Other governments, for instance, France, the Ottoman Empire, and Prussia, at different times were in touch with Hungarian rebels or the noble opposi­ tion. The emperor was also supreme commander of the armed forces, al­ though here his effectiveness was checked by the fact that he had to depend on the local estates for war taxes and recruits, in particular in the Hungarian lands, including Transylvania and Croatia. Dominated by the local nobility, these bodies attempted to keep their contributions as low as possible and to demand favors in return. The limitations placed on the collection of taxes severely hampered the activities of the central government. The Habsburg monarchs had the use of their family fortune and the income from the Habsburg lands. They could also collect certain taxes, such as customs dues. In times of national crisis or war, however, this income was entirely inadequate. The lack o f a sufficient financial base for a modern government was a major incentive for reform. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, political power lay in the hands o f the provincial nobility. In a direct relationship with the mass o f the people and in complete control of the unfree peasantry, this group, when united, could effectively defy the central government. Moreover, members o f the no­ bility held the high offices in both the state and the church. They formed the officer corps of the army. They paid either no taxes at all or a very low rate. Their legal position was separate; they could be tried only by their peers. Although in theory they were subject to the laws of the land, they had a definite advantage in court if their interests came in conflict with those o f a peasant or a city dweller. They also had no set military duties, although they were under some undefined obligations o f service and loyalty to the emperor. Their landholding, unlike that of the sipahis, was not tied to state service. Their real power lay in the fact that they were in effect the owners o f the land, certainly in the areas with which we are concerned. At the local level the noble completely dominated the administration. There was no equivalent to the Ottoman communal system, where elected village elders effectively took charge of their own affairs, except in the few instances that will be discussed later. Instead, the lord of the manor was the local gov­ ernment for the people on his land. In his territory he was responsible for the collection o f taxes, the administration of justice, the maintenance of law

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule and order, and the selection of recruits for the army. Along with the church authorities, he provided what health, educational, and general social benefits were available. In the provinces the nobility exerted their authority through the diets. Here the largest landowners, the magnates, usually held the predominant power, although in the Hungarian diet, the control lay in the hands o f the gentry. Expressing their opinions through these assemblies, the nobility con­ sidered themselves the political nation. They made decisions concerning the major affairs of their province, and they determined the relationship with the central government. The membership was composed of representatives not only of the nobility, but also of the church and sometimes of the free cities and the professions. Those who held noble rank, a small minority of the total population, were themselves divided both by their wealth and possessions and by the origins of their tides. At the top o f the scale stood the great landowners, some of whom, like the Esterhazy family of Hungary, might hold millions of acres; at the other end, some who enjoyed the rank could in fact be little better than free peasants or hold no land at all. At the same time the noble who belonged to an ancient family, to the historic aristocracy, felt superior to those who had been given their tides in return for state service, or who had bought their positions. Although the central government was to an extent able to exploit these differences, the nobility, great and small, ancient or parvenu , tended to close ranks when their basic privileges, such as their control over the peas­ antry or their exemption from taxation, were brought into question. In general, the nobility, especially the Hungarian, had only a weak concep­ tion of loyalty to the empire except where their interests were directly in­ volved. Their prime allegiance, certainly in the regions studied here, was to their provincial centers, the Croatian, Hungarian, and Transylvanian diets, and to their “nation” understood not as an ethnic unit, but as the privileged, noble section o f their society. Both the Croatian Triune Kingdom and the Hungarian kingdom predated the association with the Austrian royal house, and they held far more attractive, mystical associations for the nobles who liked to trace their origins to those more glorious times. With these feelings, the nobility naturally opposed attempts at centralization or at subordinating the “nation” to a common concept. This attitude hampered the general de­ velopment of the empire both in foreign and in domestic policies. It also weakened Austria in the competition with neighboring centralized monar­ chies, such as France, Prussia, and Russia. As institutions, both the Catholic and the Protestant churches identified their interests with those o f the nobility of their region. Although the Habs­ burgs were a Catholic dynasty and did give support to that faith, the higher clergy in the provinces usually stood with the estates. The high offices were almost always held by members o f aristocratic families, who naturally felt closest to the local gentry. Since the churches were also large landowners, 131

The eighteenth century with immense estates worked by serf labor, they too wished to preserve the basis of their wealth, which was similar to that of the nobility. Under these circumstances the Catholic and Protestant churches were a strong force for the preservation o f the status quo and the authority of the estates. They, o f course, played an important role in providing education and public services, such as maintaining hospitals, orphanages, and similar char­ itable establishments. They were seldom, however, a force for social reform. Two other religious organizations, the Orthodox and the Uniate, were to have different attitudes, although they too never became truly revolutionary. Representing a Romanian and Serbian population, which did not have a native nobility or a representation on the diets, they were more sympathetic to change and more willing to rely on the central government. Between the upper level of society, represented by the nobility, and the base o f the dependent peasantry lay the middle ground of free peasants, ar­ tisans, merchants, officials, teachers, and others of the professional classes. The entire question of city life, commerce, and industry is considered in a further section, and the status of the free peasantry is covered in subsequent portions o f this chapter. Here it will suffice to say that the development of an educated and articulate middle class is a major consideration in tracing the rise of national sentiment in all of the areas with which we are concerned. At the bottom o f the social scale lay the great mass of the population, consisting of either enserfed peasants or those with equal political and eco­ nomic disabilities. Upon this group weighed the major, in fact almost the entire, burden of state and church taxation. These people also made heavy payments for the use of the land. The dependent peasant population can be divided into two groups. The first, the serfs, were not personally free. Tied to the land, they owed the landholder various payments in kind and in ser­ vices, and their lives were subject to his close control. The second, who farmed the lands as tenants, were free to change their place o f residence, to marry as they pleased, and to take up another occupation, choices all denied to the serf. The weakness of the tenants’ position was that they held the land by agreement with the lord, who could evict them at will. The serf, in contrast, was at least assured of his plot for himself and his heirs. O f course, given the control o f the nobility over local administration, both groups were subject to the desires of the predominant class. Manorial land fell into two categories: alodial, or domenical, and urbarial, or rustical. The first was held by the lord as his full property; he could farm it himself or lease it to tenants. The labor could be provided by the serfs through their labor, or corvée, obligations, which were called robot in the empire, or by farm laborers paid in kind or in money. Urbarial land, in con­ trast, was that assigned to the peasant for his own use. These lands were subject to a heavy tax burden. Payments could be made in kind, in labor, or in money. In addition to these, the peasant owed the lord a multitude of other dues similar to those of the peasant on an estate in the Principalities,

132

Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule which had a similar system. The worst abuses in the Habsburg Empire ap­ pear to have been associated with the labor obligations. In return for the payments and services, the noble in theory owed certain obligations to those under him. He should have administered local affairs and the court system jusdy; he was supposed to provide protection both by maintaining a police force at home and by serving himself as an officer in foreign wars. Acting with the church, he should have provided at least min­ imum social services. Much, of course, depended on the character o f the individual noble and the attitude held toward the peasants in a given locality; conditions differed radically throughout the empire. In any event, the enserfed peasant was dependent on the ability and the good will of the landlord. As in the Ottoman Empire, the social divisions were accepted as part of the natural order ordained by God. Church and state both taught the mes­ sage that a good life is that spent in fulfilling as well as possible the function to which one is assigned. Crossing social lines was extremely difficult in both societies. This view was accepted by the peasant as well as by the lord. Peas­ ant rebellion at first was directed not toward obtaining new rights, but against lords who were not carrying out their part o f this tacit bargain and were instead encroaching on peasant prerogatives. H A B S B U R G F O R E I G N R E L A T IO N S IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Throughout the eighteenth century the hindrances and limitations placed on Habsburg state power in the international field by this social and political system were clearly apparent. The government had constant difficulties in raising money for the recurrent wars and in paying and recruiting soldiers. Austrian participation in wars with the Ottoman empire has already been discussed; the declining Ottoman state was immensely aided by the relative military weakness of its neighbor. Nevertheless, in the East the monarchy could hold its own, and in fact it did win lands at the expense of the Porte. The danger came from the other direction, from France and Prussia. At cru­ cial periods Habsburg armies had to be removed from the Eastern battlefields to meet challenges in the West. The one long period o f peace enjoyed by the Porte, from 1739 to 1768, resulted from the fact that the European powers were tied down by two great wars, the War o f Austrian Succession ( 17 4 0 j748) and the Seven Years’ War (1756—1763). Both o f these conflicts involved the question o f the possession o f Habsburg territories, in particular Silesia. After his succession in 1711 Charles VI had to deal with the problem that he had no male heirs. In 1713, in order to preserve the unity o f the lands of the empire and the Habsburg family interests, he promulgated the Pragmatic Sanction, which provided that the succession should go to the female line and that the empire’s territorial integrity should be preserved. This change in the rules o f inheritance needed the approval of the various diets and the sup­ 133

The eighteenth century port o f the m ajor foreign powers. T h rou gh concessions on other matters, C harles V I was able to w in over the diets and to gain the support o f the neighboring powers, France, Spain, Saxony, and Prussia. These govern ­ ments, however, consulted together on h ow they could best profit from the situation. In 1740 Charles’s daughter, M aria Theresa, came to the throne. She was imm ediately faced w ith the necessity o f defending her inheritance, because Frederick the Great invaded Silesia. In the general European w ar that fo l­ low ed, Austria was supported by Britain, which contributed mainly subsi­ dies, by H olland, by some Germ an states, and eventually by Russia. In o p ­ position was a strong coalition including Prussia, France, Bavaria, Spain, and Saxony, all o f which hoped to gain by the defeat and dism em berm ent o f the monarchy. In the peace concluded in 1748, Austria was com pelled to surren­ der Silesia, but otherwise the Pragm atic Sanction was upheld. A lth ough the integrity o f the em pire was preserved w ith this one exception, H absburg bitterness toward Prussia became extreme. M aria Theresa at this time enjoyed the services o f one o f the m ost able diplom ats o f the century, C ount Wenzel von Kaunitz. Ju d gin g Prussia to be the m ost dangerous enemy o f the state, he attempted to form a diplom atic front against that power. To do this he sought to reverse the diplom atic com ­ binations o f the past and to com e to an agreement w ith the traditional foe, France. Such a radical shift in alignments was difficult for both pow ers, but in M ay 1756 a defensive alliance was concluded. Well aware o f the negotia­ tions directed against him , Frederick II in A ugust 1756 invaded Saxony. In this second war o f the mid-century, A ustria, France, and Russia, w ith some Germ an states, were allied against Prussia, which was supported by Britain and other German principalities. A lth ou gh the position o f Prussia was often precarious, Frederick was immensely aided by the death o f Em press Eliza­ beth o f Russia and the accession o f Peter III. A n admirer o f the Prussian king, the new tsar sim ply reversed the Russian alignment and join ed Fred­ erick. In 1763 the Treaty o f H ubertusberg was concluded, w hich, as far as the H ab sbu rg Em pire was concerned, sim ply confirmed the loss o f Silesia. A l­ though the monarchy had thus suffered no irreparable damage, the wars had demonstrated the weakness o f the state and the need for radical reform in order to face the future.

THE REFORM PERIOD: MARIA T H ER ESA AND J O S E P H II U ntil his death in 1765 M aria Theresa’s husband, Francis Stephen o f Lorraine, had been both co-regent and H o ly Rom an Emperor. A fter his death, his eldest son, Joseph II, held these positions and became closely associated in the formulation and implementation o f the reforms. In 1780, on the death of his m other, Joseph became the sole ruler. Both M aria Theresa and J o s e p h

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I

Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule were influenced by the ideas and atmosphere o f the Enlightenm ent. T h e ef­ fect o f these doctrines on the national movements w ill be examined in sub­ sequent sections. F o r now the importance o f these new ideas is that they direcdy affected the attitude o f a grou p o f rulers know n as enlightened des­ pots, w hich included Catherine the G reat and Frederick the G reat as well as the H ab sbu rg monarchs. A lth ough they differed on many matters, they all were convinced that it was their duty to devote their reigns to the betterment o f their subjects’ lives and to strengthening their states. B elieving that state pow er should be used to achieve social progress, they favored the interven­ tion o f its agents and institutions in many phases o f national life. In the H absbu rg E m pire their attitude was revolutionary in that they wanted to insert the authority o f the central governm ent between the feudal nobility and the great mass o f the tax-burdened unfree peasantry. T he state w ould thus stand as m oderator and judge between tw o social classes. In no sense were the enlightened despots dem ocratic; they did not consider lord and peasant equals. A utocratic by conviction, they w ere determ ined that the g o v ­ ernment should be controlled by themselves o r their representatives. T h ey were firm upholders o f the principle o f everything fo r the people, but n oth­ ing by the people. R eform s w ere carried out both during the joint regency o f M aria Theresa and Joseph and w hen Joseph reigned alone, although the aims and m ethods o f the tw o rulers differed. H er experiences at the beginning o f her reign had shown the em press that reform was a political necessity; the em pire had to be strengthened so that it could meet the Prussian challenge. T h e military establishment had to be made stronger and its tax base w idened and made more secure. T h e reform s were also directed at shifting the real pow er in the state from the local aristocracy to the central governm ent and at creating a situation in which the agents o f the monarch, an appointed bureaucracy, would be in effective control o f local governm ent. Representatives o f the central governm ent w ould thus replace agents o f the provincial estates and diets. T he nobility as a class w ould still have a special position in the state, but the nobles w ou ld serve the central governm ent rather than local institutions rep­ resenting their ow n caste. O n this basis, they could also join the bureaucracy. T he reform s covered m any aspects o f national life: administration, justice, religion, education, econom ic policy, and the relationship o f lord and peas­ ant. F o r the C roats, Rom anians, Serbs, and Slovenes o f the em pire, the m ea­ sures concerning the peasantry, the regulation o f the churches, and the steps taken to im prove education w ere to have the m ost significance. These re­ forms are discussed here, first, as they applied to the entire em pire (see M ap •3), and second, as they affected the areas w ith which w e are principally con ­ cerned. The difficult situation o f the peasantry was bound to be the first concern ° f a reform ing governm ent aim ing at an increase o f state power. T h e peasantry was the main source o f tax income and o f recruits for the army. T he

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The eighteenth century

Map 13. The Habsburg Empire in 1780

central authority could not afford to see this section of the population decay. Certain measures had to be taken to assure that it could continue to play its assigned part in state life. Since noble land usually could not be taxed, it was important that the portion assigned to peasant use not be taken over by the lord. It was similarly essential that the peasant have enough land to take care o f himself and his family and also to pay the state taxes. He also could not function if he were overburdened with corvée obligations and payments to the landlord, which would affect his ability to contribute to the state. The first reforms were thus directed toward establishing a uniform system and registering peasant obligations and rights. A clear division was to be made between alodial and urbarial land. The new measures were to be enforced by the central bureaucracy, responsible not to the local authorities, but to Vi­ enna. As far as the enserfed peasant was concerned, Maria Theresa would have been willing to allow all o f the peasants a free status, but she did not proceed this far. Like the other monarchs of Europe, she did not believe in equality, but accepted the divisions of society as part o f a natural order. Her aim was simply to preserve the health of the lowest level and to keep for it the rights that belonged to its station.

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule Far more doctrinaire than his mother, Joseph II favored m ore radical m ea­ sures. Unlike M aria Theresa, w h o was basically practical and conservative, he gained from his education many o f the essential ideas o f the Enlightenm ent, including the conviction that men have inherent natural rights. A lthough never a proponent o f representative governm ent, he did want to make all o f the people o f his empire, noble and peasant alike, equal citizens before the law and equally responsible to the central governm ent. H e had also traveled throughout the em pire incognito, so he was aware o f peasant problem s, in particular, from firsthand observation. H e was thus determined to strengthen the central authority and to use his pow er and that o f the imperial bureauc­ racy fo r social and political change. H is attitude made him an outspoken opponent o f the nobility and their historic privileges exercised through the diets; he also criticized their freedom from taxation and their hold over the peasantry. S o on after his m other’s death, when he was freer to follow his ow n ideas, Joseph II moved to introduce more radical reform s, first the abolition o f serfdom . This step was taken in 1785 in the H ungarian kingdom . Th e se rf was given the rights o f the tenant: he could marry at his choice, learn a trade, and leave the land i f he found a replacement. T he m ajor problem , how ever, was not solved, since he was not given land. H e still w orked on his portion o f the manor, and he continued to have to make high payments in kind, money, o r labor obligations to hold it. In 1789 Joseph made a proposal that was intended to ease the heavy burden o f taxation on this class. H e w ished to convert the obligations to the governm ent and the landlord into a cash pay­ ment that w ould be the equivalent o f about 30 percent o f the peasant’s in­ come. This measure was detested not only by the nobles, but also by the peasants, who often were not in a position to face a conversion o f payments in kind to those in cash. The peasant reforms naturally antagonized the nobility; the Catholic church, w hose interests as a landowner were similarly affected, objected also to other aspects o f the program . U ntil this time it had been the m ajor influence on education and it had not been subject to state taxation. T he attempt to set up a system o f state schools and to tax ecclesiastical property aroused bitter opposition. M aria Theresa was herself a devout C atholic; her desire was to extend rather than to lim it the spiritual influence o f the church. Nevertheless, her reign marked the establishment o f a secular system o f elementary schools and the founding o f institutions o f higher education. T he new bureaucrats in the strengthened central governm ent obviously needed a secular training. Like other enlightened despots, she had a great faith in education as a means o f social and political improvement. She did not w ish to dam age the church, but she did regard these questions as properly under state supervision. H e r son was far m ore extreme in ecclesiastical matters. H e sought to block com pletely the pow er o f the Catholic church in areas where it came into com petition w ith the state. H is great measure here was the Toleration Patent

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The eighteenth century o f O ctober 1781, which gave to Lutherans, Calvinists, and O rthodox the right to practice their religion and to construct church buildings w ithout hin­ drance th roughout the empire. M an y o f the restrictions on the Jew s w ere also removed. This action, which did not cover religious denominations other than those mentioned, aided Protestants and O rthodox at the expense o f Catholic interests. Joseph also moved against the numerous monasteries, many o f w h om he felt were not perform ing their true function o f providing social services. Between 1782 and 1786 he dissolved around 700 m onasteries; all o f the purely contemplative orders w ere eliminated. In place o f the monasteries, he founded new state hospitals and institutions to serve the poor, the sick, and the otherwise unfortunate.

As part o f his plan to reform the administrative system of the empire, Joseph II attempted to introduce German as the language o f government. This measure, whose aim was simply to make government procedures more orderly and rational, stirred up a strong reaction, particularly in the Hungar­ ian crownlands, where Latin was normally used. Although German was the logical choice if one language were to be taken for all of the imperial lands, the issue remained a point of controversy and bitterness among all the na­ tionalities until the dissolution o f the empire. Joseph II thus struck at tw o o f the basic institutions o f the m onarchy: the provincial nobility, whose strength lay in their dom ination o f local govern ­ ment and the peasantry; and the Catholic church, the m ost pow erful ecclesi­ astical organization. Unfortunately, the em peror had no large segment o f the population that was in a position to give him effective support. T he great section o f society that he hoped to benefit, the peasantry, had no political organization o r experience. In fact, they tended as a grou p to be suspicious o f change. It was soon apparent that Joseph had tried to do too much too quickly. A wave o f reaction against the reform s, together w ith the rise o f renewed difficulties abroad, forced the em peror in January 1790 to w ithdraw m ost o f the changes, particularly in Hungary, but not those regarding serf­ dom , the E d ict o f Toleration, and the abolition o f the monasteries. These w ere, o f course, very important measures w hose enactment had a fundam en­ tal influence on lives o f the Balkan people in the empire. Joseph died soon after his forced retreat on other issues. A fter his accession to the throne in 1790, Leo p o ld II, Joseph ’s brother, could not devote his m ajor attention to internal reform . T h e French R e v o ­ lution had begun, the w ar w ith the O ttom an E m pire was in progress, and within the em pire both H un gary and the Netherlands w ere in revolt against Joseph ’s innovations. Leopold was not conservative him self - he had been an enlightened ruler when he was at the head o f the administration o f L o m ­ bardy — but he was compelled to com e to terms w ith the opposition. In 1791 he arranged a compromise w ith the H ungarian diet that restored its dam aged prestige and privileges. In the same year he concluded the Treaty o f Sistova with the O ttom an Empire and then m oved against the uprising in the N eth ­

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule erlands. His short reign marked the transition to a new period when Austrian concerns would be dominated by the fear o f revolutionary France and when essentially conservative policies would be followed.

TH E R EF O R M S IN PR A C T IC E : TH E BALKAN N A T I O N A L IT I E S IN T H E E I G H T E E N T H CENTURY

The events just recounted affected directly or indirectly all o f the regions in the empire. As we have seen, the majority of the Croats, Romanians, and Habsburg Serbs lived in lands belonging to the crown o f St. Stephen. Their fate was thus closely connected with that o f the Hungarians and with the decisions reached in the Hungarian, Croatian, and Transylvanian diets. A large number also lived in the Military Frontier, a band of territory stretching along the border with the Ottoman Empire, which was under the direct administration o f Vienna. They were affected not only by the reforming pol­ icies o f the central government, but by the wars of the century with the Ottoman Empire.

Hungary, Croatia, and Slavonia Throughout the long period of Ottoman domination, the majority o f the lands inhabited by an ethnically Hungarian population were organized into a pashalik with its center at Buda. After the expulsion o f the Ottoman army and administration at the end of the seventeenth century, the Hungarian no­ bility was determined to reestablish its control over all of the lands associated with the crown of St. Stephen and to reaffirm its predominant political po­ sition. The Hungarian strength lay not with the great landowners, the mag­ nates, but with the lower nobility, the gentry, and their control of the coun­ ties, the basic administrative units. The counties had their own assemblies, which ran the local government and chose representatives to the diet. In 1687 this body, meeting at Pozsony (Bratislava), accepted the Habsburg emperor, Leopold I, as the hereditary king of Hungary, but only upon the assurance that historic rights and privileges would be maintained. It will be noted that the title o f the Habsburg ruler in this part of his domains was king; the designation emperor applied to the territories included in the Holy Roman Empire, o f which Hungary was not a part. Thereafter, the Hungarian diet remained in opposition to centralizing pressure from Vienna. This assembly, which could be summoned by the king or the palatine, the king’s representative, was divided into two chambers, the first representing the interests of the great landowners and the second repre­ senting those of the gentry. The first chamber met under the chairmanship of the palatine and was composed not only of great landowners, but also of 139

The eighteenth century church dignitaries, headed by the Catholic primate, the archbishop o f Esztergom , and the leading officials o f the kingdom , including the ban o f C ro a­ tia. T he low er house contained the representatives chosen by the county as­ semblies, some delegates from the royal towns, and low er church and judicial officials. In principle, legislation had to originate in the low er chamber, but both houses had to agree on measures before they could be adopted. F o r the H absbu rg governm ent, which handled H ungarian affairs through the offices o f the H ungarian C ou rt Chancellery in Vienna, the control held by the diet over the levying o f taxes, particularly the extra revenues needed in wartim e, and over the recruitment o f soldiers was extremely frustrating. D espite the assent o f the diet, the establishment o f H ab sbu rg rule in the Hungarian kingdom was a difficult process. Religious differences caused much friction. M o st H ungarian nobles had joined the ranks o f the R eform ation; they were thus Calvinists o r U nitarians, and they opposed the diligent efforts o f the Catholics in the areas w on back from O ttom an control. T he terrible conditions caused in the countryside by the wars led to much peasant unrest. T h is situation, together w ith the continued opposition o f some H ungarian nobles, led to the outbreak o f a m ajor revolt against H absburg rule in 1703. U nder the leadership o f Ferenc Rakoczy, the movement com bined the ap­ parently contradictory issues o f the resistance o f the nobility to Vienna and the desire o f the peasantry for an improvem ent o f their status and, i f possible, an end to serfdom . N ob le and peasant w ere thus united against H absburg rule. Th e situation was dangerous to the em pire because both L o u is X IV and Peter the G reat gave their support, in order to deal a blow to a com peting power. A lth ough the H absburg army was able to defeat the rebel forces, Charles V I in 1711 in the Peace o f Szatm ar was forced to accept w hat was in fact a com prom ise solution. In return for the recognition o f H ab sbu rg rule, he had to confirm again the privileges o f the nobles and agree to the large measure o f autonom y that the H ungarian lands held. Later the H ungarian diet accepted the Pragm atic Sanction, but only when the king recognized the indivisibility o f the lands o f St. Stephen; a possible Croatian o r Transylvanian secession was thus blocked. In the Treaty o f K arlow itz, Slavonia and a section o f C roatian territory came under H absbu rg rule; Dalmatia, which had been part o f the form er Triune K in gd om , became a possession o f Venice. Th e H absbu rg governm ent took the full responsibility o f organizing the newly w on territory despite the fact that it had belonged to the H ungarian crow n before the O ttom an con­ quest. A b o u t h alf o f the territory o f Croatia and Slavonia was joined to the M ilitary Frontier, under the direct administration o f Vienna. T h e rest, known as C ivil Croatia and C ivil Slavonia, became tw o political units separated by a section o f the M ilitary Frontier. T he center o f Croatian political life was C ivil Croatia, w ith its diet in Zagreb. H ere the ch ief influence was in the hands o f a m iddle and small nobility that was Croatian in nationality and Catholic in

Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule religion. The large landowners were both Croatian and Hungarian. As in Hungary proper, the strength of the nobility lay in their control of the coun­ ties. The Croatian nobles faced a difficult situation. They opposed domina­ tion by either Vienna or the Hungarian diet, but they wished to maintain intact their feudal privileges over their lands and serfs. The Catholic church also had a strong position in Croatia, a condition that was to have a decisive influence on relations with the Serbs. The government of Civil Croatia was headed by the ban, or governor, who was appointed by the crown and was usually a Hungarian. The unicameral chamber, the sabor, was composed of the great landowners, the representa­ tives o f the lesser nobility elected on the country level, the Catholic prelates, delegates from the free towns, and some others. This body sent representa­ tives to the Hungarian diet. Three went to the lower house, where they were seated apart, and one to the upper chamber. On the country level, as in H un­ gary, the highest official was nominated by the king from among the large landholders, but his deputy and other officials were selected by the county assemblies, who also chose representatives to send to the diet in Zagreb and were responsible for local administration. The difficulty of maintaining an existence apart from Hungarian and Aus­ trian direct control remained a major Croatian problem at all times. Unfor­ tunately, the Croatian nobility failed to produce an outstanding national leader. In 1671, after the defeat o f a conspiracy in which Ottoman assistance was sought, Fran Krsto Frankopan and Peter Zrinski were beheaded, so that the influence o f two leading Croatian-Hungarian families was brought to an end. Throughout the eighteenth century the Croatian nobles, in an effort to maintain their internal autonomy and their special privileges, generally took a middle position in the quarrels between Vienna and the Hungarian oppo­ sition. During the Rakoczy revolt they supported the Habsburgs. The Croa­ tian diet also accepted the Pragmatic Sanction, but only in return for assur­ ances that their special rights would be protected. At this time a strong declaration on the nature o f the relationship with Hungary was made: it was an equal personal union through the king, who was, of course, the Habsburg emperor: According to law we are a land affiliated with Hungary, and in no way a subject people of Hungary. At one time we had our own na­ tional non-Hungarian kings. No force or slavery made us subordi­ nate to Hungary, but we through our own free will became subjects not o f the Hungarian Kingdom, but of the Hungarian King. We are free and not slaves.1 1

Q uoted in Elinor M urray Despalatovic, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement (Boulder, C o lo .: East European Quarterly, 1975), P· “ ■

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The eighteenth century Despite such declarations, Charles VI, in his promise to the Hungarian diet that he recognized the integrity o f the lands o f St. Stephen, gave assur­ ance that royal support would not be given to a Croatian withdrawal from the union. The reforms o f Maria Theresa and Joseph II changed aspects of the Croa­ tian administration. In 1767 the empress introduced a new system as part of her reorganization of the empire. A Royal Council, headed by the ban, took the place o f the diet as the chief office of government. Its major lasting con­ tribution was the reorganization o f the school system, including the estab­ lishment o f a Royal Academy that later became the University o f Zagreb. The Council, which was disliked by the nobility, was abolished in 1779, and both Civil Croatia and Civil Slavonia were placed under the Hungarian Re­ gency Council. With this change both the ban and the Croatian sabor lost authority. The most radical measures came in the reign of Joseph II. He abolished the county organization of the Hungarian kingdom and divided it into dis­ tricts headed by officials chosen by the crown. The county assemblies ceased to function. This extreme interference in what they regarded as their legal and historical rights united the Croatian and Hungarian nobility. The land­ holders, large and small, strongly opposed the abolition of serfdom and the limitation of their traditional freedom from taxation; the attacks on the Cath­ olic privileges and the monasteries aroused Croatian anger. Both the H un­ garians and the Croatians opposed the substitution of German for the tradi­ tional Latin as the language of administration. The emphasis on the protection o f their class privileges explains many of the actions of the Croatian nobles in 1790. Strongly opposed to Joseph’s re­ forms and to Austrian centralism, they surrendered much o f their autonomy to the Hungarian diet. They agreed that the Croatian lands would be under a general Hungarian administrative authority and that the power o f the ban and the sabor would be limited. The major political decisions were hence­ forth to be made, not in the Zagreb assembly alone, but in joint sessions held with the Hungarian diet. In the next years Croatian autonomy was gradually eroded; Croatian laws were made in Hungary. The chief function o f the Za­ greb diet was to chose representatives to the Hungarian assembly and to discuss the decisions made there. After 1790 much o f the old system was reintroduced throughout the Habsburg Empire, but the shift o f power in Croatia remained permanent. Joseph’s attempt to make German the language o f administration had a particular significance in the Hungarian kingdom. The entire issue o f the language o f administration was to become a hornets’ nest for the next cen­ tury. Croats and Hungarians joined to oppose German, but then their inter­ ests parted. Once the question had been raised, Hungarian representatives wanted their language to be used in the kingdom. This solution would have

Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule been extrem ely unfavorable fo r the C roats, few o f w hom knew M agyar, and w ou ld naturally have limited their participation in the H ungarian diet and their holding o f state offices. T h e joint diet o f 1791 kept Latin, but agreed that Hungarian would be a required subject in the schools o f Hungary proper and an elective in C roatia and Slavonia. T h e situation in C ivil Slavonia differed in many respects from that in C ivil C roatia, w hich enjoyed m ore privileges and rights o f autonom ous rule. A fter the term ination o f the O ttom an dom ination the Slavonian lands were dev­ astated and depopulated. U n til 1745 they were under a dual m ilitary-civilian governm ent that devoted great efforts to resettling the province and restoring its prosperity and productivity. In seeking to develop the area the H absbu rg governm ent gave o r sold large estates to nobles, governm ent officials, m er­ chants, and others - men w h o were usually Germ an o r H ungarian. Som e lands w ere granted to Germ an settlers w h o had the status o f free peasants. O ther peasants m oved in from other Croatian lands o r from across the O t­ toman border. T h e basic difference between C ivil C roatia and C ivil Slavonia can be seen in the fact that there were approxim ately 9 ,000 nobles in C roatia, but only 314 in Slavonia. A land o f large estates and a small noble class o f a mixed national background, Slavonia nevertheless shared m any o f the prob ­ lems o f n eighboring C roatia. In 1745, w ith the establishment o f a purely ci­ vilian adm inistration, som e territory was assigned to the M ilitary Frontier and to H ungary, but the greater part was divided into three counties. As elsewhere, these w ere the basic units o f local governm ent; their assemblies sent delegates to both the Croatian and the H ungarian diets. D espite this organization, the Slavonian status in the empire was in fact hazy; the p ro v­ ince certainly did not claim the same position as Croatia. M o st o f the inhabitants o f Croatia and Slavonia w ere, o f course, peasants w ho had the same problem s as those o f their status in other parts o f the H ungarian kingdom . A lth ou gh conditions on the estates differed widely, in general, the se rf o r tenant was under the obligations that have been discussed elsewhere. H e paid dues and labor services to his landlord, the state, and the church. F o r the use o f a plot sufficient to support him self and his family, he surrendered from a tenth to a fourth o f his produce; he was also obligated to w ork at least one o r tw o days a week on the lord’s land and to perform transport services w ith his cart and oxen i f he had any. H e ow ed, in addition, the m any other taxes and payments com m on to the time. H is landlord con­ trolled not only the land, but the local administration, including the police and the judicial system. T h e lord o f the manor, in the role o f judge, could hand ou t sentences, including fines and corporal punishment. H e also, before the adm inistrative reform s, collected the state taxes. T he abuses possible in such a system are obvious. A n attempt at peasant reform was made by Charles V I , w h o, how ever, was discouraged by strong noble opposition. Th e first m ajor measure was the

143

The eighteenth century regulation of 1756, known as an urbarium, which came into effect in Slavonia in 1762. Its provisions give an excellent picture of the conditions under which the peasant labored. They have been described as follows: The basic obligations of the serfs in Slavonia were the payment of a tithe of three florins and the rendering of 24 days o f corvée with a team of draft animals, or 48 days o f manual corvée, per homestead. Corvée with a team of draft animals and manual corvée could, under certain circumstances, be paid in money, with a standard wage o f 20 kreutzers for the former and 10 kreutzers for the latter per day. If the landlord needed additional labor, he paid the serfs a standard wage (24 and 12 kreutzers per day, respectively) . . . Agricultural workers without land, but owning a house, paid a tithe of one florin annually and rendered 12 days o f manual corvée.2 A homestead, or basic plot o f land, was defined as approximately thirty-four, forty-six, or fifty-seven acres (twenty-four, thirty-two, or forty yokes), de­ pending on the quality of the soil. U n d er this regulation the landlords retained im portant rights, including those o f hunting and fishing and o f m aintaining taverns and butcher shops. Th ey were responsible fo r the police and justice; they could punish their serfs “ by im position o f various fees, beatings, and irons, and sometimes even cap­ ital punishment.” 3 T he peasant was also liable to labor services on public w orks, as w ell as his payments to church and state. T he provisions dealing w ith payments fo r land usage were to remain in effect until 1848 w ith only som e changes. An urbarium for C roatia was issued in 1780, but its conditions were m ore stringent for the peasant: A full hom estead in Croatia amounted to between 14 and 24 yokes o f arable land and 6 to 8 yokes o f m eadows, depending on the qual­ ity o f the soil. T h e corvée am ounted to 52 days annually w ith a team o f draft animals or 10 4 days o f manual w ork per full hom estead, o f which 45 */2 days had to be actually rendered, while the remainder could be paid in money. Serfs w ith smaller farms had to render pro ­ portionately smaller amounts o f corvée. Th e tithe in m oney in Croatia was only one florin per hom estead, but the serfs in Croatia, unlike those in Slavonia, had to deliver to the landlord a tithe in produce a ninth o f all crops, w ine and livestock. There was also a special tax on houses. I f the landlord and the serf agreed, both corvée and the 2 3

I

Jo zo Tom asevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia (S tanford, Calif.: S tan fo rd U niversity Press, 1955), pp. 71—72. T om asevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change, p. 72.

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule

Map 14. The Habsburg Military Frontier

tithe in produce could be paid in money. Furthermore, the serfs were obligated to render to the landlords a couple of capons, a couple of chickens, a dozen eggs, and a quantity of butter per full homestead annually. They were also obligated to render transportation services to the landlord.4 Individual serfs in both Slavonia and Croatia could leave their lands if they fulfilled their obligations and if the lord agreed. T h e reform s o f Joseph II, including the em ancipation o f the serfs o f 1785 and the unsuccessful attempts to limit the peasant payments to around 30 percent o f their incom e, also affected Croatia and Slavonia. A fter his death, peasant reform languished. T he next m ajor changes were not to be made until the revolution o f 1848.

The Military Frontier B y the end o f the seventeenth century the H absbu rg Em pire had acquired a large Serbian population concentrated in the Banat and southern Hungary, but also in the lands o f the M ilitary Frontier (see M ap 14). D u rin g the long period w hen the H absbu rg and O ttom an empires shared a com m on frontier there was constant m ovem ent across the borders. The largest single m igra­ tion occurred w ith the im m igration o f Arsenije I I I and his follow ers, but individuals and groups were always able to enter the m onarchy w ith relative ease. A lth ough the m ajority were Serbs, som e were C roats, principally from Bosnia. Serbian merchants and craftsmen form ed a strong element in the cities, but the m ajority o f refugees were peasants, many o f w hom constituted 4

T om asevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change, p p. 72—73.

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The eighteenth century the population o f the M ilitary Frontier. Th e occupation o f large areas fo r­ m erly a part o f the Triune K in gd om by a Serbian population o f O rthodox faith was to have a lasting effect on the area and on the relations between the C roats and the Serbs. T h e border between the tw o empires was difficult fo r each to hold and to garrison. T h e H absburg governm ent, as w e have seen, had continual prob ­ lems raising m oney and recruiting soldiers for war. A n open area, the frontier region suffered from frequent raids organized on both sides. O ttom an irreg­ ulars led periodic expeditions to seize the inhabitants to sell as slaves o r to carry o ff their livestock and produce. G roups o f bandits, operating freely in a lawless environm ent, preyed on both the O ttom an and the H absbu rg p o p ­ ulation. T h e problem o f maintaining peaceful conditions was extremely d if­ ficult. N either em pire could afford to keep the area under constant m ilitary occupation. In the early sixteenth century the H ab sbu rg governm ent began to make use o f the transient, unruly population. In return for a guarantee o f the free exercise o f the O rthodox religion and the use o f a plot o f land, some o f these men agreed to settle as military colonists. Th ey protected the frontier region, but they supported themselves. The state also erected a line o f forti­ fied villages and outposts that were manned by these settlers and a few profes­ sional soldiers. T he colonists elected their ow n military com manders ( vojvodas) and their village elders (knezes). Tw o administrative centers were established: Karlovac for the Croatian M ilitary Frontier and Varazdin for the Slavonian. In the sixteenth century the frontier was extended to the A driatic, w ith K arlob ag as the headquarters. T he expenses o f the border defense, such as the provision o f guns and ammunition, were carried by the Inner Austrian authorities. Karlovac was under Carinthia and Cam iola; Varazdin under Styria. In 1630 the H ab sbu rg governm ent issued a charter, called the Statuta Valachorum (Vlach Statutes), which form ally established the conditions for the area. T h e M ilitary Frontier was put directly under the control o f the em ­ peror; the land thus remained in the possession o f the state. It was granted in return fo r military service, not to individuals but to household com m uni­ ties, zadrugas, which were considered the best basic unit o f organization in a difficult and dangerous time. Each zadruga was expected to provide one soldier, and they were collectively responsible for the obligations to the state. T h e zadrugas were joined in villages, w hich elected their o w n leaders, the vojvodas and the knezes; these, along w ith the H ab sbu rg officials, w ere re­ sponsible for local administration. Th e members o f the border com munities thus enjoyed much self-government. Th e similarities w ith the political o rga­ nization within the O ttom an Em pire are obvious. T he H absburg go vern ­ ment also gave assurances to the Serbian population in regard to the O rth o ­ dox church. T he M ilitary Frontier was advantageous to the state in that it provided a cheap source o f m anpower to garrison the border. T h e frontier soldier was not paid a salary, but was supported by his family. F o r the settlers the condi­

1 46

Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule tions w ere much superior to those in the adjoining provinces, where the peasants also usually wanted to join the frontier. Th e soldier was not a serf; he was a free man living in a self-administering community, and he was proud o f his status. T h e frontier organization, nevertheless, caused problems o f its ow n. The ch ief source o f friction was the constant conflict w ith the Croatian diet. A s the A ustrian border m oved forw ard into form er O ttom an lands, the Croatian nobility naturally expected to gain control o f them and to reimpose the feudal order o f preconquest days. Instead, the H ab sbu rg governm ent took posses­ sion o f the territory and organized it for its ow n profit. A lthough a border area was set up under the ban o f C roatia, it did not function as well as or have the significance o f the frontier under direct imperial control. Problem s w ere also caused by the C atholic church, which constantly opposed the spe­ cial status given to the O rthodox. T he Inner Austrian administration, which w as supposed to provide support, proved reluctant to assume any heavy ex­ penses. A lth ou gh conditions on the land w ithin the military confines w ere better than those outside, there w as certainly no econom ic prosperity, despite some H ab sbu rg efforts to im prove conditions. T he region remained one o f the poorest o f the empire. Problem s o f corruption and inefficiency plagued the m ilitary establishment. In addition, as a soldier the frontier peasant was d if­ ficult to control and discipline. A t first he had been able to collect booty, and he continued to plunder even friendly territories. Frontier bands w ere also subject to frequent m utiny and desertion. R eform s introduced during the reign o f M aria Theresa were designed to subject this border population to m ore discipline and control. T he soldiers were organized into regiments attached to definite districts. Restrictions were im posed on their right to elect officials, and a tighter organization was intro­ duced. In 1754 a series o f regulations was introduced,· which further limited self-governm ent. T h e only settlers to be allowed in the region were to be the peasant soldiers and those directly connected w ith the frontier organization. Th e land remained the property o f the governm ent; the zadrugas received allotments to support one o r m ore soldiers. Officers, but not regular soldiers, w ere paid. Som e m ilitary com m unities, such as Petrovaradin (Peterwardein), Zem un (Sem lin), Slavonski B rod, and Srem ski K arlovci, had populations that included merchants and artisans; they paid their obligations to the state in m oney and w ere excused from military service. T h e M ilitary Frontier was by this time expected to provide men to fight all over E urope and not just on the border. In time o f peace the frontier peasant also had to provide services. H e was subject to labor obligations on the fortifications, and he was expected to help in the suppression o f bandits. O ne o f his im portant duties was the maintenance o f the quarantine. Because o f the prevalence o f the plague and other dangerous, com municable diseases in the O ttom an E m pire, the H absburg governm ent kept a strict quarantine

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The eighteenth century along the frontiers. Travelers entering the monarchy were forced to remain in seclusion for up to three weeks, and all letters and goods were disinfected by the primitive means o f the time. T h rou ghou t the eighteenth century pressure continued from both the Croatian and the H ungarian diets to gain control o f the region. D iscontent and unrest was also apparent am ong the frontier soldiers. Because o f the resentment arising out o f the fact that m ost o f the officers w ere Germ an, a regulation issued in 1754 provided that two-thirds o f the com m issions were to g o to m ilitary colonists, w ith the preference given to Catholics o r Uniates. A n officer class thus was created from the Slavic population. D espite the m any criticisms, both from the Croatian diet and from w ithin the colonies, the frontier remained intact until 1881. T he area contained approxim ately half the territory and over 40 percent o f the population o f the historic provinces o f Croatia and Slavonia, and was linked w ith similar frontier organizations in the Banat and Transylvania. A s w e have seen, the center o f Croatian political life w as C ivil Croatia, an area where the local administration was in the hands o f a C roatian nobility. A t the end o f the eighteenth century this group voluntarily surrendered most o f its autonom y to the H ungarian diet, which was dom inated by the H u n ­ garian gentry. T he m ove was a result o f fear that centralizing reform s from Vienna w ould deprive the privileged classes o f their special position, includ­ ing their im m unity from taxation and their control over the peasantry. The Catholic church gave support to this attitude and fought bitterly against m ea­ sures such as Joseph I I ’s Toleration Edict. T he M ilitary Frontier caused fur­ ther friction. T h e Croatian diet continually opposed the fact that the central government administered territories that had historically been associated with the Triune K in gd o m and that were vitally im portant to the Croatian national position. T he setdement o f large numbers o f Serbs was an issue at this time only in regard to their O rthodox faith. T he predom inant influence in Croatia was intensely conservative, both in politics and in religion, throughout the period.

The Serbs T h e Serbian population o f the em pire lived in circumstances quite different from those o f the m ajority o f the inhabitants o f the H absbu rg Em pire. Th ey controlled no definite portion o f territory, and they w ere o f the O rthodox religion, which was under attack in other parts o f the monarchy. N everthe­ less, they had certain privileges that set them apart and put them in a better position than some o f the peasant populations o f other ethnic origins. Their relatively favorable status rested on the special privileges granted by L e o ­ pold I in 1690 at the time o f the m igration o f Arsenije I I I and his adherents. It w ill be remem bered that the Serbian refugees were prom ised freedom o f religion and an autonom ous church administration. T h e situation that sub­

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule sequently developed show ed many similarities w ith the millet system in the O ttom an Em pire. T h e Serbian O rthodox citizens enjoyed their privileges w herever they settled; their rights were not dependent on a territorial base. A s in the O ttom an Em pire, the church dignitaries became in practice the leaders o f a kind o f Serbian secular governm ent, w ith a Serbian m etropolitan, established at Sremski Karlovci, at its head. The regular meetings o f the councils came to resemble national assemblies. T h ey were held prim arily to choose bishops and the heads o f monasteries, but they also discussed general prob ­ lems and matters o f interest to the Serbian community. T h ey could hear com ­ plaints and make protests. T h e strong lay element that w e have seen in the church under O ttom an rule was also present here; representation in the assemblies reflected the entire Serbian community. A fter 1749 the m em ber­ ship included the bishops, twenty-five representatives from the clergy, twentyfive from the M ilitary Frontier, and twenty-five from other territories and tow ns w ith a Serbian population.5

With the suppression of Pec, Sremski Karlovci became the foremost Ser­ bian Orthodox ecclesiastical and educational center. This Metropolitanate was in a far stronger financial position than the other Slavic Orthodox institutions in either the Ottoman Empire or the Habsburg Monarchy. The city acquired impressive buildings in the baroque style, and the first Serbian schools of higher education were established there. Since great reliance was placed on theologians sent from Kiev, Russian influence was strong. The literary lan­ guage at this time was the so-called Slavo-Serbian, an artificial creation close to Church Slavic, but not to the speech o f the common people. As within the Ottoman Empire, the church kept alive the memory of the medieval Ser­ bian empire; its past history was idealized and made glorious. Church paint­ ing and literature similarly recalled the past. The cultural activities o f the Met­ ropolitanate were backed by the work done in the monasteries of the FruSka Gora. D espite the advantages that it enjoyed, the Serbian church was naturally not satisfied w ith w hat was a secondary status in a state that was predom i­ nantly C atholic; the political situation was also unsatisfactory. W hen Arsenije and his follow ers left the Serbian lands, they had expected their stay in the H ab sbu rg Em pire to be o f short duration. T h ey hoped to return w ith the victorious Austrian army. A s years passed and the frontier stabilized, it was to be expected that the Serbian population w ou ld press for a special territory and a recognized secular administration. T he question o f a national area was alm ost im possible to settle. It could only have been carved out o f H ungarian or C roatian lands and accom plished at the expense o f these people. T h e rec­ ognition o f a civil governm ent brought up similar problems. D espite these differences, in general the Serbian population preferred to cooperate w ith the 5 V ladim ir Dedijer et al., History of Yugoslavia, trans. Kordija Kveder (N ew York: M cGraw H ill, 1975), P· 237·

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The eighteenth century central authority. Serbian privileges depended upon the protection of Vienna. When this was not given, the Orthodox Serbs could not withstand Catholic Croatian and Hungarian pressure. By the end of the eighteenth century Serbian colonies were present not only in the countryside, but in the cities. Like the Greek merchants, Serbian traders had by this time become an important element in the commerce o f the monarchy. Although they often succeeded in gaining wealth, their O rtho­ dox faith proved a definite hindrance to their activities. They were usually not eligible to buy property or to become full members o f the city commu­ nity. The prohibition on acquiring property held for the Orthodox in both Civil Croatia and Civil Slavonia, as well as in other regions. Nevertheless, the Serbian population o f the monarchy, organized under the Orthodox church and in possession o f definite privileges, by the end of the century had established a strong position and had a community of differ­ ent social levels. The merchants, the Orthodox clergy, the teachers, and the officers of the Military Frontier formed an upper class. The peasant-soldier o f the Military Frontier was not only a free man, but one who had gained considerable experience in fighting. The Orthodox church was more than a religious institution. It formed a substitute for secular leadership, and it pre­ served the memory of Serbian statehood. Transylvania After the Ottoman conquest in the sixteenth century, Transylvania was given wide autonomous rights, surpassing in practice those o f Wallachia and Moldavia, which had a similar status within the empire. The Transylvanian princes often conducted an independent foreign policy. They waged war and were in direct contact with other governments through their representatives. In governing the province the prince was assisted by a coun­ cil o f twelve and the diet. By the end of the sixteenth century there were three recognized “nations,” the Hungarians, the Szeklers, and the Saxons, and four religions, Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Unitarian. The Hungarians, as we have seen, had arrived in Transylvania in the tenth century, and the area became part o f the Kingdom of Hungary. The Szeklers, who were closely related to the Hungarians and spoke their language, followed later; they were at first border guards and free landholders. The Saxons were German immi­ grants from the Rhineland who had come in the twelfth century. Both the Szeklers and the Saxons had received charters from the king of Hungary confirming their privileges and granting them self-government in the areas where they settled. The Szeklers were to be found primarily in the eastern Carpathians; the Saxons in the area between the cities o f Bra§ov (Kronstadt) and Sibiu (Hermannstadt), with another center around Bistrija (Bistritz) (see Political conditions

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule

M ap 15). C luj (Kolozsvar, Klausenburg), the largest city o f Transylvania, was largely H ungarian by the eighteenth century. T h e religious divisions in the province were also significant. Th e R e fo r­ m ation m ade considerable progress am ong the H ungarian nobility, w h o saw it as a m ovem ent directed against the H absburgs. It was also accepted by the Saxons, w h o became Lutherans. T he H ungarians were henceforth both C al­ vinist and Lutheran; the Szeklers, Catholic, Lutheran, and Unitarian. B y the end o f the sixteenth century the Protestant churches had an equal status in the province w ith the Catholics and representation on the diet. T h e four recognized, o r received, religions were thus the Catholic, Lutheran, C alvin ­ ist, and Unitarian. T he clergy o f these faiths all enjoyed the position and privileges o f the nobility. In general, the province was organized much as the other lands o f the H ungarian crow n. T he nobility through their county organizations and their position on the diet dom inated the political life o f the country and held con­ trol over an enserfed peasantry. T h e Saxon territory, known as the Fundus Regius, o r Konigsboden (R o yal L an d ), had certain special institutions. It was governed by a count and an assembly known as the Nationsuniversitdt. This

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The eighteenth century body chose the candidate to be count, but the nom ination had to be ap­ proved by the king. Recogn izin g that they w ere but a small m inority in Tran­ sylvania, the Saxons w ere extremely jealous o f their autonomy. H ungarians and Rom anians were not allowed to hold property in their territory, nor could they m arry Saxons. Th e privileged grou p consisted not only o f the noble landowners, but also o f the peasant farmers and the city inhabitants. T h e Saxon cities, in particular Bra§ov, were m ajor com mercial centers. T he political and religious organization left com pletely ou t o f the picture the R om anian population and the O rthodox church, that is, the m ajority o f the people in Transylvania in the eighteenth century. O ccupying no particular area, Rom anians were to be found in all o f the regions controlled by the privileged nations. T he weakness o f the Rom anian position lay prim arily in the fact that the population consisted almost entirely o f enserfed peasants w h o w orked on H ungarian, Szekler, o r Germ an estates. A R om anian n obil­ ity, representing scarcely i percent o f this class, tended to cooperate w ith its H ungarian equals. In no part o f the em pire did a serf population play a political role. In Transylvania the term nation referred to the political “ na­ tion” o f the privileged orders; it was not an ethnic designation. H ungarian, G erm an, and Szekler peasants were scarcely better o ff than their Rom anian counterparts, except that they belonged to accepted religions. Certainly the Rom anians’ adherence to the O rthodox faith was to prove a handicap to their political and social position. Unlike the Serbs, w ith their cultural center o f Sremski Karlovci, the Rom anians had not received a special charter o r guaranteed privileges. A M etropolitanate was established at Alba Iulia, w hich w as under the jurisdiction o f the m etropolitan o f U n groValachia in Bucharest. It could, how ever, offer little practical support to its members. As an autonom ous principality under O ttom an sovereignty, Transylvania had been subject to a tribute, which had at first been ten thousand florins and then had been raised, and to a number o f other payments. H ow ever, it had never been reduced to a pashalik, nor had the O ttom an land system been applied. A s in M oldavia and Wallachia, the native nobility remained in con­ trol, and it was highly sensitive about its rights and privileges. In 1688, after the defeat o f the O ttom an armies, the diet declared an end to O ttom an rule. A s elsewhere, the transition to H absburg rule was not easy. T h e nobility feared that the existing political system w ould be disturbed. In 1691 L e o ­ pold I issued a charter confirm ing the continuation o f the system o f govern­ ment based on the three nations and the four religions; the old laws and institutions were thus preserved intact. A regular contribution to the em pire was agreed upon, but any supplementary taxes w ould need the approval o f the diet. Sim ilar arrangements w ere made concerning the military. H ence­ forth, Transylvania was considered one o f the H ungarian crow nlands, al­ though it preserved its autonom ous position.

Transylvania thus entered the Habsburg Empire with assurances that its 152

Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule unique organization w ould be kept. A t the head o f the province stood the institution o f the gubem ium , consisting o f a president and twelve councilors, w hose mem bers were drawn equally from the recognized nations and reli­ gions. T h e diet was com posed o f a single chamber, w hich included represen­ tatives from the Saxon, H ungarian, and Szelder districts; the high officials o f the church and state; and delegates nominated by the crow n. These last ap­ pointm ents enabled the central governm ent to exert influence within the province. Since votin g was done by estates, each measure had to have the approval o f all three nations. In Vienna, the Transylvanian A ulic Council supervised the affairs o f the principality. In governing Transylvania the H absburg governm ent soon faced difficulties similar to those in other lands o f the H u n ­ garian crow n. H ow ever, the existence o f the mass o f O rthodox peasants, w ithout political o r religious rights, offered the central authorities certain welcom e opportunities to attempt to strengthen their position. T h e m ajor opposition to H ab sbu rg control o f Transylvania came from the local H u n ­ garian nobility, w hich was largely Protestant. In the Transylvanian diet the m ajority was also Protestant. It w ou ld obviously be to the advantage o f the state should there appear a large group o f new converts to Catholicism w h o w ould be dependent on Vienna and in opposition to the H ungarian nobility. M oreover, m any responsible H absbu rg statesmen agreed w ith the premise popular at the time o f the Reform ation that it was preferable for a people to have the same religion as their ruler. Th e missionary zeal o f the Catholic church supported this idea. T he Jesuit order was back in Transylvania in 1693. T he only obvious large gro u p that m ight be converted was the O rthodox Rom anian. T h e situation o f the O rthodox church was extremely dangerous. D eprived o f an adequate source o f incom e, since they could not levy a tithe, the local clergy w ere dependent on the fees they could collect fo r services and donations from a congregation that already was forced to pay a tax to the recognized church w ith jurisdiction in their region. T he priest often had to earn his livin g b y w orking as a se rf o r tenant on the land o f a noble. The Protestant organizations had previously and unsuccessfully tried to make converts here. T h ey had, how ever, m ade the mistake o f attacking those forms o f religion, such as the veneration o f ikons, the fasts, and the observance o f numerous holidays, that were close to the heart o f the O rthodox peasant. M oreover, conversion to a Protestant church offered no social or political advantages. T h e Rom anian, whether he abandoned his faith o r not, w ould remain w ithout political rights o r representation. In seeking converts at the end o f the seventeenth century, the Catholics used m ore subde methods. T h ey concentrated on w in nin g converts not to Catholicism , but to the U niate, o r G reek Catholic, church. T he conditions for m em bership were simple; very little change in doctrine was required for the O rthodox. Th e convert had only to agree to the four articles o f the C o u n ­

The JJniate and Orthodox churches

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The eighteenth century cil of Florence of 1439, which had been called to attempt to reunite the two great branches of the Christian religion. These included the recognition of the pope as the head of the church, the acceptance of the descent o f the Holy Spirit from both the Father and the Son, and belief in the existence of purga­ tory.6 The Orthodox could thus keep much of their faith; the liturgy and canon law were left untouched. The Uniate church made a great effort to win over in particular the Orthodox clergy, whose position was indeed difficult and humiliating. Its members were offered at least a chance o f gaining the position held by their equivalents in the recognized institutions. T h e attractions o f the new church proved overw helm ing to a m ajority o f the O rthodox clergy, w h o accepted it in the hope o f bettering their personal situations and o f w inning at least a semblance o f equality w ith the Catholics. T h e union was accepted in 1697 in a synod held at A lba Iulia under M etro ­ politan Teofil. A fter his death, his successor, Atanasie A n ghel, com pleted the negotiations. In return for the acceptance o f the A ct o f U n ion o f 1698 by the form er O rthodox clergy, Leopold I issued a decree, the D iplom a o f 1699, which made the union legal and gave to the Uniate clergy the rights and privileges o f the Catholics. Th e priests were freed from labor services and tithes. In 1700 a general synod o f the church accepted the articles o f Florence. Leop old I then issued a second decree in which he renewed his previous assurances. Atanasie was placed at the head o f the U niate organization. D e­ spite their expectations and L eop old ’s decrees, the U niate clergy did not o b ­ tain a position o f equality w ith representatives o f the recognized religions. T h eir activities w ere carefully watched, and an official was assigned to super­ vise them.

The Uniate church became in fact a target for attack from all sides. The privileged nations and religions understood the Habsburg motives in en­ couraging the conversion. Moreover, the move did have the potential of up­ setting the balance of political life in Transylvania. Should the Romanians be in a position to claim equality on the basis o f religion, the dominance of the three recognized nations would be threatened. It must be remembered that the Romanians were in the majority throughout the entire province. Strong opposition also came from the Orthodox establishments both within and without the empire. The metropolitan at Sremski Karlovci, the major Orthodox center of the monarchy, denounced the Uniate church. The patri­ archs of Jerusalem and Constantinople, the metropolitan in Bucharest, the Romanian princes, and the Russian clerics all attacked its actions. What was decisive, however, was the fact that the mass of Orthodox peasantry preferred to remain with their old faith. Even though the Habsburg government ac­ tively aided the Uniates - in fact, acted as if all the Romanian Orthodox had shifted - the movement did not command widespread enthusiastic support. Some joined simply for convenience, but kept their basic Orthodox loyalties. 6

F o r a discussion o f the C ouncil o f F lorence see R uncim an, The Great Church, pp. 103—in .

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule In practice, the two churches had some conflicts, but they also cooperated Both the Orthodox and the Uniate churches had as the majority of their members peasants to whom differences of doctrine were unintelligible or who were indifferent to these issues. The basic reason for the weakness of the Uniate movement was probably the failure of the recognized religions to accept this church as an equal. The Hungarian clergy, as has been mentioned, identified their interests with those of the Hungarian nobility, who opposed an increase of Habsburg or Roma­ nian influence. The movement did have, nevertheless, certain unexpected, positive results for the Romanians. The Habsburg officials offered encour­ agement to the Uniates’ educational efforts, since they felt such endeavors would increase the influence of the organization. As a result, the Uniate church became the center o f a Romanian intellectual revival that had a profound effect not only on Transylvania, but also within the Principalities. The Ro­ manian national ideology for the next century was shaped by the work of what came to be known as the Transylvanian School. It enunciated and prop­ agated the idea of Romanian national equality, which was justified on a his­ torical basis. The work was begun by an extremely able bishop of the Uniate church, loan Inochentie Clain (Klein, Micu), who was in office from 1729 to 1751. His objective was to achieve an equal position in the province for both the clergy and the lay members o f his church. He felt that the best method by which to achieve this goal was the acceptance o f the conditions o f union and the fulfillment of Leopold’s decrees. He also believed in working through and cooperating with the central government. Between 1730 and 1744 he sent twenty-four petitions to Vienna. Clain’s program is important both for the goals that he sought to achieve and the arguments that he used. He worked for political rights, that is, the recognition o f the Romanians as a fourth nation with an equal position in the diet, and also for peasant reforms. He supported a radical modification in the position of the serfs, claiming that they should be allowed freedom of movement and that they should be able to acquire an education or learn a trade. The corvée, he contended, should be set at two days a week. His ideas were thus similar to those of the reforming monarchs. To justify his demands, Clain argued not only that the Romanians were the majority in the province, the group who paid the most taxes, but also that they had lived continuously in Transylvania longer than the Hungarians or the Saxons. The doctrine o f historical continuity was to be the intellectual basis of future national pro­ grams and was to cause much controversy between Romanian and Hungar­ ian historians and propagandists. The ideas expressed by Clain were thus o f extreme importance for the future national conflicts. In his writing he claimed that the Romanians of Transylvania were the direct descendants o f the Roman settlers, and thus the heirs o f ancient Rome. He argued that the Roman legions had completely annihilated the Dacians, the previous inhabitants, and had then settled the 155

The eighteenth century area w ith colonists from R o m e and Italy. In 270, w hen the R o m an armies had been forced to withdraw, only the soldiers and administrators had m oved across the D anube; the farmers had remained. D urin g the long period o f turm oil that follow ed, this Rom an population retreated to the hills and m ountains, only to return in m ore tranquil times. W hen the H ungarians conquered Transylvania, they found a Rom anian governm ent under the lead­ ership o f D uke Gelu. A fter he was killed, the Rom anians chose the H u n g ar­ ian leader, Tuhutum , as their ruler. Th e union was, nevertheless, on an equal basis. T he R om anian position declined only later, when the people were il­ legally deprived o f rights that had been previously guaranteed. A s can be seen, C lain’s arguments rested not only on the idea o f the prior occupancy o f the area, but also on the pure R om an stock o f the colonists. It w ill be rem em ­ bered that, in fact, the Rom an settlers came principally from the Balkan lands, and the Rom an s did intermarry w ith D acians, w h o w ere not destroyed. Nevertheless, despite certain misconceptions in it, C lain’s doctrine served an im portant national purpose in that it gave the Rom anians an ancestry that could be considered superior to that o f the H ungarians, Slavs, and Germans. In an age when historic rights and lineage were o f prime significance, this argum ent was very effective.

Not only did the Uniate leaders support programs in the Romanian inter­ est, but their church made great efforts to improve the education available to their supporters. Blaj became the center of Romanian cultural activities. A printing press was established, which produced its first book in 1753, and a secondary school was opened in 1754. Aided by Catholic institutions outside the province, Romanian students were able to go to Rome or Vienna to study. This group of educated clergy, although small in number, supplied the Romanian population with an articulate, active group o f intellectuals who were to play a major part in the subsequent national movement in Transyl­ vania. The doctrines they supported and publicized were to be the national program both in their own province and in Moldavia and Wallachia. As in the areas previously discussed, the reforms introduced by Maria Theresa and Joseph II in Transylvania affected chiefly the status o f the peasantry, the organization o f the administration, and the churches. The peasant question is of principal importance to our account because the Romanians formed the major component o f the serf population. In all o f Transylvania in the eighteenth century, the nobility constituted a small percentage of the inhabitants, 4 .4 percent at the beginning of the cen­ tury and 6.7 percent by 1867. O f the peasantry, the majority, 73.2 percent, were serfs, and 20.5 percent were free peasants. Among the remainder, a large per­ centage were migrant workers.7 Like others in their category in other parts The reform in Transylvania

7

Constantin Daicoviciu and M iron Constantinescu, eds., Brève histoire de la Transylvanie (Bu­ charest: Editions de l’académie, 1965), p. 143.

Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule o f the empire, the serfs were subject to high payments to the state, the church and their landholders. In addition, the O rthodox w ere com pelled to contrib­ ute to religious institutions o f which they were not members. A s elsewhere the corvee obligations caused the m ost discontent. In 1714 the diet set the rate at the high level o f four days a week for all members o f a serf family. It w ill be noted that the feudal burdens were higher in Transylvania than in Wallachia o r M oldavia. In 1769 an urbarium issued for Transylvania, known as C erta Puncta, placed the lim it at four days, o r three i f the peasant provided his ow n animals. T he reform s, which paralleled those in other parts o f the monarchy, suffered from the disadvantage o f being easy for a nobility w h o controlled the local administration to disobey. Th e land question was further affected by the measures taken by the central governm ent to extend the M ilitary Frontier into Transylvania in 1762. Th e m ove was made from political rather than military considerations. Th e fro n ­ tier zone w ould give the imperial governm ent a firm base from w hich to control the local nobility; advantages were also expected in that the area would be the source o f taxes and soldiers. T he establishment o f the frontier, h o w ­ ever, w as n ot easy. T h e Slavonian and Croatian zones had been set up on lands that had been devastated and depopulated; there was also a clear need to defend the area from the danger o f attack from across the border, i f only from lawless bands. In contrast, the border zones o f Transylvania were heav­ ily populated, particularly the Saxon lands; there was no fear o f an attack from the Principalities. Nevertheless, despite the strong objections o f the local aristocracy, tw o Rom anian and three Szekler regiments were form ed and settled in villages running along the frontier w ith the D anubian Princi­ palities. A s in the other border areas, the conditions for the peasant soldiers were considerably better than those for the serfs and tenants on the neighboring estates. T h e local peasants pressed to join the frontier settlements. T h e R o ­ manians, in particular, found themselves in a better situation. A t first, the H ab sbu rg authorities sought to settle only Uniates, but they soon also tol­ erated O rthodox soldiers. In the m ilitary colonies the Rom anians were on an equal level w ith the other nationalities, and they w ere not subject to the dues and labor obligations that were at such a high level in Transylvania. A lth ou gh there were repeated small-scale actions o f resistance am ong the enserfed peasantry th roughout the century, the largest uprising originated in connection w ith the M ilitary Frontier. Catherine the G reat and Joseph II, it will be remem bered, in the 1780s form ulated am bitious plans for the partition o f the O ttom an Em pire. In preparation for w ar a decree was issued in 1784 registering villages in the frontier zone. Since the peasants thought that this measure applied to the entire country, large numbers o f villages attempted to join the frontier establishment. A s soldiers the peasants w ould escape serf­ dom and be freed o f labor dues. W hen the local nobility attempted to stop the m ovem ent, the peasants organized and prepared to resist.

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The eighteenth century A m ajor revolt in which the peasant participants expressed centuries o f bitter grievance broke out under the leadership o f three men named H orea, Clo§ca, and Cri§an. A s in all such uprisings, atrocities were com m itted on both sides. M an o r houses w ere burned, and there were high casualties. A t first, the revolt was extremely successful; the rebels gained control o f a w ide area o f Transylvania, and the nobility were thoroughly terrified. Em phasizing their loyalty to the em peror, the rebels declared that the uprising was directed against the Transylvanian estates. T h eir program was extremely radical for the tim e; it called not only for the end o f serfdom and the establishment o f social equality, but also for the division o f the lands o f the estates. D espite the declarations o f loyalty, the H absburg governm ent had to take action. Since it was at first unable to suppress the m ovem ent by force, it undertook negotiations w ith the rebel leaders. T h e army was then sent against the peas­ ant forces, which were com pletely crushed. Tw o o f the leaders, H o rea and Clo§ca, w ere publicly executed by quartering as an example to their form er followers.

Although the revolt was suppressed with great severity, Joseph II had a complete investigation made of the affair. The emperor was himself well aware o f the bad conditions in Transylvania, since he had traveled there incognito in 1773, 1783, and 1786. His commission o f inquiry placed the blame for the uprising on the exploitation of the peasantry. In 1785 he issued a decree end­ ing serfdom and, as in other areas, granting the peasant personal freedom and allowing him to move if he had fulfilled his obligations. The burning question, a limitation of labor dues, was not settled. In 1791 and 1792 the diet recognized the abolition of serfdom, but the peasant had to give five months’ notice before leaving the estate and he had to find a replacement. Joseph ’s radical reform s had perhaps greater significance for Transylvania than for the other regions that have been discussed. B oth his peasant m ea­ sures and his attacks on the political and religious privileges o f the entrenched estates shook the entire system. H is attitude on religious tolerance w as a great benefit to the O rthodox church. T h e first o f the recognized nations to be dealt a real blow was the Saxons. In 1781 Joseph issued a decree on Concivilitat, o r equality o f citizenship, which ended the exclusive rights o f the Germ ans and granted an equal position to all o f the inhabitants o f the Saxon territory. Rom anians and H ungarians, like Germ ans, could n ow acquire property and enter guilds. T h e action, which struck at the roots o f Germ an privilege, show ed that the em peror was no Germ an nationalist despite his desire to introduce Germ an as the language o f administration. In 1784 Joseph II proceeded to a radical reorganization o f the Transylva­ nian political structure. A s elsewhere, he elim inated the counties, which were the base o f noble power, and substituted new divisions headed by officials w h o w ere chosen by and responsible to Vienna. T he administrative bounda­ ries were drawn w ithout reference to historic o r national considerations. A ll

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule were to be equal in the province, but German was to be the language of government. T h e E d ict o f Toleration, issued in 1781, was to have a particularly beneficial effect on the O rthodox church. T h e act allowed freedom o f w orship in pri­ vate homes and the building o f churches and schools where m ore than a hundred families subscribed to a faith. T he O rthodox were now in a much better legal position; they could set up m ore churches and act more freely than before. M oreover, the H absburg governm ent gave up the attempt to treat all Rom anians as Uniates. M oves were initiated to choose a new head fo r the O rthodox o f Transylvania, w h o had not had a bishop since 1698, when Atanasie and his followers had joined the rival institution. Thereafter, the R om anian O rthodox had had to look to the Serbian organization at Sremski K arlovci, although they were not covered by Leopold I ’s assurances. N ow , however, they w ould again have their ow n bishop. The metropolitan at Sremski Karlovci w as asked to subm it three names to Joseph II; he chose Ghedeon N ichitici, a Serb, w h o assumed office in 1784. H is church remained depen­ dent on Srem ski K arlovci in matters o f doctrine. In 1810 the R om anian O r­ thodox w ere given the right to name their ow n bishops. Sibiu became the O rthodox center, as A lba Iulia was that o f the U niates and Sremski K arlovci that o f the Serbian O rthodox.

Although the new measures of toleration strengthened the Orthodox po­ sition, they naturally gained Joseph II more enemies. One of the reasons that had led the government to favor the appointment o f an Orthodox bishop was its dislike o f the influence on Transylvanian Romanians of Orthodox organizations outside the country, particularly in Bucharest. Other conse­ quences o f the action also caused great disquiet, particularly among the Cath­ olics. A mass return to the Orthodox church occurred at the expense o f the Uniates. Even Joseph was forced to agree to measures that would make such actions difficult. W ith Joseph ’s death the m ajor administrative changes in Transylvania were revoked. T h e province returned to the system o f rule by the three recognized nations and the four religions. Nevertheless, the retention o f the provisions abolishing serfdom and the lessening o f the limitations on the O rthodox did benefit the Rom anian people. M oreover, by the end o f the century they had a small intellectual class w h o could effectively argue fo r an im provem ent in the R om anian position. In 1791 som e members o f this grou p com posed a petition, know n as the Supplex Libellus Valachorum, which was sent to L e o ­ pold II. Its arguments were very similar to those first expressed by Bishop Clain. T h e m em orandum restated the thesis o f the Rom an origin o f the R o ­ manian people and the assertion that they and the O rthodox church had been on an equal level w ith the H ungarians and the Saxons until the fifteenth century. T h e docum ent thus called not for the granting o f new rights, but for the restoration o f those which had been in existence previously. T h e petition­

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The eighteenth century ers desired that the Rom anians be given proportional representation on the Transylvanian administrative bodies and share the privileges o f the dom inat­ ing nations. T h ey also wanted to hold a national assembly similar to those convened by the Serbian O rthodox. A fter L eo p o ld II had read the petition, he sent it on to the Transylvanian diet. There, as could be expected, it was firmly rejected. Once back in control, the H ungarian, Szekler, and Saxon aristocracy had no intention o f m aking concessions. H avin g successfully defied the attempts o f Joseph II to im pose a centralized administration, they were certainly not go in g to surrender to a m ovem ent that had even m ore dangerous implications to both their political pow er and their social position. T he Banat In addition to the regions discussed thus far, three other areas o f the H ab s­ burg Em pire are o f importance to this narrative. Tw o o f these, Bukovina and the Slovene lands, are discussed in greater detail later. Bukovina became a part o f the m onarchy only in 1775 and was then administered together w ith the new ly acquired Polish province o f Galicia. T he Slovenes, w h o inhabited all o f C arniola and part o f Styria, Carinthia, Istria, G orizia, and Gradisca, shared in the history o f the events o f the Germ an Austrian part o f the empire. Since this area had never been the scene o f devastating wars o r great m ove­ ments o f population, it was m ore prosperous than the lands previously dis­ cussed. A separate Slovene m ovem ent did not commence until the next cen­ tury. In com parison, the Banat had a turbulent and destructive past. Because it had been under direct O ttom an rule, both the administrative and the land systems o f that em pire had been in effect. A s a border area and the scene o f constant fighting, the territory had been largely depopulated except fo r some centers around fortified points. Th e peasants raised livestock, w hich could easily be m oved in troubled times. A fter the H absbu rg governm ent acquired the province in 1718, the question o f its political future arose. D espite pressure from H ungary, which expected to acquire it, the province was first made a crow nland and placed under a m ilitary administration. It was divided into eleven districts; the villages remained under the administration o f the local knezes according to the system in effect in the O ttom an territories and the M ilitary Frontier. T he H absbu rg governm ent had full control o f the disposal o f the land, w hich was n ow state property. T he aim was to make the region a strong bulw ark against the O ttom an Em pire and an econom ically prosper­ ous area that w ould yield high returns in taxation. A n active policy o f colo­ nization was thus em barked upon. A t this time, the Banat was a transition area where the Rom anian- and Serbian-speaking people merged. A lth ough it originally was prim arily R o ­ manian, a large Serbian im m igration over a long period had occurred. The

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule population was mostly peasant, but it also included artisans and merchants. After the Habsburg annexation, the authorities made great efforts to attract German settlers, because it was believed that they could develop the land most efficiently. The new immigrants were given the status of free peasants and excused from taxes for a period. Better farming methods were indeed introduced, and new crops such as rice and cotton developed. The govern­ ment discouraged Hungarian immigration for obvious political reasons. The Habsburg authorities also handed out large tracts o f land as rewards for service or to those with sufficient influence to obtain the grants. Both the Catholic and Orthodox churches held estates. Because all of these were worked by serf or tenant labor, they had the same problems as the neighboring lands and were similarly affected by the reforms. The majority of the population was Orthodox, but the Serbs were in a better position than the Romanians. Nevertheless, the Romanian population did enjoy some o f the same privi­ leges, since they formed part of the Serbian congregation. A part of the Banat territory was organized as a Military Frontier similar to that in Croatia and Slavonia. Until the last decade o f the eighteenth century the Banat was under the administration o f the central authorities in Vienna. After a period o f in­ decision, they joined the region to Hungary, but as a distinct province. It remained thereafter under Hungarian control. THE FR EN CH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON

From the accession of Leopold II in 1790 until the conclusion o f the Con­ gress o f Vienna in 1815, the main concern of the Habsburg government was its relations with France. Leopold’s forces were soon to be crushed by the armies o f this revolutionary power. In this period France represented a deadly threat because o f both its military might and its conquering ideology. The fate o f the French monarchs was a shock to conservative Europe. In 1792 Leopold saw his sister, Marie Antoinette, and his brother-in-law, Louis XVI, imprisoned; in 1793 they were guillotined. European rulers also realized that many o f the conditions that had brought about the revolution in France were present elsewhere. Within the Habsburg Monarchy the peasants, still bur­ dened with heavy obligations, were a restless element. Sections o f the nobil­ ity, especially in Hungary, had used the vocabulary of the Enlightenment to justify the maintenance of their national and feudal privileges. Under these circumstances the Austrian government could afford no more experiments such as those in the time o f Joseph II. The abolition o f serfdom and the Toleration Edict remained, but no further major advances were to occur until 1848. T he next em peror, Francis II (1792-1835), thus brought the era o f enlight­ ened despotism to an end. A practical man o f little im agination, he intro­ duced a new conservative spirit into the direction o f the state. T he French Revolution had shaken all o f those in privileged positions, and the nobility

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The eighteenth century needed the support of the monarchy against the larger threat. Those who had previously stood for provincial and historic rights found grounds for coop­ erating with the proponents o f a strong central authority. The main enemy of both was French aggression and the associated revolutionary ideology. The struggle was to be carried on not only on the battlefield, but also at home. Various measufes of internal control were introduced, including a spy system, increased police surveillance, and a censorship that examined works printed in the country and imported from abroad. Education came to em­ phasize loyalty and good citizenship; religion was favored as an instrument of assuring and enforcing support for the established regime. Despite the fears aroused by the revolutionary movement, the question of Hungarian separatism remained acute for Vienna. The landowning nobility had remained prosperous during the Napoleonic Wars, which were not fought in their lands. The wars brought high prices for the products o f their estates, and they as a class were free from taxation. Nevertheless, they continued to fight the special war taxes necessary to defend the empire and the recruitment for the army that took peasant labor from their profitable estates. In this period there was also continuing pressure for the introduction of Hungarian as the language of administration and higher education. The Habsburg conflicts with France resulted in a long series of depressing defeats and unfavorable peace treaties. Almost all of these brought about a loss o f Habsburg territory, usually involving the southwestern frontier. From 1792 to 1797 Austria fought in the War o f the First Coalition in alliance with Prussia, Britain, Holland, and Spain. In the Treaty o f Campo Formio the empire ceded its Belgian lands and in return received Venice, Istria, and Dal­ matia. The War of the Second Coalition, from 1798 to 1801, in which Austria fought with Russia, Britain, Naples, Portugal, and the Ottoman Empire, ended with the Treaty o f LuneviUe, which brought about major changes in central Europe but allowed the monarchy to keep the former Venetian terri­ tories. The War of the Third Coalition, commencing in 1805, brought further defeats, in particular the disaster at Austerlitz in 1805, and was concluded by the Treaty o f Pressburg. Here the empire ceded the Venetian lands to the new Kingdom o f Italy and lost more German territory. In 1809, after a major attempt at national revival, the Austrian army, under the command of Arch­ duke Charles, made a great effort to defeat Napoleon, who at the time was involved in Spain. Further shattering losses forced the monarchy to conclude yet another severe peace. In the Treaty of Schonbrunn Galicia and more Ger­ man lands were surrendered, along with territory that Napoleon was subsequendy to incorporate into a new political entity called the Illyrian Provinces. For a short period after 1805 the French government controlled important South Slav lands. In 1809 Dalmatia, some Slovene lands, parts o f the Croatian Military Frontier, and Civil Croatia were joined together to form the Illyrian Provinces, an area that was incorporated directly into France. Through the creation o f this Balkan dependency, the French government aimed to estab­

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Balkan nationalities under Habsburg rule lish a strong political base in the region to protect its position in Italy and to put pressure on the Habsburg Empire. The new boundaries also gave France direct access to Ottoman territory. In setting up the new government, the French officials did not take into consideration the local customs, which they regarded as primitive and barbarous, and they proceded to introduce the French administrative system intact. The country was divided into depart­ ments, and it received the legal, administrative, and fiscal institutions of France. The Napoleonic domination resulted in the application of many revolu­ tionary principles. Since French military power was overwhelming, little care had to be taken of local or conservative sensibilities. The changes went far beyond the most extreme ideas of Josephism. The manorial system was ended; the peasants were to receive all of the land they worked. The labor dues for the landowners and the tithe for the church were abolished without compen­ sation. The Code Napoléon was applied, and all men were declared equal before the law. Taxation, however, remained. Much discontent was aroused by the continuation, or even increase, o f the high state taxes and the use of the corvée on public works, such as the building o f the roads necessary for French military needs. The local population also did not like being con­ scripted into the French army. In the few years that France held the Illyrian Provinces, not all the reforms could be completed. French attention was focused primarily on other and more important sections of Europe. No attempt was made to apply the new institutions to the tribal areas o f southern Dalmatia. French military officers admired much in the organization of the Military Frontier; there were few changes there. Moreover, with Britain in control of the seas, little could be done to promote the prosperity o f the Dalmatian coastal towns. Nevertheless, the French occupation had certain lasting influences. First, the old order was completely overturned, and the population was exposed to new ideas and at least the plan for a more efficient administrative system. Local languages were also more widely in use. Although this problem was to have more significance in the future, the difficulty of choosing and adopting one literary language was clearly evident. The Illyrian Provinces were inhab­ ited chiefly by two peoples: the Croats in Dalmatia and Croatia, who spoke dialects o f the same language, and the Slovenes, whose Slavic language was distinct from that of the Croats. The Napoleonic rule thus brought together South Slav people under one government, but it did little more than bring out what was to be a major problem hindering Yugoslav unity in the future. The Habsburg military fortunes remained low until after 1812, when Na­ poleon launched his ill-advised attack on Russia. Thereafter, the Habsburg government, under the direction o f Prince Clemens von Metternich, was one of the leaders of the coalition that brought Napoleon to defeat. In March 1814 the allied troops entered Paris. In the subsequent peace negotiations, which were held in Vienna in 1814 and 1815, few problems arose in connection with the regions with which we are concerned. The great controversy in the

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The eighteenth century peace negotiations concerned the fate o f the Polish lands. T h e ch ief alteration from the conditions that had prevailed on the H ab sbu rg southeastern border before the long period o f w ar was the definite incorporation o f the former Venetian lands into the monarchy. Istria and D alm atia were annexed; north­ ern Italy was organized into the K ingdom o f Lom bardy-V enetia, which was placed under a H absburg archduke. The Treaty o f Bucharest o f 1812, o f course, had already settled the problems with which the O ttom an Em pire was di­ rectly concerned. T he Porte did not participate in the Congress o f Vienna, and Balkan problems were not discussed. T he Treaty o f Vienna was to have great significance for the H absburg Em­ pire. D espite its continual defeats in war, the peace settlement left the empire the predominant power in the Italian peninsula and among the German states. T h rou ghou t the next fifty-five years, until the defeat by Prussia in 1866. the m onarchy was to concentrate on the maintenance o f its influence in these areas. Balkan and Eastern questions were secondary. T he H ab sbu rg govern­ ment, which had every interest in preserving this favorable situation, thus joined w ith Prussia and Russia in the H o ly Alliance, w hose principal aim was to maintain the status quo and the conservative political order that had been established.

3 Balkan people under Ottoman and Habsburg rule: a comparison we have examined the position o f the Bal­ kan people in two great empires, the Ottoman and the Habsburg. Their fortunes were determined not only by the economic, political, and social structure of the state in which they lived, but also by the domestic and for­ eign issues in dispute at the time. In some respects the problems o f the two governments were similar; in others they differed sharply. Certainly for both the Ottoman and Habsburg leaders the chief political question in the eigh­ teenth century was the relative power balance between the central and the provincial authorities. They, however, approached the question from differ­ ent directions. The Habsburg Monarchy sought to gain a control over feudal estates that it had never possessed previously; the Ottoman sultans, in con­ trast, attempted to reassert an authority that they had once held. The resist­ ance to Austrian centralism and absolutism came from a historic nobility whose lineage might rival that of the Habsburg family. The Porte was chal­ lenged by a motley array o f ayans, beys, Christian and Muslim military lead­ ers, and outright bandits - groups that did not have centuries-old traditions of political power. For both states military defeat, or the threat thereof, played a major role in bringing about reform. The Ottoman situation was comparatively more dangerous, since foreign states did contemplate the dismemberment o f the empire. The Porte faced threats from Austria, Russia, and Persia; the mon­ archy’s chief adversary was first France and then, in the middle o f the nine­ teenth century, Prussia. Internal reform thus had to be undertaken in order to put the state in a better condition to face its enemies. The Ottoman at­ tempts at reform were limited; the aim was purely pragmatic. The military had to be improved or the central government would fall before foreign aggression and internal subversion. The Austrian efforts were far more so­ phisticated. An effort was made to alter the political structure o f the empire in a fashion that would enable the central government to collect more taxes and have a better access to the population for the direct recruitment o f sol­ diers. Moreover, the purposes o f the changes were more than military. On the basis o f the political ideology o f the Enlightenment, the reforming monarchs held a definite conception o f their role as responsible leaders of all of their people. There was no similar attitude in Constantinople, where reforms n th e p re c e d in g pages

I

1 65

The eighteenth century situated to express his desires either legally or by revolt. The nobility, not a village notable, ran the local administration; there were no peasant armed forces like those formed by the armatoles and haiduks. Among the Habsburg subjects only the Serbs of the Military Frontier had either the experience or the organization to act, and their influence was exerted chiefly in Ottoman lands. Agricultural conditions, not political, national, or religious issues, re­ mained the prime peasant concern. The high cultural achievement o f the monarchy, its architecture, art and music, of course held no advantages for this section of society, which had at the most only a primary level of educa­ tion. Despite the lower general conditions, some Ottoman Christian peasants did have advantages in landholding, if not in theory at least in practice. It is very difficult to make generalizations here because of the lack of comparative studies on agricultural conditions. However, if we use as the standard the goal of all peasant households to gain free control of a plot of land that could be farmed according to the desires o f the family, this wish could more readily be fulfilled within the Ottoman domains, excluding Moldavia, Wallachia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina, which had a native nobility and a feudal organi­ zation. The landholding restrictions on the timars and chiftliks have been discussed. There were, however, wide areas where the equivalent of peasant farming was conducted or where the raising o f livestock in the hills and pasturelands was the basis o f existence. It must also be emphasized that the Ottoman Christians did have village administrations, local leaders, and some­ times armed forces at their disposal, which could back their claims in land disputes. There was, in addition, always a great deal of available unoccupied land, and movement was possible within the empire. Although fundamental changes were not to occur in Balkan life until the nineteenth century, some indication had already been given o f the direction that these would take. Leaders in both empires in the eighteenth century attempted to deal with what they regarded as the major problems. The O t­ toman emphasis was on military reform to enable the state to control rebel­ lious local pashas and to withstand foreign invasion. The Austrian monarchs, particularly Joseph II, attempted a fundamental reorganization o f the gov­ ernment. As we have seen, these reforms, introduced from above, were largely unsuccessful. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars the conservative forces had reasserted their domination. The major issues were left unsolved. The Porte still faced the dangers o f outside aggression and internal dissolution; the problems facing the Habsburg Monarchy in attempting to hold together an empire composed of widely different provinces remained. Moreover, new issues, arising from the economic changes of the era, were to add additional complications to the situation.

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PART II

The revolutionary y ears, 1804-1887

4 The first national revolutions

T

H E H I S T O R Y O F T H E B A L K A N P E N I N S U L A from 1804 to 1887 IS

dom inated by the theme o f national revolt and the formation o f the new governm ents. D u rin g these years an independent Greece, Ser­ bia, and Rom ania and an autonom ous Bulgaria were to be established. A n Albanian national m ovem ent also arose. Th e first revolutions broke ou t in three separate areas - the pashalik o f Belgrade, the D anubian Principalities, and the Peloponnesus and Rum eli - in the first three decades o f the century. H ow ever, before discussing these events, it is necessary to consider certain general developm ents involving not only the Balkans but also the rest o f Europe, w hich were to have an im portant effect on the revolutionary activi­ ties: first, the form ulation and w ide acceptance o f national and liberal ideol­ ogies; second, the changing econom ic conditions; and third, the increasing intervention o f the European great powers and the origin o f the Eastern Question.

