Incentives for Regional Development Competition Among Sub-National Governments
Kala Seetharam Sridhar
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Incentives for Regional Development Competition Among Sub-National Governments
Kala Seetharam Sridhar
Incentives for Regional Development
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Incentives for Regional Development Competition Among Sub-National Governments
Kala Seetharam Sridhar
© Kala Seetharam Sridhar 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–4788–8 ISBN-10: 1–4039–4788–0 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sridhar, Kala Seetharam, 1966– Incentives for regional development : competition among sub-national governments / Kala Seetharam Sridhar. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–4788–0 (cloth) 1. Economic development – Government policy. 2. Regional planning – Government policy. 3. Tax incentives. 4. Industrial policy. 5. Industrial promotion. I. Title. HD75.S77 2005 338.9—dc22 2005042144 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
To my parents, husband and my little Vindhya
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Contents List of Tables
x
List of Figures
xii
Acknowledgements
xiii
List of Abbreviations
Part I 1
xv
Introduction
Regional Development Incentives in the United States and India 3 1.1 Introduction and background 3 1.2 Motivation for the book 3 1.3 What is the black box that converts incentives to regional development? 4 1.4 Why cross-national comparison? 6 1.5 Gaps in the literature 9 1.6 Research objectives 11 1.7 Overview of the book 13
Part II
Tax Incentives: Theory and Evidence
2 Impact of Tax Incentives on Economies: Analytical Framework 2.1 Introduction and motivation 2.2 Literature review 2.3 Objectives of the model 2.4 Assumptions of the model 2.5 The model 2.6 Predictive power of the model
19 19 19 20 20 22 37
3 Competition Among American States: Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Theoretical framework 3.3 Description of EZs in the United States 3.4 Description of enterprise zones in Illinois 3.5 Research methodology 3.6 Estimation of reservation wages 3.7 Benefit–cost analysis 3.8 Summary of the results
39 39 40 41 43 48 53 57 61
vii
viii Contents
4 Impact of Tax Incentives on the Unemployment Rate: Evidence from Ohio 4.1 The importance of the problem and the motivation for research 4.2 Overview of the chapter 4.3 A model of unemployment 4.4 Tax incentive programmes in Ohio 4.5 Implementation of the model 4.6 Data 4.7 Methodology 4.8 Results from the estimation 4.9 Policy implications 4.10 Concluding remarks 5 Benefits and Costs of Regional Development: Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zone Programme 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Past literature 5.3 Ohio’s enterprise zone programme 5.4 Data 5.5 Benefit–cost methodology 5.6 Benefit–cost analysis 5.7 Policy implications
Part III
64 64 66 66 68 70 73 75 80 85 85 87 87 88 89 90 90 97 110
Infrastructure Incentives: Theory and Evidence
6 Impact of Growth Centres on Unemployment and Firm Location: Evidence from India 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The importance of and the motivation for research 6.3 Objectives 6.4 Description of the growth centres programme 6.5 Theory and model 6.6 Description of variables and data 6.7 Results from the estimation of the unemployment rate 6.8 Estimation for GCs 6.9 Concluding remarks 7 Firm Location Decisions and Their Impact on Local Economies: Evidence from India’s Growth Centres 7.1 Introduction and motivation 7.2 Objectives 7.3 Field visits to GCs 7.4 Summary of GCs visited 7.5 Impact of GC (infrastructure), and tax incentives on firm location
117 117 118 119 124 125 127 130 133 138 139 139 139 140 153 154
Contents ix
7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11
Part IV 8
The impact of GC firms on local labour markets The export orientation of firms Corporate social responsibility Firm-level implications Growth-centre-level implications Concluding remarks
157 159 161 162 164 166
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned from the United States and India 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Lessons for the United States 8.3 Lessons for India 8.4 Is the American experience relevant for India? 8.5 Can the corporate sector help? 8.6 Concluding remarks
169 169 171 173 177 183 184
Notes
185
References
204
Index
210
List of Tables 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
Summary of selected studies on enterprise zones Achievements of the Illinois enterprise zone programme Fiscal effects of the programme Estimation of reservation wages: results from regression Case 1: summary of net benefits from ‘new’ jobs Case 2: summary of net benefits from relocated jobs Descriptive statistics for variables Estimation of the unemployment rate Estimation of the unemployment rate with dummies for duration Switching regression model of reservation wage with sample selection Profile of Ohio’s enterprise zones, 1997 Profile of Ohio’s non-zone census block groups, 1997 Distribution of reservation wages imputed for Ohio’s enterprise zones Distribution of average net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for the (531) firms in Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 1 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios in Ohio’s (143) enterprise zones, scenario 1 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for the (575) firms in Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 2 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for (148) Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 2 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for (198) firms in Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 3 (assumed elasticity 0.3) Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for (91) firms in Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 3 (assumed elasticity 0.1) Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for Ohio’s (62) enterprise zones, scenario 3 (assumed elasticity 0.3) Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for Ohio’s (32) enterprise zones, scenario 3 (assumed elasticity 0.1) Summary of average B–C ratios in various scenarios at firm level and zone level
x
42 48 50 55 58 58 79 80 84 92 93 94 95 99 101 103 104
105
106
108
109 110
List of Tables xi
5.14 5.15 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7
Proportion of zones with B–C ratios 1 in various scenarios Efficiency losses in various scenarios Description of data used in estimation of unemployment rate Comparison of data for areas with and without GCs Results from OLS and 2SLS estimations OLS estimation of unemployment for low- and high-unemployment areas Description of data for GCs Estimation of GC performance Registered industrial units and total employment in Karnataka’s districts, 1999–2000 Summary of manufacturing and services employment, UP districts Overview of GCs visited All firms located in GCs visited, and their location decisions Impact of GC firms on local labour market Export orientation of GC firms and suggestions for government policy Corporate social responsibility: evidence from GC firms
111 112 129 130 131 134 135 137 142 147 154 155 158 160 161
List of Figures 2.1 The distribution of wage offers 2.2 The impact of the EZ (tax incentives) with capital mobility 3.1 Distribution of unemployment rate in Illinois EZs 4.1 Determination of the unemployment rate 7.1 District map of Karnataka, India 7.2 District map of Haryana, India 7.3 District map of Uttar Pradesh, India
xii
24 36 46 70 143 144 146
Acknowledgements This book, as in all cases, is the result of cooperation from several people, without which it would not have been possible. First of all, I would like to thank the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy for facilitating the time to work on this book. I would like to thank the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development which funded the research in Chapters 2, 4, and 5, through its 1997 Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant H-21090SG. For work in these chapters, I am very thankful to Professors Chuck Adams, Don Haurin, late Professor G.S. Maddala, Anand Desai, and Mary Marvel, all at the Ohio State University, for their guidance. For work in Chapter 3 pertaining to Illinois’ enterprise zones, I am indebted to Professors Peter Fisher and Alan Peters at the University of Iowa, for their guidance and comments. I thank the Ohio Department of Development for providing data necessary for the evaluation of Ohio’s enterprise zone programme in Chapters 4 and 5. Further, I am very thankful to the various enterprise zone administrators in Ohio for patiently filling out my survey pertaining to infrastructure costs and several CRA administrators in Ohio for their discussions over the phone. Finally, I thank the erstwhile Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs, and the current enterprise zone administrators in Illinois, Mr Thomas Henderson and Mr Mickey Harris, with the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, for sending me current information about Illinois enterprise zones. For work in Chapters 5 and 6, I am indebted to the Indian Institute of Management in Lucknow, India for providing seed money to facilitate the research. I am very thankful to Mr Onkara Murthy at the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) for taking me around the various firms in the Hassan growth centre. Further, I am thankful to Mr K.C. Sharma with the Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) for taking the time to visit several firms in the Bawal growth centre along with me. I thank Mr Alok Kumar, Joint Managing Director of the UP State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC), and his colleagues, for taking the time to answer my questions relating to growth centres in UP during my visit to Kanpur. Further, I am grateful to Mr K.C. Mishra and his colleagues with the Gorakhpur Industrial Development Authority for introducing me to various firms and answering my detailed questions. I thank Mr N.P. Singh of the Satharia Industrial Development Authority for facilitating my visits to various firms in the Satharia growth centre, to enable the assessment. In all of the growth centres that I visited, I wish to thank heartily the representatives of various firms that made themselves available to answer xiii
xiv Acknowledgements
the various questions I had about their location decision and other aspects of their operation. Finally, I would like to thank Mr S. Jagadeeshan, Joint Secretary in the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, for arranging to send me secondary data regarding growth centres in the country. I thank Dr Amaresh Bagchi at NIPFP, Mr R.K. Bajaj, Commissioner of Income Taxes, and Ms Ann Martin of Palgrave, for heartily offering to help with Palgrave’s tax form. I am very thankful to Ms Amanda Hamilton of Palgrave, the commissioning editor for this book, who patiently and promptly answered all of my questions relating to all aspects of the book. Thanks are due to Mr Keith Povey for his patience with copy-editing and proof-reading the book. I thank Ms Amita Padhwal for her assistance in formatting the book. Further, I would like to thank Sage Publications for permitting me to reprint substantial parts of my work that had been published previously in the Economic Development Quarterly, 10 (1), 69–90 in Chapter 3. I wish to thank the University of Delaware’s College of Business and Economics for providing copyright permission to reprint substantial parts of my paper published in the Review of Regional Studies, 30 (3), Winter 2000, 275–98 in Chapter 4. Further, I would like to acknowledge with thanks the copyright permission granted by the Centre for Community Economic Development at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for allowing me to reprint substantial parts in Chapter 5, from my paper published in the Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, 31 (2), 2001, 1–32. Thanks are due to the editorial office of the Economic and Political Weekly for permitting me to reprint parts of my paper 38 (39), 2003, 4121–30 in Chapter 7. Last but not least, I thank the incredible support and encouragement of my husband from the time of the proposal formulation to the fruition stage to writing and formatting. My little daughter, Vindhya, supported efforts of the book in her own way, without being aware of how much she was contributing. Finally, my parents and family played a big role in providing the moral support necessary for completing this work. KALA SEETHARAM SRIDHAR
List of Abbreviations 2SLS AFDC A&N Islands ARV B–C BEA CAGR CETA CPI–U CPS CRAs CRTS CSR CT DCCA DCEO DIPP EC EZs FL FY GCs GDP GIDA GIS GLS GPO HSIDC IL IN INR I–O Analysis IRBs IT KIADB LHS MAX MIN MNCs
Two-Stage Least Squares Aid to Families with Dependent Children Andaman and Nicobar Islands Annual Rental Value Benefit–Cost Bureau of Economic Analysis Compounded Annual Growth Rate Comprehensive Employment Training Act Consumer Price Index–Urban Current Population Survey Community Reinvestment Areas Constant Returns to Scale Corporate Social Responsibility Connecticut Department of Commerce and Community Affairs Department of Economic Opportunity Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Enterprise Communities Enterprise Zones Florida Fiscal Year Growth Centres Gross Domestic Product Gorakhpur Industrial Development Authority Geographic Information Systems Generalized Least Squares Government Printing Office Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Illinois Indiana Indian Rupees Input–Output Analysis Industrial Revenue Bonds Information Technology Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Left hand side Maximum Minimum Multinational Corporations xv
xvi List of Abbreviations
MO MW N/A NCR NIUA NLS OBES OH OLS PDS PSID PPPs RCs RHS SC SEZs SIC SIDA ST TIRC UA UEZ UP UPA UPSIDC US Department of HUD US VAT
Missouri Megawatts Not Applicable National Capital Region National Institute of Urban Affairs National Longitudinal Survey Ohio Bureau of Employment Services Ohio Ordinary Least Squares Public Distribution System Panel Study of Income Dynamics Public–private Partnerships Renewal Communities Right hand side Scheduled Castes Special Economic Zones Standard Industrial Classification Satharia Industrial Development Authority Scheduled Tribes Tax Incentive Review Council Urban Agglomeration Urban Enterprize Zone Uttar Pradesh United Progressive Alliance UP State Industrial Development Corporation United States Department of Housing and Urban Development United States Value Added Tax
Part I Introduction
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1 Regional Development Incentives in the United States and India
1.1
Introduction and background
In this book, I study the effectiveness of policies to promote regional development and competition among sub-national levels of government. I study competition among sub-national governments in the United States and India to attract private investment, respectively with the use of tax and infrastructure incentives. I examine empirical evidence regarding incentives offered by state and local governments in the United States and contrast this evidence with that from incentives offered by state governments in India. Note that although the title speaks of ‘incentives for regional development’ I will only discuss financial/tax incentives and infrastructure incentives in the book. The reader should be aware that the regional development literature includes non-financial incentives also. There is a stream of literature on regional development (that is, learning regions, milieu of innovation, industrial districts),1 which is widely discussed throughout the world. Such policies have been characterized as ‘new wave’ policies (Bartik, 1991) or demand-side policies (Eisinger, 1988). They are all programmes targeted at existing firms. Those policies include services such as providing information regarding the existence of markets, export promotion assistance, assistance to small firms in the form of business incubators, hosting of trade fairs, support of high-technology, e-learning programmes, and other services which boost firm productivity and the development of the region as a whole. While the reader must be aware that there is a stream of literature in each of these areas, the focus of this book is supply-side policies that target branch plant recruitment.
1.2
Motivation for the book
The motivation for this book comes from the extensive use of financial incentives to attract firms and jobs in the United States (especially through the use of enterprise zones (EZs)) that continues to be hotly debated and 3
4
Incentives for Regional Development
aggressively pursued by states. For instance, the conventional state of Iowa in the Midwestern United States recently passed enterprise zone legislation, and as of September 2002, 332 EZs were certified in this state, with the programme’s popularity having steadily grown since 1997 (McDermott, 2002). In November 2003, I met the Mayor of the City of Chicago. He expressed the firm view that if Chicago does not offer financial incentives, it will lose out in the war for jobs. So while many sub-national governments in the United States realize the futility of such financial incentives in general, no state or local government wants to lose out in the ‘race to the bottom’. For this reason, they continue to offer such incentives. The motivation for the book also comes from the poor state of infrastructure in India’s various states, where the use of programmes such as growth centres (GCs) that provide infrastructure incentives to firms can trigger huge infrastructure reforms throughout the country. Florida (2002) showed that those US cities and regions that use tax incentives, in fact, attract manufacturing industries, and it may appear that these firms are contributing little to regional development in the present knowledgebased economy. It may be misconstrued that in the present knowledge-based economy, regional development comes from innovation, which calls for incentives other than taxes and infrastructure. Boekema et al. (2000) argue that successful firms, as well as governments, are those which have control over and access to flows of information and knowledge of technologies, markets, and organizational and managerial practices. Note, however, that infrastructure (including good roads, uninterrupted power, reliable telecom, banking and related services) is quite critical to the success of all firms – whether they are primarily manufacturing, services or knowledge-based. In the case of India, although it has emerged recently as a knowledgeintensive economy dependent on IT and IT-enabled services, it continues to be a developing economy with an underdeveloped infrastructure and is not yet a full fledged knowledge-based economy in the sense that the USA and Europe are. Because of this, what is good for the industrial economy is good for the Indian economy. Further, all the leading thinkers of the world, including economists and corporate leaders, agree that a large and sound manufacturing base is necessary to compete in the globalized market. So as Eisinger (1995) points out, there is a return to industrial recruitment among the American states. This is also true in relation to the Indian states which are pursuing entrepreneurial and knowledge-based strategies targeted at existing firms, along with financial incentives to attract new ones.
