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ic discourses | identity matters: scho the student body in academic disco entity matters: schooling the studen in academic discourses | identity m ers: schooling the student body in a n academic discourse d o n n a l ec o u r t
identity matters
identity matters schooling the student body in academic discourse
DONNA LeCOURT
S t a t e Un i v e r s i t y o f Ne w Yo r k P r e s s
Published by S TAT E U N I V E R S I T Y O F N E W Y O R K P R E S S ALBANY © 2004 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, address State University of New York Press 90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207 Production, Laurie Searl Marketing, Michael Campochiaro Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data LeCourt, Donna, 1963– Identity matters : schooling the student body in academic discourse / Donna LeCourt. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-7914-6055-X (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-6056-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Critical pedagogy—United States. 2. Multicultural education—United States. 3. English language—Study and teaching (Higher)—Social aspects—United States. 4. Education—Biographical methods. I. Title. LC196.5.U6L43 2004 370.11'5—dc22
2003055625 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For my parents and all the “Edgies”
Contents
acknowledgments
ix
introduction
1
chapter one MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF IDENTITY POLITICS, OR HOW IDENTITY MATTERS IN PUBLIC AND ACADEMIC DISCOURSES
13
interchapter one : HOME PLACES
34
chapter two ACADEMIC DISCOURSE AND SUBJECT PRODUCTION: TOWARD A TECHNOLOGY OF POWER
37
interchapter two : LEARNING MY CLASS
70
chapter three TURNING OURSELVES POWER, AND DESIRE
INTO
SUBJECTS: IDENTIFICATION, 73
interchapter three : THE IMPOSTER
IN
ME
100
chapter four COLONIALISM, CAPITALISM, AND COMPOSITION: STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS ON COMPOSING IDENTITIES
105
interchapter four : LOSS
140
AND
GAIN
viii
contents
chapter five THE TURN TO IDENTITY: MULTIPLICITY MATERIAL RELATIONS OF POWER
AND
interchapter five : MY BLINDNESS
AGENCY
WITHIN
143 190
chapter six WRITING MATTERS: REVITALIZING AGENCY
193
appendix
223
notes
225
works cited
229
index
239
Acknowledgments
No one writes alone, and the collaborators on this project were many since Identity Matters represents the fruition of ten years of work, spanning my graduate work at Ohio State University, my nine years at Colorado State University, and my new position at the University of Massachusetts. Although little remains from my dissertation in this book, I owe a special debt to my dissertation committee: Andrea Lunsford, Nan Johnson, and H. Lewis Ulman. Andrea’s influence deserves special mention; she serves as a model of the kind of scholar I hope to be. I am also grateful to many friends and colleagues involved in earlier versions of this work who had inestimable influence over both my thinking and writing: Carrie Leverenz, Todd English, Heather Graves, Mindy Wright, Kelly Belanger, Susan Kates, Amy Goodburn, Paul Trembath, and Chip Rhodes. I owe a special thanks to my composition colleagues at Colorado State University and the University of Massachusetts: Michael Palmquist, Kate Kiefer, Stephen Reid, Charlie Moran, Marcia Curtis, Peggy Woods, and Anne Herrington. Their collegial presence remains an inspiration to me and a continual source of support. To those who listened to my ideas with such infinite patience, I express my sincere gratitude, especially to Kimberly Town-Abels, Sarah Rilling, and Laura Thomas. I am deeply appreciative, in particular, of Sarah Sloane, an extraordinary friend and colleague for her generous and challenging readings of this manuscript. Thanks as well to Priscilla Ross at the State University of New York Press for her support of this project. I am also deeply indebted to the literacy autobiography writers, whose texts continue to provoke me to find new insights, and to my students, who never fail to inspire me in their commitments to social change and their honesty about my pedagogies. Finally, and most importantly, I offer sincere thanks to my parents, Doris and Charles LeCourt, who never fail to encourage me in any way they can.
ix
Introduction
This book began, as so many of my professional endeavors do, in my teaching practice and my own experiences as a student. In particular, it began in stories of failure and frustration, from an attempt to better understand what was taking place in my classrooms and why I was so invested in the pedagogies that kept failing me. From practice, I was led to theory, but theory does not begin in the academy; it begins in everyday interactions and reactions. It begins in autobiography. It becomes a search for understanding that which everyday realities or accepted ways of thinking cannot explain. I introduce this text, then, as I began it: in the narratives of my teaching and school history that continually shadow the more theoretical work that makes up so much of the following chapters. LEARNING FROM FAILURE: MATERIAL AND DISCURSIVE IDENTIT Y RELATIONS
Because I grew up in a working-class, inner-city neighborhood, school was not always a friendly place. My childhood friends knew this even better than I did. Many of them dropped out as soon as possible, explaining that “school had nothing to offer” them or their lives. For my own part, I was suspended for drinking on school grounds, delighted in smoking illegal substances during lunch, and was frequently accused of “mouthing off.” Despite these seemingly predictable experiences (after all, we are constantly told how “at risk” students like me are in our school systems), I also loved school, learning, and books. The combination of these experiences propelled me to become a teacher. Unlike so many teacher candidates I now see in my classes, my inspiration came not from a desire to model my most influential teachers (and there were some) but to be as different from them as I could be, to change curriculum and instruction in ways that would benefit my early peers who so quickly became disenfranchised from school (only about 20 percent of my sixth grade class went on to get a high school diploma). With these goals in mind, I began my teaching career over fifteen years ago. My first full-time position was teaching basic writing to inner-city Chicago students who were enrolled in a special program called CHANCE: an opportunity to illustrate a potential not evident in the traditional requirements for university admission (SATs, grades, etc.). My second position found me in inner-city Boston, 1
2
identity matters
teaching in an alternative high school for returning drop-outs, those expelled from Boston Public Schools, or those BPS recommended for an alternative setting, usually ex-gang members and expectant mothers. Given the structural inequities of our education system, these environments were also highly multicultural. It was not unusual in either institution for mine to be the only white face in the classroom. If there were others, they were students like I once was, primarily from Southie (the neighborhoods in the South End of Boston made famous in the movie Good Will Hunting). Although I now teach in an institution where the majority of students are white, middle-class, and suburban, my early experiences as teacher and student continue to inform my pedagogies and what I hope to accomplish through the teaching of writing: the strategic use of the very identity differences that so marginalized my friends and my students as a source of agency to alter power relations. I hope that my students, through enacting their differential relations to culture, can bring the agency they possess—fostered by fluid identities forged in multiple discourses—to bear on acts of writing. If my pedagogies can encourage students to be critical readers and writers of culture, their ability to question how their own identities have been constructed within ideology will incite a critical sense about those ideologies and their ability to alter them. Such critical acts of understanding, I presume, will then translate into material and discursive action whereby students will seek solutions to social problems, or at the very least, reconsider their own investments in them. Although admittedly lofty goals, I am certainly not alone in my attempts to connect writing to culture, identity, and social justice. I am also not alone, I fear, in how miserably I often fail in doing just that. What I’ve come to realize, via my failures, is that there was a missing element to how I have both theorized and attempted to enact these goals: the student herself and how she lives and experiences culture as body in the material world. In focusing so much on difference as a theoretical concept, I overemphasized the discursive role of identity, forgetting what my own past should have consistently reminded me of: We don’t live identity only in a discursive realm, we live it in interactions with other people in cultural spaces continually overdetermined by material realities of poverty, racism, violence, and threat as well as the more corporeal investments we have in maintaining particular social relations with others. We live identity, that is, as social beings, as bodies, not just minds. At one point, I knew this, or more accurately, felt it to be true. I understood, that is, why so many of my friends dropped out of school; they did so in favor of maintaining alliances with the culture we grew up in, one which seemed diametrically opposed to the one school was asking us to inhabit. Those of us who stayed in school attempted to maintain these social alliances through our clothing; we girls deliberately marked our difference through army pants, workboots, and “big hair” while the middle-class students marked their bodies in the preppy styles of the late 1970s. Leaving school, my friends understood,
introduction
3
was to opt out of the middle class. While never an explicit choice to be materially oppressed, the continual remarks that “school has nothing to offer me” suggest an implicit choice to remain aligned with culture as it is currently being lived (e.g., Ogbu; Willis). My early childhood friends understood that culture is not only an act of perception or construction, it is also a material experience in the world that allowed one to do certain things: to maintain social ties, to seek out forms of success, to desire certain modes of being. Only when reimagined within this understanding of culture experienced materially as body as well as discursively through acts of the mind did I come to understand my students’ resistance to my pedagogy as not their failure, but my own: my own inability to account for the more material influences of culture in a pedagogy focused on discourse as the primary site of identity constitution and social relations. Let me offer two examples of “failure” that have most influenced the rethinking of identity that occupies the following chapters: Sheila and Matt. Sheila’s and Matt’s stories, while indicative of many others’, resonate so strongly for me if for no other reason than my pedagogy, at first, seemed to be so successful for them. I have grown used to the complaints that cultural issues should not be part of a writing curriculum from students who refuse to engage my pedagogy. These students resisted primarily through their insistence that I should be either teaching them to write successfully for other classes or focusing on literacy skills necessary for their future careers. While such admonitions that I was not performing my job appropriately made me uneasy, I found myself dismissing their complaints as further evidence of ideological interpellation. Dismissing the failure of those who never engaged was easy (too easy, as I will explain later); dismissing the failure of those who did engage, like Sheila and Matt, was impossible and bore further scrutiny. Sheila initially appeared to be one of those students for whom my pedagogy had been most successful. In a course primarily designed around critical pedagogy and cultural studies, Sheila wrote scathing and insightful critiques of cultural relations, seemed to understand how ideology created identities such that power could be orchestrated over them more easily, and even took up the challenge of social transformation in her papers, offering suggestions for material change. In a conference toward the end of the course, however, I discovered that my seeming success was not to be. Sheila arrived in the office, at the point of tears, ostensibly to ask for advice about graduate schools. As she began to talk, she explained that my class (Literacy and Cultural Difference) and others she had taken in critical theory had caused her to re-evaluate the role of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in her life. She highlighted how this church’s literacy practices inscribed an ideology with which she wanted to disassociate herself, particularly the practices that had created an oppressive situation for women. As in her papers analyzing other cultural sites, Sheila indicated in these reflections how well she is able to connect social- and self-critique through an examination of the ideological function of cultural signs. Despite this critique,
4
identity matters
she didn’t want to leave the church because doing so would mean “leaving” her husband and children due to her inevitable excommunication. Sheila and I discussed the possibility of becoming a critical member of the church and working toward change, but she saw this option as untenable given the church’s hierarchical structure. I recommended accepting her “school” subject positions and her “church” ones as parts of a multiple subject wherein contradictions need not be resolved, but Sheila rejected my attempt to see the fluidity of identity as part of how culture could be lived. Not reconciling her conflicting positions, Sheila was convinced, would only lead to more of the trauma she’d been experiencing for months. Not surprisingly, this conversation led to others, none of which created a resolution. On the last day of class, Sheila reported that she had reached her own resolution: She was going to pursue a graduate degree in the sciences so that both her professional and religious lives could be continuously foundational. Her only choice, she felt, was to reject outright the critical insights she still felt were “right.” Enacting these insights, however, made her “real” life unlivable. Sheila’s refusal to act upon the critical insights she had discovered in my class was at first incredibly frustrating for me. I had no way of explaining such a reaction. The typical, knee-jerk assumption that I had applied too often to other students—that she was too interpellated by ideology to take up the challenge she had posed for herself—wouldn’t work for Sheila. It was simply too facile a reaction to the emotional trauma Shelia was obviously experiencing; its explanatory power was further undermined by the serious cultural work in which she had engaged all semester. When I came to think about this interaction in more material terms, however, Sheila’s reaction made much more sense: She had chosen to pursue an identity that facilitated her social relations with others. That is, Sheila existed in culture not only as a mind, able to critique culture, but also as a body materially invested in institutional structures (religion, marriage) that mediated and organized her ability to live in particular social relations with other bodies. In this way, my initial reaction proved correct, but with a twist. Sheila was indeed resisting my pedagogy due to her ideological investments, but not investments she was unwilling to critique through a discursive intervention, but rather a felt relation to ideology that manifested itself in investments with other people in the material fabric of her life. Without these ideological investments, her ability to live in the world would inexorably change: She would lose her children, husband, and other family members. Altering the way she perceived the world affected more than her own ability to enact agency; it would change how her body literally lived culture in ways that she, quite understandably, could not accept. Similarly, Matt also continues to haunt me as a highly frustrating “failure” because my pedagogy seemed to work so well for him. Yet, like Sheila, his critical insights led to an equal unwillingness to alter his material relations. Matt, a young white man, continually critiqued the power relations embedded
introduction
5
in multiple literacies (with remarkable insight, empathy, and with a sophisticated sense of ideology), but each paper concluded that there was no need for change since the current situation benefited him so well. Why, he continually asked, should he seek to change a cultural situation that predisposed him to the very kinds of success he was seeking? Should he willingly give up his potential ability to care for himself and his future children in favor of an abstract concept of social equity? Matt’s reactions may be typical of others’, but because they contradicted so much of what I had come to know of him, I found his responses as inexplicable as Sheila’s. Matt was an extremely sensitive man deeply concerned about what he saw as the power inequities of our culture. What, then, would lead him to resist seeking ways to alter the power relations he so insightfully described? What I came to realize, of course, was that, like Sheila, more material interactions with culture undergirded Matt’s response. While my pedagogy sought to encourage an examination of multiple power relations—an analysis Matt conducted quite well in his reading of the cultural sites he chose to examine—Matt perceived his own identity more structurally. In his material interactions in the world, Matt, quite accurately, had learned that maintaining his sense of self was inextricable from his ability to support himself financially, to take care of himself as both body and identity. The desire for economic security is literally quite real: Those without financial means are discounted, vilified, and held up to ridicule in our society. To be without money in our society is to be oppressed in the most structural of ways that literally put the body at risk: homelessness, unemployment, poverty, violence. Any threat to the identity that ensured such material success, Matt told me quite clearly in the conclusions to his papers, should be resisted. In such a material realm, Matt correctly intuited that those without means are not afforded the ability to choose or enact identity; only those within the middle class are allowed that privilege. To disrupt his desire for economic success, then, was to ask him to literally opt out of his own agency when read through the material realms of culture he interacts with daily. The interaction of the dominant and marginal encouraged, indeed required, by my pedagogies too often had this result: My attempt to read culture as a local interaction with multiple possibilities was undercut consistently by the more structural concepts of power my students experienced as bodies in the material world. The juxtaposition of dominant and marginal identities I asked them to consider did not necessarily lead to a call for change; rather, it just as often replicated the very power relations it was meant to critique. By listening closely to such resistance, I’ve learned a lot from my students. What I’ve learned most recently is how inadequately my pedagogies address the more material concerns that so deeply impact their lives. By valorizing difference as a means of critiquing power, my pedagogies were ill-prepared for the other ways such an interaction might affect the identity constitution of students who were understandably
6
identity matters
concerned with the very real material benefits dominant discourse offered them. My most resistant students, who I dismissed so easily, kept trying to tell me this. FROM QUESTIONING PEDAGOGY TO QUESTIONING THEORY
What, I had to wonder in the wake of such student reaction, made my pedagogies so consistently neglect these material factors in my students’ lives? The answer was astoundingly simple: I had overlooked the view of culture encouraged by the theories on which they were constructed. Over the years, I have enacted a wide array of pedagogies, consistently revising my practice in response to research and scholarship. I have attempted multicultural pedagogies based in discourse communities, seeking to teach a respect for linguistic and cultural difference through the study of multiple communities. I have taken seriously the challenge to construct my classrooms as contact zones wherein students seek to engage each other’s difference in attempts at border crossing. Most recently, I have been strongly influenced by critical pedagogy and cultural studies, where I try to work with my students on strategies for reading the multiple, and frequently oppressive, meanings our society offers in cultural sites. Despite their obvious pedagogical differences, I finally realized that there was a similar theoretical premise undergirding all my pedagogies: a focus on how discourse constructs identity. I may have moved from a more fixed concept of identity authentically constructed in closed communities to a more poststructural concept of the fluidity of identity, but all these pedagogies sought a discursive intervention— through literate acts of reading and writing culture—into identity constitution. Such an intervention only seemed logical given my role as a teacher of writing influenced by theories that presume identity, reality, and ideology are discursively constructed. The experiences of students like Sheila and Matt, however, are not easily explained through such theory. From them I have learned that identity is also perceived, lived, and enacted in much more material ways, and that my pedagogy was itself blind to these aspects of culture. By relying primarily on discursive conceptions of identity, I, thus, was continually producing my own set of disabling binary oppositions: I emphasized the local over the structural, the discursive over the material, and the mind over the body. Recognizing how ideologically suspect such hierarchies are, I finally had to ask how my pedagogies might be producing student failures through the limits my theory was imposing upon their understandings of culture. It took my students’ reactions and resistance to finally make obvious to me the irony of neglecting the material influences on identity while simultaneously seeking to offer my students a way to impact the social real. In this way, my teaching practice prompted me to reexamine more than my pedagogy: It led me to reconsider the very theories on which such pedagogies were predicated and, conversely, what effect these pedagogies might actually be having on my stu-
introduction
7
dents’ identity constitution as students in my classroom. Looking at academic discourse more materially, that is, also led me to consider my own role in the material and my influence on student identity construction itself. Located within an institution as they are, my pedagogies do more than offer interventions into identity politics; they also participate in the social relations supported by these politics. If students perceive their identities through both the material and discursive realms of culture, how do they perceive academic discourse’s role in those social relations? What effect does learning this discourse have on the very identities I seek to highlight as sources of agency? These questions emerge from my suspicion that my own pedagogies may partially explain the reactions they have received. That my pedagogies, in neglecting the material, might also unwittingly participate in supporting structural power relations. That my pedagogies, while seeking to transform identity through ideology critique, might be offering equally oppressive options for constructing it. Such realizations led to the guiding question of this text: What does it mean for our pedagogies if we take seriously academic discourse’s role within the material realms of culture? I take up this question specifically as an issue of identity constitution and its effect on agency. Rather than presuming the fluidity of identity and/or seeing identity as complete ideological interpellation, I attempt to mediate between these two positions. From my students I have learned that my overly discursive emphasis needs to be tempered. In this I agree with Teresa Ebert: Our theorizing of subjectivity and social action may have been overly determined by our discursive turn toward poststructuralism with the effect that the more materialist elements of culture are underplayed. I am not, however, advocating discarding the significant insights poststructuralism adds to our understanding of discourse and identity. The influence of discourse on material reality and identity constitution, after all, is inextricable from our concern with how writing might function as a material intervention into the world. Rather, I take as instructive Rosemary Hennessy’s admonition that the discursive and material can never be seen in opposition, but rather are dialectical and mutually supporting relations: As a discursive category, the social becomes meaning-full within frames of intelligibility, the ideological practices, through which meaning is constructed. The “logic” of the social—or the structures by which social relations are made intelligible—informs every cultural narrative. What counts as the “social” affects whether and how we make connections among activities of various sorts—work and culture, laws and trade. What constitutes the “social” in a culture’s stories affects (and is turn affected by) its distribution of resources and power, categories of value, terms of inclusion and exclusion . . . Understanding the practice of meaning-making as ideology implies that this activity is the effect of struggles over resources and power that are played out through the discourses of culture . . . [language],
8
identity matters then, . . . is the necessary and inescapable process of making sense by negotiating the discursive materiality of one’s lived reality. (14).