BALKAN NATIONALISM : THE BACKGROUND OF T H E R E V O L U T I O N S Balkan national leaders and intellectuals in the nineteenth century were to be deeply influenced by tw o political doctrines that had their origin in Western Europe: liberalism, w ith its roots in the ideas o f the Enlightenm ent o f the eighteenth century; and nationalism, w hose basis was more in the rom anti­ cism and historicism o f the nineteenth century. M any writers and philoso­ phers in the eighteenth century, deeply impressed by the scientific discoveries o f the previous period, came to believe that there existed certain laws or principles determ ining politics and society similar to the “ natural laws” o f the material w orld. Th ey hoped that w ith the use o f reason they could discover these and form ulate them into statutes for the governing o f the state. M ost o f these men were idealists; they had faith in the perfectibility o f man and society. Since their goal was the assurance o f human happiness and well­ being, they wished state institutions to serve and benefit the governed. Their concepts w ere not necessarily democratic. A s w e have seen, one o f their num ­

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 ber, Joseph II, like other enlightened despots, fully intended to rule autocrat­ ically, but his aim was to act in the interest o f all of the social levels o f the Austrian population. Although some of the doctrines of the Enlightenment did indeed serve the interests of the centralizing monarchies, other aspects strengthened their op­ position. Attacking the concept of the absolute, mercantile state, some writ­ ers claimed that in accordance with the idea of natural law, all individuals were endowed with certain rights, which they held from birth and which should be regarded as “inalienable.” In the American Declaration o f Indepen­ dence, a fine formulation of the basic ideas of this school of thought, these were declared to be “life, liberty and the pursuit o f happiness.” Private prop­ erty was often added to this list of natural rights. The argument was thus made that there were areas in the life of each in­ dividual in which the government should not interfere. In order to assure that intrusions should not take place, and to define what was private and what was public, it was believed that a constitution, a form of social contract, should be drawn up that would clearly set the limits of the state’s power and guarantee the rights of the individual citizen. These concepts strongly stressed political equality; all men, no matter what their social or ethnic background, were to have the same rights in the state. The emphasis was on the freedom o f the individual and his protection against the tyranny of government or society. These convictions were the basis of nineteenth-century liberalism. It will be noted that the liberal of this period, while usually espousing political equality, seldom if ever supported social or economic leveling, or the inter­ vention o f the state to aid one section of the population. Nineteenth-century nationalism altered the direction of some of these ideas. For most o f the writers o f the Enlightenment, the state, or nation, was con­ sidered an association of individuals who were joined together by some sort of social contract, whether written or implied. The aim of the government should simply be to promote the general welfare in the widest terms and to protect the population against outside invasion. The subject of chief empha­ sis was the definition o f the relationship of the individual and the state au­ thorities, and the strict supervision o f the power of the latter. The state was considered a rational organization of free-standing citizens; it had few if any mystical or emotional overtones. In contrast, nationalist doctrines almost all took the emphasis off the in­ dividual and placed it completely on the collective entity, the nation. Much of the vocabulary o f romantic nationalism was greatly influenced by the writ­ ing of Johann Gottfried Herder, a German philosopher, whose ideas were to have a great impact on Eastern Europe. He saw individuals in society only as part o f the Volk, which can be roughly translated as the people or, better, the national group. Herder believed that art, music, literature, local customs, laws —in fact most forms of cultural and political life —were manifestations o f the unique spirit, or Volksgeist, of each people.

The first national revolutions In contrast to liberal ideology, which placed so much emphasis on assuring the citizen rights against both his government and his society, national ide­ ologies often went to the opposite extreme. It was argued that God had divided mankind by nationality. Certain attributes, such as a common lan­ guage, a single religion, similar customs, and long historical association, joined individuals in one nation. To some writers the citizen existed primarily as part of his collective group; he had no real rights against the nation and its institutions. Personal freedom was thus to be attained not through constitu­ tions and similar legal documents, but through identification with and sub­ mission to the collective will of the nation, sometimes expressed by a charis­ matic leader. The nationalist was extremely interested in the study and purification of his language, since he regarded this manifestation of national character as perhaps the most important. It was argued that one language alone was im­ printed in each individual; it was the natural expression of the thought and innate character of the nation to which he belonged. Each writer should use only his own language, because in it alone could he express his true ideas and his national culture. Foreign words were to be rigorously expunged from the vocabularies o f every language as detrimental to natural modes of expression. Nationalist philosophers were similarly concerned with the revival o f the his­ tory o f their nation and with folk and fairy tales. They delighted in delving into the murky past of their own people, and they professed a high regard for the peasant, whom they saw as the element o f society least harmed by “foreign” cultural influences. At first, it should be emphasized, these writers did not set up a hierarchy of superior and inferior nations. They merely argued that the individual could best realize himself through identification with the nation, the natural, Godordained division o f mankind. For instance, German writers, including Her­ der, showed great admiration for and interest in Balkan folk literature, in particular Serbian oral epic poetry, which was regarded as a superior example o f the Volksgeist in action. It was only later, when these vague conceptions were translated into practice and into political programs, that national leaders came to emphasize the unique and marvelous qualities o f their own people and to use this argument to justify their control over others. This trend, which can be seen in all the national movements, reached its culmination in National Socialist Germany in the twentieth century. Extreme national doctrines in both Eastern and Western Europe were often followed with the greatest enthusiasm by those who had little practical ad­ ministrative experience or actual political power. Revolutionary nationalism had a strong attraction for sections of the population, such as students, pro­ fessors, writers, lawyers, and other members o f professions, who were well educated but often excluded from high state positions. Their programs placed much emphasis on action and on the necessity o f struggling for a noble goal; their efforts thrived in an atmosphere of conspiracy and violence. Most of 173

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 them were convinced of the rectitude of their position, and they were sure that they held the key to the future. The revolutionary movements throughout Europe in the nineteenth cen­ tury combined liberalism and nationalism, although obvious contradictions existed between aspects o f both doctrines. The leaders usually concentrated on the breakup o f feudal or autocratic regimes and their replacement by con­ stitutional governments. They accepted the national basis for the state, that is, that peoples with a common language and historical past should be joined together. As will be shown, they often compromised their liberal political principles once they had gained power, but their national enthusiasms sel­ dom wavered. The implications of liberal and national ideology for southeastern Europe were clear: both the Habsburg and the Ottoman empires should be dissolved and replaced by national states with constitutional governments. Theory aside, already in the eighteenth century certain events that served to impel the Bal­ kan peoples along this course had taken place. Some aspects o f this develop­ ment, particularly the cultural revival and the increased interest in language, were exactly in line with nationalist doctrine. Cultural revival: history and language In a discussion of the age o f nationalism in the Balkans it is important to emphasize first that neither Habsburg nor Ottoman rule had completely de­ stroyed a feeling of unity among the individual nationalities or brought about a total loss o f the memory of a more glorious past. There had, after all, been Byzantine, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Wallachian, and Molda­ vian states with distinct cultures and histories that recorded considerable achievements. The citizens of each state had shared a common language, religion, culture, and other attributes that defined the perimeters of a national unit in the nineteenth century. Certain institutions o f the Ottoman system guaranteed that the remembrance o f former triumphs would be carefully pre­ served, even among a largely illiterate peasant population. Certainly the Orthodox church served as a major vehicle in the transmis­ sion and preservation of past traditions. Although the Patriarchate often col­ laborated closely with the Ottoman government, the church as a whole kept alive the idea that its members were distinct and superior and that the Mus­ lims were transgressors on Christian territory. Providing the only available education, the Orthodox institutions could make certain that the Ottoman state authorities were never in a position to control Christian thought. The lack o f a secular school system deprived the Muslim rulers o f this convenient propaganda tool. In addition, a popular religious literature recounted tales o f the lives o f saints, martyrs, and heroes. Especially prominent were the stories o f the neo-martyrs, who had suffered for their defense o f Christianity against Islam. Religious art also carried the symbols and portraits of former 174

The first national revolutions rulers and reminded the viewer of the great Byzantine, Bulgarian, and Ser­ bian empires of the past. A second major method o f cultural transmission was through the tight village community. Without a popular written literature, formal histories, or newspapers, succeeding generations of illiterate peasants learned about the past from their storytellers and their oral epic and popular poetry. In the nineteenth century European writers, including J. W von Goethe, A. Mickiewicz, A. S. Pushkin, and Sir Walter Scott, were fascinated by the richness of the Balkan folk tradition and brought this literature to the attention of the West. All of the Balkan peoples had treasuries of myth, poetry, and song. Among the earliest were the Greek songs that told of the exploits of tenthcentury Byzantine border warriors against Arab opponents. The best known of these was Digenis A b i t as. Later Greek poems recounted the national tragedy o f the fall of Constantinople. Epic poetry was particularly important among the Slavic people, whose tales were sung to the accompaniment of a onestringed instrument, the gusla. The Serbian songs concentrated on the medie­ val state and its downfall, the Croatian on events after the fifteenth century. The Muslim Bosnians had folk poetry in which the Turks were the major figures. For the Christian Slavic people the common hero was Prince Mark, called Marko Kraljevic in Serbian and Krali Marko in Bulgarian. His exploits and the battle o f Kosovo became the central events of past history, though the concentration on this major defeat carried the assumption that at some time Christian liberation would be achieved. In addition to the oral literature with religious or historical themes, all Balkan people had popular ballads, including the klepht or haiduk songs, which concerned the activities of these bandit groups. Although the outlaws were originally neither nationalistic nor even particularly patriotic, they did create a type of heroic figure that was to be much admired and was to have a place in the future national struggles. The songs, which emphasized the idea o f freedom and the identity o f man and nature, were concerned chiefly with the activities of individuals who alone or with a close band of faithful com­ rades fought fiercely and bravely against strong odds. Opposition to tyran­ nical rule and the glorification o f the life o f the hero had an obvious appli­ cation to resistance to Ottoman rule. Although these sources of knowledge about the past were to remain im­ portant in the village, other work would influence in particular the more educated and cosmopolitan elements of Balkan society. Beginning in the eighteenth century individual scholars became increasingly engrossed in the study of their language and history. Language involved some very difficult problems. As we have seen, the population o f the peninsula consisted largely of a peasantry that spoke a multitude of dialects, all, nevertheless, falling into the major divisions of Greek, Albanian, Romanian, and South Slavic. As printing facilities became available and as more writers wished to use their national tongues, it was, o f course, necessary to decide upon standard literary 175

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 languages, w hich w ould also be taught in the schools. T he language issue, which has caused m ajor controversies until the present, w ill be discussed throughout this account. T h e Greeks, w ith their superior educational facilities and their respect for learning, w ere the first to meet the question o f the literary language. In some respects their choice was the m ost difficult. In addition to the m any different G reek dialects spoken at the time, they had inherited the great tradition o f the classical w orld and its literary masterpieces. T he tem ptation was strong not to abandon the language that had been spoken and written in fifth-century Athens. There was, in addition, the heritage o f Byzantine and O rthodox learning. T h is issue had to be faced at the time o f the G reek cultural revival in the eighteenth century, which took place largely outside the Ottoman lands. T h e m ajor center became Vienna when in 1783 Joseph II allowed books to be printed in Greek. Venice and the Ionian Islands also played a role in the m ovem ent. Tw o figures dom inated the G reek literary scene: R ig as Feraios and Adam antios Korais. F o r the language question the w ork o f K orais was particularly significant. Influenced by European thought, particularly that o f the Enlightenm ent, K o ­ rais was draw n to classical rather than Byzantine G reek civilization. D eeply concerned w ith the political education o f his people, he wished the resur­ rected nation to express the spirit o f the ancient culture. H is main undertak­ in g was the publication o f seventeen volum es o f classical texts, know n as the L ibrary o f G reek Literature. A s far as the contem porary w ritten language was concerned, he believed that it should be as close to the classical gram m ar and vocabulary as possible. H e was also in favor o f expunging the Italian, Slavic, and Turkish w ords that had become a part o f everyday speech over the past centuries. W ith these convictions in mind, he devised an artificial literary language, know n as katharevousa, which was to be adopted as the official language fo r governm ent and education in the future G reek state. R ig as Feraios is best known as a revolutionary w riter and agitator. Unlike K orais, he w rote in dem otic Greek, the spoken language o f his people. H is highly em otional and nationalistic ou d ook is expressed in his “ War H ym n,” w hich well illustrates the passionate feeling o f early Balkan nationalism. H o w long, m y heroes, shall w e live in bondage, alone, like lions on ridges, on peaks? L ivin g in caves, seeing our children turned from the land to bitter enslavement? L o sin g ou r land, brothers, and parents, o u r friends, our children, and all ou r relations? B etter an h our o f life that is free than forty years in slavery.1 1

Q u o te d in L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 14% (N ew York: R in eh a rt, 1958), p. 279.

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The first national revolutions T h e division on the question o f the standard literary language was to become and remain a m atter o f m ajor controversy and to have unfortunate repercus­ sions in G reek political life. Th e Serbian choice was to be different. T h e m etropolitanate at Sremski K arlovci in the H ab sbu rg M onarchy was the first m odern cultural center, and the church played a m ajor role in literary development. D u rin g the eigh ­ teenth century a close connection w as maintained w ith K iev and the Russian O rthodox institutions there. Russia, still the single O rthodox state not under foreign control, offered a greater attraction to the H absbu rg Serbs than the Greek- and O ttom an-dom inated Patriarchate. Because o f this situation and the fact that m any Serbian theological students w ere educated in K iev, a considerable num ber o f Russian w ords w ere incorporated into the literary language, w hich, it w ill be remembered, was Church Slavic. Th is so-called Serbian-Slavonic language, w hich was used by the church and the educated Serbs, did not conform either to the spoken idiom or to the standard form used elsewhere in the Balkan Slavic O rthodox w orld. It was nearly as artificial as katharevousa. Th e m ajor influence in diverting the language from this course was the w ork o f tw o scholars, Dositej O bradovic and V u k Karadzic, both o f w hom w rote in the vernacular. T h e greatest influence on the developm ent o f the literary language was exerted by Karadzic, w h o chose the dialect o f H erce­ govina as the standard form and compiled a grammar and a dictionary. Deeply interested in the Serbian cultural heritage, he also collected popular songs and poems. A s w e shall see, the Croatian writers w ere to adopt the same dialect, a choice that w ou ld facilitate greatly the Yugoslav m ovem ent o f the future. Th e selection o f the dialect that was to form the basis for the literary lan­ guage w as particularly significant fo r each Balkan Slavic people and was to have enorm ous political implications for the future. In all o f the national movements language was the m ost im portant attribute o f nationality. A l­ though it w as relatively easy to differentiate am ong Albanian-, Greek-, R o ­ m anian·, and Turkish-speaking people, the South Slav population presented certain m ajor problem s. F rom the A driatic, across the peninsula to the Black Sea and the A egean, the inhabitants spoke dialects that marked a gradual transition from C roatian and Serbian in the w est to Bulgarian in the east. The efforts o f scholars and politicians to divide these people by neat lines into Bulgarians, C roats, Serbs, and later M acedonians, w ith language as a ch ief consideration, was to lead to mutual recrimination and hatred in the future. Th e study o f history was also to have an im portant role in the national movements. W hereas a com m on language was regarded as the prim e deter­ m inant o f w hich people should form a state, their past history was seen as a m ajor factor deciding the territory they should occupy. T h e w ritin g o f the Transylvanian School o f historians and their emphasis on the prior and con ­ tinuous residence o f Rom anians in certain lands since ancient times has al­

177

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 ready been discussed. O ther writers representing their ow n national interests w ere to follow similar themes. A lthough descriptions o f the fall o f Constan­ tinople and the battle o f K o so vo m ight have the effect o f bringing the C hris­ tian people together, other episodes did not. A s historians delved into the pre-O ttom an era and revived the memories o f past glories, the overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions o f the medieval empires became obvious. When historic boundaries became a justification for national claims, sharp contro­ versies were inevitable. M any issues in more recent times also brought the Balkan people into conflict. T he entire question o f G reek and Phanariot in­ fluence in the eighteenth century was a troublesom e and divisive one. Both Rom anian and South Slav writers protested G reek privilege and power. A t this time Father Paisii, a m onk at M t. A thos, in an effort to protect his people against G reek pressure, w rote a highly nationalistic history o f Bulgaria in which he asserted that “ the Bulgarians were the most glorious o f all the Slavic nations, they were the first to have tsars, they were the first to have a patri­ arch, they w ere the first to be Christianized, they ruled over the greatest area.” 2 In the previous pages religion has been given as one o f the ch ief attributes o f nationality. T h e role o f the O rthodox establishment in preserving Chris­ tian identity has also been emphasized. In the future O rthodoxy w ould play an im portant role, especially in the struggle against the O ttom an and H abs­ burg em pires and in defining and dividing the Serbian and Croatian nation­ alities. H ow ever, the organization o f the national revolutions was to be pre­ dom inantly in the hands o f a secular leadership, particularly in the Ottoman lands. Som e elements in the church w ere to fight against these movements and prefer the retention o f the old order. Regrettably, the com m on O rthodox faith o f the Balkan nations never hindered them from engaging in bloody conflicts w ith each other. T h e three main determinants o f Balkan nationality - language, historical association, and religion - continue to be m ajor themes fo r the rest o f this book. These attributes became both the basis for the building o f the nation­ states and the reasons for som e o f the conflicts between them. T he fact that the nineteenth century was also an age o f national developm ent in Central E urope and Italy naturally fortified these currents w ithin the H absbu rg and O ttom an em pires. Som e political institutions were indeed to be imported from other parts o f Europe. T h e national revolutions themselves, however, had their origins prim arily in local conditions and past Balkan history. E u ­ ropean id eology was later used to explain o r justify the actions taken, but these ideas w ere not the cause o f the events themselves. In discussing the general ideological background to the revolutionary years, one other aspect is o f interest. In the next pages, in the accounts o f the revolts 2

Q u o te d in C harles A. M oser, A History o fBulgarian Literature, S6S-1944 (T he H ag u e: M outo n , 1972), p. 42.

The first national revolutions themselves, numerous examples are given o f the activities o f secret societies, some o f w hich had their headquarters in Constantinople, and o f propaganda activities carried on throughout the entire empire. T he question arises w h y the O ttom an authorities were so inept in m eeting this challenge and w hy they could not initiate an effort to com bat the ideological warfare. O ttom an officials did indeed make a large num ber o f arrests; executions o f conspirators and traitors were com mon. Nevertheless, the governm ent had few means either o f “ thought control” o r o f influencing the Balkan Christians in its favor. T h e organization o f the empire precluded to a large degree any such efforts. A s lon g as the Christian subject was prim arily under the influence o f the O rthodox church and the village community, the Porte had no means o f reaching him directly or individually. It was thus weakly equipped to deal with internal subversion o r to com bat ideas detrimental to its control.

Econom ic considerations One o f the m ajor elements contributing to the encouragement o f the national movements was the im provem ent o f general economic conditions, particu­ larly the commercial revival o f the eighteenth century. Despite the anarchy and lawlessness in some regions, trade between the O ttom an Em pire and Europe increased rapidly both by the Balkan overland routes and by sea. T he policies o f the H absbu rg Em pire and Russia contributed to creating favor­ able conditions for Balkan merchants and seafarers. A t the end o f the seven­ teenth century, the Treaty o f K arlow itz, on the H absburg initiative, not only had set the boundaries between A ustria and the O ttom an Em pire, but also had provided for trade between the signatories. The Ottoman-Habsburg border thereafter witnessed a steady rise in the exchange o f goods, especially in the im port o f raw materials and foodstuffs into the monarchy. A second im por­ tant influence on commerce came w ith the Russian conquest and settlement o f the lands north o f the Black Sea. Th is region became thereafter a m ajor grain-producing area. Its products were shipped by w ay o f Black Sea ports, particularly Odessa, through the Straits to Western Europe. Th is situation gave the Russian governm ent an economic as well as a strategic interest in the Straits. A lth ough trade between Russia and the Porte did not attain sig­ nificant proportions, the situation did develop to the benefit o f the Greeks. The Russian carrying trade was almost completely in the hands o f the Greek shipowners, w h o, by the terms o f the Treaty o f Kuchuk Kainarji, w ere al­ low ed to fly the Russian flag. A s in the previous period, international commerce remained the province o f the non-M uslim citizens o f the em pire, in particular the Greeks, A rm en i­ ans, and Jew s, but also other O rthodox Christians. T h eir advantageous p o ­ sition at the expense o f the M uslim s can be understood by reference to the relatively lo w standing o f the merchant in O ttom an society, where prestige and pow er w ere traditionally associated w ith landholding, the military, and 179

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 public office. T h e O ttom an ruling classes, when they invested money, usually preferred to place it in land o r in state-connected enterprises such as tax farm ­ ing o r the purchase o f lucrative administrative positions. Christian notables also made their fortunes in real estate and tax collection. Although the m er­ chant had a superior status in relation to the mass o f the population, the peasantry, he ranked below those w ith the real pow er in the state. A m on g the merchants, those engaged in international trade enjoyed cer­ tain advantages that did not pertain to those whose activities were limited to the O ttom an Em pire. Local trade and the supplying o f manufactured goods to the internal market were largely conducted by small merchants and crafts­ men, concentrated in the cities, w hose activities were tightly regulated by the guild system. T h e close control in effect here, however, was not applied to those w h o handled international or long-distance transport and trade. The vast possibilities in this field were exploited by an enterprising group w ho belonged neither to the top levels o f O ttom an society nor to the guilddom inated merchant and artisan class o f the towns. O rthodox Slavic and G reek merchants, as well as Jew s and Arm enians, w ere able to take full ad­ vantage o f the situation. T he O ttom an E m pire had, o f course, been trading w ith Europe since the sixteenth century. T he first commercial agreements, called capitulations, had been negotiated w ith France. Th ey o f necessity had to contain certain pro­ visions that were to the advantage o f the Europeans. M ost significant for the future w ere the regulations concerning extraterritoriality, which gave foreign consuls legal jurisdiction over their citizens. This arrangement had originally been made to meet the problem that a Christian merchant could not expect to receive a fair trial in an O ttom an court, where his evidence w ould not be admitted. T h is privilege, later flagrandy abused, served to remove many fo r­ eign citizens from all O ttom an police control. Nevertheless, without extra­ territoriality o r some similar measure, it w ould have been difficult for a E u ­ ropean to engage in trade in the empire. T he com mercial agreements had other stipulations that were to be o f great disadvantage to the empire. T he first pacts usually set the tariffs at the low rates o f 3 to 5 percent ad valorem. Agreem ents at this time and later hindered the O ttom an Em pire from adopting protectionist policies; the condition de­ pressed and discouraged native production. In the nineteenth century, as we shall see, all o f the great powers cooperated to maintain what was in fact an unequal commercial relationship. D espite the fact that European merchants were allowed to do business in the em pire, they were faced with obstacles. N o t only was there a great deal o f hostility to foreigners, but the Western Europeans did not understand either the local languages o r the methods used in conducting commercial affairs, including w ho should be bribed and how much. A s a result, foreign entrepreneurs had to depend on O ttom an intermediaries, who were usually O rthodox Greeks. These agents were called dragom en, just as were those 180

The first national revolutions w h o served the Porte in similar functions. A great deal o f corruption sur­ rounded all com mercial transactions, and the foreign consulates were deeply involved. T h e consuls w ere em powered to issue to O ttom an subjects papers, known as berats, that exem pted them from local taxes and legal jurisdiction. These men could then enjoy the advantages o f the capitulations. In addition, many consulates fo r a fee w ou ld grant citizenship o f their states. A n example o f the extreme abuse o f this system was to be found in the D anubian Princi­ palities, w here thousands o f people, many o f w hom were Russian refugees, were able to claim Austrian citizenship. T h e G reeks’ m onopoly o f the position o f commercial agent was paralleled by the strong hold o f these people on all the enterprises connected w ith the sea. T h ey dom inated the positions from shipowner and shipbuilder to com ­ m on sailor. Greeks manned the vessels o f all o f the trading nations; they w ere the m ajor grou p from which the O ttom an navy recruited its sailors. A fter French shipping was driven from the M editerranean during the N apoleonic Wars, and the activities o f the other powers w ere severely reduced, G reek ships had alm ost com plete control o f the carrying trade. The increased commercial activity in the Near East reflected certain changes in Western Europe that were to be o f great advantage to Balkan agricultural interests. E urope was in a period o f econom ic upsurge; this region, England in particular, was on the eve o f the great transform ation that was to take place with the industrial revolution. B oth Western and Central E urope w ere soon to feel an increasing need for Balkan products, including raw materials for their factories and food to feed the grow in g city populations. T h e market was to be particularly g o o d fo r such items as cotton and m aize; livestock and animal products w ere always in demand. M o st o f the produce fo r this market was to come from small peasant farms. The chiftlik estates, however, also shared in the benefits o f the new com m er­ cial conditions. These estates, as w e have seen, were concentrated in the river valleys, along the seacoasts, and near m ajor trading centers. In theory, they should have been better able to exploit the situation, but in fact they never developed sufficiently to becom e the m ajor source o f goods for the interna­ tional market. T h e units remained small, usually from fifteen to thirty acres in size, and new methods o f scientific farm ing were not introduced. Sharecropping continued to be the regular basis o f production. In their international transactions the Balkan merchants im ported m anu­ factured goods and colonial products, such as spices, w oolen cloth, glass, watches, guns, and gunpow der. In return they exported oil, raisins, w ax, silk, wool, tobacco, timber, cotton, wheat, com , and animal products such as salted meat, leather, and livestock. T he distribution o f such goods w ithin the B al­ kans was also prim arily in the hands o f non-M uslim merchants, in particular the Greeks, Tsintsars, Serbs, and Bulgarians. T he bulk o f these wares were bought and sold in the city markets or at regular fairs held along the trading routes. M ost o f the m ajor Balkan towns had a considerable population o f 181

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 merchants engaged in long-distance trade or acting as agents in com mercial transactions. Since Greeks played such a prominent role in them, m any cities came to have a high percentage o f Greeks among the population, even though the countryside m ight be inhabited by another nationality. Trade w ithin the Balkans and over the frontiers was severely hampered by the poor com m unications and the lack o f internal improvements. R o ad s were not adequately maintained, nor were waterways improved. M o st go od s had to be transported by water o r by pack animal - horse, mule, donkey, o r even camel. T h e advantage o f this latter m ode was that any track o r trail could be used. O ld R om an routes were regularly employed. Since the countryside was not safe, w ith both Christian and M uslim outlaws abounding, the m erchant had to travel w ith armed guards and preferably in a caravan. A large num ber o f the Balkan inhabitants, often M uslim , w ere regularly em ployed as m ule­ teers, packers, and armed guards for merchant caravans. T h e m ajor trade routes o f the peninsula remained much the same as they had been in ancient tim es; they extended both east to west and north to south. T h e great road remained, running from Constantinople to Plovdiv, Sofia, NiS, Belgrade, and then to the H absburg lands, w ith a branch also go in g from Ni§ to the great port o f Thessaloniki (see M ap 16). Trade also passed from the A driatic coast, from ports such as Split (Spalato), D urres, and D ubrovnik, to inland cities such as Sarajevo, N o vi Pazar, and Belgrade. A m ajor trade route in the D anubian Principalities went from the D anube to Bucharest and then over the mountains to Bra§ov in Transylvania. T h e cities along these lines o f com m unication were well prepared to receive the m er­ chants and their animals; inns, called bans, were maintained at regular inter­ vals along the roads. O rthodox merchants similarly predominated in Balkan-related commerce w ithin the H ab sbu rg Em pire. A fter the signing o f the Treaty o f K arlow itz m ost o f this trade m oved along the inland routes. O n ly tow ard the end o f the eighteenth century and the beginning o f the nineteenth could the m on­ archy exploit its new ly acquired Dalmatian territory o r begin to develop the port o f Trieste. A lth ough the H absburg government attempted to adhere to mercantilistic policies, which called fo r a surplus o f exports over im ports, these principles could not be applied to the Balkan area. It has been estimated that in 1779 the ratio o f overland imports to exports was 5:1. T h e main prob ­ lem was that the im poverished Balkan region was a poor market fo r A ustria’s m anufactured luxury goods, nor did it need the grain that the H absbu rg E m pire also exported. In contrast, there was a steady H ab sbu rg dem and for Balkan raw materials, such as cotton, w ool, tobacco, timber, and livestock. T h e merchants, usually O rthodox, w h o were engaged in these com mercial ventures w ere subjects o f the m onarchy and principally Serb o r G reek in nationality. Like their equivalents in the Ottoman territories, they w ere in a go o d position to study local conditions, and they had agents in the Balkans.

182

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887

MEDIT ER RAN EAN

SEA

Map 16. The Ottoman Balkans, 1815

These O rthodox merchants form ed an im portant part o f the population o f Vienna and other H absbu rg cities. It has been estimated that by the middle o f the eighteenth century there were eighteen thousand Serbian, G reek, and Tsintsar merchants in the monarchy, living in the highest concentration along the border between the tw o em pires.3 3

I

Jo h n R . L am pe an d M arvin R . Jackson, Balkan Economic History, isso-ipso (B loom ington: In d ian a U niversity Press, 1982), p. 60.

184

The first national revolutions Th us, w ithin both the H absburg and the O ttom an states, the control o f international trade was held by certain limited groups o f the population; in the O ttom an E m pire almost all foreign trade was in non-M uslim hands. A l­ though there was some concern in Austria about the situation, there was no practical alternative. T he Eastern trade was profitable and necessary. In the H ab sbu rg E m pire neither the enserfed peasantry nor the landed nobility had the talent o r inclination to enter the business w orld. A s in the O ttom an E m ­ pire, these groups preferred to invest in land. In the Balkans the M uslim population was indeed engaged in com merce, but usually only as small local traders, shopkeepers, and artisans, although there were some M uslim m er­ chants engaged in long-distance trade within the em pire, and some active in the Black Sea ports. The O ttom an attitude tow ard foreigners, how ever, and the lim ited know ledge o f foreign languages were handicaps. T h e existence o f a large num ber o f Balkan O rthodox people engaged in trade in the O ttom an Em pire —and it m ust be remem bered that the numbers include muleteers, porters, sailors, and others on the low er levels o f these undertakings — was to have a definite effect on the political evolution o f the Balkans. A lth ou gh their num bers were small in com parison to the peasant population, merchants and their associates occupied crucial positions, and they traveled around. Som e o f these men were well satisfied w ith O ttom an conditions. T h e low tariffs encouraged trade; the O ttom an governm ent did not impede o r regulate international commerce. There were no m ajor bar­ riers to m ovem ent w ithin the empire. E ven the corruption o f the system offered som e advantages. W ith sufficient m oney it was possible to accomplish almost anything. M an y operated efficiendy in this atmosphere, and those w h o benefited from the situation naturally sought to maintain it. In contrast, others in the merchant com m unity were deeply dissatisfied. Som e internal conditions were not conducive to trade. T he merchant suffered from the poor roads and the unim proved waterways, and the disorder and anarchy in the countryside made his business dangerous. H e could benefit from a governm ent that w ould maintain adequate police forces and guaran­ tee law and order. M o st im portant, he was almost com pletely w ithout p ro ­ tection abroad. W hereas European consuls were resident in almost all the m ajor O ttom an trading centers, the Porte maintained no similar offices in other countries to assist its citizens. The em pire thus did not offer protection and encouragem ent to its m erchant class; it merely placed no particular hindrances o r limitations on their activities. Because o f their travels and their residence in foreign cities, the merchants were in a go o d position to com pare systems o f governm ent. T h e w ide differ­ ences between conditions in the O ttom an Em pire and those in E uro pe were m ost apparent to them. M oreover, many, particularly the Greeks, were well educated. T h eir travels brought them into contact w ith Europeans w ith sim i­ lar interests, and they were thus enabled to become acquainted with current political doctrines. T h e ideas connected with the French R evolution were to 185

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 prove particularly attractive to individuals w h o felt oppressed and restrained by the O ttom an system, o r w h o felt that the governm ent was backward and tyrannical. Th ose w h o had not made a success o f their undertakings were m ost likely to be attracted by revolutionary ideology. Certain o f the future leaders o f the national liberation movements were direcdy affected by their com mercial backgrounds, either as members o f overseas merchant com m u­ nities o r sim ply as livestock dealers crossing between the tw o empires.

Th e Eastern Q uestion T h e solution o f Balkan and O ttom an problems was infinitely com plicated by the fact that in the nineteenth century this region became a m ajor center o f great-pow er conflict, and the fate o f the area became intim ately linked with the maintenance o f the European balance o f pow er (see M ap 17). Th e entire cluster o f issues surrounding the decline o f the O ttom an Em pire, the revolt o f the subject people, and the European intervention became known as the Eastern Q uestion. This problem was to become the single m ost important cause for diplom atic controversy am ong the powers and was to lead to the only tw o general wars in the century after the C ongress o f V ienna — the Crim ean War and World War I. T h e question that must be answered first is w hy this area was so important to the m ajor European governm ents. Certainly Britain, Russia, Austria, and France, to be joined by Germ any and Italy after their national unifications, all had com peting and vital interests involved in the fate o f the region. M any o f the m ajor issues had already arisen in the eighteenth century. A t that time Russia and A ustria, usually in alliance, extended their frontiers at the expense o f the O ttom an Em pire until the Russian boundary reached the Pruth and the Austrian the D anube-Sava line. D u rin g this period France usually stood fo r the integrity o f the em pire, since it wielded the greatest influence in C o n ­ stantinople; Britain at first did not play a m ajor role in the conflict. T h e first pow er to shift its attitude radically was the H ab sbu rg Em pire. In the Treaty o f Vienna, as w e have seen, that governm ent acquired the D al­ matian coast as w ell as a predom inant position in the Italian peninsula and among the German states. Thereafter, the Habsburg statesmen ceased to work actively tow ard the incorporation o f any more Balkan people into the empire; they had difficulty enough controlling the m ultinational population they al­ ready held. A lth ough the H absbu rg governm ent remained in alliance with R ussia, it sought to restrain any advance o f its partner in the E ast because it/ could take no com pensating benefits. Austrian leaders were well aware o f the advantages that Russia enjoyed am ong the O rthodox people, and they feared that a further extension o f Russian territory o r influence w ould endanger A ustrian security on the eastern and southeastern frontiers. H absbu rg diplo­ macy in the first h alf o f the nineteenth century was thus to become passive. 186

Thefirst national revolutions

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SEA

Map 17. Europe in 1815

Where possible, restraints were placed on the activities o f other powers, but Austrian diplomats were no longer in the forefront o f negotiations. The form er H absburg position was now taken by G reat Britain, which, as we have seen, had become actively concerned in O ttom an affairs only at the end o f the eighteenth century. Previously the state had been engrossed in the duel for em pire with France. A fter its victory over its rival and the acquisition o f India, the British governm ent gave its m ajor attention to the protection o f its vast colonial dom ains and the commercial routes to the East. These lines o f com munication ran direcdy through the O ttom an territories. T he situation became even m ore serious with the developm ent o f steam transport and the opening o f the Suez Canal in 1869. With the weakening o f France, Britain regarded Russia as the ch ief threat to its w orld position. Britain’s constant fear was that the Russian army w ould inflict a fatal defeat on the O ttom an Em pire, which w ould be follow ed by the collapse o f that state and

187

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 the establishment o f Russian domination in the Balkan peninsula and at the Straits. T h e apparent Russian menace had an Asiatic perspective. D u rin g the nine­ teenth century Russia not only absorbed the Caucasus area, but extended control over the Central Asian steppelands and the three khanates o f K hiva, Bokhara, and Kokand. The Russian border by 1885 thus reached that o f Britishprotected Afghanistan. Russian advances in the Far E ast at the expense o f China were also seen w ith apprehension in London. W ith points o f conflict running from the Pacific to the Mediterranean, it can be understood w h y British diplom ats watched the Russian moves w ith such care. M oreover, the key to the entire situation appeared to lie in Constantinople and the Turkish Straits. Because o f these concerns, the British governm ent supported the m ainte­ nance o f the O ttom an Em pire and its continued dom ination over its wide territories. T h e alternative appeared to be an inevitable Russian control o f the region, in particular o f the Balkans and the Straits. This policy, together w ith its continued enthusiasm for colonial expansion, placed the British g o v­ ernm ent in a contradictory position. At home, where liberal victories resulted in an ever-w idening franchise, and on the Continent, where Britain usually joined w ith France in opposing the conservative powers, support was given to national and liberal movements. In contrast, in their ow n colonial posses­ sions and in the Eastern Q uestion, the British leaders follow ed quite different policies. A lth ough they always encouraged efforts to reform the Ottoman adm inistration, movements that had as their objective the dissolution o f the em pire were usually firmly discouraged. D espite the defeat o f N apoleon, France continued to pursue an active pol­ icy in the M editerranean, but with the major attention directed tow ard N orth A frica and Syria, and not Constantinople and the Balkans. In the M editer­ ranean region, seen as a w hole, the chief French opponent remained Britain, w hose fleet controlled the waters o f that sea. H ow ever, in the m ore restricted area o f the A egean and Black seas, the French governm ent could cooperate w ith the British in opposing a Russian advance. French policy, in fact, pre­ served a great deal o f freedom o f action. When France’s interests were served, its diplom ats could support the maintenance o f the O ttom an Em pire. They had, how ever, the alternative o f agreeing to a partition and o f taking E gypt, Syria, and A lgeria, areas to which claims had already been staked out. A s can be seen, although the policies o f Britain, France, and A ustria often conflicted in the N ear East, all were extremely apprehensive about Russian actions. It had certainly been clear throughout the eighteenth century that the Russian governm ent did have definite territorial goals, all o f which could be achieved only at O ttom an expense. From the reign o f Peter the Great onw ard, an active policy o f expansion in the Black Sea region had been fol­ lowed. B y the end o f the eighteenth century, not only had the lands north o f that sea been taken, including the Crimea, but Russia was deeply involved in

188

The first national revolutions the affairs o f the O rthodox Balkan people, in particular the Greeks, Serbs, M ontenegrins, and, o f course, the Rom anians in the D anubian Principalities. Before 1812 the tsarist governm ent had considered annexing the Rom anian provinces, but had limited itself to the acquisition o f Bessarabia. In the nineteenth century the Russian governm ent was to retain the advan­ tages in Balkan affairs that it had enjoyed previously. Russian armies w ere in a position to menace C onstantinople, and, as w e have seen, the Balkan people did in fact offer a potential source o f support. Som e groups always called for Russian intervention. Should the Russian statesmen wish to exploit O ttom an weakness, they could usually count on Balkan allies. O ther considerations, however, tended to take precedence and to limit se­ verely any tem ptation to pursue a forw ard policy in the area. In com parison w ith the West, Russia was a backward state. T h rou ghou t the nineteenth cen­ tury, w hen Western and Central E urope were undergoing a period o f rapid econom ic transform ation w ith the industrial revolution, Russian develop­ ment lagged behind. A lthough Russian armies were large in size, they were not particularly effective on the batdefield. The repeated victories w o n against the weak O ttom an em pire were not easily achieved. T h e Russian borders w ere also long and difficult to defend. T he great fear o f the governm ent th roughout the century was that the adoption o f an adventurous course in the Eastern Q uestion w ould lead to the form ation o f a European coalition and a crushing m ilitary defeat. This possibility, which became a reality in the m iddle o f the century, constandy hampered Russian actions. Fortunately fo r Russian interests, the governm ent had alternatives to war by w hich it could achieve diplom atic suprem acy in the N ear East. I f the destruction o f the O ttom an Em pire were abandoned as a goal, Russia could instead adopt a policy o f alliance, and through close cooperation control and supervise the actions o f the weaker partner. A lready Russian-O ttom an m ili­ tary actions had been undertaken during the N apoleonic Wars. Th e occupa­ tion and subsequent administration o f the Ionian Islands had been a joint venture. Should this course o f action be chosen, the Russian governm ent o f course could not actively support Balkan revolutionary movements. It too w ould have to counsel the O rthodox population to accept the situation, a policy that was often neither effective nor popular. T he Russian statesmen, how ever, had already discovered a partial solution to this dilemma. A s w e have seen, in the treaties dealing w ith the D anubian Principalities, provisions had been inserted enabling the Russian governm ent to supervise the internal political conditions o f the provinces. In Article V I I I o f the Treaty o f Bucharest o f 1812, similar stipulations gave St. Petersburg a tight to interfere in Serbian affairs. There w ere, in addition, the numerous vague provisions in other treaties dealing w ith the protection o f O rthodox Christianity. W ith these religious and political rights o f protection, Russian officials could both w ield great influence in Constantinople and also w in fa­ vor am ong the Balkan peoples. T h ey could exert their pow er to gain reform s 189

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 see, to break dow n in crises involving the Balkans. In this area Prussia had no direct interests, and Austrian and Russian aims were often in open con­ flict. D espite the conservative stance o f all o f the m ajor pow ers, revolutionary m ovem ents continued to gain strength and to disrupt international affairs. R evolts took place in som e German states, in Italy, and in Spain and her colonial possessions. T h e events in Central E urope and Italy w ere particularly dam aging to Austrian interests. H absburg foreign policy was under the di­ rection o f one o f the m ost able diplomats o f the time, Clem ens von Metternich. W inning over the tsar to his view s, he was able to im plem ent a policy that called fo r m ilitary intervention wherever a legitimate m onarch had been overthrow n o r was threatened by revolutionary activity. U n d er this program Austrian armies marched into Italy and put dow n revolts in the K in gd om o f the Tw o Sicilies and Sardinia in 1821; French troops undertook the same mis­ sion in Spain in 1823. A lth ough Britain, and later France, w ithdrew from the Continental coali­ tion, Russia, A ustria, and Prussia remained joined in an alignm ent that not only stood for opposition to revolutions, but also favored positive measures fo r their suppression. F o r Alexander I “ the revolution” had become a truly m enacing presence. B y the time o f the opening o f the C ongress o f Laibach (Ljubljana) in 1821, w hich had been called to deal w ith Italian affairs, the tsar was convinced o f the existence o f an international revolutionary committee, w ith headquarters in Paris, which organized revolutions throughout Europe and engaged in constant intrigue and agitation. Both the national and the liberal bases o f m ost o f the revolts did in fact constitute a direct threat to the three conservative regimes. It can thus be seen w hy Russia and the H absburg E m pire, the tw o states immediately adjacent to the Balkan O ttom an prov­ inces, were strongly against change by revolutionary, violent means, and why they were com m itted to the defense o f the status quo in international rela­ tions.

T h e revolutionary situation in the Balkans In the previous pages the general background to the first Balkan revolutions has been examined. It would, however, be a mistake to assign too much importance to elements that were in some ways extraneous to the everyday experiences o f the average Balkan inhabitant. A lthough E uropean ideology, the revival o f national consciousness am ong the intellectuals, the rise o f an O rthodox merchant class, and the com peting goals o f the great powers in the N ear E ast all play a role in our story, the immediate causes o f the first revolts lay rather in the internal conditions in the peninsula, almost all o f w hich had arisen in the eighteenth century. First in importance was the o b ­ vious failure o f the O ttom an governm ent to maintain law and order in the countryside and to control the unruly and brigand elements, both Christian 192

The first national revolutions and M uslim . T h is situation forced peaceful Christian as well as M uslim p o p ­ ulations to organize in their ow n defense. Local centers o f governm ent thus arose, w hich in turn com m anded the loyalty and obedience o f the inhabi­ tants. Th e breakdow n o f central authority resulted not only in the form ation o f alternate political centers, but in the prevalence in m any regions o f armed bands, legal and illegal, w ith often com peting interests and jurisdictions. The activities o f the ayans, kirdzhalis, illegal janissaries, bandits, and Bosnian captains have been m entioned before. To these m ust be added the legal or quasi-legal form ations o f the armatoles, the police forces o f the municipal authorities o r the notables, the legal janissary units, the Serbs o f the M ilitary Frontier, and a Wallachian militia know n as the pandours. A large proportion o f the Balkan population was armed and had military experience, not so much as part o f a regular army as in guerilla fighting. Local armies com manded by a native officer corps could thus be raised in times o f crisis. Local Balkan leaders also had a keen awareness o f the use that could be made o f the com peting great powers. A lthough after 1812 no European g o v ­ ernment wished to be faced w ith an Eastern crisis, Balkan revolutionaries continued to expect outside intervention. A s w e shall see, Russian aid was often assumed. A lthough there was much rhetoric on the subject, both then and since, there were few signs o f any deep affection linking the Balkan people to any European state. D espite the O rthodox connection, Balkan leaders reg­ ularly sought French, Austrian, and even British soldiers and money, as well as Russian. T h ey w ere grateful for any assistance received, but they did not intend to recompense this aid with political privileges unless it proved abso­ lutely necessary. Nevertheless, the fact that the revolutionaries w ere w illing to gam ble w ith great-pow er politics and to sum m on European assistance could create a dangerous situation.

THE SERBIAN REVOLUTION The conditions just described were all present in the pashalik o f Belgrade, which became the first center for a successful Balkan national revolution (see M ap 19). T h is border province contained a population o f around 368,000 prior to 1804,4 and a high percentage o f the people were experienced fighters. It w ill be rem em bered that during the w ar between the H absbu rg and the Ottoman em pires, w hich was concluded by the Treaty o f Sistova in 1791, Serbian Freicorps under their ow n officers had fought on the Austrian side. D espite these services, the Serbs received no gains in the peace agreement. General disillusionm ent subsequendy prevailed over the hope o f w in nin g ad­ vantages by cooperation w ith the monarchy. T h e goal o f the Serbian leader4

V lad im ir D ed ijer e t al., History o f Yugoslavia^ trans. K ordija K veder (N ew York: M cG raw H ill, 1975), p. 263.

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887

Map 19. The expansion of Serbia, 1804-19«

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The first national revolutions ship at this time was to reestablish peace and security in the countryside and achieve, i f possible, the recognition by the Porte o f certain local autonom ous rights. Sultan Selim III had a similar desire for tranquility in his lands. N o t only had he been defeated by foreign armies, but in domestic affairs his rule was continually challenged by rebellious ayans and janissaries. It was certainly to his interest to conciliate his Christian subjects. Therefore, in 1791, 1792, and 1794 he issued firmans in which he acceded to many o f the Serbian wishes; the relationship between the Porte and the Serbian population was better defined, and some autonom ous rights were guaranteed. T he Serbs w ere to collect their ow n taxes; they w ere to have the right to bear arms and organize a m ilitia; assurances w ere given that measures w ou ld be taken to lim it the abuses in the conditions o f landholding on the chiftliks. In addition, the sultan appointed to local positions men w h o were given the task o f concili­ ating the Serbs and suppressing the unruly elements. It w ill be remembered that at this tim e the Porte, under Russian pressure, had made similar prom ­ ises o f autonom ous rights to the Principalities. T he grave weakness in this arrangement was that the Porte was in no p o ­ sition to fulfill its pledges. T he unsetding element in Serbian affairs w as, as elsewhere, the janissary corps. T he O ttom an governm ent had previously adopted a policy o f sending these men out into the provinces to remove them as a source o f trouble in Constantinople. In the Serbian lands, as in other areas, they proved im possible for the local O ttom an authorities to control. They w ere a menace in the countryside, where they seized lands and villages and established chiftlik estates on which conditions were much w orse fo r the peasant than under the traditional landholders. Th e janissary actions were bitterly opposed not only by the Christians, but by the legal, established M uslim population o f governm ent officials, merchants, and sipahis. In 1791, as part o f the reforms to be made in the pashalik, the O ttom an governm ent decided that the janissaries w ould be prevented from returning to Belgrade. T he H absbu rg army had occupied the city until the end o f the war, so at the time there were naturally no janissaries in residence. They, however, w ere determ ined not to accept this decision, and they were in an excellent position to defy the sultan. Their ally was Pasvanoglu, the pasha o f Vidin, w h o was successfully resisting O ttom an authority. T h e rebel ayan, o f course, wanted his janissary supporters back in Belgrade, where they could aid him. W ith the support o f Pasvanoglu and kirdjali forces, the janissaries launched an attack on Belgrade in the spring o f 1797. M eeting the danger o f the rebellious janissaries and im plem enting the po l­ icy o f conciliating the Christians were the responsibilities o f H adji M ustafa Pasha, the pasha o f Belgrade. Probably o f G reek descent, M ustafa had a fa­ vorable attitude tow ard the Serbs and approved o f the concessions that had been m ade to them. A t this time the Serbs w ere able to form a militia o f

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 fifteen thousand men, which gave them control o f the strongest single armed unit in the pashalik, and they were able to defend Belgrade successfully. The O ttom an policies also led to an increase in cooperation between the Serbian local leaders. A front was thus formed between the O ttom an officials and the Christians against the lawless ayans and their associates. A t first, the measures taken by the Porte proved successful. Th e supporters o f Pasvanoglu met defeat everywhere, and by 1798 he was under siege in his fortress at Vidin. H ow ever, this was also the year when N apoleon launched his invasion o f E gypt. W ith only limited troops at his disposal, Selim was forced to w ithdraw his forces on the Danube to meet the new danger. The action proved to be a disaster for the Serbs. The Porte was com pelled to make terms w ith the M uslim rebels; Pasvanoglu was recognized as governor o f Vidin. Even worse, the janissaries were allowed to return to Belgrade, al­ though they were required to respect the authority o f H adji M ustafa Pasha. T h e inevitable then happened. Once entrenched in the pashalik, the janissar­ ies m oved to take full pow er into their ow n hands, and H ad ji M ustafa was killed. A period o f chaos followed. Although the control o f the province was in the hands o f the rebellious elements, they quarreled am ong themselves. Nevertheless, Pasvanoglu and his janissary allies were clearly m ore pow erful than the local O ttom an officials and the Serbs. In 1802 four janissary leaders, called dahis from their rank in the corps, rose to predom inant power. T he janissaries were able to take over control in the countryside. A gain their actions were extremely dam aging, not only to the Christians, but also to the loyal and peaceful Muslim population and the legal authorities. Nevertheless, despite the violent and destructive behavior o f the janissaries, m any M uslim s opposed granting concessions to the Serbs o r co­ operating w ith Christians, since they had no faith in Christian loyalty to the empire. Faced w ith a reign o f terror and unable to gain protection from the legal authorities, the Serbian population was forced to act in its ow n defense. A rm ed units w ere organized throughout the country. F o r the future the most im portant center o f resistance was that established in the Sum adija under the leadership o f the local notable and livestock trader Karadjordje Petrovic. B y the spring o f 1804 he had thirty thousand men ready for combat. Th e actual beginning o f the revolt was occasioned by the dahis’ plans to massacre the Serbian leaders. Convinced that they were faced by a rebellion, the janissaries decided to act first. In January and February they killed per­ haps as m any as 150 men. T h e Serbian population was thus forced to take measures o f self-defense. A t first there was no central leadership; the revolt took the form o f a spontaneous response to janissary atrocities. H ow ever, in February about three hundred notables gathered in OraSac in Central S u ­ madija and chose Karadjordje as their leader. A t this time there was no o p­ position to the nom ination o f a single commander. A fter M ay 1804 K ara­ djordje signed his proclamations with such tides as “ Suprem e Vojvoda” and

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The first national revolutions “Leader.” Given the dangerous situation o f the time, the Serbian notables accepted the necessity of establishing a strong authority. Although the Serbs were in revolt, it is important to note that they were in rebellion not against the sultan, but against the janissaries who were them­ selves defying the Porte. Throughout this period the Serbian leaders contin­ ued to negotiate with the Ottoman government. The Serbian objectives re­ mained consistent during this first period of rebellion. They sought simply the implementation of the firmans that Selim had already granted, and they thus merely desired that the Porte assure them o f the fulfillment of promises already made. Their aim was to rid their land o f the dahis, not to gain inde­ pendence, although the firmans, if put into effect, would indeed have given them many autonomous rights. Limitations would have been placed on the Turkish presence in the pashalik. The Serbs wished to make certain that the janissaries would indeed be expelled and their ownership of rural property terminated. In addition, they themselves wanted to provide the military forces needed in the province; the Ottoman troops were to leave. They also insisted that the tribute and other taxes be levied and collected by Serbian officials. Once again the Serbs won the approval and support o f the central govern­ ment. Not only were their forces successful in the field, but the sultan ap­ pointed Abu Bekir, the vezir of Bosnia, as pasha o f Belgrade, with instruc­ tions to crush the janissaries. In August 1804 the dahi forces were defeated and the four leaders executed. With the elimination of this danger, conditions could be expected to improve in the province. In fact, little had been settled. The pashalik was still the scene of a three-cornered conflict among, first, the janissaries, who were still in residence; second, the pasha and the traditional Muslim elements; and, finally, the Serbs. The balance was soon upset. Once again the janissaries refused to accept the authority of the Ottoman officials. In the winter and spring of 1805 they laid waste to the countryside, and they secured the deposition of Abu Bekir. Meanwhile, the Serbian leadership had gained in power and self-confidence. It had succeeded in organizing military forces that had won victories, and there was no intention of retreating. Moreover, it was decided that foreign assistance should be sought. Attempts were thus made to secure aid from both St. Petersburg and Vienna; a delegation was sent to Russia in 1804. What the Serbian leaders desired was some sort of a great-power guarantee for their autonomy. By this time, it will be remembered, Russia was acting as guarantor in the Danubian Principalities, and the Ionian Islands were un­ der joint Russian and Ottoman protection. This issue was, however, very sensitive for the Porte. It naturally opposed granting any outside power a means by which it could interfere in internal Ottoman affairs. In addition to attempting to secure outside aid, the Serbian leaders tried to gain the support o f other Balkan Christians, in particular their brother Serbs living in Bosnia, Montenegro, and Hercegovina. The events in the

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 pashalik w ere, o f course, follow ed w ith intense interest by the Serbs living across the border in the H ab sbu rg lands. A s had happened regularly in the past, the disturbances in the pashalik caused thousands o f refugees to flee into Austrian territories. D espite the efforts o f the H absburg authorities to prevent the crossing o f the frontier, Serbian groups had litde difficulty in m ovin g freely across the boundary in both directions. Selim thus once again faced a crisis. T h e janissaries were anything but obedient subjects, but the Serbs presented what might become an even greater danger to the interests o f the em pire as a whole. In the past many influential M uslim s had always argued against concessions to the Christians; these con­ servative circles were also com badng the sultan’s attempts at m ilitary reform. Fearin g Christian rebellion as well as M uslim opposition, Selim reversed his policy. Instead o f conciliating the Serbs, he decided to suppress them. Hafiz Pasha, the governor o f NiS, was ordered to march against them. In A ugust 1805 the first m ajor clash between Serbian troops and a regular O ttom an army took place. T h e Serbian victory marks the commencement o f the Serbian revolution in the real sense o f the w ord. In this battle the Serbs fought not against a M uslim rebel force, but against the sultan’s troops. T h e Serbian m ilitary victories continued. In N ovem ber 1805 the fortress o f Sm ederevo fell; it became the first capital o f the rebel governm ent. Belgrade was captured in D ecem ber 1806. T h e Serbian peasant soldiers had thus been able to take con­ trol o f the entire pashalik. D espite their m ilitary successes, the Serbian leadership remained w illing to negotiate w ith the Porte on the previous terms. Efforts, meanwhile, contin­ ued to obtain Russian o r Austrian intervention. Th e Serbian position was much im proved in the summer o f 1806 when w ar recommenced between R ussia and the O ttom an Em pire. B oth sides had need o f Serbian support. E ven before the fighting was renewed, the Porte, fearing the probability o f hostilities w ith Russia, was w illing to make concessions. It n ow agreed to the entire Serbian program , including the removal o f the janissaries and the use o f local troops to garrison Serbian fortresses and the frontier. Although the O ttom an governm ent was w illing to offer what amounted to full auton­ omy, the question remained whether any agreement w ould be kept once the Russian danger passed. M oreover, the Serbs had an alternate offer. Previously, their requests for aid had been regularly rejected in Vienna. Th e Serbian delegation sent to R ussia in 1804 had received a similar negative reception. A lthough its mem­ bers had held a m eeting w ith the Russian foreign minister, Prince Adam C zartoryski, in N ovem ber, he had advised them to negotiate w ith the Porte. A t that time Russia was pursuing a policy o f cooperation with the Ottoman governm ent, but by 1806 the situation had entirely changed. O nce at war w ith the Porte, the Russian governm ent welcom ed Balkan assistance, as it had in the past w hen it had regularly called upon the Christians for support

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The first national revolutions during the invasions of Ottoman territory. At this time, a Russian army was in the Principalities; a fleet was cruising in the Adriatic, and, in cooperation with the Montenegrins, Russian troops were in occupation of the ports o f Kotor and Budva. Serbia could form a link among the areas of operation. In June 1807 a Russian emissary, M arquis F. O . Paulucci, arrived in B el­ grade. H is instructions were to assess the situation and to see w hat the Serbs needed. H e was not authorized to negotiate a regular agreement. N everthe­ less, in June he proceeded to conclude a form al convention. Its terms not only provided for Russian assistance to the Serbian rebels, but assured that Russian influence w ou ld remain strong in the future. T h e first article o f the agreement read: “ T h e Serbian people m ost hum bly beg H .I.M . to appoint a capable governor w h o w ill bring order to the people, administer the Serbian land, and devise a constitution in consonance w ith the customs o f the people. T he prom ulgation o f the constitution should be done in the name o f H .I.M . Alexander the First.” 5 Russian advisers and military garrisons w ere also to be sent. In accepting the terms o f this agreement, the Serbs had made a clear choice. Faced w ith the alternatives o f agreeing to the O ttom an offer o f an autono­ mous status o r o f join in g Russia and fighting for full independence, they had decided on the second course o f action. T h ey had no means o f know ing that the negotiations did not have the approval o f St. Petersburg. U nfortunately for the Serbs, the w ron g decision had been made. T he acceptance o f the Russian alliance in Belgrade coincided almost exactly w ith the m eeting o f Napoleon and Alexander I at Tilsit. H ere the tw o emperors concluded a treaty settling m ost o f the m ajor controversies that divided them. In this agreement N apoleon undertook to attempt to negotiate an armistice between Russia and the O ttom an Em pire. Certainly the pact precluded any m ajor Russian effort to support the Serbian rebels. In A ugu st 1807 Russia and the O ttom an Em pire concluded the armistice o f Slobozia. A lthough Alexander did not approve its terms, tw o years o f uneasy peace follow ed. T he ultimate fate o f the Serbian revolution now rested on the course o f international events and also on the concurrent political struggle that was taking place in C onstanti­ nople. A fter 1807 the fortunes o f the revolution steadily declined. N o t only was the fate o f Serbia increasingly dependent on the relations between the great powers, but a split occurred in the Serbian leadership. A s w e have seen, Karadjordje had been chosen to head the rebel forces at the beginning o f the revolt. H e remained the outstanding figure during this period even though he had to face increasing opposition. T he Serbian leader had been born in the Sum adija, probably in 1768. H is family, w hich was poor, em igrated to the 5

M ichael B o ro P etro v ich , A History o fModem Serbia, 1804.— 1918, 2 vols. (N ew York. H a rc o u rt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), I, 54- 55·

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 Vojvodina. D uring the Austro-Turkish w ar Karadjordje became a mem ber o f the Freicorps and fought in western Serbia. Once peace was restored, he returned to the Sum adija, where he became a livestock merchant. H e en­ gaged in trade over the border w ith the monarchy. H e also joined the na­ tional militia that Selim III had authorized, and became an officer. H e had thus acquired considerable practical military experience before the Serbian revolt. A lth ough he held the title o f supreme com mander o f the revolution­ ary troops, Karadjordje was only one o f many such m ilitary men in Serbia. In their ow n districts similar local leaders held prestige and power. These men were anxious to protect their personal positions, and they w ere jealous o f any single central authority. These local loyalties naturally hindered Karadjordje. In addition to orga­ nizing the m ilitary effort against the O ttom an army, he was faced w ith the problem o f adm inistering the lands under Serbian control. H e therefore had to arrange for the collection o f taxes and the establishment o f law courts. A lth ough he had the necessary attributes o f a military leader, being coura­ geous, strong-w illed, and skillful, he had more difficulty in governing the state. M oreover, his successes on the battlefield were bound to cause jealousy. W hat the Serbian lands needed in this time o f danger was a strong central governm ent that could organize the territory for victory. T h e local notables, how ever, were m ost reluctant to surrender any pow er to one o f their number o r to accept a secondary position in the government. T h ey were also in a position to make their objections heard. T he revolution was being fought not by a regular army, but by peasant soldiers led by their local leaders. Thus the notables had their ow n armed guards. Their attitude was to be that o f opposition to any transfer o f authority to a central regime that they and their adherents could not control. T h ey sought means o f binding K aradjordje’s hands and assuring that he did not gain dictatorial powers. A s w e have seen, th roughout Balkan history, the local aristocracy had consistendy opposed a centralized state. In order to meet the objections, Karadjordje agreed to the establishment o f a G overn ing C ouncil in 1805, which was supposed to be a check on his powers. A t first, he was able to assure that the members were his supporters. In 1808 he had him self proclaimed hereditary supreme leader, although he agreed to act w ith the G overning Council. In fact, at this time he had no strong political rivals. H e appointed his followers to the m ajor political po­ sitions, and his candidates were sent to run the local administrations. N ever­ theless, the opposition never ceased its efforts to weaken his authority. The situation became w orse when Constantine Rodofinikin, the agent o f the Russian army, arrived in Belgrade in A ugust 1807. H e cooperated w ith K ara­ djordje’s critics and used them against the Serbian leader. M eanw hile, the international situation was again w orsening fo r Serbia. A lth ough R ussia was not actively at war with the O ttom an Em pire, the pol­

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The first national revolutions icy o f agreem ent w ith France had not been successful. Th e m eeting between N apoleon and A lexander I at E rfu rt in 1808 had resulted in an impasse over Eastern affairs. T h e internal situation in the O ttom an Em pire had similarly deteriorated sharply. In Constantinople Selim III and his successor, M ustafa IV, w ere both deposed and killed; M ahm ud II then ascended the throne. D u rin g this period o f political crisis the O ttom an governm ent again showed itself w illin g to offer the Serbs w ide autonomy, but in the discussions be­ tween the representatives o f the tw o parties, no agreement could be reached on the exact boundaries to be assigned to an autonom ous Serbian state. T he Serbs also still wanted a foreign guarantor. Because o f these issues, no satis­ factory arrangem ent could be made. T h e lull in the fighting ended in 1809. A lthough the Serbs had expected m ilitary assistance from Russia, little was in fact delivered. T he rebel forces were thus driven on the defensive; in A ugust 1809 an O ttom an army marched on Belgrade. W ith this reversal o f fortunes a mass exodus o f Serbs across the D anube occurred, am ong them the Russian agent, Rodofinikin. Faced w ith disaster, K aradjordje appealed both to the H absburg Em pire and to N a p o ­ leon, again w ithout success. D espite the fact that the O ttom an troops were not able to reconquer all o f Serbia, a turning point had been reached in the first revolution. R ebel armies were now on the defensive; their aim became to hold w hat territories they had and not to make further gains. Som e im ­ provem ent in their position, however, took place in 1810, when a degree o f R usso-Serbian m ilitary cooperation was established and when the brilliant Russian general M . I. K u tu zov was in com m and o f the operations against the O ttom an Em pire. W eapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and some financial aid also arrived at this time. U nfortunately for Serbian interests, the Russian position soon underwent another radical change. Faced w ith the imminent danger o f a French inva­ sion, the Russian diplom ats pressed tow ard a conclusion o f the negotiations that were g o in g on with the O ttom an representatives. In these discussions the ch ief Russian objective had been the acquisition o f the D anubian P rin ­ cipalities, o r at least M oldavia; Serbia was a secondary matter. Because it needed an agreement quickly, the Russian governm ent was forced to accept the line o f the Pruth R iver and thus the partition o f the M oldavian territory. Serbia w as not com pletely forgotten. Article V I I I o f the Treaty o f Bucharest o f 1812 provided for the full reoccupation o f Serbia by the O ttom an authority, but w ith the prom ise o f amnesty. O ttom an garrisons w ould return: B ut in order that those garrisons shall in no w ay annoy the Serbians contrary to the rights o f the subjects, the Sublim e Porte, m oved by a feeling o f clemency, w ill settle with the Serbian nation the neces­ sary securities. It w ill grant to the Serbians, at their request, the same advantages which are enjoyed by its subjects o f the islands o f the

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 A rchipelago and other countries, and w ill make it feel the effects o f its high clemency in making over to them the administration o f their internal affairs, in fixing the whole o f their tributes, in receiving them from their ow n hands, and w ill, in short, settle all these matters w ith the Serbian nation.6 T he Serbian governm ent was not aware o f the negotiations leading to the agreement, nor did the Russian governm ent inform it o f the contents. T he terms w ere learned only when the O ttom an authorities sought their fulfill­ ment. T h e Serbian leaders w ere naturally m ost concerned about the sections providing fo r O ttom an reoccupation o f the fortifications and the cities o f the pashalik, an action that w ou ld put the Porte again in full military control o f the Serbian lands. N o r were the provisions for autonom y clear. T h e Russian advice was that the Serbs should negotiate direcdy on the subject w ith the O ttom an governm ent; St. Petersburg w ould give diplom atic support. Even w orse, the Russian governm ent was now forced to w ithdraw all o f its troops, not only from Serbia, where some units had been operating fo r almost tw o years, but also from Wallachia and M oldavia. Russia w ould thus not be in a position to exert pressure on Constantinople for the observance o f treaty obligations. T h e Serbian resources were by this time nearly exhausted. T h e constant fighting since 1804 had left the country w ithout further means o f resistance. Russia was fully occupied w ith the French invasion. T h e O ttom an govern­ ment saw that it had the opportunity to settle the Serbian question, and in Ju ly three O ttom an armies converged on Serbia. In O ctober 1813 Karadjordje, the m etropolitan Leontije, and the other members o f the governm ent crossed the D anube into Austria. F o u r days later the O ttom an arm y reoccupied B el­ grade, from which it had been expelled in 1806. Th e first Serbian revolution thus came to an end. O nce back in possession o f the pashalik, the Porte at first tried a policy o f conciliation. It had a great interest in securing peaceful conditions. A general amnesty was issued, and many em igrants returned from the Austrian lands. O ther notables, w h o had not left the country, subm itted to the authority o f the new pasha o f Belgrade, Suleiman U skuplii. A m o n g these was the prom ­ inent notable, M iloS O brenovic, w h o in return was confirmed in his position as oborknez o f Rudnik. T he main force o f the regular O ttom an arm y then left the country. M atters did not, how ever, settle dow n since the problems o f internal administration remained. T h e Serbs were still armed, and they out­ num bered the O ttom an troops left behind. T he years o f revolution and fight­ ing had left a legacy o f bitter feeling between the Christians and M uslim s. Incidents and atrocities were bound to occur on both sides. 6

Edward Hertslet, The Map o f Europe by Treaty, 4 vols. (London: Butterworths, 1875—1891), III, 2030-2032.

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The first national revolutions T h e future leader o f the second Serbian revolution, M iloS O brenovic, first tried collaboration. W hen a local uprising broke out in 1814, he offered to suppress it on the condition that the participants be granted amnesty. T he failure o f Suleim an to abide by his assurances caused the outbreak o f a new revolt. W hen the pasha executed some o f the rebels, the Serbs feared that another massive outburst o f O ttom an reprisals could be expected. A ccord­ ingly, they organized again fo r resistance, this time under the leadership o f M iloS. T h e revolt com m enced in A pril, but it was soon successfully con­ cluded. T h e international situation was much m ore favorable this time. T he wars w ith France w ere at an end, and the Porte did not w ant a new revolu­ tion in its lands that would draw European attention to its domestic problems. From the beginning o f the revolution M ilos declared that he was acting not against the sultan, but against Suleim an and his policies. H e was thus always ready to negotiate a settlement. In Constantinople the Russian dip­ lomats also prodded the Porte in regard to the implementation o f Article V I I I o f the Bucharest treaty. D eterm ined to follow a policy o f appeasement, the O ttom an governm ent rem oved the pasha o f Belgrade from office. N e ­ gotiations then com m enced between the Serbian representatives and M arashli A li Pasha, the vezir o f Rum elia. A n oral agreement was reached in N ovem ber 1815, w hich the sultan subsequently confirmed in a firman. M iloS requested and received terms similar to those which the Porte had been w ill­ ing to grant to Karadjordje in 1807. Th e Serbian leader was recognized as supreme knez, o r prince, o f Serbia. A National Chancery o f twelve Serbian notables was to be set up in Belgrade as the highest court o f the land. Serbian officials w ere to collect the taxes and to administer local affairs. Janissaries were forbidden from o w n in g land. O ther provisions allowed the Serbs to keep their weapons, assured them o f trading privileges, and granted a full amnesty to those w h o had participated in the rebellion. T he terms o f the agreement established Serbia as a sem iautonomous state that w as, neverthe­ less, still closely bound to the O ttom an Em pire. A fter the conclusion o f the understanding both M iloS and M arashli, w h o remained vezir o f R um elia until 1821, attempted to maintain peaceful condi­ tions. M iloS w as faced w ith the problem o f organizing a new administration and o f com bating the same type o f opposition that had hindered K ara­ djordje. Q uestions o f dom estic politics w ere to be the ch ief concern o f the prince th roughout his relatively long reign. Eleven years o f revolutionary activity had thus gained for the Serbs many autonom ous rights and a native prince. T he achievement o f this goal had not been easy. Serbian fortunes were closely tied to the ebb and flow o f European politics, and repeated attempts to obtain H absburg o r Russian support had been necessary. T h rou ghou t this period the Serbian leaders suffered from the fact that the pashalik o f Belgrade was o f litde general strategic value o r inter­ est to any European state. A s w e have seen, the Russian governm ent, al­ though offering some assistance, was quite w illing to abandon its small ally

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 when its European interests called for such a course of action. The Serbian revolution was a minor event of the time; it took place in a remote region, far from the European centers of power. In contrast, the second Balkan na­ tional revolution, that of the Greeks, caused the major European diplomatic conflict o f the third decade of the century.

TH E R EV O L U TIO N IN TH E D A N U B IA N PRINCIPALITIES A lth ou gh the m ajor events o f the G reek revolution o f the 1820s w ere to take place in the Peloponnesus and in Rum eli, the name by which southern m ain­ land Greece was known at this time, the revolt was also to involve the R o ­ manian Principalities. H ere the G reek m ovem ent, which was based on Phanariot support, was first to parallel and finally to run counter to a native Rom anian uprising led by Tudor Vladim irescu. F o r clarity and convenience the events in Greece proper are discussed here separately from those in M o l­ davia and Wallachia, although they were often concurrent and interdepen­ dent. T h e ch ief link between the actions in the tw o separate areas was to be the activities o f the G reek revolutionary organization, the F ilik i Etairia, or the Friendly Society. T h e Serbian revolution, as w e have seen, had been carried to success by peasant soldiers under their local leaders, w ith Karadjordje holding the cen­ tral authority as suprem e commander. T h e social basis o f the G reek revolt was to be m ore com plex. G reek society was divided into w hat were almost tw o separate w orlds. T he low er level was form ed by the inhabitants o f Greece proper. Its population o f peasants, fisherman, notables, and military men was similar to that o f the neighboring Balkan lands. A t the top, other Greeks, in particular the Phanariots o f Constantinople and the Principalities, the m er­ chants engaged in international trade, and other members o f the diaspora, enjoyed the privileges the O ttom an Em pire could provide to those o f its Christian subjects w h o cooperated. T he aims o f these tw o groups w ere also som ew hat different, although both looked forw ard to the end o f O ttom an rule. T h e desire o f some Phanariots to dominate and eventually take over the em pire has already been discussed. Their dream remained the reestablishment o f the Byzantine Empire and the formation o f a state whose boundaries would enclose a large non-Greek population. Som e even equated the jurisdiction o f the Patriarchate o f Constantinople w ith their future nation. A lth ough individual Phanariots were to play a m ajor role in the revolution, the G reek merchant com m unity w ith its wide European connections was perhaps even m ore important. Especially influential were to be the Greeks w h o had settled in southern Russia, in Bessarabia, and in the port city o f O dessa, the birthplace o f the m ajor central organization o f the revolution.

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The first national revolutions T he Filiki Etairia was founded in 1814 by three im poverished G reek m er­ chants, Em m anuel Xanthos, Athanasios Tsakalov, and N ikolaos Skoufos. It was much like similar societies existing in Europe at the tim e; it had an elab­ orate ritual, levels o f membership, and melodramatic practices. T h e “ G reat O ath” that new members were required to swear declared in part:

Finally I swear upon your holy name, oh sacred and wretched fa­ therland. I swear upon your lengthy sufferings, upon the bitter tears of your imprisoned and persecuted people, shed for so many centu­ ries until this moment by your wretched children. I devote my entire self to you. Henceforth, you will be the cause and the purpose o f my thoughts. Your name will be the guide of all my actions and your happiness the reward o f all my efforts. If ever I should, even for a moment, become oblivious to your sufferings and fail to fulfil my duty to you, may divine justice exhaust upon my head all the thunder o f its righteousness; may my name, inherited by my heirs, be de­ tested; may my person become the object of curses and anathema of my compatriots; and may my death be the inescapable punishment and reward for my sin, so that I may not infect the purity of the Etairia with my membership.7 The basic objective of the society was the organization of an uprising against the Ottoman Empire with the aim of establishing a Greek state with Con­ stantinople as the capital. The goal was thus a revival o f the Byzantine Em­ pire, not the formation o f a state on strictly national lines. The Etairia at first was not very successful. Between 1814 and 1816 only thirty members were enrolled; wealthy Greeks hesitated either to join or to contribute money. The leaders soon realized that to advance further they would need Russian assistance, both military and financial, and a leader with power and influence. The ideal candidate for this position was, o f course, Ioannis Capodistrias, who at this time shared the post of Russian foreign minister with Karl Nes­ selrode. Capodistrias had been born in Corfu. During the Napoleonic Wars he was associated with the Russian administration o f the Ionian Islands. In 1809 he entered Russian service and thereafter rose rapidly through the ranks of the bureaucracy. He was approached in 1817 by Nikolaos Galatis, a member of the Etairia who had been sent to St. Petersburg to attempt to enlist his support. The Russian foreign minister, although an ardent Greek patriot, at this time believed that the liberation of Greece could best be achieved by a Russo-Turkish war. Since the time was not ripe for that event, he advised the 7

Q u o te d in G eo rg e D . F rangos, “T h e Philiki Etairia: A P rem atu re N ational C oalition,” in R ich ard C lo g g , e d ., The Struggle fo r Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the isoth. Anniversary o f the Greek War o fIndependence (H am d en , C o n n .: A rch o n B ooks, 1973), p p. 99-100.

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The revolutionary yean, 1804-1887 Greeks to organize only on an educational and cultural basis. A t this stage it appears that both Capodistrias and the tsar learned o f the plans fo r a revolt against the O ttom an Em pire in some detail. In 1818 the headquarters o f the society were m oved to Constantinople, and rapid progress was made thereafter. A new system o f organization was adopted; twelve “ apostles” were appointed and each was given the responsibility o f organizing a definite district. T he success o f the Etairia was to be quite amaz­ ing. F ro m the capital o f the empire it set up a netw ork o f secret cells in G reek territory and the D anubian Principalities. M on ey was collected and instruc­ tions w ere sent ou t to all the centers o f Greek life. D espite the failure to gain Russia’s help, the leaders had no hesitation in im plying that they were acting w ith the know ledge and support o f that governm ent. Since they had the open assistance o f certain O rthodox church officials in Greece proper, and since Russian consulates had become recruiting centers, Russian sponsorship seemed obvious. M ost o f the Russian consuls in the Balkans at this time were Greeks; so they w ere naturally sympathetic to the cause. In view o f the free use that the society made o f the name o f Russia, m ost o f its members ex­ pected the tsar’s active assistance in the future rebellion. A t the head o f the entire netw ork o f local cells was supposed to be an unnam ed, secret leader, w h o was rum ored to be Alexander I himself. W ith this apparent high backing, the society was able to recruit very influ­ ential members. In Greece proper Theodoras K olokotron is, the strongest m ilitary leader; Petrobey M avrom ichalis, the ruler o f M ani in the Pelopon­ nesus; Germanos, the metropolitan o f Patras; and other prominent men joined. In the Principalities the Phanariots were naturally draw n to this national m ovem ent. T h e merchant class, with about 54 percent, predom inated in the rank-and-file membership. O f this number a high percentage w ere recruited in the Principalities o r in southern Russia. M ilitary men, the clergy, and the G reek notables also joined, but very few peasants became members. O n a mem bership list o f over a thousand, only six names w ere from the class that represented the overw helm ing majority o f the nation. In general, wellestablished merchants did not join, but the less successful, or those w h o had failed, w ere attracted.8 D espite its successes, the society recognized that it needed a real sign o f R ussia’s approval and a leader w ho was directly connected w ith that power. In 1820 Capodistrias was again approached. A lthough he still refused to take the position, he m ay have suggested Alexander Ypsilantis, a general in the Russian army and an aide-de-camp o f the tsar, as an alternative. T h e son o f the form er Wallachian hospodar Constantine Ypsilanti, Alexander had been educated in Russia. D espite his military rank, he had no experience in actual fighting. A lth ough there is some controversy on the question, it appears that

8

F ran g o s, “T h e P h ilik iE ta iria '' pp. 87-94.

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The first national revolutions Capodistrias did not inform Alexander I o f the new developments. In other w ords, the tsar’s principal minister concealed from him the fact that prepa­ rations w ere being made on Russian soil for a revolt against a governm ent w ith w h om Russia was at the time on tolerable terms. O nce in charge o f the organization, Ypsilantis gave every hint that A lex­ ander I knew and approved o f his activities. H e took personally a title that meant “ deputy” or “viceroy,” implying that a “ supreme authority” stood above him. A lth ough the tsar was never named, the association seemed obvious. Certainly, it was this apparent connection w ith Russia that w on so many converts to the Etairia, particularly in the D anubian Principalities. M oreover, Ypsilantis appears to have convinced the governors o f Bessarabia and the O dessa region that he had some sort o f official backing. T h at section o f R u s­ sia became a staging area for the revolt. A lth ough the Etairia did not obtain guns from R ussian arsenals, other supplies and m oney were openly collected. G reek residents in Odessa could easily obtain passports fo r the D anubian Principalities. M eanw hile, the plans fo r the revolution proceeded. T he leaders o f the so­ ciety decided that the revolt should center in the Peloponnesus, but w ith a prior diversionary action in the Principalities. W hat seem rather w ild plans were also made to burn Constantinople, kidnap the sultan, and sink the O t­ toman fleet. A lth ou gh the basic goal remained the establishment o f an inde­ pendent G reek nation, the advantages o f the outbreak o f a parallel general Balkan rebellion were obvious. M o st im portant w ould be the attitude o f Serbia. A great effort was made to attract Serbian support. Karadjordje, w ho had em igrated to Bessarabia, was recruited into the Etairia, and he did take an active part in its w ork. In contrast, M iloS O brenovic was fully uncooperative. A t this time the prince was follow ing a policy o f collaboration w ith the O t­ toman governm ent; his ch ief aim was to secure from the suzerain pow er the form al recognition o f his title on a hereditary basis. T he entire question also became entangled in dom estic conflicts. W hen in Ju ly 1817 Karadjordje re­ turned to Serbia, M iloS had him executed. H is head was then sent to the sultan as a sign o f fealty. Thereafter the prince continued to resist firmly any tem ptation to join the G reek efforts. H ad Russia entered, his reaction m ight have been different. A s it was, throughout the revolution he maintained his reserved attitude. A lth ou gh it had first been decided that the revolt should have its center in the Peloponnesus, preparations did not advance there as fast as expected. T he first revolutionary action thus took place in M oldavia, and it was launched without adequate coordination with events in Greece. Nevertheless, the choice o f the Principalities as the area from which to commence a G reek liberation m ovem ent was quite logical given the conditions o f the time. T he Phanariot regimes guaranteed that the authorities w ould be friendly. T he Etairia had been able to recruit w idely from am ong the G reek boyars, although not from 207

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 those w ith a Rom anian background. The prince o f M oldavia, M ihai Su ju , w as in the society, and the cooperation o f a prominent Rom anian, Tudor V ladim irescu, had been assured. In addition, the geographic position o f the Principalities was strategically excellent. I f the Etairia wished to involve the other Balkan people - the B u l­ garians, Serbs, and Rom anians — the best plan was obviously to commence the rebellion in M oldavia; the victorious revolutionary forces could then march through the Balkan lands on the w ay to Greece. It was expected that the inhabitants along the route w ould flock to the G reek standards. M oreover, the provinces w ere adjacent to Russia, from w hom help was still expected. T h e belief in R ussian support remained widespread, even am ong those w h o knew o f the previous refusals. M any apparendy were convinced that i f they started the revolt, they could force the tsar to act. T h ey expected that a Greek uprising w ou ld be met by Turkish reprisals so appalling that the protecting O rthodox pow er w ou ld be com pelled to intervene. Internal conditions in the Principalities also made that region ready for revolt, but not in the direction desired by the Etairia. In fact, its leaders seem to have been singularly blind to the effects o f the lon g period o f Phanariot dom ination. T he abuses o f the regim e had, in fact, increased after 1812. The tw o princes w h o were appointed at that time were loan Caragea, w h o ruled Wallachia from 1812 to 1818, and Scarlat Callimachi, w ho was in office in M o l­ davia from 1812 to 1819. D u rin g their reigns the Principalities w ere under extreme fiscal pressure both from the Porte and from the princes, each o f w h om had paid a high price for his throne and had to show a profit on his investment. Taxes w ere increased and peasant obligations became m ore o p­ pressive. T h e situation was very bad indeed. The corruption and m isgovernment under C aragea was so extreme that he was forced to flee the country. H e was replaced in 1818 by Alexander Sufu, w ho arrived w ith eighty relatives and a suite o f eight hundred, including an Albanian guard. U n d er these con­ ditions it can be understood w h y hatred for the Phanariot rule w as so w ide­ spread. T h e native boyars and the oppressed peasants were joined in a com ­ m on cause. T hree potentially revolutionary forces were thus in existence in the Prin­ cipalities. We have already discussed the Etairia and its links w ith the Pha­ nariot regime. The native boyars constituted a second faction. Although many had indeed collaborated w ith the Greek princes, their main desire was to reestablish a native rule. T h eir attitude toward the Porte was ambivalent. T h ey w ere w illin g to consider the retention o f O ttom an suzerainty, but on the condition that the political authority in the Principalities be returned to their hands. I f not, they preferred independence w ith foreign — that is, R u s­ sian o r Austrian - protection. T h ey were certainly not partisans o f a great H ellenic revival. T h e third element in the situation was provided by the ex­ istence o f mass discontent am ong the peasantry. T h eir grievances w ere over their taxes and the conditions o f landholding; their goals were thus social

The first national revolutions rather than national in character. T h eir support, nevertheless, was absolutely essential to the success o f any rebellion. The importance o f the availability o f trained, armed men has been em pha­ sized in connection with the Serbian revolt. A lthough the arm ing o f the countryside was not as general in the Principalities as it was in some lands under direct O ttom an administration, certain local military fores did exist. There was, o f course, no national army, but the princes had personal guards and the police at their disposal. In addition, during the wars o f 1768—1774 and 1787—1792, other armed groups appeared. A s in Serbia, local volunteers joined both the H absbu rg and the Russian armies. U nits also had to be o r­ ganized to defend Wallachia against the kirdjali raids in the time o f Pasvanoglu. O ltenia became the center o f a legal militia, the pandours. T h ey were recruited from the free peasants, and like the H absburg soldiers o f the M ili­ tary Frontier, they com bined agriculture w ith military duties. T he pandours received a salary and tax-exemption privileges. Th ey played a m ajor role dur­ ing the N apoleonic Wars; they fought against Pasvanoglu; and they cooper­ ated with the Russian army against the Porte. B y 1811 they were around six thousand strong. A n active mem ber o f this militia, Tudor Vladim irescu, w h o was to become the principal Rom anian leader, had pursued a career which was in many ways similar to that o f Karadjordje. B orn in 1780 in a fam ily o f free peasants, V la ­ dimirescu took part in the w ar against the O ttom an Em pire as a com m ander o f the pandours and received a Russian decoration for his actions. H e later held the position o f subprefect o f Clo§ani. H e had by this time risen to the rank o f a low er boyar. Terminating his military career in 1812, he subsequently became a very successful businessman and came to ow n houses, lands, and vineyards. Like his Serbian counterpart, he was active in livestock trading with the H ab sbu rg Em pire. In the course o f his various pursuits, he was able to travel widely, visiting, for example, the Banat, Transylvania, and Buda. H e lived in Vienna for about tw o hundred days in 1814 at the time o f the C o n ­ gress o f Vienna. A lthough w ithout a form al education, he was thus a man o f wide experience. In 1820 Ypsilantis was, as w e have seen, in Bessarabia m aking plans fo r the rebellion. H e had already chosen as the commander o f the revolutionary troops operating in the Principalities a Greek, Georgakis O lym pios, w ho had been in the pandours. Prince M ihai Su ju had been w on over; the hospodar o f Wallachia, A lecu Sup i, had not, but he was dying. A tem porary Wallachian governm ent was in office, and three o f its members w orked out an agreement with Vladim irescu, prom ising to support him i f he w ould start a revolt in Oltenia. Vladim irescu also came to an understanding w ith the Etairia. It was expected that the society w ould commence its rebellion in the Principalities, but that, once it w as successful, its forces w ou ld cross the D anube and pro­ ceed on to Greece. In January 1821 Vladim irescu left Bucharest fo r Oltenia. A t this time Alecu

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 S u ju died, leaving the tem porary governm ent fully in charge. In February, at the village o f Pade§, Vladim irescu issued a violently revolutionary declara­ tion, calling on the peasants to rise against the boyars. H is w ords had noth­ in g at all to do w ith Greek, o r even Rom anian, national liberation: B rothers living in Wallachia, whatever your nationality, no law pre­ vents a man to meet evil with evil . . . H o w long shall w e suffer the dragons that sw allow us alive, those above us, both clergy and politicans, to suck ou r blood? H o w long shall w e be enslaved? . . . N e i­ ther G o d nor the Sultan approves o f such treatment o f their faithful. Therefore, brothers, come all o f you and deal out evil to bring evil to an end, that w e m ight fare w ell.9 A lthough Vladim irescu him self tried to make a distinction between the “ g o o d ” boyars w h o supported his m ovem ent and the others, the peasants, w ho joined him in thousands, were not so discriminating. They burned houses and bam s, and they looted the boyar estates. A true social revolution was in progress. Vladim irescu form ed an army, called the People’s Assembly, w hose basis was the grou p o f six hundred pandours w ho had come to his support at once. Vladim irescu’s m ovem ent, it w ill be noted, was not directed against the Porte. H e and his supporters called upon the suzerain pow er to restore “ old conditions” - in other w ords, to return to the days before the Phanariot G reek rule. Vladim irescu also appealed to the O ttom an governm ent to send a representative to investigate the conditions in the Principalities and to rem­ edy the abuses and the sufferings o f the people. T h rou ghou t this period he remained in touch w ith the O ttom an agents and with the pashas in com mand o f the D anube forts. T h e situation thus became extremely com plicated. Vladim irescu had com ­ menced a revolt after a prior agreement w ith the tem porary administration in Wallachia and the Etairia. H is call for peasant support had been enthusi­ astically received, but his followers had social rather than national o r political goals. Extrem ely disturbed by the situation, the Bucharest regim e sent a force to try to stop the Rom anian leader; its members instead deserted to V lad i­ mirescu. O n M arch 12 the People’s Assem bly started to march tow ard Bucha­ rest, where it arrived at the end o f the month. M eanw hile, Ypsilantis had gone into action. O n M arch 6 he and a few associates crossed the border from Bessarabia. H is victory in M oldavia was easy; he sim ply took over control o f the governm ent from Suju. T h e local military forces supported him , and he appealed for volunteers. A ppearing in the country wearing a Russian uniform , Ypsilantis gave his follow ers the 9

Quoted in Andrei Ojetea, ed., The History o f the Romanian People (New York: Twayne, 1970), p. 317.