1.3 What is the black box that converts incentives to regional development? Throughout the book, regional development refers to improvement in the areas’ infrastructure, amenities, job opportunities, and, more generally, its
Regional Development Incentives 5
attractiveness as a place to live and carry out business. Given that financial and infrastructure incentives are important for regional development for one reason or another, what is the mechanism that converts tax benefits and infrastructure to regional development? Relevant aspects to consider here are: ●
●
Manufacturing industries and those that have first-mover disadvantages (for instance, information technology) are attracted by tax and infrastructure incentives, so a region can potentially enhance its economic base with the offer of such incentives. Recall that whenever the social benefits from an activity are greater than the private costs, there are grounds for subsidizing such activity. Take the case of fledgling industries such as information technology (IT) and IT-enabled services. The first movers into the industry have been at a disadvantage because of the specific kind of skills required (software programming and data processing, to give a couple of examples). Given that these skills are scarce in relation to demand, attrition in this industry is high, the first-mover firms are at a disadvantage because of the financial and other resources spent in training the manpower. So at least initially, there might be some grounds for policy to subsidize such firms, by providing tax or infrastructure incentives, since the gains from employment are substantial. The other mechanism that converts tax or infrastructure incentives to regional development is the extent to which such firms are footloose. In the context of developing countries such as India, the industries do tend to stay on once attracted to a particular region. Once the infrastructure is made available and firms do fix a location, relocations are quite rare. I have confirmed this with the Department of Company Affairs, Government of India.
In the context of the United States, footloose firms are more common, casting doubts on the ability of such incentives to translate into sustainable regional development. However, even there, many states such as Ohio have incorporated clawback of tax incentive arrangements in the event of nonperformance or relocation, should firms relocate to another region. Such arrangements, while still very incipient, do act as a check on footloose firms that could prevent the full realization of tax or infrastructure benefits by regions. So tax and infrastructure incentives do have a number of benefits that have spin-offs for regions. Infrastructure investments can increase employment through both direct and indirect effects (Alleman et al., 2002). For instance, investing in telecommunication will increase the demand for the goods and services used in their production and increase total national output. In their evaluation of the New Jersey Urban Enterprise Zone (UEZ) programme, Rubin and Armstrong (1989) take into account the direct and indirect benefits from the programme. Using the input–output model
6
Incentives for Regional Development
developed by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for New Jersey in order to estimate these impacts, the study calculates the output multiplier to be 1.61 and the employment multiplier to be 2.26. This means that every $1 of direct expansion in output generated an additional $0.61 in indirect output by other companies, and every job added by the firms resulted in an additional 1.26 jobs. While this evidence is more than a decade old, Keefe (2004) finds that EZ designation raised employment growth in California’s zones by about 3 per cent each year during the first six years after designation, but did not persist in later years. Similar results are reported in Chapter 4 of this book. We have to make several observations about the relative importance of tax incentives and public (primarily infrastructure) services based on the literature. First, when the level of public (infrastructure) services is held constant, the benefits to firms of tax incentives are quite significant. Although there are several factors that are more important than taxes to business location decisions, tax incentives enable corporate planning for reinvestment. Further, whenever traditional factors (such as transport costs, raw material availability, size of, and proximity to the market) are likely to be different across states, such traditional factors are more important in influencing manufacturing firm location decisions. However, across locations (such as within a state) where traditional factors are constant, tax incentives are likely to play a more important role in influencing firm location. Further, it is not necessarily the case that incentives to industry will be harmful to the development of infrastructure. One good example is the Indian state Karnataka’s proposal to replace financial with infrastructure incentives to the auto industry. Karnataka promised training institutions, schools, colleges, office complexes, housing, a globally well-knit telecom network, roads, dedicated power and water supply necessary for the development of automobile manufacturing units, vendors and dealers in the state. While highlighting the continued importance of manufacturing in India, if other states in India and sub-national governments in other countries also follow this example, competition will enhance, rather than stifle, their infrastructure competitiveness. These examples provide some evidence that such tax and infrastructure incentives have favourable impacts on the economic base of local economies.
1.4
Why cross-national comparison?
The cross-national comparison of India and the United States is of relevance, as India has a federal structure similar to the United States, in which there are a large number of sub-national governments which compete against one another. In the United States of America, the last two decades of the twentieth century were characterized by substantial delegation of responsibilities by
Regional Development Incentives 7
national governments to their lower levels of government. This phenomenon, termed the New Federalism, began with the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Similarly, in India also, a reversal of concentration of central decision-making began to occur in the last two decades of the last century (Bagchi, 2003).2 In the United States, the last two decades of the twentieth century have been characterized by acceleration of competition among states and local governments with the offer of tax incentives to firms to make investment and create employment in their states and local areas. A tool of regional development that is very popular in the United States is enterprise zones (EZs). The EZ concept was born in Great Britain where the Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe advocated tax cuts to boost the economy. This concept was introduced in the United States by a geographer, Stuart Butler. EZs in the US are geographically targeted areas chosen for development, and firms that locate in these areas receive tax credits, exemptions and abatements. This can make considerable differences to firms because moving just a mile across state borders – or, even within a state for that matter – can save them millions of dollars. The offer of tax incentives was proliferating even among Indian states in the post-1991 period. Until recently, there were several instances of tax competition. The leaders of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh – two leading states in South India – had been competing fiercely with each other to secure the location of Microsoft’s newest India facility. In terms of actual tax incentives also, there had been several instances of generous abatements during the 1990s in India, quite similar to ‘smoke-stack chasing’ in the United States. While states in the United States continue to offer tax incentives and many other sops, a conference of state chief ministers and the Union Finance Minister in India decided in November 1999 to stop this tax war among the Indian states.3 The decision was taken by Indian states because the offer of tax incentives, apart from affecting the general fiscal health of the states, also affects the states’ ability to provide public infrastructure services. This is especially so, given the fact that sales tax revenue accounts for nearly one-quarter of own source revenue, and roughly two-thirds of all revenue, for the majority of the Indian states. Similar concerns are also being expressed in US academic and policy circles with property tax abatements being the most important incentive at the local level. Consistent with the idea of place-oriented policies, GCs in India are like the EZs of the United States, except that they offer primarily infrastructure incentives for investors that locate there. The United States and a number of countries around the world – China, the Middle East, and countries including India have been adopting some form of place-oriented policies, be it called EZS, special economic zones or GCs. A big advantage of the ‘zone’ concept being that it can be initially tried out experimentally in a small area. If it works, well, it can be extended to other areas. If it does not, then we know
8
Incentives for Regional Development
that it doesn’t work. It thus avoids the risks and costs of trying a programme in a fully-fledged manner without knowing its effects. Further, place-oriented policies such as EZs call for the targeted development of the area rather than advocate that people should be mobile to make use of job opportunities where they exist. Place-oriented policies recognize that there are likely to be a large number of people that are immobile because of the social, psychological or economic costs of moving. These people are most likely to be those with the lowest skills. Therefore place-oriented policies such as EZs and GCs deserve an in-depth consideration for their impacts on areas that adopt them. In this book, I present evidence of place-oriented policies, EZs and GCs, from this perspective. The GCs programme was initiated by India in 1988 in order to promote the industrialization of backward areas in the country. As a result, 71 GCs were established throughout India. They were allotted to the various states on the basis of combined criteria of area, population and the extent of industrial backwardness, as long as they were located at a minimum distance from major cities in the area (the specific designation criteria are described in Chapter 6). These GCs provide basic industrial infrastructure like power, water, telecom, and banking to enable the states to attract industries. Central government funds for the programme were to be leveraged by the states for purposes of financing. The infrastructure (growth centre) approach is important to consider as it is a test of the alternative to the tax war (not place-oriented policies). Further, it is an important approach to increase rural industrialization to enable convergence where disparities exist among sub-national units (see Dreze and Sen (1996) to understand the magnitude of disparities among Indian states).4 Even in the United States, quite stark inter- and intra-state disparities exist, similar to those in India. For instance, south-eastern Ohio is relatively poor compared to northern/central Ohio. The Appalachia has traditionally been a pocket of poverty. Thus, recognizing that it is important for all sub-national governments to attract private investment and jobs, states/local governments in the United States continue to use EZs and tax incentives in order to attract private investment. Infrastructure incentives assume special importance in light of the scepticism regarding tax incentives in academic and policy circles everywhere, and the decision to stop the tax war among the Indian states. Further, note that countries everywhere are increasingly concerned about their fiscal deficits caused by financial incentives and also the extent to which such deficits stifle growth. This is especially the case if we consider (in federations) the central government’s deficit along with that of the states and local governments as a proportion of GDP. As with EZs and tax incentives in the United States, scepticism surrounds GCs in India and their effectiveness in attracting firms. Commentators’ views have varied from a perception of the GCs programme having been a
Regional Development Incentives 9
colossal failure in attracting firms to one that strongly believes in their effectiveness because of the infrastructure incentives available to firms that locate there. I present in this work, along with empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of incentives offered in the EZs of the United States, empirical evidence of the effectiveness of GCs. Why should policy-makers in other countries care about the GCs of India? The Indian growth centre approach represents infrastructure and public service incentives, and has implications for sub-national governments that wish to attract private investment. In light of the recent decision of the Indian states to call a stop to the tax war (the so-called ‘race to the bottom’), and scepticism regarding tax incentives, there is a need to explore other, sustainable, options for sub-national governments everywhere to compete effectively for industrial investment. In summary, the similarities between India’s GCs and US EZs that make the two programmes amenable for comparison are: 1. India and US are large democracies and are federations with a decentralized, three-tier (national, state and local) government structure. 2. US EZs and India’s GCs are both geographically targeted and place-oriented, not people-oriented programmes such as those focusing on employees and on-the-job training. 3. Both the programmes offer some degree of flexibility to their respective sub-national government units to design the programmes. This gives rise to competition between the sub-national units that compete for investment. This, in fact, is the core objective of the book. For these and various other reasons explained above, place-oriented policies such as tax incentives and GCs deserve in-depth consideration for their impacts on the rest of the economy. In this book, I develop an analytical framework to analyze the impact of such place-oriented policies on the economy that adopts it. Further, I present cross-national empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of these policies from American EZs and India’s GCs.
1.5
Gaps in the literature
There is a substantial body of literature on regional development incentives in the United States and elsewhere. Since there are several studies that provide a comprehensive literature review, I will not undertake that here, except providing a more suggestive and critical review, based on those from the United States. I review the sparse regional development literature from developing countries in somewhat greater detail in Chapter 6 when I discuss GCs. Byrnes, Marvel and Sridhar (1999) examine city-firm bargaining decisions and study the factors that explain the generosity of tax abatements, in the context of Ohio’s EZs. Fisher and Peters (1998, 2002) study, respectively, industrial
10 Incentives for Regional Development
incentives in American states and cities and state enterprise zone programmes in the United States. While Fisher and Peters (2002) study the national-level performance of EZs,5 they study in detail Ohio’s enterprise zone programme. They find that EZs as tools of growth are highly questionable. Further, a majority of the literature that studies economic development incentives in the United States does not study non-tax incentives (Steinnes, 1984; Papke, 1987, 1991; Tannenwald and Kendrick, 1995; Tannenwald, 1996, cited in Fisher and Peters, 1998). Various papers in Kenyon and Kincaid (1991) study, in the American context, whether competition among state and local governments is detrimental to public service and tax systems. They present a political science perspective of a model of federalism and the economic perspective of competition among firms in a market economy, without, however, offering detailed empirical evidence of the alternative views. Brunori (1998, 2001) deals with the problems of state taxation policy in the United States in the event of incentives, e-commerce, and globalization, and how they can be overcome. No cross-national evidence, however, is presented in the context of globalization. The past literature has looked at the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting investment in the context of developing countries. For instance, various papers in Shah (1995) quantify the effect of investment incentives on business decisions related to production and investment in selected developing countries and then use the results to rank tax policy instruments in terms of their usefulness in promoting investment. Despite the fact that various studies in Shah (1995) examine both conceptually and empirically the impact of taxes on various business decisions, it has certain caveats. The work provides no empirical evidence of non-tax policies to promote industrial development. There is also no evidence reported from India; other developing countries’ policies are studied and evaluated. There are studies that evaluate specific fiscal, or industrial incentives in Indian states. An early example is Tulasidhar and Rao (1986), which shows employment and output loss due to tax incentives, albeit in a partial equilibrium framework. Rajaraman, Mukhopadhyay and Bhatia (1999) study fiscal incentives from the central Indian state, Madhya Pradesh, and find that fiscal incentives have a statistically insignificant impact on large and medium investment in Madhya Pradesh. None of these studies evaluate different kinds of (tax and infrastructure) incentives offered by sub-national governments in a federation, crossnationally. Such data and research are sparse in the literature. This book bridges this gap since no state-of-the-art research in the area compares the effectiveness of tax vis-à-vis infrastructure incentives in firm location decisions, and their effects on unemployment, and evaluates net benefits. It also constructs an analytical framework to understand the impacts on the rest of economy of place-oriented policies that rely on tax incentives.