When we recognize the interconnections of the material and the discursive in this way, we also have to acknowledge that social conditions are not only supported/ constructed by discourse, but also that discursive interactions, like the teaching of writing, are inextricable from the material world in which they operate. The social real impacts the discursive as much as the opposite might be true. Attempting to understand more clearly how the material impacts such discursively constructed pedagogies prompted me to write this book. By focusing on how the discursive and material interact with the teaching of academic discourse to produce and enable identity, I hope to better understand not only why my pedagogies so often fail, but also how I might be (re)producing the very disabling concepts of identity that might explain such failures. In particular, I hope to understand whether my teaching of academic discourse has a socially reproductive effect on how my students perceive and enact their identities rather than offering them the socially transformative understanding of cultural difference I intend. In this way, this book is an attempt to take up the challenge Matt and Sheila posed to me, an attempt to understand how the discursive and the material realms of culture interact in my classes. Through such a new understanding of how the discursive and material interact with a body’s ability to construct identity, my hope is that I can come to reenvision my pedagogy and enact the goals I hold so dear in ways that better intervene into culture as it is lived by my students. The first step to realizing such a goal is to reconsider identity formation as it is constructed within academic discourse. How does academic discourse participate in and/or resist the cultural understandings of identity our students bring with them to our classrooms? Can the local interventions we attempt in our pedagogies stand up to the structural operations of power our students have experienced as bodies in the material world? Only through such investigations, I argue, might we understand how our students embody the multiple, conflicting discourses that we hope to enact in favor of agency, and critically interrogate what role we play in how such identities are formed. Only then might I do better by the next Sheila or Matt who enters my classroom. THE SITE OF INVESTIGATION
To begin inquiring into identity constitution in academic discourse, my investigation turns to students’ own depictions of academic discourse in literacy autobiographies written as a class assignment. In an attempt to uncover what students themselves might say about these interactions and issues, I collected forty-six literacy autobiographies, including all process work, and conducted discourse-based interviews with a smaller subset of these writers. By analyzing what real students say when they reflect on the role that language education has
introduction
9
played in their lives, I attempt to situate my concern for pedagogy’s role in constructing identity within the material realms of culture. I turn to student depictions of discourse, that is, as a way of grounding the more theoretical discussions of the relationships among power, materialism, discourse, subjectivity, and identity I explore in this text, attempting to maintain a dialectical encounter between the students’ descriptions and the theoretical explanations we might provide for those descriptions. In the ensuing chapters, then, I examine the ways two student populations—graduate students in English and basic writers—present their interactions with academic discourse in literacy autobiographies written for basic writing courses or graduate seminars at a large midwestern university.1 I chose these two groups because they represent distinct points on a continuum of experience with academic discourse. While the basic writers have had experience—and frequently success—with writing tasks in school up to this point, college writing is a different thread of that discursive realm, one that requires learning new discursive positions. Similarly, the graduate students also have a twofold relationship to academic discourse. Like the basic writers, they are an integral part of the discourse, having successfully negotiated the “thread” of academic discourse that is college writing. However, by seeking to become professionals in English studies, they are also on the margins of the discursive realms reserved for teachers and scholars. Thus, both these groups of writers have special insight into the nature of academic discourse. When writers approach a new manifestation of discourse, or when difficulties with using a discourse’s language arise, they become more aware of a discourse that is exterior to their sense of self. This awareness allows the writers more insight into the ways in which academic discourse may be seeking, or has sought, to act upon them. This type of analysis follows Sharon Crowley’s assertion in A Teacher’s Guide to Deconstruction that writers unfamiliar with certain manifestations of a discourse are “more in touch with the flow of différance” than are more experienced writers (35). Crowley hypothesizes that “inexperienced writers” perceive différance more clearly because they “find their own voices simply drowned out by those of teachers and other sources of discursive authority” (35). In other words, the self is more easily erased by the intertext into which it is trying to write itself. Such a sense of différance also gives the writers, particularly the graduate students, perspectives from which to view their ongoing immersion in academic discourse and the consequences of that immersion on their current sense of self and use of language. It is this unique position that makes these texts so valuable for an inquiry into identity constitution and its effects on agency. They give us something much different than literacy autobiographies published by professional scholars (e.g., Rose; Gilyard, Voices). Although I have learned much from these works, they come to us as testaments about past relationships rather than the reflections of one currently immersed in the very processes I seek to inquire into. Since my goal is to understand the process by which identity is constituted
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identity matters
and enacted in relation to academic discourse, texts written while still a student offer more insight into the specificities of identity formation. Further, the students take up these interactions on their own terms and in relation to their own experiences in the social real. Rather than theorizing identity, the students offer narratives of how they have experienced and lived identity, commenting explicitly on how those experiences interact with academic discourse. As a result, they offer significant insight into the material relations that so concern me here. I grant that my own theorizing of these texts could interfere with these representations, but I do not want to overstate this concern. The truth-value of the texts’ experiences and the preservation of the writers’ intent are moot points in this analysis. The autobiographies serve as artifacts wherein public and academic languages for understanding material interactions with culture merge; thus, the autobiographies should not be viewed as authentic representations of voice. Instead, they highlight the nature of discursive interactions in a historical moment, telling us as much about discursive-material relations as they do about individual writers. A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
In analyzing the literacy autobiographies, I also employ a terminology specific to the perspective I am taking here. This terminology attempts to acknowledge academic discourse’s imbrication and connection to multiple discourses in American society as well as its specificity and multiplicity within academic institutions. Thus, my use of the term “academic discourse” refers not to a closed system of discursive relations as has been posited in discourse community theory nor to “one discourse among many” as in theories of the contact zone. Rather, academic discourse in this discussion designates part of a discursive formation that limits and defines a certain discursive realm that is inseparable from the other discourses with which it interacts. In short, academic discourse is not a totality unto itself; it is a segment of a larger discursive presence that operates within U.S. culture. However, academic discourse is distinguishable in its production of particular uses and forms of language, epistemologies, objects of knowledge, and institutional relations. In this way, language is a part of discourse, not its totality. As such, I further distinguish between “discourse” as a broad term indicating epistemological, ideological, institutional, and social relations; and language, as a specific material artifact of a discourse that includes forms of text, speaking, and processes of reading and writing. To prevent confusion, I will refer to the manifestations of academic discourse in writing and speaking as “schooled language,” rather than academic discourse as is frequently done. Schooled language will designate anything written or spoken within the institution for an authority of that institution (e.g., teachers, journals, professional communities, etc.) and serve as a signifier for the type of literacy other discourses (e.g., business, etc.) value because it is perceived as “schooled.”2
introduction
11
Although academic discourse functions within the larger discursive formation of U.S. culture, my analysis also distinguishes between academic discourse and those discourses students deem more closely linked to home and experience. I will refer to these discourses as “competing cultural discourses.” Like academic discourse, they form part of a larger formation yet are distinguishable through how they circumscribe ways of using language and worldviews specific to material and historical contexts. Because these discourses are not linked directly to an institution, they are harder to define. I presume, however, because of the research into their manifestations, that they are linked to culturally determined groupings of persons, most probably influenced by race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, gender, region, and religion (e.g., Heath, Shirley Brice; Street; Moss). Although I am forced by the nature of our language to depict these discourses in my discussion as separate entities, they may, and probably do, share similarities with academic discourse, yet they do not define the same part of the formation. OVERVIEW
Through the literacy autobiographies, I explore how the discursive and material interact in constituting student identity and analyze the effects that identity formation may have on our attempts to enact the agency that lies in cultural difference within socially transformative writing pedagogies. To investigate this question, I move continually back and forth between the theoretical and the real, putting the literacy autobiographies and the cultural theories I use into constant dialectical relation with one another. Similarly, I seek to put the material, embodied experience of culture into constant conversation with our discursively influenced theories about identity and how it is experienced/enacted. I begin this investigation with just such a conversation, then, between the various rhetorics made available for understanding identity in both the public and academic realms, arguing in chapter 1 that composition’s discussions of identity and agency are continually marked by tensions that are historically concurrent with, and evocative of, public identity rhetorics. Chapter 2 turns more explicitly to the literacy autobiographies, examining what theory of discourse and subjectivity might best explain the interactions with academic discourse the autobiographies put forth. In this way, chapter 2 also sets up a theoretical concept for discourse that guides the ensuing chapters. Chapter 3 offers a more materialist explanation of the relations the students describe in an attempt to understand the structural power relations that affect the literacy autobiographies’ descriptions of discourse. Specifically, chapter 3 focuses on the material-discursive construction of desire as an embodied element of culture in how students perceive their options for identity construction, both in academic discourse and capitalist society. Chapter 4 brings the discursive and material back into conversation with one another, looking at how the material influences of capitalism function in conjunction with academic discourse to “mark” the possibilities for identity in the precise categorical relations offered in the public
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realm. Using postcolonial theory, chapter 4 examines how the linguistic marking of difference in a self/Other relation creates possibilities for identity formation that accord with the power relations to which identities are subjected in the social real. Finally, chapter 5 considers the consequences of such linguistic markings of identity boundaries for how students interpret the potential agency of their other cultural identities, even to the point of erasing that influence in some cases. Relying upon theories of how we experience culture as both body and discourse, chapter 5 attempts to illustrate how social and power relations influence identity formation such that agency is continually undercut. Throughout chapters 2 through 5, I attempt to highlight not only the discursive-material relations that are inciting the student writers to constitute identity in particular ways but also the role composition pedagogy plays, as a central aspect of this discursive-material relation, in how students perceive their identities and their possibilities in the world. As a result, chapter 6 turns more explicitly to pedagogy, offering possible interventions into the processes of identity formation just explicated that might better enact the forms of agency on which our socially transformative pedagogies rely. The chapters that follow, then, are undoubtedly theoretical, employing a diverse range of critical and cultural theories to explain identity formation as both a discursive and material interaction. Yet, the literacy autobiographies continually function both to temper the insights of this theory, and in many cases, to produce new theoretical insights themselves. In this way, I hope to reflect in the text the very interactions of the “real” and the “discursive” that I am attempting to theorize, and to allow theory to emerge from student experience rather than only subject that experience to my theoretical lenses. Finally, a central argument of the text is that all identities, including my own, are constructed within lived experiences. As such, there is also an identity that undergirds all this work, an identity formed within its own material and discursive interactions with public and academic discourses, with the material interactions of the classroom and the frequently abstruse composition theories that guide pedagogy. In an attempt to animate and accentuate the frustrated teacher, the working-class student, and the body I now inhabit, short, personal interchapters appear between each chapter in the text as a way of both disrupting the more academic argument I am constructing and exposing the lived history and material location of its writer. Such interchapters serve as reminders both of the body who is undergoing similar attempts to reconstruct identity as those I hope to offer students and of the material conditions under which this text was produced.
chapter one
Material Conditions of Identity Politics, or How Identity Matters in Public and Academic Discourses
The grand theme of your career may be that the burden of representation is an illusion—a paradigm, par excellence, or ideological mauvaise foi—but that will only heighten your chagrin when you realize that it follows you everywhere like your own shadow. It isn’t a thing of your making, and it won’t succumb to your powers of unmaking—not yet anyway. —Henry Louis Gates Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man THE DAY AFTER THE L.A. RIOTS a friend called me to cancel our lunch date.
She couldn’t, she explained, be with a white person today. My first reaction was empathetic; in the wake of such a violent occurrence within race relations, my race certainly seemed problematic. Why would an African American woman want to discuss such a volatile racial event with her white friend? Could I possibly understand her perspective if I tried? But, as good a liberal as I was trying to be in this situation, I was also somewhat confused. I wasn’t just any white person—I was Donna, her long-standing friend. Why must she only see race and not our more local relationship? In the way only a white person could, I had hoped we were “past all that.” What I’ve come to realize, of course, is that few of us are “past all that,” no matter how much we want to assume that civil rights and liberal, humanist political actions in the past thirty years have helped us exceed a politics based on race. If I didn’t know this, recent events over the past decade were constantly there to remind me: the Million Man March, the resurgence of white power groups, the O. J. Simpson trial, the dragging death of James Byrd Jr. in Texas, the white reaction to the contention that African Americans were deliberately kept from voting or undercounted in Florida during the 2000 presidential election, the
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persistence of racial profiling despite its illegality, the death of an unarmed African American man by Cincinnati police, which occurred as I wrote this chapter. . . . Such occurrences, of course, come up not only as an issue of race, but of all identity politics categorized around the inescapable classifications of gender, class, race, and sexuality operating in U.S. society that continually appear in shocking events such as the Matthew Shepard murder, school shootings, the Brandon Teena horror, the popularity of groups like the Promise Keepers or Montana Freemen. I could go on, but any American citizen could create such a list. The specific list of events matters not so much as how clearly such occurrences speak to how we are certainly not “past” the politics of identity that have so characterized the end of the twentieth century—neither structurally, as in these national events, nor locally, as in the cancelled lunch date. As startling as such images of violence and inequities are in U.S. society, identity politics also manifests itself in less visible ways. The way we perceive our identities as raced, classed, sexed, and gendered results in particular ways of viewing such events where communication seems to break down. For me, this point was made most clearly in the aftermath of the O. J. Simpson trial. As a feminist, it seemed perfectly logical that I should be critical of the verdict since the crux of the case was the death of a wife at the hands of her husband. In short, I understood the case within the precise gendered terms within which the legal and media discourses presented it. It was murder, plain and simple, and thus obviously wrong, another instance of men using physical strength to dominate women. Yet I found myself surprised that many of my feminist friends disagreed. I clearly recall disturbing conversations with two African American friends, in particular, as they tried to explain why they responded differently, seeing the verdict as a victory in the wake of the historical injustices suffered by African American men in the court system. While one of them was convinced O. J. was guilty, she felt gratified that O. J., as a wealthy man, could access the best lawyers to “beat the system” as so many whites do on a daily basis. His wealth, however, was another sticking point for me. As someone with a working-class background, the idea of “buying justice” rankled, indicating yet another instance of the privilege afforded the rich. In this way, categories of identity, both those we inhabited ourselves and how we understood others to play out in the cultural scene, became almost cards in a game of poker. We went back and forth in our conversation: Race trumped gender concerns for my friends, while gender trumped race for me. Class became the explanation for both injustice and justice, depending on the speaker. Identities functioned as immutably and substantially as if they were, indeed, as real as a deck of glossy playing cards. The ace of clubs could be nothing but the ace of clubs, so categorically did we discuss identity. At a certain point, we simply had to agree to disagree on our reading of the verdict; as hard as we tried to understand one another’s reaction—and we did in most cases—that understanding did not lead to different conclusions.
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Both these conversations after the L.A. riots and the O. J. Simpson verdict encapsulate how inextricable identity politics are from issues of rhetoric. In particular, they illustrate that how we come to understand and perceive identity indelibly affects our ability to discuss such cultural issues, perhaps the most volatile at the dawn of a new century. In these conversations, identity took on two forms. In the case of the L.A. riots, my friend and I perceived identity as a category of body: Physically, we were either white or Black (cultural, discursive encodings for the physical, a way of viewing body within racial categories that, although constructed, also structured our vision). As a physical quality, difference seemed immutable. We presumed that such physical bodies meant we had irreconcilable viewpoints that should not be brought into the open or addressed because of the inevitable conflict they would create. In the second conversation, we made judgments less on the physical body but in ways intimately connected to the same. We assumed our differing experiences of culture led to interpretative strategies wherein our experience of the world and the influence of history upon that experience would inevitably remain dissimilar. Even recognizing the positions we took as culturally constructed (i.e., connected to historical events, personal experience, etc.), we assumed the identities constructed in these spheres to be authentic. If we inhabited a certain body, then we took on particular identities and viewpoints as a result. This authentic link between body and experience, further, helps explain the more physical difference marked in the first conversation: Seeing body as raced immediately meant different identities, different views, the need to end conversation to preserve our friendship. As my friend commented after the L.A. riots, “I don’t think us being together today would be good for our friendship. I’m too angry at white people.” In making judgments based on our races, our classes, and our gender, we were doing much more than mere stereotyping. We assumed similarity (gender) and difference (race, class) to be authentically written on the body through experience. Our interpretations of the world, we presumed, were inevitably linked to how our bodies had been socialized to think in the groupings in which our experience was constructed. In short, we accepted the categorical nature of identity as we had inherited it. Even in our “enlightenment” about the cultural nature of identity, we still presumed its authenticity by concluding that experience would be differentially understood, made meaningful within the communities in which we had experienced it. And we weren’t wrong, as the O. J. Simpson conversation attests. Frankly, only a white person had the luxury of seeing race as a nonissue, as if it need not, in our society, “color” my experience in a way it unavoidably does for people of color. By focusing on class and gender, my whiteness spoke. By neglecting class, my friends’ financial privilege spoke. As women, none of us could ignore gender. We enacted our bodies quite well. Memories of conversations and discussions that have taken these forms over the years greatly disturb me: They are nothing if not stoppages of cultural interaction wherein any potential to “see differently” is interrupted by a logic of
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the body connected to cultural authenticity that seemingly cannot be traversed. Such failures of communication are, pure and simple, impediments to rhetoric and its ability to work in favor of social change. If I thought this were only a personal issue, perhaps I would not be so disturbed, but we see such scenes play themselves out over and over again on the public stage in diverse and seemingly irreconcilable reactions to cultural events. Living in northern Colorado, for example, I am haunted by scenes that played out after Matthew Shepard’s murder (he died in my town’s only hospital). Debates over whether the killing could be considered a hate crime brought out tensions among class issues (did the two men kill Matthew because of anger over their economic plight?) and sexuality (do gays and lesbians “count” as a protected class?). Should class trump sexuality? Could sexuality be factored into legal discourses? Even the funeral became a site of identity politics as mourners had to pass a picket line made up of a religious right group bearing signs reading “Matthew in hell.” On my own campus, one fraternity lost its charter for creating a homecoming float depicting a scarecrow tied to a fence post, obviously invoking how Shepard’s body was found. The exclusively white, presumably heterosexual, middle-class members of the fraternity couldn’t understand why their “joke” had such significant repercussions. The inability to read such events similarly is connected to the body no more clearly than in issues surrounding sexuality. The perception of too many is that the bodies of gays and lesbians exists in such difference that even liberals discuss sexual multiplicity in terms of “tolerance.” Sexual difference is marked so strongly in our society, however, that tolerance need not lead to seeing the body as acceptable—as possessing the same rights to marry, adopt children, access health benefits for partners, or even drink in particular bars. My experiences, no doubt, mirror the experiences of many other American citizens when identity politics makes itself so visible as in these recent events. Such is the scene of identity politics in this country that identity has become a contested site intersected by a seemingly endless number of discourses, by institutional discourses like law and government, experiential discourses of identity and body, economic discourses of business and socioeconomic class, consumerist discourses that allow us to “buy” ethnicity, media discourses that allow us to “travel” among cultures while not being affected, and so on. The sheer diversity of discourses surrounding identity impacts all aspects of our experience in the material realms of culture. Pulling at one thread seems to send a whole ball of yarn toppling toward our heads as we seek to understand how such events continually recur, and how we might prevent the continuing pervasiveness of oppression based in identity. Frustration emerges continually in seemingly unanswerable questions. Will we ever move beyond our current state of identity relations if we continually disregard difference or preserve its authenticity so strongly that no discussion can take place unless we share these same experiences? Whose experience should “trump” the other’s? How do we talk with one another to enact social change within such a scene?
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It is precisely this cultural scene into which so many composition pedagogies seek to intervene. Yet given its complexity, are we up to the task? Public rhetorics lead to a seemingly inescapable identity politics that forestalls our attempt to discuss difference outside of the body. These discourses further impact our material experience of the world and pervade all our social interactions in everyday life, including how we construct, perceive, and enact our own identities materially and discursively. Such politics—both their embodiment and seeming resolution—are so deeply entrenched in our institutions and the material realms of culture that I increasingly fear our attempt to exceed such a politic in the composition classroom may be doomed to failure. Given that academic discourse functions not only in conjunction with these other cultural discourses but also as a prominent institutional discourse, what roles do we play in perpetuating as well as deconstructing the discourses by which we learn and enact identity? How is academic discourse embedded within the scene of identity politics and to what effect on student identity constitution? These are the questions this chapter seeks to take up by illustrating, as much as is possible, the way in which composition itself may be implicated in the very scene of identity politics it attempts to alter. PUBLIC SPACES AND CLASSROOM SPACES
The realm of identity politics has become so central to rhetorical education that we have come to accept that acts of communication take place within and between identities (between and among representatives of discourse communities, or in contact zones created only by leaving our “safe houses”) and, as such, that our attempts to address “public” audiences need to be radically refigured. While we may seek a public rhetoric that might focus on shared investments in certain forms of action, rather than alliances built upon similar identities (e.g., Wells; Harris, Teaching), those actions, of necessity, are similarly located in our interpretations of events, interpretations impossible to separate from identities. Like it or not, identity politics is the playing field of rhetoric at the beginning of a new century. A unitary public is no longer viable; rather the public might better be imagined as that which “require[s] multiple negotiations and positionings for every possible speaker” (Wells 333). One central task of rhetorical education, then, has become that of helping students highlight what those positions might be by providing opportunities where difference is no longer marginalized under a false concept of a unitary consensus about social norms but becomes a possible site of rhetorical action. The presumption is that a better understanding of the cultural nature of one’s own positions will form the grounds through which a new public rhetoric might emerge where students better understand how to negotiate across, within, and between differences in attempts to create a more fully democratic public sphere. These two goals, however, frequently do not operate as well together as we might imagine. Instead, working to highlight
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difference frequently only exacerbates borders rather than encourages one to cross them because of how often our pedagogies incite public understandings of identity that actively work against a rhetoric of communicative action or border crossing. In my past attempts to enact a contact zone pedagogy, for example, my students were just as likely to become more mired in their own positions—in precisely the ways they had come to understand them as a practice of everyday life—as they were to attempt to talk across and between positions. Although contact zone pedagogies are successful in that students come to recognize their experience as a position inscribed by culture, my attempts at contact only made those positions more visible and, paradoxically, more firmly entrenched as a result. Discussions often foregrounded the constructed nature of positions—for example, with comments continually prefaced by “as a white person” or “as an African American.” Students claimed ownership of those positions so vociferously that African American students would claim whites could never “understand” a reading by Cornel West, or female students would tell male students they had no right to discuss an essay on women’s experience. Seeing claims of positionality as a means of discussing difference did not lead to exceeding such positions to traverse boundaries. Frequently, just the opposite was the case. Adding critiques of power to this pedagogical mix helped some students see the role discourse and culture played in this constitution and occasionally exposed the multiplicity of positions available for interpreting culture. Yet, instead of engaging their new understanding of identity to alter social conditions, my students came to see such power relations as not only unavoidable but also necessary for living life in the social real. The cultural currency offered through capitalism, for example, became not a means of explaining oppression but more often a reason to maintain the status quo. If “moving up the social ladder” was the way to ensure material success, it should be pursued; further, it provided a route for others to escape oppression. Class politics were not opportunities for critique; instead, they explained how equality could be achieved. Such rhetorical stoppages, even in pedagogies designed to transcend them, seem to imply that no matter how much “contact” occurs between bodies, borders will not be crossed. To use Wendy Hesford’s terminology, the “autobiographical scripts” that culture makes available for understanding identities locate us in such ostensibly locked positions that borders can seem absolute. My teaching experiences have highlighted well the scripted responses engaged all too often by students. Assuming we should “get past” seeing a difference based in race, or that the only option is to stop engaging, to “agree to disagree,” or that wealth will solve all ultimately reflect many of the strategies my students, when discussing issues of difference, seem to bring up consistently. Ranging from the comments that we are “all the same” (and thus difference should not matter) to an acceptance of difference as indissoluble, yet equal (usually expressed almost precisely as an Arby’s slogan: “different is good”), to the assumption that class
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mobility will alter identity politics, my students, like me and my friends, reflect the cultural rhetorics available in the public sphere for discussing identity. Although we may wish to see such student reactions as failures to engage the contact zones of the classroom, we also have to recognize that such reactions have been well learned in the material realms of U.S. culture. Emphasizing student identity, even when exposing its cultural and ideological nature, does not always allow us to predict what students might bring to the classroom. Rather, it is just as likely that students will invoke the understandings of identity they already use to understand themselves as part of the material world; that is, the public rhetorics of identity that continually categorize bodies such that a particular body is presumed to understand its experience of the world in particular ways. In the logic of identity politics, my white body encodes a variety of assumptions about what I’ve experienced, how I think, and my position of power in culture. Even if I try to exceed those presumptions when I speak, my “body” is read in ways that counter such attempts. In a contact zone, my body speaks as loudly as does my rhetoric. Although discourse theory suggests that identities are occupied in more multiple ways than these examples indicate, identities are too often acted upon as if they were authentic and unified within the cultural categories by which we explain our experience to ourselves and others. While we may wish to enact these multiple subjectivities in favor of other kinds of discursive action, the way we perceive identity frequently prevents such an intervention into culture. These perceptions may be recognized as just that—cultural constructions—but in material interactions, in the social real in which we operate on a daily basis, such perceptions are frequently enacted much differently. Written into our thoughts and feelings, our bodies encode our perceptions of who we are and can be in the world. Rather than only the locus of culture—that which contains the discursive—bodies function, as Peter McLaren explains, as “the central relay point— the point d’appui—in the dialectical reinitiation of meaning and desire” (Predatory 63). The body, that is, experiences and enacts culture as more than a discursive relation, but rather as a confluence of meaning, desire, and affect literally written into the flesh. We learn our identities in discursive relations that mediate experience; we perceive our bodies in their material relation to the world via such discursively constructed identities. Experience and discursivity work in a dialectical relation. McLaren summarizes this move quite succinctly: “Since all experience is the experience of meaning, we need to recognize the role that language plays in the production of experience. You don’t have an experience and then search for a word to describe that experience. Rather, language helps to constitute experience by providing a structure of intelligibility or mediating device through which experiences can be understood” (Predatory 128). This mediation is, further, inseparable from bodies as a material element of experience. How we understand our body’s relation to identity (the physical and social markings by which identities are encoded in the social real) inevitably influences both our