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The first national revolutions impression that a large Russian arm y was right behind him. O n M arch 7, in a proclam ation to the M oldavians, he inform ed them that his forces w ould march through the Principalities and then cross the Danube. There should be no fear o f O ttom an reprisals: “ Should the Turks dare to penetrate into M oldavia, an all pow erful force was ready to punish them for their audac­ ity.” 10 A t first, there was no reason to doubt the assurances o f the Etairia. T he R ussian consul in Ia§i, A ndrea Pisani, did nothing to disenchant those w h o were convinced that the Russian army w ould soon arrive. U n der these circumstances, the Etairia received a great deal o f support. M oney, weapons, and recruits poured into its headquarters. Rom anians as well as Greeks o f­ fered their assistance. In Ia§i, Ypsilantis and the M oldavian boyars com posed a petition to Alexander I, entreating him to give aid.

Everything hinged on the Russian reaction. The fact that the reply was delayed for weeks added to the general confusion and allowed the Etairia to keep up the pretense of Russian involvement. Already on March 7, however, the Russian Foreign Ministry had sent instructions to the Russian consul in Bucharest denouncing Vladimirescu’s revolt. The Romanian leader did not hear of the Russian attitude until toward the end of March. Until that time he too continued to assure his followers of Russian approval, probably bas­ ing his claims on declarations made by the Etairia. Finally, on March 17, the Bucharest consulate received the tsar’s disavowal o f Ypsilantis; an anathema from the patriarch o f Constantinople also arrived. The Russian attitude was finally open and unequivocal. Many aspects of Russian policy at this time are not clear. It does seem, however, that the tsar did not know about the existence of the conspiracy, although he was aware o f some of the activities o f the Etairia. The involve­ ment o f his foreign minister was obviously far greater. At the time of the revolt Alexander was meeting with his allies at Ljubljana to determine what measures should be taken in regard to the revolutions that had broken out in the Italian peninsula and Spain. The tsar’s strong conservative views were strengthened by Mettemich’s increasing influence. It was extremely unlikely that Alexander would endorse the kind of revolutionary activity that was taking place in the Principalities. The authority of the legitimate ruler, the sultan, was being challenged; in the countryside revolutionary mobs were burning the houses o f the Romanian nobility. The tsar’s denunciation of the revolt was accompanied by a recall o f the Russian consuls in Bucharest and Ia§i. Capodistrias was soon to lose his post as foreign minister. M eanw hile, a crisis was developing in the Principalities. Valdimirescu ar­ rived in Bucharest w ith about 65,000 men on A pril 2. A t the same time Y p si­ lantis, w ith his troops, w h o num bered considerably fewer, set out fo r the Wallachian capital. Vladim irescu, w ith the strongest armed force, was w o rk ­ ing in cooperation w ith the Wallachian governm ent and continued to remain 10

O je te a , History o f the Romanian People, p. 320.

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 in com m unication w ith the O ttom an authorities. H e made attempts to tone dow n the social implications o f his m ovem ent; the peasants were instructed to pay their taxes. N either Vladim irescu nor Ypsilantis was in com m and o f anything like a real army, nor did they have regular means o f supply. Both forces lived o ff the country, and the Etairia had already caused much anger in M oldavia because o f pillaging. Despite Vladim irescu’s attempts to restrain his supporters, they too engaged in acts o f violence and in looting. With disorder and anarchy increasing, a mass flight o f boyars and merchants be­ gan. Som e were frightened by the peasant uprising; others had been involved w ith the Etairia and feared O ttom an reprisals. Transylvania received m ost o f the refugees; twelve thousand went to Bra§ov and seventeen thousand to S ib iu .11 O n A pril 18 Ypsilantis finally arrived at the outskirts o f Bucharest, accom­ panied by w hat was little more than a m ob num bering about five thousand. H is follow ers had no military training and few arms. T he tw o leaders held a m eeting on A pril 20, but it served principally to bring out their basic dis­ agreements. Vladim irescu wanted the G reek forces to m ove ou t o f the coun­ try and to cross the D anube as had been originally planned. H e emphasized that he w ished to rem edy the abuses in the governm ent, rather than to chal­ lenge Ottoman rule. Ypsilantis was in a dangerous military position. On April 6 a revolt had taken place in the Peloponnesus, and the O ttom an government was preparing to meet the insurrection there and in the Principalities. With­ out either Russian o r strong Rom anian support, Ypsilantis’s m otley force could not hope to defend itself against the regular O ttom an army.

Vladimirescu was similarly caught in a difficult situation. His army was strong, but it also could not defeat the Ottoman professional soldiers. In the negotiations with the Romanian leader, the Ottoman representatives insisted that his troops either lay down their arms or join in the fight against the Etairia. Not only did Vladimirescu not trust Ottoman assurances, but he also did not think that his men would march against Ypsilantis’s army, whose ranks were likewise filled with Romanians. In this tense situation, Ypsilantis withdrew to Tirgovi§te, while Vladimirescu remained in Bucharest. B oth armies feared an O ttom an intervention. One o f the first acts o f the Etairia in M oldavia had been the massacre o f Turkish civilians in Ia§i and G alaji (Galatz), and the Porte obviously had to act to restore its authority. O n M ay 13 an O ttom an army entered the country and advanced on Bucha­ rest. Vladim irescu and his forces abandoned the city, as did the Wallachian governm ent, w hich left fo r Bra§ov. B y this time both Ypsilantis and Vladi­ mirescu had decided that their best course o f action w ould be to retreat to the mountains. A t this point the tw o movements came into direct conflict. Well aware o f their relatively weak military power, the Etairia leaders deter­ 11

D an B erindei, L ’A nnée révolutionnaire 1S21 dans les Pays roumains (B ucharest: É ditions de l’A cadém ie, 15)73), P· 1S2.

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The first national revolutions mined that they should attempt to gain com m and o f the pandour army. Th ey also knew o f Vladim irescu’s negotiations w ith the O ttom an authorities, acts that they regarded as treason. Ypsilantis was aided by the fact that the R o ­ manian leader had alienated som e o f his commanders w hen he executed pandour officers fo r looting. W ith the assistance o f these dissidents, the G reek leadership was able to kidnap Vladimirescu. H e was tortured and then exe­ cuted on the night o f June 8-9. Thereafter Ypsilantis tried to take com m and o f the pandours by announc­ ing that V ladim irescu was alive and had been sent to Bessarabia. T h e m ove failed; this arm y was also in a process o f dissolution. Once it became apparent that a social revolution w ou ld not take place, m any o f the peasants sim ply left. W ith the dissappearance o f Vladim irescu, others join ed the deserters. T h ey were close to their Oltenian hom es, and there was nothing for them to fight for. Ypsilantis was thus left w ith entirely inadequate forces to meet the advancing O ttom an army. H e was also not an experienced o r able field com ­ mander. O n Ju n e 19 at D r5g&§ani he suffered a disastrous defeat. D eserting the remnants o f his army, he crossed over into Transylvania. There he was arrested, and he spent the last seven years o f his life in an Austrian prison. A similar m ilitary collapse took place in M oldavia. Su ju abdicated and fled to Russia. T h e last stand o f the Etairia in the Principalities was on June 29, at Sculeni on the Pruth River. W ith the defeat o f the Greek forces, the O ttom an army was in com plete control o f the Principalities. A lth ough the Russian governm ent had denounced the revolutionary m ovem ent, it remained deeply concerned w ith the events in these neighbor­ ing lands. A t first the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, G . A . Stroganov, cooperated w ith the Porte, but disagreements soon arose. Russian ad­ vice had encouraged the Porte to suppress the revolts. H ow ever, when the Ottoman army entered the Principalities without a prior agreement with Russia, as was required by the treaties, the Russian governm ent strongly protested. Even w orse in Russian eyes were the actions taken in Constantinople as a result o f the events in the Peloponnesus. There, as in the Principalities, the Greek revolutionaries had massacred O ttom an civilians. In reply, the O tto ­ man authorities com menced massive reprisals. A s far as the O rthodox w orld was concerned, the worst atrocity occurred when a group o f janissaries hanged the patriarch o f Constantinople and some o f his bishops on Easter eve. Such a direct attack on the O rthodox population and its religious leader could not be ignored by Russia, any m ore than the Porte could allow the indiscriminate murder o f M uslim s. M oreover, the Russian governm ent had certain obligations. In the past it had claimed repeatedly that it held a kind o f religious protectorate over the O rthodox. A s previously noted, the Treaty o f K uchuk K ainarji had a clause specifically referring to the G reek lands and stating that “ the Christian religion shall not be exposed to the least oppres­ sion.” A lth ough Alexander I did not change his mind on the question o f revolution, he did take a strong stand on the religious issue. T he Russian

213

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 governm ent took the position that the Porte had the right to punish revolu­ tionaries, but that it should not massacre innocent Christians. T h e distinction w as, o f course, often difficult to m ake.12 These issues led to the breaking o f diplom atic relations in A ugu st 1821. T h e O ttom an army remained in occupation o f the Principalities for sixteen months. Once again both provinces had to support a foreign army. The emigres remained abroad, either in Transylvania o r in Bukovina. It w as, o f course, to the interest o f the Porte to try to restore a stable political situation. Russian pressure remained strong. In A pril 1822 tw o delegations w ith seven members each came to Constantinople. Th e M oldavians were led by Ion Sturdza, the Wallachians by G rigore G hica. B oth represented the interests o f the R o m a ­ nian boyars, and they presented similar program s. T h e m ajor dem and was the restoration o f native rule and the end o f Phanariot exploitation, w ith all high offices henceforth held by Rom anians. T he delegates sim ilarly requested the rem oval o f the G reek hegum ens (abbots) o f the D edicated M onasteries and the appointm ent o f native clerics. A Rom anian m ilitia to replace the form er A lbanian guard w as also desired. T h e Porte agreed to these demands and nam ed the heads o f the delegations as princes o f their provinces. These actions w ere not accepted by the Russian governm ent, which insisted on its right under the treaties o f passing judgment on the candidates for the thrones. Russo-O ttom an relations thus entered a period o f crisis. T h e ch ief issues in dispute concerned the condition o f the Principalities and Russian rights o f intervention. M an y boyars returned to the Principalities at this tim e, although some remained abroad until 1826. Som e local landowners took reprisals against those w h o had taken part in Vladim irescu’s rebellion. Villages were disarmed, and the attempt was made to collect back taxes. In general, how ever, the matter was handled w ith m oderation. T h e boyars w ere relatively content; they had gained much o f their political program . A native adm inistration was in pow er in both Principalities. T he Porte had acceded to m ost, i f not all, o f the R om anian requests. It had taken no reprisals for the revolutionary actions o f some Rom anian boyars and peasants. H avin g achieved their goals, most boyars w ere in favor o f m aintaining the link w ith the O ttom an Em pire.

T H E G R E E K R E V O L U T IO N A lth ough the revolution collapsed in the Principalities, a similar m ovem ent was having greater success in the G reek lands, where conditions w ere much m ore favorable for a national uprising. A s w e have seen, local com m unity governm ent was strongly organized in the region; the Peloponnesus enjoyed 12

See th e R ussian circular despatch o f June 22/July 4 , 1821, in B arbara Jelavich, Russia and Greece during the Regency o f K in g Othon, 1832-183S (Thessaloniki: In stitu te for Balkan Studies, 1962), p p . 12+—128.

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The first national revolutions

Map 20. The expansion o f Greece, 1821-1919

an alm ost fully autonom ous administration. Th e G reek islands too for all practical purposes ran their ow n affairs. T h e very independence o f these areas was, how ever, to cause problem s during the revolution. Once the revolt be­ gan, the G reek forces divided both on social and on geographical lines. In general, the Greeks o f the three main areas o f Rum eli, the Peloponnesus, and the islands form ed separate groups w ith their ow n interests and objectives (see M ap 20). The Greeks o f the diaspora and the Phanariots w ho were forced to leave O ttom an service were a fourth category. O n social lines the notables, 215

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 the wealthy shipowners o f the islands, and the military men w ith their peas­ ant follow ers constituted three distinct elements that could either ally with o r fight against one another. It w ill be noted that there was no peasant m ove­ ment similar to that in Wallachia. T h e individual peasant was closely tied to the social structure o f his ow n tight com m unity; he fought w ith the local captain for the interests o f the area where he lived. Figh tin g between O ttom an and Greek forces was already under w ay con­ siderably before the outbreak o f the revolution in A pril 1821. T h is conflict involved the old quarrel between the Porte and the disobedient provincial ayan A li Pasha, w hose headquarters were at Janina in Epirus. A s w e have seen, he was a continual thorn in the side o f the O ttom an authorities. H e had played between the rebels and the governm ent in the western Balkans, and he had entered into relations w ith foreign governm ents. A lth ough he was w illin g to accept the sovereignty o f the Porte, his aim was the establish­ ment o f an autonomous state with all the power in his ow n hands. H e formed ties w ith the Etairia, hoping to w in G reek support for his o w n plans. In 1819 M ah m ud II decided that he w ou ld have to be destroyed. Well aware o f the O ttom an danger, A li prepared to resist. H e began a great effort to w in G reek and Albanian Christian aid. H e im proved conditions in the villages under his control, and he appealed to the local captains to join him. Som e Greeks did indeed enter his service. Nevertheless, the O ttom an arm y was able to make advances against him, although w ith considerable difficulty. In 1820 considerable O ttom an forces were tied up in the conflict w ith A li Pasha in the western Balkans. T he involvem ent o f so m any O ttom an troops in this struggle offered the Greeks a fine opportunity for action. R e c­ ogn izin g the favorable aspects o f the situation, the Etairia and Ypsilantis, as w e have seen, decided to begin their rebellion, w ith an uprising scheduled for both the Peloponnesus and the D anubian Principalities. T he revolt in Greece was delayed sim ply because the necessary preparations could not be made in time. T h e emphasis was then placed on the Principalities. T h ey were to be a source o f m oney and recruits and were to be used to draw Russia into the conflict. In fact, although Ypsilantis com menced his rebellion in M o lda­ via, preparations continued in Greece proper. There was little coordination, how ever, between the centers, and the revolt in the Peloponnesus arose pri­ m arily from local events. L ike the Principalities, the Peloponnesus offered extremely favorable con­ ditions fo r the organization o f a revolution. T h e G reek people had consid­ erable autonom y under their ow n primates. T h e control o f the countryside was m ore in G reek than in O ttom an hands. M oreover, there was a large concentration o f m ilitary men in the area, particularly in M ani. It was also possible to maintain close contact with the islands, which had similar rights o f self-governm ent. In the G reek lands the O ttom an authorities were concerned not so much about the activities o f the Etairia as about the possibility that mass Christian

The first national revolutions support m ight be given to A li Pasha. H e had always been able to w in some assistance from both G reek and Albanian Christians in the area. In M arch the O ttom an officials summoned the O rthodox leaders, including the pri­ mate o f the Peloponnesus and the bishops, to Tripolitza for a conference. T he Greeks were reluctant to obey the call because they feared what m ight happen to them. In fact, those w ho did appear were imprisoned. Som e in­ dividuals then started taking direct action. Local leaders began attacking res­ ident Turks, and such acts w ere widespread by the end o f M arch. O n A p ril 2 a full revolt broke out in M ani. T h e sym bolic act that was henceforth cele­ brated as m arking the commencement o f the revolution occurred on A pril 6. O n that date, according to popular belief, B ishop Germ anos o f Patras raised the standard o f rebellion at the monastery o f A ghia Lavra. U prisings then occurred th roughout the G reek regions and in the islands, in particular on H ydra, Psara, and Spetsai, which w ould subsequently serve as m ajor centers fo r G reek naval operations. Som e o f the first Greek actions were taken against unarmed O ttom an setdements. It is estimated that fifteen thousand out o f the forty thousand M uslim residents o f the Peloponnesus w ere killed.13 T he survivors fled into the fortified tow ns, some o f which held out until the end o f the revolution. O ther cities were captured; Tripolitza was taken in O ctober 1821, and the inhabitants were massacred. Christian atrocities were fully matched by the O ttom an reaction. T he hanging o f the patriarch has been described. Sim ilar events occurred in other parts o f the em pire that had a G reek population. In 1822 the massacre on C hios, where m any thousands died, attracted general European attention. A s a rule, O ttom an actions were fully reported in E u ­ rope, w ith all o f the gruesom e details; Christian atrocities tended to be ig ­ nored. There was at first no massive O ttom an m ilitary operation against the Greek rebels; the em pire continued to concentrate on defeating A li Pasha. A n army also had to be sent to the Principalities to deal w ith the revolt there. T he involvem ent o f the O ttom an forces in the western Balkans and the Rom anian provinces allowed the rebels in the Peloponnesus time to consolidate their position. Finally, in January 1822, A li was captured and executed, and his head was sent to Constantinople. Th e Porte was now free to deal w ith the Greeks. In addition to E piru s, the O ttom an forces were able to subdue Thessaly and M acedonia. T h e rebels, however, kept their stronghold in the Peloponnesus, and they controlled some territory north o f the Isthmus o f C orinth in R u meli, including the cities o f M isolonghi, Thebes, and Athens. The ch ief O ttom an m ilitary effort was thus directed against this area. In 1822 and 1823 the Porte sent armies to relieve the fortress cities still held by O ttom an troops. T h e operation was not easy. T he rebels had the services o f 13

Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle fo r Independence, 1821-1833 (London: Batsford, 1973), P· 59-

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2I8

The tomb of Ali Pasha in Janina

The first national revolutions a navy, w hich consisted prim arily o f individual shipowners acting on their ow n initiative, usually as pirates. T h ey were very effective against the O tto ­ man naval forces, which were weak, and even m ore efficient in cutting sea communications. Because o f this situation, the Ottoman invasion had to come by land. Arm ies w ere sent from both Epirus and Constantinople, but the supply lines w ere long and the cam paigning season short. T he troops were constantly harassed by G reek guerilla fighters, w ho, unlike their opponents, were masters in exploiting the advantages o f the m ountainous terrain. Wisely, the Greeks w ent into com bat not as a regular, organized army, but in individ­ ual bands under the local captains. W ith this even balance o f strength, a stalemate had set in by 1825. Since victory seemed im possible w ithout outside assistance, M ahm ud II decided to appeal to the pasha o f E gyp t, M uham m ad A li. Like A li Pasha, this Albanian chieftain had risen to high position in the O ttom an service. A s the ruler o f E g y p t he had defied O ttom an authority, and it was only his ow n military weakness that induced the sultan to turn to this rebellious and independent vassal. M uham m ad A li was w illing to intervene, but at a high price. F o r his services he dem anded Crete fo r him self and the Peloponnesus fo r his son Ibrahim , w h o was a brilliant m ilitary commander. W ith the sultan’s agree­ ment to these terms, the E gyptian troops entered the conflict. H igh ly suc­ cessful, they first took Crete and then, in February 1825, entered the Pelopon­ nesus. In contrast to the G reek guerilla w arriors, the Egyptian troops form ed a disciplined army. T h ey had been trained by French military advisers along m odern European lines. T h ey proved superior in fighting to the Greeks, w h o not only had inferior equipm ent, but lacked an organized plan o f action. In A pril 1826 M isolonghi fell; soon thereafter O ttom an soldiers were in occu­ pation o f the A cropolis o f Athens, the symbol o f the ancient civilization. It seemed that the revolt w ould be crushed. M eanwhile, internal dissension had weakened and divided the revolutionary leadership. In addition to fighting, the G reek rebels had to administer the regions under their control and organize some sort o f national governm ent. T he problem s that arose here were very different from those in Serbia, where one man had been able to take over both the civilian and the military leadership and hold that position, even against strong opposition, until he was defeated by the O ttom an army. In contrast, in Greece the forces o f local autonom y were so strong that they were able to prevent one man o r one center from predom inating. The G reek revolution suffered from certain basic weaknesses. There had been, as w e have seen, no general Balkan rising, nor was there a mass peasant movem ent against Turkish rule. Instead, throughout the G reek lands, local military men led their followers in limited actions against the Ottoman forces. T h e entire revolution, in fact, was fought by armed bands under local cap­ tains. These men, w ith a klepht mentality, felt it a point o f honor not to surrender control to a higher authority. A s in the past, the captains individ­

219

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 ually were in strong com petition w ith one another. D urin g the revolution they continued to use whatever opportunities were offered to enlarge their jurisdictions. T h ey seized booty, and they sought to extend their control over villages from w hich they could collect taxes for their ow n use. Som e, to im ­ prove their ow n position, even collaborated w ith the O ttom an authorities. T h e lawlessness o f this military element, which was the ch ief fighting arm o f the revolt, was a continual problem for the civilian leaders. T h ey had no means o f com pelling obedience from these armed men. T heodoros K olokotronis w as to cause the m ajor problem s, but there w ere m any like him throughout the region. Soon after the commencement o f the revolt another political influence en­ tered the G reek scene. T he Porte at this point looked w ith extreme suspicion on all Greeks in its service, particularly on those w ho held im portant posts in Constantinople. M any were forced to leave; others, enthusiastic supporters o f G reek freedom , wished to take part in the struggle on the mainland. A fter the defeat in the Principalities, Alexander Ypsilantis, as w e have seen, spent the rest o f his life in prison. H is brother D im itrios, w h o attempted to replace him , was not an able leader, and he did not play an im portant role in subse­ quent events. T he Etairia as an organization faded into insignificance; other groups w ere to take over the direction o f the revolution. A m o n g the C o n ­ stantinople Greeks w h o form ed a part o f this new leadership, perhaps the m ost im portant was A lexander M avrokordatos, w h o was henceforth to play a m ajor role in G reek political life. Since the Phanariots and the diaspora Greeks usually did not hold exten­ sive property in Greece o r have a firm local political base, they tended to support the establishment o f a single predom inant central authority, which they could hope to control. T h ey could w in pow er in dom estic politics by m anipulating the com petitive native political groups and exploiting local an­ tipathies. Well acquainted w ith European political theory and practice, they were prim arily responsible for the constitutional form o f the first govern­ ments. G reek political life was to involve, in addition to the members o f the over­ seas G reek com m unities w h o arrived at this time, local leaders w h o based their influence either on regional loyalties o r on class conflicts. T he g eo ­ graphic division was am ong eastern and western Rum elia, the Peloponnesus, and the islands. T he social conflict was prim arily between the military men and their peasant follow ers, on the one hand, and the primates, w h o could ally w ith the shipowners and islanders, on the other. M uch o f the dom estic history o f the country during the revolutionary period revolves around the struggle between these groups to capture the central authority. T h e victor not only w ould dom inate the administration, but w ould be the agent w ho dealt with foreign governments and received the loans that were being sought abroad. A s in Serbia, prom inent G reek leaders w ent by the principle that they w ould accept no central authority that they could not themselves control.

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The first national revolutions T he story o f the conflict and civil w ar within the revolutionary ranks is com ­ plex; only the outline can be presented here. Th e first general m eeting held to attempt to form a central governm ent took place at Epidaurus in D ecem ber 1821. H ere the delegates, w h o came from the various parts o f insurgent Greece, sought to draw up a constitution. T h eir ch ief effort was directed tow ard preventing any single individual from attaining a position o f unfettered suprem e power. T h eir ideal, like that o f their counterparts in Serbia, was an oligarchy o f primates. T h eir m odel doc­ ument was the French Constitution o f 1795. Following its example, they placed the executive pow er in the hands o f a committee o f five, headed by M avrokordatos. Each mem ber represented a region. This weak organization did not possess the pow er to control local authorities o r defiant individuals. In D ecem ber 1822 another gathering o f notables was held at Astros. H ere some changes w ere made in the constitution. Th e m ajor event, however, was the quarrel that arose between Kolokotronis, backed by his armed bands, and the governm ent, w hich led to the outbreak o f civil war. K olokotronis held the city o f N au plion; his opponents at Kranidi form ed an administration under the leadership o f G eorge Kountouriotis, w h o represented the interests o f the islands. A lth ough Kolokotronis was induced to surrender control o f N auplion, the bitter internal struggle continued. N either faction succeeded in establishing a regime that could com m and general respect and obedience. M eanw hile, as w e have seen, the E gyptian forces had landed in the P elopon ­ nesus, and they w ere w inning victories. T he national assembly held on Troezene in 1827 was to be m ore successful. B y this date it was clear that the great powers w ould intervene in Greek affairs. A stable governm ent w ith real authority had to be form ed that could deal w ith the new situation. A nother constitution was drawn up, but, m ost im portant, Capodistrias accepted an invitation to become president. A t the same time, tw o British Philhellenes, Sir Richard Church and Alexander C ochrane, w ere given com m and o f the land and naval m ilitary forces. T he crisis o f these years also served to give impetus to the form ation o f political parties. A t the beginning o f the civil war, political activity centered around the conflicts between strong individuals, each backed by a personal fo llo w ­ ing. T h ey m ight represent regions, factions, o r social classes, but they were associated w ith n o form al program s o r organizations. Broader-based groups em erged at this time, taking the names o f the great powers to w hich the members looked fo r support. Th e involvem ent o f the great powers in the G reek civil w ar is discussed in detail subsequently. For internal affairs the role that Russia, Britain, and France w ould henceforth play in G reek politics had equal significance. Local political leaders, recognizing the decisive importance o f foreign intervention, sought to associate themselves w ith a pow er and to gain that governm ent’s support fo r their ow n ambitions. A s could be expected, the Russian Party came into existence w ith the election o f Capodistrias, although he did not fo llo w a

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 distinctly pro-R ussian policy during his term in office. T h e French Party was led by Ioannis K olettis, w hose ch ief support came from Rum eli. This group favored a candidate from the French house o f Orléans as the future ruler o f Greece; it received som e assistance from Paris. T he British Party, w ith A lex­ ander M avrokordatos at its head, was in a particularly strong position. British naval power, which was predom inant in the M editerranean, could determine the fate o f the Greek revolt; British Philhellenes were active in the Greek cause. A ll three parties put their faith in the intervention o f their patron pow ers, and all sought subsidies from their consulates. T he first truly national governm ent in Greece was form ed by Capodistrias soon after his arrival in Greece in February 1828. A fter the tsar’s denunciation o f the G reek revolt, Capodistrias left Russian service and w ent to live in Switzerland. D espite his long years in Russian administration, he was pri­ m arily a G reek patriot. H is experience in holding high office in the Russian governm ent led him to seek to introduce into Greece the political institutions that w ere favored at that time, particularly by the conservative states. H e thus w ished to establish a centralized, bureaucratic, but “ enlightened” regime that w ou ld give the executive a great deal o f power. There w as, how ever, no m od­ ern precedent for this type o f governm ent for the G reek lands, w hose admin­ istration under O ttom an rule had been decentralized. Both the notables and the m ilitary men were strongly entrenched and determ ined to defend their tigh t local circles o f authority. M oreover, as a new arrival in Greece, C ap o ­ distrias had not had time to build a large group o f personal supporters, nor did he have a territorial base. A t first he received the backing o f Kolokotronis and his follow ers and o f the Peloponnesian notables. Th e members o f the French and British parties denounced him as a Russian partisan, which he was not, at least not in the detrimental sense they meant. Nevertheless, during his short period in office Capodistrias did draw up plans for a centralized governm ent and a national administrative system; this w ork is discussed in a later section in connection w ith its permanent influence on G reek political life. H e also carried on negotiations w ith the great powers on the status o f a future autonom ous G reek state. It had been decided that Greece w ou ld be a constitutional monarchy. Since there appeared no possi­ bility o f the feuding G reek factions’ agreeing on a single native candidate, the powers had decided that the country should have a foreign prince. The m ost popular candidate was L eop old o f Saxe-C oburg, a Germ an prince w ho was the British choice. H e , however, refused because he was not satisfied either w ith the financial arrangements o r w ith the boundaries o f his king­ dom . H e later became the king o f Belgium . Capodistrias, w h o may have discouraged the prince w ith the hope o f gaining the high office for himself, was not to live to see the form ation o f the G reek kingdom . In O ctober 1831 he was assassinated in an act o f revenge by a family several o f w hose members he had imprisoned. Personal honor and the blood feud were living realities in revolutionary Greece.

The first national revolutions W ith the death o f Capodistrias, the governm ent passed into the hands o f a trium virate consisting o f A vgoustinos Capodistrias, the president’s brother, K olokotronis, and Kolettis. This group, too, was unable to maintain control over the country; once again anarchical conditions were prevalent every­ where. Meanwhile, the failure o f the Greek revolutionary troops to win battles, together w ith the inability o f the civil leaders to form a stable, lasting g o v ­ ernment, had led Russia, France, and Britain to take matters into their ow n hands. G reat-pow er intervention took the form o f military actions against the O ttom an and Egyptian forces and the determ ination o f the form o f the first G reek governm ent. These states also named the king. T h e G reek revolution provided dangers for the great powers that had not been present during the Serbian revolt o r the events in the Principalities. Serbia w as geographically remote from the sensitive areas o f European diplo­ m acy; the Principalities were a Russian and H absbu rg sphere, and these tw o powers were in agreement. In contrast, the Greek strategic position and Greece’s w idely scattered islands made the control o f its territory a m atter o f European concern. O f the great pow ers, the H absburg M onarchy and Prussia were only peripherally involved in the fate o f the area. Britain, France, and Russia, on the other hand, had m ajor interests at stake. O f the three states, Britain, w ith naval dom ination in the M editerranean, was in the best position to influence G reek affairs. France wished to maintain the balance o f pow er in the M editerranean and had influential partisans in Greece. T he French g o v ­ ernment also had close relations w ith M uham m ad A li and a point o f support in E gyp t. In the past R ussia had been the pow er that could exert the greatest influence, prim arily because o f the com m on O rthodox religion and the R u s­ sian involvem ent in O ttom an and Rom anian affairs. We have already seen h ow the Etairia relied on eventual Russian aid; such support seemed entirely logical in view o f the past relationships. W hen the revolt broke out in 1821, no great pow er was ready for an inter­ national crisis in the East. Castlereagh, the British prime minister, and R o b ­ ert C an ning, his successor, were both for the maintenance o f the O ttom an Em pire. M etternich was extremely hostile to any revolutionary activity, and he w ished to protect O ttom an territorial integrity. In his opinion the uprising was a clear case o f a dangerous revolutionary challenge to a legitim ate sov­ ereign, and com parable to the movements in Italy, Germany, and Spain that the conservative monarchs were bent on suppressing. T h e G reek actions also opened the area to Russian penetration and could bring up issues that m ight endanger the H o ly Alliance.

The Russian reaction, as we have seen, was of two sorts. Alexander I was in a period of intense conservatism; he also detested revolutionary outbreaks. Nevertheless, Russia did have treaties with the Porte concerning the govern­ ment o f the Principalities, and certain responsibilities toward the Orthodox Christians. The difference between the punishment of guilty rebels and the victimization o f innocent Christians was impressed on the Ottoman govem223

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 ment. In addition, the measures taken by the Porte w ere hindering Russian trade. It w ill be remembered that much o f the Russian grain trade w ith E u ­ rope was carried in G reek ships flying the Russian flag. N o t only had the revolt made the seas unsafe, but the O ttom an authorities w ere hindering the passage o f these Russian cargoes through the Straits. Russia also had conflicts w ith the O ttom an governm ent concerning the Caucasus. D espite these points o f dispute with the Porte, Alexander did not w ish the crisis to lead to an outbreak o f hostilities. H e did not seek the dissolution o f the O ttom an Em pire, o r even its severe weakening. M oreover, he was w ell aware that he could not take strong action w ithout consulting other states, since unilateral intervention m ight lead to the form ation o f a European coa­ lition against Russia. Thus, although diplomatic relations with the Porte were broken in 1821, no m ilitary action was taken. Instead, the Russian leaders preferred to follow the path o f negotiation and act in cooperation w ith the other great powers. T h e basic Russian policy continued to be what it had been in the past: it favored the creation o f autonom ous Balkan governm ents under O ttom an sovereignty, similar to the regimes in the D anubian Princi­ palities, w hich w ould, i f that advantage could be obtained, be under Russian protection. In January 1824 Alexander circulated through the European cap­ itals a plan calling for the establishment o f three autonom ous G reek states that were to be given the same status as M oldavia and Wallachia. T h e idea aroused little enthusiasm. To Britain in particular the proposal seemed little m ore than the attempt to extend Russian influence over yet another Balkan area. D espite British fears, the control o f Greece was not a Russian goal. R ussia was far m ore concerned about events in the Principalities, Serbia, and the Caucasus. O n these questions, it w ill be noted, R ussia negotiated w ith the Porte alone; on G reek affairs a policy o f close cooperation w ith the p o w ­ ers was pursued. M eanw hile, the British governm ent was under increasing public pressure to act in support o f the revolutionaries. In Britain, as in the rest o f E urope, the rom antic m ovem ent o f Philhellenism was to influence the actions and attitudes o f the governm ent. In all the European states the political leaders and the influential members o f the public had received a remarkably similar classical education in which the language and culture o f ancient Greece had been prom inent. W hen considering the G reek revolution o f the 1820s, these men often transferred the impressions o f Greece that they had gained in their youth to the contem porary Balkan scene. T h ey thus saw the G reek captains and their peasant follow ers as the direct descendants o f the m ythological he roes o f the ancient w orld. T he O ttom an forces w ere regularly portrayed as brutal barbarians w h o were inflicting unprovoked terror on innocent and civilized victims. W hat was in fact G reek national propaganda was thus ably presented by painters, writers, poets, and politicians throughout the w orld. F o r the form ation o f British opinion the m ost influential Philhellene was certainly L o rd B yron , w h o died at M isolon ghi in 1824. Q uoted here to dem ­

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The first national revolutions onstrate the em otional appeal o f Philhellene w riting and the connection that it made between ancient and m odern Greece are some verses o f his that were written before the revolution: T h e isles o f Greece, the isles o f Greece! W here burning Sappho loved and sung, W here grew the arts o f w ar and peace, W here D elos rose, and Phoebus sprung! Eternal summer gilds them yet, B u t all, except their sun, is set.

T he m ountains look on M arathon — A n d M arathon looks on the sea; A n d m using there an hour alone, I’d dream ’d that Greece m ight still be free; F o r standing on the Persians’ grave, I could not deem m yself a slave.

Trust not for freedom to the Franks T h ey have a king w h o buys and sells; In native sw ords, and native ranks, The only hope o f courage dwells; B u t Turkish force, and Latin fraud, W ould break you r shield, how ever broad.

Place me on Sunium ’s marbled steep, W here nothing, save the waves and I, M ay hear ou r m utual m urm urs sweep; T here, swan-like, let me sing and die; A land o f slaves shall ne’er be mine D ash dow n yon cup o f Sam ian w in e!14 In addition to the appeals from sections o f its educated public, the British governm ent had practical reasons for entering the conflict. Its trade in the M editerranean had been injured by the events in Greece. M oreover, Britain feared that i f it did not take action, Russia m ight decide the question alone. The wisest policy m ight thus be to join that pow er in order better to contain and control its m oves. British intervention was slow. First, in 1823, the revo­ 14

F ro m “ S o n g o f th e G reek P oet,” in Don Ju an , in R o b e rt M . Gay, ed. The College Book of Verse, 12S0-192S (B o sto n: H o u g h to n M ifflin, 1927), p p. 35S-361.

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 lutionaries were recognized as belligerents, an action that im proved their po­ sition at sea. Then in 1824 a loan was floated in Lon don . It was very badly if not fraudulendy administered, but it did involve financial assistance to the revolutionary government. The great change in the British attitude came with the E gyptian army’s invasion o f Crete and the Peloponnesus. Th is move al­ tered the balance o f pow er in the M editerranean and w as detrimental to the British position there. A lexander I died in 1825 and was succeeded by his brother, N icholas I, who was to adopt a much firmer attitude tow ard the questions at issue with the Porte. Even more strongly conservative than his predecessor, he insisted upon O ttom an respect for Russian rights under the treaties, but he too favored cooperation w ith the other powers on the Greek question. In 1826 the British governm ent sent the D uke o f W ellington to St. Petersburg to attend N icho­ las’s coronation. There in A pril Russia and Britain concluded the Convention o f St. Petersburg, an agreement obligating the tw o to seek to mediate a settlement o f the G reek conflict. T he aim was to achieve the establishment o f an autonom ous state; the borders w ere not designated. A lth ou gh the H abs­ burg E m pire stayed out o f these negotiations, France joined in Ju ly 1827. The French m onarch, Charles X , was a Philhellene; furtherm ore, France could not afford to stand aside on questions involving the M editerranean. T h e three allied powers then proceeded to take positive measures o f inter­ vention to stop the fighting in Greece. T h e revolutionaries accepted the me­ diation, but the Porte refused. A s a consequence, the European powers took a step that was gready in the G reek interest by setting up a naval blockade, enforced by a squadron com posed o f ships from the three states, to keep E gyptian supplies and men from crossing to the Peloponnesus. A n incident was almost bound to occur under these circumstances. In O ctober 1827 the allied force entered N avarino Bay, where a Turko-Egyptian fleet was an­ chored. Shots were exchanged, and a m ajor battle began. T he O ttom an fleet was dem olished; fifty-seven vessels were sunk w ith a loss o f eight thousand men. Th e m ajority o f these O ttom an sailors were G reek nationals, since this sector o f the population provided m ost o f the m anpower for the Ottoman navy. T h e incident at N avarino set in m otion a series o f events that were to be highly beneficial to the G reek cause, although this trend was not imme­ diately apparent. T h e D uke o f W ellington w as by that time the British prime minister. D enouncing the entire episode, he w ithdrew his country from fur­ ther participation in the m ediation effort and thus reversed C anning’s policy o f associating w ith R ussia in order to control and lim it its actions. D u rin g this period the Russian governm ent continued to negotiate with the Porte on other matters in dispute. T h e O ttom an governm ent had diffi­ culty resisting demands from its pow erful neighbor. T h e state was in a very weak position: it had not been able to handle the G reek rebellion; and it faced a coalition o f powers w h o appeared determined to act in favor o f the insurgents. Th u s when Russia delivered a virtual ultimatum in M arch 1826,

The first national revolutions the Porte could do little more than accept and agree to negotiate the matters in dispute. In October 1826 the Convention of Akkerman was signed; the Ottoman government conceded almost all of the Russian demands. The agreement provided for the settlement o f the Asiatic frontier and the com­ mercial conflicts that had arisen. Most important for the Balkan states, two “Separate Acts” regulated the affairs of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia. Rus­ sia received a clear protectorate over all three provinces. Despite this surren­ der, the negotiations gave Mahmud II time to proceed with internal reform. In June 1826 the sultan took the important step of abolishing the janissary corps. This act would allow him to embark upon a major reform of the army in the future, but it temporarily weakened the Ottoman military potential. The news o f the disaster at Navarino in October 1827 aroused a violent reaction in Constantinople. The Turkish fleet had been sunk by powers with whom the Porte was at peace. A strong wave of anti-Western religious feeling swept Constantinople. The empire broke relations with Britain, France, and Russia, but the chief animosity was directed against St. Petersburg. The Con­ vention o f Akkerman was denounced, and a Holy War was declared against Russia. The actual fighting did not commence until April 1828, when Russian troops entered the Principalities. During this new Russo-Turkish war, Greek issues for a short period ceased to occupy the center o f the stage. However, with the Ottoman army fully engaged in meeting the Russian invasion, the Western powers could regulate Greek affairs. In August 1828 Muhammad Ali agreed to withdraw the Egyptian troops from the Peloponnesus. A French expeditionary force took their place, and British officers and men were sent to other areas o f Greece. Although at war with the Ottoman Empire, the Russian government was fully aware o f the dangers in the situation. It did not want to impose a settle­ ment in the East that would result in a massive reaction by the other govern­ ments. Its goals in the war thus became little more than the implementation of the provisions o f the Convention of Akkerman, which the Porte had al­ ready accepted. The Russian leaders were aware that Constantinople could not be occupied even if the Russian armies were in a position to take the city. Despite the fact that they had cooperated with Britain and France in the Greek question, they fully recognized the limits that had to be placed on their ambitions. These considerations played a major part in an important decision con­ cerning future policy toward the Ottoman Empire that was made at this time. The Russian leaders decided that they would seek not to destroy or partition the Ottoman Empire, but rather to dominate it from within. In­ stead of directly conquering the state, they would assure that Russian repre­ sentatives had the primary influence in the councils of the sultan. This policy naturally had an effect on Russian relations with the Balkan people. If the Russian government could achieve predominance over the entire empire, it would be less likely to support Balkan liberation movements that would weaken 227

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 the Ottoman state. In fact, in the next years Russia was to become more interested in protecting the Porte than in aiding Balkan national movements. Firm support was given to the maintenance of the autonomous rights that had already been granted, but further changes were not encouraged. T h e Treaty o f A drianople o f Septem ber 1829, in conform ity w ith this pol­ icy, was moderate in its terms. T he achievement o f victory had not been easy fo r the Russian army. B oth Russia and the O ttom an E m pire needed a con­ ciliatory peace. In direct gains, Russia took control o f the D anube Delta and som e territory along the Caucasian boundary. A large indem nity was im­ posed, w hich the O ttom an Em pire, in a bad financial condition, deeply re­ sented. In addition, the terms o f the C onvention o f Akkerm an were recon­ firmed. In Article X the Porte agreed to accept an autonom ous status for Greece. T he treaty also assured the opening o f the Straits fo r the passage o f Russian commercial vessels and guaranteed freedom o f trade throughout the empire. A lth ough Russia had thus negotiated the questions dealing w ith Serbia and the Principalities w ith the Porte alone, it joined its allies to setde the G reek situation by mutual agreement. In these final stages, it w ill be noted, no G reek participants were included in the negotiations. T h e powers recog­ nized that the ch ief difficulty in Greece was assuring a stable government. Capodistrias had attempted to set up a strong regim e, but the British, re­ garding him as a Russian partisan, had not trusted him. A fter his assassina­ tion, the country again fell into political chaos. There was no recognized national leader w ith w hom the allies could w ork, and a stable government was not in power. Th e Treaty o f Lon d on o f February 1830 was the m ost im portant agreement for the form ation o f the m odem Greek nation. H ere the three powers set the boundaries and settled the form o f governm ent. Largely at British urging, it was decided that the state w ould be independent rather than autonomous. T h e British diplom ats were highly concerned lest the country becom e a R u s­ sian satellite; they thought that this event w ould be less likely i f all connec­ tions between Athens and Constantinople were severed. A lth ough the R u s­ sian governm ent w ould have preferred an autonom ous status, it accepted the new arrangement. Britain’s concerns over Russian influence also led it to wish to lim it the size o f the state as much as possible. To protect their interests in the future, the three powers appointed themselves the protectors, or guar­ antors, o f the country - a provision o f the treaty that was to provide unlim­ ited excuses fo r intervention later. Since the governm ent was to be monarchical, a ruler had to be named. The search was difficult, since all o f the new protectors had to approve the choice. Leop o ld o f Saxe-C oburg, as w e have seen, refused because o f the difficult situation in Greece and his discontent with the conditions that were offered him. In 1832 the pow ers finally named O tto, the second son o f L u d w ig I, the Philhellene king o f Bavaria. T h e new m onarch, only seventeen at the time o f

The first national revolutions his appointm ent, arrived in Greece in February 1833. H e took the G reek form o f his name, O thon. H e was provided w ith a loan and w hat w ere in fact expanded boundaries fo r his kingdom . W ith the frontier finally draw n at the Arta-Volos line, the new G reek state was com posed o f on ly about 800,ooo people, a quarter o f the G reek inhabitants o f the empire. A lth ou gh an independent Greece was finally in existence, it was a far cry from the dreams o f the Greek nationalists. A small, im poverished Balkan state, it had little resemblance to the recreated Byzantine Em pire that was the ideal not only o f the Phanariots, but o f m ost Greek political leaders. M o re­ over, its independence was severely limited. In the future the three founding great pow ers w ere to make full use o f their right o f protection. Furtherm ore, the Bavarian administration that was established had at first little G reek par­ ticipation. A m odern G reek state was on the m ap, nevertheless, and a na­ tional governm ent was to com e to pow er w ithin the next decade.

: th e a c h iev em en FIRST REVOLUTIONS

c o n c l u s io n

t s

of th e

T h e first national liberation movements had thus w on a measure o f success, although not w hat their original organizers had wished. Serbia under Prince M iloS had gained m any rights, but not a fully autonom ous status. Further advances, how ever, w ere to be achieved w ith the application o f the terms o f the Treaty o f A drianople. In Wallachia and M oldavia both the Greek-led re­ volt and the peasant rebellion had failed. H ow ever, the Phanariot regim e was brought to an end and a native government installed. As a result o f the RussoTurkish War, O ttom an sovereignty was to be further limited, but w ith a great increase o f R ussian influence in the country. T he consequences o f the G reek revolution w ere not so clear. T h e Greeks as a nation had lost a great deal. T h ey no longer provided the princes fo r the D anubian Principalities. W ithin the O ttom an Em pire they w ere regarded as traitors, particularly by the M uslim population. Phanariots still held high offices, but they w ere no longer in a special, privileged category. T h e Greek position in business and commerce was also weaker. Arm enians tended to replace Greeks in banking, and Bulgarian merchants became increasingly im ­ portant in supplying state and m ilitary needs. Like the Greeks o f C onstanti­ nople and o f the diaspora, the population o f mainland Greece had suffered severely. T h e land was devastated after ten years o f civil w ar and foreign occupation. M oreover, the state established in 1830 was extremely limited in territorial extent. T he powers had also felt it necessary to endow the techni­ cally independent nation w ith a Bavarian administration and, as w e shall see, a m ercenary arm y o f foreigners. D espite the fact that there was no general rising in the Balkans at this time, the m ovem ents in Greece, Serbia, and the Principalities shared certain com ­ m on features. D u rin g this period the leaders in each area had to define more

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887

Pass and waterfall in the Balkan Mountains

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The first national revolutions closely their goals for the future. Only the Filiki Etairia started out with a full-fledged political program, calling for the establishment o f a free Greece with wide boundaries. The Serbian revolution began as a spontaneous defen­ sive action against unruly janissaries; the revolt in the Peloponnesus, despite the previous preparations o f the Etairia, took place because of the primates’ fear that the Ottoman authorities might take reprisals against them. Vladimirescu’s rebellion was never ostensibly directed against Ottoman control. Nevertheless, by the end of this revolutionary period, in every region the clear desire of the leadership was the formation o f a national state with either an independent or an autonomous status. Each area also had a government that could both negotiate with the powers and present a common front in relations with the Porte. Central administrations existed in both Serbia and Greece, where previously there had been scattered communal authorities. In the Principalities native princes governed the country, not Greek agents of the Porte. The movements shared certain other similarities. All used terrorist meth­ ods, and these succeeded. We have seen how the massacre of Muslims was among the first actions of the Christian insurgents. These atrocities were often directed not against individuals or officials who had been guilty of cruel or unjust acts, but rather against civilians who had no means o f defending themselves. The Ottoman authorities replied with even harsher means of re­ prisal, although the Porte found it very difficult to deal with Christian rebel­ lion without the use o f the regular army. The government did not have ade­ quate police control on the local level anywhere in the empire. In the Principalities, o f course, it had no armed forces. The Christian revolutionaries also used cruel measures against uncoopera­ tive members o f their own faith and nationality. One account, discussing methods of recruitment for the Serbian revolt, informs us: “It was the custom to persuade the hesitant to join the rebellion by having more resolute neigh­ bors set fire to their houses or for Karadjordje to hang a Turk on their thresh­ old.” 15 In the latter case the rebels would denounce the householder to the authorities, and he would then be forced to flee to the hills and join the insurgents. In the course o f the revolt, its participants often did more damage to their own countrymen than to the Ottoman opponent. Vladimirescu’s peasants burned and looted. The breakdown o f order and the lack o f ade­ quate police control gave free reign to criminals and violent individuals. Ioannis Makrigiannis, one of the leading military men of the Greek revolution, found that he could not keep his followers from destructive actions. He described an event o f 1824 as follows: After my men had seen how the troops under Gouras and others were pillaging the country people while they themselves were for15

D ed ijer e t al., History o f Yugoslavia, p. 266.

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 bidden to do so by me, they too would no longer listen to me on the march. In a village near Tripotamon some of them plundered the village without taking thought for me as their senior commander. I feared they would rob me too and young Sisinis and others, and I should be taken for a liar and a man of no honour . . . As my own men had looted the village, when the wretched inhabitants came before me in tears and I could not help them, I felt a deathly shame.16 Balkan history to the present has regularly been filled w ith accounts o f great physical cruelty not only to equal adversaries, but to the defenseless, the defeated enemy, and prisoners. A lth ough some o f the stories are an ex­ treme exaggeration, they do reflect the atmosphere o f bitter and merciless w arfare that w ent on not only between the Christian population and the M uslim rulers, but also am ong the nationalities themselves. M an y o f the cus­ toms o f the time w ere deeply repulsive to Western observers. We have seen previously in this account the practice o f sending a severed head to the sultan. T h e staking out o f heads and impalem ent w ere regular m ethods o f public control. In som e prim itive areas head collecting was part o f the local culture. To the M ontenegrins, fo r example, the practice had great sym bolic signifi­ cance. A prom inent m odem Yugoslav writer explains:

The severed head was the greatest pride and joy o f the Montenegrin. H e regarded the taking o f heads as the m ost exalted act and spiritual solace — having been nurtured in mythical history and in the naked struggle for life. H e had not felt hatred for the cut-off head, the hatred he was bound to feel fo r it in its live state, but on ly esteem and solicitude. H e washed it, salted it, com bed it. A fter all, it was a human head and the badge o f his ow n highest merit. T h e M o n te­ negrins did not exhibit heads to terrify their enemies, as the Turks were w o n t to do, but as signs o f public acclaim and recognition. T he num ber o f heads one took was remembered, handed dow n , and marked on gravestones . . . T h at which seemed like savagery to the foreigner was for the M ontenegrin the poetry o f w arfare.17 A lth ou gh Serbia, Greece, Wallachia, and M oldavia undoubtedly gained a great deal o f freedom from O ttom an control in this period, the authority o f the Porte w as replaced by a dom ination that could, i f fully exercised, become even m ore difficult to withstand. B y 1830 the Principalities and Serbia were under a recognized Ru ssian protectorate; Greece was under the three-power guarantee o f Britain, France, and Russia. Th is great-pow er control exerted a 16 17

I

Io an n es M akriyannis, The Memoirs o f General Makriyannis, 1797-1864*, trans. and ed. H . A. L id d erd ale (L o n d o n : O x fo rd U niversity Press, 1966), p. 57. M ilo v an D jilas, Njcgol (N ew York: H a rc o u rt, Brace & W orld, 1966), p p. 245-246.

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233 Pass in the Balkan Mountains

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 determining influence on the political development of the Balkan states over a long period. The terms protection and protectorate, as used here, describe the establishment by a single state or a group o f states of a right o f interference in or control over the internal or foreign policy of another country, one that is recognized in some form by an international treaty or a tacit understand­ ing. The working o f this institution for the rest of the century is described in detail later in this account. However, in summary, the Principalities were to be under Russian protection to 1856 and then under great-power supervision to 1878; Serbia was under Russian protection to 1856 and under great-power authority until 1878, and then it became a client o f the Habsburg Empire until 1903; Bulgaria was in the Russian sphere from 1878 to 1886; Greece had the misfortune to have three protectors, who kept this position until 1923. The degree o f influence exerted by a protecting power depended on the circumstances o f the time and the issues involved. However, the generally recognized principle of the right o f European supervision meant that the first governments o f the Balkan states were organized more by the great powers than by the national leaders. An exception is to be found, however, in the case of Serbia, whose first administration was the work of Prince MiloS. The European states, together or singly, determined the form o f the Greek king­ dom in the 1830s, the organization of the Danubian Principalities in 1856, the government o f autonomous Bulgaria in 1878, and that o f Albania in 1913. Thereafter, the powers repeatedly intervened in the internal affairs o f each state. In the coming years the Balkan leaders thus had to deal not only with the Porte, but also with the European states, who had enormous military, political, and economic strength behind them.

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5 The formation of the national governments p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s the stages by which four Balkan people won a wide degree of control over their own administration have been examined. By 1816, under the rule of Prince Milos, Serbia had gained rights of internal self-government, although not a fully autonomous regime. Montenegro had succeeded in maintaining a defiant attitude that made the attempt to collect regular taxes or interfere in its local affairs too costly a policy for the Ottoman Empire to undertake under normal circumstances. The Danubian Principalities by 1822 had been able to get rid of their Phanariot governors; the exact relationship with both the Porte and Russia had still to be determined. Greece by 1830 was at least in theory a fully independent state, despite the Bavarian administration and the great-power protection. Although Montenegro was to continue to engage in almost constant bor­ der warfare, and the Danubian Principalities were to undergo another Rus­ sian and Ottoman occupation in 1848, with these exceptions the Balkan states enjoyed a period of relative tranquility that was to last until the 1870s. One major European conflict, the Crimean War, did involve Balkan issues directly, but, though the Principalities did once more experience a Russian, followed by a Habsburg and Ottoman, occupation, there was no fighting on the pen­ insula and local armies were not engaged. These years could thus be devoted to the consolidation of the internal regimes and to attempts to modernize and improve the lives o f the inhabitants. Problems of domestic administra­ tion accordingly dominate the history o f these four areas in this period. Al­ though they were to develop both socially and politically along differing paths, all shared certain common problems. The first task that had to be undertaken was the formation o f national administrations; in each state a strongly centralized regime was established. As we have seen, under the Ottoman system the Christian population had enjoyed wide rights of self-administration through local communities and the millet system. The Christians did not, however, have national secular orga­ nizations within the Ottoman Empire. The church took the place o f a Ser­ bian, Bulgarian, Albanian, and Bulgarian civil administration. An exception, of course, could be found in the Principalities, with their princely courts in Bucharest and Ia§i, but these provinces had never been directly administered

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n th e

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 by the Porte. In practice, the building of national governments involved tak­ ing power from local authorities, who had functioned effectively in the past in their own spheres. This move inevitably met with much opposition in both Christian and Muslim areas where the local notables were jealous of their power and prestige. However, it was obvious that the small states could not survive without central, strong leaderships that could in each case mobi­ lize and use the resources of the entire nation. Closely tied with the formation o f the administration was the extremely sensitive issue o f who or what group would control the state apparatus. As we have seen, throughout Balkan history there had been conflicts between the ruler, or whoever held the executive power, and the notables and military men with their ties to definite localities. The latter regularly followed the principle that we have seen in the Greek and Serbian revolutions of refusing to recognize the authority of an executive they could not control. As we shall see, this group was often to adopt Western political ideology to the extent of calling for constitutions or charters, which would limit the power of the ruler, and for the establishment of some sort of council or assembly to share in the control of the state. These were not democratic movements. Powerful families and strong individuals fought for predominance in the government; they wished to control it for themselves and their followers. Although many gained their strength from their authority in the countryside, few called for a decentralized administration or a widening of the franchise to include the peasant majority. In addition to building domestic institutions, the Balkan leaders had to determine their relations with their neighbors and with the great powers. The autonomous states in theory should not have conducted foreign relations - that was the privilege and the duty o f the Porte. In fact, all did in one form or another. Usually special agents were sent to the European courts to present the individual national point o f view in times of crisis. Even more effective, however, were the direct relations established between the European consu­ lates in the Balkan capitals and the national governments. European consular agents were very active throughout this period. They competed with one another for predominant influence, and they interfered constantly in domes­ tic affairs. They championed rival political factions, and they sought special privileges for their clients. Their position was often very strong. Owing to the capitulations they had a special legal standing, even in the autonomous states, that put them outside the jurisdiction of the local courts. They could also offer protection and favors to natives; some could even sell their own country’s citizenship. As part o f their foreign relations the governments had to formulate a na­ tional policy. O f course, none of these states included all o f the Balkan inhab­ itants of the nationality concerned. Obviously, diplomatic and military plans had to be made for the eventual acquisition of further territories. At the same time the national idea had to be propagated. It is impossible to judge the 236

The formation of the national governments extent to which the people in any Balkan area held deeply nationalistic con­ victions - that is, in the sense o f believing that the nation-state was the nat­ ural moral and political division for mankind and that it should command the first allegiance o f the citizen. The majority o f peasants were probably emotionally most closely attached to their families and regions and perhaps their local churches. Certainly the new governments did take seriously the task of teaching patriotism to the population. National propaganda, for both internal and foreign consumption, became a major state industry and was perhaps the strongest component of the education given in the new school systems. With the achievement o f autonomy or independence, the new regimes had to regulate their relationships with the Orthodox church, which, as we have seen, fulfilled many important functions under the Ottoman rule. One of the first moves that each government made was to attempt to separate its eccle­ siastical organization from the Constantinople Patriarchate. Although it was obvious that the churches could not remain under the jurisdiction of a hier­ archy closely associated with the Ottoman Empire, the move also was to the benefit of the state. What occurred at this point was not a separation of church and state, as happened in liberal Western Europe, but the subordina­ tion of the religious to the secular authorities. The government took over those aspects o f life that had formerly been under millet jurisdiction, includ­ ing not only matters such as education and social welfare, but also to an extent the moral guidance o f the population. Under Ottoman rule the O r­ thodox church had major political responsibilities; it held the Christian people together and ordered their lives. The new national churches were to be run by synods whose members were often political appointees; their main con­ cerns were often not to center on purely ecclesiastical problems. Although a small minority o f the population in each state was to decide the major political questions, their actions, o f course, involved the fate of the peasant majority. Excluded from direct participation in the political activities, the peasants were primarily interested in the land question, particularly in the issues involving ownership, or payments where plots were held on the sharecropping or leasing system. State taxes and labor dues were also a grievance. The major objective of most peasant families was the securing o f direct con­ trol over a definite piece of land, and then, if possible, the extension of this property. We have seen the great confusion o f the land system in the eigh­ teenth century, with the multiple methods of landholding and the weight of taxation and labor dues carried by the individual. A regulation of this ques­ tion was an absolute necessity for the national regimes, and the solutions they adopted were to have a determining effect on the future evolution of each state. A ll o f the Balkan governm ents were acutely aware that their economic developm ent lagged behind that o f Western Europe. B y the end o f the cen­ tury, despite the em ergence o f the independent states, the gap between B al­

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 kan and Western European levels o f development had widened considerably. The efforts made to modernize Balkan societies and to introduce advanced Western technological achievements, such as railroads and the telegraph, are an important part o f the history of the region. The principal emphases o f this chapter, however, are the problems o f political organization, the relations among the Balkan states and with the great powers, and the land and peasant question. General economic issues are covered in a subsequent section. S E R B I A F R O M M I L O S TO M I L A N

The status of the Serbian principality had been settled, it will be remembered, on the basis o f the agreement between Milos and Marashli Ali Pasha, the vezir o f Rumelia. MiloS was recognized as supreme knez; his government was to administer the country and collect the taxes. His rule, however, was not hereditary. Moreover, in contrast to the situation in the Danubian Prin­ cipalities, in Serbia the Ottoman presence was still strong and obvious. An Ottoman governor was appointed for Belgrade; other officials and judges remained in residence. The sipahis, the merchants, and the garrisons o f the fortress cities were further reminders of Ottoman control. The main objective o f the first period o f Milos’s rule was to change these conditions. He wished to strengthen his personal position and win further autonomous rights for the state. Serbia at this time was an extremely primitive land. It was, one authority writes, a poor and primitive pashalik with the physical appearance o f an American frontier region and with cultural characteristics reflecting the past centuries o f Ottoman rule. The few roads that were cut through the forests could be traversed only on foot, on horseback, or by oxcart. Two roads alone were fit for carriage traveling, but this did not cause hardship because only two people boasted carriages, the pasha in Belgrade and Prince MiloS himself. The Serbian peasants regarded the surrounding forests as a nuisance to be rid o f as soon as possible and, like the American fron­ tiersmen, they set fire to vast stands in order to scatter corn seed between the charred stumps. Also, the manner of everyday life in the Morava Valley closely resembled that in the Ohio Valley - the same log cabins, home-made furniture and clothes, plain food but plenty o f it, plum brandy in place o f rum, books and schools conspicuous by their scarcity, and an abundance of malaria and other diseases which were treated by a combination of home remedies, barbers, and quacks.1 1

L. S. S tavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (N ew York: R in eh a rt, 1958), p· 251.

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The formation of the national governments Only the outward appearance, however, linked Serbia with the American West. MiloS’s reign was to demonstrate how deeply the Ottoman rule had affected the political outlook of the Balkan people. MiloS’s first task was to organize a central administration. He had inherited only one state institution, the National Chancery, which was a higher court; otherwise he had no basis on which to build. MiloS was not an educated man; he could not read or write. Nor had he experienced life outside the Ottoman Empire. With this background he naturally adopted Ottoman ex­ amples in running his state; essentially he acted like a Turkish pasha. He was opposed by the local notables, who resented his attitude as well as the eleva­ tion of one o f their number to the supreme position. They were used to running their own districts with little interference from a central authority. The struggle between the prince and the dissident notables was to be the central theme of Serbian political history over the next decades. MiloS had the advantage o f being an extremely clever and wily politician. He succeeded not only in dominating the political situation, but in making himself very wealthy. Rising from his origins as a poor peasant, he became one of the richest men in Europe. Since the public money and his private funds were not clearly separated, he did not hesitate to use his advantage in his speculations. He took possession of state lands and property that had been confiscated from Ottoman owners. Using the state labor taxes, he had the peasants work off their obligations on his private undertakings. He held a monopoly on livestock exports and on the sale of salt. He also owned large estates and seventeen villages in Wallachia. Despite his autocratic attitude and his obvious corruption, MiloS was a popular and respected leader among the population at large. He was a figure that the peasant could understand. Illiterate and rude in manner, he was not far separated from the average man. Throughout his reign the prince had difficulties in dealing with the Porte and the notables, but the majority of the people gave him their full support. MiloS’s controversies with the Porte concerned both his personal authority and the exact rights of the Serbian government. His position was not hered­ itary, and the borders o f the principality had not been finally determined. Although MiloS remained in touch with the Russian government, which as­ sured him o f backing in the attempt to secure the implementation of Article VIII o f the Treaty o f Bucharest, the prince preferred to deal directly with the Porte. His method was still to make gains through collaboration with the Ottoman authorities; he made frequent professions of loyalty and devotion to the sultan, and he distributed rich bribes widely. His first objective was to secure the right o f hereditary succession for his family. Because the prince did not want to jeopardize his relations with the Porte, he refused to cooperate with the Etairia in its endeavor to organize a great Balkan rising. There were certainly no close ties between the Serbs and the Greeks, and the Serbian interests had been adversely affected by the Phanariot 239

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 influence in Constantinople. Th e G reek leaders for their part w ere prim arily interested in using the Serbian lands as a base o f operation fo r their national revolt. M oreover, the entire question became entwined in Serbian internal politics and the opposition o f some notables, w h o saw in Karadjordje a pref­ erable alternative to M iloS. T he return o f the leader o f the first revolution was thus a challenge to the pow er o f the prince. T he assassination o f K ara­ djordje in Ju ly 1817 marked the com mencement o f a feud between the Obrenovic and Karadjordjevic families. W hen M iloS failed to w in O ttom an approval o f hereditary succession, he sum m oned an assembly in 1817 and had it declare him hereditary prince. W ithout the assent o f the Porte o r the great powers, the act had, however, little real value. Thereafter, MiloS turned to consolidating his rule in the country. T h e N ational Chancery was filled w ith his adherents. H e similarly made cer­ tain that he w ou ld not be opposed by the com munal authorities. H e person­ ally appointed the oborknez in each locality and paid him a salary; the local assemblies w ere deprived o f their form er authority. W ith the assistance o f his relatives and friends, the prince was able to maintain his control o f the state. A lth ough there were frequent conspiracies against him, he suppressed them by direct and brutal methods. H e was, however, unable to expand Serbian autonom ous rights through the policy o f collaboration. A s was true in the Principalities, changes in the political relationship w ith the Porte were to come only as the result o f inter­ national crises and the actions o f Russia. This great pow er did continue to support the Serbian position. In A rticle V o f the C onvention o f Akkerman o f O ctober 1826, the Porte gave assurances o f the fulfillment o f its obligations under previous agreements. These were further defined in an A dditional Act as the granting to Serbia o f

freedom of religious worship, the choice of its chiefs, the indepen­ dence of its internal administration, the re-annexation of the districts detached from Serbia, the consolidation o f the various taxes into a single sum, the making over to the Serbians [of] the administration of the properties belonging to Muslims, subject to the payment of the proceeds thereof at the same time with the tribute, liberty of commerce, permission for the Serbian merchants to travel in the O t­ toman dominions with their own passports, the establishment of hospitals, schools, and printinghouses; and, finally, the prohibition to Muslims, other than those belonging to the garrisons, to establish themselves in Serbia.2 T h e accomplishment o f these aims, o f course, was to depend on the R u s­ sian victory in the Russo-Turkish War o f 1828-1829, a conflict in which Ser2

E d w ard H ertslet, The Map o f Europe by Treaty, 4 vols. (L o n d o n : B u tterw o rth s, 187s—1891), 1, 758- 759-

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The formation of the national governments bian participation was not requested. Article V I o f the Treaty o f A drianople confirmed the previous conditions and made additional m ention o f a cession o f territory. Th is stipulation concerned the status o f six districts that Serbia claimed, but that were not administered by M ilos. In a firman o f O ctober 1830 the O ttom an governm ent granted the Serbian principality a fully autonom ous status. M ilos was recognized as hereditary prince; he was to rule w ith an assembly. T he tribute was to be fixed, and no M uslim s were to live in the state except fo r the soldiers attached to the six fortresses that remained under direct Ottoman control. Other Muslims would have to sell their property and leave. T h e question o f the six districts was not finally setded until 1833. A t that time the Porte, hard pressed by a conflict w ith E g y p t, ceded the territory in question, and the tribute was set at 2.3 m illion piastres a year. W ith the establishment o f firm boundaries and the definition o f the relationship w ith the Porte, Serbia’s main attention could be devoted to the question w h o , o r w hat faction, w ou ld run the autonom ous governm ent. A ccording to the firman o f 1830, M ilos was to rule w ith a council and an assembly, bodies that in theory w ould serve as a check on his authority. In Serbia there was also a traditional institution, the skupstina, a popular assem­ bly o f the male population o f a district that was called together in times o f crisis to hear and ratify the declarations o f its leaders. B y 1830 the arbitrary rule o f the prince had created a united opposition com posed principally o f notables, merchants, governm ent officials, and others w h o had been harm ed by M ilo s’s actions o r w h o hated him personally. In the ensuing decade they attempted to force the prince to establish a council or an assembly that w ould share his pow ers, an action that indeed was called for by the agreement w ith the O ttom an Em pire. M iloS, as could be expected, w ould not voluntarily limit his authority. In 1835 an assembly o f about four thousand met and drew up the so-called Presentation Constitution, which called fo r these institu­ tions. T h e prince did appoint a council, but he then ignored it and the rest o f the provisions o f the document. T h e constitutional question also involved the great pow ers, w h o follow ed Serbian dom estic events through their consulates in Belgrade, m ost o f which were established in this period. Russia already had representatives in the prin ­ cipality; they w ere joined in 1835 by an Austrian consulate, in 1837 by a British, and in 1838 by a French. A s in Constantinople and in every other Balkan capital, these consulates vied for influence over the governm ent and partici­ pated actively in dom estic quarrels. In this political crisis the opposition to M ilos was known as the C on stitu­ tionalist Party; its ch ief was Toma Vucic-Perisic. T he goal was the acceptance o f a constitution that w ou ld lim it the powers o f the prince and force him to govern in association w ith the leading men o f the country. T he issue was not that o f popular participation o r democratic reform . T h e alternatives offered were rule by a corrupt prince or by an oligarchy. W ith these choices, the

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 British and French governments gave their support to MiloS and his absolut­ ist system; Russia, in contrast, backed the Constitutionalists. Under strong pressure from the domestic opposition, Milos was forced to agree to an al­ teration in the government. A Serbian delegation was sent to Constantino­ ple, where the discussions were influenced primarily by Russia. The Ottoman Empire was in the midst of a new Egyptian crisis, and Russia’s support of the empire assured this power a predominant diplomatic position in Con­ stantinople. In December 1838 a document known as the Turkish Constitu­ tion was issued. More an administrative statute than a true constitution, this charter was, nevertheless, to form the basis o f the government o f Serbia until 1869. Its most important aspect was the limitation that its provisions placed on the previously arbitrary power o f the prince. Henceforth, he was to gov­ ern in association with a council o f seventeen. He was to nominate the mem­ bers, but they could not thereafter be removed. The prince and the council were to be jointly responsible for legislation; Milos had the right of veto. The document also regulated other aspects of state life, such as the bureaucracy and the judicial system. Unable to accept this new arrangement, MiloS abdi­ cated and left the country. Despite his departure under these adverse circumstances, the prince had accomplished much during his reign. He had regulated the status of Serbia within the Ottoman Empire, and he had gained a very favorable boundary settlement. Although Russia was by treaty the protecting power, neither that state nor any other great power was able to exercise the type o f political domination that we shall see in operation in neighboring states. Moreover, the prince had established the framework for the internal administration. The foundations were thus laid for the state bureaucracy. By the end o f MiloS’s reign the state officials numbered 672, o f which 201 were police. These men were to form an influential group in the future and to develop their own organization and interests. Under the first prince, however, posts in the state service were filled primarily with MiloS’s supporters. Despite the fact that the ruler, like m any other revolutionary leaders, was him self illiterate, he was concerned w ith the developm ent o f education. In the 1830s both elementary schools and a high school were opened. A printing press was in operation in 1831. A t first the situation was very difficult. There was a shortage o f adequately trained teachers, as well as o f books and school supplies. D u rin g the first decades o f the autonom ous state the ch ief intellec­ tual influence was to com e from the Serbs o f the H ab sbu rg M onarchy, w ho had had better opportunities than the Serbs under O ttom an rule to obtain an education. These Serbs from across the border, know n as precani, were also to form an im portant element in the new bureaucracy, since they had the skills needed by the state. Th e Vojvodina was to remain the cultural center o f the Serbs until the you ng state had the chance to catch up. T h e status o f the Serbian church was also regulated during M iloS’s reign. In 1830 the sultan agreed to restore its form er autonom y; the national orga­

Theformation of the national governments nization was headed by the metropolitan o f Belgrade, w h o was from 1833 to 1859 the very able Peter Jovanovic. A lthough O rthodoxy was indeed to play an im portant role in Serbian national development, the leadership o f the state was henceforth clearly in the hands o f the secular authority, that is, the prince and his government. A s w e can see, the peasant was given no role in the new constitutional order. T h e Turkish Constitution placed the political pow er in the hands o f a narrow grou p o f influential men. There was no provision for the sum m oning o f a skupStina. Political authority had been fully transferred from the village and the nahije to the capital, Belgrade. Formerly, under O ttom an administra­ tion, the peasant had often played at least a limited political role as part o f his com m unity o r as a revolutionary fighter; he was now to be governed by agents o f the central governm ent sent to his locality. Nevertheless, much had been gained as a result o f the revolution. M ost im portant, the peasant did receive the type o f land settlement that he preferred. Serbia, as has been show n, was traditionally the land o f the small peasant farm. A s a result o f the revolt and the subsequent agreements, those peasant families which had formerly been attached to estates ow ned by M uslim s did gain full possession o f the land they worked. D uring and imm ediately after the revolution every effort was made to force the Turkish landowners out o f the countryside. Life was made difficult and dangerous for those w h o at­ tem pted to remain. Where possible, M iloS seized O ttom an state property. T he later treaties, which forbade the settlement o f M uslim s in Serbia, com ­ pelled these people to sell their property and emigrate. The sipahis were forced to leave in 1830, but they did receive indemnification fo r their losses. Their land then passed to the small owner. O f course, the land question was not as pressing in Serbia as in certain other regions. There were still huge stretches o f forests and unused land. Nevertheless, the settlement made at this time assured that Serbia w ould become a land o f small peasant proprietors, not o f great landed estates. In 1836 an act was passed to protect the peasant from losing his land to creditors; it set a minim um, including a house, a small plot o f land, and some livestock, that could not be taken away from the peasant household. A fter M iloS abdicated in June 1839, the sucession passed to his son M ilan. This prince, w h o was very ill w ith tuberculosis, died after twenty-six days w ithout ever having taken charge o f the governm ent. A regency held pow er until his brother M ichael returned from abroad in M arch 1840. T h is sixteenyear-old prince was in a m ost difficult position. H e faced the opposition both o f the Constitutionalist Party and o f those w h o wished his father to return. In 1842 he too was forced to leave the country. A n assembly, which was dom ­ inated by the Constitutionalists, was then summoned. T h ey chose as ruler Alexander Karadjordjevic, the son o f the great revolutionary leader. T h e reign o f Alexander was marked by the dom ination o f the C onstitu­ tionalist Party, led by Toma V u iic-P eriJic, Avram Petronijevic, and Ilija Ga-

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 raSanin. T h ey were backed by the notables, bureaucrats, and merchants w ho had form ed the opposition to M ilos’s regime. The pow er in the governm ent n ow lay in the council, not in the office o f the prince. T h e aim o f the new administration was a well-run state. It was interested in assuring the rule o f law, econom ic freedom , and a go od educational system. T he leaders were not dem ocratic; they expected their party to dominate the state. D u rin g their period in power, they did achieve some o f their goals. T h e centralized, bu­ reaucratic regime was strengthened. A law code, based on Austrian models, was issued in 1844. Like M iloS, the Constitutionalists filled the governm ent posts w ith their supporters. These men, often born in the H ab sbu rg M o n ­ archy, were at least better educated than their predecessors in office, but they too had little in com m on w ith the peasantry. T h ey form ed a bureaucratic elite and, as such, caused m uch discontent am ong those w hom they w ere sent to administer.

Alexander, as can be readily understood, did not have control o f the situ­ ation. He was personally not a strong man. His position was affected by the fact that the Karadjordjevic family did not enjoy the right o f hereditary rule, which had been conceded only to the Obrenovic dynasty. The prince had no popular base o f support in the country; he could not summon the peasantry in his defense against the bureaucratic regime. His rule was also disliked by both Russia and the Habsburg Empire, who were cooperating in interna­ tional affairs. O f course, always in the background there was the threat of an Obrenovic restoration, although its proponents were divided between the candidatures o f MiloS and of Michael. Alexander’s reign covered the years of two major events in European his­ tory - the revolutions o f 1848 and the Crimean War, both o f which will be discussed in greater detail elsewhere. The revolutionary situation in the Habsburg Empire naturally aroused much interest in the principality, partic­ ularly the events involving the Serbian population of the monarchy. Some Serbs did cross the border to participate in the revolts or to fight against the Hungarian insurgents. The Crimean War caused an even greater problem. When the Ottoman Empire became involved in war with Russia in 1853, there was naturally a temptation to take advantage o f the Ottoman distraction to make territorial gains. In 1854 France and Britain joined the Ottoman side. These powers, together with the Habsburg Empire, wished to keep the con­ flict out o f the Balkans and to protect their ally’s interests. Strong pressure was thus put on Belgrade not to act. D u rin g this period the Serbian governm ent was closer to France than to any other power. B oth Russia and A ustria continued to look w ith disfavor and suspicion on the Karadjordjevic administration. Since Serbia could not hope for support for an aggressive policy, no concrete advances were made in foreign relations. Nevertheless, the question o f future territorial objectives w as a matter o f constant discussion. In 1844 GaraSanin drew up a plan, called the N aiertanije, w hich probably best illustrates the direction o f Serbian na­

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The formation of the national governments tionalist thought. The document called for the unification o f the lands that were considered predominantly Serbian and Orthodox, including Bosnia, Hercegovina, “Old Serbia” —that is, the Kosovo region —Montenegro, the Vojvodina, and northern Albania. A lth ou gh the prince was in a weak position, he still made constant efforts to protect o r strengthen his authority. A m ajor point o f conflict was the com ­ position o f the cabinet, w hose members were chosen by Alexander from the council. Th is body was divided between the adherents and the opponents o f the prince. T h e Constitutionalists at this point proposed that an assembly be convened to define the powers o f the executive branch o f the governm ent. Such m eetings had been held in the past to consider other problem s. In D e­ cem ber 1858, 439 representatives attended the St. A n drew Assembly. D espite their b elief that they could control the participants, the Constitutionalists found themselves outm aneuvered. There was indeed a great deal o f o pposi­ tion not on ly to Alexander, but also to the Karadjordjevic dynasty. A s a result, the assembly deposed Alexander and voted to call back Prince M iloS and the O brenovic dynasty. R etu rn in g after a long period in exile, M iloS reigned for only a year and a h alf before he died at the age o f eighty. H is political ideas had not changed; he fully intended to rule as an absolute monarch. In 1859, however, it was agreed that the assembly w ou ld meet on a regular basis every three years, but as an advisory rather than a legislative body. T he Serbian governm ent was thus composed o f three potentially conflicting elements: the prince, the council, and the assembly. These com peting centers were to form the basis fo r new political alignm ents and for tw o parties. In the future the Liberal Party was to serve to rally the supporters o f the assembly, whereas the Conservative Party backed the authority o f the council and the prince. In i860 Michael Obrenovic commenced his second reign. N o w thirty-seven and far m ore experienced, he was well educated and he had traveled widely. H e was acquainted w ith the general international situation, and this aspect o f his reign is o f principal significance. H is internal policy w as, in general, also successful. Like his father he was determined to rule, but he was w illing to give his authority a constitutional form. A s required, he held the assem­ blies every three years, but he assured that his supporters dom inated the pro ­ ceedings. H e used the police to supervise the elections, and he made certain that the bureaucracy was com posed o f his partisans. H e cooperated princi­ pally w ith the Conservative Party; the Liberals were forced into opposition. H is ch ief minister was Ilija GaraSanin, w h o had also been prom inent in the previous reign. A lth ough M ichael’s early death precluded the accomplishment o f his w ider goals, he did achieve certain definite advances in foreign policy. H is first o b ­ jective was the strengthening o f the army. H ere he met with great success. H is m ilitary forces became the strongest am ong the Balkan states. In 1861 he introduced regulations that made all males from twenty to fifty years old

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 liable to military service. H e could thus count on having approximately ninety thousand soldiers available in case o f war. A lthough their training and equip­ ment left much to be desired, the numbers were impressive. T h e next obvious m ove was to rid Serbia o f the O ttom an m ilitary garrisons in the six fortress cities. O f these, Belgrade held a particular significance. The city had a M uslim population o f about three thousand, com posed principally o f soldiers and merchants. Incidents between the Christian and M uslim inhabitants were difficult to avoid, and such an event in 1862 resulted in the shelling o f the city by O ttom an troops from the fortress o f Kalem egdan. T he Serbian govern­ m ent, appealing to the great powers fo r backing, began a long period o f negotiation w ith the Porte aimed at rem oving all o f the garrisons, a goal that was accom plished only in 1867. M ichael’s reign is known particularly fo r the sponsorship that the prince gave to the form ation o f a Balkan alliance system aimed at the overthrow o f O ttom an rule. T h is period o f national and revolutionary agitation in the pen­ insula, as w ell as in Central E u rope, is discussed further in a later section. H ow ever, it should be noted here that M ichael was able to conclude agree­ ments w ith M ontenegro in 1866, w ith Greece in 1867, and w ith Rom an ia in 1868. T h e prince made Serbia the center for revolutionary and national activ­ ity in the Balkans. H is sympathetic attitude tow ard Bulgarian groups in Ser­ bia w as to be o f great assistance in furthering their aim o f organizing a rev­ olutionary m ovem ent within the Bulgarian lands. A s far as Serbian objectives w ere concerned, the goals fo r the future were enlarged to include Catholic C roatian as well as Serbian O rthodox lands under H absbu rg rule. T he lead­ ership o f any South Slav m ovem ent, no matter w hat territory o r people it em braced, w as, o f course, to remain in the hands o f Belgrade. M ichael’s am­ bitious program was cut short w hen he was assassinated in June 1868. Since M ichael had no direct heirs, his nephew M ilan succeeded him. The new prince was only thirteen at the tim e, so a regency had to be appointed. M ilan had an unfortunate background fo r his high position. H e had been born in Wallachia in 1854. H is mother, M arie C atargiu, became the mistress o f the Rom anian prince Alexander C uza after her husband died. M ilan, w ho at the age o f nine had been sent to Paris for his education, did not have a happy childhood. H is entire reign was characterized by his personal weakness and instability; it also covered a period o f w ar and national disaster. T he you n g ruler was to receive a new constitution, replacing the document o f 1838. U n d er the sponsorship o f the regency a constitutional assembly was sum m oned in 1869. It w ill be noted that although Serbia was still under O t­ tom an sovereignty, there was no interference in the activities o f this body either by the Porte o r by the powers. Th e constitution that was issued left the prince w ith a strong position in the state. T he assembly too had im por­ tant powers. Three-quarters o f its members w ere to be elected; one-quarter were to be appointed by the prince, w h o also had the pow er to dismiss it. T h e council was reduced to litde m ore than an administrative committee.

The formation of the national governments The document contained declarations on civil rights, including freedom of speech, assembly, and the press. From 1815 to 1869 Serbia had thus advanced from the position o f a semiautonomous province to that of a state with almost complete self-government. In theory, the Ottoman Empire was still the suzerain power; a tribute was paid. In practice, however, the Porte made little effort to influence internal affairs. There was more interference in foreign policy, but this consideration did not hinder Michael from pursuing active and aggressive programs. As far as the internal administration was concerned, the government had advanced from the primitive level at the time of MiloS, where the ruler held complete power and made use o f the state treasury, to the constitutional regime of 1869. During this period, as we have seen, local government was placed under the control of the centralized bureaucracy. Although it can be argued that most o f these changes were beneficial to the development o f the nation, certain other attributes of the autonomous regime were not. The use of the police in elections and the prevalence of corruption in politics have been mentioned. It should, nevertheless, be pointed out that in Serbia, as in other Balkan states, certain practices were accepted as either normal or inevitable that would have been strongly criticized else­ where. The Ottoman rule, in a period of decline, had been deeply corrupt, at least by Western European standards. It could not be expected that the new Balkan regimes would change traditional practices overnight. M ONTENEGRO

Similar moves toward political consolidation were made during the same period in the second Serbian state, Montenegro. At the beginning of the century this country was without recognized boundaries, and its status in relation to the Ottoman Empire had yet to be defined. Montenegrin leaders often maintained that they were independent; the Ottoman Empire, in con­ trast, firmly insisted that these lands were an integral part o f its territory. It was an extremely backward region, both politically and economically. Despite the existence o f the bishopric in Cetinje and the office o f governor, the real authority remained with the tribes. Loyalty was to the local leadership and to family-based groups. The extreme poverty o f the land was due to its mountainous and rugged character. Since few areas were suitable for culti­ vation, the principal occupation was animal husbandry, with the concentra­ tion on the raising of small animals like goats and sheep. Raiding and cattle rustling were, as we have seen, a part o f the economy. Throughout the cen­ tury the basic problem o f hunger remained. The land was too poor to sup­ port its population. Emigration or territorial expansion were among the few solutions to the dilemma that appeared possible, and throughout this period Montenegrins left for Serbia, Russia, or the Habsburg lands. The alternative, an active policy of expansion, was not easy to implement. 247

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 Access to the sea at K o to r had not been gained despite the M ontenegrin exploits during the N apoleonic Wars. In fact, there was a threat that the neighboring military leaders m ight endanger the state itself. T h e western B al­ kans were at this time in a condition o f almost continual turm oil and warfare o w in g to the fact that the Porte could not subdue the local notables. In addition to A li Pasha o f Janina, Bosnian and other Albanian beys continued to resist control from Constantinople, and they quarreled ceaselessly with each other. R ival centers were established at Shkoder, M ostar, Sarajevo, and Travnik. A lthough the M ontenegrins could play between these groups to some extent, the danger always existed that they m ight com bine against their Christian neighbor. T h e threat was to become even greater later in the cen­ tury, w hen O ttom an reform measures succeeded to the extent o f forcing all o f the rebellious pashas to recognize the authority o f the Porte. M ontenegro then faced the possibility o f an O ttom an occupation. T h e constant threats from w ithout had the positive effect o f virtually com ­ pelling the M ontenegrin clans to accept a single authority. O bviously, w ith ­ ou t unity, the land could fall under the dom ination o f one or several o f the contending M uslim forces, o r under the direct administration o f the O tto ­ man Em pire. M ontenegro had, as w e have seen, tw o recognized leaders, the bishop and the governor, o f which the first had generally been the m ore pow erful. A side from these offices, the Cetinje governm ent consisted o f very little else. It did not carry on the normal functions o f a state; there was no regular collection o f taxes, no army, no administration fo r the various re­ gions, and no system o f justice. It has been estimated in the first part o f the nineteenth century there were about 120,000 people, divided into thirty-six tribes and living in 240 villages. There were no roads; com m unication was by horse o r pack animal. Th e capital, Cetinje, contained the m onastery and only a few stone houses. T he leaders thus had to start from the beginning in building a political structure, and they had very poor material w ith which to work. Som e im portant steps tow ard form ing some sort o f central administration had already been taken in the eighteenth century under the leadership o f B ish op Peter I. In 1798 an assembly o f tribal chiefs met in Cetinje to consider com m on problems and to coordinate the defense o f the territory. D ecisions w ere taken for both M ontenegro and Brda. This assembly accepted a code o f laws and established a central court, known as the kuluk, which had both administrative and judicial functions. D espite these accomplishments, Peter I, during his long reign, had little success in establishing anything like a central governm ent w ith real authority in the countryside. It was im possible to set up an administrative system o r organize an army unless taxes could be levied, and the tribes were no m ore w illin g to pay taxes to Cetinje than to the Porte. Efforts to stop their raiding and looting were equally futile, as were attempts to prevent the tribes from fighting each other.