Regional Development Incentives 11
1.6
Research objectives
The objectives of the research in this book are to answer several questions: 1. What are the effects of place-oriented policies such as EZs (or those that provide tax incentives) on the rest of the economy? 2. Do such incentives merely redistribute employment? 3. What are the effects of tax and infrastructure incentives on the unemployment rate of areas adopting them? 4. Are the net benefits from employment worth the costs of creating them? To answer the first of these questions, I build an analytical framework to analyze the impact of geographically targeted policies that provide tax incentives, on the economies that adopt them and on the rest of the economy, in Chapter 2. In the model I point to the cause of unemployment in the backward areas. I show the relationship between the reservation wage and unemployment rate, following Jones (1989). I then show the general equilibrium response to the tax abatement provided in EZs, in a generalized framework incorporating capital mobility, following Harberger (1962). The analytical framework developed indicates that the capital and employment impact of the tax cut on capital in the area depends on certain sets of parameters. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively answer questions regarding the redistribution of employment, effect of tax incentives on unemployment rate, and comparison of the benefits and costs of EZs. Chapter 6 considers the question regarding the effect of infrastructure incentives on the rate of unemployment. Chapter 7 makes an attempt to answer these questions from a qualitative perspective, probing into aspects that could be missed in a purely quantitative or econometric approach. Regarding question two, note that the regional development literature has long argued that taxes do not affect firm location decisions. Furthermore, even if they do, they merely redistribute employment from one location to another. The thesis of the work is that poorer states/regions are justified in offering (infrastructure) incentives to attract industry and employment. If distressed areas, with the provision of incentives, were to be successful in attracting firms to invest and create employment, greater social net benefits would accrue to the area, as Bartik (1991) argues. Net benefit from a job is analogous to consumers’ surplus (in the goods market).6 Net benefit from a job is the extent to which actual wage is higher than the wage at which a person is willing to accept a job (which is referred to as a person’s reservation wage). If earnings were to be constant across areas,7 net benefits would be higher if persons are willing to accept jobs at lower wages. This is not to say that it is socially beneficial for persons to be willing to accept jobs at lower wages. But it is easy to imagine that persons in poorer, high-unemployment areas
12 Incentives for Regional Development
and poorer states, where job opportunities are difficult to come by, unemployed persons value the importance of having a job. As Bartik (1991) argues, they are likely to search more rigorously for job openings, wait longer in line for job interviews and less likely to quit a job once they obtain one. For these reasons, they would be willing to accept a job, if it becomes available, at a wage lower than the rate a person would be willing to accept in relatively richer, low-unemployment areas. Therefore, if an unemployed person in a high-unemployment area were to be offered a job, net benefits derived from this job would be higher than that from a similar job in a low unemployment area. In Chapters 3 and 5, I report evidence of this, based on data from the United States. Haurin and Sridhar (2003), using data from the United States, however, find no impact of higher local unemployment rates on individuals’ reservation wages. Nevertheless, as they suggest, it is sensible to attack clusters of high unemployment with policies that increase the demand for workers. The thesis of the book is also that infrastructure incentives, if offered by distressed areas, can become a more sustainable way to increase net benefits from employment. This is valid not only in a developing country such as India, but also in countries such as the United States, where the southern states have remained much poorer than their northern/western counterparts. Thus, we have to think about stimulating, rather than stifling competition, in the provision of infrastructure by sub-national governments. Such reforms are much needed. From this viewpoint, infrastructure incentives are crucial in influencing firm location decisions because they encourage competition among the states in the provision of infrastructure, quite critical to firms. The study thus focuses on the provision of infrastructure incentives as contrasted with the experience from tax incentives to attract private investment, as a more sustainable way of reducing regional disparities. This is especially so since the private sector is now the widely accepted driver of job growth in most countries. For instance, in India, according to data compiled from the Central Statistical Organization, aggregate employment in private sector large industries increased by an annual compound rate of 0.9 per cent during the period 1993–4 to 2001–2, whereas it declined by 0.4 per cent in the public sector during the same period. The private sector’s share in the country’s organized sector total employment increased from 25.6 to 27.6 per cent over this period, whereas the public sector’s share declined from 71 to 69 per cent in 2001–2. Furthermore, data support the continued importance of manufacturing, although the larger share of employment growth in India’s private sector was accounted for by the service industry (finance, real estate and insurance). India’s manufacturing sector witnessed increased employment growth during the period 1993–4 to 2001–2, and increased by 0.6 per cent annually compounded, raising its share in total employment from 16.9 to 17.9 per cent. In contrast, employment in public sector manufacturing fell by 3.5 per cent annually during the same period!
Regional Development Incentives 13
1.7
Overview of the book
The book is divided into four parts. Part I is introductory, consisting of Chapter 1. Part II of the book focuses on tax incentives and consists of Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. The focus of Part III of the book is infrastructure incentives and consists of Chapters 6 and 7. Part IV consists of the concluding chapter. The plan for the book is as follows. In Chapter 2, I outline a theoretical model that shows the effects of placeoriented policies such as EZs (that provide tax incentives) on the economy that adopts it and the rest of the economy. In the model I point to the cause of unemployment in the EZ. I show the relationship between the reservation wage and unemployment rate, following Jones (1989). I then show the general equilibrium response to the tax abatement provided in EZs, in a generalized framework incorporating capital mobility, following Harberger (1962). The analytical framework developed indicates that the capital and employment impact of the tax cut on capital in the EZ depends upon three sets of parameters: 1. Relative factor intensities of firms in the two areas; 2. The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in firms in the areas; 3. The price elasticities of demand for goods Z and Y produced by EZ firms and non-EZ firms respectively. The framework shows that it is impossible to isolate the incidence of the tax cut given in the EZ solely to the EZ. In Chapter 3, I answer the following questions: are the local benefits of tax incentives greater than the costs? Further, are benefits greater in highunemployment areas than they are in low-unemployment areas? Next, do such policies generate net benefits for a state, even if they redistribute jobs? I present my empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the Illinois EZ programme from the Midwestern United States. I choose the Illinois programme because Illinois is one of the most important states in the Midwestern United States. Further, Illinois was one of the first states in the United States to adopt the EZ legislation once the EZ concept had been introduced in the United States from the United Kingdom in the 1980s. In this chapter, I discuss the various state EZ programmes in the USA after a summary overview of all state EZ programmes, I describe the Illinois EZ programme – its designation criteria, and tax incentives. Based on a simple OLS estimation of the reservation wages, and the imputation of benefits for Illinois, in this chapter, I find that, overall, the local benefits of creating jobs in Illinois EZs are greater than the costs of generating them. I highlight the assumptions and caveats of the empirical work. In Chapter 4, I answer the question about the effects of tax incentives on the unemployment rates of areas that adopt them. I describe Ohio’s
14 Incentives for Regional Development
enterprise zone programme. The Ohio programme is of interest as it has the dubious distinction of having nearly the largest number of EZs in the country, after Louisiana and Arkansas, and the ‘pirating’ of firms the programme has encouraged. As Fisher and Peters (2002) point out, Ohio is also one of the few states in the country that has a systematic database regarding various aspects of its EZs. I study, at Ohio’s census block group level, whether the unemployment rate is affected by the presence of a tax incentive programme. An empirical model is developed that describes the determination of unemployment in the EZ. The estimation of unemployment rate using Census data for Ohio, taking into account the treatment effects problem, shows that such programmes have a significant impact in reducing unemployment. The net impact of being an EZ for a period of seven years is approximately a three percentage point reduction in area unemployment. The results also suggest that three to five years could be the optimum period for offering incentives. In Chapter 5, I answer the question as to whether the benefits from regional development programmes such as EZs are worth their costs, using evidence from Ohio’s EZ programme. I study what happens when corrections are made to the empirical methodology used to estimate reservation wages. Then I present evidence from my analysis of Ohio’s EZ programme. Further, I present benefit–cost analyses of Ohio’s programme in various scenarios, making varying assumptions about the employment elasticity of tax incentives. I find that the net benefits of regional development can be expected to be greater than their costs. However, because of their efficiency implications, I find that it could be beneficial for high-unemployment areas to adopt tax incentive policies. Part III of the book focuses on infrastructure incentives. Chapter 6 describes India’s GC programme, symmetric to description of EZs in the US in Chapters 3 and 4. I present evidence from India’s GCs and study the effect of infrastructure incentives on the unemployment rate of districts that contain them using Census of India data (analogous to study of Ohio, in Chapter 3). I do not find GCs to have a statistically significant effect on unemployment rate. In this chapter, I also assess the performance of GCs where they exist and study whether infrastructure affects firm location decisions. I find that, among states having GCs, those having the financial resources to develop larger number of plots with infrastructure are the ones that are successful in attracting firms. Based on these findings, I conclude with implications for policy. In Chapter 7, I present qualitative evidence from my visits to GCs in India to study what could be missed based on purely quantitative data/empirical evidence. Based on the fieldwork, I find that without the infrastructure provided by the growth centre, many firms (even some representing local entrepreneurship) would not have located there. Given the scepticism about states and communities offering incentives to firms, I study the contribution
Regional Development Incentives 15
of firms to local communities where they locate. I find that these firms have favourable impacts on the local labour markets where they have located. Few of these firms export and some of them contribute socially to the communities in which they have located. I conclude with several implications for policy at the firm level and growth centre level. At the firm level, I summarize the suggestions made by various firms to improve the government’s industrial policy. At the growth centre level, I summarize implications for their designation criteria, based on the field visits. In the final chapter, I summarize the many policy implications that arise out of the work for policy-makers everywhere regarding place-oriented policies and other incentives for regional development. Finally, I highlight some areas for future research.
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Part II Tax Incentives: Theory and Evidence
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2 Impact of Tax Incentives on Economies: Analytical Framework
2.1
Introduction and motivation
In this chapter, I develop an analytical framework that shows the effects of place-oriented policies such as enterprise zones (EZs) on the regions that adopt them and on the rest of the economy.1 The analytical framework developed in this chapter can also be applied to GCs, wherever tax incentives are offered.2 The EZ programme has been one of the most controversial topics in the literature and in policy. Place-oriented policies such as EZs focus on the area’s development rather than arguing that people should be mobile. Such policies recognize that there are likely to be a large number of people who are immobile because of the social, psychological or economic costs of moving. The migration literature shows that immobile people are most likely to be those with the lowest levels of skills. Therefore place-oriented policies such as EZs deserve in-depth consideration for their impacts on labour and the rest of the economy. In this chapter, I develop an analytical framework to analyze the impact of the EZ on the economy that adopts it, and on labour.3
2.2
Literature review
There is a vast body of policy and empirical literature that evaluates EZs. These studies have evaluated EZs in various states of the United States – Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Kentucky, New Jersey and California (Rubin and Armstrong, 1989; Erickson and Friedman, 1989; Seyfried, 1990; Elling and Sheldon, 1991; Redfield and McDonald, 1991; Papke, 1994; Landers, 1996; Dowall, 1996; Boarnet and Bogart, 1996). See Sridhar (1998) for details of these various studies. However, few of these studies provide an analytical framework that assess the impact of EZs on their economies. Ge (1995) and Seyfried (1990) develop analytical models which examine both the direct and indirect 19
20 Incentives for Regional Development
impacts of EZs on their regional economies. Both concentrate on production in analyzing the effect of EZs, and focus on cost minimization for firms when they locate in the EZ. They ignore the effects of the EZ on labour. It appears that none of the existing studies considers the efficiency implications of EZs or constructs an analytical framework to study their effects on labour. It is important to take into account some physical characteristics of the area, and distress characteristics pertaining to labour in the area, because most EZ programmes, at least those in the USA, specify explicit distress criteria that are used for the designation of zones. For instance, in the state of Illinois, EZs are required to document size and distress criteria for designation (these criteria are described in detail in Chapter 3). The size criteria in Illinois relate to the geographical area of the zone. A proposed EZ in Illinois must also satisfy at least one of four distress criteria relating to poverty, unemployment, low income or population loss. In this chapter I attempt to answer the following questions in the model: are EZs efficient if they are adopted by high-unemployment areas? What are the impacts of the zone on the rest of the economy? The chapter addresses these issues and develops a framework to analyze the adoption of programmes such as EZs by high-unemployment areas and examines their efficiency. It also evaluates the impact of the zone on the rest of the economy, applying some of the standard literature on analyzing the effect of tax incentives.
2.3
Objectives of the model
The objectives of the model to evaluate the EZ are as follows: 1. To describe the consequences of disequilibrium in the labour market of the high-unemployment area before it is designated as EZ, and to examine the cause of unemployment in the EZ. 2. To show that the area’s unemployment rate determines the reservation wage along with a host of other factors affecting the benefits and costs of remaining unemployed. 3. To examine whether economic rent accruing from jobs to job searchers in the EZ is higher. 4. To characterize the effect of the tax abatement on capital given in the EZ, on the EZ and the rest of the economy, taking into account full capital mobility.
2.4
Assumptions of the model
The model is based on certain assumptions: 1. There are two areas in the economy: one designated as EZ and the other being the rest of the economy, which I refer to as the non-EZ area (NEZ).
Analytical Framework 21
The NEZ may be considered as all areas that do not have an EZ programme or other programmes that abate taxes. EZ firms produce good Z, and NEZ firms produce good Y. In reality, this assumption is consistent with the fact that certain areas specialize in the production of those goods in which they have a comparative advantage. Rubin and Zorn (1985) show the comparative cost advantage different states in the United States have in different SIC category industries. In India, a typology of cities and states is emerging whereby each specializes in the output of a certain good or service (textiles, information technology and IT-enabled services and so forth). Thus, based on comparative advantage, we could easily classify areas without a loss of generality. 2. Goods Y and Z are produced by two factors of production, capital (K) and labour (L). In taking into account capital and labour, all conventional factors of production – land, labour, capital and organization – are implicitly taken into account in the model, since land can be considered to be a special kind of capital (real capital), and organizational skills a special case of labour. LZ and LY refer respectively to labour employed in the EZ and the NEZ firms. KZ and KY refer to capital employed in the EZ and NEZ firms respectively. PZ and PY are the prices of the final goods Z and Y respectively. PKZ and PLZ refer to the factor prices of capital and labour respectively in the EZ. Similarly, PKY and PLY refer to factor prices and refer to the price paid by users of capital and the price of labour (wage) in the NEZ area. Because EZ areas are, in reality, blighted, it is assumed that fLZ (the marginal product of labour in the EZ) fLY (the marginal product of labour in the NEZ). This is the result of differences in the use of capital across the areas. Specifically, KZ/LZ KY/LY, and for this reason, the marginal product of labour in the EZ is lower than in the other areas. Because fLZ fLY, the labour market is not in equilibrium when the EZ is designated. The model elaborates on this. The capital market is in equilibrium so that PKZ PKY PK. This implies that fKZ fKY and PKZ PKY.4 Consumers supply the factors in fixed amounts. 3. It is assumed that production is subject to constant returns to scale (CRTS) technology. CRTS has many interesting properties. The assumption of CRTS means that the average as well as the marginal products of the factors are dependent only on the ratio in which they are combined (Chiang, 1984; Krauss and Johnson, 1974), which, here is the capital–labour ratio. In empirical work, studies have found that a majority of the two-digit SIC industries studied were subject to CRTS. An interesting early example is Moroney (1967), in which, based upon estimates of production functions in two-digit SIC manufacturing industries in the United States, he concluded that a majority of these industries were subject to CRTS. More recent
22 Incentives for Regional Development
examples relate to plant-level data. For example, Bailey et al. (1992) used plant-level data and found that the plants they examined were characterized by constant returns to scale. Griliches and Ringstad (1971) argued that essentially constant returns were needed to rationalize the observed large dispersion of establishment sizes within a given industry. Basu and Fernald (1997) concluded that a typical two-digit industry in the United States appears to have constant or slightly decreasing returns to scale. Thus, when we look at empirical work, it appears that CRTS may not be an unrealistic assumption to make. 4. Firms in the two areas are unequally factor intensive, or KY/LY is greater than KZ/LZ (Y relatively capital intense) at any given feasible factor–price ratio. This assumption, along with CRTS, creates a production-possibility frontier that is uniformly concave to the origin. 5. The model allows for unemployment to exist.5 This is consistent with the way in which EZs are designated on the basis of certain distress criteria that includes high unemployment. LZU is the number unemployed in the EZ. The total labour force in the EZ area is LZ LZU NZ. The model also allows for unemployment to exist in the NEZ (let’s say, the natural rate of unemployment), but it is less than that in the EZ so that it does not qualify for EZ designation. In the NEZ, the total labour force NY is equal to LY LYU. LYU is the number unemployed in the NEZ. The total labour force in the economy is NZ NY N. 6. Factors are paid according to the value of their marginal products in equilibrium. Taken along with the assumption that fLZ fLY, this assumption means that wages in the EZ in the initial equilibrium are lower than in the NEZ. Capital markets, however, are in equilibrium, meaning that although different amounts of capital are used, the price of capital is the same in the two areas in the initial equilibrium. 7. The government provides a subsidy on the use of capital as well as labour in the EZ. This is equivalent to a refund of taxes paid on capital and labour to firms in the EZ. 8. The prices of goods are defined such that the value of all goods in the original equilibrium is one.