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experience itself and which languages we see as most available to understanding that experience. We see these mutually embedded relations clearly in my reactions to the O. J. Simpson verdict. As a white, working-class woman, my experiences of the world as a body are inseparable from how I perceive these positions. While my whiteness allowed me to ignore race, the experience of the past—and the languages of economic oppression applied to those experiences—could not be separated from how I viewed a material event. Although class is arguably less written on the body, it is enfleshed in multiple ways in my experience. Affectively, it manifests itself in the despair, anger, and violence that frequently accompany economic oppression. Such affective reactions result from the investment of desire in consumer culture, in the presumption of class mobility, in the capitalist credo that class can be exceeded, even while material conditions vociferously cry that it cannot. Physically, it appears most vividly in my images of work uniforms, sweating bodies, and the physical disabilities manual labor has written on my family members’ bodies. Even as I live an ostensibly middle-class existence in the present, I bear this history with me through choice, because of the value I place on maintaining social relations with family and friends who still live a working-class existence. I invest in a working-class identity, that is, as a way of publicly announcing social allegiances to historical relations of oppression, to the local experience of my past, and to the bodies I most value. In this way, our understandings of identity are intimately connected not only to our own body—and how it has been encoded by others—but also our relationships and investments in social relations. We may theorize identities as multiple, but our students do not live only in our classrooms. Rather, any attempt to locate agency in difference will be continually affected by our students’ interactions in culture as it is lived in material interactions with others that may not always be accounted for in our approaches. This is not only an issue of inequitable power relations enacted upon the body in the material world but also one of affect and connection, of the social relations we need to maintain our social lives. As Keith Gilyard has pointed out, the challenge we offer to concepts of authenticity may not be enough to impact the significant influence of the material relations in which such authentic identities are learned. . . . academic postmodernism, including that which gets valorized in composition classes, often gets stuck in passive relativism, just a classroom full of instability. It’s useful at times to complicate notions of identity, but primary identities operate powerfully in the world and have to be productively engaged. I think King had it right, for example, when he dreamed of Black kids and White kids holding hands (219). There are whole realities attached to those Black hands and White hands that have been insufficiently dealt with to date and won’t be if we insist on prematurely converting King’s dream to one of hybridity kids holding hands with junior border crossers. When we engage in discussion about fluidity, we ought
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to keep in mind the question of who can afford to be anchored to a focus on the indeterminate. (“Literacy” 270)
Although identity may be socially constructed through discourse as our invocations of postmodern and cultural theories assume, there are, indeed, “whole realities attached to those Black hands and White hands” that ultimately influence how those identities are experienced. We don’t live identity as discourse; we live identity within bodies. This interaction of bodies and identities in the contact zone also helps explain why so many of our pedagogies do not achieve their intended results. Although I might encourage students to see identity as fluid, as constantly changing and able to cross borders, their sense of themselves as bodies, understood within the particular languages our culture makes available for understanding self, continually reasserts the cultural premise that undergirds so much of our society’s identity politics: body = experience = thought. Within public rhetorics, identities are not fluid but unified within particular cultural experiences. We are presumed to have similar experiences to other bodies “like us” that are understood within similar community discourses for explaining experience. Through such logic, my students firmly identify with particular cultural positions (“as a white person”) that seem to bespeak an entire identity. Even as students come to critique the presumptions they make about identity’s link to raced, sexed, and gendered bodies, such interventions do little to disturb their sense that their own bodies signify and contain who they are as thinking, feeling, desiring beings. My body is how I perceive myself. I have lived in this body for years; it is this body with whom others interact, and through this body that I construct the social relations that sustain me in the material world. My body is not, assuredly, an abstract site that merely serves to give boundary to the multiple discourses impacting my material interactions with the world. There is a substance to body, my students continually remind me, that is not perceived as fluid or discursive. Rather, we live within social relations with others that are perceived as bodily interactions. In this way, our rhetorics and experiences of identity work tautologically. We enact cultural positions in particular ways because we have both constituted and experienced our own selves in those ways. Those positions then produce, almost unceasingly, new rhetorics of identity always limited by the ways we already perceive them. The complicating factor, however, is that such reliance upon authenticity claims does not appear to impact one’s concern for social justice. My students are not reactive in their willingness to recognize oppression or their desire to imagine a better world. Their reactions, that is, cannot be simplistically read as ideological interpellation that facilely accepts current conditions. Rather, their understandings of self and difference, forged in public rhetorics, allow for both thinking categorically and the assumption that we can exceed those categories. My students may act as bodies, but they understand equity as exceeding materiality. Recall that my students also argue for equity
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through concepts of “shared humanity,” “acceptance of diversity,” or “equalizing power relations through capital.” In such arguments, lived experience of the world can be transcended (shared humanity), the power relations such experience invokes negated (acceptance), or inequities addressed easily through current systems (economics). There is a clear conflict here between how my students explain the world in equity arguments and how they experience it categorically, a conflict that emerges from public rhetorics that attempt to both recognize difference and exceed it simultaneously. Public rhetorics, that is, remind us that while we live in bodies, the way to exceed difference is to simultaneously recognize difference and ignore it. The apparent contradiction of an equalizing rhetoric and a body that cannot exceed difference is one that easily hides its potential hegemony. Rhetorically, we can invest in equity arguments where difference does not “matter”; however, in the social real—in the fabric of everyday life—we are consistently reminded that body does indeed matter. It matters affectively in forming alliances with others; it matters experientially in making “our individuality” corporeal; it matters materially in what rights we are accorded and what threat our bodies are exposed to. What we lack is a rhetoric that can discuss such differences without becoming locked into authenticity claims that prevent dialogue, ignore power relations, and attempt to negate history. We are caught, that is, in a world where rhetoric and the material are seemingly opposed. Rhetorical tropes of “diversity,” “humanity,” and “class mobility” seem viable means of impacting the material because they allow us to ignore the very grounds of difference we see and feel in oppressive identity relations. There is a clear mismatch between how we understand identity, even when we recognize its cultural construction, and how we live it. Like any cultural moment, we have inherited this seemingly inescapable paradox from history, most particularly from the highly visible identity politics of the 1960s and 1970s. In the wake of civil rights actions taken up on behalf of African Americans, Latinos, women, gays and lesbians, and myriad other groups, it has become almost impossible not to perceive self—to understand self and its possibilities for being in the world—within the categories we have inherited from such actions. Given the cultural context in which such movements sought to intervene—the assumption of equal opportunity and common humanity organized to privilege only a certain identity (the white, straight, middleclass, male)—such a new understanding of difference was undeniably the appropriate response. Disrupting how we understood identity as irrelevant to action upon the world within such a historical moment could only be accomplished through an attention to collective politics, to the attempt to group difference in order to highlight inequities, while simultaneously moving toward the same telos of universal rights for all. Such an intervention has been successful on many fronts, ending oppressive conditions of institutional segregation by race, creating new laws attempting to erase discrimination, moving many women
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into the workforce, and so on. While resulting in significant advances for many groups—while others still struggle to achieve just these gains (e.g., gay rights’ actions in favor of similar protections under the law)—we also have inherited an understanding of identity (our own and others’) that may prove disabling to the dream of a fully enfranchised democracy, rather than a legal mandate that has been unable to alter social conditions. Women still earn less than men for the same work; people of color still disproportionately make up more of the poor; the middle class continues to shrink as fewer and fewer people possess more and more of the wealth in our country; and most significantly, people still are harassed, molested, attacked, and killed because of their race, gender, and sexuality. Ironically, what we have inherited might be understood most pointedly as a rhetoric of authenticity created through our attempts to respect diversity while maintaining allegiances to universal values (reason, justice), economies (capitalism), and the institutions meant to ensure their perpetuation (law, business, government, education). When we begin thinking diversity, we acknowledge that different cultural experiences, and their encoding in the languages by which we understand experience, come to create diverse cultures within American society. This move to a multicultural society, which attempts to preserve diversity within the ideological structures of a particular nation, encourages a respect for difference within sameness. That is, we recognize different cultural ways of knowing and attempt to count them as equal, while still preserving a link to a national consciousness that we might all be said to share. Events such as the O. J. Simpson trial, however, expose how difficult our attempt to walk this line can be when competing interpretations vie for prominence. Consistently, such events highlight a recurring national issue: how cultural difference can be maintained simultaneously with an allegiance to social institutions that mandate a more unified identity for a nation’s citizenry. As a country, we are consistently pulled in two seemingly opposed directions, toward sameness and difference simultaneously. Little wonder our students’ discussion of identity politics seeks to both respect diversity and assert common humanity simultaneously with little attention given to the power relations that might make such goals impossible. This pull toward a unitary public simultaneous with attempts to respect diversity results in a seemingly endless tension between our attempts to achieve a social consensus and not marginalize any perspectives in the construction of that consensus. As John Trimbur argued so long ago, however, rarely is it possible to achieve consensus without marginalizing others (“Consensus”). Rather than creating a social scene in which difference is respected and valued, discussions of identity presume an authentic link between body, identity, and experience that has resulted in a continual ranking of identities. Once something is appropriately categorized, it becomes much easier to order those categories such that certain identities, whose perspectives most mirror that of dominant discourses and institutions, are continually placed “on top” under the rubric of a unified consensus of rationality and public good. While identity politics has
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given us a language to discuss such moves, it also provides the premises by which such discussions take place, ensuring a replication of power relations wherein some voices speak more loudly than others and some perspectives have more currency than others. Within the goal of sameness, difference is consistently refigured as a battlefield of the public good versus personal or community interest. Recent conservative responses to identity politics reflect this tension clearly insomuch as such responses link claims of discrimination to personal agendas (e.g., accusations of “playing” the race or gender card), or more to the point, as impediments to the pursuit of commonly held goals. The backlash against affirmative action policies and feminism are apt cases on point. Within such rhetorics, power hides. The material facticity of being in the world continually undercuts our goals of sameness and difference as coexisting impulses, but our rhetorics remain to assure us that the mismatch between how we live in the world and how we explain it need not be examined. By seemingly resolving the tensions wherein we act categorically but presume identities need not be categorical, such rhetorics ensure our experience of the world need not impact our understandings of equity. The paradox of difference and sameness becomes resolved through the discursive means offered to explain contradictory experiences of the real world. We may feel oppression, but we can explain it. We may enact self as if borders were absolute, but our rhetorics are there to assure us they can be crossed. Thus, I, like my students, can understand why my friend wants to cancel our lunch date, but still feel that we should be able to get beyond those very differences that I enact myself in response to the Simpson trial. It is in the tension between these two impulses—toward sameness and difference—that we find the confluence of multiple institutional, media, and economic discourses in which our students are asked to forge their identities. While consumerism may benefit from diversity, capitalism works more smoothly within hierarchies and complete investments in the economic system. Although social programs and initiatives (e.g., affirmative action, antidiscrimination laws) may seek equality, the self-same assumption of rational means by which equality can be reached is embedded in a legal system that, by definition, cannot recognize difference unless it is already categorized (i.e., “protected classes”). The integrity of the “one-man-one-vote” society is weighed against accusations of misconduct in Florida. Sameness and difference collide over and over again as impulses toward multiplicity and national good continually vie for prominence in local situations. Much the same occurs in our classrooms as we attempt rhetorics of multiple identities within an institution whose function is to ensure the continuation of the meritocracy, providing a means to equal opportunity while simultaneously rank ordering merit for potential employers. We seek to enact the agency of multiple identities while simultaneously offering new identities through our teaching of accepted literacies that are best able to operate within the institutions of power in our society.
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COMPOSITION AND IDENTITY POLITICS: TRANSFORMATIVE AGENCY OR IDENTITY FORMATION?
This seeming paradox of difference within sameness is one in which composition is deeply implicated. Composition has consistently attempted to take seriously the mandate of equality through a shared language while simultaneously respecting difference and diversity. In its function as the cultural institution dedicated to ensuring meritocracy, higher education in this country is inextricably involved in debates over identities and how they come to gain power. The same can be said of the teaching of writing, dating back almost to the onset of language education in public schooling in the United States. Not surprisingly, insofar as composition studies is located in and responds to the same social exigencies, our pedagogies reflect a historical trajectory of shifting understandings of identity similar to those in the public sphere. Composition’s theories of identity and language attempt to negate the more material affects of identity politics and the institutional power in which our pedagogies are located. In sum, our own history reveals a similar attempt to disassociate the discursive from the material, the rhetorical from the real, and, most significantly, the institution from power relations. Traditionally, American education, more often than not, has been viewed as supporting an egalitarian and liberatory agenda that smoothly intersects with our cultural mythos of democracy and individualism. Hence, some educational historians interpret the move to public education in America as a way to extend social benefits to the lower social classes. Under the rubric of “equal opportunity,” education provided the venue for any American to live the American dream. Not surprisingly, this “egalitarian turn” in education, as Andrea Lunsford points out, also affected a change in the nature of rhetorical education. Lunsford ties this change to the development of land grant institutions through the Morrill Act of July 2, 1862: The land grant universities welcomed a much broader spectrum of the American public than had heretofore had access to higher education, and these students were by and large untrained in Latin and Greek—the traditional languages of the Academy. As the vernacular slowly became the language of choice in all universities, instruction in composition emerged as a powerful means of immersing students in the skillful use of English, at least partially in the belief that the “right and proper” use of the English language was requisite to participation in the intellectual and economic life of the republic. (“Nature” 6)
Thus rhetorical education prepared students, or at least gave them the language, to become part of the dominant culture, providing them with the means for social acceptance within that culture.
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Although expressed in democratic terms, rhetorical education also functioned as a primary form of acculturation, creating identities through the pursuit of a monolingual body politic with similar investments in supporting dominant cultural institutions and values. The discourse taught in schools could be read as an inherent good if education is viewed as providing the linguistic resources with which to become an active member of a valued society. To achieve this status, the student not only learns academic discourse but also becomes a member of the dominant culture through her facility with its language. In this way, language education became linked to instruction in dominant culture, to the desire for a national consciousness characterized by a similar language, worldview, and ideology, learned simultaneously with a discourse that would inculcate such an identity and ensure its reproduction in the public sphere should the student “merit” entrance into positions of power. In its own historical trace, composition, that is, becomes mired in structural relations of power; its institutional location connects writing instruction inextricably to the production of the acceptable ideological citizen, worker, and consumer. In this way, composition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries participated in the public consensus about identity: Equality could best be achieved through sameness, albeit a route to sameness offered only to men of a particular class and ethnicity. While composition’s history is undoubtedly one of teaching “sameness,” the beginning of what we might call modern composition studies, brought to the forefront during Open Admissions (historically contemporaneous with Civil Rights), also speaks to our concerns with difference. Early on such attempts to enfranchise new groups entering the university resulted in pedagogies aimed at accommodation and acculturation meant to give students the means to compete within the meritocracy through the “sameness” of their language use (see Lu and Horner). Learning academic discourse, that is, served as the precursor to university success, and thus the material and social benefits a university education was meant to confer. The public attention at this time to the “literacy crisis,” for which such admissions policies were partially blamed, mandated such an approach. Yet, as Patricia Harkin and John Schilb have pointed out, such a crisis also resulted in greater attention to the cultural backgrounds of students and a critique of the function of school. Through the influence of work in the ’70s, such as Mina Shaugnessy’s groundbreaking approach to error or resolutions like “Student’s Right to Their Own Language,” we came to recognize the inextricable relationship between language use and cultural identity. Social involvement became the foremost model for explaining reading and writing ability, encouraging us to define literacy as “a growing metacommunicative ability—an increasing awareness of and control over the social means by which people sustain discourse, knowledge, and reality” (Brandt 32). By acknowledging the connection between discursive and social practice, we also recognized the ways in which this literate practice reflects the culture (i.e., knowledge, worldview, and relationship to re-
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ality) embodied in the social relations and histories of various communities: the social real as it is lived in local contexts. In response to such realizations and under the influence of a variety of social discourse theories, pedagogies of the 1980s moved to more liberal approaches based in discourse communities supported by significant research into multiple literacies (e.g., Heath, Shirley Brice; Street). With such pedagogies, we hoped to explain how sameness and difference might exist simultaneously. We could teach academic discourse as a precursor to meritocratic entitlement, while simultaneously acknowledging and valuing the diverse communities from which our students hailed (e.g., Bartholomae; Bruffee; Bizzell, “What”; Dean). Connecting literacy practice to community, identity, materiality, and ideology, however, also led to some disturbing questions about the effects of teaching academic discourse itself. If identity was forged through discursive-material interactions in a given community, then how is identity constituted when students begin to operate in many communities? Recognizing the connection between ideology, discourse, and identity, in sum, raised the question of how the varying power relations among discourse communities within the social real might affect the ongoing process of identity formation. Reflecting on the significant status academic discourse holds in culture, Patricia Bizzell perhaps encapsulates this concern best when she considers that academic discourse could rewrite identity in favor of dominant culture, even within a curriculum acknowledging the multiple discourse practices and worldview of other communities (“What”). Such a concern, however, occupied composition scholars for only a relatively short time, as we quickly backed off from the implications such a question provoked. In our concern for difference, we came to occlude our implication in producing sameness that characterizes so much of composition’s history. We held out hope, that is, that sameness and difference could be pursued simultaneously, lest we risk questioning how composition’s democratic agenda—now refigured as the preservation of multiple identities—might impact the meritocratic value of learning academic discourse, and thus our expertise in and commitment to teaching that discourse. Even Bizzell, in the very essay where she raises this question, backs off from its potential implications. While Bizzell admits that academic discourse, because of its societal status, “makes a strong bid to control all of a student’s experience,” she still claims that the goal of pedagogy is to make students “bicultural,” able to move between an academic and a “home” discourse (“What” 299, 298). Even though she concedes the power of academic discourse and refers to the school “as an agent of cultural hegemony,” Bizzell continues to argue that the dominance of a certain discourse community does not have to equal a conversion (“Cognition” 237). With the influence of Joseph Harris’s Braddock award-winning essay, “The Idea of Community in the Study of Writing,” the conviction that composition could honor both difference and sameness simultaneously became readily accepted. In this essay Harris criticizes those who describe acclimation to academic discourse as a process of being “born again”
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(16) by arguing that such a description falsely polarizes the academic community and other “common” communities. Instead, Harris argues that acclimation to academic discourse is not an initiation but an addition to a student’s already complicated language. Under this view, composition came to see the boundaries of communities as constantly shifting, while individuals were imagined to “cross and recross” boundaries continually, “joining other communities one moment, returning to a ‘home’ community the next” (Porter 216). Despite evidence that such border crossing is not always possible (e.g., Brodkey, “Literacy Letters;” Balester; Malinowitz), the conclusion to this 1980s debate now infuses most composition theory. Academic discourse came to be seen as providing an “addition” to an already complicated identity that was written within multiple experiences and languages such that the writing subject could, in the ’90s, be reenvisioned as a site of multiple and conflicting discourses (see Faigley). Composition came to see the classroom as a space of multiple, interacting discourses where the fluidity of the subject could exceed its given cultural inscriptions to become a critical agent capable of rewriting culture. Relying on the fluid subject and the multiplicity of discourse did not negate the concerns about power evident in the 1980s. Instead, multiple power relations became the precise means by which agency could be achieved and ideological interpellation resisted. Berlin and Vivion summarize this point well: While writing “may result in a simple accommodation to hegemonic codes, . . . it usually involves a negotiated transaction and even resistance. In other words, cultural codes are rarely totally predictable in their effects on lived experience” (x). Because all local contexts are overdetermined by multiple discourses interacting within a given moment, a single writing context produces a variety of subject positions that have the potential to both interpellate the subject ideologically and/or provide spaces wherein that inscription can be resisted. In this view, the contexts available for writing subjects are probably best imagined as “leaky sites of struggle and ongoing negotiation where no outcomes can be guaranteed in advance” (Trimbur, “Postmodern” 130). Enacting the possibilities for agency, as a result, relies on the subject’s ability to see culture as “leaky” by mobilizing the multiplicity he brings to any cultural production, including acts of writing. While community-based pedagogies focused on “preserving” difference as a site equal to academic discourse (a diversity concept of multiculturalism), more recent approaches focus on bringing “people out of their various ‘safe houses’ and into a ‘contact zone’” (Harris, Teaching 120) imagined as a site of conflict (Pratt) or negotiation (Harris) where multiplicity could be engaged. Other pedagogies take this premise of the multiple subject beyond contact to a critique of culture wherein students learn to reread the cultural scene in favor of social transformation (e.g., Berlin; Fitts and France) or reread their own identities as constructed in particular historical and ideological relations as a way of engaging the agency of the subject (e.g., Hesford; Brodkey, Writing). In these pedagogies, our chief concern about identity is activating its potential for agency, its poten-
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tial to exceed particular discursive inscriptions in favor of action leading to social transformation. Although the route to such agency is hotly debated, our concerns for social empowerment have become aligned with the ability to critique culture and activate difference in favor of rewriting the world. Power relations are central to such concerns, yet the power of academic discourse to constitute identity introduced as a central issue in the 1980s has largely been elided by a focus on the fluidity of subjectivity. Examining our current focus on social agency within history and the social events to which it is reacting, however, makes it difficult to relegate questions of identity constitution to theoretical presumptions about its additive effect on student identity. Rather, in this admittedly cursory and deliberately interpreted history of composition, we see mirrored the continual attention to sameness and difference that characterizes much of our current public rhetorics about identity politics. Since the inception of modern composition studies, the teaching of writing is figured as a site of both sameness and difference: as the site of learning national consciousness, while simultaneously attempting to negotiate the minefield of contemporary identity politics through attention to the variety of cultures that make up this nation. Given these connections between public rhetorics of identity and the goals of composition pedagogy, I have to ask whether our current reliance on the variety of identities and the mixed, contested array of discursive positions available to our students is an appropriate intervention into such a cultural scene. Identities are, as so many have theorized, multiply constructed in varying relations of power, yet can we presume that identities forged within such power relations can be felt and enacted as sites of agency given the significant influence of more material interactions in the social real and the public rhetorics through which we are encouraged to understand identities? TEACHING WRITING/TEACHING IDENTITY: DISCURSIVE IDENTITIES IN MATERIAL RELATIONS
What guides this question is a concern that we may have neglected power’s more material effects in our search for agency within identity and culture. Composition’s focus on the fluidity of subjectivity, that is, reveals a deep entrenchment in discourse theory that, while seeking to take the material into account, relegates the materiality of social life to secondary status. The discursive encodes the material, writes the body, and thus, the way to impact the material is to analyze discourse, to see oneself as a discursive construction, and to alter one’s rhetoric to change the world. While I am in complete sympathy with these objectives, I worry that we may have also created a causality loop (discourse = the “real”) that can lock us into a binary relation between the discursive and the material, limiting our ability to understand our own role in identity construction and our students’ experiences as body in the material world. Privileging discourse over the material, in short, exposes not only a
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potential inability to intervene into our student’s understandings of identity but also the material role academic discourse plays in helping create the very hierarchies to which our students are subjected. Theories focused on the discursive construction of subjectivity, for example, are too easily undercut by the ways in which our students experience identity authentically in material relations and the categorical public rhetorics through which they are encouraged to understand that experience. Multiple identities, we must always remember, result as much from unequal power relations in history (and in the present) as from the panoply of signs and discourses that characterize our post-Fordist, consumerist society. Although constructed via discourse, there is also a material history to that discourse that is inseparable from body. As Stuart Hall puts it so succinctly, “identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves in, the narratives of the past” (qtd. in Gates xiv). Part of that positioning is physical. Skin corporeally connects us to the past: “Different shades, textures, and feel of skin” serve as “testimony both to the subjective state of individuals and to the histories that have molded them; of fair Aboriginal skin as a document of the planned erasure of black skin; of the muddied skin of the white working class”(Probyn, “Eating” 87). We cannot escape skin, sexual organs, or the way discourses read our bodies through the lens of history. Such identities, as a result, are continually subjected to unequal power relations as part of everyday experience. Presuming we can exceed these positions discursively through multiple subjectivities deflects attention from these inequities, aligning composition theory with public rhetorics that seek to disassociate power from equity. Although certainly not a “common humanity” argument—in fact, its antithetical position is what allows it to seem such a positive social intervention—the presumption of multiplicity functions similarly to focus attention on the mobility of the subject rather than its ability to be fixed within structural power relations. Although identities may be multiple, they are perceived and enacted categorically and authentically with significant material effects. Henry Louis Gates Jr. illustrates the paradox of the constructed nature of identity versus how it is lived and enacted quite clearly: “One is not born a woman,” Beauvoir famously wrote; and neither are you born a man, or a black, or the conjunction of the two. But what good does that do you? You can rebel against the content of an identity you didn’t get to choose—and yet badly stitched vestments are not easily cast off. . . . Hence the appeal of that comforting old lie: I’m not a black x (poet, president, whatever), I’m an x who happens to be black. Alas circumstance won’t have it so. Nobody happens to be black: this is a definitional truth. For a world in which blackness is elective or incidental—a world where you can “happen to be” black—is a world without blackness, a world, that is, where the concept has been dismantled or transfigured beyond recog-
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nition./ So you might inveigh against, say, the ideology of authenticity, but in some measure you participate in it all the same. (xvii, original emphasis)
If one’s body is coded as raced within the social real (or gendered, classed, or categorized in myriad other ways), one is inevitably forced by the reactions of others to inhabit such categories authentically. Within a society that codes identities categorically, perceptions of one’s own identity cannot escape such encoding. Our rhetorics of identity, in short, are us, and thus, inevitably affect our attempt to act upon the world and define self. While multiple options exist, we do not necessarily perceive them within the structures imposed upon our identity within the material world. Similarly, while power may function in multiple relations, it is just as often felt, enacted, and perceived structurally as part of everyday life. Theoretically, I may want to dispute the more structural effects of power, but the ways identities are treated and enacted does not allow such a vision. Just ask a single mother thrown off welfare, or a woman sexually harassed by her boss, or a young Black man “profiled” by the police whether power relations of identity aren’t experienced structurally quite often. Seen as part and parcel of such a cultural scene, the interaction of structural and poststructural concepts of power are no less relevant to how we might imagine the power academic discourse wields through its institutional role in the social real. As Hesford argues, there is a danger in “romantic[izing] the primacy of the local” and seeing “local sites as independent from larger power structures, social relations, and discourses” (xxii–xxiii). One of those dangers may lie in assuming such local relations can obviate the potentially oppressive function academic discourse may play in constituting identity. Our theories, that is, again correspond with public rhetorics, attempting to disconnect our material location—in institutions of school—from the normalizing function schooling is purported to serve. Through our focus on discursive theories, for example, we are assured that occupying positions inscribed through academic discourse need not affect the multiple subject’s agency. Instead, we hold out hope for difference within sameness, enacted by the very students who seek to gain the material benefits schooling can accord. Never innocent about power, composition still tries to situate itself in opposition to the very institution that forms its material function in culture, relying upon the instability of power relations to ameliorate our potentially more oppressive role in identity politics. That our pedagogies’ attempts to see identity as performative and rhetorical could easily be undercut by the larger power structure in which schooling functions, however, must be taken seriously. Far from a successful intervention into such a scene, composition’s focus on the fluidity of subjectivity could easily be co-opted by public rhetorics as yet another assurance that difference can exist simultaneously with sameness. Connected as it is to public rhetorics of equality through class mobility, academic discourse is well positioned to seem the “way out” of inequitable power relations while simultaneously maintaining one’s primary alliances.