Justice also remained primarily a tribal matter. The elders of each tribe

The formation of the national governments judged their members. Relations am ong the tribes were based on custom ary law. O ne serious problem that the central administration was to attempt to end w as the blood feud, a tradition that existed throughout certain o f the backward areas o f the Balkans. A ccording to this custom , i f one m em ber o f a clan, o r a similar association, killed a mem ber o f another, the life o f one o f the m urderer’s fellow clansmen had to be taken. Since this act in turn called for revenge, th e chain o f deaths could be very long. Even when the central governm ent ordered executions after a regular legal process, the sentence was carried out by a firing squad, all shooting simultaneously, so that the respon­ sibility fo r the death could not be assigned to one individual o r family. T h e problem s raised by the existence o f the dual offices o f bishop and govern or w ere to be solved by Peter’s successor. T he governorship had been held regularly by the Radonjic family, just as a Petrovic always became bishop. The position o f bishop had traditionally passed from uncle to nephew, since bishops w ere required to be celibate. T he choice now fell upon R ade, w ho in 1830, the year o f his selection, was just seventeen. H e was not a monk, and he had received no form al education. A n open struggle fo r pow er broke out between the Petrovic and R adonjic families. A lth ough the jurisdiction o f the govern or had never been clearly defined, the R adonjic supporters had usually claimed that his powers were equal to those o f the bishop. A t this time, how ever, V u k R adonjic attempted to establish the superiority o f his office and to claim full jurisdiction over secular affairs. H e was unable to w in the support o f the clan chiefs, w h o instead backed the Petrovic family, probably seeing in an ecclesiastical leader less o f a threat to their ow n local power. A s a result, the office o f governor was abolished and the members o f the Randonjic fam ily w ere either killed or banished. Th is m ove left the bishop the undisputed secular and religious leader. F o llo w in g tradition, Rade became a m onk and adopted the name Peter II, although his subsequent life did not give any evidence o f a deep religious calling. H e also used the name N jegos. Like his uncle he faced severe limita­ tions on his power. H e had no army, militia, or police under his com m and; he could use only the military forces provided by his family and clan. H is greatest problem was the m anagement o f the tribes on the outer fringes o f the state, w h o often refused to obey him o r joined his opponents. There was constant resistance to his authority am ong all the clans. It was im possible for him to control their raiding into O ttom an territory, which had become an element in the econom ic life o f the region. Nevertheless, he was able to take som e steps tow ard establishing a regular administrative apparatus. In the creation o f state offices, the tutorial hand o f the Russian court was again apparent. A s w e have seen, Russia had show n at times a great interest in M on ten egro, especially w hen the strategic position o f these lands could be o f value to its policy. T he R ussian subsidy, w hich had been paid intermit­ tently, had constituted one o f the m etropolitan’s few financial resources. In 1831 the Russian governm ent sent tw o envoys, Ivan V ukotic and M atija V u-

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 iicevic, who were both Montenegrins; they were accompanied by D. Milakovic, who subsequently became Peter’s secretary. Their principal task was to assist in the establishment o f stronger institutions of central government. A nother assembly o f chiefs was held, and in 1831 the Adm inistrative Senate o f M ontenegro and Brda was form ed to replace the court created in 1798. T h e senate was com posed o f sixteen men w h o were to receive salaries from , and represent the interests of, the central administration. Possible opposition was blunted by the appointment o f chiefs and prom inent men to the posi­ tions. A t the same time, an organization known as the G uard was form ed; its members w ere sent to the districts and the clans, w here they served both police and judicial functions. The commanders were called captains and were chosen from the prom inent men o f the clans. A ll the members received sala­ ries. T h eir duties were to serve the central governm ent, to assure that the decisions o f the senate were fulfilled, and to guard the frontiers. T h e essential role o f Russia in these reform s is clear. Th e salaries and the state expenses came chiefly from the Russian subsidies. Attem pts were made again in 1833 to introduce regular taxation, but even though the rates were low, the taxes were strongly resisted. T he amount o f the Russian subsidy remained higher than the revenues that could be collected in the country. In that same year Peter II w ent to Russia on his first visit and was there con­ firmed as bishop. H e was received by N icholas I, and he returned home with rich gifts, including a sum o f money, the promise o f an increased subsidy, books and ikons fo r the church, and a printing press. N o w in a stronger position, Peter dism issed V u kotic and took full control o f the government. D espite these m oves, Peter was w ell aware that the principal power was still in the hands o f the clans, w hose chiefs were chosen on a hereditary basis and w ho had a vested interest in maintaining political conditions as they were. T h e best policy for the bishop to adopt was simply to try to manipulate his rivals and play them against each other. H e had his uncle, Peter I, can­ onized to increase the prestige o f his family. H e enjoyed constant Russian support, at least in the first part o f his reign. H is closest contact with official R ussia was through the consul in D ubrovnik, Jerem ija G agic, a Serb who had joined the opposition to Karadjordje in the revolutionary period. Forced to em igrate, he had entered Russian service. In 1815 he was appointed consul in D ubrovn ik, where he remained fo r forty years.

In addition to these attempts at internal consolidation, Peter carried on an active foreign policy. The major goal remained, as in the eighteenth century, that of securing an outlet to the Adriatic. As before, the Habsburg Monarchy was firmly opposed. Vienna, like the other powers, was convinced that Mon­ tenegrin acquisition of a seaport would signify principally that Russia had acquired a base on the Adriatic. In this respect, the Russian connection was a hindrance to Montenegrin interests. On the other borders, attention was paid chiefly to three strategic points: Spuz and Podgorica (Titograd) in the 250

The formation of the national governments east, and G rah o vo in the northwest. In 1831 and 1832 attempts to take P o d ­ gorica failed, even though the Porte was in a weak military position because o f the concurrent conflict w ith E gypt. In 1842, after similar local skirmishes, both sides agreed that G rahovo w ould be neutral territory. D u rin g this pe­ riod, Peter faced continual revolts from the clans. In 1837 he w ent to Russia to explain his difficulties, and there received an increase in the subsidy and w heat to relieve a famine that was goin g on at the time. H e was accom panied on his return by another Russian agent, Iakov Ozeretskovskii. A lth ou gh Peter was an able ruler, he is better known for his w riting. H e is considered the greatest Serbian poet. H is chief works are The Mountain Wreath (1847), Light of the Microcosm (1845), and The False Tsar Stephen the Small (1851), the last o f w hich, o f course, dealt w ith the career o f the eighteenthcentury adventurer. A lthough prim arily concerned w ith problem s o f human existence, Peter w rote passionately about the Serbian (identified direcdy w ith the M ontenegrin), past. Th is quotation comes from the beginning o f his m ost fam ous w ork, The Mountain Wreath:

Our God hath poured His wrath upon the Serbs, For deadly sins withdrawn His favour from us: Our Rulers trampled underfoot all law, With bloody hatred fought each other down, Tore from fraternal brows the living eyes; Authority and Law they cast aside, Instead chose folly as their rule and guide! And those who served our kings became untrue, Crimson they bathed themselves in kingly blood! Our noblemen - God’s Curse be on their souls — Did tear and rend the Kingdom into pieces, And wasted wantonly our people’s power. The Serbian magnates - may their names rot out! They scattered broadcast Discord’s evil seed, And poisoned thus the life-springs of our race.3 C ertainly internal dissension was the m ajor problem w ith which Peter had to deal. O nce again, in 1846-1847, he was faced with revolt. T he rebels co ­ operated w ith the pasha o f Shkoder and had to be suppressed by force. A l­ though the bishop was able to hold his country together, the central govern ­ ment remained weak, w ith the Russian subsidies continuing to be the main source o f income. There was no treasury; Peter had a safe in which he kept the state money. There was no judicial system or laws to com m and general respect. T h e captains judged some small cases, and the senate handled larger i

Q u o te d in M ilovan Djilas, NjcgdS (N ew York: H a rco u rt, Brace & W orld, 1966), p. 294·

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 crimes; but the organization remained prim itive. A lthough the first prim ary school was opened in 1833, education was not readily available even on the lowest level. In 1851 Peter II died o f tuberculosis, after having previously named his

nephew Danilo as his successor. Danilo had been educated in Russia and, like his uncle, had not received a religious training. Moreover, he had no desire to be a bishop and he wished to marry. With the approval of both Russia and the Habsburg Empire he secularized his office and in 1852 proclaimed himself prince. Like his predecessors he had a great deal o f difficulty exerting his authority over the tribes. In fact, the situation deteriorated at this time be­ cause of changes that had taken place in Constantinople. In an era o f reform , the O ttom an Em pire had succeeded in reestablishing its authority in Bosnia over the dissident beys. H ere an active and strong policy was being carried on by O m er Pasha Latas, the governor, w hose goal was the reestablishment o f O ttom an control in the entire region. H is first m ove was to try to detach the Piperi tribe from allegiance to Cetinje. A n open conflict broke out when M ontenegrin forces attempted to seize Zabljak on Lake Shkoder in 1853. O m er Pasha was able to advance into M ontenegrin territory, and D anilo was forced to call on the powers for assistance. H e was able to obtain the strong backing o f the H absbu rg Em pire, which at this time preferred to have the prince rather than the O ttom an authorities in control o f this region bordering on Dalmatia. A n ultimatum was delivered to Constantinople, and as a result O m er Pasha was recalled and the captured M ontenegrin territory was returned. A fter this conflict, D anilo attempted to build a stronger military organ i­ zation. H e registered his fighting m en, but he had to leave the tribe as the basic military unit. In his internal administration, he met some opposition from the senate, which had gained m ore pow er at the end o f Peters reign. D anilo was, however, a strong leader, and he was able to maintain his au­ thority. In 1855 a law code was issued that was based on the principles o f equality before the law and the protection o f the rights o f private property. T h e M ontenegrin rulers, unlike the Serbian, did not have to deal w ith the land question; in fact they probably did not have sufficient pow er to do so. Th e basic means o f livelihood was animal husbandry. Problems o f land usage w ere handled by the tribes and the villages. D u rin g the Crim ean War there was naturally much enthusiasm about using the opportunity to capture some neighboring Ottoman territory. U nder strong pressure from A ustria, D anilo remained quiet. H is passive attitude caused some tribes to attempt again to w ithdraw from his authority, but he was able to subdue them. W ith Russia in a weak position, the prince attempted to establish closer relations w ith France. Once the w ar ended, however, Russian influence was reestablished. In 1858 another crisis w ith the O ttom an Em pire occurred. A t this time there was much unrest am ong the Christian popula­ tion o f H ercegovina. U prisings there often involved the participation o f

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Montenegrin tribes, who raided the area even in relatively peaceful times. In May 1858 a Montenegrin and Hercegovinian force took Grahovo. At this time both France and Russia intervened with the Porte in favor o f Montenegro, and the boundary between the principality and the neighboring Ottoman lands was finally fixed. An extension o f territory that included the city in dispute was secured (see Map 21). In i860 Danilo was assassinated. He was succeeded by Nicholas I, who was to rule until the end of World War I. This last Montenegrin ruler was bom in 1841 and educated in France. He inherited a principality that had won a remarkable position in international relations, one that was entirely incommensurate with its small size and extreme poverty. We have seen how Russia was willing to send large subsidies, which were the main support of the central administration. Austria also paid careful attention to events in this region. It was to be a common witticism in Europe that Cetinje consisted o f thirteen foreign consulates and a hotel. The exact status o f Montenegro in relation to the Ottoman Empire re­ mained murky. The Porte continued to claim that the region was an integral part o f the Ottoman Empire, but it was unable to collect taxes or a tribute. The Ottoman government was certainly not able to influence internal admin­ 253

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 istration, and by this time it was clear that the European powers would not allow the area to be subdued by military means. In the next years Montene­ gro was to continue to contribute to the unrest in the western Balkans and to remain in close touch with Serbia, which shared the same desire for terri­ torial expansion and a clear break from any vestige o f Ottoman control.

G R E E C E U N D E R K IN G O TH O N T h e first attempts at the organization o f a G reek central administration were made, as w e have seen, during the revolution. A t that time the G reek notables established governm ents patterned on Western constitutional form s. These regimes broke dow n o w in g to the rivalry between factions o f primates and m ilitary men. In contrast to the situations in Serbia and the Principalities, in Greece no single man em erged to take the leadership o f the revolt. T h e great­ est degree o f success was achieved by Ioannis Capodistrias, w h o was at least able to lay the foundations for the future. A n experienced administrator, he attempted to establish a governm ent based on the rule o f law. Like other statesmen o f his era, he had as his ideal a strongly centralized state w ith the principal pow er in the hands o f the executive. Th e failure o f his successors, after his assassination, to maintain an orderly governm ent reinforced the de­ term ination o f the three powers, France, Russia, and Britain, to take full responsibility for the G reek government. T h e new king, O thon, arrived in his first capital, N auplion , in February 1833; the governm ent did not m ove to Athens until 1835. Since he was still a m inor, the king was accom panied by three regents. K in g L u d w ig I, w ho w ished to provide his son w ith the best support possible, appointed able men to the regency. A t its head he placed C oun t Joseph von A rm ansperg, an ex­ perienced administrator. T he other tw o members w ere L u d w ig von M aurer, a jurist and professor o f law, and M ajor General K arl von H eideck, a Philhellene w h o had served in Greece during the revolution and was thus well acquainted w ith local conditions. K arl von A bel became the secretary. A m in­ isterial council, com posed o f Greeks, was also form ed. Nevertheless, the real pow er in the governm ent was in the hands o f the regents, particularly in the period before O thon came o f age. Well prepared for their duties, the Bavarian officials attempted to introduce an enlightened administrative system on the pattern o f the best o f m onarchi­ cal governm ents. T h ey divided the tasks. M aurer concerned him self prim arily w ith the codification o f laws, church affairs, and education. H eideck orga­ nized the armed forces. A bel was responsible for internal affairs and foreign relations. A nother adviser, Johann Greiner, handled econom ic problems. A l­ though several constitutions had been drawn up during the revolutionary period, the Bavarians were not in favor o f the introduction o f representative institutions at this time. K in g L u d w ig I had indeed given som e vague assur­

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The formation of the national governments ances about a constitution when his son was chosen as king, but the regents proceeded to establish a centralized absolute monarchy. The situation facing the regents was a difficult one. Greece had a far more complex social and political heritage than Serbia or Montenegro. Some parts of the new kingdom were as primitive as Montenegro; in contrast, many of the former Phanariots who arrived during the revolution had an education and experience equal to the regents’. In addition, the notables of the Pelo­ ponnesus had long been accustomed to handling their own local affairs. Many problems were to be caused by the fact that the Bavarians, like Capodistrias, and with the best o f intentions, attempted to impose on the Greek kingdom patterns o f life and government that had been developed elsewhere. The Greeks were accustomed to the Ottoman system, both in basic spirit and in appear­ ance. An example o f the differences that could occur, on a not especially serious level, is given by Maurer. When Othon arrived in Greece, some o f his Greek officials did not wish to remove their hats. They maintained that they also were not accustomed to taking off their hats before the sultan. The question o f taking-off-hats or nottaking-off-hats was officially considered, and in the end the present Greek officials were given the alternative o f either presenting them­ selves in the eastern fashion, that is, throwing themselves on the floor in order to kiss the royal feet, and in this case they could keep their hats on their heads, or presenting themselves according to the European manner, and in this case appearing with bare heads.4 The chief tasks before the regents were the organization of the administra­ tion, the establishment of a judicial system, the codification o f the law, a setdement of the church question, the organization o f an army, and the for­ mulation o f a land policy. The first problem was that of local administration. Here the foundation laid by Capodistrias was developed. Greece was divided into ten provinces (nomarchies), which were subdivided into counties (epar­ chies), and then into municipalities (demes). The chief officials o f the prov­ inces and counties were appointed by the central government. Despite the fact that more allowance was made for participation at the lowest level, the system as a whole ended the former traditions o f local self-government. As in other states that underwent similar political reorganizations, Serbia in par­ ticular, community offices tended to be headed by men appointed from the capital who had no previous experience in the locality to which they were assigned and no personal connections with the inhabitants. Although in theory this condition should have assured an impartial attitude among the officials, and should have provided at least a partial check on corruption, the final 4 G e o rg L u d w ig v on M au rer, Das Gritcbischc Volk, 3 vols. (H eidelberg: M o h r, 1835), II, 6 9 -7 0 .

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 effect was not in the interest of the local population. As the century pro­ gressed, the public officials not only received better educations than the rest o f their countrymen, but became increasingly a class separated by manners and economic status from the peasant majority. As elsewhere, the strength­ ening o f the central regime was to limit popular participation in government severely. B oth the establishment o f a judicial system and the religious settlement w ere the w ork o f M aurer, perhaps the best o f the Bavarian advisers. A code o f laws was drawn up under his supervision, based on G reek custom ary law as well as on Byzantine and Western models. T he question o f the relationship o f the O rthodox church o f independent Greece w ith the Patriarchate w as, o f course, a matter o f grave importance. D u rin g the revolution the patriarch had excom municated the Greek religious leaders, w h o, o f course, had been a m ajor support o f the movement. It was also clear that the independent state needed a church hierarchy that was not even indirecdy under the control o f the Porte. M aurer him self was a liberal Protestant w h o had received his legal training in N apoleonic France. T he final arrangement was w orked out in consultation w ith an ecclesiastical com m ission, but M aurer’s influence was strong. H is attitude has been described as follow s: “ M aurer looked upon the church as a department o f the state and subordinate to it. T he situation in his hom eland was a m odel for him, for in Bavaria both Catholic and Protes­ tant churches w ere dom inated by the secular power. Catholic bishops were allowed to correspond with Rom e only through the intermediary o f the king.” 5 A strong dependence on the secular authority was, o f course, in conform ­ ity w ith O rthodox tradition. In the settlement made at this tim c^which was not accepted by the Constantinople Patriarchate until 1850, the G reek church was separated from the Patriarchate. O thon was its head; he administered church affairs through a H o ly Synod w hose members were royal appointees. A n attempt was also made to reform the monasteries, m any o f w hich were in an extremely bad condition. Those with less than six members were closed, w ith their property taken by the government. O ne o f the m ost difficult questions facing the regency was the organization o f a national arm y that could both defend the state and assure civil tranquility. Th e country certainly could not rely on the captains and their m ilitary bands, the forces that had fought the revolutionary war. T h eir disruptive activities and feuds had been chiefly responsible for the anarchy and violence o f the period. Recognizing the necessity o f assuring the new regim e a firm support, the protecting powers had arranged that O thon w ould have the services o f a mercenary force o f about 3,500 soldiers. These men, m ost o f w hom were Germ an o r Sw iss, had to be paid relatively high salaries, and they were a severe strain on the Greek budget. 5

C harles A. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-1852 (C am bridge: C am ­ b ridge U niversity Press, 1969), p. 106.

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The formation of the national governments With the regular arm y com posed m ostly o f foreign soldiers, the problem o f w h at to do w ith the G reek veterans became serious. Thousands o f these fighters remained from the revolutionary period, m any w ithout alternative means o f em ploym ent. Even i f the governm ent had wished, they could not easily have been integrated into a m odern army. Th ey did not like uniform s, drill, o r discipline. Som e simply went hom e and were absorbed into their village life. T h ey m ight be given honorary military titles and land. Others became policemen or joined the bandits. T h ey remained, nevertheless, a dis­ turbing element for quite a while. The foreign troops also caused difficulties. Th ey were naturally resented by the population. A lthough some stayed per­ manently in Greece and eventually became citizens, the m ajority had left by the end o f the 1830s. Thereafter the army was com pletely G reek in com posi­ tion, but as had been feared, it did not form a loyal and reliable backing for the monarchy. In fact, political activities by the military were then and were to continue to be a m ajor source o f disruption in Greece. It should also be noted that, although the soldiers w ere at first in the m ajority Germ an in nationality, the navy remained com pletely in G reek hands. In Greece as in Serbia, one o f the m ajor questions to be settled by the national administration concerned the ownership and distribution o f the land. A gain the decisions taken w ould largely determine the future social and po ­ litical life o f the country. T he status o f a considerable am ount o f land had to be decided. It m ust be remem bered that only a small percentage o f G reek acreage is arable; farm land was thus scarce and valuable both from the eco­ nomic aspect and because ownership conferred prestige and power. B efore the revolution it has been estimated that in the territory o f independent Greece about 65,000 M uslim landholders controlled over h alf o f the land.6 M uch o f the rest was held by Christian notables w ho had assembled large estates. The Greek population thus consisted largely o f a peasantry w h o w orked on a sharecropping arrangement on both M uslim and Christian estates. D u rin g the revolution, as w e have seen, the M uslim population was driven out o r massacred and its property plundered. Christian landowners did not receive a similar treatment. In Serbia during and after the revolution, the peasant on a M uslim estate in general simply took possession o f the land that he w orked. There was thus an autom atic transfer to small peasant ownership o f much M uslim property. This process did not take place in Greece. The revolutionary governm ents were in the control o f notables w h o often held large estates. These regimes also needed money. In 1821 it was decided that Christian peasants on form er O ttom an-held lands w ould continue to make payments, but at a reduced rate and to the state. The peasants thus continued

6

O n th e lan d q u e stio n see W illiam W. M cG rew , “T h e L an d Issue in th e G reek W ar o f In d e ­ p endence,” in N ik ifo ro s P. D iam an d o u ro s e t al., eds., Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity and Change (T hessaloniki: In stitu te for Balkan Studies, 1976), p p . in -129 .

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 to be sharecroppers. This action was to form a precedent for the future. In the Epidaurus constitution the former Ottoman properties were declared to be national estates. This decision was logical and intelligent given the con­ ditions of the times. The state lands could be used as collateral for essentia] foreign loans, and they also provided about the only regular source of income during the revolutionary period. As in the past, the taxes were farmed by the notables, who thus kept intact their former privileges. During the war, however, the government used the promise of land for recruitment purposes. These assurances proved impossible to fulfill. The no­ tables with large estates did not want to be faced with demands from their peasant sharecroppers for a radical reform; and if former Ottoman estates were divided among their cultivators, the application o f the same principle might be demanded of the Christian owners. Despite the fact that there was no general land distribution, some state land did in fact move into private hands. During the revolution notables and captains were in the position sim­ ply to appropriate property that fell under their immediate jurisdiction. Since land was the principal investment and source o f wealth, the temptation to seize it where possible was great. T h e Bavarian regim e in Greece in theory favored the small landowner. Bavaria, after all, was a land o f prosperous peasant farm ing. In 1833 it was estim ated that only a sixth o f the Greek peasants ow ned land; the rest culti­ vated private estate land o r state property. F o r the use o f the national land, the cultivator paid a tax o f 25 percent o f the produce, as com pared to the 10 percent that was levied on freeholders. In 1835 a law was passed that allowed all the veterans o f the revolution to purchase land. H ow ever, paym ent had to be made, and m ost o f the eligible buyers did not have the necessary funds. Th u s the peasant was neither assigned a plot nor allowed to keep the land he w orked. H e could sim ply bid for plots at a state auction. There was little response. T h e G reek peasants were not organized as a class, and they had no general feeling o f grievance o r solidarity. M oreover, at this time there was little pressure o f population on the land. Alternate means o f livelihood ex­ isted; Greeks found em ploym ent in large numbers as fishermen, sailors, small merchants, shepherds, and artisans.

The Bavarian regency accomplished a great deal during these first years, organizing the country on the pattern of a modern state. The process was not easy. Jealousies and rivalries divided the regents, and Armansperg was able to secure the recall of both Maurer and Heideck. In 1835 Othon reached his majority, but he kept Armansperg as his chief counselor even after the dissolution o f the regency. By 1837 the opposition to this official had become so intense that he was replaced by the weaker Ignaz von Rudhart. By this time Othon had gained confidence and was determined to rule the country himself. In 1836 he married the Protestant princess Amalia of Oldenburg, who as queen was to play a prominent role in national life. Although Othon 258

The formation of the national governments was an absolute monarch, he was not authoritarian in either attitude or man­ ner. He had, however, some serious personal problems. A major division between the king and the Greek people was always the Catholic faith of the monarch. Orthodoxy was a serious matter; it was an integral part of Greek life and certainly o f the national movement. Othon was not only a Catholic, but a devout and faithful member of his church. At the time of his nomination, it had been agreed that he would bring up his heir in the Orthodox faith. If indeed he had been fortunate enough to have had children, his problems might have been less serious, but it soon became apparent that Othon would probably remain childless. The state needed a royal heir, both to assure the stability of the throne and the dynasty and to end the religious controversy surrounding the ruler. In addition to the criticism of the monarch arising from this issue, Othon and his advisers met the type of opposition that had faced the central govern­ ment during the revolution and that we have seen in Serbia and Montenegro, which had native rulers. Greek notables and military men who had previously run the government found themselves displaced by the Bavarian officials and the Greeks who worked with the regime. As elsewhere, these groups formed political alignments and parties to win back influence or to displace their adversaries. As has been noted, throughout the Balkans families and familybased relationships were basic to the social and political system. In Monte­ negro the bishops had to meet the opposition of the clans and rival families. A similar situation existed in Serbia, where both Karadjordje and MiloS had to fight against local leaders with personal and family backing. In Greece too political life revolved around the activities of strong leaders whose supporters looked to them for guidance, protection, and favors. This patron-client re­ lationship could form a network of considerable influence, since a patron could himself become a client of a yet more powerful man, who could in turn seek a protector at a higher level. There were other institutions that also served to connect families. Most important was the kumparia; a strong and ambitious man could become godfather to literally hundreds of children, thus forming blood ties with their families. He did them favors, but could also command their allegiance. In politics this situation could have important consequences. The institu­ tions of government that were adopted in Greece depended on at least some standards of honesty and efficiency among the officials. Neither a centralized bureaucracy under an absolute monarch nor a representative system could function without public responsibility and some awareness o f the needs of the entire nation. Yet Greek political life was not to center on specific issues. There were no equivalents to the Serbian Constitutionalist, Liberal, or Con­ servative parties. Instead, political conflicts were likely to involve the struggle between factions led by powerful individuals to control the government. Once in office, the successful politician was expected to reward his supporters. Ad­

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 ministrative appointments and patronage went to the victors and their ad­ herents; those who lost were simply dismissed from their positions. Elections thus usually involved the simple issue o f which group would control the spoils. In this situation the temptation to adopt illegal and violent means was strong. The officials in power could use the police and their local agents; the opposition could organize riots and employ brigands. During the first part of Othon’s reign the three political parties of the revolutionary period —the French, the Russian, and the British —dominated the political scene. Despite their attachment to the foreign consultâtes, they too were each essentially based on the leadership of a strong individual. Of the three, the most popular was probably the French Party, headed by Ioannis Kolettis. At this time France could give more encouragement than Britain or Russia to Greek expansion and was less concerned than they about pro­ tecting the territorial integrity o f the Ottoman Empire. Kolettis was also an able political leader. Next in influence was the Nappist, or Russian, Party. Its political orientation was conservative and Orthodox. The most influential members were, first, Capodistrias, and then Kolokotronis and Andreas Metaxas. The party with the greatest potential influence, however, was the Brit­ ish, under the direction o f Mavrokordatos. With naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, Britain was always in the best position to impress its views on the Greek government. The major impediment to the popularity o f this group was the British desire to uphold the Ottoman Empire, a policy that precluded aid to Greek expansion. The Russian Party enjoyed the strongest position during the Capodistrias regime; the British were supreme with Armansperg; the French were to have the chief influence after 1844. Despite the fact that these parties carried the names of foreign powers, they were not blind tools of the patron consulates. In fact, the parties sometimes manipu­ lated the great powers more than the powers were able to exploit the parties. Nevertheless, their existence allowed a degree of foreign interference that had no parallel in Serbia or Montenegro. T h e king, it w ill be noted, did not have the support o f a Bavarian o r royal party. H e could not even be sure o f his army. B y 1838 m ost all the foreign soldiers had returned hom e, although some officers remained. W ithout a firm m ilitary o r political backing, the king had to play between the factions. H e also had to deal w ith a bad financial situation. State expenditures n o w far exceeded income. A m ajor problem was the high payments that had to be made in connection w ith the foreign debt contracted during and after the revolution. Dissatisfaction w ith O thon’s rule and w ith conditions in the state increased in the early 1840s. Th e protecting powers pressed for financial re­ form . C hiefly concerned w ith the repayment o f the debt, they asked for a reduction o f m ilitary expenses and the size o f the army. There was also criti­ cism o f the autocratic government. As in other states, the opposition to Othon sought to limit the royal powers through other institutions. To many the

The formation of the national governments introduction o f constitutional governm ent seemed the best means o f m eeting the situation. In 1843 the British and Russian parties, w ho were temporarily out o f power, joined to back a military coup d’etat. In September the Athens garrison marched on the palace and took the king prisoner. Since the alternative was abdication, O thon agreed to dismiss his remaining Bavarian advisers and accept a con­ stitution. In N ovem ber an assembly was convened, com posed o f delegates not only from the G reek kingdom , but also from M acedonia, E piru s, and Thessaly. T h e leading roles in the deliberations were taken by M avrokordatos and K olettis. T h e Russian Party was forced to stand aside because N icholas I w ou ld not condone participation in the making o f a constitution w hose acceptance by the king had been forced by an armed revolt. T h e G reek g o v ­ ernment, how ever, received constant advice from the British and French con­ sulates, representing protectors that were favorable to the introduction o f a constitutional regime, but wanted it to be conservative in nature. They wished to avoid any situation that m ight make Greece a center o f revolutionary dis­ turbance o r m ight lead to the reopening o f the Eastern Question. The constitution of 1844 was fully satisfactory to conservative opinion. It

provided for a limited constitutional monarchy, but the king had wide pow­ ers. Othon could veto legislation, and he appointed and dismissed the min­ isters. A two-house legislature was established, with the lower chamber elected on the basis o f universal manhood suffrage and the upper, the senate, nomi­ nated by the ruler. The leaders o f the revolt o f 1843 had thus attained their objective: the king was to share his authority with an elective assembly. It will be noted that the movement had been carried through by a small group of opposition politicians who obtained military support. The action had not involved the population at large. It was, however, to serve as a precedent and to show the power that could be exerted in the government by the military. The introduction o f a constitutional regim e in fact led to no real change in Greek politics. T h e first elections gave the victory to the French Party and K olettis, w h o until his death in 1847 held the principal position in the g o v ­ ernment. W orking closely w ith O thon, his regim e was to fo llo w the classical pattern o f a royal dictatorship in the Balkans. K olettis appointed his sup­ porters to the principal positions, and he used governm ent patronage to as­ sure loyalty. Exercising his official pow ers, he made certain that he m ain­ tained control o f the assembly. H e had no hesitation about using violence and terror against his opponents. Nevertheless, he was an extremely popular leader. M uch o f the opposition to O thon had come from notables w h o had no w ide popular support themselves. M oreover, K olettis and the king both came to stand fo r the kind o f national expansion that w on enthusiastic sup­ port. T h e Philhellene Bavarian regents had seen m odem Greece as a reborn Athens; the classical, pagan civilization had been their ideal. K olettis and m ost G reek nationalists were in contrast to base their program s on the B yz ­

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 antine tradition and the O rthodox faith. T h e G reat Idea, w hose influence in the eighteenth century has already been discussed, became their objective too. T h ey tended to believe that the correct boundaries fo r a resurrected G reek state should encompass all the lands that had been under Byzantine rule o r under the jurisdiction o f the Patriarchate o f Constantinople at any period. These goals w ere made clear by Kolettis in a speech before the con­ stitutional assembly in January 1844:

The kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is only a part, the smallest and poorest, of Greece. The Greek is not only he who inhabits the kingdom, but also he who lives in Janina, or Thessaloniki, or Seres, or Adrianople, or Constantinople, or Trebizonde, or Crete, or Sa­ mos, or any other country o f the Greek history or race . . . There are two great centers o f Hellenism, Athens and Constantinople. Athens is only the capitol of the kingdom; Constantinople is the great cap­ ital, the City, i Polis, the attraction and the hope of all the Hellenes.7 The great hindrance to the promotion of a national irredentist policy at this time, however, was the fact that most o f the great powers were firmly against any Greek action. In the 1830s two Ottoman-Egyptian crises oc­ curred, the first from 1831 to 1833 and the second from 1839 to 1841. At this time Britain and Russia, usually at odds in Eastern affairs, joined the Habs­ burg Monarchy to support the maintenance o f the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In 1841 Greek public opinion was aroused when a revolt broke out in Crete. An even tenser situation developed during the Crimean War, when Russia, the great Orthodox power, was fighting the Ottoman Empire, France, Britain, and Sardinia. Despite the imbalance of this coali­ tion, there was enthusiasm about using the opportunity to acquire more ter­ ritory. Irregular bands did operate in the Greek lands under Ottoman control, but these were easily suppressed by the local authorities. To make certain that the Greek government remained passive, the Western allies sent a squadron to Piraeus, where it remained from 1854 to 1857. The two protectors also imposed a Mavrokordatos ministry on the king. The failure to exploit the situation or to make any other concrete gains in foreign affairs was an important element in the king’s increasing unpopular­ ity. After the Crimean War the parties connected with the foreign consulates dissolved. The new political combinations represented little more than the interests o f strong leaders and their supporters. In the elections the candi­ dates won who could control local patronage and the police. The individual voter, when he had a free choice, preferred the man who promised him the greatest benefits; issues were infrequendy a matter of political debate. Con­ 7

Q u o te d in E d o u a rd D riau lt an d M ichael L héritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nosjours, 5 vols. (Paris: Les Presses universitaires de F rance, 1925-1926), I I, 252-253.

The formation of the national governments stitutional governm ent and a wide franchise had thus caused little alteration in traditional political methods. A lth ough O thon was anything but a tyrannical ruler, he had by the 1860s gained m any opponents. H is m ost vulnerable point was the fact that he had n o children. E ven w orse, there was no obvious candidate for the throne. T he constitution made it obligatory that the next ruler be O rthodox. O thon’s brothers were not enthusiastic about changing their faith o r endangering by such an act their possible succession to the Bavarian throne. T h is situation w ou ld be dangerous for even a highly popular monarch. In addition, O thon had to face criticism from a new generation o f G reek youth, w hich was not only better educated than its predecessors, but also m ore aware o f current European political ideology. T he yo u n g men were strongly influenced by the liberal and national ideas o f the m id-century and by the revolutions o f 1848. T h ey had studied at European universities o r at the U niversity o f A thens, which opened in 1837. Extrem ely critical o f the constitution o f 1844 and the entire G reek political system, they wanted to introduce a parliam entary dem ocracy and reduce the king to a figurehead. D espite widespread dissatisfaction, the revolt that broke out in O ctober 1862 resembled closely the events o f 1843. There was no revolutionary m ove­ ment involving the general population. Instead, once again the revolution was essentially a m ilitary coup. A t the time O thon and A m alia w ere on a cruise on their yacht; when they heard that several garrisons had revolted, they did not return to Athens. There were some m inor disorders, but the transition o f pow er was relatively smooth. A provisional governm ent under the leadership o f D im itrios Voulgaris w as form ed, w hich then turned to the task o f choosing another prince and fram ing a new constitution. A fter the departure o f O thon, the three protecting powers imm ediately asserted their authority. T h ey named the new ruler, although they did not interfere in the drafting o f the constitution. T h e G reek leaders themselves w o u ld have preferred Prince A lbert, the second son o f Q ueen Victoria, as their king. T h ey had hoped by this choice to acquire the Ionian Islands, which w ere still under British rule, and support fo r further expansion. T he protecting pow ers, how ever, had agreed am ong themselves not to nominate a candidate from a reigning dynasty, so this choice was im possible. T h ey finally chose the seventeen-year-old Prince W illiam G eorge o f the D anish G liicksburg dynasty. A constitutional assembly in A thens accepted the nom ­ ination o f this prince, w h o on his accession took the name G eorge. In 1866 K in g G eorge I m arried G rand Duchess O lga and thereby gave his dynasty a valuable link w ith the Russian imperial family. Since G eorge was the British favorite, Britain agreed to surrender the Ionian Islands; they became a part o f the G reek kingdom , although they w ere neutralized. T h e new king was given a constitution, based on the liberal Belgian C o n ­ stitution o f 1831, that w as designed to limit sharply the royal power. Article X X I stated: “ A ll pow er has its source in the nation and is exercised in the

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 manner appointed by the constitution.”8 There was to be no question of an absolute or a divine-right monarch in the future. Nevertheless, the king still held the authority to appoint and dismiss the ministers; he could also dissolve the chamber. Like other rulers of the day, he could declare war and make treaties. The legislative branch o f the government was composed of a single chamber; the senate was thus abolished. The representatives were to be elected by direct, secret, manhood suffrage and were to serve for four years. The ministry was responsible to the assembly. These changes too had remarkably little effect on Greek politics. Condi­ tions remained much as they had been before. George I arrived with a Danish adviser, Count Sponneck, who became a controversial figure. As had been the case with previous foreigners, he soon faced so much opposition that he was forced to leave. The political parties were still little more than factions organized around leaders, among whom the most prominent were Dimitrios Voulgaris, Alexander Koumoundouros, Thrasyvoulos Zaimis, and Epaminondas Deligeorgis. The political scene gave an appearance o f extreme insta­ bility; from 1864 to 1881 there were nine elections and thirty-one govern­ ments. The liberal constitution also had no effect on the corrupt system. Whenever the government changed, all of the civil service positions were filled by the winning faction; the losers simply lost their jobs. It was still important for a political party to be in office when elections were held, so that it could use the police to control the voting in its own interest. Although there were indeed disagreements on national issues, the real struggle involved the spoils of office and personal honor and prestige. TH E D A N U B IAN P R IN C IP A L IT IE S U N D E R R U S SIA N P R O TE C TIO N

The pattern o f political development in the Principalities from 1821 to 1854 contrasted in many respects with that in Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. One particular difference was in the degree of control exerted by an outside state. Although the protecting powers had interfered a great deal in Greek domestic politics and Russia had strongly influenced events in Serbia and Montenegro, the Russian domination in Wallachia and Moldavia was far more pervasive. Despite the fact that the aim of Russian policy was the improve­ ment o f conditions in the provinces, the pressure exerted aroused a great deal o f resentment. The national movement o f the mid-century was thus to be directed more against the Russian protector than against the Ottoman su­ zerain. Russian intervention in Romanian affairs had its legal base in the Treaty of 8

T h e c o n stitu tio n is p rin te d in G eorge Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution and o f the Reign o f K in g Otho, 2 vols. in 1 (L o n d o n : Z en o , 1971), p p . 345-357·

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The formation of the national governments Kuchuk Kainarji; these rights were strengthened in the agreement o f 1802. In 1821 the Russian government broke relations with the Porte because it had failed to come to an agreement with St. Petersburg concerning the military intervention in the Principalities. The Russian government was serious about enforcing its treaty rights, and these were strengthened considerably in the Convention o f Akkerman o f October 1826. In a separate agreement attached to the treaty, Russia was recognized as the protecting power. In addition, changes were made in the political organization of the provinces. The hospodars were henceforth to be elected by the divans - that is, the councils of boyars - from among this class, and they would hold office for seven years. The elections would have to be confirmed by both St. Petersburg and Con­ stantinople. Both Principalities were to be given new administrative regula­ tions. Although the Ottoman government denounced this treaty after the disaster at Navarino, its terms were repeated in the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829. Here the rights of the Porte in its vassal states were limited to the collection o f a fixed tribute and a voice in the choice o f the princes. Article V stated that Moldavia and Wallachia were under the suzerainty of the Porte and that Russia “guaranteed their prosperity.” They were to “enjoy the free exercise o f their worship, perfect security, an independent national govern­ ment, and full liberty of commerce.”9 An Additional Act to the treaty defined the new conditions in greater de­ tail. Most significant for the future was an end to the Ottoman right of preemption on the products of the Principalities. The provinces thus no longer had to provide articles such as grain, sheep, and timber almost exclusively to Constantinople; instead, they could trade freely with the rest of the world. In addition, the payments to be made to the Porte were henceforth to be limited to the annual tribute, whose amount was to be set, and a sum to be paid on the investiture of each prince. As in Serbia, Muslims were not to live in or hold property in the Principalities, except under special circumstances. The Ottoman government was to withdraw its garrisons from the fortress cities o f Turnu Severin, Giurgiu, and Braila. The Muslim inhabitants were to sell their property within eighteen months. Also very important was the pro­ vision that a quarantine was to be established along the Danube. This stipula­ tion gave force to the idea that a definite break existed between the Princi­ palities and the rest of the Ottoman lands. Finally, the treaty allowed both provinces to organize militias, and the provision requiring new administra­ tive regulations was repeated. In the treaty Russia com pelled the O ttom an E m pire to pay a very high indemnity. U n til this obligation was fulfilled, Russian troops were to remain in occupation o f the Principalities. Th ey did not leave until 1834, and during this period M oldavia and Wallachia were both under Russian m ilitary rule. 9

H ertslet, Map o f Europe, II, 817.

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 T h e reorganization o f the administration o f the provinces was thus carried through under Russian supervision. Th is action was taken under the direc­ tion o f C o u n t Pavel D . Kiselev, an extremely able and enlightened adminis­ trator. A s president o f both divans from N ovem ber 1829 to A p ril 1834, he was principally responsible for the reforms that were introduced. A fter assuming his post he imm ediately took action to establish the quarantine because o f the threat o f plague and cholera. H e im ported wheat from Russia to meet the famine conditions, and he organized a national militia. H is ch ief contri­ bution, however, was his supervision o f the form ulation o f new administra­ tive statutes for both provinces. T h e Principalities remained an im portant strategic area fo r Russia. Even though the governm ent did not w ish to annex the region, it wanted to make certain that the provinces w ould remain a buffer and under Russian dom i­ nation. T h e land was also a convenient base from which to m ove southward tow ard Constantinople should another w ar occur. T h is policy, as w e have seen, had been follow ed consistently since the eighteenth century. A s before, it was to the Russian interest to assure that the provinces were both prosper­ ous and contented. A great effort was thus made to try to introduce a prac­ tical and progressive political system. After the signing o f the Akkerman convention, committees had been formed to draft new administrative regulations, but little had been accomplished. N o w tw o other com mittees, each com posed o f four members (tw o chosen by the divans and tw o by the Russian officials), w ere appointed. T h ey met under the chairmanship o f the Russian consul-general, M atei Leovich M inciaky (M inchiaki). W hen their w ork was com pleted, K iselev made some changes in the texts and forw arded them to St. Petersburg. There they were approved and returned to the divans, w h o were allowed to discuss but not change the final version. T he statutes were issued in Wallachia in Ju ly 1831 and in M oldavia in January 1832. These documents were not constitutions, but rather detailed administra­ tive regulations. T h ey created parallel, but not identical, institutions in both provinces. Accordingly, they marked a definite step tow ard an eventual uni­ fication o f the tw o Rom anian states. Like the measures taken by the Bavarian regency in A thens, the O rganic Statutes (Reglem ents organiques) established a system o f governm ent based on the best examples o f current administrative practice as seen by a conservative, m onarchical, but enlightened leadership. E ach province was to be ruled by a prince, w h o w ou ld be elected for life by an extraordinary assembly o f 150. H e w ou ld be chosen from am ong the great boyars. T he legislative pow er was to be exercised by boyars’ assemblies that w ere to be held in each province, w ith thirty-five members in the M o l­ davian and forty-tw o in the Wallachian body. These assemblies passed the laws, but the prince had a right o f veto. W ith the approval o f both the Porte and Russia, he could prorogue, but not dissolve, the assembly. Sim ilar means

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The formation of the nationalgovernments o f interference by St. Petersburg were inserted in other parts o f the docu­ ments. The Organic Statutes were a clear advance over the system previously in existence, but they gave the control o f the country to the great boyars and Russia. The strong position o f the privileged noble class was similarly re­ flected in the sections of the reform dealing with the land and peasant ques­ tions. In the eighteenth century, as we have seen, Romanian serfdom had ended, but the question who owned the land had not been settled. The issue was not critical at that time because the main source o f peasant support was catde raising. The peasant, who had a plot of land that he cultivated, could graze his livestock on the common pasture land and could gather wood in the forests. There was no shortage o f land. If conditions on the estate became too bad, he could simply flee. The Organic Statutes brought about certain fundamental changes. Most important, the boyar was designated as the owner o f the land; the peasant families were allowed a share based on the number o f cattle that each owned. Families were divided into three categories: first, those who had four oxen and a cow or ten sheep; second, those who had two oxen; and third, those who had no animals at all. The first group was allotted nine acres, with the others receiving proportionally less. If a peasant wanted more land, he had to make a special arrangement with the boyar. The labor obligation was set at twelve days, but again the work period was defined by tasks accomplished, and in practice it came to amount to about twenty-four to thirty-six days in Wallachia and over fifty in Moldavia. In Wallachia, where the landowners tended not to operate their estates personally, they often preferred to take cash payments rather than labor dues. They then rented out all o f their land on terms agreed upon with the peasantry; the estates were managed by stew­ ards while the owners lived in Bucharest or traveled in Europe. In Moldavia the owners were more likely to supervise their estates personally. The unequal relationship between the peasant and the boyar can best be understood when it is remembered that the latter had complete control of the administrative and judicial system. The peasant could not rely either on the police or on the courts to defend him against unjust exactions. In addi­ tion, although he was not technically bound to the soil, he did not have unlimited freedom of movement. He had to give six months’ notice if he wished to leave his land, and he had to pay his share o f the village taxes. Kiselev was deeply critical o f the situation. He commented concerning the boyars’ assembly that, having constituted itself judge in its own cause, it is only natural that it seeks to extend its own privileges at the expense of others, who are neither represented nor defended by anyone. That goes so far, that by an insidious clause regarding labor dues they have bound the 2 67

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 villagers to the soil, though they are free by right, and every day they tend to make o f them slaves, to oppress them the m ore.10 T h e Rom anian boyar made another great gain in this period. T h e end o f O ttom an preem ption rights opened the Principalities to trade w ith the West at a tim e when dem and for grain to feed the gro w in g Western industrial population w as increasing. T he market fo r Rom anian agricultural products thus rose during the century. It was to the interest o f the R om anian land­ ow ner to secure control o f as much land as possible and to assure an adequate labor supply. T he O rganic Statutes thus gave the boyar the type o f agrarian regim e that was to his best advantage. In January 1834 R ussia and the O ttom an Em pire signed the C onvention o f St. Petersburg. T h e Porte accepted the O rganic Statutes, and the tribute was set at 3 m illion piastres. In an action that was an exception to the provisions o f the new regulations, the tw o powers named the first princes, w h o w ere to reign for only seven years. T he Russian choices, Alexander G hica in Wallachia and M ihail Sturdza in M oldavia, assumed office; the Russian arm y then evacuated the provinces. T he Russian governm ent had achieved m ost o f the objectives form ulated at the time o f the Russo-Turkish War. It held a position o f preeminence at Constantinople and in the Balkan peninsula in general. A lth ough some Russian officials, including Kiselev, had advised the annexa­ tion o f the Principalities, an alternate solution had been found in the intro­ duction o f a regim e that gave Russia dom ination w ithout the com plications and expenses o f direct rule. T h e political system established at this time, based on the O rganic Statutes, lasted until 1854. It gave the direct control o f the country to the boyars, with R ussia as overseer. T he dom inating class represented only a small fraction o f the population, and as w e have seen, there was little cohesion am ong the boyars. Like other Balkan notables, they w ould not accept the authority o f one o f their number unless they could control him o r unless he represented their interests. T h e constant intrigues am ong the boyar factions and against the prince were to weaken the governm ents and to make them m ore open to Russian intervention. A fter the departure o f the Russian troops both Principalities faced the same m ajor econom ic and political problems. N either was in a prosperous condi­ tion, and heavy expenses had to be met. Th e tribute had not been paid during the Russian occupation, so the back installments were due. A paym ent also had to be made when the princes were invested by the sultan. T h e cost o f the Russian occupation and administration in the past years was charged to the provinces. M oreover, the political situation was not stable. Three centers o f authority existed: the princes, the assemblies, and the Russian consulates. 10

Q u o te d in B arbara Jelavich, Russia and the Rum anian National Cause, 18S8-18S9 (rep rin t ed., H am d e n , C o n n .: A rch o n B ooks, 1974), p. 3; see also p. 4

26 8

The formation of the national governments T he opposition to the princes centered, as could be expected, in the assem­ blies. In each province the boyars did all they could to embarrass and hinder the w o rk o f the prince. F o r their part, the Russian representatives kept a close watch on the situation and interfered constandy in the governm ent. T h ey also became involved in the dom estic intrigues. A ccording to the O rganic Statutes, appeals could be addressed to both the Porte and Russia. D issident groups not only follow ed this path, but also turned to other foreign consu­ lates, w hich in turn were not averse to embarrassing the Russian governm ent. A n atm osphere o f conspiracy and discontent thus existed in both Bucharest and Ia§i. T h e situation was worse in Wallachia. There Alexander G hica, the brother o f the form er hospodar, found him self faced w ith form idable opposition. T he Russian governm ent had supported his appointment because it consid­ ered him reliable. H e, however, had many enemies, w hose numbers increased once he became prince. H e appointed tw o o f his brothers as ministers; and their actions made his rule still m ore unpopular. Even m ore serious, Ghica came into conflict with the protecting power. Minciaky was replaced as consulgeneral in Bucharest by P. I. Ruckm ann (Rikm an). T h is agent had a difficult task to perform . Th e Russian governm ent was pressing for the acceptance o f a so-called A dditional Article to the Wallachian O rganic Statute, w hich it claimed had been “ inadvertently” left out o f the original version. Th is pro ­ vision stated that the Principality could not change the statutes w ithout the consent o f the Russian and O ttom an governm ents. I f accepted, this stipula­ tion w ou ld have been a real blow to the autonom y o f the province, and it was deeply resented as such. G reat influence was exerted. W hen the Walla­ chian assembly w ou ld not accept the article, it was dissolved. Russia was finally forced to act through the Porte to com pel a second assembly to accept the measure. T h e Wallachian assembly was a center o f opposition to G hica as well as to the Russian consulate. In 1840 another consul-general, I. A . D ashkov, was appointed, w h o proved sympathetic w ith the prince’s adversaries. W hat hap­ pened next is described by N icholas Karlovich G iers, w h o was attached to the Russian consulate in Ia§i and w h o was impressed by the corruption o f Romanian politics. Commenting on the past activities o f the boyars, he wrote: Each had his ow n party, and all o f them joined together to over­ throw G hica. A com plaint was drawn up at the General Assem bly o f D eputies . . . enum erating the abuses o f Prince G hica’s administra­ tion, and it was resolved by an overwhelm ing m ajority o f votes that the com plaint be subm itted to both courts. A s a consequence o f these doleances, as they w ere called in diplom atic language, the R u s­ sian and the Turkish governm ents appointed . . . com m issioners to investigate the case . . . Th e Turkish com missioner, as is customary, took full advantage o f the situation, and made a fortune by taking

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 bribes from the hospodar as well as from each o f the candidates for the office o f prince by prom ising each individual the support o f the Porte. W hile ou r representative, listening to anybody and everybody, tried to form a fair opinion on the state o f affairs, he was deceived, being unfamiliar with both the region and the people.11 A s a result o f this investigation, Ghica was deposed in 1842. A n election was then held according to the stipulations o f the O rganic Statute, and G eorge Bibescu became prince. A rich boyar w h o enjoyed Russian favor, Bibescu had studied in Paris. A lth ough he had been at the head o f the opposition to G hica in the assembly, he found that this body w ou ld not accept his direction either; again the b o ­ yars conspired to bring dow n one o f their number. O nce more, too, the question o f the special privileges to be allowed to R ussia came into question. A R ussian engineer, Alexander Trandifilov, had been given a concession to survey the province for minerals and then to exploit the resources he found. T he assem bly attempted to block the agreement. W ith the approval o f both R ussia and the Porte, Bibescu prorogued the assembly and governed by de­ cree fo r tw o years. T h e Trandifilov grant was nevertheless not upheld. In 1846 an assem bly that w as m ore favorable to the prince was elected. H is enemies, w h o remained num erous, sought support in the British and French consu­ lates, where they received encouragem ent and assistance. R ussia continued to back the prince. E ven with this difficult internal situation, Bibescu was able to secure the passage o f som e im portant legislation. Extrem ely signifi­ cant for the future were to be the customs union w ith M oldavia, put through in 1847, and the law on naturalization o f the same year, w hich made it easier fo r a M oldavian to become a Wallachian citizen. Bibescu w as also responsible for im provem ents in the city o f Bucharest and for measures to im prove edu­ cation. Events went more smoothly in M oldavia, where the prince, M ihail Sturdza, was both clever and strong. H e too was faced w ith the problem o f constant opposition from the boyars, but he was able to control them. W hen they denounced him to the Porte and Russia, he successfully defended himself. H e had no difficulty in securing the passage o f the A dditional A rticle, so that question did not form a matter o f dispute w ith Russia. H e took care to remain on go o d terms w ith the Russian consulate in Ia§i; he was also in touch w ith the rival French and British agents. A lthough his regim e, too, was corrupt, he did attempt some internal improvements. R oads, bridges, and hospitals were constructed, and the postal system was developed. M ea­ sures w ere passed to im prove education, which nevertheless remained poor. T h e regim e o f the O rganic Statutes was in m ost Rom anian opinion closely 11

C harles Jelavich an d B arbara Jelavich, eds., The Education of a Russian Statesman: The Mem­ oirs o f Nicholas Karlovich Giers (Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 1962), pp. 192- 193·

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The formation of the national governments associated w ith Russian dom ination. Therefore the discontented elements tended to blame the problem s o f the time on the protecting power. M ost o f the Russian representatives were responsible diplom ats w h o were concerned about the welfare o f the Principalities. T h ey did, nevertheless, allow them ­ selves to be drawn into the dom estic intrigues between the boyar factions and into the controversies between the assemblies and the princes. T h is par­ ticipation in Romanian political life was bound to win Russia enemies among those w h o w ere not given support. M oreover, the Russian activities, no m at­ ter what their intentions, w ere representative o f Russia’s special position and its dom ination o f Rom anian political life. In addition, the regim e o f the O r­ ganic Statutes was extremely conservative in nature. Russia’s support o f this system gained it the hatred o f those w h o wished further political reform . In the future, the nationalists, w h o wanted a truly independent governm ent, and the liberals, w h o sought a genuine constitutional regim e, w ere to see Russia as the principal obstacle to the introduction o f their program s. A t this time the Principalities w ere undergoing a period o f rapid social and cultural change. B y the 1840s the influence o f Western E urope was becom ing increasingly apparent. Th is trend was show n in the manners and dress o f the boyar class. T h e older generation still retained the national costume w ith long robes, whereas their children prided themselves on w earing the latest Paris fashions. T h e differences were to be m ore than superficial. N o t only Western styles were introduced, but also the political ideologies currently in favor am ong the m ore radical groups. These were absorbed by the new gen ­ eration that was educated outside the Principalities. There were no institutions o f higher education in the Principalities. This lack affected in particular the considerable num ber o f wealthy yo u n g men, sons o f boyars, w h o could afford to travel and w ho had no pressing need to follow an occupation. T h ey could live o ff the proceeds o f the family estates. T h e point o f attraction fo r them was Paris, which had the advantage o f com ­ bining elegance and culture w ith revolutionary excitement. B efore 1848 this city was the center o f liberal and national political agitation. Particularly im ­ portant was the influence o f the Polish emigres w h o had been forced to leave their country after the failure o f the revolution o f 1830 against Russian rule. T he m ost prom inent, A dam Czartoryski, the form er minister o f Alexander I, established what was in fact a government-in-exile, which was in touch with nationalist movements all over Europe. Italian, German, and Hungarian young men w ere also deeply involved in the revolutionary activities. Like their con­ tem poraries, the Rom anian youth entered into the conspiracies and elabo­ rated plans for a national revolt in the Rom anian lands. A lth ough they agreed upon no single program , m ost o f the future R o m a ­ nian revolutionary leaders stood for the unification o f Wallachia and M o ld a­ via under a constitutional regim e that w ou ld provide full guarantees o f civil liberties and som e sort o f a representative system. T h ey were united in their opposition to the O rganic Statutes and to Russian protection. F o r the R o ­

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 manians, as for the Poles, Russia was the main obstacle to national liberation. T he revolutionaries organized both w ithin and w ithout the country. Literary societies and secret associations were form ed in the Principalities, but Paris remained the center o f organization and agitation. In February 1848 a revolt broke out in Paris that was to touch o ff a wave o f revolution throughout Europe. T he Germ an states, the Italian peninsula, and the H ab sbu rg E m pire w ere chiefly affected; conservative, monarchical regimes w ere toppled. The aim o f the victors was the introduction o f consti­ tutional and national governm ents. There were no uprisings in Russia; in the O ttom an dom ains only the D anubian Principalities were to be involved. The first action occurred in Ia§i, and it was mild indeed. O n A pril 8 about a thousand people, prim arily townsm en, liberal boyars, and opponents o f the prince, assembled in the St. Petersburg H otel. Speeches w ere made attacking Sturdza, and a petition was drawn up fo r subm ission to the prince. H is re­ action was sw ift. H e arrested about three hundred people, som e o f w hom were later exiled. T h ere were no prisons in which boyars could be kept; they were usually confined in monasteries for the length o f their sentences. T h e revolution in Wallachia was a far m ore serious matter. Th e participants were to provide much o f the national leadership for the next decades, and the m ovem ent was to set the pattern fo r future Rom anian developm ent. Th e principal figures w ere Ion and D um itru Bratianu, N icolae and R a d u G olescu, C . A. Rosetti, and Nicolae Balcescu. In M ay a revolutionary committee headed b y Balcescu, R osetti, and A. G . G olescu was form ed. T h is grou p im m edi­ ately dispatched Io n G hica to Constantinople to reassure the Porte on the intentions o f the revolutionaries. It is interesting to note that once again, as in 1821, Constantinople was inform ed that the objective was not an end to O ttom an rule, but the regaining o f “ old rights.” T he form al beginning o f the Wallachian revolution was the issuance o f the Islaz Proclam ation on June 21. T h is docum ent contained a standard liberal program o f twenty-one points. Its aim was the replacement o f the regim e o f the O rganic Statutes and an end to Russian protection. T h e leaders at this time appointed a provisional g o v ­ ernment and m oved from Islaz to Bucharest, w here the revolutionary forces had also achieved a victory. Bibescu at first agreed to the Islaz program , but on June 26, after an assassination attempt, he abdicated and left fo r Transyl­ vania. A new governm ent was set up, w ith M etropolitan N eofit at its head; it included also Balcescu, A. G . G olescu, I. C . Bratianu, and C olonel Ion O dobescu, w h o was in com m and o f the limited armed forces o f the Princi­ pality. Bucharest was thus once again the center o f a revolutionary m ovem ent, although the conditions were in m any ways quite different from those o f 1821. O f great significance was the fact that the revolutionaries did not have an arm y at their com mand. There was no force that was the equivalent o f the pandours and volunteers w h o joined Tudor Vladim irescu. T he com m ander o f what troops were available, O dobescu, used them in Ju ly in an unsuccess­

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The formation of the nationalgovernments ful coup against the governm ent. This situation saved the provinces from the ravages o f a violent civil war, but it meant that the revolutionary leadership w ould have to achieve its goals by negotiation and diplomacy. In addition, in contrast to the 1821 uprising, this action was in no sense a peasant m ovem ent. In fact, the land question caused a split in the leadership when it came up for debate. T h e revolutionaries, w ith few exceptions, were boyars themselves. T h ey were not eager to undermine their econom ic base with a radical peasant reform . O f course, the new regime had little time in w hich to implement any kind o f a program . Its three m onths in pow er had to be devoted to immediate tasks o f organization and defense. Som e attempt was made to put into effect parts o f the Islaz Proclam ation, but the main effort was directed elsewhere. T h e ch ief fear o f the revolutionary governm ent was a Russian armed inter­ vention. In Ju ly a Russian arm y entered M oldavia, although its purpose was to keep watch on the revolutionary situation in Transylvania and the H ab s­ burg Empire, rather than to suppress the movement in M oldavia, which Sturdza had well under control. T h e presence o f the Russian force in the neighboring province, how ever, caused so much concern in Bucharest that the revolution­ ary leadership left the city. A new regime based on the O rganic Statutes and headed by M etropolitan N eofit was then set up. W hen a popular reaction overthrew this administration, the insurgent governm ent was restored. Plans for a constitutional assembly were prepared. M eanwhile, attempts were made to placate the Porte and to gain French and British diplom atic support. T h e O ttom an governm ent found itself under contradictory pressures. The French and British representatives, happy about the Russian embarrassment, w ished to restrain any intervention. Russia, in contrast, strongly urged the Porte to take action against the revolutionary movement. Th e O ttom an g o v ­ ernment limited its moves to the dispatch, first, o f an army to stand watch at the D anube and, second, o f a com missioner, Suleiman Pasha, to Bucharest. There Suleiman negotiated with the Romanian leaders a settlement that called fo r the replacement o f the revolutionary regim e by a regency that w ou ld, nevertheless, include som e members o f the insurgent administration. U n d er Russian pressure, the Porte rejected this solution and sent another represen­ tative, F uad Pasha, to secure the establishment o f a governm ent based on the O rganic Statutes, w ith all revolutionary influences removed. A t the same time, the Russian and O ttom an armies prepared to occupy the provinces. O ttom an troops entered on Septem ber 25, w ith the Russian army follow in g on Septem ber 27. Since the revolution did not have an armed force, it could not resist. Som e volunteers had been assembled in O ltenia, but they disbanded w hen it became obvious that the opposition was over­ whelm ing. A new governm ent under Constantine Cantacuzino was then o r­ ganized, and the revolutionary leaders fled the country. Russia next m oved to reestablish a firm control o f the situation. In M ay 1849 the C onvention o f Balta Lim an was signed w ith the Porte. U nder its provisions the princes were

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 to be chosen by Russia and the Porte for seven-year terms; the assemblies were to be replaced by divans whose members would be nominated by the prince and the Ottoman government. This agreement marked the height of Russian power in the Principalities. Russian troops remained in occupation until 1851 and returned again in 1853 at the commencement of the Crimean War. The revolution o f 1848 in Wallachia had thus been a failure. D espite the popular enthusiasm fo r reform , there had been no great peasant uprising to accom pany the actions o f the boyar leadership; no people’s army made its appearance. O f course, such a force w ould have had little chance against the Russian and O ttom an armies. It w ould also have brought up embarrassing questions fo r the revolutionary leadership, since m obilization o f the peas­ antry could easily have led to actions against the social and econom ic interests o f the boyar group. T he revolt, nevertheless, did have im portant results. The m ajor national leaders fo r the next decades w ere to com e from the ranks o f the revolutionaries, w h o were known as the “ forty-eighters.” A lth ough Balcescu died o f tuberculosis, the Bratianu and Golescu brothers and Rosetti, am ong others, were to play m ajor roles in subsequent events, as were two prom inent M oldavians, M ihail Kogalniceanu and A lexander Cuza. Once in exile these m en, concentrating on the achievement o f the national rather than the liberal aspects o f the revolutionary program , continued their activities in the national interest. T h eir goal was the unification o f the Principalities and, because they recognized that rule by native hospodars had resulted in contin­ ual intrigues and dom estic instability, the nom ination o f a foreign prince. As before, they saw Russia, not the O ttom an Em pire, as their ch ief obstacle. U ntil that pow er was eliminated from its position o f protector, they had little hope fo r national or liberal advancement.

OTTO M AN R EFO R M : TH E C R IM E A N W AR

We have seen in the preceding pages how Serbia became an autonomous state, Greece won its independence, the Principalities loosened their connec­ tions with Constantinople, and Montenegro remained out of the control of the Ottoman government. At the same time, within the empire, powerful Muslim leaders, such as Muhammad Ali, Ali Pasha, and others, were able to set themselves up as the real rulers o f their provinces and to defy the com­ mands o f the Porte. The question naturally arises what the sultan and his ministers were doing to counter this disintegration of their domains. Throughout this period the Ottoman statesmen were well aware of their dangerously declining power; they recognized that the existence o f the em­ pire was at stake. They, however, faced problems not shared by the Christian leaders. O f first importance was the fact that the conservative, religious forces were much stronger in the Muslim community. For five centuries the Otto­ man system had apparently worked. Emphasis on Muslim predominance and

religious division had built a m ighty empire. M oreover, those w ith vested interests in the maintenance o f the old conditions held pow erful positions; Christian notables as well as M uslim beys could block change. A s could be expected, the M uslim religious establishment was a hindrance to reform . It could not be expected that the ulema w ould give support to reform s w hose ultimate aim was the secularization and m odernization o f M uslim society. A m atter closely connected w ith the reform question was the trouble the Porte had in m eeting pressures from the great powers. A lth ough these states regularly referred to the em pire as the “ sick man,” they were am ong the ch ief contributors to this condition. T h ey intervened in O ttom an affairs for many reasons - for instance, to advance their ow n spheres o f control, in response to appeals by Balkan people, o r to preserve the balance o f power. In the eighteenth century the Russian and Austrian objectives had been to acquire O ttom an territory. In the nineteenth century the powers often concerned themselves w ith Eastern crises prim arily in order to assure that one o f their number, usually Russia, did not use the opportunity to acquire dispropor­ tionate territory o r influence and thus upset the balance o f pow er in the area. A fter 1815 the powers principally involved in this struggle w ere France, B rit­ ain, and Russia. M utually antagonistic, any tw o could ally should the third threaten to gain a predom inant position. A t this time, it w ill be noted, the H ab sbu rg Em pire, absorbed in serious problems in Central Europe, m ain­ tained a passive, negative attitude. O f the three m ajor powers concerned, France, w ith its ambitions in A frica and A sia M inor, posed the greatest im ­ mediate threat to O ttom an territorial possessions. In 1830 France annexed A lgiers; its claims w ere to extend further to E g y p t and Syria. T h e French governm ent, how ever, w ithout a large arm y in the area and w ith a navy sec­ ond to the British, could not endanger the O ttom an Balkan interests o r d i­ rectly threaten Constantinople. G reat-pow er intervention in O ttom an affairs was selective and capricious. Each governm ent sponsored that party o r nationality which w ould support its general diplom atic interests. In the autonom ous states and in Greece the local consulates took part in the dom estic factional struggles and in the con­ flicts between the ruler and his pow erful opponents. G reat-pow er sponsor­ ship also upset the balance w ithin the empire. T he interference was always solely in b eh alf o f the Christians. N o outside state spoke for the M uslim s, although they suffered from similar conditions o f bad governm ent under O t­ toman administration and from outright repression under Christian rule. There was little the Porte could do about the situation. It did not have the m ilitary pow er to prevent foreign interference, and it could not keep order in its ow n house. T h e desperate need for change had been recognized even in the eighteenth century. Selim III had concentrated on military reform . In the nineteenth century the condition o f the arm y remained the first concern, but the O tto ­ m an leaders w ent much further in attem pting to reorganize the em pire to

27S

276 C o n s t a n t i n o p le

The formation of the national governments meet the challenge o f the great powers and their own restless subject people. Like their Christian contemporaries, they took as their ultimate objective the establishment o f a centralized bureaucratic monarchy, with a single law for all of the citizens, based on equal rights and, in theory, on equal responsibil­ ities. Whether such a goal was obtainable, given the national and religious composition o f the population and the history of the area, was to be decided at this point. M ahm ud II, w h o came to pow er as a result o f the revolutionary actions o f 1808, fully realized the necessity o f reform . U nlike his predecessor, he m oved very slowly. In fact, eighteen years o f preparation preceded his first step. H is main task was to deal w ith the m ilitary vulnerability o f the empire. T h e jan ­ issaries had becom e little m ore than a m ob o f unruly men w h o w ere m ore capable o f pulling dow n the central governm ent and creating anarchy in the countryside than o f defending the state against a foreign invader. T h e sipahis had setded dow n to be provincial country gentlemen. W ith the traditional forces thus in disarray, it was clear that the country needed an arm y organized on m odern, Western European lines. Th e sultan did have certain troops at his com m and, but these w ere not sufficient to protect a great empire. B efore a real reform could be instituted, the problem o f the janissaries had to be met. T h ey w ere difficult to oppose because o f their close connections w ith the ulema. Proceeding w ith care, M ahm ud II w orked carefully to reassure the religious authorities, and he also introduced his ow n men into positions o f com m and in the janissaries. A t the same tim e, M ahm ud II was faced by the opposition o f the rebellious pashas, in particular A li Pasha o f Janina. A lth ough the O ttom an authorities knew o f the activities o f the Etairia in Greece, they had chosen to concentrate on subduing the M uslim rebel. T h eir success here, how ever, elim inated the one strong M uslim military force in the area that could have been used against the G reek revolution. W ithout an adequate army and w ith no readily avail­ able Balkan M uslim ally, M ahm ud II was forced to appeal to another refrac­ tory vassal, M uham m ad A li, and offer him Crete and the Peloponnesus for his services. A s w e have seen, the E gyptian arm y was very effective; under the com m and o f M uham m ad A li’s son, Ibrahim , it took Crete and landed in the Peloponnesus. In the north the O ttom an army captured M isolon ghi in A pril 1826.

Also at this time, the sultan prepared to destroy the janissaries. Not only had they demonstrated their incapacity in the Greek events, but in June 1826 they staged another revolt, this time in protest against the formation of a special corps in the army, which they saw as a challenge to their influence. Having prepared his ground, Mahmud was able to abolish the corps and also to move against the Bektashi dervish order that had been closely associated with it. The janissaries had been more than a military organization; they had been the chief support of the traditional conservative forces, who thus lost their military auxiliary. Although the sultan’s action succeeded, the empire 277

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 was left tem porarily in an unusually exposed situation. Because o f this w eak­ ness, the Porte was forced to b o w to Russian demands and accept the terms o f the Akkerm an convention. T h e Russian ultimatum caused great anger in O ttom an official circles, where opinion was divided on the question whether the em pire should fight o r not. In this atmosphere the news o f the battle o f N avarin o came as a great shock. M ahm ud II had introduced reform s in the navy; it had n ow been effectively destroyed, and by pow ers w h o w ere not at w ar w ith the Porte. T h eir squadrons continued to patrol the G reek coasts. T h e outburst o f anger and frustration was directed chiefly at Russia, w h o had been responsible for m ost o f the past hum iliations. T h e w ar that broke out in 1828 w as fought under the w orst o f circumstances. T h e m ilitary forces w ere not ready for com bat, and no help could be expected from the European powers. A lth ou gh the Treaty o f A drianople was a b low to the em pire, it was far from deadly. F o r the Porte the w orst aspect was the heavy indemnity, w hich it was not able to pay. Som e territory in A sia was surrendered, but w ith the exception o f Greece and the D anube D elta, the Balkan lands re­ m ained intact. T h e independent Greece created by the Treaty o f L o n d o n o f 1830 m eant the loss o f only a fraction o f the Greek-inhabited lands. O f course, R u ssian influence over both Serbia and the D anubian Principalities had been gready. strengthened. Nevertheless, w hen the internal condition o f the em­ pire is considered, the final outcom e o f the revolutionary events o f the 1820s had not been especially destructive. T he state itself had never been in danger. T h e next decade was to present exacdy this threat. A fter the setdem ent o f the G reek question and the peace w ith Russia, the Porte faced a m ajor chal­ lenge from E gyp t. M uham m ad A li was certainly the strongest and the most able o f the rebel ayans. H e was b o m in M acedonia in 1769 o f an Albanian family. In 1798 he had been sent to E g y p t w ith an A lbanian force to fight N apoleon, and there he subsequendy rose in the administrative and military service. In 1805 he was named governor. O nce in pow er he introduced an extremely effective reform program. H e was assisted by French advisers, whose presence gave France a stake in his success. H is goal, too, was the establish­ m ent o f an efficient centralized bureaucratic administration under his abso­ lute control. H e was able to introduce m any o f the reform s that w ere subse­ quendy to be attempted by the Porte. F o r instance, he replaced the tax farmers w ith salaried officials; he issued standard law codes; he set up an educational system ; and he em ployed foreign teachers and technicians. H is greatest achievement, how ever, was his organization o f a m odern disciplined army· H is son, Ibrahim Pasha, was to prove a brilliant military commander. T h e settlement o f the G reek crisis was a great disappointm ent to M u ham ­ m ad A li. A lth ou gh he was given the administration o f Crete, he naturally lost control o f the Peloponnesus, which was a part o f independent Greece. H e thus dem anded Syria as a replacement. W hen the Porte refused, he sent his arm y to capture the prize. H e succeeded in w inning a great victory over the O ttom an army at K o n ya in Decem ber 1832. T he road was then open fo r the

The formation of the national governments conquest o f A natolia, and Constantinople w as itself in clanger. Faced by this crisis, M ahm ud II was forced to turn to his form er adversary, Russia. N o other governm ent w ould come to his assistance. In Ju ly 1833 the tw o powers signed the Treaty o f U nkiar Iskelessi (H iinkar Iskelesi). A lth ough this was a mutual defense treaty, the pact in fact marked the achievement by R ussia o f a position o f predominance in Constantinople, which was a m ajor goal o f Russian policy at the time. T h e E gyptian advance was stopped, but M u ham ­ m ad A li gained much o f w hat he wanted, in particular the control o f Syria. H e was in a position to develop a great A rab em pire centered on the R ed Sea; E g y p t, w hich enjoyed the diplom atic backing o f France, had the poten­ tial o f becom ing a m ajor power.

These military disasters brought into sharp focus the urgent necessity for reform in the empire. Measures had to be taken to strengthen the central government at the expense of the religious, military, and provincial influences that had been so strong in the past. Changes were implemented that were designed to make the administrative organization more efficient and honest and to bring it more in line with contemporary European practice. Depart­ ments headed by ministers were established. A Council o f Ministers was formed, which functioned like a cabinet and coordinated the activities o f its members. Officials were to receive regular salaries, and a hierarchy was set up for the bureaucracy. Reforms were also introduced in the local governments, with the objective o f securing more central control over their activities. Because o f the nature of the Ottoman government, nothing equivalent to the struggle between the prince and the notables that we have seen elsewhere could occur. However, two centers of influence did develop. The first, the Porte, represented the bureaucracy; the second, the Palace, included the sul­ tan’s immediate family, his servants, and the officials of the royal household. The same intrigues and personal rivalries took place here as in other govern­ ments. One of the great accomplishments o f Mahmud’s reign was his attempt to open Muslim society more to the outer world. Concerned about form and style as well as content, the sultan dressed like a European ruler and com­ pelled his officials to follow his example. The robe and turban were replaced by the frock coat of the European bureaucrat, and the fez became the official Ottoman head covering. The sultan himself attended concerts and receptions at the embassies, and his manner o f living became more open than before. The other branches o f the government naturally reflected this change of at­ titude toward the outside world. In 1836 a Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established, and at the same time permanent embassies were opened in the major European capitals. The need to know foreign languages was recog­ nized, so schools were set up for that purpose. The central government was thus reorganized and the basis laid for a closer understanding o f the European states. These changes were very difficult to accomplish. The strength o f the conservative opposition, which probably 27 9

E ntrance

to the g o v e rn m e n t b u ild in g s, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e

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280

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The formation of the national governments represented the opinion of the majority of the Muslim population, was shown particularly in the question of education. The state desperately needed tech­ nical and professional schools. In the Balkan states secular school systems had been set up without a major confrontation with the Orthodox church, even though education had traditionally been under its jurisdiction. The situation was quite different in Constantiople, where the ulema remained a major ob­ stacle. Nevertheless, certain special institutions, such as a medical school, were opened. The same problems were met here as in the Balkan states; there was a shortage of books, equipment, and competent teachers. M ilitary reform remained the ch ief focus o f interest. T he defeat at Konya had taught a costly lesson. Foreign advisers were once again em ployed; this time they cam e chiefly from Prussia. T h e Porte naturally preferred to rely on assistance from a state with a high reputation in military achievement, but one that until then had shown little interest in the Eastern Question. The great Prussian general Helmut von Moltke came to Constantinople and played a m ajor role in m ilitary reorganization; British advisers were used for the same purpose in the navy. O ttom an students were also sent to European military institutions. T h e progress made in the military field was evidently grossly overestim ated by M ahm ud II, w h o appears to have made a complete m isjudgm ent o f the capabilities o f his army. H e had never accepted the defeat by E g y p t; revenge was always upperm ost on his mind. In 1839 he declared w ar on E g y p t w ith the aim o f destroying M uham m ad A li and regaining the lost territories. T h is campaign was a disaster from the beginning. M ahm ud died o f tuberculosis in June 1839 w ithout learning the full extent o f the defeat. H is son, A b d u l M ejid, came to the throne at the age o f sixteen in the midst o f a dangerous crisis. Fortunately for the empire, the international rivalries were to aid in the maintenance o f O ttom an integrity. T he close association o f France w ith M uham m ad A li’s E g y p t awoke the fears o f both Britain and Russia about the balance o f pow er in the Mediterranean. R ussia was also under the o bligation to defend the em pire after the conclusion o f the Treaty o f U n kiar Iskelessi. A coalition was therefore form ed am ong Russia, Britain, Austria, and Prussia in support o f the O ttom an Em pire. A protracted crisis follow ed, but neither France nor E gyp t could withstand this com bination. M uham m ad A li was forced to w ithdraw from Syria and Crete, but he re­ tained the hereditary rule o f E gyp t. Th e powers came to a further under­ standing. In 1841 the C onvention o f the Straits, which for the first time placed the Turkish w aterw ay under international supervision, was signed. A ccording to the terms o f the treaty, the Straits w ould be closed to ships o f w ar o f all outside nations in time o f peace. This stipulation protected the interests o f Russia, B ritain, and the O ttom an Em pire equally. British warships w ould not be able to menace Russian southern shores; similarly, Russian squadrons could not endanger British shipping in the M editerranean; and the Porte was as­ sured that a hostile fleet could not appear to threaten Constantinople. In time

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 o f war, o f course, the O ttom an Em pire was free to sum m on allied navies into its territorial waters. Russia allowed the Treaty o f U nkiar Iskelessi to lapse. These agreements reflected a close R u ssian -B ritish understanding and N ich ­ olas’s desire to w ork w ith Great Britain. H e considered France the main dan­ ger to Europe, chiefly because o f its influence on the revolutionary m ove­ ments. W ith the settlement o f the E gyptian question, the O ttom an E m pire was free to concentrate on dom estic affairs. T he great period o f reform , known as the Tanzimat, o r “ Reordering,” was about to begin. M easures undertaken at this time w ere a continuation o f those o f M ahm ud II, and the goal re­ mained that o f saving the empire. Certain changes w ere made in the basic principles o f administration. Previously, the Ottoman government had worked through other institutions and agents. F o r the Christians the millet and the village com m unities had been m ost im portant; these authorities, n ot the cen­ tral offices in Constantinople, were in touch w ith the individual. N o w the governm ent was to attempt to control its citizens directly. In order to do this, new institutions had to be adopted, m ost o f them patterned after European examples. T h e aim remained the establishment o f an efficient administration conducted by honest bureaucrats dedicated to the service o f the state. The general goals were stated in the first great docum ent o f the reform period, the imperial rescript o f the Giilhane (R ose Garden) o f N ovem ber 1839. Basically a declaration o f intention, it prom ised a governm ent based on security o f life, honor, and property; equal justice; and a regular system o f taxation. A very able group o f statesmen attempted to achieve some o f these objectives. It w ill be noted that the reform m ovem ent centered in the Porte, that is, in the governm ent, rather than in the Palace. A bdul M ejid and, at first, his successor A bdul A ziz played a less im portant role than the ministers, a situation that naturally caused friction between the tw o centers o f influence. T h e first reform er o f prominence was M ustafa Reshid Pasha, w h o was grand vezir six times and foreign minister three times. Associated w ith him were A li Pasha and Fuad Pasha, both o f w hom had w ide experience in Europe. A hm ed C evdet Pasha was known for his w ork in supervising the draw ing up o f a new law code, known as Mecelle (L a w C ollection), which was issued between 1866 and 1888. M idhat Pasha was experienced in provincial affairs. A fter the C rim ean War the influence o f France and Britain was param ount in Constantinople. Th e O ttom an reform ers, like their Balkan contemporaries, preferred to use French examples fo r their administrative reform s. Britain was, o f course, a strong supporter o f both the maintenance o f the em pire and internal reorganization. In 1838 the British and O ttom an governm ents signed the Treaty o f Balta Lim an, which was exceedingly favorable to B ritain’s com­ mercial interests. Both trade considerations and the strategic importance o f the O ttom an lands gave this naval pow er an interest in the maintenance o f O ttom an integrity.

At this time the chief governing institution was the Council of Ministers,

The formation of the national governments which included representatives o f groups such as the ulema, the military, and officials from the palace. In addition to those affecting the central govern­ ment, reform s w ere also undertaken in the provinces. A t first the attempt w as made to lessen the powers o f the governors; councils were associated with them in w hich Christians as well as M uslim s sat. Th e process o f reform was interrupted in the 1850s by the crisis that led to the Crim ean War. T h is con­ flict, the only general European w ar between 1815 and 1914, arose direcdy from the fam iliar issues associated w ith the Eastern Q uestion: the necessity felt by m ost European powers o f m aintaining the O ttom an E m pire and thus the balance o f pow er in the N ear East. T h e question o f the religious protectorates has been discussed previously. A ustria in the Treaty o f K arlow itz, France in various agreements, and Russia in particular in the Treaty o f K u ch u k Kainarji had acquired certain vaguely defined rights to speak in favor o f their coreligionists. In 1851 a conflict arose between France and R ussia concerning religious jurisdiction over the H o ly Places in Jerusalem , which involved the Catholic and O rthodox churches. In February 1853 the Russian governm ent sent to Constantinople a special em ­ issary, Prince Alexander M enshikov. A n arrogant and overbearing diplom at, M enshikov not only insisted on satisfaction in regard to the original issue, but dem anded a clear recognition o f the Russian right to protect the O rth o­ dox Christians o f the O ttom an Em pire and thus to speak in behalf o f 12 m illion O ttom an subjects. T he Russian officials may have genuinely believed that their previous treaties gave them this privilege. N icholas I also seems to have felt that he had some sort o f an understanding w ith B ritain over eastern affairs. Nevertheless, the demand, particularly in the form in which it was presented, could be accepted neither by the Porte nor by the powers, since it w ould have signified the dom ination o f the em pire by R ussia and a com plete upset o f the diplom atic equilibrium in the eastern M editerranean. B y slow stages the Western powers and Russia were draw n into war. W hen the Porte refused to accept a Russian ultimatum , w hose demands included the question o f protection, a Russian army was sent in Ju ly 1853 to occupy the Principalities. In O ctober the O ttom an E m pire declared war. A t the same time the British and French fleets entered the Straits in support o f the O tto ­ man position. In N ovem ber the Russian Black Sea fleet sank the Turkish navy at Sinope (Sam sun); all o f the ships and four thousand men were lost. Finally, in M arch 1854, France and Britain entered the conflict. It was very difficult for the belligerents to find a battlefield. In June 1854 the H absbu rg go vern ­ ment presented the Russians w ith an ultimatum dem anding that they evacu­ ate the Principalities. H ab sbu rg troops, in cooperation w ith O ttom an forces, then entered the region. A t the same time, the m onarchy and the Germ an states came to an agreement to keep Central E urope neutral. U n der these circumstances the allies, w hich included Piedm ont as w ell as France, Britain, and the O ttom an E m pire, w ere reduced to attacking in an unlikely spot, the Crim ea. A lth ou gh a year o f fighting did result in the capture o f the main

283

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 fortress o f Sebastopol, this victory was in no way decisive for the Western powers. However, Russia too was in difficulties. The defeat on its own ter­ ritory was a humiliation for the army and the tsarist regime. Both sides were willing to make peace. T h e Treaty o f Paris o f 1856 gave certain advantages to the Ottoman Em pire, although m ost o f its provisions were overturned w ithin the next quartercentury. M ost im portant, the m ilitary defeat and the terms o f the peace were a sharp check fo r the principal O ttom an antagonist. Russia was to concen­ trate henceforth on internal reform and not renew its Balkan adventures for tw enty years. F o r the Porte the m ost im portant stipulation o f the treaty was that concerning the neutralization o f the Black Sea. To assure O ttom an safety and to p ro te a British interests, it was agreed that neither Russia nor the O ttom an Em pire was to maintain warships in the Black Sea or fortifications on its shores. Th e O ttom an Em pire could, however, station a fleet in the Straits. O ther sections o f the treaty were similarly beneficial to the Porte. Three districts o f southern Bessarabia were given to M oldavia, an action that rem oved Russia from the ranks o f the riparian states o f the D anube; this measure was o f prim ary importance to Austria. T he treaty also returned the D anube D elta to O ttom an control. O ther provisions o f the peace, in contrast, w ere to prove extremely dam ­ aging to O ttom an authority in the Balkans, although their implications were not at first obvious. Russia was required to surrender any claim to a protec­ torship o f the Balkan Christians. The question, however, was not dropped. Instead, the signatory powers assumed the position o f joint guarantors. It w ill be noted that the H absbu rg Em pire and Prussia, as well as the belligerent states, took part in the peace conference and signed the treaty. Contradictory clauses in the agreement com plicated matters. In Article V I I the signators prom ised “ to respect the independence and the territorial integrity o f the O ttom an Em pire.” A s regards the Christian nationalities, the sultan com ­ municated to the powers the text o f a firman, the H atti H um ayun, which he intended to release on the question. T he Christian states in return agreed that they did not have the right “ to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations o f H is M ajesty the sultan w ith his subjects, nor in the internal adm inistration o f his empire.” 12 In practice, these provisions were to lead to great confusion and to serve to facilitate a massive interference by the great pow ers in any crisis between the sultan and his Christian subjects. W ith the conclusion o f the Crim ean War another period o f reform com ­ menced. A li and Fuad were the ch ief O ttom an statesmen concerned. The H atti H um ayun was issued in 1856; as w e have seen, it became a part o f the Treaty o f Paris. D raw n up under foreign pressure, the document was a dec­ laration o f intentions and an assurance that Christian and M uslim w ould be treated on an equal basis. A s far as the practical measures undertaken are 12

H ertslet, Map o fEurope, II, p p. 1254,1255.

284

The formation of the national governments concerned, the most important for the Balkan people were those dealing with provincial administration and taxation. Provincial reform, o f course, had be­ gun before the Crimean War. The Ottoman experience with the rebellious Muslim pashas had shown that it was essential that the provinces be con­ trolled. A major effort was made to reassert the authority of the Porte in areas such as Bosnia, where local authorities had often acted quite independendy. In this reorganization the empire was divided into vilayets, then into livas or sanjaks, then into kazas, which were subdivided into nahiyes, and further into villages. At the head of the vilayet was a governor. Associated with him was an Administrative Assembly including the heads of the administrative divi­ sions as well as three Muslim and three Christian representatives, who were chosen by their communities. A similar system was applied to the lesser sub­ divisions. Although at first the power o f the governor was reduced, he was later given more authority and control over the administrative apparatus. One of the strongest complaints expressed by the Christians against O t­ toman rule had always been the system o f taxation. Reform in this area was fundamental to the continued existence o f the state. The wars and reforms had absorbed huge sums o f money. If anything, the amounts collected had to be increased, but reform was needed in both assessment and collection. The question of assessment had already been taken up in the reign o f Mah­ mud II. A census and a land survey were conducted from 1831 to 1838 in the interests o f a better allocation o f taxes. In the new reforms, attempts were made to simplify and reduce the number of the taxes that the government collected. The effort was also made to abolish tax farming and to have the collections made by salaried officials. When such measures proved impossible to implement, new regulations were issued to control the abuses o f the old system. In the 1840s the Christian community leaders were made responsible for the collection o f the head tax and later for the tithe. In actual practice, very little was done to reduce the extreme corruption in this area of admin­ istration. There were too many vested interests involved. Both Ottoman of­ ficials and Christian notables regarded this source o f income as part of the rewards of their offices. The continued corruption at the bottom was paralleled by a condition of growing chaos at the top of the Ottoman financial institutions. To meet the cost of reform, as well as its regular military and administrative expenses, the Ottoman government resorted to unwise borrowing. The first loan was re­ ceived in 1854; by i860 the state was paying 20 percent o f its income on the service o f the debt, and by 1875 the figure had risen to 50 percent. In 1877 payments on the debt had to be suspended, since the funds could not be raised. Some attempts were made to control the situation. In accordance with measures introduced after 1858, annual budgets were prepared. Their value Was reduced by the fact that the government was never able to collect the revenues that were expected, and so the budgeted expenses were not covered. Basic to the Ottoman financial problems was the relative poverty of the 285

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 em pire. A gricultural methods were prim itive; subsistence farm ing was the rule in m ost areas. Industrial grow th was stifled by the difficulties w ithin the em pire, such as the scarcity o f capital for investment, the insufficient legal fram ew ork, and the lack o f safe and easy transport facilities. T he com mercial agreements made previously, which allowed foreign powers to im port their products virtually duty free, were also extremely detrimental to O ttom an de­ velopm ent. Austrian and British m anufactured goods flooded the O ttom an market to the detriment o f the native producer, w h o could n ot meet the com petition. T h e treaties prevented the Porte from taking effective measures to protect its ow n industries in their period o f grow th. A similar shortsighted policy governed the handling o f state lands. In the L an d L a w o f 1858 the attempt was made to regain control over property that had passed into pri­ vate hands, but the effect was quite the opposite. Tenants and tax farmers continued to regard their holdings as private property.