2.5 2.5.1
The model Disequilibrium in the labour market
The disequilibrium in the labour market of the EZ is the result of its high unemployment rate, which, by definition, means that a large proportion of its labour force is unemployed. Butler (1981), one of the pioneers of the EZ concept in the United States, argued that minimum wage legislation is the primary cause of unemployment in the United States and that, therefore, relaxing this minimum wage
Analytical Framework 23
constraint in the areas designated as EZs would alleviate the level of unemployment. However, this still does not explain why unemployment is concentrated in certain areas that become designated as EZs. Clearly, then, the literature on EZs does not provide a model of unemployment in the EZs, that is, does not explain the cause of unemployment in EZs. This model makes an attempt to provide that explanation. Here I elaborate on the reasons for individual unemployment in the EZ and the rate of unemployment in the area. 2.5.2
A model of unemployment
The model of unemployment that is developed here derives from the neoclassical assumption of high reservation wages. This is the explanation that individuals are unemployed if their reservation wages exceed market wages. Such an explanation appears reasonable for individuals in the EZ because of their high reservation wages relative to the market wage prevailing in the EZ. The high reservation wages in the EZ is realistic because of the benefits of remaining unemployed in the United States (Feldstein, 1978).6 The income of the unemployed is high because they are most probably recipients of unemployment compensation and probably other non-market income such as welfare payments. Given their level of skills, these individuals are unlikely to find gainful employment. This causes them to remain unemployed. The literature on job search indicates that high reservation wages relative to market wages cause unemployment, especially when unemployment benefits are generous. Feldstein (1978) shows how a combination of a high marginal tax on earnings and no tax on unemployment compensation makes the private cost of unemployment small and causes an individual to remain unemployed. To understand this effect, consider a situation in which each job searcher faces a distribution of wage offers with wr (his reservation wage) E(w) (his expected wage) ws (the maximum wage given his skills). This may be graphically shown in Figure 2.1. In Figure 2.1, the horizontal axis is the wage rate w(s) (wage given skills). The vertical axis is a frequency (refers to the number) of job offers available at the various wage rates. In the middle of the curve is shown the highest frequency and it decreases as we move away from the mean/median/mode. The curve that is obtained is the probability density function of the random variable, wage. It is normally distributed with mean at E(w). Given that the person finds a job, his/her expected wage is the weighted average of the job offers in the w(r) to w(s) range. This average wage is denoted by E(w) in Figure 2.1, which shows that the mean is also the median and the mode (which is characteristic of normally distributed random variables). We know that the individual would reject any job offer that offers w wr. Thus the area under the curve between wr and ws represents the probability
Frequency of job offers
24 Incentives for Regional Development
0
wr
E(w)
ws
Wage rate Figure 2.1 The distribution of wage offers
of the job searcher finding an acceptable job in any period (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994). The higher this probability, the lower is the expected duration of unemployment. The benefits (such as unemployment compensation) of remaining unemployed essentially decrease the area under this curve by increasing wr (moves it further to the right) and lengthens the duration of unemployment. The unemployed in high-unemployment areas usually place a high value on the importance of having a job when compared to those in lowunemployment areas, as Bartik (1991) and Theodossiou (1992) argue, in the absence of policies that increase incomes of the unemployed (such as unemployment compensation). If such policies were to exist, they would only be willing to take up a job that offers income higher than their current income. But they are less mobile because of psychological ties to the area and the costs of relocation. These are also the ones with lower skills, less educated and likely are recipients of welfare payments.7 Therefore such individuals (who have high reservation wages relative to low market wages) tend to be concentrated in the EZ area. The market wage is low because profit-maximizing employers are willing to pay a wage only according to the skill of the workers. We know from assumption two of the model that fLZ fLY, that is, the marginal product of labour in the EZ is less than in the NEZ area. The literature on EZs points to the blight in these areas, which, according to this model, is due to the low capital–labour ratio in the EZ. The low capital–labour ratio leads to low productivity in the EZ for those employed and potential low productivity for
Analytical Framework 25
those who are unemployed. So the EZ labour force is eligible only for a lower market wage. This model offers an explanation as to why individuals with high reservation wages relative to low potential market wages tend to be concentrated in the EZ area. So prior to the designation of the area as an EZ, profitmaximizing employers do not have incentives to hire workers with low skills. It is also likely that these individuals are recipients of unemployment compensation, and are unlikely to find gainful employment given their skills, even though they do place a high value on the importance of having a job. So formally, the unemployment status (USij) of an individual i living in the jth area is determined by the difference between reservation and market wage: USij f(wijr wij)
(2.1)
where wijr is the reservation wage and wij is the market wage of the iith individual living in the jth area. The unemployment rate of the jth area may be summed over the unemployment status of i individuals living in the jth area.8 It may be written as follows:
Uj
兺 US i
ij
Population
(2.2)
Substituting for USij from (2.1):
Uj
兺 f(w i
r ij
wij)
Population
(2.3)
Thus, the aggregate unemployment rate in the jth area is dependent upon the extent to which reservation wages of individuals are higher than market wages in the aggregate. Specifically, (2.1) and (2.2) show that the unemployment rate of the EZ is high if the reservation wages of individuals are high relative to the market wage in the area. Thus, the high unemployment rate in the EZ is due to the low productivity of labour and their relatively higher reservation wages compared to the market wage. Thus, under conditions of high unemployment, EZ designation of the area acts as an important place-oriented policy to improve the blighted area in which tax abatements are provided to arrest the decline of the area. Tax abatements provide firms with incentives for investment. In section 2.5.3, I show how the tax abatement in the EZ induces in-migration of capital into the EZ due to the shifting of resources to the EZ area from the NEZ. I elaborate
26 Incentives for Regional Development
on the general equilibrium effects of tax abatement provided to firms in the EZ, first explaining the relationship between the reservation wage and the local unemployment rate and the effect of new employment on economic rents in the EZ. Next, in this section, I explain the relationship between the reservation wage and the unemployment rate. The reservation wage It is useful to recognize in a model that allows for unemployment that the standard environment in which job search is modelled involves the search for a job from a known distribution of job offers. Various models of job search ( Jones, 1989; Addison and Siebert, 1979; Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994) show that the unemployed individual’s decision to work is determined by the costs and benefits of unemployment. The model here follows Jones (1989) closely. As in Jones (1989), let be the instantaneous probability of receiving a job offer and F(w) be the distribution of job offers, b be the benefit level while remaining unemployed, and c be a measure of the costs of being unemployed. From the viewpoint of the individual job seeker, the decision to work is a function of the benefits and costs (b c) of remaining unemployed. I assume that job seekers try to maximize their utility by maximizing the income they receive from a job. Such utility-maximizing behaviour leads to the equation: rV b c
冕 max{0,W(x) V } dF(x) ⬁
(2.4)
0
In (2.4), r is the interest rate, V is the present discounted value of being unemployed, (b c) refers to the net benefits of being unemployed. The latter part of the equation represents the capital gains derived from the income from a job, which is the maximum of the net income from a job, W(x), (which is made net of the cost of being unemployed, V) if employment is found or zero. In such a situation, the optimal job search strategy displays the reservation wage property with the critical value being the reservation wage wr (Zuckerman, 1984). The reservation wage, or the lowest wage at which the unemployed are willing to supply positive labour (accept a new job), obeys: rV rW(w r ) w r
(2.5)
Equation (2.5) shows that the reservation wage wr equals imputed search income.9 Substituting for rV from (2.5) in (2.4), as in Jones (1989):
( )冕 max(x w ) dF(x)
wr b c r
⬁
wr
r
(2.6)
Analytical Framework 27
Thus the reservation wage, as in (2.6), equals the net benefits (b c) while unemployed, and a factor that depends on the expected wage in next employment adjusted for the arrival rate of job offers. Then it is possible to approximate (2.6) in some linear fashion, as in Jones (1989): wir ␣0 ␣1(bi ci) ␣2i ␣3i ei
(2.7)
In (2.7), bi ci is the difference between benefits and costs of remaining unemployed for the ith individual, i is the expected wage in next employment, i is the arrival rate of job offers as defined earlier, and ei is a random error term. i is a function of the various individual-specific characteristics as well as regional labour market conditions that determine the arrival rate of job offers. So i 兺j ␣3j Xij
(2.8)
The unemployment rate of the area is an important indicator of the regional labour market conditions that determines the arrival rate of job offers for individual i and so of his/her reservation wage. So, substituting for i in (2.7): wir ␣0 ␣1(bi ci) ␣2i ␣3Uij ei
(2.9)
Uij is the unemployment rate of the jth area ( j Z, NEZ) in which the ith individual lives. The model in (2.9) is estimable. Among plausibly many others Jones (1989) and Haurin and Sridhar (2003) estimate this relationship. Chapter 3 also estimates this relationship. Chapter 5 uses reservation wage estimates from Sridhar (1998). Moreover, a hypothesis can also be formulated with regard to the relationship between the reservation wage and the area’s unemployment rate. The actual experience of job seekers in high-unemployment areas shows that they are willing to accept lower reservation wages for some reasons: it is more likely than not that they are risk-averse. Although it is reasonable to expect that unemployed job seekers, even in high-unemployment areas, frequently begin their search with a high reservation wage, as time passes, they are likely to lower their reservation wage for reasons of family or financial hardship (Theodossiou, 1992). Thus the reservation wage of unemployed searchers can be considered to be a gradually declining function of time spent in unemployment, which is long in high-unemployment areas. This could be the case because they have family/psychological ties to the area or they are unwilling to bear the social or financial costs of relocation. The testable hypothesis that comes out of this is that unemployment rate of the area has a negative impact on the reservation wage of individuals residing in the area.
28 Incentives for Regional Development
Economic rent As in standard labour economic theory, we can define economic rent bij as the extent to which actual wages are above the reservation wage. That is: bij wij wijr, j EZ,NEZ
(2.10)
where wij and wijr are respectively the wage and reservation wage of the ith individual in the jth area,10 which could refer to the EZ area (EZ) or non-EZ area (NEZ). If the hypothesized relationship between the reservation wage and the area’s unemployment rate were true, the reservation wage (wrij) would be low in the EZ because of its high unemployment rate.11 However, wages (wZ) in the EZ are also low (compared to the NEZ) due to the low capital–labour ratio in the EZ (assumption six of the model). If a similar hypothesis were to hold in the NEZ, it would have higher reservation wage (wYr ) than the EZ. Wages in the NEZ (wY) are also high, by assumption six. So it is difficult to conclude whether the EZ or NEZ will benefit from higher economic rents. Thus, whether economic rents would be higher in high- or low-unemployment areas is an open question that can be tested in the empirical work. In the following section, I show how the tax abatement in the EZ induces in-migration of capital into the EZ from outside. I elaborate on the general equilibrium effects of tax abatement provided to firms in the EZ, and the effect of new employment on economic rents in the EZ. 2.5.3 The general equilibrium response to the tax abatement Harberger (1962) considers the effect (and the ultimate incidence) of a sector-specific corporation income tax, taking into account its general equilibrium effects on the entire economy. His analysis has become a standard framework for analyzing different kinds of taxes in the literature. I adopt his analytical framework in order to analyze the effect of the property tax abatement provided to firms in EZs that is equivalent to a tax cut on the use of capital in the EZ. In addition to a subsidy to capital, most state EZ programmes include a subsidy for labour. Reflecting this, the model includes a subsidy to labour. An equal subsidy for labour and capital is the same as a subsidy for the good produced by the sector. Therefore I decompose the subsidy to capital and labour into a subsidy for one input (that is, the tax abatement which is a subsidy to capital), and a subsidy for the output (produced by the EZ area). The subsidy for the output results in a reduction in the price of the good produced by the EZ area, which becomes (PZ CZ), where PZ is the price of the output, and CZ the subsidy on the output.
