Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: The Cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas

Identity and Change in East Asian C onflicts The Cases of China, Taiwan, and the K oreas

Edited by

Shale Horowitz Uk Heo Alexander C. Tan

IDENTITY AND CHANGE IN EAST ASIAN CONFLICTS

© Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, Alexander C. Tan, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7787–8 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7787–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Identity and change in East Asian conflicts : the cases of China, Taiwan, and the Koreas / edited by Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, and Alexander C. Tan. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: Democratization and national identity in the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts—the evolution of China’s national interest : implications for Taiwan—Taiwan : political and national security of becoming “Taiwanese”—Economic interdependence between China and Taiwan : implications for identity and national security—Explaining U.S. policy towards China and Taiwan—Rising China vs. estranged Taiwan— North Korea in crisis : regime, identity, and strategy—South Korea’s response : democracy, identity, and strategy—Strategy in the Korean conflict—Japan’s response to Asia’s security problems—The North Korean nuclear crisis—The United States and East Asia : past and future. ISBN 1–4039–7787–9 (alk. paper) 1. East Asia—Politics and government—21st century. 2. East Asia— Foreign relations. 3. Conflict management—East Asia. 4. National security—East Asia. I. Horowitz, Shale Asher. II. Heo, Uk, 1962– III. Tan, Alexander C. JQ1499.A58.I34 2007 355’.033051—dc21

2006050670

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: March 2007 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

For Kristin, Azariah, and Anika Horowitz Sooho, Min, and Jieun Heo Anita Co, Chungwei, Joshua, and Julian Chu-Tan

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables

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Acknowledgments

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Contributors

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1 Democratization and National Identity in the China-Taiwan and Korean Conflicts Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, and Alexander C. Tan

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2 The Evolution of China’s National Interest: Implications for Taiwan Peter R. Moody, Jr.

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3 Taiwan: Political and National Security of Becoming “Taiwanese” Hans Stockton

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4 Economic Integration between China and Taiwan: No Spillover into the Identity and Security Realms Cal Clark

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5 Explaining U.S. Policy toward China and Taiwan Steven B. Redd 6 Rising China versus Estranged Taiwan Shale Horowitz and Alexander C. Tan

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7 North Korea in Crisis: Regime, Identity, and Strategy Terence Roehrig

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8 South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy Uk Heo and Jung-Yeop Woo

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9 U.S. Strategy in the Korean Conflict Milica Begovic and Karl DeRouen Jr.

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10 Japan’s Response to Asia’s Security Problems Dennis Patterson

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11 The North Korean Nuclear Crisis In-Taek Hyun and Sung Deuk Hahm

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12 The United States and East Asia: Past and Future Shale Horowitz

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Index

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List of Figures and Tables

Figures 3.1 Taiwanese/Chinese ethnic identification, 1992–2004. 3.2 Preferences on Taiwan’s future status. 3.3 Popular opinion on “One Country, Two Systems” in Taiwan. 3.4 Taiwan people’s perception of PRC hostility. 4.1 Dynamics of the take-off of cross-Strait economic links. 4.2 How democratization moderated the national identity and cross-Strait relations cleavages. 10.1 Feelings of closeness towards China. 10.2 Feelings of closeness toward South Korea. 10.3 Japanese views of PKOs. 10.4 Japanese feelings toward the SDF. 10.5 Attitudes toward economic cooperation.

54 57 58 60 72 83 197 198 199 200 202

Tables 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

Taiwan’s trade with China Taiwan’s investment in China Social communications across the Taiwan Strait The battle over sovereignty between China and Taiwan 4.5 Effects of major events on cross-Strait trade and investment 6.1 Presidential and legislative Yuan elections since 1992: percentage vote shares of main parties

75 76 79 81 85 117

Acknowledgments

We thank the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s Center for International Education for supporting this collaborative research project. We are particularly grateful to the Center’s Academic Program Director, Patrice Petro, and its International Education Program Director, Sara Tully.

Contributors

Milica Begovic was born in Titograd, Montenegro (present-day Podgorica). She is currently pursuing her doctorate in Political Science. Her research interests are intractable civil and ethnic wars. The focus of her dissertation is on external involvement in ethnic conflicts. She is currently completing an essay on the civil war in Bangladesh for the book Civil Wars of the World. Cal Clark is Professor of Political Science and the Director of the MPA Program at Auburn University. He is the author or coauthor of five books and coeditor of ten books. In addition, he has published approximately 115 journal articles and 85 book chapters. His recent books include the coauthored Comparative Development Patterns in Asia (Rienner, 1997) and the coedited Beyond the Developmental State (Macmillan, 1998), Democracy and the Status of Women in East Asia (Rienner, 2000), Globalization’s Impact on State-Local Economic Development Policy (Nova Science, 2001), and The Health Care Financial Crisis (Nova Science, 2001). His work has appeared in such journals as the American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, Governance, Harvard International Review, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Policy Studies Journal, and Policy Studies Review. He also has been president of the American Association for Chinese Studies (2002–2004). Karl DeRouen Jr. is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama. His research interests are conflict processes and international political economy. Some of his most recent work appears in British Journal of Political Science, Foreign Policy Analysis, Latin American Research Review, Civil Wars, American Politics Research, and International Studies Quarterly. He is coediting two-volume reference works on civil war and on defense policies of the world. He is part of a three-year grant looking at internal conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. Sung Deuk Hahm is Professor of Political Economy at Korea University and a faculty associate of the McDonough School of

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Business at Georgetown University. He is the preeminent scholar of the Korean presidency. He is a friend and adviser to Presidents Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Roh Moo Hyun. He is the director of the Korean Institute for Presidential Studies (KIPS), and the deputy director of the Korean Legislative Studies Institute at the Korean National Assembly. He received his PhD from CarnegieMellon University. He has published 18 books and over 100 articles in edited volumes and scholarly journals. His books include the bestseller, The Korean Presidency (1999, in Korean) and After Development: The Transformation of the Korean Presidency and Bureaucracy (Georgetown University Press, 1997). He has served as a guest analyst for various media, including CNN, BBC, ABC, MSNBC, NHK, Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Financial Times, Newsweek, Time, Business Week, Yomiuri Shimbun, and Mainichi Shimbun, and is a regular columnist for Joongang IlboInternational Herald Tribune (English edition) and Asahi Shimbun (Japanese edition). Uk Heo is Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He is author, coauthor, or coeditor of five books. His articles have appeared in Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, Political Research Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Peace Research, International Interactions, Armed Forces and Society, American Politics Quarterly, Asian Survey, and other journals. His research interests are in the political economy of defense spending, international conflict, and Asian politics. Shale Horowitz is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He is the author of From Ethnic Conflict to Stillborn Reform: The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Texas A&M University Press, 2005), and coeditor of Human Rights and Societies in Transition (United Nations University Press, 2004), Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan (Praeger, 2003), and The Political Economy of International Financial Crisis: Interest Groups, Ideologies, and Institutions (Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). He is the author or coauthor of articles in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Comparative Political Studies, Comparative Studies in Society and History, East European Politics and Societies, European Journal of International Relations, Journal of Peace Research, International Interactions, International Studies Quarterly, Party Politics, and other journals.

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Professor In-Taek Hyun is Director of IPSIKOR (International Policy Studies Institute of Korea). He is also Director of the Ilmin International Relations Institute and Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. He has also served as Dean of Budget and Planning at Korea University, and a member of Advisory Committees for the ROK National Security Council, the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of National Defense, and the National Assembly. Professor Hyun received his PhD from UCLA. He is the author or coauthor of Asia’s Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling Traditional and Human Security (2000); European Unification and New European Security Order (1998, in Korean); Searching for a New National Strategy (1995, in Korean); Korea and Japan (1993); APEC and A New Pacific Community (1993); and Korean Defense Spending (1991, in Korean). He also has numerous professional articles, both in Korean and English. Peter R. Moody, Jr., is Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. His more recent books include Tradition and Modernization in China and Japan, Political Change in Taiwan, and Political Opposition in Post-Confucian Society. He is editor of China Documents Annual and book review editor for the Review of Politics. He has written on Chinese politics, Asian international affairs, Chinese political thought, international relations theory, and theory of political parties. Dennis Patterson is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas Tech University. He has published numerous scholarly articles in such journals as Comparative Political Studies, British Journal of Political Science, World Politics, and Women and Politics, on such topics as elections and electoral influences on policymaking in Japan. His coauthored book, The Japan that Never Was: Explaining the Rise and Decline of a Misunderstood Country, was published in 2005 by the State University of New York Press. Steven B. Redd is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. His research primarily focuses on the cognitive and emotional aspects of foreign policy decisionmaking. He has published articles in the American Political Science Review, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Synthese, and International Studies Perspectives. He is currently president of the Foreign Policy Analysis section of the International Studies Association. Terence Roehrig is Associate Professor with the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) faculty in the National Security Decision Making

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Department of the Naval War College. He is the author of two books, From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea (Lexington Books, 2005) and The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea (McFarland Press, 2002). He has also published articles and book chapters on North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, North Korean security policy, human rights, and transitional justice. Hans Stockton is Associate Professor in the Center for International Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas. He is the author of The Impact of Democratization on the Utilization of Clientelistic Styles of Ruling Parties in East Asia. His work has appeared in journals such as the American Journal of Chinese Studies, Asian Perspective, The Chinese Journal of Administration, Comparative Political Studies, and Global Economic Review. Alexander C. Tan is Associate Professor/Reader in Comparative Politics and Political Science Program Director in the School of Political Science and Communications at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. Prior to moving to New Zealand, Alex was a tenured Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at the Political Science Department of the University of North Texas. He has also worked in Taiwan as a research fellow with Taiwan Institute of Economic Research and as a banker with Hongkong Bank (HSBC). He is currently an editorial board member of International Studies Quarterly, Electoral Studies, and Political Research Quarterly. He has written widely in the areas of comparative political parties and comparative political economy of the advanced industrial democracies and the newly industrializing countries. He is author of Members, Organizations, and Performance and coeditor of Taiwan’s National Security: Dilemmas and Opportunities. He has also authored articles in Journal of Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, European Journal of Political Research, Party Politics, Electoral Studies, and other journals. Jung-Yeop Woo is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. His research focuses on international conflict, East Asian security, and Korean politics. His publications include two book chapters, on South Korea’s defense policy and on the Korean War.

Chapter 1

Democratiz ation and National Identity in the China- Taiwan and Korean C onflicts Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, and A l e x a n d e r C . Ta n

Since September 11, 2001, international relations and conflicts in the

Middle East and South Asia have attracted the lion’s share of attention from analysts and journalists. This is especially true in the United States, given that tens of thousands of U.S. troops are fighting insurgent-terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unfortunately, there has been corresponding neglect in covering and analyzing other regions. Of these other regions, East Asia is undoubtedly the most important. Most people are well aware of the economic prowess of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and over the last 25 years, of China’s rise to become the “factory of the world.” There is less awareness that the region harbors two of the world’s most dangerous conflicts—between China and Taiwan, and between North and South Korea. Both of these conflicts could involve the United States and its key ally Japan in massive conventional wars, which might escalate into nuclear wars. Both the China-Taiwan and the Korean conflicts are legacies of the Cold War. But both have now long outlasted the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the slower-motion, but seemingly even more irreversible “de-communization” of China.

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This shows that both conflicts, while arising in the context of superpower rivalry after World War II, have self-sustaining elements. If anything, the two conflicts have become more dangerous and unpredictable after the Cold War. Why has this happened, and what are the prospects for the future? The China-Taiwan conflict of the Cold War era was about which of the two regimes—the Communist Party regime of Mainland China and the Nationalist (Kuomintang) regime on the island of Taiwan—was the legitimate government of all China. The United States initially supported the anticommunist Nationalists, but later in the Cold War made common cause with the Mainland Communists against the Soviet Union. Taiwan’s government no longer claims to represent all of China. Mainland China’s government is focused on sustaining economic growth and modernization. Yet military conflict between China and Taiwan seems more likely now than at any time since the 1950s. China’s and Taiwan’s governments regularly trade denunciations and, as in the 1950s, look to be arming and training to fight one another. How did the conflict become more intense when its central issues appear to have been resolved? Similarly, the Korean War and the subsequent Cold War on the Korean Peninsula were about whether the communist North or the anticommunist South would become the sole, legitimate government of the Korean people. From their origins in the Soviet–American partition of Korea after World War II, the Northern and Southern regimes were constructed and protected by their superpower backers. International communism is now little more than a historical memory. Yet Korea is at the center of a tense, seemingly interminable crisis over the Northern regime’s nuclear weapons program. North Korea’s traditionally bellicose threats continue; U.S. and South Korean leaders exchange their traditional quiet solidarity for public bickering; and China has emerged as the key player in the endless diplomatic negotiations with North Korea. Again, why has the conflict become more intense at a time when superpower rivalry has ceased to sustain it? Since the 1980s, changing national identities have transformed the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts. Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea and liberalization in China have forced leaders to compete for popular legitimacy by appealing to national identities. Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, these contested national identities have been the main factors driving change in the conflicts— pushing China and Taiwan inexorably apart and toward a showdown, while helping to sustain what appeared to be a mortally wounded North Korea. This explains why one U.S. ally, Taiwan, has become

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more hawkish, while the other, South Korea, has turned more dovish. U.S. foreign policy is struggling to adjust. In this volume, we seek to understand these developments by emphasizing the theoretical importance of national identity. National identity defines the group that the state is supposed to serve and protect, and is associated with national cultural, economic, political, and geopolitical goals that the state is supposed to promote. That is, national identity has strong implications for defining national interests. National identity is grounded in a variety of objective characteristics of the national group. But it can take a variety of forms even when political rivals are forced to compete to obtain public support for their preferred versions. It can be even more extensively shaped by authoritarian regimes that promote preferred versions through control of the mass media, education, and other cultural institutions. This approach to understanding the national identity foundations of foreign and security policies partakes of multiple traditions in international relations theory. It recognizes the importance of the factors emphasized by realists—varying levels of military power and the resulting balances of power that emerge in response to different threats and conflicts.1 However, these power resources and constraints do not explain the identity and goals of the national units. To explain these identities and goals, it is necessary to use the liberal and constructivist approaches. Liberals point to the importance of regime type, which determines the character of leaders and the groups or segments of the population to whom they are responsible.2 Constructivists go further and argue that this still leaves much room for variation in national identities and interests. Constructivists emphasize that identities and interests are further defined through an ongoing process of interaction with other states in the international system, which parallels the internal political process emphasized by liberals.3 Both internal politics and international interactions influence the objectives and norms likely to guide foreign and security policy. National identities are central to explaining the origins and ongoing character of the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts. Particularly in democracies and less repressive authoritarian regimes, changing national identities interact with changing external conditions to influence political competition and leadership outcomes, and thereby, national security goals and strategies. The most significant regime transformations have occurred in China, Taiwan, and South Korea. In these countries, more liberal regimes are forced to bring national identities and interests into line with more popular, historically grounded conceptions. In doing so, the regimes must adapt to the

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consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse, while building new, more internally focused bases of legitimacy. Domestic political, economic, and cultural changes, along with new patterns of international relations, in turn, feed back into further evolution of national identities, and identities and policies continue to adjust to one another. The following sections examine this process in more detail, focusing first on the China-Taiwan conflict and then on the Korean conflict. We then summarize the contents of the volume.

National Identities and Interests: The Influence of Regime Type What explains the form taken by national identity and associated views of national interests? What factors influence how these identities and interests change over time? There are both structural and situational determinants. Structural determinants are the slow-changing characteristics that differentiate core national groups from surrounding groups. Typically, the core national group is a majority or near-majority ethnic group. Apart from some degree of perceived kinship, ethnic groups are marked off from neighboring ethnic groups by characteristics such as language, religion, physical appearance, common political history, elite and mass culture, and so on. Ethnic groups become national groups when they define themselves as collective units of political selfdetermination on territories claimed as homelands. For core national groups, the characteristics that differentiate them involve collective issues of cultural identity, claims to territory, and political self-rule. What are the linguistic, historical, and other traditions that should be inculcated through educational and cultural institutions? What lands does the nation claim to possess? What kinds of political institutions best insure group self-determination? How are such cultural, territorial, and political interests to be defended against internal and external threats? Situational determinants are potentially faster-changing institutions and current events that regularly shape and reshape the details of how differentiated national groups perceive their collective identities and interests. International relations generate a constant stream of events that affect national group attitudes toward neighboring groups and states, and these attitudes in turn affect group self-images and interest assessments. Internal political events, economic developments, and cultural trends have similar effects. For our purposes, such events and developments are particularly important in shaping threat perceptions—perceptions of external and internal threats to the identity, security, and core priorities of the nation. International and

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internal events also affect power relations, and thus how severe threats are perceived to be. Usually, the most serious threats—those over land and political control—come from other states and internal ethnic minorities. Threatening states and internal minorities may seek territory possessed by the dominant national group, or they may refuse to cede territory claimed by the nation. They may also seek to overthrow existing national political institutions and substitute their own control or influence, or they may resist a nation-state’s efforts to impose its own institutions.4 There is a long-standing debate between primordialists, who emphasize structural determinants of national identity and interests, and instrumentalists, who emphasize situational determinants. Primordialists emphasize that, at least in the short run, objective and subjective markers of group identity fix ethnic and national identities. Such identities give rise to national group interests in physical and cultural security and in political power and policies that protect and promote such interests. Such identities and interests are hard features of the social and political landscape that politicians ignore at their peril. In contrast, instrumentalists focus on the longer-term change of national identities and the variation in how national interests can be defined and protected. They seek to emphasize how—despite the constraints impose by markers of group identity and efforts to protect core national interests—national identities and security strategies are constantly redefined by internal demographic, economic, cultural, and political changes, and by international interactions with states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In this volume, we do not feel a need to take a position on this debate. Both primordialists and instrumentalists offer valuable insights, which are not necessarily inconsistent.5 Our interest is in explaining changes in national identities and interests. On the one hand, this requires attention to the core characteristics and interests of the national groups. On the other, we must necessarily look at factors beyond the core characteristics and interests that are capable of explaining changes in identities and interests. Our main emphasis is on changes in the political institutions through which national interests are represented and protected. In particular, there is a crucial distinction to be made between more and less democratic political institutions or regimes. Political institutions are central to any effort to explain why, of the main ways that national identities and interests may be defined against their structural backgrounds and amid their situational features, some forms, interests, and strategies are chosen over others.6

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The structural constraints leave open many possibilities. Within this range, there is a narrower set of possibilities capable of earning broad national support under democratic regimes. Democratic political competition will produce changes over time within this narrower range, in response to changes in situational needs and perceived adequacy of past policies. Over longer periods of time, changes in structural and situational features may produce significant “drift” of identities and interests. In contrast, highly authoritarian political regimes can sustain a wider range of national identities and interests, including many that could not earn majority support under democracy. Thus, one would expect changes from one authoritarian regime to another, or changes between democratic and authoritarian regimes, to have the potential to produce more drastic changes in national identities and interests—although such drastic changes are certainly not necessary. In contrast, changes from one democratic government to another would be expected to produce more incremental change. Changes under democracy are potentially larger when there has been a recent transition from authoritarianism, and when post-transition governments have remained relatively conservative. The China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts provide excellent laboratories for this approach. In both cases, the early Cold War decades saw two authoritarian states locked in conflict over which was the legitimate representative of a common, politically divided nation. Each state sought to discredit and displace its co-ethnic state rival, and thus unify the nation under its own political institutions. In all four states, highly authoritarian regimes provided leaders with considerable latitude in defining national identities and national interests. These identities and interests, though often defined in seemingly artificial ways, for long seemed set in stone.

National Identities and Interests on a Collision Course: Political Liberalization and Intensifying Conflict between China and Taiwan Significant change began in China in the 1980s, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime gradually liberalized its economy. China moved away from Mao Zedong’s radical communist ideology and the associated internal political and economic turmoil, and redefined its goals and methods in the direction of developmental–authoritarian nationalist regimes of the capitalist camp—particularly the Cold War regimes of U.S. allies such as Singapore, South Korea, and of course,

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Taiwan.7 In foreign policy, China pulled back from solidarity with the international communist cause, which had initially been pursued in alliance with the Soviet Union, and from the late 1950s and 1960s, in opposition to Soviet leadership. Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, reoriented Chinese foreign policy toward China’s immediate geographical periphery. Initially, this meant a continuing focus on the Soviet threat, but without Mao’s aggressive ideological edge. Internally, China’s reforms fell well short of democracy. But they involved significant economic, cultural, and political liberalization, making the regime more dependent on popular legitimacy. This was most apparent during the 1989 Tiananmen Square student demonstrations, which posed an unprecedented threat to the regime and were ultimately repressed with force. Thus, the CCP regime developed both a greater capacity and a stronger need to redefine China’s national interests.8 With the turn to market-based economic development and the waning commitment to internal and internationalist communist orthodoxy, traditional Chinese nationalism offered a natural substitute as a legitimizing ideology.9 Tiananmen Square showed that, while rapid economic growth was important for internal legitimacy, it was not necessarily sufficient in a poor country experiencing uneven economic development and rising expectations. Historically, Chinese nationalism was a central ideological plank for the Chinese Communists as well as the rival Chinese Nationalists or Kuomintang (KMT). Given China’s ancient political and cultural identity and greatness, combined with her recent humiliation at the hands of the European colonial powers, the United States, and most recently, Japan, securing China’s political independence and reviving her economic, cultural, and geopolitical potential was an appealing cause for all educated and culturally aware Chinese. As communist ideology faded, this remained true. With the liberalization and collapse of the USSR, Taiwan became the natural external focus of this traditional Chinese nationalism. From this perspective, a renegade KMT regime on Taiwan continued to divide China with the help of foreign powers—above all the United States. Amid all the changes in China’s post-Mao foreign policy, the most important constant was the commitment to absorb Taiwan. After Tiananmen Square, however, it turned from a theoretical duty into a practical obsession. Here was an issue that naturally unified Chinese public opinion behind the incumbent regime. This produced a constant stream of high-profile public commitments to “reunification,” along with loud threats to use force against a recalcitrant Taiwan. Although initially driven by diversionary political convenience—by the legitimizing value of focusing the Chinese public’s attention on the external

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issue of China’s “unification”—it was strongly reinforced by internal and international power considerations. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which saved the communist regime at Tiananmen Square, immediately attracted budget increases far in excess of China’s high economic growth rate. The PLA, always a hawkish voice on Taiwan, devoted its rapidly expanding resources to building up the modern, combined air, missile, sea, and land forces necessary for the daunting task of invading Taiwan. With the Soviet threat a fading memory, with China’s power growing steadily, and with the long-term commitment of the United States to defend Taiwan open to doubt, balance of power calculations also seemed to make forcible unification feasible. Thus, by the mid-1990s, China’s communist regime had committed its otherwise-shaky legitimacy to the cause of absorbing Taiwan, while lavishing prodigious resources on the central institutional pillar of its rule, the PLA. The liberalization of the communist regime, which began with an emphasis on economic reform, soon led to a renewed emphasis on Chinese nationalism, with “unification” with Taiwan as the core foreign policy goal. To this ideological commitment, China’s growing wealth and the regime’s institutional dependence on the PLA added a snowballing military capability. In the late 1980s, meanwhile, both Taiwan and South Korea had made complete transitions to democracy. In both cases, the old authoritarian regimes had justified their political institutions and economic policies in terms of the struggle to defeat their communist ethnic rivals. In Taiwan, by the late 1980s, it became increasingly difficult to represent the national struggle in the same old terms. The CCP regime began to resemble an earlier version of the KMT regime, which had ruled Taiwan since fleeing the Chinese mainland in 1949. Moreover, the internal economic reforms were increasing China’s power just as the decline and collapse of the USSR eliminated China’s most serious external threat. If the authoritarian KMT regime had continued to rely internally on force rather than on broader legitimacy to maintain its power, its position might soon have become untenable. This is largely because the KMT regime continued to be dominated by Mainlander elites that had fled to Taiwan in 1949. Most of Taiwan’s population hence saw the regime not only as repressive, but also as culturally, politically, and even ethnically alien. Such perceptions were not altered by Taiwan’s rapid economic development under KMT stewardship. Democratization was the KMT’s answer to a more adverse external environment, but it also meant redefining Taiwan’s national identity and interests in accordance with public opinion.

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The KMT had to redefine itself to appeal to the pivotal swing voters that would decide elections—voters who were Islanders rather than Mainlanders.10 To begin with, this meant dropping the claim to represent the Mainland as well as Taiwan, and trying to forge a “new Taiwanese” identity unifying Mainlanders and Islanders. The KMT’s traditional unification goal was put off into the indefinite future, conditional on the consent of both the Mainland and the “new Taiwan.” This was sufficient to meet the minimum desires of the Islander swing voters—obtaining equal treatment in all dimensions of internal life, including politics, and keeping out of the clutches of a repressive, poor, somewhat alien, and unpredictable mainland communist regime. For about a decade, this makeover allowed the KMT to win elections by significant margins. This solid post-democratization tenure was due to two main factors. First, democratization and embrace of the new Taiwanese identity removed the biggest grievance against the KMT, which otherwise had an enviable record of providing public goods and promoting broad-based economic development. In this sense, Taiwanese voters had good reason to be conservative. Second, the main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), had liabilities that went beyond its inexperience in governing. The DPP was founded and known primarily as the party of Taiwanese independence—the party that viewed Taiwan as having a distinct national identity and promised to declare Taiwan formally independent from China. But Beijing had publicly committed to attacking Taiwan in response to a declaration of independence. Although most Islanders were sympathetic to this goal, they were not sympathetic to the reckless manner in which the DPP appeared to be pursuing it. Thus, the DPP too had to adapt to democratization if it wanted to compete successfully for power. In the late 1990s, the DPP committed itself not to declare formal independence, that is, it made clear that it would pursue its goals in a way that did not recklessly provoke Beijing. The DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bien, won the 2000 presidential election, helped by a ruling camp split that divided the traditional KMT vote. In 2004, having proven himself competent and measured in office, Chen was reelected against an opposition unified behind the KMT candidate.11 In office, the DPP has pursued a national security policy that emphasizes “soft” as well as “hard” power. It has continued to maintain large armed forces, and tried to adapt them to deter the many possible lines of attack that might be taken by the modernizing PLA. But it has supplemented this hard approach by also developing Taiwan’s will to

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resist from the inside out. This strategy is centered on strengthening a Taiwanese national identity separate from China. Starting from the practical interest of Taiwanese in avoiding the political and cultural repression and economic risks associated with Beijing’s rule, it emphasizes the distinctive language, culture, and history of Taiwan to harden the nascent Taiwanese national identity, and maintains a low boil of verbal skirmishing with Beijing to make clear what is at stake and to build internal political loyalty and solidarity. This Taiwanese national identity project, although criticized by the Taiwanese opposition and many external observers as unduly provoking Beijing in the short run, is vital to sustaining Taiwanese will in the longer run, as the balance of power shifts inexorably in Beijing’s favor.12 China’s economic liberalization has recently fueled a spectacular increase in economic interdependence between China and Taiwan. Liberal theorists often argue that significant interdependence should tend to harmonize interests and reduce the risk of conflict. However, the ideological and practical forces pushing Taiwanese identity away from China appear to be much stronger than the contrary pull of economic interdependence.13 To summarize, Taiwan’s democratization forced the KMT to adopt a Taiwan-centered national identity. It also required the DPP to push the development of such a separate national identity at a more measured pace. It is common for analysts of nationalism and national identity to talk about how states can form national identities over time, usually through a combination of external conflicts and internal economic, cultural, and political integration policies. In Taiwan’s case, it is more accurate to say that the combination of an external conflict and the state’s successes in building a modern economy and society have forced the state to accommodate itself to the nation. To survive, the state had to bring its goals and methods into conformity with the demands of the nation. The result is sharper differentiation from a stronger and more nationalistic China.

National Identities and Interests Reconciled to the Status Quo: North Korean Decline, South Korean Democratization, and Improved North-South Relations Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea’s highly authoritarian regime has changed little. It has retained its legitimizing ideology of “self-reliant” Korean nationalism, combined with the political structure, centralized power, and economic system characteristic of traditional, Soviet-style communist regimes. This structure was

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created to preserve the regime’s power and communist credentials, while still appealing to Korean nationalism and preserving the North’s autonomy vis-à-vis its Soviet and Chinese patrons. The waning of the Cold War led the Soviet Union to withdraw economic support, which sent the North Korean economy into a tailspin. At the same time, China was moving toward more friendly relations with South Korea. The military backing provided by the USSR and China, since the Korean War, could no longer be counted upon. South Korea’s continuing economic growth, along with her unimpaired military alliance with the United States, made the North’s national and ideological rival an increasingly formidable foe. These external events and the associated internal economic decline threatened the regime’s survival. The Northern regime did not want to go the way of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states. There were (and are) two obvious responses to the North’s weakness. One is the route taken by Mainland China—market reforms coupled with limited liberalization of the society. Another is to redouble internal control and external military deterrence efforts, to guard against some combination of internal opposition and South Korean and U.S. intervention. North Korea has taken some steps toward market reform. However, 15 years after the Soviet collapse, these amount to little. Some joint ventures with South Korea have been undertaken. But these have not developed into significant enterprises—not going far beyond the initial goodwill investments made by South Korean governments and conglomerates. Price decontrol measures have been used mainly to limit development of black markets, as opposed to building the basis for a transition to a market economy.14 Meanwhile, estimates are that, despite huge quantities of food aid from South Korea, Japan, the United States, and other countries, between 1 and 2 million North Koreans (5–10 percent of the North’s population) have starved to death, and millions more are chronically malnourished. To ensure political loyalty, a disproportionate share of scarce resources flows to the North Korean military. The North Korean regime, then, fears economic liberalization and limited cultural and political openings more than a starving populace. It worries that economic and cultural contact with the outside world will create alternative nodes of wealth and organization, which may be activated by greater knowledge to mobilize against the regime. If this were to happen, the North Korean security forces themselves might become unreliable. In any clashes with demonstrators or disloyal North Korean security forces, South Korea and the United States might also be

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tempted to intervene. Fearing the political consequences of serious market reform, the North relies on continuing internal coercion and isolation, justified by its traditional “self-reliance” ideology. Externally, the North has ramped up its military deterrent against South Korea and the United States. Here the Northern regime maintains its Cold War-era strategies—ferocious intimidation and propaganda efforts within, along with a huge conventional army massed across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that forms the border with the South. Without Soviet support, and with its South Korean and U.S. rivals maintaining a qualitative technological advantage, this conventional army can no longer pose a credible threat of conquering the South. However, thousands of its artillery pieces are within easy range of the Seoul metropolitan area, which includes around a third of the South’s entire population. The South would be unlikely to risk tens of thousands of casualties to attack the Northern regime. But it is not hard to see how this deterrent might seem insufficient to the North. First, how effective would the North’s “rusty” Soviet-era equipment prove in a high-tech war with the South and the United States? Second, if internal disorder in the North should appear to threaten the regime, would Southern leaders resist the temptation to help finish the job? The North’s answer to these doubts is its nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs. Once built, these offer a more ironclad guarantee that the South and the United States view the costs of attacking the North as unacceptably high.15 Now consider the post–Cold War evolution of regime, national identity, and military strategy in the South. In contrast to the Cold War-era KMT regime on Taiwan, South Korea’s military regime chose democratization from a position of strength. Once the military regime had achieved its primary objectives of strengthening and stabilizing the South, there no longer seemed to be a need to incur the internal political costs of authoritarian rule. Huge gains in living standards had made the South Korean development model largely selfsustaining under democracy—although government-big business ties came under greater scrutiny, and authoritarian limits on labor organization and social welfare benefits were loosened. The South’s economic development had also made it far more powerful than the North. Combined with the liberalization and later the collapse of the USSR, this seemed to banish the North Korean invasion threat that had loomed over the South since the Korean War. Predictably, however, South Korean democracy did not respond to the declining North Korean threat in the manner of the old authoritarian regime.

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At first, South Korean democracy conserved the definitions of national identity and interests inherited from the military regime. Although the political repression and corruption of the old regime were rejected, its economic and geopolitical achievements seemed unassailable. Thus, in the first two elections following democratization, conservative governments closely associated with the old regime were elected. But things were slowly changing under the surface. A new generation was maturing that had little memory of the Korean War and the long march out of rural poverty. This generation identified more with the late authoritarian-era struggle for democracy, human rights, and clean government. Yet, it took a series of external shocks to activate this generational potential for political change. First, in 1997, South Korea was struck by the Asian financial crisis. This exposed the efficiency and financial costs incurred by the privileged position of South Korea’s business conglomerates. These businesses used their traditional ties with the government to funnel the bulk of domestic savings into capitalintensive investments in highly competitive sectors such as autos and memory chips. When domestic demand fell, local interest rates shot up, and the South Korean won was devalued, the huge debts, heavily denominated in U.S. dollars, could not be serviced. Suddenly, the dark side of the South Korean economic miracle came into focus, and a Center-Left government led by Kim Dae-jung was elected. Apart from attacking the privileged position of the conglomerates, Kim’s government adopted a more conciliatory position toward the North. At first, these policies had limited resonance with the public, largely because they did not elicit any significant concessions from the North. With each year, however, the older generation passed on, and was replaced by a new generation without the old hardened hostility and suspicion toward the Northern regime. In 2001–2002, events mobilized the new generation against this traditional hostility and suspicion. First, the September 11 attacks led the United States to identify the North Korean nuclear program as a primary source of risk for nuclear terrorism. Soon after, it was revealed that the North had violated the 1994 Agreed Framework—in which it agreed to freeze its plutonium-based nuclear program in exchange for economic assistance—by building a clandestine, enriched uraniumbased nuclear program. At the same time, the United States was moving toward overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, which after September 11 had also been identified as a principal risk-node for terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. Within South Korea itself, a U.S. military vehicle accidentally crushed two South Korean girls to

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death. The U.S. personnel were then acquitted of wrongdoing by a U.S. military tribunal, outraging South Korean public opinion. Together, these events constituted a kind of “perfect storm” that adversely affected South Korean perceptions of the United States, particularly among the younger generation. The United States now seemed capable of precipitating a military confrontation with the North, in which South Korea would bear most of the costs. Moreover, both international charges of “unilateralism” in response to the invasion of Iraq, and the acquittal of the U.S. personnel in the killing of the South Korean schoolgirls, could be interpreted to signal U.S. arrogance and disregard for the interests of other countries. It must be emphasized that this was not merely a matter of perceptions, which all parties have an incentive to try to manipulate in their favor. The public resonance of the South Korean Center-Left’s more hostile attitude toward the United States was grounded in a difference in hard national security interests opened up by the North’s nuclear program. The North’s nuclear program is more of a threat to the United States than to South Korea. The United States is worried that nuclear materials and technologies will be transferred to rogue states or terrorists willing to use nuclear weapons against the United States. On the other hand, North Korean nuclear weapons are only likely to be used against the South in the event of a North-South war. Such a war would almost certainly destroy the Northern regime, so the North is unlikely to initiate one. Therefore, the primary risk of war now seems to come from overzealous U.S. pressure to end the Northern nuclear program. To the extent that avoiding war with the North becomes the South’s primary foreign policy goal, its policy toward the North evolves toward an emphasis on unconditional aid and diplomatic reassurance, designed to shore up the Northern regime against any instability that might precipitate war. This represents a sea change from the Cold War-era national identity and interests of the South. Instead of the traditional emphasis on doing what it takes to protect the South and eventually absorb the North, the new policy sees stabilizing the North as a way of protecting the South. This change is possible because the North no longer seems to pose an offensive threat to South Korea’s security, and because absorbing the North might involve significant costs and risks for the South. For the younger generation, which lacks the older generation’s instinctive hostility toward the North, it becomes possible to make even sharper distinctions. The arguably risky policies pursued by the United States can now be portrayed as the primary threat, whereas conserving the status quo is arguably the best way to avoid war and pursue Korean

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unity through a long-term, peaceful process of reconciliation. Of course, this calculation does not emphasize the interests of the North Korean population. In the South’s authoritarian-era version of Korean national identity and interests, it would make sense to confront a weakened North to include the North’s population in the benefits enjoyed by the South—even at the risk of significant costs for the South. However, this logic does not work under democracy. Democracy covers only the South, and democracy is averse to war unless there is a core national interest that justifies the expected costs. But confronting the Northern regime may impose heavy costs on the South and primarily stands to provide long-term benefits to the Northern population. Hence democracy favors a national identity and national interest calculation limited to the “little” Korea of the South, rather than the “greater” Korea also encompassing the North. All South Koreans continue to pay lip service to a formally unified Korean ethnic and national identity. However, the Center-Right has little enthusiasm for bearing the costs of confronting the North, while the Center-Left views the United States as more likely to precipitate a war than the North.16 To summarize, the weakened Northern regime, wary of the risks of internal liberalization, has sought heightened security by maintaining internal regimentation and the associated national identity, while building nuclear and missile capabilities to shore up its external security. Meanwhile, democratization and generational change created the potential for new developments in South Korean identity and interests. This potential began to develop as a result of the Asian financial crisis. However, it only advanced more fully when the North Korean nuclear program, combined with the U.S. war on terror, drove a national security interest wedge between South Korea and the United States. The new South Korean identity is content with a divided Korea, as long as that seems more likely to guarantee peace. Korean national interest can then be identified with shoring up the North and “containing” the United States.

Organization of This Volume and Chapter Summaries This volume is organized as follows. We begin with the China–Taiwan conflict. Separate chapters on China and on Taiwan cover the evolution of national identity and its impact on political development and foreign and security policy. Then, a chapter examines how rapid economic integration is affecting China-Taiwan relations. Then there

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are chapters on U.S. policy towards China and Taiwan, and on current and likely future trends in China-Taiwan relations. A similar approach is taken toward the Korean conflict. Separate chapters on North Korea and South Korea trace relations between national identity, political development, and foreign and security policy. Two chapters then examine U.S. and Japanese policies, and another chapter summarizes current and likely future developments in the North Korean nuclear impasse. The concluding chapter summarizes past U.S. policies in the two conflicts, along with the development of Japan’s foreign policy. It then reviews the main scenarios for the future. In Chapter 2, Peter Moody examines changes in China’s national identity and interests. Since 1949, China has consistently asserted that sovereignty over Taiwan is a core element of its national interest. Yet the actual experience of the past 110 years and more suggests that an autonomous Taiwan or, indeed, a Taiwan controlled by or allied with a power actively hostile to China, does not objectively constitute a fatal threat to China’s security. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interest in taking control over Taiwan was initially due to the flight of the nationalist, KMT regime to the island in 1949. The KMT continued to claim that it was the legitimate government of all China, and this required the CCP to insist on China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. As long as relations remained good with the USSR, however, narrow Chinese national interests were subordinated to the international communist cause. Thus, as a result of China’s entry into the Korean War, the United States provided a security guarantee to Taiwan that rendered China helpless to impose her control. Following the break with the USSR, the CCP eventually built a tactical alliance with the United States and made Taiwan a low priority. With Deng Xiaoping’s turn toward economic liberalization, and later the liberalization and collapse of the USSR, economic development increasingly supplanted communist ideology as the CCP’s main source of legitimacy. The 1989 student protests and their suppression exposed CCP legitimacy as tenuous. CCP leaders naturally turned to Chinese nationalism as a substitute. Following the Soviet collapse, this led to a focus on reasserting control over Taiwan. This focus has become widely and deeply popular among the Chinese public, and this makes it difficult for Chinese leaders to back down from formal commitments not to tolerate Taiwanese independence and to somehow assert Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. The U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific has so far deterred China from the use of force. China’s leaders have not been willing to jeopardize their economic achievements by attempting risky military efforts to impose control over Taiwan.

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That may change if they feel that Taiwanese policies so defy China’s claims to Taiwan as to pose a serious threat to the CCP’s internal legitimacy. A working hypothesis, then, is that Chinese policy should be understood in the context of a modified constructivism: sovereignty over Taiwan has become a perennial part of the Chinese elite’s definition of what constitutes China, with this attitude reinforced by the domestic political process. The extent to which this interest is acted on depends in part upon the international context, particularly upon policies pursued in Taiwan and the United States. In Chapter 3, Hans Stockton asks whether Taipei’s search to consolidate the internal component of its security—democracy—is working at cross-purposes with the goal of securing external security vis-à-vis China. The key dynamic in this predicament is the debate over a new sense of national identity on Taiwan. This Taiwanese identity may be culturally compatible with the Chinese state, but it is politically incompatible with the CCP-controlled state as it now exists. This new identity has come to the fore as a cause and consequence of the dynamics of the democratic transition on Taiwan. Stockton discusses how recent Taiwanese identity was formed under the impact of traditional Chinese culture, the alien and highly authoritarian character of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang regime, and then the successive liberalization efforts of Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui. Each of these phases were responding to challenges from the Mainland, as well as from within Taiwan. After reviewing the history of Taiwan’s crossStrait policy, Stockton examines how cross-Strait relations have been influenced by the identity debate. Finally, the impact of Taiwanese identity is evident in the recent evolution of Taiwanese national security strategy. This includes not only a more high-tech response to the Mainland air, sea, and missile buildup. There is also a new doctrine of “all out defense,” in which a stronger public sense of national solidarity is expected to animate a more stubborn and flexible response to any Mainland use of force. The emergence of a new Taiwanese identity has dimmed the prospects for political unification. While consolidating the new Taiwanese national identity may be necessary for long-term survival as a separate state, it does so at the cost of increasing tensions with a more powerful and assertive Mainland. This increases the probability of a cross-Strait military conflict in the near future. In Chapter 4, Cal Clark asks how growing cross-Strait economic interdependence is affecting China–Taiwan relations. Since the late 1980s, there has been an explosion of economic transactions and social communications between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of

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China. For example, China now receives a quarter of Taiwan’s exports and well over half its outward foreign investment (67 percent in 2004); and there are now well over half a million Taiwan citizens living in just the Shanghai area. This reflects both major policy changes in the two countries since the mid-1980s and the growing complementarity of their economies. The two economies, moreover, can be considered “integrated” because China and Taiwan are not just exchanging goods and services. They have developed a functionally linked economy, in which different stages of the production process occur on the two sides of the Strait. For example, advanced components are produced in Taiwan and exported to China for final assembly. Several well-developed research traditions conclude that growing trade and economic interdependence between two countries—such as that between China and Taiwan over the past 15 years—should markedly reduce hostility and the probability of military conflict. However, the state of cross-Strait relations seems quite inconsistent with this logic. Directly, the burgeoning economic integration between Taiwan and China was accompanied by rising, not diminishing, political hostility and security threats. More indirectly, the linkage between government policy and economic relations was quite weak, to say the least. Finally, Taiwan’s domestic politics have been marked by a new emphasis on Taiwanese national identity politics. This occurred at the same time that expanding economic and social contacts between China and Taiwan might have been expected to attenuate, rather than intensify, identity conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. In Chapter 5, Steven Redd analyzes U.S. foreign policy toward China and Taiwan. Redd begins by examining Cold War foreign policy across the various presidential administrations. He then moves on to post–Cold War foreign policy—the Clinton and Bush presidencies. He compares various administration approaches to the Taiwan crisis, examining how and why policies varied within and between administrations. Numerous international and domestic factors have contributed to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China, complicating both foreign policy processes and outcomes. Internationally, the Communist takeover of Mainland China in 1949, the Mainland entry into the Korean War in 1950, the Sino-Soviet break of the late 1950s and 1960s, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989–1991, ushered in major changes in U.S. attitudes toward China and Taiwan. Internally, ideological differences across presidential administrations, and between presidents and Congress, have also had crucial effects. The policy that emerged since the 1970s has sought to build better relations with China, while preventing China from forcibly absorbing

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Taiwan. This has involved a commitment to China’s position that there is only one China, which includes Taiwan, while insisting that Taiwan’s current informal independence cannot be altered through the use of force or threats. Since the 1990s, this policy has been challenged both by Beijing’s rapidly growing economic power and cross-Strait military capability, and by a surging Taiwanese identity defined in opposition to the threat of Mainland domination. However, these changes only seem to have added new clarity and solidity to the traditional U.S. policy. In Chapter 6, Shale Horowitz and Alexander Tan explain how changing identities and power relations are putting China and Taiwan on a collision course. With China’s relative economic and military power growing rapidly, and the regime’s legitimacy increasingly based on appeals to Chinese nationalism, China may soon be tempted to use force against Taiwan rather than continue to accept the status quo. How is Taiwan responding to this looming threat? In Taiwan, since the early 1990s, Taiwanese identity has rapidly supplanted Chinese identity. This has pushed all the main political parties toward the new identity, and brought the DPP to power. Rising Taiwanese identity has also affected military strategies. It has accelerated Mainland military mobilization on the Taiwan Strait along with offsetting preparations in Taiwan. It has also strengthened Taiwan’s will to retain her independence, and thereby led to newer, more unconventional defense strategies. One such strategy is to enhance ideological legitimacy in the United States and Japan. Another is to embrace economic integration with China—a development hitherto seen as threatening. A third is to deter a Chinese attack by credibly committing to a more dogged fight to preserve independence, even under conditions where such a fight seems hopeless. Last, a strong Taiwanese identity makes it more likely that China’s increasing conventional military predominance will ultimately call forth a Taiwanese nuclear deterrent. Of these newer or potential strategies, only a nuclear deterrent seems likely to provide an ironclad guarantee of Taiwan’s independence. In Chapter 7, Terence Roehrig looks at the development of the North Korean regime, emphasizing the close links between its top–down version of Korean national identity and the state’s security strategy. For over 1,200 years, Koreans shared a common identity shaped by history, language, and culture. The partition of the Korean Peninsula at the close of World War II threatened this identity, with competing versions emerging in the North and South. In the North, Kim Il Sung ruled with an iron fist, fashioning an identity through the force of his own will and the power of a totalitarian police state. Central to North Korean identity is the ideology of juche, which

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translates roughly as self-reliance. Juche is a combination of Korean nationalism and a Confucian version of socialism that calls for North Korean political and economic independence. Since the partition, North Korea’s chief goal has been to impose its version of Korean identity on the entire peninsula, with force if necessary. However, in the past 10–15 years, North Korea confronted a multitude of problems, including a disastrous economy, loss of Chinese and Soviet aid, and a deteriorating external security environment. The failing economy challenges the wisdom of juche as an economic philosophy, making it more difficult for the regime to maintain its manufactured identity. Market reform efforts have been belated and limited, probably because rapid and significant liberalization is seen to involve unacceptable political risks. The more adverse security environment has been addressed by a nuclear weapons program. The nuclear program seems to offer a reliable counterweight against the huge conventional military advantage of the South Korean and U.S. militaries. But it also maintains North Korea’s isolation and hence complicates any economic reform efforts. In Chapter 8, Uk Heo and Jung Yeop Woo summarize the more complex development of regime type, identity, and security strategy in South Korea. In a relatively short period of time, South Korea has achieved miraculous economic and political strides, becoming an industrial and technological powerhouse and then a vibrant democracy. With these achievements, the younger generation has shifted away from the traditional pro-U.S. mentality toward a more independent identity. This changed national identity has been reflected in election outcomes and in government policies toward North Korea and the United States. The younger generation, which has grown up during a period of economic prosperity without serious security concerns, tends to want South Korea to become a “normal” country and to deal with foreign and security issues in an independent manner. In practical terms, the younger generation tends to view the U.S. hard line toward the North as creating a higher risk of war than the North’s nuclear program. This has led the South Korean government to be less cooperative with the United States and friendlier toward North Korea. In Chapter 9, Karl DeRouen and Milica Begovic analyze the U.S. response to North Korea’s nuclear program. They explain how the Bush administration has reversed earlier Clinton policies that set out to engage North Korea using economic incentives. They detail how Bush administration policies are based on preexisting ideological opposition to the Clinton administration approach, and describe the stricter

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bargaining position taken toward North Korea. They argue that the more hard-line Bush administration policies are less likely to elicit significant concessions than those of the Clinton administration. They also argue that U.S. reliance on preemptive force and unilateralism endangers relations with South Korea, a crucial U.S. ally in the region. Dennis Patterson, in Chapter 10, explains Japan’s security policy and operational plans in East Asia both during and after the Cold War, with a special emphasis on its response to the Korean nuclear crisis. Japan’s post–Cold War security behavior has been dramatically different from its behavior prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Specifically, throughout the Cold War era, Japan’s security behavior operated in support of the U.S. security regime, which dominated security relations in East Asia. Japan thus had a limited and stable selfdefense policy. Indeed, Japan identified its security role as being primarily economic, that is, encouraging economic development in a way that promoted peace in the East Asian region and throughout the world. However, as the Cold War ended and new security concerns became salient, Japan’s security behavior became more active and expansive. In this context, “active” means that Japan increased the nature and extent of its participation in regional security activities; “expansive” means that it evolved plans to project its power farther from the home islands, in an effort to deter any threat to the nation. While a number of factors help to explain this dramatic shift in security behavior, this chapter shows that three were most important. First, the bursting of Japan’s economic bubble and the long recession that ensued undermined the government’s ability to identify Japan as an alternative model of economic development and, thus, as a promoter of peace through government policies that encouraged rapid growth. Second, China’s military modernization and the crisis on the Korean Peninsula made security concerns a more salient domestic political issue than they were during the Cold War. And, finally, these two developments led to a sea change in domestic opinion that increasingly encouraged political leaders to be more active in securing the defense of the Japanese homeland. These changes in domestic opinion reflect changes in Japan’s postwar national identity. The extent to which this postwar identity incorporated pacifism and negative attitudes toward the Japanese Self-Defense Forces has been exaggerated. However, it did include an emphasis on Japan’s distinctive model of economic development, along with a corresponding reliance on international economic aid and investment in managing foreign relations. Combined with rising regional security threats and heightened fears of terrorism, Japan’s economic difficulties since 1989 have led

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more Japanese to view her as a “normal country.” This involves a reduced emphasis on economic aid and ties, along with more “normal” military preparations to deal with ongoing and emerging threats. In Chapter 11, In-Taek Hyun and Sung Deuk Hahm review the current state of the Korean nuclear crisis, and offer guidelines for future progress. In recent years, the pendulum of the Korean nuclear crisis has swung back and forth between optimism and pessimism. Since China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States have held the fourth rounds of talks in Beijing aimed at persuading North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons development, the pendulum seems somewhere at the middle point of this spectrum. Both the South Korean and the U.S. governments have been eager to continue the six-party talks to peacefully resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis. It remains to be seen, however, whether this mechanism of dialogue will eventually bring about peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, settling the issue and creating a new strategic environment in which every party feels secure. This essay examines how changing external conditions of North and South Korea—particularly shifts in the balance of power including the United States, Japan, China, and Russia—interact with internal political developments and evolving national identities in South Korea to influence the present and future of the Korean nuclear crises. Hyun and Hahm review how the end of the Cold War and generational change in the South, coupled with the more hard-line approach of post–9/11 U.S. foreign policy, have led South Korea and the United States to disagree in their approaches to North Korea. Since there are no good military responses to North Korea’s nuclear program, and since China and Russia are likely to block economic sanctions, diplomatic negotiations continue to provide the only promising route forward. These are more likely to succeed if a number of conditions are met. First, it is necessary that China send a stronger message to North Korea than before, that there can be no alternative except dismantling its nuclear program. China faces a tough diplomatic challenge in seeking to persuade an unpredictable North Korea to return to the table and resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Second, a more flexible and sophisticated American diplomatic option can also help to move negotiations forward. In Chapter 12, Shale Horowitz summarizes the post–World War II development of U.S. policies toward China and Taiwan, and on the Korean Peninsula, along with recent developments in Japan’s foreign and security policies. He argues that rising Chinese military power and increasingly strong Taiwanese identity create an increasing risk of war.

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There is little that the United States can do to alter these trends. For now, the United States keeps the two sides apart. However, the United States will be increasingly hesitant to go to war with a rising China, particularly if Taiwan is perceived to be relying more on the United States than on its own capabilities. In the long run, Taiwan must assume more of its own defense burden if it is to remain independent of Beijing’s control. On the Korean Peninsula, the end of the Cold War, the Korean nuclear program, and September 11 created newly diverging interests between the United States and South Korea. While the United States is most concerned about the threat of nuclear proliferation from the North, South Korea is more interested in avoiding a costly conventional war with the North. Thus, the diplomatic and economic pressure that the United States views as necessary to compel the North to completely and verifiably eliminate its nuclear program are seen by much of South Korea as measures that dangerously increase the risk of conventional war. In the six-party talks, the two parties seem to have settled on a lowest-common-denominator approach to the North. This involves obtaining Chinese (and Russian) support to use the threat of economic sanctions to enforce a trade. The North will receive military security guarantees and economic assistance, in exchange for the complete and verifiable dismantling of its nuclear program. Although no more promising approach is evident, this effort is likely to fail. This is because the North highly values its nuclear program, and is rightly skeptical that China and South Korea will respond to future cheating by the North with punitive economic sanctions. Finally, Horowitz emphasizes that Japan is by far the most important ally of the United States in East Asia–both due to Japan’s power and its closely aligned security interests. Thus, it is vital that U.S. policies toward the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts be closely coordinated with those of Japan.

Notes 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Shale Horowitz, “The Balance of Power: Formal Perfection and Practical Flaws,” Journal of Peace Research 38 (2001): 705–722; Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 2. Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977); Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Bruce M. Russett,

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8.

9.

Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City: Anchor, 1973); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). Classic works taking various positions include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991); Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); and Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). There are more extreme versions of both primordialist and instrumentalist arguments. Extreme primordialists might argue that objective characteristics define both group identity and interests in a precise manner, leaving little or no space to subjective interpretation and values. Extreme primordialists might also argue that group leaders always prioritize such objectively determined group goals. Extreme instrumentalists might argue that objective characteristics have little effect on group identity and interests, and that group leaders invariably place their own power and wealth interests above the group interests they claim to represent. We reject all of these arguments. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russet, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986,” American Political Science Review 87 (September 1993): 624–638; Ross A. Miller, “Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (1999): 388–402. It is no accident that the so-called East Asian development model spread most rapidly within East and Southeast Asia, before spreading more weakly to other parts of the developing world. For China, spatial, ethnic, and cultural proximity made the East Asian model much more attractive. Apart from geographical proximity to China, Singapore and Taiwan have Han Chinese ethnic majorities, and Korea has historically fallen within China’s cultural orbit. Other potential models were British-ruled Hong Kong and democratic Japan, but these were not compatible with preserving the CCP’s authoritarian rule. For an extended discussion, see Chapter 2 in this volume, “The Evolution of China’s National Interest: Implications for Taiwan” by Peter Moody. Chinese nationalism had always been beneath the surface of Mao’s regime, in the form of a strong independent streak that guarded against

D E M O C R AT I Z AT I O N

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

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excessive Soviet influence and insisted on a leadership role for China in the international communist movement. In retrospect, however, the commitment to communist orthodoxy was often damaging to China’s narrower economic and national security interests. Mainlanders, including those coming over from the Mainland with the KMT and their descendents, are estimated to constitute 10–15 percent of Taiwan’s population. Although the DPP also increased its parliamentary representation, it was not able to win an outright majority. Thus, when the opposition is unified, it retains the ability to block DPP initiatives in the legislature. For more detail on the development of Taiwanese identity and its geopolitical implications, see Chapter 3 in this volume, “Taiwan: Political and National Security of Becoming ‘Taiwanese,’ ” by Hans Stockton and Chapter 6, “Rising China versus Estranged Taiwan,” by Shale Horowitz and Alexander Tan. See Chapter 4 in this volume, “Economic Interdependence between China and Taiwan: Implications for National Identity and Security,” by Cal Clark. North Korea’s market reforms bear no resemblance to the full-scale transitions to market economies that have occurred in China, Eastern Europe, and more recently, Vietnam. They are closer to, but still more limited than, the measured changes in Cuba, which are also designed to funnel money into the hands of the regime while keeping most of the economy in state hands—that is, under exclusive regime control. The North Korean regime has been more ambitious about raising cash through illegal or questionable activities: growing heroin poppies and selling refined heroin through international criminal networks; counterfeiting U.S. dollars and other foreign currencies; and covertly selling arms and military technology to criminal networks and “rogue” states. These activities yield the regime hundreds of millions of dollars each year. See Chapter 7 in this volume, “North Korea in Crisis: Regime, Identity, and Strategy” by Terence Roehrig. The nuclear and missile programs have had the additional benefit of providing the North with “blackmail” leverage to extract additional international aid. Some of the weapons and technology can also be sold abroad without provoking a South Korean and U.S. military response. But these blackmail and sales dividends are unlikely to add up to much beyond the frontloaded costs of the nuclear and missile programs. So, without taking into account the insurance the programs provide for regime survival, these dividends do not provide a sufficient explanation. It should also be noted that, if the North should start wholesale transfers of crucial nuclear materials and technology to rogue states or terrorist organizations, the United States will be forced to attack, with or without the cooperation of the South. In that event, the South will almost

26

H o r ow i t z , H e o, a n d T a n certainly join the U.S. effort. On this point, see Chapter 12 in this volume, “The United States, Japan, and the China-Taiwan and Korean Conflicts: Past and Future” by Shale Horowitz. 16. See Chapter 8 in this volume, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy” by Uk Heo and Jung Yeop Woo.