In addition to the financial burdens mentioned, the Ottoman government had to undertake the expenses resulting from the tragic fate o f the Muslim inhabitants of former Ottoman territories. The Russian occupation of these lands created conditions that led to the emigration of hundreds of thousands o f Muslims. Between 1854 and 1876 it has been estimated that 1.4 million Tatars left the Crimea. Russian forced resettlement policies carried through between 1863 and 1866 resulted in the immigration into the Ottoman Empire o f around 600, ooo Circassians. The Porte was not prepared to handle this mass movement, and there was an enormous loss o f life. Although the male Muslim element in the Ottoman population was increased despite the losses, the problem o f the resettlement of these people within the empire was over­ whelming. The Christian great powers, who were to prove so sensitive about the fate o f the Balkan people, felt no necessity to assist here. In 1861 a new sultan, Abdul Aziz, came to the throne. Despite the growing criticism of the Tanzimat reforms, he continued his predecessor’s policies. Ali and Fuad remained in power. Throughout the Tanzimat period the Porte was the center o f government. The bureaucrats, as could be expected, gained a large number of enemies, both on the right, from those who resented the secularizing and westernizing influences, and on the left, from a new group, the Young Ottomans, who felt that the changes had not gone far enough. The men who formed the latter group had grown up in the reform atmo­ sphere. Usually civil servants, writers, army officers, or businessmen, they were educated and well aware o f events in the rest o f the world. They com­ bined progressive ideas with a deep respect for Islam and the Ottoman past. Although they were willing to take from Europe anything that would strengthen their state, they wished to preserve what they considered the es­ sential nature o f their society. Their specific aim was the introduction o f rep­ resentative institutions into the government. After the death o f Ali Pasha in 1871, a basic change in direction occurred. Abdul Aziz was determined to rule himself. Russian influence increased, par­

The formation of the national governments ticularly during the vezirates of Mahmud Nedim. The sultan followed a pol­ icy o f balance among his ministers. By this time it was apparent that the reforms were not achieving the major goal of pacifying the Christian popu­ lation. In 1866 a revolt broke out in Crete; in 1875 and 1876 rebellions swept through Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Bulgaria. Although these movements had economic as well as political aspects, it was quite apparent that the Christian population wanted independence under their own leaders, not equal citizen­ ship in a reformed Ottoman state. The Tanzimat reforms had satisfied few in the empire. Those who lost their former positions were deeply aggrieved; the progressive elements o f Muslim opinion wanted more radical measures. In May 1876 the conservative and liberal forces joined hands in a revolt that overthrew Abdul Aziz and introduced another period o f extended crisis for the empire. As far as the Christian population was concerned, the reforms had simply come too late. They could only have worked if they could have been based on a unifying principle stronger than that of nationalism or religion. None such existed. Ottomanism, symbolizing the unity of the empire’s citizens, was not a term to attract wide support. The Ottoman Empire was no longer a great conquering power. It had suffered from repeated foreign intervention, humiliating defeat in war, and financial bankruptcy. Moreover, the new mea­ sures themselves had not been very popular. The centralizing institutions were difficult to apply to a population that had for centuries been governed on another basis and that was divided by religion, national background, and provincial loyalties. The Tanzimat officials were no substitute for the former religious and communal leaders. The parting o f the ways between Christian and Muslim was clear at the beginning o f the century, and the reform era made the divisions even more apparent. If communal and church authority was reduced, the Balkan people wanted their own national governments, not continued control from a centralized administration in Constantinople. T H E FO R M A T IO N OF T H E R O M A N IA N STATE

The stipulations of the Treaty o f Paris of 1856 had a greater effect on the Danubian Principalities than on any other area. Russia’s protectorate was brought to an end; that power could no longer exercise control over Roma­ nian political life. The significance o f the substitute European guarantee had yet to be shown. Moldavia was given back three districts of southern Bessa­ rabia, part o f the larger region lost in 1812 (see Map 22). The neutralization of the Black Sea affected Romanian interests also, in that it limited the Rus­ sian military and naval capabilities in the region. With the end of the Russian protectorate and the internal regimes based on the Organic Statutes, it was clear that a new political organization would have to be introduced in the Principalities. Since the powers were divided on its nature, it was decided that the question would be settled by diplomatic negotiations after the ad287

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887

Map 22. The expansion o f Romania, 1861-1920

journment o f the conference at Paris, and that the wishes o f the inhabitants would be consulted. Important as these stipulations were for future Romanian national devel­ opment, the diplomatic revolution that occurred following the Crimean War was o f potentially even greater significance. In the first part o f the century Continental politics had been dominated by the Holy Alliance, the combi­ nation o f Russia, Prussia, and the Habsburg Empire, whose common goal was to maintain the status quo on the Continent and keep the conservative governments in power. They had cooperated to suppress revolutionary activ­ ity throughout Central Europe and in the Italian peninsula. In 1849 a Russian army had been sent to Transylvania to put down the Hungarian revolution and maintain the Habsburg domination. The failure o f Vienna to repay this debt in 1854 aroused enormous bitterness in Russia. Habsburg actions during the Crimean War were, in fact, extremely damaging to the Russian cause. Once the war was concluded, the Russian statesmen were determined to take revenge. Not only was the Holy Alliance shattered, but the field was open for liberal and national movements that could only be to the detriment o f the monarchy.

288

289 The Sulina Channel, the mouth of the Danube

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 Russian foreign relations w ere to be almost com pletely reversed. Nicholas I had regarded France as the forem ost Russian adversary because o f its spon­ sorship o f revolutionary movements. Certainly the French ruler, N apoleon III, made no secret o f his sympathy for national and liberal ideas. H is policy became i f anything m ore pronounced after the Crim ean War. Yet Alexander II, w h o came to the throne in 1855, and his ministers w ere to w o rk closely w ith Paris in the postw ar years. Russia was about to enter a period o f internal reform . T h e state could not afford to remain isolated. A n inform al alliance w as thus established w ith the French governm ent that was to have great significance for the Principalities. W hereas previously the R ussian represen­ tatives had acted to suppress liberal and national agitation, they n ow stood w ith France in support o f a nationalist program . A fter 1848 the leadership o f the Rom anian national m ovem ent lay princi­ pally in the hands o f those w h o had participated in the revolution. W ith the radical change in international alignments, they could hope to obtain their objectives through diplomacy. The national program remained the unifica­ tion o f the Principalities and the nom ination o f a foreign prince. A more radical plan, which w ould include full independence and the inclusion in the union o f all the Rom anian lands - that is, Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bes­ sarabia — was regarded as im possible to fulfill. There w ere even strong hin­ drances to the accom plishment o f the m ore limited objectives. A t the end o f the w ar an Austrian arm y was in occupation o f the Princi­ palities. T h e H ab sbu rg aims were not clear. In the negotiations that took place on the R om anian question, France became the cham pion o f the na­ tional cause, and its stand was supported by Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia. T he Russian position signified the change in attitude that had taken place. T he Russian statesmen also hoped that they could divide France from Britain and thus break the Crim ean alliance. Prussia and Sardinia, w ith their ow n program s fo r Germ an and Italian unification, naturally associated themselves w ith France. These four powers w ere w illing to accept the organization o f the Principalities in the form desired by the liberal Rom anian leaders. M o st strongly opposed to a program o f unification and a foreign prince w ere the O ttom an Em pire and Austria. T he Porte saw any alteration in the status o f the provinces as a further erosion o f its rights as suzerain. Th e C ri­ mean War had been fought in theory to defend the em pire, rather than to contribute to its dissolution. T he H ab sbu rg M onarchy at this time and later feared that a strong R om anian national unit w ould exert too great an influ­ ence on the R om anian population o f Transylvania. T h e British governm ent w avered between the tw o positions. Finally, it decided that the form ation o f a united R om anian state w ou ld be detrimental to its policy o f building up the O ttom an Em pire as a bulw ark against Russia.

Not only could the powers not come to an agreement between themselves, but their attempt to learn the opinion o f the Romanian people led to even further controversies. Two sets o f elections were held in the Principalities; 290

Theformation of the nationalgovernments both show ed m ajorities for union and a foreign prince. A fter a period o f tension, the pow ers met in Paris in the summer o f 1858 to decide the question. D espite the results o f the elections, the convention agreed upon in A ugust 1858 changed the stipulations o f the O rganic Statutes but did not provide for union. Wallachia and M oldavia w ere given parallel, but separate, institutions. They were each to have a prince and an assembly. In order to appease the unionists, a central com mission was established at Foc§ani, but its functions were limited. T h e princes were to be elected by special assemblies and ap­ proved by the sultan. T h e representatives to the assemblies, w ith the fran­ chise limited to the boyar class, w ere to hold office fo r seven years. T h eir dudes w ere to oversee the budget, taxation, and the ministries. Elections were held on the basis o f this statute in the w inter o f 1858-1859. In both provinces the special assemblies chosen to name the prince selected the same man, Alexander C uza, a liberal and a forty-eighter. A lth ough the convention had not precisely forbidden such an action, it was certainly against the spirit o f the entire docum ent, w hich aimed at m aintaining the separation o f the Principalities. T h e double election w as a trium ph o f liberal-national policy, but it w as a question whether the powers w ou ld accept it. Once again the protectors took the responsibility o f deciding an internal question. T h ey split, as could be expected, into tw o camps. T h e Porte and the H ab sbu rg M onarchy w ere firmly opposed to the personal u nion; France, Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia supported it. Britain, the ostentatious propo­ nent o f constitutional governm ent elsewhere, did not like the action, but did not see h o w it could be changed. F rom this time on the R om anian liberals benefited from the fact that the powers recognized that they could not easily enforce their wishes on the provinces. Th e obvious measure w ould be an entrance o f the O ttom an army, an alternative that the m ajority o f the states w ould not consider. T he agreement o f all the protectors was needed fo r an O ttom an intervention. N either the Russian nor the H absburg arm y could be used as a policeman because o f the antagonism between the tw o governm ents and the general distrust o f their m otives. T he crisis that arose at this time was eased in Ju n e w hen A ustria became involved in a w ar w ith France and Sar­ dinia. T h e defeat o f the m onarchy rem oved one opponent o f union and made a settlement possible. In Septem ber 1859 the guaranteeing states recognized the double election, but on ly fo r the lifetime o f Cuza. D espite the lim itation there was a general recognition that once the provinces had been joined, they w ould be difficult to separate.

Although Cuza was prince o f both Moldavia and Wallachia, his position was very difficult. He faced the same opposition from the boyars as his pred­ ecessors. His problems were compounded by the fact that he had to govern in both Principalities. He thus had to deal with two separate assemblies and administrative systems. He had personally little experience in national admin­ istration, and he was well aware that liberal opinion preferred a foreign prince. He had no reliable political support. The franchise assured that the conserv­ 291

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 atives w ould be predom inant in the assemblies. T he prince thus had to secure a change in the electoral laws before he could be certain o f adequate backing in the legislatures. Two political parties com peted fo r political power. Th e Liberals, hence­ forth stood for the national program, and, with some reservations, they called for franchise and land reform . T h e Conservatives, w ith no set objectives, preferred the maintenance o f the status quo and the preservation o f the spe­ cial political and econom ic privileges o f the boyars. A convinced Liberal him­ self, C uza recognized that his m ajor goals w ould have to be, first, an amal­ gamation o f the legislative and administrative institutions o f the tw o provinces and, second, an electoral reform that w ould break the Conservative control and allow the country to take further measures that w ould benefit w ide sec­ tions o f the population. T he administrative and legislative union was accomplished w ith surpris­ ingly little difficulty. Relying on diplomatic means, Cuza turned first to France and the Porte to convince them o f the necessity o f the move. H e then pre­ sented the question to the other guarantors. B y the end o f 1861 he was able to w in their consent, although again the union was to apply only to the reign o f the prince. With the establishment o f a single assembly and administrative system, a true Rom anian national state had been established, although it was officially known only as the U nited Principalities o f Wallachia and M oldavia. Th e first goal o f the liberal revolutionaries o f 1848 had thus been accom­ plished. Even w ith this advance, C uza had great difficulties in controlling his gov­ ernment. A s in Greece and Serbia, the prom inent men were reluctant to con­ cede authority to one o f their number. T he assembly thus once again became a center o f opposition to the prince. Cuza had a definite program that he wished to implement, but he was blocked by this situation. In 1863, however, he took an action that was bound to gain public approval by secularizing monastic property, including the lands o f the D edicated M onasteries. These institutions had played an im portant role in the life o f the Principalities in the past. T h ey w ere under the authority o f the patriarch o f Constantinople and w ere adm inistered by G reek ecclesiastical officials. O ver the centuries they had amassed great wealth through pious donations, until by the nine­ teenth century they controlled 11 percent o f the arable lands o f the provinces. T h e profits on their holdings were “ dedicated” to certain H o ly Places, such as M t. A thos. T h ey had becom e extremely unpopular. C onditions fo r the peasants w ork ing the estates were w orse than for those on private lands. Although they were supposed to maintain certain charitable institutions, such as hospitals, for the benefit o f the population, they had failed to do so. In previous years the princes had made efforts to regulate their activities, but w ith little success. T h e institutions had the backing not only o f the Patri­ archate, but also o f the Russian governm ent, which made use o f the monas­ teries during the frequent occupations. In December 1863 the assembly passed

29 2

Theformation of the nationalgovernments the expropriation measure; compensation was offered, which the Patriarchate refused. Negotiations on this matter dragged on for years. In the end the Patriarchate received nothing. All parties could unite on this issue. In contrast, the great domestic ques­ tion, that involving the peasantry, was to cause a bitter conflict. Obviously, some move had to be taken to regulate the status o f the majority o f the population. The position of the peasant had been a major issue in the revo­ lutions o f 1848 in the Habsburg Monarchy; neighboring Russia in the 1860s was undergoing a period of radical peasant reform. Here the serfs were lib­ erated and they received land. The Romanian peasant was not a serf - that is, he was not legally tied to the estate - but he did owe labor dues and payments for the use of his land. Some changes clearly had to be made in the relationship o f peasant and the landowner. Such measures, however, were not likely to be carried through with the cooperation of the Romanian as­ sembly, dominated as it was by boyars whose interests were closely involved. Cuza solved the problem by a coup d’etat in May 1864. When the assembly passed a vote o f censure o f his ministry, he used soldiers to dissolve the body. He then announced a new statute that would both give him more power and widen the franchise. The measure was approved by a plebiscite with the vote of 682,621 to 1,307. Quite obviously, the methods of coercion available to the prince had been used freely. This alteration of the political institutions that had been established by the great powers was a clear challenge to their authority over the country. Their reaction was very weak. As usual, France supported the Romanian decision. The chief opposition came from the Habsburg Empire, backed by Russia, who disliked the methods used. Once again the disunity o f the protectors and the recognition that they had really no means o f enforcing a negative decision led them to accept an accomplished fact. With the government securely under his control and with the assistance of his most important minister, Mihail Kogalniceanu, Cuza proceeded with the regulation of the land question. The Agrarian Law of 1864 was perhaps the major piece of legislation introduced in the century because of its effects on social and economic conditions in the Principalities. The intention o f the law was to guarantee each peasant direct ownership of a plot of land and to create a prosperous and independent class o f small proprietors. Previously, it will be remembered, the peasant had only the right to a collective share in a por­ tion of the estate. In the new law, once again, ownership of draft animals was made the basis o f the distribution of land. A family owning four oxen and a cow received 13.6 acres (5.5 hectares); those with two oxen and a cow were given 9.6 (3.9), and those with one cow got only 5.7 (2.3). A peasant with no animals could keep his house and garden plot, or about 0.5 acre (0.2 hec­ tares). In return for the tithe and labor dues that he lost, the boyar was to receive compensation. The peasant paid the state over a period o f fifteen years, and the government in turn indemnified the landholder. The peasant 293 j

The revolutionary years, 1804—1887 land was declared inalienable for thirty years, a measure designed to prevent the landlord from regaining full control o f his former estate. The reform did not work as intended; a strong and prosperous class of peasant farmers did not appear. The major problem was that the peasants, except perhaps those in the first category in the division, did not receive adequate amounts of land to support their families. Moreover, the boyar kept control o f the forests and pastures that previously had been regarded as common land and had been used for the raising of cattle. The change had an immediate effect on the diet o f the inhabitants. Less meat and dairy products were available; com became the staple in the peasant diet. The more valuable wheat was sold as a cash crop, eventually destined for export. Under these circumstances the peasant, to supplement his meager income, was forced to work on the land still retained by the boyar, who had been required to surrender not more than two-thirds of his estate. Since this class dominated the local administration, the individual landholders had often used their position to assure that they kept the best land or to cheat on the amounts surrendered. Thus in most areas the boyar land continued to be cultivated by the peasants, usually on a sharecrop basis; they provided their own tools and animals. Despite the original intention of the Agrarian Law, its ultimate effect was to improve the position of the boyar. With the continuing rise in demand abroad for the agricultural products o f the Principalities, the large landowner remained in a good position to benefit from the economic conditions o f the time. Although Moldavian boyars often ran their estates, the Wallachian landowner still generally preferred to live in Bucharest or abroad and to ap­ point a steward to run his affairs. He was not interested in improving the use of his land or introducing modem agricultural methods. With so much cheap labor available, there was no incentive for change. The entire situation was to the great disadvantage of the peasantry, whose position worsened consid­ erably during the second half of the century, particularly as the population continued to rise. The Principalities were to remain a land o f large estates and a depressed peasantry, in contrast to neighboring Serbia and Bulgaria, where small peasant farms predominated. In addition to these reforms, the Cuza administration was responsible for other important measures. A civil code based on the French Code Napoleon was issued, and local government was organized on the centralizing prin­ ciples that we have seen elsewhere. The control that could be exerted over the local officials and police by Bucharest gave the men in office the advantage in the elections that prevailed in Greece and Serbia. A system o f primary and secondary education was established, and universities were opened in Bucha­ rest and Ia§i. The measures could not, o f course, be put through without opposition. It was to be expected that the Conservatives would seek Cuza’s overthrow, but he had also won the dislike o f the Liberals. They made no secret o f their preference for a foreign prince. 294

Theformation of the nationalgovernments By 1866 C uza w as thus faced w ith enemies on all sides, and he had received very litde credit fo r his achievements. H e was him self not an intensely am ­ bitious man. H e had repeatedly declared that he regarded him self as a tem ­ porary substitute fo r the foreign prince w hom the Liberals desired. M o re­ over, like K in g O thon, he did not have an obvious successor. H e had no legitimate sons. H is mistress, M arie O brenovic, did have children, but their sucession was improbable. Cuza was also unpopular with the protecting powers because o f his acts o f defiance in the past; they supported his maintenance in pow er chiefly because they could envisage no better alternative. The overthrow of Cuza in February 1866 thus came as no great surprise. The action was a military coup; a group of army officers entered the prince’s room and forced him to sign an abdication. He made no resistance and as­ sured the local consuls that he too preferred the foreign prince desired by the leaders o f the revolt. The conspiracy had been the result of an understanding between the Conservatives and the Liberals. Ion BrStianu and C. A. Rosetti were to play a particularly active role in the next weeks. A provisional gov­ ernment was appointed and a regency set up. The goal o f the leaders was the maintenance o f national unity, a foreign prince, and constitutional govern­ ment. They did not seek to break the link with the Ottoman Empire. The assembly next proceeded to choose a prince. The first preference was Philip of Flanders, a brother of the king of Belgium. When he refused, Ion Bratianu undertook the task o f finding an alternative candidate who would accept the position. The Principalities were in a potentially dangerous situation. According to the treaties, Moldavia and Wallachia should have separated with the end of the reign o f Cuza. Although France still supported a united Romania, Rus­ sia, the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Britain preferred a re­ turn to the former situation. Europe, however, was on the eve o f the war between Prussia and Austria that was to decide the issue of supremacy in Germany; the principal attention was on this area. In the Principalities the regency argued that the choice o f a prince was a purely internal matter not subject to great-power interference. Meanwhile, Bratianu had found a pos­ sible candidate in Charles of Hohenzollem-Sigmaringen. This prince, the son of the head of the Catholic branch o f the Prussian royal family, was also a cousin o f Napoleon III. With close French and Prussian connections, he was a good candidate for the Romanian throne. With the tacit consent o f both France and Prussia, the prince accepted the offer. The provisional govern­ ment in April held what proved to be a classic example o f a controlled pleb­ iscite; the choice was approved 685,969 to 224. Since Charles was an officer in the Prussian army and war with Austria was about to break out, the prince had to travel through Habsburg territory to Romania in disguise. He arrived in his new country in May 1866. The sub­ sequent Prussian victory in the war with Austria and the obvious impossibil­ ity of securing his removal without a military intervention led the powers to 295

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 recognize his election by the end o f the year. With a foreign prince securely on the throne, the Rom anian Liberals had thus achieved the second part o f their national program . T h e O ttom an suzerainty was nom inal; the Porte had no influence on internal affairs. T h e next step in the national m ovem ent was to be the attainment o f full independence. T h is goal fully corresponded w ith the ideas o f the new prince, w h o did not want to be an Ottoman vassal. After his accession to the throne he strongly supported any measure that w ould weaken the few rem aining ties w ith the Porte. H is initial years in power, however, were prim arily devoted to dealing w ith the internal opposition. H is first governm ent was under the leadership o f the Conservative Lascar C atargiu, but it contained both R osetti and Ion Bratianu. A constitution was approved to replace the convention o f A ugu st 1858, w hich had previously been the basis o f governm ent. Based on the B el­ gian C onstitution o f 1831, the docum ent contained guarantees o f free speech, press, and assembly. Th e prince was given a strong position; he named and dism issed the ministers; he could dissolve the assembly and veto legislation. T h e tw o-house legislature consisted o f a senate and a cham ber o f deputies. A n indirect system o f election assured the continued predom inance o f edu­ cated, wealthy, and property-holding sections o f the population. W ith the political organization determined, Charles em barked upon a pro ­ gram designed to strengthen and m odernize the country. Proud o f his m ili­ tary background, he devoted particular care to building an efficient R o m a­ nian army. H e asserted as great a degree o f independence from Constantinople as possible; his principal attention was directed to securing the right to carry on m ore o f the normal functions o f an independent ruler, including the m int­ ing o f coins, the awarding o f m ilitary decorations, and, m ost im portant, the negotiation o f treaties w ith other governm ents w ithout the intervention o f the Porte. Postal, telegraph, and consular conventions w ere concluded at this time. T h e prince also wished to secure international recognition o f Rom ania as the official name o f the state. In 1869 he made a popular m arriage with Elizabeth o f W ied, a Protestant, w h o w as later to become know n in Europe fo r her w ritin g about R om an ia under the name o f Carm en Sylva. Like K in g O thon and A lexander C uza, Charles did not produce an heir. H is one child, a daughter, died at a you ng age. T h is foreign prince found the task o f governing no easier than had the native rulers. Charles, in fact, was him self in much the position that Cuza had been in. H e had no personal party, and he had to play between the opposin g factions and individuals. In 1870-1871 a m ajor internal crisis almost led to his abdication. In Ju ly 1870 the Franco-Prussian War com menced. The prince naturally supported Prussia, whereas m ost o f the politically influential men in the state preferred the R om anian patron, France. R ussia used the occasion to denounce the Black Sea clauses o f the Treaty o f Paris, and there w as anxiety in Bucharest that a claim w ould be made fo r the three districts o f southern Bessarabia acquired in 1856. Som e groups were also opposed to

Theformation of the nationalgovernments the conservative monarchical form o f governm ent that had bCen established. In this atm osphere o f dom estic unrest, agitation directed against the prince rose. A small uprising that took place in Ploe§ti in A ugu st was suppressed, but a ju ry subsequently freed the participants. These events, together w ith his great difficulties in governing the country, deeply depressed the prince, w h o cam e to the conclusion that he could not rule under the constitutional regim e in effect. Like Cuza, he felt that the executive powers had to be ex­ panded. H e thus w rote a letter to the governm ents o f the guarantor states stating his problem s and expressing his willingness to abdicate. This message was received most unsympathetically in all the capitals, where it was felt that the prince was sim ply laying the groundw ork fo r a declaration o f independence. Th e Franco-Prussian War and the Russian denunciation o f the Treaty o f Paris had caused dangers enough; the powers dreaded another Eastern crisis. T h ey were certainly not go in g to g o to the aid o f the prince in his dom estic quarrels. T he agitation against Charles reached its height on the night o f M arch 22—23, 1871 · Dem onstrations held by French sympathizers when the Germ an colony in Bucharest was holding a dinner to celebrate the Prussian victories resulted in a m ajor crisis in the governm ent. A lready un­ happy w ith the conditions o f his rule, Charles was now ready to leave. R e ­ alizing the dangers to the nation i f such an action occurred, the responsible Rom an ian leaders acted to calm the situation. C atargiu form ed a C onserva­ tive ministry, which was to last fo r five years. Retaining control o f the legis­ lature, this regim e assured a period o f dom estic tranquility. T h e defeat o f France and the unification o f Germany, follow in g closely on similar events in Italy, created a new diplom atic balance on the Continent. In the early 1870s Russia, Germany, and the H absbu rg Em pire joined together in an inform al association known as the Three Em perors’ Alliance, a com bi­ nation that w as to dom inate European diplom acy fo r the next years. N one o f these pow ers wished a new Eastern crisis. D espite the fact that the inter­ national situation was not favorable to attempts to expand its autonom ous position, the Rom anian governm ent continued in these endeavors. Its great­ est success was the conclusion o f commercial conventions with Austria-Hungary and R u ssia w ithout the intervention o f the Porte. D espite the tem porary check to further m ajor accom plishments, it can be seen that between 1856 and 1875 real advances had been made in the Rom anian national program as enunciated in particular by the Liberal Party. M oldavia and Wallachia had been united, and a foreign prince was on the throne. N ei­ ther the suzerain pow er nor the protectors had been able to prevent R o m a ­ nian m oves tow ard greater autonomy. In internal affairs a constitutional g o v ­ ernm ent had been established, and attempts, at least, had been made to meet the peasant problems. In these years the principal supporter o f the Principal­ ities in foreign affairs had been France. Its defeat in 1871 was to have im por­ tant consequences for the future. In fact, no other pow er was subsequently to assume a similar attitude o f assistance and patronage. 297

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 C O N C LU SIO N : TH E BALKAN R E G IM E S

n a t io n a l

By the 1860s national governments had thus been established in four areas. The single fully independent state was Greece. Serbia and the Danubian Prin­ cipalities were still under Ottoman sovereignty, although this status involved little more than the payment of a tribute and some other minor obligations in regard to internal affairs. The position o f Montenegro was unique. Despite the fact that the state was generally recognized as part of the Ottoman Em­ pire, the Porte had no control over Montenegrin internal affairs and could not collect a tribute. In foreign policy the Balkan governments acted in an equally independent manner. The Ottoman foreign ministry was still in theory supposed to handle the international relations of the entire empire, but in practice the Balkan states had regular and direct contact with other govern­ ments. In their internal development the new national regimes tended to follow the same general pattern and to face similar difficulties. In each state the centralized bureaucratic monarchy was considered the best form o f govern­ ment. Political control was thus shifted from the village communities and the regional divisions to the capital city. Here the struggle to control the central authority, and with it the administrative network, dominated the scene. The major conflict was that between the executive and the legislative branches of government, that is, between the prince and his supporters, on the one hand, and the groups who were excluded from power, on the other. The opposition first demanded the establishment of councils or assemblies of notables to check the power o f the executive. Later the idea of a representative assembly and constitutional government was introduced. The vocabulary of the liberal and democratic movements of Europe was used, but in fact the issue was whether a strong ruler or an oligarchy should run the country. The average peasant did not have a direct political role in the state except as a revolution­ ary fighter. Domestic controversies involved not only this conflict between the ruler and the notables, but also the struggle for political power among the prom­ inent men who joined competing factions or parties. Some organizations were formed around a strong leader, whereas others were based on issues, such as support or opposition to the prince, or questions o f domestic reform. Victory in an election meant more than the triumph of a man or an idea. It gave the winning party the control o f the bureaucracy and thus of the ap­ pointments to major posts, which in turn allowed access to sources of real profit. Much has been said about the corruption o f the Ottoman political system. The Christian states were to follow in the same path. It should first be emphasized that all governments are to a degree corrupt; the problem in the Balkans was that this aspect of political life limited and weakened the entire society to a notable extent. 298

Theformation of the nationalgovernments When discussing corruption in office, it must be remembered that many practices that were not acceptable in Western Europe were regarded in the Balkans not only as correct, but in some instances as admirable. For example, nepotism was a standard practice. It was thought normal for a man to ap­ point members o f his family to high offices when he gained power; it was a sign o f his attachment and loyalty to those closest to him. Similarly, he was expected to reward friends and supporters. The assignment of public posts on the basis of political patronage rather than merit caused little violent out­ rage. Once in office, such officials regularly followed the Ottoman practices and took advantage o f their positions. Again, many o f their activities were accepted. Payments for services rendered were not regarded as unusual. The term bakshish covered both outright bribes and what the Western European would regard as tips. Officials in the lower branches of the bureaucracy were often so miserably paid that they had to augment their incomes through these practices. The total effect was unfortunate. Balkan states were not only im­ poverished, but also badly administered. T h e O ttom an governm ent, as w e have seen, attempted to halt the disinte­ gration o f its em pire by a policy o f reform . B y the 1870s, i f not lon g before, it was clear that the m ajor aim o f these changes, the reconciliation o f the Balkan people still under direct O ttom an rule, could not be accomplished. Th e attraction offered by the national idea was too strong. M oreover, the leaders in Greece and the autonom ous principalities had regularly used real and invented O ttom an horrors to back their ow n position. T he concept o f a “ Turkish yoke” became an integral part o f national m ythology and official propaganda. T h e constant emphasis on this theme served to influence the population under O ttom an administration and to obscure or draw attention away from the defects o f the Balkan governments. The high degree o f interference by the great powers has been emphasized in the preceding pages. These practices were legal and based on international treaties. R ussia had the right to intervene in the Principalities and Serbia until 1856; the three-power protectorate over Greece remained theoretically in effect until 1923. In addition, A ustria and France could speak for the C ath­ olics and Russia fo r the O rthodox o f the peninsula, although what this pro­ tection entailed was never clearly outlined. A fter 1856 all o f the signatories o f the Treaty o f Paris were guarantors o f the Balkan states, but again no defini­ tion o f what this involved was attempted. In any event, the m ajor powers, Russia, A ustria, France, and Britain, did take a decisive role in determ ining the fate o f the Balkan nations. T h ey not only exerted control over foreign relations, but entered w ith enthusiasm into local politics. Each consulate had its clients. Th is intervention on every level was not evenhanded. It seriously interfered w ith the O ttom an ability to run the em pire, and it became a m ajor factor in the relations o f the ruler in each country with opposition politicians and w ith the Porte.

299

6 The national issue in the Habsburg Empire

T H E H A B S B U R G E M P I R E A F T E R 1 81 5: TH E H U N G A R IA N PRO BLEM

the Habsburg government was again in a favorable position in international affairs, but most o f the domestic problems remained unsolved. In the eighteenth century, as we have seen, the principal opposition both to the establishment of a strong autocratic monarchy and to reforms of any kind had come from the nobility, with their base of power in the provinces. They defended their privileged position on the grounds o f historic rights and traditions. The French Revo­ lution had deeply frightened this group. During the long period o f warfare it had shown itself more willing to cooperate with the court and accept a central direction, but with the return of peace the former attitude o f criticism and resistance was again adopted. The major challenge to Habsburg authority was to come, however, from another direction. The doctrines o f the French Revolution continued to have an appeal to certain sections o f the population, for instance, members o f the professional classes, the lower gentry, the non-Catholic church leaders, and some merchants, artisans, and students. These people were educated and aware o f general European conditions, but they had no political power. They were to support programs calling for the introduction o f representative institu­ tions and a guarantee of civil rights. They were also to espouse national pro­ grams strongly. In other words, their goals and activities resembled closely those o f their contemporaries in the Balkan states. Throughout the century the Habsburg government was to remain contin­ ually on the defensive in domestic and international affairs. To understand the repeated retreats made in this period it is important to recall the basic nature o f the state. As in the eighteenth century, the monarchy remained a collection o f lands united by a dynasty that had control of the army and the bureaucracy and that could ally with various other political elements. The Habsburg government was still largely dependent on the provinces and their diets for financial support and recruits for the imperial army. To maintain control the Habsburg leaders had to accomplish a juggling act among the various interests, both national and social, within the empire. They had to f t e r th e c o n g r e s s o f V ien n a

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The national issue in the Habsburg Empire ally with those groups w hose support was essential and to maintain a balance am ong the political opponents — in other w ords, to follow a divide-and-rule policy. We have seen how both the O ttom an Em pire and the Balkan states became in the nineteenth century centralized monarchies w ith strong bureaucracies. A t the time o f M aria Theresa and Joseph II, reform s had been made in this direction, but the provincial, class, and national opposition had always been too strong fo r any great success. Som e advances could be made, but the provincial authorities could never be com pletely subordinated to the central administration. In this struggle w ith the dissident elements the H absburg governm ent suffered from the fact that it could not use the popular slogans and catchwords o f the day fo r education and propaganda. Lo yalty to the monarch and the church w as serving less and less as a principle com m anding widespread support. Liberalism and nationalism, the ideals o f a large part o f the politically active segm ent o f the population, could endanger the m on­ archy. T h e governm ent itself could appeal to no individual national grou p as such. A lthough Germ an was the preferred language for state affairs, the court did not represent specifically Germ an interests. In fact, in the period under discussion, the principal danger to the em pire was to come from the gro w in g pow er o f Prussia in the Germ an states and the attraction o f Germ an liberal­ ism w ithin the empire. Germ an liberal and national m ovem ents, i f brought to their logical conclusion, w ould mean the end o f H absbu rg rule and pos­ sibly the dissolution o f the state. There could, o f course, be no “ H absburg,” any m ore than there could be an “ Ottoman,” nationalism in the true sense o f the word. Th e solution that the governm ent adopted to deal w ith these problems was sim ply to attempt to maintain the status quo as long as possible. W hen this endeavor failed com pletely in 1848, an opposite approach was adopted and experiments were made w ith different systems o f political organization. T h e weakness here was that political adjustment and reform require a period o f peace and stability in international affairs. F rom 1848 to 1866, the crucial years fo r the settlement o f its internal problem s, the m onarchy w as faced w ith continual challenges abroad. M any o f these, involving national movements in neighboring states, had repercussions within the monarchy. A fter the C ongress o f Vienna, as before, Clem ens von M etternich was the ch ief architect o f H absbu rg foreign policy. In internal affairs he was not a centralist. H e regarded the em pire as a federation o f historic provinces, each w ith its o w n customs and traditions that should be preserved. Essentially a man o f the eighteenth century, he respected historic rights, but he denounced the revolutionary principles o f the equality o f individuals and nations. A l­ though his influence on H ab sbu rg internal policy was never as great as on international relations, he recognized the close links between the dom estic and the foreign policy o f any state. H e thus felt strongly about preventing the accession to pow er o f revolutionary governm ents in regions o f im por­

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 tance to H ab sb u rg interests. H e supported the close cooperation o f the E u ­ ropean pow ers, in particular A ustria, Russia, and Prussia w ithin the bounds o f the H o ly Alliance, and their intervention in the internal affairs o f other states when the legitimate authorities were threatened by revolutionary activ­ ity. Like Alexander I and Nicholas I, he was willing to send the H absburg army to restore or protect a ruler w hose position was endangered by revolu­ tionaries using methods o f force and violence. U ntil 1870 the principal H absburg concern centered on events in the G er­ man and Italian lands. Th e protection o f H absburg interests in these regions was the main aim o f foreign policy, and Balkan and Eastern affairs usually w ere distinctly secondary in importance. T h e generally negative H ab sbu rg attitude in the Eastern Q uestion and the desire not to becom e involved in the Balkan controversies reflected this attitude; H absburg neutrality in the C rim ean War, for instance, was made necessary at least in part by conditions in Italy. T h e H absbu rg diplom ats took a m ore active role in the negotiations over the D anubian Principalities, because o f the effects that any changes in this region m ight have on the Rom anian population o f the empire. In 1835 Francis I died, to be succeeded after much controversy by his eldest son, Ferdinand, but this monarch did not have the mental ability to govern. Th e state, w hose main unifying element was the dynasty, thus had at its head an incom petent em peror, w ith the actual authority transferred to the m inis­ ters and other members o f the H ab sbu rg family. The chief problem s that had to be met at this point were the rising demands for a settlement o f the peasant land problem and the increased dangers from Hungarian nationalism. T h e m ajor social problem o f the m onarchy was the discontent o f the peas­ antry. A lth ough conditions differed widely, in many areas even the reforms o f the enlightened despots had not been put into effect. Th e situation was becoming increasingly unsatisfactory from the point o f view o f both the peasant and the progressive elements am ong the large landholders. Peasant attitudes in particular were changing. There was less inclination to believe that G o d had assigned each individual a role in life and that people should fulfill their functions w ithout com plaint. A s in the Balkan lands, the peasant in the m on­ archy wanted to end all feudal dues and services and to obtain full ownership o f a definite plot o f land. H e had ways o f expressing his feelings: peasant revolts had been com m on in the past, and more passive tactics were also em ployed. O ften sick chickens and rotten produce were sent to fulfill feudal obligations; the peasant assigned to robot tasks might lo a f on the job. T h e nobility too was discontented w ith the agricultural situation. Som e disliked o r w ere bored by their feudal duties, such as holding m anorial courts and providing local administration. Others lived in dread o f massive peasant uprisings like that o f H oria in the previous century. The m ore enlightened am ong them wished to extract greater profits from their estates. Fo llo w in g the example o f their class in Britain and Prussia, they sought to gain full control o f their lands and farm them w ith w age labor. T h ey were perfectly

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The national issue in the Habsburg Empire w illin g to end the robot, but they wanted to be indemnified for any losses, w ith the state taking the responsibility. F o r the noble the ideal solution to the agrarian problem w ou ld have been the full em ancipation o f the peasant, w ith the ow nership o f the land rem aining in the noble’s hands. T h e agricultural situation reached a state o f crisis in the late 1840s, with bad harvests in 1845, 1846, and 1847. E ven before 1848 some peasants were refusing to fulfill their obligations. A s a class they remained extremely weak. There w ere no organized groups and no recognized leaders. T h e future rev­ olutions were to be led by members o f the m iddle class or the gentry, w hose programs called for liberal and national reforms whose implementation would put them in power. T h ey claimed to talk fo r the “ nation” and the “ people,” but the reform s desired by the m ajority o f the peasants were either o f low priority o r tacked onto the revolutionary program s, i f they were included at all. T he strongest opposition on a national basis faced by the H absbu rg g o v ­ ernment in this period came from Hungary. It was recognized in Vienna that the A ustrian position in the Germ an and the Italian lands could not be m ain­ tained w ith a militant, discontented H ungary at the rear. M oreover, the em ­ pire needed financial support and soldiers from Hungary. T he H ungarian leadership was always fixlly aware o f the strength o f its position. F ro m the end o f the seventeenth century, w hen the H ungarian territories were finally freed from O ttom an control, emphasis had regularly been placed on the pro­ vincial and historical rights o f the lands o f the crow n o f St. Stephen. T he nobility, as the political nation, had led the resistance to the central authority. It show ed a strong determ ination to maintain control over all the regions that had been a part o f historic H ungary, although the special position o f C roatia was recognized. W hereas previously the H ungarian leadership had been feudal and aristo­ cratic, in the nineteenth century another group, prim arily from the small landowners, o r gentry, and the m iddle class, was to play an increasingly im ­ portant role in national life. Strongly influenced by the ideology o f the French R evolution, the new leaders used the vocabulary o f this m ovem ent in their attacks on the autocratic H ab sbu rg governm ent. In their relations w ith the non-H ungarian nationalities, their attitude was quite different. It is im por­ tant to emphasize that the H ungarians themselves were divided between m oderates, like Stephen Szechenyi, w h o favored cooperation w ith Vienna and a lim ited reform program , and radicals, best exemplified by Lajos K o s­ suth. B o m o f a Slovak father and a Germ an mother, K ossuth supported a radical political program that called, on the one hand, for individual liberties, the abolition o f special noble privileges, and peasant emancipation and, on the other, for H ungarian national predominance. Th is position, which was to be the basis o f the revolutionary demands in 1848, had extremely negative im plications fo r the other nationalities in the H ungarian crownlands. The H ungarian liberals offered them a regim e based on liberty and equality, but

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 on an individual basis and on the condition that they accept M agyar national supremacy. L ike the O ttom an attitude o f complete acceptance o f the C hris­ tian convert to Islam , that o f the H ungarian radical was one o f willingness to receive as an equal citizen any m em ber o f another national gro u p w ho w ould learn his language and adopt the culture and customs associated with it. Som e revolutionaries w ere to regard it as treason if an individual sup­ ported his unique national interests in a controversy w ith the H ungarian authorities. A very com plicated gam e was thus being played in the H ab sbu rg lands. H ungarian radicals stood for their unique national rights in the struggles against the centralizing endeavors o f Vienna, but they w orked fo r H ungarian domination in their ow n lands. The H absburg statesmen, with a much weaker national basis than their opponents, feared H ungarian liberal agitation be­ cause o f its effect on the other people in the monarchy. Th ey knew, neverthe­ less, that they could not continue to have a m ajor role in European affairs or hope to hold their em pire together w ithout a cooperative Hungary. This struggle had, o f course, direct effects on the South Slav lands and Transyl­ vania. In theory it should have given the national leaders in these regions the opportunity to play between the tw o rivals and extract the m axim um bene­ fits. A lth ough such a policy was attempted at times, it was often not wisely conducted. A s w ill be show n, in m ost controversies it was the H ungarian leadership that w as able to control the situation, and w ith a realistic and clever attitude, to gain its m ajor objectives.

CROATIA AND SLAVONIA: THE ILLYR IAN MOVEMENT A fter 1815, in the H ab sbu rg lands w ith w hich w e are principally concerned, Vienna had under its jurisdiction the Slovenian lands, D alm atia, Transyl­ vania, and the M ilitary Frontier zones. C roatia and Slavonia, w ith certain autonom ous provincial institutions, were part o f the H ungarian crownlands. T h e R om anian and Serbian populations o f the Banat and southern H u n gary w ere under direct H ungarian administration. T he position o f C roatia had been weakened, it w ill be remem bered, w hen in 1790 the local assembly, the sabor, had voluntarily surrendered a great deal o f authority to the H ungarian diets, w hich m et either in B ud a o r in Bratislava and which included only a few C roatian representatives. Financial control lay in their hands. A s in the eighteenth century, the Croatian administration was headed by a ban, ap­ pointed by the H ungarian Chancellery in Vienna, which was the m ajor ad­ m inistrative office fo r the H ungarian lands. T h e predom inant class in C roatia was still the landed nobility. It, however, provided no strong national leadership. T h e upper nobility had a m ajority o f Italian, German, and Hungarian families, and it was cosmopolitan in its views.

The national issue in the Habsburg Empire This attitude was shared by the low er nobility, which was prim arily Croatian but was m ore concerned w ith its position as a privileged class than with defending C roatian national rights. A s elsewhere in the empire, this latter grou p dom inated the local governm ent and provided the membership o f the sabor. In all the lands o f the H ungarian crow n, the language o f administration and education was Latin. Latin had the enorm ous advantage o f being inter­ national in the true sense: it was known to educated men throughout E u ­ rope, and it was also the language o f the Catholic church. P rior to the nine­ teenth century this linguistic unity made the administration o f the H ungarian lands easier. There was a com m on language o f politics and culture. H ow ever, H ungarian nationalists now began to press for a change. T h ey w ished to replace Latin w ith H ungarian in governm ent and education. Th is attitude w as a reaction against the use o f Germ an by Vienna, but it was n ot a senti­ ment that could be shared by the other nationalities. H ungarian was not a w orld language; it could not com pare in any respect w ith Latin in the literary and cultural horizons that it opened for those w h o mastered it, nor was it spoken outside Hungary. M oreover, as an Altaic tongue, it was difficult for Slavic, R om ance, o r Germ anic speakers to learn. A t first the C roatian nobility show ed little opposition to H ungarian pres­ sure. Because o f the large-scale intervention in Italy in the 1820s to suppress the revolutionary movements, Francis I needed to recruit in the H ungarian kingdom . T h e counties refused to levy troops w ithout directions from the H ungarian diet, w hich was called into session in 1825 for the first time since 1811. T h e sabor also met to choose its delegates to this body. T h e diet used the opportunity to demand the replacement o f Latin w ith H ungarian as the official language. Since they w ere interested in checking the authority o f V i­ enna, the Zagreb delegation supported this action, as w ell as the introduction o f the study o f H ungarian into the educational system. In 1827 and 1830 the sabor approved the learning o f H ungarian as a com pulsory subject in C ro a ­ tian schools. T h is language decision was to become the m ajor subject o f attack by the Croatian national opposition. T he membership o f this m ovem ent was rela­ tively limited. T he nobility, as w e have seen, was in the m ajority not nation­ ally minded. There was no specifically Croatian commercial or industrial class. The cities in C roatia and H u ngary proper had a strong Germ an element, as well as a mixed population o f other nationalities. Croatian national interests were enunciated and defended largely by a grou p drawn from the educated sections o f the population, including men from the low er nobility, the clergy, the professions, and the army. M oreover, as in the Principalities, an im por­ tant role was taken by the educated youth, w h o shared m any ideas o f their generation throughout Europe. Unlike the wealthy Wallachians, the Croatian students could not afford to study in large numbers in Paris. T h ey could, however, attend institutions in G raz and Vienna. H ere they came in touch

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 w ith revolutionary ideologies and, even m ore important, w ith romantic na­ tionalism as propounded by Germ an writers such as H erder and by Slovak scholars, in particular P. J. Safarik and Jan Kollar. T h e m ost important figure am ong the Croatian intellectuals in this period was Ljud evit G aj, w h o was to inaugurate the Illyrian movement. Born in 1809 o f a fam ily o f Germ an background in a small tow n north o f Zagreb, Gaj as a student in Buda and G raz was immensely influenced by the w o rk o f Safarik and Kollar. H e was also brought in touch w ith the w ork o f V u k Karadzic, and he came to admire the Serbian songs and poem s that were enjoying a vogu e am ong the intellectuals. T h e objective o f m any o f the schol­ ars o f the time was to uncover the Slavic past and establish a unified Slavic culture that could be used to counter claims o f preeminence by Hungarians and Germ ans. A s w e have seen, all the national movements placed a great emphasis on language and history. G aj m oved in the same direction. Like the Rom anians in Transylvania, he sought to link the Croatians w ith a people w h o had lived in the area before the Germ ans and H ungarians. Just as the Rom anians used the Dacians and Rom ans, Gaj claimed that the South Slavs were the descendants o f the ancient Illyrians and thus were the original in­ habitants o f the land. A ll o f those associated w ith him did not hold this view, and even Gaj later modified his arguments, but the entire program that they supported is know n as the Illyrian movement. O nce the term Illyrian came into use the question naturally arose what regions this Illyria had included and w hich people were its contem porary representatives. Gaj him self spoke in vague and romantic terms o f lands stretching “ from Villach to Varna,” which w ould include Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, northern Albania, Bulgaria, and southern Hungary. Gaj’s m ajor supporter from the nobility, Janko DraSkovic, w rote that “ Illyrians are the descendants o f the ancient Illyrians o f G reco-R om an times,” w h o were later “ broken up into Croatians, Serbs, Slovenes, and Bulgarians.” 1 W hatever the boundaries and people included, the ch ief significance o f this program was its claim that all South Slavs were basically one people and that, by im­ plication, they should form a political unit. G a j’s m ajor direct influence was to be on language. Since he believed in a unified South Slav culture, he wished the differences in language to be min­ imized as much as possible. First in importance was the question o f ortho­ graphy. C roatian w as w ritten w ith different spellings in the various districts. Gaj favored a Czech system using diacritical marks. E ven m ore important was his adoption o f the Stokavian dialect for the Croatian literary language.2 1 Q u o te d in W ayne S. V ucinich, “C roatian Illyrism : Its B ackground an d G enesis,” in Stanley B. W inters and Joseph H eld , eds., Intellectual and Social Developments in the Habsburg Empire from M aria Theresa to World War I (B oulder, C olo.: E ast E u ro p ean Q uarterly, 1975), P· 88· 2 In V lad im ir D edijer e t al., History ofTugoslavia, trans. K ordija K veder (N ew York: M cG raw H ill, 1975), p. 103, n. 1, th e follow ing clear explanation o f th e dialerts is given: “T h e SerboC ro atian language is divided in to three basic dialects according to th e form o f th e interrog-

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The national issue in the Habsburg Empire This form was spoken by all o f the Serbs and the great m ajority o f the C ro a ­ tians, and a com m on literary language w ould constitute a bond am ong them. T he choice was entirely logical since this dialect was in general use, and it had a literature. Th e alternative, the kajkavian, was used only in Zagreb and districts to the north o f the city, and was a less-developed language. The Croatian language reformers did not face the type o f opposition that con­ fronted Karadzic. There was no equivalent o f the “ Slavo-Serb” literary lan­ guage, since the Catholic church used Latin. T he Illyrian m ovem ent was by far the strongest intellectual current am ong the Croatians before 1848. Since it was to the interest o f Vienna to counter H ungarian activities, the H absbu rg authorities at first made no m ove to hin­ der the activities o f proponents o f these ideas. In 1835 Gaj received permission to publish tw o journals, N ovine Horwatzke (Croatian N ew s), which appeared twice a week, and D anica (M orning Star), a weekly literary supplement. R eadin g room s w ere established and societies form ed to propagate the ideas o f the m ovem ent. F rom a cultural and intellectual point o f view, Illyrianism wa.‘ a great success. Stokavian was used in the schools, and it did becom e the Croatian literary language. “ Illyrian” could thus be placed in com petition w ith H ungarian. T he activities o f Janko DraSkovic were also important to the movement and to C roatian politics. Educated in France and active in political life, D ra ­ skovic used the Illyrian conception to assert the independence o f Croatia within the fram ew ork o f the monarchy. H e was in favor o f the reorganization o f the em pire into a federation o f nations. T h at he w as sent as a representative to the H ungarian diet in 1832 is a reflection o f a change o f attitude that was taking place tow ard Hungary. Instead o f cooperating against Vienna, the Croatian members o f the diets o f 1832-1836, 1839, and 1840 resisted the H ungarians’ efforts to impose their language, and they stood strongly for the maintenance o f Croatian autono­ mous rights. T h ey were not able to check the H ungarian actions themselves, but the H ab sbu rg governm ent vetoed the offending legislation. T he Croatian agitation naturally disturbed the H ungarian politicians. To appease them, Vienna in 1843 forbade the use o f the w ord Illyria. Th e adherents o f the m ovem ent sim ply switched to the w o rd national and continued their activi­ ties. Th e Illyrian m ovem ent was to involve much w ider issues than the question o f Croatian relations w ith the H ab sbu rg and H ungarian authorities. It w as a Croatian-sponsored program , but its basis was Yugoslav; that is, it embraced all o f the South Slav people and not m erely the Croats. A s a tactic to oppose ative p ro n o u n what, kajkavian (w h at = kaj), fakavian (w hat = fa ), and Stokavian (w hat = 5to ). K ajkavian is sp o k en to d ay in n o rth w estern parts o f C roatia, fakavian in th e n o rth e rn coast area an d o n th e A driatic islands, Stokavian in all o th e r regions. Stokavian is the basis o f m o d e m sta n d ard S erb o -C ro atian. Stokavian has three subdialects according to the p ro ­ n u n ciatio n o f th e orig in al Slavic vow el represented by th e letter ju t."

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 H ungarian and Germ an influences, this direction had its advantages, but to be effective it needed the cooperation o f the Serbs and Slovenes. T h eir reac­ tion was to be prophetic for the future and to bring out the fundamental weaknesses o f a Yugoslav orientation. M ost Slovenian intellectual leaders from the first rejected the idea. With a developing cultural life o f their ow n, they did not want to associate w ith a m ovem ent w ith its center in the H ungarian lands. F ew Serbs saw any advantages in it in com parison with their ow n strictly Serbian orientation. Certainly the Illyrian conception had little to o f­ fer them. T h ey were proud to be Serbs and O rthodox; w h y should they be Illyrians? There was no reason to abandon the emphasis on K o so v o and the medieval Serbian kingdom fo r this mythical ancient basis. M ost Serbian na­ tionalists follow ed the ideas o f Karadzic, w h o believed that all w h o spoke the stokavian dialect were Serbs. Th ey thus regarded the Croats as schismatic Serbs w h o had broken away and joined the Catholic church. T h e question o f leadership was also involved; an Illyrian orientation w ou ld make Zagreb the center. To nationalistic Serbs the w hole m ovem ent had the taint o f H absburg expansion and Catholic o r U niate proselytism. The Illyrian m ovem ent, it w ill be noted, did not use the w o rd Croat. In fact, this term tended to be identified w ith the opposition and w ith those w h o supported cooperation with the H ungarians against the H absbu rg g o v ­ ernment on the old basis. T he first true political party in Croatia was form ed in February 1841 w ith this program . T he C roato-H ungarian Party, w hose members were also known as Unionists o r M agyrones, stood for a close as­ sociation w ith Buda, and they rejected the w ider Yugoslav orientation. O ther opposition to the Illyrian principles came from those w h o disliked the new literary language and preferred the kajkavian dialect, o r were even w illin g to accept H ungarian. Som e Catholics disliked any close links w ith the O rthodox Serbs. M em bers o f the old nobility did not approve o f the revolutionary principles associated with the movement. N evertheless, by 1848 the Illyrian influence was predom inant in Croatian cultural activities. In politics its victory was not so complete. Its standpoint was represented by the Illyrian, o r N ational, Party, which was organized in Septem ber 1841. A lth ough it was to become the m ost influential Croatian political organization, an im portant element in the population still supported a strong union w ith Hungary. A nother party was soon to arise that w ould challenge the emphasis on Illyrianism o r Yugoslavism at the expense o f C ro a­ tian nationalism.

THE HABSBURG MONARCHY, 1848-1867 F rom 1848 to 1867 the H absburg M onarchy was in a period o f internal and external crisis. T he challenge came from liberal elements within the empire w h o attacked the absolute m onarchy and from the national movements at hom e and abroad. W ithin the monarchy the main problem remained H u n ­

The national issue in the Habsburg Empire gary. In E urope Germ an and Italian revolutionaries fought against H absbu rg influence and sought to establish unified national states. T he attempts o f the H ab sbu rg governm ent to deal w ith this situation affected the political con­ ditions in both C roatia and Transylvania. The major danger to the continued existence o f the H absburg Em pire came in 1848 and was the result o f internal rather than external pressures. In Janu­ ary 1848 a revolt broke out in Sicily; in February a m ajor revolution in France forced K in g L ou is Philippe and his governm ent out o f power. In M arch the revolutionary wave engulfed Central Europe and Italy. O n M arch 13 a revo­ lution in Vienna resulted in the form ation o f a new governm ent and the dismissal o f M ettem ich. T he court attempted to meet the situation by issuing a constitution similar to the Belgian, but the revolutionary leaders preferred to draft one o f their ow n. It was thus agreed that a constitutional assembly w ould be called. T h e court, feeling endangered, m oved to Innsbruck. T h e spring and sum m er o f 1848 was a period o f intense political activity not only throughout the monarchy, but also in the Germ an and Italian states. T he kingdom o f Piedm ont took the leadership in the Italian peninsula; an all-Germ an parliam ent, also attended by delegates from the H ab sbu rg E m ­ pire, was convened at Frankfurt. Parallel to this Germ an gathering, a Slavic congress was organized in Prague and opened at the beginning o f June. U n ­ der Czech influence the representatives supported a program o f Austroslavism, w hich called fo r the reorganization o f the m onarchy into separate auton­ om ous national units, an action that w ould strengthen the influence o f its Slavic people. T he em pire was thus not to be dissolved, but transform ed into a federation o f nations. T he meetings were disbanded only a few weeks later by the H ab sbu rg army. A lth ough the Prague congress met but a short time, the A ustroslav idea was to remain an alternative solution fo r the reorganiza­ tion o f the m onarchy that was to enjoy support am ong some Slavic groups. D espite the fact that a revolutionary regim e held pow er in Vienna, the court retained control over the army. In Ju ly the H absburg forces com ­ manded by General Radetzky defeated the Sardinians at the battle o f Custozza. Bohem ia was brought under control soon thereafter. M eanw hile, del­ egates arrived in Vienna for the opening o f the constitutional assembly. Under the presidency o f A rchduke Joh n, this parliament abolished the rem aining feudal obligations o f the peasantry. With their m ajor demands satisfied, the peasants’ interest in further revolutionary activities declined rapidly. In O c­ tober another revolutionary outbreak forced the court to m ove to O lm iitz; the parliam ent transferred its m eetings to Kremsier. T he H ab sbu rg arm y then marched on Vienna, and by the end o f O ctober the imperial forces were in full control o f the city. A lth ou gh H absbu rg authority had been reestablished over m ost o f the im perial lands, it was quite apparent that Ferdinand I could not fulfill the duties o f em peror in times o f crisis. H e thus abdicated in D e­ cember in favor o f his nephew Franz Joseph, w ho was eighteen years old. Actual authority in the governm ent was wielded by Prince Felix Schwarzen-

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The revolutionary years, 1804.-1887 berg, under w hose intelligent leadership the imperial authority w as to be reim posed th roughout the H absbu rg domains. B ack in control in Vienna, the governm ent had to face the immediate ques­ tion o f the future organization o f the empire. T h e revolutionary events had made clear that a constitution w ould have to be issued and changes made. T h e issues to be decided were the familiar ones o f choosing between a cen­ tralist o r a federal form o f administration and establishing a balance between the executive and legislative branches o f the governm ent. In M arch 1849 the court produced its ow n constitution and simply prorogued the K rem sier as­ sembly. T h e new docum ent provided fo r a highly centralist regim e w ith a single parliam ent, com m on citizenship, and one legal and administrative sys­ tem fo r the entire empire. A strong program o f civil liberties was also in ­ cluded. T h e constitution was particularly dam aging to the H ungarian position. T h e ruler was to be crow ned only as em peror o f A ustria, not also as king o f H ungary. T h e lands o f the crow n o f St. Stephen w ere divided am ong the K in gd o m o f H ungary, the G rand Principality o f Transylvania, the M ilitary Frontier, and the K in gd o m o f D alm atia, C roatia and Slavonia, as the new territorial divisions w ere named. C roatia received the port o f R ijeka (Fium e) and the possibility o f eventually acquiring Dalmatia. T h e advantages that could be w on by the non-H ungarian population o f these lands w ere clear. T h e constitution took little account o f the dangerous situation in the H u n ­ garian regions. In fact, it was a question whether the docum ent could be applied there at all. T he H absbu rg governm ent had reestablished its au­ thority over the H absbu rg lands, it had defeated the revolution in Italy, and it w ou ld ultimately regain its form er position in the Germ an areas; but the m ajor challenge was to still com e from the H ungarian revolutionary regime, w hich was at the height o f its pow er in the spring o f 1849. Its main army, led by General A rthur G orgey, controlled H u ngary proper; a second army, under the com m and o f the Polish general Jo z e f Bern, had defeated the imperial forces and held Transylvania. Th e H absbu rg leaders could not allow the secession o f the Hungarian lands. With their loss, the empire w ould no longer be a great power. T h e m ost successful o f the revolutionary movements in the em pire was undoubtedly the H ungarian. A lthough it was finally defeated, it did bring about the form ation o f a functioning governm ent under a strong leader, Lajos K ossuth , and the organization o f a very effective army. O nce in control, the revolutionary regim e introduced a highly centralized system o f adminis­ tration, but one accom panied by liberal reforms. A t first, facing attacks on all sides, the court accepted the new conditions. A fter O ctober 1848, however, w ith control again reasserted in its other lands, the H ab sbu rg governm ent turned its attention tow ard the H ungarian situation. A strong factor in H ab sbu rg favor was the extreme dissatisfaction that the new measures had aroused am ong the non-H ungarian nationalities. A s w e shall see in the next

The national issue in the Habsburg Empire section, Vienna was able to rally support from the C roatian, Serbian, and Rom anian population. Even w ith this assistance, the H absbu rg arm y was still unable to defeat the H ungarian forces. Faced w ith this situation the court came to a fateful decision. A Russian army, it w ill be remembered, was stationed in Wallachia and M oldavia, where it had been sent to suppress the revolutionary activities in the Principalities. In January som e Russian troops had already undertaken an unsuccessful ac­ tion in Transylvania against the forces o f General Bern. In M ay 1849 Franz Joseph w rote to N icholas I and requested a far m ore extensive intervention. A s a result o f the tsar’s favorable reply, a Russian arm y o f 150,000 men crossed the frontier. B y A ugu st the H ungarian forces had been defeated and H ab s­ burg rule had been reestablished over all the land o f the H ungarian kingdom . With the end o f the Hungarian revolution, the H absburg government could proceed w ith the reorganization o f the empire. T he new system, w hich was to be in effect from 1849 to i860, was prim arily associated w ith the name o f Alexander Bach, the minister o f interior. A Germ an o f liberal inclinations, he, like m any o f his peers, wished to establish an enlightened regim e m odeled on the ideas o f Joseph II. T he constitution o f 1849 was never put into effect. Instead the state went back to the absolutist pattern, by which the em peror held com plete pow er unchecked by a representative assembly. W ith the defeat o f Hungary, there was no effective opposition left to the adoption o f a strongly centralized administrative organization. T he em pire was divided into districts that w ere governed by officials appointed from Vienna. T he objective w as a unitary state w hose administration w ould stand above the nationalities and the historic divisions and w ould guarantee the same rights to all H absbu rg citizens. T h e same laws and regulations were to be applied throughout the empire. A s in the time o f Joseph II, the language o f governm ent was to be Germ an. T h e new arrangem ent was a particular shock for the H ungarian leadership. Th ose w h o had participated in the revolution, o f course, had fled the country o r had been im prisoned. M any had em igrated to the O ttom an Em pire. O ver the next years members o f this em igration slow ly returned to take active roles in the resistance to the Bach regime. U nder the new system H u n gary was fully incorporated into the empire, w ith its lands divided into five districts. Hungary, Croatia, Transylvania, the Vojvodina, and the Military Frontier were separate jurisdictions. T he county organizations and the diet in B uda, the central organs o f H ungarian autonomy, w ere dissolved. T h e country was governed by a Germ an-speaking bureaucracy, a great num ber o f w hose m em ­ bers w ere Czech in nationality. T h e disasters suffered by the H absbu rg Em pire during the Bach period were the result m ore o f foreign than o f domestic com plications. T h e Austrian position in international relations after the Congress o f Vienna had rested on the H o ly Alliance, the partnership o f Prussia, Austria, and Russia. A lth ou gh this com bination had not always w orked well in the Eastern Q uestion, it had 311

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 fulfilled its main function o f stabilizing political conditions on the Continent and protecting its members’ interest in partitioned Poland. A s w e have seen, a Russian arm y came to the rescue o f Vienna in 1849. To the extreme dissat­ isfaction o f Russia, the H absburg governm ent did not adopt a similarly be­ nevolent attitude tow ard Russia during the Crim ean War. A t that tim e the H absbu rg Em pire remained neutral, but its actions rather favored R ussia’s enemies. D u rin g the w ar the prim acy o f Austrian concerns in the West was again dem onstrated. T h e H ab sbu rg statesmen feared that i f they assumed a pro-Russian attitude, the French w ould raise a revolutionary m ovem ent in Italy. T h e adoption o f a neutral policy, how ever, broke the H o ly Alliance, and thus the main dam to national revolutionary activity in Central Europe and Italy w as eliminated. In the next years Russia w orked in cooperation w ith France. T he first product o f this entente, as w e have seen, was the union o f the D anubian Principalities against strong Austrian opposition. T he sec­ ond, even m ore serious, was the unification o f Italy between 1859 and 1861. A lth ough the em pire still held Venetia-Lom bardy, it no longer influenced the rest o f the peninsula. T he defeat in Italy brought the Bach regim e to an end. A centralized sys­ tem had not created a governm ent strong enough to defend the em pire’s interests, and other alternatives thus had to be tried. A t this point decisions were being made by Franz Joseph and a grou p o f close advisers. T he changes were introduced by decree and w ithout much prior w arning. In the O ctober D iplom a o f i860 a return was made to the form er basis o f provincial control, and an attempt was made to meet H ungarian grievances. T he conditions existing before 1848 were thus reestablished, except that some reform s, in particular peasant em ancipation, were retained. A central body, the Reichsmt (Im perial C ouncil), was created; its members were nom inated by the provin­ cial diets, w hich, o f course, were again functioning. N o sooner had this or­ ganization been announced than the governm ent again reversed itself. Strong internal opposition to the diplom a, particularly from the Germ an Liberals, resulted in the issuance o f the February Patent o f 1861, which reinstated cen­ tralism and made the Reichsrat a real parliament w ith an upper and lower house. T h e provincial diets, losing some o f their previous rights, n o w had as their ch ief function the election o f delegates to the central assembly. F rom 1861 to 1865 A nton von Schm erling was the principal minister. A l­ though he received the support o f some o f the national leaderships, he was strongly opposed by the H ungarians. W hen they refused to send delegates to the Vienna parliament, their diet was dissolved. A t the same time, in an effort at appeasement, the governm ent returned the Vojvodina and a section o f disputed Croatian territory to H ungarian jurisdiction. M eanw hile, with the H ungarian problem still acute, the probability o f a show dow n w ith Prus­ sia over predom inance in the Germ an lands was becom ing constantly greater· T he H absbu rg leaders were well aware that they could not risk a w ar i f there

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The national issue in the Habsburg Empire was the possibility that com plications m ight arise in Hungary. A settlement here was thus essential for Vienna. D espite the defeat in 1849, the H ungarian position had remained firm. M oreover, unlike the other nationalities, the H ungarians had demonstrated their ability to organize a strong revolutionary governm ent and to bring an army into the field. U nd er pressure from the international situation, the A u s­ trian governm ent therefore com menced discussions w ith the H ungarian moderates, led by Ferenc Deak. In 1865 a m inistry under C oun t Richard Belcredi was appointed and given the task o f reaching an agreement. D eak was w illin g to accept a settlement based on a personal union o f the H u n g ar­ ian lands w ith the rest o f the em pire, with a com m on policy for foreign affairs and defense, but w ith the complete control o f the administration o f the k in g­ dom left in the hands o f a national governm ent responsible to a H ungarian parliament. In 1866 the H ab sbu rg arm y was defeated by Prussia, w hich then proceeded w ith the organization o f the N orth Germ an Confederation. T he H ab sbu rg E m pire was excluded from influence in Germ an affairs. Th is sec­ ond m ajor defeat in less than a decade made inevitable the em pire’s accept­ ance o f the H ungarian demands. T h e A usgleich (Com prom ise) o f 1867 represented a m ajor reorganization o f the em pire that w as to last until the end o f the m onarchy in 1918. A n expression o f the moderate H ungarian program , the document divided the em pire into tw o distinct political units (see M ap 23). T he lands o f the H u n ­ garian crow n w ere henceforth to be administered as a centralized state under the provisions o f the M arch Law s o f 1848, which had been passed in Pest during the revolution. Franz Joseph was recognized as king, but his position in H u n gary was that o f a limited, constitutional monarch. Th e tw o sections o f the em pire w ere to have only three com m on ministries: Foreign Affairs, D efense, and Finance, the last o f which w ould have jurisdiction only over the expenses connected w ith the other tw o. D elegations from the reorga­ nized Reichsrat and the H ungarian parliament w ere to meet regularly to con­ sider com m on problems. A customs union, which was to be renewed every ten years, was also agreed upon. To reflect this fundam ental change, the state was to be known as A ustria-H ungary. T he name Hungary was used to refer to all o f the lands under its authority; the choice fo r the other h alf was not as obvious. A t the time, the term the Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Reichsrat was used officially. T h e names Cisleithania for the areas under V i­ enna and Transleithania for H ungary, based on the line o f the river Leitha, have also been adopted by some authors. F o r the rest o f this narrative, the name A ustria w ill refer exclusively to the non-H ungarian h alf o f the empire. Franz Jo sep h ’s title was king in H u ngary and em peror in Austria. Vienna was the capital o f A ustria and the hom e o f the joint ministries. In 1872 B ud a was united w ith Pest, and Budapest was henceforth the H ungarian capital. T h e Ausgleich was an enorm ous H ungarian victory, although it did not

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The national issue in the Habsburg Empire fulfill the expectations o f those w h o had sought complete independence. In practice, how ever, there was not to be an equal division o f power. In the next years the H ungarian governm ent was able to present a united front on all m ajor issues. In contrast, the Austrian section underwent a series o f internal crises that weakened its ability to deal w ith Budapest. T h e predom inant in­ fluence o f H ungarian interests in foreign affairs was to be am ply illustrated in the next years. Thus the H ungarian section, w ith a smaller population, o f w hich on ly about a h alf were actually M agyar in nationality, was able to exert a disproportionate influence over the life o f the entire state. T he Ausgleich, o f course, w as to have a devastating effect on the political life o f the South Slavs and Rom anians, particularly those living in the lands o f the H ungarian crown.

CROATIA, SLAVO NIA, AND THE VO JVO D INA,

1848-1868 T he years 1847 and 1848 marked the culmination o f the Croatian and H u n ­ garian conflict over language. There was also a dispute over the extent o f the territory that should fall under Croatian jurisdiction. T he sabor was dom i­ nated by the N ational Party, which held Yugoslav o r Illyrian views. Its im ­ mediate program called for the unification o f D alm atia, the M ilitary Frontier, and the port o f R ijeka w ith Croatia and Slavonia under an autonom ous ad­ ministration. In addition, the party wanted a bishopric established in Z agreb and a university. In 1847 the sabor declared Croatian the official language. M eanw hile, the diet in Budapest was proceeding along the same nationalistic path. W hereas the sabor was seeking to w iden the territorial limits o f its control, the diet w ished to restrict Croatian authority even in the lands that had previously been recognized as Croatian. In 1847 another law sought to im pose H ungarian as the language o f governm ent. Its provisions stated that Latin could be used w ithin Croatia, but all dealings w ith Budapest had to be in H ungarian, w hich was also made a com pulsory subject in the schools. T he Croatian language was to have no place in official correspondence between Zagreb and Budapest. T h e sabor and the diet w ere thus proceeding in dia­ metrically opposite directions. B efore the revolution broke out, the court had attempted to maintain a balance between the disputing parties. In M arch 1848, when Vienna was un­ der revolutionary control and the court was forced to leave the city, the H ab s­ burg officials w ere com pelled to assent to H ungarian demands. A s long as the arm y was tied dow n in Italy, they had no means o f assuring obedience in any o f the imperial territories. A lthough the central governm ent was thus paralyzed, the non-H ungarian population o f the H ungarian kingdom orga­ nized both in favor o f revolutionary ideals and against the H ungarian actions. Th e H ab sbu rg governm ent accordingly had alternate centers o f pow er with w hich it could cooperate.

The revolutionary years, 1804.-1887 Simultaneously, w ith the rebellions in Buda and Vienna, the revolutionary fever took control in Zagreb. Th e basic national program remained the same, but the demand was expressed for further liberal reform s, in particular an end to feudal obligations. T he m ovem ent in C roatia was aided by the services o f an able leader. In M arch Baron Josip Jelaiic, a colonel in the M ilitary F ro n ­ tier, was named by the court as ban o f Croatia; he was at the same time raised in rank to general and put in charge o f the M ilitary Frontier. H is appoint­ m ent as ban was accepted by the sabor. Jelaiic first directed the Croatian officials not to follow any instructions except those issued in Zagreb, and in A p ril relations w ith the H ungarian governm ent w ere severed. A proponent o f the Illyrian idea, Jelacic cooperated with the National Party. H e also o r­ ganized a national guard and called for new elections for the sabor, which was to meet in June. M eanwhile, similar events were occurring in the regions inhabited by Serbs. M eetings were held in centers such as Sremski K arlovci and N o vi Sad, which had a large Serbian population. T he demands remained w hat they had been in the previous century: the recognition o f Serbian as an official language, a position o f equality w ith the Catholics fo r the O rthodox church, and annual meetings o f the church assemblies. T he latter, it w ill be remem bered, con­ tained strong lay elements and concerned themselves w ith matters o f general interest to the Serbian population. A s before, the Serbian program called for the assignment o f a definite geographical jurisdiction and the appointment o f a military commander, or vojvoda. In M ay a national assembly attended by several thousand people met in Sremski Karlovci. T he delegates chose Jo sip Rajacic as patriarch and Stephen Supljikac as vojvoda. T h ey further sought the recognition o f a national territorial unit, consisting o f the Banat, Backa, Baranja, and a part o f Srem , known collectively as the Vojvodina. The general area, according to the military census o f 18 5 1 , had a population o f 4 0 7 , 0 0 0 Serbs, 3 9 5 , 0 0 0 Rom anians, 3 2 5 , 0 0 0 Germ ans, 2 4 1 , 0 0 0 Hungarians, and 3 2 , 0 0 0 others. T he total num ber o f Serbs in the em pire was given as i , 4 3 8 , o o o . 3 T he Serbian program called for the close association o f the V ojvo­ dina w ith the Croatian state and an autonom ous position in relation to H u n ­ gary. Naturally these claims were completely unacceptable to the H ungarian revolutionary leaders, w h o tended to see the Serbs as intruders on their his­ toric territory. M ore encouragement, however, came from Vienna. In D e­ cem ber the new em peror, Franz Joseph, approved the appointments o f both Rajacic and Supljikac and gave assurances concerning the establishment o f a national organization for the Serbs. Clashes had already begun in June be­ tween Serbian and H ungarian bands. D uring the revolutionary period there was little fighting in Croatian territories, but the Vojvodina was to be dev­ astated. i

C . A. M acartney, The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918 (L o n d o n : W eidenfeld & N icolson, 1968), P· 4 4 7 ·

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The national issue in the Habsburg Empire In June the new ly elected sabor met in Z agreb and proceeded to enact a program o f liberal reform , including the abolition o f all feudal obligations. Representatives w ere sent to the Slav C ongress at Prague; the Austroslav views expressed there received C roatian support. T h e sabor fully approved o f the reorganization o f the em pire on a national and federal basis. Its m ajor goal was the revival o f the Triune K in gd om , w ith territories that w ou ld in­ clude Croatia, Slavonia, D alm atia, Rijeka, and M edjum urje, a piece o f terri­ tory that had form erly been a part o f Hungary. Stron g support was given to the principle o f cooperation w ith the Vojvodina Serbs, and the leaders o f the tw o movements w orked closely together. T he question o f relations w ith V i­ enna and Buda remained; negotiations were carried on w ith both. Th e C ro a ­ tian leaders w ere w illing to come to an agreement w ith H ungary, but only on the basis o f political equality. T h ey demanded from Buda essentially what the H ungarians were seeking from Vienna. In both cases, the objective was the establishm ent o f a close relationship but w ith guarantees o f complete autonom y in internal affairs. C roatian representatives carried on discussions w ith the H ab sbu rg governm ent on the same basis. B y Septem ber negotiations had broken dow n between Z agreb and Buda on the one hand, and Vienna and B ud a, on the other. Im perial troops, led by Jclacic, crossed the D rava R iv er into H ungarian territory. In O ctober the H ab sbu rg governm ent declared the H ungarian diet dissolved and appointed Jclacic com m ander o f the arm y operating in the area. These events brought about the com plete victory o f the radical element in H u n gary; K ossuth took full control. W hen the O ctober revolt broke ou t in Vienna, Jelacic was forced to suspend his operations in H u n gary so that his troops could take part in the recapture o f the city. T h e subsequent failure o f the H ab sbu rg arm y to subdue the H ungarian rebellion and the entrance o f the Russian army have been described previously. In this cam paign Croatian, Serbian, and R o m a ­ nian soldiers joined w ith Russians and Austrians against the H ungarian rev­ olutionaries, w h o w ere supported b y a large Polish contingent. B y the end o f the revolutionary period the Croatian leaders thus saw de­ feated the H ungarian attempts to impose unity. T he sabor had enacted re­ form measures o f which by far the m ost im portant concerned peasant em an­ cipation. In A pril 1848 in B uda and in A ugu st in Vienna, laws were approved concerning the peasants. Sim ilar measures w ere enacted by the sabor in June. A ll o f the obligations o f the peasant to the lord, including the tithes, labor dues, and other payments, w ere abolished. T he peasants were to obtain al­ lotments o f land. A n indemnity was paid, set at the amount that it was esti­ mated the lord w ou ld have received over a period o f twenty years; this stan­ dard had been used regularly in other regions. Th e governm ent was to com pensate the landlords and then to collect payments from the peasants in installments over twenty years. Pasture and forest lands were also divided. T h e lord held his assigned sections o f the estate in full ow nership; the peas­ ant’s share was given to the com m unal associations. T he nobility and the 317

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 church w ere henceforth to be liable to taxation on the same basis as the peasantry. T h is settlement was not implemented, o f course, w ithout much controversy. T he m ajor difficulty lay in determ ining the am ount o f com pen­ sation to be given the individual noble. A fter the defeat o f the H ungarian revolution w ith their assistance, both the C roats and the Serbs expected to be rewarded w ith the granting o f ex­ tended autonom ous rights and the recognition o f the territorial divisions to w hich they laid claim, that is, the lands o f the Triune K in gd o m and the Vojvodina. Instead, they, like the defeated H ungarians, were forced to accept the Bach system. C roatia was divided into six districts w hose officials were appointed by Vienna; the sabor did not meet. A ll vestige o f C roatian auton­ om y disappeared. Jelacic remained as ban until his death in 1859, but his tide was largely honorary. The administration was in the hands o f German-speaking officials w h o w ere sometimes Croatian but often Germ an, Czech, o r Slovene. T h e Austrian legal system and civil code were enforced. Nevertheless, some advances w ere made in this period. T h e measures concerning the peasantry w ere carried ou t; Zagreb once again became a bishopric. R ijeka was assigned to Croatia, but D alm atia and the M ilitary Frontier retained their form er sta­ tus. In 1849 the Vojvodina became a crownland, w ith Franz Joseph taking the position o f grand vojvoda. It too was governed direcdy from Vienna. T h e establishment o f the centralized system naturally displeased alm ost all the C roatian political leaders. T h ey had received nothing fo r their support o f the m onarchy in 1 8 4 8 and 1 8 4 9 . A succinct remark, made by a H ungarian to a C roat, sum m ed up the situation: “ W hat w e received as a punishm ent was bestowed upon you as a reward.” 4 A t this time political alignments w ere form ed that w ere to last until 1 9 1 4 . T h e form er parties, the N ational Party and the U nionists, o r M agyrones, remained active. Th e first was to split on the issue o f cooperation w ith Vienna, but the U nionists remained firm in their support o f H ungary on about any terms. In 1 8 6 1 another grou p, the Party o f R igh ts (meaning Croatian state rights), w hich stood fo r Croatian nationalism in the true sense o f the w ord , was form ed under the leadership o f A nte S tarievic and E u g en K vatem ik. A s w e have seen, the N ational Party believed in South Slav cooperation and placed C roats, Serbs, and Slovenes on an equal plane. T h e Party o f R igh ts, in contrast, em phasized the historic rights o f C roatia and opposed the Yugoslav orientation o f the Nationalists. Starievic, a form er adherent o f the Illyrian idea, argued that all South Slavs were really C roatians; the Serbs and Slovenes had broken away from the main body o f the nation. H is views thus paralleled som e Serbian contentions that Croatians w ere sim ply apostate Serbs. A part from these extreme o p in ­ ions, w hich w ere not held by all the members, the Party o f R ig h ts w ished a 4

Q u o te d in R o b e rt A. K ann, The M ultinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1842-1918, 1 vols. (N ew York: C o lu m b ia U niversity Press, 1950), I, 126.

318

The national issue in the Habsburg Empire perm anent partnership neither w ith Vienna nor w ith Buda. A t best, it w ould accept union only through a com m on monarch. T he m ost influential figure supporting the Illyrian position at the time was Bishop Josip Strossm ayer, w h o w orked closely w ith Franjo R a ik i. A ppointed bishop o f D jakovo in 1849, Strossm ayer took a prom inent part in Catholic activities. A strong believer in South Slav cooperation, he preferred the term Yugoslav to Illyn an. A s a leader o f the N ational Party, he played a m ajor role in form ulating the decisions that were made at this point. In 1861, it w ill be rem em bered, the February Patent established a central assembly, the Reichsrat, to w hich delegates from the provinces w ere to be sent. T h e H ungarian diet refused to participate in this parliament. The ban o f Croatia, Josip Sokievic, tried to w in C roatian support fo r the new organization o f the empire. A s m ight be expected, the U nionists, w h o follow ed the H ungarian lead, and the Party o f R ig h ts, w hich wanted a fully autonom ous o r independent state, opposed cooperation. The National Party divided on the question. One group, under Ivan M azuranic, favored the sending o f representatives to the Reichsrat i f an agreem ent could be made that w ould add D alm atia and the M ilitary Frontier to Croatia. T he m ajority o f the party, however, under Strossm ayer’s leadership, preferred to refuse participation. In 1863 M azuranic form ed the Independent N ational Party, w hich supported a policy o f agreement with V ienna. In 1865, how ever, the original N ational Party w on the elections to the sabor. O n instructions from Vienna, this assembly nom inated a delega­ tion that attem pted unsuccessfully to negotiate a new political relationship w ith its H un garian counterparts. M eanw hile, the discussions that were to result in the A usgleich com ­ menced between the H absbu rg governm ent and the H ungarian representa­ tives. In the final agreement, as has been seen, H ungary demanded and suc­ ceeded in acquiring the inclusion o f C roatia in its part o f the D ual Monarchy. C roatian representatives were not seriously consulted on this decision, which decidedly shaped the political future o f the country. H enceforth, the H u n ­ garian authorities w ould have the com m anding position in any further ne­ gotiations. T h e significance for C roatia o f the altered relationship between Vienna and Buda was soon made obvious. In 1867 the newly appointed ban, Levin Rauch, w h o w as also the leader o f the U nionist Party, took measures to suppress the activities o f both branches o f the N ational Party and o f all o f those w ho w ould not accept the situation. Elections were then held for the sabor. U sin g the means in his control to influence the vote, Rauch was able to assure that the U nionists w on fifty-tw o out o f sixty-six seats. W hen the opposition del­ egates refused to recognize the results o f this fraudulent election, the ban sim ply appointed other men to take their places. T h e sabor next appointed a twelve-m em ber delegation that was sent to B uda to negotiate w ith a similar com m ittee chosen by the H ungarian diet. D espite its strong position, the H ungarian governm ent was w illin g to rec­ 319

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 ognize some C roatian rights to political autonomy. The N agodba (A gree­ ment o r Com prom ise), negotiated in 1868, established C roatia as a separate political unit w ithin the K in gd om o f H u ngary w ith autonom ous jurisdiction over its internal affairs, police, justice, religion, and education. T he Croatian language could be used in domestic administration and in the H ungarian parliam ent w hen jo in t problems were being discussed. F o rty Croatian dep­ uties were to be members o f that body. O ther provisions, however, w ere not so favorable. T he powers and position o f the ban were to prove particularly critical. Th is official was to be appointed by the king on the nom ination o f the minister-president o f H ungary, a procedure which guaranteed that he w ou ld represent H ungarian interests. M oreover, he had the right to pro­ rogue the sabor and to govern until the next election. T he H ungarian g o v­ ernment also retained a strong control over Croatian econom ic and com m er­ cial affairs, including banking, railroads, weights, measures, coinage, and the conclusion o f com mercial treaties. T he territorial arrangements similarly did not coincide w ith Croatian desires. C roatia did acquire the lands o f the M il­ itary Frontier in 1881, but H u ngary took Rijeka, and Dalm atia remained un­ der Austrian rule. In Septem ber 1868 both the sabor, w ith its U n ion ist m a­ jority, and the H ungarian parliament accepted the settlement. A s can be im agined, the N agod ba was greeted w ith violent opposition w ithin C roatia. O nly the U nionists supported it. In O ctober 1871 Kvaternik organized an uprising in Rakovica and was killed during its suppression. There was little, in fact, that the Croatian leaders could do. Both the Austrian and the H ungarian governm ents approved o f the agreement. T he intensity o f the reaction, how ever, influenced the H ungarian authorities to agree to m ake some revisions. A nother delegation, consisting o f six Unionists and six mem bers o f the National Party, which included Strossm ayer, asked for alter­ ations that included the nom ination o f the ban by the king w ithout the in­ tervention o f the H ungarian governm ent, the recognition o f the right o f the sabor to send five representatives to the joint A ustro-H ungarian delegations, and the assurance that C roatia w ould administer its ow n finances. N on e o f the major demands were met, although some concessions were made on lesser matters. D isillusioned, Strossm ayer retired from active political life. He nevertheless remained bishop o f D jakovo, and he was to w ield great personal influence until his death in 1905. T h e political evolution o f C roatia, Slavonia, and the Vojvodina after 1848 was thus to the detriment o f the South Slav population. T he conditions in D alm atia and Slovenia, which remained under Austrian administration, will be discussed in a later section, but here too there had been few advances for the national movements. In the lands o f the H ungarian crow n one national idea, and one only, achieved an astounding success. F rom crushing defeat m 1849 the H ungarian leaders were able to guide their nation to a position o f partnership in a reorganized em pire by 1867. T h e new situation was unfavor­

The national issue in the Habsburg Empire able not on ly for the Slavic population, but also for the m ajority o f the in­ habitants o f Transylvania.