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Ignoring the potential that our pedagogies might also be creating identities in accordance with the options available in public discourses, frankly, concerns me a great deal. I fear our quick turn away from these questions in the 1980s may not have been only a theoretical turn, but one in which we could, albeit unwillingly, absent ourselves from literacy’s reproductive function in favor of seeing ourselves as supporters of difference. In making such a claim, I do not want to negate the significant contribution that such pedagogies have made in offering multiple ways to intervene into identity politics. In our fervor for creating equitable and critical pedagogies, however, I suspect that we may also have unwittingly allowed ourselves an “out” whereby our own role in constructing identities continuous with dominant ideology may have been given short shrift. By attending so closely to questions of agency and social transformation, composition has not looked closely enough at the more oppressive function academic discourse might serve. If we imagine students’ experience of identity as a body who desires and experiences in both discursive and material interactions, however, we also have to acknowledge that the fluidity of the subject could potentially be undermined by its experience as body and social being. Social being is negotiated structurally even if individual bodies interact locally. Agency may be possible in the complex relations local contexts provide, but how we em-body identity is never only local; it is also always already a fact of social being. This connection between material relations and identity formation highlights two potential challenges to presumptions of agency in composition theory: (1) the effect of the institution’s role in the social real on how students constitute identity, and (2) the effect of social relations in the material world on how one perceives the potential agency of cultural difference. EM-BODYING IDENTITY AND QUESTIONS OF AGENCY IN THE SOCIAL REAL
In complicating identity through redefining culture as an ongoing process, discourse as multiple, and the subject as fluid, composition has admittedly attempted to exceed its own social location and productively intervene into identity politics. Further, I am convinced that at times identities function in precisely the ways we have theorized, as researchers like Hesford and Brodkey demonstrate brilliantly. I am convinced, that is, that writers do “struggle with inherited social narratives of self ” and students do “negotiate their identities in response to perceived power relations” such that sites of resistance can be created out of even potentially oppressive discourses and students can redefine their identities in acts of self-agency and use such agency to affect material conditions (Hesford xxxiii). If difference always operates alongside sameness, however, I think we also have to ask whether the influence of “sameness” in institutional rhetorics might have an equivalent influence over identity formation and agency. There is a limit, of course, to how much of this complex relation among the material and discursive elements of culture we might take on as part of
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composition pedagogy. What I argue in the rest of this text, however, is that the central issue with which we concern ourselves is quite appropriately the agency of our students. Yet before we can productively support such agency, we need to examine more closely how identity is constituted within academic discourse. Discursive understandings of agency need to be tempered by the way the structural and postmodern interact in material relations. Given the social status of academic discourse and its links to other institutions of power, we must ask what effect forging identities in academic discourse has on how students come to understand, and choose among, the various identities culture makes available to them. Only through a clearer understanding of how students negotiate the construction of identity—within social relations, as bodies in material interactions, and as desiring beings—as part of their instruction in academic discourse might we, then, take on questions of agency more directly.
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interchapter one : Home Places
A colleague, hearing about the book I was planning to write, stopped me in the hallway to ask whether I was worried about writing a book on identity politics as a white woman. My response of “not really” took her by surprise. In today’s academic and public environment, I’m sure, she saw me as being extremely insensitive to the politics of my own body and privilege. Yet I write this text precisely as a way to interrogate her question and the politics that led to it—the easy equation of body, culture, and material privilege. I had, she warned, to be very careful about how I positioned myself. So I start my personal story here, but not with any intention of being careful. Instead, I want to begin here with a short story about myself as a member of American culture and, thus, always inevitably immersed in identity politics. The premise behind my colleague’s question, of course, is that as a white chick, I either was absented from debates on identity politics and/or had no experiential base on which to speak of them. I’m not sure that’s entirely possible as an American in the twenty-first century if we imagine race as a performative cultural act rather than an authentic category of being or biology. On the other hand, it’s impossible for me not to be “white” and coded by whiteness given the way my body moves in the world of late capitalist, racist American culture—no one’s body in this culture escapes whiteness. American culture is never monocultural, yet it is permeated with power relations that consistently privilege parts of my body—its whiteness, my heterosexuality—and disparages others—my gender, my class (but not my class mobility). My body aside for the moment— although its materiality marked by breasts, freckles, pink skin, and excess body fat can never truly be left behind—what might be said to be “my” culture? I doubt I can answer that fully, but I can say it’s peopled by bodies, voices, and experiences that are not as easily encoded as my body. My home place was never coded so simply. It is populated with various images. My first friend ever at the age of three, Eartha Pike, and the musical accents of her Jamaican mother as she cooked us lunch. My gaggle of girlfriends, all of the MacDonald family next door, good Scots, and the raging of their father, angry, as so many of the neighborhood men were, at the conditions of the working class. The competition over who had to get government food and who did not (we didn’t, the
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MacDonald’s did). The constant noise of living, music, marital fighting, fire engines, and traffic that floated into our windows on any given day or night. My first major, drop-dead, can’t-think-of-anything-else crush on Danny Martinez, the Puerto Rican boy who lived two three-deckers down the street. My ensuing crush on Jimmy LaPlante, the Inuit boy who lived upstairs from Danny. Later, in junior high, walking arm in arm with Bob White, an African American schoolmate, and Rich Mendoza, another boy from the island, down a major street just to piss off the people passing by (we were getting smarter about identity politics by then). My bestest, bestest friend, Bridget O’Connor, the daughter of an Irish cop, from whom I was never apart for our entire grammar school years. The raging racism of so many in the neighborhood, who were convinced people of color were stealing their jobs, contrasted with the close friendships most of them had with people of color. My first love, in high school, Larry Jelsine (previously Gelsimino, changed at Ellis Island when his grandfather came over), whose police record and Harley made my father forbid me to see him (after which we, of course, snuck around until he dropped me a week later—romances are short at sixteen). My mother’s admonitions to marry a French Catholic boy like she did and her mother before her. The priest constantly reminding us that premarital sex was a sin, but abortion was worse and birth control forbidden by the church. The vacant look in my uncle’s eyes when he returned from his job digging graves; the sweat on my mother’s body during the summer months as she left the inferno of the hospital kitchen where she worked, which, of course, lacked air-conditioning. The French spoken at every holiday celebration as my older relatives talked of “adult” topics so that us “American” kids wouldn’t understand. The teacher who told me “clepe” (a Quebecois version of crepe) was not a homonym for drape, nor even a word. These are the voices and the people I remember, all equally permeated by the media images of the Brady Bunch and Partridge Family that the whole neighborhood ran into their houses to watch on Friday evenings. My home place, populated as it was with diverse and contradictory voices, experiences, and bodies, did not produce a happy, “living in the salad bowl” narrative of American culture. Neither for myself nor my friends. Larry Jelsine fell off a roof while working for a contractor when I was in my twenties and is now a quadriplegic. Bridget O’Connor died last year. My most recent news of Bob was that he was in prison. Danny Martinez moved, although my cousin, Gina Lianetti, married his cousin, George Lopez, ten years ago. (They now live in a single home with my aunt, uncle, another married sister, and all their children.) My best friend in high school, Larry’s sister, came out as a lesbian fifteen years ago and lost most of her friends from the neighborhood as a result. My brother, when he came out, was kicked out of the house and spent two years separated from my parents while I snuck around, once again, to see him. His best friend from fifth grade is now a pimp I hear. All but one of the three MacDonald girls had a baby while in her teens. Most of my friends from
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elementary school dropped out by high school, the girls for babies, the boys for the army or jobs. And me? I sought to escape the material oppression all around me, supported by my parents’ insistence on educational success, and learned to forget all the voices that I once valued so much. I “got out” in the parlance of the neighborhood and followed my parents’ admonitions to do “better than they did”—“work with your brains, Donna, not your brawn,” my father always told me. I went to college and on to teaching. My multiaccented home place was all that I once knew but I learned to forget, learned to disconnect with it, learned a desire to “get out” and run. How, I now wonder, did I come to be so normalized? When did I learn that the languages of my youth should not be voiced? Why has it taken me so long to realize again what was once so natural? Multivoicedness is now a deliberate effort, not a natural reaction to place, time, and context. It’s a surprise when I remember, when I realize the “we” of a given composition article, say, is not me nor was it ever meant to include the me who grew up in the streets of Worcester, Massachusetts, an industrial city once known for manufacturing that, during my formative years, was hit hard by the move to a service economy as factory after factory closed. It has become painful yet necessary, however, to re-member my body on which the traces of Worcester have left an indelible mark. My home place now is decidedly middle-class and white but, as a result of remembering, no less multiaccented as a result. I carry the traces of Worcester with me now. I have a wonderful normative narrative I can pull out when the occasion arises that allows my body and its encoding to seem well integrated—I know how to be white, straight, and middle-class, and frequently am—more and more often as I move up the academic hierarchy. But other voices, other selves, are still available to me and I still perform (am) them. The languages available to me, the rhetoricity through which I am/be, are as much Rich’s, Bob’s, Eartha’s, Bridget’s, the MacDonald’s, Larry’s, my parents’, my brother’s, my Boston students’ as they are my colleagues’ and the Brady Bunch. To be American, even though we rarely see it in white folk (or even in “white trash,” a term from my youth that I’ve decided to embrace), is to be afforded the possibility of being multicultural, or if we happen to occupy a white body, to become Marcia Brady. Whether I will once again become more Marcia and less Eartha is a constant fear I live with, a constant possibility I have to actively work against.
chapter two
Academic Discourse and Subject Production: Toward a Technology of Power
I feel like English isn’t worth my time in some ways, but I know there isn’t a easy way out as long as I live. I would like to know how English and our writing styles came about and how every day in society they change . . . I know these questions are stupid but I can’t help to think about them. —Tim’s literacy autobiography Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites with specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion. —Stuart Hall, “Who Needs Identity?” COMPOSITION, AS A FIELD, has taken seriously the challenges posed by recent theories of discourse and subjectivity. Depending on the pedagogy, we have employed varying theories of the subject to guide our understanding of how identity might explain the writer’s agency. What we still know less about, however, is how our students come to understand their own identities within postmodern culture. Our students, and all citizens for that matter, are offered multiple positions out of which to construct identity, positions created through the conflicts and convergences in public, media, experiential, and institutional discourses. Such choices include academic discourse. Before we can understand how the teaching of writing might support the subject’s agency to transform the social, then, we must first ask what kinds of subject positions academic discourse, itself, offers for identity construction. We must begin, that is, to untangle the complicated relations among academic discourse, subjectivity, and identity that take place within the confluence of discursive and material relations. Only
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when we come to understand both why and how students interact with academic discourse as an act of identity-formation might we get a better sense of how our pedagogies’ presumptions about subjectivity influence our students’ ability to refigure the social scene of identity politics and take the first step to realizing composition’s goals of writing as social action and intervention into self. The initial site of inquiry into such questions must be academic discourse itself. As Stuart Hall points out in the epigraph, identities are forged out of multiple discursive relations within the social real, but they begin in specific discursive relations located in the material specificity of history and institutions. Understanding identity construction, thus, begins with understanding the process by which subject positions are created. If we understand subject positions as “possibilities for self-hood that exist in the socio-cultural context of writing, both the broader context of society at large, and the more specific institutional context of a particular act of writing,” then identity formation begins with the positions a given discourse makes available (Clark and Ivanic 136). Only through an understanding of academic discourse’s subject positions can we move to the more central question of identity construction: identification. In Hall’s terminology, identification reflects not only the process by which we take on subject positions as identities, but also our own role in this process, recognizing that “the subject [also] invests in the position” (“Who” 6). In this way, identity can be imagined as the meeting point of discourse and self wherein the subject makes a choice, influenced by other discourses and social relations, to invest in particular subject positions and take them on as part of identity construction. Hall refers to this process as suture: I use ‘identity’ to refer to the meeting point, the point of suture, between on the one hand the discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be ‘spoken’. Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us. (“Who,” original emphasis 6)
Before we can look to issues of identity construction, we must first understand the nature of the discourse that “hails us” by offering subject positions with which we might identify. Developing such an understanding involves an intricate series of questions, beginning with the initial process of moving from writing a particular manifestation of language to the creation of subject positions within the discursive realm in which that language functions. What is the relationship between subject positions, constitution in discourse, and the languages we produce? How might our understandings of subjectivity lead to a theory of how identity interacts with learning to write in a particular discourse? Following Hall’s lead, I seek to understand the process by which identities might be constructed in academic dis-
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course by looking at how the discourse, itself, might best be characterized. Through a close reading of the literacy autobiography corpus described in the introduction, this chapter explores a set of related moves that might help us begin to investigate the questions above by determining (1) how students depict academic discourse; (2) what discursive relationships their depictions suggest in terms of the subject formation learned in writing classrooms, and finally, (3) how critical/cultural theory might explain these depictions. Although I take my direction from cultural theory, I begin with the literacy autobiographies’ descriptions of academic discourse for the explanatory power they offer in pointing me toward the discursive theory that might best explain their descriptions. In this way, I seek to have theory, as much as possible, emerge from student experience, rather than presume that my own theoretical investments might best explain what the students offer. This chapter, then, sets the stage for a more thorough discussion of identity in academic discourse, via the students’ voices, by describing how subject positions are created, a necessary precursor to exploring how occupying such positions might affect identity constitution. As such, the chapter focuses on the discursive elements of subjectification to set the foundation for the more central material issue: why students might choose to construct discursive identifications in ways that impact identity through their lived relations in the social real. By beginning with the discursive, however, I do not mean to elide material relations. Examining discourse as the site of subjectification does not absent such subject positions from the more material effects of power. Discursive relations, as Hall suggests, emerge within modalities of power that have significant consequences for how identities are marked in difference and potentially excluded from the processes by which identifications are taken up as part of our action as bodies in the social real. In examining the literacy autobiographies’ depictions of this discourse, then, we also see how the students begin to situate academic discourse within the specificity of power relations that operate in the material world. The (student) writers come to see the realm of academic discourse, that is, in terms of such difference, and to place power within the discursive realm precisely as Hall explains. In its focus on the discursive, then, this chapter also begins to set the scene for a more thorough analysis of the material realms of culture if for no other reason than that the literacy autobiography writers so acutely sense the power of academic discourse to both withhold power from them and restrict alternative literacy practices. In this way, even when focusing on discourse, the interaction of the discursive and material realms of culture on identity construction surfaces precisely because of the materiality of language itself. Academic discourse emerges from its material location in institutions of higher education, yet it is perceived first and foremost as a discursive interaction since a student’s experience of it begins with reading and writing its language. However, that linguistic interaction can never be separated from its institutional location, bringing with it the power
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relations the institution is meant to negotiate and support. Thus, it is the material artifact of academic discourse—its textual practices and products—that presents itself most obviously as inviting subjectification. Writing practice announces itself through the conventions available for its use within particular sites. If the creation of subject positions is inextricably tied to “the conventions for all types of action, of which writing is one,” then through the social action of producing text in particular conventional ways, students are also invited to take on “what is encoded in them”: the “interests, values, beliefs and relations of status and power” embedded in those conventions and their concomitant subject positions (Clark and Ivanic 137). Through its language, as a material element of culture, academic discourse presents particular discursive options for constructing identity within its realm. Although the literacy autobiography writers perceive academic discourse only as learning a particular linguistic act, such education opens up a site of discursive-material interaction that further affects one’s relations to other forms of social being. DIVIDING LINES: STUDENT DEPICTIONS OF ACADEMIC DISCOURSE
The forty-six literacy autobiographies I examined, not surprisingly, offer multiple and contradictory accounts of the students’ encounters with academic and other discourses. In the rhetorical terms of Kenneth Burke, the texts articulate a bifurcated relationship to academic discourse that includes both identification and division. On one hand, in certain contexts or moments in time, the writers do feel as if they can wield the power of academic discourse self-consciously to exercise their intentions. In these depictions, the writers present themselves as agents, as writers whose human agency controls the writing act and the discursive realm in which that textual act participates. If writers are depicted as agents, they are seen as in control of discourse. Humans are seen as the creators of discourse when they perceive themselves in an identified relationship with it. The motives for a linguistic act, and the power of that act, are situated in the human agent (Burke 117, 172). Agency, or the ability of language to exert power (instrumentality), may come partially through the discourse itself; however, agents have the ability to use the agency of discourse self-consciously. In these depictions, the identification between the language the students use and their ability to realize their intentions with it are so strong that the writers become almost consubstantial with the discourse. On the other hand, when the writers encounter a new manifestation of this discourse, or fail to succeed in school reading and writing tasks, their texts depict academic discourse as an entity somehow separate from their use of its language. In this divided relationship—one that distinguishes between academic discourse and the writers—academic discourse is seen as possessing a power or agency of its own, apart from those who use its language. The process of meaning-making and the knowledge writing seeks to
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create are seen as residing in the discourse itself. The agency of writing lies not in the writer as agent but in the agency of discourse. Not surprisingly, it is in the writer’s divided relationship with academic discourse that we get the clearest picture of a discourse seeking to act upon those who would speak its language, “hailing” those who would write “as if ” they controlled the discourse itself to identify with its subject positions. By examining more closely the ways in which the writers characterize academic discourse when they feel divided from it, we begin to see how the discourse possesses a power of its own, a power that exists beyond the writers’ control. Part of this power is its ability to create its own agents, to inscribe the (student) writers as subjects of its power, to interpellate subjects so that they, too, might be “spoken” by the discourse. The (student) writers can use a discourse’s language with power, but that power is granted through the discourse rather than the writer’s agency. Within such a process of subjectification, I believe we can see how, when the texts bespeak an identification with academic discourse, they are merely voicing part of what Althusser calls the ideals already internalized by the “dutiful subject,” one who “believes it is possible to inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the action of his material practice” (qtd. in Clifford 43). Before taking up the depictions of identification, then, I turn to images of division wherein the discourse most clearly declares itself to its initiates. Through such a discursive picture, I hope we can come to a greater understanding of the processes of subjectification such a discourse might orchestrate and represents as a fait accompli in the more seamless relationship between self and text found in the images of identification. As might be expected, the themes characterizing a divided relationship are more prevalent in the basic writers’ texts than in those of the English graduate students.1 Because of their placement, the basic writers do not yet see themselves as powerful in their use of schooled language in the new context of college. Thus, academic discourse emerges as distanced, exterior, restricting, and inaccessible. On the other hand, the graduate students generally identify with academic discourse and therefore see its language as a part of the linguistic repertoire that allows them to exercise their intentions. The basic writers’ marginal position regarding this “new” discourse makes the already constructed and powerful nature of the discourse more immediate and distinguishable, even though most of these writers would undoubtedly be unable to describe their relationship in this way. In fact, when asked about the metaphors and terminology that imply division, the writers I interviewed usually responded that they “hadn’t meant to write that” (Denzel’s interview). As writers attempting to “master” academic discourse, the basic writers are made more aware of the shifting nature of identification and division. The way in which the depiction of discourse shifts from one of identification to one of division is further supported in the graduate student texts. Although these texts do not display distance with schooled language in general, a
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similar divided relationship appears in their texts when the narratives begin to center on graduate school and the professional language of English studies. While their relationship to academic discourse might predominantly be one of identification, because they can use certain manifestations of it to achieve their intentions, as soon as this ability is taken away upon entry to graduate school, the discourse permutates in unexpected ways. As a result, the graduate students are distanced, feeling as if the familiarity of the discourse has been stripped away in this new context. The graduate students’ experiences remind us that schooled language serves only as a general descriptive term for manifestations of academic discourse that are neither singular nor monolithic. Instead, academic discourse embodies many different levels of authority achieved through its various textual manifestations. Thus, while the graduate students remain identified with certain manifestations of academic discourse, they feel divided from the ones they are encountering for perhaps the first time. The similarities between the way the professional language of English studies is discussed by the graduate students and “college-level” language is presented by the basic writers are striking, yet not surprising given the marginal position of both groups to these manifestations of academic discourse. In both cases, encountering a “new” discourse results in a clearer sense of différance, a sense that might not otherwise have been felt. This relationship of division is precisely what allows the (student) writers to characterize the nature of academic discourse most fully. The nature of academic discourse is characterized as an entity that is (1) separate from human control, (2) able to withhold its agency—the instrumentality of its power—from humans, and (3) capable of restricting other ways of using language. I discuss the specific nature of these characteristics below under the headings of distance, inaccessibility, and restriction respectively.