Analytical Framework 29
According to Harberger’s analysis, the tax abatement is equivalent to a tax cut which will have the immediate effect of creating a wedge between the price of capital between the EZ and the rest of the economy. Users of capital in the EZ pay a lesser price (PK AKZ) for the use of capital, where AKZ is the tax abated on capital invested in the EZ. The tax abatement has the effect of lowering the price of good Z that EZ firms produce because investors in the EZ can now produce and supply higher output at the same cost as before, because of the savings induced by the abatement. Investors in the NEZ firms still continue to pay the price on capital, PK, which includes the tax (there are no taxes abated in the NEZ). At this point, the NEZ firms will increase their supply of good Y by an amount sufficient to lower the price of Y on par with that of Z. Whether or not the NEZ firms are able to do this depends on the demand elasticity for the good (Z) produced by the EZ firms. The percentage change in the demand for Z as a result of the tax abatement, is formally derived below. The goods market: demand In a two-good economy, one would expect the demand for goods to have some price elasticity and that Z and Y would be substitutes. To see this, let us characterize the demand equation for Z as follows, following Harberger: Z f
冢P
Z
CZ PY
冣
(2.11)
Equation (2.11) shows that the demand for Z is a function of the price of Z and Y. Totally differentiating the demand for Z, dZ
⭸f
冢
PZ CZ ⭸ PY
PYdPZ PYdCZ (PZ CZ)dPY
冣
P2Y
(2.12)
In order to express the change in percentage form, we divide (2.12) by Z:
冤
冥
dZ ⭸Z 1 dPZ dCZ (PZ CZ) dPY Z PY PZ CZ Z PY P2Y ⭸ PY
(2.13)
By assumption 8 of the model, the price of goods (PZ CZ) and PY, are equal to one, and (2.13) can be written as: PZ CZ dZ Z [dPZ dCZ dPY] PY Z PZ CZ Z PY
(2.14)
30 Incentives for Regional Development
In (2.14), it may be noted that {[⭸z/⭸((PZCZ)/PY)] [((PZCY)/PY)/z]} is the demand elasticity for Z in terms of the relative prices (PZCZ/PY). So in simplified form, (2.14) may be written finally as: dZ (dPZ dCZ dPY) Z
(2.15)
where {[⭸z/⭸((PZCZ)/PY)] [((PZCY)/PY)/z]} Equation (2.15) shows that the percentage change in the demand for Z depends on elasticity of demand for Z in terms of relative prices. It should be noted that the elasticity appearing in (2.15) is compensated because the marginal propensity to consume of households and the government are assumed to be equal so that the income effect in consumer demand exactly offsets that in government demand (Myles, 1995). Thus only the substitution effect is present. If | | 0, the demand for Z (produced by the EZ firms) increases more than proportionately in response to a decrease in its price. The goods market: supply For market clearance, the percentage change in demand for Z must equal the percentage change in the supply of Z. To determine the percentage change in the supply of Z, we totally differentiate the production function Z f (KZ, LZ):
dZ
⭸f ⭸f dK dL ⭸KZ Z ⭸LZ Z
(2.16)
Expressing (2.16) in percentage change form, and dividing the LHS and RHS by Z and f respectively, ⭸f ⭸f ⭸K ⭸L dZ Z Z dKZ dLZ Z Supply f f
冏
(2.17)
Multiplying and dividing through by KZ and LZ ⭸f ⭸f KZ LZ ⭸K dK ⭸L dLZ dZ Z Z Z Z Supply KZ LZ f f
冏
(2.18)
Analytical Framework 31
Equation (2.18) can be written as: dZ Z
冏
Supply
KZ
dKZ dLZ LZ KZ LZ
(2.19)
In (2.19), it may be noted that ⍜KZ is the share of capital income in the value-added, ⍜LZ is the share of labour income, in the value added for firms in the EZ. Equation (2.19) shows that the percentage change in the supply of output by EZ firms depends upon the shares of labour and capital income in the value-added for EZ firms. The factor market: firms’ demand for factors Because of a shift in demand for good Z, increased profits accrue to EZ firms that produce Z. So the NEZ capital will have an incentive to flow into the EZ, in order to equalize returns to factors in both the areas. What happens then depends on relative factor intensities, and the firms’ demand for factors in the two areas. Following Harberger, changes in factor demands can be specified in terms of their direct elasticities of substitution. So I define elasticities of substitution, as in Tresch (1981): K 冢 L 冣 S f d log冢 冣 f K d log冢 冣 L S f d log冢 冣 f d log
Z
Z
(2.20)
z
LZ
KZ
Y
Y
(2.21)
Y
LY
KY
SZ and SY are, respectively, the direct elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, of firms in the EZ and NEZ. With the marginal products in the EZ and NEZ firms equal to their respective price ratios, we can write:
冢f 冣 d log冢P
d log
fLZ
K
KZ
AKZ PLZ
冢f 冣 d log冢PP 冣
d log
fLY
K
KY
LY
冣
(2.22)
(2.23)
32 Incentives for Regional Development
Then, substituting for the ratio of marginal products from (2.22) in (2.20), we have:
冢KL 冣 S d log冢P Z
d log
AKZ PLZ
K
Z
Z
冣
(2.24)
Similarly,
冢KL 冣 S d log冢PP 冣 Y
d log
K
(2.25)
Y
Y
LY
Consider the LHS of equation (2.24),
冢KL 冣 K1 d冢KL 冣 K1 冤L dK L K dL 冥 Z
d log
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
LZ
Z
Z
Z
2 Z
Z
LZ
冢dKK 冣 冢dLL 冣 Z
Z
Z
(2.26)
Z
Similarly for the price ratios,
冢P
d log
K
冣
AKZ dPK dAKZ dPLZ PLZ PK AKZ PLZ
Because PK PLZ 1,
冢P
d log
K
冣
AKZ dPK dAKZ dPLZ PLZ 1 AKZ
(2.27)
Substituting (2.26) and (2.27) into (2.24) gives us:
冢dKK 冣 冢dLL 冣 S 冢dP1 AdA Z
Z
K
KZ
Z
Z
Z
dPLZ
KZ
冣
(2.28)
When we do this similarly for Y, we get:
冢dKK 冣 冢dLL 冣 S (dP Y
Y
Y
Y
K
dPLY)
(2.29)
Y
Equations (2.28) and (2.29) show that the percentage change in the demand for capital over labour by firms depends on the elasticity of substitution between the factors as well as change in their prices. Thus, the relative growth of demand for capital and labour will differ. While factor markets
Analytical Framework 33
continue to equate factor prices with values of marginal products, equilibrium is attained only when factor prices (wages and returns to capital) are equalized across the areas. As capital continues to flow into the EZ, demand for labour increases, as described above. This increases employment (LZ) in the EZ. However, it has to be noted that first-order effects always dominate. This means that firms that eventually locate in the EZ are more capital-intensive, although they also have increased demand for labour.12 Note that the subsidy to capital in the EZ equates the capital–labour ratios across the two areas now. With increasing employment in the EZ, there is a high probability that local residents will fill the jobs created by the new capital. This is because new jobs in the EZ are assumed to be allocated to unemployed on a random selection process. When the selection process for jobs is random, zone residents (even though they have few skills) have an equal chance of being selected from the pool of unemployed, by employers who are now subsidized. The assumption of a random selection process in the EZ when firms create jobs is supported by empirical evidence from the United States. Empirical work from the US reports that, on average, about 50 per cent of jobs created in the EZ go to zone residents. In a collection of ten case studies of statedesignated EZs, the (US Department of HUD, 1986) observed that 70 per cent of jobs created each in the Bridgeport EZ, CT and the Chicago EZ, IL, 46 per cent in the Macon EZ, MO, 19 per cent in Michigan City, IN, 30 per cent in the Tampa zone (FL) and 5 per cent of the York zone (PA), were held by zone residents. In the Louisville (Kentucky) zone, it was found that 31 per cent of the jobs created were held by persons who were either lower income or zone residents. Erickson and Friedman (1989), based on a survey of local EZ coordinators conducted by the US Department of HUD, found that the mean share of jobs held by zone residents was over 61 per cent, with a median of over 68 per cent. Data from Immergluck (1997), from the Chicago EZ, indicated that the barriers between EZ residents and jobs were dependent on some factors. He found that local employment was much higher in Latino parts of the zone and in African American neighbourhoods where there were more public sector jobs, very small firms and few manufacturers. Such data are sparse in the context of developing countries such as India. I report some evidence of this in Chapter 7 from India’s growth centres. Thus, when a substantial portion of the jobs that are created are held by zone residents the unemployment rate of the EZ falls. With an increasing use of capital and an increase in the capital–labour ratio, both labour productivity and industrial output rise. Some explanations for rising industrial output (apart from the increasing use of capital) could be due to improved managerial and organizational capabilities and enhanced labour efficiency through on-the-job training programmes in the EZ area.
34 Incentives for Regional Development
Thus, at the optimum, the unemployment rate in the EZ is lower than in the initial equilibrium, and that in the NEZ is the same as before. This is because of firms’ increasing demand for labour, made possible by the rise in the capital–labour ratio (resulting from the subsidy to capital), and the rising productivity of labour in the EZ. We have to note that, by assumption, the NEZ operates at a natural rate of unemployment. Tobin (1972) estimated that a 5 to 6 per cent natural rate of unemployment has been associated with more than 20 per cent excess capacity in the capital stock. Thus the EZ acts only as a tool to direct the excess capacity of capital in the full-employment areas to high-unemployment areas and serves to reduce their unemployment rate. The model says that capital moves across areas; this does not necessarily imply the migration of firms. But the movement of capital causes an improvement in the total economy’s overall well-being, although a change in the price of capital initiated in one area due to the existence of the EZ, is transmitted to other areas.
Market clearance For market clearance, the goods and factor markets have to remain in balance. The following has to be true for the goods market to be in equilibrium: dZ Z
冏
Demand
dZ Z
冏
(2.30) Supply
Because capital and labour are in fixed supply, the amounts of their inmigration into the EZ must be equal to the amount of their out-migration from the non-EZ region so that: dKZ dKY
(2.31)
dLZ dLY
(2.32)
The above conditions show that what capital and labour the EZ gains must be equal to the amounts of the factors lost by the non-EZ area. Comparative statics: change in capital and labour in the EZ In order to obtain the change in the capital invested (dKZ) and labour (dLZ) in the EZ at the equilibrium as in Harberger’s model, I follow the procedure described in Myles (1995) most closely. After some manipulation, we end up with a system of three simultaneous equations that can be solved simultaneously for dKZ, dLZ, and dPK.13 The simultaneous system that was used to solve for dKZ, dLZ, and dPK is shown below in matrix form.
Analytical Framework 35
冤
fKZ KZ 1 KZ 1 KY
fLZ LZ 1 LZ 1 LY
冥冤 冥 冤
(fKZ fKY) SZ (1 AKZ) SY
dKZ dLZ dPK
冥
dAKZfKZ SZ SZdPLZ (1 AKZ) SYdPLY
The simultaneous system, when solved, gives the solution for dKZ, dLZ, and dPK. The exact expressions obtained for dKZ and dLZ (which are of greater interest, because one of the important goals of EZs is to promote employment and investment growth in the designated areas) are quite cumbersome and so I do not report them here. They are reported in the Appendix to this chapter. It is sufficient to note that the change in capital invested and labour, dKZ and dLZ, depend on the relative magnitude of certain parameters in equilibrium. The framework provided above indicates that the effect of the tax abatement on dKZ, and dLZ is testable. More generally, the Harberger analysis, when applied to property tax abatements in EZs, indicates that the capital and employment impact of the tax cut on capital in the EZ depends on three sets of parameters: (i) Relative factor intensities of firms in the two areas; (ii) The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in firms in the areas; (iii) The price elasticities of demand for goods Z and Y produced by EZ and NEZ firms respectively. The analysis also indicates that it is impossible to isolate the incidence of the tax cut given in the EZ and restrict it to the EZ alone. Because competitive factor markets equalize returns to capital everywhere in the economy, if investors in the EZ enjoyed an increase in the return to capital, investors everywhere will also experience the same increase. Moreover because goods and factor markets are interdependent, the changes could get transmitted to consumers in the form of changes in goods prices. Thus, Harberger’s analysis describes how the migration of capital occurs in response to changes in the rate of return to capital across areas. The general equilibrium response to the tax abatement is shown in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.2 shows that the tax abatement (tax cut) on capital leads to in-migration of capital into the EZ. Depending on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour (SZ), the new capital leads to increase in productivity, wages and employment. This affects the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate finally determines the reservation wage. The difference between wages and reservation wages determines economic rent.
36 Incentives for Regional Development
Enterprise zone (EZ)
Rest of economy (non-EZ)
Reservation wage (w rZ)
Reservation wage (w rY)
Unemployment rate (UZ)
Unemployment rate (UY) Economic rent
Employment (LZ)
Employment (LY) Migration of capital (dKZ)
Wages (wZ)
Elasticity of substitution between capital and labour (SZ)
Price of capital less tax abatements (PK – AKZ)
Capital in-migration
Wages (wY) Capital out-migration Elasticity of substitution between capital and labour (SY)
Price of capital (no abatements) (PK)
Figure 2.2 The impact of the EZ (tax incentives) with capital mobility
More specifically, the testable hypotheses that emerge from the theoretical model are: (i) The relationship between the reservation wage and unemployment rate; (ii) The determinants of area unemployment rate being the EZ (or the existence of other incentive programmes), the duration of the programme’s existence and labour in-migration into the area. It may be noted that the context for this test is laid out in Figure 2.2. A reduction in the price of capital through tax abatements (that occurs only in EZ-designated or incentive areas) increases the capital–labour ratio in the EZ and increases labour productivity, raising wages and employment and affects the unemployment rate. Thus, zone designation, and the duration of the zone’s existence, affect the area’s unemployment rate, according to the model. Thus, one of the testable hypotheses that emerges from the model is that in an empirical examination of the unemployment rate, we include a dummy for (tax or infrastructure) incentive programmes, and the duration of the zone’s existence, in addition to other controls as exogenous variables. This is empirically tested in Chapters 4 and 6.
Analytical Framework 37
In the empirical work, one could also empirically test other hypotheses that emerge from the theoretical model. The question as to whether or not dAjz dbjz, that is, whether the cost of the abatement (EZ programme) exceeds the economic rent in the EZ, at equilibrium, forms the basis for the benefit–cost analysis in the empirical work reported in Chapters 3 and 5.
2.6
Predictive power of the model
It is a widely accepted view that a model should be judged by the accuracy with which it can predict what we observe, as well as the realism of its assumptions. The predictive power of the model that is presented here depends upon the realism of the assumptions. First, the assumption of disequilibrium in the EZ before EZ designation is consistent with what we observe. EZs are in reality abandoned areas with high unemployment rates (when we take into account the designation criteria in most of the state EZ programmes). Hence for persons in the EZ, the job search behaviour characterized by low reservation wages seems realistic due to reasons of family, other social/psychological reasons or the costs of relocation. Further, the general equilibrium response to the tax abatement is to be expected because of the inherent mobility of capital, in response to changes in its price, until it is equalized across areas. Further, the effects could also be transmitted to the goods market in both areas. Thus, the analysis indicates that it is impossible to isolate the incidence of the tax abatement to the EZ alone, which mirrors the real-world situation. A simple example of this in the model is the movement of capital. The model indicates that the migration of capital (although not necessarily of firms) serves to lower the unemployment rate in the EZs, without changing that in the other areas. Thus, when we begin with realistic assumptions regarding initial conditions in the EZ and study the implications of a tax abatement in the context of a theoretical framework, we obtain a set of hypotheses that seem both plausible and testable. Given these facts, the model that is presented here is of sufficient generality that it is applicable to most place-oriented programmes. In the forthcoming chapters, I provide empirical evidence of the effectiveness of such place-oriented programmes.