TRANSYLVANIA B efore 1848 Transylvania was administered through the special chancellery in Vienna. T h e H ab sbu rg governm ent appointed the governor and the ch ief officials. T h e diet, w hich was not convened between 1810 and 1834, was made up o f representatives from the privileged section o f the population and m em ­ bers appointed by the imperial authorities. T he form er system o f the three recognized nations, the Saxon, the H ungarian, and the Szekler, and the four accepted religions, C atholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and U nitarian, continued. In the diet the consent o f all three nations had to be obtained for a law to pass. D espite the fact that they form ed the m ajority o f the inhabitants o f Tran­ sylvania, the Rom anians continued to have no official representation in the governm ent. A population com posed largely o f peasants, they were excluded by their social class as well as by their nationality. A s was the case w ith the O rthodox Serbs in the Banat, the national leadership was in the hands o f the clergy, w hich was divided between the O rthodox and the U niate hierarchies. A lth ou gh the tw o churches had certain points o f friction, they w ere able to cooperate a great deal on the political and cultural level. In the eighteenth century, as w e have seen, the cultural leadership was in the hands o f the Uniates. It was to pass to the O rthodox largely because o f the efforts o f Bishop A ndreiu §aguna, w ho was to play a m ajor role in the Rom anian national movements. T h e hold o f religious institutions on Rom anian cultural life w as the natural result o f the fact that the churches provided m ost o f the education available to the Romanians. The church trained the teachers for the elementary schools; higher education was available at the U niate school in Blaj and the O rthodox seminary in Sibiu. The only Rom anian-language publishing house was run by the Uniate church at Blaj. The emphasis in religious training was, o f course, not nationalism but religion and the duties o f a go o d citizen. T h e central position o f the churches and their national leadership was recognized by the H absbu rg governm ent, w h o dealt w ith them as the agents o f the Rom anian people. In the 1830s and 1840s this m onopoly was challenged by a rising group, consisting m ainly o f middle-class intellectuals, such as teachers, lawyers, civil servants, doctors, artisans, and merchants. T h ey were critical o f the church leadership, and m ost were liberal and national in political conviction. Like their contem poraries am ong other Balkan people, they were convinced o f the importance o f language as the true expression o f a national culture. Placing an emphasis on the Latin base o f Rom anian, they favored rem oving Slavic

321

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 and other foreign w ords and using the Latin rather than the C yrillic alphabet. A lth ough they accepted the concept o f the Rom an origins o f their people and the continuity o f residence in Transylvania, they did not rely w h olly on historical arguments. Follow in g contem porary liberal doctrine, they argued that since the Rom anians were the m ajority o f the population o f Transylvania and provided the m ost taxes and recruits for the army, they should have ad­ equate representation in the political institutions. T h eir concrete demands w ent beyond recognition as a fourth privileged nation. T h ey wanted, in ad­ dition, a position in the governm ent proportionate to the size o f their pop­ ulation. T h eir demands were thus revolutionary and struck at the aristocratic and feudal basis o f Transylvanian society. These views soon appeared in print. In 1838 G eorge B arijiu and his collaborators began publication in Bra§ov o f the Gazeta de Transilvania (Transylvanian Journal) and its literary supple­ m ent, Foaia pentru minte, im ma $i literatura (Paper for M in d, H eart and Literature). These became the ch ief vehicles for the expression o f the opin­ ions o f the intellectuals. It is difficult to judge the size o f this group, which was to be very influen­ tial in the future. There were about two million Romanians in H ungary proper and Transylvania at this time. In 1838 there were only about five hundred subscribers to Gazeta de Transilvania; there was little change by i860.5 Yet these men w ere to form the political and cultural leadership for the rest o f century. A t first they shared this position w ith the O rthodox clergy. T h e co­ operation between the intellectual and religious leaders was not always easy. T h e intellectuals were not anticlerical, but they did want some changes in church management. They believed that the lay members should have a stronger influence in the administration, and they wanted to introduce m ore nation­ ally oriented topics, such as Rom anian literature and history, into the edu­ cational system. They also wished the Uniate and Orthodox churches to work m ore closely together. T he outstanding figure am ong the intellectuals was Sim ion B am u jiu , a teacher o f philosophy in the high school in Blaj. A m on g the clergy, the bishop o f the O rthodox church, A ndreiu §aguna, was by far the m ost im portant; his contemporary, loan Lem eni, at the head o f the U n ­ iate hierarchy, was eventually to abandon the Rom anian national movement. In Transylvania, as in C roatia, the H ungarian leaders made the language question the central point in their national program , and they argued in the diet for the replacement o f Latin w ith H ungarian. T h ey w ere supported by the Szeklers, but opposed by the Saxon deputies. Th e Germ an interests were threatened as much as the Rom anian by these demands. T he Saxons, h ow ­ ever, w ere hampered by the fact that they wished to preserve the political structure in Transylvania intact. A s long as they sought to maintain complete control over the Saxon districts, they could not cooperate w ith the Romanian 5

K eith H itch in s, “T h e Sacred C u lt o f N ationality: R um anian Intellectuals and th e C hurch in T ransylvania, 1834-1869,” in W inters an d H e ld , Intellectual and Social Developments, p. 135-

322

The national issue in the Habsburg Empire m ajority w hose leaders demanded representation in proportion to their numbers. A fter the outbreak o f the revolution, in M arch and A pril 1848, the H u n ­ garian diet proclaim ed the full union o f Transylvania w ith the rest o f the H ungarian lands. Transylvania was to lose its diet, but to receive sixty-nine seats in the B uda assembly. H ungarian interests were clearly served by this move. T h e H ungarian population was a m inority in Transylvania. If, h o w ­ ever, the province w ere added to H un gary proper, the H ungarians w ould have a bare m ajority in the united territories. A s elsewhere, the H ungarian revolutionaries offered liberal reform s in other spheres. A n y Rom anian or Saxon w h o accepted the H ungarian language and cultural dom ination w ould enjoy a position o f full equality in the state. N aturally this attitude w on little favor am ong the non-H ungarian people. In 1848 local meetings were held throughout the Rom anian-inhabited ter­ ritories in Transylvania, the Banat, and H ungary itself. There was also con ­ siderable peasant agitation. The laws on emancipation passed in H un gary were delayed in their application in Transylvania, and w hen the nobility at­ tem pted to continue to collect their feudal dues and labor services, the peas­ ants reacted w ith violence. The situation in Transylvania was further com pli­ cated by the fact that a H ungarian nobility held control over a Rom anian peasantry. T he peasant representatives joined with the intellectuals and clergy in form ulating and presenting a national program . T h eir center o f organiza­ tion was to be Blaj. T h e first R om anian national m eeting o f significance in this revolutionary year was held at the end o f A pril. O n M ay 8 another conference was held, attended by §aguna, B am u jiu , A vram Iancu, w h o was to lead the peasant m ovem ent, and other intellectuals and clergy. T he Rom anian leaders faced exactly the same problem as their contemporaries in Croatia: Should they cooperate with Vienna or Buda? A solid front was presented against full union with H ungary, but there was disagreem ent on the question o f negotiation with these rival centers. H ow ever, even those w h o wished to w ork w ith the Hungarian revolutionaries desired a recognition o f Romanian national rights, an im possible condition. The strongest group, including §aguna and Barnujiu, favored cooperation w ith Vienna. Th e aim was to achieve recognition as a nation w ith authority over a definite territory - in other w ords, a pro­ gram very similar to that desired by the Serbian leadership. In the future, §aguna w as to be the ch ief link w ith the H absbu rg governm ent, w hich in turn recognized the bishop as the representative o f Rom anian interests. T h e main task o f the previous m eeting was the preparation o f a national assembly, which was called to meet in the m iddle o f May. H ere, on M ay 15 17, the m ajor decisions were again made by the intellectuals and the clergy. §aguna and Lem eni were chosen as presidents o f the assembly, w ith Barnujiu and G eorge B arijiu as vice-presidents. T h eir program was announced to a gathering o f thirty thousand in a field outside Blaj. T he R om anian demands

323

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 were presented in a sixteen-point petition to the emperor. Its content clearly demonstrated the enormous advance that had been made from the previous Romanian goal, which had been simply recognition as the fourth political nation. The Romanian objective was now stated as the complete reorgani­ zation of the administration of the province, with the Romanian population assigned a position commensurate with its numbers, including a proportion­ ate share in the representation to the diet and in the public offices. Romanian was to be an official language. The changes were to be accomplished by a constitutional assembly, and, until it met, the question of union with Hun­ gary should be postponed. The petition also included the standard list of liberal reforms that we have seen elsewhere, such as guarantees of freedom of speech and the press, the abolition of special privileges, peasant emancipa­ tion, and an end to restrictions on trade and industry. Two delegations, headed by the bishops, were then chosen; one was sent to Vienna to present the petition to the emperor and the other to Cluj to the meetings of the Transylvanian diet. At the same time a permanent Romanian National Committee was established with its headquarters in Sibiu. §aguna became president and Barnujiu vice-president. O f the twenty-three members, there were six priests, five professors, and twelve lawyers and officials. The assembly at Blaj was dominated by moderates. No violent revolutionary ac­ tivities were contemplated. Instead, the leaders proposed legal means of ac­ tion. They composed petitions to the government, and they formed delega­ tions with bishops appointed to head them. At the end o f the meeting, the bishops cautioned the assembled crowd to be patient and to wait for the reaction o f the government. The Romanian initiative was to be unsuccessful. §aguna arrived in Vienna in June at a time when the court was in a very weak position. In action taken just before §aguna was received, the emperor, fearful o f Hungarian opposi­ tion, had approved the revolutionary March and April laws, which included the union o f Hungary and Transylvania. The bishop then went to Buda, where he held discussions with the Hungarian officials from June until Sep­ tember. Lemeni was similarly disappointed. The Transylvanian diet met in May, with the bishop and a few others who were of noble rank as the only Romanian delegates. In June peasant reforms were approved; the Hungarian laws served as the model. Since the Hungarians and Szeklers had a majority, they were able to secure the acceptance of the union with Hungary. It could not be expected that the Romanian leaders would either approve the decision or recognize the authority of the diet to carry through such a measure. Meanwhile, the Wallachian revolution had gone down to defeat. In Sep­ tember Russian and Ottoman armies were in occupation o f both Principali­ ties. Refugees streamed into Transylvania; Bra§ov and Sibiu were central places of refuge. Most of these people passed through the province and continued on to Western Europe. Some, like Nicolae Bilcescu, became involved in the events in Transylvania. The leaders o f the Wallachian revolt had much sym­ 324

I

The national issue in the Habsburg Empire pathy for the Hungarian revolutionary regime, which had many principles in common with their own short-lived movement. Before 1848, and in the years afterward, Romanians from the Principalities and Hungarian liberals coop­ erated. At this time Balcescu attempted to bring the Hungarian and Roma­ nian leaders together to form a common front against Russia and the Habs­ burg Empire, the two conservative powers who had stood as the main block to revolutionary change in Europe. The problem remained the Hungarian government’s refusal to give sufficient concessions. Although it was willing to recognize that Croatia had certain historic rights, it would not extend a similar recognition to Romanian or Serbian claims. Not until July 1849, on the eve of defeat, was the Hungarian position in regard to these nationalities modified. Meanwhile, violence increased in the countryside. Atrocities were com­ mitted both by Hungarian soldiers and by Romanian peasants seeking to obtain the implementation of the emancipation laws. In areas where the reg­ ular government broke down, Romanian popular leaders were able to take control. An important center o f Romanian authority was established in the Western Mountains. Here Avram Iancu headed a group of armed peasants who were able to defend their position until the end of the revolution. Fight­ ing had, of course, already commenced in other sections of the empire. The Serbs in the Banat and the imperial troops were both at war with the H un­ garian revolutionary forces. In Transylvania the Romanians supported the Habsburg army; the Szeklers joined the Hungarians. The military situation was radically altered when General Bern took charge o f the Hungarian forces. By the end o f the year he was able to bring under control almost all of Tran­ sylvania except the Western Mountains. Transylvania was thus under H un­ garian military rule. In December the Romanian leaders held another meeting, over which §aguna again presided. The program remained the establishment of a Roma­ nian autonomous region. It was to be governed by a Romanian official named by the emperor who would have a position similar to that o f the ban in Croatia. The Romanian National Committee still favored cooperation with Vienna, even though the Habsburg government had not recognized it as an official body. An immediate problem had also arisen. The Romanian repre­ sentatives had to decide what to do about the danger presented by General Bern’s campaign. At this time, the Romanian, Serbian, and Saxon leaders all agreed that the intervention of the Russian army stationed in Wallachia should be requested. The power that had crushed the revolution in the Principalities was to be asked to protect the Transylvanian Romanians against the Hungar­ ian threat. §aguna thus went to Bucharest to attempt to gain this assistance. As a result o f a Habsburg request, a Russian force did enter Transylvania. It was, however, defeated. The major Russian intervention did not come until summer. §aguna went next to Olrnutz with a delegation to present to Franz Joseph,

325

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 w h o had just becom e emperor, a petition requesting the form ation o f an autonom ous R om anian principality. In M arch 1849 the constitution issued at O lm iitz recognized a separate Transylvania and Vojvodina, but it w ent no further in m eeting R om anian demands. A ll subsequent negotiations had to w ait until the H ungarian problem was settled. In June the Russian army, answ ering a H ab sbu rg appeal, entered Transylvania, and b y the m iddle o f A u gu st the H ungarian forces had been defeated. In the revolutionary period, as w e have seen, the Rom anian and Saxon as w ell as the Croatian and Serbian support had gone to the H ab sbu rg side. Each o f these national leaderships had expected a reward fo r their loyalty in the form o f political concessions favorable to their cause. A ll were to be equally disappointed. T h e Bach system, o f course, was no m ore acceptable to the Rom anians than to the Croatians, the Serbs, the Saxons, o r the defeated H ungarians. Transylvania was divided into districts, which were governed by officials appointed from Vienna. T he governor now lived in Sibiu. A lthough the official language o f administration was Germ an, the new regim e did not favor the Saxons, w h o lost all o f their autonom ous privileges. A m o n g the Rom anians the influence o f the clergy remained strong; §aguna w as still the dom inant figure in their political life. T he U niate bishop, Alexander §ulujiu, w h o had been appointed in 1848 when Lem eni was suspended fo r his proH ungarian activities, was less active. T he Rom anian leadership maintained its policy o f cooperation w ith Vienna despite the limited success obtained in 1849. A n opportunity for national advancement came in i860 and 1861 at the time o f the constitutional experiments. §aguna was a member o f the Reichsrat that met from M ay to Septem ber i860, and there he again presented the R o m a­ nian demands. T h e policy o f collaboration was continued after the issuance o f the February Patent o f 1861. A t this time, it w ill be remembered, the H u n ­ garians refused to send delegates to a central parliament, but the H absburg governm ent was determ ined to proceed w ith its establishment. In order to choose its delegates, the Transylvanian diet was summoned to meet in Sibiu in Ju ly 1863. A new electoral law issued at this time extended the franchise to m ore Rom anians. A s a result, forty-six Rom anian, forty-tw o H ungarian, and thirty-tw o Saxon representatives were chosen. A fter the governm ent had nom inated its members, the diet was com posed o f fifty-seven Rom anians, fifty-four H ungarians, and forty-three Saxons. A lm ost all the H ungarian del­ egates refused to attend the sessions, arguing that the legal basis o f the Tran­ sylvanian governm ent was that established by the M arch 1848 laws: Transyl­ vania was a part o f Hungary, and only the Buda diet had jurisdiction. After a second election was held, w ith the same results, the diet was opened w ith­ out H ungarian o r Szekler representation. D om inated by the Rom anians and Saxons, the body proceeded to grant the Rom anian request to be accepted as the fourth recognized nation; the U niate and O rthodox churches were placed on the same basis as the older religions, and R om anian became a

326 I

The national issue in the Habsburg Empire recognized official language. The basic demands o f the eighteenth century had thus been met. However, the entire internal and international position o f the Habsburg Empire had meanwhile changed, and the Hungarian view­ point was about to prevail. T h e decision o f Franz Joseph to accept the H ungarian position on Tran­ sylvania was com m unicated in a personal audience o f the em peror w ith §aguna in 1865. T h e policy o f cooperation w ith Vienna in order to gain recog­ nition o f the Rom anian rights had thus ended in dismal failure. O nly one real advance had been made. In Decem ber, 1864 the R om anian O rthodox church had been separated from the authority o f Sremski K arlovci; it n ow had its o w n center at Sibiu with §aguna as metropolitan. Nevertheless, in the vital question o f political autonomy, the w orst possible solution from the Rom anian view point had been adopted. Since they were not recognized as a “ historic” nation, the Rom anians, like the Serbs, received no special political rights, such as those included in the Croatian N agodba. Instead, they were granted some privileges in the Nationalities L a w passed by the H ungarian parliament. Its provisions, however, though they were liberal in appearance, were never fully implemented. In the next years the intellectuals were to take control o f the national m ove­ ment. Strongly critical o f the previous policies, which had involved cooper­ ation w ith the governm ent, they adopted a policy o f “ passivism” and w ith ­ drew from active participation in political life. T h ey were not to alter their attitude until the 1880s.

c o n c l u s i o n : t h e H a b sb u rg em pire IN 186 7 Th e year 1867 was to be a decisive break in H ab sbu rg history. T he Ausgleich marked the victory o f the m ost active and aggressive nationality in the em ­ pire. T he H ungarians were henceforth to enjoy the principal benefits o f the association w ith Vienna and to make few sacrifices for it. D urin g the previous years the political history o f the C roats, Serbs, and Rom anians had been strongly influenced by this struggle between the H absburg governm ent and the H ungarian leadership. There was much sym pathy w ith the H ungarian position. T he nationalities were opposed to Austrian absolutism , and they usually supported arguments o f historic privilege. T he liberal and national doctrines o f the H ungarian revolution were favored by many groups th roughout the empire. T he m ajor problem s arose when it became apparent that the H ungarian program , which called fo r a unitary state em bracing all o f the lands o f the crow n o f St. Stephen, clashed directly w ith the demands for territorial autonom y and national recognition that were being made by Croatian, Serbian, and Rom anian leaders. Just at the time w hen the H u n g ar­ ian governm ent sought to obtain the maximum historical boundaries and to weaken as much as possible the central imperial authority, similar desires

327

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 were being expressed by the other nationalities. After 1848 it was clear that Hungarian national goals were just as incompatible with Croatian, Serbian, and Romanian desires as were the policies o f the previous Habsburg abso­ lutist regime. Before 1867 the nationalities had at least some possibility o f playing be­ tween Vienna and Budapest. T h ey chose different paths. §aguna sought to cooperate w ith the H ab sbu rg governm ent; Strossm ayer preferred to seek an agreement w ith Hungary. In the end neither alternative was satisfactory. The H ungarian leaders were able to maintain a firm and unyielding position. In contrast, the H ab sbu rg governm ent, weakened by the defeats in Germ any and Italy and the m ultitude o f domestic problems that arose in all its lands, could not withstand H ungarian pressure. N o other nationality was strong enough to provide an alternate partnership.

We have seen an evolution in some of the national programs in the years before 1867. In the eighteenth century the emphasis was placed on historic rights guaranteed by treaties or charters. By 1848 the idea o f individual and national rights had become important. Thus petitions from Romanians em­ phasized that their nationality formed the majority of the population o f Tran­ sylvania and paid the most taxes. Historical arguments, however, were never abandoned. There was also some change in the leadership, although the par­ amount position of the church is amply demonstrated in the careers o f Stross­ mayer, Rajacic, and §aguna. At this time members of the educated middle class assumed active political roles. They were primarily professionals, for example, teachers, doctors, lawyers, officials, and army officers. Politics, how­ ever, remained the concern of a small proportion o f the population through­ out the empire. The peasants as a class were almost totally excluded from political activity, except when they were called upon to fight either in the Habsburg army or as members of revolutionary bands.

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7 War and Revolution, 1856-1887

HE

TW O

DECADES AFTER THE

C R IM E A N

W A R W ere t o o ffe r an

open field for revolutionary activity, largely owing to the disarray of the previous alliance system. After 1815, it will be remembered, the cooperation o f Austria, Russia, and Prussia in the Holy Alliance had pro­ vided an effective dam against the overthrow o f conservative, monarchical regimes by national liberal movements. The Russian assistance to the Habs­ burg Monarchy in 1849 marked a climax in this activity. The Habsburg ac­ tions during the Crimean War and the intense reaction of the Russian gov­ ernment against this policy split the former alliance, and for a brief period Russia cooperated with France. Napoleon HI, who had himself come to power through revolutionary action, was willing to sponsor and assist other such movements. His chief interest was Italy, but he was also concerned with events in the Danubian Principalities and Poland. The entente with Russia held through the unifications in Italy and the Principalities, but fell apart on the Polish question. In 1863 a revolution broke out in the Russian-ruled Polish lands, which won a great deal o f open support and sympathy in France, Britain, and the Habsburg Empire. Thereafter, Russian relations with Paris cooled. Instead, the Russian government turned to Prussia as the only pos­ sible partner in international affairs. Russia’s subsequent backing o f the Prus­ sian unification o f Germany was to have a profound significance for the Habsburg Empire and, indeed, for the Balkan peninsula. Although the diplomatic aspects of the revolutionary period are important, the movements themselves, of course, were organized by the national lead­ erships. They were often in touch with other groups with similar aims, in particular with Italian, Hungarian, and Polish organizations. Most influential for Eastern Europe were to be the activities o f such men as Czartoryski and Kossuth, who had held high political positions in their states and who con­ tinued to play leading roles even in exile. After the failure of the Polish revolts o f 1830 and 1863 and the Hungarian revolution of 1848—1849, Polish and H un­ garian emigres were actively involved in further conspiracies. Their leaders regarded themselves as heads of govemments-in-exile, and they dealt with other European statesmen often on an equal basis. They had agents through­ out Europe, and they continued to play important roles in international di­ plomacy. Their goals were the reconstruction of their states rather than social 329

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 o r political reform . A lthough they m ight be liberal and m ight support a w id ­ ening o f the franchise to include the educated, property-holding classes, they were seldom democratic. Balkan events w ere to be strongly affected not only by H ungarian and Polish influences, but also by the Italian unification m ove­ ment. There were connections both w ith the left w in g o f M azzini and G ari­ baldi and w ith the right, under the leadership o f C avou r and the kingdom o f Sardinia. T h e revolutionary situation in the Balkans was also affected by the activi­ ties o f revolutionary groups on the left w h o espoused program s ranging from moderate liberalism to socialism, anarchism, and com munism. O ften em pha­ sizing the social instead o f the national aspects o f revolution, they aim ed at the introduction o f democratic regimes. T h ey also, o f course, supported the idea o f the national state. Unlike the m ore conservative groups, the leaders on the left did not have access to heads o f governm ent and officials. T h ey tended to w ork through secret committees and to base their hopes fo r success on revolution rather than on diplom atic negotiations o r regular political pro­ cedures. It is im portant to note that underground revolutionary activity was widespread. Innum erable secret societies w ith elaborate program s for action existed, although only a few were to be successful or to influence the course o f events. Because o f their large number, it was often difficult fo r officials and governm ents to distinguish am ong them o r to decide w h o and w hat each truly represented. It was the secretive, conspiratorial tone o f m any o f these movements that disturbed conservative regimes, in particular tsarist Russia. N ational movements w ith a conservative leadership m ight receive support, but dem ocratic o r socialist agitation, which w ou ld endanger the social or political structure o f the great powers, became the target o f intense police investigation. T he tw o great national movements after 1 8 5 6 w ere, o f course, the Germ an and the Italian. B oth w ere carried through on traditional lines by basically conservative leaderships. They succeeded through war and diplomacy, namely, the w ar o f Sardinia and France against the H absbu rg Em pire in 1 8 5 9 and the subsequent conflicts o f Prussia w ith A ustria in 1 8 6 6 and w ith France in 1 8 7 0 1 8 7 1 . A ll o f these events had immediate repercussions in the Balkans. The defeat o f the H absbu rg Em pire and the unification o f Italy had a negative effect on the reign o f K in g O thon, but greatly aided in the unification o f the Principalities. T h e Prussian victory in 1 8 6 6 contributed much to the final negotiation o f the A usgleich; it thus had a detrimental influence on the H ab s­ burg Balkan nationalities. Th is crisis, how ever, allowed Prince Charles to consolidate his position in Bucharest. T he defeat o f France in 1 8 7 1 and the subsequent weakness o f that state in international relations was a disadvan­ tage in particular to the non-Slavic states o f Greece and Romania, w ho thereby lost their m ost effective patron. In an age o f national upsurge, when the map o f E urope was rapidly chang­ ing, it was natural that the Balkan governm ents should seek to fo llo w a sirru330

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 lar path. N ational unification and advancement were the watchwords o f the day. A united Italy and Germ any had been created; H ungary shared in the control o f the H ab sbu rg Em pire. Independent or autonom ous governm ents held pow er in the Principalities, G reece, M ontenegro, and Serbia, but the O ttom an Em pire still controlled the greater part o f the peninsula - Bosnia, H ercegovina, Epirus, Thessaly, M acedonia, Thrace, and the Bulgarian and Albanian regions. A s w e have seen, Balkan statesmen and writers had already draw n up m any schemes for the partition o f these lands. F o r instance, the M egali Idea, aim ing at the recreation o f the Byzantine Em pire, in its furthest extension foresaw the Greek acquisition o f lands south o f a line running through the Balkan M ountains to the A lbanian coast. GaraSanin’s N aiertanije aimed prim arily at the annexation o f Bosnia, H ercegovina, and the K o so vo region; union w ith M on ten egro; and the securing o f an outlet on the Adriatic. The R om anian nationalists sought the unification o f Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia w ith the tw o autonom ous provinces. W ithin the H ab sbu rg E m ­ pire proponents o f the Illyrian idea supported the join in g o f all South Slavs from “ Villach to Varna.” N o t only w ere these program s m utually contradictory, but they obviously involved the interests o f the great pow ers. The m ost difficult problem was faced by the Rom anian nationalists. T h ere seemed little probability that the H absburg Em pire w ou ld surrender Transylvania and Bukovina o r that Russia w ould give up Bessarabia. T he extension o f the Serbian and G reek bounda­ ries at the expense o f the O ttom an E m pire also met obstacles. G reat Britain after the C rim ean War, as before, supported the territorial integrity o f the M uslim state. T he H ab sbu rg M on archy had a similar interest. It certainly had no desire to have a strong Serbia as its southern neighbor. T h e Russian governm ent, w ith its attention devoted prim arily to internal reform , wished to maintain go o d relations w ith the Porte and conditions o f tranquility in the Balkans. A fter the defeat by Prussia, France was in no position to exert influence in Eastern affairs. U n d er these circumstances, the Balkan leaders could expect to meet not just a lack o f support, but outright opposition from the great pow ers, should they attempt a policy o f territorial expansion. With this negative attitude am ong the European states, the Balkan states­ men had to look to other alternatives. A fter 1856 an isolated national military action was not a practical policy. T he reform ed O ttom an arm y could defeat any regular Balkan force. D iplom atic negotiations, such as those which re­ sulted in the unification o f the Principalities and the acceptance o f a foreign prince, could succeed only i f they involved the internal affairs o f the states and not the extension o f their boundaries. T he only other possibility, unless hopes o f expansion were abandoned, w as the organization o f a cooperative undertaking by the Balkan governm ents and their adoption o f measures o f mutual support. Attem pts were indeed to be made to bring the Balkan g o v ­ ernments together and to enlist the aid o f the Italian, Polish, and H ungarian national and revolutionary leaders. Q uestions o f conflicting objectives and 331

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 the partition o f Balkan territories still under O ttom an rule had to be met at this time.

BALKAN COOPERATION A lth ough this narrative has been prim arily concerned w ith the relations o f the Balkan people w ith the Porte and the great powers, some signs o f mutual cooperation have already been noted. In the eighteenth century both the Russian and the H absbu rg governments had called for a general Balkan ris­ ing to aid them in their military endeavors. T he Etairia had envisaged a simi­ lar united action in support o f its goals. Thereafter, student and revolutionary groups w ith similar aims were in touch, particularly in centers such as Paris, Geneva, and Lon d on . It is very important, however, to emphasize that these m ovem ents, w ith their many interconnections, were not necessarily antiO ttom an. In fact, after 1849 they were m ore likely to be prim arily directed against R ussia and the H absbu rg Em pire. Italian, Rom anian, Polish, and H ungarian revolutionaries certainly considered these tw o governm ents to be their principal adversaries. In contrast, all three were m ore friendly toward the O ttom an Em pire. Exiled from their ow n countries, m any Hungarians and Poles entered O ttom an state service. T he aim o f these ém igrés was not the partition o f the O ttom an lands, but the establishment o f H ungarian and Polish states at the expense o f Austria and Russia. T he conspiracies organized by these groups could be quite complicated. In 1859 the French and Piedm ontese governm ents were in contact w ith H u n ­ garian revolutionaries, w h o in turn carried on negotiations w ith Cuza. The aim was to arrange for the delivery to the Principalities o f French weapons, which w ou ld be given to H ungarians resident in M oldavia, w h o w ould then make raids into Transylvania and thus divert H absburg forces from Italy. The action required negotiations between H ungarian and Rom anian agents who had clashed quite sharply during the revolution o f 1848 over the political conditions in Transylvania. In these discussions the H ungarian representa­ tives agreed that a plebiscite w ould determine the ultimate fate o f Transyl­ vania, should a victory be achieved. T he aim was the establishment o f a Danubian C onfederation w hose members w ould be H ungary, Serbia, and R om ania, all independent states. These plans had to be abandoned when N apoleon III concluded the Truce o f Villafranca with the H absbu rg Em pire in 1859 and thereby w ithdrew French military backing from further revolu­ tionary conspiracies. U n d er strong pressure from the powers, C uza had to suppress Polish and H ungarian intrigues organized on Rom anian territory. Nevertheless, in the future the Principalities were to remain a center o f rev­ olutionary activities and a safe haven for radical groups; the Rom anian go v­ ernment looked on these organizations with a very tolerant eye. Other movements were directed solely against the Ottoman Empire. The 332

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 m ost serious attempt to form a Balkan alliance was m ade by M ichael Obrenovic. B y the m iddle o f the century the dangers o f great-pow er interference in Balkan aiFairs had become apparent. N o Balkan state wished to substitute European, that is, Austrian o r Russian, rule for that o f the Porte, which was in fact becom ing increasingly less burdensome. C ould the Balkan govern­ ments agree am ong themselves, they m ight be able to obtain their objectives w ithout calling in outside assistance. T he m ajor flaw in this policy was the obvious fact that the Balkan armies were not strong enough to defeat a reformed O ttom an army. It has been estim ated that the Serbian army, the best force available, num bered only about ninety thousand m en; Greece had a scant eight thousand under arm s.1 T h e R om anian arm y was to be developed later, during the reign o f Prince Charles. A ll o f the governm ents put their faith in the organization o f their m ilitary forces along Western models instead o f concentrating on the developm ent o f the techniques o f guerilla w arfare, in w hich they w ere in fact m ost effective. D espite this drawback, almost all the Balkan leaders w ere eager to undertake aggressive national program s. The center o f the negotiations was Serbia. W orking w ith his foreign m in­ ister, Ilija Garasanin, Prince M ichael maintained contact throughout his reign w ith the other Balkan rulers, although alliances were not signed until 1866, 1867, and 1868. T he Serbian territorial goals remained much the same as those outlined in the Nacertanije. There was much discussion about a w ider South Slav conception that w ould involve the H absbu rg Croats and Serbs; M ichael had dealings w ith Strossmayer. H ow ever, the m ajor emphasis remained on the acquisition o f w hat were considered historic Serbian lands. The m ost im portant negotiations were carried on w ith Greece, beginning in 1861 when O thon was still on the throne. E ager to gain prestige in foreign policy to buttress his declining influence, the king w illingly entered into the discussions. T h e m ajor obstacle to an agreement was the difficulty o f dividing the O ttom an territory. N either governm ent was hindered by any ideas o f “ self-determination.” T h ey felt little concern about possible Bulgarian claims and none at all about the Albanians. T h e G reek governm ent wished to ac­ quire all o f M acedonia and suggested a partition o f the Bulgarian-inhabited territories, w ith Serbia taking the land north o f the Balkan M ountains and Greece that to the south. Serbia sought M acedonian regions, the K o so vo area, Bosnia, and H erecegovina, w ithout much real interest in o r knowledge o f the exact ethnic com position o f the areas. T h e negotiations were in abey­ ance from 1862 to 1866, and in this period O thon was replaced by G eorge I. A great opportunity for the Balkan states appeared to com e in 1866, a year o f crisis in E urope. In February a revolution resulted in the overthrow o f Alexander C uza. In the summer Prussia defeated A ustria, a prime foe o f Ser­ bian expansion. A t the same time a revolt broke out in Crete. T he first Balkan I Michael Boro Petrovich, A History o fModem Serbia, 1804-1918, 2 vols. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), I, 329.

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 agreement, that between Serbia and Montenegro, was signed at this time. In his attempts to bring the Balkan states together, Michael had cooperated well with Montenegro, whose inhabitants considered themselves Serbs. Prince Nicholas was willing to relinquish his throne should a union o f the two states be possible. Since Michael was childless, the Montenegrin ruler evidently had hopes that, if the Serbian throne became vacant, he might succeed. The treaty signed at this point provided for cooperation to prepare for an uprising against the Ottoman Empire. The goal was the formation o f a single Serbian nation with Michael as prince. D iscussions w ith Greece were again taken up, but serious problem s soon arose. T h e G reek governm ent, deeply involved in C rete, wished the Serbs to undertake obligations to g o to w ar w ith the Porte to divert O ttom an forces from the island. Instead, the Serbian leaders used the difficulties in w hich the Porte found itself to gain from it the final evacuation o f the fortresses on Serbian territory. Nevertheless, in A ugu st 1867, Serbian and G reek represen­ tatives signed an agreement at V oslau, a tow n near Vienna, in w hich the tw o states agreed to aid each other should either be attacked by the O ttom an Em pire. T he problem o f the division o f M acedonia w as avoided; a declara­ tion was made that, as a minim um, Serbia w ou ld receive Bosnia and H erce­ govina and Greece w ould annex Epirus and Thessaly in any situation that made these territorial changes possible. N egotiations w ere also proceeding w ith Bucharest. T h e m ajor obstacle to R om anian participation in a Balkan union directed against the O ttom an E m ­ pire was the simple fact that no m ajor Rom anian territorial objectives were involved. T h e next great goal was Transylvania. A lth ough the Serbian g o v ­ ernment did indeed regard A ustria as a principal block to expansion into O ttom an territory, neither the Serbian nor the R om anian leaders could con­ template a cam paign against Vienna. Thus, although Serbia and R om ania had as yet no direct interests in conflict, they also had no com m on goals. In February 1868 a treaty was signed, but it was sim ply a declaration o f friend­ ship.

In addition to carrying on discussions with the neighboring powers, the Serbian government gave support to conspiratorial groups who were plan­ ning insurrections in Ottoman lands. Assistance to Serbian secret committees in Bosnia was to become a standard policy throughout the century. Even more important was the aid offered to Bulgarian leaders, in particular to George Rakovski. Cooperation with Bulgarian revolutionaries naturally complicated further the question o f the division o f Ottoman territory. Like the Greeks and the Serbs, the Bulgarian committees had developed their plans for a future state, which in most o f their programs included Macedonia and Thrace. M ichael’s assassination in 1868 brought an end to these schemes o f Balkan cooperation. E ven before his death, the prince appears to have changed his view s, in particular in regard to Austria. H e had close relations w ith H u n ­

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 garian nationalists, and their attitude tow ard Vienna shifted sharply after the conclusion o f the Ausgleich. A nother serious attempt to bring the Balkan states together to achieve a com m on goal was not to occur until 1912. Th is early effort had show n the grave weaknesses in any pan-Balkan movement, and the contradiction between the territorial objectives o f the states was to becom e even m ore evident after the Albanian claims were introduced.

In the next crises each Balkan government was to follow an independent policy. Only in some instances was there cooperation to achieve a common goal. Once again the leaderships showed a preference for seeking the assist­ ance o f a great-power patron, a practice that caused European attention to focus on the Balkans in the 1870s. Although in the future there were always to be some groups and individuals, generally left-oriented and underground, who supported programs o f Balkan cooperation and appeasement, in gen­ eral, on the official level, the Balkan governments, who were competing for the same territory and whose prestige and power were in question, retained a suspicious and competitive attitude toward one another. In other words, the relations among the Balkan states resembled closely those among the European great powers.

THE BU LG AR IAN NATIO NAL M OVEM ENT

By the 1860s both the Greek and the Serbian governments were faced with a Bulgarian national movement whose territorial goals conflicted seriously with their own. The comparatively late development o f Bulgarian national agita­ tion can be easily understood. Situated geographically nearer to Constanti­ nople than the other Balkan regions, the Bulgarian lands were always subject to closer surveillance from the central government and were more open to military control. Greek cultural dominance, which was a natural result o f previous historical developments and which was approved by the Porte and to an extent by Russia, was also difficult to throw off. Moreover, in contrast to the Serbs, Montenegrins, Romanians, and Greeks, the Bulgarians had no central institutions that could organize and unite the people; the church was under Phanariot control. They also had at first no links with a foreign power who could act as a patron in foreign relations. A further hindrance to the national movement was the fact that after 1830 the economic conditions in the country improved rapidly. With the Ottoman reforms and the restoration o f order in the country there no longer existed the type o f provincial anarchy and blatant economic exploitation that had pushed other areas into revolt. As shall be shown, there were local peasant rebellions against the landholding and taxation system, but no great internal uprising similar to the Greek and the Serbian revolutions. The rise o f national consciousness in Bulgaria, as elsewhere, was preceded by a cultural revival. Like the Serbs and Greeks, the Bulgarians preserved remembrances o f their past history through the church and through folk335

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887

Village near Adrianople

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 songs and folklore. H ow ever, the higher offices in the church were in Greek hands. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Church Slavonic, a language close to Bulgarian, had been replaced by G reek in m ost services. T h e establishment o f Bulgarian as the literary language was thus essential. Th e first history o f Bulgaria was com pleted in 1762 by Paisii, a m onk at the m onastery o f H ilandar at M t. A thos. H is aim was to demonstrate that the Bulgarians to o had a glorious past history. In 1806 another cleric, Sofronii, bishop o f V ratsa, published a collection o f sermons entitled Kyriakodromiom (Sunday B oo k) which was printed in R im n ik in Wallachia. O ther books in Bulgarian appeared in Constantinople, the Danubian Principalities, and other places, w ith their numbers increasing in the 1840s and 1850s. A fter the C ri­ mean War the printing o f books was permitted in Bulgaria. A great interest was shown in history, grammar, arithmetic, and translations o f foreign works. In addition, educated Bulgarians had access to Russian publications because o f the sim ilarity o f the languages. A s elsewhere in the Balkans, education was at first available only in the churches and monasteries. O n the lower level what schools there were con­ centrated on reading and w riting and on C hurch Slavonic. T h ey did not provide the training necessary for commerce, nor did they introduce their pupils to the affairs o f the w ider world. T he best secular institutions were the so-called Helleno-Bulgarian schools. There the students learned Greek, which had the advantage o f being the commercial language o f the Black Sea region. Th e G reek schools also introduced their pupils to the progressive political ideas o f E u ro pe, in particular liberalism and nationalism. Th e first purely Bulgarian school o f higher education was established in G abrovo in 1835. It became a m odel fo r similar institutions in other cities, such as Kazanluk, Triavna, and Sofia, which w ere trade and m anufacturing centers. There was no Bulgarian establishment on the university level. F o r an advanced educa­ tion the Bulgarian student could attend the Protestant m issionary schools, w hich w ere opened around the m iddle o f the century, o r g o abroad. Som e studied in universities in France, Austria, and Germany, but the group that was to be the m ost significant in the future received a Russian education. A lth ou gh the Russian governm ent was to play a m ajor role in the estab­ lishment o f an autonom ous Bulgarian state, the first relationship was quite one-sided. A t the beginning o f the century Russian interest was naturally focused on the Principalities, Serbia, and Greece, w hose national movements direcdy involved Russian interests. U ntil the 1870s Russia also stood behind the authority o f the Patriarchate o f Constantinople, because it was believed im portant to maintain as far as possible the strength and unity o f the O rtho­ dox w orld. Russian armies w ere, o f course, in occupation o f the country during the Russo-Turkish War o f 1828—1829. Thereafter, it w ill be remem­ bered, R ussia supported the maintenance o f the territorial integrity o f the O ttom an Em pire. T h e subsequent defeat in the Crim ean War prevented the Russian governm ent from adopting a forw ard policy on any Balkan issue for

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 almost twenty years. Official Russia thus offered the Bulgarian nationalist little hope for assistance. Yet this great power was the best source o f foreign support. Encouragem ent, how ever, came from another direction. In 1858 the Slavic Benevolent Society was founded. Representing the views o f the Panslavs, it offered scholarships to yo u ng Bulgarians to study in Russia. A basically con­ servative organization, it sought to bring the Slavs together under Russian leadership. H ow ever, the Bulgarian students w h o received these grants came in contact w ith the radical Russian youth, w h o were under the influence o f writers such as D . I. Pisarev, N . G . Chernishevsky, and Alexander Herzen. Th us, instead o f being instilled w ith love and respect for O rthodox, auto­ cratic R u ssia, m any absorbed the m ore radical European ideologies. Others were deeply affected by the Panslav orientation. Panslav interest in Bulgarian affairs was to remain constant and to have an enorm ous influence on later Bulgarian history. The developm ent o f the Bulgarian national m ovem ent was naturally deeply affected by the events that have been previously described, in particular the G reek revolution and O ttom an reform . A t the beginning o f the nineteenth century the situation in the Bulgarian lands had been very bad indeed. The effects o f the breakdow n o f O ttom an central authority had been disastrous. T he bandit state o f Pasvanoglu had been based in V idin , and the kirdjali raids had devastated the region north o f the Balkan M ountains. Thereafter condi­ tions im proved markedly. Bulgarian merchants and businessmen benefited especially from the decline o f G reek influence in Constantinople after the G reek revolt; they were able to replace their form er G reek com petitors in many fields. A lthough strong Bulgarian merchant colonies already existed in Constantinople, Bucharest, and other localities, these expanded in size and became m ore prosperous. T he end o f O ttom an preem ption rights in the Principalities was also in the Bulgarian interest. W ith the loss o f control over Wallachia and M oldavia, the Porte came to prefer to rely on E g y p t and B u l­ garia for its supplies, particularly for the city o f Constantinople. W hen a regular O ttom an arm y was created in 1826, its clothing and fo od was pro­ vided principally by Bulgarian sources. From 1830 until 1876 Bulgarian merchants and manufacturers enjoyed the

market o f the entire empire. During these years an active cloth industry, based on home handicraft production, developed in the Balkan Mountains. In this period o f prosperity, the Bulgarian cities were centers for the manufacture of carpets, metalwork, shoes, and clothing, the production and sale o f which were regulated by merchant and artisan guilds. Bulgarian merchants handled these items and also natural products, such as grains, cattle, honey, wax, ani­ mal products, wine, pig iron, and salt. They had offices in Constantinople as well as in major trading cities. After 1856, they like their Ottoman colleagues, were affected by the increasing penetration o f British and Austrian products. Local handicrafts could not compete with the low prices o f machine338

War an d revolution, 18S6-1887 manufactured goods. Although the main effects were not to be felt until later, the free-trade policy adopted by the Porte under British influence was even­ tually to have an extremely detrimental effect on the economies o f all the Balkan nationalities. In addition to enjoying relatively prosperous econom ic conditions, the Bulgarian lands had a great deal o f local self-governm ent at the lowest ad­ ministrative level. A lth ough no single central Bulgarian authority existed, the com m unities controlled virtually all their internal affairs. M ost Bulgarians were thus governed directly not by O ttom an officials, but by their ow n no­ tables. In general, each locality elected one or tw o mayors, w h o were assisted by a council o f five to twelve men. T he communal organization had many functions. F o r instance, it dealt w ith legal questions, such as the draw ing up o f contracts, and disputes between Christians; it controlled the educational system, including the appointm ent o f teachers and the building o f schools; and it acted as an O ttom an agent in tax collecting. It also handled m ost o f the relations o f the citizens w ith the O ttom an authorities, including matters such as the quartering o f soldiers, bribes, and gifts. D urin g the Tanzimat period this com m unity system was made part o f the O ttom an administrative organization; standard regulations were set in the Provincial R efo rm L aw o f 1864. A s in other Balkan lands with similar institutions, problems arose within the com m unities themselves. T h ey tended to be controlled by a m inority o f notables w h o benefited from certain privileges, such as tax collecting. These men w ere usually conservative, and they wanted to maintain the system that was favorable for their personal interests. Nevertheless, the com munities did play a m ajor role in the struggle to establish a national church and to develop an adequate educational system. They also gave the individual Bulgarian some support against unjust actions by officials representing the central O ttom an administration.

The Bulgarian peasantry, which constituted the overwhelming majority o f the population, shared in the general improving conditions in the Ottoman lands. The peasant’s position was certainly superior to that o f his contempo­ rary across the Danube in the Principalities. The free peasants and shepherds lived predominantly in the hill and mountain areas; the chiftlik estates were in the lowlands. All the peasants paid taxes and labor dues to the govern­ ment; the dependent class gave a share o f its products and labor service in return for its land. Here too the major objective o f every peasant was to secure full control over his plot or to enlarge his holding. He also had an interest in a reform o f the tax system and in securing recognition o f the equality o f Muslims and Christians in the empire. The peasant revolts prior to this period were directed primarily toward correcting the abuses in the landholding and taxation systems, rather than toward securing national lib­ eration. The abolition o f the janissaries in 1826 and the sipahis shortly thereafter brought up the question o f the disposal o f their lands, which should have 339

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 reverted to the state. T he sipahi control had already com menced to disinte­ grate; some individuals had converted their holdings to chiftlik estates. A t first the sipahis continued to hold their lands in return for tax payments, but the Porte later replaced this system with regular pensions. W ith the removal o f the landholders, the peasant w h o actually worked the lands considered his plot his private property. H e did not want to pay redem ption costs, and he resisted attempts o f M uslim landholders to retain their estates. A com plicated pattern o f land ownership em erged from this situation, but in general the agricultural land was passing into the possession o f the small peasant pro­ prietors. T he process, however, was slow, and it caused much discontent. W ith these generally favorable conditions, Bulgaria should have been a g o o d place to test the success o f the Tanzimat reforms. I f they w orked any­ where, they should have im proved conditions there. In fact, the problems m et in Bulgaria were typical o f those encountered throughout the O ttom an provinces, and thus they merit examination in greater detail. T he aim o f the Tanzimat was, as w e have seen, to prom ote the tranquility and prosperity o f the em pire; a condition o f equality was to be established between M uslim s and Christians, and the m ajor abuses o f the administration were to be cor­ rected. Th e tw o areas o f governm ent that were in urgent need o f change were the provincial administration and the means used to collect taxes. Th e secur­ ing o f an efficient and honest administrative system was particularly difficult. Officials had to be found w ho w ould be loyal to the Porte and not open to corruption. T he local notables and military men, both Christian and M uslim , w h o had strongly entrenched interests, had to be brought under control. A t first the sw ift rotation o f officials was used as a means o f preventing any individual from developing a center o f personal pow er o r sources o f private profit. T h is measure meant that often the men appointed came from other parts o f the em pire and had little know ledge o f or sym pathy w ith local con­ ditions. T h e m ajor effort at administrative reform took place after the Crim ean War, w hen the Porte decided to establish a m odel province ou t o f the regions south o f the D anube. In 1864 the Danube vilayet, com posed o f the districts o f Silistria, V idin, and NiS, was organized. The able O ttom an reform er M i­ dhat Pasha was placed in charge. The attempt was made to place M uslim s and Christians on an equal level; Christians sat on the administrative coun­ cils. T h e Porte also appointed Christian officials to serve in the area, but most o f these w ere Poles, Croatians, o r A lbanians, not Bulgarians. M idhat made a great effort to im prove the conditions in the country through a program o f public works. H e built roads, bridges, schools, and m odel farms. H e was particularly interested in providing a better education so that the Bulgarian youth w ould not be com pelled to study abroad. Despite his go o d intentions and successes, M idh at was replaced after only three years. H is endeavors were not sufficient to counter the prevailing trends both in the O ttom an govern­ m ent and in the Christian society.

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 Sim ilar failures met the O ttom an efforts to reform the methods o f tax col­ lection and assessment. D uring the reign o f M ahm ud II a census and a land survey w ere taken for purposes o f distributing the taxes on a fairer basis. A t this time and in later years the entire question o f tax collection was reviewed repeatedly. T he possibility o f levying a single tax to replace the m ultitude o f m inor payments w as similarly discussed. Since it proved impractical for the Porte to collect taxes directly, the necessity o f regulating the tax-farm ing sys­ tem arose. T h e m ajor issue here was whether it was better to assign the con­ tracts fo r a single year, opening the danger that an agent m ight sim ply clean ou t his district, o r for a longer period, in which case he m ight develop his ow n special interests. D u rin g this period Christian notables took over an increasing share o f tax collecting. This m ethod did not end the abuses, but it did bring this grou p into the O ttom an system. In the end the tax reform s sim ply did not w ork. Even when in theory just one tax was to be collected, the tax farmers and local officials w ould levy it several times a year, or collect it and other payments as well. T h e basic problem remained the difficulty o f finding honest governm ent officials. T he Porte attempted to control the sit­ uation by sending out special investigators o r com m issions, but these too could be corrupted. D espite an im provem ent in conditions during this period, there was in fact an increase in the num ber and intensity o f peasant revolts after 1835.2 Th ey were caused at least in part by rising expectations. T he peasants were well aware o f the assurances o f the Tanzimat reform ers, and they expected the prom ised benefits. W hen these did not occur, there was great discontent. F rom the point o f view o f the peasant majority, one o f the great problems was that they had no w ay o f m aking their complaints known directly to C o n ­ stantinople. T h ey sent multiple petitions to officials, but they lacked institu­ tions through w hich they could express their views. T he reform s did not help here. A lth ou gh in the 1840s Christians w ere added to local administrative councils, this measure did not im prove the situation. H igh er officials often just ignored the recommendations o f these councils, or they appointed docile representatives o r notables w h o were deeply involved in local corruption. In general, the Bulgarian population blamed the local authorities, not the cen­ tral governm ent, for administrative abuses, but there w ere no means o f cir­ cum venting incom petent and dishonest officials. W hen the reform s failed to stifle domestic discontent, the O ttom an offi­ cials often blamed either Russian o r Serbian agitation. A lth ough it was true that the Serbian governm ent was giving support to Bulgarian revolutionaries in exile, these men were not particularly effective in organizing internal sub­ version. T he Russian governm ent was certainly not in the business o f pro­ m oting rebellions. Russian pressure for reform was exerted directly through 2 See Mark Pinson, “Ottoman Bulgaria in the First Tanzimat Period —the Revolts in Nish (1841) and Vidin (1850),” M iddle Eastern Studies n, no. 2 (May 1975): 103-146.

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 diplomatic channels or the Orthodox church. The chief cause o f unrest within the Bulgarian lands came from local conditions. The peasant program was clear. The chief emphasis remained on the land question, with the objective o f assuring that each family held full property rights over a given plot, for which it would be assessed only a light tax burden. Freedom from labor dues either to the state or in connection with landholding was also desired. Even i f the reform s had achieved a greater success, the developm ent o f a Bulgarian national m ovem ent was to be expected. National doctrines were becom ing generally accepted throughout Europe. M oreover, som e measures had to be taken to defend Bulgarian interests, in view o f the attitude o f both the G reek and the Serbian governm ent tow ard the territories still under the jurisdiction o f the Porte. I f the Bulgarians’ claims were not asserted, the re­ gions they inhabited m ight be partitioned am ong other states. T h e question that first had to be decided, however, was the path to be follow ed. A s else­ where, the national leaders had tw o basic choices. T h ey could seek to achieve their goals through diplom acy and negotiations w ith the Porte and the great powers. Th is m ethod had been adopted by the Principalities after 1856 and by M ilos in Serbia. T h e alternative was the organization o f revolutions on the line o f the revolts in Greece and o f Karadjordje in Serbia. T h e first course o f action was favored by the grou p known as the “ Elders,” w hich consisted prim arily o f merchants and notables. T h ey desired an extension o f Bulgarian autonom ous rights w ithin the empire, not a destructive revolution. T h ey had a stake in the system, and they were used to dealing w ith O ttom an officials. T h ey expected to be able to reach their objectives by an agreement w ith the Porte. T h eir center was Constantinople, where a large colony o f merchants lived.

This stand was challenged by those who preferred direct and violent means. As was the case with the forty-eighters in the Principalities, the main support for this position came from the educated youth, usually from prosperous families, who had traveled and who were influenced by the radical ideologies o f the day. More democratic and socialistic than their elders, they nevertheless retained the romantic fervor o f earlier revolutionary endeavors that we have seen in other areas. They wished to obtain national liberation through their own efforts, and thus they did not seek great-power support. These men organized a number o f separate committees. Conspiratorial centers were es­ tablished in Bucharest, Belgrade, and Odessa. The leaders were in touch with similar groups in other parts o f Europe. Despite the sincerity o f many o f these men and their firm belief in the romantic conception o f a great national rising to defeat the forces o f tyranny and oppression, such a policy was simply impractical at the time. The impor­ tance o f the availability o f an armed force for a successful revolution has been emphasized previously. Except for a relatively small number o f armed men engaged in legal and illegal activities, the Bulgarians did not have the military organization necessary to start a revolt. Moreover, the relatively long period 342

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 o f tranquility in the Bulgarian lands, the generally go o d econom ic condi­ tions, and the O ttom an reform attempts had affected the population. M any w ere indeed extrem ely discontented, but there was certainly no large body o f desperate men w illing to risk their lives fo r national liberation. T h e situation was not com parable to that in Serbia in 1804 o r in Greece in 1821, w hen armed peasants were often faced with the alternative o f fighting o r being killed. M oreover, the Bulgarian lands were too close to the center o f Ottoman power. T h e reform ed Turkish army, although it m ight have difficulty w ith a greatpow er adversary, was fully capable o f dealing w ith any force that could be raised in Bulgaria. U n der these circumstances the patronage o f a great pow er was urgently needed. Q uite obviously, assistance could com e only from Russia. T h e H ab s­ burg M on archy consistently opposed Balkan national m ovem ents; Britain supported the maintenance o f the empire. There were no direct links to France. A lth ough the Russian governm ent in the post-Crim ean period had neither the ability nor the desire to em bark on Balkan adventures, it remained the best hope for the Bulgarian nationalist. In 1864 one o f the m ost influential Russian diplom ats, Nicholas Pavlovich Ignatiev, was appointed as the R u s­ sian representative in Constantinople. H e thereafter attempted to keep in close touch w ith all Balkan revolutionary and national movements. A n enthu­ siastic Panslav, he w as a strong proponent o f measures leading to Slavic unity and increased autonom ous rights for the Balkan people. H ow ever, he was first and forem ost a R ussian nationalist. H e expected the national movements to contribute to Russian prestige and pow er and to accept direction from St. Petersburg, and he opposed actions that were not under Russian control. T h e first victory fo r the Bulgarian national cause involved his m ediation, but he did not achieve the result he desired.

As we have seen, the Greeks, Serbs, and Romanians had insisted upon a separate national church organization as soon as they won autonomy or in­ dependence. Under the leadership o f the moderate elements in Constanti­ nople, an attempt was made to separate the Bulgarian hierarchy from the Patriarchate even before advances had been made in the political sphere. The Giilhane decree o f 1839, with its assurances o f religious equality, was used as an argument against the continued authority o f the Greek-dominated Pa­ triarchate in the Bulgarian lands. This first step toward religious autonomy failed. Russia at the time was backing the Patriarchate. The problem o f the Dedicated Monasteries in die Principalities and the separation o f the church o f independent Greece had already caused the Russian government much concern. The Bulgarian cause, however, did make one advance. In 1849 the sultan agreed that the “ Bulgarian millet” could have its own church in Con­ stantinople. This was the first official recognition that a Bulgarian nation existed. The situation became more favorable after the Crimean War. Not only did the new reform measures give more hope, but the Patriarchate appeared will­ 343

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 ing to make som e concessions. These, however, were never sufficient to meet the Bulgarian demands. M ost important was the change in the Russian atti­ tude. Filaret, the m etropolitan o f M oscow and the m ost influential Russian religious leader, was w orried about the activities o f the Am erican Protestant missionaries and the Uniates, w h o represented French and Polish influences, in Bulgaria. H e was thus w illing to support the Bulgarians’ desire to have their ow n hierarchy, a share in the church revenues, and services in C hurch Slavonic. W ith the arrival o f Ignatiev in Constantinople, active Russian intervention com menced. T he church councils discussed the question, but they accom­ plished very little. T h e Patriarchate naturally opposed a further lim itation o f its direct jurisdiction and a loss o f income. It w ill be remem bered that in 1863 C uza secularized the lands o f the Dedicated M onasteries, an act that dealt a serious blow to the Patriarchate’s finances. Throughout the negotiations over the Bulgarian question, Ignatiev attempted to mediate and to find a com pro­ mise between the tw o positions. N either he nor the Russian governm ent wanted a further weakening o f the Patriarchate or quarrels am ong the Balkan O rthodox. W hen no results were obtained through negotiation, the Bulgarian church leaders acted and in 1866 expelled the G reek bishops. T he Porte became se­ riously concerned. U n w illing to face a Bulgarian revolt on the matter, the Porte agreed to the form ation o f a separate Bulgarian church. T h e debate then shifted from the question o f the establishment o f such an institution to that o f its territorial jurisdiction. T he G reek governm ent also entered the controversy. A lth ough it had insisted on a national ecclesiastical organization after independence, it could not readily accept a similar Bulgarian demand because o f the implications fo r the future. Obviously, the territory that w ould be assigned to the jurisdiction o f the new church m ight eventually be in­ cluded in a future Bulgarian state and thus lost to Greece. T he issues were too explosive to be easily decided by negotiation. In 1870 the Porte took the m ajor step tow ard the solution o f the question, when it issued a firman that established the Bulgarian Exarchate, as the new institution was called. The territory under its jurisdiction included the lands north o f the Balkan M o u n ­ tains and the Varna and Plovdiv regions. M ost important, in Article X it was decreed that i f two-thirds o f the inhabitants o f a district wished to jo in the Exarchate, they w ould be allowed to do so. Th is act opened a bitter conflict am ong the Christian church organizations. In the next years the Exarchate w as able to make considerable progress at the expense o f the G reek Patri­ archate. Naturally, this solution was unacceptable to either the Patriarchate o r the G reek governm ent. In M arch 1872 A ntim I became exarch. H e then an­ nounced the separation o f his church from Constantinople. In reply, the pa­ triarch declared him schismatic. Nevertheless, w ith o r w ithout the Patri­ archate’s approval, a Bulgarian church was in existence. Its creation was largely

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War and revolution, 1856-1887 the result o f the efforts o f moderate Bulgarian leaders and o f the Ottoman government. Ignatiev and his government had been willing to accept a sepa­ rate Bulgarian organization, but they disliked the manner in which it was accomplished. The advance had been achieved essentially through coopera­ tion with the Porte. It did not win prestige for the Russian diplomat, and it weakened Orthodox unity. Meanwhile, at the time when the moderates were concentrating on the religious question, those who favored revolutionary action were organizing. Their activities naturally had to take place primarily outside the Ottoman lands. Serbia and the Principalities were to offer the most favorable condi­ tions for these conspiracies. The Bulgarian revolutionary movement had no single organization or leader. There was also disagreement among the com­ mittees on many important issues, including those o f soliciting the aid o f a great power and o f cooperating with other Balkan revolutionary organiza­ tions. From the beginning the Bulgarian actions included the use o f armed bands, or chetas, which were organized in Wallachia and then sent across the Danube. Their objective, which was to attempt to instigate a great peasant rebellion, was never attained. The first action o f this type was organized in 1841 by Vasil Hadzhivulkov and Vladislav Tatich. It should be emphasized that the chetas, like the Bulgarian movement in general, enlisted the support o f very few people. There was never to be the mass peasant support for a revolt that we have seen in Serbia or even in Wallachia at the time o f Tudor Vladimirescu. During the reign o f Michael Obrenovic, Serbia offered a place o f refuge for the revolutionaries. The principal figure at this time was George Rakovski, who in 1861 commenced the publication o f a journal, Dunavski Lebed (Danubian Swan). He favored the organization o f an uprising in Bulgaria and the winning o f great-power assistance. Should his projected rebellion succeed, he was willing to enter into a federation with Serbia and the Prin­ cipalities, but not with Greece, The revolutionary groups had the same diffi­ culties as the governments in deciding questions concerning the future boundaries o f the national states. After conflicts with the Serbs over this and other issues, Rakovski moved in 1862 to the Principalities, and Wallachia henceforth became the major center o f Bulgarian revolutionary activity. Con­ ditions were extremely favorable there. Many Bulgarians lived in Bucharest and the Danube port cities, with ready access to their countrymen across the river. The Romanian government was also extremely lenient in its treatment o f the conspirators and lax in enforcing measures to control them. Although the great powers repeatedly warned the Romanians about tolerating these organizations, litde was ever done. Many Romanian Liberals were sympa­ thetic to the Bulgarian cause. Moreover, even if the government had wanted to be strict, it was difficult to suppress small-scale clandestine activities o f this kind. T h e Russian governm ent was particularly strong in its protests to Bucha­

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 rest over the actions o f the radical revolutionary groups. In the past it had objected to the use o f Rom anian territory by H ungarian and Polish revolu­ tionaries; it was no m ore sympathetic to the Bulgarians. In 1868 a cheta was organized by Hadzhi Dimitur and Stephen Karadzha. They led 120 men across the river, w here they w ere quickly defeated by the O ttom an troops. T he R u s­ sian consul in Bucharest had w arned the Rom anian governm ent before the raid was begun that R u ssia wished the action stopped. T he Russian represer tatives w ere sympathetic to the Bulgarian desire for greater autonomy, and they were close to conservative Bulgarian circles in Bucharest, in particular to the Bulgarian Benevolent Society, which had close links w ith the Russian consulate; the Russian diplom ats, how ever, stood strongly against revolu­ tionary acts under radical leadership and any undertaking that they could not control.

Despite the opposition o f the powers and the failure to find any serious response among the Bulgarian people, the left revolutionary forces continued to organize and to prepare for future action. In 1870 the Bulgarian Revolu­ tionary Committee was formed for the purpose o f uniting all o f the radical groups within and without Bulgaria. Its goal was declared to be the forma­ tion o f an autonomous or independent state and a possible federation with Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Romania. After Rakovski died o f tubercu­ losis in 1867, the leadership passed to the moderate Liuben Karavelov. Prom­ inent in the movement were two other men, Vasil Levski and Khristo Botev, who were directly in the Balkan romantic revolutionary tradition. Levski be­ lieved that Bulgarian liberation should come through a mass peasant revolt and that foreign assistance should not be sought. In 1869 he went to Bulgaria to organize support for an uprising. Botev, Bulgaria’s greatest modem poet, was a socialist and a supporter o f the idea o f a general revolution. A disaster for the movement occurred in 1872. At that time Levski and a fellow conspir­ ator, Dimitur Obshti, were once again in the midst o f preparations for a rebellion in Bulgaria. In order to obtain money, Obshti robbed a train. When he was caught, he confessed the plan o f the revolt, in order to demonstrate that he was not a common criminal. With this information the Ottoman authorities had no trouble capturing those involved in the conspiracy. Levski and Obshti were hanged. The failure o f this attempt caused Karavelov and some others to leave the committee. They felt that some sort o f outside as­ sistance, even if only from the Balkan states, was indispensable for success. O ther members o f the com mittee, nevertheless, continued the preparations for rebellion despite the discouragements o f the past. A nother attempt, the Stara Z agora revolt o f 1875, had equally dismal results. Badly planned and led, it received little support inside Bulgaria. Still undiscouraged, the revolution­ ary leaders continued their preparations. T he O ttom an governm ent had its hands full w ith a revolt that had broken ou t in 1875 in Bosnia and H ercego­ vina, and had concentrated its main m ilitary forces in the western Balkans. T h e plans fo r the new uprising were under the direction o f G eorge Benkov-

War and revolution, 1856-1887 ski. Preparations were made inside Bulgaria, and plovdiv was to be the cen­ tral point o f the revolution. Although the Bulgarian leaders had not wished to commence the rebellion until the middle o f May, they were forced to advance the date when their plans became known to the Ottoman authorities. On May 2 (or April 20 by Old Style dating) a revolt broke out in the Balkan Mountain towns o f Koprivshtitsa, Panagiurishte, and Klisura. The fighting thereafter was largely concentrated in this area; there was no mass uprising in other regions. The original rebellion was quickly crushed. Its last episode led to the death o f Botev, who at the end o f May seized a Danube steamer with a group o f two hundred supporters and crossed the river. The Ottoman officials learned at once o f this landing and had no difficulty in quickly annihilating the force. The April Uprising, which became the major event in later Bulgarian na­ tionalist mythology, was a complete failure as a revolution. Quite apart from the disasters that it brought upon the Bulgarian people, its leaders were un­ able to enlist the support o f even a small percentage o f the population. Only a few localities were involved. It certainly did not gain the support o f the peasantry; its leaders did not have an agrarian program. Most o f the partici­ pants - artisans, merchants, teachers, and students - were from the middle classes o f the towns and villages. The leaders came mostly from prosperous families. Once the revolt started, the majority o f the population wanted noth­ ing to do with it. As one writer describes the reaction: Not pitched battles, but paralyzed ignorance, treachery, flight, mu­ tual invective, and desperate dreams o f saving the situation domi­ nated the Bulgarian cause in this one-sided affair. Bulgarian initia­ tive, such as it was, almost immediately passed into the hands o f conservative members o f the community. These elements disavowed the rebels and denied that the Bulgarians had rebellion in their hearts.3 Despite its failure, the revolt was to become a major issue in European diplomacy because o f the atrocities committed in its suppression. The Otto­ man government at the time was hard pressed to deal with the problems facing it. The rebellion in the western Balkans was continuing. The empire had few regular troops on the scene and therefore used irregulars, called bashi bozuks, and Circassians to deal with the revolt. At the beginning the uprising had been accompanied by a massacre o f Muslim civilians. In reply, the Ot­ toman irregulars used methods o f the utmost violence. The figures on the number killed differ according to the source. The Bulgarian estimates range from 30,000 to ioo,ooo; the Ottoman government admitted to over 3, 0 0 0 . 3 Thomas A. Meininger, “The Response of the Bulgarian People to the April Uprising, Southeastern Europe 4 , no. 2 (1977) :26o.

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 T he best estimates are probably the British and Am erican, which are between 12,0 00 and 15,000. T h e responsibility for the reprisals rests prim arily on the O ttom an irregular forces and the Circassians, w h o were recent arrivals in the country and w ho had themselves undergone a tragic fate. A fter the Russian conquest o f the Caucasus, a policy o f com pulsory resettlement had been adopted. Forced to leave their hom eland, the m ajority o f the people had em igrated to the O tto­ man Em pire. Th e governm ent attempted to settle about 10 0 ,0 0 0 to 250,000 in Bulgaria. Integrating such a large grou p into a population that numbered under 4 m illion was difficult. T h ey were not well received, and they lived in m iserable conditions. In other w ords, m any o f the excesses were the acts o f people w h o were themselves victims o f atrocious treatment. B y June the revolution had been com pletely suppressed. T he Bulgarian question w ou ld henceforth be handled by the great powers. It w ill be noted that the revolutionary activities just described were organized and carried through on Bulgarian initiative alone, w ith some help from individual R o ­ manians. N either the Russian governm ent nor the Panslav committees had been involved, although many European diplom ats laid the direct responsi­ bility on the Russian organizations. T he future o f Bulgaria was discussed in the genera] negotiations carried on am ong the powers in 1876—1877, which had as their m ajor problem a solution to the crisis that had arisen w ith the revolt in B osnia and H ercegovina. T he principal achievement o f the A pril U p risin g was that it forced the European governm ents to deal w ith condi­ tions in the Bulgarian lands, as well as in the western Balkans.

BOSNIA AND H ERCEG O VIN A In dealing w ith Bosnia and H ercegovina in the nineteenth century, the O t­ tom an governm ent encountered many o f the problems that were present in the previous period. C onstituting about a third o f the population, the M us­ lim element continued to dom inate the region. The great m ajority o f this grou p, it w ill be remem bered, were Slavic in background and Serbo-Croatian in speech. O ther M uslim s o f various ethnic origins had com e to Bosnia as janissaries, sipahis, governm ent officials, o r refugees from H ungarian lands that had passed under H ab sbu rg control. Since many o f these men, par­ ticularly the janissaries and captains, w ere trained fighters, the central govern­ ment had great difficulty in enforcing its desires on the provincial govern­ ment. In the eighteenth century the Bosnian military elements had been in frequent conflict with the central government and occasionally with each other, and they w ere involved in the affairs o f M ontenegro and Albania. T h is con­ dition was to continue until the middle o f the nineteenth century. D espite the M uslim control o f Bosnia, the Porte had been unable to rely on the region for support against its adversaries. A t the time o f the Serbian revolt the Ottoman government had not received effective aid until 1813, when

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 Ali Pasha Derendelia was vezir. Soon thereafter a janissary uprising took place in Sarajevo. Although another governor, Ali CeMeddin Pasha, achieved some successes against these rebels, the Porte was not in a position to move effec­ tively against them until 1829, after the Russo-Turkish War. Mahmud’s aboli­ tion o f the janissaries was naturally strongly resisted. The opposition became fully organized in 1831 when it was realized that the sultan really intended to implement the military reforms. The formation o f a modern army struck direcdy at the privileges and position o f the Bosnian military men. The Mus­ lim landholders and the military joined together under a leader named Hiisein, a captain. Their political program strongly resembled that put forward by the Christians in other parts o f the Balkans. They demanded autonomy for Bosnia and Hercegovina with an elected native ruler. They were willing to recognize the suzerainty o f the sultan and to pay tribute. Husein was in touch with Mustafa Pasha Bushati o f Shkoder, who was similarly resisting Ottoman central control. The Bosnian forces were on their way to join with Mustafa when the Albanians were defeated by an Ottoman army under the leadership o f Mehmed Reshid Pasha. Meeting with Husein, Mehmed Reshid assured him that his demands would be met and that he could be vezir o f Bosnia. When Husein returned home, he was faced by an uprising against his authority led by Ali Rizvanbegovic and Smail Aga 6engic, both from Hercegovina. The Ottoman forces backed these men, and together they de­ feated Husein. Hercegovina was at this point separated from Bosnia and placed as a re­ ward under the rule o f Ali Rizvanbegovic. In 1834 a new administrative sys­ tem was introduced into Bosnia; the province was divided into six sanjaks, 4 2 nahiyes, and many more communes. Officials appointed by the Porte were placed in charge o f the major districts. In 1845 provincial councils were set up. All o f these centralizing measures were strongly opposed by the local Muslim leaders. During the vezirate o f Tapir Pasha, from 1847 to 1850, they again organized and rebelled against the central authority. The Ottoman gov­ ernment sent their best general, Omer Pasha Latas, to subdue the uprising. A Serbian convert from Lika, Omer Pasha had been in command o f the Ottoman army o f occupation in Wallachia in 1848 and 1849, and he had sub­ sequently crushed a rebellion in the Vidin area. He arrived in Bosnia in 1850 with a strong army. He not only defeated the Bosnian rebels, but moved against Ali Rizvanbegovic, who had also attempted to rule independendy. By 1851 the Ottoman government was in full military control o f both Bosnia and Hercegovina. About six thousand had been killed in the suppression o f the Muslim defiance o f central control. Omer Pasha then turned to improving the conditions in the region. New administrative divisions were drawn with a military commander at the head o f each. In 1853 Omer launched an attack on Montenegro, but Austrian intervention with the Porte resulted in his re­ call and the end o f what had been a highly successful campaign. Events in this period in Bosnia, Hercegovina, Montenegro, and the Alba­ 349

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 nian lands w ere closely interwoven. In all o f these regions the attempts o f the Porte to centralize the governm ent and to assert its direct authority over its lands were greatly resented by the local notables. M ontenegro, as w e have seen, was able to resist the O ttom an forces. T he M uslim s o f Bosnia, H erce­ govina, and Albania, where local rebellion was crushed, were becom ing in­ creasingly disillusioned w ith the O ttom an governm ent. T he centralizing re­ form s cut direcdy into their privileges and seemed to offer no com pensating benefits. Influential M uslim s throughout the em pire objected to the increas­ ing influence o f the Christian great powers in Constantinople. Stron g resent­ ment remained directed against the changes that had been made in the ad­ m inistration and the m ilitary system. Similarly, the continued efforts made to reform the tax system and to aid the peasant struck at the interests o f M uslim leadership. N o t surprisingly therefore, during the Crim ean War the central governm ent received only minimal assistance from Bosnia. D espite this opposition from the strongest element in Bosnian society, the Porte pressed the reform program . In the sixties, during the administration o f Topal O sm an Pasha, an effort was m ade at further internal improvements. Schools and roads w ere built; a railroad running from Banja Lu ka to N o vi began operation in 1872. Nevertheless, Bosnia and H ercegovina remained am ong the m ost backward areas o f the peninsula. T h e M uslim landholding nobility and the military represented, o f course, only a m inority o f the inhabitants, both Christian and M uslim . L argely ex­ cluded from political influence, the Christian population has been estimated at about 43 percent O rthodox or Serb and 22 percent Catholic o r C roat. Since B osnia was a border region, both groups had connections across the fron­ tiers. T he C roats were well aware o f events in Zagreb. Som e were acquainted w ith the supporters o f the Illyrian program , w ith its espousal o f cooperation between Serbs and Croats. T he Franciscan order, the predom inant Catholic institution in Bosnia, had a great deal o f influence upon the C roatian society. T h e O rthodox hold on the Serbian population was, o f course, equally strong. A s w e have seen, both Bosnia and H ercegovina were am ong the first o b ­ jectives o f the Serbian national program . Should they be acquired, together with the Sanjak o f N o vi Pazar and the lands o f O ld Serbia, a com pact Serbian state o f a respectable territorial extent w ou ld be established. F rom the 1840s the Serbian leaders directed their attention westward. T h ey assumed that the M uslim population was Serbian in ethnic background despite the religious difference, and they thus saw Bosnia and H ercegovina as Serbian national lands. T h e M ontenegrin rulers were w illing to cooperate. M ontenegro kept its ow n territorial objectives, in particular access to the sea and an extension o f the frontiers into H ercegovinian and Albanian lands, but the leaders felt that they were Serbs and they supported Serbian national objectives. D uring the reign o f M ichael, under GaraSanin’s direction, agents were sent into B os­ nia and H ercegovin a to establish a netw ork o f organizations that w ould sup· port the Serbian cause.

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 The Serbian program , it is important to note, was national, not social. GaraSanin’s agents sought the unification o f the provinces w ith Serbia, and they did n o t advocate radical agrarian reform. Yet this issue was the predom ­ inant one in the lives o f the m ajority o f the people. Peasant conditions, de­ spite the reform s, remained bad. C onstituting 90 percent o f the population, the peasantry, both Christian and M uslim , were subject to heavy obligations. Th e fact that the landowners were o f the same national background and lan­ guage as those w h o w orked their estates did nothing to im prove matters. T h ro u gh o u t the century there were constant peasant uprisings caused by the bad agrarian conditions, but they were directed against local abuses, not against the central governm ent. T he situation was made w orse by the Porte’s diffi­ culty in con trolling the begs and agas w h o retained their local social and econom ic privileges even after the central administration was in the hands o f officials appointed from Constantinople. Agrarian relationships had changed litde since the eighteenth century. There were still tw o principal types o f estates, the agaliks and the begliks. O n the first the peasants had certain rights to use the land; in 1859 these were guar­ anteed by law. T he begliks, in contrast, were the full property o f the landlord. The peasant w orked the land on terms agreed upon w ith the owner. H e paid a large percentage o f his produce to the beg, and he ow ed labor dues. The peasants objected principally to the conditions o f landholding on the agaliks and the labor obligations on the begliks. T h ey were also injured by the high state taxes and the abuses o f tax farm ing.4 A s part o f the reform program the Porte tried to do som ething to alleviate the position o f the Bosnian peasant. A fter 1851, w ith the rebellion crushed and its authority reestablished, the O t­ toman governm ent could take some measures. In 1858 the land was registered and classified. T h e next year the agaliks were recognized as the property o f their holders, but the state guaranteed certain rights on them fo r the peas­ ants. N eith er the peasants nor the begs and agas liked these regulations. Th ey were alm ost impossible to enforce, and they did not offer adequate protec­ tion for the peasant. T he M uslim landholders naturally made every effort to turn the agaliks into begliks and thus avoid state interference. T h e agrarian conditions w ithin the O ttom an Em pire had by the 1870s be­ come the concern o f the great powers. T h eir consuls throughout the Balkans reported regularly on these questions. Peasant groups also sent petitions con­ cerning their grievances not only to the Porte, but to the foreign represen­ tatives. A n y m ajor rebellion w ould necessarily be a matter o f European inter­ est. In the Treaty o f Paris o f i8j6 the European powers had declared themselves to be guarantors and protectors Qf the Christians, although what this meant had never been clearly defined T h ey did, however, have some rights o f inter­ 4 For the agrarian conditions in B. >sn;a ant[ Hercegovina see Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Pol­ itics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 96-107.

351

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 vention in favor o f the Balkan Christians i f extremely dangerous o r atrocious conditions arose. In the summer o f 1875 a revolt broke out in H ercegovina and rapidly spread into Bosnia. T he basic cause was the agrarian situation and the strained relations between the peasants and the landholders, both o f w h om , it w ill be remembered, were usually South Slavic in language and ethnic background, although they differed in religion. T h e m ovem ent was thus prim arily social and econom ic, not national, in nature. T he rebels were in a very strong position. T h ey were backed by the armed m ountain tribes inhabiting lands adjacent to M ontenegro, w h o were experienced fighters, and aid was received from Dalmatia. Th e Porte was thus called upon to sup­ press a rebellion in a region where previously it had found military operations costly and impractical. This event was to reopen the Eastern Q uestion and to lead to another Russo-Turkish War. T H E C R I S I S OF 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 7 8

Although the Balkan lands continued to be a center o f great-power concern, no major conflict erupted in the twenty years after 1856. The unification o f the Principalities, followed by the accession o f a foreign prince, and the re­ volts in Crete were settled by diplomatic means. One other major alteration occurred in the balance o f forces in the region. During the Franco-Prussian War, which broke out in the summer o f 1870, Russia adopted a policy o f benevolent neutrality in favor o f Prussia. When it became clear that this latter power would make enormous gains, the question o f compensation for Russia arose. The objective was clear. Ever since the signing o f the humiliating Treaty o f Paris, the first goal o f Russian foreign policy had been to break the terms o f this peace, in particular the clauses pertaining to the neutralization o f the Black Sea and the cession o f southern Bessarabia. The opportunity had now arisen when positive action could be taken. At the end o f October the Rus­ sian foreign minister, Alexander M. Gorchakov, denounced the Black Sea provisions in a circular note to the powers. His action caused particular con­ sternation in London because this limitation had been the major British achievement in the Crimean War. Nevertheless, a conference o f the signatory powers o f the treaty was held in London. They accepted the Russian action, and some alterations were made in the conditions surrounding the closure of the Straits. The Russian government was thus freed from the treaty restrictions pre­ venting it from fortifying its southern coast and maintaining a Black Sea fleet. Although very few measures were taken in this direction, a major block to Russian action in the Balkans had been removed. The Russian leaders, how­ ever, had no intention o f adopting adventurous policies. Instead, after the unification o f Germany, they supported the rebuilding o f the conservative alliance with Vienna and Berlin whose chief purpose was the preservation o f the status quo. The new alignment, known as the Three Emperors’ Alliance 352

War and, revolution, 18S6-1887 (Dreikaiserbund), was based not on signed agreements, but rather on the close relations that were maintained among the three monarchs, Alexander II, Franz Joseph, and William I, and the frequent consultations o f their min­ isters. The rulers exchanged visits, discussed questions o f current importance, and cooperated in international affairs. As long as these three powers re­ mained united, they formed the most powerful diplomatic combination in the world. In the past the danger spot in the relations o f these states had always been the N ear East, because o f the often contradictory interests o f Russia and the H ab sbu rg Em pire. Austrian fears o f Russian predominance in the Balkans were never laid at rest. T he rebellions in Bosnia and H ercegovina produced exacdy the type o f situation that had caused conflict in the past. M oreover, influences w ere at w ork w ithin Russia that could lead to friction between the tw o pow ers. A lth ou gh both G orchakov and the tsar, as well as m ost o f their principal advisers, w ere in favor o f continuing a policy o f retrenchment in foreign affairs, other elements in Russian society were arguing fo r m ore pos­ itive action. Alexander II always allowed much divergence o f opinion am ong his ministers, and he consulted different advisers on foreign policy matters. G orchakov was in his late seventies and was often sick. T he governm ent was thus open to the pressure exerted upon it by the adherents o f the Panslav doctrines, w hich had w on increasing popularity after the Crim ean War. T h e Panslavs had no single program o r spokesman. In general, they stood for the rem oval o f all the Slavic people from foreign, that is, O ttom an or H absburg, rule and their organization into a federation o f states in which Russia w o u ld take the leading role. T h eir emphasis was on the O rthodox Slavs: the Serbs, Bulgarians, and M ontenegrins. T h ey certainly did not stand for the liberation o f Polish territory from Russian rule; in fact, they regarded the C atholic Poles w ith extreme distrust and as traitors to their fellow Slavs. In foreign relations they tended to be more anti-Habsburg than anti-Ottoman. There was much talk about the road to Constantinople leading through V i­ enna. T h e central organization for the m ovem ent was the Slavic Benevolent Society, w hich was founded in 1858 in M oscow, w ith branches established later in other cities. It was this grou p that brought hundreds o f Bulgarian and other Slavic students to study in Russia. T he Panslavs had at their service a number o f talented publicists and journalists, including Ivan Aksakov, M . N. K atkov, R . A . Fadeev, and N . I. Danilevsky. It is im portant to note that although they w ere proponents o f radical action abroad, they were strongly conservative in dom estic politics. Thus they fully supported Russian autoc­ racy. Th e Panslav ideas offered a great attraction to large elements o f Russian society in the 1870s. Russia had been defeated in a m ajor European conflict; the great reform s w ere not achieving their expected goals. A united Germ any had been created, and although it was at present an ally, the unification marked a resurgence o f Germ an power. T he Panslav program offered a plan fo r R u s­

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 sian and Slavic greatness in a period o f apparent national weakness, and its doctrines attracted a large num ber o f highly influential people. B oth the em ­ press and the heir to the throne, the future Alexander III, w ere to have a part in the movement. Ignatiev, the ambassador at Constantinople, was a Panslav, but, as w e have seen, he was prim arily interested in using the Slavic people for Russian aims. Panslavism was in fact a fad; its influence in foreign policy was not long-lasting. H ow ever, a protracted period o f crisis that arose in the Balkans allowed its proponents to play an influential role in the form ation o f foreign policy. W hen the O ttom an Em pire was unable to suppress the uprising in Bosnia and H ercegovina, the members o f the Three Em perors’ Alliance consulted. A t this time the Russian governm ent recognized the priority o f the H ab s­ burg interests, because o f the geographic location o f the rebellion, and the lead in the negotiations was taken by the H absbu rg foreign minister, G yula Andrassy. In D ecem ber 1875 the three powers offered a reform proposal, the A ndrassy N o te, as a basis o f settlement. T he terms were accepted by the Porte, but refused by the insurgents. In M ay 1876 another program , the B er­ lin M em orandum , was form ulated, but it was rejected by the O ttom an g o v ­ ernment. B y this time the crisis had intensified, w ith the outbreak o f the Bulgarian revolt and the subsequent massacres. M eanw hile, political conditions had deteriorated in Constantinople. A com bination o f conservatives, w h o wished to return to old w ays, and liberals, w h o wanted to advance tow ard representative institutions, overthrew A bdul A ziz at the end o f May. M urad V then came to the throne. M entally impaired by the events surrounding him , the new sultan was never able to assume the duties o f his office. T he O ttom an governm ent was thus in a state o f confusion until A ugust, when the stronger and m ore determined A bdul H am id II came to power. D u rin g this period o f O ttom an weakness, conditions in the B al­ kans worsened. W ith the continuation o f the revolt and the increasing inter­ vention o f the great powers, the Montenegrin and Serbian governments found themselves under great pressure to take advantage o f the situation. In the past M ontenegro had been deeply involved in the affairs o f the neighboring lands. T he governm ent had designs on H ercegovinian territory and wanted to acquire an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. N egotiations had, as we have seen, been carried on w ith Serbia, particularly during the reign o f Prince M ichael O brenovic. A fter his death, the Serbian governm ent had adopted a more passive attitude and had shown less interest in national expansion. Milan was still you ng; foreign policy was under the direction o f Jo van Ristic, who was not in favor o f bellicose policies. D espite the lack o f official involvem ent, various groups continued the w ork o f national organization and propaganda. Th is was still an age o f romantic nationalism and revolutionary ardor. D uring the sum m er o f 1875 there was naturally great pressure on both M ilan and Prince N icholas o f M ontenegro to support the insurgents and to exploit the O ttom an weakness. Nicholas was quite w illing to take strong action, but

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 Milan hesitated. The elections had returned a majority that favored military action, but the prince recognized that the country was not ready for war. Moreover, all o f the powers, including Russia, were urging restraint. A lth ough official Russia was thus attem pting to prevent Serbia and M o n ­ tenegro from m oving, support for an opposite course o f action came from the Panslav circles w h o had actively involved themselves in the affair. M on ey and volunteers poured into the area. In M ay 1876 General M . G . Cherniaev, w h o had been responsible for the great Russian victories in Central Asia, arrived in Belgrade to take com m and o f the M orava section o f the Serbian army. T h e com bination o f Serbian public pressure and Panslav enthusiasm was too strong fo r M ilan. In Ju ly both Serbia and M ontenegro were at w ar with the Porte. Th e belligerents hoped that another uprising w ould occur in Bulgaria and that help w ould come from the insurgents in Bosnia and H e r­ cegovina. Nevertheless, the correctness o f M ilan’s judgm ent o n the unpre­ paredness o f his forces was soon demonstrated. T h e M ontenegrin arm y was quite successful, but Serbia faced disaster. C hem iaev proved a poor com ­ mander in this situation. There w ere few trained soldiers am ong the five thousand Russian volunteers, and they became the cause o f friction and con­ troversy. In contrast, the O ttom an army, strengthened by the reform s and w ith better equipm ent, was able to w in a series o f victories. W hen in O ctober the road to Belgrade had been opened, the Russian governm ent intervened, forcing the Porte to make an armistice at the beginning o f Novem ber.