Chapter 2

The E volution of China’ s National Interest: Implications for Taiwan P e t e r R . M o o d y , J r.

Ever since its founding, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has

claimed sovereignty over its “sacred territory,” Taiwan. American acknowledgment of this claim, however ambiguously expressed,1 has been a condition for normal relations with the PRC. The assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan is treated as a core Chinese national interest; sovereignty over Taiwan is one aspect of the officially defined Chinese national identity. The focus on identity implies a commitment to what is now called a “constructivist” approach to foreign policy, at least partially in opposition to the predominant Realist vision. Under the more austere forms of Realism, international politics is explained in terms of the number of “actors” in the international system and their relative “capacities” (or power).2 The constructivist approach identifies different kinds of international systems, including different kinds of anarchy, and stresses the role of ideas in the formation of national interest: the national interest, to some extent, is what those in charge of things are interested in.3 Those committed to an area-studies analysis are constructivists by instinct. Constructivism is often considered an alternative to the power politics mentality some associate with Realism.4 China has not had

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real control over Taiwan for well over a hundred years (with the partial and dubious exception of 1945–1949); during this time China has had its good times and its bad, but there is no evidence that control over Taiwan is in a Realistic sense a “vital” Chinese interest. If interests can be given a voluntaristic interpretation—matters of ideas and perceptions—then states may have greater freedom of action than Realism implies. But if interests are socially or politically constructed, policy may be beyond the influence of what outsiders may consider rational calculations of benefit.

Chinese Perceptions of Chinese Interest In their declaratory mode, current Chinese elites disdain power politics. According to a 2004 official reconstruction, the predominant political vision in China has been based upon Mencius’s premise that human nature is good. State policy has traditionally valued harmony (he wei gui), harmony explicitly distinguished from uniformity (he er butong). China, we learn, has never been an aggressive power.5 The foreign policy of Republican China tended toward idealism in its rhetoric—small wonder, perhaps, inasmuch as China was generally the victim of power politics. Foreign policy in the PRC, whatever was said in the early twenty-first century, has tended toward Realism in the sense that it emphasizes power relationships. During Mao’s time, however, a focus on China’s narrower national interests was supplemented by what could be called revolutionary interests,6 as well as Mao’s desire that China be seen as a global actor. Since Mao’s death economic development has become more prominent as a goal of foreign policy. During the last quarter of the twentieth century this went together with a commitment to an old-fashioned claim of absolute state sovereignty. Since about the turn of the century, this has evolved into a greater explicit awareness of the political consequences of global economic integration.

Maoist Foreign Policy An influential if contested interpretation treats the Chinese communist movement as an expression of peasant nationalism (rather than of radical social preferences).7 More recently there has been a “rebunking,” informed by the publication of contemporary Soviet documents, noting the close coordination between the Chinese and Soviet Party leaderships.8 For the Chinese communists there was no inherent

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contradiction between China’s national interest and a general revolutionary interest, since one goal of the revolution was to rid China (and the world) of imperialism. This perception, however, was shaped by a particular ideological predisposition (thus, the Kuomintang (KMT) was also nationalistic and anti-imperialistic, but did not define China’s interests in the same way the communists did). The communists saw themselves as part of a worldwide revolutionary movement and, despite often major differences, accepted Moscow’s leadership of that movement. The split with the Soviet Union came in part from a Chinese perception that the Soviets had betrayed the revolution. Sino-Soviet Friendship In early 1950, after difficult and protracted negotiations, the new Chinese regime signed a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union directed against the United States (“Japan or any power allied with Japan”). On strictly Realist grounds there was no inherent reason for hostility between the United States and the PRC, any more than there was between America and the old KMT regime. The grounds for the antipathy were ideological—as were the grounds for Sino-Soviet friendship.9 The Soviet alliance provided China with relatively generous developmental aid and gave China protection from the United States (disregarding that the alliance itself was a major reason China needed protection). Prior to the Korean War, the United States was not clearly committed to defending Taiwan from a Mainland attack. That war, and especially Chinese intervention in Korea in the fall of 1950, cemented hostility between China and the United States for a generation. The intervention seems to owe at least as much to the relationship with the Soviet Union as it does to any Chinese state interest. Recent Chinese commentary implicitly blames regime leader Mao Zedong for sacrificing China’s national interest in favor of fulfilling an internationalist duty, assuaging Stalin’s distrust, and carrying through on rash promises made to the North Koreans. The intervention in Korea cost China its best opportunity to conquer Taiwan.10 The break with the Soviet Union also initially turned on ideological questions, although, obviously, much more was involved, with Realist and even personal concerns embedded in an ideological matrix. Khrushchev’s attacks on Stalin threatened the unity of the socialist camp, a pillar of China’s own security. It also potentially threatened Mao’s position in the Chinese regime. Mao thought that Soviet progress in nuclear weapons and guided missiles had shifted the world

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balance of power in favor of the socialist bloc (“the east wind prevails over the west wind”), allowing the Soviets to take a stronger stand against America. For the Soviets, the same progress generated an overriding goal of avoiding all-out war with the United States. By the late 1950s the Chinese had concluded that in a crunch the Soviets would not risk their own well-being to defend China against the United States.11 The reaction at the time was to brand the Soviets as too proAmerican. Khrushchev evidently thought (in the words of a popular saying) that if he sang enough psalms the Americans would lay down their butcher knife and become Buddhas. China asserted itself as leader, if only by example and inspiration, of the world revolution, especially in the Third World that Russia had betrayed. The conflict took on its own dynamic, and by the end of the 1960s the Chinese were considerably more afraid of being attacked by the Russians than by the Americans. Sino-Soviet Conflict The quarrel took the shape it did for ideological reasons, but its momentum eventually made specific ideological positions nugatory, pushing more purely strategic considerations to the surface.12 Lin Biao’s once famous 1965 exposition of people’s war located the dynamics of world revolution in the Third World and forecast a process whereby the “rural areas” of the world would encircle and overcome the world’s “urban” centers (North America and Europe, including the Soviet Union). It asserted that the Chinese revolution (as then construed in Maoist ideology) was the contemporary world’s only valid revolutionary model. Lin did not really have a program for world conquest; his meaning should be seen in the context of the contemporary world situation and Chinese domestic politics.13 The peoples of the world should make revolution after the fashion of Chairman Mao, but each people should make its own revolution without outside support. In a cold-hearted Realist interpretation, this would keep the United States bogged down in Vietnam without attracting an American attack on China, freeing China from any need to reconcile with the Soviet Union and leaving the regime room to tear at its own entrails in the Cultural Revolution. With the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the proclamation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, China worried that the Soviets might be planning a similar attack on them. While the Maoists had the utmost contempt for the Czech “communism with a

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human face,” they did not like the Soviets taking it upon themselves to eradicate that movement. The Soviets became “social imperialists,” hardly different from American imperialists. The ideological conflict lost its point: there seemed no longer any common premises to squabble over. Following the battles along the Ussuri River in 1969, Mao decided to try to “link with the Americans to resist the Soviets.”14 The emerging Chinese worldview was Realist in substance; and its manner of articulation would not have been out of place in the Stratagems of the Warring States or the Romance of the Three Kingdoms. It continued to be couched in an ideological idiom, Mao’s interesting thesis about the “three worlds” and the “contradictions” among and within them. The substance was that each superpower, the United States and the Soviet Union, wants to dominate the globe alone, but both share a common interest in blocking any challenge to their supremacy and avoiding all-out war with each other. In the current world situation the United States, thwarted in Vietnam and buffeted by OPEC, is a declining superpower, while the Soviet Union grows stronger every day. Third World, including Chinese, interests, then, lie in lining up with the Americans to check the Soviets.15 In practice this evolved into what amounted to an unofficial alliance between China and America, and the Chinese press in the 1970s was filled with exhortations to the Americans to show a little backbone and stand up to the Russians. Implications for Taiwan During the Maoist period there was close to implacable hostility toward the Taiwan regime: both sides, after all, had a claim to the same scarce resource, the title to the legitimate government of all China. The communists were “determined to liberate Taiwan.” The hostility was exacerbated by the ideological rivalry and by the protection accorded Taiwan by its relationship with the United States. Both, however, did share a common antipathy to any concept of Taiwan independence. Mao at least may have held out the hope that a combination of patriotism and ambition would induce Chiang Kaishek to negotiate a peaceful settlement—whereby Chiang might, say, be guaranteed his control over Taiwan and also given a position of honor in the PRC government, in return for accepting the sovereignty of the PRC. Today Mainland commentary sometimes betrays nostalgia for the Chiangs. By the early 1970s both China and America were eager to establish a relationship, but China insisted that America accept China’s definition

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of Taiwan’s status, or at least phrase things in a way that could be construed as acceptance. China in fact did not expect any immediate action on Taiwan, but did demand American acceptance, in principle, of China’s position.16

The Reform Era Following the death of Mao, Chinese foreign policy rhetoric lost much of its belligerent character. The focus turned to economic development rather than political alignments and military security, a change reflecting both domestic politics and a turn in the general world environment.17 The turn away from radicalism at home also entailed an abandonment of radicalism and militancy in foreign policy. The new leadership saw state strength as requiring economic growth, to be achieved by greater reliance on the market and greater interaction with the outside world: reform and opening. The “peoples of the world,” according to the slogan, no longer wanted revolution but development. China’s own growth required 20 years of peace—a moving 20 years, it seems, the count beginning anew each day. The general policy change was also reflected in a change in the official self-image of the state. Both the Nationalists and the Communists were Chinese patriots and both were highly nationalistic. Communist nationalism, however, had been of a radical sort, an identification with what was taken to be China’s popular, as opposed to elite tradition.18 For example, the KMT, especially under Chiang Kai-shek, took as one of its heroes Zeng Guofan, the conservative Confucian scholar who organized the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion. For the Communists, the heroes were the Taipings.19 From the early 1980s the regime no longer identified itself as a revolutionary break with the higher Chinese tradition, but, rather, as the natural continuator and heir of that tradition.20 During the 1980s China ceased support for foreign Asian communist parties, aligning itself, if anything, with the more conservative regimes in the region. On VJ day in 1965 Lin Biao had famously proclaimed China as the spiritual, if not the operational leader, of revolution in the Third World, and also claimed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had been the leader and organizer of China’s victory over Japan in the War of Resistance. In a statement on the same occasion 40 years later, Hu Jintao thanked the powers allied with China for their help, and even, however grudgingly and incompletely, shared credit with the KMT (which had actually led that fight). Hu somewhat inconspicuously admitted that China’s main contribution in the final years of the war had been to tie down

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large numbers of Japanese troops, keeping them away from the more active areas of combat.21 But within this general parameter there have been at least three different foreign policy orientations. During the 1980s China acted as a status quo power at home in a world increasingly dominated by the United States. In the 1990s China was more or less in opposition to American triumphalism. Since the turn of the century and especially since September 11, 2001, China has identified with the broader international community, avoiding confrontations with the United States but apparently hoping to rely on multilateral action to check American activism. The Era of Good Feelings The 1980s seem, maybe not only in retrospect, a golden age in Chinese-American relations and world affairs generally. The ideological animus between the two sides was largely gone. The Chinese economy was becoming more liberal and there seemed good chances that the political system would follow. China felt less under threat than it had in a long time. Life was getting better. By the late 1970s China was in a quasi-alliance with the United States and the more conservative Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN as it was then constituted), fearful of Soviet power. Certain Chinese leaders, indeed, came to feel China was far too closely bound to the United States to the detriment of its own interests: it lost much of its leverage on the Taiwan question and lost influence among Third World countries whose cause it formerly purported to champion. This sense became especially strong after the election of Ronald Reagan, whose anti-Soviet backbone did not need stiffening and who was determined to enhance American military power even without Chinese urging. On top of this, by the mid-1980s Soviet power was itself on the wane. Nor was there any residual ideological hostility toward the Soviets. Rather, Chinese analysts began to assert that overreactions to “Soviet revisionism” had contributed to the overheated atmosphere leading to the Cultural Revolution. China began actively to cultivate a friendly relationship with the Soviets without seeking any enmity with the United States. The sad thing for China was that the reconciliation with the Soviets came too late to do any good. As the outward sign of the end of hostilities, Mikhail Gorbachev visited Peking in May 1989, in the middle of the student democracy protests. After that came repression in

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China, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and a couple of years later, the fall of the Soviet Union itself. Soviet weakness removed Realist checks on American assertiveness. The first Gulf War showed the efficacy of American advanced military technology, something that the political leadership of Mao’s day had affected to despise. An Era of Pretty Bad Feelings During the 1990s China was by and large hostile to the prevailing world order dominated by the United States, but was not willing to push the hostility to direct confrontation. The student democrats of 1989 were very pro-American, at least in their imagination, and in the wake of the crackdown their rulers took to accusing “hostile western forces” of plotting for China’s “peaceful evolution” to capitalist democracy. There was even renewed ideological criticism of the Soviet Union, with Gorbachev accused of selling out Leninism. The Chinese authorities did not bother to conceal their approval of the attempted coup by Soviet hard-liners in August 1991 and their disappointment at the coup’s failure. Chinese foreign policy recovered its bearing with Deng Xiaoping’s strong reassertion of his personal authority in 1992. Party conservatives believed that the liberal economic reforms had encouraged the disorder of 1989. After June 1989 the reform process was not exactly reversed, but it was slowed. The problem was that after June 4 a strong economy was about the only support left for the regime’s legitimacy and a strong economy depended on the liberal reforms. In Deng’s view, Soviet weakness had nothing to do with absence of democracy and everything to do with economic failure. China’s reforms took off again in 1992 and the economy started to boom. Economic growth required increased integration with the general world system, so China remained engaged with the United States. But whereas in the 1980s military reform enjoyed lowest priority among China’s “four modernizations,” in the 1990s the defense budget tended to grow yearly in double digits: partly a reward to the soldiers for having done the Party’s dirty work in 1989; partly to encourage their obedience to the new civilian leadership; but also to enhance China’s capacity to defend against the Americans and to conquer Taiwan. The authorities’ anti-American attitude found new support among the vocal (mainly young, urban, and educated) public, as the former good feelings toward America soured.22 On the one hand, the United States did not seem prepared to forego any profit for the sake of

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fostering democracy in China; on the other hand, American rhetoric about the “enlargement” of democracy and promotion of human rights became increasingly interpreted as attempts to control China’s domestic affairs to America’s advantage. The shift in articulate public opinion reflects both domestic and international developments. The very fact that the regime, apparently stripped of all legitimacy, did not collapse in 1989 encouraged many of the previously alienated to accommodate themselves to that fact, while the experience of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after the end of communism gave rise to second thoughts about the consequences of a collapse. This was reinforced by a natural pride in the country’s economic growth. During the 1990s regime, propaganda interpreted American’s promotion of democracy and the market as a strategy to keep America’s undisputed dominant position in the international order and, especially, to thwart any possible Chinese challenge to that dominance. There was enough in American behavior to give some credibility to this interpretation. The tipping point may have been China’s 1993 failure to win the honor of hosting the 2000 Olympics, a failure popularly attributed, not necessarily validly, to American opposition. Anti-Americanism was enhanced by the intervention in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and, especially, by the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.23 Official and unofficial Chinese analysis routinely found evidence of America’s desire to rule the world.24 The Taiwan Strait confrontation of 1995–1996 brought matters to a head. In its early years, the Clinton administration was moving toward a more “normal” relationship with Taiwan, and the sending of two aircraft carriers to “observe” the provocative 1996 Chinese military exercises was the clearest signal since 1979 that the United States would defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack. But that crisis also made both sides think more deeply about the implications of mutual hostility. China backed away from the kinds of threats it had made in 1996, while the Americans more explicitly embraced the Chinese definition of the Taiwan issue. During the 1990s China was wary of multilateral action, tending to see international organizations as extensions of American influence. China opposed new developments in international law thinking on humanitarian intervention or international enforcement of human rights, adhering instead to the old-fashioned principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention. China also sought to make friends with other powers who might feel constrained by the United States. China and India sent out timid feelers toward each other. As the decade wore on, once again China and Russia became friendly, the Russians seeing America as denying

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them the respect they deserved. The two powers were especially close during the 1999 Kosovo war, and began to assure each other that they enjoyed a strategic partnership. But the need of both to avoid overly alienating the United States prevented the relationship from growing too close. With Russia, China sponsored the formation of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, joining the two big powers with the former Central Asian soviet republics. All the member states (if not necessarily their populations) shared common interests in containing Islamic radicalism and ethnic separatism and in countering American penetration of Central Asia. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen massacre, some in China even contemplated attempting to form a united front with Japan, a country then in tension with the United States, especially on economic policy. In both countries, grievances about the economic conflict spilled over into more general cultural and political resentments.25 During the 1990s, however, Japan moved closer to becoming a “normal” country (that is, a potentially militarily active country). One motive may in fact have been the relative estrangement between Japan and the United States at the beginning of the decade, along with a sense at the time that with the Cold War over there was a possibility of at least a partial American military withdrawal from the Western Pacific. Japan’s new militancy took the form of enhanced military cooperation with the United States: Japan was making itself a more active partner with the Americans, and so was more likely to be treated with respect, while at the same time was preparing for the possibility that one day the Americans would be gone. Japan’s new political activism was probably one motive for China’s own military buildup during the 1990s, although that buildup was itself also probably a motive for Japan’s increased activism. The relationship with Japan is made particularly sensitive by Japan’s former relationship with Taiwan. Japan seems to be one of the few places occupied by Japan where that country is not merely admired but genuinely liked. Anti-Japanese sentiment on Taiwan itself is largely confined to the mainlander community, and both the KMT and CCP have in the past suspected Japan of fostering Taiwan independence as a way of restoring Japan’s former colonial position on the island. During the 1990s Japan (rather ambiguously) seemed to commit itself to extending its own defense perimeter toward Taiwan. And should America ever undertake to defend Taiwan against an attack from the Mainland, there is no way Japan could remain uninvolved. The always touchy relationship between China and Japan was exacerbated during the first years of the twenty-first century. The new

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premier, Koizumi Junichiro, began regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto temple honoring Japan’s war dead. China (and other Asians, particularly Koreans) interpreted the visits as symbolic of Japan’s renewed determination to be a major military power and its lack of genuine regret for its past depredations. In the spring of 2005 there were sometimes violent demonstrations against Japan in several Chinese cities, the participants being mostly young and including many students. Some saw this as regime mobilization of popular antipathy toward Japan, a way of silencing reservations about the regime’s own defects and strengthening China’s ability to put Japan on the defensive. The authorities certainly would want to put Japan off balance, but they were in fact ambivalent about the expressions of popular discontent. The close economic ties with Japan made it impossible for China to take an overly hostile attitude toward Japan, but any hint of conciliation by the government could be construed as capitulation to imperialism. At least since the 1919 May Fourth movement, agitation against Japan has been a relatively safe way to agitate against those in power: in this scenario, Japanese arrogance should call for a strong Chinese response; a response that is not strong enough to suit the mobs is evidence of weakness, if not treason, by the authorities; and weakness toward Japan is then traced to other defects in the general system of rule. The popular anti-Americanism of the 1990s and early twenty-first century may also have been a covert expression of anti–regime sentiment. In the wake of the September 2001 attacks, China’s “unofficial official” press published a few articles to the effect that the United States had been asking for it. The top leadership, though, probably figured that this was not the proper time to provoke the United States, and also that there were good reasons for having some sort of united front against terrorism in any case. Also, America’s preoccupation elsewhere opened new opportunities for China. After September 11, the general Chinese posture toward the United States remained critical but non-obstructive.26 Peaceful Rise As China’s economy continued to grow, there was speculation that China was the next world power, in a position similar to that of Germany or the United States a hundred years earlier.27 But China’s rise, according to official commentary, was to be peaceful, a refutation of the Realist vision of world politics.28 China grew increasingly

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tolerant of international, multilateral action to deal with international issues, even admitting room for some flexibility on state sovereignty on issues of human rights. Observers noted China’s growing “soft power” influence particularly in Southeast Asia, a counterbalance to regional fears of America’s inclination to wield “hard” power.29 All of this may reflect a tectonic shift in the structure of world affairs, the emergence, say, of Alexander Wendt’s Kantian world order.30 Or the change of emphasis may have more banal sources— Realist counters to overwhelming American power. Whereas during the 1990s the United States chose where possible to operate through international or multilateral institutions, after 2001, for good reasons or bad, the United States was less hesitant about unilateral action. In the international quadrille, then, it was natural for China to dance to the internationalist tune.

Taiwan Policy in the Reform Era The reform era rapidly brought a change of tone toward Taiwan, with threats of liberation being replaced by appeals to reunify. The Mainland aspired, of course, to peaceful reunification, but refused to rule out military action. Early overtures to the island included promises of substantial economic aid, a notion those on Taiwan found amusing. By the early 1980s, this evolved into the proposal of one country, two systems: Taiwan would accept the overall sovereignty of the PRC (or, sometimes, a newly defined “China”), but would keep its own social, political, and economic system, even its own military forces. If the “Taiwan authorities” would only accept the principle of one China, anything at all could be negotiated. With Taiwan no longer formally defended by the United States, China becoming more prosperous, and the rule of the Communist Party less fearsome, the Chinese rulers seemed to believe the goal of reunification was actually in grasp. Deng Xiaoping even listed reunification as one of the great tasks to be achieved in the 1980s.31 Many of the barriers between the two sides came down, the Mainland being more open to influence from Taiwan than Taiwan from the Mainland. Taiwan became a major source of Chinese capital. The PRC gradually replaced Taiwan as the representative of China in all the major international fora, but also, at least in principle, allowed Taiwan to participate in those that did not have state sovereignty as a criterion for membership (the Asian Development Bank; the Olympics; ultimately, APEC and the WTO). Taiwan had to participate, however, under a name acceptable to the PRC (not the

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Republic of China (ROC) or China or Taiwan, but under names such as “Chinese Taipei”). China would not accord any legitimacy, however, to the notion that the “Taiwan authorities” ruled a state. Despite talk of how anything at all could be negotiated, the Mainland tended preemptively to reject any suggestions from Taiwan on possible solutions— for example, the idea by some on Taiwan that the two sides might form a confederation—as a subterfuge for independence. The communists ultimately came to endorse the concept of “one China, different interpretations,” a “compromise” supposedly reached in 1992. While there is a certain objective foundation for the notion that there was some sort of compromise that year,32 nothing was made of it until 2000, around the time of the election of the erstwhile pro-independence Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan’s president, when the “agreement” was dubbed the “1992 consensus.”33 After a brief flirtation the Chen regime rejected the concept. There may never really have been any true working consensus, since the Mainland was always quick to reject any interpretation that did not confirm to its own (no one China, two governments; one nation, two states; the aforementioned confederation). And all parties on Taiwan agreed that Taiwan was sovereign, whether under the name of the ROC or the name of the island, and in any case Taiwan was not in any sense subordinate to or “part of” the PRC. The Chen people claimed there was no agreement accepted by the Taiwan government. But, of course, the negotiations took place under nominally nonofficial auspices; and if there had been a consensus, perhaps it was between the CCP and the KMT. Chinese rigidity during the KMT period perhaps cost the country some opportunities. There has perhaps been greater flexibility since the coming to power of the Chen’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (the one China, different interpretations business, for example), a tacit expression of regret for the lost opportunities—a longing for things that might have appealed to the KMT but had no appeal for the DPP. The more or less official line of the Taiwan regime, meanwhile, had shifted from anticommunism to resistance to political unification with the Mainland, which Beijing would consider an anti-China position. Under the circumstances there is little left for China to offer, leaving room only for military threats and, possibly, military action. And the threats seem counterproductive. Taiwan does not, wisely or not, seem to take the threats very seriously (less seriously than America does). To the extent they are taken seriously, they reinforce trends on Taiwan that China does not like. At bottom, China really

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does not want to go to war to “reunify” Taiwan, and its threats of force are not sufficient to deter Taiwanese action short of an overt declaration of independence. Should there be such an overt declaration China would almost have to go to war, or sacrifice all its credibility. A war, particularly if it brought in the United States, would destroy all that China has accomplished over the past generation; but Chinese spokesmen strive to give the impression, how valid we have yet to learn, that they are willing to pay this price.

Explanations Realist assumptions certainly explain much of China’s policy toward Taiwan. They are particularly useful in understanding the general international acceptance of China’s claims to the island, since these do not seem to be based upon any abstract acceptance of the justice of these claims. Rather, China insists that its claims be acknowledged, and there are advantages to pleasing China and few advantages to pleasing Taiwan. Beyond this, Realism can account for the particularities of how China has approached the issue at different times. It is less useful in explaining why China has made the issue such an important one. What evidence there is shows that China is capable of prospering without exercising control over Taiwan and indeed that control over Taiwan by forces hostile to China has not decisively threatened China’s security or prosperity. The lack of a “vital” interest in control over Taiwan may partly account for the relative absence of overt action to achieve that control. On the other hand, the infrequency or sporadic nature of overt action against Taiwan during the periods of greatest hostility (the 1950s) can be explained by China’s lack of capacity for overt action. Chinese military power has increased since 1979 and since 1980 there has been no “unambiguous” American commitment to defend Taiwan. Yet during this period China sometimes shelved its interest in Taiwan in the face of more direct threats and closer opportunities. Thus, interest in Taiwan seems inversely related to the intensity and immediacy of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Threats from the Soviet Union motivated friendship with the United States, and a milder posture toward Taiwan was part of China’s price for friendship with the United States. By the 1980s, with the diminishing Soviet threat, China’s leaders came to see an overly close relationship with America as limiting their ability to exercise an effective policy toward Taiwan.

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This is certainly not to argue that China ought to welcome Taiwan’s coming under the control of a hostile power, but under current world conditions this does not imply a necessity to control Taiwan itself. Control over Taiwan would also be of military advantage to China—its own unsinkable aircraft carrier (as General MacArthur once referred to the island) to defend its southern and eastern coast. But this is not a vital interest and, in any case, would seem to be precluded at least in the short run by the policy of one country, two systems. China’s more enduring interests in Taiwan need to be explained in constructivist terms, particularly, of course, contemporary nationalism. For China’s ruling elite, the incorporation of Taiwan is part of what constitutes Chinese national identity. This, however, is historically contingent. Sun Yat-sen seems to have had no problem with Taiwan under Japanese control; and Mao Zedong once famously told Edgar Snow that after Japan’s defeat Taiwan, along with Korea, might become independent.34 The process by which Taiwan came to be so deeply a part of Chinese national identity includes strong elements of power politics, at least as much domestic as international. Under Chiang Kai-shek’s rule Taiwan represented an alternative Chinese regime and so was a challenge to the legitimacy of the PRC. This is probably the clearest explanation for China’s disinclination to grant Taiwan any kind of international standing, at least as a political entity. By the end of the 1980s Taiwan was implausible as an alternative Chinese regime. However, by that time, and especially in the 1990s, CCP legitimacy depended little on its revolutionary credentials, and instead on its role as an embodiment of Chinese nationalism and patriotism. By that time, in fact, CCP definitions of nationalism and patriotism converged toward those once associated with the KMT. “Taiwan as a part of China” had become built into the definition of Chinese patriotism. By the 1990s the Mainland rulers had to increasingly deal with public opinion, however limited its composition, that had itself become highly nationalistic.35 Given the relatively fragile basis of CCP legitimacy anyway, together with the practical exigencies of international life that sometimes required the leadership to make compromises they would otherwise rather avoid, Chinese statesmen would not be seen as selling out China’s sacred national interests. And any one leader who showed lack of irridentism toward Taiwan would be vulnerable to rivals who were willing, rhetorically anyway, to take a harder line.36 There would seem to be no realistic way of winning Taiwan over with blandishments. The political dynamics on the island, outside the

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control of the Mainland leadership and indeed outside the control of the individual leaders on Taiwan, might create a situation in which the Mainland believes it must undertake a war it knows in advance to be disastrous and that everyone wants to avoid. The danger may gradually erode over time; but an explicit abandonment of the bottom line position on Taiwan—there is one China and Taiwan must accept that—is unlikely under the current order. The way in which China asserts its interests on Taiwan can be explained well enough in terms of the general structure of the international system and the current relationships within it, but these Realist considerations do not account for the interest itself. Indeed, the claim to Taiwan is, if anything, itself a potential threat to China’s security, in that it may provoke a war with the United States should Americans choose to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack; and the threat to Taiwan can only encourage America to plan and deploy for a potential war against China. The claim to Taiwan is not an objective Chinese national interest because the larger Chinese political process has made it so. It became an interest most directly as a consequence of the KMT-CCP rivalry. It remains an interest after any real threat from the KMT had passed, not merely from inertia but by the dynamics of the play of domestic politics in the PRC. That Taiwan is a part of China has become an organic feature of Chinese patriotism, and any Chinese politician who might suggest that Taiwan ought to be allowed to go its own way, that conquering it is more trouble than it is worth, would be vulnerable to charges of treason from his rivals in the leadership, even if all should recognize in their hearts that this is a reasonable position. Since it definitely violates Realist considerations of prudence for China to risk a wider war in order to conquer Taiwan, China’s rulers face a dilemma: How to turn loose without letting go?

Concluding Thoughts China cannot abandon its claim to Taiwan and would not care to exercise it. Chinese analysts sometimes characterize the American stance on Taiwan as “no war, no unification, no independence.”37 This, in fact, seems to be the outcome that provides the minimum protection of basic interests for all parties to the issue. But how long can it remain a stable solution? From China’s perspective, how long can it credibly maintain its sovereignty over Taiwan without exercising it? There were hints—in the grand tradition of high politics relating to Taiwan, highly ambiguous—that by 2004 the Chinese leadership was

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looking for something more satisfactory. The fear prior to the March presidential election on Taiwan was that should Chen Shui-bian be reelected he would not only continue his gratuitous38 and somewhat mean-spirited program of “de-Sinification” (“reconstructing” Taiwan identity in a way to minimize the Chinese heritage), but would also, sometime between 2006 and 2008, push for formal independence. Peking was scheduled to host the 2008 Olympic games, and the Chinese authorities evidently feared Chen would think that the danger of spoiling the games would deter them from taking strong action. On March 3 the Hong Kong Standard quoted an “expert” from Tsinghua University to the effect that war is inevitable should Chen win the upcoming elections—which Chen indeed did, by hook or by crook. There were reports in the foreign press of generals and whatnot saying off the record that even at the cost of the Olympics, in full awareness of the destruction of life and property, despite catastrophic economic setbacks, China would surely go to war should Taiwan declare independence.39 On May 16, the official news agency Xinhua published a commentary: Chen Shui-bian has a record of bad faith and broken promises; but no matter who holds power on Taiwan, peace and stability are possible if only there is a recognition of one China. Both the Mainland and Taiwan, Xinhua said, belong to this one China—one of the most generous ways of framing the issue, as it implies some equality between the two sides, neither superior to the other. In the following months there were a series of statements, leaked primarily through the Hong Kong Communist press, to the effect that barring explicit moves toward independence there would be no attack on Taiwan for 20 years, more or less.40 In March, 2005, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted an “anti-secession law,” something first noised the previous December.41 This could represent the thrashing around of people at a loss about what to do. But it is also consistent with a coherent strategy. In this construal, China as a practical matter has given up the hope of unification.42 This means (or we are perhaps meant to think it means) that should Taiwan declare independence, or do anything the Mainland will unambiguously take as a declaration of independence, there will certainly be a war. To postpone a war for 20 years is tantamount to saying there will be no war; or at least that those who are making decisions now have no intention of going to war over Taiwan. The hope, presumably, is that Taiwan will refrain from making trouble prior to the Olympics, and the future will take care of itself. The anti–secession law is, in the venerable spirit of Ah Q, a way of

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pretending that China presently is unified and that Taiwan should not, in the manner of Virginia or South Carolina, try to break away. This is, of course, a highly debatable conjecture, and one probably incapable of being tested (for even if it were policy, say, at the time of the adoption of the anti-secession law, there is nothing to guarantee that those in charge may not change their minds at any time). But it does seem as if by the last months of 2004 official Mainland discourse yammered about deterring independence and “secession,” and had little to say about unification and even less about one country, two systems. If the Mainland has indeed quietly given up on any real reunification, this implies a “solution” of sorts to the Mainland’s dilemma—it will accept Taiwan’s de facto independence indefinitely as long as Taiwan refrains from flaunting its victory, rubbing it in, pushing its luck. Taiwan should allow the Mainland a little face.43 This brings us back to the theoretical issue posed in this essay, the relationship of Realist and constructivist understandings of world affairs. The moral is probably that theory is easy but the world is messy. China’s interest in Taiwan is a political construct, an unusually strong one; but objectively China has no vital interest in the control of Taiwan. Perhaps because China is so large and powerful, it has few particular interests that are truly vital.44 To some extent it can pick and choose its interests, at least as far as system-level influences are concerned. And it can, with some pain, tolerate dissonance between its constructed interests (its national identity) and what is Realistically feasible. In the early 1970s there was a popular saying on Taiwan: a small country has no foreign policy. We should expect Realism to trump constructivism more decisively on Taiwan than on the Mainland. Taiwan’s national identity remains contested, but at the governmental level it has undergone radical change in the decades since 1949: from being the legitimate government of all China to having nothing to do with China at all (close neighbors, distant kin, as the vice president put it). But there are probably more continuities in both content and manner of conduct of Taiwan foreign policy from Chiang Kai-shek through Chen Shui-bian than there are differences. The logic of the international system does not function automatically, and there is no guarantee that the political dynamics of the island (made even more unpredictable by their democratic nature) will not push the authorities there to act in ways the Chinese rulers, by virtue of their own political dynamics, will not be able to tolerate.

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Notes 1. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “America’s Two Point Policy and the Future of Taiwan,” Asian Survey 28 (1988): 881–896. 2. The most influential work setting out the contemporary version of Realism remains Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). There are, of course, many variations on the Realist theme, leading to different predictions about how international politics works. Waltz’ own theory, it should be noted, is couched in principle at the “system” level, and strictly speaking should not be used to explain the foreign policy behavior of particular states. I’m capitalizing Realism in this essay when it is used as a term of art, the designation of a particular approach—leaving open the possibility that Realism is not necessarily realistic. 3. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Wendt identifies three styles of international anarchy arrayed in a banal progressivist historical order. Some of Wendt’s themes are anticipated and expressed less bumptiously in the “English school.” Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). 4. As John Vasquez puts it, Realism “constructs a world appropriate to the struggle that gave it rise.” The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 148. 5. Chen Fubing, “Explaining the Sources of Chinese and Western Concepts of International Politics,” Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, March 13, 2004: 32. Both Chinese phrases are taken from the Confucian Analects. 6. The concept is developed in Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Revolutionary Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). 7. Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). 8. Michael M. Sheng, Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 9. Wang Ming, Mao’s Betrayal (Moscow: Progress Press, 1979). 10. Qing Shi, “Behind the Curtain on How the 1950 Plan to Liberate Taiwan Came to Nothing,” Xin Hua Wenzhai, April, 1997: 68–72. 11. Despite its sometimes dated, shrill, tone, Franz Schurmann’s The Logic of World Power (New York; Pantheon, 1974), especially 244–327, remains a powerful and persuasive analysis of the mid-Cold War relations among China, America, and Russia, showing the inextricable melding of Realist and ideological factors. 12. In the Chinese construction, then and now, the issue was China’s desire to preserve its independence from Soviet domination, not, as Western commentators used to argue, a desire to contend with the

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13. 14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23.

24.

Soviets for leadership of the world communist movement. Sun Zexue, “Power Struggle or a Fight for Equality: On the True Nature of the Sino-Soviet Dispute,” Xinhua Wenzhai, September 20, 2004: 52–56. The focus on independence or equality, however, reflects a new consciousness of national as opposed to revolutionary interests. Donald Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York: Pegasus: 1967). Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai’s Last Years) (New York: Mingjing Chubanshe, 2003), 398. The fullest and most mature exposition of this vision came after Mao’s death, and not long before the rationale for foreign policy was to change, in a long polemic refuting an Albanian contention that China had sold out revolution, People’s Daily, November 1, 1977. See also Schurmann, The Logic of World Power, 368–388. Lucian Pye, Chinese Communist Negotiating Style (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, 1982), says the Chinese like to insist on agreement on general principles, allowing details to be worked out later. Pragmatic Americans, apparently, do not want abstract generalities to stand in the way of concrete results. A consequence is that the Americans are vulnerable to charges of bad faith when the Chinese choose to remind them that words mean something. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986). This is a theme of Joseph Levenson’s Confucian China and Its Modern Fate (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-chih Restoration, 1862–1874 (New York: Antheneum, 1966). On the “rehabilitation” of Zeng Guofan, see Geremie Barmé, “To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic: China’s Avant Guarde Nationalist,” China Journal 34 (1995): 209–234. Lin Biao, Long Live the Victory of People’s War (Peking: People’s Publishing Company, 1965); Hu Jintao’s comments carried by Xinhua, September 3, 2005. Peter Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). In personal conversations Chinese of a very liberal persuasion admitted in 1996 that the people of Taiwan had good reason not to want to live under the rule of the crowd then in charge in Beijing, but at the same time argued that the United States had no business interfering in what was, after all, China’s own internal business. Chinese public opinion seems uniformly to accept the embassy bombing as deliberate, however impossible or inexpedient it may be to offer a rationale for the Americans doing such a thing. Some popular nationalism may be covert criticism of the rulers, with the critics able to position themselves as more patriotic than their rulers and berating their rulers for their weakness in the face of

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26. 27.

28.

29.

30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35.

36.

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foreigners. This, however, seems more applicable to anti-Japanese sentiment (very strongly expressed in the spring of 2005) than to antiAmericanism. He Xin, “The World Economic Situation and China’s Economic Problems: Record of the Talk between He Xin and Japanese Economics Professor Susumu Yabuki,” Xin Hua Wenzhai, February, 1991: 44–55. Su Ge, “Review of America’s Adjustment of Its Security Strategy,” Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu, March 13, 2003: 5–10, 22. For example, National Intelligence Council, “Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project,” January, 2005. http://www.cia. gov/NIC_globaltrend2020 (accessed February 2005). Xu Jin, “Peaceful Rise is China’s Strategic Choice,” Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu, March 13, 2004: 1–8; Robert Suettinger, “The Rise and Descent of ‘Peaceful Rise,’ ” China Leadership Monitor, September 2004: 1–10. Michael Chambers, “China and Southeast Asia: Creating a ‘Win-Win’ Neighborhood,” Asia Program Special Report, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 2005: 16–22; Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Chance,” Prospect, March 2005. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 314. Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping), 1995–1982 (Peking: Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 204. For a description and documentation, with an analysis from the Mainland perspective, see Xu Shiquan, “The 1992 Consensus: A Review and Assessment of Consultations between the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation,” American Foreign Policy Interests, 23 (2002): 121–140. For the genesis of the term, see Taipei Times, February 22, 2006. Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York: Random House, 1938), 88. As was common at the time, Snow renders the island’s name Formosa. The context gives the impression that Mao had not given any particular thought to the issue and, probably, did not really know that much about it. Zhao Suisheng, “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations,” Political Science Quarterly 115 (2000): 1–33; Gries, China’s New Nationalism. In his classic discussion of Japanese decision-making in the last days of World War II, Joseph Butow identifies a similar dynamic. All the leaders knew that Japan had lost the war and would have to surrender, but no one dared to say so. Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954). Butow treats this phenomenon as a peculiarity of Japanese culture, but it is probably universal. Compare Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

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P e t e r R . M o o dy, J r . 37. Su, “Review of America’s Adjustment of Its Security Strategy,” 9. 38. Some might object that there was a pressing need to strengthen Taiwan identity, given the threat from China. But surely there would be greater security in emphasizing a double identity, as hinted at by Chiang Ching-kuo in his last months and more systematically developed in Lee Teng-hui’s concept of the “New Taiwanese.” Chen’s program needlessly antagonized China and threatened to alienate substantial portions of the public on Taiwan. 39. There is much ambiguity about just what would be construed as a declaration of independence, especially since the general consensus of all parties on Taiwan is that the system is already independent. The most overt step would be some sort of formal declaration, along with a change in the name of the state. But the ambiguity means that what would constitute a “declaration” is highly arbitrary. 40. Ta Kung Pao, September 25, 2004; also, Zhongguo Tongxun She, September 21, 2004. 41. A further conjecture is that the anti-secession law was a replacement for a harder “unification law,” hinted at in the Hong Kong communist press in the spring of 2004. 42. There is an impression that around the early twenty-first century there came to be at best formalistic references to one country, two systems applied to Taiwan. Hong Kong’s return to the motherland was supposed to be a model of how that formula would work, but by 2004 the Hong Kong example was not very compelling. 43. One of the many problems with this is that what happens in Taiwan will depend upon the play of politics on the island, and is not really within anyone’s control. 44. This would seem to follow from Waltz’ comparison of big power politics with oligopolistic competition. Big powers have a certain freedom of action, so their behavior is not completely a function of the system.

Chapter 3

Taiwan: Political and National Security of Becoming “ Taiwanese” Hans Stockton

T

he inauguration of Chen Shui-bian in March 2000 initiated a new stage in Taiwan’s democratic consolidation, but also represented a momentous challenge to cross-Strait relations and, therefore, Taiwan’s national security. After four years of little progress in bridging the gap between Taipei and Beijing, Chen’s reelection in 2004 again prompted sustained rhetoric and threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For the remainder of President Chen’s second term, the Mainland leadership will find it increasingly difficult to deal with a ruling party founded on Taiwan independence—political and, some argue, cultural independence. Of considerable concern to Beijing is the potential for Chen-sponsored constitutional changes on Taiwan that could remove elements of Taiwan’s de jure status as a Chinese state. In the first months of 2006, Chen reemphasized his desire to continue to build a “Taiwan consciousness,” in part through constitutional reform. The debate leading up to the constitutional revisions promised for 2006 or 2007 will undoubtedly evoke ever-stronger warnings from the Mainland against permanent separation. If reforms alter the first six articles of the extant constitution to the point of removing the Chinese state from the constitution, then the near-term result would most likely be a military clash. Even if the reforms are milder, the consequence is that subsequent administrations on the island will find traditional justifications for formal political reunification untenable. If this is the case, the last half of Chen’s

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second term will be a most dangerous period for cross-Strait relations. With the historic meetings of Lien Chan and James Soong on the Mainland in mid-2005, a new layer of complexity has been added to the debate, as the Mainland has successfully wedged itself in the domestic politics of Taiwan. Given this context, the greatest and most persistent challenge to the national security of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan is the resolution of the issue of Taiwan’s future status in relation to mainland China. The most immediate and encompassing threat related to the status issue is Beijing’s commitment to the use of force, if necessary, to bring Taiwan under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control. This has become even more explicit with Beijing’s 2005 approval of an “anti-secession law,” making Taiwan’s separation illegal. This in turn, prompted President Chen to publicly consider a referendum and/or law making such forced annexation illegal in Taiwan. Adding substance to the rhetoric, the People’s State Council released a defense white paper at the end of December 2004, which discussed China’s military modernization and development of regional offensive capacities. The white paper indicated that “the vicious rise of the Taiwan independence forces” have become the biggest immediate threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As well, the report promised that China would crush Taiwanese independence at any cost. Beijing’s positioning of over 500 ballistic missiles across from Taiwan; recent construction of 23 amphibious assault vehicles and 13 attack submarines; and improvements in air and sea forces have limited most of Taiwan’s defense scenarios to stand–off capacity of a period of weeks. The goal of this essay is to highlight the possibility that Taipei’s search to consolidate the internal component of its security (democracy) is working at cross-purposes with the goal of securing the external component of security in relation to the Mainland. As noted in the introduction to this volume, early democratization in Taiwan legitimized the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the Nationalist regime, and projected an image of Taiwan as a young democracy deserving the support of the United States. Into the twenty-first century, however, elite manipulation of the national identity issue has been a key means of obtaining electoral support. Linked to this, of course, is the national identity of Taiwan and its relationship with the Mainland. Democracy in this latter period has allowed for destabilizing elements of the national identity agenda to create turbulence in the political system, national security, cross-Strait relations, and relations with Washington.

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The editors of this volume argue in the introduction that the national identity-democratization nexus has affected Taiwan’s “selfimage.” Ultimately, the struggle over national identity formation in Taiwan has also forced some reconsideration of the image that Taiwan projects to the Mainland, Washington, and the rest of the world. This national image would normally be one of an economic dynamic, wealthy, democratic, and stable state, which commands the allegiance of the populace, elites, and the military establishment. In the pages that follow, we will see that democracy has allowed for intense elite competition over national identity that has polarized the society. The key dynamic in this predicament is the debate over a new sense of national identity on Taiwan. This identity may be culturally compatible with the Chinese state, but is politically incompatible with the Chinese state as it now exists under the CCP. This new identity has come to the fore as a cause and consequence of the dynamics of the democratic transition in Taiwan. Clearly, Taiwanese nationalism, in contrast to Chinese nationalism, is not new to the discussion of Taiwan’s internal political development. It has, however, gained central attention in analyses of cross-Strait relations, and, therefore, Taiwan’s national security. The key challenge for scholars of crossStrait relations is to ascertain whether continued democracy and identity formation in Taiwan might create mass pressures on Taipei’s elites to retain the status quo, secure a new de jure international status, or move back to a unification line. This essay discusses emerging national identity in Taiwan within the context of cross-Strait security and subsequently, Taiwan’s future status. This chapter is organized into three sections. Section one briefly reviews identity formation in Taiwan and how this has affected Taiwan perspectives toward the Mainland. Section two presents the recent history of cross-Strait policy in Taiwan and examines how democratization and the identity debate have influenced cross-Strait relations. Section three discusses Taiwan’s national defense policy. This chapter concludes with a summary of the forces that will continue to challenge Taiwan’s national defense policy.

National Identity Despite different perspectives on the reality, meaning, and consequences of a new identity on Taiwan, scholars tend to ascribe the origins of national identity in Taiwan to three primary determinants. First, time apart from the Mainland has resulted in generations raised in Taiwan that were not part of the grand struggle in the Mainland. These

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generations were, however, raised in an intensely anti-Chinese Communist environment where the distinction between Chinese Communist and China may have been lost. Second, the creation of a new national identity has been a reaction against the contemporary system and symbols of the Mainlander-dominated ROC in Taiwan. Finally, the process of regime opening and democratization in Taiwan over the last two decades has created the institutional and civil space in which a collective debate could take place on national identity that departed from Taiwan as solely a repository of high Chinese culture. A discussion of national identity in Taiwan should be broken down into two dimensions that work toward the creation of a nation-state on the island; the construction of the state institutions and processes and the aggregation of an exclusive national identification owing allegiance to that state. Hutchinson’s dichotomy of nationalism is instructive in this pursuit in which he distinguishes between political nationalism and cultural nationalism.1 The former is an effort to secure a sovereign representative state for the community and to secure its members’ rights of citizenship. This has been accomplished in Taiwan since 1949. The latter is an attempt to reunite different aspects of the nation and is premised on a sense of community derived from shared history, beliefs, customs, and habit. Prior to Taiwan’s democratization, the rival political nationalisms of the CCP in the Mainland and the KMT in Taiwan impeded political reunification, as the two diametrically opposed regimes sought to elevate their claims to sovereignty, yet premised reunification under the guise of a shared Chinese national identity. Cultural nationalism, as long as it was Chinese cultural nationalism under the KMT, facilitated reunification. More recently, in the face of a rising Taiwanese cultural and political nationalism, prospects for reunification have dimmed. Those most fervently supporting independence argue that the great struggles in Taiwan have been against occupation and suppression. Taiwan’s 400 years of occupation has been one of the more radical approaches to characterizing its past, but an intuitively attractive encapsulation.2 Struggle has quite frequently been against those symbols and officials representing the Chinese state—whether directed at the Ming Dynasty, the Qing’s cession of Taiwan to Japan, or the treatment of Taiwan by the KMT upon the island’s return by Japan. Contemporary forces that have shaped the people and state on Taiwan, on the other hand, include the 2–28 Incident, period of White Terror, imprisonment of Taiwanese opposition leaders on Green Island, and the Kaohsiung and Chungli Incidents. Each of these incidents was seen by many as a campaign by the Mainland–dominated KMT against

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the Taiwanese population, which was also under threat by Mainlanders on the other side of the Strait. Taiwan’s extended political and economic isolation from the Mainland has allowed sufficient space and time for the emergence of identification with the territory and people of Taiwan island.3 This identity is much stronger than “provincial identification,” which commonly demarcates local identity throughout the Mainland. Due to European colonialism and marginalization from Mainland rule, generations of Taiwan people have long been isolated from Chung Kuo (central kingdom or state of China), while retaining their historical racial identity as hua ren (members of a nation of racial Chinese). Chun remarks that hua xia, as a “myth of sacred communion with the past was more importantly a definition of culture or civilization that transcends considerations of ethnic identity and the realities of political affiliation.”4 Although embedded in the collective origins of hua xia, cultural and political national identities on Taiwan have developed along different paths from those on the Mainland. While retaining its connections to hua xia, Zhong argues that Taiwan has developed its own “political culture fostered by a sense of common fate (shengming gongtongti).”5 Time apart from the Mainland, combined with political and economic modernization, has created a different political culture and a “blurred identity” on Taiwan. Taiwan finds itself now in an identity crisis, where political development and new historical conditions have created a situation in which the traditional sense of national identity, linked to the Mainland, is being found untenable. Dittmer and Kim state that “identity crisis occurs when national boundaries blur or are challenged at the margins.”6 In such a situation it “is necessary for the participants of the system to redefine who they are and how they are different from all other political and social systems.”7 In the case of Taiwan, democratization and localization have allowed for public consideration of what defines the nation and state of the ROC in Taiwan. Surveys asking respondents to identify themselves as “Chinese, Taiwanese, or dual Chinese and Taiwanese” have illustrated the marked rise of Taiwanese identification and decline of Chinese identification. As reflected in figure 3.1, the population has become, by 2005, evenly split between Taiwanese and dual identifiers. This does not imply any immediate moves toward independence. Extensive survey research on Taiwan has indicated that most respondents tend to be pragmatic in their recognition of the military threat posed by Beijing. Sheng groups survey respondents by rational and

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Percentage

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40

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1992.06 1992.12 1993.06 1993.12 1994.06 1994.12 1995.06 1995.12 1996.06 1996.12 1997.06 1997.12 1998.06 1998.12 1999.06 1999.12 2000.06 2000.12 2001.06 2001.12 2002.06 2002.12 2003.06 2003.12 2004.06 2004.12

0

Date and month Taiwanese

Taiwanese and Chinese

Chinese

Figure 3.1 Taiwanese/Chinese ethnic identification, 1992–2004. Source: “Taiwanese/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan,” Election Studies Center, National ChengChi University. http://www2.nccu.edu.tw/~s00/eng/data/ Political% 20Attitude02.htm (accessed January 3, 2006).

affective preferences for independence and reunification.8 He finds that while the smaller group of affective respondents tends toward strong preferences for independence or reunification, the larger group of rational respondents (or pragmatists) tends toward the status quo. A subsequent study by Niou also confirms the pragmatism of most Taiwanese.9 The emergence of a localized, Taiwanese identity is in part fostered by a greater degree of flexibility on the part of people on Taiwan when considering the determinants for being Taiwanese when contrasted with the determinants for being Chinese. Lin draws upon a 1996 survey in which respondents were asked to define Taiwanese and Chinese.10 He writes that the Taiwanese label was affiliated with “territorial/political and subjective/psychological criteria” and the Chinese label was most often affiliated with “primordial/cultural criteria.”

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Can a separate nationalism on Taiwan emerge from a political allegiance to the ROC government or must its realization wait until a clearly distinct cultural identity arises from the whole society? Studies have indicated that an increasing number of ROC citizens acknowledge their own ability to make this distinction. A growing number of people identify themselves culturally and racially as Chinese, but politically as Taiwanese.11 An emerging culture in Taiwan is not distinct from China, but incorporates Chinese and local traditions to arrive at a new synthesis. Thus, shared origins dating back to Cathay have, by the turn of the century, developed along different paths and arrived at different outcomes on each side of the Strait. During the period of KMT hegemony on Taiwan, the integration of Chinese cultural and political identification was actively promoted by the state and party structures of the ROC. From 1945 to 1965, the KMT conducted a vigorous Glorious Restoration (guang fu) campaign to legitimize the rule of the KMT’s Mainlander elites on Taiwan. From 1966 to 1976, a campaign of Cultural Renaissance was carried out to localize Chinese culture on the island as well as to provide a stark contrast to the Cultural Revolution in the Mainland. After Chiang Kai-shek’s death, Chiang Ching-kuo carried out his own campaign of “cultural reconstruction” that sought to embrace local Taiwanese cultural distinctions, while also depoliticizing culture. Throughout each of these campaigns, the KMT attempted to raise the kind of high Chinese culture that the communists were busy destroying in the Mainland. As the successor to China’s cultural heritage, the KMT sought to legitimize the ROC claim to China in the eyes of its citizens and those of the international community. These programs had several unintended consequences. First, they aggravated the ethnic divide on the island. KMT high culture excluded Taiwanese local customs and increased the impression that there actually was a distinction between what was Taiwanese and what was Chinese. Due to their early “Motel Mentality” toward Taiwan, the KMT did little to convince Taiwanese that Taiwan enjoyed any significant future role in a unified China. Second, the virulent anticommunism espoused by the KMT aimed at “fellow Chinese” worked against its own efforts to convince Taiwanese that a common identity with the Mainland existed. Third, Mainlander rule (identified as Chinese rule) so alienated the populace that political opposition aimed at the KMT was also inclined to oppose the very Chinese symbols that it represented. The rise of a Taiwan nationalism based on “Taiwan for Taiwanese” was an inevitable consequence of KMT authoritarianism.

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President Lee’s pronouncement of a “New Taiwanese” identity during the 1998 legislative elections was indeed an effort to find a point of national political unity for the ethnic divide on the island and to induce people to localize their sense of cultural identity, regardless of place of origin. It was the idea of nation-state as it exists in Taiwan that Lee was seeking to convey across Mainlander-Islander ethnic lines. As “New Taiwanese,” citizens seek to define and construct, not the nation-state of Imperial China or the PRC, but that of contemporary Taiwan. Here, the differences in regime between the two sides of the Strait become relevant. In democracies, Hertz states that “the nation is the possessor of sovereignty, the state is the machine for implementing its will, and the government is the management of the state appointed by the nation.”12 This entails that the people on Taiwan are indeed free to redirect the debate on national identity away from the policies of the old KMT. Redirecting this debate, however, now brings our attention to cross-Strait policy.

Changing Cross-Strait Policy In his seminal work, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China, Tien made one of the earliest comments on the effect of Taiwan’s democratization on cross-Strait relations. Tien viewed the end of martial law in July 1987 as a critical juncture in which “reforms may have profound implications not only for the island’s internal political life, but also for the future evolution of Mainland-Taiwan relations.”13 In the decade since Tien’s comment, democracy in Taiwan has all but ended any chance of peaceful political unification with a nondemocratic Mainland. The rise of a stronger Taiwanese opposition movement and election of an independence-minded president have not, however, resulted in armed conflict. Twenty years into the democratization of Taiwan’s political system, the cross-Strait dialogue is now a multilevel game in Taiwan, as state leaders are now subject to the popular ballot box and have lost hegemonic control over the executive and its powerful bureaucracy. In contrast, the PRC is still conducting a one-level game of negotiation, and has been extremely wary of the introduction of new popular forces in Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy process.14 A reason for increasing concern in Beijing has been the rise in public support for non-unification outcomes, illustrated in figure 3.2. With the passing of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, Chiang Ching-kuo continued the KMT claim that Taiwan was part of China and that the

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Figure 3.2 Preferences on Taiwan’s future status. Source: “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with Mainland Trend Distribution in Taiwan,” Election Studies Center, National ChengChi University. http://www2.nccu.edu.tw/~s00/eng/ data/Political%20Attitude03.htm (accessed January 3, 2006).