Appendix Solutions for change in employment and investment in EZ A.1 Solution to the system of equations The simultaneous equations are in matrix form, and Cramer’s rule is used to solve for dKZ and dLZ. So dKZ
兩D1兩 兩D兩
38 Incentives for Regional Development
where |D| is the determinant of the matrix and |D1| is the determinant of the matrix with its first column replaced by the d vector. So
冤
冥
SYdPLY SZfLZ (fKZ fKY)
LZ 1 AKZ
冤
冥
S dA f SZ(fKZ fKY) (dPLZ(1 AKZ) dAKZ) LY(1 AKZ) Z KZ KZ dKZ
冤
冥
SYdAKZfKZ fLZSYSZ dPLZ(1 AKZ) dAKZ LY LZ 1 AKZ
冤
冥 (f
SZfKZ 1 1 (1 AKZ) KYLZ LYKZ
KZ
冤K 1L
fKY)
Y Z
冥
冤
冥
fKZ fLZ 1 SZ LYKZ KZLZ
In a very similar way, dLZ
兩D2兩 兩D兩
where |D| is the determinant of the matrix as before and |D2| is the determinant of the matrix with its second column now replaced by the d vector. The expression obtained for dLZ turns out to be: 1 [SZ(dAKZfKZ (dAKZ dPLZ(1 AKZ) (fKZ fKY)))] KY(1 AKZ) SYdPLYfKZ dLZ
冤L (1S A Z
Z
冤
KZ)
冥
冥 (f
SKZfKZ 1 1 (1 AKZ) KYLZ LYKZ
冤
冥
SYSZfKZ dAKZ dPLZ(1 AKZ) (1 fKY) KZ LZ (1 AKZ) KZ
冤K 1L
fKY)
Y Z
冥
冤
冥
fKZ fLZ 1 SZ LYKZ KZLZ
3 Competition Among American States: Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones
3.1
Introduction
Until recently, supply-side regional development policy, consisting of financial and tax incentives, credits, and abatements, was believed to be ineffective. First, such policy was thought to have no effect on firms’ location decisions; secondly, it was argued that such policies were zero-sum games that redistributed jobs between places, while leaving the total number of jobs within the economy unchanged. The previous chapter developed an analytical model to study the impact of policies such as EZs not only on the economy of the region in which it is situated, but also on the rest of the economy. In this chapter, we examine empirically whether such policies produce net benefits and have favourable equity implications. Using data from the EZs of Illinois in the Midwestern United States, this chapter answers, from a local and state perspective, the challenge raised against the zero-sum nature of supply-side regional development policy. Illinois is selected because it is one of the most important states in the Midwestern United States. Furthermore, Illinois was one of the first states in the United States to adopt the enterprise zone legislation once the EZ concept had been imported from the United Kingdom in the 1980s. The previous chapter showed why reservation wages can be expected to be lower in high-unemployment areas. This chapter will focus on whether tax incentives can produce positive net benefits and have equity implications. Specifically, this chapter examines the following questions: Are benefits greater than costs when state and local governments grant tax incentives to businesses? Are the benefits from tax incentives greater in highunemployment areas, because of low reservation wages, when compared to low-unemployment areas? While the first question addresses efficiency considerations, the second question takes into account the redistributive implications of supply-side policy. 39
40 Incentives for Regional Development
The chapter is organized as follows. First, the theory behind the research is reviewed, along with the assumptions of the research; then an introductory section on EZs is followed by a description of how work in this chapter differs from earlier literature. Since EZs in Illinois have been chosen for the analysis, one section describes the Illinois programme. This background of the study area is provided in order to facilitate a broader understanding of the benefit–cost analysis of the programme presented in the chapter. The Illinois background section is followed by measures of costs and benefits chosen for the analysis, the research methodology, and the results from the regression and benefit–cost analysis. The chapter concludes by summarizing the results, drawing implications, and indicating areas for further research.
3.2
Theoretical framework
As discussed in Chapter 1, Bartik (1991) challenges the conclusion that supply-side policies were ineffective and had zero-sum effects. The bulk of the empirical evidence reviewed by Bartik for the USA supported the contention that supply-side, cost-reducing incentives had measurable effects on business location decisions, contrary to earlier evidence. Bartik’s econometric studies indicated that the long-run elasticity of business activity with respect to state and local taxes is in the range of 1.0 to 3.0 for intra-metropolitan location decisions (Bartik, 1991: 43). That is, if a small suburban jurisdiction within a metropolitan area raised its taxes by 10 per cent, it could expect in the long run a reduction in its business activity by 10 to 30 per cent. Bartik (1991) showed that a redistribution of jobs could result in net benefits to the locality adopting the policy, on grounds of equity. Bartik concluded that the benefits of redistributing jobs to high-unemployment areas were likely to be higher because of lower reservation wages, defined as the lowest price at which an individual is willing to work. The social benefits or economic rent from a job are equal to the wages paid minus the reservation wage. Since the reservation wage is inversely related to the value placed on having a job, in a high-unemployment area, many individuals who place a high value on getting a job will remain unemployed for a long time and will have low reservation wages. In such cases, the net benefit of a job – the wages paid minus the reservation wage – is high. Conversely, given the wages paid, an individual with a higher reservation wage will derive less benefit from a job. Thus, in a high-unemployment area, the benefits from a given number of jobs would be higher because of lower reservation wages and greater net benefits per job. Since this argument is plausible, this chapter provides empirical evidence of the proposition that the benefits of tax incentives are greater than their costs, which was also a testable hypothesis that emerged from the model developed in Chapter 2. In particular, this chapter provides some empirical evidence to examine whether the benefits are greater than costs in
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 41
high-unemployment areas because of low reservation wages, from the EZs of Illinois, one of the most important states in the Midwestern US. 3.2.1
Assumptions
One basic assumption underlying the research questions to be answered in this chapter is that tax incentives affect decisions about business location; a related assumption is that all location factors, with the exception of zone incentives, are similar among sites that firms are considering. In other words, it is assumed that employment generated in these zones is attributable to zone incentives. Further, it is assumed that jobs created in the zones will be filled by the local unemployed, primarily to justify local expenditure (a different version of this assumption is used in Sridhar (1998), a study which evaluates Ohio’s programme). Even though this assumption may not always be realistic, and many jobs from local growth are held by in-migrants moving between areas, as Bartik (1991) demonstrates, local job growth affects the unemployment rate and labour force participation rate in a persistent manner.1 Therefore, it can be expected that the jobs created in the zone will have some effects on the local unemployed. Given these assumptions, the research questions pertaining to supply-side policies are studied with respect to EZs in the state of Illinois. Supply-side policies, as opposed to new-wave policies, as highlighted in Chapter 1, consist of financial incentives such as industrial revenue bonds (IRBs), property tax abatements, direct state loans, and non-financial incentives (such as customized industrial training), which are primarily targeted at branch plant recruitment. Since EZs offer incentives targeted at plant recruitment, they may be considered as representing traditional – or supply-side regional – development policy. Selecting zones within a single state controls for variation in enabling legislation and the general climate surrounding the package of incentives (Reese, 1991). Furthermore, EZs in Illinois (IL) are designated on the basis of diverse distress criteria relating to income, population, and poverty, in addition to unemployment. So not all zones in Illinois are necessarily highunemployment areas. If it were, indeed, the case that all zones were highunemployment areas, the sample would be too homogeneous to test the proposition that competition encourages growth in these areas. Since zones in Illinois are either high unemployment or high-poverty, low-income or high-population loss areas, the choice of these zones would be varied enough to test the hypothesis of research in this chapter.
3.3
Description of EZs in the United States
There are two separate sets of EZ programmes that operate in the US – one at the federal level and the other at the state level. The federal programme initially
42 Incentives for Regional Development
added 11 empowerment zones and 99 communities to the list of state zones (Peters and Fisher, 2002). The United States Department of HUD re-energized the Federal Renewal Communities (RCs), Urban Empowerment Zones and Urban Enterprise Communities (ECs) Initiative in December 2001 by designating 40 urban and rural RCs and eight new urban ECs. These new designees were able to use a $22 billion tax incentive package to open new businesses, provide thousands of new jobs, and rehabilitate and build new housing, in these urban and rural areas located throughout the United States. These are federally designated areas and are administered by the US Department of HUD. Around 35 of the 50 states in the United States have state enterprise zone legislation that enables them to target their distressed areas for growth with the use of incentives. In this and forthcoming chapters dealing with empirical work relating to place-oriented programmes such as EZs and GCs, the focus is the state-administered programmes (not programmes that are centrally or federally administered) because they allow enough flexibility and variation to states in administering the programmes. Table 3.1 summarizes the studies carried out to date on state EZs. While providing a summary and critical overview, the table demonstrates that one question left unanswered by the literature thus far is whether EZs have favourable equity implications because of low reservation wages. So far, in the literature, benefits from jobs created in or redistributed to EZs have not been viewed in the light of reservation wages. Table 3.1 Summary of selected studies on enterprise zones Study
State/Zone
Measure
Technique
Finding
Keefe, 2004
California
Employment growth
Propensity score matching model
Positive
Lambert and Coomes, 2001
Louisville EZ, KY
Jobs and capital formation
Shift-share
High programme costs and low economic benefits
Boarnet and Bogart, 1996
New Jersey
Employment and municipal property values
Econometric evidence
Negative
Dowall, 1996
California
Jobs and business investment
Shift-share analysis and survey
Zone incentives have done little
Logan Jr and A. Barron, 1991
Florida
Jobs, housing
Descriptive statistics
Inconclusive
Rubin, 1991
New Jersey
Tax revenue from investment
I–O analysis
Positive
P. Grasso and S. Crosse, 1991
Maryland
Employment growth
Interrupted time series
Inconclusive
Elling and Sheldon, 1991
IL, IN, KY, OH
Ability of zones to attract firms
Multiple regression
Modest
L. Papke, 1991
Indiana
Jobs
Cost/Job
Positive
Continued
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 43 Table 3.1
Continued
Study
State/Zone a
Measure
Technique
Finding
Dabney, 1991
See note
Location
ANOVA
Negative for high-tech
Rubin and Wilder, 1989
Evansville, IN
Comparative advantage of the zone
Shift-share
Positive
US GAO, 1988
Maryland
Employment levels
Interrupted time series
Negative
CA OAG, 1988
California
Employment growth
Descriptive statistics
Positive
US HUD, 1986
Bridgeport, CT
Jobs
Local officials’ assessments
Positive
US HUD, 1986
Chicago, IL
Unemployment
Local officials’ assessments
Modest
US HUD, 1986
Dayton, OH
Unemployment rate
Local officials’ assessments
Little change
US HUD, 1986
Louisville, KY
Jobs
Local officials’ assessments
Positive for small firms
US HUD, 1986
Macon, MO
Investment, jobs
Local officials’ assessments
Positive
US HUD, 1986
St Louis, MO
Jobs to zone residents
Local officials’ assessment
Negative
US HUD, 1986
Michigan City, IN
Potential success
Local officials’ assessments
Modest
US HUD, 1986
Tampa, FL
Firm decisions to invest
Local officials’ assessments
Modest
US HUD, 1986
Thief River Falls, MN
Location decisions
Interview with firm representatives
Modest
US HUD, 1986
York, PA
Location decisions
Local officials’ assessments
Negative
Note: a. The study by Dabney examines eight EZs in different states. The locations are Baltimore, Maryland; Dayton, Ohio; Decatur, Illinois; Louisville, Kentucky; Norwalk, Connecticut; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; St Louis, Missouri; and Topeka, Kansas.
This chapter analyzes the relationship between benefits from jobs created (or redistributed) in EZs and their reservation wages. Using a cross-section of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 1987, I estimate reservation wages and net benefits from jobs created in the zones of Illinois, and compare them to the costs of the programme.
3.4
Description of enterprise zones in Illinois
At the time research for this chapter was completed, the Illinois Department of Commerce and Community Affairs (DCCA) was administering the EZ programme. Since this time, the name of the DCCA has been changed to the
44 Incentives for Regional Development
Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO). All Illinois municipalities and counties, individually or in combination, may apply for enterprise zone designation. EZs in Illinois can vary in size from 0.80 square kilometres (half a square mile) to 24 square kilometres (15 square miles). In 2004, the state has 95 zones (at the time the research was completed, there were 90 zones). There are some size and distress criteria an area must meet in order to be designated an enterprise zone in Illinois. 3.4.1
Size criteria for enterprise zone designation
The following are criteria for an area to be designated an EZ in this state. The criteria below are based upon amendments to the relevant Act, as found in Section 520.210, effective 14 February 2003 (obtained from the Illinois DCEO): (i)
(ii)
An enterprise zone must be a minimum of 0.80 square kilometres (onehalf square mile) and may be up to 24 square kilometres (15 square miles), excluding lakes and waterways. Where the EZ is a joint effort of three or more units of government, or two or more units of government, if located in a township divided by a municipality of 1,000,000 or more inhabitants, and where the certification has been in effect at least one year, the minimum is 0.80 square kilometres (one-half square mile) and the maximum is 21 square kilometres (13 square miles), excluding lakes and waterways. The area must be contiguous, but should not include wholly surrounded territory within its boundaries. In terms of coverage, the areas must: (a) be entirely within a municipality; or (b) be entirely within the unincorporated areas of a county, except where reasonable need is established for such zone to cover parts of more than one municipality or county; or (c) comprise all or part of a municipality and an unincorporated area of a county.
3.4.2
Distress criteria for zone designation
There are some distress and other criteria an area should also meet in order to be eligible to apply for enterprise zone designation in Illinois. A proposed EZ must satisfy at least one of four distress criteria concerning poverty, unemployment, low income, or population loss: (i)
(ii)
Unemployment: The unemployment criterion is met if the zone has an annual average unemployment rate of at least 120 per cent of the state’s average unemployment rate for the 12 months ending the previous 30 June. Anyone who is not presently employed and/or has exhausted all unemployment benefits is considered to be unemployed, for purposes of calculating the unemployment rate. Poverty: The poverty criterion is met if the poverty rate for each census tract, minor civil division or county civil division that contains any part
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 45
of the area proposed as an Enterprise Zone is at least 20 per cent, as of the 2000 Federal Census. The poverty rate is computed using the number of persons in families or who reside together as unrelated individuals who had incomes below the poverty threshold in the 2000 Federal Census, as a proportion of population. (iii) Low income: The low-income criterion is met if at least 70 per cent of the households in the zone have incomes equal to or less than 80 per cent of the median household income of the community in which the zone is located. (iv) Population loss: The population loss criterion is met if the enterprise zone suffered a population decrease of 20 per cent or more between 1980 and 2000, as determined by Federal Census data for those years.