During this period the representatives o f the Three Emperors’ Alliance kept in close touch. After the commencement o f the Balkan conflict, Gor­ chakov and Andrässy met in July in Reichstadt. Here they came to an under­ standing concerning their mutual interests in the crisis. Although there were to be important differences between the Austrian and the Russian version o f the decisions reached, the statesmen agreed on a policy o f cooperation and settled certain questions in connection with the war that was in progress. They decided that, should the Ottoman Empire win, the territorial status quo ante should be preserved. If, however, the Balkan states were victorious, a partition o f the Ottoman possessions would be undertaken, but no large Slavic state would be created. Montenegro and Serbia would receive exten­ sions o f territory; Greece would be given Thessaly and Crete. The remaining Ottoman lands would be divided into three autonomous states - Bulgaria, Rumelia, and Albania - whose territorial extent was not specified. Constan­ tinople was to become a free city. The two diplomats also provided for re­ wards for themselves. Russia was to receive back southern Bessarabia and an extension o f the Russian boundary in the Caucasus area; Austria-Hungary was to obtain compensation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. It was on this point that the two governments were later to disagree on what had been decided at Reichstadt. The Habsburg representatives later were to claim the right to annex or to determine the fate o f almost the entire area o f the two provinces; the Russian government, in contrast, asserted that only “ Turkish Croatia,” a 355

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 small area in northwest Bosnia adjacent to Dalmatia, had been assigned to Vienna. In any case, it was agreed that Serbia was not to gain its principal territorial objective. W hen it became clear that the tw o Balkan states w ou ld be defeated, and when the full extent o f the massacres in Bulgaria became known, a very strong public reaction against the O ttom an Em pire occurred in both Britain and Russia, which was to affect the attitudes o f both governm ents. In London the conservative cabinet o f Benjam in Disraeli found its policy o f supporting the O ttom an governm ent severely hampered. E ven m ore im portant, the Russian statesmen faced strong pressure from the Panslavs and those ele­ ments o f Russian society w h o felt that support should be given to the O rtho­ dox Slavic people in their struggle against O ttom an control. Serious prepa­ rations fo r w ar were com menced, but the responsible Russian statesmen still sought a peaceful solution. In an effort to achieve a settlement, representa­ tives o f all o f the great powers met in Constantinople in D ecem ber 1876. H ere they drew up proposals and presented them to the Porte. T h e O ttom an g o v­ ernment, however, took the occasion to issue a constitution, which it claimed gave full equality to all o f the O ttom an citizens and made the intervention o f the powers needless. T he European suggestions were thus rejected, and the conference broke up. D espite this failure, further efforts to settle the crisis through diplom acy continued from January to A pril 1877. With the failure o f these negotiations, the Russian leaders had to face the probability o f war. T h eir m ajor fear was that the events o f the Crim ean War m ight be repeated, and they m ight find themselves fighting a European coa­ lition. A ustria-H ungary and Britain caused the m ost concern. U n d er these circumstances it was considered essential that H absburg neutrality be as­ sured. In January and M arch 1877 further agreements were made that achieved this aim and reaffirmed the general partition arrangements o f Reichstadt. A t the same time an agreement on the passage o f troops was discussed with the Rom anian governm ent. Since a peaceful settlement seemed hopeless, the tsar in A p ril reluctandy came to the conclusion that w ar could not be avoided. O n A pril 16 the convention with Rom ania was signed; on A pril 24 the R u s­ sian troops crossed the Pruth River.

The Russian statesmen had wished to avoid a war because o f both their uncertainty over the reaction o f the other powers and their lack o f confidence in their own military capabilities. The reforms begun in the 1860s had not been completed, and the Black Sea defenses were not in readiness. During the war the Ottoman navy commanded the Black Sea. The Russian leaders fully realized the great financial burdens which a war would entail and for which they were not prepared. The difficulties o f the war justified many o f their previous apprehensions. After passing through Romania, the army 1° June crossed the Danube and thereafter won a series o f quick victories. Bul­ garian volunteer units joined the Russian troops. In July, however, the adv-

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 vance w as stopped at Pleven (Plevna), and the O ttom an arm y succeeded in holding this city until December. With this serious check, it became clear that the w ar w ou ld not be w o n quickly. In this situation the attitude o f the Balkan states became im portant. A t the beginning o f the campaign the Russian lead­ ers had shunned their assistance, looking upon their participation as a nui­ sance and a hindrance. The Balkan governments also wanted arms and money, w hich the Russians could not easily provide. H ow ever, w ith the failure o f Russia’s first offensive, assistance from the Rom anian, Serbian, and Greek armies took on another aspect. Each o f these governm ents, facing a decision about entering the war, found it under the circumstances not an easy one to make. M ontenegro w as still technically at w ar w ith the Porte; Serbia had made peace in M arch ; Greece was neutral. T he R om anian position was per­ haps the m ost com plicated. A lth ough the Rom anian governm ent had signed the agreement concern­ ing Russian passage, it had not imm ediately entered the war. In fact, the entire diplom atic situation caused great uneasiness in Bucharest. T he R o ­ manian leaders w ere concerned that the presence o f the Russian army in the country w ou ld lead to a return o f the conditions o f the protectorate. T h ey also, w ith justification, feared that Russia w ould take back southern Bessa­ rabia. To protect themselves against the possibilities, they had insisted that the treaty on troop passage contain assurances about R om anian “ territorial integrity and political rights.” O nce the hostilities com menced it was difficult for the Rom anian governm ent to remain passive, since nationalist public opinion pressed fo r action. O n M ay 21 the senate and the cham ber passed a resolution declaring the independence o f the country, which the prince signed the next day. N o great pow er recognized this act; it was chiefly significant for dom estic politics. Rom anian policy was being decided at this time principally by Charles, in cooperation w ith the Liberal statesmen Ion Bratianu and M ihail Kogalniceanu. T h e prince, in particular, disliked Rom anian neutrality. H e w ished to exploit the situation to make positive gains fo r his country. W hen after the Pleven defeat the Russian governm ent requested Rom anian participation, he was eager to agree, particularly when he was offered the com m and o f the operations around this beleaguered city. Rom anian troops thus w ent into action at Pleven and in the Vidin-Belgradchik area. Th e Serbian decision was m ore difficult. T he country was exhausted by the previous war. T he governm ent was also apprehensive about the territorial settlement that m ight follow the conflict. A t the Constantinople conference the powers had agreed on the establishment o f tw o autonom ous Bulgarian states, w ith the line o f division running from north to south. Areas claimed by Serbia, such as N i3 and Skopje, had been assigned to Bulgarian authority. The Serbian leaders thus wanted both assurances on what they w ould receive at the peace and financial assistance before they w ould com m it their country

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 to war. A lth ou gh they never received satisfactory assurances, they did enter the w ar on D ecem ber 13, after the fall o f Pleven. T h ey feared that i f Serbia did not fight, its claims w ou ld be ignored at the peace conference. T h e G reek governm ent w as, i f anything, in a w orse position than the other tw o states. O n the one hand, an opportunity had apparently arisen to gain m ore territory; on the other, the British governm ent exerted constant pres­ sure to prevent a G reek action. Even m ore dangerous, the Russian support w ould clearly be given to the Balkan Slavs, the Bulgarians in particular. Like the H absbu rg, British, and Rom anian governm ents, the G reek leaders o p ­ posed the creation o f large Slavic states. T h ey had been jolted by the deci­ sions o f the Constantinople conference, w hich had included territories they considered ethnically G reek in the Bulgarian provinces. T he ardent nation­ alists were convinced that M acedonia, Epirus, Thessaly, and Thrace w ere sol­ idly Greek in population. The question whether to enter the war or not caused a split in the governm ent, which was also under pressure from a public en­ thusiastic fo r war. Finally, in early February 1878, G reek troops crossed into O ttom an territory. W hen it was learned that an armistice had been signed between R ussia and the O ttom an Em pire on January 31, this arm y had to w ithdraw back behind its ow n borders. T h e victory had not been easy for the Russian forces to achieve. T h e ad­ vance had been stalled at Pleven until Decem ber, when the city was finally taken. Thereafter, the army had m oved sw iftly tow ard Constantinople. Fac­ in g a m ilitary disaster, the O ttom an governm ent asked fo r peace, and on January 31 the armistice was concluded at Adrianople. O ttom an and Russian representatives then negotiated a treaty, which was signed at San Stefano on M arch 3. A lth ough assurances were given that this agreement was “ prelim i­ nary” and that the terms involving a change in European treaties w ou ld sub­ sequently be reviewed by the powers, it caused consternation in the E u ro ­ pean capitals. T h e San Stefano settlement threatened to upset gravely the balance o f pow er in the N ear East, and it led to a protracted crisis. T h e negotiations had been conducted chiefly by Ignatiev, and the terms reflected his concern for Russian interests. F o r the great powers the most disturbing sections o f the agreement w ere those calling fo r the creation o f a large Bulgarian state w hose territories w ould include lands north and south o f the Balkan M ountains, M acedonia, and a large section o f Thrace (see M ap 24). It could be assumed that this state w ould be a Russian satellite. The treaty provided fo r a two-year occupation by the Russian army and Russian participation in the organization o f the governm ent o f the new autonom ous state. Th e geographical extent o f the country, together w ith the Russian m il­ itary occupation, w ould have placed Constantinople under a permanent threat from the north. W ith full control o f M acedonia, Bulgaria w ould also be the strongest Balkan power. O ther provisions o f the treaty were also disturbing. M ontenegro received a huge increase in territory; in fact, that state m ore than tripled in size. In

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Map 24. The Treaty o f San Stefano; the Treaty o f Berlin contrast, Serbia received only about 150 square miles o f additional territory, much less than that assigned to M ontenegro. Rom ania received even worse treatment. D espite the fact that the state had joined in the w ar and thus had becom e a Russian ally, the treaty required that southern Bessarabia be surren­ dered in return fo r the D anube Delta and D obrudja. Greece and AustriaH u n g ary received nothing. D espite the secret treaties, the H absbu rg interest in B osnia and H ercegovina was not given recognition, and a large Slavic state had certainly been created. T h e agreem ent was chiefly detrimental to British and H absburg interests; both pow ers protested strongly. A British fleet entered the Straits. T h e R o ­ manian, Greek, and Serbian governments also made their dissatisfaction clear. T h e Serbian position was particularly difficult. It was obvious that Russian patronage w ou ld henceforth be placed exclusively behind Bulgarian national aims. In fact, the Russian governm ent told the Serbian representatives that they should look to Vienna for support. T h e Rom anian governm ent refused to accept the surrender o f Bessarabia and appealed to the other governments. A period o f extreme tension lasted through the spring months. Facing this opposition and fearful that it m ight have to deal w ith a situa­ tion sim ilar to the Crim ean War, the Russian governm ent backed dow n. In M ay it made an agreement w ith Britain w hose ch ief provisions included the division o f the large Bulgarian state. A ustria-H ungary was given assurances that its desires w ould be taken into consideration in relation to Bosnia and H ercegovina. In addition, R ussia agreed to attend a European conference that w o u ld take place in Berlin under the chairmanship o f the Germ an chan­ 359

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 cellor, O tto von Bism arck. Since the discussions w ould involve changes in existing European treaties, all o f the great powers - Russia, Britain, France, Germ any, Italy, A ustria-H ungary, and the O ttom an Em pire - w ere invited. There w as to be no participation by the Balkan states, although their govern­ ments w ere allow ed to send representatives to present their views at the ses­ sions that concerned their interests. T h eir opinions, in fact, were to have little, i f any, effect on the proceedings. T h e C ongress o f Berlin opened on June 13, 1878, and lasted a m onth. Its principal achievement was a partitioning o f a large part o f the O ttom an E m ­ pire, w hich lost control over m any o f its remaining Balkan possessions (see M ap 24). T h e large Bulgarian state was divided into three sections: Bulgaria, including the area to the north o f the Balkan M ountains together w ith the Sofia region, was to becom e an autonom ous tributary principality; Eastern Rum elia, the land between the Balkan and the Rhodope m ountains, received a sem iautonom ous status w ith an O ttom an appointed Christian governor and w as placed under great-pow er supervision; M acedonia and Thrace were returned to direct O ttom an rule. It was assumed that Russia w ould be the predom inant pow er in the autonom ous principality. To balance this Russian gain, A ustria-H ungary received the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and H ercegovina. In addition, the m onarchy w as allowed to occupy the Sanjak o f N o vi Pazar, a strip o f territory separating Serbia and M ontenegro. This territorial arrangem ent was the principal bargain o f the conference. A s a re­ sult, Russia gained a strong position in the eastern h alf o f the peninsula, with the H ab sbu rg E m pire assum ing a similar position o f dom inance in the west, including a m ajor influence in Serbia. F rom the point o f view o f the Balkan states, the results o f the conference were very disappointing. R om ania, M ontenegro, and Serbia were recognized as independent. M ontenegro obtained a port on the A driatic, but not as m uch territory as it wished. Serbia received only some additional land. A l­ though G reek claims were still not met, Article X X IV o f the treaty provided that the G reek governm ent should enter into negotiations w ith the Porte; should the tw o states not com e to an agreement on a territorial settlement, the great pow ers w ou ld mediate the dispute. D espite the protests o f the R o ­ m anian representatives at the conference, their governm ent was still required to surrender southern Bessarabia and to take in return the D anube D elta and Dobrudja. The recognition o f Romanian independence was attached to changes in the status o f the Jew s in the state, conditions that were strongly resented in Bucharest. Therefore, although all o f the Balkan governm ents received some com pensation, the treaty in no w ay met their aspirations. Th e m ajor losses w ere suffered, o f course, by the O ttom an Em pire. In addition to the lands that went to the Balkan states, the Porte had to cede even m ore im portant areas to the great powers. Russia, besides southern Bessarabia, acquired Batum , K ars, and Ardahan. Even before the Berlin con­ ference opened, Britain had com pelled the O ttom an governm ent to surren-

War and revolution, 1856-1887 der control o f the island o f C yprus, a m ajority o f w hose inhabitants were Greek. T h e greatest O ttom an resentment, however, was felt over the H ab s­ burg occupation o f Bosnia, H ercegovina, and the Sanjak. T he m onarchy had not defeated the Porte in a war, and the demand was totally unexpected. Th is settlement marked the effective end o f O ttom an pow er in the Balkan peninsula. A lth ough A lbania, M acedonia, as well as Thessaly and Epirus until 1881, w ere still under O ttom an administration, they could be held only with difficulty. A n A lbanian national m ovem ent had already taken shape. Both Bulgarian states, together w ith Bosnia, H ercegovina, and the Sanjak o f N o vi Pazar, were still technically a part o f the em pire, but the governm ent held no illusions that they w ould ever be returned to full O ttom an control. T h e peace was also very unpopular in Russia. It appeared to many R u s­ sians that their country had fought a cosdy w ar and received very little for its efforts. M o re than that, the governm ent had been called to account by E u ­ rope and had been forced to agree to the partition o f the large Bulgarian state, the one great achievement. It appeared that the real victors were B rit­ ain and the H ab sbu rg M onarchy; they had gained C yprus and BosniaH ercegovina. A lth ough this judgm ent was certainly true in regard to Britain, w h o had indeed w on a great diplom atic victory, the H ab sbu rg gains were to become a heavy liability. T he occupation o f Bosnia and H ercegovina, w ith their Serb, C roat, and M uslim population, was sim ply to add another na­ tional problem to a state that was unable to handle the controversies it al­ ready had. W orld War I was to have its immediate origin in just these issues. T he closing o f the C ongress o f Berlin in Ju ly 1878 did not mark the end o f the territorial changes occasioned by the Russo-Turkish War. The Greek claims had to be discussed and new boundary lines drawn. M oreover, the frontiers o f M on ten egro and A lbania had still to be settled. T h e Albanians were now com pelled to organize to defend their national lands.

A L B A N I A : T H E L E A G U E OF P R I Z R E N Th e treaties o f San Stefano and Berlin both assigned Albanian-inhabited land to other states. Th e inability o f the Porte to protect the interests o f a region that was 70 percent M uslim and largely loyal forced the Albanian leaders not only to organize for their defense, but also to consider the establishment o f an autonom ous administration like those which Serbia and the D anubian Principalities had enjoyed. T he revolt o f the Albanians against both the greatpow er decisions and the O ttom an authority com pelled the Porte once again to take action against this refractory M uslim population. The Albanian lands had never been easy for the governm ent to control. A t the beginning o f the century there had been tw o great pashaliks, which often acted independently o f the central governm ent. A li Pasha o f Janina, it w ill be remem bered, alternated between cooperating w ith and defying Constanti­ nople; the Bushati fam ily in Shkoder adopted a similar position. A fter the

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 death in 1796 o f Kara M ahmud Bushati, w ho had resisted the Porte, his brother, Ibrahim Pasha, was appointed as his successor in the governorship. O pposed to the policies o f K ara M ahm ud, Ibrahim governed in cooperation w ith the Porte until his death in 1810. A fter a struggle over the governorship, M ustafa Pasha Bushati came to pow er in 1811. A lth ough he too proved recalcitrant in his attitude, the O ttom an governm ent did not m ove against him because o f its prim ary concern with A li Pasha. M ustafa was able to bring a large area under his control and to w ork w ith the mountain tribes. In 1820, it w ill be remembered, M ahm ud I decided to crush A li Pasha. H e first discharged him from his official posts and then sum m oned him to C o n ­ stantinople. W hen A li refused, he was sentenced to death and an arm y was sent to Janina. T he fact that the O ttom an governm ent chose to concentrate its strength against Janina allowed the G reek rebels the opportunity to gain their first victories in the Peloponnesus and Rum eli. A lth ough m ost o f A li’s local allies deserted him, he was able to put up a strong resistance from his fortress city. Finally, in January 1822, O ttom an agents had him assassinated and his head was sent to Constantinople. T h e O ttom an arm y was then free to deal w ith the G reek revolt. M ustafa Pasha supported the O ttom an military efforts against both A li Pasha and the G reek rebels. In 1826 he took part in the victory at M isolonghi. Thereafter, he resumed his independent stance, but the war with Russia in 1828-1829 prevented the Porte from m oving against this defiant vassal. In 1830, how ever, the sultan was again free to act. H e dispatched M ehm ed R eshid Pasha to Albania. H ere the O ttom an general invited the principal A lbanian M uslim leaders to meet w ith him in Bitola in A u gu st 1830. Despite the safe-conducts that had been given, he massacred about five hundred o f these men. The most prominent begs and agas were thus eliminated. Mehmed R eshid then turned to defeat M ustafa Pasha. H e, however, surrendered and spent the rest o f his life as an official in Constantinople. This decisive action by the central government ended the period o f almost seventy-five years when the Albanian lands had been controlled by local leaders. T h e Albanian pashaliks had not been representative o f a national movement. T h ey were based on the pow er and influence o f a strong leader, A li Pasha, and o f the Bushati family. T h eir loyalties and allegiances could shift radically. T h ey fought both w ith and against the O ttom an army; they could cooperate w ith o r fight their G reek and Slavic neighbors. W ith the region back under its control, the Porte was able to introduce some reforms. A lth ough the timars were abolished in 1832, this measure had little effect on the country. In m ost areas the large estates had already passed into the full possession o f individual landholders. Th e O ttom an state too held huge tracts o f land. T he system o f large estates w ith M uslim owners was to remain predom inant, especially in the central lowland areas. In the m oun­ tains the tribal system was still in effect. Because o f this situation the question o f land reform o r peasant rights was not to become a m ajor issue until after

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 World War I. R u ral conditions were bad. A t this time, as before, there was a great deal o f em igration. Large Albanian colonies existed in Rom ania, E gyp t, Bulgaria, the U nited States, and Constantinople; the settlements in southern Italy have already been mentioned. A lbanian opposition to the Tanzimat reform s was to be expected. Like the Bosnians, the Albanian M uslim notables resented officials im ported from Constantinople and preferred to be governed by their ow n begs. T h ey sim i­ larly disliked the military reform s and the establishment o f a m odern army based on recruitment. Albanian m ilitary men had always fought for the O t­ toman Em pire, but they wished to retain traditional procedures and to follow their ow n leaders into battle. In Albania as in Bosnia, the Porte could not secure m any soldiers for the Crim ean War. In fact, it was difficult for the governm ent to enforce any o f its decrees in this M uslim society. Attem pts to control the highland regions w ere abandoned. There the population contin­ ued to run its ow n affairs under its tribal leaders according to the local laws and customs. Nevertheless, despite this widespread opposition, administrative changes were accomplished. N ew regional divisions were made, but at no time were the A lbanian lands joined in a single political unit. In 1836 the region was divided into the eyalets o f Janina and Rum elia, with Bitola as the center. In the reform s o f 1865 three vilayets were created: Shkoder, Janina, and B itola; a fourth, K o so vo , was added later. A ll had large populations o f other nation­ alities. A lth ou gh the Porte had by this time gained much experience in deal­ ing w ith national problem s, it did not look upon the Albanians as presenting a difficulty o f this sort. Since they were M uslim s, they were regarded as O t­ tomans despite their distinctive language and past history. Indeed, up to this time there had been no national movement comparable to those which we have seen in other Balkan regions. Som e intellectuals had been aware o f the issue, but there was no central organization and no real national program . Th e negotiations am ong the powers in 1878 forced a radical change in the Albanian attitude. T h e Treaty o f San Stefano, which assigned Albanianinhabited territory to Serbia, M ontenegro, and the Bulgarian provinces, vir­ tually com pelled a defensive action. In the spring o f 1878 prom inent A lbani­ ans in Constantinople organized a secret committee. T he m ost im portant individual here was A bd u l Frasheri, w h o was to remain the leading figure in the early stages o f the Albanian national movement. In M ay this group de­ cided to call a general m eeting at Prizren that w ould be com posed o f repre­ sentatives from all o f the Albanian lands. Th e vital necessity o f the form ation o f a central authority and the organization o f an armed force was recognized. O n June 10 the conference opened at Prizren. It was attended by about eighty delegates from the four vilayets; the representatives were predom i­ nantly M uslim religious leaders, notables, and clan chiefs. T h ey decided to set up a permanent organization w ith its headquarters in Prizren; it was to be under the direction o f a central committee. A netw ork o f regional orga-

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 nizations in other areas o f the country w ould be subordinate to this authority. T he central committee w ould have the pow er to levy taxes and raise an army. D urin g the meetings a division o f opinion arose that was to be o f fundam en­ tal importance at this stage o f Albanian national development. Th e m ajor issue to be setded was the attitude to be taken toward the O ttom an govern­ ment. A t first the Porte gave support to the Albanian actions. It, however, wanted the representatives to declare themselves Ottom ans, not Albanians. Th ose w h o supported this position urged the new organization to emphasize its M uslim O ttom an com position and to direct its ch ief efforts tow ard de­ fending all M uslim lands, including Bosnia. A second group, under the lead­ ership o f Frasheri, stressed the unity o f all Albanians no m atter w hat their religion. These men wished to concentrate on the achievement o f predom i­ nantly Albanian goals and to seek to secure an autonom ous administration. Since m ost o f the delegates were conservative M uslim s, the conference in the end supported the maintenance o f O ttom an suzerainty. D espite these differences o f opinion, a central authority was established w ith a center at Prizren. Thereafter the League o f Prizren, o r the Albanian League, was to direct the efforts made to prevent the implementation o f the treaties. O ther centers also were established, o f which the best know n to the outside w orld was that at Shkoder. H ere Catholics and M uslim s w orked to­ gether. Prenk Bib D oda, a M irdite mountain captain, played a prominent role in events in this region. O ne o f the main tasks undertaken by the Prizren assembly was the dis­ patching o f a m em orandum to the C ongress o f Berlin. Th is appeal had no m ore effect on the great-pow er decisions than had those o f any other Balkan nationality. In the Berlin treaty M ontenegro was assigned the cities o f Bar (Antivari) and Podgorica, together w ith the districts o f G usinje and Plav, w hich the A lbanian leaders regarded as integral parts o f their ow n lands. T h ey w ere also concerned about the future territorial settlement w ith Greece. There was a strong internal reaction against the cessions to M ontenegro and against the Porte, w hich had not defended the Albanian regions. Centers o f resistance w ere established, in particular in the areas near the border, that is, Prizren and Shkoder in the north and Prevesa and Janina in the south. The Albanian defiance w as aided by the fact that able fighting men w ere available for action. Like M ontenegro, Albania had a large supply o f armed men w ho regarded m ilitary valor as the highest virtue. In A ugu st 1878, the powers, as provided for in the Treaty o f Berlin, set up a com m ission to delineate the Turkish-M ontenegrin border. T h ey expected the Porte to enforce the decisions upon the local population, despite the fact that the O ttom an forces in the region were not strong enough to do so. A lthough it made some efforts to implement the treaty provisions, the O t­ toman governm ent could only benefit from Albanian resistance. It gave the rebels arms, and it approved their collection o f taxes. In m any areas where

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W ar an d revolution, 1856-1887 the O ttom an forces were obligated to w ithdraw by the peace agreements, the Albanians sim ply took control after the Turkish evacuation. T h e A lbanian forces, nevertheless, had to be prepared to fight both the M ontenegrins and the O ttom an army. T h ey w ere very successful against M ontenegro. T h e Albanian reaction was so strong that the powers decided to switch the territories involved. Instead o f Gusinje and Plav, they gave M ontenegro the port o f U lcinj (D ulcigno). T he Albanians firmly resisted the surrender o f this city too. To force the transfer the European pow ers set up a naval blockade, and they pressed the O ttom an governm ent to act. M eanw hile, difficulties had arisen in the south. T he Treaty o f Berlin had directed Greece and the O ttom an Em pire to enter into negotiations. In these the Porte naturally wished to give up as little territory as possible. A t the same time A lbanian committees w ere organized at Prevesa and Janina. Th ey were w illing to accept a cession to Greece o f Thessaly, but not o f Epirus, w hich they claimed was Albanian. Once again O ttom an authorities sup­ ported the resistance and provided arms. In M ay 1881 the powers decided that only the relatively small A rta district o f Epirus should be given to Greece, which received also Thessaly. T he O ttom an governm ent at this point faced a difficult choice. It was un­ der strong pressure from the European powers to enforce the transfer o f Ulcinj to M ontenegro, and there w ere aspects o f the Albanian movement that could bring a challenge to the Porte’s authority in the region. A s w e have seen, m any A lbanian leaders, w ith a grow in g consciousness o f their ow n national individuality, supported a program calling for the unification o f the Albanian-inhabited lands into a single political unit w ith the capital at B itola; Albanian was to be the language o f governm ent and education. T h ey did not seek independence because they recognized that the country was too weak to stand alone. Th is attitude did not receive general acceptance. T h e division o f opinion was show n in a m eeting held by the League in July 1880 in Gjirokaster, w hich was attended by delegates from all the Albanian regions. H ere Frasheri presented the arguments fo r an autonom ous organization. A ccord­ ing to his plan, the Porte w ould appoint a governor fo r A lbania, tribute w ould be paid to the em pire, and support w ould be given in war, but oth­ erwise the country w ould administer its ow n affairs. A t this congress and at another held at D ib er in O ctober 1880, attended by about three hundred representatives, the conservative forces supporting a close union w ith the O ttom an E m pire were stronger than those favoring a truly autonom ous status. The entire m atter was to be settled by force. A lthough the Porte at first hesitated on the policy to follow, it finally determined, both from domestic and from international considerations, to suppress the League and deliver Ulcinj to M ontenegro. A large army under D ervish Pasha was sent to A l­ bania, where it received assistance from loyal Albanians. T he League at-

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 tem pted to resist, but in A pril 1881 Prizren was taken and the m ovem ent collapsed. T he resistance in U lcinj was similarly crushed. T he O ttom an offi­ cials did not take strong reprisals: T he leaders were arrested and som e were deported. Frasheri him self was captured, sentenced to death, and then to life im prisonm ent instead. H e was released in 1885, but remained in exile until his death in 1892. T h e O ttom an governm ent restored the centralized adm inistra­ tive system. Som e Albanians were named to official posts, but no other moves w ere made tow ard political autonomy. Since the m ajority o f the population was M uslim , the Porte continued to regard the Albanians prim arily as O tto ­ mans. D espite the final failure, the League o f Prizren had accom plished a great deal. B oth M ontenegro and Greece received significantly less Albanian terri­ tory than they w ou ld have gained w ithout the organized protest. M oreover, the great pow ers were made aware o f the existence and separate national interests o f the Albanian people. T he danger that A lbanian lands w ould be partitioned am ong the neighboring Balkans states remained, but at least a first step had been taken in the direction o f national organization. BULGARIAN U N IFICATIO N , 1878-1887 T h e division o f the Bulgarian state set up in the San Stefano treaty was nat­ urally a bitter blow to the Bulgarian nationalists. T h ey thereafter regarded the boundary draw n by this treaty as the state’s correct border, and its attain­ ment became the national goal. D espite this disappointm ent, much had been achieved. Tw o Bulgarian states were in existence, and it was generally ex­ pected that Eastern Rum elia w ou ld eventually join the autonom ous princi­ pality (see M ap 25). In addition, changes had occurred in the countryside that w ere to the advantage o f the Bulgarian peasantry. D u rin g the war, the Bulgarians had seized O ttom an lands and personal property. Even m ore im ­ portant, thousands o f M uslim s had fled southward tow ard Constantinople. D u rin g the centuries o f O ttom an rule a large M uslim and Turkish population had settled in the territory south o f the Balkan M ountains. A lth ough the Treaty o f Berlin confirmed the rights o f these people, neither the Bulgarians nor the Russians intended to allow them to remain. In A u gu st 1878 a Russian order stipulated that a M uslim accused o f crimes w ould be tried in a military court; some executions were carried out as a result o f this measure. Other M uslim owners were victims o f extreme harassment. U n der these conditions m ost M uslim s w ere afraid to return to o r to stay in their form er homes. In the end the Bulgarian peasants acquired the land after m aking a paym ent to the state, and som e com pensation was paid to the original owner. T he land settlement resulting from the w ar was thus to accelerate the developm ent o f Bulgarian agriculture in the direction it had already taken. Like Serbia, B u l­ garia was henceforth to be prim arily a land o f small peasant farms. Because o f the process by w hich Bulgarian autonom y had been w on , there

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was in 1878 no recognized central authority. In the movements in other lands - in M ontenegro, Serbia, Greece, and the D anubian Principalities - a na­ tional leadership had been form ed before the state passed ou t o f O ttom an control. D espite the fact that n o similar developm ent had occurred in B u l­ garia, the people did have som e administrative experience. T h ey had held posts in the O ttom an administration, and the village com munities had run their ow n affairs. A s in other Balkan states, the change to an autonom ous regim e did not involve a social upheaval. Those w h o had run local affairs under O ttom an rule n o w began to direct the nation.

The organization o f the first national government was made the responsi­ bility o f the Russian government. The Treaty o f Berlin limited the Russian army occupation to nine months. Russia’s major gain from the war was the creation o f the autonomous Bulgarian state, and the Russian officials were determined to establish a strong and stable government that would be closely tied to Russia in the future. Although it was not stated in the treaty, all of the powers recognized Russian predominance in the area. As had been the case in regard to the Danubian Principalities after the war o f 1828-1829, it was in the Russian interest to have Bulgaria become a model principality. Moreover, the Russian representatives wanted to set up an administration 367

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 that w ould serve as a point o f attraction to the Bulgarians o f Eastern Rum elia and that w ou ld aid in an eventual unification. T he Russian governm ent thus accepted for Bulgaria m odern and progressive institutions that were far in advance o f those existing in Russia itself. It must be remem bered that Russia at this time was an autocracy and had no national representative institutions whatsoever. T h e Russian com missioner, Prince A . M . D ondukov-K orsakov, assumed in Bulgaria the tasks that had been undertaken previously by K iselev in the Principalities. H e and his assistants drew up a draft constitution, based on the Serbian and Rom anian examples, that provided for a strong executive. It was sent to St. Petersburg and there examined by various committees. A fter it was returned to Bulgaria, it was considered by a constitutional assembly, which met at T u rn ovo in February 1879. T he Russian authorities made it clear that the draft was only a suggestion and that the assembly w as perfectly free to alter its stipulations. T h e constitutional assembly was attended by 231 delegates, o f w hom 89 w ere elected and the rest chosen from am ong church and civil notables. The representatives soon divided into tw o camps, the Liberals and the C onserv­ atives. T he basis o f disagreem ent was the issue o f h ow much pow er should be given to the executive, and h ow much to the legislative branch o f govern­ ment. Since the Liberals w ere stronger, the T u rn o vo constitution placed the real pow er in the hands o f an assembly that was to be elected by universal m anhood suffrage. Provision was also made for a second assembly to be sum ­ m oned only on special occasions, such as the confirmation o f a new ruler, the am ending o f the constitution, o r the discussion o f questions regarding the disposition o f Bulgarian territory. A s in the neighboring countries, a central­ ized administrative system was introduced. T he state was divided into de­ partments and districts, w hose officials were appointed by the central govern ­ ment. M ore pow er than in other Balkan states, however, was given to the local population on the lowest level o f administration, the com m unes, in recognition o f their historic role in Bulgarian life. H ere an elected council chose the mayor. A lth ough a Bulgarian assembly was chiefly responsible fo r the constitu­ tion, the great powers chose the ruler. T h ey named the twenty-two-year-old prince o f H esse, A lexander o f Battenberg, to the position. H e had the enor­ mous advantage o f being related to the British royal fam ily as well as to the tsar, w hose w ife was the sister o f A lexander’s father. Bulgaria, like Greece and Rom ania, thus had a ruler from a European dynasty o f considerable prestige. T h e prince was an extremely able man, but he had no background in Balkan affairs and, o f course, no experience in dealing w ith the problem s o f consti­ tutional governm ent. M eanw hile, the powers had supervised the establishment o f an administra­ tion in Eastern Rum elia that represented the w orst that can com e from in­ ternational collaboration. In A pril 1878 an O rganic Statute was issued that

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 was the product o f a mixed com m ission, w ith the British, Italian, H absburg, French, and Russian representatives each drafting a section. T he result was a docum ent o f 495 articles that was much too com plicated for the province. T h e mess thus created is illustrated by the comments o f the British consul in Plovdiv on the French-sponsored administrative regulations: B efore the w ar o f 1877, the present Province o f Eastern Rum elia was divided into two Sandjaks and fourteen Cazas. The tw o Prefects with the fourteen Baillis w h o then governed the Province were found more than sufficient. Now, then to the System with which the French delegate has endow ed it, there are six Departm ents and twenty-eight Cantons, and consequently, six Préfets, six “ Conseils généraux,” six “ Com m issions permanentes,” twenty-eight “ Baillis,” twenty-eight “ Com m andants de Gendarmerie,” twenty-eight “ Com m issaires de Police” and so forth . . . O bscure Ham lets which before the War never saw an Official - except the tax collector - have n o w been erected into “ C h e f lieux de Cantons” w ith each o f them a “ B ailli” “ Com m andant de Gendarm erie” “ Com m issaire de Police” a “ Juge de C anton” a “ Percepteur de Finance” a “ Caissier” a “ C h e f des C o n ­ tributions indirectes” and a Brigade o f Gendarm erie consisting o f six o r eight gendarmes . . . A province which contains at the utmost 800,o o o inhabitants - the population o f a C ity o f the second rank has been endow ed w ith an Executive w orthy o f a K ingd om . Besides the G overn or General, there is the Secretary General or D irector o f the Interior, D irectors o f Justice, Public Works, Education, and a C om m ander in C h ie f o f M ilitia and Gendarm erie.5 T he first governor was A leko Pasha. H e had associated w ith him an assem­ bly o f fifty-six mem bers, o f w hom thirty-six were elected. A leko soon w on the disfavor o f both the Russian and the O ttom an governm ents. W hen his term o f office expired, he was replaced by G avril Effendi Krustevich. A s could be expected, from the beginning there was a strong desire for unification w ith Bulgaria. A t first the Russian representatives supported any activity in this direction. Com m ittees were organized and “ gym nastic societies,” w hose members could be used for revolutionary activities, were founded. Lo cal R u m elian officials too expected that union was only a m atter o f time. T he main Russian effort was made in Bulgaria proper. A s they had done in the Principalities, the Russian agents expected to have a strong influence in the running o f the governm ent. T he ch ief diplom atic representative was A . P. Davydov, the consul-general in Sofia. The real source o f Russia’s strength, 5

Q u o te d in C harles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs o f Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879- 18 S6 (Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 1958), pp- 209 - 2 10 .

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 how ever, lay in its control over the new Bulgarian army, w hich w as in the process o f form ation. T he minister o f w ar for Bulgaria, General P. D . Parensov, was a Russian, as were all o f the officers above the rank o f captain. T h e Russian War M inistry expected to be consulted on all matters o f im por­ tance. T h is arrangement gave the Russian governm ent a m ilitary strongpoint in the heart o f the Balkan peninsula and near Constantinople. It should also have assured it full political dom ination in the principality. Three centers o f political pow er em erged at this point: the prince, the political parties, and the Russian agents. T he situation was further com pli­ cated by the fact that the Russian representatives did not agree. Instead, the diplom atic and military agents supported different parties. A lexander soon found that he could not govern w ith the constitution, which he thus wished to change. H is position was supported by the Conservative party and by D avydov. In contrast, the Liberals and General Parensov opposed the move. In 1881 T sar Alexander II was assassinated. H e was succeeded by his son, A lexander II I, w h o was extremely conservative in political orientation. Prince A lexander was thus able to obtain Russian support fo r the suspension o f the constitution. Relations, however, were soon to become worse. T he tsar and the prince, although cousins, did not get along well. Alexander I I I did not w ant to be treated as a relative, but as the ruler o f a m ighty em pire to w hom the Bulgarians ow ed gratitude and deference. M oreover, by this time increas­ ing numbers o f Bulgarians had become tired o f Russian interference. B y 1883 the situation developed to the point where the prince and the political parties joined together to form a com m on front against the Russian officials. In return for Liberal support, the prince restored the T um ovo constitution. Faced w ith this opposition, the Russian diplom ats changed their attitude toward the union o f Bulgaria and Eastern Rum elia. W hereas previously they had favored the measure and had made it one o f their m ajor aims in foreign policy, they now sought to prevent an action that w ou ld increase the prestige and pow er o f a prince w hom they wished to replace. M atters had nevertheless progressed too far in Eastern Rum elia. In Sep­ tem ber 1885 a revolt broke out in Plovdiv that was quickly successful. The leaders took control o f the governm ent and declared the union o f the pro v­ ince w ith Bulgaria. T h e revolution placed Prince Alexander in a very difficult position. In the previous m onth he had met w ith the Russian foreign m in­ ister, N . K . G iers, and had given assurances that he w ould not prom ote a unification. T h e union was also in violation o f the Treaty o f Berlin and could not be accomplished without great-power approval. Russian opposition could beexpected. Nevertheless, the prince was fiilly aware that, unless he retained the leadership o f the Bulgarian national movement, he w ould lose his throne. H e therefore accepted the situation and gave his full support to union. Th e Russian reaction was angry and immediate. A ll o f the Russian officers were recalled, a m ove that was intended to leave Bulgaria defenseless. Serbia, expecting Bulgaria to be weak as a result o f the internal crisis, de­

War and revolution, 18S6-1887 cided to take advantage o f the situation. U ntil this time M ilan’s reign had not been much o f a success. A personally unpopular ruler, he had achieved little in the national interest. H is army had been defeated in the w ar w ith the O ttom an Em pire in 1876. T h e territorial additions gained in the Treaty o f Berlin w ere small com pensation for the previous sacrifices and expectations. T h e H ab sbu rg M onarchy was in occupation o f exactly those lands which the Serbian nationalists had desired. M oreover, M ilan had been forced to sign an agreement w ith Vienna that placed him under the dom ination o f the m on­ archy. Russian favor and support had until the mid-i88os gone to the B u lgar­ ians. T h e unification o f the tw o Bulgarian states in 1885 did indeed upset the balance o f pow er in the Balkans, and M ilan felt that he could not allow this change w ithout gaining compensation. To enforce this position, his govern ­ ment declared w ar in N ovem ber and commenced an invasion o f Bulgaria. To the surprise o f most observers, the Serbian army was decisively beaten. AustriaH u n gary was forced to intervene to protect its Balkan ally. Peace was made sim ply on the basis o f the restoral o f the prewar conditions.

Although the Bulgarian government gained no concrete rewards from the victory, the powers were compelled to recognize that the union would have to be accepted. The great problem was the enforcement of the terms o f the Berlin treaty. As the suzerain power, the Porte would have to carry out any military measures taken, and no government wanted to allow the Ottoman army into the area. Moreover, the Bulgarian defiance o f Russia changed the British attitude. The previous objection to a large Bulgaria had been based on the assumption that the state would be a Russian puppet and a permanent danger to Constantinople. Now that Prince Alexander was opposing his pro­ tector, the British reaction was favorable. The Habsburg attitude was similar. Given this situation, the Russian government had no practical means of blocking the unification. A compromise solution was therefore reached. The Porte recognized the personal union of the two states and appointed Alex­ ander as governor of Eastern Rumelia for a five-year term. Despite this lim­ itation, the prince proceeded to govern both areas as if they were one political unit. The two assemblies were immediately joined together. These events naturally caused profound discontent in St. Petersburg. If union was to be accomplished, the Russian statesmen had wished it to be under their sponsorship and with the credit going to them rather than to the prince. As could be expected, they laid the blame for this awkward situation on Alexander. Most Russian officials were firmly convinced that the Bulgar­ ian people were deeply pro-Russian and loyal to their leadership. Believing that their partisans would command popular support, they therefore coop­ erated in the organization of the opposition to the prince. In Bulgaria at this time, as in every country, there were a number o f dis­ contented elements, including some army officers who felt that their talents had not been sufficiendy rewarded. A conspiracy was organized with the knowledge o f the tsar and of the Russian ministers o f foreign affairs and war. 371

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 On the night of August 2 0 -2 1, 1886, a group of officers seized the prince, forced him to sign an abdication, and escorted him out of the country. A revolutionary government was then set up. This military coup and the kid­ napping of the prince had litde popular backing. A counterrevolution under the direction of Stephen Stambolov, a Liberal politician, soon overturned the new regime. Alexander was then invited to return. After crossing the border into Bulgaria, the prince made a grave mistake. Hoping to win Rus­ sian support, he sent the tsar a telegram stating: “As Russia gave me my crown, I am prepared to give it back into the hands of its Sovereign,” an offer that was prompdy accepted.6 This ill-judged action was resented by the Bul­ garian patriots, who did not wish to remain in political subservience to St. Petersburg. Alexander had no other alternative than to abdicate. A regency was appointed and the prince left the country. Stambolov remained the most prominent national leader. When it became apparent that his government would retain a defiant attitude, the Russian government broke relations with the state on whose establishment so much effort had been expended. A special assembly was summoned to choose a new Bulgarian ruler. The position o f the country was very difficult. The powers had expected that Bul­ garia would remain in the Russian sphere. Its break with St. Petersburg marked a significant alteration in the balance of power in the peninsula and the Black Sea region. The shift won the enthusiastic approval not only of Great Britain, but also of Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian leaders had a great deal of difficulty in finding another prince. No power had officially recog­ nized the new situation or wished to defy Russia openly on the issue. Finally, Ferdinand o f Saxe-Coburg accepted the office and became prince in August 1887.

Ferdinand’s position was very precarious. He did not have great-power sanction. He could expect that conspiracies would be formed against him with Russian approval and assistance. At first he ruled in cooperation with Stambolov, but in 1894 disagreements forced the Bulgarian minister to re­ sign. He was assassinated in 1895. By this time Ferdinand recognized that, because his own situation was so tenuous, regular relations would have to be restored with Russia. In addition, he and the other Bulgarian leaders were well aware that they could not attain their territorial objectives in Macedonia without great-power assistance, and this support could come only from Rus­ sia. The new tsar, Nicholas II, and the Russian diplomats also were in favor of a rapprochement. Regular relations were restored in 1896, and Russia and the other powers then recognized Ferdinand. The union had been accepted as permanent. A united Bulgarian state under a foreign prince had thus been established. Although it was still in theory under the suzerainty of the Porte, that govem6

Q u o te d in C . Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, p. 258.

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 ment had no influence within the country. Great advances had been made. However, the nationalists still considered the Bulgaria defined by the Treaty o f San Stefano as their goal. Events in Macedonia were followed with close attention. The Bulgarian unification and the deposition of Alexander had caused major international crises in the 1880s. Macedonia was to be the next center o f conflict in the Balkans. THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1887-1897: A D E C A D E OF R E L A T I V E Q U I E T

The predominant diplomatic alignment of the period before 1878 was, as we have seen, the Three Emperors’ Alliance. The extreme Russian dissatisfaction with the meager results o f the Russo-Turkish War was thereafter turned not against the outright opponent, Britain, but against the Russian allies, in par­ ticular Germany. Many Russian statesmen felt that the German government had not returned in kind the benevolent assistance that St. Petersburg had rendered during the period o f German unification. When relations became particularly strained in 1879, Bismarck looked for alternate diplomatic com­ binations. The Three Emperors’ Alliance o f the 1870s had been an informal entente. In the future, in contrast, the international alignments were to be based on written engagements that specified the obligations of the partners. These were in theory secret, but their general contents were usually known. The Balkan states became associated with the alliances o f the great powers either direcdy, through supplementary agreements, or indirectly, through some sort o f special relationship with one of their members. In the negotiations after 1878 the principal responsibility was taken by Bis­ marck. Germany, the strongest European state, stood at the center o f the diplomatic stage. It will be noticed that Balkan issues played a key role in the formation of the alliances. The Dual Alliance, signed by Germany and AustriaHungary in October 1879, was the first agreement made at this time. A de­ fensive alliance directed against Russia, it obligated its members to go to war should either be attacked by Russia. The treaty was particularly significant because it involved Germany deeply in Balkan affairs and on the side of Vi­ enna. Despite the distrust that had developed between Russia and the Habs­ burg Empire, Bismarck was able to bring all three courts together again in June 1881 when the Three Emperors’ Alliance was revived, this time in the form o f a written agreement. A general neutrality pact, this document had clauses dirtcdy affecting the Balkans. The signatories agreed that Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia could unite at a propitious time and that the Habsburg Empire could annex Bosnia-Hercegovina under favorable circumstances. All three powers were to consult on any changes that occurred in the Balkans, and the Russian interpretation of the closure of the Straits was accepted. A third agreement, the Triple Alliance, followed in May 1882. It linked

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The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 Germ any, Italy, and Austria-H ungary. A lthough it was directed at first pri­ marily against France, it too was to have great significance for Balkan affairs. R egard in g their country as an equal great pow er, and dissatisfied w ith the failure to make gains at the C ongress o f Berlin, the Italian statesmen wished to share in influence in the Balkans. A t each renewal o f the pact, which o c­ curred every five years, the Italian governm ent pressed for the recognition o f its position. T he ch ief interest was show n in the fate o f the Albanian regions, w here Italy hoped to play a role similar to that o f R ussia in the eastern part o f the peninsula and A ustria-H ungary in the west. B y 1883 a pattern o f alliances had thus been form ed, w ith G erm any at the center. T h is netw ork included Serbia and Rom ania. A fter 1881 Serbia became associated w ith the H ab sbu rg Em pire through a series o f agreements, and in 1883 the R om anian and H absbu rg governm ents concluded a defensive alli­ ance directed against Russia, to which Germ any later adhered. Since these treaties w ere defensive in nature, their obligations did not conflict w ith those undertaken by G erm any and A ustria-H ungary in the Three Em perors’ A lli­ ance. T h ey did, however, tie the Balkan states to Vienna and Berlin. T h e weakest alignment was obviously that o f the Three Em perors’ A lli­ ance. T h e basis o f an understanding between Russia and the H absbu rg M o n ­ archy was an implicit division o f the Balkans into tw o spheres o f influence, w ith R ussia predom inant in Bulgaria. It was this balance that A lexander o f Battenberg and then Ferdinand o f Saxe-C oburg destroyed. H ab sbu rg sup­ port o f the Bulgarian actions made the renewal o f the alliance in 1887 im pos­ sible. Since neither R ussia nor Germ any wished to break their partnership, another pact, the Reinsurance Treaty, was signed by these tw o powers. It was basically a neutrality agreement, but Germ any assured the Russian govern ­ m ent in a secret protocol that support w ould be given in securing a favorable regim e in Bulgaria and in maintaining the closure o f the Straits. A s long as R ussia did not have adequate coastal fortifications or a strong Black Sea fleet, its governm ent wished to make certain that in case o f w ar the British fleet could not enter the Black Sea; the tw o countries were in conflict in Central A sia and A fghanistan, as well as in the N ear East.

Although Germany had apparendy joined with Russia on the Bulgarian question, Bismark at the same time gave tacit approval to the formation of a counter-alignment, the Mediterranean Agreements. These informal under­ standings linked Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Spain against French expansion in northern Africa and in support o f the status quo in the Medi­ terranean and Black Sea regions - language that implied backing for Ferdi­ nand’s rule in Bulgaria. This alignment made any Russian military action in Bulgaria almost impossible and led to St. Petersburg’s eventual acceptance of the new regime. This elaborate alliance system was upset w hen the Germ an em peror, W il­ liam II, in 1890 dropped the Reinsurance Treaty and accepted Bism arck’s res­

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War and revolution, 18S6-1887 ignation. B oth France and Russia w ere thus out o f any diplom atic system. N either could afford to remain isolated. In 1891 and 1894 they signed first a military agreem ent and then an alliance. T h e Continent was thus divided into tw o diplom atic camps. O n one side stood Russia and France; on the other G erm any and the H ab sbu rg Em pire were joined by the D ual Alliance, and Germ any, Italy, and the m onarchy by the Triple Alliance. R om ania and Serbia were associated w ith what came to be known as the Central Pow ers by sup­ plem entary agreements. T he break between Berlin and St. Petersburg in 1890, which w as com pletely a Germ an initiative, was to be extremely significant for Balkan affairs. Germ an prestige and pow er were ultimately to be used to support the H ab sbu rg interests and to contribute to a renewal o f the Russia n -H a b sb u rg antagonism in the region. Britain, it w ill be noted, joined neither side, preferring to follow a policy o f “ splendid isolation.” A fter the passing o f the crisis over Bulgaria, however, these alliances had litde direct effect on events in the Balkans. In fact, the area was to enjoy a relatively lo n g period o f repose. T he European powers wished to avoid an­ other Eastern conflict, so they cooperated to maintain calm in the area. T he H ab sbu rg M onarchy was thoroughly occupied with its internal problem s; it had to fo llo w a cautious foreign policy. Russian attention was draw n increas­ ingly to the F ar East. Britain too no longer looked at O ttom an affairs in the same light. In 1882 a British arm y occupied E gypt. Thereafter the base for British N ear Eastern policy became E g y p t and Suez, not Constantinople and the Straits. T h e reluctance o f the powers to become involved in another O t­ tom an crisis was clearly show n in the years 1894 to 1897. A t this time a na­ tional m ovem ent very similar to those in the Balkans occurred in the A rm e­ nian provinces. Local revolts were repressed with massacres, which, like those in B ulgaria in 1876, were fully reported in the European press. H ow ever, this time the great pow ers did not organize the massive intervention that had occurred in the previous period. D espite the existence o f the tw o European alliance systems and the break­ dow n o f the Three Em perors’ Alliance, Russian and H absbu rg interests in the Balkans w ere very close in this last decade o f the century. B oth wanted conditions o f tranquility maintained in the region. In A pril 1897 Franz Joseph and his foreign minister, A gen o r G oluchow ski, traveled to St. Petersburg, w here they signed an agreem ent w ith the Russian governm ent stipulating that the tw o pow ers w ould cooperate in m aintaining the status quo in the Balkans. F o r a decade thereafter the governm ents did w ork together to pre­ vent any m ajor crisis from developing that could reopen the Eastern Q ues­ tion. There were to be tw o m ajor centers o f disturbance in the Balkan pen­ insula. In 1897, as the result o f another Cretan uprising, Greece and the Ottoman E m pire w ent to war. T h e G reek arm y was defeated, but great-pow er pressure prevented the Porte from taking any G reek territory. Instead, a small indem n­ ity was paid. Th roughout this period there were also constant problem s in

The revolutionary years, 1804-1887 Macedonia. However, Russia and the Habsburg Empire were to cooperate to try to calm the situation. All o f the great powers, with the exception of Austria-Hungary, were occupied with carving out empires for themselves in Asia and Africa. Russia was soon to become involved in a disastrous war with Japan. No power wished to be distracted by Balkan events.

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Conclusion The national movements: a century of accomplishment toward the formation of the Balkan na­ tional states had been taken. An independent Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia, and an autonomous Bulgaria, were in exis­ tence. A movement aiming at the unification of the Albanian lands had been organized. Although the Balkan people of the Habsburg Empire had suffered a political setback with the conclusion of the Ausgleich, Croatia enjoyed a restricted but nevertheless autonomous status. The Romanians, Serbs, and Slovenes had political organizations, usually closely identified with their churches. The paths to national independence or autonomy had been varied. In Ser­ bia and Greece local notables led armed peasants into battle against the O t­ toman army. Although foreign intervention was in the end decisive in deter­ mining the final political status, the revolutionary forces did take control of national lands and establish governments. In contrast, the Danubian Princi­ palities and Bulgaria, despite the fact that revolts occurred, owed their free­ dom from Ottoman control largely to shrewd diplomatic negotiations in Ro­ mania’s case, and to a war waged by Russia in Bulgaria’s. The position of the nationalities inside the Habsburg Monarchy before 1867 was, o f course, entirely different. They could not call in outside assist­ ance or play the international diplomatic rivalries. There was, however, the possibility of utilizing the internal struggle between the imperial government in Vienna and the most self-confident and nationally conscious group in the empire, the Hungarians. Since the majority of the Habsburg Croats, Serbs, and Romanians lived within the boundaries of the lands o f the crown o f St. Stephen, their fate was closely tied to the results of this conflict. When the choice had to be made, the Romanian leadership sided with Vienna; the Croats at times supported the Hungarian position. With the conclusion of the Ausgleich both lost their gamble, and they were placed under the effective domination of a militant and aggressive Hungarian administration. The battie for power between the national groups and Budapest, and between that cap­ ital and the Habsburg imperial government, was to end only with the col­ lapse o f the monarchy in 1918. A great deal has been said in this account about the role of the great pow­ ers. In the nineteenth century, not only were they influenced by their desire

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Conclusion to maintain the balance o f pow er in the N ear East, but individual govern ­ ments w ere often tem pted to make use o f their advantages to gain a control­ ling position either in a single region o r in the entire area. T he French inter­ est and influence in the E g y p t o f M uham m ad A li and in the Principalities has been noted. A t different periods Britain, France, and Russia contested for predom inance in the councils o f the sultan. A ll o f the Balkan people at one time o r another called for British, French, H absburg, o r Russian assistance. T h e tem ptation to answer the appeals and to exploit them was sometimes great. M uch o f the European intervention rested on treaties concluded by the Porte that gave the governm ents individually o r collectively the right to interfere in O ttom an dom estic affairs o r limited the actions o f O ttom an offi­ cials in their o w n territory. These agreements dealt w ith m ore than the affairs o f the nationalities; as w e have seen, capitulations and trade treaties gave special privileges to foreigners trading inside the empire. T h e treaties o f Karlow itz and Kuchuk Kainarji were the first that allowed outside powers the right to speak in behalf o f O ttom an Balkan subjects. E ven m ore dangerous to the Porte were the agreements signed in the nineteenth century, such as the C onvention o f Akkerm an in 1826, the Treaty o f A drianople o f 1829, the Treaty o f Lon d o n o f 1830, and the Treaty o f Paris o f 1856, all o f w hich gave the great powers political protectorates over Balkan territories. It should nevertheless be emphasized that intervention was a two-edged sw ord. T h e Balkan people often asked foreign governm ents for assistance; they expected this aid to be given freely and w ithout political implications. W hen a European pow er attempted to gain repayment fo r its expenditures o f m oney o r lives, the Balkan governm ents usually reacted w ith horror and indignation. Russia, o f course, was the state m ost affected by this circum ­ stance. Its repeated wars w ith the O ttom an Em pire had been the ch ief instru­ m ent securing autonom ous rights in the Balkans. These efforts cost enor­ m ous am ounts, which, considering the meager results gained for Russian national interests, could better have been spent at hom e. This dilemma was well expressed in a letter from A . G . Jom ini, a close associate o f G orchakov, to N . K . G iers, w h o at the time was second to the foreign minister. Writing in the m iddle o f the Russo-Turkish War o f 1877—1878, Jom ini took a pessimis­ tic view o f the outcom e o f the conflict, which was to be com pletely justified by subsequent events:

Moreover, even if, in one way or another, we finish by achieving our object, it would still be impossible for me to see things through rosetinted glasses! In that case first of all will come the setding of ac­ counts. Once the gunsmoke and the clouds of glory have faded away the net result will remain; that is to say enormous losses, a deplorable financial situation, and what advantages? Our Slav brothers freed, who will astonish us with their ingratitude . . . This is the balance which I foresee if everything goes as well as 378

Conclusion possible. I cannot find this situation a good one, or the policy which is drawing us towards it at the cost of the country’s ruin an able one! I persist in thinking that instead of pursuing these Slav chimaeras, we should have done better to see to our own Slav Christians. If the Emperor would come down from the heights and from official splendours and play the role o f Haroun al Rashid, if he would visit incognito the suburbs of Bucharest and those o f his own capital, he would convince himself o f all there is to be done to civilize, organize and develop his own country, and he would draw the conclusion that a crusade against drunkenness and syphilis was more necessary and more profitable to Russia than the ruinous crusade against the Turks for the profit of the Bulgars!1 In addition to the direct intervention by the diplomats, there was, as has been demonstrated, a strong European influence over the political institu­ tions adopted by the Balkan states. In every case, the governments came to be based on constitutions drawn after Western models. However, the extent of this outside influence can be overstated. Certainly, the form and language of European liberalism was used, but the Balkan societies did have precedents for representative institutions. The interests of the nobility and the notables had been defended in the councils of the medieval kingdoms; the divans in the Principalities had the same function. Peasant participation in administra­ tion during the Ottoman period was perhaps even more significant. The role o f the communities has been discussed; there heads of peasant families had a major role in deciding local affairs. The institution of the skupStina in Serbia, where the men o f a region met to discuss major problems, played an impor­ tant part in the evolution of the Serbian political system. Similar customs existed in primitive areas such as Montenegro. In fact, these traditional, dem­ ocratically based institutions were to cause problems for all of the national regimes. Although representative assemblies had a place in Balkan history, central­ ized, secular Christian administrative systems usually did not. With only a few exceptions, the Balkan people in the past had been governed indirecdy through agents o f the central power or by a local nobility that might rival in real authority the titular master o f a region. Through most of the period of Ottoman rule, the Christian was under the direct authority of his millet and communal leaders, not the representatives o f the Porte. In the Habsburg domains and the Danubian Principalities he was subject to the local noble, not to the monarch’s officials. In the nineteenth century the convictions of most Balkan statesmen, as well as the influence o f the great powers, led to i

Jo m in i to G iers, S ep tem b er 1/ 13 , 1877 , in C harles Jelavich an d B arbara Jelavich, eds., Russia in the East, 1876-1880 (L eiden: Brill, 1959 ), PP· 59, 6 0 ; trans. in M . S. A nderson, ed., The Great Powers and the N ear East, 1774—1923 (N ew York: St. M a rtin ’s Press, 19 70 ), p p. 96 - 98 ·

379

Conclusion the adoption o f centralized bureaucratic regimes. H ere the aim was to extend the control o f the central offices o f the state over the citizenry w ithout the interm ediary o f provincial o r local institutions. Agents o f the central govern­ ment w ou ld thus deal direcdy w ith the individual. Th e Balkan governm ents adopted this system, because it was considered m odern, progressive, and en­ lightened at the time. Th e O ttom an Tanzimat reform s, the Bach system in the H absbu rg Em pire, and the H ungarian administration in 1848-1849 and after 1867 were all based on the attempt to organize the lands in question on these principles. T he result o f this process, which is discussed in greater detail in Volum e II, was the limitation o f the political pow er o f the peasantry and the grow th in influence o f a m iddle class com posed prim arily o f those m em ­ bers o f Balkan society w h o were able to acquire a higher education. The representative institutions granted in the constitutions were thus canceled ou t by the existence o f a strong, centralized bureaucracy that, in control o f the police and the electoral procedures, could manipulate and dom inate the political process. A lth ough by 1887 much had been accomplished, many o f the m ajor goals o f the national leadership had not yet been fully attained. Th e territorial uni­ fication o f the states had not been achieved; the Albanian national movement in particular had far to go. M oreover, m any South Slav and Rom anian na­ tionals lived in the H absburg Em pire, w hich at the beginning o f the tw en­ tieth century remained a strong, functioning great power. T h e O ttom an E m ­ pire also still controlled much o f the peninsula. In addition, although national regim es had been organized, these governm ents had to face severe economic and social problems. Th e tragedy o f the tw o devastating w orld wars o f the twentieth century, both o f which caused great destruction in the Balkans, was to make their solution even m ore difficult. T he accomplishment o f the final form ation o f the m odern Balkan states o f Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, R o ­ mania, and Yugoslavia, and their subsequent efforts to secure econom ic ad­ vancement and to maintain their independence in an era o f continuing greatpow er im perialism, w ill provide the m ajor themes for the second volum e o f this narrative.

380

Bibliography

T

h i s b i b l i o g r a p h y c o n t a i n s a selection o f books in English de­

signed to guide a reader w h o w ould like more inform ation on the subjects covered in this volum e. It does not, o f course, include all o f the excellent books concerning Balkan history that are available. Articles have been excluded, as well as w orks in other languages. F o r inform ation on pu b­ lications o f these sorts and on studies on the Balkan area in all disciplines the reader is referred to Paul L . H orecky, ed., Southeastern Europe: A Guide to Basic Publications (Chicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press, 1969), and to the bibliographic essays in volum es V and V I I I o f A History of East Central Eu­ rope., edited by Peter F. S u gar and D onald W Treadgold, cited herein. A n examination o f American scholarship in Balkan studies is to be found in Charles Jelavich, ed., Language and A rea Studies: East Central and Southeastern E u­ rope (Chicago: U niversity o f C h icago Press, 1969). Publications that appeared in the decade after the com pletion o f that book are review ed in the journal Balkanistica 4 (1977-1978), in an issue devoted to the question. F or a better understanding o f Balkan life in this period, the reader is strongly advised to read som e o f the m any travel accounts on the region. T h e m ajority o f these are listed in Shirley H o w ard Weber, Voyages and Travels in the Near East during the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Am erican School o f Classical Studies at A thens, 1952). A lth ou gh this book does not cover the subject in detail, som e surveys o f Balkan literature are listed in the final section o f the bibliography. G E N E R A L H I S T O R I E S Op T H E B A L K A N S D jordjevic, D im itrije, and Stephen Fischer-Galati. The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition. N e w York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1981.

Hosch, Edgar. The Balkans: A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Day. Translated by Tania Alexander. Ne\y York: Crane, Russak, 1972. Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich. The Balkans. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich, eds. The Balkans in Transition: Essays

on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century. R eprin t ed., H am den, C o n n .: Archon Rooks, 1974·

381

Bibliography Lam pe, John R., and M arvin R. Jackson. Balkan Economic History, isso-mo. Bloom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1982.

Ristelhueber, René. A History of the Balkan Peoples. Edited and translated by Sherman David Spector. New York: Twayne, 1971. Schevill, Ferdinand. The History of the Balkan Peninsula. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1933Seton-Watson, Robert W The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans. London: Constable, 1917. Stavrianos, L . S. The Balkans, 181S-1914· N e w York: H o lt, Rinehart & W in­ ston, 1963. The Balkans since 1453. N e w York: Rinehart, 1958. Stoianovich, Traian. A Study in Balkan Civilization. New York: Knopf, 1967. Sugar, Peter F., and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Seatde: U niversity o f W ashington Press, 1969.

Sugar, Peter F., and Donald W Treadgold, eds. A History of East Central Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Vol. V, Southeastern Eu­ rope under Ottoman Rule, 13S4-1804, by Peter F. Sugar, 1977; vol. VIII, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920, by Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, 1977. NATIO NAL AND IM PER IAL H ISTORIES

Balkan nationalities A L B A N IA N S

Frasheri, Kristo. The History of Albania. Tirana: n. p., 1964. L o g o reci, A nton. The Albanians: Europe’s Forgotten Survivors. B oulder, C olo.: W estview Press, 1977. M arm ullaku, Ram adan. Albania and the Albanians. Translated by M argot M ilosavljevic and BoSko M ilosavljevic. Lon d on : H urst, 1975.

Swire, Joseph. Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom. London: William & Norgate, 1929. B U L G A R IA N S

K ossev, D., H . H ristov, and D. A ngelov. A Short History o f Bulgaria. Sofia: F oreign Languages Press, 1963. Macdermott, Mercia. A History of Bulgaria, 1393-188S. Allen & Unwin, 1962. M ichew, C . The Bulgarians in the Past: Pages from the Bulgarian Cultural History. Lausanne: Librairie Centrale des N ationalités, 1919. GREEKS

Campbell, John, and Philip Sherrard. M odem Greece. London: Benn,

1968.

C lo g g , Richard. A Short History o f M odem Greece. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1979.

382

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C hirot, D aniel. Social Change in a Peripheral Society: The Creation o f a Balkan Colony. N e w York: A cadem ic Press, 1976. G iurescu, D inu C . Illustrated History o f the Rom anian People. Bucharest: Editura Sport-Turism , 1981. O jetea, A ndrei, ed. The History o f the Rom anian People. N e w York: Twayne, 1970. Seton-W atson, R o b ert W A History o f the Roumanians from Rom an Times to the Completion o f Unity. Cam bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1934. S E R B S , C R O A T S , A N D S LOV ENES

Auty, Phyllis. Yugoslavia. N e w York: Walker, 1965. C lissold, Stephen, ed. A Short History o f Yugoslavia from Early Times to 1966. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1966. D edijer, Vladim ir, Ivan B ozic, Sim a C irkovic, and M ilorad E km eiic. History o f Yugoslavia. Translated by K o rd ija Kveder. N e w York: M cG raw -H ill, 1974· G azi, Stephen. A History o f Croatia. N e w York: Philosophical Library, 1973. Temperley, H . W V History o f Serbia. N e w York: Fertig, 1969. Tom asevich, Jozo. Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia. Stan­ ford, C alif.: Stanford U niversity Press, 1955.

The Ottoman Em pire D avison, R o d eric H . Turkey. E n glew oo d Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-H all, 1968. G ib b , H . A . R ., and H aro ld B ow en. Islamic Society and the West: A Study o f the Impact o f Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the N ear East. 1 vo l., 2 pts. L on d o n : O xford U niversity Press, 1950,1957. Inalcik, H alil. The Ottoman Em pire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600. Translated by N orm an Itzkow itz and C olin Imber. N e w York: Praeger, 1973. Itzkowitz, Norm an. Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition. N ew York: K nopf, 1972.

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The Habsburg Em pire K ann, R ob ert A . A History o f the Habsburg Empire, IS26-1918. Berkeley: U n i­ versity o f C alifornia Press, 1974.

The M ultinational Em pire: Nationalism and N ational Reform in the Habs­ burg Monarchy, 1848-1918. 2 vols. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1950. Macartney, C . A . The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918. Lo n d o n : W eidenfeld & N icolson, 1968. M ay, A rthu r J. The Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914. N e w York: N orton Library, 1968. Tapie, Victor. The Rise and F a ll o f the Habsburg Monarchy. Translated by Ste­ phen H ardm an. N e w York: Praeger, 1971. Taylor, A . J. P. The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918. N e w York: H arper Torchbooks, 1948.

SELECTED STU DIES: P R E -N IN E T E E N T H CENTURY Barker, Thom as M . Double Eagle and Crescent: Vienna’s Second Turkish Siege and Its Historical Setting. A lbany: State U niversity o f N e w York Press, 1967. Cassels, Lavender. The Struggle fo r the Ottoman Empire, 1717-174$ ■ London: M urray, 1966. Fine, John V A ., Jr. The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation. Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1975. M cN eill, W illiam H . Venice: The H inge o f Europe, 1081-1797. C hicago: U n iver­ sity o f C hicago Press, 1974. O lson, R o b ert W The Siege o f Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743B loom ington : Indiana U niversity publications, 1975. 384

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THE N INETEEN TH CENTURY: THE F O R M A T I O N OF T H E N A T I O N A L S T A T E S TO 1 9 1 4

Economic Developments Berend, Ivan T., and G y o rg y Ranki. Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. N e w York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1974. Blaisdell, D onald. European Financial Control in the Ottoman Em pire: A Study

c f the Establishment, Activities, and Significance o f the Administration o f the Ottoman Public Debt. N ew York: Colum bia U niversity Press, 1929. Evans, Ifo r L . The A grarian Revolution in Roumania. Cam bridge, M ass.: H arvard U niversity Press (Belknap Press), 1962. Feis, H erbert. Europe the World’s Banker, 1870-1914· N ew York: N orto n , 1965. H o ievar, Toussaint. The Structure o f the Slovenian Economy, 184S-1963. N ew York: Studia Slovenica, 1965. Sugar, Peter F. Industrialization o f Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878-1918. Seatde: U n i­ versity o f W ashington Press, 1963. Warriner, D oreen. Contrasts in Em erging Societies: Readings in the Social and

Economic History c f South-Eastern Europe in the Nineteenth Century. Bloom ington : Indiana U niversity Press, 1965.

General Studies on Diplomacy AnastassofF, C hrist. The Tragic Peninsula: A History c f the Macedonian Move­ mentfo r Independence since 1878· St. Lou is: Blackwell & Wielandy, 1938.

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London: Murray, 1915. H elm reich, Ernst C . The Diplomacy o f the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard U niversity Press, 1938. Jelavich, Barbara. The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814-1918. Reprint ed., H am den, C on n .: A rchon Books, 1975.

The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887. Bloom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1973.

St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974. Bloom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1974. Jelavich, Charles, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal A ffairs o f Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886. Berkeley: University o f C alifornia Press, 1958. Langer, W illiam L . European Alliances and Alignments, 1870-1890. N e w York: V intage Books, 1964. M edlicott, W illiam N . The Congress o f Berlin and A fter: A Diplomatic History o f the N ear Eastern Settlement, 1878-1880. Lon don : M ethuen, 1938. Petrovich, M ichael B. The Emergence o f Russian Panslavism, 18S6-1870. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1956. Puryear, Vernon J. England, Russia and the Straits Question, 1844-1856. Berke­ ley: U niversity o f California Press, 1931.

Stavrianos, Leften S. Balkan Federation: A History c f the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modem Times. Northhampton, Mass.: Smith College Studies in History, 1944· Stojanovic, Mihailo D. The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878. Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939· Sum ner, B. H . Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880. O xford: O xford University Press, 1937. Temperley, H . W V England and the N ear East: The Crim ea. Reprint ed., H am den, C o n n .: A rchon B ooks, 1964. W ilkinson, H . R. Maps and Politics: A Review o f the Ethnographic Cartography o f Macedonia. Liverpool: U niversity Press o f Liverpool, 1951.

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G reat Britain, Office o f the Admiralty, N aval Intelligence D ivision. A lbania: Basic Handbook. 2 pts., 1943—1944. Skendi, Stavro. The A lbanian N ational Awakening, 1878-1912. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1967.

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Beam an, A . H ulm e. M . Stambuloff. Lon don: Bliss, Sands & Foster, 1895. Black, C . E . The Establishment o f Constitutional Government in Bulgaria. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 19+3. Clarke, Jam es F. Bible Societies, Am erican Missionaries, and the N ational R evival o f Bulgaria. N e w York: A rn o Press, 1971. C orti, E g o n Caesar C onte. Alexander von Battenberg. Translated by E . M . H od gson . Lon d on : Cassell, 1954. H all, W illiam W Puritans in the Balkans: The American Board Mission in B u l­ garia, 1878-1918. Sofia: Cultura Printing H ouse, 1938. H arris, D avid. Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors o f 1876. C hicago: U niversity o f C hicago Press, 1939. M acD erm ott, M arcia. The Apostle o f Freedom: A Portrait o f Vasil Levsky against a Background o f Nineteenth Century Bulgaria. Lon d on : Allen & U n w in , 1967. M adol, H ans R oger. Ferdinand o f B ulgaria: The Dream o f Byzantium . Trans­ lated by Kenneth Kirkness. L on d on : H urst & Blackett, 1933. M eininger, Thom as A . Ignatiev and the Establishment o f the Bulgarian E xar­ chate, 1864-1872: A Study in Personal Diplomacy. M adison: State H istorical Society o f W isconsin, 1970. GREEKS

A ugustinos, Gerasim os. Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics o f Greek Society, 1897-1914. Boulder, C o lo .: E ast European Quarterly, 1977. Chaconas, Stephen G . Adamantios Korais: A Study in Greek Nationalism. N ew York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1942. C lo g g , Richard, ed. and trans. The Movement fo r Greek Independence, 17701821: A Collection o f Documents. London: M acm illan Press, 1976. C lo g g , Richard, ed. The Struggle fo r Greek Independence: Essays to M ark the isoth Anniversary o f the Greek War o f Independence. H am den, C o n n .: Archon B ooks, 1973. C ouloum bis, T. A ., J. A . Petropulos, and H . J. Psomiades. Foreign Interfer­ ence in Greek Politics: A n Historical Perspective. N ew York: Pella, 1976. Crawley, C . W The Question o f Greek Independence: A Study o f British Policy in the N ear East, 1821-1833. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1930. D akin, D ouglas, The Greek Struggle fo r Independence, 1821-1833. Lon d on : Batsford, 1973· The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913. Thessaloniki: Institute for B al­ kan Studies, 1966. The Unification c f Greece, 1770-1923. Lon d on : Benn, 1972. D iam andouros, N ikiforos P., and John P. A nton, Joh n A . Petropulos, and Peter Topping, eds. Hellenism and the First Greek War o f Liberation (1821-

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Frazee, Charles A. The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece, 1821-18S2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. H enderson, G. P. The Revival o f Greek Thought, 1620-1830. A lbany: State U n i­ versity o f N ew York Press, 1970.

Jelavich, Barbara. Russia and Greece during the Regency o f K in g Othon, 1832183s. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1962. Russia and the Greek Revolution o f 1843. M unich: O ldenbourg, 1966. K aldis, W illiam P. John Capodistrias and the Modem Greek State. M adison: State H istorical Society o f W isconsin, 1963. Kaltchas, Nicholas S. Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modem Greece. N e w York: C olum bia U niversity Press, 1940. K o fos, Evangelos. Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 187S-1878. Thessaloniki: Insti­ tute for Balkan Studies, 1975.

Kolokotrones, Theodoros. Memoirsfrom the Greek War o f Independence. Trans­ lated and edited by E. M. Edmonds. Chicago: Argonaut, 1969. Koumoulides, John T. A. Greece in Transition: Essays in the History of Modem Greece, 1821-1974· London: Zeno, 1977. Levandis, John A. The Greek Foreign D ebt and the Great Powers, 1821-1898. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944· Makriyannis, Ioanncs. M akriyannis: The Memoirs o f General M akriyannis, 17971864. Translated and edited by H. A. Lidderdale. London: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1966. Papacosma, S. Victor. The M ilitary in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d’etat. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1977. Petropulos, John Anthony. Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom o f Greece, 1833-1843· Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. Prevelakis, Eleutherios. British Policy towards the Change o f Dynasty in Greece, 1862-1863. Athens: n.p., 1953. W oodhouse, C. M. Capodistria: The Founder o f Greek Independence. Lon don : O xford U niversity Press, 1973. The Battle ofN avarino. Lon d on : H od der & Stoughton, 1965. The Greek War o f Independence: Its Historical Setting. L o n d o n : Hutchinson’s U niversity Library, 1952. R O M A N IA N S

B od ea, Cornelia. The Romanians’ Struggle for Unification, 1834-1849· Trans­ lated by Liliana Teodoreanu. Bucharest: Academ y o f the Socialist R e ­ public o f R om ania, 1970.

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'

Bibliography B ob an go, Gerald. The Emergence o f the Rom anian N ational State. Boulder, C o lo .: E ast European Quarterly, 1979. Constandnescu, M iron, et al., eds. Unification c f the Romanian National State: The Union o f Transylvania with O ld Rom ania. Bucharest: A cadem y o f the Socialist R epu blic o f Rom ania, 1971. East, W illiam G . The Union c f M oldavia and Wallachia, 18S9. C am bridge: C am ­ bridge U niversity Press, 1929. Eidelberg, Philip Gabriel. The Great Rum anian Peasant Revolt o f 1907: Origins c f a M odem Jacquerie. Leiden: B rill, 1974. Florescu, R ad u R . N . The Struggle against Russia in the Roum anian Princi­ palities, 1821-1854 ■ M unich: Societas Academ ica D acorom ana, 1962. G eorgescu, V lad . Political Ideas and the Enlightenm ent in the Rom anian P rin ­ cipalities, 1750-1831. Boulder, C o lo. E ast European Quarterly, 1971. H itchins, K eith. Orthodoxy and N ationality: A ndreiu §aguna and the Rum a­ nians o f Transylvania, 1846-1873. C am bridge, M ass.: H arvard U niversity Press, 1977. The Rum anian N ational Movement in Translyvania, 1780-1849. C am bridge, M a ss.: H arvard U niversity Press, 1969. Jelavich, Barbara. Russia and the Formation o f the Rom anian N ational State, 1821-1878. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, 1983. Russia and the Rum anian N ational Cause, i8s8-i8s9. R eprin t ed., H am den, C o n n .: A rchon B ooks, 1974. Jelavich, Charles, and Barbara Jelavich, eds. The Education o f a Russian States­ m an: The Memoirs o f Nicholas Karlovich Giers. Berkeley: U niversity o f C alifornia Press, 1962. Jo w itt, Kenneth, ed. Social Change in Rom ania, 1860-1940. Berkeley: Institute o f International Studies, 1978. O ldson, W illiam O . The Historical and Nationalistic Thought ofNicolae Iorga. Boulder, C o lo .: E ast European Quarterly, 1973. R iker, T. W The M aking o f Roum ania: A Study o f an International Problem, 18S6-1866. O xford: O xford U niversity Press, 1931.

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D espalatovic, E lin or M urray. Ljudevit G aj and the Illyrian Movement. B o u l­ der, C o lo .: E ast European Quarterly, 1975. D jilas, M ilovan. Njegof. Introduced and translated by M ichael B. Petrovich. N e w York: H arcourt, Brace & W orld, 1966. E dw ards, L ovett E , trans. and ed. The Memoirs o f Prota M atija Nenadovtc. O xford: O xford U niversity Press (Clarendon Press), 1969· M cC lellan, W oodford D . Svetozar Markovic and the Origins o f Balkan Social­ ism. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1964. M acK enzie, D avid. The Serbs and Russian Panslavism, 1875-1878. Ithaca, N .Y .: C ornell U niversity Press, 1967.

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The Ottoman Em pire Bailey, E E . British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movements: A Study in AngloTurkish Relations, 1826-1853. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942. Berkes, N iyazi. The Development o f Secularism in Turkey. M ontreal: M cG ill U niversity Press, 1964. Davison, Roderic H . Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 18S6-1876. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1963. D evereux, R ob ert. The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study o f the M idhat Constitution and Parliam ent. Baltim ore: Johns H opkins Press, 1963. K arpat, Kem al. A n Inquiry into the Social Foundations o f Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, from M illets to Nations. R e ­ search M onograph no. 39. Princeton, N .J.: Princeton University, Center fo r International Studies, 1973. Karpat, Kemal, ed. Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis. Leiden: B rill, 1973. M ardin, §erif. The Genesis o f Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modern­ ization c f Turkish Political Ideas. Princeton, N .J .: Princeton U niversity Press, 1962. Ram saur, Ernest E . The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution c f 1908. Prince­ ton, N .J.: Princeton U niversity Press, 1957.

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Barac, Antun. A History o f Yugoslav Literature. Translated by Peter MijuSkovic. Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1973. Dimaras, C. Th. A History o f Modem Greek Literature. Translated by Mary P. Gianos. Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1972. Mann, Stuart E. A lbanian Literature: A n Outline o f Prose, Poetry, and Drama. Lon d on : Q uaritch, 1955. M oser, Charles A. A History o f Bulgarian Literature, 865-1944- T h e H agu e: M ou ton , 1972.