ROC was the sole sovereign government of all of China. Chiang Ching-kuo’s successor, Lee Teng-hui, began to move Taiwan away from this standard party line. While Lee continued the “one China” rhetoric early in his tenure, he also began to formalize the realities of contested sovereignty and national divide by explicitly recognizing two equal governments ruling over their respective parts of China. By promoting a German-style reunification between two sovereign political entities under the National Reunification Guidelines in 1991, Lee conditioned the liberalization of the “Three Links” and reunification on democracy, freedom, and prosperity, as opposed to Communism.15 The creation of the cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Council and Straits

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Exchange Foundation in 1990 and 1991, respectively, institutionalized the policy divide and was an attempt to force the PRC to deal with the Nationalist government at the state level. While President Lee was not promoting Taiwan independence (Tai Du), he was promoting the localization of the ROC in Taiwan through “Taiwan Only” (Du Tai). Yu writes that after consolidating his power with the periphalization of Hau Pei-tsun, Lee than “began to pave the ground to turn his ‘Du Tai’ policy into ‘Tai Du’(11).”16 In the post-Hong Kong handover period, reunification under the “one China, two systems” mandated by Beijing has not been a popular option with the Taiwan public. The two systems approach has been wildly unpopular with an overwhelming majority of ROC citizens, as they have witnessed Beijing’s moves to slow or reverse some of Hong Kong’s earlier liberal reforms. Figure 3.3 provides the distribution of survey responses on the question “Is the ‘one country, two systems’ formula applicable to solving the problems across the Straits?” 100

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Surveys on Taiwan show negative mass attitudes toward “one country, two systems” consistently above 70 percent.17 Under such an arrangement, while economic gains could be significant, reunification would result in the termination of the independent state in Taiwan, the subjugation of a national (rather than provincial) identity enjoyed in Taiwan for half a century, and the erosion of many hard-won political liberties. On the other hand, provocative moves toward independence promise military conflict that would probably lead to the destruction of the state on Taiwan, the complete elimination of political liberties under a PRC military occupation, and economic collapse. Lee’s shift from “Taiwan only” to what has been perceived by many as an independence stance was noted early in his first full term as ROC president. “By emphasizing qualities that the KMT could offer Taiwan rather than addressing the needs of the greater Chinese state, perhaps the KMT unintentionally has been drawn into accepting that Taiwan, not some greater China, is the state . . . and has accepted the reality that Taiwan itself is the nation.”18 This pragmatic approach to Taiwan’s status vis-à-vis the Mainland and the world led to the launch of the ROC’s UN membership drive in March 1993. Chu viewed this as an effort “to foster a sense of common destiny (shengming gongtongti) among the 21 million people [on Taiwan] and a step towards separation.”19 The culmination of Lee’s efforts to reshape the cross-Strait dialogue took shape in the form of his summer 1999 comments during a German radio interview, when he remarked that Taipei-Beijing relations should be characterized as “special state-to-state” relations. In the minds of those across the Taiwan Strait, this was all but an open declaration of Taiwan’s independence from the Mainland. Needless to say, Beijing’s responses to Lee’s decade-long efforts to redefine crossStrait relations have been hostile. The CCP’s policies on Taiwan’s eventual reunification have remained essentially unaltered. CCP leaders have viewed Lee as a separatist and have perceived his pragmatic diplomacy, liberalization of the KMT, and democratization of Taiwan as interconnected steps in a larger conspiracy to permanently divide the motherland. The rise and fall of the Taiwan people’s perception of Beijing’s hostility toward the state and people in Taiwan are closely linked to unification-unfriendly pronouncements by Taipei and Beijing’s reactions, as shown in figure 3.4. In his inauguration speech on May 20, 2000, Chen presented the five “nos” and one “if” that would determine the nature of Taipei’s relations with the Mainland. As long as Beijing resisted the use of military force, he would not declare independence; not change the

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Figure 3.4 Taiwan people’s perception of PRC hostility. Source: Mainland Affairs Council. http://www.mac.gov.tw (accessed March 9, 2005).

“national title”; not introduce a “state-to-state description in the Constitution”; not call for a referendum to change the status quo; and not abolish the National Unification Council or the Guidelines for National Unification. Many have taken Chen’s aggressive moves for constitutional reform, set for 2006, as an intention to violate one or more of these promises. Frustrated by Taiwan’s increasing diplomatic isolation and a lack of progress in cross-Strait relations, the ROC president ignited controversy on August 3, 2002 with his “one side, one country” (yi bian, yi kuo) remarks perceived to favor Taiwan’s abandonment of reunification under a single Chinese government. Although the Chen administration quickly sought to downplay Chen’s subsequent combative tone, the Mainland government has since been solidly convinced that its

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own characterization of Chen as a “splittist” had been legitimized. The Pan-Blue opposition parties—the Nationalist Party (KMT) and People’s First Party (PFP)—also quickly denounced President Chen’s comments. KMT Chairman Lien Chan stated, “Chen’s reckless remarks have tied the future and the well-being of Taiwan’s 23 million people to the gunpowder keg of Taiwan independence.”20 Chen’s policy of “Go slow, No haste” (an extension of former President Lee’s “No haste, Be patient” policy) during his first term was held by Beijing as a hollow representation of Taipei’s reunification policy. Chen has been reticent to refer directly to “reunification” when discussing cross-Strait negotiations. Instead, he has preferred to refer to the goal of cross-Strait talks as that of “integration.” Also, the Mainland continues to insist that the two sides can meet only after Taiwan accepts its version of “one China” that includes Taiwan as a lesser part of China. Chen has preferred to promote a single China based on different interpretations of Taiwan’s relationship to the Mainland. This has all prompted Beijing to warn Taipei on several occasions that continued delays in reunification could prompt a military response. By the end of the first year of his second term, Chen’s “five nos” pledge was again embodied in the February 24, 2005 “Ten Point Consensus” reached between himself and the opposition PFP leader, James Soong.21 Point two in the consensus stipulates that the bases of cross-Strait relations are “adherence to the Constitution, maintenance of the status quo, and cooperation in promoting peace.” Point seven of the consensus addresses national security, with the three driving strategic objectives of the ROC being “security of the nation, stability across the Taiwan Strait, and peace throughout the region.” This coalition was short-lived, as Soong made his historic visit to the Mainland in May 2005 and distanced himself from the pro-independence president. In summary, the development of Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy has gone through three main phases: the Chiang era of divided sovereignty and the goal of unifying the two Chinas under the KMT regime; the Lee era of promoting the distinct political sovereignty of the ROC as it existed on Taiwan and a confederal form of reunification; and the Chen era of promoting Taiwan sovereignty and consideration of permanent political separation from the Mainland. Each of these periods has coincided with different stages in the democratization and identity debate in Taiwan. Rising opposition to KMT or “Chinese rule” in Taiwan fed the democratic opposition, which in turn created the pressure to Taiwanize the KMT by Chiang Ching-kuo. The demand for genuine political party competition also

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led Chiang to legalize opposition parties. Lee recognized that the KMT needed to prevent the opposition’s monopoly of the identity debate and sought to capture the “native” vote through localization. Part of this localization was creating greater distance between the ROC and PRC and between Taiwanese and Chinese, while promoting a “new” Taiwan identity. This then created room for his crossStrait policy—realized as “special state-to-state” relations. The escalation of the identity debate, combined with the KMT’s inability to control the framing of the debate, were partially responsible for Chen’s victory in 2000. Chen’s victory was due in part to his ability to secure the votes of pro-localization supporters, a plurality of voters in the face of a divided KMT. Cross-Strait policy was then reformulated as one of “integration” rather than “unification.”

National Security While protection from external threats is an important task of national security, security also entails the consolidation of internal components that are essential for maintaining a viable state. Two such components are national identity and national process. First, there must be a shared vision of national identity within the polity of what constitutes the state and regime that is to be protected. A new emphasis on identity has emerged with the Constructivist school. Essentially, Constructivists argue that Realist and Liberalist schools do not take sufficient account of actor identity construction and the subsequent effect of that construction on state interests. States, as social actors, may not hold their political identities constant. If identities change, then this alters political interests and thus national security policies.22 There is hardly a better case study of this theory than that of Taiwan. Second, there must be an agreement on how the mass interest is conveyed to elites and the extent to which elites must be responsive to those interests. The satisfaction of these two conditions creates the social and political capital that state leaders rely upon when constructing and implementing domestic, national security, and foreign policy strategies. As discussed later, popular support and participation is central to Taiwan’s defense strategy of “all out defense.” This is capital that leaders use domestically to defend against inter- and intra-party challenges, as well as for bolstering their external legitimacy. These domestic struggles also go toward building an identity within and of the nation for outside actors by defining and redefining domestic norms and structures. This then also shapes international interaction and treatment.

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In its simplest form, Taiwan’s national security is premised upon securing the state and its inhabitants from invasion. Yet the issue becomes quite complex when we turn to asking questions about what and who are being protected. After his review of the 2002 ROC National Defense Report (hereafter, NDR 2002), Roy astutely remarks that the construction of a coherent security strategy for Taiwan faces an unanswered paramount question, “Is China the enemy or the mother country?”23 Is the Chinese state of the ROC, which existed under 50 years of KMT domination, that which is being protected for posterity? Is the preservation of that same state the long-term goal of national security policies? Or is securing sovereignty simply one step in the incremental move toward a new incarnation, one without the international obligations and barriers of the ROC? Responding to such questions has been complicated by the debate on national identity that has paralleled the emergence of democracy in Taiwan. Such questions are far from academic, given that the answers will shape the spirit, language, and popular support of subsequent policies. Clearly, ROC security strategy has changed from retaking the motherland to securing the physical security of Taiwan and its inhabitants. As late as 1989, national defense doctrine promoted “using Mainland China as the main battleground, and Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait as the auxiliary battlefields.”24 The same year, President Lee exhorted his party to move away from the dogmatism of the Chiang Kai-shek-era “one China” doctrine toward a more pragmatic “one China” principle of Taipei’s interpretation based on peaceful coexistence. By 1991, this would result in Taipei renouncing its commitment to retake the Mainland by force. Under the rule of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, defense was premised upon a “big army” doctrine, necessary for building the capacity for Taipei to invade the Mainland. Thus, resource-allocation preference went to the army. With Lee’s ascendancy, a shift away from this doctrine occurred in part as a reflection of his own power struggles within the party. Naval and air force officers were increasingly appointed to senior positions, a budget reallocation began, and doctrine changed from invasion of the Mainland by a strong army to joint defense operations. This reallocation has been realized in the post-Lee era with the air force budget (10.6 percent) finally surpassing that of the army (10.2 percent) in the FY 2003 budget. The ROC defense policy is currently directed by the strategic concept of “effective deterrence, resolute defense.” As Roy notes, during former President Lee Teng-hui’s term in office, the strategic concept reversed from “strong defense, effective deterrence” to the current

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version.25 While placing a dominant focus on deterrence and defense, ROC defense policy is not entirely passive.26 The NDR 2004 is peppered with references to counterattack, such as “employing tactical counterattack measures promptly so at to take the initiative.”27 In the early years of the Chen administration, an element of preemptive deterrence, such as missile strikes on Mainland cities, was considered but has not been formalized. The stated goals of national security policy in the NDR 2004 are “to maintain the overall national security, secure the survival and sustained development of the Nation, and maximize the welfare of the people.”28 Defense strategy ultimately places defense priorities in the concept of “all out defense.” The doctrine of “all out defense” strategy in case of attack clearly relies upon mass support and mobilization in a time of war. The 2002 NDR calls for a “consensus of survival, which is concerned, supported, and participated by all the people.”29 The NDR 2004 conceptualizes “all out defense” as “a defense uniting people’s will to fight and a war of protecting our home, property, and hometown through the comprehensive power of the civilian and the military.”30 The support and commitment of the people, so important to national security, are directly linked to the ongoing internal identity and future status debate on Taiwan. National interests presented in the 2004 NDR are presented as “1) securing the survival and development of the Nation; 2) safeguarding people’s safety and welfare; and 3) defending liberty, democracy, and human rights (59).” Political and social stability or “development” are intrinsically linked to the identity and future status debate on Taiwan. The 2004 NDR reports that the policy objectives are “1) safeguarding the integrity of sovereignty; 2) securing the sustaining development of the Nation; 3) preventing any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait; and 4) promoting regional security and stability (59).” Key to the 2004 NDR is the continued call to professionalize the armed forces; in the language of the defense reports, to “legalize” the national defense system. The most important recent reform of the armed forces occurred with the passage of the National Defense Law (NDL) in 2000. The NDL placed the previously autonomous command system directly under the jurisdiction of the civilianized Ministry of National Defense. Clearly after nearly a century of Nationalist Party socialization and politicization of the armed forces, an important goal of President Chen has been to reaffirm the loyalty of the armed forces to the ROC Constitution. While the military has been quite adamant in its dedication to the constitution and the

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office of the commander-in-chief, there has been ongoing concern about officers’ disdain for Chen’s independence rhetoric and actions. Threat prevention is directly linked to managing pronouncements by Taiwan’s leadership pertaining to future status, “earnest” engagement with Beijing, and promulgation of confidence building measures (CBMs). The nature of pronouncements out of Taipei is determined to a great extent by developments in the domestic debate on identity and future status. The “catch-22” situation that Taipei finds itself in is manifested in several ways. First, moves away from the KMT-era status quo to promote Taiwan’s sovereignty at the same time threaten sovereignty by provoking hostility from Beijing and causing turbulence with Washington. Second, maintaining the current status quo, deemed to be splittist by Beijing, threatens to invite an attack by the Mainland. Third, moving more aggressively toward reunification may defuse tensions in the manner of “trading time for space,” but would end the sovereignty of the ROC at the state level. Fourth, moving toward the ultimate expression of sovereignty, through something akin to “one China, two states” under the ROC flag or “one China, one Taiwan” under a Republic of Taiwan, also promises to prompt an attack by the PRC. A fifth manifestation of the “catch-22” revolves around the “all out defense” strategy upon which the island’s final defense rests. This strategy requires steps toward creating a unifying nationalism among the Taiwan populace. Yet even if a “Taiwan only” approach to a unifying nationalism were to bolster the implementation of this defensive strategy, the steps taken toward creating island-wide unity might then trigger a military response by the Mainland. If an attack on Taiwan were to come at a later point, the “all out defense” strategy is not likely to prevent the Mainland’s invasion of the island, but could impact the successful conquest and subsequent occupation. Whether this would be enough to dissuade the PRC leadership from taking the initial offensive actions is unknown. Clearly the directions and distance that Taipei can move are limited by the political struggle on Taiwan, in combination with the PRC military threat, the counterbalance of ROC defense, and the U.S. strategic commitment to Taiwan. The interwoven dynamics of democratization and national identity have led Taiwan to its current stance on sovereignty and, therefore, on cross-Strait relations. As such, reversing this stance in a more explicit direction of unification will prove to be problematic.

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Conclusion Over time, the ROC’s legitimacy in Taiwan as the sovereign state of the Chinese people has declined domestically and internationally. In the end, the KMT’s efforts to stamp out the national alternative failed and the party finds itself in the opposition. When one combines these outcomes, one must ask, what does national identity on Taiwan now look like and how will this “new look” affect national security? Contradictory processes of nation-state building on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are working against the prospect of a united Chinese national political identity and, as long as Beijing retains a militaristic stance, pose serious security threats not only to Taiwan, but also to the larger East Asia region. Nationalism in the PRC has developed in reaction against Republican China, the “splittist” government on Taiwan, and Western and Japanese imperialism. The overarching framework for Chinese nationalism in the Mainland has been premised on a traditional sense of “Chinese culturalism” as a means to “distinguish a mainstream Confucian image of China as a culturally defined community” that transcends modern conceptions of the nation-state.31 PRC leaders view efforts in Taipei to build a “unique” localnational identity as revisionism and a betrayal of Chinese culturalism. Leaders of the Taiwanese Left, on the other hand, do not perceive the elevation of a national identity on Taiwan as contradicting a larger sense of “Chineseness,” but as being complemented by it. National identity or civic identity, as opposed to identity with a culturally defined nation, is the relationship between the people of a territory (polity) and state (legal authority) that is created when the people of that polity identify with the state. These two very different points of departure significantly hinder the conceptualization of “One China” (as a civilization or state), threaten escalation of military tensions, and will continue to undermine unification talks. The emergence of a new identity in Taiwan has hindered the prospects for political unification and thus complicates the planning and implementation of national security policy on Taiwan. While the debate over the composition of a “unique” Taiwanese cultural identity will continue, political national identity in Taiwan is complete. It is bounded geographically to Taiwan by the polity under the jurisdiction of the state in Taipei. If consolidated, this new identity may become an insurmountable obstacle to peaceful political unification, regardless of individual changes in levels of economic, political, or social integration. Sustained political and economic development in Taiwan will continue to push Taiwanese people away from the old

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KMT-sponsored Chinese acculturation preferred by the PRC, toward a localized identity that embraces hua xia or Chunghua within a synthesis of Taiwanese and Chinese.32 Ultimately, the continued reliance of the PRC on military force works against peaceful political unification as it continues to propagate hostility and division. If, however, congruence of national identities as Chinese can be reestablished, Taiwan may simply continue the status quo. Congruence may only occur if China continues its own process of economic liberalization and initiates political liberalization. Thus, time works for unification if a common struggle ensues to realize a unified Chinese motherland. On the other hand, once this point of convergence is realized, the desire in Taiwan for formal reunification may have expired. The core challenge to ROC national security is to create a formidable defense that maintains a military deterrent. As discussed earlier, part of this defense calls upon the support and participation of Taiwan’s inhabitants. The continuing divisiveness of the identity debate feeds and is fed by partisan wrangling for votes. This, then, further complicates the creation of a coherent defense policy premised on who and what the capital in Taipei represents and, therefore, who and what the people of Taiwan will be called to defend. In conclusion, the resolution of the national identity debate is paramount to Taiwan’s national security. Taiwan’s continued development and stability are contingent upon resolving the internal political and social divides. Given that Taiwan’s economy and security are dependent on its external relationships, it must present to that system a coherent and consistent set of norms and expectations in order to continue to operate effectively within the international system. In terms of what Taiwan projects to the international community, it has maintained consistency in its democratic, pacifist, and capitalist identification. The key problem is that the image of what the nation is and where its future fits into the state system is so chaotic that international actors are unable to place Taiwan into their own long-term future planning with any certainty. Underlying all of this, of course, is the inability of Taipei and Beijing to reach agreement on where Taiwan will and should embed its future in regard to China. Should Taipei seek to embed this future in a manner unacceptable to Beijing, war is more likely. This then would activate the “all out defense” of Taiwan discussed earlier. Will the turbulence of the identity and future status debate on Taiwan dilute the national will so essential to Taiwan’s own defense? Even if the localization campaign enjoyed widespread success such that “all

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out defense” became a practical reality, the scale and scope of this campaign might prompt a preemptive strike by the PRC. In the long term, it is not clear whether the successful unification of identity in Taiwan would be a sufficient deterrent to offensive actions by Beijing.

Notes 1. John Hutchinson, Modern Nationalism (London: Fontana Press, 1994). 2. Su Bing, Taiwan’s 400 Year History: The Origins and Continuing Development of the Taiwanese Society and People (Washington, DC: Taiwanese Cultural Grassroots Association, 1986); Mellisa Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Leo Ching, Becoming “Japanese” (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Marc Cohen, Taiwan at the Crossroads: Human Rights, Political Development and Social Change on the Beautiful Island (Washington, DC: Asia Resource Center, 1988); Marc Cohen and Emma Teng, Let Taiwan Be Taiwan ( Washington, DC: Center for Taiwan International Relations, 1990). 3. Qimao Chen, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solution,” in Sui-sheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–96 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), 127–162; Shelley Rigger, “Competing Conceptions of Taiwan’s Identity: The Irresolvable Conflict in Cross-Strait Relations,” in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait, 229–242; Jun Zhan, Ending the Chinese Civil War: Power, Commerce, and Conciliation between Beijing and Taipei (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 4. Allen Chun, “From Nationalism to Nationalizing: Cultural Imagination and State Formation in Postwar Taiwan,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 31 (1994): 55. 5. Yang Zhong, “Taiwan’s Presidential Election and Sino-U.S. Relations,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 6 (2000): 60. 6. Samuel Kim and Lowell Dittmer, “Wither China’s Quest for National Identity?” in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim, eds., China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 7. 7. Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 111. 8. Emile Sheng, “Cross-Strait Relations and Public Opinion on Taiwan,” Issues & Studies 38 (2002): 17–46. 9. Emerson Niou “Understanding Taiwan Independence and Its Policy Implications,” Asian Survey 44 (2004): 555–567. 10. Chia-Lung Lin, “The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism,” in Stephane Corcuff, ed., Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 219–242. See also Mei-chih Li, “Basis of Ethnic Identification in Taiwan,” Asian Journal of Social Psychology 6 (2003): 229–237.

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11. Joseph Bosco, “The Emergence of a Popular Culture,” in Murray Rubenstein, ed., The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 392–403; Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity,” China Quarterly 165 (2001): 102–129; Keith Maguire, The Rise of Modern Taiwan (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 1998). 12. Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 3. 13. Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1989), 3. 14. Bin Yu, “Behind the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: Strategic Maneuvering and Policy Options,” in Bin Yu and Tsung-ting Chung, eds., Dynamics and Dilemma: Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in a Changing World (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), 229–252; Sui-sheng Zhao, “Taiwan: From Peaceful Offense to Coercive Strategy,” in Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang, eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 83–108. 15. Yun-han Chu, “The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” in Sui-sheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait,163–196; Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); Enbao Wang, “The Hong Kong Model and China’s Reunification,” in Bin Yu and Tsung-ting Chung, eds., Dynamics and Dilemma,109–124. 16. Tai-fa Yu, “Taiwanese Democracy under Threat: Impact and Limit of Chinese Military Coercion,” Pacific Affairs 70 (1997): 7–35. 17. Mainland Affairs Council, “Public Opinion Surveys,” http:// www.mac.gov.tw (accessed July 18, 2005). 18. Wachman, Taiwan, 259. 19. Chu, “The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” 184. 20. “Pan Blue Camp Pans Chen’s Talk,” Taipei Times, August 5, 2002, http: //www.taipeitimes.com/news2002/08/05 (accessed August 5, 2002). 21. “The Joint Statement of President Chen and Chairman Soong,” Office of the President of the Republic of China, http://www.gio. gov.tw (accessed January 14, 2006). 22. Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 33–75. 23. Dennis Roy, “Taiwan’s Threat Perceptions: The Enemy Within” (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Occasional Papers, 2005): 8. 24. Government Information Office, Republic of China Yearbook 1989 (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Publishing Company, 1989), 217.

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H a n s S to c k to n 25. Roy, “Taiwan’s Threat Perceptions,” 5. 26. The stated armed forces “vision” is to develop a knowledge-based military and force superiority. Arms procurement priorities for 2005 are diesel electric submarines, P3-C Anti-Submarine Aircraft, and PAC-III missiles. 27. Ministry of National Defense, National Defense Report 2004 (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense), 65. 28. Ibid., 59. 29. Ibid., 64. 30. Ibid., 69. 31. Jonathan Manthorpe, Forbidden Nation: A History of Taiwan (New York: Palgrave, 2005); see also John Fitzgerald, “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism,” Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 33 (1995): 75–104. 32. Annette Lu, “Shattering the ‘One China’ Cocoon: A New Path for Taiwan and China,” Harvard International Review 22 (2001): 14–19.

Chapter 4

Economic I ntegration between China and Taiwan: No Spillover into the Identity and S ecurity Realms Cal Clark

Since the late 1980s, there has been an explosion of economic and

social transactions between the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has created a growing integration, at least in the economic sphere. This, in turn, indicates that a good deal of amity must exist at the level of “low politics” or “people-to-people diplomacy” between the peoples of the two countries. Initially, it was hoped that the rapid expansion of these ties would almost inevitably constrain the two governments from letting their political rivalry get out of hand. Steve Chan, for example, noted in the mid-1990s that these economic interactions were little affected by the sharp swings in “high politics” between Beijing and Taipei, suggesting that they might be promoting “peace by pieces.”1 By the early part of this decade, however, it had become clear that growing economic integration across the Taiwan Strait was moving on a very separate track from the continuing, if not escalating, roils of high politics across the Taiwan Strait. This chapter, hence, examines the lack of “spillover” from economic integration and social communications into the realms of national security and identity. The first section describes the economic and social processes that are increasingly linking

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Taiwan to the Chinese Mainland, while the second shows that growing economic integration has been accompanied by increasing, not decreasing, tensions about national identity and security.

Growing Economic Integration across the Taiwan Strait Social and economic interactions between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland took off in the late 1980s after four decades of almost complete isolation due to the Cold War hostilities between Taipei and Beijing. As sketched in figure 4.1, Taiwan opened the door for crossStrait interactions when it changed its policy of prohibiting any contact with China in the mid-1980s. In particular, it allowed indirect trade through third countries in 1984 and then permitted ROC citizens to “visit relatives” on the Mainland for humanitarian purposes in 1987. Over the next few years the government greatly expanded the

Enabling policies in China 1988 decision for export-led growth 1988 special incentives for Taiwan investment

Facilitating conditions Economic complementarity Cultural ties Geographic proximity

Explosion of cross-Strait trade and investment in late 1980s and early 1990s

Enabling policies in Taiwan 1984 indirect trade permitted 1987 visits permitted Late 1980s capital and foreign exchange controls liberalized Figure 4.1 Dynamics of the take-off of cross-Strait economic links.

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scope of legal contacts, considerably enhancing the opportunity for “indirect” trade with and investment in the Chinese Mainland. For their part, the island’s residents and businesspeople quickly stretched the legal limits quite substantially. Neither of these policies, it should be underlined, could have been foreseen to have particularly momentous consequences. At that time, the economic effects of the 1984 decision were clearly marginal; and the decision to allow visits to China in 1987 was seemingly a short-term reaction to a drop in votes for the Kuomintang from the normally reliable constituency with roots in the Mainland.2 This “opening,” furthermore, occurred at precisely the time when the economies in both the ROC and PRC were undergoing fundamental transformations that made them much more complementary than they had been at their earlier stages of development. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Taiwan underwent very rapid growth based upon exporting goods made with relatively cheap labor. By the 1980s, however, the resulting prosperity had driven up wages to the point that Taiwan was losing competitiveness in labor-intensive production. Consequently, many of Taiwan’s businesses began to move the labor-intensive parts of their production “off shore.” Their ability to move, in addition, was also facilitated by general liberalization reforms in Taiwan that greatly reduced restrictions on capital movements and foreign exchange. While the first flows in this investment were concentrated in Southeast Asia, the new availability of the Chinese Mainland made it a prime location for new factory sites for many Taiwan businesspeople.3 For its part, China was just switching its strategy for industrial development as well. Deng Xiaoping’s “market reforms” in the early 1980s had moved the PRC away from the Maoist emphasis upon heavy industry and state corporations. For most of the 1980s, though, rural areas were the focus of the restructuring and the resulting economic dynamism, both in agriculture itself with the “responsibility system” and in the rapid growth of village enterprises in light industry. Change proved to be much harder to stimulate in heavy industry and urban areas, however. Thus, in the late 1980s China embarked upon another economic reorientation with a “coastal development strategy” aimed at attracting the light and labor-intensive industries that were being priced out of Hong Kong and Taiwan by cost considerations and at using them to emulate the export-led industrialization of the East Asian capitalist nations.4 This set the stage for the “facilitating conditions” in the middle of figure 4.1 to come into play. China had just decided to emphasize

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precisely the industries that Taiwan was being forced to shed, creating a perfect economic complementarity that had not existed before. Just as importantly, China was quite close in geographic terms; and the growing contacts, even noneconomic ones, across the Taiwan Strait demonstrated a cultural affinity and closeness that made doing business much easier than in more foreign and alien locations. The combination of these factors, in turn, explains the explosion of trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Clearly, policy changes in the PRC and ROC were a necessary prerequisite for opening the door to economic interactions between the two countries. However, there would have been little movement through this door if the “facilitating conditions” had not been highly favorable. In addition to pursuing export-led growth in general, the Chinese also created a set of Regulations Encouraging Taiwan Compatriots to Invest on the Mainland in July 1988 that gave preferential treatment to Taiwanese businesspeople (compared to other foreign companies and overseas Chinese) investing in export industries in Fujian Province; and other provinces, cities, and localities soon began to provide similar incentives. Consequently, Taiwan investment began to pour into southern coastal China; and, unlike other foreign investors, Taiwan entrepreneurs were little deterred by the political crackdown after the Tiananmen Square repression in June 1989 and the general economic problems that China was experiencing in 1989–1990 (which undoubtedly contributed to the tensions leading up to Tiananmen Square). Taiwanese investors, therefore, played a very important role in the takeoff of China’s export economy, which fueled rapid growth for the next decade and a half and earned China the nickname of “the world’s factory.”5 This confluence of fundamental economic change in Taiwan and new opportunities in the PRC, therefore, almost immediately produced a tremendous growth in economic interactions across the Taiwan Strait, as indicated by the data on trade between China and Taiwan in table 4.1. For example, Taiwan’s exports to China more than tripled between 1987 and 1990 (from $1.2 to $4.4 billion) and then jumped fourfold again by 1995 (to $19.4 billion) before stabilizing at about $20 billion during the second half of the decade and then jumping dramatically again in the early twenty-first century, as they doubled between 2001 and 2004 to approximately $45 billion. Correspondingly, China became Taiwan’s most important export market as the share of Taiwan’s exports going to the Mainland quintupled from 5 percent in 1989 to 17 percent in the mid- and late

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Table 4.1 Taiwan’s trade with China EXPORTS Value (US$ bn)

% of Taiwan’s Total Exports

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

1.0 0.8 1.2 2.2 3.3

3.2 2.0 2.3 3.7 5.0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

4.4 7.5 10.5 14.0 16.0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

IMPORTS % of China’s Total Imports

Value (US$ bn)

% of Taiwan’s Total Imports

2.3 1.9 2.8 4.1 5.6

0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6

0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1

6.5 9.8 13.0 16.5 17.2

8.2 11.8 13.1 13.5 13.9

0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.9

1.4 1.8 1.6 1.4 2.2

19.4 20.7 22.5 19.8 21.3

17.4 17.9 18.4 17.9 17.5

14.7 14.9 15.8 14.2 12.9

3.1 3.1 3.9 4.1 4.5

3.0 3.0 3.4 3.9 4.1

25.0 21.9 29.5 35.4 44.9*

16.8 17.9 22.6 24.5 25.9

11.0 9.0 10.0 8.6 8.1

6.2 5.9 7.9 11.0 15.0

4.4 5.5 7.1 8.6 9.9

* Projected from exports of $41.2 billion for January through November. Sources: Chu-yuan Cheng, “Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: Mutual Dependence and Conflicts,” in Winston L. Yang and Deborah A. Brown, eds., Across the Taiwan Strait: Exchanges, Conflicts, and Negotiations (New York: Center for Asian Studies, St. John’s University, 1999) pp. 66 and 69; Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly Number 145 (November 2004), Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 2005. www.mac.gov.tw. pp. 24, 27, and 28.

1990s to 25 percent in 2003–2004. In contrast, the importance of Taiwan in China’s imports rose to a peak of 16 percent in 1997 but then dropped to 8 percent in 2004 due to the huge expansion of China’s international trade. Thus, this trading interdependence between the two countries is becoming increasingly “asymmetric” due to the huge Chinese market. Finally, the direction of ROC-PRC trade has been quite unbalanced throughout this period, although it has become somewhat less so over time. For example, Taiwan’s exports to the Mainland were eight times the value of its imports in

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the mid-1990s. This disparity dropped to four times in the early twenty-first century, which still left a huge trade surplus.6 Growing trade was accompanied (in fact, stimulated) by a fairly massive flow of outward foreign direct investment (FDI). This is because Taiwan companies on the Mainland imported machinery and more sophisticated components from Taiwan for the production (primarily assembly) of goods being exported to third markets (particularly the United States).7 Investment in China by Taiwan businesspeople was negligible until the late 1980s but then took off rapidly, helping to stimulate the explosion of cross-Strait trade between the late 1980s and mid-1990s. Official data almost certainly understate the amount of investment in the PRC by Taiwan businesses by a considerable amount. Still, the data on Taiwan’s FDI in China in table 4.2 are more than adequate for showing the major trends. By the end of 1995, for instance, Taiwan’s total cumulative investment in the Chinese Mainland was estimated at approximately $30 billion by nearly 30,000 firms. Contracted investment was fairly constant at about $5 billion per year during the first half of the 1990s, with a one-year surge of $10 billion

Table 4.2 Taiwan’s investment in China (in billion US$) Year 1991 and before 1992 1993 1994

Contracted Investment $3.5 bn $5.5 bn $10.0 bn $5.4 bn

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

$5.8 bn $5.1 bn $2.8 bn $3.0 bn $3.4 bn

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* Cumulative through September 2004

$4.0 bn $6.9 bn $6.7 bn $8.6 bn $8.8 bn $76.6 bn

* Projected from contracts of $6.6 billion for January through September. Source: Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly Number 145 (November 2004), Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 2005. www.mac.gov.tw, p. 29.

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in 1993. It then dropped to about $3 billion per year during 1997–1999, before starting a new increasing trend at the turn of the century, rising to almost $8.5 billion in 2003 and 2004.8 The nature of Taiwan’s foreign investment became more large scale and sophisticated, as well. Taiwan investors moved from joint ventures to solely owned enterprises and began to build and supply their own factories. The structure of these ventures was also upgraded from simple assembly to “upstream” heavy and more capital-intensive or high-tech production. In particular, by the mid- to late 1990s, the mix of Taiwan investment in the PRC began to shift from predominantly small business in labor-intensive exports to much larger businesses seeking to penetrate the Chinese market in heavy industry (e.g., Formosa Plastics) and consumer goods (e.g., President Enterprises). There was also a geographical spread of Taiwan investment from an initial concentration in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces to Shanghai and then to almost all regions in China. Even state corporations became involved in major deals (e.g., the on-againoff-again contract between the ROC’s China Petroleum Corporation and the PRC’s China National Offshore Oil Company for joint exploration in the South China Sea that was initiated in August 1996).9 By the turn of the new century, a new round of increasing economic interactions between Taiwan and China commenced, as both trade and investment rose fairly consistently. This new spurt of economic interactions between Taiwan and China was driven by several factors sequentially. First, when Taiwan’s economy was growing robustly during 1999 and the first half of 2000, the high-tech component of crossStrait relations especially benefited (e.g., two-thirds of the new investment projects approved during 2000 involved the electronics industry). One major project in this area, a $6.4 billion joint venture for Shanghai semiconductor plants announced in May 2000, was certainly fraught with both symbolic and political significance, since it involved the sons of Jiang Zemin, the PRC’s President, and Y.C. Wang, the head of the huge Formosa Plastics empire in Taiwan. This seemed to indicate that those with the best reason to know believed that crossStrait relations would not blow up. Second, once the global recession in high-tech production hit Taiwan in the autumn of 2000, many domestically oriented businesses on the island tried to expand to the Mainland to make up for the deteriorating economic situation in the ROC.10 Finally, as Taiwan’s economy picked up again after the 2001 recession, the initial logic of economic expansion reasserted itself. For example two-thirds of Taiwan’s outward FDI in 2004 went to the Mainland, with 45 percent of it in the electronics industry.11

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This tremendous growth in economic interactions has created real economic integration across the Taiwan Strait. The two economies can be considered “integrated” because China and Taiwan are not just exchanging goods and services but have developed a functionally linked economy that has integrated into the global division-of-labor in what Gary Gereffi has termed a “commodity chain”—that is, interlinked production processes spanning several nations.12 In particular, advanced components are produced in Taiwan and exported to China for final assembly, creating the huge trade imbalance that was seen in table 4.1 earlier. For example, it has been estimated that at the beginning of the twenty-first century almost 75 percent of China’s information technology (IT) exports came from factories owned by Taiwanese. Thus, substantial segments of both Taiwan’s and China’s economies participated in these commodity chains, which in turn made a major contribution to China’s huge trade surplus with the United States.13 This rising level of economic integration, in turn, laid the foundation for more intense social communications and perhaps even community building across the Taiwan Strait. Once Taiwan relaxed its prohibition on contacts with China in 1987, social contacts and linkages across the Taiwan Strait multiplied many-fold, as indicated by the data in table 4.3. The monthly number of visitors flowing across the Strait quickly reached a million a year and then grew steadily to an average of just over 3.5 million annually from 2000 to 2004. By the early 1990s, in addition, over 15 million pieces of mail flowed across the Taiwan Strait each year. Subsequently, the level of mail interactions remained fairly constant as they appeared to be replaced by telephone communications, which multiplied tenfold from 48 million in 1993 to just over 500 million in 2004. This certainly implies that many of the residents in China and Taiwan have been able to “get to know one another” in what has been termed “people-to-people diplomacy.”14 Furthermore, because investment and commerce necessitate further interactions and communications in and of themselves, there are now substantial “Taiwan communities” in many Mainland cities—with, for example, an estimated 500,000 ROC citizens living for most of the year in Shanghai alone—leading some observers even to comment upon the growing “Taiwanization” of parts of China.15 Increasing interactions across the Taiwan Strait, moreover, are not just limited to the economic sphere. A substantial number of Taiwanese are also rediscovering their “roots” in Fujian Province. For example, Murray Rubinstein describes the fascinating process of cross-Strait “temple politics” in which temples in Taiwan “adopt” older ones in Fujian.16

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Table 4.3 Social communications across the Taiwan Strait Year

Visitors from Taiwan to China (Millions)

Letters in Either Direction (Millions)

Telephone Calls in Either Direction (Millions)

1988 1989

0.4 0.5

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

0.9 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.4

15.2 16.8 17.7 19.1

48.0 61.2

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

1.5 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.5

17.6 18.0 16.3 14.7 13.4

77.8 96.5 125.7 149.2 178.3

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

3.1 3.6 3.7 2.7 3.7*

14.0 12.6 16.3 16.8 15.4*

206.7 269.7 383.2 435.7 511.0*

* Projected from 3.4 million visits, 14.1 million letters, and 468.4 million calls for January through November. Source: Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly Number 145 (November 2004), Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 2005. www.mac.gov.tw, pp. 36–38.

A Disconnect with Identity Politics and National Security A well-developed research tradition argues that growing trade and economic interdependence between two countries, such as China and Taiwan over the past 15 years, should markedly reduce the hostility and the probability of military conflict between them for several reasons. Commerce creates shared benefits and a “shadow of the future” that become increasingly costly to break. Consequently, domestic constituencies emerge that pressure the respective governments to maintain amicable relations. In addition, the increase in interactions between two countries that trade helps to promote mutual understanding and to break down negative stereotypes.17 In the case of the European Community during the postwar era, for example, institutional change (such as the formation of the European Economic

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Community) greatly increased trade, tourism, student exchanges, and other forms of social communications among European nations. Growing social communications, in turn, gradually changed popular attitudes. Finally, greater mutual friendliness and at least passive support for moving toward greater supranational integration then set the stage for new institutional initiatives promoting integration in Europe.18 The case of cross-Strait relations seems quite inconsistent with this logic, however. Directly, the burgeoning economic integration between Taiwan and China was accompanied by rising, not diminishing, political hostility and security threats. These clashes both reflected and themselves helped stimulate growing feelings of nationalism on both sides of the Strait. In particular, national identity issues became the driving force in Taiwan’s domestic politics in the first few years of the twenty-first century. Still, the series of political confrontations between Taiwan and China over the past ten years have had surprisingly little discernible impact upon the economic and social interactions across the Taiwan Strait. Despite the growing economic integration and social communications across the Taiwan Strait, the summary of relations between Taipei and Beijing over the past ten years in table 4.4 show that they have been fairly stormy, with periodic crises in which the possibility of an outbreak of military hostilities appears to have been significant, even if perhaps not highly probable. This instability reflects the mutually incompatible sovereignty claims of the two governments. The PRC claims that there is only one China, which Beijing governs, and that Taiwan is part of China, while Taiwan strenuously denies that it is subject to Beijing’s sovereignty. These conflicting sovereignty claims, furthermore, are based upon strong feelings of nationalism and “face” on both sides. For many if not most citizens of China, Taiwan is a territory that was stolen during the century of imperialism and unequal treaties; and only its return to the motherland can make China whole once again. For many if not most citizens of Taiwan, in sharp contrast, China is a threatening new imperialist who has denied them the international status and dignity that every other country enjoys, thereby marring the economic and political success that the island has achieved. Consequently, it is certainly not surprising that the sequence of crises and near crises depicted in table 4.4 erupted with Beijing and Taipei taking turns in provoking a “tit-for-tat” cycle. China initiated the series of confrontations with its “missile diplomacy” of 1995–1996, in what appeared to be an overreaction to Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States. Lee then provoked a new crisis in 1999 with his statement that “special state-to-state relations” existed between Beijing and Taipei.

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Table 4.4 The battle over sovereignty between China and Taiwan Round #1 President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan visits Cornell University in June 1995 Beijing claims this represents Taiwan Independence and retaliates with “missile diplomacy” during Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996 Lee’s strong victory in 1996 election suggests China’s threats were counterproductive Round #2 President Clinton’s “Three Nos” in Shanghai in June 1998 support PRC’s position on sovereignty, raising fears in Taipei of pressures to make unacceptable concessions President Lee announces theory of “Special State-to-State Relations” between Taiwan and China, provoking rage in China over his support for Taiwan Independence The United States first scolds Taiwan and then seeks to deter China from minor military retaliation Round #3 Beijing threatens harsh consequence if a pro-Independence candidate wins Taiwan’s 2000 election for President Chen Shui-bian of the DPP (the unnamed target of Chinese threats) narrowly wins Chen conciliatory in pledging not to pursue Independence (“5 Nos”) in inaugural address China ignores Chen’s concessions and changes central demand from Chen’s not pursuing Independence to accepting “One China” principle China continues missile buildup that is seen as provocative and threatening by both Taiwan and the United States Round #4 Chen switches policy with theory of “one country on each side” of Taiwan Strait in Summer of 2002 From late 2003 through 2004, Chen campaigns in presidential and legislative elections with strongly nationalistic appeal to his “base constituency” China’s public reactions quite limited, but at times Beijing clearly communicates a growing sense of threat Round #5 First direct flights between China and Taiwan for Chinese New Year “10-Point Consensus” between Chen Shui-bian and James Soong in February 2005 quite conciliatory on policy toward China China’s Anti-Secession Law in March 2005 reignites tension in Strait

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A year later, China threatened dire consequences if Chen Shui-bian was elected president of Taiwan in 2000, and contemptuously ignored Chen’s conciliatory initiatives after his election. After several years, Chen took a much more assertive stance toward China in the summer of 2002, declaring that there was “one country on each side” of the Taiwan Strait and strongly appealing to Taiwanese nationalism during the 2004 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan.19 Finally, a “fifth round” seemed to be emerging in 2005. In Taiwan, Chen Shuibian moved in a considerably more moderate direction when Taiwan and China negotiated the first direct flights between the PRC and ROC for the Chinese New Year, and when Chen and James Soong of the opposition PFP met and reached a “10-point consensus” that included a conciliatory policy toward China that Beijing should have welcomed. However, the PRC responded by adopting its Anti-Secession Law that was clearly aimed at Taiwan, again raising tensions in the Strait.20 The cycles of hostility between the two governments, furthermore, do not just reflect the views of a small political leadership but are strongly supported by increasingly nationalistic citizenries.21 This growing nationalism on both sides of the Strait implies that, even at the level of social communications and “low politics,” the spillover from economic integration has been surprisingly circumscribed. In particular, this is strongly illustrated by the rise of national identity politics in Taiwan. This occurred at the same time that burgeoning cross-Strait contacts might have been expected to attenuate, not intensify, identity conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. The questions of national identity and “ethnic justice” have long been seen as perhaps the overriding concern in Taiwan, even when its direct expression was repressed by martial law. Thus, democratization brought this issue to the top of Taiwan’s agenda in the early 1990s. The inability of a majority of Taiwan’s current citizens to select their rulers before 1991, due to the restrictions of martial law, allowed the government to be dominated by Mainlanders (i.e., the 15 percent of the population who evacuated from the Mainland to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek in the late 1940s). The Mainlanders were seen by many Islanders, those who resided in Taiwan at the end of World War II, as treating the Taiwanese (who are also almost entirely Han Chinese) as “second class citizens” in their own land. In addition, there was a legacy of political oppression called the “white terror,” most especially the tragedy of the February 28, 1947, or 2-2-8 Incident, in which a limited popular uprising brought a massive retaliation that resulted in an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 deaths, mostly by execution.22

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Taiwan’s democratization, therefore, was widely expected to unleash Taiwanese nationalism on two interlinked but distinct issues: (1) rejection of the Mainlander-dominated political regime; and (2) growing hostility toward and the absolute rejection of China’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, which was ironically at least tacitly supported by the Kuomintang’s policy of “Mainland Recovery.” Yet, such a polarization did not emerge in the early 1990s. In fact, as sketched in figure 4.2, the dynamics of Taiwan’s partisan politics actually worked to moderate this potentially explosive cleavage. After Islander Lee Teng-hui became president and party chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) following Chiang Ching-Kuo’s death, he skillfully first worked to consolidate power and then moved to the middle of the ideological spectrum on national identity and crossStrait relations, portraying himself and the “new” KMT as moderates between the extremes of the Pro-Independence DPP and the ProUnification “old KMT” and New Party (which split off from the KMT in 1993).23 For its part, the DPP began to moderate its position on Taiwan Independence, which had been explicitly added to its Party Charter in 1991, during the mid-1990s, when its radical image on the issue appeared to cost it significantly at the polls. For example, some (but far from all) DPP leaders began to argue that Taiwan was already an independent nation, making a formal declaration of independence immaterial. Indeed, the evident desire of most DPP politicians to

DPP

Trashing at polls in 1991 leads to some moderation

KMT Lee victory leads to commitment to eventual unification coupled with aggressive “pragmatic diplomacy”

Huge Peng loss in 1996 and Chinese threats convince most DPP leaders that independence is impossible

TAIP defection helps moderate image

Growing consensus among parties and in society on national identity and cross-Strait relations Taiwanization of KMT reduces Islander resentment

New Pro-unification after Party 1993 break with KMT

1. “New Taiwanese” identity 2. Consensus on cross-Strait relations at 1996 NDC 3. Candidate moderation and similar stances on crossStrait relations in 2000 elections

Chinese threats during 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis make supporting unification untenable

Figure 4.2 How democratization moderated the national identity and cross-Strait relations cleavages.

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move toward a more centrist view on national identity caused several leaders and groups to defect from the DPP and to form the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), claiming that the DPP had forsaken its major issue. This also helped to moderate the image of the DPP.24 By the late 1990s, therefore, a consensus had seemingly emerged among both the population and the major parties on moderate positions on national identity and cross-Strait relations, leading Shelley Rigger to describe Taiwan as “post-nationalist.”25 In terms of national identity, for example, Lee Teng-hui’s concept of a “New Taiwanese” identity that was open to both Islanders and Mainlanders alike has proven to be very popular across the political spectrum.26 Perhaps surprisingly, the growing moderation on cross-Strait relations and national identity even carried over to the 2000 presidential campaign. While the candidates certainly criticized each other (and especially caricatures of the others), they all really advocated moderate positions of toning down hostilities with Beijing, while strongly defending Taiwan’s existing sovereignty. They differed from one another much more in phraseology than substance.27 Chen Shui-bian’s victory in the 2000 presidential election was greeted with near shock in the PRC due to Beijing’s claims that he was a supporter of Taiwan Independence, which the PRC considered a casus belli. However, he sought to reassure Beijing with his inaugural speech’s “5 Nos,” which made a commitment not to do anything to change Taiwan’s status unless the PRC intervened militarily.28 China responded with studied contempt to Chen’s conciliatory approach. It quickly switched its primary demand from Taiwan’s not declaring independence to Taiwan’s accepting the “One China Principle,” a certain “deal-breaker.” After two years of frustration, Chen took a much sharper position on cross-Strait relations in the summer of 2002, advancing a theory that “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” existed, provoking significant unhappiness in both Beijing and Washington.29 In addition, his domestic policy seemingly sought to stimulate Taiwanese nationalism as well. Wei-chin Lee, for example, argues that Chen promoted a “cultural revolution” (reference to Mao’s Cultural Revolution intentional) that included such initiatives as changing the name of many organizations and agencies from “China” to “Taiwan” and stressing Taiwanese in language policy.30 Chen then ran a campaign in the 2004 presidential election that appealed strongly to Taiwanese nationalism. Jacques deLisle named it the “Taiwan Yes!; (China No!)” campaign, after one of its central themes and slogans.31 Growing economic integration and social communications across the Taiwan Strait, hence, certainly did not have much of a spillover

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into questions about national identity and security. However, the tension and hostility in these areas of “high politics” had surprisingly little feedback into the dynamics of cross-Strait interactions. Table 4.5, for example, shows that economic problems did affect the flows between China and Taiwan adversely, as would certainly be expected. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 (sometimes dubbed the “Asian flu”) did lead to a marked decline in new investment projects, but evidently did not affect the levels of trade and social communications very much. Taiwan’s 2001 recession sparked by the drop in world demand for high-tech products had, if anything, even less of an effect. Trade dropped appreciably, but the growth of investment and social communications continued apace as the recession pushed more Taiwan businesses to move to China to take advantage of the huge internal market there, rather than just using the PRC as an export platform.32 In contrast, the political crises included in table 4.5 had almost no discernible impact on the economic and social interactions between Table 4.5 Effects of major events on cross-Strait trade and investment Event

Seeming Impact

Economic Crises 1997–1998 Asian flu

Investment fell appreciably; growth of trade and social communications continued but clearly slowed down

Taiwan’s recession of 2001 due to drop of global demand for high tech products

Some drop in trade; investment and social communications continued to climb

Political confrontations 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre

Trade, investment, and social communications continued to grow

1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis

Both trade and investment growth stabilized but did not really drop; growth in social communications continued

1999–2000 Crisis of Lee’s “special state-to-state” theory and Chen’s election

Both trade and investment began to climb again after dip due to Asian flu; social communications continued to grow

2002–2004 Growing Chinese hostility to Chen’s increased appeals to Taiwanese nationalism

Dynamism of cross-Strait economic and social interactions, if anything, accelerated

Sources: Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 given earlier.

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Taiwan and China. The Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 hurt China’s relations with foreign investors from most nations, but trade, investment, and social communications from Taiwan actually continued their rapid growth in 1989–1990. Even the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996, where Taiwan itself was the target of Chinese military intimidation, did little to disrupt economic and social interactions across the Strait. Furthermore, the periodic political confrontations between Beijing and Taipei in the early twenty-first century did not put much, if any, of a damper on the renewed spurt in cross-Strait economic flows and social communications. Taken together, hence, these data certainly suggest that economic relations between China and Taiwan were much more responsive to economic than political factors. More fundamentally, in one very key respect, the nature of the economic, religious, and social links between China and Taiwan has had a salutary dampening effect upon the divisive internal debate in Taiwan on national identity, over whether the island’s citizens are Chinese or Taiwanese. This debate, in turn, has inflamed high politics between the PRC and ROC several times over the last ten years. This issue is especially dangerous because of its potential for polarizing proIndependence Taiwanese identifiers and pro-Unification Chinese identifiers.33 Given the image of ethnic polarization within Taiwan, it is perhaps surprising that literally thousands of Islander (i.e., Han Chinese residents whose ancestors came to Taiwan long ago) businesspeople and temple leaders, rather than Mainlander politicians, played the leading role in promoting the economic integration between Taiwan and China, which created significant grassroots pressure on both the Lee and Chen governments to keep their challenges to the PRC from becoming too provocative.34 This reverse twist in how one aspect of the ethnic factor in Taiwan politics has become melded into cross-Strait relations, thus, underlines the perhaps surprising conclusion that economic integration, on the one hand, and conflict in the security and identity realms, on the other, are following very distinct tracks in the volatile relations between Taipei and Beijing. As argued in much more detail in Chapter 1, “Democratization and National Identity in the China-Taiwan and Korean Conflicts,” the eruption of competing nationalisms in both China and Taiwan provides the primary reason for this fundamental disconnect between the growing social and economic integration between them, on the one hand, and the escalation of their conflicts in the security realm on the other. In Taiwan, this is clearly a function of democratization since the unrealistic national identity claims of the “old” KMT simply became untenable once authoritarian controls were lifted. A somewhat

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similar process also occurred even in authoritarian China, as appeals to Chinese nationalism became the regime’s principal legitimizing motif in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square. Consequently, the normal logic of integration producing spillover into the political realm has been overwhelmed by the driving force of mutually antagonistic nationalism in both countries.

Notes 1. Steve Chan, “Peace By Pieces? The Economic and Social Bases for ‘Greater China,’ ” American Asian Review 14 (1996): 35–50. 2. Yu-shan Wu, “Economic Reform, Cross-Straits Relations, and the Politics of Issue Linkage,” in Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S.G. Wu, eds., Inherited Rivalry: Conflict across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 111–133, provides an excellent overview of these interacting policy changes. 3. Tun-jen Cheng and Peggy Pei-chen Chang, “Limits of Statecraft: Taiwan’s Political Economy under Lee Teng-hui,” in Wei-chin Lee and T.Y. Wang, eds., Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988–2000 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 113–146; Caleb Clark, “The Taiwan Development Model: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations,” in Kenneth Klinkner, ed., The United States and Cross-Straits Relations: China, Taiwan, and the US Entering a New Century (Champaign: Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Illinois, 2001), 167–193; Cal Clark, “Trends in Taiwan: An Economic Perspective,” Issues and Studies 30 (1994): 23–52; Wu, “Cross-Straits Relations.” 4. Barry Naughton, “Economic Policy Reform in the PRC and Taiwan,” in Barry Naughton, ed., The China Circle: Economics and Electronics in the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), 81–110; Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Wu, “Cross-Straits Relations.” 5. Wu, “Cross-Straits Relations.” 6. Paul J. Bolt, “Taiwan-China Economic Cooperation: Ties that Bind?” in Kenneth Klinkner, ed., The United States and Cross-Straits Relations, 194–219; Chu-yuan Cheng, “Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits: Mutual Dependence and Conflicts,” in Winston L. Yang and Deborah A. Brown, eds., Across the Taiwan Strait: Exchanges, Conflicts, and Negotiations (New York: Center for Asian Studies, St. John’s University, 1999), 63–83; Peter C.Y. Chow, “Complementarity and Competitiveness of the Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Problems and Prospects,” in Winston L. Yang and Deborah A. Brown, eds., The Republic of China on Taiwan in the 1990s (New York: Center for Asian Studies, St. John’s University, 1997), 173–189; Yun-han Chu,

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7.

8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

“The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), 163–195; Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “Will Inter-China Trade Change Taiwan or the Mainland?” Orbis 35 (1991): 517–531. Bolt, “Ties that Bind”; Chu, “Political Economy”; Cheng-Tian Kuo, “The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Investment in China,” in Tunjen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S.G. Wu, eds., Inherited Rivalry, 153–169; Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994); Barry Naughton, “Economic Policy Reform”; Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan. Bolt, “Ties that Bind”; Cheng, “Economic Relations across the Taiwan Straits.” Julian Baum, “Strait Talking,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 6, 1997: 22–26; Bolt, “Ties that Bind”; Cheng and Chang, “Limits of Statecraft”; Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); Chin Chung, “Division of Labor across the Taiwan Strait: Macro Overview and Analysis of the Electronics Industry,” in Barry Naughton, ed., The China Circle: Economics and Electronics in the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), 164–209. Bolt, “Ties that Bind”; Terry Cooke, “Business and Politics across the Taiwan Strait,” Foreign Policy Research Institute Papers, http:// www.fpri.org (accessed February 4, 2006). Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly 145 (November 2004) (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 2005.), 31–32, http:// www.mac. gov.tw (accessed February 1, 2006). Gary Gereffi, “More Than the Market, More Than the State: Global Commodity Chains and Industrial Upgrading in East Asia,” in Steve Chan, Cal Clark, and Danny Lam, eds., Beyond the Developmental State: East Asia’s Political Economies Reconsidered (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998), 38–59. Bolt, “Ties that Bind”; Chu, “Political Economy”; Kuo, “Taiwan’s Investment in China”; Cooke, “Business and Politics”; Lardy, China in the World Economy; Naughton, “Economic Policy Reform”; Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan; Wu, “Cross-Straits Relations.” Clough, Cooperation or Conflict; Ralph N. Clough, Reaching across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993); Gary Klintworth, New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan’s Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995); Tse-kang Leng, The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Hsin-hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the

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16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

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Prospects for Reunification (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994). Bolt, “Ties that Bind”; Cooke, “Business and Politics”; “US-Taiwan Pact Needed for Security,” Taipei Times, May 24, 2002, http://www.taipeitimes.com (accessed March 25, 2003). Murray A. Rubinstein, “Taiwan Experience in Fukien: A Case Study of Socio-Religious and Economic Relations between the R.O.C. and P.R.C.,” paper presented at the thirteenth International Conference on Asian Affairs, St. John’s University, 1995. Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967); Ronald A Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970). Cal Clark, Asia Update: The 2000 Taiwan Presidential Elections (New York: The Asia Society, 2000); John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Democracy’s Consolidation or Devolution? (Baltimore: University of Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 2004); Martin L. Lasater, The Taiwan Conundrum in U.S. China Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000); Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999). Caroline Hong and Huang Tai-lin, “Chen, Soong Sign 10-Point Consensus,” Taipei Times, February 25, 2005: 1; Huang Tai-lin, “Chen Regrets China’s ‘Politicization’ of Direct Charter Flights,” Taipei Times, January 29, 2005: 1; Jim Yardley, “China Denies ‘Taiwan Law’ is a ‘War Bill,’ ” New York Times, March 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com (accessed March 25, 2005). Melissa J. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan’s National Identity Politics and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey 44 (July-August 2004): 484–512; Shelley Rigger, “Is Taiwan Independence Passé? Public Opinion, Party Platforms, and National Identity in Taiwan,” in Chien-min Chao and Cal Clark, eds., The ROC on the Threshold of the 21st Century: A Paradigm Reexamined

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22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

30.