3.4.3
Other criteria
Other criteria that were subsequently added to size and distress criteria for areas to be designated as zones in Illinois, are described below: (i) Job creation: The Illinois DCEO may designate an area as an Enterprise Zone when such designation results in the development of ‘substantial’ employment opportunities by creating or retaining a minimum of 1,000 full-time equivalent jobs due to an investment of $100 million or more, and help alleviate the effects of poverty and unemployment within or the vicinity of the zone. New units of government being added to an existing Enterprise Zone must qualify under the same qualification criteria as the existing Enterprise Zone. (ii) Closed military bases: A military base closed by the United States Department of Defense that has been properly designated as and is currently operating as a Local Redevelopment Agency. (iii) Although the DCEO does not require the applicant to use census geography boundaries as the boundaries for the EZ, census geography must be used to demonstrate how the area meets one of the eligibility criteria. The census geographies to be used have to be the smallest geographies for which data are available and which encompass the entire proposed Enterprise Zone. When an Enterprise Zone boundary splits a census tract, county civil division, or minor civil division, the rules specify that data for block groups or enumeration districts have to be entirely within the Enterprise Zone and those that include any part of the Enterprise Zone should be included in the calculation. The number of zones in Illinois increased from 90 in 1992 to 95 in 2004. This increase in the number of zones over the decade could be the result of the addition of new criteria pertaining to job creation or military bases, or more areas qualifying according to pre-existing criteria, relating to size
46 Incentives for Regional Development
or distress. It is interesting to note non-distress criteria such as jobs and closed military bases. Criteria such as ‘substantial job creation’ can be subjective and discretionary, and they suggest that potentially non-deserving areas could also secure zone designation and use tax incentives to attract firms to their area, at the cost of the exchequer. This study uses a sample of 68 zones for which data on unemployment were available at the time the research was completed. Of these 68 zones, 48 were high-unemployment areas, whose unemployment rates in 1990 were above 120 per cent of the average unemployment rate for the state during the year. The remaining zones were either average- or low-unemployment areas. Figure 3.1 shows a frequency distribution of the unemployment rates in the zones. The unemployment rate is normally distributed, with ten zones in the state having unemployment rates between 0 and 6.6 per cent (the Illinois average for 1992); ten zones with unemployment rates between 6.6 and 7.92 per cent, which is 120 per cent of the state average; and so on. The largest number of zones (36) had unemployment in the range 7.92–14.51 per cent, according to 1992 data. According to the state’s distress criteria for EZ designation, zones are considered high-unemployment areas if they have unemployment greater than 120 per cent of the state average. In terms of this criterion, 48 out of the 68 zones chosen had unemployment rates greater than 7.92 per cent as of 1992 (see Figure 3.1), and have been classified as high-unemployment areas. The variation in unemployment rates among zones was sufficient to test the hypotheses with regard to high unemployment areas. The benefit–cost analyses reported in this chapter are based on 1992 Illinois EZ programme data. Note that while current data are available for the state’s EZs, more recent data are not available for reservation wages.
Number of zones in the range
40
36
35 30 25 20 15 10
10
10
11
5
1
0 0–6.59
6.6–7.91 7.92–14.51 14.52–21.11 21.12–27.72 Range of unemployment rate (%)
Figure 3.1 Distribution of unemployment rate in Illinois EZs
0 >27.72
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 47
The reservation wage question was not asked of respondents in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics after 1987 (http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu). Note that it is the assumptions and methodology that are of interest here. The analysis can be easily replicated for recent years without loss of generality. 3.4.4
Incentives in the Illinois EZ package
The IL DCEO describes many of the tax benefits available to businesses locating in Illinois EZs. These include investment tax credit, sales tax deduction, machinery and equipment sales tax exemption, utility tax exemption (applicable to gas, electricity, and telecommunications companies), jobs tax credit on Illinois income taxes, local property tax incentives (the most important for the work in this chapter) and dividend deductions. We are interested in the property tax abatements offered to firms, as a measure of the programme costs. This is because the other incentives noted above are state-level and would be predetermined as far as local governments are concerned. Further, some state-level incentives could well be the same across several zones. Since we are interested in local net benefits, the analogous measure of costs has to be local, and the property tax abatement is the most relevant to consider as programme cost. Property tax abatement There are two types of property tax abatements in Illinois EZs: tax abatement and assessment reduction (available only in Cook County).2 Any taxing district may abate any portion of its taxes on real property located within an EZ. However, the amount cannot exceed that attributable to improvements, renovation, or rehabilitation of existing improvements. This is a local incentive, and hence the abatement rates and amounts can vary from zone to zone. Industrial property in Cook County is generally assessed at 36 per cent of its market value. Under the EZ special incentives, improvements to EZ property are assessed only at 16 per cent of market value for eight years as part of the Cook County assessment reduction incentive. As explained by the DCEO, the tax rate remains the same, but a company’s tax liability drops because the rate is multiplied by a much smaller property value. Other counties in IL assess all property at 33 per cent of its market value. In all cases, under the EZ programme, the value of abated property is subtracted from the tax base prior to calculation of the tax rate. Table 3.2 summarizes the achievements of the Illinois enterprise zone programme to date. The programme has seen a steady increase in the number of businesses investing, jobs created, and the dollar amount of actual investments made by individual firms in the zones registering the highest percentage increase over 1991–2004. Note that the actual number of ‘jobs retained’ has shown a decline over 1991–2004. ‘Jobs retained’ are jobs that would have moved out of the zones if incentives had not been provided. It is not clear what the counterfactual is – that is, what would have happened
48 Incentives for Regional Development Table 3.2 Achievements of the Illinois enterprise zone programme
Number of businesses investing Investment by companies (in $ million) Jobs created Jobs retained
Annual average, 1984–89
1991
2004
% change, 1991–2004
875
1,528
2,136
39.79
670 9,070 20,050
1,010 9,823 31,319
2,503 13,966 19,070
147.82 42.18 39.11
Source: Illinois DCEO.
if incentives had not been provided. Would jobs have moved out, or would they have remained there if incentives had not been given? Many firms use ‘moving out’ as a threat with local governments, if incentives are not given. But it is not clear if they would have actually moved even if the incentive had not been given. Because of this ambiguity, decline in the number of jobs retained is perfectly consistent with a programme doing well.
3.5
Research methodology
As noted above, research in this chapter assumes that the tax incentives available in the enterprise zone programme are responsible for creating jobs; however, this may not always be true. There are two other possibilities: 1. The programme might merely redistribute jobs from one location to another. 2. The programme may not do anything at all (neither create nor relocate jobs). Regarding the assumption of research in this chapter that incentives affect business location decisions and are responsible for creating jobs, note that Bartik’s summary of existing empirical research on the topic shows that tax incentives affect business location decisions. Based on this assumption, we are concerned with two possibilities: the programme creates jobs, or, that it merely redistributes jobs. The research methodology formulated takes these alternatives into account. Option two above (that the programme may not do anything at all) is not considered relevant. McDonald (1997) argues that there are problems with such an approach for two reasons: First, the counterfactual (the effect on employment in the absence of the programme) is not taken into account. Secondly, job creation is not a valid measure of gain from the programme. This is because job creation in IL is coincident with a firm obtaining a building permit to qualify
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 49
for the sales tax exemption on building materials (as shown in Redfield and McDonald, 1991), whereas building permits are continually issued and jobs created in the local economy. McDonald argues that it is not clear if this can be attributed to the existence of the EZ or to the tax incentives. The problems McDonald discusses relate to the counterfactual, which I do not deal with in a systematic manner here. In Chapter 4, I estimate an econometric model in which an outcome variable, unemployment rate, is dependent on a dummy for tax incentives (along with other characteristics), using Ohio’s data.3 This enables me to assess the effect of tax incentives on unemployment rate in Ohio. For the empirical work in this chapter, measures of raw costs and benefits were developed in order to assess whether the benefits from providing abatements in Illinois’ zones are greater than the costs of providing them. According to Bartik (1991, Table 7.7), the net benefits of development policies seem most sensitive to the programme cost per job created and the magnitude of real earnings effects. On this basis, measures of costs and benefits were chosen. 3.5.1
Measures of costs
Forgone property tax revenues, as a result of incentives given to businesses in the zone, were chosen as a measure of costs of the Illinois EZ programme. Property tax abatements are an important part of the state’s zone package, as reflected in the fact that, in a survey, 94 per cent of Illinois enterprise zone administrators reported that property tax abatements were available to potential investors in the zone (Elling and Sheldon, 1991: 139, Table 9.1). There are also several studies that point to the importance of property taxes in business growth and location. Because of the role that property tax abatements play in local government finance, and since there were no data on what percentage of programme costs other incentives formed in the Illinois total enterprise zone package,4 property tax abatements were chosen to reflect costs of the Illinois enterprise zone programme.5 However, it is questionable whether the forgone property tax revenues from the abatements can really be viewed as ‘costs’ of the programme. In fact, if we assume that all jobs associated with the EZs are new jobs, the relevant costs of the programme would be the fiscal effects of the new jobs, including the abatements. One such fiscal effect would be the cost of providing public services to businesses in the zone. It could be assumed that the property taxes paid would cover some or all of these costs; however, property tax revenues could be less than, equal to, or greater than the extra public-service costs from the new jobs. Consider the illustration in Table 3.3;6 here, it is assumed that with the programme, ten jobs are created, and the cost per job is $100. With this assumption, public-service costs amount to $1,000. Three different scenarios are taken into account in order to analyze the fiscal effects of the programme.
50 Incentives for Regional Development Table 3.3 Fiscal effects of the programme Without programme
Public service costs Property taxes without abatement Property tax abatement 60% of tax Taxes after abatement Cost of programmea
With programme ($) Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
0 0
1,000 1,000
1,000 1,500
1,000 500
0 0 0
600 400 600
900 600 400
300 200 800
Note: a. As can be seen, the cost of the programme is the difference between the public service costs and net property tax revenue (property taxes after abatement).
In scenario one, it may be noted that the property tax abatement is equal to the cost of the programme. Here, the net fiscal effect of the new jobs is zero without the abatement – that is, the extra public-service costs from new jobs just equal normal property tax revenues. With the abatement, the cost of the programme is the cost of the abatement: that is, $600. In scenario two, where property tax revenue from the new jobs (without abatement) is higher than the extra public-service costs required for their creation, the cost of the programme is, in fact, less than the abatement dollars provided, assuming the same property tax rate as in scenario one. In other words, new industry generates a fiscal surplus, which can be used, at least in part, to finance the incentives. However, where property tax revenue from new jobs is less than the extra public-service costs required, the cost of the programme will be higher than the abatement costs (scenario three). There is no empirical evidence about how costs of the enterprise zone programme in Illinois compare with those of property tax abatement costs. In general, no empirical work has compared the cost of extra public services incurred, to the tax costs (revenues) incurred for new businesses by the local government.7 In this analysis, a situation similar to scenario one is assumed to prevail; in other words, if new businesses are usually a fiscally neutral proposition for local governments, our assumption that abatement costs are equivalent to local programme costs will be accurate. It is reasonable to assume that, if businesses did not locate in the area, the cost of providing public services to them would also be non-existent, and there would be no jobs created (see US Department of HUD, 1986). On the other hand, if businesses located in the zone, we may assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the extra cost of providing public services to the new business is exactly equal to the normal property tax revenue from new jobs created by the business. In Ohio’s EZs, as we observe in Chapter 5, the firms locating there, in fact,
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 51
generated enough fiscal surplus to finance the cost of providing public services to them. 3.5.2
Measures of benefits
The number of new jobs created represents the most apparent benefits of growth; while necessarily representing a labour market perspective, they are chosen as a measure of benefit. In the actual analysis, an attempt is made to consider two extreme cases: (i) All the jobs that are ‘created’ are new (not merely relocated from somewhere); (ii) All the jobs ‘created’ are simply relocated from elsewhere.8 When jobs are new, the benefits are wages paid minus the reservation wages. In this case, the analogous measure of benefits chosen was earnings from jobs, net of estimated reservation wages. Courant (1994) argues that the mere number of jobs created should not be counted as welfare-increasing for the economy, except if they have distributional implications, which it has, in this case, because of the implications of net benefits being higher in high unemployment areas. The data on earnings by industry were obtained partly from the Census of Population and Housing (from the US Bureau of Census), and Employment and Earnings (from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics). Reservation wage, the lowest amount (wage) necessary to encourage the individual to work, was estimated as a function of the unemployment rate, using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). As indicated by the model in Chapter 2, the net earnings (benefits) obtained from jobs created in the ith zone were compared to the abatement dollars spent (Ai) in the ith zone to obtain the benefit–cost ratio (B–C ratio). Mathematically, this may be represented as follows: NB(i) 兺 JijEj 兺Wir HjWjJij j
BC Ratio
(3.1)9
j
NB(i) Ai
(3.2)
In equation (3.1), NB(i) refers to net benefits from jobs in zone i, Jij refers to jobs created in the ith zone and jth sector (industry or occupation), and Ej refers to the annual average or median earnings10 in the jth sector (industry or occupation). Wir is the estimated reservation wages per hour per job in the ith zone. Hj refers to average hours worked per week in industry j, and Wj refers to average weeks worked per year in industry j.11 Reservation wages were assumed constant across all j’s (industries or occupations); they were assumed to vary across zones with varying unemployment
52 Incentives for Regional Development
rates, but constant for all jobs within a zone. It might well be the case that an unemployed person with higher education and skills may have a higher reservation wage and vice versa. Note the following, however: 1. The reservation wage estimates used to impute reservation wages for the zones also take into account education and skills (see Table 3.4). 2. Unemployment rates also differ across different jobs (industries or occupations). Since reservation wages are assumed to depend upon the unemployment rate, the assumption that reservation wages are the same for all jobs within a zone having a certain unemployment rate is reasonable. In case all the jobs are merely relocated to the zone from some other location, the benefits are not as defined in equation (3.1), but are equal to the earnings net of reservation wages in the alternative location less the earnings net of reservation wages in the zone.12 For the purposes of simplification, the alternative location was assumed to have the state’s average unemployment rate, 6.6 per cent for 1990.13 There is a net social benefit, in other words, only if the jobs provide greater benefit to those in the EZ than elsewhere, assuming that earnings are identical. Thus, assuming that the jobs relocated are identical in terms of hours and earnings, the net benefit to the state would be the reservation wage at the alternative location minus the reservation wage at the enterprise zone location. While net benefits from new jobs are represented by equations (3.1) and (3.2), net benefits from relocated jobs may be represented as follows: NB 兺Wkr HjWjJij 兺Wir HjWj Jij
(3.3)
NB 兺 HjWjJij(Wkr Wir )
(3.4)
j
j
or, j
BC Ratio
NB A
(3.5)
NB refers to net benefits to the state of Illinois as a whole; Wkr refers to the reservation wage at the kth (alternative) location. All the other terms are as defined in equations (3.1) and (3.2). It was possible to estimate net benefits from jobs, because the industry or occupation in which jobs were created in all zones was known. Because of this, it was possible to assign jobs created to an industry or occupation with a certain standard SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code, and to use the average or median earnings for the industry in order to represent gross earnings.14 For the purpose of estimating benefits in the case, where all jobs were assumed to be new, average earnings for that industry or occupation
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 53
were used to estimate gross earnings from jobs created in the zones. For the purposes of estimating benefits in the second case (where it was assumed that all jobs were relocated from somewhere else), the reservation wage at the enterprise zone location was subtracted from that at the alternative location in order to obtain net benefits. Net benefits in this case can be positive or negative, depending upon the relative unemployment rates in the origin and area of relocation.