DISTANCE Many of the images of distance in the basic writers’ texts are embedded, found only in apparently inadvertent references, structural moves at the sentence-level, noticeable absences, or metaphors. More intriguing is the fact that the texts rarely belabor these points; that is, once a brief reference might be made to the distanced relationship of discourse, the texts quickly move on to a positive experience with literacy or an overt statement about why learning schooled language is good and necessary. In fact, even though the themes of distance and exteriority are pervasive throughout the basic writers’ texts, they also write texts that are predominantly glowing accolades to the need for “good writing” and their own success with it in the past. The tension between the need to see oneself as successfully part of a discourse and the perception that this discourse is not one’s own is much more prevalent in the basic writers’ texts than in the graduate students’; the latter only speak of these themes in the localized time period of beginning graduate school. Intriguingly, the basic writers, much more so than
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the graduate students, highlight their positive experiences with literacy. Rarely did an autobiography by a basic writer focus primarily on negative experiences or difficulties (only five texts). The need to present an ethos of a person who has the ability to use language well and succeed in school, however, should not be surprising given that the institutional label of “basic writer” has called that ability into question. Success in this realm becomes defined as the ability to overcome this unexpected obstacle. (The nature of their placement as “obstacle,” or a “shock,” is expressed explicitly in all but six of the texts.) There is a lot at stake in believing in oneself as a writer capable of doing college-level writing— a testament in itself to the power of the discourse for material success. For example, Charlie, a basic writer, writes that he finally realized why his mother and father, “and countless number of teaching aides” had forced him to struggle with “this eccentric language” (i.e., schooled language, my emphasis).2 Yet immediately after conjuring up this image of a distanced, quirky, fairly incomprehensible language with his allusion to “eccentric,” Charlie returns to validating the language of school immediately. His next sentence begins: “I believe that communicating properly is one of the most important concepts we must all learn at an early age.” Yet the distance from an exterior discourse that Charlie’s text tries to submerge—by immediately contradicting its articulation— recurs in other images as well. Significantly, Charlie also alternatively uses the terms “literature” and “English” in his discussion of literacy. “Literature” refers to all reading and writing done in school; “English” refers only to his outside reading and the short horror stories he likes to write for fun. Whether these quick switches from suggestions of division to maxims on the need for identification are results of the context in which the text was written is impossible to discern (i.e., a university class that would obviously value learning this schooled writing). Yet it is more likely, given the nature of his text, that Charlie did not intentionally choose to present schooled language as distant and incomprehensible. His text does not overtly report negative experiences; his narrative primarily focuses only on why schooled literacy can be and is a positive force in his life. As a result, I read his use of the term “eccentric” as an example of a perception about discourse that does not reach a conscious level for the writer. Charlie’s insight into his divided relationship with academic discourse seems inadvertent because this relationship contradicts the control most of the basic writers want to have. Similarly, Tim makes a consistent—and surprising—switch between the terms “British language” and “English language” in his autobiography. The descriptor, British language, is invoked whenever he speaks of schooled language; English language is reserved only for references to home language and, like Charlie, nonassigned reading and writing. In Tim’s text, we see more clearly than in any other the separation being made by many of these writers between characterizations of schooled language as “distanced” (i.e., a divided relationship) and more personal language (i.e., an identified relationship). The other texts do not
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explicitly use nationalist terms to invoke the foreign, distanced nature of school discourse, yet these images are evoked just the same. Bruce’s text, for example, presents a more implicit, visual image of distance. He writes that “Mrs. Parks showed patients with my reading and . . . writing.”3 The ellipsis serves to separate Bruce, indicated by the possessive pronoun “my,” from schooled writing. This is the only instance of an ellipsis in Bruce’s entire text; its use is such a striking departure from Bruce’s usual style that his teacher comments on it in every draft. Despite these comments, Bruce retains the ellipsis in his final graded version, implying that whatever he felt was being communicated by this structure was too important to cut from his text. While Bruce presents an image of distance related only to schooled writing, Aretha focuses on speech. In a discussion of how she tried to correct her dialect and “talk straight and correctly” in school, Aretha includes several examples of what she means by dialect. Although she discusses other aspects of dialect (e.g., double negatives), the only concrete examples that she chooses to set off by quotes involve personal pronouns in which she is implicated. When she writes of her eighth grade English teacher discussing people “with a terrible use of language,” she explains that “he would mainly be talking about how people would say ‘you be, I be’.” A few lines earlier in the text Aretha ties her own speech with her teacher’s description of the way “people” talk. In contrast, when she discusses her boyfriend’s use of dialect her example is “we is, they is.” Significantly, in these examples she sets up a consistent distinction between two groups, one personal and one removed. By using plural pronouns in her boyfriend’s example, she aligns herself (“we”) with him and his language rather than her teacher’s. Her teacher’s example implies blame and separation (I, the teacher, be; you, the student, be) while her boyfriend’s quote includes her and only excludes “they.” In these apparently innocent examples of speech patterns, Aretha’s autobiography implies her distance from the language of the teacher. Yet, like Charlie, her discussion is located within the larger context of learning to “talk straight.” Even as the writers present themselves as people who are a successful part of academic discourse, or are attempting to become a part of it (“talking straight”), they simultaneously comment on how this language (or alternately, knowledge) can also be more than distant. In a second theme related to division, the writers present academic discourse as something almost tangible that comes from outside of them. Frequently, metaphors of “tools” and “gifts” are invoked. Todd writes that he received his “literacy tools from other people,” while Dan mentions that he does not yet have enough language “tools” and needs to “collect more.” Diane has also taken language from others in that she “acquired” her “English skills” from her teachers. All of these references conjure up images in which the writers themselves have the power to take language, as a physical, definable entity, from others, whose province it is presumably to guard and distribute it. But just as frequently the writers refer to an entity beyond human control that is given only to the privileged. Swati speaks of schooled language
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as confusing; she couldn’t “find the answers,” as if the answers existed in a space separate from her, a space she couldn’t access. Both Latisha and Tim speak of facility with schooled language as a “gift from God.” It could easily be argued that these writers are merely invoking cultural commonplaces for describing literacy: tools, innate ability (i.e., God-given), the search for answers. This is undoubtedly true, yet I find their invocation, as well as the colloquialisms themselves, significant in defining the perceived nature of academic discourse for these writers: Its language is not theirs but something that they must take, earn, or find because, and here’s the crux, it is somehow being held away or hidden from them. Only Diane writes of “acquiring” the tools from her teachers instead of taking or searching on her own, and even in this construction, the verb “acquire” places the responsibility for receiving such tools on the teacher-subject. The nature of schooled language as something outside of the writers that they must find is tied to either human agents (i.e., teachers and “other people”) or language itself. While the basic writers connect their images of distance and exteriority to schooled language in general (or occasionally to specific teachers), the graduate students discuss these discursive characteristics only in terms of “graduate school language”—both the writing and speaking of it. Although not all the graduate students overtly express the entrance to graduate school as representing a marked difference in their relationship to discourse, over half of them comment on a new feeling of distance from the literate practices required in graduate school. In these discussions, all the issues expressed in the basic writers’ texts come together in a single locus. However, there is a fairly marked difference in the ways the graduate students characterize the nature of “grad school” language. The graduate students primarily focus on issues of structure and jargon rather than ideas and knowledge. Even though they perceive that this new manifestation of academic discourse is separate and foreign, resulting in feelings of severe discomfort, they rarely tie this perception to an indictment of the quality of their ideas; instead, they focus upon a skills-related image of writing and reading that appears nowhere else in their texts. Their past successful experience with reading and writing seems to allow them to deflect their discomfort with this discourse from impinging on their ability to think in complex ways; it is only the expression, or writing and speaking, of these ideas that is called into question. This separation is intriguing in itself given that, as teachers of writing (all the graduate students are also composition TAs), these writers would likely label such a division false. It almost seems to serve, instead, as a defense mechanism, allowing them to deflect the feelings of inadequacy such a division from academic discourse has brought about. The most pervasive image evoked in these discussions of graduate school writing is one of disempowerment; any previous perceptions of using schooled writing in purposeful ways has been taken away from these writers. Tricia writes in a note to her professor that one of her peer responders commented that the “central thread” in her text is that “reading and writing have been
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altogether very empowering experiences for me. I agree, at least until graduate school. I’m not sure it’s that simple anymore.” Here, Tricia implies that reading and writing in graduate school has moved into another space for her, a space in which she no longer retains the power she previously felt over schooled language. Patty similarly suggests that graduate school discourse is something different for her when she comments that she really only learned to write in graduate school, an assertion that is undercut by the report of exclusively successful experiences with writing in her primary, secondary, and undergraduate classes. Other writers, however, are less covert about the effects of encountering a new way to write and express their ideas. Sarah writes that her first graduate course “was an unnerving experience. . . . After [this course] I tried to avoid writing courses because I was afraid my writing skills were not adequate for the graduate level.” Janet’s text employs even more vehement terminology about the effects of this new language: “My safe, happy, unassuming attitude toward myself and my abilities as a reader and writer of texts was shattered when I started graduate school.” For Vicki, a recovering alcoholic, graduate school language (i.e., literary criticism) was a source of pain: “I did the best I could, but writing anything academic was still painful for me, because when I wrote, my body cried out for a drink and a cigarette.” In all these examples, the sense that schooled language is theirs to use in purposeful ways to express their ideas has been stripped away. The nature of this language has turned a previously “natural” discourse into something other, something distant that is frightening and disturbing. In sum, the images in both the graduate students’ and basic writers’ autobiographies speak to how writers can exist in a divided relationship with the language they seek to use, and thus to the discourse that embodies that language. Not surprisingly, a relationship of division between the (student) writers and academic discourse emerges in all these texts when the writers are attempting to master a new manifestation of the discourse, whether it be “college” writing or the professional language of English studies. More surprising, however, is the way in which the writers in their current marginal positions, particularly the basic writers, reflect back to a similar divided relationship in the past, implying that such feelings are not new but rather were forgotten when they again achieved identification with the discourse. Perceiving academic discourse as an entity separate from themselves leads the students to characterize the power of this discourse much differently than when they felt identified with it. Rather than discerning academic discourse as their own to exercise their intentions—something over which they have control— the discourse is now presented as having power over them. Part of this power includes the ability of the discourse itself to withhold its language from them.
INACCESSIBILITY One of the ways the writers imply that academic discourse possesses its own agency is through their assumption that the discourse can restrict their access to
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this agency. The texts demonstrate the unattainability of academic discourse primarily through their confusion and frustrations with it; its language seems so distant and perplexing that the writers feel they will never become a part of this discourse. For example, LaVonne, an African American woman who has been consistently corrected for using dialect in school, remarks that “I try to speak in quote, unquote ‘proper English’ which in itself is ironic because I’m not even sure what ‘proper English’ is.” The way she links schooled language to textuality and distances herself from it in her emphasis on the “quoted” nature of “proper” English is remarkable, given that she is referring to her speaking rather than writing or reading. By placing schooled language within a textual realm, LaVonne implies that the language of school is somehow spoken writing and therefore divided from her “natural” way of speaking. Further, by admitting that she isn’t “even sure what [it] is,” LaVonne indicates how inaccessible it appears to her. Dominic more explicitly links his confusion to the textual nature of academic language when he complains that works of literature appear to him only as “a clutter of words.” He later wonders if literary texts would make more sense read backwards. Dan feels this inaccessibility so strongly that his text conflates literacy with a battle whose outcome is practically predetermined: He portrays Michael Jordan as a “language boss” because he “fights against the odds.” Latisha implies that even hard work does not seem to matter in overcoming such odds. She wonders why everyone always says that “practice makes perfect” because this adage does not seem to apply to her language education: “I’ve been practicing for eight consecutive years and nothing has changed.” She comments that consistent practice with sports has always worked for her and asks “what is the difference” with language. Seen in the context of the other writers’ remarks, the difference seems to be the way in which academic discourse exists in an exterior space, a space that somehow gives it the ability to withhold its language from them. Even though the unattainable nature of academic discourse results in frustration and confusion for these writers, most of the texts do not link the withholding of this discursive power to their teachers, or any human agent; instead, it is the discourse itself that restricts their access. Cassandra’s text demonstrates the absence of individual humans as controllers of such an unattainable discourse fairly clearly. Cassandra links the discourse she feels she can’t access to a tradition and history that goes beyond her teacher. According to her narrative, she had always been a successful writer until she was moved into an honors class. On the first paper assignment, she worked for hours attempting to interpret a quotation, but failed to come up with a draft for conference day. She describes her walk to the teacher’s desk for her conference as follows: “I walked from my desk to hers as if I was in a tunnel surrounded by Walt Whitman, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Richard Wright screaming ‘You don’t have your paper complete. HA! HA! HA!’” Cassandra not only places the agency of the discourse she has failed to write outside of her teacher’s province; she also depicts the historical embodiments of the discourse as antagonistic and mocking, as a heteroglossia
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filled with the disembodied voices of famous men. Further, these historical embodiments are only too happy to withhold their language and the power that comes with it. Cassandra describes herself as being “stuck”: “I was as they say, ‘working with the best’ but, the best had gotten the best of me.” Like Cassandra, LaVonne writes of an “outside” language that is not linked to human agency but has the ability to act upon her. LaVonne’s narrative is characterized by alternatively successful and unsuccessful interactions with schooled language. Her sophomore year in high school marks a turning point in a short period of unsuccessful attempts at school reading. She describes reading Lord of the Flies and Julius Caesar as “two books [that] combined to break through my reading defense shield.” Reading these two texts marked the beginning of a love for literature assigned in English classes with the exception of a “Beowulf sideswipe” in her senior year. In both these sections, LaVonne places the books in the subject position; it is they who “break through” and “sideswipe” her, not the classes or the teachers. Significantly, not only do the books influence her, but they also have a potential destructive power. She obviously felt at one point the need for a “defense shield” against certain texts, and perhaps rightly so, given the “sideswipe” she is later dealt by Beowulf. The graduate students also suggest that academic discourse has the ability to restrict their access to it. While the graduate students are primarily concerned with how attempting to write the professional language of English studies has disturbed their sense of power with language, they also comment on how their divided relationship with the discourse removes it to a space of exteriority that can withhold its power from them. Sheila’s text most clearly states this sense of being outside the discourse due to a hierarchy implicit in its language: I resented this language because it excluded me from participating. In most of my early seminars, my attempts to understand the content of the discussions was distanced by unfamiliar words, names, and jargon I didn’t understand. . . . The hierarchy implicit in this system can be stifling. . . . My ideas seemed naive in the forms in which I expressed them. . . . I still suffer from the insecurity that my ideas are inferior—or rather, that they are inferior because I don’t communicate them in required ways.
Significantly, Sheila does not question the quality of her knowledge or assume that knowledge is exterior as many of the basic writers do, but she does imply that this language exists in order to keep her, and others like her, outside of the hierarchy, to prevent them from accessing the power to express their ideas in a form in which they would be heard. Like Cassandra and LaVonne, she intuits a power structure that seeks to omit her, but unlike the two basic writers, she ties the structure to human agents later in her text: “egotistical professors.” Not all the graduate students place the responsibility for exclusion in the teacher’s lap. In contrast, Janet also feels as if the knowledge she needs to express her ideas “correctly” exists outside of her, but she links this exteriority to a more amor-
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phous location: “I felt sure everyone knew ‘secrets’ that I didn’t know, and I longed to find some big, black book in the library that contained all the answers about how to ‘do’ graduate school.” Although other humans possess the facility with writing that she desires, she does not perceive a human intention in keeping access from her; instead, she invokes an image of the institution—“a big, black book in the library.” In these allusions, we begin to see how the writers unconsciously perceive power existing within academic discourse itself. In one of the most provocative images of this power, Ben does not see the hierarchy embodied in academic discourse as inevitable; instead, he imagines it breaking down in a dream. On a day in an English class in which the topic seemed particularly removed from anything to do with him, Ben begins to daydream about the destruction of the school. In the dream, not only is the school on fire, but the result of the fire is that the ceiling tiles begin to fall down. Despite Ben’s fantasy, however, the power of academic discourse to embody its own agency recurs constantly in the autobiographies. Academic discourse’s ability to exert power without the presence of human agents becomes most clear with the next theme. While the writers occasionally place the power of discourse in the hands of institutional authorities when they discuss its inaccessible nature, they consistently place such power in the discourse itself when they discuss its ability to restrict other ways of interacting with language.
RESTRICTION The texts depict the ability academic discourse has to restrict other ways of using language in all the areas of language use: reading, speaking, and writing. By requiring what the writers intuit as a certain type of reading process, the institution (and therefore its discourse) disallows processes and interpretative strategies that the writers feel are more “natural” to them. Similarly, the requirements for speaking and writing in school are portrayed as impeding the writers’ ability to speak and write in languages that feel somehow closer to their “true” sense of themselves. In sum, academic discourse itself is imbued with the power to determine what may be written and spoken, and how texts may be read. By setting up its own parameters for language use, the discourse can simultaneously restrict other ways of using language that do not fit within these parameters. The results of academic discourse’s restrictive ability are quite serious for the students. Disallowing their “other” reading and writing practices asks the students to restrict the language practices with which they feel most confident, placing the students in not only a position of division with the discourse, but also one of powerlessness. Academic discourse’s ability to restrict other ways of reading is exhibited primarily through descriptions of “home” reading practices that reflect different attitudes toward texts than those presented in school. For Aretha, this restrictive
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ability surfaces not in different ways of reading but in the move from oral to textual authority. Aretha’s text conveys a feeling of distance caused by the language of texts, causing her to find the language evocative of a different meaning than the one she learned at home. This distance comes out most clearly in her characterization of finding the meaning of the King James version of the Bible “confusing.” She loved the Bible stories and prayers her grandmother taught her as a child, but when these stories are moved into the space of print with an antiquated language, the stories and prayers become something different, and more significantly, something she doesn’t like or understand. Her original way of interpreting biblical images is restricted by the textual nature of the Bible, and she must now learn a new interpretative strategy. Although other basic writers express a similar discomfort with the reading strategies of school, most of the texts suggest a different relationship to texts. In their characterizations of home reading and the reading experiences they found pleasurable, a more collaborative and interactive relationship with texts is invoked. Neil, for example, writes about loving the early reading he did with his parents, a type of reading that was always interactive. His parents asked questions, listened to his reading, and all three of them created new endings to stories. Such an interactive model as a preferred mode does not disappear for Neil as he grows older as it does for most children, perhaps as a result of the influence of school. Even in high school, he writes that the only time he could come up with a “good” reading of a poem and enjoy the process was when he and his mother worked on it together, talking out different interpretations. Like Aretha, Neil finds meaning in verbal interactions, but he transfers this way of discovering meaning to texts as well. Similarly, LaVonne depicts her home reading as interactive and describes her two most successful reading experiences as collaborative interpretations of the Bible with her parents and a book starring Oscar the Grouch she read as a child, in which the reader becomes a character in the story. Neither Neil nor LaVonne’s texts mention that this interactive reading model is allowed with school reading. In fact, Neil even juxtaposes the way he generated reports about poetry with his mother to the individual reports expected of him by his teachers, remarking that he never does well on the latter. The limitations put on their interactive reading practices have intriguing consequences for Neil and LaVonne’s subsequent relationships to texts assigned in school, and the ways of reading they construct as a way of dealing with this limitation. Both LaVonne and Neil, as well as many other basic writers, report that their ways of reading in school were primarily characterized by memorization. The nature of memorization portrayed in their descriptions emerges as almost a “cover tactic” and is typically linked to a fear of teachers discovering their subterfuge. If they expected to read aloud on a certain day, they would memorize passages in advance because, as Neil put it, he “can’t read,” an assertion undercut by his descriptions of reading at home. This fear of discovery, however, is very real, and the descriptions of it are almost reminiscent of an
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alcoholic’s fear of someone discovering their drinking. The nature of memorization as “cover” is probably best described in LaVonne’s account of having to read a portion of The Life of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. over the P.A. for Black History month: I had a week to prepare for the big day, so every night after school I would go home and memorize a paragraph. When the day came for me to read, I walked into the P.A. room to get it over with. When my turn came to read, I pulled out the paper for the sake of not being discovered as a fake, and began reciting. When I was finished I was commended by my teachers and classmates about how well I read. If only they knew.
Although it is impossible to discern the direct cause of reading becoming primarily memorization for these writers, such techniques could be connected to the restriction of their interactive reading styles. The individual nature of school reading presents texts as autonomous; what the text says is more important than any interaction people can have with the text. It almost seems as if these writers have taken this presentation of texts to the extreme: If they cannot bring texts into an environment with other people then neither will they interact with texts individually. Instead, such an individualistic model of reading seemingly translates to memorization, a pure repetition of another’s words in which they are only a vehicle. Thus, the schooled reading model not only restricts their “other” reading styles, it also seems to force these readers to take a powerless stance toward texts. Restriction, then, is closely tied to the discourse’s efforts to change the students’ way of reading and/or reasons for reading. The writers feel as if the discourse that has already prevented them from accessing its power is further attempting to change their successful and pleasurable relationships to reading. This is not to say that reading styles or relationships to texts are monolithic, or that two models of reading cannot be used by the same person. In fact, many of the graduate students also comment on reading differently in nonschool contexts but report that they can maintain more than one reading style simultaneously. Yet the graduate students still see this other reading as inappropriate because of its content or context. Reading nonassigned texts invokes feelings of guilt similar to those expressed by the basic writers about their memorizing texts. For example, Mary refers to her outside reading as “illicit” in grade school, but she only saw this reading as unacceptable when she read something not assigned while physically in the classroom. It is not her reading and writing practices that are restricted, only the amount and times she can read. Tricia ties her feelings of “guilt” or “inadequacy” to reading texts deemed “unsophisticated” by school, particularly romance novels. Similarly, Rajiv does not feel restricted in his way of reading in school, but he does feel distanced by assigned texts. As a gay male, Rajiv constantly feels betrayed by characters because their assumptions about sexuality never reflect his own feelings. His frustration surfaces in questions:
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“Why does the princess always have to marry the prince? Why did Emma have to marry Mr. Knightley?” What is most striking about all these descriptions, especially given how prevalent they are in the autobiographies, is that in none of them is the restriction of reading practices, processes, and interpretative strategies linked to human agents. The autobiographies never refer to a particular teacher, or even a single class, that prompted their feelings about these practices being inadequate. Instead, the texts connect the restriction of these more “natural” reading practices and/or choices of material to schooling itself. Academic discourse, not a human agent, is given the agency to restrict other ways of approaching texts, a depiction that continues in the autobiographies’ descriptions of speaking and writing. Although only two of the texts—one by a basic writer and one by a graduate student—designate speaking as their most “natural” expression of self, both these texts indicate that this type of speaking is restricted by school. For Denzel, his “language communicating skills” are the strongest and least affected when he is speaking with his friends, using what he alternately terms “black dialect” and “slang,” which he defines as the language of young, black men based on the terminology of rap musicians. Denzel realizes, however, that such speaking in school is inappropriate; he mentions that this language is usually perceived as being “ununderstandable” by white students and teachers. He further comments that his “language communicating skills” are most inappropriate in schooled writing assignments. For Denzel, this restriction is particularly frustrating because he places his persuasive power in his “language communicating skills.” Denzel is proud of what he terms his “persuasive” ability. He has always been told by his mother and other family members that he is a persuasive person. He provides examples of being able to persuade his mother to allow him to do things she normally would not. As he moves into the present, his persuasive abilities are discussed within the context of women and his ability to persuade women of many things, although he writes that he prefers not to go into detail about what these “things” might be. By restricting these “communicating skills” within a school context, then, Denzel is rendered unpersuasive—powerless— with language in a way he has not been in other contexts. Like Denzel, Mary refers to language that expresses her “true” self as taking place in conversation. In fact, talking, she realized early, was a way of giving a part of herself to others: “I soon realized that if I talked, the other person would talk back. We would learn something about each other. The more I gave of myself through language, the more (at least ideally) I would get back.” It is only through speech that Mary expresses this exchange of selves, a communication that expresses her inner voice. Unfortunately, she comments, such an exchange rarely happens in class discussion; instead, it occurs only in out-of-school contexts. It is important to note that the only examples of restricted ways of speaking are linked to what are normally described as racial or gendered communicative styles. Denzel’s description of his “language communicating skills” parallels de-
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scriptions of African American English, while Mary’s description of the “exchange of selves” through conversation is reminiscent of “women’s ways of using language.” The only overt example of how schooled writing restricts other ways of using language, however, comes from a white male. Tom provides perhaps the clearest image of the ways in which schooled writing attempts to change the writer’s language by restricting other uses. Throughout Tom’s text, he writes of searching for an avenue within language that would express his thoughts. He finds that avenue in unrestrained uses of speech; however, his father—a symbol of power—tries to force a more acceptable schooled language upon him. Tom writes, “I was never afraid to express myself no matter what I was thinking, I would just blurt it out. This made my dad worry because he always put a major emphasis on having to learn to write a coherent paragraph.” Tom becomes increasingly frustrated with his father’s emphasis on this “coherent” logic because he does not believe such a structure would allow him to express himself. Significantly, Tom sees “the paragraph”—the materiality of discourse—not his father’s admonitions, as that which restricts his ability to express himself in other ways. Similarly, he expresses anger at the school for concentrating on reading and writing rather than valuing “thinking.” Schooled reading and writing restrict Tom from expressing what he sees as his true thoughts, not a human agent. TOWARD A THEORY OF THE SUBJECT
What emerges from these depictions of academic discourse is, on one level, not surprising. That academic discourse should appear powerful in its influence over the writers and somewhat inaccessible might easily be explained by the writers’ position as students in writing and/or composition theory classes at the time they produced these autobiographies. What is more intriguing is the way they depict the discourse as an entity in and of itself that is so “different” it needs to be marked by an alternative nomenclature—English versus literature; British versus English; us versus them—and so inaccessible that memorization seems a viable option to enacting its language. Schooled language is clearly neither the language they see as linked to their “natural” way of communicating, nor is it necessarily a language that invites interaction. It is not even the language that others, like their teachers, ultimately control. Instead, it is the language of power and knowledge that resides in institutions rather than people. For the material-discursive connections so central to my analysis here, this institutional link between language and its power is highly provocative. The writers clearly sense the discourse as a separate entity, offering subject positions they do not currently occupy but strongly desire, and thus associate with a discourse that has the power to restrict their access to it. Yet it is this very exteriority that gives the discourse the power to withhold its knowledge and power from their attempts to produce its language. The discourse’s inaccessibility, however, is not portrayed within the conventional understanding of power