31.

32. 33. 34.

(Baltimore: School of Law’s Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1999), 47–70; Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations (Hong Kong: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Brown, “Is Taiwan Chinese?”; Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994). Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Steven J. Hood, The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997). Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); T.Y. Wang, “One China, One Taiwan: An Analysis of the Democratic Progressive Party’s China Policy,” in Wei-chin Lee, ed., Taiwan in Perspective (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2000), 159–182. Rigger, “Is Taiwan Independence Passé?” Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?; Rigger, “Is Taiwan Independence Passé?” Clark, The 2000 Taiwan Presidential Elections. Deborah A. Brown, “Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential Election and CrossStrait Relations,” in Deborah A. Brown, ed., Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential Election: Implications for Taiwan’s Politics, Security, Economy, and Relations with the Mainland (New York: Center for Asian Studies, St. John’s University, 2001), 101–153. John F. Copper, Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (Baltimore: University of Maryland, School of Law’s Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 2000); Shelley Rigger, “Taiwan in 2002: Another Year of Political Droughts and Typhoons,” Asian Survey 43 (January 2003): 41–48; Shelley Rigger, “Taiwan in 2003: Plenty of Clouds, Few Silver Linings,” Asian Survey 44 (January 2004): 182–187. Wei-chin Lee, “Taiwan’s Cultural Revolution: Identity Politics and Collective Action since 2000,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004. Jacques deLisle, “The Aftermath of Taiwan’s Presidential Election: A Symposium Report,” (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2004). Bolt, “Ties that Bind”; Cooke, “Business and Politics.” Wachman, National Identity and Democratization. Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for International Policy Research, 1992); Chu, “Taiwan’s National Identity Politics”; Clough, Reaching across the Taiwan Strait; Kuo, “Taiwan’s Investment in China”; Leng, The Taiwan-China Connection.

Chapter 5

Expl aining U.S. Policy toward China and Taiwan Steven B. Redd

U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East currently dominates the headlines and is a chief topic of discussion among both scholars and policymakers. However, of equal, or even greater, importance is U.S. foreign policy toward East Asia, particularly China and Taiwan. Taiwan’s status as an internationally unrecognized state and China’s claim to ownership over Taiwan, combined with China’s threat to attack Taiwan should the latter attempt to declare independence or be recognized by others, combine to create a volatile situation. Taiwan’s recent democratization, along with China’s and Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and high volume of trade with the United States and each other, further complicate U.S. foreign policy toward these two actors.1 Factors such as the U.S. war on terror, foreign policy concerns in North Korea and Japan, as well as domestic considerations also affect U.S. foreign policy toward China and Taiwan. I examine U.S. foreign policy toward China and Taiwan by first briefly reviewing the historical context of U.S. policy during the Cold War. I then examine U.S. national security strategy in the post–Cold War era, focusing on the administrations of presidents William Clinton and George W. Bush. I examine both internal and external factors that have helped shape U.S. foreign policy toward these two countries. I conclude this chapter by briefly discussing policy implications for U.S. foreign policy in the present and future.

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U.S. Foreign Policy during the Cold War 2 After World War II, the United States initially envisioned China as an ally, with China being ruled by Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces. The victory of Mao’s communists over the nationalists in 1949, combined with China’s entry into the Korean War, changed U.S. thinking in the region. The United States subsequently undertook a number of steps to protect Taiwan from any possible Chinese attack. These steps included a personal visit from General MacArthur to assess defense needs, plans for the training of troops in Taiwan, the eventual allocation of $4.2 billion in technical assistance and military aid, and a Mutual Defense Treaty agreed upon in December 1954.3 The continued Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union eventually changed U.S. national security strategy in East Asia. The initial change in focus from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began with Nixon and Kissinger’s secret meetings with the PRC—an attempt to “play the China card” against the Soviet Union. The result was the 1972 Shanghai communiqué wherein Nixon normalized relations with China. A key issue in the normalization talks between Premier Zhou Enlai and President Nixon was the issue of Taiwan. The United States insisted that any future reunification between China and Taiwan should be achieved peacefully. However, the PRC refused to rule out the use of force as a way to unite the two sides. The process of normalization with China continued under the Carter administration. Official diplomatic relations with China were restored on January 1, 1979. As a consequence of this normalization, the United States agreed to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, sever all formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, and withdraw U.S. troops from Taiwan. The United States also acknowledged that there was only one China and that Taiwan was part of China. Consequently, all relations with Taiwan occurred on an “unofficial” basis. However, the United States balked at Chinese requests to halt arms sales to Taiwan. Congress, historically more predisposed to favoring Taiwan, immediately responded by drafting and passing the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). To summarize, the TRA strengthened the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense by more clearly stipulating that any resolution to the China-Taiwan impasse had to be undertaken through peaceful means, and that the United States considered any forceful attempts at resolution to be a direct threat to U.S. interests in the region.

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Furthermore, the United States agreed to provide defensive arms to Taiwan. The TRA also implied that the United States would maintain the capacity to resist any attempts by Beijing to resolve the China-Taiwan dispute through force or other forms of coercion.4 When Ronald Reagan defeated Carter in the 1980 election, a primary component of his election platform was a strong stance against communism. Reagan criticized Carter’s China policy, vowing to take a harder line toward the PRC and to strengthen relations with the Republic of China (ROC).5 The PRC continued to pressure the U.S. government to discontinue arms sales to Taiwan. In subsequent negotiations, the PRC attempted to get the United States to set a date for stopping arms sales to Taiwan, while the United States tried to get any reduction in arms sales contingent on promises from the PRC to not use force against Taiwan. A compromise was reached and Reagan issued a communiqué on August 17, 1982, wherein the United States set no specific date for the termination of arms sales to Taiwan but instead stated that [the United States] does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.6

China further agreed that it would strive to achieve a peaceful settlement with respect to the Taiwan issue. The language in the 1982 communiqué was sufficiently vague that, in effect, it was not binding and the United States continued to provide defensive arms to Taiwan.7 Moreover, the 1982 communiqué covered only foreign military sales and was not applicable to commercial sales. In fact, Reagan issued the Six Assurances to a concerned Taiwan, stating that the United States agreed (1) not to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan, (2) not to hold prior consultation with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan, (3) not to play any mediation role between the PRC and Taiwan, (4) not to revise the TRA, (5) not to alter its position regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty, and (6) not to pressure Taiwan into negotiating with the PRC.8 The election of President George H.W. Bush heralded hope in the PRC for more favorable relations between the United States and China, given that Bush had previously served as the U.S. Representative to China under President Ford. However, the suppression and eventual

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massacre of students demonstrating for democracy in June 1989 dramatically changed the relationship between the United States and China. Bush immediately suspended arms sales to China. Congress responded to “Tiananmen” even more forcefully, passing various bills designed to strengthen U.S. sanctions already enacted against China.9 Another result of the Beijing crackdown was that arms sales from the United States to Taiwan increased at a rapid rate, culminating in President Bush’s decision to sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan for $6 billion in 1992. Taiwan had long desired F-16s but previous presidents had resisted selling them to Taiwan because they were concerned about hampering U.S.-China relations.10 To be sure, Bush’s sale of F-16s to Taiwan may have been influenced by domestic political calculations, given that he was in the midst of a reelection campaign at the time of the sale. Moreover, some argue that relations between China and the United States were bound to change at this time because of the gradual collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The United States no longer needed to play the “China card” against the Soviet Union.11 To summarize, “strategic ambiguity” is often mentioned as the predominant theme in U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan during the Cold War. A policy of strategic ambiguity implies that the United States tries to strike a middle road between favoring the PRC and Taiwan. More specifically, the United States would attempt to deter either side from initiating any actions that would lead to conflict. This policy would entail deterring China from attempting to resolve the impasse by resorting to force, and deterring Taiwan from declaring independence. The United States was not opposed to reunification, but instead insisted that any resolution had to be undertaken in a peaceful manner. Nathan argues that U.S. policy for a quarter-century has “combine[d] clarity about the ends of the policy with ‘strategic ambiguity’ about the means.”12 In other words, the United States has been very clear in stating that it was adamantly opposed to any forceful attempts to resolve the China-Taiwan dispute, but it has also been somewhat unclear or ambiguous as to exactly what it would do to assure a peaceful resolution. Some scholars would point out, though, that not only was U.S. policy ambiguous but that it was also inconsistent, implying that, in fact, there has been no central theme or plan. As Drury argues, It is outcome-oriented hindsight that suggests US policy has been well formulated and consistent. Closer inspection of the process shows that since 1949, US policy is ambiguous and has been made on an ad hoc basis. Instead of coherent planning, the policy has emerged from a

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combination of international pressures and lobbies, domestic politics, and ideologies of presidents and their advisors. Further, the process has been jarred by each new president’s interest and efficacy in foreign affairs, goals for American security, and approach to the Asia-Pacific region.13

A closer review of the previous section would seem to support both arguments in some respects. In terms of process, the United States has vacillated between favoring the PRC and Taiwan. These decisions have not been the result of some grand scheme or doctrine, but instead have been the result of the many factors identified by Drury.14 On the other hand, U.S. policy has been consistent in stressing the importance of a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The United States has managed to deter both sides from changing the status quo, even though the specific policy options pursued have been somewhat inconsistent across various Cold War administrations. In the next section I explore these dynamics further in describing and analyzing U.S. policy during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Both internal and external factors contributed to their foreign policies, explaining how and why policies varied both within and between their administrations.15

Post–Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy President William J. Clinton Clinton strongly criticized both President George H.W. Bush and China during the 1992 presidential campaign. He even referred to Chinese leaders as “the butchers of Beijing.”16 He maintained sanctions begun in the previous Bush administration in response to Tiananmen, and he even blocked attempts by Beijing to host the 2000 Olympic games. Clinton froze $1 billion in high-technology sales to China in 1993 because the PRC had sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan.17 He also followed through on Bush’s previous decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan (more than $6 billion worth), and authorized additional new arms transfers to Taiwan. Zhang and Hyer also note, “In September 1993, the US agreed to sell Taiwan 41 Harpoon anti-ship missiles worth $68 million, missiles that Taiwan had sought almost as long as the F-16s.”18 By the end of 1993, though, Clinton had completely changed his stance, opting for more favorable relations with the PRC, including moves toward lifting U.S. sanctions against China. He also denied more advanced weaponry to Taiwan, including theater missile defense improvements and Burke-class destroyers equipped with the technologically advanced AEGIS targeting system.

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In 1995, under pressure from Congress, Clinton extended a visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, in June. China responded by conducting live missile tests across the Taiwan Strait in July and August 1995 and again in March 1996, in an effort to dissuade Taiwanese from voting for Lee.19 Clinton responded by sending two aircraft carriers and supporting naval ships into the Taiwan Strait. China ceased the live missile “testing” shortly after the Taiwan elections. Right after the incident in the Taiwan Strait, Clinton instructed Anthony Lake, his national security advisor, to conduct a review of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. Hsiung notes, The crucial recommendation that emerged from the review was that the United States should never again get into a position where it could blunder into a hot war with China over Taiwan. Two steps were recommended: (a) that the United States, for its own interest, should redirect its policy toward the PRC, in what became known as an “all-out engagement” policy initiative; and (b) that a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question must be encouraged forthwith.20

Hsiung further states that the overall goal of this new “engagement” policy was to integrate China into the mainstream of the international arena and the world economic system. To this end, Clinton traveled to China in June 1998 and stipulated the “Three No’s policy,” wherein the United States expressed no support for Taiwan independence, no support for two Chinas, or one China and one Taiwan, and no support for Taiwan gaining membership in any international organization where statehood is a requirement.21 Shortly after, the United States and China signed an agreement opening the mainland to greater investment and trade, Clinton worked for China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Clinton even encouraged Congress to grant permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) to China.22 As with previous presidential administrations during the Cold War, Clinton began his post–Cold War tenure as president very critical of the PRC and favoring Taiwan to a greater degree, only to shift his policy toward favoring China. However, U.S. policy toward China did not remain consistent during Clinton’s term, with fluctuations back and forth between favoring China and favoring Taiwan. Why did Clinton, as well as previous presidents, vacillate between courting China and Taiwan? The answer can be found in both international realities and domestic factors, which serve to both constrain and push the chief executive to adopt different policies.

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International factors helped shape Clinton’s approach toward the China-Taiwan dispute. As mentioned previously, the end of the Cold War most likely provided the initial context within which the new Clinton administration crafted its policy toward China. The United States no longer needed China to the same degree that it had before, since there was no longer any Soviet Union against which the United States needed to play the “China card.” This may have been one reason why Clinton campaigned and began his first term with such a hard line against the PRC. However, upon entering office, Clinton realized that other international factors pulled him in the direction of the PRC. Initially, China’s economic power seemed to provide an impetus for Clinton’s changed policy, stated that “the United States could have a significant, if not decisive, impact on the choices China makes integrating China into international security, economic, and environmental institutions.”23 Along noneconomic lines, it is plausible that Clinton sought greater cooperation between the United States and China as a way to deal with geostrategic concerns in the area. Osius notes that China consulted with the United States and helped to a degree to restrain North Korea primarily with respect to nuclear proliferation issues.24 Given China’s economic growth, its possession of nuclear weapons, and its growing military might, it is difficult to ignore China’s role in the region or to even to contemplate how the United States might undertake a policy to marginalize the PRC. Events in Taiwan also helped shape U.S. policy toward the region. Lee Teng-hui became president of Taiwan in 1988 and he began a rapid process of liberalization including Taiwan’s transition to democracy. As one scholar argues, “Lee Teng-hui . . . came to regard [democratization] as a useful defense against an overly easy accommodation with the mainland” and that “successive presidential and legislative elections have moved the island’s political center away from unification and confirmed a mainstream preference for the status quo.”25 In July 1999, Lee Teng-hui referred to the relationship between China and Taiwan as “special state-to-state relations.” As expected, Beijing was very angry over his assertion that Taiwan was a state, in a sense implying that it was separate and independent. President Clinton immediately issued what has come to be known as the “three pillars,” which includes “reaffirmation of America’s oneChina policy; insistence on a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue; and encouragement of a resumption of cross-strait dialogue.”26 As Bush summarizes, “The open discussion of independence, the emergence of a strong Taiwanese identity, and the possibility that the

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[Democratic Progressive Party] DPP might come to power could not be ignored because of their potential implications for peace and stability.”27 Although international factors and domestic factors in Taiwan helped shape U.S. foreign policy toward China and Taiwan during Clinton’s administration, domestic factors in the United States perhaps played the most significant role in contributing to the complex and often inconsistent nature of U.S. foreign policy during Clinton’s tenure in office. Congress, interest groups, and public opinion all contributed to and influenced U.S. policy. To be sure, these domestic “actors” all influenced U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan during the Cold War; however, I did not discuss these actors earlier simply for the sake of brevity. I do so now as a means of comparing domestic influences during the Clinton administration with the past as well as with policy during the George W. Bush administration (discussed in the next section). Congress has long been the chief foil to executive-level decisionmaking with respect to the China-Taiwan dispute.28 As discussed earlier, previous administrations have vacillated between supporting Taiwan or leaning more toward China. In contrast, Congress has been much more consistent in expressing overwhelming support for Taiwan over time. Congressional support for Taiwan began to manifest itself primarily in response to Nixon’s overtures to China in the early 1970s. Carter’s decision in 1979 to officially recognize China and to subsequently regard all U.S. relations with Taiwan as “unofficial” spurred Congress to take action. As discussed, it responded with the TRA. Similarly, a bipartisan Congress reacted angrily to Reagan’s 1982 communiqué promising Beijing that the United States would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan. It pressured the Reagan administration to craft the previously discussed Six Assurances to Taiwan. Congress, of course, also considers Reagan’s 1982 communiqué to be less binding than the 1979 TRA, since the 1982 communiqué was never ratified by the Senate.29 The Tiananmen events led to even more congressional activism. Several years later in 1994, former Senator Charles Robb, a Virginia Democrat and chair of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated that U.S. relations with Taiwan were a shared “responsibility between the Congress and the executive branch. . . . Congress is by law more actively involved in the conduct of relations with Taiwan than other countries in the world.”30 Throughout Clinton’s two terms as president, Congress attempted to counter administration policy favoring the PRC. On a number of

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occasions, both the Senate and the House attempted to strengthen the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan by adding amendments to the 1979 TRA—although none of the proposed changes were ultimately enacted as law. The Murkowski Resolution and other similar resolutions at the time attempted to communicate a more pro-Taiwan stance on arms sales. The 1999 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA) was designed to change the “unofficial” relationship between the United States and Taiwan and establish a formal military relationship between the two.31 Part of the motivation for Congress’s action with respect to the TSEA, beside simply countering Clinton’s leanings toward the PRC, can be found in a 1999 Department of Defense report. The Pentagon reported that a buildup in missile capability by the PRC would soon pose a major threat to Taiwan. Hughes reports in great detail the extent of China’s buildup of ballistic missiles as a means to simultaneously threaten Taiwan and deter U.S. action in defense of Taipei.32 The Pentagon report also included a feasibility study for constructing a missile defense system for Taiwan.33 The House Committee on International Relations even proposed a nonbinding resolution in 1997 to include Taiwan in a theater missile defense system.34 The TSEA passed in the House in 2000 but was ultimately shelved and later died in the Senate.35 One anecdote provides a particularly interesting insight into the congressional constraints that administrations face in crafting U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. James Sasser, President Clinton’s ambassador to China, recalled an exchange between a member of a congressional delegation visiting China shortly after the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995–1996, wherein one of the members of Congress asked a senior Chinese official, “I just want to know . . . if you’ve accepted Jesus Christ as your personal savior.”36 Goldstein and Schriver summarize the relationship between the executive and congressional branches by stating, “Whenever the administration sought to improve relations with the PRC while Beijing’s threat to Taiwan grew, there was renewed Congressional activism and a subsequent increase in inter-branch conflict.”37 Any discussion of domestic constraints on executive-level decisions pertaining to the Taiwan crisis should include interest groups and the public. In the interest of space, I will not explain in great detail the numerous pro-Taiwan and pro-China interest groups. Suffice it to say that myriad interest groups lobby Congress and attempt to pressure the president to adopt policies favorable to their particular agendas. One group that I will highlight is referred to as the “Blue Team.”

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The Blue Team comprises congressional representatives and various interest groups that have a decidedly pro-Taiwan and anti-China stance and lobby actively to get administrations to increase U.S. support for Taiwan.38 Public opinion is rather ambivalent toward the Taiwan crisis. The American public tends to favor Taiwan over China, primarily based on the latter’s human rights problems, the Tiananmen Square massacre, and threats from China toward Taiwan. However, many Americans are willing to look past many of these issues as time passes, because of the attractiveness of China’s growing economy. As Tien and Nathan summarize, “Most Americans are repulsed by the Chinese government’s disregard for the human rights and belligerent statements toward Taiwan, but they remain attracted to China’s huge potential market.”39 It is difficult to conclude, based on the examination provided earlier, which factors influenced U.S. foreign policy toward China and Taiwan to the greatest degree. Certainly, Clinton’s own ideas about how best to deal with China and Taiwan as well as Congress’s preferences for Taiwan influenced eventual policy options enacted. The consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy, new leadership in Taiwan, and hints from these leaders with respect to Taiwan charting a new independent course, led to aggressive PRC responses. These factors in turn influenced U.S. policy. Clinton’s policy, then, was a function of numerous events, actions, and actors, and policy toward China and Taiwan moved back and forth between these two actors as various factors manifested themselves through time and space. What becomes clear is that Clinton’s policy was in many respects similar to previous administrations’ policies. They, too, were unable to chart a completely consistent course toward the Taiwan crisis because of the multiplicity of actors attempting to influence policy. As Campbell and Mitchell note, “Significant disagreements within Washington muddle the U.S. position and mitigate the policy’s effectiveness.”40 President George W. Bush As noted earlier, Clinton started the policy of “engagement” with China. Bush has continued that policy; although the Bush administration does not consider China to be a strategic partner, instead calling it a strategic competitor.41 Moreover, upon becoming president, Bush seemed to take a harder stance on security issues with respect to China. Bush felt that Clinton’s policy of strategic engagement was too soft and would lead to adventurism against Taiwan on the part of the PRC. The Bush administration also declined to reiterate the “Three Nos” policy previously stipulated by Clinton in 1998 while visiting

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China. As Yang states, “On the whole the Bush Administration preferred a containment plus engagement strategy while emphasizing the former.”42 Bush’s policy was more in line with the Republican and conservative hawks in the new administration, such as Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz. Chai posits that their views can be expressed by the following statement: “If the United States and other great democracies do not move quickly to counter Communist China’s military ambitions, America and its allies will soon suffer the devastating consequences of having ignored the dragon rising in the East.”43 In April of 2001, President Bush himself made the most provocative declaratory statement about U.S. intentions with respect to China and Taiwan in a statement made on Good Morning, America, wherein he said that the United States would do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack.44 As Chai states, “No previous U.S. president had ever made such a pronouncement.”45 Later in the day, Bush did say that the United States was committed to the one-China policy. However, Secretary of State Colin Powell had also earlier stated publicly, “Let all who doubt, from whatever perspective, be assured of one solid truth: We expect and demand a peaceful settlement, one acceptable to people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait,” and, “We will stand by Taiwan and we will provide the defense needs of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act [and] subsequent communiqués [between Washington and China].”46 The Bush administration followed up its rhetoric with policy recommendations and action. As mentioned previously, China has been increasing its ballistic missile capability opposite Taiwan as well as increasing in number and quality its naval destroyer and submarine force and electronic warfare capability.47 Rear Admiral Michael A. McDevitt (Ret.) of the Center for Naval Analysis, reviewing the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) undertaken by the new Bush administration and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, stated that [t]his translates into a call for a . . . capability that is able to defeat China’s short- and medium-range ballistic missile force, . . . deal with China’s large submarine force, . . . maintain air superiority over the maritime approaches to Japan and Taiwan, and . . . strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait by being able to hold at-risk targets of importance in China.48

Moreover, Bush also promised additional arms sales to Taiwan, including Kidd-class destroyers, diesel-electric submarines, and patrol

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planes, but not the more technologically advanced AEGIS system or the PAC-3 antimissile system.49 This $4 billion deal was the biggest arms sale to Taiwan since the 1992 $6 billion deal that included F-16s.50 Shortly after announcing this arms package to Taiwan, Bush made another change in U.S. policy, declaring that the United States would no longer undertake the annual review of Taiwan’s arms requests but would instead handle future requests on a case-by-case basis. This new procedure effectively takes this annual domestic and international political battle out of the public realm and makes it a more routine process. As Dickson states, “Taiwan will be treated just like other allies. This is an important symbolic gesture, one that does not require a change in formal policy nor contradict the time-honored ‘one China’ policy of the US government.”51 Sutter notes that in a radio address Bush even compared Taiwan to the Philippines, a formal U.S. ally.52 As Bush was moving forward with a renewed emphasis on the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, the EP-3 incident occurred. The U.S. surveillance plane collided with a Chinese jet fighter, with the Chinese pilot perishing in the collision. The plane made an emergency landing on Hainan Island and a tense standoff ensued between the United States and China. The crew was ultimately released but China refused to give up the plane. Although Bush initially refused to contact Chinese President Jiang Zemin to discuss the situation, the Bush administration eventually worked out its differences with China. As Dickson posits, The Bush Administration had demonstrated it did not desire a hostile relationship with China and was open to negotiating their disputes, despite the new administration’s concerns over China’s potential as a looming military threat and its desire to reduce the importance of China in its overall strategy toward Asia.53

To this end, the Bush administration has reduced China’s role as the key nation in U.S. East Asian policy. Instead, the administration is concentrating on key allies—above all Japan—and other important regional powers such as Russia and India. Administration officials feel they can trust Japan because it shares many of the same interests and values as the United States. The Bush administration supports Japan’s rearmament, and there is speculation that it even favors the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. There is also an effort toward encouraging India to improve its military capabilities. As George Perkovich, a South Asia expert with the Carnegie Endowment for

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International Peace, stated, “The administration says it loves India in its own right and is not trying to contain China, but when officials say this, they then mutter under the breath, ‘Of course, India is a neighbor of China and if China draws certain conclusions, this is O.K.’ ”54 The Bush administration has also worked to establish allies in Central Asia, although U.S. efforts in Central Asia are focused more on combating terrorism than on countering Chinese power. The Bush administration has also increased military training and cooperation between the United States and Taiwan, though it has done so quietly. The majority of these steps involved communications issues, including upgrading technology and establishing more secure and reliable links between the United States and Taiwan. The administration also took steps to improve Taiwan’s diplomatic status by warmly welcoming Taiwan’s president, Chen Shui-bian, to the United States. This trip included very public visits to Houston, Texas, and New York City. Chen’s warm reception and public greeting was in marked contrast to his earlier visit to Los Angeles in 2000, when the Clinton administration imposed tight restrictions on Chen’s activities.55 The events of September 11, 2001, profoundly affected U.S. foreign policy around the world. President Bush focused all of his administration’s efforts on the “war on terror,” and this new national security imperative had ramifications for the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. The Bush administration knew that it would have to garner international support for its antiterror initiatives, and China was one of the first countries to express support for the United States. Bush traveled to China in October 2001 to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit and again in February 2002, and on both occasions expressed a desire for a better working relationship with the PRC. Powell acknowledged that the 9/11 attacks helped improve relations between Beijing and Washington, noting, “Here was something that had nothing to do with contests between two competing ideologies: communism and capitalism. Here was an enemy that affected us all. And it was something that everybody could join in against.”56 China has cooperated with the United States by working to reduce arms sales to countries that the United States has accused of assisting terrorists. While some would argue that China has said more than it has done, Hickey points out that the United States and China reached an agreement wherein China “will restrict the export of missile technology to North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria—countries the US has accused of aiding terrorists.”57 China has also been willing to help the United States deal with the North Korean nuclear crisis; again,

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some would argue that China has done less than it could have to date. The United States has reciprocated primarily by resuming high-level diplomatic contacts and pushing for more economic benefits for China. The United States also did not stand in the way of Beijing acquiring the 2008 Olympics. Of course, Chinese officials have expressed a desire for the United States to move even further and address possible concessions on the Taiwan issue. However, Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, stated that “China is operating under the mistaken assumption that the war against terrorism and Iraq will get them something in return on Taiwan, that the US will make concessions on Taiwan. This won’t happen” (emphasis added by cited author).58 Yang summarizes the Bush administration’s new approach to China by stating, “Although its fundamental strategy and policy towards China remains unchanged, its concrete policy and tactics are changing.”59 Sutter argues that the war on terrorism has kept domestic debate relatively quiet, which in turn allows the Bush administration a freer hand in dealing with the complex Taiwan crisis.60 Events in Taiwan have also affected U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan under the Bush administration. For the first time in Taiwan’s history, an opposition party, the DPP, gained control of the government in 2000, as its leader Chen Shui-bian was elected president. Chen had been a longtime advocate of independence from China and his election concerned the PRC. Chen warned “that if China attacked Taiwan he would declare independence.”61 However, the Bush administration has made it clear that it would not support any declarations or movements toward independence on the part of Taiwan. For his part, Chen also stated in his May 20, 2000 inaugural address that, so long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push for the inclusion of the so-called “state-to-state” description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification.62

He has, however, refused to accept the “One China” principle.63 During the 2004 Taiwan election, Chen and the DPP arranged a public referendum condemning China’s threat of force against the island and its growing missile capability. Chen also considered adopting a new constitution to replace the original 1940s version.64 Bush responded by rebuking Chen and stating that “the comments and actions made

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by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”65 It is also probably fair to say that U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan has been less influenced by Congress than in previous administrations primarily because the Bush administration was already predisposed toward favoring Taiwan and taking a harder line against China. Moreover, conservative Republicans are generally the most vocal and avid supporters of Taiwan. Since President Bush is of the same party, there has generally been less desire to “score” political points. That is not to say that Congress has not tried to push the Bush administration even further toward Taiwan. Congressional members formed the Taiwan caucus in April 2002 to express greater support for Taiwan.66 Later that same year in October, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003, which “designates Taiwan as a ‘major non-NATO ally’. This puts Taiwan on par with Japan and South Korea.”67 Although Bush objected strongly to some of the provisions on constitutional and procedural grounds and was concerned that it could lead to some questioning about U.S. commitment to the “one China” policy, he did sign the legislation into law. The public as well as interest groups have also not forced the administration’s hands to the same degree as occurred during Clinton’s terms in office. Again, this can partly be attributed to Bush’s own policies and approach toward Taiwan and China, but it is also partly a function of the perception of Bush’s resoluteness toward dealing with the Taiwan crisis in his own way. He appears to have been able so far to take a somewhat harder line against China while simultaneously not causing Chinese leaders to complain too loudly. As Sutter concludes, the “Bush Administration does not appear to see the need to engage in extensive negotiations with Chinese officials or make concessions to the PRC in order to persuade China to change its behavior.”68 Hickey notes that “Beijing has come to the realization that bullying tactics won’t work with the Bush Administration.”69 Conversely, while the more favorable approach toward Taiwan has led to some slightly louder calls for independence on the part of some, it has not gotten out of hand to date. In fact, Hickey posits that “Taipei’s drive to upgrade relations with Washington has hit a ‘glass ceiling.’ ”70 He concludes by stating that the Bush administration has managed to improve relations with Taiwan while at the same time expanding the U.S. relationship with Beijing.71 Of course, not everyone agrees with the current administration’s approach toward the Taiwan crisis. The question becomes, then, can this delicate balance of U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan be maintained or is this simply

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a historical artifact? Furthermore, should the United States be doing something else either more pro-China or more pro-Taiwan, and what would the consequences of each be? In other words, can we arrive at any specific policy recommendations for the current administration and future administrations?

Policy Implications Campbell and Mitchell note that the United States has many core goals and objectives with respect to China and Taiwan: “the promotion of democracy, the preservation of U.S. credibility, loyalty to traditional allies and friends, the engagement and integration of an emerging power into the international system, and the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia as a whole.”72 The question is which of these goals is paramount? The answer will vary depending on whom one asks and when they are asked. Swaine argues that [Taiwan] is of considerable importance to the United States for at least three reasons. First, Washington’s policies toward Taipei directly affect the credibility of U.S. commitments to other potentially destabilizing regional or global issues. Second, U.S. support for Taiwan is closely tied to U.S. interests in nurturing newly established democracies, especially those that are threatened by authoritarian governments. And third, it is always important to demonstrate loyalty to long-time friends.73

Of course, China is also of paramount importance for several reasons. It is now the second or third largest economy in the world and trades extensively with both Taiwan and the United States. It also possesses formidable military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, and these abilities are increasing rapidly. It is also strategically located, and its economic and military power can affect U.S. regional interests positively or negatively. The United States, then, must strike a balance between China and Taiwan, because favoring one over the other usually translates to favoring one at the expense of the other. In a sense, it is a zero-sum game because each side feels that movement toward the other harms its interests. If the United States leans toward China, two things usually happen. First, China begins to demand more concessions from the United States concerning Taiwan. As discussed, this behavior became apparent following the September 11 attacks. Second, Taiwan feels its interests threatened as well and tends to start talking about going its own way, that is, independence. If the United States favors

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Taiwan, then two things usually happen. First, China becomes belligerent and usually threatens Taiwan verbally and/or physically—the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995–1996 being but one example. Second, Taiwan reads too much into U.S. overtures and again hints at independence, thinking that it can hide behind the protection of the United States. Andrew Nathan states that the United States must undertake a policy of dual deterrence toward China and Taiwan, deterring China from forcibly reunifying Taiwan while simultaneously deterring Taiwan from declaring independence or moving in that direction.74 Christensen adds that deterrence is not sufficient, especially with respect to China. He argues that the United States must also reassure China that the United States is not merely trying to hold out so it can assist Taiwan in declaring independence at a later time.75 He further argues, “A commitment to Taiwan’s freedom and democracy, but not its sovereignty, will allow the United States to strengthen Taiwan’s military security, improve military contacts with Taiwan, and enhance protection of U.S. forward-deployed forces where necessary and possible, without triggering conflict in the process.”76 Some analysts suggest that the United States should actively seek to bring the two sides to the negotiating table to work out their differences.77 However, from a national security standpoint, perhaps negotiations between the two are not desirable. It is not likely that the two will come to any agreement on unification given the differences in their governing systems, that is, neither side is inclined to change its government in order to accommodate the other. Moreover, negotiations are likely to lead to pressure for change and such change is apt to be strongly resisted by both sides. Ignoring problems or putting off a solution is often not a recommended course of action, but perhaps in this case it is the wisest. Dickson notes that, “in Washington, a common metaphor for handling the Taiwan issue is ‘kick the can’. . . . The US cannot solve the Taiwan issue on its own. The best it can hope for is to keep the can moving without a fight breaking out.”78 This strategy, of course, is easier said than done. Even now, there appear to be new strains in the U.S.-China relationship. In February 2005, a flurry of media stories reported growing tension between the United States and China. The new CIA director, Porter Gross, “warned that China’s military modernization is tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and increasing the threat to US forces in the region,” and that China was making determined military and diplomatic efforts to “counter what it sees as US efforts to contain or encircle China.”79 As expected, China condemned the

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United States, saying that the United States has “severely interfered with Chinese internal affairs and sent a false signal to the advocates of Taiwan independence.”80 Furthermore, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review will be even more pessimistic about China’s growing military power than was the 2001 review. During Bush’s February visit to Europe, he spoke with various leaders about China, because some European nations were looking to lift their arms embargos against China. The United States and Japan also met in February to discuss China’s military growth and concerns for Taiwan. Japan noted that Taiwan was a shared security concern with the United States. U.S. lawmakers even joined the fray by introducing a bill in the House of Representatives that called on the Bush administration to restore diplomatic ties with Taiwan.81 The current administration as well as future administrations will have to continue to work to assure China that the United States is opposed to Taiwan’s independence. However, the United States will also have to warn China, preferably behind the scenes, that it is also opposed to any attempts to unite Taiwan with China by force. As Grinter states, the United States needs to “make it quietly but unmistakably clear to the Chinese that if they attack Taiwan they will fight the United States.”82 The United States will also need to continue to assure Taiwan that it is committed to Taiwan’s defense but not its independence. Ultimately, the United States should “avoid the sharp swings of policy toward China that characterized the Clinton years. When the US leans too far toward Taiwan, China makes trouble, and when the US tilts too close to China, Taiwan and its friends in Congress cause problems for the administration.”83 While this strategy may not solve the problem permanently, it is the best that can be hoped for under the circumstances.

Notes 1. For a more thorough discussion of democratization, economic development, and identity change in China and Taiwan, see the previous Chapters 2, 3, and 4 in this volume, by Peter Moody, Hans Stockton, and Cal Clark, respectively. 2. I only briefly discuss U.S. foreign and national security policy toward China and Taiwan during the Cold War. For more thorough and detailed treatments see, e.g., Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.Taiwan Relations since 1942 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004); Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994); Martin L. Lasater, The Taiwan Conundrum in U.S. China Policy

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4.

5.

6. 7.

8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

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(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000); Winberg Chai, “The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations: An Interpretation,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 29 (2002): 131–147. Georgy Zinoviev, “The Taiwan Question and the History of Forming a Normative Base for American-Chinese Relations,” Far Eastern Affairs 4 (2003): 58–73. For a more detailed discussion of the TRA and its impact on the U.S.China-Taiwan triangle, see Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act,” China Quarterly 165 (2001): 147–172. In terms of arms sales, for the four years of the Carter presidency U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan averaged approximately $364.0 million, while for the eight years of the Reagan presidency U.S. FMS to Taiwan averaged $556.0 million. Wei-Chin Lee, “US Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton,” Journal of Contemporary China 9 (2000): 53–75. Ibid., 70. See also Ibid., 57; Qingmin Zhang and Eric Hyer. “US ‘Dual Track’ Policy: Arms Sales and Technology Transfer to China Mainland and Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China 10 (2001): 89–105. Goldstein and Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” 154; and Hickey, United States-Taiwan Security Ties, 35. Chai, “The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations,” 136; Lee, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan,” 64–65; Zhang and Hyer, “U.S. ‘Dual Track’ Policy,” 99–100. Zhang and Hyer, “U.S. ‘Dual Track’ Policy,” 101. Lee, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan,” 64; Zhang and Hyer, “U.S. ‘Dual Track’ Policy,” 99; see also Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003). Andrew J. Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy,” Washington Quarterly 23 (Spring 2000): 93; see also Kurt M. Campbell and Derek J. Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?” Foreign Affairs 80 (July/August 2001): 14–25. A. Cooper Drury, “Ambiguity and US Foreign Policy on ChinaTaiwan Relations,” in Uk Heo and Shale A. Horowitz, eds., Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 56. Drury first uses the metaphor of the duck paddling in the water, wherein the surface is calm but beneath it is chaotic, to describe U.S. policy in the region. He then revises his assessment by stating, “Instead of evolution or even the duck paddling in the water, US policy toward China and Taiwan has taken a path more like a rabbit escaping a predator—a series of quick shifts, sharp turns, and backtracking.” Drury, “Ambiguity and US Foreign Policy on China-Taiwan Relations,” 63.

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15. For a more thorough discussion of U.S. China and Taiwan policy during the Clinton administration, see David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); and Ramon H. Myers, Michael C. Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh, eds., Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 16. Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 381; quoted in Chai, “The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations,” 136. 17. Ted Osius, “Legacy of the Clinton-Gore Administration’s China Policy,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 28 (Fall 2001): 125–134. 18. Zhang and Hyer, “U.S. ‘Dual Track’ Policy,” 101. 19. For a more thorough discussion of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995, see Suisheng Zhao, Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999). 20. James C. Hsiung, “The U.S. ‘All-Out Engagement’ China Policy and Its Implications for Beijing and Taipei,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 26 (Spring 1999): 30. 21. Chai, “The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations,” 137; Goldstein and Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” 160; Hsiung, “The U.S. ‘All-Out Engagement’ China Policy,” 34; Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy,” 96; see also Gang Lin and Xiaobo Hu, “US-China Relations and the Taiwan Factor,” Journal of Contemporary China 8 (1999): 545–555. 22. Goldstein and Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” 165. 23. Osius, “Legacy of the Clinton-Gore Administration’s China Policy,” 125; see also Chai, “The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations,” 137. 24. Osius, “Legacy of the Clinton-Gore Administration’s China Policy,” 129. 25. Bush, At Cross Purposes, 244. 26. Ibid., 233. 27. Ibid., 6. The DPP was the opposition party to the established and ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party in Taiwan at the time and had previously stated in various venues its preference for independence and desire to pursue a path separate from Mainland China. 28. I present and discuss some of the major actions taken by Congress to strengthen U.S. relations with Taiwan in opposition to the executive branch. For a more detailed examination of congressional activities, especially with respect to the TRA, please see, e.g., Goldstein and Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship.” 29. Lee, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan,” 67. 30. “Hearing of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee,” Federal News Service, September 27, 1994; quoted in Goldstein and Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” 156. 31. Zhang and Hyer, “U.S. ‘Dual Track’ Policy,” 101–102. See Goldstein and Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” 163–169, for a more thorough discussion of the TSEA deliberations and details.

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32. James H. Hughes, “China’s Ballistic Missile Threat,” Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 27 (Spring 2002): 3–22. 33. Goldstein and Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” 161. 34. Lee, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan,” 69. 35. Bruce J. Dickson, “New Presidents Adjust Old Policies: US-Taiwan Relations under Chen and Bush,” Journal of Contemporary China 11 (2002): 645–656. 36. Robert M. Hathaway, “The Lingering Legacy of Tiananmen: Grand Strategy and Domestic Politics,” Foreign Affairs 82 (September/ October 2003): 162. 37. Goldstein and Schriver, “An Uncertain Relationship,” 165. 38. Jiemian Yang, “Sino-US and Cross-Strait Relations under the Post‘11 September’ Strategic Settings,” Journal of Contemporary China 11 (2002): 657–672. 39. Charles Tien and James A. Nathan, “The Polls-Trends: American Ambivalence Toward China,” Public Opinion Quarterly 65 (Spring 2001): 131. 40. Campbell and Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?” 22. 41. Colin Powell, Secretary of State was careful to note, however, that “China is not an enemy and our challenge is to keep it that way”; Yang, “Sino-US and Cross-Strait Relations,” 661. 42. Yang, “Sino-US and Cross-Strait Relations,” 658. 43. Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II, Red Dragon Rising (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999): 19; quoted in Chai, “The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations,” 138. 44. Campbell and Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?” 22. 45. Chai, “The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations,” 138. 46. Charles Snyder, “Powell ‘demands’ Cross-Strait Peace,” Taipei Times, January 19, 2001, http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/01/19 (accessed February 28, 2005). 47. Lawrence E. Grinter, “Handling the Taiwan Issue: Bush Administration Policy toward Beijing and Taipei,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 29 (Spring 2002): 3–15. 48. Rear Adm. Michael A. McDevitt (Ret.), “The Quadrennial Defense Review and East Asia,” PacNet Newsletter no. 43 (October 26, 2001), http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0143.htm (accessed April 8, 2002). Quoted in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?” Washington Quarterly 25 (Summer 2002): 23. 49. Dickson, “New Presidents Adjust Old Policies,” 649; Grinter, “Handling the Taiwan Issue,” 9. 50. Yang, “Sino-US and Cross-Strait Relations,” 665. See also Robert Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy toward Beijing and Taipei,” Journal of Contemporary China 12 (August 2003): 477–492; and Robert Sutter, US Policy toward China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998). 51. Dickson, “New Presidents Adjust Old Policies,” 651.

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52. Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy toward Beijing and Taipei,” 482. 53. Dickson, “New Presidents Adjust Old Policies,” 651–652. 54. Celia W. Dugger, “Wider Military Ties with India Offer U.S. Diplomatic Leverage,” New York Times, June 10, 2002, 1A; quoted in Chai, “The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations,” 144. 55. Dickson, “New Presidents Adjust Old Policies,” 652. 56. James Dao, “Closer Ties with China may Help US on Iraq,” October 4, 2002, in Taiwan Security Research, http://www.taiwansecurity.org (accessed April 5, 2003). Quoted in Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “Continuity and Change: The Administration of George W. Bush and US Policy Toward Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China 13 (August 2004): 473. 57. Hickey, “Continuity and Change,” 474. 58. Ibid., 474. 59. Yang, “Sino-US and Cross-Strait Relations,” 669. 60. Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy toward Beijing and Taipei,” 481. 61. Grinter, “Handling the Taiwan Issue,” 7. 62. Ibid., 7–8. 63. Chai, “The Taiwan Factor in U.S.-China Relations,” 142. 64. Michael D. Swaine, “Trouble in Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs 83 (March/April 2004): 39–49. 65. Ibid., 39. 66. Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy toward Beijing and Taipei,” 481. 67. Hickey, “Continuity and Change,” 475. 68. Sutter, “Bush Administration Policy toward Beijing and Taipei,” 490. 69. Hickey, “Continuity and Change,” 478. 70. Ibid., 474. 71. Ibid., 478. 72. Campbell and Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?” 14. 73. Swaine, “Trouble in Taiwan,” 43. 74. Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy,” 102–106. 75. Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” Washington Quarterly 25 (Autumn 2002): 7–21. 76. Ibid., 20. See also Grinter, “Handling the Taiwan Issue,” 12; Swaine, “Trouble in Taiwan,” 46. 77. David Shambaugh, “Facing Reality in China Policy,” Foreign Affairs 80 (January/February 2001), 50–64. 78. Dickson, “New Presidents Adjust Old Policies,” 656. 79. Edward Alden, “CIA Issues Warning on China’s Military Efforts,” Financial Times, February 16, 2005, http://www.ft.com (accessed February 28, 2005). 80. “China Slams U.S. Remarks on Military,” Yahoo!News, February 18, 2005, http://news.yahoo.com (accessed February 28, 2005).

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81. Patrick Goodenough, “Dump Outdated, Dishonest ‘One China’ Policy, Lawmaker Urges,” CNSNews, February 18, 2005, http://www.CNSNews.com (accessed February 28, 2005). 82. Grinter, “Handling the Taiwan Issue,” 12. 83. Dickson, “New Presidents Adjust Old Policies,” 656.

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Chapter 6

Rising China versus Estranged Taiwan 1 Shale Horowitz and A l e x a n d e r C . Ta n

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n Taiwan, since the early 1990s, Taiwanese identity has rapidly supplanted Chinese identity. This has pushed all the main political parties to adopt policies favorable to the new identity, and brought the Democratic Progressive Party to power. Rising Taiwanese identity has also affected military strategies. It has accelerated the cross-Strait arms race by alarming Beijing, which in turn has led to an offsetting buildup in Taiwan. It has also strengthened Taiwan’s will to retain her independence and, thereby, has led to newer, more unconventional defense strategies. One such policy is to enhance the ideological legitimacy of Taiwanese nationalism in the United States and Japan. Another policy is to embrace economic integration with China—a development hitherto seen as threatening. A third policy is to deter a Chinese attack by credibly committing Taiwan and its allies to a more dogged fight to preserve Taiwanese independence, even under conditions where such a fight seems hopeless. Finally, a strong Taiwanese identity makes it more likely that China’s increasing conventional military predominance will ultimately call forth a Taiwanese nuclear deterrent.

National Identity and Political Development A distinctly Taiwanese national identity unfolded rapidly following Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s. This process can be seen

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in many areas of Taiwan’s culture and politics. Consider the changes over time in the familiar polls asking whether people identify themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both. From 1992 to 2004, those that consider themselves to be only Taiwanese rose from 17.3 percent in 1992, to around 25 percent in the mid-1990s, to around 40 percent from 1999 to the present; whereas those that self-identify exclusively as Chinese fell from about 26 percent in the early 1990s, to around 20 percent in the mid-1990s, to a bit over 10 percent in late 2001, to 6.3 percent in June 2004.2 Since the early 1990s, there has been a corresponding decline in the fortunes of Taiwan’s traditional ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT, which continued to rule Taiwan after being driven from the Mainland in 1949, long presided over an authoritarian regime committed to reunification with China under a noncommunist regime. As the United States restored relations with Beijing, and Beijing modernized under Deng Xiaoping, the KMT sought to bolster its legitimacy. It admitted ethnic Taiwanese into a ruling elite hitherto dominated by Mainlander refugees and eventually democratized the political system. Meanwhile, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—the opposition party most closely associated with a distinct Taiwanese identity and enduring Taiwanese independence—grew into a formidable rival. Those identifying as supporters of the DPP rose from 2.7 percent in June 1992 and 5.4 percent in December 1992, to a range of 10.5–13.6 percent in the mid-1990s, to over 20 percent in 1998, to a range of 23.5–26.6 percent since 2000. With slight downward blips in between, those who identify with the KMT have been close to 35 percent in June 1992, June 1995, December 1996, and December 1999. Since the KMT-derived People First Party (PFP) formed in 2000, the KMT and the PFP together have attracted around 30 percent—with the PFP declining steadily from a high of 17.5 percent in December 2000, to 10 percent in June 2004.3 Table 6.1 shows DPP, KMT, PFP, and other major party vote shares in legislative and presidential elections since 1992.4 The DPP’s moderation under Chen Shui-bian’s leadership has been evident in the decision not to seek a formal declaration of independence from China and in its market-oriented economic policies. Combined with the KMT’s Mainlander origins and authoritarian history, this made inevitable an eventual change in government under Taiwanese democracy. The DPP’s rise was accelerated by the split in the KMT leadership, with James Soong defecting to form the PFP. The split reflected the KMT’s more general failure to continue along

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Table 6.1 Presidential and legislative Yuan elections since 1992: percentage vote shares of main parties

2004 presidential election 2001 legislative Yuan elections 2000 presidential election 1998 legislative Yuan elections 1996 presidential election 1995 legislative Yuan elections 1992 legislative Yuan elections

DPP

KMT

50.1 36.6 39.3 29.6 21.1 33.2 31.0

49.9 31.3 23.1 46.4 54.0 46.1 53.2

PFP

New Party

20.3 36.8

TSU

7.8 7.1 14.9 13.0

Note: Figures for Legislative Yuan elections are for district seats rather than proportional seats. KMT’s 53.2 percent vote share for 1992 Legislative Yuan elections excludes 7.7 percent of votes going to KMT candidates running without KMT support. The New Party was strongly pan-Chinese in orientation, while the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) is strongly Taiwanese. Source: Election Study Center, Results of Recent Elections (Taipei, Taiwan: National Chengchi University, 2004). http://www2.nccu.edu.tw/~s00/eng/data/data.htm (accessed September 5, 2005). National Endowment for Democracy, Consolidating Democracy in Taiwan (Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy, 1996). http://www.ned.org/forum/reports/ taiwan.html (accessed September 5, 2005).

the “Taiwanization” path blazed by its longtime leader, Lee Teng-hui. Since Chen’s presidential election victory in 2000, the DPP has shown itself to be a responsible party in power, earning a large increment in electoral support. To avoid marginalization, the KMT and PFP are thus being forced to continue to redefine themselves as Taiwanese parties. Younger KMT and PFP leaders will have to embrace Taiwanese identity even more convincingly. This will allow them to transcend the Islander/Mainlander ethnic cleavage and increase their credibility as defenders of Taiwan’s independence.5

China’s Military Buildup China’s rapid economic growth has belatedly fueled a massive military buildup, which seems likely to continue indefinitely. Although growing resources are funding a broad-based modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the cutting edge of the new procurement, organization, and planning efforts seeks the capacity to impose unification in Taiwan through a rapid and decisive attack. This would shatter Taiwan’s air and sea defenses and command and control mechanisms and establish by air and sea a large invasion force on Taiwan. Such a fait accompli would deter U.S. intervention and demoralize the Taiwanese will to resist, leading Taipei to accept a strongly policed “one country,

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two systems” outcome. The most fearsome evidence of these preparations is the 700–800 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) based in the coastal provinces along the Taiwan Strait. To this can be added the huge procurement and joint production contracts with Russia, which are equipping China’s air force with advanced fighters and building a modern fleet of submarines and surface ships. There are also increasingly large formations of elite troops trained for special operations, air assault, and amphibious assault. The most prominent remaining weak point is sealift capacity to transport and supply the large numbers of troops needed for a conventional amphibious invasion of Taiwan.6 To counter the military buildup underway across the Strait, Taiwan has sought to improve its air, sea, and land defense capabilities, and to strengthen political and military relations with the United States and Japan. The highest military priority is missile and air defense. Missile attacks and large numbers of modern Russian fighter planes threaten to overwhelm Taiwanese antimissile and antiaircraft defenses, disrupt command and control, render air fields inoperative, and thereby establish the Mainland air superiority crucial to a successful crossStrait invasion. This threat is being met by improving Taiwan’s missile and antiaircraft defenses and building more secure and redundant air bases.7 It is even more effectively countered by the threat of American, and possibly, Japanese intervention. New submarine and antisubmarine capabilities seek to counter blockade and invasion threats, but again the threat of U.S. intervention is far more effective. The basic problem is that, as China’s military buildup continues from its current, relatively limited level, Taiwan seems likely to become increasingly dependent on the threat of U.S. intervention. In addition, Taiwan’s military spending is only about 3 percent of GDP, a relatively low figure that has not moved much in response to China’s build-up.

Taiwanese Nationalism, Nontraditional Strategies of Defense, and the Future The use of Taiwanese nationalism by the DPP is usually discussed as a strategy to win elections, which has the secondary, negative, consequence of provoking Beijing and thereby increasing the risk of war.8 However, it is doubtful that Beijing is more likely to go to war because of provocative political statements from Taiwan, rather than when a war seems winnable at a reasonable cost. More fundamentally, Taiwanese nationalism adds valuable new dimensions to Taiwan’s defense capabilities. At least since Clausewitz, analysts have attributed great importance to a people’s will to fight for the objectives of a military victory.

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The popular will solidifies the will of the leaders and improves the cohesion and staying power of the war effort.9 Beijing and Taipei seem to understand this phenomenon better than Western elites. Thus, Beijing loudly describes all high-profile measures to appeal to Taiwanese nationalism—such as ongoing efforts to amend Taiwan’s constitution and the 2004 referendum drawing attention to Beijing’s cross-Strait missile buildup—as tantamount to a slow-moving formal declaration of independence. In contrast, DPP and other like-minded Taiwanese elites view appeals to Taiwanese identity as the key survival asset of their nation—as the main means by which their people can be inspired to shoulder an increasingly heavy and daunting burden of defense. Beijing and Taipei both understand that, if Beijing is able to impose an implicit veto on appeals to Taiwanese nationalism, it will be as significant a step toward unification on Beijing’s terms as a veto on Taiwan’s military defense upgrades. The gradual replacement of KMT-style Chinese nationalism with DPP-style Taiwan nationalism has indeed solidified the public’s determination to preserve Taiwan’s independence. This in turn has provided political space for the DPP to develop new strategies of defense. To begin with, the DPP has maintained the traditional strategies of recent KMT governments. One is to ratchet up military procurement in response to Beijing’s buildup. The other, perhaps more surprising strategy, is to keep open a long-term option for peaceful, voluntary unification. This is now couched, not as unifying “one China,” but, following Lee Teng-hui’s lead, in terms of building closer relations between two states through a gradual process of economic, cultural, and EU-style political integration.10 Interestingly, Taiwan nationalism has also fed through into three more specific strategy changes that have increased Taiwan’s deterrent power. First, it has helped make Taiwan a more attractive and worthy ally in the United States and Japan, particularly among their mass publics. Taiwan is now not just a progressive democracy, but also an embattled nation. Second, the DPP’s recent economic liberalization vis-à-vis the Mainland can be seen as having a military strategy dimension. Apart from the domestic political benefits that it offers in forestalling an issue that might be seized upon by the KMT or PFP, it is a deft jujitsu move against Beijing. It denies Beijing a carrot that could have been used to influence Taiwan’s domestic politics, while increasing Beijing’s own dependence on Taiwan and the Taiwanese to fuel China’s economic growth. Since sustaining such growth is the main political survival strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the economic “embrace” is a valuable deterrent against any use of force

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against Taiwan. With respect to Beijing’s Taiwan policy-making, growing economic bonds and related cultural and demographic ties offer the most credible path toward peaceful unification. In Taiwan, the DPP has a greater political capacity to reconcile such an integration process with Taiwanese identity and national interests. Third, Taiwanization clouds the prospects for an “easy kill.” It makes it less likely that Beijing could compel surrender with a brief demonstration of overwhelming force and more likely that there would be bitter resistance long after it seems that an invasion is succeeding. Over the medium and longer runs, though, Beijing’s steadily increasing military power will make a military solution increasingly attractive. In the 1970s, Taiwan agreed to set aside the option of building a nuclear deterrent in exchange for an informal American offer of protection. This bargain will tend to unravel if the United States appears to be losing the will to face down Beijing. It is true that Chen Shui-bian appears ideologically averse to building a nuclear deterrent. If Beijing’s threat increases in step with the Taiwanization process, however, democratic politics will soon produce leaders without such ideological limitations.