Munteano, Basil. M odem Romanian Literature. Bucharest: Editura Cuvantul, 19+ 3-

391

Index

In a d d itio n to th e m aterial no rm ally co n tain ed in an index, th e reader will find here a listing o f m o st o f th e fo reig n w o rd s, usually T urkish, used in th e text. T h e page o r pages cited co n tain a tran slatio n o r a d efinition o f th e term . T h is index th u s also serves as a glossary. A b d u l A ziz, O tto m a n su ltan , 2 8 2 , 2 8 6 - 2 8 7 , 354 A b d u l H a m id I, O tto m a n sultan, 116 A b d u l H a m id II, O tto m a n su ltan, 3 5 4 A b d u l M ejid , O tto m a n su ltan , 2 8 1 , 2 8 2 A bel, K arl v o n , 2 5 4 A b u Bekir, 1 9 7 A chaean L eague, 7 A chaia, P rincipality o f, 23 A drian o p le, 3, 9, 3 1 , 114, 358 A drian o p le, T reaty o f (1 8 2 9 ): A d d itio n al A ct to , 2 6 5 ; A rticle V o f, 2 6 5 ; A rticle V I of, 2 4 1 ; A rticle X o f, 2 2 8 ; pro v isions of, 2 2 8 , 266, 278, 378 A driatic Sea, 1, 3 A egean Sea, 1, 3, 73 aga (defined), 8 9 agalik (defined), 8 9 A gram , see Z ag reb A grapha, 73 A grarian Law, 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 A hm ed C ev d et Pasha, 2 8 2 A hm ed III, O tto m a n sultan, 114 A inali Kavak, T reaty o f (1 7 7 9 ), 78 A kkerm an, 6 9 , 71 A kkerm an, C o n v e n tio n o f (1 8 2 6 ), 2 2 7 , 2 2 8 , 240, 265, 278 A ksakov, Ivan, 353 A lba Iulia, 154 A lbania, see A lbanians A lbanian L eague, see L eague o f P rizren A lbanians: C h ristian s am o n g , 8 1 ; early his­ to ry o f, 2 5 - 2 6 ; eig h teen th -cen tu ry centers o f p o w er o f, 8 4 ; as g ra n d vezirs, 8 1; as ja n ­ issaries a n d sipahis, 8 1 ; in K osovo, 9 3 ; an d L eague o f P rizren , 3 6 1 - 3 6 6 ; a n d mass conversions to Islam , 8 0 - 8 1 ; M uslim s am o n g , 8 1 , 8 3 , 3 5 0 , 3 6 1 , 3 6 3 , 3 6 4 ; u n d er O tto m a n E m p ire, 8 0 - 8 4 , 3 3 1 , 3 6 1 -3 6 6 ; an d rebellion o f S ken d erb eg , 3 4 —3 5; and regional divisions, 3 6 3 ; an d struggles for po w er, 9 7 ; and tax atio n , 8 0 —8 1, 8 3, 8 4 ; as

th reat to M o n te n eg ro , 8 7, 365 A lbanoi, see A lbanians A lbert, prince, 263 A leko Pasha, 369 A lexander o f B attenberg, 3 6 8 , 3 7 0 —372, 373, 374 A lexander th e G reat, 7 A lexander I, tsar o f R ussia, 120, 121, 191, 199, 2 0 6 , 2 0 7 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 4 , 2 2 6 , 2 7 1 , 302 A lexander II, tsar o f R ussia, 2 9 0 , 3 5 3 , 370, 372 A lexander I II , tsar o f R ussia, 3 5 4 , 3 7 0 A lexandria, 4 9 Ali C eläleddin Pasha, 349 Ali Pasha, 2 8 2 , 28 6 Ali P asha D erendelia, 34 9 Ali P asha H ek im O g lu , 90 Ali P asha o f Janina, 80, 8 4, 118, 120, 123, 1 2 4 -1 2 5 , 216, 217, 219, 274, 277, 282, 3 6 1 -3 6 2 alodial land, see m anorial land A m alia o f O ld en b u rg , 2 5 8 , 2 6 3 A natolia, 5, 2 2, 3 0, 4 1 , 27 9 A ndjelkovic, K o fa, 94 Andrässy, G yula, 3 5 4 , 355 A nghel, A tanasie, 154, 159 A nkara, battle o f (1 4 0 2 ), 31 A n tim I, exarch o f B ulgaria, 34 4 A ntioch, 4 9 A ntivari, see Bar A rabs, 13, 22 A rad, 91 A rber, A rbereshe, see A lbanians A rchipelago, D uchy o f the, 23 archon (defined), 5 7 - 5 8 , 75, 146 A rdahan, 360 Arge?, 21 A rgos, 5 A rm ansperg, C o u n t Joseph v o n , 2 5 4 , 2 5 8 , 26 0 armatole (defined), 6 1 , 76

393

Index armatolik (defined), 7 6; see also kapitanate A rm enians, 6 2 A rm en o p o u lo s, C o n stan tin e, 75 A rsenije I II C rnojevié, patriarch o f P e i, 92, 93, 129, 145, 148, 149 A rsenije IV, p atriarch o f Pec, 93 A ru m an ian s, see V lachs A sen, Ivan, 18 A sen, Jo h n II, B ulgarian em p ero r, 18 A sen, P eter, 18 askeri (defined), 4 0 , 4 4 A sparukh, 15 A stros, 2 21 A th en s, 4 , 5, 6 , 6 4 , 77 A th o s, M t., 2 9 2 , 3 3 7 A ttica, 5 A u g u stu s, R o m a n em p ero r, 7 A urelian, R o m a n em p ero r, 9 A usgleich o f 1 8 6 7 , 3 1 3 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 7 , 3 3 0 , 335, 377 A usterlitz, 120 A ustria, 3 1 3 ; see also H a b sb u rg E m pire, H u n g ary A u stria-H u n g ary , 3 1 3 ; see also H a b s b u rg E m ­ p ire, H u n g ary A ustroslavism , 3 0 9 , 3 1 7 Avars, 10, 13, 15, 19 «yaws (defined), 123 A zov, 6 5 - 6 6 , 6 8 A zov, Sea of, 15 Bach, A lexander, 311—3 1 2 , 3 1 8 , 326 bajrak (defined), 83 bajraktar (defined), 83 bakshish (defined), 2 9 9 Bâlcescu, N icolae, 1 1 1 , 2 7 4 , 3 2 4 , 325 B aldw in, c o u n t o f F landers, 23 Balkan (defined), 1 Balkan M o u n ta in s, 1, 3, 9 7 Balkan peninsula: ag ricultural land in, 3; and basis fo r m o d ern states, 2 6 —2 7 ; coloniza­ tio n o f, by G reeks, 4 , 7; H u n g a ria n settle­ m en ts in , 19; invasions of, 9 - 1 0 , 13, 15, 2 3 ; m ig ra tio n to , by B ulgars, 15; m ig ra­ tio n to , by Serbs, 18; m ineral w ealth of, 3; m o u n tain o u s ch aracter of, 1, 2 (M ap 1); native Illyrian p o p u latio n of, 2 5 ; nobles of, 2 9 - 3 0 ; peasants of, 2 9 - 3 0 ; perim eters of, 1; p o p u latio n of, 2 7 ; religious affiliations o f p o p u latio n s in, 2 9 ; river system of, 1; R o m a n settlem ents and influence in, 7, 9; T urkish settlem en ts in, 2 2 ; see also Balkan states, names of individual countries Balkan states: centralized bureaucratic re­ gim es in, 3 8 0 ; com m ercial activity in, 1 8 1 186; n in eteen th -cen tu ry alliances of, 2 4 6 , 3 3 3 —3 3 5 ; paths o f au to n o m y of, 3 7 7 ; role o f g re a t p o w ers in , 2 9 9 , 3 7 7 - 3 7 9 ; status of, in th e 1860s, 2 9 8 —2 9 9 ; see also Balkan

peninsula, names o f individual countries Balkan Wars (1 9 1 2 , 191 3 ), 39 Balta L im an, C o n v e n tio n o f (1 8 4 9 ), 2 7 3 274 Balta L im an, T reaty o f (1 8 3 8 ), 282 ban (defined), 25 B anat o f Tem esvar: u n d e r H a b s b u rg E m pire, 6 6 , 6 8 , 9 3 , 9 4 , 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 ; u n d e r H ungary, 3 0 4 ; O rth o d o x church in, 161; peasants in, 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 ; p o p u latio n of, 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 ; te r­ ritory added to , 72 Banja L uka, 350 Bar, 36 4 Bar, C o n fed eratio n of, 69 B arijiu, G eorge, 3 2 2 , 323 B a m u jiu , S im ion, 3 2 2 , 3 2 3 , 3 2 4 Basarab, prince o f W allachia, 21 basin bozuks (defined), 34 7 Basil II, B yzantine em peror, 1 7 -1 8 B atum , 360 Bayezid th e T h u n d e rb o lt, O tto m a n sultan, 31 beglik (defined), 89

begs, see beys Belcredi, C o u n t R ichard, 313 Belgrade, 3 4, 6 4 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 9 4, 2 0 3 , 2 4 3 ; as cen ter o f S erbian national m ovem ent, 92; as first center for a successful Balkan revo­ lution, 193; M uslim s in, 2 4 6 ; an d trade an d invasion routes, 3, 9 7, 182 B elgrade, T reaty o f (1 7 3 9 ), 6 8 , 105 Bern, Jozef, 3 1 0 , 3 1 1 , 325 Bender, 69 Benkovski, G eorge, 3 4 6 - 3 4 7 berats (defined), 181 Berlin, C ongress of, see B erlin, T reaty o f (18 7 8 ) Berlin, Treaty o f (1 8 7 8 ), 3 6 0 - 3 6 1 , 364, 365, 3 6 6 , 3 7 0 , 371 Berlin M em o ran d u m (1 8 7 6 ), 35 4 Bessarabia, 123, 125, 189, 2 8 7 , 2 9 0 , 355, 35 9 beys (defined), 8 3, 89 Bibescu, G eorge, 2 7 0 , 2 7 2 B iograd, 23 Bism arck, O tto von, 3 5 9 - 3 6 0 , 3 7 3 , 374, 375 B istrija, 150 B istritz, see Bistri{a B itola, 9 7, 3 6 2 , 3 6 3 , 365 Bitolj, see Bitola Black Sea, 1, 6 8 , 6 9 , 71 Blaj, 156, 3 2 1 , 323 B ogdan I, prince o f M oldavia, 21 B ogom il heresy, 16 B ohem ia, 309 B okhara, 188 B oniface IX, pope, 31 B onneval, C laude Alexander, c o u n t of, 116

Index Boris, B ulgarian ruler, 1 5 - 1 6 B oris II, B ulgarian em p ero r, 17 B osnia: ad m in istratio n o f, 3 4 9 ; an d A ustriaH u n g ary , 3 5 5 , 3 6 0 ; captains in, 88, 9 0; C h ristian p o p u latio n of, 8 9, 3 5 0 ; conver­ sions to Islam in , 3 6 , 8 8 ; and D alm atia, 2 5 ; and dev sh irm e, 4 1 ; an d D ubica War, 9 0 ; early h isto ry of, 2 5 ; 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 7 6 revolt in, 2 8 7 , 3 4 6 , 3 5 2 ; an d H a b s b u rg E m pire, 89, 9 0 ; u n d e r ju risd iction o f P atriarchate, 9 1 ; la n d h o ld in g in , 8 8 - 8 9 ; an d M uslim s, 8 8 , 8 9 - 9 0 , 3 4 8 - 3 5 0 ; an d N aiertan ije, 3 3 1 ; n o tab les in , 9 0 ; O rth o d o x ch u rch in, 8 9 ; u n d e r O tto m a n s, 32, 8 8 - 9 0 , 331, 3 4 8 - 3 5 2 , 3 6 1 ; peasants in, 8 9 , 3 5 1 ; and Serbia, 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 5 0 ; society of, 88 B o sp h o ru s, see Straits Botev, K h risto , 3 4 6 , 3 4 7 B raf, 121 Braila, 6 9 , 105, 2 6 5 B rankovic, G eo rg e, 31 Bra§ov, 15 0 , 15 2 , 182, 2 1 2 , 322 B ritia n u , D u m itru , 2 7 2 , 2 7 4 B rJtian u , Io n , 2 7 2 , 2 7 4 , 2 9 5 , 2 9 6 , 3 5 7 Bratislava, 139, 3 0 4 B rda, 8 5 , 8 7 , 2 4 8 , 2 5 0 B rincoveanu, C o n stan tin e, 6 6 , 101 B ucharest, 2 3 5 , 2 9 4 B ucharest, T reaty o f (1 8 1 2 ), 118, 164; A r­ ticle V III of, 189, 2 0 1 - 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 , 2 3 9 B uda, 6 4 , 9 1 , 13 9 , 3 0 4 , 3 0 8 ; see also B uda­ pest B udapest, 2 1 2 , 3 1 3 ; see also B uda, Pest B udva, 121 B ug R iver, 6 9 , 112 B ukovina, 6 6 , 7 0 , 16 0 , 2 9 0 B ulgarian B en ev o len t Society, 34 6 B ulgarian E xarchate, 3 4 4 B ulgarians a n d B ulgaria: an d A pril uprising, 3 4 7 - 3 4 8 ; cen ters o f political p o w er of, 3 7 0 ; an d co n stitu tio n al assem bly at T u rn o v o , 3 6 8 , 3 7 0 ; an d cultural revival, 3 3 5 , 3 3 7 ; early h isto ry of, 1 5 - 1 8 ; a n d 1 8 7 5 1876 revolt, 2 8 7 ; a n d F irst B ulgarian E m ­ pire, 16; G reek influence o n , 5 6, 5 7, 9 7 ; and G reek P ro ject, 7 1 ; an d H ellenoB ulgarian schools, 3 3 7 ; an d lan dholding, 3 3 8 - 3 3 9 , 3 4 2 ; an d local self-governm ent, 3 3 9 ; an d M uslim s, 9 5 , 3 6 6 ; and national m o v em en t, 3 3 5 - 3 4 8 , 3 6 6 - 3 7 3 ; an d O r ­ th o d o x ch u rch , 12, 9 5 , 9 7 ; u n d e r O tto m a n E m p ire, 9 5 - 9 7 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 9 ; and Panslav in ­ fluence, 3 3 8 ; an d peasants, 3 3 9 - 3 4 0 , 3 4 1 ; an d rev o lt in Plovdiv, 3 7 0 ; a n d R ussia, 3 3 7 - 3 3 8 , 3 4 1 , 3 4 3 , 3 4 4 , 3 4 5 - 3 4 6 , 359, 367—3 7 2 ; an d San S tefano, 3 5 8 ; an d Ser­ bia, 2 4 6 , 3 4 1 , 3 7 1 ; a n d S tara Z ag o ra re­ volt, 3 4 6 ; an d tax atio n , 3 4 0 - 3 4 1 ; and trad e, 3 3 8 —3 3 9

B ulgars, 1 0 ,1 5 , 19 B urebista, D acian king, 9 Bushati, Ib rah im Pasha, 362 B ushati, K ara M a h m u d , 8 4, 8 7, 123, 124, 125, 362 Bushati, M ehm ed Pasha, 84 Bushati, M ustafa Pasha, 3 4 9 , 362 B yron, L o rd , 2 2 4 - 2 2 5 B yzantine E m pire, 1 0 - 1 3 , 2 1 - 2 3 , 5 6; de­ cline and collapse of, 18, 2 2 - 2 3 , 3 1, 32; em p ero r in, 11; ethnic co m p o sitio n of, 11; G reek language in, 11; influence o n Balkan civilization of, 13, 2 9 ; religion in, 12—13; tem p o rary resurgences of, 15, 1 7 -1 8 , 23; and Venice, 2 2 - 2 3 ; see also R o m an E m pire B yzantium (city), see C o n stan tin o p le B yzantium (em pire), see B yzantine E m pire Callatis, 7 C allim achi, Scarlat, 208 C a m p o F o rm io , T reaty o f (1 7 9 7 ), 119, 162 C a n n in g , R o b e rt, 22 3 C antacuzino, C o n stan tin e, 27 3 C antacuzino, G eorge, 105 C antem ir, D im itrie, 6 6, 101 capitulations, 180, 2 3 6 , 378 C apodistrias, A vgoustinos, 2 2 3 , 2 2 8 C apodistrias, Ioannis, 2 0 5 , 2 0 6 , 2 0 7 , 2 1 1 , 221, 2 2 2 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 8 , 2 5 4 , 2 5 5 , 260 Caracalla, R o m an em peror, 11 C aragea, lo a n , 208 C arp ath ian M o u n ta in s, 1 C astlereagh, V iscount, 2 2 3 C atargiu, Lascar, 2 9 6 , 2 9 7 C atargiu, M arie, 2 4 6 C ath erin e th e G reat, 6 8 - 7 2 , 78, 8 6, 9 0 , 112, 119, 121, 157 C atholic church, 10, 5 3, 7 7, 8 1, 8 9, 9 1 , 137; see also C hristian churches, Papacy, U n iate church C engic, Sm ail A ga, 34 9 C erta P uncta, 157 C etinje, 36, 8 5, 2 4 7 , 2 4 8 , 253 C harlem agne, 2 2 , 128 C harles V, H a b sb u rg em peror, 34 C harles V I, H a b sb u rg em peror, 129, 133, 134, 143 C harles X, king o f F rance, 2 2 6 C harles X II, king o f Sw eden, 6 6 , 101 C harles o f H ohenzoU em -S igm aringen, 2 9 5 2 9 7 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 3 , 35 7 C harles o f L orraine, 64 C hem iaev, M . G ., 355 C hem ishevsky, N . G ., 338 C hesm e, 69 chetas (defined), 345 chiftliks (defined), 5 9 - 6 0 C hios, 6 9 , 2 1 7 chorbazhi, see archon

395

Index C h ristian churches: co n trasted , 77; division b etw een , 2 2 , 2 9 ; u n d e r H a b sb u rg s, 131— 132; tem p o rary u n io n of, 32 C h u rch , Sir R ich a rd , 221 C h u rch Slavic language, see O ld B ulgarian language C im p u lu n g , 21 Circassians, 2 8 6 , 3 4 7 -3 4 8 “circle o f equity,” 4 3 - 4 4 Civil C ro atia, 1 4 0 - 1 4 3 , 148, 150; see also C ro ats an d C ro atia Civil Slavonia, 14 0 , 1 4 3 - 1 4 5 , 150; see also Slavonia claca, 109 dacaji, 109 C lain, lo a n In o ch en tie, 1 5 5 -1 5 6 C laudius, R o m a n em p ero r, 9 Cloaca, 158 C luj, 151, 3 2 4 C o ch ran e, A lexander, 221 C oncivilitat, 158 C o n stan ta, 7 C o n stan tin e, o f R ussia, 70 C o n stan tin e, B yzantine em p ero r, 10, 11, 12 C o n stan tin o p le: as capital o f B yzantine E m ­ pire, 11; cap tu res of, 16, 18, 2 3 , 32; and th e devshirm e, 4 1 ; d isc o n te n t in, 115; as focus o f g reat invasion ro u tes, 3; janissaries in, 4 7 ; Ju stin ian ’s b u ild in g p ro g ram in, 13; as m ajo r p o rt, 30; R ussian th reat to , 71; v ulnerability of, 190; see also B yzantine E m p ire, P atriarch ate o f C o n stan tin o p le C o n stitu tio n alist P arty (S erbia), 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 C o rin th , 5, 7 C o m a ro , d o g e o f Venice, 85 C rete, 4 , 15, 2 3 , 6 4 , 76, 7 7, 2 1 9 ; desired by G reece, 3 5 5 ; revolts in, 2 8 7 , 375 C rim ea, 6 8 , 6 9 , 71 C rim ean W ar, 2 3 5 , 2 4 4 , 2 6 2 , 2 8 3 - 2 8 4 , 302 Cri§an, 158 C ro atian language, 3 0 6 - 3 0 7 , 3 1 5 , 320 C ro a to -H u n g a ria n P arty (C ro atia), 3 0 8 , 319, 320 C ro ats an d C ro atia: an d A ustroslav su p p o rt, 3 1 7 ; an d au to n o m y, 141, 142, 3 1 8 ; and d em an d fo r liberal reform s, 3 1 6 ; an d diet in Z ag reb , 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 ; early histo ry of, 2 3 2 5 ; g o v ern m en t o f, 141; u n d e r H a b sb u rg E m p ire, 3 4 , 6 5 , 129, 135, 1 4 0 - 1 4 5 ; and H u n g ary , 2 0 , 2 4 - 2 5 , 142, 3 0 4 , 3 0 5 ; and Illyrian m o v em en t, 3 0 4 - 3 0 8 ; an d nobles, 3 0 4 - 3 0 5 ; an d peasants, 1 4 3 - 1 4 5 ; political e v o lu tio n o f, after 1 848, 3 1 5 - 3 2 1 ; and re­ ligion, 2 4 ; an d R oyal C ouncil, 142; social classes of, 3 0 4 - 3 0 5 crusades, 18, 2 2 - 2 3 C u m an s, 10 C ustozza, b attle o f (1 8 4 8 ), 30 9 C uza, A lexander, 2 4 6 , 2 7 4 , 291—2 9 5 , 2 9 6 ,

2 9 7 , 332, 3 3 3 , 344 C yprus, 6 4 , 7 7, 3 6 1 -3 6 2 C yril, 16 Cyrillic alphabet, 16, 2 1, 2 9, 322 C zartoryski, P rince A dam , 198, 2 7 1 , 32 9 D acians and D acia, 4 , 19, 71, 112

dabis (defined), 196 D alm atia: an d Bosnia, 2 5 ; u n d e r H a b sb u rg E m pire, 164, 3 0 4 ; an d H ungary, 2 5 ; u n ­ d e r jurisdiction o f P atriarchate, 9 1 ; and Serbia, 2 5; and Venice, 2 3 , 2 5 , 6 5, 6 8 , 77, 85 D am ad Ib rah im Pasha, 114 Danica, 3 0 7 Danilevsky, N . I., 353 D an ilo , bishop o f M o n te n eg ro , 85 D an u b e R iver and valley, 1, 3, 4 , 9, 10, 19 D an u b e vilayet, 340 D an u b ian C onfederation, 332 D an u b ian Principalities: an d A grarian L aw o f 1 864, 2 9 3 - 2 9 4 ; boyars in, 2 1 , 1 0 1 -1 0 3 , 105, 106, 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 ; eth n ic backgrounds o f peoples of, 2 1 ; fiscal pressure o n , 1 0 4 105; an d G reek P roject, 7 1; as interest o f N ap o leo n I II , 3 2 9 ; lan d h o ld in g in, 108; and n in eteen th -cen tu ry centers o f au­ thority, 2 6 8 - 2 6 9 ; an d O rth o d o x church, 12; an d O tto m a n E m p ire in nin eteen th century, 2 6 5 ; an d O tto m a n -R u s s ia n w ar o f 1 7 1 0 -1 7 1 1 , 6 6, 189; peasants in, 106, 1 0 8 -1 0 9 , 2 6 7 - 2 6 8 ; P h an ario ts in, 56, 57, 102, 1 0 3 - 1 0 4 , 1 0 7 -1 1 0 ; rev o lu tio n in, 2 0 4 , 2 0 6 , 2 0 7 - 2 1 4 , 2 7 1 - 2 7 4 , 3 3 1 , 332; R ussian in terv en tio n in, 1 0 1 -1 0 5 , 1 1 0 112, 1 1 9 -1 2 3 , 2 6 4 - 2 7 4 , 2 8 7 - 2 8 8 , 2 9 0 , 3 3 7 ; social an d cultural changes in, d u rin g n in eteen th century, 2 7 1 ; as source o f m ili­ tary supply, 100; an d T reaty o f Jassy, 72; see also M oldavia, N ap o leo n ic W ars, R o ­ m anians an d R o m an ia, W allachia D ardanelles, see Straits dariilharb (defined), 39 dariilislam (defined), 39 D ashkov, I. A ., 2 6 9 - 2 7 0 D avydov, A. P., 369 D eak, Ferenc, 313 D ecanski, S tephen, 19 D ecebalus, D acian king, 9 D ed icated M onasteries, 104, 2 9 2 - 2 9 3 defterdars (defined), 57 D eligeorgis, E pam inondas, 2 6 4 dem es (defined), 255 D en m ark , 66 D ervish Pasha, 365 devshirme (defined), 4 1 , 4 6 D iber, 365 Digenis Akritas, 175 D im itu r, H ad zh i, 346

Index D io cletian , R o m a n em p ero r, 9 , 10 D ip lo m a o f 1 6 9 9 , 1 54 D ip lo m a o f 1 8 6 0 , 312 D israeli, B enjam in, 3 5 6 Divan (defined), 4 2 D jakovic, B ish o p Isaija, 92 djizia (defined), 81 D n iep er R iver, 6 9 D n iester R iv er, 7 2 , 112 D o b ru d ja, 3 5 9 D o d a, P re n k B ib, 3 6 4 D o lg u ru k ii, Iu rii, 86 do m enical lan d , see m an o rial land D o n d u k o v -K o rsak o v , P rince A. M ., 3 6 8 D ràgàçani, 2 1 3 dragoman (defined), 5 4 - 5 5 , 1 8 0 -1 8 1 D rag o m an Pass, 3 D raskovic, Janko, 3 0 6 , 3 0 7 D rava R iver, 1, 3 1 7 Dreikaiserbund, see T h ree E m p e ro rs, A lliance D rin R iver, 3 D rin a R iver, 10 D u al A lliance, 3 73 D u b ica W ar, 9 0 D u b ro v n ik , 2 5 , 3 0 , 9 8 - 9 9 , 119, 121 D u lcig n o , see U lcinj Dunavski Lebed, 345 D u razzo , see D u rrës D u rrës, 3, 2 5 , 182 D uSan, S tep h en , 19, 2 7 , 36 E astern B arrier, 6 4 E astern Q u e stio n , 1 8 6 - 1 9 2 , 2 8 3 , 302 E astern R o m a n E m p ire, see B yzantine E m ­ pire E astern R u m elia, 3 6 6 , 3 6 8 - 3 7 1 E d ic t o f T o leratio n (1 7 8 1 ), 1 3 7 -1 3 8 , 148, 159 E d im e , see A d rian o p le E g y p t, 4 , 2 3 , 2 6 2 , 3 75 E lizabeth, em press o f R ussia, 8 5, 134 E lizabeth o f W ied, 2 9 6 E lp h in sto n e, L o rd , 72 en lig h ten ed d esp o tism , 135 E n lig h ten m en t, influence of, o n Balkan lead­ ers, 1 7 1 -1 7 2 eparchies (defined), 2 55 E p etio n , 7 E p id au ru s, 2 21 E p id a u ru s c o n stitu tio n , 2 5 8 E p iru s, 19, 2 3 , 7 3 , 2 1 7 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 4 , 361 E rfu rt, 12 2 , 201 E tairia, see F ilik i E t atria ethnarch (d efin ed ), 5 0 E u g en e, p rince o f Savoy, 6 5 , 6 8 , 116 eyalet (defined), 5 7 Fadeev, R . A ., 3 5 3 F eb ru ary P a te n t o f 1 8 6 1 , 3 1 2 , 3 1 9

Feraios, R igas, 176 F erd in an d I, H a b sb u rg em p ero r, 3 0 2 , 30 9 F erd in an d , king o f H ungary, 34 F erd in an d o f S axe-C oburg, 3 7 2 , 3 7 4 fetva (defined), 43 Filaret, m etro p o litan o f M oscow , 34 4 F ilik i Etairia, 2 0 4 , 2 0 5 —2 1 3 , 2 1 6 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 3 , 2 3 9 , 3 3 2 ; basic objective of, 2 0 5 , 2 0 7 , 2 3 1 ; o rg an izatio n of, 20 6 firm an (defined), 4 0 fis (defined), 83 F ium e, see Rijeka Florence, C ouncil of, o f 1 4 39, 3 2 , 1 5 3 -1 5 4 Foaia pentru minte, tmma ji literatura, 322 F o u rth C rusade, 18, 2 2 - 2 3 France: alliance w ith R ussia of, 3 2 9 , 375; an d E astern Q u estio n , 188; an d 1848 rev­ o lu tio n , 3 0 9 ; and G reek P roject, 70; and H ab sb u rg s, 6 4 , 8 7, 161—164; and O tto ­ m ans, 3 4, 5 3, 6 4 , 6 9 , 71, 72, 1 1 8 -1 1 9 ; an d P oland, 3 2 9 ; and Serbs, 2 4 4 ; and V en­ ice, 8 7; w ars of, 6 5 , 6 6 , 8 7 , 119, 3 3 0 ; see also C rim ean W ar, F ranco-P russian War, N apoleonic Wars Francis I, king o f F rance, 3 4 , 6 4 F rancis I, H a b s b u rg em p ero r, 3 0 2 , 305 Francis II, H a b sb u rg em p ero r, 161 Franco-P russian W ar, 2 9 6 , 3 3 0 , 352 F ran k o p an , F ran K rsto, 141 F ranz Joseph, H a b sb u rg em p ero r, 309, 311, 3 1 2 , 3 1 3 , 3 1 6 , 3 1 8 , 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 , 3 2 7 , 353, 375 F rasheri, A bdul, 3 6 3 , 3 6 5 , 36 6 F rederick the G reat, 6 8, 6 9 , 134 Freicorps (defined), 9 4 F u ad Pasha, 2 7 3 , 28 2 Fundus Regius, 1 5 1 -1 5 2 G ab ro v o , 3 3 7 G agic, Jerem ija, 2 5 0 G aj, L judevit, 3 0 6 , 3 0 7 G alatis, N ikolaos, 2 0 5 G allipoli, 30 G arasanin, Ilija, 2 4 3 - 2 4 4 , 2 4 5 , 331, 333, 3 5 0 -3 5 1 Gazeta de Transilvania, 32 2 G azi H asan Pasha, 117 G elu, D u k e, 156 G en o a, 30 G eo rg e I, long o f G reece, 2 6 3 - 2 6 4 , 333 G erm an language, 138, 1 4 2 -1 4 3 , 3 0 1 , 311, 326 G erm anos, b ish o p o f P atras, 2 0 6 , 2 1 7 G erm ans, see Saxons G erm any, 3 3 0 , 375 G hegs, 83 G hica, A lexander, 2 6 8 , 2 6 9 , 2 7 0 G hica, G rigore, 107 G hica, G rig o re D ., 2 1 4

397

Index G hica, Io n , 2 7 2 G iers, N icholas K arlovich, 2 6 9 - 2 7 0 , 3 7 0 , 3 78 G iu rg iu , 2 6 5 G jirokastër, 8 1 , 365 G lagolitic script, 16 G o eth e, J. W. v o n , 175 G olescu, A . G ., 2 7 2 G olescu, N icolae, 2 7 2 G olescu, R a d u , 2 7 2 G o luchow ski, A gen o r, 375 G orchakov, A lexander M ., 3 5 2 , 3 5 5 , 378 G ôrgey, A rth u r, 3 1 0 G o th s, 9, 19 G rah o v o , 2 5 1 , 2 5 3 G raz, 3 0 5 , 3 0 6 G reat B ritain: an d th e E astern Q u estio n , 1 8 7 -1 8 8 ; an d E g y p t, 3 7 5 ; naval p o w e r of, 3 - 4 ; an d O tto m a n s, 72, 119, 123, 3 3 1 ; an d P o lan d , 3 2 9 ; reaction to G reek revolu­ tio n o f, 2 2 4 - 2 2 6 ; an d R ussia, 7 2; “splen­ d id isolatio n ” o f, 3 7 5 ; an d trad e w ith Asia, 4 7 ; see also C rim ean W ar G reater M o rav ian K in g d o m , see M oravia G reat Id ea, see M egali Idea G reek C ath o lic ch u rch , see U n iate church G reek language, 10, 11, 12, 2 3 , 2 7 , 5 5, 1 7 5 1 77, 3 3 7 G reek P roject, 7 0 - 7 1 , 7 8 - 8 0 , 8 7 G reeks an d G reece: ancient histo ry of, 4 - 7 ; and arm y, 2 5 6 - 2 5 7 , 2 6 0 , 3 3 3 ; an d a u to n ­ o m o u s g o v ern m en t, 3 3 1 ; an d B ulgarians, 5 6 , 5 7 , 9 7 ; an d co m m unal g o vernm ent, 7 3 - 7 5 ; an d C o n s titu tio n o f 1844, 2 6 1 ; an d C rete, 3 5 5 ; an d first n atio n al g o v ern ­ m en t, 2 2 2 ; an d G reat B ritain, 2 2 4 - 2 2 6 ; an d G reek P ro ject, 7 1; u n d e r K in g O th o n , 2 5 4 - 2 6 4 ; an d lan d h o ld in g , 2 5 7 - 2 5 8 ; and levels o f society, 2 0 4 , 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 ; an d local a d m in istratio n , 2 5 5 ; an d M acedonia, 3 3 3 ; an d m aritim e m onopoly, 181; and n o ­ tables, 7 3 , 7 5 ; an d O rth o d o x church, 12, 2 5 6 ; u n d e r th e O tto m a n s, 7 3 - 8 0 ; political p arties o f, 2 6 0 ; an d p o p u latio n co n cen tra­ tio n s, 7 3 ; an d rev o lu tio n , 2 0 4 - 2 2 9 , 2 6 3 2 6 4 ; an d R ussia, 7 8 - 8 0 , 2 2 3 - 2 2 4 , 2 2 6 2 2 8 , 3 3 7 ; an d Serbs, 5 7 , 2 4 0 ; an d Slavic states, 3 5 8 ; an d T reaty o f L o n d o n , 2 2 8 ; and Venice, 7 6 - 7 7 ; an d w ar w ith O tto m a n E m p ire (1 8 9 7 ), 3 7 5 ; see also P hanariots G reiner, Jo h a n n , 2 5 4 gubem ium (defined), 153 G ü lh an e d ecree (1 8 3 9 ), 2 8 2 , 343 G usinje, 3 6 4 guvem adur (defined), 85 H a b s b u rg E m p ire: an d agriculture, 3 0 2 3 0 3 ; a n d B an at o f Tem esvar, 6 6 , 6 8 , 9 3, 9 4 , 1 6 0 —16 1 ; basic n a tu re o f em p ire of,

3 0 0 - 3 0 1 ; an d Bosnia, 8 9 , 9 0 , 3 5 5 , 360; centralized au th o rity of, 127, 165; as ch ief th reat to O tto m a n E m p ire, 5 3 , 7 7 , 105; co n trasted w ith O tto m a n E m pire, 1 2 7 133, 1 6 5 -1 6 8 ; and C ro ats, 3 4, 6 5 , 129, 135, 1 4 0 -1 4 5 ; and D alm atia, 164, 3 0 4 ; and E astern Q u estio n , 1 8 6 —187; and F rance, 6 4, 87, 1 6 1 -1 6 4 ; an d G reek P ro j­ ect, 7 0; an d H ercegovina, 3 5 5 , 3 6 0 ; and H ungary, 6 5, 1 2 9 -1 3 0 , 131, 1 3 9 -1 4 5 , 3 0 3 - 3 0 4 , 3 1 0 - 3 1 5 , 3 1 7 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 7 -3 2 8 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 4 - 3 3 5 , 3 7 7 ; lan d h o ld in g under, 1 3 2 -1 3 3 ; an d M ilitary F ro n tier, 1 4 5 -1 4 8 ; an d M o n te n eg ro , 8 7; an d nam e A ustnaHungary, 3 1 3 ; an d n eutrality in C rim ean W ar, 3 0 2 ; nobles u n d er, 129, 1 3 0 -1 3 1 , 133, 3 0 2 - 3 0 3 ; peasants u nder, 1 3 2 -1 3 3 , 135, 137, 1 6 7 -1 6 8 , 3 0 2 - 3 0 3 , 3 2 8 ; and P oland, 3 2 9 ; p o sitio n o f B alkan peoples u nder, 166; p o sitio n o f m o n arch under, 1 2 9 -1 3 0 ; and P ragm atic S anction, 1 3 3 134; reform s under, 1 3 4 - 1 3 9 , 1 6 5 -1 6 6 , 168; religion un d er, 128, 1 3 1 -1 3 2 ; and revolution o f 1848, 3 0 9 ; an d R om ania, 135, 152, 1 5 5 -1 6 0 , 3 7 4 ; and R ussia, 2 4 4 , 2 8 8 , 3 1 2 ; an d Serbs, 6 8 , 9 1 - 9 5 , 135, 145, 1 4 8 -1 5 0 , 316, 3 7 4 ; an d Slavonia, 3 4, 6 5, 140, 1 4 3 -1 4 5 ; and trad e w ith Balkans, 97, 182; and T ransylvania, 6 5 , 101, 1 5 0 -1 6 0 , 30 4 , 3 2 1 , 3 3 2 ; and Treaty o f B elgrade, 6 8 ; an d Treaty o f K arlow itz, 6 5 , 6 6 , 9 7 , 9 8 , 101, 2 8 3 ; an d Treaty o f P assarow itz, 8 9, 93, 105; and Treaty o f P ressburg, 121; and W allachia, 105; and w ar w ith O tto m a n E m p ire (1 6 8 2 -1 6 9 9 ), 6 4 - 6 5 , ( 1 7 1 4 1 7 1 8 ), 6 8 , 9 3 , ( 1 7 3 6 -1 7 3 9 ) , 6 8 , 9 3 , 105, ( 1 7 8 8 -1 7 9 1 ) , 7 1 -7 2 , 9 4 - 9 5 ; an d w ar w ith Prussia (1 8 6 6 ), 3 1 3 , 3 3 0 ; an d w ar w ith Sardinia and France (1 8 5 9 ), 3 3 0 ; see also H o ly L eague, N apoleonic Wars H ad ji M ustafa Pasha, 195, 196 H ad rian o p o lis, see A drianople H adzhivulkov, Vasil, 345 H afiz Pasha, 198 H ag ia S ophia, 13 haiduks, haiduts, see klephts H alil H am id , 117 harts, 182 haraf, 61 H a tti H u m ay u n , 2 8 4 - 2 8 5 H eideck, K arl von, 2 5 4 , 2 5 8 H ellas, 4 ; see also G reeks an d G reece H ellenes, 4 ; see also G reeks an d G reece H ercegovina: and A ustria-H ungary, 3 5 5 , 3 6 0 ; captains in, 8 8, 9 0 ; C hristian p o p u la­ tio n of, 8 9; conversions to Islam in, 88; 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 7 6 revolt in, 2 8 7 , 3 4 6 , 3 5 2 ; u n ­ d e r jurisdiction o f P atriarchate, 9 1; and M uslim s, 8 8, 8 9, 3 4 8 - 3 5 0 ; an d the N aier-

398

Index tan ije, 3 3 1 ; n o tab les in , 9 0 ; O rth o d o x ch u rch in , 8 9 ; u n d e r O tto m a n s, 3 2, 8 8 90, 3 3 1 , 3 4 8 - 3 5 2 , 3 6 1 ; peasants in, 89; an d P eter th e G reat’s Balkan cam paign, 6 6; an d Serbia, 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 5 0 H erd er, Jo h a n n G o ttfrie d , 172, 306 H e rm a n n sta d t, see Sibiu H erzen , A lexander, 3 3 8 H exabilis, 75 History o fMontenegro, 8 6 H istria, see Istro s

hodza-bashi, see anhon H o ly Alliance, 19 1 , 2 8 8 , 3 0 2 , 3 1 1 - 3 1 2 , 329 H o ly L eague, 6 4 , 7 7 , 8 5 , 92 H o ly W ar: co n c e p t o f, 3 9 ; as m ain function o f O tto m a n E m p ire, 4 2 ; against R ussia, 227 H o rea, 158, 3 02 hospodar (defined), 6 6 H u b e rtu sb e rg , T reaty o f (1 7 6 3 ), 134 H u n g a ria n lan g u ag e, 143, 150, 3 0 5 , 3 1 5 , 322, 323 H u n g ary : an d B an at o f Tem esvar, 3 0 4 ; and b attle o f M o h acs, 3 4 , 128; an d C roatia, 2 0 , 2 4 - 2 5 , 14 2 , 3 0 4 , 3 0 5 ; an d D alm atia, 2 5 ; d ie t o f, 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 ; an d em igre revolu­ tio n ary m o v em en t, 3 3 2 ; an d H a b sb u rg E m p ire, 6 5 , 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 , 131, 1 3 9 -1 4 5 , 3 0 3 -3 0 4 , 3 1 0 -3 1 5 , 317, 319, 3 2 7 -3 2 8 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 2 ; an d M ag y ar nationality, 315; peasants in , 3 1 7 - 3 1 8 ; an d rev o lu tio n o f 1 8 4 8 - 1 8 4 9 , 3 2 9 ; a n d Slavonia, 2 5, 3 0 4 ; and T ransylvania, 2 0 , 2 1 , 151, 152, 3 2 3 3 2 7 , 3 32 H iin k a r Iskelesi, T reaty o f, see U n k iar Iskelessi, T reaty o f (1 8 3 3 ) H u n s , 9 , 1 0 ,'1 9 H u n y a d i, Jo h n , 31 H iisein , 3 4 9 H var, 121 H y d ra, 2 6 , 2 1 7 Ian cu , A vram , 3 2 3 , 325 Ian cu o f H u n a d o a ra , see H u n y a d i, John la§i, 6 6 , 6 8 , 1 05, 121, 2 1 2 , 2 3 5 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 2 , 294 Ib rah im P asha, 2 1 9 , 2 7 7 , 27 8 Ignatiev, N ich o las Pavlovich, 3 4 3 , 3 4 4 , 345, 354, 358 Illyrian m o v em en t, 3 0 6 - 3 0 8 , 331 Illyrian Party, see N a tio n a l P arty (C roatia) Illyrian P rovinces, 1 62—163 Illyrians an d Illyria, 4 , 2 5 , 26 Illyrium , 9 In d e p e n d e n t N atio n al P arty (C ro atia), 31 9 Io an n in a, see Janina Io n ia, 5 Io n ian Islands, 6 8 , 7 7 Io n ian Sea, 1

Iro n G ates, 1 Isker R iver, an d valley, 1, 3 Islaz P roclam ation, 2 7 2 Ism ail, 69 ispravnik (defined), 107 Issa, 7 Istanbul, see C o n stan tin o p le istimalet (defined), 42 Istria, 70, 164 Istros, 7 Italian language, 25 Italy, 3 2 9 , 330, 3 3 2 ; see also L om bardyV enetia, K in g d o m of, N aples, K in g d o m of, P ied m o n t, Sicily, T w o Sicilies, K in g d o m o f th e, Venice Ivelic, M arko, 121 Janina, 8 4, 125, 3 6 2 , 363 janissaries: A lbanians as, 8 1; converts as, 4 1 ; d u ties of, 4 2 ; as fighting force, 4 7 ,4 8 ; need fo r reform of, 114; as political force, 47—4 8 ; in provinces, 4 7 ; rebellion of, 114; role in first Serbian revolution of, 1 9 5 -1 9 8 Jassy, see Ia§i Jassy, Treaty o f (1 7 9 2 ), 72, 8 0, 112 Jelacic, B aron Josip, 3 1 6 , 3 1 7 , 318 Jerusalem , 49 Jo h n , archduke, 3 0 9 Jom ini, A. G ., 378 Joseph II, H a b sb u rg em peror, 70, 72, 9 0, 112, 129, 1 3 4 -1 3 8 , 142, 145, 148, 1 5 6 159, 160, 167, 168, 3 0 1 , 311 Jovanovic, Peter, 24 3 Justinian, B yzantine em peror, 13

kadi (defined), 43 kadiliks (defined), 5 7 kafes (defined), 4 6 kajkavian dialect, 3 0 7 K alem egdan, 2 4 6 K aloyan, B ulgarian em peror, 18 kanuns (defined), 4 0 kapitanate (defined), 76, 88 kapitanios (defined), 76 kapoi (defined), 76 kapudan-pasha (defined), 75 K aradjordje P etrovic, 196, 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 , 2 0 1 , 2 0 2 , 2 0 7 , 2 0 9 , 2 3 1 , 2 4 0 , 2 5 9 , 342 K aradjordjevic, A lexander, 2 4 3 , 2 4 4 , 245 K aradzha, S tephen, 346 K aradzic, V uk, 177, 3 0 6 , 3 0 7 , 308 K ara M ustafa Pasha, 6 4 K aravelov, L iu ben, 346 K arlobag, 146 K arlovac, 146 K arlow itz, see Srem ski Karlovci K arlow itz, Treaty o f (1 6 9 9 ), 5 5, 182, 378; A rticles X III an d XTV of, 6 5 ; B osnian b o r­ d e r established by, 8 9 ; H a b s b u rg gains

399

Index K arlow itz, T reaty o f (cont.) fro m , 6 5 , 6 6 , 9 7 , 9 8 , 101, 2 8 3 ; results of, 1 29, 14 0 ; V enetian gains from , 7 7, 8 5 ; as w atersh ed o f O tto m a n history, 65 K ars, 3 6 0 K astrio ti, G eo rg e, see S kenderbeg katharevousa, 176 K atkov, M . N ., 3 53 K atu n i, 85 K au n itz, C o u n t W enzel v o n , 134 kaza (defined), 5 7 , 2 8 5 K azanlük, 3 3 7 K erch, 6 9 K h erso n , 71 K hiva, 188 K h o tin , 105 Kilia, 6 9 kirdjalis (defined), 9 7 Kiselev, C o u n t Pavel D ., 2 6 6 , 2 6 7 - 2 6 8 , 368 K lau sen b u rg , see Cluj K lein, M icu, see C lain, lo a n In o ch en tie klephts (defined), 6 1 - 6 2 , 7 5 , 7 6, 175 K lisura, 3 4 7

knez, see archon knezina (defined), 91 koca-baji, see archon K o fa ’s W ar, 9 4 , 9 5 K ogälniceanu, M ih ail, 2 7 4 , 2 9 3 , 3 5 7 K o k an d , 188 K olettis, Io an n is, 2 2 2 , 2 2 3 , 2 6 0 , 2 6 1 , 26 2 K ollär, Jan, 3 0 6 K o lo k o tro n is, T h e o d o ra s , 2 0 6 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 , 222, 223, 260 K o lo m an , k in g o f C ro atia, 2 4 K o lo zsv ir, see Cluj K o m iro m , 91 Königsboden, see Fundus Regius K onya, 2 7 8 , 281 K op riv sh titsa, 3 4 7 K o p rü lü , Fazil A h m ed , 4 6 , 5 5, 6 4 K opriilii, M e h m ed , 4 6 , 64 K o p rü lü , M u stafa, 6 5 K orais, A d am an tio s, 176 ΚοΓςέ, 81 K o ritsa, see ΚοΓςέ K oso v o , 8 1 , 9 3 , 2 4 5 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 3 , 36 3 K o so v o P olje, b attle o f (1 3 8 9 ), 3 1, 175, 308 K o ssu th , L ajos, 3 0 3 , 3 1 0 , 3 1 7 , 3 2 9 K o to r, 8 5 , 12 0 , 12 1 , 2 4 8 K o u m o u n d o u ro s, A lexander, 2 6 4 K o u n to u rio tis, G eo rg e, 221 K rem sier, 3 0 9 , 3 1 0 K ro n stad t, see Brasov K ruje, 2 6 K ru m , K h an , B ulgarian ruler, 15, 16 K rusi, battle o f (1 7 9 6 ), 8 7 K rustevich, G avril EfFendi, 3 6 9 K u b an , 15

K uchuk K ainarji, T reaty o f (1 7 7 4 ): Articles V II and X IV of, 70; A rticle X V I of, 111; and balance o f p o w e r in Black Sea, 6 9; provisions of, 6 9 , 7 0, 7 8, 111, 2 1 3 , 2 8 3 , 3 7 8 ; an d R ussian influence in D an u b ian P rincipalities, 110, 265 K ücük K ajnarca, T reaty of, see K u ch u k K ain­ arji, T reaty o f (1774) kul (defined), 4 1 , 4 6 kuluk (defined), 2 4 8 kumparia (defined), 25 9 K upa River, 1 K utsovlachs, see Vlachs K u tuzov, M . I., 201 K vatem ik, E u g en , 3 1 8 , 320 Kyriakodromtom, 3 3 7 Ladislas I, king o f H un g ary , 2 4 L aibach, see L jubljana L aibach, C ongress of, 192 Lashkarev, S. L ., I l l L atin language, 2 5 , 2 9 , 138, 143, 3 0 5 , 315, 322 L azar, prince o f Serbia, 31 L eague o f P rizren, 364, 3 6 5 , 3 6 6 L eith a R iver, 313 L em eni, lo a n , 3 2 2 , 3 2 3 , 3 2 4 , 32 6 L eontije, m etro p o litan , 2 0 2 L eo p o ld o f S axe-C oburg, 2 2 2 , 22 8 L eo p o ld I, H a b sb u rg em peror, 9 2, 139, 152, 154, 159 L eo p o ld II, H a b sb u rg em peror, 72, 9 2 , 129, 138, 159, 160, 161 Levski, Vasil, 346

liva, see sanjak L jubljana, 211 L om bardy-V enetia, K in g d o m of, 164 L o n d o n , 54 L o n d o n , Treaty o f (1 8 3 0 ), 2 2 8 , 378 L o u is P hilippe, king o f F rance, 309 L o u is X V I, king o f F rance, 161 L o u is II, k in g o f H ungary, 34 Lov£en, M t., 85 L uck, T reaty o f (1 7 1 1 ), 101 L u d w ig I, king o f Bavaria, 2 2 8 , 2 5 4 LunevUle, Treaty o f (1 8 0 1 ), 162

M acedonia: desired by G reeks an d Serbs, 3 3 3 ; an d G reek P roject, 7 1; M uslim s in, 9 5 ; u n d e r O tto m a n s, 9 5 - 9 7 , 2 1 7 , 331, 360, 3 6 1 ; p o w er struggles in, 9 7 M agyar language, 143 M agyars, 10 M agyrones, see C ro a to -H u n g a ria n P arty (C roatia) maballas (defined), 62 M a h m u d I, O tto m a n sultan, 116

400

Index M a h m u d II, O tto m a n su ltan , 1 2 5 -1 2 6 , 2 0 1 , 216, 219, 227, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 341 M a h m u d N ed im , 2 8 7 M akrigiannis, Io an n is, 2 31—23 2 m anorial lan d , 132, 163 M an zik ert, b attle o f (1 0 7 1 ), 22 M arashli A li P asha, 2 0 3 M arch L aw s o f 1 8 4 8 , 3 13 M ark o , K rali or Kraljcvic, see M ark, Prince M aria T h eresa, H a b s b u rg em press, 6 8 , 70, 12 9 , 1 3 4 - 1 3 6 , 14 2 , 14 7 , 156, 167, 301 M arie A n to in ette, q u een o f F rance, 161 M aritsa R iver, b attle o f (1 3 7 1 ), 31 M ark, Prince, 175 M arkovic, N ich o las, 8 6 M arseilles, 5 4 M au rer, L u d w ig v o n , 2 5 4 , 2 5 5 , 2 5 6 , 25 8 M av ro co rd at, C o n stan tin e, 105, 106, 107, 108, 1 67 M a v ro co rd at, N ico lae, 1 0 7 M av ro k o rd ato s, A lexander, 5 5, 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 , 222, 260, 261, 262 M av ro k o rd ato s, Io an n is, 55 M avrom ichalis, P etrobey, 2 0 6 M axim ian, R o m a n em p ero r, 9 M azeppa, Ivan S tepanovich, 66 mazili (defined), 1 07 M azuranic, Ivan, 3 1 9 MeceUe, 2 8 2 M ed iterran ean A g reem en ts, 3 7 4 M ed ju m u rje, 3 1 7 M egali Id ea (G rea t Id ea), 5 6 , 2 6 2 , 331 M e h m ed I, O tto m a n sultan, 31 M e h m ed th e C o n q u e ro r, O tto m a n sultan, 32, 4 6 , 4 9 M eh m ed III, O tto m a n su ltan, 4 5 - 4 6 M e h m ed P asha K ukavica, 9 0 M eh m ed R e sh id Pasha, 3 4 9 , 3 6 2 M enshikov, P rince A lexander, 2 8 3 M esem bria, 7 M etaxas, A ndreas, 2 6 0 M e th o d iu s, 16 M e tte rn ich , P rince C lem ens v o n , 163, 192, 2 1 1 ,2 2 3 , 3 0 1 - 3 0 2 , 3 0 9 M ichael V I II P alaeologus, B yzantine em ­ peror, 2 3 M ichael th e Brave, prin ce o f W allachia, 35 M ickiew icz, A ., 175 M id h a t P asha, 2 8 2 , 340 M ilakovic, D ., 2 5 0 M ilitary F ro n tier, 139, 140, 143, 1 4 5 -1 4 8 , 1 5 7 -1 5 8 , 161 M iliu tin , S erbian ruler, 19 millet (defined), 4 8 - 5 3 millet bashi (defined), 5 0 M inchiaki, see M inciaky, M atei L eovich M inciaky, M a tei L eovich, 2 6 6 , 2 6 9

M ircea th e O ld , W allachian ruler, 31 m iri (defined), 59 M isolonghi, 2 1 7 ,2 1 9 , 2 2 4 , 2 7 7 , 362 M ohäcs, battle o f (1 5 2 6 ), 3 4 , 128 M oldavia: a u to n o m y of, 9 9 ; centers o f po w er in, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 ; first prince in, 2 1 ; O rganic S tatutes in, 2 6 6 - 2 6 9 ; u n d e r O tto m an s, 3 5, 36, 9 9 - 1 0 1 ; peasants in, 109; and R ussia, 6 8 , 1 0 1 -1 0 5 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 , 123, 2 6 4 2 7 4 ; see also D an u b ian Principalities, R o ­ m anians an d R o m an ia M oltke, H e lm u t von, 281 M onastir, see Bitola M o ngols, 10 M o n te n eg ro : a n d A lbania, 8 7, 3 6 5 ; attack o n , by O m e r P asha, 3 4 9 ; attem p ts a t cen­ tral ad m in istratio n of, 2 4 8 - 2 5 4 ; a u to n o ­ m o u s g o v ern m en t in, 3 3 1 ; characteristics of, 2 4 7 ; an d C ongress o f B erlin, 3 6 0 , 3 6 4 ; d u al offices in, 2 4 7 , 2 4 9 ; e m ig ratio n from , 2 4 7 ; a n d H a b s b u rg E m p ire, 8 7 ; justice in, 2 4 8 - 2 4 9 ; an d th e N acertanije, 3 3 1 ; n in e ­ te e n th century p o p u latio n of, 2 4 8 ; O r th o ­ dox chu rch in, 5 6, 8 5 ; an d O tto m a n E m ­ pire, 3 6, 8 4, 8 7 , 2 5 2 - 2 5 4 , 3 5 5 - 3 6 1 ; revolt in, 8 5, 2 5 1 ; an d R ussia, 6 6 , 8 5 - 8 7 , 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 , 2 5 2 , 2 5 3 ; an d San S tefano, 3 5 8 —3 5 9 ; an d S erbian national objectives, 3 5 0 ; taxation in, 8 4; an d V en­ ice, 85 M orava R iver an d valley, 1, 3, 4 M oravia, 16 M o ro sin i, Francesco, 77 M o ru zzi, A lexander, 122 M ostar, 8 8 , 248 muftis (defined), 43 M u h a m m a d Ali, 2 1 9 , 2 2 3 , 2 2 7 , 2 7 4 , 2 7 7 , 2 7 8 , 2 8 1 , 2 8 5 , 378 miilk (defined), 59 M ü n n ic h , G eneral, 6 8, 105 M u ra d I, O tto m a n sultan, 31 M u ra d II, O tto m a n sultan, 3 1 , 34 M u ra d IV, O tto m a n sultan, 6 4 M u ra d V, O tto m a n sultan, 35 4 M ustafa B ayraktar P asha, 125, 126 M ustafa R esh id P asha, 2 8 2 M ustafa III, O tto m a n sultan, 116 M ustafa IV, O tto m a n sultan, 125, 126, 201 M üteferrika, Ibrahim , 115 mütevelli (defined), 59 M ycenae, 4 N afertan ije, 2 4 4 - 2 4 5 , 3 3 1 , 333 N ag o d b a, 3 2 0 , 3 2 7

nahije, see nahiye nabiye (defined), 5 7, 9 3 , 2 8 5 N aissus, see NiS N aples, K in g d o m of, 35

401

Index N ap o leo n B o n ap arte, 1 1 8 - 1 2 0 , 162, 199, 278 N ap o leo n H I, 2 9 0 , 2 9 5 , 3 2 9 N ap o leo n ic W ars, 1 1 8 - 1 2 3 , 1 6 2 -1 6 4 N a p p ist P arty (G reece), 2 6 0 nart (defined), 109 N arv a, b attle o f (1 7 0 0 ), 6 6 natio n alist ideologies, 1 7 2 -1 7 8 : an d history, 1 7 7 -1 7 8 ; an d language, 173, 1 7 5 -1 7 7 ; an d relig io n , 1 7 4 - 1 7 5 , 178 N a tio n a l P arty (C ro atia), 3 0 8 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 6 , 3 1 8 ,3 1 9 Nationsuniversitdt (defined), 1 5 1 -1 5 2 N a u p lio n , 2 2 1 , 2 5 4 N av arin o , 78 N av arin o Bay, b attle o f (1 8 2 7 ), 2 2 6 , 2 2 7 , 265 N eo fit, M e tro p o lita n , 2 7 2 , 2 7 3 N eretv a R iver, 1, 3 N eseb u r, see M esem bria N esselrode, K arl, 2 05 N eth erlan d s, th e , 4 7 , 72 N icaea, C o u n cil o f (3 2 5 ), 12 N icaea, E m p ire o f, 23 N ich itici, G h ed eo n , 159 N icholas I, b ish o p o f M o n te n e g ro , 2 5 3 , 2 9 0 , 334, 3 5 4 -3 5 5 N icholas I, tsa r o f R ussia, 2 2 6 , 2 6 1 ,2 8 2 , 3 0 2 ,3 1 1 N icholas II, tsar o f R ussia, 372 N ico p , b attle of, see N icopolis, b atd e o f (1 3 9 6 ) N ico p o lis, b attle o f (1 3 9 6 ), 31 N ik o u sio s, P an ag io tis, 55 NiS, 3, 9 , 10, 3 1 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 182, 3 4 0 , 3 5 7 N izam -i Cedid , 118 NjegoS, see P eter II, b ish o p o f M o n te n e g ro NjeguS trib e , 85 no m arch ies (defined), 255 N o rth G erm an C o n fed eratio n , 31 3 N o v i, 3 5 0 Novine Hotwatzke, 3 0 7 N o v i Pazar, Sanjak of, 182, 3 6 0 , 361 N o v i S ad, 3 1 6

oborknez (defined), 9 3 O b rad o v ic, D o sitej, 1 7 7 O b ren o v ic, M arie, 2 9 5 O b ren o v ic, P rince M ichael, 2 4 3 , 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 , 247, 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 4 5 , 3 5 0 , 35 4 O b ren o v ic, P rince M ilan (ruled 183 9 ), 24 3 O b ren o v ic, P rince M ilan (ruled 1 8 6 8 -1 8 8 9 ), 2 4 6 , 3 5 4 - 3 5 5 , 371 O b ren o v ic, P rince MiloS, 2 0 2 - 2 0 3 , 2 0 7 , 234, 2 3 8 -2 4 5 , 259, 342 O b s h ti, D im itu r, 3 4 6 O ch ak o v , 7 1 , 72 O dessa, 5 4 , 8 0 O desso s, see V arna

O d o b escu , Io n , 2 7 2 - 2 7 3 O h rid , 18 O h rid , A rchbishopric of, 4 9 , 5 5 - 5 6 , 8 1, 9 5 97 O h rid , Lake, 3 O ld B ulgarian language, 16, 5 5, 177, 3 3 7 “O ld Serbia,” see K osovo O ld Slavonic language, 29 O lga, queen o f G reece, 263 O lm u tz, 3 0 9 , 3 2 5 , 326 O ltenia, 6 8 , 9 3 , 105, 106 O lym pio s, G eorgakis, 2 0 9 O m e r Pasha L atas, 2 5 2 , 349 oral literature, as tran sm itter o f trad itio n , 175 O rg an ic S tatu te o f A pril 1 8 78, 3 6 8 - 3 6 9 O rg an ic S tatutes, 2 6 6 - 2 6 9 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 1 , 2 7 2 , 291 O rlo v , Alexis, 6 9 , 78 O rlo v , G regory, 78 O rth o d o x church: in B anat o f Temesvar, 161; in B osnia an d H ercegovina, 8 9; in B ul­ garia, 12, 9 5 , 9 7 ; and C atholicism , 10, 53; an d C hristian ideology, 5 2; conversions to, 5 3 ; an d E dict o f T oleration, 159; and G reece, 12, 2 5 6 ; G reek language in, 12; in H ercegovina, 8 9; in M o n te n eg ro , 5 6, 85; and O tto m a n E m pire, 9 7 - 9 8 ; P hanariot influence o n , 5 6 - 5 7 ; an d preservation o f trad itio n , 1 7 4 -1 7 5 ; an d R om anians, 12, 152, 3 2 7 ; in R ussia, 12, 5 6; an d Serbs, 12, 19, 9 1 - 9 2 , 1 4 8 -1 5 0 ; see also C hristian churches, O rth o d o x m illet, P atriarchate o f C o n stan tin o p le, U n iate church O rth o d o x m illet, 4 9 - 5 0 O sm an, Turkish leader, 30 O sm an III, O tto m a n sultan, 116 O th m a n , see O sm an, Turkish leader O th o n , king o f G reece, 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 , 2 5 4 , 256, 2 5 8 - 2 6 3 , 2 9 6 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 3 ; regency of, 2 5 4 -2 5 8 O tto , see O th o n , king o f G reece O tto m a n E m pire: C hristians under, 4 8 - 5 3 ; cities in, 6 2 ; and concept o f justice, 4 4 4 5 ; and co n q u est o f B yzantium , 18, 22, 3 0 - 3 4 ; co n trasted w ith H a b sb u rg E m pire, 1 2 7 -1 3 3 , 1 6 5 -1 6 8 ; c o rru p tio n in, 4 6 , 52, 54, 5 5, 5 8, 103, 106, 167, 2 3 9 , 2 5 9 , 2 8 5 , 2 9 9 , 3 3 9 ; g o v ern m en t of, 3 9 - 5 3 , 5 7 - 6 2 , 165, 2 8 5 ; guilds u n d er, 4 8 , 6 2 ; im pover­ ish m en t of, 4 6 - 4 7 , 2 8 5 - 2 8 6 ; landholding in, 4 2 - 4 3 , 5 9 - 6 0 ; an d law o f Islam , 40; and m ilitary successes u n d e r M u rad IV, 64; m ilitary w eakness of, 4 6 , 6 2 , 1 1 3 -1 1 4 ; M uslim s under, 6 0 , 6 2 , 1 2 3 - 1 2 5 , 2 8 6 ; an d nam e Ottoman, 3 0; notables under, 58, 1 2 3 -1 2 6 ; peasants u nder, 4 2 , 4 8 , 5 8 6 2 , 1 6 7 -1 6 8 ; as perceived by E uropeans, 1 6 6 - 1 6 7 ; p o sitio n o f Balkan peoples in, 166; reform s un d er, 11 3 —114, 1 1 6 —118,

402

Index 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 , 168, 2 7 4 - 2 8 7 , 3 3 8 , 3 4 0 ; rela­ tio n sh ip o f P h an ario ts to , 5 4 - 5 7 , 1 0 1 106; religious divisions w ith in , 3 9 - 4 0 , 4 4, 128; a n d revolt in C o n stan tin o p le, 115— 11 6 ; as “sick m an,” 2 7 5 ; social p o sitions w ith in , 4 0 - 4 4 ; su ltan u n d er, 4 0 , 4 5 - 4 6 ; taxatio n u n d er, 4 2 , 4 7 , 5 0, 5 8, 6 0 - 6 1 , 114, 2 8 5 ; an d trad e, 1 7 9 -1 8 6 ; and Treaty o f P assarow itz, 7 7 ; an d w ar w ith G reece ( 1 8 9 7 ), 3 7 3 ; an d w ar w ith H a b s b u rg E m ­ p ire ( 1 6 8 2 -1 6 9 9 ) , 6 4 - 6 5 ; an d w ar w ith R ussia ( 1 7 1 0 -1 7 1 1 ) , 6 6 - 6 8 , ( 1 7 6 8 1 7 7 4 ), 6 9 , ( 1 8 0 6 -1 8 1 2 ) , 122, 198, ( 1 8 2 8 -1 8 2 9 ) , 2 4 0 - 2 4 1 , 3 3 7 , (1 8 7 7 1 8 7 8 ), 3 5 6 - 3 6 1 ; an d w ar w ith R ussia and H a b s b u rg E m p ire ( 1 7 3 6 -1 7 3 9 ) , 6 8 , 9 3, 105 (1 7 8 7 -1 7 9 2 ), 7 1 -7 2 , 80, 9 4 - 9 5 ; and w ar w ith S erbia an d M o n te n e g ro (1 8 7 6 ), 3 5 5 ; an d w a r w ith Venice ( 1 6 4 5 -1 6 6 4 ) , 8 1 ; an d w ar w ith Venice an d H a b sb u rg E m p ire ( 1 7 1 4 -1 7 1 8 ) , 6 8 , 8 5, 105; see also C rim ean W ar, H o ly L eague, under names of

P ec, P atriarchate of, 19, 4 9 , 5 5 - 5 6 , 9 1 - 9 2 , 94 Pechenegs, 10, 17 P eloponnesian W ars, 5 P eloponnesus, 5, 11, 2 6, 73, 2 1 7 , 2 1 9 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 7 , 3 6 2 ; cap tures of, 2 3 , 6 5 , 6 8 , 7 7; go v ­ e rn m en t in, 7 3, 75, 2 1 4 - 2 1 5 P eople’s Assembly, 21 0 Persians and Persia, 13, 2 2, 6 8 , 9 0 Pest, 3 1 3 ; see also B udapest P eter I, b ish o p o f M o n te n eg ro , 8 6, 120, 121, 2 4 8 , 25 0 P eter II, bish o p o f M o n te n e g ro , 2 4 9 - 2 5 2 P eter the G reat, 56, 6 6 , 8 8, 101 P eter III, tsar o f R ussia, 8 6, 134 P etronijevic, A vram , 243 P etrovic, D anilo , prince o f M o n te n eg ro , 2 5 2 -2 5 3 P etrovic, R ade, see P eter II, b ish o p o f M o n te ­ n egro P etrovic, Vasilije, bish o p o f M o n te n e g ro , 8 5,

other countries

86

P h an ario ts, 5 3 - 5 7 , 1 0 2 -1 0 5 , 1 0 6 - 1 1 0 O zeretskovskii, Iakov, 251 P hilip, prince o f F landers, 295 P hilip o f M aced o n , 7 Paisii, F ath er, 178, 3 3 7 P hilippopolis, see Plovdiv palltkarta (defined), 76 P indus M o u n ta in s, 1 P an ag iu rish te, 3 4 7 Piraeus, 26 2 pandours (defined), 1 93, 2 0 9 Pisani, A ndrea, 211 P an n o n ian P lain, 3, 19 Pisarev, D . I., 338 Panslav m o v em en t, 3 5 3 , 3 5 4 , 355 Plav, 3 6 4 Papacy, 12, 2 2 , 2 9 , 6 4 - 6 5 , 7 7; see also C a th ­ Pleven, 3 5 7 , 358 olic ch u rch Plevna, see Pleven P ap ad o p o u lo s, G rig o rio s, 78 Pliska, 15, 2 7 P arensov, P. D ., 3 7 0 Ploe§ti, 2 9 7 P arga, 119 P lovdiv, 3, 182, 3 4 4 , 34 7 P aris, T reaty o f (1 8 5 6 ), 2 8 4 , 2 8 7 - 2 8 8 , 3 5 1 P odgorica, 2 5 0 , 2 5 1 , 3 6 4 3 5 2 , 3 78 P odolia, 6 4 , 65 P arty o f R ig h ts (C ro atia), 3 1 8 - 3 1 9 P oland: an d C o n fed eratio n o f Bar, 6 9 ; and pasha (defined), 5 7 G reat B ritain, 3 2 9 ; and H a b s b u rg E m pire, pashalik (defined), 3 4 , 5 7 3 2 9 ; as interest o f N ap o leo n III, 3 2 9 ; par­ titions of, 6 9 , 70, 7 2; revolution in, 329, P assarow itz, T reaty o f (1 7 1 8 ), 55, 6 8 , 114: 3 3 2 ; and R ussia, 6 6 , 6 8 - 6 9 ; and Treaty o f B osnian losses fro m , 8 9 ; H a b s b u rg gains K arlow itz, 6 5 ; and Treaty o f V ienna, 1 6 3 from , 8 9 , 9 3 , 10 5 ; M o n te n e g ro and, 8 5; O tto m a n gains fro m , 7 7 ; V enetian losses 164; see also H o ly L eague fro m , 7 7 , 8 9 Poltava, battle o f (1 7 0 9 ), 6 6 , 101 P asvanoglu O sm a n P asha, 9 7 , 118, 121, 122, P om aks, 95 124, 125, 195, 196, 2 0 9 , 338 P o rte , see O tto m a n E m pire P atriarch ate o f C o n stan tin o p le, 12, 4 9 - 5 3 , P otem kin, G regory, 7 1, 112 91, 9 4 , 9 7 , 2 5 6 ; c o rru p tio n of, 5 2; duties Pozarevac, Treaty of, see Passarow itz, T reaty and resp onsibilities o f, 5 0 ; election to , 52; o f (1718) G reek influence o n , 5 5 - 5 7 ; as hig h est state Pozsony, see Bratislava office after em p ero r, 4 9 ; relation to R om e P ragm atic S anction, 1 3 3 -1 3 4 , 140, 141 o f, 2 2 , 2 9 , 7 7 ; R ussian in terest in, 3 3 7 prelam , 242 P atro n a H alil, 115, 116 P resentation C o n stitu tio n , 241 Paul, tsa r o f R ussia, 11 9 , 120 Preslav, 16, 17, 2 7 P a u lii, C o lo n el, 8 6 P ressburg, Treaty o f (1 8 0 5 ), 121, 162 Prevesa, 119 Paulucci, M a rq u is F. O ., 199 Pax R o m an a, 9 P rincipalities, see D an u b ian P rincipalities

403

Index PriStina, 19 P rizren, 19, 9 2 P ro b u s, R o m an em p ero r, 9 protectorate (defined), 2 3 4 Provincial R e fo rm L aw o f 1 864, 339 Prussia, 6 9 , 7 0 , 72, 2 9 6 , 3 1 3 , 3 3 0 , 352 P ru th , battle o f th e (1 7 1 1 ), 6 6 , 8 8 , 114 P ru th R iver, 1, 123, 186, 2 0 1 , 3 5 6 P sara, 2 6 , 2 1 7 P ushkin, A. S., 175 Pylos, 4 Q u ad ru p le Alliance, 191 Racki, F ran jo , 3 1 9 R acoviia, M ih ai, 107 Radetzky, Jo sep h , 3 0 9 R adonjic, Jovan, 8 7 R adonjic, V u k , 2 4 9 R agusa, see D u b ro v n ik Rajacic, Josip, 3 1 6 , 3 28 Rakoczy, F erenc, 140, 141 R akovski, G eo rg e, 3 3 4 , 345 R aJ, 19 RaSka, 18 R au ch , L evin, 3 1 9 reaya (defined), 4 0 , 4 4 R eglem en ts o rg an iq u es, see O rg an ic S tatutes Reichsrat, 3 1 2 , 3 1 9 R eich stad t, 3 5 5 - 3 5 6 R ein su ran ce Treaty, 3 7 4 rev o lu tio n ary m o v em ents: achievem ents of, in Balkans, 2 2 9 - 2 3 4 ; co m m o n features of, in Balkans, 2 2 9 , 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 , 2 3 4 ; enem ies of, in Balkans, 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 ; im m ediate causes of, in Balkans, 1 9 2 -1 9 3 ; influence o n Bal­ kans o f leftist, 3 3 0 ; an d m ajo r pow ers, 1 9 2 ; ten ets o f, in n in eteen th -cen tu ry E u ­ ro p e, 1 74; see also under names o f individual

countries R h o d es, 4 R h o d o p e M o u n ta in s, 1, 95 R ijeka, 3 1 0 , 3 1 5 , 3 1 7 , 32 0 R ik m an , see R iick m an n, P. I. R im nik, 3 3 7 R istic, Jo v an , 3 5 4 R izvanbegovic, A li, 3 4 9 robot (defined), 132 R o d o fin ik in , C o n stan tin e, 2 0 0 , 201 R o m a n E m p ire, 7 - 1 2 ; see also B yzantine E m ­ pire R o m an ian language, 3 2 4 , 32 6 R o m an ian N atio n al C o m m ittee, 32 4 R o m an ian principalities, see D an u b ian P rinci­ palities, M oldavia, T ransylvania, W allachia R o m an ian s an d R o m ania: an d C o n g ress o f B erlin, 3 6 0 ; a n d fo rm atio n o f national state, 2 8 7 —2 9 7 , 3 3 1 ; an d H a b s b u rg E m ­ p ire, 1 35, 15 2 , 1 5 5 - 1 6 0 , 3 7 4 ; an d O rth o -

d ox church, 152, 3 2 7 ; an d peasants, 2 9 3 2 9 4 ; an d R ussia, 3 5 6 , 3 7 4 ; an d San Stefano, 3 5 9 ; see also D an u b ian P rincipalities, M oldavia, T ransylvania, W allachia R o m e, 49 R o setti, C . A ., 2 7 2 , 2 7 4 , 2 9 5 , 2 9 6 R iickm ann, P. I., 2 6 9 R u d h a rt, Ignaz von, 25 8 R um eli, 73, 2 0 4 , 362 R um elia, 124, 3 6 3 ; see also E astern R um elia R uschuk, see R use R u schuk F riends, 125, 126 R use, 125 R ussia: an d annexation o f C rim ea, 7 1; and B ulgaria, 3 3 7 - 3 3 8 , 3 4 1 , 3 4 3 , 3 4 4 , 3 4 5 3 4 6 , 3 5 9 , 3 6 7 - 3 7 2 ; an d C ongress o f Ber­ lin, 3 6 0 ; an d D an u b ian P rincipalities, 6 8 , 1 0 1 -1 0 5 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 , 1 1 9 -1 2 3 , 2 6 4 - 2 7 4 , 2 8 7 - 2 8 8 , 2 9 0 , 3 3 7 ; an d E astern Q u estio n , 1 8 8 - 1 9 0 ; as expected su p p o rte r o f P h an a­ rio ts, 5 7; an d F rance, 3 2 9 , 3 7 5 see also N a ­ poleonic W ars; an d G erm any, 3 7 5 ; and G reat B ritain, 72; an d G reece, 78, 80, 2 2 3 - 2 2 4 , 2 2 6 - 2 2 8 , 3 3 7 ; an d G reek P ro ­ ject, 7 0 - 7 1 , 7 8 - 8 0 , 8 7 ; an d H a b sb u rg E m p ire, 2 4 4 , 2 8 8 , 3 1 2 ; an d M o n te n eg ro , 66, 8 5 -8 7 , 1 2 0 -1 2 1 , 2 4 9 -2 5 0 , 252, 253; O rth o d o x church in, 12, 5 6; and P atriar­ chate o f C o n stan tin o p le, 3 3 7 ; an d P oland, 6 6 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 70, 7 2; an d R o m an ia, 356, 3 7 4 ; an d Serbia, 1 9 8 - 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 - 2 0 4 ; as th re a t to O tto m a n E m pire, 5 3; and Treaty o f A inali Kavak, 7 8; an d T reaty o f Bel­ grade, 6 8 ; and T reaty o f K uchuk K ainarji, 6 9 - 7 0 , 7 8 , 110, 2 6 5 ; an d T reaty o f Passa­ ro w itz, 8 9; an d W ar o f th e L eague o f A u g sb u rg , 6 5 - 6 6 ; an d w ar w ith O tto m a n E m p ire ( 1 7 1 0 -1 7 1 1 ) , 6 6 - 6 8 , ( 1 7 3 6 1 7 3 9 ), 6 8 , 9 3 , 105, ( 1 7 6 8 -1 7 7 4 ) , 6 9, (1 7 8 7 -1 7 9 2 ), 7 1 - 7 2 , 8 0 , ( 1 8 0 6 -1 8 1 2 ) , 122, 198, ( 1 8 2 8 -1 8 2 9 ) , 2 4 0 - 2 4 1 , 337, (1 8 7 7 -1 8 7 8 ), 3 5 6 ; an d w ar w ith Sw eden (1 7 0 0 -1 7 2 1 ) , 6 6 (1 7 8 8 ), 71, 8 0; see also C rim ean W ar, H o ly L eague R ussian Party, see N ap p ist P arty (G reece) rustical land, see m anorial land

sabor (defined), 141 Safafik, P. J., 306 §aguna, B ishop A ndreiu, 3 2 1 , 3 2 3 , 324, 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 , 3 2 7 , 328 St. A ndrew Assembly, 245 St. P etersb u rg , C o n v e n tio n o f (1 8 2 6 ), 226, 26 8 St. S ophia, see H ag ia Sophia S alonika, see T hessaloniki Sam uel, B ulgarian em peror, 17 Sancta S ophia, see H ag ia S ophia

404

Index sanjak (defined), 5 7 , 2 8 5 San S tefano, T reaty o f (1 8 7 8 ), 3 5 8 - 3 5 9 , 363, 366, 373 Sarajevo, 8 8 , 8 9 , 182, 2 4 8 Sardinia, 192, 3 3 0 S arm izegetusa, 9 Sava, b ish o p o f M o n te n e g ro , 86 Sava R iver, 1, 3, 10 Saxons (defined), 2 1 ; see also T ransylvania, Saxons in Saxony, 6 6 , 134 S canderbeg, see S k en d erb eg S chm erling, A n to n vo n , 3 12 Scholarios, G eo rg e G en n ad ios, 4 9 S ch o n b ru n n , T reaty o f (1 8 0 9 ), 162 S chw arzenberg, P rince Felix, 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 S co tt, S ir W alter, 175 Sculeni, 21 3 S cutari, see S h k o d er Sebastiani, H o race, 120 S ebastopol, 2 8 4 Selim III, O tto m a n sultan , 1 1 7 -1 1 8 , 124, 1 25, 19 5 , 196, 19 8 , 2 0 1 , 27 5 Seniavin, D . N ., 1 20 Senta, 65 S eptinsular R ep u b lic, 119 S erbian lan g u ag e, 177, 3 1 6 Serbs an d Serbia: an d A d d itio n al A ct to C o n ­ v en tio n o f A kkerm an, 2 4 0 ; arm y of, 2 4 5 2 4 6 , 3 3 3 ; an d au to n o m y , 2 4 1 , 3 3 1 ; and b a td e o f K o so v o , 3 1 , 1 75, 3 0 8 ; an d B os­ nia, 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 5 0 ; an d B ulgaria, 2 4 6 , 3 4 1 , 3 7 1 ; an d C o n g ress o f B erlin, 3 6 0 ; consulates in , 2 4 1 ; an d D alm atia, 2 5 ; early h isto ry o f, 1 8 - 1 9 ; an d F rance, 2 4 4 ; and G reeks, 5 7 , 2 4 0 ; a n d H a b s b u rg E m pire, 6 8 , 9 1 - 9 5 , 135, 145, 1 4 8 - 1 5 0 , 3 1 6 , 3 7 4 ; and H erceg o v in a, 3 3 3 , 3 3 4 , 3 5 0 ; an d jan ­ issaries, 1 9 5 - 1 9 8 ; an d M acedonia, 3 3 3 ; an d m ig ra tio n to Balkan p eninsula, 18; u n ­ d e r M ilo s, 2 3 8 - 2 4 3 , 2 4 5 ; an d M uslim s, 94, 2 4 3 ; an d O rth o d o x ch u rch , 12, 9 1 - 9 2 , 1 4 8 - 1 5 0 ; u n d e r O tto m a n E m p ire, 9 1 - 9 5 , 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 ; an d peasants, 9 1 , 2 4 3 , 2 5 7 ; and privileges o f O rth o d o x citizens, 1 4 8 -1 5 0 ; rev o lu tio n ary activity o f, 122, 125, 1 9 3 2 0 4 , 2 4 6 ; R u ssian in terest in, 1 9 8 - 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 - 2 0 4 , 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 , 3 3 7 ; sipahis in, 2 4 3 ; and w ar w ith O tto m a n E m p ire (1 8 7 6 ), 3 5 5 -3 6 1 Serdica, see Sofia S ereth R iver, 1, 123 Seven Years’ W ar, 6 8 , 133, 134 seyhulislam (defined), 4 3 sheriat (defined), 4 0 S hkoder, 8 1 , 8 4 , 8 7 , 2 4 8 , 2 5 1 , 3 6 3 , 3 6 4 S h k u m b i R iv er an d valley, 3, 81 Sibiu, 15 0 , 15 9 , 3 2 1 , 3 2 4 , 3 2 6 , 3 2 7 Sicily, 3 0 9 ; see also T w o Sicilies,

th e K in g d o m o f th e S igism und, k in g o f H u n g ary , 31 Silesia, 133, 134 Silistria, 340 S im eon, B ulgarian em peror, 16 S in g id u n u m , see Belgrade sipahis ·. A lbanians as, 8 1 ; ineffectiveness of, 4 7 ; land grants to , 4 2 ; responsibilities and perquisites of, 4 3 ; in Serbia, 2 4 3 ; te rrito ­ rial rig h ts of, 59 Sistova, T reaty o f (1 7 9 1 ), 7 2, 9 0 , 9 4 , 132, 193 Skadar, see S hkoder Skender, see S kenderbeg S kenderbeg, 3 4 - 3 5 Skopje, 19, 2 7 , 9 2 , 9 7 , 3 5 7 Skoplje, see Skopje S koufos, N ikolaos, 205 skuphina (defined), 241 Slavic B enevolent Society, 3 3 8 , 353 Slavonia: agricultural land in, 3; g o v ern m en t of, u n til 1745, 143; u n d e r H ab sb u rg s, 34, 6 5 , 140, 1 4 3 -1 4 5 ; an d H un g ary , 2 5 , 3 0 4 ; an d Illyrian m ovem ent, 3 0 4 , 3 0 8 ; landh o ld in g in, 143; peasants in, 1 4 3 - 1 4 5 ; p o ­ litical evo lu tio n of, after 1 848, 3 1 5 —3 2 1 ; an d reg u latio n o f 1756, 144 Slavo-Serbian language, 149 Slavs, 10, 1 3 - 1 5 , 19 Slobozia, 199 Slovenes, 2 3 , 129, 135, 160, 3 0 4 S m ederevo, 9 1 , 198 Sobieski, Jo h n , k in g o f P o lan d , 6 4 Sofia, 3, 9 , 3 1 , 9 7 , 182, 3 3 7 S ofronii, b ish o p , 3 3 7 Sokievic, Josip, 31 9 Spain, 192 Spalato, see Split S parta, 5 Spetsai, 2 6 , 2 1 7 S plit, 182 S ponneck, C o u n t, 2 6 4 S puz, 2 5 0 Srem ski K arlovci, 8 7 , 147, 3 1 6 , 3 2 7 ; as Ser­ bian religious an d cultural center, 5 6, 9 3, 94, 9 7 , 149, 152, 154, 159, 177 S tam bolov, S tephen, 372 Stara P lanina, 95 Starfcvic, A nte, 318 S tatu ta V alachorum , 146 S tephen, S t., 1 9 - 2 0 S tephen th e G reat, prince o f M oldavia, 35 S tephen N em anja I, king o f Serbia, 18 S tephen the Small, 86 S tephen II, king o f Serbia, 18 S tephen U ro5 V, k in g o f Serbia, 19 S tip, 92 S tokavian dialect, 3 0 6 —3 0 7 Straits, 6 9 , 1 9 0 -1 9 1

405

Index Straits, C o n v e n tio n o f th e (1 8 4 1 ), 2 8 1 - 2 8 2 S tro g a n o v , G . A ., 2 1 3 Strossm ayer, B ish o p Josip, 3 1 9 , 3 2 0 , 328, 333 S tru m a R iv er an d valley, 1, 3 S tu rd za, Io n , 2 1 4 S tu rd za, M ih ail, 2 6 8 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 2 S ublim e P o rte , see O tto m a n E m pire Suleim an th e M ag n ificent, O tto m a n sultan, 32, 34, 36, 39, 4 5, 64 Suleim an P asha, 2 7 3 Suleim an II, O tto m a n sultan, 4 6 Suleim an I II , O tto m a n sultan, 65 Suleim an U sk iip lu , 2 0 2 , 2 0 3 Suli, 7 3 , 8 0 , 8 3 §ulu{iu, A lexander, 3 26 S um adija, 9 4 , 196 Supljikac, S tep h en , 3 1 6 Supplex LibeUus V alachorum , 1 5 9 -1 6 0 S u p i, A lecu, 2 0 9 , 2 1 0 S u fu , A lexander, 2 0 8 S u fu , M ih ai, 2 0 8 , 2 0 9 S uv o ro v , A lexander, 7 1, 112 Sviatoslav, tsa r o f R ussia, 17 S w ed en , 6 6 , 7 1 , 8 0 Sylva, C a rm en , see E lizab eth o f W ied S zatm ar, Peace o f (1 7 1 1 ), 140 Szechenyi, S tep h en , 303 Szeklers (defined), 2 1 ; see also T ransylvania, Szeklers in T am erlane, 31 Tanzimat, 2 8 2 , 2 8 6 , 2 8 7 , 3 4 0 T ap ir P asha, 3 4 9 T artars, 19, 6 6 , 6 9 T atich, V ladislav, 3 45 Tem esvar, see B an at o f Tem esvar Teofil, m e tro p o lita n , 154 T h eb es, 4 , 5 T heiss R iver, see Tisza R iver T h eo d o siu s, R o m a n em p ero r, 12 T hessaloniki, 3, 3 0 , 3 1, 9 5 , 9 7 , 182 T hessaly, 19, 2 6 , 7 3 , 2 1 7 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 4 , 355, 3 6 1 , 3 65 T hracian s a n d T h race, 3, 4 , 7 3, 9 5 - 9 7 , 331, 360 T h re e E m p e ro rs’ A lliance, 2 9 7 , 3 5 2 , 3 5 4 , 355, 373, 374 T ilsit, T reaty o f (1 8 0 7 ), 121, 122, 199 tim ar lan d , 4 2 , 5 9 - 6 0 T im i§oara, see B anat o f Tem esvar T irgovi§te, 2 1 2 T iryns, 4 Tisza R iver, 1 T ito g ra d , see P o d g o rica T om is, see C o n stan ja T om islav, k in g o f C ro atia, 23 T opal O sm a n P asha, 35 0 T osks, 83

T o tt, B aron de, 117 T rajan, R o m an em peror, 9 Trandiifilov, A lexander, 2 7 0 T ransleithania, see A ustria-H u n g ary T ransylvania: an d Aulic C ouncil, 153; a u to n ­ o m y of, 3 4 ,1 5 0 , 1 5 2 -1 5 3 ; u n d e r H a b s­ b u rg E m p ire, 6 5 , 101, 1 5 0 - 1 6 0 , 3 0 4 , 3 2 1 , 3 3 2 ; H u n g arian s in, 1 5 0 - 1 5 3 , 321, 3 2 2 - 3 2 3 , 3 2 4 , 3 2 6 ; an d H ungary, 2 0 , 2 1, 151, 152, 3 2 3 - 3 2 7 , 3 3 2 ; N atio n al A ssem ­ bly of, 3 2 3 - 3 2 4 ; “n atio n s” an d religions of, 1 5 0 - 1 5 3 , 3 2 1 ; u n d e r O tto m a n E m ­ pire, 3 5 , 3 6 , 150, 152; peasants in, 1 5 6 158, 3 2 3 ; political stru ctu re of, 1 5 1 -1 5 2 , 1 5 8 - 1 5 9 , 3 2 1 ; p o p u latio n of, 1 5 6 - 1 5 7 , 3 2 1 ; revolt in, 1 5 7 -1 5 8 ; an d R o m an ian language, 3 2 1 -3 2 2 ; R o m an ian s in, 152, 3 2 1 -3 2 4 , 3 2 5 - 3 2 7 ; Saxons in, 1 5 0 -1 5 2 , 153, 3 2 1 , 3 2 3 , 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 ; Szeklers in, 150, 152, 153, 3 2 1 , 3 2 2 , 3 2 4 , 3 2 5 , 3 2 6 ; see also R om an ians an d R o m an ia Transylvanian School, 155 Travnik, 88, 89, 24 8 T riavna, 3 3 7 T riple Alliance, 3 7 3 - 3 7 4 T ripolis, see T ripolitza T ripolitza, 7 8, 2 1 7 T riune K in g d o m , 2 5 , 3 1 7 , 318 T rogir, see T rogurium T ro g u riu m , 7 T sakalov, A thanasios, 20 5 T sintsars, 15, 62 T u h u tu m , 156 T ulip P erio d , 1 1 4 -1 1 5 T urkish C o n stitu tio n , 2 4 2 , 2 4 3 “T urkish C roatia,” 3 5 5 - 3 5 6 T u m o v o , 2 7 , 31 T u m u Severin, 2 6 5 T v rtk o , S tephen, 25 T w o Sicilies, K in g d o m o f th e, 5 4 , 192 T zim isces, Jo h n , B yzantine em p ero r, 17

U lcinj, 365, 36 6 ulema (defined), 4 0 ,4 3 , 113 U lm , 120 U n iate church, 1 5 3 -1 5 5 U n io n ists, see C ro a to -H u n g a ria n P arty (C roatia) U n ite d Principalities o f W allachia an d M o ld a­ via, see R om anians an d R om ania U n k iar Iskelessi, Treaty o f (1 8 3 3 ), 2 7 9 , 2 8 1 , 28 2 urbarial land, see m anorial land U rb a riu m o f 1 756, for Slavonia, 144 U rb a riu m o f 1769, for Transylvania, see C erta P uncta U rb a riu m o f 1780, for C ro atia, 144 U skiib, see Skopje

406

Index vakif (defined), 59 valide sultan (defined), 4 6 V araid in , 146 V ardar R iver, 1; 3 Varna, 7, 3 4 4 Varna, battle o f (1 4 4 4 ), 32 Venice: an d B yzantine E m p ire, 2 2 - 2 3 ; an d D alm atia, 2 3 , 2 5 , 6 5 , 6 8 , 7 7, 8 5 ; as enem y o f p atriarch an d P o rte , 5 3; an d F rance, 87; an d F o u rth C ru sad e, 2 3 ; an d G enoa, 30; an d G reece, 7 6 - 7 7 ; a n d G reek P roject, 70; G reeks in , 5 4 ; m aritim e em pire of, 3, 2 2; and M o n te n e g ro , 8 5 ; and T reaty o f K arlow itz, 6 5 , 77, 8 5 ; an d T reaty o f Passarow itz, 77, 8 9 ; an d w ar w ith O tto m a n E m ­ pire ( 1 6 4 5 -1 6 6 4 ) , 8 1 , ( 1 7 1 4 -1 7 1 8 ) , 6 8, 8 5 , 105; see also H o ly L eague Via E g n atia, 3 V ictoria, q u een , 2 6 3 V id in , 12 4 , 3 3 8 , 3 4 0 , 3 4 9 , 3 5 7 V ienna, 3 4 , 5 4 , 6 4 , 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 V ienna, T reaty o f (1 8 1 5 ), 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 , 186 vilayet (defined), 5 7 , 2 8 5 Villafranca, T ruce o f (1 8 5 9 ), 332 V illeh ardo u in , G eoffrey de, 23 Vis, 7 V lachs, 15 V lach S tatu tes, see S tatu ta V alachorum V ladim irescu, T u d o r, 2 0 4 , 2 0 8 , 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 , 2 1 1 - 2 1 3 , 231 Vladislav, k in g o f P o lan d an d H un g ary , 31, 32 vojvoda (defined), 146, 3 1 6 V ojvodina, 3, 2 4 2 , 3 1 6 , 3 1 8 , 3 2 6 Volkgeist (defined), 172, 173 Voulgaris, D im itrio s, 2 6 3 , 2 6 4 V uficevic, M atija, 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 V u iic-P eriäic, T om a, 2 4 1 , 2 4 3 V u k o tii, Iv an , 1 2 0 , 121, 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 W allachia: a u to n o m y o f, 9 9 ; boyars in, 1 0 7 110; as cen ter o f B ulgarian revolutionary

activity, 345; centers o f p o w er in, 1 0 0 101; 1848 rev o lu tio n in, 2 7 2 —2 7 4 ; first prince in, 2 1 ; H a b s b u rg rule in, 105; O r ­ ganic S tatutes in, 2 6 6 - 2 6 9 ; u n d er O tto ­ m ans, 35, 3 6, 9 9 - 1 0 1 ; an d Pasvanoglu, 122; peasants in, 1 0 7 -1 1 0 ; an d R ussia, 1 0 1 -1 0 5 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 , 2 6 4 —2 7 4 ; taxation in, 1 0 7 -1 1 0 ; see also D an u b ian P rincipalities, R om anians an d R om ania W ar o f A ustrian Succession, 6 8 , 133 W ar o f th e L eague o f A u g sb u rg , 65 W ar o f th e F irst C o alitio n , 162 W ar o f th e S econd C o alitio n , 162 W ar o f th e T h ird C o alitio n , 162 W ellington, D uke of, 2 2 6 W illiam I, G erm an em p ero r, 353 W illiam II, G erm an em peror, 37 4 W illiam G eorge, prince o f D en m ark , see G eorge I, lung o f G reece X anthos, E m m anuel, 205 Yenikale, 69 Ypsilanti, A lexander, 107 Ypsilanti, C o n stan tin e, 122, 125, 20 6 Ypsilantis, A lexander, 2 0 6 - 2 0 7 , 2 0 9 , 2 1 0 , 2 1 1 - 2 1 3 ,2 1 6 ,2 2 0 Y psilantis, D im itrio s, 22 0 Z abljak, 252 Z adar, 23 zadruga (defined), 91 Z agreb, 2 7, 9 0 , 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 , 142, 3 0 7 , 308, 3 1 6 ,3 1 7 Z aim is, T hrasyvoulos, 2 6 4 Z ara, see Z adar Z eta, 18 ziamet (defined), 42 Z ifa , 19 Z rinski, Peter, 141 zupan (defined), 18 Z vonim ir, king o f C roatia, 24

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S U P P L E M E N T A R Y PLATES

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View o f the Dardanelles The Seraglio Point Port Constantinople Yenikoy on the Bosphorus The Bosphorus (opposite the Genoese Castle) Entrance to the Black Sea (from the Giant’s Grave) Ruse. (The Danube) The plains o f Lower Wallachia. (The Danube, from the Castle o f Sistova)