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as wielded by people in positions of authority. Instead, power lies in the discourse itself invoked through schooling as a structural element of experience. In this way, the students’ depictions of academic discourse offer a material element to the discursive: the academic institution. They further imply that it is this institution that organizes the effects of power they feel so strongly, not only denying their access to its language but also restricting alternative literacies from its contexts. In sum, the literacy autobiographies implicate discourse in material power relations as part of the way they are “hailed” to occupy the subject positions its language makes available, linking the execution of this power to the discourse’s institutional embodiment. Theorizing inductively from the literacy autobiographies, I offer Foucault’s theory of discourse as a way of understanding both these points: a discursive agency that lies within an institution, and an influence on subject production with significant power implications. With its explanations of the links among institutions, discourse, power, knowledge, and subjectification as part of a material practice in the social real, Foucault’s theory provides an ideal starting point for better understanding the possible effects of academic discourse’s subject production on identity, at least within the specificity of this one particular discourse as part of a larger discursive formation. In what follows I apply this theory of discourse to the key questions raised by the literacy autobiographies: Why is agency placed in discourse rather than human agents as authorities of a given discourse, and how might such a theory explain subject production in the autobiographies’ images of identification with the discourse? Most significantly, the understanding Foucault offers to the central role played by the institution in such subject production helps explain not only why the students characterize power as an effect of the institution rather than its subjects, but also the construction of the desire for its subject positions that leads to identity formation, a topic to which I turn in the following chapter. In many ways, the theory of discourse offered seemingly treads old ground: that discourse offers subject positions for students to occupy is readily accepted in composition theory. What Foucault offers, however, is new insight into the key role the institution plays in how discursive relations are ordered in the social real, a central premise to understanding the more material effects of discourse on identity construction. THE AGENCY OF DISCOURSE
While Foucault has had much influence in composition studies, we most often take up questions of power via the panopticon and other specifics of his work. A project that seeks to understand the process of subject formation, however, must begin earlier, with his concepts of discourse itself and the complex interactions it describes among language, discourse, power, institutions, and the material realms of culture. Thus, I turn briefly from the literacy autobiographies to a more detailed reading of Foucault to both provide explanatory power for the
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literacy autobiographies’ depictions of academic discourse and set up terminology central to exploring identity formation in the ensuing chapters. Foucault’s key term for discourse—discursive formation (a revision of his earlier reliance on episteme)—recognizes discourse as the site of multiple and indefinite power relations that only materialize within particular historical circumstances that are ever-changing. As such, discourse itself is ahistorical; it has no beginning or end, no formal unity (Archaeology 117). It is only in discursive formations—linked to historical moments—through which discourse manifests itself in particular relations. Other possibilities exist, but are ontologically absent as in Derrida’s concept of arche-writing (i.e., always in a state of becoming, an absence that is necessary for presence to exist). Discourse itself, as Manfred Frank points out, is not “ordered per se” (original emphasis). Instead, “the order of discourse [in] its being-status is purely virtual, whilst its reality involves the permanent change and re-creation of discursively constituted meaning (yet not in a way which can be tied down to any will to power)” (114). Thus, discursive formations cannot be tied to any human will that constructs it. Discursive formations are found neither in the thoughts of men and women nor in institutions; they reside in discourse itself (Archaeology 100). Discursive formations, then, are the key to understanding how a particular discourse embodies its own agency and produces its own agents. The primary characteristic of discursive formations is their ability to produce and define what will be counted as knowledge. It is by controlling the production of knowledge that discursive formations order the “indefinite and multiple” power relationships within discourse. Such an ordering allows them to exercise this power strategically. In fact, it is only by this production of knowledge that discursive formations can be distinguished. “Whenever one can describe a system of dispersion,” Foucault tells us, “we have a discursive formation” (Archaeology 37). Such a system of dispersion is defined by a regularity among the ostensibly disparate knowledge, types of statements that make authoritative claims to knowledge, the concepts produced by that knowledge, and the theories (or statements) grounding these claims to knowledge. In contradiction to the constructivist premise that knowledge is produced by a specific epistemology agreed upon and created by human intervention, Foucault places the production of epistemologies in the discursive formation: “It should be noted that the strategies thus described are not rooted, anterior to discourse, in the silent depths of a choice that is both preliminary and fundamental . . . one must not relate the formation of theoretical choices either to a fundamental project or to the secondary play of opinions” (Archaeology, original emphasis 69–70). The way Foucault describes the placement of knowledge and ideology within the formation itself is remarkably similar to how the literacy autobiographies designate knowledge residing in texts, language practices, and knowledge production that are not only inscrutable but also unrelated to the authorities of the discourse in the bodies of teachers. Seemingly intuiting the discourse as a force
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beyond even the authorities’ control, the students place the power of discourse in history (Cassandra), in textuality itself (LaVonne), or in that “big, black book in the library” (Janet). The discourse further withholds the power it might confer, a sentiment captured most clearly by Sheila: “I resented this language because it excluded me from participating.” Discourse’s exclusionary nature, encapsulated so well here, is further linked to power as we saw in the image of a book “sideswiping” a writer (Cassandra) or the frustration at the vigilant safeguarding of that power, emerging provocatively in Ben’s dream of a burning institution. Not incidentally, this connection between power, control, and knowledge residing in a discourse is one that Foucault also elucidates, arguing that knowledge production is inextricably linked to the way discursive formations exercise power. In his discussion of Foucault, Deleuze explains this inseparable relationship: “. . . knowledge (connaissance) never refers back to a subject who is free in relation to a diagram of power; but neither is the latter [power] ever free in relation to the forces of knowledge (savoirs) which actualize it” (75). In other words, knowledge is produced through power relationships, and power is actualized through knowledge. This insight highlights Foucault’s significant contribution to my inquiry of the materialist elements of discursive subjectification: discourse’s implication in power relations that are experienced nondiscursively in the social real. Through denying access to certain forms of knowledge, valued for their cultural currency in more material interactions, discourse orchestrates power relationships both by interpellating consciousness, as we usually imagine the processes of subjectification, and through cultural relations in its more material manifestations in linguistic practice and institutional arrangements. Although power is never predictable in its outcomes or effects, it is regulated in power/knowledge relations. As François Chatelet explains, we might best imagine “power as exercise, knowledge as regulation” (qtd. in Deleuze 74). Knowledge, further, becomes regulated through institutional structures that invite subjectification and ensure the exercise of power within particular cultures. As such, part of the material realization of such power comes with the relationship among discourse, language, and institutions. Institutions function within formations as regulators of knowledge production and as the linkage to other formations and impositions of power. Like the rules for knowledge production, institutions are manifestations of a discursive formation that help to organize the way power is exerted. The great fantasy of institutions, Foucault asserts, “is the idea of a social body constituted by the universality of wills. Now the phenomenon of the social body is the effect not of a consensus but of the materiality of power operating on the very bodies of individuals” (“Body/Power” 55). In particular, institutions ensure a particular formation’s ability to exercise its power through their connection to the State. Institutions, then, serve to organize the power relations of multiple discourses within a discursive formation. As Deleuze explains: If . . . we try to define the most general character of the institution, whether or not this is a State, it seems to consist of organizing the relations which
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are supposed to exist between power and government, and which are molecular, or ‘microphysical’ relationships, around a molar agency: ‘the’ Sovereign or ‘the’ Law, in the case of the State; the Father in the case of the family; Money, Gold or the Dollar in the case of the market; God in the case of religion; Sex in the case of the sexual institution. (76)
Or, knowledge in the case of the academic institution. The academic institution, in short, becomes yet another instrument of academic discourse’s agency. It regulates access to its knowledge and organizes its relationship to the State and other discourses of power, something the literacy autobiographies seem to understand quite well when they place the agency of language in the institution rather than human agents. The “molecular” relations of learning to write specific kinds of texts, that is, are perceived through the “molar” relations by which power is invested in institutions. Institutions announce their power within the social real; microphysical relations of discourse do not. By connecting learning to write to institutional power, the students intuit a power relation between the material artifact of academic discourse (schooled language) and its molar agency, even as they occlude the discursive from their descriptions, presuming that writing is an intentional act of self. Inextricable from its institutional embodiment, academic discourse organizes power relationships with significant material effects that exceed the seemingly multiple options for constructing identity available in culture. In this way, discursive formations, through their regulatory functions organized in institutions, order the force present in discourse in such a way that it can act upon humans through social practices like writing. The ability to be affected by power is simply a “matter of force, and the power to affect is like a function of force” (Deleuze, original emphasis, 71–72). The force itself exists as a “pure function” that is directed to specific ends through discursive formations. Further, discursive formations exert this power by functioning as “brutal restrictions and systems of exclusion, which owe their unity to the ties of their ‘disseminality’” (Frank 114). Such systems of exclusion, as part of the technology by which a discourse exercises its power and exclusive right to “name” that which can be known appears in the literacy autobiographies most clearly in images of restriction: the exclusion of alternative reading strategies (Neil and LaVonne), “illicit” texts (Mary), alternative languages (Denzel), or alternative functions for communication (Mary and Tom). In a microphysical execution of molar agency, this restriction from knowledge and power is conducted through the material artifact of language. Language’s material function is something the graduate students, in their attempts to separate their knowledge from the “unnerving” experience of writing “graduate language” (Sarah) point to most strongly, although the basic writers’ invocations of “grammar” and “systems” indicate a similar sense of language as the culprit responsible for their struggles. In a Foucauldian world, the way in which power is exerted on humans is caught up in the formation’s ability to restrict and exclude an individual from access to knowledge and authority, precisely the connection the students make
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in the literacy autobiographies. It is through these power relations, and their links to knowledge production and institutional validation, that discourses come to “hail us,” in Hall’s terms, to construct identifications with particular subject positions rather than others. If subjectivity is constituted by discourse, then it is the play of discursive strands that constitutes the grounds within which we can be thought to speak (or write) authoritatively on a subject, that we can be said to “know.” Once we are qualified to “know,” we can become, like the “egotistical professors” blamed for restricting access to schooled language, an authority with the discourse and over those who have not yet gained such a status. The agents of the institution who occasionally get “blamed” in the autobiographies are granted such agency via the discourse. Their own subjectification within it, then, qualifies them to “control” certain manifestations of the discourse’s knowledge and language. Facility with writing a discourse’s language, in this way, indicates knowledge, and through knowledge, power. Not possessing such facility, the students continually remind us, is to be powerless within the discourse, and, instead, be one of the “objects” over which its power can be executed. Since the formation embodies the production and routes to knowledge, it also prescribes the “rules” for speaking about that knowledge, a knowledge we cannot access without being able to speak the discourse’s language. Thus, language serves as the initiator of subjectification, the proof of a subject’s authority, and the means by which other subjects are excluded from the power-knowledge relations in which it is invested. The writing space, in sum, is the space of social interaction with the discourse by which power relations can be organized, subjects produced, and the perpetuation of power relations ensured. Foucault labels the spaces created by a formation in which humans are allowed to speak “enunciative modalities.” The key term here is modality, or method and form. The speaking subject, certainly, operates and produces purposeful language within a discursive formation, but the language, or statements issued by the subject, are not caused by the intention of the author or speaker. Instead, the constant series of operations of a discursive formation are manifested on the surface of discourse, creating a “vacant place that may be filled by different individuals.” This space can be seen as “a dimension that characterizes a whole formulation qua statement” (Archaeology, original emphasis, 95). In other words, a formation orders discourse in particular moments (or rhetorical situations) in ways that embody the production of knowledge by producing strategies (theories) and concepts (ideas) that need human subjects to articulate them. The formation provides, and indeed circumscribes, positions through which humans can speak its knowledge. The ability to speak on a topic, then, does not reveal a transcendental subject or a psychological subjectivity; rather, a discursive formation is, Foucault explains, “an anonymous field whose configuration defines the possible position of speaking subjects” (History 122). It is the conditions of enunciative modalities as they are influenced by history, culture, and context that Foucault terms discursive practice (Archaeology 117). While the
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students’ depictions reside on this level of discursive practice—a focus on material manifestations of language—their depictions suggest such Foucauldian links among texts (discursive practice), enunciative modalities, knowledge and, thus, the discourse of which these form a part. The power these connections provide the discourse is even more clearly acknowledged by the students, particularly in their frustrations at being able to access it. If we acknowledge that such knowledge, power, institutions, and language practice are inextricably linked in the ways Foucault describes, placing the agency of such power within the discourse is eerily accurate. BECOMING A SUBJECT: THE INTERIORIZ ATION OF ACADEMIC DISCOURSE
Such an explanation of academic discourse’s function and power, however, is only partial if we focus exclusively on its ability to remain distant and inaccessible from those who would speak its language. As we know, students do not simply reside on the margins of this discourse. They have, after all, been writing and reading in academic contexts for thirteen to eighteen years depending on their stage in schooling, thus the enunciative modalities of academic discourse have not always been restricted from them. They have been, and will continue to be, “speaking subjects” within academic discourse even as they seek out new modalities that they are currently unable to fill. How students fulfill these modalities might best be explained through the literacy autobiographies’ images of identification. In the identified relationship, students acknowledge their ability to access the power of the discourse; in fact, their depictions no longer invoke a discursive agency. Rather, as Foucault might explain, they see themselves as the agents of the discourse since they now fill particular modalities rather than being denied access to them. Although much of the writers’ attention in the literacy autobiographies was preoccupied with images of division, almost all suggest that schooled language can be used intentionally to achieve their purposes and that certain manifestations of this language seem natural—a “true” expression of their “inner selves.” When the writers report how schooled language serves to exercise their intention or express their “true” voice, they indicate an identified relationship with academic discourse. Their use of schooled language becomes inseparable from their own thoughts and actions, implying that they have become almost consubstantial with the discourse that embodies this language, and have, in Hall’s terms, “sutured” themselves to particular enunciative modalities, identifying with the subject positions such modalities create. The belief in the ability to use schooled language in effective, and indeed even powerful, ways is fairly strong with both basic writers and graduate students. For most of the basic writers, however, this purposeful use of schooled language is more commonly expressed as a promise of the future or a fact of
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their pasts rather than a reality in the present, a reflection of their real or perceived marginalized position within the university’s expectations regarding literacy. The basic writers demonstrate their identification with academic discourse almost exclusively through stories of success with its language, manifested by high grades and teacher praise. In particular, the basic writers report many successful experiences with writing in English classes, commenting on the As and Bs they have always received or mentioning in detail a paper a teacher especially liked. By noting the ability to use schooled language to achieve the approval of the school’s authority, the writers point to their identification with academic discourse, an identification that results in being able to use the discourse’s language self-consciously to achieve an end—good grades. When success stories are being retold, there is no mention of difficulty or frustration with schooled language; instead, they are depicted as natural expressions of the writers’ voices. Further, the basic writers’ ability to succeed in school writing tasks is linked directly to themselves as agents who control meaning making. Cassandra’s text clearly illustrates this type of identification. When she relates success stories and reports receiving consistently good grades, Cassandra puts herself in apposition to her facility with schooled language. She refers to herself during successful times in school as “I, Cassandra, the great essay writer,” equating herself with the language she writes. Such an identification provides a striking contrast to the discussions of attempting to facilitate a “problematic” or “troublesome” language that appear in the discursive relationship characterized by division. While indications of identification in the basic writer’s texts emerge consistently in stories of good grades and teacher praise, a large number of them also express this identification by pointing to creative writing assignments. Creative writing in school is designated as a venue for their most “natural” voice. Intriguingly, creative writing is also juxtaposed with other types of school writing, what we might term critical writing, whenever it is mentioned in the texts. While “critical” writing can be used to exercise the writer’s intention only at certain points, “creative” writing is the manifestation of academic discourse with which the basic writers consistently identify. For the majority of the basic writers, creative writing is the only type of writing about which they express enthusiasm and pleasure. Charlie, for example, writes that he loved creative writing because “we were allowed to let our thoughts and feelings run free and write whatever we wanted. That appealed to me greatly because I had a unique imagination.” This unique imagination manifested itself in what Charlie terms “blood and guts” stories as opposed to the “sissy” writing required in noncreative contexts. In Charlie’s description of letting his thoughts “run free” when writing “whatever we wanted,” he implicitly ties this type of writing to an expression of his thoughts, something that drew upon what was inside of him. Similarly, Zeeva loved to “write creatively,” especially the mystery stories she wrote in elementary school. Swati is proud of the “descriptive papers, poems, and essays” she wrote in eighth grade and was disappointed when she was no longer allowed to write in this way
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upon entering high school. Writing, she laments, was no longer “fun.” Tom expresses almost antagonism toward the “other” type of writing required by school; he writes that he loves to make up his own stories and does not want to get them from “someone else.” Aretha loved “creative journal writing” because she could put down her thoughts and feelings as they occurred. Even in her description of what seems a more natural way of writing for her, Aretha feels it necessary to designate this writing as “creative,” acknowledging a distinction between creative and critical writing, a distinction between different enunciative modalities (those with which they have had success and those with which they have not) which is made in most of the texts. Although the basic writers reveal their identification with academic discourse through the attainment of their goals (evaluation) and expressing their “natural selves” (creative writing), they also occasionally mention the power schooled language gives them in other contexts. In these examples, recognized success with schooled language signifies a type of literacy that is acknowledged as powerful in other realms. For instance, Joe links his ability with schooled language to proving to the “rich kids” that he was just as good as they were: “I figured that if I could persuade the rich kids in our school that I was as smart as them, heck, I could persuade anybody into doing anything.” As in many of the images of identification, there is no mention of using a specific type of language to accomplish this persuasion. Instead, the reader only perceives that this persuasion was accomplished through the way others identified Joe with schooled language by connecting Joe’s persuasive abilities with his success in schooled writing assignments narrated earlier. When he explains the consequences of his linguistic acts, Joe takes the nominative position in the sentence. The implied referent of “Joe, the successful user of schooled language” is expressed only with the pronoun “I,” indicating Joe’s identification and consubstantiality with this language, and, by extension, with academic discourse. Examples like Joe’s of using the signifying power of schooled language to affect someone beyond school authorities, however, are rare. Further, even the identification with academic discourse achieved through successful evaluation is transitory in all the basic writing texts. Not surprisingly, the basic writers rarely feel the ability to achieve their purposes with schooled language in their present circumstances. It is highly probable that these writers may feel more powerful with language than is apparent from their texts, yet they do not overtly refer to this power because they lack the ethos to do so in this context—a text written for a class in which they were placed due to what they interpret as their inability to use schooled language effectively. This lack of ethos, however, may be precisely what has affected their identification with academic discourse at this point in their history as writers. In other words, the context in which the autobiographies were written cannot be separated from the institutional authority embodied in the discourse from whose language they now feel divided.
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Like the basic writers, the graduate students rarely make overt reference to exercising power with schooled language in academic contexts. Further, this lack seems to emerge, as with the basic writers, from the graduate students’ institutional positions. The different position of the graduate students, however, yields a much different reading of this absence. Rather than giving the impression that the graduate students do not feel they have control over schooled language because of their new position, this absence implies the strength of their power with it: Such power is so assumed it need not be spoken (written). Power with schooled language is a nonissue except in the case of graduate school, and in this instance, the inability to use this language to serve their intentions comes as a surprise. While the ability to use schooled language for their own intentions is rarely made the topic of overt discussion, this assumption runs as a theme undergirding the texts. Such lack of overt commentary can be interpreted as a tacit recognition that the writers have firmly identified themselves with academic discourse. Nevertheless, in one of only two explicit references to the power schooled language has to effect change, Mary does tie her example to a school context. Mary writes an essay for a math teacher who frequently uses essay writing as punishment to convince her that this practice is unjust because it punishes all for the actions of the few. Mary’s essay gets results—the teacher never used that form of punishment again—because the teacher “acknowledged the sense of my argument,” even though her topic was “not exactly what she had in mind.” Yet even in this school-related example, Mary is not commenting on her power to use academic writing to achieve status or success; instead, she focuses on changing the rules of the school itself. Tellingly, Mary links this example to her subsequent uses of writing to try and effect change in the political realm—letters to members of Congress (the first in junior high) and instructional materials on environmental issues. Her power with language in these contexts reflects the way language recognized as being affiliated with school can wield a certain influence outside of an academic context. Significantly, it is the power of schooled language in realms other than school Mary feels it necessary to comment on. In a similar move, Margaret writes extensively about her belief, frequently tempered by cynicism, in her ability to “change the world” through her writing. The assumption that schooled language is their own to use intentionally is much more hidden in the texts; the graduate students make only passing reference to their ability to use this language in purposeful ways. These references are frequently found only in transitional statements. For example, in the concluding statement to one paragraph, Rich writes: “I now wonder how my love of books ever translated into a desire to create my own voice, to become a writer myself.” His facility with school reading translates to a desire to use language in purposeful ways, yet that desire to be a writer is a presence in the text that goes unwritten; his power to be a purposeful writer is assumed throughout the text. Rich’s presumption of his ability with schooled language functions as the backing for claims and warrants throughout the text, but a backing that is so ac-
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cepted it need not be made explicit. Instead, it appears only in inadvertent references, like the one above, reminding the reader of its presence. Similarly, Janet uses her facility with schooled literacy as a transition from the period of school to that of work: “As I moved from childhood through the educational system and into the working world, I was always fortunate enough to be labeled as literate.” Here, her facility with schooled language signifies accepted literacy in other realms. Janet never comments on where her literate abilities came from or how she realized she had them; rather, literacy and the power that comes with it is presumed. Tricia takes this power so much for granted that she does not even notice it as the central theme of her text; one of her peer respondents has to point it out. The implication here is that the graduate students’ identification with academic discourse is so strong that their facility with its language can go unquestioned. The writers’ assumption that schooled language can express their thoughts and exercise their intentions points to how “natural” schooled language has become for them, how inextricably a part of the writers academic discourse is. This strong identification with academic discourse can be seen clearly in both Sarah’s and John’s inadvertent remarks. Sarah briefly mentions that “in grade school I was the smart one in class. By the time I got to junior high and high school, I became more interested in my social life than really wanting to learn. This was also around the time I stopped reading so much and I just relied on the headway I had gained in grade school to get me through.” Her ability to use the language of school to meet with success in that context does not need to be discussed because it was already a part of her. In an interesting move, John only comments on frustration with schooled language because it was not challenging enough for him. He could easily manipulate school writing and do exceptionally well on standardized tests (he actually looked forward to the Iowa testing in grade school), so much so that he began to do the homework of his brother’s friends two grades ahead of him. Identification comes through most clearly, however, in Patty’s text, which provides the only overt reference to identification in all the graduate student autobiographies. Patty is the only writer who explicitly ties the expression of her own voice to academic writing, perhaps because she has been involved in an academic context as a student, teacher, and administrator for over twenty years. Patty writes that because of this long involvement with school, she believes her writing upon her acceptance into the doctoral program had finally become her own: “The words on every page were now mine.” Out of all the overt and implicit references to identification, Sheila perhaps puts it best when she remarks that her difficulty in graduate school was “really the first time when I’d felt any sort of prolonged inadequacy in my ability to communicate.” The ability to communicate in a school context was taken for granted until this point, although she, unlike the other graduate students, does posit a reason for this assumption. “Perhaps because there were so few struggles,” she writes, “I have little memory of school.” Sheila’s telling comment reveals how
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little we learn about the nature of academic discourse when we examine only the writers’ identification with it. It has become almost too obvious to comment on for the graduate students, and too disputed by their current institutional position for the basic writers. Even in such positions, however, each of the forty-six texts mentions some form of identification, whether it be material success (grades, tests), the influence gained with others (teachers, classmates), culturally lauded labels (“literate,” “smart”), or the power it gained them in other realms. In such images of identification—even when identification operates as an accepted, unspoken premise in the texts—we get a sense of the writers as inextricably part of academic discourse, as subjects who fill at least some enunciative modalities of the discursive formation. The writers, in short, become part of the discourse itself in Foucault’s formulation. When an individual fills the “vacant place” created by the discursive formation, she then becomes what Foucault calls a “speaking subject,” the “speaking I,” or the “knowing subject.” Thus, the speaking subject becomes yet another instrument by which a discursive formation perpetuates its power. Speaking subjects perpetuate the power of discourse by speaking (writing) within the rules it exerts to produce knowledge and, thus, limiting that knowledge to certain enunciative modalities already provided by the discourse, a proliferation of meaning beyond its auspices being that which the discourse would most seek to contain. Once a subject has “filled” an enunciative modality, then, she becomes an instrument of the discourse’s power over others, becomes quite simply an authority within the epistemological realm expressed by that modality. Yet, the literacy autobiography writers, quite understandably, speak not to the power the discourse has gained over them, but instead, place the power they have gained through the discourse. As speaking subjects they are now able to benefit from the institution’s links with other cultural discourses, to engage in the forms of power the discourse has seemingly accorded them as agents. This emerges most clearly in the writers’ references to civic authority, influence with the “rich kids,” and achievement through tests and essay grades. When the writers comment on their identification with academic discourse, it is no coincidence that the importance of this identification lies with the power it grants the writer both within the institution and with the society in which the institution resides. As the writers clearly tell us, there are many advantages to becoming a “speaking subject” of academic discourse. This is why being “divided” from it can be so frustrating and impacts their sense of confidence and power. TEMPORARY ATTACHMENT OR IDENTITY FORMATION?