The CCP Regime’s Taiwan Options: Inward and Outward Strategies The CCP’s “inward” strategy puts regime survival and legitimacy, and, therefore, economic development, first. Taiwan and the Taiwanese have already made significant contributions to this development, and the current huge and rapidly increasing levels of interdependence make future contributions even more promising.11 Given an inward orientation, the issue of unification with the “renegade province” is valuable as a diversionary means of identifying the CCP regime with traditional Chinese nationalism. In this strategic setting, war with Taiwan is unlikely in the near future, because it would trade a favorable economic and political environment for one fraught with serious risks. This is not to say that the Taiwanese fruit will not be plucked if a sufficiently cheap, safe means becomes available. The alternative “outward” strategy would prioritize seizing control over Taiwan. This involves ramping up military preparations to establish air superiority and to conduct an invasion by air and sea. In parallel, an effort would be made to cajole and intimidate the United States into backing away from Taiwan’s defense. Such a strategy has significant economic, military, and even internal political costs. Any use of force would cause a significant short-term economic shock, as well as slow the average rate of growth in the longer run. Whether intended

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as such or not, the use of military force would be perceived as a broader effort to project Chinese influence in the region and to supplant the United States as the dominant military power. This would galvanize a counter-coalition and produce a particularly significant reaction toward rearmament in Japan. It might even lead Japan to cross the nuclear threshold. Finally, the greatest long-term costs would result from the need to use massive force in subduing Taiwan. On Taiwan, this would lead to a Tibet-like situation—a permanently hostile population, against which heavy-handed repression and huge Mainland migrations would have to be used to maintain order and deter future secession. On the Mainland, any initial nationalist euphoria would be supplanted by the spectacle of a Tiananmen Square–like incident on a massive scale. When added to the likely economic difficulties, this might create a critical mass of internal political opposition. If the invasion were to fail, moreover, the internal backlash could be devastating. To sufficiently determined Mainland nationalists, however, these costs and risks might be acceptable. Beijing’s current strategy appears closer to the inward one. Since the costs of preparing as opposed to implementing an outward strategy are relatively low, in truth, there is a kind of mixed strategy underway. The underlying logic is that an outward strategy could conceivably succeed on the cheap. If the United States can be forced or persuaded to abandon Taiwan, the Taiwanese might become demoralized by the prospect of a bloody and losing war and acquiesce in the economic consolations of “one country, two systems.” This is clearly the best outcome for Beijing. The risk to Beijing is that the associated rhetoric and military threats will bolster Taiwanese and U.S. determination. There is evidence that this has already happened.12 To this extent, half-hearted but full-throated pursuit of the outward strategy has reduced its chances of success. It would have been wiser to pursue the strategy quietly, without creating the appearance of an immanent military threat. On the other hand, this would involve foregoing most of the internal, diversionary benefits to political legitimacy. That these benefits have not been forgone indicates that the inward strategy is, at least currently, the operative one. The main task for the United States and Taiwan is to make sure that Beijing’s cost-benefit calculations continue to favor the inward over the outward strategy.

The United States: Best Responses How can the United States raise the expected costs and lower the expected benefits of the outward strategy? There are many complementary means. The most effective is to clearly commit to come to

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Taiwan’s defense militarily. President Clinton moved in this direction by sending U.S. naval forces into the region in response to China’s threats and missile tests during the run-up to the 1995–1996 Taiwanese elections. More recently, President George W. Bush has openly and unambiguously committed the U.S. to protect Taiwan from a Mainland invasion. At least for the present, then, the United States has dropped the central plank of the traditional diplomatic policy of strategic ambiguity.13 Formally, strategic ambiguity sought to maintain the geopolitical and diplomatic status quo by avoiding unconditional commitments, whether to defend Taiwan or to push for reunification. Its proponents calculate that the threat of abandonment prevents Taiwan from declaring independence and thus unduly provoking and alienating Beijing, and that, at the same time, support for the status quo deters Beijing from launching a risky military attack. Informally, strategic ambiguity also keeps open the option of abandoning Taiwan unconditionally, if and when the expected cost of confronting Beijing becomes too high. As long as the anti-Soviet alliance with Beijing existed, and Beijing did not have a credible threat of invading Taiwan, strategic ambiguity served U.S. interests well. In this context, the strategy mainly functioned to deter Taiwan from taking actions—such as declaring formal independence—that would endanger tactical cooperation with Beijing and push her back toward the USSR. However, the policy makes less sense after the collapse of the USSR, especially as an increasing military threat from Beijing makes Taiwan highly dependent on the United States. With the balance of power moving so adversely, there is little risk of Taiwan alienating the United States by declaring formal independence. More importantly, ambiguity may lead Beijing to miscalculate and wrongly assume that the United States will not come to Taiwan’s defense—as Moscow miscalculated in Korea.14 In the new, post–cold war geopolitical setting, Presidents Clinton and Bush have felt compelled to dispel the ambiguity to prevent Beijing from miscalculating. Such deterrence efforts would be strengthened by informally integrating Taiwan into U.S. regional defense planning, including air and missile defense arrangements. This would involve greater coordination of military planning and related procurement and training efforts. The United States can also signal that an assault on Taiwan will produce a massive and adverse geopolitical and economic policy reaction. It should be clear that attacking Taiwan will produce an antiChinese containment coalition and associated regional rearmament,

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with Japan emerging in a leading role alongside the United States. Related policies would be to threaten to recognize Taiwanese selfdetermination rights in the international diplomatic arena and to provide safe havens and financial support abroad for both Taiwanese and Mainland political and civil society organizations. Just as important, it should be made clear that an invasion will lead to broader restrictions on dual-use, high-technology exports and investments, and heightened conditionality in trade relations. These restrictions could also be calibrated to strike at industries and businesses with stronger CCP ties.15 At the same time, the United States must also seek to keep the inward strategy attractive. This means maintaining current diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic carrots in relations with Beijing, and supporting peaceful reunification after a long-term process of economic, cultural, and demographic integration. The United States should continue to rule out a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence, which would badly damage Beijing’s internal legitimacy. Even in Taiwan, there is a realization that such a loss of face could interact with internal power struggles to make Beijing lash out.16 This might begin with limited measures such as a trade embargo or blockade, but there would be a serious risk of escalation. However, as China’s military buildup raises the likely costs to the United States of a war across the Strait, Clinton- and Bush-style ad hoc commitments to defend Taiwan will increasingly lose credibility. Here it is largely up to the Taiwanese to show the United States that that they are worth defending, and to take on as much of the defense burden as possible.

The DPP: Comparative Advantages in Offering Nontraditional Best Responses Building on the traditional conventional defense efforts and diplomacy of previous KMT governments, the DPP government under President Chen has begun to develop a number of nontraditional strategies that grow naturally out of a stronger Taiwanese identity. Two of these– which might be called “snarling dog” and “embattled nation”—raise the expected costs of Beijing’s outward strategy. Another one— “economic jujitsu”—increases the benefits of the inward strategy. To increase the expected costs of the outward strategy, Taiwan will continue to enhance her own military defense capabilities. Even against a foe like Beijing, a small but technologically advanced country can accomplish a great deal. Apart from the conventional air, missile, sea, and point-of-invasion defense efforts already discussed, there

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are significant supplementary options. One is to enhance capabilities to strike at Mainland shipping, ports, and other strategic points. Such efforts cannot last long, however, if an invasion of Taiwan itself succeeds, and hence are more important in deterring Beijing from attempting to strangle Taiwan with a blockade. These traditional conventional defense strategies can be supplemented by a nontraditional, “snarling dog” posture. This would force Beijing to fight bloody, protracted battles in Taiwan’s cities and mountains, with all of the attendant long-term economic and political costs. To mount such an effort, Taiwan’s local defense capabilities would have to become more decentralized and well prepared—more secure against decapitation and loss of supply routes. For such preparations to be effective and credible, it is obviously necessary that the Taiwanese people have a strong and growing will to pay heavy costs to sustain their political autonomy. Here the DPP’s Taiwanization efforts have military strategy implications that commonly escape those that view them purely in terms of leadership ideology, electioneering, and internal politics. If Beijing believes that there will be no surrender once an invasion bridgehead is secured, but that this would have to be followed up by difficult and lengthy low-intensity struggles to secure Taipei, other large cities, and the main mountain ranges—and then by intensive policing of a permanently embittered, hostile population—it will seem that much more attractive to leave unification as a politically valuable ideal. Taiwanization is strategically valuable in two other respects. First, it is one prong in a larger effort to craft a favorable image as an embattled nation—above all, to secure the loyalty of the United States and attract greater support in Japan. This effort involves sending an ideological message through a variety of contact channels. Taiwan must appear to be an ally worth protecting on the level of principle as well as realpolitik. With the market-oriented turn of the CCP and the end of the Cold War, democratization was an important means of increasing Taiwan’s ideological legitimacy. Taiwanization amplifies this legitimacy. Taiwan is then seen to be fighting not just for individual freedom and democracy, but also to maintain a distinct national identity. Just as Taiwan nationalism has growing resonance in Taiwan itself, national self-determination movements—particularly when they are democratically and responsibly led—enjoy great prestige internationally. For example, Taiwan’s apparently hopeless efforts to reenter UN organizations are a natural platform from which to trumpet these appeals. Beijing is unlikely ever to allow Taiwan to enjoy formal membership and recognition. Nevertheless, the effort publicizes the

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unique diplomatic discrimination imposed by “bullying” Beijing, and in the process informs the outside world of Taiwan’s accomplishments and character. This general ideological message is propagated through outreach efforts tailored to strategic target groups in the United States—Congress, the Democratic and Republican Parties, journalists, academics and students, multinational businesses, Chinese American communities, tourists, and so forth. Greater efforts along these lines are likely in the United States and Japan.17 Taiwanization does not just help to drive up the expected costs of the outward strategy. It is also makes Beijing’s inward strategy more appealing. An important means of doing so is the DPP’s decision to dismantle most of the long-standing restrictions on economic ties with the Mainland, and thereby accept the associated explosion in cross-Strait trade, investment, business, and personal travel. Given Beijing’s unification ambitions, such integration would be inviting a “shotgun wedding,” if it were not offset by a strong and growing Taiwanese political identity. In general, Western elites have not understood this point, because they tend to exaggerate the power of economic incentives relative to those based on national identities and other cultural ideals and values. Canadians would not think of sacrificing their independence to U.S. demands, no matter how dependent Canada becomes on the U.S. economy. Similarly, the DPP provided the confidence and credibility to push forward economic integration without prejudice to Taiwan’s distinct national and political identity. This “economic jujitsu” move maximizes the economic value of the status quo—probably pushing it well beyond the level that would exist under “one country, two systems”—and thereby raises the expected economic costs of using force against Taiwan. The status quo’s benefits are even greater in light of the DPP’s decision not to declare formal independence and instead to leave open the option of peaceful unification through a long-term integration process. In time, cultural and demographic integration will follow galloping economic integration. EU-like institutional bonds can then be initiated and gradually intensified. With peace, goodwill, and time, it is hard to see how this process will end short of de facto unification. Openness to such a partnership makes it possible to reconcile the inward strategy with Chinese nationalism. This scenario must be made clear not only to the CCP leadership but also to the Mainland masses. Mainland public opinion can be made to see the advantages of peaceful, gradual unification based on respect for human rights and democracy. This would further constrain Beijing from adopting the outward strategy. The DPP governments have so far done a poor job of

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addressing the Mainland public. This has allowed the CPP government to don the mantle of Chinese nationalism and reap significant diversionary gains in claiming legitimacy. Taiwanese governments must make a more concerted effort to sell an alternative vision of Chinese nationalism—as a democratic federation of Chinese peoples. It must hammer away at the point that Mainland democratic reform will make war impossible and integration inevitable.

The Future: Formal Alliance or Nuclear Surge Again, there is an obvious weakness with the potential to unravel the current array of Taiwanese and U.S. responses: China’s increasing relative economic and military power. The will of the United States to defend Taiwan is liable to weaken as the expected cost of fighting Beijing escalates. In the face of threats from Beijing, doves in the United States can be expected to argue for an accommodation. Let Beijing swallow Taiwan, they will argue, in the hope that this will satisfy Beijing and more certainly avoid a cataclysmic war. Although the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 commits the U.S. government to help Taiwan provide for her defense, it is up to individual U.S. presidents to decide on the use of military force. Currently, there is no formal defensive alliance that obligates the U.S. government to come to Taiwan’s defense.18 Projecting current trends forward, it seems just a matter of time before the United States has a president without much inclination to take great risks to secure Taiwan’s autonomy. If U.S. support erodes, then so too may the will of the Taiwanese people to resist in a hopeless military struggle. The more Taiwan looks to have to fight alone, and the more Taiwanese become demoralized, the more Beijing will be tempted to threaten and use force to compel unification. Such loss of will in response to Beijing’s growing relative power is by no means guaranteed and may even be unlikely. It seems particularly unlikely that the Taiwanese themselves will lose their will to fight. U.S. disengagement alone, however, will make the use of force a real option for Beijing. There are two answers to this problem. One is for the United States to commit to a formal defensive alliance with Taiwan, preferably with the participation of Japan. This would tie the hands of U.S. presidents, and make the expected costs of an attack on Taiwan prohibitive. Is there enough popular support in America to allow this to happen? Would such a commitment, which would alienate Mainland public opinion and bolster the legitimacy of the CCP regime, be in the national interest of the United States? Most

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American leaders and citizens seem likely to answer these questions in the negative. This leaves the nuclear option. When the Carter administration looked like it might be withdrawing from traditional U.S. defense commitments, there was a surge of secret nuclear programs among America’s East Asian allies. Taiwan had such a program. Reports are that it was abandoned under U.S. pressure, in exchange for an informal security guarantee.19 However, if the United States withdraws its support, an increasingly “Taiwanese” Taiwan will not be bound by this agreement. If there is evidence that U.S. commitment is faltering, there will be strong political pressure in Taiwan to build a fast-surge nuclear weapons capability—of the kind that may already exist in Japan. This would allow Taiwan to assemble a sufficiently fearsome nuclear strike capability within a time frame appropriate to a developing invasion threat. On September 25, 2004, responding to opposition protests against plans for a huge new round of conventional weapons purchases from the United States, DPP Premier Yu Shyi-kun stated, “The best scenario will see a ‘balance of terror’ being maintained across the Taiwan Strait so that national security is safeguarded.” He added, “If you fire one hundred missiles at me, I should be able to fire at least fifty at you. If you launch an attack on . . . Kaohsiung, I should be able to launch a counterattack on Shanghai.”20 Although Yu did not explicitly refer to a nuclear capability, the use of the doomsday term “balance of terror” would seem to imply the possibility. Certainly there is no immediate need to pursue the nuclear option. It would unnecessarily provoke the United States—when the United States is pressuring rogue states such as Iran and North Korea to eliminate their own nuclear programs and when the United States has furnished Taiwan with a strong near-term defense guarantee. If and when the United States seems ready to abandon her, however, Taiwan will see a stark choice between building a reliable, nuclear-based deterrent, and the alternatives of humiliating submission or hopeless struggle. From a strategic point of view, a U.S. defense commitment and a nuclear strike capability are substitutes: both remove any uncertainty that may exist in Beijing about whether the inward strategy is to be preferred to the outward one. In the absence of either a U.S. defense commitment or a Taiwanese nuclear capability, the relative attractiveness of the outward strategy will increase considerably and the risk of war will grow. In the China-Taiwan conflict, there seem to be three possible long-term outcomes. One is a nuclearized Taiwan, resulting from a

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conventional balance of power inexorably shifting in Beijing’s favor. Another is unification, probably achieved by a Mainland invasion and occupation of Taiwan rather than by Taiwan’s peaceful capitulation. This would be most likely to occur as the U.S. security guarantee declines, but before Taiwan’s nuclear deterrent is ready. A final option is a formal or informal agreement on peaceful, EU-style integration, in which Beijing’s military buildup is ratcheted back, Taiwan commits to maintaining the political status quo, and the process of economic, cultural, and demographic integration is given time to develop. Eventually, it would be desirable for such a peaceful integration deal to be formalized. The United States should make it clear to Beijing that it will not cooperate in making the second, probably violent, option more feasible—for example, by aggressively forestalling a Taiwanese nuclear program while simultaneously withdrawing its own military protection. If Beijing sees that pursuing the violent absorption option will almost certainly lead to a nuclearized, unbound Taiwan, it will begin to see the merits in peaceful integration. Greater efforts must also be made to present these options directly to the Mainland public, which can decide for itself what best serves the interests of the Chinese nation. This will further constrain Beijing from considering war.

Notes 1. An earlier version of this essay was published as “The Strategic Logic of Taiwanization,” World Affairs 168 (Fall 2005): 87–95. Permission to reprint is gratefully acknowledged. Shale Horowitz thanks the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s Center for International Education for travel research support. Alexander Tan received research support from University of Canterbury Grant #U6572. 2. See Election Study Center, Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese (Taipei: National Chengchi University, 2004), http://www2.nccu. edu.tw/~s00/eng/data/data.htm (accessed December 3, 2005). Around 45 percent considered themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese throughout the period, while those giving no response fell from 11.0 percent in June 1992 to 4.9 percent in June 2004. 3. See Election Study Center, Party Identification of Taiwanese (Taipei: National Chengchi University, 2004), http://www2.nccu.edu.tw/ ~ s00/eng/data/data.htm (accessed December 3, 2005). 4. In a postelection “Roundtable on Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Election” organized in Taipei on March 21, 2004, by the Chinese Association of Political Science, Hsu Yung-ming of the Academia Sinica spoke of a significant “political realignment” favoring the DPP. He attributed the

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5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

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DPP’s gains to the rising power of Taiwanese identity and the associated credibility problems of the KMT and PFP. Hsu noted particularly large shifts in favor of the DPP among older and less educated voters, who had traditionally tended to favor the KMT or PFP on the basis of perceived technical competence. The status quo, in which Taiwan has all the functional attributes of an independent state, but has not formally declared itself to be independent of China, will be referred to here as one of “independence” or “autonomy.” “Formal independence” is here taken to involve the additional, formal declaration. U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2004 Report to Congress of the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington, DC: U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2004), http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/ 2004/04annual_report.pdf (accessed September 5, 2005); United States Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex. pdf (accessed September 5, 2005); Republic of China, Taiwan Ministry of National Defense, National Defense White Paper (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, 2003), http://163.29.3.66/whitepaper. pdf (accessed September 5, 2003). Republic of China Ministry of National Defense. For a recent example, see Hugo Restall, “Chen Shui-bian’s Last Hurrah,” Far Eastern Economic Review 169 (January/February 2006): 34–37. Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982); Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). Shui-bian Chen, Second Inaugural Address: Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan (Taipei, Taiwan: Mainland Affairs Council, 2004), http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/macpolicy/chen930520e.pdf (accessed February 4, 2005). From 1991 through May 2004, cumulative Taiwanese investment on the mainland is estimated at $37 billion. The $2.7 billion invested in January–May 2004 alone is a 60 percent increase over the same period of 2003. In January–May 2004, indirect trade (imports and exports) with China is estimated at $23.8 billion, a 37.9 percent increase over January–May 2003. Mainland Affairs Council, Preliminary Statistics of Cross-Strait Economic Relations (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 2004), http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/csexchan/economic/ 9305e.pdf (accessed December 3, 2005). Beijing’s missile tests and general saber-rattling of 1995-1996 appear to have been a particularly strong impetus to Taiwanese identity and nationalism. See Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait:

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13. 14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

S h a l e H o r ow i t z a n d A l e x a n d e r C . T a n Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), and the data series cited in note 1. Ralph Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999). The offsetting, “beneficial” miscalculation would be Beijing wrongly expecting the United States to aid Taiwan, and, therefore, holding back an attack that would otherwise have been made. Of course, there is a risk that such a bluff would be called damaging the reputation of the United States as an ally. On balance, the expected benefit of any beneficial miscalculation would seem to be lower than the expected cost of any adverse, Korea-style miscalculation. Such a response could be partly, but not wholly, undermined by EU free-riding. Certainly, the more closed EU market does not offer a substitute for the U.S. or Japanese markets. This is why the Taiwanese public, despite its increasingly strong Taiwanese identity, has continued overwhelmingly to favor maintaining the political status quo over declaring or seeking formal independence. The Taiwanese are unique among East Asian peoples in their favorable attitudes toward Japan and the Japanese. The heavy flow of Japanese tourists through Taiwan has created a natural constituency for Taiwanese outreach efforts. The United States terminated its bilateral defense treaty with Taiwan on January 1, 1981, two years after cutting off formal diplomatic relations. John F. Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999). Chieh-yu Lin, “No Balance of Terror in the Works, MND [Ministry of National Defense] Says,” Taipei Times, October 1, 2004, http:// www.taipeitimes.com (accessed March 5, 2005).

Chapter 7

North Korea in C risis: Regime, Identity, and Strategy Te r e n c e R o e h r i g

W

hen World War II came to a close, the United States and the Soviet Union made the decision to divide Korea following Japan’s surrender.1 This decision to separate the peninsula physically severed the common identity held by the Korean people for over 1,200 years. Since that time, the North and South have headed in different directions. While retaining some elements of a common historical and cultural identity, they have pursued radically different political and economic paths. Throughout much of the post–World War II period, Pyongyang’s relations with Seoul were adversarial, as both hoped to impose their vision of Korean identity on each other. At times this struggle erupted into violence, the most severe occurring in 1950 with North Korea’s effort to use force to reunify the peninsula. However, for most of the time, both sides have stared across the border at each other, maintaining a watchful eye and insisting that reunification be done on its own terms. The end of the Cold War brought significant changes for North Korea’s identity and security strategy. It lost the political and economic support of two important allies, and faced a democratic and economically prosperous South along with a formidable U.S.Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance. In addition, North Korea confronted monumental economic problems, which brought into question the core ideology of the state, and more serious security concerns, which have contributed to the current crisis over its nuclear

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weapons ambitions. Finally, in July 1994, the central figure of North Korean identity, Kim Il Sung, died, generating many questions about the succession of his son, Kim Jong Il. In dramatic fashion, all of these circumstances challenged the North Korean conception of identity and posed threats to the very existence of the regime. The challenges and threats have had a significant impact on North-South relations and Pyongyang’s security strategy. This chapter examines the changing nature of North Korean identity, and how this has affected its security strategy and struggle for survival.

Defining the North Korean Identity For most of Korea’s long history, the North and South shared the same identity. Often a tumultuous one, the peninsula was subjected to numerous invasions by regional powers and from 1910 to 1945, endured a brutal occupation by Japan. During that time, Japanese authorities attempted to eradicate Korean identity by forcing the adoption of Japanese names, speaking the Japanese language, and worshiping the religion of Shinto. Despite these efforts, Koreans clung fiercely to their culture. Coming out of the Japanese occupation after World War II, Koreans believed that their hopes for an independent state would now be fulfilled. Instead, Korean unity was torn apart when U.S. and Soviet officials divided the peninsula following the surrender of Japanese forces. Despite early intentions to reunite the regions, Cold War hostility cemented the division and in 1948, separate states were created, divided by the thirty-eighth parallel. The division became even more intractable with the Korean War (1950–1953). In spite of a common history, language, and culture, the two Korean states fought a devastating conflict that claimed the lives of close to 2.5 million Koreans and left both to develop separate identities for a Korean state. An important starting point for examining North Korean identity is the man responsible for creating it: Kim Il Sung. Kim was born in 1912 in Pyongyang. At a young age, Kim moved with his parents to Manchuria, where he lived until the early 1930s. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, and Kim joined a band of guerrillas to fight against the Japanese. Later, in World War II, Kim fled across the Manchurian border to join Soviet forces. After the war, the Soviets helped install Kim to lead the country, and on September 9, 1948, authorities officially proclaimed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). From 1945 until his death, Kim Il Sung ruled the DPRK with an iron fist, fashioning an identity through the force of his own will and

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the power of the state. He created a police state that some scholars have described as a combination of a Confucian kingdom based on strict hierarchical order and a totalitarian socialist state that demands absolute obedience and loyalty.2 The regime tolerated no dissent and authorities sent thousands to labor camps for “reeducation” in an effort to ensure the proper understanding of North Korean identity. Kim Il Sung implemented a state-planning model to control the economy by determining prices, allocating resources, and setting production goals. In addition, he focused on a Stalinist version of production that emphasized heavy industry. Initially, the economy did quite well, outperforming its counterpart to the south. However, by the 1970s, the North Korean economy began to slip, due to poor economic performance, the inefficiencies of a communist system, and poor decisions, particularly some by Kim Il Sung. Central to North Korean identity is the ideology of juche, which translates roughly as self-reliance. Touted as an original creation of Kim Il Sung and enshrined in Article 3 of the constitution, juche is a combination of Korean nationalism and a Confucian version of socialism.3 Reinforced incessantly in citizens from an early age, the doctrine allows no deviation from official orthodoxy.4 Juche first appeared in 1955 and later, in the 1960s, the ideology became more fully developed in the North’s effort to distance itself from the Soviet Union and China. Juche is a declaration of independence and self-reliance, a theme Kim Il Sung believed resonated with all people who were victims of colonization. However, juche is also a statement of Korean nationalism celebrating Korean culture and traditions.5 In the tradition of Confucian hierarchy, juche stresses the importance of the leader. Oh and Hassig note, “Society is viewed as one big family headed by a wise, stern, benevolent father to whom unconditional respect and gratitude are owed.”6 All North Koreans must give their absolute loyalty and obedience for the care provided by the Great Leader. To buttress juche, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have utilized important symbols in Korean history. According to state propaganda, both Kims are descendents of Tan’gun, the mythical founder of the Korean nation and have inherited his “spirit of independence.” Although Kim Jong Il was born in Russia in 1942, state authorities maintain that his birth occurred at Paektusan, the highest mountain on the peninsula and the birthplace of Tan’gun.7 The development of juche is a response to several factors. First, it is a reaction to Korea’s history of foreign domination by China, Japan, the Mongols, and now the U.S. “imperialists” in the South. Juche is a rallying cry for Koreans and all oppressed peoples to live in greater

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freedom and independence. In addition, juche is an implicit criticism of South Korea, its ongoing relationship with the United States, and the continuing presence of U.S. troops on the peninsula. Second, juche is a call for unity among the North Korean people and a quasi-religious doctrine that requires enthusiastic support from all citizens. People should come together in this large national family, led by the benevolent leader and party. Only then will the nation throw off the chains of colonialism.8 Finally, juche is a proclamation of independence from its allies, China and the Soviet Union. Despite signing security agreements with Moscow and Beijing in July 1961, Kim Il Sung began to question his allies’ reliability, in part due to the growing Sino-Soviet rift9 and the Soviet retreat during the Cuban missile crisis. Kim Il Sung also became a target of Red Guard criticism during China’s cultural revolution. According to Dae-Sook Suh, “Kim was tired of revisionism in the Soviet Union as well as dogmatism in China, and he wanted to chart his own self-reliant course for North Korea.”10 To support his authority, Kim Il Sung created a personality cult that elevated his exploits, particularly those as an anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter. Authorities either exaggerated or fabricated his deeds, creating a god-like persona that embodied the socialist revolution in Korea. Over 30,000 monuments were constructed to honor his accomplishments, the largest built in 1972 to celebrate his sixtieth birthday. As Bruce Cumings noted, “No leader in the twentieth century has stamped a nation with his presence more than Kim.”11 As Kim Il Sung intended, it is difficult to separate the identity of North Korea from his own. The propaganda efforts continued under Kim Jong Il, labeled the “Dear Leader” by the state-run media. Despite a relatively undistinguished record as a college student, Kim Jong Il was credited with authoring over 1,400 items on juche and other subjects.12 A February 2005 national seminar extolled the achievements of Kim Jong Il, “who has led the struggle for the defense of socialism and the building of a great prosperous powerful nation to victory.” Several officials at the seminar noted “the undying feats Kim Jong Il has performed by ushering in a new era of Juche revolution, praising his history of revolutionary leadership as a history of victory and glory.”13

Securing the Identity: North Korean Security Strategy For most of his rule, Kim Il Sung intended to define the identity of the entire peninsula through reunification on his terms and through

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force if necessary. Along the way, his strategies changed, but the goal of reunification and his desire to dictate the Korean identity drove the DPRK’s security policy. Soon after his installation by Soviet authorities, Kim spent several frustrating years maneuvering and waiting to bring about the anticipated reunification of North and South. In 1949, after months of border clashes and efforts to destabilize the South, Kim Il Sung decided it was time to take more direct action. Making several trips to Moscow and Beijing, Kim lobbied Stalin and Mao for approval to invade South Korea, believing he could conquer the South before the United States could respond. On January 30, Kim finally convinced Stalin to approve the invasion and later obtained Mao’s assent as well.14 On June 25, 1950, Kim Il Sung initiated the “Fatherland Liberation War,” sending his forces across the border in an effort to bring about reunification. Kim underestimated U.S. resolve and only Chinese intervention saved his regime.15 After the war, Kim faced the arduous task of rebuilding a war-torn country and quashing the opposition within the party that followed the disastrous consequences of going to war. By the 1960s, Kim had succeeded in rebuilding North Korea and eliminating any internal opposition. Yet, despite the security agreements with Beijing and Moscow, Kim’s allies made it clear they had little interest in starting another war in Korea. In conjunction with juche, the DPRK shifted to a more self-reliant defense posture, which focused on a strategy of subversion and destabilization to bring down the South Korean government. Kim wanted to ensure that North Korea could pursue its goal of dictating Korean identity without being dependent on the Soviet Union or China. In 1962, Kim Il Sung announced a shift away from a conventional war strategy toward a Maoist version of people’s war. A little over a year later, Kim refined the strategy to focus on three stages needed to reunify Korea. First, North Korea had to rebuild its own “revolutionary base” by educating and training its own people with the proper doctrine and strengthening the economic and military power of the state. Second, Kim called for encouraging the revolutionary forces within South Korea and organizing the masses with a vanguard party in the South. Finally, international forces must be strengthened through the pursuit of friendly relations with other third world states resisting U.S. imperialism.16 Though Kim’s intentions were uncertain, it is likely this shift indicated his reluctance to challenge directly the U.S.-ROK alliance and U.S. military power, while maintaining hope for eventual reunification under his terms. This way, North Korea could increase pressure gradually and generate the desired revolutionary movement within the South,

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but allow room for a retreat should the United States or South Korea respond effectively. North Korean efforts to conduct a “people’s war” and destabilize the South reached a crescendo in 1967 and 1968, with over 220 infiltrators killed on missions in the south. The most serious incident occurred in the January 1968 commando raid that attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee at his residence. Two days later, North Korea seized the USS Pueblo, and in November 1968, a 120-man team infiltrated the ROK’s east coast. Soon after, Kim Il Sung backed away from such confrontational behavior, in part because the costs were becoming increasingly high, and he could not afford to keep losing soldiers at this rate. Moreover, it is likely that Kim hoped to force a U.S. withdrawal from Korea, given the ever-increasing U.S. entanglement in Vietnam. Since the United States was not showing any sign of leaving, and efforts to destabilize the ROK only intensified Southern fear and hatred for the North Korean regime, Kim decided it was time to back off. By 1969, Kim Il Sung adopted a more conciliatory approach that included a series of talks with the South to lessen tension and work toward peaceful reunification. The negotiations produced an accord in 1972 that addressed reunification efforts for both Koreas, though the agreement was never implemented. While Kim appeared to be holding out an olive branch, it was likely he continued to aim for reunification on his terms, with his conception of Korea’s identity taking hold throughout the peninsula. During these years, North Korean relations with its allies continued to be rocky. Kim had already been wary of Soviet support, accusing them of “arrogance,” “xenophobia,” and “big-power chauvinism.”17 He also began to doubt the dependability of support from China. With the thaw in Sino-U.S. relations during the Nixon administration, Pyongyang realized that its interests in reunification would be subordinate to China’s interests in rapprochement.18 As a result, North Korea would have to rely further on juche in steering an independent course both at home and abroad. To address this deterioration in its security environment and exert its independence, North Korea embarked on a substantial buildup of its conventional forces throughout the 1970s. By 1980, Pyongyang had increases of 20–30 percent in almost every category of its force structure, including military personnel, tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRL), armored personnel carriers, and special forces. With Seoul located only 30 miles from the border, increased artillery and MRL forces in forward-deployed positions gave Pyongyang the ability

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to shell the southern capital from positions along the DMZ. North Korean forces had the advantage of tactical surprise and a credible threat of punishment should South Korea or the United States instigate a conflict on the peninsula. The increase in North Korean capabilities became sufficiently troublesome that the United States conducted a complete review of its estimates and concluded in 1982 that the military balance between the DPRK and the ROK had shifted in the North’s favor. The Pentagon report concluded that “U.S. air and ground forces in the South produce a rough overall balance,” but that North Korea’s buildup merited “close watching to ensure that their short-term advantages do not tempt them into aggression and war.”19 While Seoul and Washington viewed the buildup as indicating possible aggressive intentions, it is not clear what Kim Il Sung’s motives were. Was the North demonstrating again, its willingness to pursue reunification by force and dictate Korean identity under its leadership? Several actions pointed to a willingness to turn up the pressure on the South. In 1974, a North Korean assassin attempted to kill South Korean President Park, and ROK officials discovered the first of four infiltration tunnels dug by the North under the DMZ. Finally, in 1980, Kim stated: We must do away with the colonial fascist rule of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges in South Korea and reunify the country, and thus end the distress and tragedy of our fellow countrymen and carve out a bright future for our nation. If reunification does not come quickly and division continues, our nation will remain bisected forever, and the South Korean people will be unable to cast off the yoke of colonial slavery.20

While the North’s military buildup and forward deployments may have appeared aggressive, there is another possible explanation. Fearing the growing military power of South Korea and the United States, the North’s actions may have been a defensive strategy in an effort to protect its own political identity. U.S. and ROK forces are similarly forward deployed, requiring the DPRK to defend the forward area between Pyongyang and the DMZ to prevent any deep invasion into its territory. U.S. nuclear weapons, present in Korea until 1991, further complicated North Korean calculations, requiring Pyongyang to match U.S.-ROK deployments with a conventional buildup. Finally, by the 1970s, the South Korean economy began to overtake the North’s, allowing Seoul to spend considerable amounts on

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military preparedness. While South Korea was allocating close to 6 percent of its GNP for defense, North Korea was spending almost 20 percent, despite the support it received from Moscow and Beijing. As North Korea lost confidence in its allies, felt further threatened by U.S.-ROK military capabilities, and saw ROK economic progress, Pyongyang concluded it must assume a self-reliant posture in economic, political, and security matters, making juche the cornerstone of North Korean policy.

The End of the Cold War The collapse of the Soviet Union and the years that followed brought tremendous change to North Korea, its security environment, and its quest for defining Korean identity. After years of adherence to juche and the goal of imposing this ideology on the entire peninsula, Pyongyang has had to focus on regime survival and maintaining Kim Jong Il’s hold on power. Rather than seek to impose its conception of Korean identity on the South, the North has now been struggling to ensure the identity the Kims worked so hard to construct. The past 10–15 years have been an unsettling and dangerous time for the DPRK, as it has battled forces that threaten to destroy the regime. The first of these post–Cold War challenges was the loss of Soviet and Chinese economic aid, a blow that had serious consequences for an already struggling economy. With an economic system that was failing, further complications occurred when the DPRK experienced several years of severe famine, with estimates of those who perished as high as 2 to 3 million.21 Despite increased output in recent years, North Korea is likely to remain dependent on outside food sources for the foreseeable future unless it implements significant economic reform. In spite of Chinese efforts to prod the DPRK in this direction, Kim Jong Il has employed relatively minor reform efforts that so far have produced few results. Reliance on international food aid poses a serious challenge for the continued viability of juche and the veracity of the regime’s claims regarding its superior ideology and conception of Korean identity. Pyongyang was also greatly disappointed with the loss of political and military support given by its former protectors. China has continued its 1961 security treaty, but made it clear that no support will be forthcoming should Pyongyang initiate a conflict with the South. Given past wariness of Chinese support, it is likely that North Korea places little stock in the Chinese security guarantee. Russia went even further when Boris Yeltsin declared the Soviet-North Korean treaty

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had little value, and in 1995, indicated his desire to renegotiate the pact. The new agreement, signed in 2000 by Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Il, contained only a vague security clause, and Moscow made it equally clear that Russian assistance would arrive only if North Korea were attacked.22 Even more disconcerting for Pyongyang was the growing relationship between its former allies and South Korea. Both China and Russia realized they could no longer continue to shun the South. Both moved toward a “two Koreas” policy that built relationships with both Pyongyang and Seoul. In 1992, Russia and South Korea normalized relations while trade ties between them increased significantly.23 According to one scholar, North Korea now had “very little to offer Moscow. A democratic Russia . . . sees no ideological value in links with an unreformed Stalinist regime, which it regards as a lingering relic from its own tragic past.”24 North Korea’s response was predictable. Russia “is all but in the camp of forces hostile to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”25 China has also attempted to balance ties with South Korea while maintaining relations with the North. Beijing established normal relations in 1992 and its economic and political contacts with Seoul grew rapidly. According to another scholar, “The ROK’s contribution to China’s economic development goals is seen as far more important than the ideological ties binding Pyongyang and Beijing, even at a time when the Chinese leadership sees all socialist states as under siege.”26 Thus, even the shared political and historical identity as communist states could not outweigh Chinese economic interests. However, the Chinese retain a great interest in events in North Korea, fearing the dangers of a collapse or change in the DPRK regime. These worries include a mass wave of North Korean refugees, conflict on its border, and a unified Korea run from Seoul and allied to the United States. To prevent these catastrophes, China helps maintain the North Korean regime through trade, opposition to UN/U.S. sanctions, and diplomatic support. Beijing has tried to nudge Pyongyang toward economic reform with less reliance on ideology to determine economic decisions. However, North Korean behavior is often frustrating and mysterious to Chinese leaders. In the end, for Pyongyang, the actions of China and Russia were a betrayal of the decades of solidarity it shared with its communist allies, and indicated that little significant economic and military support would be forthcoming. The end of the Cold War also brought an escalation of the nuclear confrontation with the United States. North Korea signed the nuclear

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nonproliferation treaty in 1985, pledging to forgo the development of nuclear weapons. While Pyongyang allowed some inspections in the early 1990s, officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency were subsequently refused access to other sites. With only limited inspections there was fear that the DPRK was diverting nuclear material for use in a weapon. By the time the Clinton administration came into office, the crisis had reached a fever pitch. While the United States alternated between offering incentives and threatening sanctions, North Korea responded that sanctions would be viewed as an act of war, and threatened that “Seoul will turn into a sea of fire.”27 A collision course was averted in June 1994 when former President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang and received Kim Il Sung’s tentative agreement to a plan to end the crisis. President Clinton had considered air strikes to take out the North’s nuclear facilities and Secretary of Defense William Perry instructed the air force to develop a plan for such an action. However, Clinton decided against it, fearing an air strike “was highly likely to start a general war.”28 After months of talks, interrupted by Kim’s death in July, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework in October 1994.29 Though this issue appeared settled, numerous implementation problems arose, including extensive delays in several provisions of the accord. Sometime in 1998, North Korea embarked on a secret, parallel nuclear effort. In 2002, the United States confronted the DPRK with this violation of the 1994 agreement, leading to its unraveling and the current dilemma of an apparent North Korean nuclear weapons program.30

A Changing Identity? The post–Cold War period has had a profound impact on North Korean identity and the security strategy devised to protect and advance it. First, on July 8, 1994, North Korean identity suffered a severe blow with the death of its architect, Kim Il Sung. By the time of Kim’s death, the “management” of juche and the state had been turned over to his son and designated successor, Kim Jong Il. However, many questions remained regarding not only political succession but also the direction of the state, its ideology, and the possibility of economic and political reform. Second, with the end of the Cold War and the deteriorating DPRK economy, it became increasingly clear that Pyongyang would be unable to push reunification and fulfill the goal of imposing its conception of Korean identity on the entire peninsula. The continued

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strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance and the ROK’s military capabilities, juxtaposed with the loss of Russian and Chinese economic and political support, meant that any North Korean effort to bring about reunification by force would likely mean the end of its regime. Moreover, with the fall of so many communist states, North Korea’s ideology was discredited internationally and the “community” of fellow Marxist-Leninist states was greatly reduced, further increasing North Korea’s sense of isolation. Finally, the end of the Cold War challenged the economic foundations of juche, the core of North Korean identity. The ability to prosper in an international, globalized economy through self-reliance was a dubious proposition from the start. The DPRK was able to sustain the independence of juche so long as Russian and Chinese subsidies continued, a clear contradiction to the ideology. The loss of aid combined with the famines of the 1990s made North Korea increasingly dependent on outside food aid, making juche more difficult to sustain in all but name. Many North Korean analysts began to predict the demise of the DPRK under the weight of its economic troubles. However, the regime has shown a remarkable ability to “muddle through.”31 In an effort to address some of the economic difficulties, North Korea instituted a series of reform measures in 2002 that by themselves were relatively modest and in the end, ineffective. Yet as an indication of North Korean willingness to introduce change, they may have been significant steps. These reform efforts included introducing wage and price reforms on food, electricity, and housing to align them closer to market levels. Food rationing ended along with subsidies for some failing industries. Pyongyang also opened an “autonomous capitalist investment zone” on its Northwest border with China that will be free from government control. Other measures included creation of the Ranjin-Sonbong special economic zone, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project in cooperation with Hyundai, and preparing to reestablish road and rail links with the South for the industrial zone at Kaesong.32 Overall, these efforts have failed to produce the desired results, due largely to poor infrastructure to support the ventures, high inflation, outdated technology, and continued U.S. economic sanctions.33 The North has also sought to move beyond the self-reliance of juche by opening up diplomatic relations with over 140 countries and participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum. In June 2000, North and South Korea held a historic summit meeting between Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung, which was the high point of South Korean

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President Kim’s “sunshine policy” to improve relations with the North.34 This policy of engagement continues under current South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun. Economic problems and attempts to address this through reforms have posed additional troubles for the leadership’s efforts to maintain its identity. The worsening economic situation has no doubt raised questions in the minds of North Korean citizens regarding the wisdom of juche as an economic philosophy. Though discontent within the North is tempered greatly by a repressive police state and the public’s lack of knowledge about how bad conditions are, there is some evidence that the public is becoming exceedingly unhappy with its standard of living. Yet, while the economic problems are a challenge to the regime’s manufactured identity, so too are economic reforms and efforts to change the development plan that is at the core of the regime’s identity. It is clear that the North Korean economy will need significant reform measures to have some hope of generating prosperity and stability. Yet, those reforms will run contrary to years of indoctrination concerning the economic principles of a Marxist-Leninist state. The government will need to explain why this is so and why, after enduring years of deprivation, it is now time to alter or abandon the juche revolution. This will take some work, yet if the changes can generate some relatively quick results, this may compensate for the seeming abandonment of this core economic tenet of North Korean identity. Moreover, economic reform raises the possibility that the regime will lose control over the economy and society, endangering Kim Jong Il’s hold on political power. North Korea’s nightmare scenario is the political meltdown that occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, Kim Jong Il will likely walk a careful line that implements gradual economic reform, without pulling out the economic cornerstone of North Korea’s identity that justifies his hold on power.

Implications for North Korean Security For most of its existence, North Korea defined its identity through juche and its determination to impose that identity on the entire peninsula. In the past 10–15 years, North Korean leaders have been forced to reappraise the feasibility of reunification on their terms. Moreover, given the threats, both internal and external, to its security, Pyongyang has had to reorient its strategy from one focused on expanding its ideological influence on the South to one of regime survival. Its deteriorating economy, lack of allies, and rocky relationship

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with the George W. Bush administration, have placed North Korea in a battle for its existence. There are several security dimensions to the focus of regime survival. First, in 1998, North Korean leadership moved toward a “military first” posture that ensured the armed forces received top priority for national resources, despite the catastrophic economic conditions. These efforts have included building up its conventional military capabilities and pursuing nuclear weapons in an effort to give the DPRK a credible threat of punishment to deter U.S.-ROK aggression. In addition, “military first” ensures that Kim Jong Il retains the support of the armed forces, a crucial player in the DPRK power structure. Second, as time passed and it became exceedingly difficult for North Korea to match the conventional force improvements of the South, Pyongyang began to put more effort into acquiring nuclear weapons. The 1994 Agreed Framework appeared to put a cap on this ambition, but North Korea opted to pursue a clandestine nuclear program based on enriched uranium, an alternative to the plutoniumbased program frozen under the 1994 agreement. North Korea’s motivation for cheating remains a matter of debate. For some, the revelation of a covert nuclear weapons program was proof that Pyongyang could not be trusted and that it was determined to acquire nuclear weapons. However, others have argued that this alternative program may have been developed as a hedge against what Pyongyang viewed as backsliding by the United States in fulfilling its share of the Agreed Framework. In either case, possibly around 1998 and with the help of Pakistan, the North embarked on another route to nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapons capability remains an important source of leverage for North Korea, but one it must be careful not to overplay. On the one hand, North Korea views nuclear weapons as a deterrent to U.S. efforts for regime change in the North, despite U.S. assurances it has no intention of invading. With the January 2002 designation of the “axis of evil,” the war in Iraq, Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice’s inclusion of North Korea in the “outposts of tyranny,” Bush’s statements labeling Kim Jong Il a tyrant, and recent U.S. efforts to address DPRK counterfeiting, North Korean leaders still fear they might be targets for regime change or efforts to bring about the collapse of the regime. Possessing nuclear weapons greatly complicates any military action the United States might take and provides the North with increased bargaining power. The United States has provided greater assurance that it has no intention to invade the North and that benefits will follow a verifiable agreement to give up its nuclear ambitions. This has improved the

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negotiating climate at times between Washington and Pyongyang. However, both sides have little trust in each other, and the DPRK is unlikely to give up its nuclear capability until it receives what it believes is a credible security guarantee. More importantly, North Korea will insist on a commitment from Washington to move toward normal relations including the elimination of economic sanctions and removal of its name from the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. Deletion from the terrorism list would give North Korea access to funds from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which is currently blocked under U.S. law. On the other hand, ending its nuclear weapons program is a crucial lever for the North to acquire badly needed economic aid. Washington and others in the current round of Six-Party Talks— China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea—have indicated that significant amounts of aid would follow North Korea’s renunciation of nuclear weapons and a verifiable agreement to ensure that claim. Security concerns remain paramount for North Korea, but significantly more economic aid will flow northward when the nuclear weapons impasse is settled. However, Pyongyang must be careful, because pushing too hard on the security dimensions and appearing overly menacing may make it more difficult for the United States and Japan to sell any major aid package at home.

Conclusion The years since the end of the Cold War have brought many challenges to North Korean security, threatening to extinguish the regime and its identity built in the years since its creation in 1948. These challenges have emanated from internal sources, such as a failing economy and the cruelties of nature, and from external sources, including the loss of support from its major allies and an increasingly hostile relationship with the United States. The Korean people, in both North and South, share important parts of their identity, and reunification remains an important goal. However, it is becoming unlikely that reunification, and hence, any sort of merging of their identities will happen on the North’s terms—as the North Korean regime battles simply to survive and maintain its own identity. Economic and political reform, even if it is done slowly, presents its own problems. To reform successfully, Kim Jong Il must transform an ideological identity that has been ingrained in the people through years of constant “education” and propaganda. The ideology is relatively inflexible and quasi-religious, making alterations awkward and difficult.

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Moving ahead with reform will be difficult and dangerous. Economic reform opens the door for greater contact with and influence from the international community, while gradually loosening the regime’s grip on society and the economy. There have been some hopeful signs that North Korea is interested in embarking on gradual economic reforms, yet it will likely remain a slow process that ensures that Kim Jong Il maintains his hold on power. Pressure from North Korean citizens could be a source for change. While there are some signs of discontent, the government remains firmly in control of any public dissent. Some North Koreans “vote with their feet.” But this is difficult, since the best route is across the border into China, and Beijing returns captured refugees to a horrible fate in the DPRK. Even if one is successful, remaining family members may face imprisonment or death. It is not clear how long North Korea will be able to sustain this path, but so far, it has shown an uncanny ability to survive despite daunting problems. Some have called for encouraging a collapse of the regime, but this will not occur easily and will bring a host of unsettling possibilities, including instability, violence, and refugee problems. Thus, Pyongyang is likely to continue on the path of incremental, perhaps glacial, reform for some time. The nuclear weapons issue is crucial. Until this is resolved, North Korea is unlikely to receive the extensive aid it needs to address some of its pressing economic problems. All of the countries involved are united in the view that North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, and will push Pyongyang in that direction, despite disagreement over the methods to do so. North Korea will continue to receive assistance from China and South Korea, and others, particularly food aid, either out of humanitarian concerns or to prevent a destabilizing and costly North Korean collapse. Much larger amounts of aid and investment, to support North Korea’s gradual reform program, will not arrive until the nuclear weapons issue is settled. Certainly, the increased aid will need to be coupled with greater economic reform to have any chance of sustaining North Korean economic development plans.

Notes 1. The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. 2. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2000), 9. 3. Ibid., 15–19.

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4. See Chapter 1, in this volume, “Democratization and National Identity in China–Taiwan and Korean Conflicts,” by Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, and Alexander Tan. 5. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 403–405. See also Oh and Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass, 12–40. 6. Oh and Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass, 22. 7. Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Taugherlini, eds., Nationalism and the Construction of the Korean Identity (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies Berkeley, 1998), 3. 8. See Oh and Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass, 15–21, and Gavan McCormick, Target North Korea (New York: Nation Books, 2004), 68. 9. See Chapter 2, in this volume, “The Evolution of China’s National Interest: Implications for Taiwan,” by Peter R. Moody, Jr. 10. Dae-Sook Suh, “Kim Jong Il and New Leadership in North Korea,” in Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee, eds., North Korea after Kim Il Sung (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 19. 11. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, 396. 12. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, “North Korea’s Nuclear Politics,” Current History (September 2004): 274. 13. “National Seminar on Kim Jong Il’s Songun Revolutionary Feats Held,” Korean Central News Agency, February 10, 2005, http://www. kcna.co.jp (accessed February 15, 2005). 14. Kathryn Weathersby, “To Attack, or Not Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” Cold War International History Project, http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?-topic_id=14-09&fuseaction= library.document&id=169 (accessed August 29, 2004). 15. See Chapter 2, in this volume, “The Evolution of China’s National Interest: Implications for Taiwan,” by Peter R. Moody, Jr. 16. Byung Chul Koh, “Unification Policy and North-South Relations,” in Robert A. Scalapino and Jun-Yop Kim, eds., North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1983), 274–275. 17. Ralph N. Clough, “The Soviet Union and the Two Koreas,” in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 178, and Donald S. Zagoria, “North Korea: Between Moscow and Beijing,” in Robert A. Scalapino and Jun-Yop Kim, eds., North Korea Today, 351. 18. Norman Levin, “Global Détente and North Korea’s Strategic Relations,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 2 (Summer 1990): 38–40. 19. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981): 89. 20. Korean Central News Agency, October 10, 1980, as quoted in Koh, “Unification Policy and North-South Relations,” 265.

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21. Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 215. 22. Seung-Ho Joo, “The New Friendship Treaty between Moscow and Pyongyang,” Comparative Strategy 20 (2001): 467–481. 23. Ibid., 478. 24. Paul Marantz, “Moscow and East Asia: New Realities and New Policies,” in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the PostCold War Era (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 35. 25. As quoted in Herbert J. Ellison, “Russia, Korea, and Northeast Asia,” in Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, eds., Korea’s Future and the Great Powers (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), 177. 26. Paul H.B. Godwin, “China’s Asian Policy in the 1990s: Adjusting to the Post-Cold War Environment,” in Sheldon W. Simon, ed., East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, 132. 27. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Will Urge U.N. to Plan Sanctions for North Korea,” New York Times, March 20, 1994, A1. 28. Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 122–123. 29. For more detailed discussions of the Agreed Framework, see Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004); Victor Gilinsky, Nuclear Blackmail: The 1994 U.S.Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Agreed Framework on North Korea’s Nuclear Program (Stanford: Stanford University Press); Terence Roehrig, “One Rogue State Crisis at a Time!” World Affairs 165 (Spring 2003): 155–178; and Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame. 30. For more detailed discussions of the North Korean nuclear problem, see Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Terence Roehrig, From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003); James M. Minnich, The Denuclearization of North Korea (Bloomington, IN: 1st Books, 2002); and James T. Laney and Jason T. Shaplen, “How to Deal With North Korea,” Foreign Affairs 82 (March/April 2003): 16–30; and Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995). 31. Marcus Noland, “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through,” Foreign Affairs 76 (July/August 1997): 105–118. 32. Howard W. French, “North Korea Adding a Pinch of Capitalism to Its Economy,” New York Times, August 9, 2002, A1, A9, and “North Korea to Let Capitalism Loose in Investment Zone,” New York Times, September 25, 2002, A3.

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33. “Desperate Straits,” Economist 367, May 3, 2003, 26. 34. See Terence Roehrig, “Assessing North Korean Behavior: The June 2000 Summit, the Bush Administration, and Beyond,” 67–88, and Uk Heo and Chong-Min Hyun, “The ‘Sunshine’ Policy Revisited: An Analysis of South Korea’s Policy toward North Korea,” 89–103, in Uk Heo and Shale A. Horowitz, eds., Conflict in Asia: Korea, ChinaTaiwan, and India-Pakistan (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 2003).

Chapter 8

South Korea’ s R esponse: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy U k H e o a n d J u n g - Ye o p Wo o

T

he Korean Peninsula is one of the few regions in the world that still live with Cold War–style military confrontation. North Korea adopted the “military first” policy and concentrated its resources on the military. In addition, they have developed nuclear and missile programs, which have been a primary source of security volatility in the region. In response, South Korea has maintained high levels of defense spending. U.S. troops have remained in South Korea since the Korean War, although the number of troops has declined.1 During the Cold War, South Korea and the United States maintained a close relationship. However, there seems to be a disagreement between the two countries concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. For instance, Unification Minister Chung Dong-Young, in an interview with an Internet media outlet on August 17, 2005, said, “North Korea must have the right to use nuclear energy peacefully for agricultural, medical and power-generation purposes.” His comments came as a surprise, because U.S. President George W. Bush reiterated his opposition to a peaceful North Korean nuclear program just a day before.2 After the six-party diplomatic talks ended, U.S. Representative Christopher Hill complained about South Korea. According to him, Russia and Japan supported the United States in opposing North Korean acquisition of light water nuclear reactors,

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ostensibly for energy purposes. But South Korea supported North Korea’s position. Part of the reason for the disagreement comes from differences in national interests and perceptions of North Korea. South Korea is primarily concerned about the possibility of another war on the peninsula, which leads her to be more tolerant of North Korea’s provocative foreign policy behaviors and the brinkmanship strategy on the nuclear issue. On the other hand, Washington’s main concern seems to be to prevent North Korea from transferring nuclear weapons and technology to other rogue states and terrorists. Furthermore, the current Seoul government does not seem to consider North Korea the main threat. Instead, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration views North Korea from the compatriot nationalism perspective. This is based on the idea that Seoul should be more sympathetic to North Korea, even against Washington’s will, on the grounds that North Koreans are ethnically the same. This view implies changes in national identity because South Korea used to view herself as a U.S. ally, relying for its security largely on the U.S. military and regarding North Korea as the primary enemy. What has produced these changes in national identity in South Korea? Various changes in the international political environment, domestic politics, and socioeconomic conditions seem most important. In this chapter, we discuss how political, economic, and national security developments explain national identity change in South Korea, which has in turn affected electoral outcomes and security policies. This study, therefore, will help us understand South Korea’s recent policy toward North Korea and the discord with the United States concerning the North Korean nuclear issue.

Political and Economic Development and National Identity In 1961 Major General Park Chung-Hee came to power through a military coup. To divert public attention from authoritarian politics and to legitimize the military regime, Park focused on economic growth with a series of five-year economic plans. To this end, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was organized and filled with technocrats. The EPB adopted the export-oriented industrialization approach and played a key role in economic policy decisions. The government also promoted exports through credit allocation and government subsidies, which led to the creation of chaebols (business conglomerates). Aided by good export performance, South Korea enjoyed phenomenal economic growth.3

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However, authoritarian rule and repression led the domestic political opposition to demand human rights improvements and a more democratic political system. Instead of democratizing the political system, President Park extended his presidency through a number of constitutional amendments. Human rights were seriously abused and opposition movements were harshly suppressed. Park justified the authoritarian regime by emphasizing successful economic growth and the threat from North Korea. Public education emphasized the military confrontation between the two Koreas and related security concerns. Communists were heavily criticized through public education and South Korea clearly identified herself as a U.S. ally with a capitalist market system. Despite slow political development, the economy continued to enjoy rapid growth, which resulted in an expanded middle class and increased college education. The Park administration based its legitimacy on economic development. However, the second oil shock in 1979 led to economic difficulties in South Korea, which provided the opposition party with a window of opportunity for political development. Opposition leaders, along with college students, and supported by the middle class, demanded greater political rights and democratic reforms. In 1979, domestic political instability led to the assassination of President Park Chung-Hee by Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director Kim Jae-Kyu. Public hope for democracy, however, was shattered with Major General Chun Doo-Hwan’s bloodless coup in 1980. Military dictatorship and human rights abuses continued.4 With the “Third Wave” of democratization around the world, international pressure on South Korea to democratize increased. Domestic political demands for democracy from opposition party leaders and democracy activists also escalated. As a result, South Korea gradually became a democracy in the late 1980s. Transition to democracy improved human rights and brought about political development. As a result, the first civilian president, Kim Young-Sam, was elected in 1992.5 Although he was elected as a governing party’s candidate, President Kim’s election was a meaningful step in the democratization process. During the Kim Young-Sam administration, democracy was deepened. A local autonomy system was adopted to reduce the concentration of power. In order to hamper illegal transactions or cash payments, a real name account system was also adopted. With the campaign for globalization, the government opened up domestic financial markets and attracted foreign investment. With these changes, South Korea joined the club of developed countries—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

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However, the economy slowed down in 1996 due to falling exports. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis hit South Korea, requiring a bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The crisis had two main effects on Korean society. First, the crisis produced high rates of unemployment and a stock market collapse, thus shrinking the middle class. Since the IMF prescribed tight macroeconomic policy, interest rates shot up. As a result, a lot of small- and medium-size companies went bankrupt. Even big corporations had to pursue structural reforms to improve efficiency, which led to layoffs and early retirements. The financial crisis also shed light on the political influence of big businesses and revealed the corrupt lending practices of financial institutions. The public was very disappointed that, even after democratization, the civilian government still maintained corrupt business ties that originated under the military dictatorship. This led to falling confidence in political leaders and hostility toward political elites and wealthy businessmen.6 In this political environment, longtime opposition leader Kim DaeJung came to power. Because of the financial crisis and the IMF assistance, the Kim Dae-Jung administration focused on stimulating the economy and graduating from the IMF bailout program. The government led national campaigns to raise foreign currency reserves, which included collecting foreign coins and exporting gold donated by individual citizens. To stimulate domestic consumption, the government promoted the use of personal credit cards. As a result, South Korea paid off the IMF loan sooner than expected. However, the overuse of credit cards led to a large number of individual bankruptcies, which might become a problem in the future. The Kim Dae-Jung administration also ushered in new political elites. His victory in the presidential election was the first power transition from the ruling party to the opposition since the transition to democracy in 1987. Thus, many of the elites from Youngnam, the region of the old leaders, gave way to new faces from President Kim Dae-Jung’s home region, Honam.7 This change in the elite led to policy changes, such as increased social welfare benefits and legalization of the teachers’ labor union, which has been sympathetic to the ideology of juche (self-reliance) and the legitimacy of the North Korean regime based on illusions about the communist regime. The teacher’s union has taken the stance of anti-Americanism and viewed the interKorean relationship from the nationalist compatriot perspective. The legalization of the teachers’ labor union had two implications. First, it led to the dominance of union members at schools, and, as a result of that, had a large impact on the younger generation’s

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perceptions of North Korea and the United States. The reason is that members of the teachers union interpret recent Korean history differently. To them, the economic development achieved by the military dictatorship was based on the sacrifice of labor, while ties between governments and business gave rise to massive corruption. They also view North Korea as part of the Korean nation. They argue that North Korea is no longer a threat, and, therefore, that U.S. troops stay in South Korea for their own national interests rather than to protect South Korea. These perspectives have been delivered to young students, which led to confusion about the security realities in the region. Second, this approach provided the Left with an opportunity to come out in public under the nationalist banner. For instance, a sociology professor, Kang Chung-Koo, recently argued that the Korean War was an attempt by the North to achieve unification. Without the U.S. intervention, casualties would have been smaller. This interpretation is very similar to North Korea’s argument regarding the Korean War, although his theoretical starting point is the revisionist view of U.S. foreign policy.8 President Roh Moo-Hyun further improved the political environment for this kind of approach. Growing up in a poor family, President Roh did not go to college and never traveled to the United States before he was elected president. He argued that the relationship between South Korea and the United States must be “equal”—even if this means disagreements and arguments. This approach attracted high levels of support from the younger generation, which fueled greater political division between generations. Roh also changed the focus of economic policies from growth to redistribution, because wealth is concentrated in a small percentage of the population. The logic was that economic achievement should be more evenly distributed, given that corruption was common in the past. To this end, he raised income and corporate taxes in a progressive manner. As this policy slowed the economy, he lowered interest rates. He has also pursued balanced development around the country by planning to move publicly owned companies out of the capital city, Seoul. He even tried to move the capital city to Choongchung province, although the Constitutional Court ruled the move illegal. These policies, however, resulted in real-estate price increases all over the country. To deal with the rapid hikes in property value, property tax has been sharply raised and interest rates have also been raised. To summarize, South Korea has experienced internal division in the recent past over economic policies and national identity. Conservatives who prefer the market system achieved economic

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development, but at the cost of corruption and concentration of wealth. Liberals who prefer progressive policies criticize corruption and want to redistribute national wealth. The Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations produced the current national divisions by adopting liberal, progressive ideas in government policies, which led to changes in national identity. Next we discuss how South Korea’s security policy changed over time, reflecting changes in regime type and national identity.

National Security Policies The Traditional Military Regime9 The Park Chung-Hee administration’s policy toward North Korea was largely based on a strong anticommunist stance. The military regime focused on national security because of the confrontation with North Korea. National security at that time largely relied on the U.S. military, which stayed in South Korea based on the U.S.-South Korea mutual defense pact after the Korean War. Although South Korea has its own military, the final authority for military operations belongs to the U.S. military as a result of the Korean War. To reduce security dependence on the U.S. military, the Park government significantly increased defense expenditures as the economy developed (about 5–7 percent of GDP and 20–25 percent of the annual government budget). During this period, the government clearly sided with the United States in the international arena and designated North Korea as the primary enemy. For instance, according to a newly declassified document, South Korea eagerly supported the United States during the Vietnam War. Seoul not only sent combat troops to the conflict, but also proposed building a base for U.S. nuclear submarines in South Korea.10 In general, the U.S.-South Korea alliance was solid, and there was no room for socialism or anti-Americanism at that time. Under the U.S. security umbrella, the Park administration focused on economic development and emphasized that unification would be achieved through the United Nations. As Cold War tensions decreased in the early 1970s, however, the anticommunist stance mellowed. On August 15, 1970, President Park publicly announced a plan for peaceful unification. He also proposed that North Korea recognize the UN’s efforts to achieve a unified, democratic Korea. With this positive gesture, Seoul and Pyongyang had meetings and agreed upon three principles of unification announced in the joint communiqué of July 4, 1972: (1) unification shall be achieved without

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external influence of interference; (2) unification shall be achieved through peaceful means; and (3) a greater national unity shall be sought, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems. However, both sides still perceived unification as a zero-sum game, and an assassination attempt on President Park in 1974 led back to harsh confrontation between Seoul and Pyongyang.11 After President Park was assassinated in 1979, Major General Chun Doo-Hwan came to power through a bloodless coup. Since President Chun faced domestic political opposition, he tried to ease the tension between Seoul and Pyongyang by proposing a summit meeting in 1981, and by inviting Kim Il-Sung to visit Seoul without any preconditions in 1982. He even proposed that the two Koreas create a consultative conference to draft a constitution for a unified Korea. His move was largely based on domestic political calculations. To compensate for the lack of political legitimacy, he tried to make a noticeable improvement in the relationship with North Korea. However, North Korea did not respond positively. North Korea not only rejected all the proposals, but also launched terrorist attacks on South Korea. In October 1983, North Korean agents set off a bomb in Rangoon to kill President Chun; a number of South Korean cabinet members were killed instead. On November 29, 1987, two North Korean agents blew up Korean Air Flight 878, killing approximately 200 people. Thus, Victor Cha argues that the relationship between the two Koreas throughout the Cold War period was based on zero-sum game mentalities.12 As the world political environment changed with the end of the Cold War, South Korea normalized relationships with China and Russia. As a result the traditional alliance structure based on the East-West confrontation was no longer in place. The Roh Tae-Woo administration also sought nonpolitical exchanges with North Korea, which included open trade of goods and services, exchanges of visits, and developing a joint community between the two Koreas. He called the approach “balanced development.”13 As a result, the two Koreas signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation in December 1991. With this agreement, the two Koreas agreed to recognize each other’s political systems and pledged not to intervene in each other’s domestic affairs. In addition, the two Koreas signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—designed to stop North Korean nuclear development, although North Korea has not fulfilled her obligations under the agreement. However, according to Hart-Landsberg, it was very unlikely that the Roh Tae-Woo administration was willing to change their hard-line

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perception of North Korea even after all the positive developments between the two.14 The only reason that President Roh tried to improve the relationship between Seoul and Pyongyang was because he needed this to get more domestic support and to establish closer relations with the Soviet bloc countries and China.15 In September 1991 both Koreas joined the United Nations. Despite South Korea’s repeated attempts to join the United Nations, North Korea had always opposed it in the past. With all the changes in regional political environment as a result of the normalization with China and Russia, however, South Korea was finally able to join. Since South Korea’s joining the United Nations alone would diplomatically isolate and weaken the North, Pyongyang also had to agree to join the United Nations. Despite all the improvements in relations between the two Koreas, there was no fundamental change in Seoul’s perception of Pyongyang, because the political elites in South Korea still maintained Cold War-type, hard-line mentalities that viewed North Korea as the primary enemy and the inter-Korean relationship as a zero-sum game.16

Civilian Governments after Democratization The first civilian president, Kim Young-Sam, proposed a summit meeting to improve inter-Korean relations. However, the relationship did not improve for two reasons: (1) due to the North Korean nuclear program, a crisis developed, which led North Korea to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); and (2) South Korea and the United States continued the Team Spirit military exercise.17 In order to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis, Seoul proposed high-level talks. North Korea agreed, and five high-level discussions were held. In 1994, Pyongyang proposed a summit meeting. After two preliminary meetings, the summit meeting was scheduled in Pyongyang on July 25–27. However, North Korean leader Kim IlSung died on July 8, 1994, and the meeting was cancelled. All other contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang also stopped, as North Korea went through the process of Kim Jong-Il’s succession to power. To open up the dialogue again, the Kim Young Sam administration proposed four-party talks on April 16, 1996, including the United States and China. In the proposal, Seoul announced that it would not oppose direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang. This proposal had two important implications. First, before the proposal, South Korea insisted that the relationship between Washington and

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Pyongyang be contingent upon the improvement of inter-Korean relations. However, Seoul no longer maintained this position. Second, the proposal of four-party talks included Washington’s recognition of Pyongyang, which opened the door for U.S. economic aid to North Korea.18 Thus, the Kim Young-Sam administration’s approach to North Korea was conciliatory than those of previous governments. Another difference was the administration’s willingness to offer economic aid as an inducement. For instance, Seoul provided 150,000 tons of rice in 1995, when asked for help by Pyongyang. It was the first direct assistance provided to the North since the division of the country. Seoul demanded official dialogues between the two Koreas in return for the aid. However, North Korea did not respond positively.19 Instead, it only backfired in terms of domestic politics, as the opposition party criticized the reciprocity-based approach for setting a bad precedent. Kim Dae-Jung, while an opposition leader, introduced a unification policy design called the “three principles and three stages unification formula.” The three principles are “peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, and peaceful unification.” The three stages are the union of the republic (or the state), union by federalism, and complete unification. This policy design requires acknowledging each other’s existence, building confidence for economic exchanges, and making sincere efforts to cooperate to reach unification. To this end, the two Koreas start with nonpolitical exchanges, such as cultural activities and sporting events. In the next stage, economic exchanges and political negotiations will occur. In other words, the approach was theoretically based on functional cooperation.20 In order to implement his unification policy design, President Kim Dae-Jung adopted the “sunshine” policy, which had four principles. First, South Korea would not tolerate any armed provocation by North Korea, but would try to build mutual confidence for a peaceful relationship. Second, South Korea would not seek to absorb North Korea, reflecting North Korea’s concern about following the German unification case. Instead, South Korea would institutionalize a peaceful coexistence with the North by creating a community that gradually leads to peaceful unification based on mutual agreement. Third, South Korea would promote exchanges and cooperation in various fields. Fourth, the “sunshine” policy would be based on reciprocity.21 As a first step to peaceful unification, President Kim Dae-Jung tried to increase exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas. The logic behind this move was that the promotion of mutually beneficial relations through exchanges and cooperation in all fields is the best

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way toward a common national community. Thus, economic activities were encouraged, and the Seoul government removed restrictions on investment by South Korean companies in North Korea. This move led to the creation of the industrial site in Kaesung and opened up an opportunity for many private sector companies to start businesses in North Korea—most notably, the large-scale tourism business conducted by the South Korean conglomerate Hyundai, which provided significant cash inflows to North Korea.22 The peak of the “sunshine” policy was the summit meeting in Pyongyang with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il on June 13–15, 2000. At the meeting, the two leaders agreed to avoid any threatening acts. Kim Jong-Il also agreed to visit South Korea in the future. The first defense ministers’ talks followed the historic summit meeting in September 2000, and agreed to eliminate the threat of war. Apart from the summit meeting, however, Pyongyang did not reciprocate Seoul’s positive moves for peaceful coexistence and engagement. As a result, the Kim Dae-Jung administration changed the reciprocity principle to “provide first and expect later.” This changed approach to North Korea brought forth criticism. The oneway flow of money and aid to seemingly ungrateful North Korea started irritating the public, which led to declining public support. For instance, in 2001, only 18.6 percent of South Koreans supported President Kim Dae-Jung’s policy toward North Korea.23 As Levin and Han argue, “The consistency and single-mindedness with which Kim Dae-Jung pursued engagement with the North as president reinforces the contrast with most of his predecessors.”24 The “sunshine” policy was initially supported by the Clinton administration, which led to Secretary of State Madelyn Albright’s visit to Pyongyang. However, the George W. Bush administration perceived the engagement policy as a failure because of North Korea’s continuation of its nuclear program and had no intention of continuing the support. President Kim’s effort to persuade President Bush at a summit meeting did not lead to consensus on how to deal with North Korea. Instead, President Kim’s discord with President Bush contributed to a more distant relationship between the two countries. To make matters more complicated, the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon greatly changed the world environment and American public opinion on national security. Since this was the first time that the U.S. mainland was “attacked,” the American public became more nationalistic and aggressive concerning national security issues. Given that North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons as well as long-range missiles, September 11

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increased worries that North Korea might export their nuclear weapons and missiles to help their cash-strapped economy. In the meantime, a series of incidents in South Korea led to the rise of anti-Americanism. Two middle school girls were accidentally killed during U.S. military training exercises. The U.S. military in South Korea issued a regretful statement. Given that President Clinton apologized to the Japanese people when American Marines raped a teenage girl in Okinawa a few years earlier, a regretful statement by the press secretary was insulting to the Korean public. When the U.S. military court acquitted the soldiers involved in the accident, antiAmerican sentiment escalated and tens of thousands of people went into the streets. At this time, the Associated Press reported that the United States had fired on Korean refugees at No Gun Li during the Korean War, based on intelligence that North Korean spies were included among the refugees. The report seriously aggravated antiAmerican sentiment, particularly among the younger generation. At this time, Roh Moo-Hyun surprisingly became the presidential candidate of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). His previous expression of anti-Americanism based on national pride appealed to the younger generation, due to the incidents discussed earlier. Roh Moo-Hyun was elected president in 2002 with high levels of support from the younger generation. What concerned the conservatives and the United States most about the election of President Roh was his anti-American attitude. Just days before the close of the extremely tight race, candidate Roh said he “might favor neutrality if a war ever broke out between North Korea and the U.S.”25 This antiU.S. attitude appealed to the younger generation and helped win the presidential election, which reinforced the generational division over perceptions of the United States and North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration is different from the previous administrations in two distinctive ways. First, President Roh has been extremely sensitive to the opinion of his main constituents—younger generations who are sympathetic to the nationalistic approach. Second, the Roh administration politicized North Korea policy by stating that he was more sympathetic to the North than to the United States, given his view of national interest and ethnic affinity. Due to President Roh’s tendency to adopt policies appealing to his supporters, primarily the younger generations, the election of President Roh aggravated the generational difference. That said, the difference between generations may derive from different perceptions of national interest. Older generations experienced the Korean War and witnessed the Vietnam War. The North Korean (Communist)

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threat has always been real to them, and U.S. military support was necessary to maintain peace and enjoy economic development. However, the younger generations do not consider the North Korean military threat real. To them, North Korea is not capable of initiating a war due to economic difficulties and food shortages and, therefore, providing aid is an investment in improving the economic infrastructure for future reunification of the nation. Siding with the United States to isolate North Korea due to the nuclear development is not viewed as beneficial to the younger generation. In other words, different perceptions of national interest between generations may be the source of the recent generational discord.

Discussion and Conclusion According to Hall, national identity determines national interests, which produce policies.26 In South Korea, presidents have played a key role in determining national identity, national interests, and foreign policies, including policies toward North Korea.27 Kim and Yoon proposed two perspectives concerning how national identity in South Korea affects policies toward North Korea: (1) the state-centric paradigm and (2) the nation-centric paradigm. The state-centric perspective views inter-Korean relations as those between two sovereign states. Due to the antagonistic nature of the relationship, South Korea’s national interest lies in protecting its survival as a sovereign state against North Korea’s military threat. To this end, the ROK-U.S. alliance is critical for national security and should remain a core strategy in the future. This perspective was the dominant national security ideology during the military authoritarian regimes. In contrast, the nation-centric perspective considers inter-Korean relations to be an internal issue of the Korean people. According to this perspective, South Korea’s policy toward the North should focus on the North Korean people, and thereby reconciliation and cooperation should be consistently and persistently pursued. An implication of this perspective is that cooperation in nonpolitical sectors will lead to political integration and eventual unification. Of course, these terms are somewhat misleading. The state-centric approach is also a nationalistic approach, but it views realpolitik and power as the best way to deal with the North. Similarly, the nationcentric approach arguably focuses on serving the North Korean regime for the more exclusive benefit of the South. Nevertheless, as discussed, the “state-centric” perspective was dominant in South Korea under the military authoritarian regimes, and the “nationcentric” perspective gradually took over after transition to democracy.

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To explain what caused the changes in national identity in South Korea, we have revisited political and economic development and the evolution of national security policy, particularly North Korea policy. We found two factors that made significant contributions to the changes in South Korean national identity. First, we found that generational changes led to policy changes more sympathetic to the nation-centric paradigm. The population in their thirties and forties has been considered as the prime mover of public opinion. The characteristics of those in their thirties and forties when Kim Dae-Jung took office were different from those of these age groups under authoritarian rule. For instance, those in their thirties and forties during the military dictatorship either experienced the Korean War or at least were influenced by the devastation of the War. Moreover, they lived through the tensions of the Cold War. These experiences led them to be anticommunists. On the contrary, those in their thirties and forties in the 1990s did not experience the Korean War, but they went through political upheaval under authoritarian regimes in the late 1970s and 1980s. These differences in political conditions led them to be less concerned about the threat from North Korea. In addition, the end of the Cold War, normalization with the former Soviet Union and China, economic difficulties and starvation in North Korea, and the increased role of China in East Asian politics and trade weakened the perspective that viewed the North as the main threat to South Korea. Second, democratization in South Korea also contributed to the changes in national identity. The reason is that the power transition occurring as a result of democratization led to changes in political elites. The new political elites associated with President Kim Dae-Jung introduced a new national identity, based on the new perspective on relations with the United States and North Korea. In addition, legalization of the teachers’ labor union significantly influenced the national identity of the younger generation. This changed perception of North Korea and the United States was furthered by the Roh MooHyun administration’s continuing engagement approach to North Korea, emphasizing the compatriot nationalist perspective against U.S. will. Unlike the Clinton administration, the Bush administration employed a hard-line approach in dealing with North Korea, due to neoconservatism and Pyongyang’s violation of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework.28 The September 11 Attacks resulted in the U.S. invasion of Iraq without UN support. This kind of unilateral foreign policy by the Bush administration increased anti-Americanism around the world, including in South Korea. South Korean military assistance in Iraq, in response to the U.S. government’s request, and terrorists’

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execution of a Korean man to force the pullout of South Korean troops from Iraq, further increased anti-American sentiment, particularly among the younger generation. In conclusion, national identity change in South Korea was made possible by the transition from the Cold War-era authoritarian regime. Since then, its evolution has been a product of various events in international and domestic politics, as well as generational change. Responding to cues from new governments and related events, the younger generation calculates national interests in a manner different from the older one.

Notes 1. Uk Heo, “The Political Economy of Defense Spending in South Korea,” Journal of Peace Research 33 (1996): 483–490. 2. Digital Chosun Ilbo, August 18, 2005. In the Six-Party talks concluded in September 2005, the United States and North Korea agreed that they would discuss the issue of building light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea in the future. 3. Its per capita GNP grew from only $100 in 1963 to $14,000 in 2004. Currently, the South Korean economy is the eleventh largest in the world. See also John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and Economic Development (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Uk Heo and Alexander C. Tan, “Political Choices and Economic Outcomes: A Perspective on the Differential Impact of the Financial Crisis on South Korea and Taiwan,” Comparative Political Studies 36 (2003): 679–698. 4. Yung Myung Kim, “Pattern of Military Rule and Prospects for Democracy in South Korea,” in R.J. May and Viberto Selochan, eds., The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific (Australia: Hurst & Co, 1998); Oh, Korean Politics. 5. Oh, Korean Politics. 6. Heather Smith, “Korea,” in Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut, eds., East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One? (London: Routledge, 1999); Uk Heo and Sunwoong Kim, “Financial Crisis in South Korea: Failure of the Government-Led Development Paradigm,” Asian Survey 40 (2000): 492–507; Neal Jesse, Uk Heo, and Karl DeRouen Jr., “A Nested Game Approach to Political and Economic Liberalization in Democratizing States: The Case of South Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 46 (2002): 401–422. 7. Byong-man Ahn, Elites and Political Power in South Korea (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2003). 8. Supporters of this argument wanted to destroy the statue of General MacArthur in Inchon, although government officials including the president expressed their opposition to the move. Five members of the

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10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

16. 17.

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Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. House Representatives wrote a letter expressing their concerns regarding the attempt to destroy the statue of General MacArthur. They requested that South Korea send the statue to the United States if it was going to be torn down. Each administration’s security policy is well described in Uk Heo and Chong-Min Hyun, “The ‘Sunshine Policy’ Revisited: An Analysis of South Korea’s Policy toward North Korea,” in Uk Heo and Shale Horowitz, eds., Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and IndiaPakistan (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003). Digital Chosun Ilbo, August 26, 2005. Victor Cha, “Korea Unification: The Zero-Sum Past and Precarious Future,” in Ilpyong J. Kim, ed., Two Koreas in Transition: Implications for U.S. Policy (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1998). Ibid. Norman D. Levin and Yong-Sup Han, Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate over Policies toward North Korea (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002). Martin Hart-Landsberg, Korea: Division, Reunification and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998). Later on, South Korea established full diplomatic relations with Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia in 1989, and with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Soviet Union in 1990. Hart-Landsberg, Korea. For a detailed description of the North Korean nuclear crisis, see Terence Roehrig, “Assessing North Korean Behavior: The June Summit, The Bush Administration, and Beyond,” in Uk Heo and Shale Horowitz, eds., Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003). Bon-Hak Koo, “Challenges and Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations under the New Leadership,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 10 (1998): 79. With the September 1996 incursion of North Korean submarines into South Korean waters, tensions mounted. Despite the increased tension, four-party talks were held twice, on December 9, 1997, and on March 16, 1998. However, the talks failed to produce any meaningful results. Quinones argued that public opinion regarding Kim Dae Jung’s formula for dealing with the North was “certainly ambivalent at best.” C. Kenneth Quinones, “South Korea’s Approaches to North Korea: A Glacial Process,” in Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim, eds., Korean Security Dynamics in Transition (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 43. Chung-in Moon, “Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Peninsula,” in Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg, eds., Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1991).

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22. According to Kihl, there are two reasons for separating nonpolitical activities from politics. First, Seoul wants to assure the United States and Japan that they could change their policies toward North Korea, on the grounds that normalization between these countries will enhance the engagement of North Korea with the rest of the world. Second, due to limited resources, the South Korean government cannot provide “enough” economic aid to North Korea; so the government wants the private sector to contribute to the efforts. Moreover, Kim Dae Jung witnessed the failure of direct aid to the North by the Kim Young Sam administration. He knew how it backfired domestically when the direct government aid turned out to be ineffective. Young Whan Kihl, “Seoul’s Engagement Policy and U.S.DPRK Relations,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 10 (1998): 21. 23. Boo-Keun Ahn, “Political Poll Result,” JoongAng Ilbo, June 4, 2001. 24. Levin and Han, Sunshine in Korea, 6. 25. Anthony Spaeth, “Roh Moo Hyun Takes Center Stage,” Time Asia, February 24, 2003. 26. Rodney Bruce Hall. National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International System (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 5. 27. Levin and Han, Sunshine in Korea. 28. Roehrig, “Assessing North Korean Behavior.”

Chapter 9

U.S. Strategy in the Korean Conflict Milica Begovic and K a r l D e R o u e n J r.

It

is not surprising that the ideological makeup of the Bush administration produced an approach to the Korean conflict that differed from the Clinton years. The shock of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, however, lent a new focus and urgency to the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Stopping nuclear proliferation became an overriding priority, leading to a sharper departure from the Clinton administration’s engagement approach. The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, concluded at the end of the Korean War that saw 33,000 Americans soldiers killed and over 101,000 wounded, provided South Korea with a U.S. security guarantee. Despite the recent increase in criticism and disapproval of the American foreign policy toward the Peninsula, South Korea has continually worked on implementing Western-style democracy, helped by generous financial aid from the United States. The United States represents the largest export market for South Korea, and until it was replaced by China in 2002, the United States remained the country’s largest trading partner. South Korea maintained steady growth since the Asian Crisis in 1997, coupled with close cooperation with the United States and regional allies in the areas of security and economic relations.1 Although North Korea’s nuclear program appeared to be frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework, evidence that the program

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was secretly resumed since the late 1990s has once more made the program the central issue of international concern on the Peninsula. President Bush used the events of 9/11 to launch a global war on terrorism. Even though there is no evidence linking North Korea to the terrorist attacks in the United States, President Bush classified North Korea as a member of an “axis of evil”2 and a rogue regime. As the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq made clear, countries on the list of “axis of evil” became subject to forcible overthrow in the name of preempting terrorism and promoting democracy. The President’s proclamation was followed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s August 2001 statement in Moscow, suggesting that North Korea possesses enough plutonium for four or five nuclear warheads. Rumsfeld’s declaration marked the largest such estimate in U.S. history, and initiated a downturn in relations between the two states.3 These two proclamations were also the first of their kind since the 1998 North Korean launch of a multistage ballistic rocket over Japan. They seemed to imply an imminent nuclear danger stemming from the North. Whether North Korea transfers nuclear technology to terrorist organizations, or whether it plans to utilize nuclear weapons in attacking its southern neighbor, remains to be seen. In October 2002, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly announced that the North possesses a covert nuclear weapons program, using highly enriched uranium (HEU).4 The United States took measures to isolate the North’s regime, diminish its commitments to the 1994 Agreement provisions, refuse bilateral talks with North Korea, and eventually form a policy emphasizing sticks over carrots.5 North Korea simultaneously upped what it demanded of the United States to freeze its nuclear programs, calling for bilateral talks, removal from the list of terrorist countries, and a written legal security guarantee against attack from the United States, and its allies.6 Attempts to engage DPRK in a series of multilateral talks essentially ended in a stalemate. Following President Bush’s reelection in 2004, North Korea refused to return to the stalled talks regarding its nuclear weapons program until the United States redefined and clarified its position.7 These events stand in contrast to the dynamics of American and North Korean relations during the previous administration. The Clinton administration oversaw a paradigm shift in American policy toward North Korea, moving from a 40-year-old containment approach to a new policy of “engagement.” Renewing diplomatic relations with a country that was on the communist blacklist since the end the World War II, President Clinton vowed to “use the full powers of my office to facilitate arrangements for the financing and constructing of a

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light-water nuclear power reactor project within the DPRK.”8 Negotiations between the two countries led to the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994. The Agreement was based on financial rewards, diplomatic concessions, and improvement of bilateral relationship in exchange for the North halting its nuclear program. As stipulated in the Framework, North Korea stopped operating its reactor at Yongbyon and its long-range missile development, permitted the supervision of 8,000 fuel rods at the Yongbyon site, and promised no “hostile intent.” In exchange, Washington provided oil to the regime as a substitute for nuclear energy, and initiated construction of light water reactors less adaptable to weapons productions than the ones already existing at the Yongbyon reprocessing plant.9 The Agreed Framework set in motion steps toward a peaceful resolution of a “million/trillion” dollar problem—a term coined in inner circle of administration officials, referring to the fact that a war with North Korea “would probably cost a million lives and a trillion dollars worth of damage in a very short period of time.”10 The effects of this approach spilled over and encouraged the launch of South Korea’s “sunshine” policy toward its northern neighbor. The title of this strategy stems from an Aesop’s fable that alludes to a man being induced to shed his overcoat by a warm sun, rather than the cold wind and rain. The policy vowed not to tolerate armed provocations of any kind, while simultaneously pushing for reconciliation and cooperation between the South and North, and declaring that the Republic of Korea has no intentions “to harm or absorb North Korea.”11 The 1994 Agreed Framework’s effectiveness in diminishing the nuclear threat on the Peninsula is subject to dispute. Some argue that Clinton’s approach to North Korea was that of appeasement, that it treated the symptoms and not the disease, and that it avoided making difficult decisions.12 However, if one compares North Korea’s official threats from 1994 to 2001, and from 2001 until 2005, the latter period produced more such statements. Today North Korea is arguably less likely to negotiate, and less likely to halt its nuclear development program. While the Clinton administration had come close to using force against North Korea, it nevertheless was able to move toward engagement.

The First George W. Bush Administration, 2001‒2005 The U.S. policy regarding the Korean Peninsula was a function of two different factions within the administration. Colin Powell led the first

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group up until his recent resignation as secretary of state, shaping the policy with the help of East Asian and Korean experts, and relying on diplomacy, negotiation, and cooperation over coercion, isolation, and threats. This coalition supported enforcement of 1994 Agreed Framework, continued applying diplomatic pressure on North Korea, and insisted on urgency of diplomatic talks. In many aspects this policy orientation was a mere continuation of Clinton’s policy.13 The pro-diplomacy faction remained averse to lumping North Korea with the Middle East states suspected of seeking or possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and to perceiving the DPRK is a part of a greater global problem including terrorism, proliferation, and rogue states. Instead, it stood for a foreign policy shaped by experts on Korean issues and not counterterrorism.14 The group’s lack of influence on the administration’s decisionmaking process was evident on more than one occasion. Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage’s declaration before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United States is ready to hold direct talks with the North failed to persuade the administration’s key officers, who refused to remove preconditions—including complete, irreversible, and verifiable disarmament—set for direct talks with DPRK.15 Months prior to the November 2004 presidential elections, President Bush, on more than one occasion, implied that the United States may be willing to financially reward North Korea, as the country disarmed its nuclear arsenal.16 This alleged departure from the administration’s hard-line approach seemingly lent more credence to the State Department and created more maneuver space in which it could employ diplomatic strategies to induce a resolution of the crisis. At one point, Powell was given a green light to promise the DPRK that the United States is not trying to undermine its government, but merely desires dismantling of its nuclear weapons in exchange for other concessions.17 As we will show in following sections of this chapter, Powell played the role of a modern Don Quixote, as his methods contradicted the reality and direction of the current administration’s policy leanings toward Korea. This became evident with the secretary of state’s recent resignation, and his replacement by Condoleezza Rice. The second and far more influential group dominating the U.S. policy formation includes Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, and Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton (named UN Ambassador in August 2005 by recess appointment). The unit lobbied for isolation of North Korea through economic sanctions, demanded

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unilateral concessions on military issues, and frequently opposed diplomatic negotiations with DPRK.18 Despite the division within it (Cheney and Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Cheney, Rice), the group’s cohesiveness stems from the common ideological background that is the key factor responsible for the deviation from the Clinton policy. The members of this group are so-called neoconservatives and comprise the more powerful and influential of the two factions within the administration. The Neoconservative Movement The roots of the neoconservative movement stem back to the late 1970s, when a number of senators led by Henry “Scoop” Jackson began arguing for a more conservative foreign policy—specifically a more stringent approach toward the USSR, unconditional support for Israel, and increased U.S. defense capabilities. Jackson often argued that state power, the flawed nature of human beings, and the anarchical international system contradict the liberal belief that diplomacy, cooperation, and multilateralism are the best ways to promote peace and prosperity worldwide. Jackson’s protégés form the backbone of the current Bush administration. The Partnership for a New American Century (PNAC) is one of the key media outlets promoting neoconservative ideology. Its mission statement emphasizes preemptive and unilateral action supplemented with exercise of strength beyond challenge. These policy methods could come at the expense of traditional alliances. The PNAC mission statement emphasizes the importance of preemptive action, declaring that “the history of 20th century should have taught the U.S. that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire . . . the history of this century should have taught U.S. to embrace the cause of American leadership.”19 Furthermore, it provides a maintenance checklist regarding the future of America itself and its standing in the world: ●

●

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●

We need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future; We need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interest and values; We need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; We need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.20

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Setting the stage for what happened in 2003, the group sent the letter to President Clinton in 1998, discrediting the U.S. policy toward Iraq and Middle East, and arguing that such shortcomings are likely to produce an imminent threat to America in the near future. Furthermore, the letter urged President Clinton to consider regime change in Iraq as the only viable alternative.21 North Korea has objected to this type of rhetoric, which overtly emphasizes the need for forceful regime change in rogue states. These objections have become more shrill since North Korea was included within the “axis of evil” and the United States followed through on the promise of regime change in Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John Bolton, and Condoleezza Rice comprise the team in charge of American policy on Korea, and as we show in the following section, closely adhere to the checklist. During George W. Bush’s tenure in office, Wolfowitz collaborated with the PNAC’s advocacy campaign calling for war in Iraq.22 More recently, Wolfowitz warned North Korea that it should “stop the enormous diversion of its limited resources to its military,” and that if it chooses otherwise, it will meet American response “united, immediate, and devastatingly effective.”23 The “Rumsfeld Doctrine” entails preemptive attack and unilateral force as mainstays. To that end, Rumsfeld cautions to act early, if it is worth doing, U.S. leadership should make a judgment as to when diplomacy has failed and act forcefully, early during precrisis period, to try to alter the behavior of others and to prevent the conflict; if this fails, be willing and prepared to act decisively to use whatever force is necessary to prevail, plus some.24

Rumsfeld’s Korea policy reflects these tendencies. In his speech addressing the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Conference in Singapore, Rumsfeld declared that the emerging global threats cannot be appeased, but must be confronted, and added that “the only way to win this global struggle—this war—call it what you will—is to go on the offense to root out terrorists at their source.”25 Rumsfeld called the DPRK a “terrorist regime” constituting a global threat through its development of nuclear technology and assistance to terrorists and rogue regimes.26 In 2003, CNN reported that “Donald Rumsfeld sent a memo to U.S. officials last week discussing the possibility of ‘Regime Change’ in North Korea, but the United States has said repeatedly it has no plans to launch military

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action.”27 Furthermore, Rumsfeld declared an inevitable end to the communist regime, provoking an angry reaction from the DPRK that dubbed him as a “psychopath” and a “stupid man” who is “cursed and hated worldwide” for “wantonly harassing peace and security in different parts of the world and igniting wars.”28 Pyongyang’s official statement additionally declared: “Rumsfeld, whose political faith is to establish the U.S.-style world order by strength, is known to be a typical stupid man for professing ‘neo-conservativism,’ censured and mocked at worldwide. He is therefore not a guy who (North Korea) can deal with.”29 Further provoked by Rumsfeld’s comments professing the necessity for Korea’s nuclear disarmament, DPRK’s announced its most prized lesson from the 2003 Iraqi war, one that seems to set the two countries further apart on the road to crisis resolution: “The Iraqi war teaches a lesson that in order to prevent a war and defend the security of a country and the sovereignty of a nation it is necessary to have a powerful physical deterrent.”30 Such provocative words are not in perfect harmony with the more moderate South Korean position on North Korea. Dick Cheney began his political career with Rumsfeld’s help, whom he worked for as a special assistant in the Office of Economic Opportunity in the Nixon administration. The two have remained colleagues and close friends for more than 40 years. In 2000, with the help of Jeb Bush, Paul Wolfowitz, and Lewis Libby, and the PNAC, he authored an article called “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources for a New Century.”31 This article advocates regime change in North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and several other countries. Cheney remains true to the article’s hard-line foreign policy approach. During the preparations for the multilateral talks with North Korea, Cheney was quoted saying, “I have been charged by the President with making sure that none of the tyrannies in the world are negotiated with. We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.”32 John Bolton is the new U.S. representative to the United Nations. During his tenure at the State Department, Bolton was direct and uncompromising, as evident in his description of Kim Jong Il as a “tyrannical dictator” of a country where “life is a hellish nightmare.”33 Bolton further hindered any hope Colin Powell had in inducing positive change in the nuclear standoff with the contradictory announcement that the United States does not plan to offer any sort of concessions and incentives to DPRK unless it fulfills a number of unilateral measures regarding its nuclear weapons programs.34 North Korea issued a statement replying to Bolton, describing him as a

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“human scum and bloodsucker” who is “not entitled to take part in the talks,” essentially forcing the United States to send a replacement for Bolton to the talks.35 The following year Bolton announced that there should be no incentives for the North unless it previously consented to comprehensive disarmament agreement similar to the one recently struck with Libya. He warned against trusting the DPRK and claimed, “Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. We will not be fooled again.”36 Alluding to other rogue regimes globally, Bolton described the decision to give in to the North’s demands as a refusal to yield to “blackmail,” which would “only encourage him (Kim), and perhaps, more ominously, other would-be tyrants around the world.”37 As a Soviet specialist, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was considered to be a devotee of a traditional realist school, concerned with issues of great power relations and not those of morality and values.38 Rice’s success in bridging the ideological gap between herself and the overwhelmingly neoconservative administration was based on her insistence on the American obligation to bring about freedom and prosperity where there is none in the world: “[M]ultilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves. . . . United States has a special role in the world and should not adhere to every international convention and agreement that someone thinks to propose.”39 In terms of the current Korean policy, Rice has often criticized President Clinton’s strategy, arguing that the previous administration allowed DPRK to blackmail it with its nuclear weapons technology, and that President Bush will not go “back there again,” further proclaiming the current policy direction as “diplomatic victory for the United States.”40 This group of officials is likely to gain another member in the near future: Danielle Pletka, the current vice president at the American Enterprise Institute, who is a probable candidate for the chief of the Near East Bureau at the State Department. Pletka’s official stance on Korean Peninsula was encapsulated in her argument that the longterm issue in North Korea will be the regime change in Pyongyang, and that we “have got to bite the bullet.”41 Persistence of the nuclear threat emanating from the Korean Peninsula provides one basis for justifying and supporting the installation of an antimissile defense system in Alaska. The principal argument in favor of the system was its alleged success rate of 90 percent in intercepting North Korean missiles.42 This policy direction coincided with the administration change of approach to military and defense budgeting from a traditional acquisition program based on a definitive system designed to meet certain projected performance

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criteria, to a new, capabilities-based management that allows the current administration to request funding for ballistic missile defense without specifying ahead of time the performance requirements that generally must be met prior to deployment stage. The Bush administration pointed to the constraining nature of the previous, traditional approach, and emphasized that within the new method, the officials are relieved of any obligation to present Congress with the programmatic projections as required in the past. What was left unsaid concerned the implications for the legislative oversight ability in the area of defense spending, which stands to be limited if the new approach is accepted.43 Ironically, one way to interpret this change in military and defense budgeting is that it inadvertently provides a basis for the current administration to capitalize on failed attempts to disarm North Korea. This does not mean that the Bush administration purposefully subverted negotiations with its partners and North Korea so it could rationalize increase in defense funding. But the status quo involving a prevalent nuclear threat on the Peninsula legitimizes the allocation of more funds for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which is then justified with the prevailing nuclear threat on the Peninsula. When asked whether long-range nuclear missiles from North Korea could reach the West Coast, George Tenet replied with, “I think the declassified answer, is yes, they can do that.”44 Kenneth Quinones, one of the key State Department officials involved in negotiations with the North in 1994, a man who paid 13 diplomatic visits from 1992 to 1997, argued against Tenet’s reply, calling it a “flat out lie,” and further positing that despite DPRK’s advancements in nuclear technology, it could not produce nuclear warheads to be carried out by its ballistic missiles.45 The Bush-proposed land, sea, air, and space missile defense system stands to either gain or lose a lot of money in the near future, depending on the circumstances. The Defense Department asked for over $53 billion over the next five years for the development of such a system whose technological capabilities have yet to be tested successfully.46 It remains to be seen whether the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula will be used in the future to induce more funds for the MDA. On the other hand, if the nuclear standoff on the Peninsula is resolved and the European states succeed in negotiating Iran out of further developing its nuclear capabilities, it may be difficult to justify spending $53 billion for the MDA.

End of Agreed Framework Emphasizing the threats of WMD and terrorist links, and manned with officials of largely neoconservative bearings, the Bush administration

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embarked on a hard-line approach toward the DPRK. This became even clearer after 9/11, when the United States pointed out that North Korea had bypassed the Agreed Framework by secretly pursuing a second, enriched uranium route to nuclear weapons development. The administration also reported that a North Korean representative admitted to the existence of the HEA. In November 2002 and December 2003, the administration persuaded the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to suspend heavy fuel oil delivery, and construction of two nuclear reactors—two chief provisions of 1994 Agreement Framework. The United States persistently lobbied for international sanctions on the DPRK, a position that most regional actors refused to comply with.47 Furthermore, the United States demanded complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID) as a precondition to any talks and concessions promised to the regime under the 1994 Agreement, and influenced IAEA passage of resolution accusing the North of noncompliance in its nuclear safeguard agreement with the Agency. To this end President Bush proposed a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), aimed at assembling a coalition of countries willing to regulate the exports of WMD and preventing state-to-state transfers of dangerous technologies. Under the proposed agreement, countries can suspend shipments allegedly carrying nuclear technology and arms in the air, at sea, and on land. However, since the PSI lacks international legal standing and is thus not binding, it depends solely on the readiness of member countries to cooperate with the United States, and is incapable of terminating legal transfers of technology such as North Korean Scud missiles to Yemen.48 Coupled with the previous policy actions, the United States remains reluctant to take North Korea off of its official terrorist list. The refusal to do so is consistent with the U.S. P.L. 95–118 (the International Institutions Act), which empowers the United States to oppose IMF and World Bank proposals for any type of financial assistance to countries included on the list.49 When the Bush administration sent an envoy to North Korea at the end of 2002, the mission was to extend the ultimatum to the regime to cease and desist on the alleged highly HEU program. The DPRK denied ever making an admission of such development, and offered transcripts of the meeting that made no mention of the HEU program. When the United States declined to accept such stance, North Korea responded by activating its frozen nuclear program. North Korea reopened the plutonium reprocessing plant in Yongbyon on December 22, 2002, which is capable of producing nuclear weapons within months, and which was previously sealed under the 1994 Agreement.50 The move was followed by the

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UN nuclear inspectors leaving the country, and the country’s subsequent withdrawal from the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. The DPRK refused to hold negotiations before the UN Security Council, an institution with the legal power to impose economic sanctions. The North proclaimed that sanctions would be tantamount to an act of war.51 North Korea’s Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan was reported saying that the U.S. hostile actions in 2002 led his country to believe that the Agreed Framework is no longer in its interest.52 Predictably, the DPRK demands evolved since 2001 in face of the accumulated new developments concerning the American policy toward Korea, and the U.S. preemptive attack on the first of the three axis-ofevil countries. It now—perhaps as a result of the war in Iraq—seeks resumption of diplomatic relations with both America and Japan, and pledges willingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in exchange for a written security guarantee against U.S. nuclear and/or conventional attack. Mutually exclusive claims on both sides finally resulted in a series of multilateral talks, taking place less than a year short of the 2004 elections.

Multilateral Negotiations After failing to bring about any tangible results in April 23–25, 2003, the three-party talks (U.S., North Korea, and People’s Republic of China) evolved into the first set of six-party talks—the first round scheduled for August 27–29, 2003. A tall order of priorities included loosening of the U.S. hard-line approach, insisting on the North’s CVID as a precondition to further talks, and persuading the DPRK to halt its progress in nuclear weapons development. James Kelly opened the talks by calling for North Korea’s to return immediately to the NPT, to allow IAEA inspectors into the country, and to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Once in compliance, the DPRK would receive financial assistance. In response, the DPRK’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong-Il vowed that his country is not developing a nuclear weapons program based on HEU, that it demands a nonaggression treaty with the United States, and that the problem arose initially as a response to the change in American policy since 2000.53 North Korea put forth a new plan, based on the principle of simultaneous actions of both sides,54 which the United States promptly refused to sign, reiterating its hardline negotiation prerequisites. Participating parties pledged commitment to peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the crises, the act constituting the highlight of the talks.

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Following the first round of six-party talks, the United States attempted to persuade the North to accept its terms through a framework encapsulated in a joint statement signed by Japan and South Korea. The plan was based on peaceful solution, CVID, and security assurances for North Korea, without any reference to a timetable regarding the U.S. economic and financial assistance. South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun urged President Bush to offer concessions as quid pro quo for disarmament as a sign of goodwill. This would also offer Mr. Kim enough political leverage to remedy any potential dissent internal backlash from hard-line regime elements that might oppose backing down on the nuclear weapons program. President Bush replied negatively, refusing to give in to “blackmail” by North Korea.55 The second round of six-party talks was held on February 25–28, 2004, and it began with the North’s denying that an HEU program existed. The United States declared the existence of new evidence from Pakistan pointing to the actual HEU system in North Korea, and called on the DPRK to admit to it. The United States refused to share the latest proof, commenting that revealing it would allow the North to hide the program more efficiently in the future.56 South Korea offered a new plan, based on three phases: first, the North’s promise to dismantle would be met with the U.S. promise of security guarantee; then, the North would freeze its nuclear facilities and allow inspectors in for verification, while simultaneously receiving energy and other aid; and finally, the third phase would see verified, complete dismantling that would be met by a written security guarantee.57 Even though the United States partly agreed to the plan, the North refused to comply with some provisions, and more so declined to discuss any issue unless it is compensated for it at the same time. The compensation in this case referred to North’s insistence that the United States join South Korea, China, and Russia in providing it with the energy assistance in exchange for CVID. The North posited this prerequisite as the necessary concession that would simultaneously be implemented with the freezing of its nuclear program. Nonetheless, while the United States “understood and supported” other countries’ assistance to North Korea before its nuclear program was dismantled, it along with Japan refused to provide any aid to the North before CVID.58 The third round of six-party talks was held on June 23–26, 2004. Consistent with the previous attempts, it failed to bring about any tangible change in the nuclear status quo on the Peninsula, or in the harsh U.S. negotiating stance toward North Korea. An added point of divergence emerged in the North’s insistence on merely freezing its

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facilities, while the United States, Japan, and South Korea sought an agreement that would lay out steps toward dismantling the nuclear program. In the light of America’s refusal to offer security guarantees and foreign aid, North Korea declined to participate in the fourth round of talks scheduled for September 2004. The standoff prevailed until August 2005, when both sides indicated a willingness to continue diplomatic talks. For its part, the United States somewhat relaxed its hard-line policy toward the North. Leading up to the September talks, on a number of occasions the American officials publicly committed not to invade Pyongyang, further reaffirming the dedication to continue bilateral talks within the six-party negotiations, and recognizing the North’s sovereignty.59 President Bush even began referring to the North’s leader as “Mr. Kim.” North Korean authorities detected, and, subsequently, positively responded to this change in rhetoric,60 as evident in North’s agreement to return to the negotiating process. Other negotiation partners also played a significant role in engaging Pyongyang in the fourth round of six-party talks. South Korea offered significant economic aid to the North consisting out of 2,000 megawatts of electricity and 500,000 tons, while China continued supplying Pyongyang with energy and food assistance. Despite the readiness to negotiate, once the fourth round of negotiations began, both the United States and North Korea put forth new demands that threaten to complicate the talks further. The North still rejects American allegations of a second secret nuclear program, and objects to the central U.S. demand that it must make the first move by scrapping its nuclear weapons facilities. North Korea insists on a diplomatic relationship with the United States, a peace agreement, security guarantees, economic help, and removal of the American nuclear threat to the region. The United States demands concessions regarding the North’s development of ballistic missiles and its human rights record. The United States attitude remains that the North must take the first step by eradicating its nuclear weapons system.

Challenges for the Second Bush Administration The most daunting challenge for the current administration emerges from its reliance on the Bush Doctrine, and subsequent loss of trust and favorable image internationally. Over the previous four years, the United States witnessed a number of its allies establishing economic and diplomatic relations with North Korea—most notably South Korea.

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Without reorienting its policy and improving relations with the relevant countries, the United States stands a diminished chance at improving its image and influence in the region. As we conclude later, this may ultimately undermine overall U.S. security. North Korea’s lukewarm relations with the United States stand in stark contrast to its improving cooperation with Seoul.61 The DPRK points out, “We, from blood and using one language, can no longer live separated; we must put the earliest possible end to the tragedy of national division.”62 The South Korean Unification Ministry halted anti-North propaganda, and began broadcasting North Korean news programs on its own website. Furthermore, a new telephone hotline was established, linking the militaries of the two Koreas. A symbolic but equally powerful act occurred in summer of 2004, permitting the athletes from the North and the South to march under the same flag at the Olympic Games in Athens. Bong Geun Jun, a former senior policy adviser in South Korea’s Unification Ministry claims that “we (South) have a better relationship with the North, and feel less threatened by them; that also means we feel less of a need to rely on the U.S.”63 The two countries reached an agreement in November 2002 on a number of common economic projects, including improvement of the North’s economic infrastructure, food aid provision, restoration of a railway and roads across the demilitarized zone (DMZ), investment guarantees and tax measures stimulating South Korean private investments in the North, and construction of a Special Economic Zone in Kaesong, inside North Korea. Within this cooperative framework, the South increasingly sees the U.S. isolation strategy aimed at the North’s regime as subverting its efforts to stabilize the Peninsula and to establish a two-way economic relationship between the countries. South Korea’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Lee Soo-hyuck, in his remarks to the IISS Conference in Singapore, expressed an understanding for DPRK’s need for nuclear deterrence as the means to offset the instability and possible threats to North Korea, in addition to furnishing a bargaining chip for foreign aid that the country needs. Furthermore, he claimed that complete disarmament is unacceptable to the DPRK, since it would alienate the regime’s key internal constituent— the military. Given this information, Mr. Lee Soo-hyuck claimed that the crisis will be averted most successfully through a comprehensive set of mutual steps involving North Korea’s verifiable freeze of all nuclear programs in exchange for renewed energy and other types of assistance.64 South Korea is increasingly more critical of the Bush administration’s failure to initiate talks directly with North Korea. This attitude comes in light of the 2002 election, which saw Roh Moo-Hyun

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winning the Presidency, employing a highly critical campaign of the U.S. policy on the Peninsula. Public opinion in the South also took a more disapproving turn, especially after two American military personnel, who ran over and killed two South Korean schoolgirls, were found innocent in court-martial proceedings. A number of different opinion polls find South Koreans to be less concerned with the North’s invasion and nuclear weapons development, than with the U.S. military presence in the country, with the most recent results estimating that 39 percent of South Koreans believe the United States poses more of a threat to their country than does North Korea (33 percent).65 Don Oberdofer, a former Washington Post diplomatic correspondent, believes that the thread holding South Korea and the United States together since 1954 is slowly unraveling with the improvement of the relations between the two Koreas and the simultaneous worsening of the American global image. He argues that, “increasingly there is a fundamentally different point of view between South Korea and the United States on the North. So of course you see a strain on alliance.”66 Relations between the South and the United States worsened with the recent proposed withdrawal of 3,600 American military personnel, and their subsequent redeployment in Iraq. This initiative is seen to damage the American reputation and image in the region in two different ways. One view, dominant within the Roh administration, alleges that the Pentagon’s relocation of the Second Division aims at removing the military personnel out of range of North Korean artillery in the event of an Iraq-like preemptive attack. This position reaffirms the many opinion polls showing that South Koreans fear the United States more than they do North Korea. The second view condemns America’s move to redeploy its troops as a rollback of its commitment to protection of the U.S. regional allies, mainly Taiwan.67 Other relevant regional actors oppose the harsh U.S. stance vis-à-vis North Korea, urge peaceful resolution of the problem, and ask the United States to refrain from any action that may result in a deterioration or crisis on the Peninsula. China’s official policy opposes economic sanctions against the North, calling for greater flexibility in negotiating direct talks between the United States and North Korea, security guarantees and economic aid for the country. The official Russian policy is largely concurrent with the Chinese.

Conclusion The United States could suffer substantial losses on its foreign policy front unless it redefines its options regarding the Korean Peninsula.

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Younger South Koreans often do not share the pro-U.S. views of their parents and grandparents. Instead their sympathies often tend toward their brethren to the North, who are increasingly seen as economic victims rather than potential aggressors.68 The more the United States threatens North Korea, the more it antagonizes the South, which does not want a war on its doorstep and does not want its policy of engagement with the North undermined. Thus the saber rattling by neocons in the administration might actually be diminishing longterm American security by weakening its alliance base in the region. Of course, many of the U.S. alliance networks might be increasingly thought of as Cold War relics by the administration—much as the 30-year old ABM Treaty was. In this event, the loss of South Korea may not be an issue. However, from a Mearsheimerian perspective, the United States should not be too willing to distance itself from South Korea or even nudge it into the Chinese camp.69 Mearsheimer posits that a Chinese hegemony in East Asia would be a direct threat to the security of the United States. This is the only type of threat that regional hegemons have to fear, so they seek to thwart the formation of other hegemons. Regional hegemons add to their security by forming alliances with states near other potential regional hegemons. In other words, states prefer to buck-pass with alliance decisions. The United States did this during the Cold War. If China is indeed going to be the world’s second regional hegemon, the United States will want friends in the region to provide the first line of defense. Engagement with North Korea will signal a willingness to deepen U.S. friendship with South Korea. But the central tension remains: there is a fundamental lack of trust between the United States and North Korea. The irresponsible, authoritarian leadership of the latter plays no small part here. As mentioned in the Chapter 1, North Korea has not embraced democratization or liberalization, as have South Korea, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent China. This is where South Korea can play a key role of providing credible commitment on both sides. The progressive Roh regime has the trust of both antagonists and can help facilitate simultaneous first moves by each to reduce tensions. The administration’s inability to enforce a consistent policy direction, one that is not based on an all-for-nothing approach and underestimates negotiations and true multilateral cooperation, is likely to encourage further weapons proliferation and destabilization of the Peninsula, undermine the U.S. relations with its allies in the region, and continue to erode the overall image of America. An alternative policy would reaffirm American commitment to economic, military, and diplomatic cooperation with its regional allies,

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mainly South Korea and Japan. The United States should welcome the sunshine policy of South Korea. Other measures should focus on creating more Special Economic Zones (such as the one initiated by South Korea) within the country, thus improving North Korea’s economic infrastructure and increasing the country’s transparency, both of which are necessary for significant economic reforms to take place. This will be difficult, as the United States presently sees the industrial complex in Kaesong as a threat, and further, as a South Korean breach of its international commitments, since the South is included in the list of 32 countries that are banned from sending strategic facilities to the North.