Writing academic discourse successfully seems to require that writers take on at least some of the subject positions linked to the enunciative modalities we seek to fill to communicate and have our voices heard. The rhetorical identification the students construct with the discourse when speaking its language, that is,
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suggests that some attachment has been made between the self and discourse, but we must ask whether that attachment necessarily comes to constitute the subject. Or might such attachments, as Hall has argued, be imagined as “temporary,” forged in a continual movement of identification and disidentification that need not indelibly influence the student’s identity? In a poststructural formulation, subjectification and identity construction are seen as complements to one another. Foucault only implies the necessity of such internalization in his description of subjectification; however, Deleuze’s reading of his work makes these implications more clear. In his explication, Deleuze describes Foucault’s concern with subjectification as the process by which the exteriority of discourse becomes internalized such that the inside, or consciousness of humans, is only “an operation of the outside,” or the exteriority of discursive formations (Deleuze 97). Deleuze suggests that human identity itself is determined through the interiorization of discourses and the positions they inscribe for speaking subjects. Yet, while such an observation is a readily accepted premise of most postmodern theories, we have learned more recently from cultural studies that such interiorization is not a necessary result of occupying subject positions. Given the panoply of options for constructing identity, identity formation usually operates more fluidly, as we make and remake attachments with given discourses in ways that do not indelibly mark our identity. A key question remains, then: Can students access the power academic discourse provides through its positions as speaking subjects without the discourse becoming an inextricable part of their identity? The literacy autobiographies suggest that they cannot. In the autobiographies’ reflections on past identifications with the discourse, they also comment on the effect such identifications have had on their identity construction. When the literacy autobiographies discuss such past influences, the texts attribute this influence on their sense of self to academic discourse’s power to influence their thinking to such an extent that it becomes their own. For the most part, the students can only discuss academic discourse’s influence on them in terms of past experience. Only when their present realities have changed can they reflect on how they received ideas and ways of using language from their interactions with academic discourse that are no longer desirable. Academic discourse is presented as having the ability to become interior, an inextricable part of the writers that is seemingly difficult, if not impossible, to escape. In particular, the texts comment on how academic discourse has encroached upon and defined their thinking and writing in ways they were unable to prevent. In their depictions, the literacy autobiographies bear witness to interiorization as the inevitable result of subjectification in academic discourse, suggesting that such subjectification, for this particular discourse, may not be as “temporary” as cultural studies might argue The primary way schooled language influences the way these writers think is found, not surprisingly, in reading.4 Reading as a means of constructing a
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worldview and changing thinking is apparent in over half the basic writers’ texts and all of the graduate students’. While most of the writers see this influence as a positive aspect of their discursive interactions, some now wish they could escape it. Even very early reading experiences have the power to become part of the “reality” separate from the text as Mary’s autobiography’s attests. Mary, like all the graduate students except one, read voraciously throughout her life. The appeal of these early readings was the new worlds they presented, yet these worlds did not remain textual. Mary remarks, “as I read these books, even my own surroundings became suffused with the potential for the fantastic.” Especially in a school context, the language and content of these books work their way into the lives and selves of the writers. As Patty puts it, texts, especially the Aenid, are “part of me for life.” Janet begins her essay with the statement that reading and writing “have shaped my identity.” Reading becomes not only an activity and an exercise in escapism, but, as Rich depicts it, “a journey, a following in others’ words,” that, especially in school contexts, leads to different ways of thinking. John portrays his favorite book, Dune, as something he loved not so much for the content but more for “the complexity it brought to my view of the world and people in general.” The examples abound in the texts: books bringing a new perspective, books creating an identity, quotes becoming the manifestos by which people define their lives, and so on. In all these discussions, however, one image remains—that of taking in a text from the outside in such a way that it shapes thinking and perspective so that the writers of these autobiographies become part of the text. The text and the self become conflated in a single space. This image of “taking in” a discourse is nowhere more poignant than in the recurring images of eating: Swati “devours books,” while Margaret’s books are “comfort food” that she also “devoured.” The perspective, knowledge, and changes gained through these books are viewed predominantly as a positive aspect of literacy because these changes bring about power in terms of school and societal respect and acceptance. Owning books becomes one physical symbol of this status. Rajiv wept when his mother gave half his books to charity when he was an early adolescent; Margaret feels her books are “owed to her” because she has read them. Lori perhaps best depicts the cultural power embodied in texts when she calls libraries “the last strongholds of civilization.” Although the influence of schooled reading (most of the comments on “books” are those assigned by school) gains the reader power and status, academic discourse’s power to influence the students in this way is not always depicted positively. A handful of texts lament this power because it has forced them to see the world in ways they no longer find adequate. Not surprisingly, most of the autobiographies expressing this frustration come from graduate students. Perhaps for the first time, their divided relationship with academic discourse has forced them to reflect on the results of their identification with schooled texts that had served them so well in the past. These writers’ current
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circumstances now allow them to perceive not only the influence of schooled reading but also their frustration with worldviews they now find difficult to escape. For example, Kim recounts how her assumption of male privilege continued up until her second stint in graduate school when she was in her midthirties. Although, as an undergraduate, she was the one who desired to be a reader and writer, she explains that during this time she allowed only men to tell her what to read and write. She links this to reading assigned texts that place males in dominant positions. As a result, she sought out only male teachers. Through these experiences with schooled texts and male teachers, she inherited a “flawed sense of my female self ” that further “translated into a flawed perspective of other women.” Latisha implies that she has internalized not only the perspective of texts but also their linguistic structures. As she becomes aware of these structures’ effects, she comes to resent this influence on her speaking. In a seemingly innocuous reference, Latisha reports her frustration at the basal readers she absorbed as a child because she now feels that sentences like “Dick and Jane played” caused her, and her fellow students, to “begin talking like robots.” The frustration of trying to escape the perspectives gained from schooled reading comes out most clearly in Tricia’s text. Like many young women, Tricia spent much of her early years reading romance novels, Nancy Drew mysteries and Cherry Ames chronicles, the latter two being encouraged as “outside” reading in elementary school. Her reply to her own question of “was all this reading beneficial to me?” is telling in that it expresses the tension between the power she gains through reading and a perspective with which she is not entirely happy. “I know I can attribute my strong verbal skills to it,” she writes, “but at the same time I certainly internalized a highly romanticized world view—swallowed it hook, line, and sinker, and went back for more. And as much as I’ve grown since then, vestiges of the romanticism still lurk insidiously somewhere and surprise me.” The “insidious” effect of this immersion in an exterior discourse is what frustrates all these writers. Tricia, like Kim, is most uncomfortable about the fact that she does not know how many of these views she no longer accepts are still lurking around to surface in yet unrealized manifestations.5 Despite its exteriority, academic discourse in all these examples is capable of becoming inextricably a part of the autobiography writers’ perspectives, even to the extent of an influence of which they may not be aware. Although the majority of the examples come from reading, I do not take this as an indication that writing is not similarly involved in these processes. Instead, reading, as a literate act ostensibly focused on the reception of texts, declares itself more obviously as an act of interiorization. Given the ideological belief in their own “voices” and the sanctity of “opinion” in our culture, it is not surprising that we do not find more direct links to textual production (an act they presumably control) as an influence on identity. While not all the writers feel such internalization has had negative results, they all speak to its reality. Perhaps the most intriguing examples of internalizing
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academic discourse, however, don’t come from specific references to reading and writing. Instead, they are invoked through metaphoric images that describe how an exterior discourse can shape, change, and become a part of the writer. For example, Ben describes people as “sponges soaking up the knowledge about the world around us.” School and teaching, particularly English classes, “form” a student “just like . . . a sculpture.” When “we start out in our first years of school, all we are is a ball of clay. . . . Hopefully when we graduate from college we will be an outstanding work of art.” The clay itself has substance but no form. It exists to be molded by an exterior force into a form with cultural capital (art) that did not exist before. Even the notion of a substance that makes up the self apart from discourse begins to fade in Margaret’s startlingly poetic images of the way in which an exterior language acts upon her. Margaret writes that “everything, including my reading and writing, seems to happen to me from somewhere outside. I always picture ‘me’ as a form— bluish with speckles, within a body, not really connected.” Margaret’s text invokes an image of a fluid, almost gaseous, form for the self shaped by discourse, a self that is enclosed only by skin. On the other hand, Rich describes a self tied to a physical body, but it is not this self that interacts with discourse. Instead, the noncorporeal self exists only in relation to outside discourses. “As long as I can remember I’ve strained to hear other people’s voices, to take in words wholesale—and say them back. Other people’s words are like drugs to me, an ecstasy in the old sense of the term, an out-of-body experience” (my emphasis). Seen in the context of the rest of his autobiography, we can discern that Rich’s references to “voices” are those of his teachers’ and assigned texts. Later in the autobiography, Rich describes how he’d rather take on the voices of authoritative texts than use his own: Most significant to me now is the fact that early on I couldn’t make this artificial distinction between other people’s voices and my own: without any sense of wrongdoing I was for years a felonious plagiarist. In fifth grade, I wrote long reports on dinosaurs and on monster movies that I invariably got As on. . . . In writing about Tyrannosaurus Rex, for example, I’d go to one of my several dinosaur books and transcribe sentences piecemeal—not because I couldn’t come up with my own words but simply because I liked the feel of those book words.
Taking on “those book words” encouraged Rich to “forge for myself a like voice.” He reports that now, as a graduate student, “the words I speak come from all these voices, and they are me” (my emphasis). Taking in those voices was once an “out-of-body experience,” but now such an exterior discourse is inseparable from Rich’s definition of himself as a language user. Rich’s text in many ways sums up the effects of academic discourse’s influence that most of the writers only imply. He provides the clearest example of how academic discourse not only influences thinking, but also becomes internal-
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ized in such a way that it is inseparable from those who speak its language. Rich has clearly taken in an exterior discourse and made it his, the necessary result of becoming a speaking subject of the discourse: Its language and its attendant epistemology and ideology have become his own. Becoming a speaking subject, autobiographies like Rich’s suggest, inevitably leads to interiorizing academic discourse in such a way that its perspective becomes the students’ own. While such a merging of discourse and “self ” is referred to only as a fact of the past, or, for some of the writers, a fear in the present, this time line makes perfect sense. Because the writers operated as speaking subjects within academic discourse in the past (i.e., in their identification with it), the discourse was positioned in such a way that interiorization could take place. Given the significant benefits subjectification might bring about, it is no surprise that students might easily become subjects of the discourse. What is more surprising is the lasting effect on identity the autobiographies point to in their pasts, implying that identifications do not always function as “temporary attachments” or as fluidly as many of our theories presume. Of course, identity must function such that not all attachments can be mutable and under constant change—otherwise our presumptions about self would constantly be under scrutiny. Yet, what makes us retain and more firmly identify with some subject positions rather than others? Why does accessing the power of academic discourse also seem to influence identity formation in seemingly permanent ways? It is this move from division to identification that we need to understand more clearly if we are to assess the effect academic discourse has on identity formation and the presumed fluidity of the subject by which we construct our theories of agency.
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interchapter two : Learning My Class
Growing up in the urban center of an industrial city, I can say with certainty being “classed” was not something we thought much about. My family assumed, like so many American families, that we were simply on the lower end of the middle class, that great lump that included for us everyone not on welfare or without a trust fund. As a grammar school student, I was vaguely aware of hierarchies in our neighborhood school. I knew, for example, that I was one of only two in my class who brown-bagged it rather than receiving my meal from the free lunch program. I vaguely remember references to how “proud” my parents were that I chose to befriend other “working” children, especially Bridget, the local cop’s daughter, rather than the welfare families’ kids. In the hierarchy of our neighborhood, I was on “top,” subject to ridicule by the other children only because my brother and I had high grades, or the infrequent jokes by neighbors about my grandmother’s Quebecois accent and befuddlement that we called her “memere.” Given my local context, a neighborhood where factory workers, service workers, and welfare recipients mixed, I had little sense that within larger society my family was marked as somehow different. The few indications of this marking I received came in confusing forms: my father’s constant search for better opportunities, the pediatrician’s confusion when my mother explained that we couldn’t wait past five o’clock for an appointment since we had to catch the bus, my parents’ worry about the vacant factories we had to pass while walking to catechism at the local church, or the “difference” between the bawdy jokes and volatile arguments that characterized our family discourse and the milder conversations of the Brady Bunch. Even while I was ignorant of how class was already marking my consciousness, a few family admonitions about how to act publicly struck me as odd. We were not to discuss money outside the family. If it came up, we should avoid telling teachers whether our parents graduated from high school (they didn’t). Finally, as proud as my parents were of the work they did, it was made clear almost from birth that my brother and I were expected to “do better.” Particularly for my brother, as oldest son, college was not a choice but a presumed reality. It was once I had left the comfortable confines of my neighborhood and ventured to the large urban schools for junior high and high school that my class
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was made obvious to me. Although some hint that I would be marked “different” in these contexts should have come through the fact that none of my grammar school classmates had been tracked into honors with me, I assumed with the arrogance of an eleven-year-old, replete with belief in my own individual autonomy, that my tracking was simply a result of how much “smarter” I was than my classmates. My new classmates’ actions—almost exclusively white, and almost all from middle- to upper-class homes—provided, not surprisingly, the first glimpses that I was somehow Other. Assigned a group geography project in seventh grade, I invited Lucy, one of my group members, home to complete the project. Although I was able to dismiss the growing dismay on her face as we walked from school to my neighborhood as a personality quirk, Lucy’s declarations to the rest of my group members that I lived in a “ghetto” were impossible to ignore. My confusion at her statement is telling: a ghetto, I assumed, was where Jimmy Walker lived on Good Times. Since we didn’t live in a high-rise in Chicago, how could we live in a ghetto? We didn’t, of course, but Lucy had no other way of characterizing a row of three-deckers on a major urban street, a stone’s throw from a cemetery, the public transportation garage, a car wash, and a glass factory. Lucy’s reaction never made me ashamed, as it was obviously intended to, but it did force me to realize what “class” truly meant once I ventured beyond my neighborhood. This dawning awareness of class compelled many of my grammar school classmates to react oppositionally. They opted out of the educational imperative to be successful and defined themselves quickly as “troublemakers with no interest in school.” By eighth grade, they could be clearly distinguished from others as a group called the “Edgies,” a gang name coined from the name of our grammar school. (Not surprisingly, none of the Edgies that I know of graduated from high school.) My reaction, and that of some others like Bridget, was instead to hide our backgrounds from the derisive gaze of school and peers. Never again did I invite a classmate home unless I had been to her house first or had come to trust her. I threw myself into school, maintaining the “honors” status that ensured my teachers did not identify me as an Edgie. When Mr. Rodgers happened to ask one day if anyone in our class was an Edgie, I tentatively raised my hand only to hear his shock and surprise: I didn’t, in his words, look or act like one. I never openly admitted it again. When asked in art class to include on our “index information cards” our fathers’ place of employment, I left it blank, taking the detention that went with my refusal to fill it in when directly asked rather than admit that my father was recently unemployed, the only six-month period in my life when I remember him not working. My entire life my father had worked two or more jobs, working ten to fifteen hour days. When he bought his own business—a bar and deli—the long hours got even longer. I had learned from my father a tenet I still hold dear: The measure of a man is how hard he works. There was no way I was going to expose this hardworking man to the school’s gaze just to satisfy some art teacher’s demands!
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In junior high, I resisted somewhat, despite the new caution I had learned, the incitement to erase in public forums, whenever possible, any marking of class. My friends continued to be “from the neighborhood” or other neighborhoods like it; I followed the fashion trend of army pants and work boots that arose among the Edgies and other working-class kids. By the time I reached high school, most of my token forms of resistance were gone. Having petitioned for special permission for me to attend the “rich” public high school rather than the one I was districted for, my parents assumed they were making a decision with my best future interests in mind. For me, the division between the classes in this new school was even more obvious: A clear line was drawn early on between those of us who lived on the “wrong side of the tracks,” a metaphor only in that tracks were not the separating line, but Park Avenue. Again, tracked into honors classes, I was one of the few students not from the west side of Park Avenue and became more and more determined to demonstrate that I was as “good as” the other honors students. Although I had no conscious awareness of this as a decision at the time, it is obvious in retrospect as I changed my fashion—searching the stores with my mother endlessly for “Izod” clones (tigers instead of alligators) and yoke sweaters made of polyester blends rather than Northern Isle—and my extracurricular activities, joining the Drama Club, the newspaper, and Latin club rather than cheerleading. Between these three clubs, school, and my part-time job (I started working at fourteen), I had less free time than my classmates but I was sure never to mention this fact in those honors classes. The work ethic so ingrained during my early years, I would recognize later, was one of my greatest strengths. Speaking the value of that ethic at this age, however, seemed impossible. At this point in my life, the joy I experienced through work—and the consumptive power it gave me to buy new clothes and save for college—only reminded me that I didn’t think or act like those around me. My only token resistance in high school was in my choice of friends; I held on to those from junior high like lifelines. As resistance goes, however, it was an unconscious move; I simply couldn’t connect with most of my honor student classmates in the same way: another, constant reminder of my “difference.”
chapter three
Turning Ourselves into Subjects: Identification, Power, and Desire
The customary model for understanding this process goes as follows: power imposes itself on us, and weakened by its force, we come to internalize or accept its terms. What such an account fails to note, however, is that the “we” who accept such terms are fundamentally dependent on those terms for “our” existence. —Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power IF WE RETURN TO HALL’S DEFINITION of identity, I have thus far only
sketched a partial picture of discourse’s role in identity construction. Recall that identity, in this formulation, points to both the “discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses” and “the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects that can be ‘spoken’” (“Who?” 5–6). In chapter 2 we began to get a partial picture of the discourse’s attempt at interpellation; however, we still know little about the processes by which identification occurs. Only by looking more closely at how we come to “suture” such positions through a deliberate act of identity construction might we understand the role academic discourse plays in constructing identities and, perhaps, influencing the other subject positions our students hold dear. Specifically, we must ask whether identifying with academic discourse necessarily means students have no agency over the influence such positions might have on their constitution of self. After all, it is almost a maxim of poststructuralist and cultural theory that writing contexts are heterogeneous and, as such, offer “a range of possibilities for self-hood” (Clark and Ivanic 138). If writing contexts offer such multiple possibilities, why do the students seemingly choose identifications with academic discourse? The key to this question, I contend, is caught up in how the subject, herself, participates in identifying with the discourse through her interactions as body in the material realms of culture. This question, in short, is inevitably one about
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power. As Romy Clark and Roz Ivanic assert, there may be a range of possibilities available in any writing context, but “there are also patterns of privileging among them” (138). The literacy autobiographies illustrate how such privileging emerges from academic discourse’s connection to other institutions, discourses, and the material reality of economics in their authors’ lived experience of culture. What the literacy autobiographies offer, that is, is a way of understanding the central role the subject, herself, plays in constructing identifications with academic discourse and why she willingly invests in the reformulation of consciousness such identifications orchestrate. Understanding our own role in subjectification, the autobiographies suggest, is inseparable from how the materialdiscursive realms of culture construct desire for academic discourse. We invest, quite simply, because we want to. In this way, desire is the locus around which the relations among the discursive and material realms of culture circulate and, thus, how their effects on identity construction in academic discourse might be clarified. Desire is typically prefigured through psychoanalytic discourses that define it as the perpetual attempt to fill a “lack” that can never be fulfilled, a desire for the wholeness we once felt when we inhabited our mothers’ bodies. Hence, desire is imagined as an ahistorical process of ego formation embedded in libidinal economies. Yet, desire cannot be separated from the material conditions in which it is constructed. Rather, we learn to desire in specific social conditions as a way of ensuring our status as social agents within particular historical realities. As Bradley Macdonald has recently argued, the concept of desire “can no longer be articulated as an abstract process wedded to the unfolding and realization of selfconsciousness; rather, desire must be seen as the socially and historically embedded way in which sensuous beings [i.e., bodies] strive to make their world, aspiring toward plenitude and singularity” (24). Desire is learned both through the body’s experiences in the social real and through the multiple cultural discourses that provide meaning to those material interactions. In explaining why students seek out identifications with academic discourse through the concept of desire constructed in the material-discursive realms of culture, I attempt to highlight the more material elements of the discursive process under examination here. It is only through examining our immersion in the social real—both materially and discursively—that we come to see how discourses “hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses” and invite us to take on these positions as part of our identity formation. Students, as citizens of a particular society, already come to us with a thorough understanding of—and abiding belief in—the larger cultural ideologies that give meaning to everyday life, ideologies in which academic discourse, too, is immersed. In the autobiographies, the beliefs in autonomy, success, and the route to material gain as laid out in our culture persuasively incite students to internalize subject positions, ultimately constructing identity in accordance with the discourse. Such subjectification is actively sought out through a desire for the
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agency the discourse provides the subject as a producer of language in control of her cultural interactions, and for schooled literacy’s ability to signify a body appropriately immersed in capitalist economies. Not yet an indictment of agency resting in our multiplicity, such a picture does indicate that power plays a central role in how we constitute that subjectivity, suggesting that academic discourse influences identity construction more significantly than most composition pedagogies usually acknowledge. TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF, OR DESPERATELY SEEKING OUR OWN SUBJECTIFICATION
While Foucault concentrated predominantly on technologies of power throughout most of his life, in his later work he became more interested in the role humans play in the power of discourse to act upon them. In The Use of Pleasure, for example, Foucault self-consciously admits to this change in his project, describing his new interest as a genealogy of how the self constitutes itself as subject (11). This new project, and how Foucault connects it to his earlier work on power, can illuminate much about how we not only internalize subject positions but also seek them out and willingly participate in our own subjectification. As Hall explains, “the notion that an effective suturing of the subject to a subject-position requires, not only that the subject is ‘hailed’, but that the subject invests in the position, means that suturing has to be thought of as an articulation, rather than a one-sided process” (“Who,” original emphasis, 6). Acknowledging our role in subjectification—particularly our desire for such subjectification—has significant implications for the potential influence such positions might hold for our own identity construction. In his last seminar before his death, Foucault gives a name to his new project, technologies of the self, the means by which “a human being turns him or herself into a subject” (“The Subject” 208). Acknowledging that his primary motivation has been to describe “the organization of knowledge with respect to both domination and the self,” he now admits, “perhaps I’ve insisted too much on the technology of domination and power” (“Technologies” 18, 19). Despite Foucault’s declaration of a major shift in emphasis, technologies of the self are, not surprisingly, inextricable from technologies of power. He asserts that four technologies exist that rely on each other in order for discursive subjects to be produced: (1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in
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Each of these technologies, and their multiple interrelations, “implies certain modes of and modification of individuals, not only in the obvious sense of acquiring certain skills but also in the sense of acquiring certain attitudes” (“Technologies” 18). The production of “certain attitudes,” my main concern here, is conducted through the interplay of technologies of power and self, while technologies of production and sign systems—in their connections to the social real—serve as the necessary preconditions through which the former can exert influence. In these connections, the power imbued within a given discourse is connected to the forms of material power it can accord the discourse’s subjects. Recall the literacy autobiographies’ implicit assertions that filling enunciative modalities of academic discourse accorded their authors power civically (labels of “literate”; achieving public voice), institutionally (grades on papers; exams), and socially (influence with the “rich kids”). Because of its material benefits, academic discourse is sought after as a route to power. Its technology of power is supported both by its connections to other discourses and its claim to certain valued ways of knowing in our society. The students, thus, seek out such validation and the benefits it can accord, as we will see, by willingly engaging in “turning themselves into subjects”; in fact, they actively seek out such subjectification. The writers’ own desire “to attain a certain state of happiness” becomes the key mechanism of such a technology of self. Technologies of self, thus, work within a complex interplay of material and discursive cultural relations. The choice of technology as a primary term is essential here. A technology is a process or means by which something—in this case, discursive subjects—is produced, yet the metaphor simultaneously suggests that the power to institute such a technology is inseparable from materiality. Public and institutional rhetorics convince us that pursuing certain subject positions is, indeed, to pursue “happiness.” Such discourses further construct desire through their interrelationships with the material conditions they help create and support. The interactions of discursive reality (our languages for understanding experience) and material experience (our physical and social interactions in everyday life) work to create desire both as a conscious act of mind and a reactive sense of body that receives pleasure through this process of subjectification. Finally, subjectification is orchestrated through the material artifact of language, how it is presumed to signify materially, and in the desire for ontological Being as it is prefigured within our historical moment. In this way, discursive, material, and psychoanalytical processes produce a desire for subjectification within academic discourse, convincing us that our “choices” for identity construction are best orchestrated in favor of such socially specific desires.