Notes 1. “Visit of Republic of Korea Foreign Minister,” Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington, DC, January 29, 2001. See the introductory chapter of this volume for discussions of democratization in the region. 2. Larry A. Niksch, “Korea: US-Korean Relations-Issues for Congress,” July 18, 2003. Congressional Research Service, Report IB98045. 3. Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” September 21, 2001, Congressional Research Service, Report IB91141. 4. “U.S. Policy on China and North Korea,” James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, remarks to the World Affairs Council, Washington, DC, January 30, 2003. 5. Tae-Hwan Kwak, “The Six-Party Nuclear Talks: An Evaluation and Policy Recommendation,” Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies (Fall 2004). 6. Edward Olsen, “Trilateral Cooperation in the Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Pacific Focus: Inha Journal Of International Studies (Fall 2004). 7. “North Korea Waits for New U.S. Policy,” BBC News, December 4, 2004. 8. Nicholas Eberstadt, “North Korea: Beyond Appeasement,” in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000). 9. Matthew Reiss, “Politics, Profit, and Bush’s North Korea Policy,” Institute for Public Affairs (July 5, 2004). 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Eberstadt, “North Korea: Beyond Appeasement.” 13. Karl DeRouen, Jr. and David Jackson, “The Role of Domestic Politics in U.S. Korean Peninsula Policy,” in Uk Heo and Shale

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14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

M i l i c a B e g ov i c a n d K a r l D e R o u e n J r . Horowitz, eds., Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and IndiaPakistan (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002). Kwak, “The Six-Party Nuclear Talks.” Peter Slevin, “Biden, Lugar Assail North Korean Policy, Senators Call for White House to Open Talks with Pyeongyang on nuclear bid,” Washington Post, February 5, 2003. Kwak, “The Six-Party Nuclear Talks.” David E. Sanger, “Administration Divided Over North Korea,” New York Times, April 21, 2003. Hamish McDonald, “Cheney’s Tough Talking Derails Negotiations with North Korea,” Herald Correspondent in Beijing, December 22, 2003, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/ 12/21/1071941611806. html?oneclick⫽true. “Statement of Principle,” http://www.servizilocali.com/documenti/ principles.pdf (accessed January 8, 2004). Ibid. “Letter to President Clinton on Iraq,” Partnership for New American Century, January 26, 1998, http://www.newamericancentury.org/ iraqclintonletter.htm (accessed January 4, 2004). For information about Paul Wolfowitz look at Defense Department Bios: Paul Wolfowitz, “Axis of Influence: Appendix C: Who is Who in the Bush Administration,” World Policy Institute (July 2002); Michael Flynn, “The War Hawks,” Chicago Tribune, April 13, 2003; Jason Leopold, “Tenet: Wolfowitz Did It,” Counterpunch, July 19, 2003; Peter Slevin and Dana Priest, “Wolfowitz Concedes Iraq Errors,” Washington Post, July 23, 2003; David Ignatius, “A War of Choice, and One Who Chose It,” Washington Post, November 2, 2003. “Wolfowitz Warning to North Korea,” The Advertiser, June 3, 2003. “In Rumsfeld’s Words: Guidelines for Committing Forces,” New York Times, October 12, 2002. IISS Asia Security Conference, Singapore: Remarks as prepared for delivery by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 5, 2004. James Dao, “Bush Administration Defends Its Approach on North Korea,” New York Times, February 7, 2003. CNN.com, April, 2003; Sanger, “Administration Divided Over North Korea,” New York Times, April 21, 2003. Andrew Ward, “Pyongyang in Personal Attacks on Rumsfeld,” Financial Times, September 29, 2003. Ibid. Sanger, “Administration Divided Over North Korea.” Neil MacKay, “Bush Planned Iraq ‘Regime Change’ Before Becoming President,” The Sunday Herald, Scotland, September 15, 2002. Hamish McDonald, “Cheney’s Tough Talk Derails Negotiations with North Korea,” December 22, 2003, Herald Correspondent in Beijing.

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33. Joshua Fellman, “US Envoy Resigns Over Harsh Stance on North Korea,” Business Day, August 27, 2003. 34. “Press Briefing on North Korea and Iraq,” John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at Ninoy Acquino Airport, Manila, Philippines, January 9, 2003. 35. “North Korea Bans Bolton from Talks,” Associated Press, August 3, 2003. 36. “US Won’t Be Fooled Again by North Korea Nuclear Freeze,” AFX News Limited, July 21, 2004. 37. Reiss, “Politics, Profit, and Bush’s North Korea Policy.” 38. Glen Kessler, “The Power-Values Approach to Policy: Move to State Raises Rice’s Profile,” Washington Post, November 21, 2004. 39. Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2000). 40. “Condi Slams Clinton Korea Policy, Says ‘We’re Not Going Back There,’ ” Newsmax.com, September 9, 2003. 41. Barry Schweid, “U.S. Persistence in Using Diplomacy To Solve N. Korea Nuclear Weapons Crisis Coming Up Short,” Associated Press, December 14, 2004. 42. Wade Bose, “Missile Defense: Deploying a Work in Progress,” September 21, 2001. Congressional Research Service, Report IB91141. 43. John D. Moteff, “Defense Research: DOD’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Program,” March 10, 2003. Congressional Research Service, Report IB10062. 44. “Tenet: North Korea Has Ballistic Missile Capable of Hitting U.S.,” CNN.com, February 12, 2003. 45. “N. Korea May Test Nuclear Bomb,” Agence France-Presse, 2004. 46. Ivan Eland, “Bush’s Grandiose Missile Defense Scheme,” CATO Institute, May 7, 2001; Center for Defense Information, “Fact Sheet on Missile Defense Agency,” September 29, 2004. 47. “Russia Calls on North Korea to Cooperate with UN Nuclear Watchdog,” Associated Press, December 25, 2002. 48. “The Bush Administration and Nonproliferation: A New Strategy Emerges,” Testimony of Joseph Cirincione before the House International Relations Committee, March 30, 2004. 49. Deanne E. Rennack, “North Korea: Economic Sanctions,” January 24, 2003, Congressional Research Service, Report RL31696. 50. “North Korea Urged Not to Restart Reactor,” Washington Post, December 22, 2002. 51. Erik Eckholm, “North Korea Presses Demand for Direct Talks with US,” New York Times, January 31, 2003. 52. Reiss, “Politics, Profit, and Bush’s North Korea Policy.” 53. “North Korea Rejects U.S. Charges on Enriched Uranium,” Agence France-Presse, August 28, 2003.

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54. See KCNA, August 29, 2003, for details of the plan. http:// www.kcna.co.jp. 55. Soo-Jeong Lee, “Bush Rejects North Korean Offer of Nuclear Program Freeze for Energy Aid,” Washington Post, December 10, 2003. 56. Opening Remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 2, 2004. 57. Republic of Korea’s Deputy Minister Lee Soo-Hyuck, Press Briefing on the first day of the Plenary session at the Second Round of 6-Party Talks, February 25, 2004, http://www.mofat.go.kr/ko/division. 58. Kwak, “The Six-Party Nuclear Talks.” 59. Power and Interest News Report, “The Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks,” September 5, 2005, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac⫽ view_report&report_id⫽360&language_id⫽1 (accessed February 28, 2006). 60. Paul Kerr, “Kim Willing to Talk, Does Not Say When,” Arms Control Today, July/August (2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/ 2005_07-08/NorthKorea.asp (accessed February 28, 2006). 61. See Seung-Ho Joo, “U.S.-ROK Relations: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension,” paper presented at Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI (March 2–5, 2005). 62. Anthony Faiola, “As Tensions Subside between Two Koreas, U.S. Strives to Adjust; Thaw Strains South’s Alliance With Washington,” July 25, 2004. 63. Ibid. 64. IISS Asia Security Conference, Singapore: “Measures and Prospects on the Resolution of the DPRK Nuclear Issue” by Lee Soo-hyuck, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Republic of Korea. 65. Song-Won Choe, “South Koreans: U.S. a Bigger Threat than North Korea,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, January 16, 2004. 66. Faiola, “As Tensions Subside between Two Koreas.” 67. John Wolfsthal, “America’s Weakened Deterrence,” International Herald Tribune, May 31, 2004. 68. Joo, “U.S.-ROK Relations.” 69. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

Chapter 10

Japan ’s R esponse to Asia’ s Security Problems Dennis Patterson

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wo ongoing conflicts have defined Asian international relations throughout the postwar period. These are the conflict that exists between China and Taiwan and the conflict that has divided the Korean Peninsula since the armistice in 1953.1 While the level of threat that these conflicts have posed to the region has waxed and waned, Japan’s approach to promoting its own security interests has been highly stable, defined by many well-known characteristics. Among the more important are a ceiling on defense spending of 1 percent of GDP, an ongoing commitment to the U.S.-Japan security treaty despite periods of tension over trade issues, and a security role that is limited to self-defense of the home islands. In the last several years, however, Japan’s approach to promoting its Asian security interests has departed from the past in notable ways. These changes are ongoing and have proceeded in response to many factors, the most important of which have been the manner in which the Korean and China-Taiwan conflicts have evolved. To date, they have involved, among other things, a more active defense policy that involves the forward projection of force away from the home islands, a modernization of the land, maritime, and air self-defense forces to assist in this new effort to project military power, and the development of a more supportive domestic policy environment through revisions of the legal and doctrinal bases upon which its security policy has rested.

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How far Japan’s security policy changes will go remains to be seen, but any attempt to project future trends must rely on a careful explanation for why Japan’s security policy departed from long-established patterns in the first place. The purpose of this chapter is to provide such an explanation, and it will accomplish this by focusing on three factors. The first of these concerns international security conditions that policy planners must consider when defining and implementing security policy. While there is disagreement as to exactly how international conditions shape the security policy, there is no disagreement that the structure of the international system and the nature of existing international and regional conflicts are the principal factors that planners must take into consideration.2 A second set of factors is domestic, referring to the nature of the regime in which security policy is being examined and to the distribution of elite views and public opinion relating to security policy. The third factor, national identity, interacts with both domestic political forces and international conditions and, thus, affects the manner in which these two sets of factors help shape a nation’s security policy.3 Specifically, national identity refers to both endogenous and exogenous forces that combine to shape how a nation’s population sees itself and, as a consequence of this, the nations with which it interacts. This means that national identity acts not only as a constraint or opportunity on a nation’s leaders in their security policy roles, but also as a tool that is used by these same leaders to help justify certain policy actions while discrediting others. These three factors must be considered if we are to understand why Japan’s security policy and operational plans in Asia have been characterized by a long period of policy stability throughout the postwar period, only to depart from this stability in the last several years. Indeed, Japan’s recent departure from long-established patterns is witnessed in the more active support role the Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) have played and continue to play in such operations as the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and in efforts by the Koizumi Government to amend the legal environment to allow the country to engage in collective self-defense activities. Explaining these recent changes, however, requires that we first make clear what is meant by the stability of Japanese security policy so that Japan’s long period of policy consistency can be contrasted with the recent changes.

Japan’s Security Policy during the Cold War When we say that Japan’s postwar security policy and its operational plans to implement that policy have been characterized by a long

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period of stability, we are saying that this policy in its conceptual and actual forms remained consistent in certain fundamental ways. While these fundamentals have taken on a number of manifestations, they can be reduced to three specific aspects. The first refers to the overall structure of Japanese security policy, namely the fact that it was made and implemented within the confines of the U.S.-Japan security treaty system. Established in the early 1950s when the Allied Occupation was terminated and Japan regained its sovereignty, this security system encountered a number of challenges and crises, but it has continued intact and remains the basic framework within which Japanese security policy is designed and implemented. From its inception, this treaty system set out a hierarchy of responsibility, and it was this hierarchy that shaped the specific behavioral roles that Japan and the United States took on in providing for Japan’s security. These behavioral roles involve the second fundamental way that Japan’s security policy has been stable throughout the postwar period. Even as the Asian security environment evolved, Japan’s role was passive and supportive, while the United States assumed the main burden for providing the region’s security. This support role that Japan has taken on can be defined both by what functions it has performed and what functions it has avoided. Concerning the latter, while the region’s security imperatives require a nuclear deterrent, this function has never been taken on by Japan. Rather, Japan has relied on the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. Conventional defense, on the other hand, is where Japan’s role was more active, but its security activities were nonetheless limited to the self-defense of its home islands. For this reason, it has maintained U.S. military bases and housed American troops on its own soil so that, as security conditions require, the U.S. military could more easily project its power throughout the region. With respect to global responsibilities within the U.S.-Japan security treaty system, Japan also came to play an active role, albeit much later in the postwar period. This more active global role involved Japan participating in UN-sanctioned, noncombatant peacekeeping activities. The third fundamental way that Japan’s security policy remained stable throughout the postwar period concerns the fact that it was designed and implemented in a context of legal and doctrinal consistency. What this means is that leaders making security policy were always considerate of the constraints imposed by Article IX of the postwar constitution. This in turn meant that, regardless of what actions were demanded by the region’s changing security imperatives, security policy was guided by the doctrine of limited self-defense and Japan’s security identity was that of a junior partner.

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To be sure, there were ongoing disagreements among Japan’s political parties over just what was allowed by the constitution and what specifically was meant by limited self-defense. Nonetheless, parties to these disputes always evaluated specific security actions in the context of what was allowed by the constitution.4 It is for this reason that even when the Japanese government revised its operational plans in a way that increased Japan’s defense role, which it did from time to time, it always did so in light of what would be allowed by the constitution. For example, when the Japanese government enacted the 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law, which allowed the SDFs to participate in overseas peacekeeping operations, it was clearly to specify how this new defense behavior would not violate Article IX of the constitution.5 While Japan’s national security identity was defined by a long adherence to certain fundamentals, this does not mean that its actual policy was entirely static, because it did evolve throughout the postwar period. One way its security policy evolved was in the manner that Japan managed its alliance with the United States to keep the U.S.Japan security treaty structure intact. As the postwar period progressed, U.S.-Japan relations came under increasing amounts of tension due to ongoing trade disputes. The problem was not simply the growing U.S. bilateral trade deficit but also the fact that Japan’s economy was performing well while the U.S. economy was not. This resulted in economic and security relations becoming linked as some U.S. officials accused Japan of being a free-rider on defense. To counter these charges and to help keep the security structure intact, Japan increased its financial contributions so that it could better assist the United States in underwriting the costs of maintaining the U.S.Japan security treaty system.6 A second way that Japan’s security policy evolved throughout the postwar period relates to the country’s actual security behavior in the Asian region. This did not involve Japan taking a more active security posture vis-à-vis the other nations of Northeast Asia because, in addition to raising the ire of its neighbors, this would have violated the principle of limited self-defense that had guided its postwar security policy. Rather, Japan’s role evolved as it became a more active promoter of Asian peace and security by helping to finance economic development in the region. This was accomplished through substantial increases in overseas development assistance and through policies that encouraged investment in the countries of the region. Finally, Japanese security policy evolved throughout the postwar period by Japan becoming a more visible and important global actor.

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Again, like the more visible and important role it evolved in the Asian region, this did not mean that Japan abandoned its focus on defending the home islands. Indeed, this remained Japan’s primary defense goal. Rather, it meant that Japan increasingly behaved around the globe like it began to behave in the Asian region. Specifically, while remaining a supporter of U.S. strategy, Japan developed an identity that its international role was to help promote global peace and prosperity through increases in its overseas development assistance and investment promotion efforts. In other words, Japan supported the United States in its global security efforts by using its financial resources to promote economic development. Throughout this time, it would be incorrect to say that the evolution of Japan’s security policy did not lead to more independent policy action especially in light of Japan’s identity as a model of economic development that was different from that promoted by the United States and the West. This did occur, but Japan’s growing policy independence did not take it out of the U.S.-Japan security treaty structure nor did it redefine its security identity as the junior partner of the United States, practicing something other than limited self-defense. Consequently, even where Japan did modify its role, it did so in a very confined way. Finally, in the area of domestic factors, Japan adhered to the legal and doctrinal restrictions that had been put into place at the beginning of the postwar period.

Japan’s Post–Cold War Security Policy The end of the Cold War in Europe did not lead to immediate changes in Japan’s security policy. In fact, it was not until the Japanese Defense Agency’s announcement in 2001 that it intended to revise the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) that we witness the beginning of Japan’s departure from past fundamentals. This announcement occurred one month before the September 11 terrorist attacks, which encouraged the Japanese government to more actively pursue the security policy changes that were envisioned by the country’s Defense Agency. To understand how the changes that defense elites had been studying ultimately led the government to diverge from past fundamentals, it is necessary to examine current changes in light of these fundamentals. As stated earlier, the first of these fundamentals concerns Japan’s adherence to the U.S.-led security treaty system. What has changed since 2001 is that Japan reaffirmed its commitment to that system and

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agreed to increase the role it plays within it. On its face, this may not seem like a departure from past fundamentals, but two aspects of Japan’s reaffirmed commitment suggest otherwise. First, in the last several years, the U.S.-Japan security treaty system evolved from a defense arrangement focused on limited self-defense of the home islands in response to the region’s conflicts to one that is based on a strategy designed to preempt the threats posed by terrorism.7 As the Iraq War has shown, this current antiterrorist orientation is defined by a proactive, power-projecting security strategy that requires much more from Japan than the original security structure did. Second, many security scholars argued that a breakdown of, or a lessened commitment to, the U.S.-Japan security treaty system would be the most likely cause of Japan assuming a more assertive security policy posture in the region.8 Unfortunately for proponents of this view, this assertion is belied by recent changes. Indeed, it was when Japan reaffirmed its commitment to the U.S.-Japan security treaty system in the region that it also began designing and implementing a more active, preemptive approach to security policy. As Japan’s identity within the U.S.-Japan security system changed, so also has the actual role that Japan has taken on within that system. This change is ongoing and characterized by Japan gradually abandoning its limited self-defense posture in favor of a more active, power-projecting role. Evidence for this kind of change is witnessed in two areas. The first refers to certain security actions that Japan has already taken, and perhaps the best illustration of this rests with its participation in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Although the invasions of these two countries are now formally over, both still involve theaters of ongoing military action in which Japan’s SDFs are stationed.9 This departure from past practices should not be understated, but it is perhaps less important than the fact that Japan’s SDFs participated in the initial invasions of these two countries. It is true that the Japanese military played only a support role, providing fuel, water, medical supplies, and other necessities to United States and coalition forces during the invasions. Japanese SDFs did not engage in actual combat operations and were allowed to use force only for defensive purposes. Nonetheless, these kinds of actions are a departure from past behavior in that they are an indication not only of a more militarily active Japan but also a security policy that involves a forward projection of military power away from the home islands. To enhance its ability to be a more active participant in the war on terror, the Japanese government has embarked on a thorough remodeling of the SDFs. Some aspects of this remodeling, like the acquisition

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of PAC-3 missiles and the pursuit of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability, can be interpreted as defensive actions in that they are being designed to guard against North Korea’s missile development efforts and China’s military expansion. Other aspects of Japan’s SDFs modernization, however, must be interpreted as providing security in a post–9/11 world, which requires expanding Japan’s regional power projection capability and, thus, extending the operational range of the SDFs. These improvements involve many changes to the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDFs. With respect to the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF), perhaps the most important changes concern the deployment and continued development of Osumi-class transportation ships that are capable of carrying large helicopters, landing craft, tanks, and, thus, engaging in amphibious assault operations. In addition to this, the MSDF are in the process of developing a supply ship that is 5,000 tons larger than anything else it has and is designed to support refueling at sea operations, augmenting Japan’s power projection capabilities. Finally, the MSDF are building two improved Aegis destroyers that have the SPY-1 Aegis radar and surface-to-air missiles capable of intercepting theater ballistic missiles. The Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDFs) have also undergone and continue to undergo a number of improvements, which indicate a strategy change from defense focused on the home islands to one where military power can be projected to where it is needed. Currently, air transport activities are conducted with C-1 aircraft, but these are being replaced with a new generation of transportation aircraft that have twice the capacity, three times the speed, and the ability to carry up to 100 more personnel. In addition to this, the ASDF are modernizing Japan’s fleet of F-15s by improving their radar and missile-launch capabilities, and they are adding aerial refueling tankers to their current capabilities. While the addition of these aircrafts is being justified in terms of training efficiency and reduced landings, these aircrafts will give the ASDF a greatly extended range of operation.10 Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDFs) are also undergoing a complete modernization as a result of this overhaul of the Japanese military. Among the changes being made are the purchase of numerous up-to-date weapon systems such as Type-90 tanks, new ground-to-air missile systems, and a variety of new helicopters, both attack and transport. In addition to this, the GSDF have been developing a unit of several thousand personnel that can be rapidly deployed to overseas areas to deal with “sudden outbreaks of terror, guerilla infiltrations, and other international conflicts.”11

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Japan has also begun to revise the legal and doctrinal context within which it has conducted its postwar defense policies, and two efforts in this area are noteworthy here. The first concerns the steady stream of legislation and revisions to defense policy guidelines that have been produced by the Japanese government in the last several years. Since 2001, a number of permanent and emergency laws have been passed by the Japanese Diet, which make very clear how the country would respond in case of an attack. These legislative measures have also concerned themselves with the dispatch of SDFs overseas and the operation of American military forces stationed on Japanese soil. In addition to these legislative efforts, the Japanese Defense Agency in cooperation with a special council appointed by the prime minister is working to revise the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). This effort is scheduled to be completed sometime in 2006, and it is expected to result in a complete change in Japanese security policy. Again, this change involves refocusing Japanese security policy away from strictly defending the home islands to one that is more focused on projecting power throughout the region and fighting the war on terrorism more effectively. The second effort in this area involves attempting to address the one hindrance the Japanese government faces in its attempts to revamp Japanese security policy for a post–9/11 world. The reference here is to Article IX of the postwar Japanese Constitution which, in practical terms, requires Japanese forces to operate only under their own commanders and not as part of a larger multinational effort, and to be prohibited from deployment if the purpose of the action is the use of force. These restrictions have prevented Japan from engaging in what is known as collective self-defense, which refers to the right of a country to attack an enemy if that enemy attacks an ally. In other words, this means taking military action against a country even if it is not directly attacked by that country. There is no disagreement today in Japan that Article IX does not allow for collective self-defense, since this constitutional provision allows only for the possession of weapons that are used for limited self-defense. Where there is disagreement is over the advisability of securing the right of collective self-defense through an amendment to the constitution. As it is a controversial area, only a few postwar political leaders have tried to amend Article IX, and, of those who did try, none succeeded. While this historical legacy renders recently revived efforts to amend Article IX inauspicious, there are some aspects of current efforts which suggest that this time may be different. Most notably, efforts to remove the postwar constitution’s restrictions are more deliberate and

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systematic today than they were in the past. Evidence of this is witnessed in the care with which the Koizumi administration has taken to establish a clear position on the matter and then begun to investigate the issue at the governmental rather than just the party level.12 Moreover, the domestic political environment is more supportive today of Japan’s pursuing a more active defense policy. Specifically, there is more public support today for collective self-defense than at any time in the past, and far less public opposition to the idea of amending the constitution accordingly.13

Explaining Recent Changes in Japanese Security Policy Many factors led to stability in Japan’s security policy from the end of the World War II until the last several years. International factors have naturally been important, and, as mentioned earlier, most significant were the China and Taiwan and the North and South Korea conflicts as well as the Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories.14 It is true that the danger the two former conflicts presented to Japan differed over time, and it is also true that they have evolved as the postwar period progressed. Nonetheless, these two conflicts remained somewhat constant throughout the postwar period and, as a result, provided a level of continuity in Asian international relations that encouraged consistency in Japan’s security policy. The Northern Territories problem also evolved throughout the postwar period. This was particularly true in the late 1970s and 1980s, when a Soviet military buildup in the region raised the concern of U.S. and Japanese security planners. Nonetheless, this buildup never forced a change in Japanese security goals with respect to the Northern Territories, which has always remained the return of these islands to Japanese sovereignty. In addition to international factors, stability in Japan’s postwar security policy was encouraged by domestic factors. Most important among these was 38 years of LDP rule and rather consistent public attitudes on matters of security policy. Finally, Japan’s identity as the junior partner, focusing on the self-defense of the home islands in support of the regional security efforts of the United States, remained constant throughout this period of time. While there were many indications that significant changes were occurring in both the domestic and international environments, it was not until the early years of the new century that we would know how such changes would affect the strategic environment in Asia and, thus, the calculations made by Japanese security planners. In the international

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arena, two sets of developments were most important. The first was not region specific and refers to the impact associated with 9/11 and the ensuing global war on terrorism. Japan is no stranger to acts of domestic terror, as the sarin gas attacks on a busy Tokyo commuter train revealed. Indeed, this event brought home to Japanese officials and the average citizen the inadequacies that existed in the nation’s civil defense system. Moreover, when this event was viewed in light of the events of 9/11, it only reinforced the belief among Japanese leaders that a security policy that adequately secured the country from terrorist infiltration would have to go beyond protecting Japan from the conventional threats it had been facing in the region. An adequate security policy would have to anticipate and prevent new threats such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and infiltration by insurgents. The second set of international factors that suggested a need for a revised security policy was region specific and refers to how the evolution of East Asia’s major conflicts required Japanese leaders to rethink their strategy in the region. The first and arguably more important conflict was that occurring on the Korean Peninsula. North and South Korea have long represented to Japan the threat of two armed powers, ever mobilized for war, in very close geographic proximity. This situation in and of itself was not the cause of recent changes in Japan’s security policy, because it represented a constant threat throughout the postwar period. Rather, aspects of this conflict changed after the end of the Cold War, increasing the threat it posed and leading to a reassessment of Japan’s security policy.15 With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the withdrawal of Soviet support,16 North Korea encountered many economic difficulties and, as a result, had to develop an alternative international strategy simply to survive as a state. Part of its strategy involved being aggressive on defense, which among other things led it to develop and test new missile systems (Nodong and Daepodong). These new missiles were not only test-fired in the vicinity of Japan. Their launchings were followed by statements by North Korean President Kim Jong-Il that, when deployed, they would be aimed directly at Japan. These provocative actions were viewed negatively enough in Tokyo, but they were particularly troublesome because Japan had been grappling with other long-standing problems with North Korea. At different points throughout the postwar period, North Korean agents had abducted Japanese citizens and held them in undisclosed locations in North Korea. The problem for Japan was that these issues of retrieving abductees and persuading the North Korean government to end its destabilizing missile tests occurred at a time when a relatively new

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U.S. administration was instituting a foreign policy that labeled North Korea part of the world’s axis of evil. This meant that being closely tied to the United States only hindered Japan in its desire to end North Korea’s missile tests and retrieve people who had been abducted. To this end, the Koizumi administration pursued an independent policy action that involved setting up a direct meeting with Kim Jong-Il. This was an historic action on the part of the Japanese government, and the result was the issuance of the Pyongyang Declaration. Koizumi’s efforts were hailed as a diplomatic triumph in the Japanese press, because the North Korean leader admitted that Japanese citizens had been abducted and issued a formal apology. In return for efforts to investigate fully the abductee matter and engage in a less aggressive defense posture, Japan apologized for the “damage and suffering” experienced by the Korean people during the Occupation period and agreed to a significant package of aid. For a short time, it looked as if Japan and North Korea would put their relations on a path to normalcy, but progress was unfortunately halted when it became known that North Korea had restarted its nuclear development program.17 Upon learning of North Korea’s behavior, the Japanese government abandoned its pledge to send aid and then announced its intention to work more closely with the United States in promoting its regional security and halting North Korea’s nuclear development. While not posing the immediate threat to Japan that North Korea posed, changes in China’s regional defense posture also contributed to Japan’s decision to rethink its Asian security strategy and to reorganize the SDFs. China’s altered defense strategy became an increasingly important issue for Japan when the decline in Soviet influence in Asia gave it the opportunity to pursue its regional goals more actively. This more active pursuit of regional goals required an enhancement of China’s military power. Consequently, the Chinese government has engaged in a significant expansion of its defense spending. This has included the acquisition of equipment to outfit a blue-water navy, including Sovremenny-class destroyers, Keio-class submarines, and DF-31 ballistic missiles.18 Tokyo’s concern is not simply that China has increased its defense spending but more importantly that the Chinese government has not been forthcoming about the nature and purpose of its increased military expenditures. This matter is of great concern to Japan’s leaders because, when combined with such things as China’s increasingly threatening stance toward Taiwan and support of North Korea, China’s intentions appear to be anything but benign. Indeed, Japanese officials see China’s behavior as focused on isolating Japan and altering the military balance in the region, and this

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situation has naturally led to a decline in Sino-Japanese relations. Again, much of the cause of this decline can be traced directly to actions on the part of China. One of these involved a short-lived but nonetheless disruptive row over the disputed Senkaku Islands. These islands had been occupied by Japanese right-wing nationalists, which was understandably interpreted negatively in China. However, in an attempt to restrict rightist actions there, the Japanese government assumed more control over this territory, but, rather than acknowledge Japan’s actions as helping to defuse this issue, Beijing’s reaction was as strong as it was negative. This reaction helped destroy any trust that existed between the two states on this issue. Another problem that contributed to a decline in Sino-Japanese relations concerns China’s Taiwan policy, which is viewed in Tokyo as increasingly destabilizing. Japan became especially concerned over China’s recently enacted antisecession law, which essentially commits China to military action against Taiwan in the event of a formal declaration of independence. This is not meant to suggest that Japan bears no responsibility in the decline that occurred in its relationship with China, because the Japanese government has certainly played a part in this drama. The problem begins with the legacy of the Pacific War, which has always been troublesome for the two countries.19 This legacy had led China to react swiftly and negatively to any indication of renewed militarism in Japan. This is particularly true of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine that honors such Class A war criminals as General Hideki Tojo in addition to some 2.4 million war dead.20 However, recent demonstrations against Japan over government approvals of history textbooks have led to growing concerns in Tokyo. These demonstrations have been more widespread and virulently antiJapanese than any in recent memory, and they have heightened Japanese concerns about the Chinese government’s commitment to protecting Japanese consular property in China.21 These changes in the international conditions that define Asia’s security environment have been partner to changes in domestic conditions that have at once led to more support for and less resistance to the Japanese government going forward with a new security policy and a reorganization of the SDFs. One aspect of this occurred at the elite level and has been defined by the decline of political forces that have historically been anti-SDFs in the past.22 In addition, public attitudes related to security matters have overall become more supportive of the changes that have been occurring. One aspect of this change in Japanese public opinion concerns how Japanese evaluate the various nations of the Asian region, that is,

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Figure 10.1 Feelings of closeness towards China.

whether they feel relations with specific nations of the region are close or not. These attitudes are measured with surveys taken by the Cabinet Public Information Office,23 and they reveal that the greatest changes are witnessed in public attitudes toward China and South Korea. Concerning the former, figure 10.1 indicates that most Japanese felt close to China throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century, however, percentages of those feeling close and those not feeling close were nearly equivalent. This trend continued to such an extent that, between 2003 and 2004, Japanese not feeling close to China were nearly 20 percentage points higher than those feeling close. This was a first since data like these have been collected.24 An equally interesting change took place in the way that Japanese have viewed their relations with South Korea. Again, because of the legacy of the Japanese occupation, the relationship between these two countries has from time to time been difficult. This is reflected in the data in figure 10.2, which show, on average, that fewer Japanese felt close to South Korea than those who did not. This was particularly true in the 1990s, when those not feeling close to South Korea were as much as 25 percentage points higher than those who felt close. Given the problematic nature of Japan-Korean relations in the postwar period,

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Figure 10.2 Feelings of closeness toward South Korea.

these patterns are expected, but the data in figure 10.2 also show that Japanese feelings toward South Korea changed in the last several years. Specifically, in the latter half of the 1990s, Japanese not feeling close to South Korea began to decline while those feeling close began to increase. This reversal of previous trends was fairly dramatic and led to five straight years of more Japanese feeling close to South Korea than the opposite. Feelings of closeness toward Korea initially increased when Korea made the transition to democracy, but those holding negative views remained the more prevalent group throughout the 1990s. It was not until the last few years when North Korea adopted a more aggressive regional posture and Japanese leaders had to value more highly a stable partnership with the South that Japanese respondents felt increasingly closer to Korea. While there are no comparable time series data for how Japanese felt about North Korea, these same surveys of the Japanese public from 2002 to the present asked Japanese respondents what concerned them most about North Korea. Responses to these questions turned up the same four issues. In order of preference, there are the problems of Japanese abductees, North Korea’s nuclear program, and its missile-testing program, and the nature of its political system.25 Changes in how Japanese respondents viewed these Asian countries are indicative of an evolving domestic political climate, but they alone do not tell us whether or not Japan’s national security identity had

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Figure 10.3 Japanese views of PKOs.

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changed in a way that the Japanese public would support a reorganization of the SDFs for a more forward-based security strategy in the region. To make this determination, questions more directly concerned with the country’s security behavior are necessary, and fortunately, the Cabinet Public Information Office did ask such questions. The first reported here refers to the type of international security cooperation activities respondents thought deserved Japanese participation, and, in the last four years, the top two answers were the promotion of peace and security and combating terrorism.26 These answers are important because they imply a shift in Japan’s identity that is more supportive of security behavior that was opposed in the past. Typically, public support for peacekeeping operations typically declined when it is known that such operations involve the potential for the SDF to become engaged in a militarily active theater. Nonetheless, the data in figure 10.3 indicate continued strong support for peacekeeping activities among Japanese, and this is true even in the last few years when these kinds of operations have involved dispatching troops to militarily active theaters.27 In addition to continued support for the SDFs engaging in international peacekeeping operations, more Japanese appear to be in favor of the SDFs playing an active role in protecting Japan’s security. Surveys of the Japanese public revealed that, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, only 40 percent of Japanese polled wanted to use the SDFs in the context of the U.S.-Japan security treaty system to protect Japanese security. Over the next two decades, however, this proportion grew substantially. By the year 2000, the percentage of Japanese wanting to use the SDFs within the U.S.-Japan security system to

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Figure 10.4 Japanese feelings toward the SDF.

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protect the nation’s security had grown to 70 percent.28 This trend does reflect a change in Japan’s national security identity because data from the same surveys show that more and more Japanese feel that security is an important enough issue to be dealt with in the classroom.29 These kinds of data may seem surprising, because many Asian security specialists and Japan scholars have written that Japan’s nonmilitarist stance in the postwar period is due to a culture of antimilitarism that defined the postwar domestic security environment. As the argument goes, this culture developed in response to the destruction heaped on Japan as a result of its actions in the Pacific War,30 and one notable manifestation of Japan’s culture of antimilitarism is a strong mistrust for the SDFs. Such feelings for the military in Japan may have been true early on in the postwar period, but nothing could be further from the truth as the postwar period progressed. As figure 10.4 indicates, the overwhelming majority of Japanese held positive feelings for the SDFs as early as the late 1960s and early 1970s. Moreover, if trends have done anything to this distribution of attitudes, they have widened the gap as those with positive impressions have increased slightly and those with negative impressions have declined slightly. Finally, to understand the transformation that has been occurring in Japan’s security policy in the last few years, one must ask more explicitly to what extent the concept of national identity has played a role. To be sure, the answer to this question is more involved than can be adequately dealt with in the space remaining here. Nonetheless, what can be said is that recent changes in Japanese security policy appear to be the product of the decline of an old national identity that

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has become less adequate for the world that Japan increasingly faces than the emergence of a new, clearly defined national identity. The reference here is to the national identity that Japan evolved in the postwar period as an alternative model of development than that represented by the United States. Indeed, Japan’s high levels of economic growth and its rapid rise to becoming the second-largest economy in the world rendered it the envy of the developing and developed worlds. As a result, Japan’s postwar trajectory became the object of study by many scholars and journalists who were interested in unlocking the secrets behind its rapid postwar ascendance. Many phrases have been coined to describe Japan’s development strategy,31 but what is important is that Japan’s remarkable economic success, combined with the rapid growth of other Asian economies—which ostensibly followed the Japanese model—led its leaders to believe that Japan had something special to offer the world, something that would help encourage peace and prosperity around the world. This national identity developed by Japan as the possessor of an alternative, state-driven path from the periphery led Japanese leaders to take a more active role in international economic development. Japan not only increased its overseas development assistance to individual countries and regions, it also contributed more to international organizations, and, in the process, it endeavored to place its own unique imprint on these institutions. Perhaps the most notable example is the World Bank, which had long been guided by AngloAmerican market principles of economic development in its approach to evaluating development projects. Believing that Japan’s path did indeed represent an alternative model, the Japanese government funded a separate study to highlight the experiences of those Asian nations that ostensibly employed the Japanese model in their economic development strategies.32 This national identity guided Japan’s approach to the world for many years, but it was severely challenged when Japan was not able to sustain its own economic performance. The bursting of Japan’s economic bubble at the end of 1989 resulted in Japanese assets losing two-thirds of their value, and, within a short time, this led to troubles in the real economy. Before too long, Japan was experiencing little or no economic growth year after year, a banking system that was sagging under a mountain of bad loans, and a government struggling with increasing fiscal limitations. This climate led not only to cutbacks in Japan’s overseas giving but also to government leaders rethinking the special the special international role their predecessors had assigned to the nation.

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Figure 10.5 Attitudes toward economic cooperation.

The data in figure 10.5 track the reaction of the Japanese public to these developments. Specifically, the data refer to Japanese attitudes on what is known as “economic cooperation,” the type of international participation that coincided with Japan’s essentially nonmilitarist orientation and its national identity as an alternative model of economic development. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the data indicate that more Japanese wanted to increase the country’s level of participation in economic cooperation activities. When this percentage is combined with those who favored keeping such participation at current levels, over 90 percent of Japanese respondents are accounted for. What these data also show, however, is that support for increasing Japan’s level of economic cooperation has declined in the last 15 years, while the percentage of Japanese feeling that a decrease is in order increased. This trend has proceeded to such an extent that those desiring a decrease now outnumber their counterparts. While these data do not say that Japan should embark on a more active security policy, they do suggest that Japan’s old paradigm as the symbol of all that was wrong with the American model of economic development has indeed lost its cache. This means that Japan will be forced to look for a new identity to help guide its leaders in a search for a more secure and prosperous future. There are many possibilities, but the most likely candidate is Japan becoming a “normal country,” a slogan coined by the pro-defense politician, Ozawa Ichiro. While the other factors that have been discussed earlier do not guarantee that this slogan will replace Japan’s old identity, we need to be aware that normal countries do indeed make rational calculations of their security

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needs and then employ their resources accordingly. In light of this and the changes that have already been made to Japanese security policy, it is entirely possible that Japan is much closer to being a normal country than anyone to date has admitted.

Notes 1. While it is true that the Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories, the four islands north of Hokkaido, has figured prominently in Japan’s postwar security, it would be an overstatement to say that this security issue also defined the international relations of the entire Asian region. Nonetheless, changes in Soviet behavior on this issue throughout the Cold War and post–Cold War periods strongly influenced Japan’s security behavior. 2. For general statements of the role played by international factors, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: The Free Press, 1954); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For an application of this perspective to Asian international relations, see Suisheng Zhao, Power Competition in East Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). For a controversial application of this perspective to Japan and its relations with the United States, see George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 3. While these three factors will be dealt with separately in this chapter, domestic factors and national identity have been somewhat conflated. See, specifically, Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism,” International Security 17, 4 (1993): 119–150; and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Japan’s National Security,” International Security 17, 4 (1993): 84–118. One interesting work in Japanese that does examine domestic factors separately from national identity is Nagahisa Toshio, Gamu riron no seiji keizai gaku: senkyo seido to boei seisaku [The Political Economy of Game Theory: The Election System and Defense Policy] (Tokyo: PHP Institute Press, 2001). 4. The main parties to this dispute were, first, the LDP, which argued that the constitution allowed the maintenance of military forces to carry out the nation’s self-defense. While the LDP’s members steadfastly defended this position, there have always been members of that party who advocated changing the constitution because of the limits it imposed on security policy. However, after Prime Minister Hatoyama’s failed attempt to accomplish this through a change in the election system in the late 1950s, such advocates have remained generally small in number. The Socialists and the Communists, on the other hand, have

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5.

6.

7.

8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

long argued that Article IX prohibited the existence of the Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) and advocated a policy of unarmed neutrality. The Communists have maintained this view, but the Socialist Party (SDPJ) abandoned this position in 1994 when its chairman, Murayama, became prime minister in a coalition government with the LDP. For example, the law required that troop dispatches be limited to 2,000, that the Diet approve any mission before dispatch, that the use of weapons be limited to self-defense, and that Japanese participation be restricted to areas where a cease-fire has been put into effect. It must be noted that Japan’s strategy of providing for its own security by only making financial contributions backfired during the Gulf War. The United States and other nations rebuked Japan for not taking a more active part in this military action, especially when it was an obvious beneficiary of the oil that flowed through the Persian Gulf. This experience would have a profound impact on how the Japanese leadership would respond when called to participate in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. It is true that the end of the Cold War was announced more than a decade before 9/11 and the subsequent war on terrorism. Nonetheless, Asia’s security imperatives continued to be defined by essentially Cold War conflicts, which intensified with the decline of Soviet power in the region. See, e.g., Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum” and Katzenstein, “Japan’s National Security.” Theaters of ongoing military action were avoided in the past because they were deemed to violate Article IX of the constitution. Some of the reasons given for these improvements involve increasing flight times for combat air patrols, allowing aircraft to land at distant fields when inclement weather makes such landings necessary, and “saving stopovers” in international cooperation activities. See Korea Research Institute for Strategy, The Strategic Balance in Northeast Asia (Seoul: KRIS, 2004), especially Chapter 3. Ibid., 136. Past efforts to rid the constitution of Article IX never enjoyed the full support of all LDP members and were typically conducted by factional groups within the ruling party. A Yomiuri Shimbun article revealed that, since 1998, majorities in public opinion polls have favored a constitutional amendment. See Korea Research Institute for Strategy, 161. See note 1 earlier. The following assessment relies on the discussion of the Korean situation in Boeicho. Nihon no boei [The Defense of Japan] (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Iincho, 2004). It is important to add here that, in the post-1989 period, the former Soviet Union’s economic problems led it, not only to remove its

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18. 19.

20. 21.

22.

23.

24. 25.

26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

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support from North Korea, but also to become much less of a security threat to Japan. Prime Minister Koizumi also had to deal with an unexpectedly negative reaction from the Japanese public over revelations that some Japanese abductees were either killed or missing. See, e.g., Korea Research Institute for Strategy, 138–139. This is also true for the two Koreas and other countries in the region. It is less true for Taiwan, which tends to see the occupation period in a less negative manner. See, e.g., Teng-Hui Lee, The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity (Tokyo: PHP Institute Press, 1999). Koizumi has visited this shrine once a year since becoming prime minister in 2001. Japan’s concerns are not without foundation. It was not that long ago when Chinese officials entered a consulate building in spite of Japanese protests to seize a North Korean seeking asylum. Moreover, some protests have involved the destruction of Japanese business establishments in China. Perhaps most notable here is the decline in support levels obtained by the SDPJ, which at one time captured more than a third of the vote and now is well under 10 percent of the vote. See Naikaku daijinkanbo seifu kohoshitsu, Gekkan yoron chosa [Public Opinion Monthly] (Tokyo: Seifu Kohoshitsu, various years). The problem of North Korea’s political system reached the top-four list of Japanese concerns only in 2005. Prior to this, it was supplanted by the problem of North Korean spy vessels intruding into Japanese territorial waters. In the latest survey available, those feeling close to China declined while those with the opposition perception increased. These data are from Naikaku daijinkanbo seifu kohoshitsu, Gekkan yoron chosa [Public Opinion Monthly] (Tokyo: Seifu Kohoshitsu, various years). Naikaku daijinkanbo seifu kohoshitsu, Gekkan yoron chosa, roku gatsu go [Public Opinion Monthly] (Tokyo: Seifu Kohoshitsu, June 2002). Those having a positive view of peacekeeping operations are those who said that Japan’s participation should either increase or remain at current levels. Those expressing negative views are those who said that participation levels should decrease combined with those who said that Japan should not participate at all. See Naikaku daijinkanbo seifu kohoshitsu, Gekkan yoron chosa [Public Opinion Monthly] (Tokyo: Seifu Kohoshitsu). Naikaku daijinkanbo seifu kohoshitsu, gekkan yoron chosa [Public Opinion Monthly] (Tokyo: Seifu Kohoshitsu, 2004). Again, see Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum” and Katzenstein, “Japan’s National Security.”

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31. These include such phrases as Japan Inc. and a society of “flexible rigidities,” but perhaps the most notable was “capitalist developmental state.” See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982). 32. See World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Chapter 11

The North Korean Nuclear C risis I n-Ta e k H y u n and Sung Deuk Hahm

T

he second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, when the United States accused North Korea of running a secret uranium-enrichment program in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.1 In December 2002, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a U.S.-led consortium created by the 1994 Agreed Framework to supply North Korea with alternative energy resources, suspended heavy oil shipments to North Korea. North Korea retaliated by quitting the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in early 2003 and restarting its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program, which had been frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Despite this fact, North Korea still claimed that it had no intention of producing nuclear weapons, and that the lifting of the nuclear freeze was necessary to generate needed electricity. In fact, while the 1994 Agreed Framework froze North Korea’s plutonium program for almost a decade, neither party was completely satisfied with either the compromise reached or its implementation.2 The United States was dissatisfied with the postponement of safeguards inspections to verify North Korea’s past activities, while North Korea was dissatisfied with the delayed construction of the light water reactors (LWRs). North Korea had demanded compensation from Washington, but the United States has maintained that 2003 was only a “target date” and not a strict contractual commitment.

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On May 12, 2003, North Korea announced that the bilateral “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” signed with South Korea on January 20, 1992, was no longer valid because of “U.S. actions.” Under the agreement, South and North Korea pledged not to produce nuclear weapons, not to reprocess plutonium, and not to enrich uranium. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea also agreed to fulfill its commitments under the joint declaration. Since 2003, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States have held three rounds of talks in Beijing aimed at persuading North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons development in return for economic and diplomatic rewards. However, little progress has been made and, in August 2004, North Korea expressed doubts about the six-party process. On February 10, 2005, North Korea surprisingly announced for the first time that it had nuclear arms and rejected moves to restart six-party talks anytime soon, arguing that it needed the weapons as protection against an increasingly hostile United States. This pronouncement dramatically raised the stakes in the North Korean nuclear crisis and posed a grave challenge to both South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun and U.S. president George W. Bush, who vowed to end North Korea’s nuclear crisis through six-party talks. Furthermore, on May 11, 2005, North Korea said that it had taken steps that could allow it to harvest more plutonium for atomic bombs and that it would bolster its arsenal. Specifically, North Korea had removed 8,000 fuel rods from the reactor at its main nuclear complex at Yongbyon. If reprocessed, the rods could, after several months, yield enough plutonium for a couple of nuclear bombs. This provocative move came amid rising international speculation about a possible North Korean nuclear test. Despite a tense standoff, there have been multidimensional efforts by the parties involved in this matter to resolve the issue by peaceful means. On July 26, 2005, the fourth round of the six-party talks was resumed after a 13-month impasse. Unlike earlier rounds, this one had no set closing date, and an unusual number of bilateral meetings have taken place between the North Korean and U.S. delegations. At the beginning, expectations were not high, since there was a huge gap between North Korea and the United States on critical issues such as multilateral security assurances, diplomatic normalization between Washington and Pyongyang, and North Korea’s desire for so-called peaceful use of nuclear power—even though South Korea offered to supply North Korea with massive amounts of electricity before the talks. Surprisingly, however, North Korea agreed on September 19, 2005, to give up all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear

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programs and pledged to return to nonproliferation treaties. In return, North Korea accomplished its purpose by persuading the United States to agree to North Korea’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the agreement. The other parties expressed their respect for North Korea’s stance on the civilian nuclear programs and agreed to discuss the subject of providing a LWR to North Korea at an appropriate time. In addition, to address North Korea’s argument that it cannot disarm under the U.S. nuclear threat, the United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention of attacking or invading North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons. Despite this successful end to the fourth round of negotiations aimed at removing the threat of nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula, the first stage of the fifth round of six-party talks to solve the North Korean nuclear issue ended on November 11, 2005 without reaching a specific date for the next meeting. North Korea took issue with U.S. financial sanctions on a Macau-based bank, which allegedly helped North Korea distribute counterfeit currency and engage in other illicit activities. Therefore, tough negotiations still lie ahead for the next round of six-party talks. The participants are expected to discuss how to execute the successful agreement of the fourth round of six-party talks. In particular, verification that North Korea is dismantling its nuclear weapons program will be most critical. To make matters worse, the resumption of the six-party talks has been further confounded because of exchanges of invective between North Korea and the United States. This was triggered by comments of U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow on December 5, 2005, which described North Korea as a “criminal regime,” and denouncing its alleged illegal activities such as counterfeiting U.S. dollars and dealing in weapons of mass destruction. Under these circumstances, we examine how changing external conditions of North and South Korea—particularly shifts in the balance of power involving the United States, Japan, China, and Russia—interact with internal political developments and evolving national identities in South Korea to influence the present and future of the North Korean nuclear crisis.

What about South Korea? South Korea is one of the direct parties involved with the North Korean nuclear crisis. The essence of South Korea’s national interests lies in protecting its national security. North Korea’s nuclear weapons

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pose a serious threat to the national security of South Korea and as such directly affect South Korea’s national interests. A nuclear-armed North Korea would pressure South Korea and Japan to consider building their own atomic arsenals. Therefore, the South Korean government has been eager to continue the six-party talks aimed at peacefully resolving North Korea’s nuclear crisis. A big difference between the North Korean nuclear crises in 1994 and 2002 is the position of South Korea toward North Korea and the United States. This difference derived from South Koreans’ perceptions of the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In 1994, South Koreans believed that North Korea’s nuclear motivations constituted a serious external threat. However, in 2002, a majority of South Koreans believed that North Korea was no longer a major external threat.3 Some of them known as progressives and liberals even tended to believe that North Korea’s nuclear motivations are defensive in nature and are designed to deter external threats to North Korea. Indeed, North Korea claimed that it needs a nuclear deterrent because of a “hostile policy” from the United States. New Political and Generational Shifts in South Korea As a result of new political and generational shifts, South Koreans’ perceptions of the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons program have changed. First, the end of the Cold War changed what was at stake in the North Korean nuclear crisis. In the Cold War era, anticommunism and a military threat from North Korea had played a crucial role in South Korean security. In contrast, in the post–Cold War era, a strong nationalism has played a crucial role in South Korean security. Second, democratization in South Korea called into question the old military dictatorships, reopening issues of national identity and national priorities long settled by the imminent military threat from North Korea. Transition to democracy in South Korea started with popular demonstrations in June 1987. Since then, the pressure for political and social democratization has increased.4 Third, most South Koreans now see North Korea mainly as an object for dialogue and assistance. The generation that lived through the Korean War is being supplanted by the generation that led the fight for democratization in the 1980s. The latter, now in its thirties and forties, will dominate South Korean politics for years to come. For these young people especially, North Korea is a starving brother to be helped to his feet to pave the way for eventual, but not quick, unification.5

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Younger South Koreans are less easily swayed by appeals to anticommunism and less reflexively pro-American. They are more accustomed to prosperity and less fearful of North Korea. They are also more progressive and nationalistic in their views, although few are true followers of North Korea’s ideology. In short, with democratization and generational shift, South Koreans tend to redefine their national identity and priorities for themselves. Consensus and Divergence toward North Korea As a result of these political and generational shifts, there has been a change in South Korea’s approach to North Korea. There had seemed to be policy rifts among South Koreans on the position of South Korea toward North Korea. In fact, while the majority of the South Korean people still view North Korea as a threat, confrontation has been replaced by an emphasis on cooperation and reconciliation. Many South Koreans now see North Korea more as an object for dialogue and assistance. There is an emerging consensus especially among liberals and moderates in South Korea that (1) economic cooperation between the South and the North is needed and might be mutually beneficial in the future; (2) gradual reunification is preferable to the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime; (3) war on the Korean peninsula is less likely; (4) North Korea’s nuclear program is undesirable and should be negotiated away if possible, but it is not in itself reason to end engagement; and (5) it is necessary to help the people of North Korea overcome their economic hardships.6 While a strong majority of South Koreans agree on the need to engage North Korea, there is no consensus on the most effective means. As the debate over how to deal with North Korea grows deeper and fiercer, deep fissures are forming among the public on a number of issues: (1) the capacity of the Kim Jong Il regime to change; (2) the desirability of dealing directly with North Korea; (3) the proper way to approach North Korean human rights problems; (4) whether to reduce legal restrictions on information about and contact with North Korea; and (5) the degree of reciprocity that should be demanded from North Korea. Therefore, the crucial question is whether it will be possible to overcome the “South-South conflict” and develop a coherent approach to North Korea. Based on these consensuses and divergences on South Korea’s approach to North Korea, South Koreans had to define their national identity and priorities for themselves. In this regard, a strong majority of South Koreans expected that a direct negotiation between the two

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Koreas would provide a chance to discuss ways of promoting stability on the North Korean nuclear crisis. South Korea had hoped to use the bilateral meeting between South Korea and North Korea to persuade North Korea to return to the negotiation table. It had also subtly pressed the United States, as has China, for more flexibility on North Korea. In this regard, President Roh Moo Hyun after inauguration had expressed his desire to have a summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. Recently President Roh emphasized again that he was ready to meet Kim Jong Il “anywhere at any time,” regardless of agenda. But he added that the chance of such a meeting taking place was not high due to the current North Korean nuclear crisis. In fact, the first summit meeting took place in June 2000 in Pyongyang between then-South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. At that time, Kim Dae Jung’s visit to North Korea as part of his so-called Sunshine policy7 was a major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, paving the way for expanded economic exchange and cooperation (including the Kaesong industrial complex). Changing Attitudes toward the United States U.S. policy has played an important role in setting opportunities and constraints for the Korean nuclear crisis. A large number of South Koreans still regard North Korea as a threat, and though they consider a military invasion less likely, most do not want U.S. troops to leave the peninsula. However, South Koreans’ changing attitudes and perceptions toward North Korea intensify the debate about the engagement of North Korea and alliance with the United States. Indeed, South Korea entered a momentous political shift in 2002 when Roh Moo Hyun, a former human rights lawyer, was elected as president. He came to power on a promise to deal with the United States on an equal footing. Therefore, he emphasizes the establishment of an equal partnership between South Korea and the United States. Owing largely to the domestic political change after the 2002 presidential election, the Roh Moo Hyun government’s policy toward North Korea tends to be even more liberal than that of the Kim Dae Jung government. Amid nuclear standoff in the second nuclear crisis, the Roh government has continued to support the engagement policy, giving more humanitarian assistance8 and pursuing stronger economic cooperation. In contrast, South Korea-U.S. relations have

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been deteriorated due largely to rising anti-Americanism, increasing discord on the North Korean issue, and the Bush administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea. In fact, the Bush administration has adopted a noticeably more hardline approach toward North Korea than the Clinton administration. It listed North Korea as one of three members—that is, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—of an axis of evil. It has taken steps to form an international coalition for imposing direct pressure on North Korea through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).9 This is partly the outcome of the dominance of hard-liners in the Bush administration. A number of neoconservatives, known as “neocons,” had played an important role in the formation and implementation of the first Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea. Nonetheless, the United States has not altogether given up hope that the North Korean nuclear crisis could be resolved through dialogue. That is why the United States has called for multilateral talks to address the crisis since January 2003. In sum, new social and political shifts in South Korea have transformed views in ways that could undermine South Korea-U.S. relations unless the United States takes these changes in South Korea more seriously. The United States needs to recognize this shift if it is to dampen anti-Americanism in South Korea and chart an effective course of action for dealing with the serious problems, nuclear and otherwise, posed by North Korea.

What Will North Korea Do? Will North Korea eventually abandon its nuclear weapons program? We argue that the future of the Korean nuclear crisis is still uncertain and rather pessimistic, despite the outcome of the fourth round of the six-party talks in September 2005. There are several major obstacles to overcome, such as the high level of North Korea’s intransigence, the lack of consensus within the U.S. government toward North Korea, and South Korea’s position toward North Korea.10 While it is difficult to imagine a situation in which North Korea would simply abandon its nuclear ambitions, we sketch out three paths that North Korea would take in the process of negotiation: (1) the complete dismantling of the North Korean nuclear development program; (2) continued North Korean brinkmanship with nuclear ambiguity; and (3) announcement of North Korea’s nuclear status.11 Each path has several different scenarios. The first path, that of complete dismantling, suggests three different scenarios: (1) North Korea’s reluctance to reform and the continuation of conflict on the

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Korean peninsula in the post-dismantling stage; (2) the success of North Korea’s economic reform and the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas; and (3) the failure of North Korea’s economic reform and regime collapse. The second path, the continuous brinkmanship with nuclear ambiguity, is similar to the one that North Korea has sustained for the last several years. To some extent, the members of the six-party talks seem to believe that it might be much easier to pursue the six-party talks’ goal of denuclearization, if such an ambiguity can be maintained. For example, North Korea announced its nuclear status informally in the three-party talks among the United States, China, and North Korea in Beijing in April 2003. Interestingly enough, at that time, the United States had not accepted that this was an accomplished fact. The third path, the announcement of North Korea’s nuclear status, has three different scenarios: (1) economic sanctions against North Korea; (2) military response against North Korea; and (3) other states accepting it as a fait accompli. Ever since North Korea announced its nuclear status in February 10, 2005, the North Korean nuclear crisis seems to have entered onto path three. North Korea also urged a direct dialogue with the United States by calling off participation in the six-party talks. This announcement underscores the U.S. view that there are doubts about whether North Korea is serious about negotiating in good faith and creates greater limits on the options left for China, Russia, and South Korea. In this regard, the United States emphasized that “the North Korean nuclear crisis is not an issue between the U.S. and North Korea. It is a regional issue . . .”12 Therefore, the United States continued to support the six-party talks to negotiate the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States has discussed tougher actions aimed at cutting off hard currency earnings from North Korea’s trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and counterfeit money.13 Moreover, the United States would try to haul North Korea to the UN Security Council and tighten the economic noose on North Korea.14 In contrast, South Korea and China may be more inclined to use the economic tool against it. Russia and China, both members of the UN Security Council, may also not object to any statement by the powerful panel on the nuclear concerns gripping the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, North Korea realizes that South Korea and the United States do not have any realistic military options against it as long as it will not sell its nuclear materials, technology, or complete nuclear weapons to other countries. Furthermore, it also realized that

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the United States does not have intermediate options such as UN sanctions that would require more international unity than the Bush administration seems able to generate. North Korea has said it would consider UN economic sanctions an act of war, although whether it would retaliate militarily to those sanctions is unknown. Therefore, in the short term, North Korea might maintain a “strategic ambiguity” approach—that is, a policy of making concerned nations guess about its intent and become anxious enough to make concessions. Confusion over whether North Korea would test a bomb, even among scientific and political experts, is a clear reflection of its tactics on a nuclear crisis. In the long term, North Korea might believe that keeping its nuclear weapons is the safest course. It may have learned that India and Pakistan could have good relations with the United States and other countries despite the nuclear testing that both nations carried out in 1998.15 However, surprisingly, North Korea agreed on September 19, 2005 to give up all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and pledged to return to nonproliferation treaties. In return, North Korea persuaded the other participants, especially the United States, to accept North Korea’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the agreement. The other parties expressed their respect for North Korea’s stance on the civilian nuclear programs and agreed to discuss the subject of providing LWRs to North Korea at an appropriate time. In addition, security assurances that the United States has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention of attacking or invading North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons are being offered to North Korea. With the agreement of the fourth round of the six-party talks, North Korea is required to abandon unconditionally all of its nuclear weapons programs and other activities, return to the nuclear NPT, and abide by the UN nuclear safety regime. But North Korea seemed to disavow the agreement just a day after it was made, taking advantage of its elusive wording. North Korea said that it would not give up its nuclear activities unless the United States provides it with LWRs for generating electricity and other peaceful purposes. In contrast, the agreement reads that the five other nations will discuss the supply of LWRs to North Korea “at an appropriate time,” only after North Korea completes its obligations. At this moment, therefore, expectations are not high. There is a huge gap between North Korea and the United States on critical issues, such as a complete abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear program, its full-fledged verification, diplomatic normalization between

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Washington and Pyongyang, and North Korea’s urge for so-called peaceful use of nuclear power. In particular, North Korea urges that the peaceful use of nuclear power is its sovereign right. The United States strongly opposes it, arguing that the risk of a civilian program being used for military purposes is too high. In fact, Christopher Hill, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, emphasized that only after the Pyongyang regime met all the agreement’s requirements would discussions be considered regarding the provision of a light-water nuclear reactor to meet North Korea’s energy needs . . . the (main) issue is whether North Korea wants to essentially trade the security that it believes it is getting from producing nuclear weapons and move instead to the security of being a member of the international community and enjoying good relations with the U.S. and its neighbors. . . .16

As a result, despite this successful accord to the fourth round of negotiations aimed at removing the threat of nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula, the first stage of the fifth round of the six-party talks to solve the North Korean nuclear issue ended on November 11, 2005 even without reaching a specific date for the next meeting.17 To make matters worse, the resumption of the six-party talks has been further confounded because of exchanges of invective between North Korea and the United States. These were triggered by U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershow’s description of the North Korea as a “criminal regime” on December 5, 2005. Vershow denounced North Korea’s alleged illegal activities, such as counterfeiting U.S. dollars and dealing in weapons of mass destruction. In response, North Korea reacted angrily, saying that Vershbow’s labeling constituted a U.S. declaration of war on the North. It also said that his charges against the North Korea are fabricated. It warned that the resumption of the nuclear negotiations is dependent on the attitude of the United States toward it. In fact, the issue of North Korea counterfeiting U.S. dollars has become the most serious stumbling block for the resumption of the next round of the six-party talks. Therefore, tough negotiations are still ahead for the future of the six-party talks. The most urgent issue the six nations face is devising a sequence for implementing the accord they reached in the fourth round. In particular, the initial phase of the implementation process, in which North Korea must follow through on its commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and programs, is most critical.

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Policy Implications The policy implications of our analysis on the North Korean nuclear crisis are fivefold. First, it should be noted that none of the aforementioned scenarios is both most desirable and most feasible. For the United States and South Korea, the most desirable scenario would be the second one of the first path—the complete dismantling of the North Korean nuclear development program along with the North’s economic reform and peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas. The successful agreement at the fourth round of six-party talks in September 2005 to dismantle nuclear programs on the Korean Peninsula implies this scenario. However, it does not seem to be the most feasible one. Second, for the Kim Jong Il regime, the collapse scenario is still highly feasible. In order for the Kim Jong Il regime to avoid this scenario, it has to rely on risk taking. South Korea and the United States would like the North to rely on a “reform gamble,” rather than a “nuclear gamble.”18 Carrots alone are unlikely to be sufficient to achieve this outcome. Therefore, sanctions, either economic or military, should not be excluded as options to deal with the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, South Korea and the United States alone do not seem to have the economic leverage or credible military options sufficient to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. China does have such economic leverage, but it is not clear that China will use it. Third, China is North Korea’s last major ally and a key supplier of food and energy to the impoverished dictatorship. During the last several years, China has played a leading role in the North Korean nuclear crisis. China’s future role is more crucial for implementing the accord the six nations reached in the fourth round. It is necessary that China send a stronger message to North Korea than before, that there is no alternative except dismantling its nuclear program. Indeed, since North Korea has announced its nuclear status, Peter Brooks of the Heritage Foundation argued that the time had come for China, on which the United States had been banking for a resolution to the nuclear crisis, to tighten the screws on North Korea.19 In fact, the United States is depending heavily on China to rescue a faltering diplomatic effort to negotiate an end to the dispute between the United States and North Korea. In this regard, China is quite concerned with raising its image as a great power as well as protecting the North Korean regime.20 China’s crucial role in the future round of nuclear negotiations is evident from Chinese President

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Hu Jintao’s state visit to North Korea in October, 2005,21 and Kim Jong Il’s return visit to China in January 2006. China faces a tough diplomatic challenge in seeking to persuade an unpredictable North Korea to implement the agreed principles that the six nations reached in the fourth round and to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Fourth, a more flexible and sophisticated American diplomatic option should provide a way back to the negotiating table to implement the principles the six nations agreed upon in the fourth round. To woo it to implement the agreed-on principles of the fourth round, the United States might take a more positive attitude toward oil supplies to North Korea suspended in December 2002 and move to normalize relations with North Korea.22 For the time being, however, this option is less feasible due largely to North Korea’s alleged dollarcounterfeiting activities. Fifth, North Korea ought to return to the negotiating table as early as possible to peacefully resolve the nuclear crisis. North Korea is still most to blame, because of its disregard for the six-point agreement reached in the fourth round of the talks. It is also very important to note that getting North Korea back to the talks to implement the accord of the fourth round should not become an end in itself. The six-party talks were meant to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis—these were not meant to be just an opportunity to talk about it endlessly and achieve nothing. To make the coming round of the talks as constructive as possible, North Korea ought to show sincere efforts, first of all, to put its obligations into practice. There is the possibility that North Korea’s faithful respect of the agreement is likely to help it win LWRs earlier than expected. Otherwise, the six-party talks will be in danger of collapsing, threatening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Conclusion The pendulum of the Korean nuclear crisis has swung back and forth from optimism to pessimism during the last three-and-a-half years. It seems now that the pendulum is somewhere at the middle point of this spectrum, since China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States have held the fifth rounds of talks in Beijing aimed at persuading North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons development. Both the South Korean and the U.S. governments have been eager to continue the six-party talks for peacefully resolving the North Korea nuclear crisis. It remains to be seen, however, whether this mechanism of dialogue will eventually bring peace and stability to the

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Korean Peninsula, settling the issue and creating a new strategic environment on which every party will safely rely. In particular, North Korea’s declaration of its nuclear status on February 10, 2005, seriously complicated the already stalled six-party talks. Disarming an already nuclear-armed North Korea would be far more difficult. However, North Korea’s demand for a direct dialogue with the United States represents a return to the negotiating position that it staked out before China persuaded it to join the multilateral talks that began in August 2003. This demand appeared to bolster the assessment of many officials in South Korea and the United States that North Korea’s surprise announcement on February 10, 2005 was a gambit to win additional economic and diplomatic concessions from the United States and its allies.23 In fact, for months, North Korea has lashed out at what it calls U.S. attempts to demolish the Kim Jong Il regime and meddle in the human rights situation in North Korea. In contrast, the United States has said it wants to resolve the nuclear talks through dialogue. The tone of the United States was in stark contrast to three-and-a-half years ago, when it branded North Korea part of an “axis of evil” with Iran and Iraq. This raised hopes of a positive response from North Korea. Still, North Korea said its “principled stand to solve the issue through dialogue and negotiations and its ultimate goal to denuclearize the Korean peninsula remain unchanged. . . .”24 Such a public comment has been widely interpreted as a North Korean negotiating tactic to get more economic and diplomatic concessions from the United States before joining any crucial talks. In reality, North Korea is not likely to abandon its nuclear weapons program. There is, however, a need to engage in diplomatic efforts to determine the validity of that perception. A political solution to the nuclear issue should be possible if North Korea abandons its quest for nuclear weapons. North Korea needs to show sincere efforts to end peacefully the nuclear standoff with the United States. Without resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis diplomatically, it will be impossible to improve the relationship between the United States and North Korea and inter-Korean relations. Confrontation should be replaced by emphasis on cooperation and reconciliation in the North Korean nuclear crisis. On balance, South Korea has found itself walking a tightrope, trying to appease domestic pressure for some improvements in relations with North Korea, while international allies including the United States pressed for action on the North Korean nuclear crisis. Therefore, the discomfort between South Korea and the United

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States, due to differences in perspectives related to the North Korean nuclear crisis, should be whittled to a minimum. The anti-American emotions in South Korea, and the voices in the United States for withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, are not helpful.25 South Korea has been eager to continue the six-party talks aimed at peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. In order to achieve this, South Korea needs strong diplomatic cooperation with the United States.

Notes 1. After coming to office in 2001, the new Bush administration initiated a North Korea policy review that was completed in early June. The policy review concluded that the United States should seek “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture.” Therefore, in October 2002, bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea resumed when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited North Korea. 2. Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004). 3. Sung Deuk Hahm and Okjin Kim, “Presidential Leadership and Bureaucratic Politics in Foreign Policy-Making Process of Korea: Cases of North Korean Nuclear Crises I and II,” (in Korean), Ilmin International Review 9, 2 (2005): 23–45; In-Taek Hyun and Sung Deuk Hahm, “Analysis of the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Strategic Studies 12, 3 (2005): 89–112. 4. Sung Deuk Hahm and Chris Plein, After Development (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997). 5. International Crisis Group, “Brother from Another Planet: South Korean Views of the North,” Washington, DC, December 14, 2004. 6. Ibid. 7. In-Taek Hyun, 1999. “South Korea’s Changing Strategic Thinking and the Future of Korea-U.S.-Japan Relations,” in Ralph A. Cossa, ed., U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a “Virtual Alliance” (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 1999). 8. For example, South Korea gave 500,000 tons of rice and 300,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea in humanitarian assistance in 2005. 9. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a scheme in which several advanced industrial democracies participated. Its main purpose is to sanction directly the proliferation of nuclear weapons by rogue states. Its activities have included Spain’s search of a North Korean cargo ship heading toward Yemen; Australia’s seizure of North Korean ships

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11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

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carrying heroin; and Japanese prohibition of a North Korean cargo ship from entering a harbor. Young-chin Kim, “Focus on National Security in Dealing with North Korea,” Korea Focus (May–June 2003); In-Taek Hyun, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Settlement or Catastrophe?” (in Korean), Ilmin International Review 8, 1 (2004): 137–161. Hyun, “Second Korean Nuclear Crisis.” Washington Post, “White House Dismissed Idea of Direct Talks with North Korea,” February 12, 2005. Reuters, “China Plans Nuclear Talks with North Korea,” February 16, 2005. Dana Dillon, Harvey Feldman, Balbina Hwang, and John Tkacik, “Asia’s Security Challenges,” Backgrounder 1839 (2005): 2–3. Soon-Goo Cho, “Empirical Nuclear Weapon Dismantling and Searching For Managing Fissile Materials of North Korea Peacefully” (in Korean), Korean Journal of International Relations 45, 3 (2005): 195–217. http://www.usinfor.state.gov (accessed October 11, 2005). The delegations of six nations held a delegation chief meeting and general meeting and agreed on a statement declaring that the second stage of the talks would be held at the earliest possible date. Many believe that a date was not agreed upon for the second phase of the fifth six-party talks due to a dispute between North Korea and the United States on the implementation process of the agreement of the fourth round. The United States has not set itself a deadline to decide whether to bring the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program to the UN Security Council. However, James Foster, the U.S. state department director of Korean affairs, said “All of us are extremely frustrated by the continued boycott of the talks by the North Koreans . . .”; and Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, said that “. . . unproductive diplomacy could not go on indefinitely. We have to start achieving results soon . . .” (International Herald Tribune, May 28, 2005). Agence France-Presse, “U.S. Options Seen Limited Against NuclearArmed North Korea,” February 10, 2005; Larry Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress (2006). For example, China turned down a U.S. request to pressure North Korea to return to nuclear disarmament talks by cutting oil supplies (Washington Post, May 5, 2005). Maoming Chu, the Chinese Embassy spokesman in Washington, D.C., said “We have normal bilateral relations with North Korea. We don’t try to solve problems through pressure or sanctions . . .” (Associated Press, May 11, 2005). Even though the main purpose of Hu’s visit was to consolidate the relationship between China and North Korea, an early diplomatic

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Chapter 12

The United States and East Asia: Past and Future Shale Horowitz

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hapter 1 focused on how regime changes have interacted with international and domestic events to change national identities and foreign and security policies in the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts. This concluding chapter looks at U.S. foreign and security policy in the East Asia region. It reviews the historical development of U.S. policies, summarizes current and future challenges, and discusses policy responses. It is argued that the traditional U.S. policy of protecting Taiwan is likely to persist, but to come under increasing strain as Chinese military power grows. To avoid future instability and possibly war, the United States must quietly encourage Taiwan to assume a greater share of her defense burden. In Korea, the North’s nuclear program has opened up important differences in U.S. and South Korean interests that did not previously exist. There is a danger that the United States and South Korea will allow the North to lever these differences into a breakdown of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, to the great detriment of both the United States and the South. For now, this danger seems to have been averted, as the United States accepts the South’s priority of avoiding war, and the South agrees to support the core U.S. interest in preventing nuclear proliferation from the North to rogue states and terrorist movements. These minimum common interests appear to be holding the alliance together. Finally, it is

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argued that the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts should not be allowed to distract attention from maintaining close relations with Japan, which is by far the most important U.S. ally in the region. U.S. policies toward Taiwan and North Korea have been and must remain conditioned upon maintaining a close alliance with Japan.

U.S. Policy toward China and Taiwan: Enduring Dilemmas and Growing Dangers U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan has been shaped by the larger Cold War geopolitics of the East Asian region. Taiwan was not originally included in the post–World War II U.S. defensive perimeter in the Western Pacific—out of a desire to avoid unnecessary commitments and, from 1949, reach a modus vivendi with the new communist regime on the Mainland. This changed with China’s entry into the Korean War. Full-scale conventional war between Chinese and U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula led the United States to provide military protection, including a formal defensive alliance, to Taiwan’s Nationalist regime. This put an end to Mao’s plans to invade Taiwan and finish off his KMT rivals. The next significant change occurred as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, which culminated in border clashes in the late 1960s. The Nixon administration capitalized by building relations with China against the greater, common Soviet threat. Continued by subsequent administrations, this led the United States to recognize the CCP regime rather than the KMT regime on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China, and to accept various constraints on its diplomatic and military assistance to Taiwan. The Carter administration went so far as to break formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate the defensive military alliance. The Reagan administration was more ideologically friendly to Taipei. But it did not reverse any of the changes favoring Beijing, because its fundamental goal was the containment and rollback of Soviet power and influence. During the latter part of the Cold War, then, the basic U.S. policy was to recognize Beijing as the legitimate government of all China, while discouraging Beijing from using military force to achieve this goal. The end of the Cold War has not changed this policy, but has made it harder to implement. As discussed in previous chapters, the collapse of the USSR made absorbing Taiwan into Beijing’s main foreign policy priority. Successful market reforms increased the military capacity to do so, particularly when defense budgets were ramped up following

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Tiananmen. This has made Taiwan steadily more dependent on U.S. protection to deter Beijing. At the same time, the United States cannot easily control internal developments either in China or in Taiwan. The United States wants to avoid antagonizing the Chinese government and Chinese public opinion. It wants to manage China’s rise and encourage continued internal reforms by making the status quo as palatable as possible. On the other hand, Taiwan’s democratization imposes practical and ideological constraints on the U.S. Democratic governments cannot easily be pressured into diplomatically “comfortable” policies that defy popular will. Moreover, the United States is committed to spreading and securing democracy, both ideologically and as a matter of long-term military security. In fact, the great hope is that China will eventually follow in Taiwan’s path and make a smooth transition to democracy. So, though China and Taiwan are rapidly moving apart and may be heading toward a military showdown, the United States is driven to solidify its traditional policy. It will not antagonize China by reversing past concessions, which recognized the primacy of the Mainland government. But neither will it abandon Taiwan to forced unification. Thus, despite all the differences between the Clinton and Bush administration foreign policies, the two basic elements of China-Taiwan policy remain firmly in place. First, make it clear to Beijing that use of military force will be met and defeated by a decisive U.S. response. Second, maintain pressure on Taipei not to declare formal independence, and more generally to avoid rhetoric or policies that will unduly challenge Beijing’s formal commitment to unification. By threatening Beijing’s internal legitimacy, such challenges may provoke Beijing to respond militarily, with catastrophic consequences for all sides.1 For the future, the problem is that both sides of this “solution” are unstable and unreliable. China’s military power will almost certainly continue to grow, making Taiwan more and more dependent on U.S. military protection. Will future U.S. presidents always be willing to risk a war with China for the sake of preserving Taiwan’s independence? Chinese leaders are well aware of this issue and seek to spread its logic to U.S. elites and public opinion. In public forums and interviews with Western media outlets, lower-ranking Chinese leaders and analysts have often asked whether the United States is willing to risk an all-out nuclear war for the sake of Taiwan.2 Similarly, Taiwanese leaders and the Taiwanese public are well aware that it would be counterproductive to force Beijing’s hand by declaring formal independence. On the other hand, they also know that forging and guarding a distinct Taiwanese identity is necessary for Taiwan’s long-term survival, that

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they have no alternative but to persist in the face of Beijing’s resistance—and in fact, that Beijing’s public threats are a crucial spur to this identity. The United States can do little to affect this process, apart from continuing to warn Taiwan away from “red lines” such as declaring formal independence. Thus, the basic issue is whether Taiwan maintains a credible will and ability to inflict unacceptable costs on any Mainland regime that considers an invasion. At present, Taiwan can rely on the threat of U.S. military intervention. However, even pro-Taiwan U.S. presidents will be hard-pressed to maintain a commitment to Taiwan in, say, 25 years. Moreover, such a U.S. commitment will more quickly and surely become untenable if Taiwan becomes overreliant on U.S. protection. U.S. public opinion will not accept the prospect of a catastrophic war for a country that seems uncertain about whether to fight for its survival.3 Facing the more adverse military power balance of the future, will Taiwan continue to rise to the challenge? As discussed, Taiwan will have to maintain a large, technologically sophisticated, and dedicated force that would impose huge costs on an invading People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This means preventing Beijing from winning a quick and relatively bloodless war, and forcing even a victorious Beijing to accept the prospect of ruling a permanently hostile, restive population. If China were ruled by a democratic government, this prospect would probably be sufficient to forestall an invasion. However, the CCP regime cannot be relied upon to possess cautious leaders at all times. Prominent Chinese leaders have said repeatedly that China is prepared to pay a high price for unification. There is no alternative but to take them at their word—not so much now, as at some more advantageous point in the future, when the United States seems unlikely to intervene decisively. Although it will require a supreme effort, Taiwan is capable in deterring Beijing indefinitely. To begin with, the Taiwan Strait— 80 miles of ocean at its narrowest point—remains a major obstacle. Invading across such a water barrier is fraught with risk, even for the more sophisticated PLA of the next decades. With over 20 million people, a highly educated and productive workforce, and one of the most technologically advanced manufacturing economies in the world, Taiwan has the resources and capacities to mount a fearsome defensive effort. Taiwan is probably capable of fielding a force comparable in military capacities to what currently exists in Britain or France—that is, Taiwan has the capabilities to be a regional great power. For example, Taiwan could double her defense budget while still maintaining a robust,

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growing economy.4 Or, as Britain and France chose to do in the face of the Cold War-era Soviet conventional threat, Taiwan could choose instead to acquire her own nuclear deterrent. This would make it unnecessary to rely too heavily on the United States, or to pay a much higher price for a less reliable, purely conventional deterrent. Thus, it comes down to Taiwanese political will. A strong Taiwanese identity is the necessary foundation of such an effort. Despite all the discomfort caused by President Chen’s rhetoric and policies aimed at building such an identity, there is no alternative other than Beijing’s unpalatable offer of “one country-two systems.”5 Those that disparage Chen’s Taiwanese identity politics as nothing more than irresponsible populist posturing for votes do not seem willing to take the Mainland military threat seriously. However, while a strong Taiwanese national identity may be necessary for Taiwan’s future survival, it alone is not sufficient. In the future, Taiwanese politics will have to sustain a much heavier burden of military spending and preparation. Here there is cause for doubt. Democratic publics try to keep military spending to a minimum, and want desperately to believe that war can be avoided through greater understanding and accommodation. Already, Taiwan seems to be relying too heavily on U.S. military protection—particularly in being slow to upgrade costly but vital air and sea defenses.6 Sooner or later, Mainland leaders may realize that they can best encourage these tendencies by avoiding or even renouncing threats of attack, and by emphasizing more indirect military preparations.7 This could easily produce a dangerous situation, in which Taiwan becomes incapable of defending herself, and some future U.S. president seems unlikely to come to Taiwan’s rescue. At that point, Beijing, hoping for a quick collapse of Taiwan’s political will or defense capacities, may seriously consider an invasion.

U.S. Policy toward Korea: From Cold War Deadlock to the Six-Party Talks During the early Cold War period, the United States did not view Korea as vital to national security. This policy was reassessed when North Korean forces invaded the South. Defending the South sent a signal that the United States would act to prevent the further spread of communism. By accident, this led to a conventional war with communist China,8 which poisoned U.S.-China relations through the early 1970s.

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With the end of the Cold War, communism disappeared as a global ideological rival and threat. U.S. regional interests shifted away from the Korean Peninsula, and the China-Taiwan conflict seemed likely to become a more dangerous regional flashpoint. But North Korea’s nuclear response to economic decline forced the United States to remain engaged on the Peninsula. Neither the United States nor South Korea wanted a costly military confrontation with the North, and the 1994 Agreed Framework was a low-cost strategy that appeared to stand a chance of stopping the North Korean nuclear program. Yet the North Korean regime apparently valued its nuclear program highly, and saw correctly that the United States and South Korea were unlikely to risk a costly conventional war to force an end to it. The North’s highly enriched uranium program, in the context of the U.S. war on terror, exposed basic differences in U.S. and South Korean interests. The United States saw a significant proliferation threat, but this threat did not seem to extend to the South. This led the United States to withdraw the aid provided under the Agreed Framework, and to insist that any new aid agreement should involve a total, verifiable dismantling of the North’s program. Fearing a conventional war, and not coincidentally, continuing to place more hope in the use of carrots than sticks, South Korean leaders resisted U.S. efforts to put more pressure on the North.9 After some time, a basic level of common interests emerged to determine policy toward the North. The United States is only willing to pay the potential costs of a military strike against the North in the event of nuclear proliferation to rogue states or terrorists. If this occurred, South Korea would almost certainly suffer the consequences of a conventional war. In that event, it would pay for South Korea to support U.S. military efforts, to crush the North’s ability to retaliate massively. It is not inconceivable, however, that South Korean leaders might take the position that they could stay out (remain “neutral”)10 in a war between the United States and a nuclear-proliferating North. This would mean that the United States could not rely on using South Korean military facilities, and would have seriously diminished conventional options in a war with the North. That in turn would increase the North’s incentives to go forward with nuclear proliferation. In effect, South Korea would have become an enabler for the North. This would probably end the U.S.-South Korean alliance, because it would mean that the United States would be gaining little from protecting the South. At that point, the United States might contemplate a different trade with the North, in which it withdraws its

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military forces from South Korea in exchange for the North’s commitment to end proliferation. Of course, North Korean commitments mean little. But North Korea would have less incentive to proliferate to U.S. enemies if that would have the effect of triggering a conflict with the United States that would otherwise not occur. This scenario would make South Korea newly vulnerable to a Northern invasion, exposing the South once more to a Cold War-scale military threat from the North. This hypothetical chain of events probably explains why South Korea’s current leadership has not committed itself to stand aside in the event of U.S. military strikes against a proliferating North. Short of such a proliferation threat, South Korea is ambivalent about efforts to put pressure on the North through extensive economic sanctions, since this would risk precipitating an unnecessary war. In any event, such sanctions cannot work without China’s cooperation, since energy and other essential goods can be moved in unlimited quantities from China to the North. But China does not want to destabilize the North. For the CCP regime, the collapse of the Northern regime would not be a desirable political precedent. Geopolitically, moreover, it would put a unified, Western-oriented Korea on China’s border.11 China holds the key to ending the North’s nuclear program short of war. China alone can close the economic ring and thereby force the North to dismantle its nuclear program. But China will not do so if such sanctions seem likely to destabilize the Northern regime. This preference for stability dovetails with South Korea’s focus on engagement to avoid war. In this context, the United States has little shortterm leverage against the North short of war. But, in the absence of nuclear proliferation, the costs of war are too high. To obtain the North’s commitment to verifiable dismantling of the nuclear program, the United States thus has an interest in providing the North with security guarantees and economic aid. The problem, of course, is that this situation encourages the North to continue cheating. Pocket the security assurances and aid while continuing to build or maintain secret nuclear capabilities. Play the whole game over again if and when the cheating is revealed. Why give up the nuclear program if there is little long-term cost of keeping it? Since the United States and South Korea are not going to attack the North simply for cheating on such agreements, only China, using the threat of economic sanctions, can enforce them. This explains the current six-party negotiation structure, in which China, Japan, and Russia sit alongside the Koreas and the United States, along with the negotiating approach of trading security guarantees and

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aid for verifiable dismantling. In 2005, the parties finally initialed such an agreement. Again though, the basic problem is that China’s commitment to enforce such an agreement does not seem credible. China does not want a collapse of the North. So why would China impose genuinely far-reaching economic sanctions in response to Northern cheating? Hence, if the Northern regime does not feel significantly more secure as a result of the new agreement, it will have an incentive to cheat and preserve its nuclear deterrent. Despite these problems, the conflicting interests of the United States, South Korea, and China do not seem to leave open significant alternatives.12

Japan: Awakening Giant? The ongoing Korean and China-Taiwan conflicts are threats to Japan as well as the United States. In fact, Japan is similarly exposed, but geographically closer to the potential conflict zones. With the possible exception of the United Kingdom, Japan is the most important ally of the United States; and the United States is certainly Japan’s most important ally. The United States provided Japan with reliable security throughout the Cold War. The rise of still-authoritarian China means that Japan continues to view the U.S. alliance as vital to its security. Japan arguably has a stronger interest than the United States in maintaining Taiwan’s independence. Moreover, like the United States, Japan fears the North’s nuclear and missile programs more than its conventional forces. With respect to potential conflicts in Korea and Taiwan as well as in providing for Japan’s own defense, Japan provides crucial bases and support for U.S. forces in the region. Hence, Japan would almost unavoidably be drawn into either conflict along with the United States. In all of these ways, Japan’s interests remain well aligned with those of the United States in the post–Cold War world. Japan and the United States remain joined at the hip. Given that this received understanding of national interests was built and sustained under democracy, there is little reason to expect significant change in Japan’s post–World War II national identity and interests, which emphasize a junior, purely defensive military role in U.S.-led regional security efforts. Yet, there is some evidence that Japan is gravitating toward a more assertive identity, in which Japan would become a “normal country.” This means making more independent, militarily robust national defense efforts, as a more equal partner of the United States in the region. The factors driving these changes appear to be similar to those discussed in the case of South Korea. The newer generations in Japan

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have little memory of World War II and little commitment to the constrained defense role set down in the early postwar constitution. More recently, Japan’s economic stagnation has shaken confidence in the development-focused policies of postwar governments. These developments created potential for significant change in Japanese national identity and interests. The end of the Cold War did not usher in dramatic changes in Japan’s geopolitical environment. However, a number of incidents, all relatively unimportant by themselves, have pushed a more flexible Japanese public toward a more assertive identity. First, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs were quite visibly aimed at threatening U.S. bases in Japan. Second, Japan herself was subjected to chemical weapons attacks by a domestic terrorist group. Third, the Japanese continued to be hostile to North Korea because of a number of unresolved North Korean kidnappings of Japanese citizens. Fourth, rhetoric in both North and South Korea was strongly hostile to Japan, both because of Japan’s lessthan-forthright acknowledgment of World War II-era war crimes, and because playing on anti-Japanese sentiment was a convenient diversionary pursuit in the internal politics of both North and South. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, China has pursued a number of confrontational policies toward Japan. Against a background of unresolved disputes over offshore islands and seabed mineral rights, Chinese naval incursions and unilateral drilling in disputed waters have openly challenged Japan. China has also made use of antiJapanese rhetoric to score points with the Chinese public, and more recently, has appeared to tolerate anti-Japanese rioting in a number of major Chinese cities.13 This contrasts with the more friendly, often pro-Japanese, attitudes of the Taiwanese leaders and public. This confluence of forces has pushed more Japanese to identify their interests closely with the United States and to favor a more active, independent role in their own defense.14 However, things might develop differently. For example, why did not Japan react to the new Northern nuclear threat more like South Korea? That is, why did Japan move closer to the United States, rather than disengaging from the United States to avoid involvement in a new Korean conflict that might now pose a nuclear threat to the Japanese mainland? Chinese behavior toward Taiwan can be interpreted in a similar way. Maybe China is following the “North Korea strategy,” hoping that threats will lead Japan to withdraw support from the U.S. security guarantee toward Taiwan—just as the North’s nuclear program drove a wedge between the United States and South Korea.

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For now, it seems that Japan is reacting in the opposite way, presumably because, as discussed, the North Korean nuclear program and China’s desire to absorb Taiwan threaten Japan much the way that they threaten the United States. However, it cannot be assumed that Japanese opinion will always react in this way. During the Cold War in Western Europe, it will be remembered, a significant share of elite and mass opinion viewed the U.S.-led response to Moscow’s conventional and nuclear buildup as the greater threat—even though Western Europe was more threatened by the Soviet military buildup than the United States. If Japanese opinion begins to react against the United States for supporting Taiwan, and for pushing for diplomatic and economic sanctions to end the North’s nuclear program, the United States may be forced to choose between its East Asian allies. In that event, there is little question that the United States would choose Japan. For now, though, this is merely a theoretical possibility. Instead, Japan has reacted to the North Korean nuclear crisis and the more creeping Taiwan crisis by reaffirming her common interests with the United States, and moving toward playing a stronger, more equal role in confronting the common threats. In postwar East Asian geopolitics, Japan has always stood out as accepting an artificially limited role relative to her economic and military potential. It is possible that the tensions between China and Taiwan and over North Korea’s nuclear program, reinforced by antiJapanese diversionary politics in China and the Koreas, are nudging Japan toward becoming a “normal country.” If this trend continues, it will be momentous for the future.

The Future of U.S. Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia The alliance with Japan will continue to be by far the most important U.S. priority in East Asia. Since Japan alone is potentially more than a match for any possible Chinese threat, and since Japan’s security interests are most closely aligned with those of the United States, the United States should encourage a more robust Japanese military capability, along with a more equal diplomatic partnership in the region. The Japanese leadership and public must feel “ownership” of diplomatic and military relations with the United States—that is, that relations reflect Japanese interests, rather than a potentially unacceptable price paid for U.S. military protection. This has been the traditional U.S. policy since the outbreak of the Cold War,15 and it must continue. It will only be positive if Japan assumes an increasing share

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of the regional defense burden, and if Japanese feel that U.S. policies in Korea and Taiwan are carefully coordinated with Japan’s input and interests. In Korea, the most vital U.S. interest is in deterring the North from transferring nuclear expertise, fuel, or weapons to rogue states or terrorist groups. As discussed, this is the only contingency that seems to justify a military strike against the North, which would probably escalate to a full-scale war. For the United States as for the South, the most desirable outcome is Northern regime change without war. But there is little short-term prospect of this happening. China and South Korea, for different reasons, are not willing to use economic sanctions to attempt to force an end to the North’s nuclear program, much less to bring about the collapse of the regime. There seems little alternative to waiting for the Northern regime to decay from within, while continuing to cultivate an ideological environment favorable to such an outcome. The six-party talks seem to represent the most reasonable strategy for negotiating a full, verifiable end to the North’s nuclear program. The Bush administration is correct to insist on a full, verifiable dismantling, while recognizing the reality that the threat of coordinated regional economic sanctions are the most promising means of enforcing any agreement. On the other hand, it seems clear that China and also South Korea would probably not impose punishing sanctions in response to another round of North Korean cheating. This is known to the North. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that the North is sincere about the recent agreement in principle to end the nuclear program in exchange for security guarantees and economic assistance. First, the North will probably delay negotiating the specifics of the agreement for as long as possible. Second, the North will probably do what it takes to maintain a nuclear capability. It is important to note that the nuclear capability does not prevent the North from initiating market economic reforms. If anything, the Northern regime, before embarking on risky economic reforms, is likely to view a nuclear deterrent as a crucial guarantee against foreign interference in the event of any internal political instability. Regarding Taiwan, the United States will probably continue to provide Taiwan with breathing space for at least as long as Beijing remains unable to challenge U.S. air and naval forces in the Western Pacific. However, the United States must make it clear that, in the future, Taiwan will have to assume an increasing share of the burden. If Taiwan proves willing to do so, the United States and Japan will be more willing to lend aid and assistance. Otherwise, Beijing is likely to be able

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to use threats to erode U.S. and Japanese will. The role of Japan in this equation tends to be understated. Again, U.S. will and capacity to defend Taiwan is heavily dependent on Japan’s assent. Apart from the crucial role played by U.S. forces based in Japan, along with Japan’s own considerable military capabilities, the United States will never fight a war against China that is not acceptable to Japanese public opinion. Finally, it is worth noting that, since the mid-1990s, China’s supposedly adroit, far-sighted diplomacy has been geopolitically selfdefeating. The threats and military buildup against Taiwan have backfired by strengthening Taiwanese identity. Even more importantly, they seem to have reinforced Japanese fears. These outcomes are understandable if Chinese diplomacy is more driven by internal legitimacy concerns than by expansionist geopolitical designs. After Tiananmen, Chinese nationalism is a crucial source of legitimacy. “Unifying” the motherland by absorbing Taiwan, along with fanning still-smoldering memories of Japan’s invasion and atrocities from the mid-1930s through the mid-1940s, are reliable means of building such nationalist legitimacy. It is also possible that the CCP regime sees no conflict between its internal, diversionary priorities and China’s geopolitical objectives, calculating that saber rattling may break the will, if not of Taiwan, than at least of Japan and the United States. So far, though, the opposite has happened. It would probably be more worrisome if China ended the militant nationalist rhetoric and substituted commitments to peaceful interactions, while continuing its rapid military buildup. This would indicate an intent to lull Taiwan, Japan, and the United States into complacency, in order to bring forward the time when China could strike at Taiwan with confidence. As obvious as such a strategy might be, it would be more likely to work. Again, over the longer run, it is probable that only Taiwanese will and ability to resist could prevent such a strategy from working.

Notes 1. See Chapter 5, in this volume, by Steven Redd, “Explaining U.S. Policy towards China and Taiwan.” 2. For a recent example, see “General’s Nuclear Remarks Were Personal, China Says,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 16, 2005, http://web. lexis-nexis.com (accessed May 1, 2006). 3. See Chapter 6, in this volume, by Shale Horowitz and Alexander Tan “Rising China vs. Estranged Taiwan.” 4. As a share of GDP, Taiwan spent about 2.7% in 2002, as compared to about 4.1% for China. Other relevant comparisons for 2002 are

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5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

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Singapore at 5.0 percent and Israel at 9.7 percent. “Comparisons of U.S. and Foreign Military Spending,” Congressional Research Service January 28, 2004, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32209.pdf (accessed May 2, 2006). “One country-two systems” is the arrangement implemented by China in Hong Kong after the turnover from British control. In Hong Kong, China has had an incentive to impose “one country-two systems” without a heavy hand, largely because it is being held out as an option for Taiwan. This incentive will not exist if Taiwan is absorbed. Moreover, Taiwan has much more numerous and powerful elements that are strongly opposed to unification. Almost inevitably, China will crack down and make an example of these elements, rather than accept an endless low-intensity political struggle that might well infect parts of the Mainland. Beijing would probably also allow largescale immigration from the Mainland, as a means of solidifying longterm demographic control. Thus, in addition to the loss of political and cultural self-determination and deteriorating economic conditions, Taiwanese would face a long night of political repression amid a new influx of dominant Mainlanders. Rich Chang, “Weapons Bill Plan Gains Traction,” Taipei Times, April 24, 2006, http://www.taipeitimes.com (accessed April 24, 2006). This change to a policy of “speak softly and carry a big stick” may already be underway. See Chong-Pin Lin, “Beijing Speaks Softly to Taiwan; China’s New Cross-Strait Strategy,” International Herald Tribune, March 30, 2006, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed May 3, 2006). The North Korean invasion was broken by a U.S. amphibious assault in the rear of the North Korean forces. United States and South Korea pursued the defeated enemy across the thirty-eighth Parallel, the original partition line that divided the North and South. Rather than allow a U.S.-backed, unified Korea to form on China’s border, Mao sent in the PLA to save the North Korean regime. Had the United States known this would happen, U.S. forces would probably not have advanced beyond the thirty-eighth Parallel. See Chapter 6, in this volume, by Uk Heo and Jung-Yeop Woo, “South Korea’s Response: Democracy, Identity, and Strategy”; and Chapter 9 by Milica Begovic and Karl DeRouen, “U.S. Strategy in the Korean Conflict.” Robyn Lim, “Watch for Shifts in Alliance Patterns,” International Herald Tribune, December 24, 2002; Burt Herman, “South Korea Transforming Alliance with U.S. to Play Neutral Role in Northeast Asia,” Associated Press, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed May 1, 2006). Some analysts also argue that China’s own Korean minority, concentrated in the northwest provinces close to North Korea, would pose a greater secessionist threat if Korea were united. This point seems

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12. 13. 14. 15.

S h a l e H o r ow i t z unlikely to be as important as the political and geopolitical considerations already mentioned. See Chapter 11, in this volume, by In-Taek Hyun and Sung Deuk Hahm, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis.” For background, see Peter Hays Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking’ on Japan,” China Quarterly 184 (2005): 831–851. See Chapter 10, in this volume, by Dennis Patterson, “Japan’s Response to Asia’s Security Problems.” To take one important example, the United States objected to South Korean and Taiwanese efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities in the 1970s and 1980s, but was silent when Japan acquired large plutonium stocks in the 1970s. While ostensibly intended for use only in civilian energy generation, the plutonium stocks are usable in nuclear weapons.

Index

1982 Communiqué, 93, 98 1992 Consensus, 39 1999 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA), 99, 110 2-2-8 Incident, 82 AEGIS system, 95, 102 Agreed Framework (1994), 13, 140, 143–144, 165, 167, 174, 228 Ah Q, 44 Albright, Madeleine, 158 All Out Defense, 62, 64, 67, 68 Allied occupation (Japan), 187–188 anti-Americanism, 154, 159, 161, 162, 211, 213 anti-communism, 210, 211 Anti-Secession Law (China), 44–45, 50, 82 arms sales, 92, 93, 94, 98, 99, 101, 103, 109 Article IX (Japanese Constitution), 188, 192 Asia, 186–202: conflicts in, 186–188, 196–198 Asian Development Bank, 38 Asian financial crisis, 13, 85 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 38, 103 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 33 authoritarian regimes, 6, 210, 217: North Korea, 10–11; South Korea, 12 Axis of Evil, 143, 166, 170 balance of power, 8, 10, 19, 107 Belgrade, 35

Blue Team, 99, 100 Bolton, John, 168, 170 Brezhnev Doctrine, 30 Brooks, Peter, 217 Bush, George H. W., 93, 94, 95, 165–166, 170, 174 Bush, George W., 18, 20–21, 91, 95 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 110, 111, 112, 122, 143, 149, 158, 161, 208, 213, 225 Businesspeople, 73–74, 86 Canada, 125 Carter, 127 Carter, James (Jimmy), 92, 93, 98, 109, 140, 224 Cha, Victor, 155 Chan, Steve, 71 Chen Shui-bian, 9, 39, 43, 44, 49, 50, 60–62, 64, 82, 84, 86, 103, 104, 111, 116, 117, 120, 123, 128, 129, 227 Cheney, Richard (Dick), 168–169, 171 Chiang Ching-kuo, 17, 55, 61–63, 83 Chiang Kai-shek, 17, 31, 32, 41, 44, 55, 56, 63, 82, 92 China card, 92, 94, 97 China National Offshore Oil Company, 77 China Petroleum Corporation, 77 China, 6–8, 11, 16–17, 27–48, 56, 58, 61, 65–68, 71, 80, 84, 86, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127,

238

Index

China—continued 128, 129, 130, 133–136, 138–139, 141, 144–145, 208, 214, 218, 224–227, 229, 234: coastal development strategy, 73; economic and social ties to Taiwan, 72–79, 84–86; economic reforms, 73–74; industrial strategy, 73–74; inward strategy, 120, 121, 123, 125, 127; national identity, 8, 16–17, 19, 80–82, 85–87, 234; outward strategy, 120, 121, 123, 125, 127; political hostilities with Taiwan, 79–87; political liberalization, 6; public opinion, 7, 16, 225 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 2, 6, 7, 8, 16, 41, 50–52, 59, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126, 224 Chinese Taipei, 38 Chun Doo-hwan, 151, 155 Chung Dong-young, 149 Chungli Incident, 52 Clausewitz, Carl von, 118, 119 Clinton, William (Bill) J., 18, 20–21, 35, 91, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 105, 108, 109, 110, 122, 123, 140, 159, 161, 165–168, 172, 225 Cold War, 1–2, 11, 18, 21, 72, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 108, 109, 131–132, 138, 140, 210 commodity chains, 78 Communism, 92, 93, 101, 103 complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID), 174, 176 Confucius, 133 Congress (United States), 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100, 105, 108, 110, 125, 129 constitutional court (South Korea), 153

Constructivism (theory of international relations), 3, 17, 27, 44, 62 containment, 101, 103, 107, 108, 109 criminal regime, 209, 216 Cultural Revolution (China), 30, 33, 84 cultural revolution (of Chen Shuibian), 84 cultural ties (China and Taiwan), 74 Cumings, Bruce, 134 Czechoslovakia, 30 deLisle, Jacques, 84 demilitarized zone (DMZ), 12 democracy: see democratization Democratic Party (United States), 125 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 9, 10, 19, 83–84, 98, 104, 110, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128 democratization, 2, 6, 83–84, 86, 91, 94, 97, 100, 101, 106, 107, 108: South Korea, 12; Taiwan, 8, 9, 17, 115, 124, 225 Deng Xiaoping, 16, 34, 38, 73, 116 deterrence, 94, 95, 99, 101, 107, 112 diplomatic relations, 92, 93, 103, 104, 107, 108, 112 economic integration (China and Taiwan), 72–79, 84–86: see also interdependence Economic Planning Board (EPB), 150 engagement, 96, 100, 101, 106, 110 EP-3 incident (China and United States), 102 ethnic justice in Taiwan, 82–83 ethnicity, 4

Index European Community (EC), 79–80 European Union (EU), 125, 128, 130 executive branch (United States), 96, 98, 99, 110 export-led industrialization, 73–74 F-16s, 94, 95, 102 Five No’s, 59, 61, 84 Ford, Gerald R., 93 foreign investment, 74, 76–78, 85–86 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 105 Formosa Plastics, 77 Four Modernizations, 34 Fujian Province, 74, 77 Gereffi, Gary, 78 Germany, 37 Glorious Restoration, 55 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 33–34 Guangdong Province, 77 Gulf War, 34 Han Chinese, 82, 86 Hassig, Ralph, 133 high politics, 71, 85 Hill, Christopher, 149, 216, 221 Honam, 152 Hong Kong, 58, 73 Hu Jintao, 32, 218 human rights, 100 Hussein, Saddam, 13 Hyundai, 141, 158 identity politics, 71, 79: Taiwan, 82–86 India, 102, 103, 109, 112, 215 Instrumentalism (theory of nationalism), 5 interdependence, 10, 16–17, 19: spillover, 71, 78–80, 82, 84–85, 87; Taiwan and China, 71, 74–77, 79–80 interest groups, 98, 99, 100, 105

239

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 140, 174–175 International Institutions Act, 174 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 144, 152 International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 (Japan), 188–189 Iran, 127, 213, 219 Iraq, 13, 213, 219 Islanders (Taiwan), 9, 82–83, 86, 117 Japan, 7, 11, 21–22, 22–23, 29, 32, 36–37, 42, 91, 101, 102, 105, 108, 115, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131–133, 144, 189–203, 230–233; Constitution (see Article IX); defense spending, 185, 189–190; democracy, 230; domestic politics, 186, 188–190; national identity, 21, 186–188, 190–192, 230–231; overseas development assistance, 185–189; peacekeeping operations, 199–202; security policy changes in, 185–186, 188–189, 190–194; Cold War, 185–189; post-Cold War, 189–194; public opinion, 197–199, 200, 202; stability of, 187–188; SelfDefense Forces, 186, 190–203 Jiang Zemin, 77, 102 Joint Communique of July 4, 1972, 154 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 155 Juche (self-reliance ideology of North Korea), 19–20, 133–136, 139, 140–142, 152 Kaesong industrial complex, 141, 212 Kang Chung-koo, 153

240

Index

Kaohsiung Incident, 52 Kelly, James, 166, 175, 220 Khrushchev, Nikita, 29–30 Kim Dae-jung, 13, 141, 152, 154, 157, 158, 161, 212 Kim Il-sung, 132–138, 140, 155, 156 Kim Jae-kyu, 151 Kim Jong-il, 132–134, 138, 141–145, 156, 158, 210, 211, 212, 217, 218, 219 Kim Young-sam, 151, 156, 157 Kissinger, Henry, 92 Koizumi Junichiro, 186, 195 Korea, 29, 41: see North Korea and South Korea Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), 151 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 174, 207 Korean War, 2, 11, 12, 13, 131–132, 135, 149, 154, 159, 161, 194–195, 197–198, 224 Kuomintang (KMT): see Nationalist Party labor-intensive production, 73–74 Lee Teng-hui, 17, 56–59, 61, 63, 80, 83, 86, 96, 97, 117, 119 Lee Wei-chin, 84 Libby, Lewis, 171 Liberalism (theory of international relations), 3, 10, 18 Lien Chan, 50, 61 light water reactors (LWRs), 207, 209, 215, 218 Lin Biao, 30, 32 low politics, 71, 82 MacArthur, Douglas, 41 Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), 57 Mainlanders (Taiwan), 8, 9, 82–83, 86, 116, 117

Mao Zedong, 6, 29, 20, 41, 73, 84, 224 Maoists, 30 Maoism, 73, 84 May Fourth movement, 37 Mearsheimer, John, 180 Millenium Democratic Party (MDP), 159 Missile Defense Agency, 173 missiles, 95, 96, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 111 modernization, 107 Mount Kumgang, 141 Murkowski Resolution, 99 Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S. and Taiwan), 92, 165 National Defense Law, 64 National Defense Program Outline of 1995 (Japan),189, 192–193 National Defense Report, 63, 64 national identity, 2–6, 80, 82, 84, 86–87, 97, 108: China, 8, 16–17, 19, 234; Japan, 21, 230–231; North Korea, 10–11, 19–20; South Korea, 13, 14–15, 20; Taiwan, 8, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 84, 115, 124, 225–226, 227 National People’s Congress, 44 national security policy, 72–73, 85–86 National Unification Council (NUC), 60 National Unification Guidelines (NUG), 57, 60 Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT), 2, 7, 8–9, 10, 12, 16, 29, 32, 36, 39, 42, 50, 52, 55, 56, 61–63, 67, 73, 83, 86, 110, 116, 117, 119, 123, 129, 224 nation-centric paradigm, 160 neoconservatives, 169, 213 New Party, 83 Nixon, Richard M., 92, 98, 136 No Gun Li, 159

Index Non-Proliferation Treaty, 175 North Korea, 10–12, 13, 19–20, 91, 97, 103, 127, 131–148, 208, 212, 216, 227–230: authoritarian regime, 10–11; economic reforms, 141–142, 144–145; military first posture, 143; national identity, 10–11, 19–20; nuclear weapons, 13, 14, 20, 22, 139–140, 143–145 Northern Territories (Japan), 193–194 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 156, 207, 215 nuclear weapons, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 22, 97, 102, 103, 106, 115, 120, 128, 217, 225, 227, 228 Oh Kongdan, 133 Olympic games, 35, 38, 43 One China, 19, 57, 58, 61, 63, 65, 66, 80, 84, 97, 101, 102, 104, 105, 113 One Country on Each Side of Strait, 82, 84 One Country, Two Systems, 38, 41, 58, 59, 227 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 151 Pakistan, 143, 215 Park Chung-hee, 136–137, 150, 151, 154 Partnership for a New American Century, 169–170 peaceful resolution, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101 People First Party (PFP), 61, 82, 116, 117, 119, 129 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 8, 117 People’s Republic of China (PRC): see China

241

Permanent Normal Trading Relations (PNTR), 96 Perry, William, 140 plutonium, 208 Powell, Colin, 101, 103, 111, 167, 171 President Enterprises, 77 Primordialism (theory of nationalism), 5 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 213, 220 public opinion, 98, 99, 100, 102, 104, 105, 111 Putin, Vladimir, 139 Quadrennial Defense Review, 101, 108, 111 Ranjin-Sonbong special economic zone, 141 Reagan, Ronald, 33, 93, 98, 109, 224 Realism (theory of international relations), 3, 27, 34, 37, 41 Regulations Encouraging Taiwanese Compatriots to Invest on Mainland, 74 Republic of China (ROC): see Taiwan Republican Party (United States), 125 Rice, Condoleeza, 143, 168, 172 Rigger, Shelley, 84 Roh Moo-hyun, 142, 150, 153, 154, 155, 159, 161, 176, 178, 208, 212 Roh Tae-woo, 155 Rubinstein, Murray, 78 Rumsfeld, Donald, 166, 170 Russia, 30, 35, 102: see also Soviet Union sanctions, 94, 95 Seoul, 12 September 11 attacks (2001), 13, 37, 103, 106, 111

242

Index

Shanghai Communiqué, 92 Shanghai, 18, 77–78 Singapore, 6 Sino-Japanese relations, 195–196 Six Assurances, 93, 98 Six-Party Talks, 22, 23, 144, 229, 233 Snow, Edgar, 41 social communications across Taiwan Strait, 71, 78–80, 82, 84–85 soft power, 9–10, 38 Soong, James, 50, 61, 82, 116 South Carolina, 44 South China Sea, 77 South Korea, 11, 12–15, 20, 131–133, 135–145, 149–164, 227–230: Center-Left, 13–14, 15; Center-Right, 15; democratization, 12, national identity, 13, 14–15, 20 Southeast Asia, 73 sovereignty claims 93, 107: claims of China and Taiwan), 80 Soviet Union (USSR), 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16, 30–31, 33–34, 40, 92, 94, 97, 131–134, 138–139, 141–142, 144, 224 special state-to-state relations, 81, 97, 104 state-centric paradigm, 160 Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), 57, 58 strategic ambiguity 94, 109, 215 strategic competitor, 100 strategic partner, 100 Strong Defense, Active Deterrence, 63 Suh Dae-sook, 134 Sun Yat-sen, 41 Sunshine policy, 142, 157, 158, 167, 181, 212 Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), 84 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 92, 93, 98, 99, 101, 109, 110, 126

Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA), 99, 110 Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995–1996), 80, 86, 96, 99, 107, 109, 110 Taiwan Strait, 71, 74, 78, 80, 82, 96, 101, 107, 110 Taiwan, 8–10, 16–18, 27, 29, 31–32, 36, 38–39, 41–44, 49–70, 71, 80, 86, 224–227: democratization, 8, 9, 17, 83–84, 86, 115, 124, 225; economic and social ties to China, 72–79, 84–86; independence, 9, 31, 36, 39, 40, 42, 43, 83–84, 91, 94, 96, 97, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 115, 116, 117, 119, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130; industrialization, 73; investment in China, 74–78; Islanders, 9, 82–83, 86, 117; Mainlanders, 8, 9, 82–83, 86, 116, 117; national identity, 8, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 80, 82–84, 86–87, 115, 124, 225–226, 227; political hostilities with China, 79–87; presidential campaign of 2000, 84; presidential campaign of 2004, 84; recession of 2000–2001, 77, 85; trade policy 72–74 Taiwanization of China, 78 Taiwanization, 117, 120, 124, 125, 128 Tan’gun, 133 teacher’s labor union (South Korea), 152 temple politics (China and Taiwan), 78 Ten-Point Consensus (ChenSoong), 61, 82 terrorism, 103, 104 Theater Missile Defense (TMD), 95, 99 Third World, 30, 31, 32 Three Links, 57

Index

243

Three No’s, 96, 100 Three Pillars, 97 Three Principles and Three Stages (unification formula), 157 Tiananmen Square massacre, 7, 8, 36, 74, 86, 94, 95, 98, 100, 109, 111, 121, 225 trade balance (China and Taiwan), 75–76, 78 Tsinghua University, 43

131–141, 143–145, 165–184, 208, 216, 223–234: credibility, 106; strategic ambiguity, 122 use of force, 92, 93, 94, 104, 108 USS Pueblo, 136

U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 187–188, 191–196 U.S.-ROK Alliance, 131, 135, 141 U.S.-ROK alliance, 160 UN Security Council, 214 unification (China and Taiwan), 92, 94, 97, 104, 107, 111, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): see Soviet Union United Nations, 156 United States (U.S.), 7, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18–19, 20–21, 22–23, 30, 31, 32, 33–35, 37, 40, 42, 50, 76, 84, 91–114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130,

Wang, Y.C., 77 war on terror, 91, 103 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 168, 173–174 Wendt, Alexander, 38 White Terror, 52, 82 World Bank, 144 World Trade Organization (WTO), 38, 96 World War II, 82

Vershbow, Alexander, 209, 216 Vietnam, 30, 31, 136 Virginia, 44

Xinhua News Agency, 43 Yasukuni shrine, 37 Yeltsin, Boris, 138 Yongbyon reactor site (North Korea), 167, 208 Yu Shyi-kun, 127 Zeng Guofan, 32