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THE WILL TO KNOWLEDGE AND DISCURSIVELY INSCRIBED DESIRE: SEEKING OUT SUBJECT POSITIONS WITHIN INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
How we come to “turn ourselves into subjects” begins with a desire to occupy certain subject positions rather than others. Part of the way this desire is created is through our public and institutional rhetorics where we learn how to privilege in “appropriate” ways. Yet, such rhetorics work not simply as an imposition of ideology that would imprison consciousness; rather, such rhetorics function so well because they present themselves as a conscious choice in favor of liberation rather than subjugation. As Jana Sawicki has noted, Foucault’s entire project could be described as writing histories that show how traditional emancipatory theories have been blind to their own dominating tendencies (97). The traditional liberatory rhetoric surrounding education in the United States almost begs for an analysis that uncovers how academic discourse’s claims to liberation might also produce a desire for precisely the kinds of subjectification the literacy autobiographies demonstrated in the previous chapter. The role desire might play in how one seeks out identification is best illustrated in Foucault’s description of what a shift from archaeology (technologies of power) to genealogies (technologies of self) might lead us to: an analysis of “the practices by which individuals were led to focus their attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves as subjects of desire, bringing into play between themselves and themselves a certain relationship that allows them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being . . . in short, with this genealogy the idea was to investigate how individuals were led to practice, on themselves and on others, a hermeneutics of desire. . . .” (Use of Pleasure, my emphasis 5). What might be viewed by students as the “discovery of the truth of their being” in academic discourse—a route to their own agency—seems inextricable from the way our culture manufactures a “hermeneutics of desire” in its liberatory rhetoric about schooling. If students want “good paying” jobs, a self-satisfying career, or even to be seen as capable thinkers, they are led to believe that school is the only acceptable route to these ends. They are told this continually by parents, who learn it in turn from their parents, advice on parenting, and the apparent success accorded those educationally successful in the social real. Political commentators, journalists, and politicians take up this unspoken premise constantly in their cries to improve the state of our schools through recent initiatives for statewide school testing, “grading” of schools, vouchers, and the abolishment of bilingual programs. Any given day one can hear a talk radio host, read a news story, or watch CNN and hear testaments to the need for school improvement precisely because not doing so affects the state of our economy and our ability to compete with other countries (recall all the comparisons of U.S. and Japanese school systems in the 1980s). Failing schools further keep the poor from having opportunities
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to move up the ladder of success and ensure continuing inequities for people of color, immigrants, the poor. In short, the failure of schools equates with economic recessions, the problems of our inner cities, the shrinking of the middle class, and the pervasiveness of racism in the public sphere. This belief disperses itself endlessly by a proliferation of signs in media, politics, and education, becoming inextricably linked to lived experience in U.S. culture. Its permeation of multiple cultural spheres accounts, in fact, for its seeming imperviousness to change as seen in how resiliently this myth alters through progressive change after progressive change in education. With such a continual bombardment of messages, it is no surprise that our students, as well, would believe unerringly in the power of schools to ensure economic success. This link between economics, liberation, and schooling is equally embedded in its literate practices. The function of schools to support the myth of class mobility in the United States is continually tied to literacy now and at many points in history. As John Trimbur has argued, literacy crises throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries almost always seem to emerge precisely when concerns about class distinctions, and middle-class anxieties about loss of status, become central. Such anxieties become inseparable from a concern for literacy in progressive movements that “represent schooled literacy as a means of ameliorating class antagonisms, equalizing economic opportunity, and ensuring social cohesion and political integration” (“Literacy” 286). Harvey Graff probably denotes this move most clearly in his elucidation of the literacy myth, the presumption that literacy will automatically grant economic gain and civic participation. In its most current articulation, the literacy myth now becomes aligned with technology in the more recent calls for, and monetary investment in, “technological literacy.” Yet, focusing our attention on technological literacy only reinstantiates the literacy myth even more deeply. Although the specificities of literacy’s liberatory promises to ensure the material success of its subjects might permutate with changes in history, Cynthia Selfe shows how such a myth remains as pervasive as ever at the beginning of the twenty-first century by becoming linked to technology in ways supported by government initiatives, business and corporate grants, and parenting advice in the media. In these connections among schooling, literacy, and economics, we begin to see how discursivity and materiality might interact. While the myth that schooling equals economic success disperses into multiple meanings aligned with some of the worst aspects of our society—jingoistic nationalism, racism, the unequal distribution of wealth—what holds its multiple meanings together is its invocation of the capitalist credo: competition, class mobility, the accumulation of capital, and the need for a continually expanding economy. Such a link with capitalism, in fact, is perhaps what allows the liberatory rhetoric of school to function so well within a technology of power, despite evidence that many of its claims, for the majority of citizens, are false. Although U.S. society might be seen as proliferating an incredible diversity of values, ways of knowing, and
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actions in the world, the key belief that arguably holds us together is a trust in postindustrial capitalism. Regardless of race, creed, ethnicity, class, gender, or political affiliation, faith in capitalist processes (even for those of us who might critique it while comfortably ensconced in our middle-class homes and jobs) has seemingly become the mark of the U.S. citizen. We count on it to solve not only our own social problems but also those of international politics; the spread of capitalism has come to be seen as synonymous with the spread of democracy. The capitalist imperative to produce and consume becomes linked with multiple discourses of democracy, nationalism, citizenship, meritocracy, and economics. Within such a confluence of discourses, schooling remains firmly entrenched as the institution responsible for ensuring the perpetuation of opportunity on which capitalism relies to assure us of our continuing, presumably upward, movement within the hierarchies it imposes. Recognizing the central role capitalism plays in a multiplicity of discourses also allows us to better connect the structural and local conditions in which our students operate. While the local may never result in such predictable outcomes, the structural domination of economic systems plays a crucial role in the social real. Although Foucault allows us to connect power, institutions, and material conditions through his understanding of discourse, he neglects the more structural effects of power on identity. Peter McLaren’s insight into how a more orthodox Marxist understanding might temper the poststructural is instructive here: “While domination has a logic without design [i.e., no overt intentionality or causality] in its sign systems and social practices, it does operate through overdetermined structures” (Predatory 136–37). Not surprisingly, academic discourse becomes embedded in such structural relations through its institutional role in culture. Academic discourse achieves its influence by delimiting the parameters of what can be known, the processes by which knowledge is created, who can speak authoritatively of that knowledge, and in what terms such knowledge can be spoken (written). While any discourse might be distinguishable on these terms, academic discourse’s embodiment in a social institution accords it a cultural value only such a societal status might grant. Its rhetoric of liberation can propagate endlessly precisely because its institutional discourse functions both to support other cultural discourses and to ensure us that it functions according to culture’s dictates. That the academic institution, particularly in recent times, is equally subject to the dictates of capitalism and the imperative to perform its function correctly cannot be ignored. (Witness the arguments for school testing and the need for accountability in our public universities, all under the rubric of what employers “want” from graduates.) In this way, academic discourse’s power relies on its ability to control the production of valued knowledge and forms of literacy in our society in the particular ways granted by other institutions. If it performs in accordance with these dictates, schooling retains its privileged status as the “space” of knowledge production and the arbiter of economic success for its citizens through its certification of who can be said to “know.”
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The cultural currency of such knowledge and literate abilities allows academic discourse to produce a concomitant will or desire to gain that knowledge. This will to knowledge encourages us to “choose” to pursue success through the route prescribed by the discourse: its institution. As such, the institution becomes that which embodies academic discourse’s will to knowledge, and through knowledge, material power. Foucault explains this connection between a discourse’s will to knowledge and the institution by asserting that such a will is orchestrated through the formation’s institutional embodiment. The will to knowledge relies on the institution’s “support and distribution” (“Discourse” 219). The institution, in this case school or the academy, organizes the power relations of its discourse with that of other discursive formations. As such, the institution is seen as the venue by which students can gain the knowledge that other societal discourses (i.e., economics, government, religion, etc.) deem important and necessary. The will to knowledge, then, is not simply the students’ desire to gain the type of knowledge academic discourse produces, although for some students it might be. In its links to other discursive formations, academic discourse creates a will to knowledge because it is the only way to achieve success in these other realms. It is precisely this connection that we see in the literacy autobiographies. Although the students are writing in four different classes, with pedagogies focused on differing theories of identity and culture (from community-based pedagogies to more poststructural concepts of identity), they overwhelmingly describe the benefits of using schooled language in economic terms. In short, the local conditions of the classroom seem to have little effect on how the students perceive the cultural currency of academic discourse, and thus their desire to identify with it. The literacy autobiographies evince a clear will to knowledge in precisely the terms our cultural rhetoric lays out: schooling = economic success. The (student) writers seek facility with schooled language, that is, because of the power such cultural capital will grant them economically and civically: a way of ensuring both their futures and the approval of current authorities in their lives. The literacy autobiographies express frustration about the distant, exterior, and inaccessible nature of academic discourse because their authors feel such power is being withheld from them; thus, they seek to return to an identified relationship with the discourse in order to access this power. The chief characteristic of this desire is the writers’ willingness to learn the language of the academy. In this way, the writers demonstrate their intuitions about academic discourse’s will to knowledge (a technology of power), while placing the ability to access the power of academic discourse in its language and literacy practices (a technology of sign systems). Further, such practices are presumed to ensure material success and happiness (a technology of self ) through the ability to produce in a capitalist economy (a technology of production). In the autobiographies, such desire is closely linked to the status identifying with academic discourse grants one in realms beyond the academy to negotiate
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social relations. The graduate students’ texts articulate this connection most clearly since they have already experienced many of the rewards this status can embody. Holly, for example, describes her ostracized status within social circles because of what she labels her “geek” status, a result of her success in academics. She does not, however, ever remember wanting to give up this position because she wanted the approval of authority (defined as her mother and teachers). The approval of authorities (i.e., their cultural capital within the institutions of school and family) outweighs any social deficit among her peers. In contrast, Janet attributes her status with her cohort to her literacy. Her ability to write won her the respect of her classmates and a place on the senior committee. Her classmates assumed her writing ability would hold them in good stead because Janet “would be able to generate reports to our principal that would be so clever they would help us squeeze our way around some of the rules and regulations about planning events.” Social acceptance, in this case, relies on how literacy allows Janet to manipulate institutional authority. In both cases, Holly’s and Janet’s “literate” labels allow them to win the approval of others and to move up in their estimation, that is, to increase their cultural capital in social relations. The value schooled language confers is also described in more explicitly economic terms. Such economic benefits, in fact, seem to undergird the students’ ability to refigure social relations. The way schooled language ability can lead to a valued position in society is probably nowhere more clearly linked to capitalism than in the references to academics as competition made by half the male graduate students. Such continual references to competition metaphorically invoke a link between capitalist values and the power conferred by schooled literacy’s exchange value. For example, Rich extends the ability to “win” in school to success in the business world by describing the winners of reading competitions as “toting a great big pile of books to add to their already massive resumes” (my emphasis). Both John and Rich refer to their schooling as a career throughout their texts. Mark, upon his return to college after failing his first semester, decided almost immediately to pursue a graduate degree because he wanted the power that the professors he held in “awe” had: “I realized that I wanted to command such power over books, ideas, and students.” In the most explicitly economic connection, Janet comments on how her schooled literacy was the primary factor in her receiving a desirable position at a large insurance company after she graduated from college. She further attributes her subsequent promotions to being knowledgeable about school language. The basic writers also seem to intuit the relationship between their “resumes” and success with academic discourse; however, the status given through success with the discourse is something that they, like Mark, want to achieve because of the power it will grant them in the future. As opposed to the few (seven) basic writers who currently see their schooled language as a signifier of power in realms other than school, twenty-two autobiographies comment on the ability to use schooled language as a way of gaining power and achieving respect
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and status within society. As Spiro puts it, “being able to read and write are two very important things in life. You can’t be active in society without them.” Although the inability to use schooled language in effective ways could keep the writers from being active in and functional members of society, schooled language will help them attain the status they desire because schooled literacy, as Dan acknowledges, creates “language bosses,” a position he would like to find himself in one day. Inherent in Dan’s terminology of “boss” is an image of the status schooled literacy confers, according him power over people and within an economic system. Similarly, Diane realizes that she does not yet use “proper English,” but she appreciates the “corrections” made by her teachers in high school because she knew she had to “speak proper English if I expected to successful.” While the texts usually express how schooled language can impart a certain status within society overtly, such references are not always so clear. Swati’s text, for example, implies this link through imagery. She begins her text with a description of waiting for her mother to pick her up from school in their new Lexus. As she looks for her mother, “anxiously waiting to see the luxurious family car,” she is prompted to enter into a flashback of her arrival in the United States and her literacy history. It is the overt symbol of status and power—the Lexus—that is inextricably tied to her concern for school literacy. Desiring the power granted through academic discourse is not surprising considering the value our society puts on facility with schooled language, a value the students continue to perpetuate even in their current frustrations with their own writing, their institutional placement, and/or the intimidating language of professional English studies. Desiring to gain the knowledge the discourse can give them perpetuates the status of academic discourse as a route to liberation. Given the strength that the traditional belief in schooling as a means to economic success holds in our culture, it is no surprise that our students are likely to believe that school, indeed, is a means to material benefits in culture and to accept the meritocratic hierarchies it imposes. Even as composition’s rhetoric attempts to detach liberation from economics, multiple cultural discourses are there to ensure students that the formula of schooling = economic success = liberation operates powerfully in the social real. Students seek out the institutional discourses promised to provide economic security through cultural capital and, consequently, orchestrate their own subjectification. EM-BODYING DISCURSIVE DESIRE: ACADEMIC DISCOURSE’S POLITICS OF PLEASURE
That students might explain their desire for academic discourse in economic terms is certainly not surprising. The degree to which they do so, however, points to a desire for subjectification which functions more deeply than mere immersion in our culture’s rhetorics of schooling. Our students, to be sure, presume some degree of economic success to result from higher education, but
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they just as often admit that they know a college degree does not correlate with employment. Given how clearly our students can articulate the falseness of the schooling = economic success equation, we must ask why material conditions do not impact the way desire for academic discourse is expressed in the literacy autobiographies. What I suggest here is that the force of such a desire operates according to more than a discursive logic, and thus is not easily resisted. Instead, desire operates on both the discursive construction of thought and the bodily experience of culture as physical beings subject to both the pleasure of consumption and the oppressive effects of power on the material conditions of one’s life. Desire functions, that is, not only through effects of the mind (the connection between language and thought) but also according to the ways such discourses are “enfleshed” as part of the body’s experience of the social real. The realm of identity politics is both rhetorical and real. The “reality” of capital is, on the simplest level, an unavoidable fact of social being in U.S. culture. Our students live in a world in which poverty equates with oppression of body (homelessness, prison, starvation, poor or nonexistent health care), welfare has been gutted, and job opportunities without education become fewer and fewer. Although they know a college degree does not necessarily mean high-paying employment, they see the devaluation of the poor and working classes on a daily basis. In such a world, choosing to opt out of the capitalist credo to produce is seemingly to choose oppression. As Peter McLaren and Ramin Farahmandpur so provocatively put it, within such a world, “capitalist hegemony digs its bony talons into the structure of subjectivity itself ” as “traditionally secure factory work is replaced by the feckless insecurity of McJobs, as the disadvantaged are cast about in the icy wind of world commodity price fluctuations, as the comprador elite expands its power base in the financial precincts of the postmodern necropolis, and as the White House redecorates itself in the forms-fits-function architectonic of neo-liberalism” (84). Capitalism permeates every aspect of life in U.S. society as subjectivity becomes linked to economic status and the power to consume. As such, the persuasiveness of the economics = liberation equation does not operate only by threatening physical well-being. Instead, capitalism digs its talons into the body much more insidiously by becoming connected to desire and, through desire, pleasure. In a post-Fordist version of capital, we may have disconnected desire from “the production of labor per se,” but pleasure may still be seen as “the affective signification of that striving” toward capitalist desire (Macdonald 23). Ensuring one’s pleasure translates to attaining the capital necessary to purchase the quality of life and material goods through which pleasure is defined. Connecting subjectification to pleasure also allows us to examine how desire for subjectification is more than an imposition of ideology; instead, it is embedded in the material conditions one seeks to control and the affective investments one makes in living culture in particular ways.
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identity matters Ursula Kelly makes these connections clearly: The instability of the psyche . . . is best marked in the displacement of desire onto unattainable fantasies of wholeness and satisfaction accessed through the social. In this sense, the social acts pedagogically in that it proffers the illusion of satisfaction while banking on inevitable absence and dissatisfaction, and in its own processes, offers subject positions with which to identify and from which subjects may feel in control of desire—the materialization of the illusion. (33)
Desire, in this way, still refers to lack in the more psychoanalytic sense, but lack refigured through modes of production and consumption over which we can presume control. The ability to consume becomes inextricably linked to maintaining autonomy. The cultural capital gained through a body that signifies certain literate abilities allows students a certain control over their material conditions: their status with others increases, as Janet tells us, allowing for more favorable social relations; their power to produce economically is proffered through the promise of jobs; their influence over others accords them power in social relations by proving to the “rich kids” they are of equal ability; their ability to own the right kinds of goods—Swati’s invocation of the Lexus—accords them pleasure by satisfying consumptive desire. By “turning ourselves into subjects,” the writers imply that we can, through the economic status and cultural capital such a discourse might grant us, better control our ability to consume, our pleasure, and even the construction of our subjectivity. Controlling subjectivity becomes inextricable from “completing” subjectivity, from fulfilling the lack that undergirds the desires the students express in economic terms. As McLaren asserts, “capitalism engenders a socially constructed dialectics of desire—a libidinal economy of sorts—in which fantasy is mobilized in order to search for a substitute for a ‘lack,’ that is, to discover a material object to substitute for a mythical object we lack ‘in reality’ and which we feel we need to complete our subjectivity” (Predatory, original emphasis, 71). In short, we activate both conscious and unconscious processes in favor of constructing our own subjectivity and take great pleasure in the acts of consumption by which we hope to “complete” that subjectivity. Material conditions help us specify the nature of this lack—the failure of body to signify in ways that allow one to control their social interactions, fulfill their need for consumer goods, and achieve the kinds of respect and status the social real accords only particular kinds of subjects. Simultaneously, discourses, such as the liberatory rhetoric of schooling, specify how this lack might be filled in accordance with the material dictates our bodies encounter daily. The pleasure we receive through efforts to fulfill such lack, particularly in consumptive practices, embeds desire firmly within affect as well as mind. Structures of affect—of feeling, of pleasure—operate at the level of the body and are rarely impacted by only discursive intervention. We may “say” we “know” that
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schooling need not lead to material success, but experience and affect are not necessarily impacted by an expression of reality. Affectively, we might still invest deeply in that which we claim to eschew. Elspeth Probyn’s distinction between kinds of experience is useful in highlighting this seeming disconnect between what we might be able to realize epistemologically (as an act of mind) and what we might do or how we live ontologically (as body). On the ontological level, experiences of and in a material world are experienced as “the felt facticity of material social being” (Sexing 21–22). The epistemological level, on the other hand, attempts to bridge the gap between the articulation of experience (how we know it and describe it to ourselves and others) and its lived facticity of feeling. As Probyn puts it, “at an ontological level, experience speaks of a disjuncture between the articulated and the lived aspects of the social and, at an epistemological level, experience impels analysis of the relations formulated between the articulated and the lived” (22). This disjuncture between experience as it is lived and as it is articulated points to a gap between how we might interpret and internalize experience. Like Raymond Williams’s elucidation of structures of feeling as a key aspect of cultural interactions, Probyn’s perspective acknowledges that identities, as they are lived in the social real, do not announce themselves as cultural in the same ways our attempts to make meaning of them do. We may recognize the potential falsehood of liberatory rhetorics yet still take great pleasure, and invest much energy, in subjectification processes that experientially seem to offer the best means of completing and controlling our subjectivity. We seek Foucault’s “state of happiness” through the pursuit of wholeness, mediated through consumptive practices, that may be epistemologically suspect yet ontologically satisfying to both self and social being. Such a disconnect can exist because desire for economic success is never solely about capital, as the literacy autobiographies attest. It is embedded in social relations that help us sustain not only our own sense of self but also our social investments with others. Subjectification is just as often activated in response to seeking “respect” from others (e.g., authorities, family) as it is merely for simple economic gain. Desire incites subjectification because we experience culture not discursively or ideologically but as peopled. As Paul Trembath argues, culture does not present itself as discourse, but instead bodies within culture serve “as the mediators of social events in place of the disembodied exteriority of culture” (133), making bodies the central “presence of cultural influence” (136). One of the features of existence, for Trembath, includes the body’s ability to sense, as Deleuze explains it in the double meaning of the word in the French, which “at once means ‘meaning’ and ‘the senses’” (137, original emphasis). Sensual activity, in this light, becomes a making of meaning through an act of signification but also an act of feeling, sensing, and being; in short, a structure of affect inseparable from meaning-making activity. What an attention to sensual relations and the body as the site of social mediation explains is how ideological relations are produced within bodies as well as between and among bodies in
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their affective relations to each other and the world. In short, the body becomes a locus of differentiation where active productive forces interact with reactive ideological ones. In this way, the body—replete with its corporeality and affective investments—“is not opposed to culture, a resistant throw-back to a natural past; it is itself a cultural, the cultural product . . . a site of social, political, cultural, and geographical inscriptions, production, or constitution” (Grosz 23). Body becomes the relay point where discursive relations and material conditions meet to construct desire for particular kinds of identities. McLaren perhaps best clarifies the relations among body, desire, discourse, and the material world most succinctly through his concept of enfleshment. Enfleshment refers to “the mutually constitutive (enfolding) of social structure and desire: the dialectical relationship between the material organization of interiority and the cultural forms and modes of materiality we inhabit subjectively” (Predatory 47). How discourse may incite the “organization of interiority” is inseparable from the bodies it interacts with and those bodies’ experiences in the social real. Discursively ordered subject positions, that is, are inhabited through acts of desire, body, affect, and experience of social relations, as well as through one’s social activity in learning to produce particular kinds of texts. In the autobiographies, this discursive material connection surfaces in how desire is constructed and enacted in favor of identification with academic discourse’s subject positions. ENACTING DESIRE: REWRITING IDENTIT Y WITHIN ACADEMIC DISCOURSE
The literacy autobiography writers also illustrate the consequences of such desire: willingly constructing identifications with academic discourse. Although the writers do not want a wholesale change in identity, they do accept the necessity of needing to alter their ways of thinking, speaking, and writing as the only way to pursue their choice of material success. In their descriptions of the “change” necessary to enact their desire to fulfill academic discourse’s subject positions, the students continually invoke images of control, suggesting that control over subjectivity may be precisely what is gained through rewriting identity within academic discourse. Such descriptions, I suspect, also indicate the workings of pleasure and affect that motivate such desire just as strongly as the more overtly expressed desire for economic success and cultural status, accounting for both the strength of that desire and a willingness to alter identity in favor of completing the lack that initiates such changes. Gaining the status and power they desire is complicated for the basic writers by the fact that they do not yet feel in control of the language they need to achieve it. For example, Dominic expresses great frustration with the “great works” of literature, lamenting that “no matter how hard I worked at English I could never be any good at it.” “Being good at English” is closely linked to achieving control over a discourse with which he does not feel identified. Control over language becomes linked, further, with control over perception. For
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example, Diane expresses this need for discursive control when she explains that her weakness in writing is making her point clear. This need to “make a point” recurs at three points in her narrative, and she returns to it in response to her instructor’s question of what the class members would change if they had the chance to revise the essay. Her teacher’s comments on her literacy autobiography also reflect this need; the comments focus solely on a lack of purpose. A writer making a point, or achieving a