3.6
Estimation of reservation wages
In order to estimate reservation wages as a function of the unemployment rate for the United States, I used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).15 From the overall sample of 7,000 persons, a sub-sample of 334 unemployed persons, who had valid values for their reservation wages, was chosen from the 1987 interviewing panel.16 Based on standard labour economic theory, the reservation wages is estimated by OLS with the following as exogenous determinants: PREVWG (Previous wages): This refers to the wages from previous jobs of the unemployed, and, as may be obvious, applies only to those unemployed who have been employed before; it does not apply to unemployed graduates fresh from school. It is reasonable to believe that the previous wages of an unemployed person determine his/her current reservation wage. Its expected effect on reservation wages is positive. UNRATE: This is the unemployment rate of the county of residence of the unemployed. The unemployment rate of the local area affects a person’s reservation wage through its effect on job opportunities in the local area. Its expected effect is negative, consistent with Bartik (1991). UNCOMP: This refers to the amount of unemployment compensation that affects the economic conditions of the unemployed person, and reflects the cost of unemployment. In particular, UNCOMP decreases costs of remaining unemployed for the individual, because they ensure a continuing source of income (Holzer, 1987), and increases the reservation wages. COLL: This refers to the number of years of college education. It is quite reasonable to believe that skills as reflected in college education have a positive effect on reservation wages. MARITAL (marital status): Since marital status indicates the extent of family responsibility, its effect on reservation wages is positive. The original variable for marital status in the data set contained five categories: married, never married, widowed, divorced, or separated. For the purposes of this analysis, this variable was recorded and reduced to two categories: married (one) and other (zero), to test for the effect of family responsibility on the reservation wages.
54 Incentives for Regional Development
SEX (gender): Men traditionally have lower reservation wages since they are the primary breadwinners in most, if not all, households. Hence, the expected effect on the reservation wages is negative. Sex was recorded as a zero–one variable. For purposes of this analysis, zero represents female, and one represents male. NMI (Non-market income): Non-market income consists of AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) payments, supplemental security income, social security payments, and other welfare payments. This has the same effect on reservation wages as unemployment compensation, positive, since such payments reduce the cost of staying unemployed. AGE: Age, as usual, is measured in years, and measures the effect of the individual’s age on reservation wages. Its expected effect is ambiguous because, in some cases, age may be associated with higher work experience. In such cases, age would have a positive impact on reservation wages. In other cases, older age unemployment might indicate negative effects and lead to lower reservation wages, other things remaining constant. HS (high-school degree) and COLL (college degree): The variables HS (high-school degree) and COLL (college education) enable us to test the significance of skills associated with high-school education and college education separately, on the individual’s reservation wages. These variables were recoded from the original variable in the data set for education. The original variable consisted of eight categories: zero–five grades, six–eight grades, and so forth. The variable was recoded to two dummy variables – the two dummies being high-school degree (HS) and college degree (COLL). In the recoded form, a code of zero on the variable HS meant a high-school dropout, and a code of one meant a high-school degree. Similarly, a code of zero on the variable COLL indicated no college degree, and a code of one implied a college degree. To test for the effect of college education alone, and to avoid the possibility of collinearity among certain variables, the high-school education, age and non-market income variables were removed, and a reduced model was also estimated by OLS. Both the models are presented in Table 3.4. The reduced model was used to assess the reservation wage response to the local unemployment rate. 3.6.1
Results from regression
The complete and reduced regression models obtained, and the means for the variables in the reduced model, are shown in Table 3.4. These models were estimated by OLS.
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 55 Table 3.4 Estimation of reservation wages: results from regression Dependent variable: reservation wage Variable Constant PREVWG UNRATE UNCOMP COLL MARITAL SEX NMI AGE HS F R2
Complete model 430.04 (59.19)**a 0.28 (0.03)** 10.61 (5.91)* 0.05 (0.01)** 611.01 (66.98)** 84.87 (31.54)** 21.35 (17.71) 0.01 (0.01) 0.07 (0.90) 0.29 (30.28) 51.98 0.632
Reduced model 454.73 0.28 11.94 0.05 601.27 90.39 25.78
(42.81)** (0.03)** (5.85)* (0.01)** (66.48)** (31.40)** (17.28)
Mean
$4.63/hour 6.36% $340.83 0.05 0.32 0.61b
77.86 0.626
Notes: a. Numbers in parentheses refer to standard errors; **, * respectively denote that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1 and 5 per cent levels, when a two-tailed test is performed of the null hypothesis that b is equal to zero. b. The means for the three dummy variables – sex, college education, and marital status – show that 61 per cent were male, 5 per cent had college education, and 32 per cent were married.
Effect of unemployment rate on reservation wages: Table 3.4 shows that the relationship between reservation wages and unemployment rate is as expected: negative, indicating that, as the local unemployment rate of the county of residence increases, the reservation wages of unemployed in those counties decrease. The magnitude of the coefficient for the unemployment rate in the complete model indicates that, for every one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, there is a ten cents decrease in the reservation wage (with implied decimals). The magnitude of this coefficient becomes larger in the reduced model which indicates that, for every one percentage point increase in the area’s unemployment rate, there is a decrease in an individual’s (in that area) reservation wages to the extent of 12 cents. In both models, the unemployment rate is statistically significant (at the 5 per cent level), with the noted caveats (see Haurin and Sridhar (2003) for an assessment of the reservation wage response to the local unemployment rate, taking into account sample selection). Prediction of reservation wages The reduced model was used to impute reservation wages for jobs created in Illinois EZs. Since it is the reservation wage response to the unemployment rate that is relevant for purposes of this analysis, the mean values for all independent variables (shown in Table 3.4) except the unemployment
56 Incentives for Regional Development
rate were substituted in the model to obtain a simple regression model. The result was: Reservation wages 644.79 11.94 UNRATE
(3.6)
This procedure enabled the imputation of reservation wages and, subsequently, benefits for new as well as relocated jobs.17 Estimation of benefits from new jobs was done in a manner described earlier, in equation (3.1). To estimate benefits from relocated jobs (as in equation (3.3)), it was assumed, for the purpose of simplification, that the alternative location would have the state’s average unemployment rate (6.6 per cent in 1990). Assuming that earnings from jobs in a given industry or occupation are similar in intra-state locations, the reservation wage corresponding to the state’s average unemployment rate was estimated using the equation [644.79 (11.94 6.6)], which yields $5.66 per hour. This estimated reservation wage for the alternative location was converted into annual reservation wages in the manner described earlier. In order to estimate the benefits from relocated jobs, from the annual reservation wages obtained for the hypothetical alternative location (assumed to have the state’s average unemployment rate and the corresponding reservation wage), were subtracted the annual reservation wages for each zone. As a result, the resulting benefit for each zone assumed that the jobs were relocated from somewhere else and were not really new. When these net benefits from relocated jobs are summed across all zones, the result is not the local benefit to that zone, but the net benefit to the state, encompassing the zone and the alternative location. In order to illustrate the extreme case in which all jobs are assumed to be relocated, take the instance of two zones i and k. Let i be the highunemployment zone (in relation to state average) and k, the one with the state’s average (6.6 per cent) unemployment rate (the alternative location). A manufacturing firm in area k decides to relocate to zone i in order to realize tax savings, and moves its facility to zone i. Since the reservation wage in zone i (Wir the reservation wage at the enterprise zone location), because of higher unemployment, is lower than that in area k (Wkr, the reservation wage at the alternative location), the difference Wkr Wir would be positive, implying positive benefits. Thus, based on the finding that reservation wages are lower in high than in low-unemployment areas, even the redistribution of jobs from low- to high-unemployment areas would bring about net social benefits. In the case of the two extreme scenarios (when jobs are assumed to be new or relocated ), the ratio of net benefits (differently defined in each case as explained above) to abatements is taken for each zone to obtain the benefit–cost ratio. In the estimation of the benefits from relocated jobs, observe that there is no benefit to the zone, if the relocated jobs are not held by zone residents, primarily because local government expenditure is involved. But we must
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 57
distinguish between jobs to zone residents and jobs to residents with lower reservation wages.18 If the jobs created by zone firms were held by those with low reservation wages, not necessarily by zone residents, the benefits for the state as a whole derive primarily from an equity perspective, although there are no benefits to the zone. For the same reasons, it does not matter how many workers in enterprise zone firms actually live in the zone; even if they live elsewhere, their reservation wage is assumed to be that of the zone. It is assumed that workers in a high-unemployment area have lower reservation wages; the mere fact of the location of some of the employees somewhere outside the zone does not change their reservation wage. On the other hand, extraneous factors such as transport costs and house prices influence residential location decisions (to location inside a zone from outside the zone, for example). If relocation of a firm to the zone represents merely the movement of current employees from outside the zone, the relocation is not considered to constitute investment in a ‘new’ facility, and the jobs ‘created’ are not new, but only ‘retained’. This can be best illustrated by the example of a firm that threatens to relocate elsewhere if incentives are not provided. In such cases, retention of current employees and relocation to the zone from outside only represent ‘retained’ jobs (jobs which would have been lost, but for the incentives), not ‘new’ ones; there is no net benefit to the zone. However, there may be some social costs involved if firm relocations occur within the period of the contract.19 For examples of such contracts, see Byrnes, Marvel and Sridhar (1999) who use contract data from Ohio’s EZs to determine factors that explain abatement generosity. Contract agreements that are usually negotiated before the firm formally starts its operations in the zone may, in the event of firm relocation, include the clawback of some or all the incentives provided by the zone from which the firm is relocating. Further, other policy restraints imposed on firms can pertain to restrictive plant-closing legislation, or common tax-sharing arrangements (see, for example, Ledebur and Woodward, 1990; Peters, 1993; Eisinger, 1988). There are also other social costs involved in such cases, when corporatism may not be compatible with the social goals of the community (see Perrucci, 1994, for example). In this chapter, the social gain from new and relocated jobs is calculated only on the basis of wages, reservation wages in the alternative location, and that in the enterprise zone. Firms can contribute to the regional economies of where they locate, over and above the net benefits accruing to the community from jobs alone. Chapter 7 contains some evidence from India of ways in which firms contribute socially to communities where they locate.
3.7
Benefit–cost analysis
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the reservation wages, average net benefits, net benefits per job, and the average benefit–cost ratios, classified by zones’
58 Incentives for Regional Development Table 3.5 Case 1: summary of net benefits from ‘new’ jobs
Unemployment rate of zones, 1990 (%) Number of jobs Annual reservation wage per job ($) Gross earnings per job ($) Total net benefits ($) Average net benefits ($) Average net benefit per job ($) Abatement per job ($) Average B–C ratio Total number of zones
Lowunemployment zones
Moderateunemployment zones
Highunemployment zones
All zones
Under 8.1
8.2 to 10.9
11.0 to 20.6
0.9 to 20.6
2,841 9,336
3,396 8,552
3,481 6,896
9,718 8,261
21,763
20,657
19,372
20,597
35,965,520 2,115,620 12,169
41,543,375 2,443,730 11,939
50,763,310 2,986,100 12,301
128,272,205 2,515,140 12,136
860 14.15
879 13.58
2,231 5.51
1,358 8.94
16
16
17
49
Table 3.6 Case 2: summary of net benefits from relocated jobs Lowunemployment zones Average net benefits ($) Average net benefit per job Average B–C ratio
Moderateunemployment zones
Highunemployment zones
All zones
17,653 146 0.29
136,808 616 2.86
309,902 1,420 3.64
143,019 630 2.07
16
16
17
49
Total number of zones
unemployment category – high, medium and low – for the two cases considered for work in this chapter – new jobs and relocated jobs. Zones with a 1990 unemployment rate of less than 8.1 per cent (that is, less than 120 per cent of the state’s average unemployment rate) are classified as lowunemployment zones. Those with unemployment rate between 8.2 and 10.9 per cent are classified as having moderate unemployment, and those having greater than 11 per cent unemployment are classified as highunemployment zones. 3.7.1
Net benefits from jobs
The net benefits from jobs, using 1992 data for Illinois EZs, are reported in two scenarios representing new (scenario one) and relocated jobs (scenario two). Scenario one If all jobs were ‘new’, gross earnings are the highest on average in the low-unemployment zones and lowest in the high-unemployment zones,
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 59
consistent with assumptions two and six of the theoretical model developed in Chapter 2. When gross earnings are made net of reservation wages, however, net benefits per job are the greatest in the high-unemployment zones. This shows that the reservation wages are lower (confirmed by the sign and statistical significance of the unemployment rate in the regression shown in Table 3.4) in high-unemployment areas when jobs are created. As evidence, Table 3.5 shows that annual reservation wages per job are the lowest in highunemployment zones, and highest in the low-unemployment zones of Illinois. For the same reason, net benefits per job are high in high-unemployment zones compared to low-unemployment zones, even though earnings per job are lower (no surprise) than in the low-unemployment zones. The amount of average net benefits in the high-unemployment zones is over $2.9 million per zone (Table 3.5). The zones with high unemployment, with 3,480 jobs created, also had higher than average net benefit per job ($12,300), compared to the average for all zones. The higher overall net benefits, as well as the net benefits per job from abatements provided to the highest-unemployment zones despite lower earnings, is a result of their lower reservation wages compared to other zones. In the moderate-unemployment zones, gross earnings and net benefits per job are lower than in the low-unemployment zones. Reservation wages per job in the moderate-unemployment zones are only $780 less than in the lowunemployment areas. But gross earnings are about $1,100 less, which indicates that jobs created in moderate-unemployment areas are lower paid than those in the low-unemployment areas, which, again, should come as no surprise. A greater number of jobs are created in the moderate-unemployment than in the low-unemployment areas. On the other hand, abatement cost per job is higher in the high-unemployment areas than in the low-unemployment zones. This, while implying that it is not cost-effective to create jobs in high-unemployment areas, is due to large abatements being offered by a few zones. When all zones are taken into account, the average net benefit per job is higher than the cost per job (being $12,130), compared to the abatement cost of only $1,350. This supports the notion that if we were to assume that all jobs are new, on average, the net benefits are greater than the costs of creating them. Scenario two Table 3.6 summarizes outcomes in this scenario for zones in the three unemployment categories (high, moderate, or low) when all jobs are assumed relocated. When all jobs are assumed to relocate to low-unemployment zones from somewhere else within the state, average net benefits and benefits per job are negative, indicating a loss of benefits if jobs were redistributed from average-unemployment to low-unemployment areas. By the same token, note that the moderate- and high-unemployment areas enjoy positive net benefits even if the jobs ‘created’ in those areas were actually relocated from somewhere else (that is, from average-unemployment areas).
60 Incentives for Regional Development
Average net benefits and benefits per job are highest in high-unemployment areas (Table 3.6). Thus, there are positive net social benefits, even if all jobs are redistributed from average-unemployment to high-unemployment zones. This indicates that, if at all policy encourages relocation of jobs, from an equity perspective, they should be relocated to high-unemployment areas, where the benefits per job would be higher. 3.7.2
Benefit–cost ratios
Scenario one The benefit–cost ratio is defined as the ratio of the average net benefit to the average abatement per job. When all jobs are assumed to be new, the benefits are, on average, more than eight times the costs for all zones (Table 3.5). In the low- and moderate-unemployment areas, in fact, the benefits are more than ten times the costs. It may be seen from Table 3.5 that lowunemployment zones have the highest ratio, on average. On the other hand, high-unemployment zones have the lowest B–C ratio. Among the zones with high unemployment, the average benefit–cost ratio is lowered (in relation to the moderate-unemployment zones) primarily because of abatement costs in two zones: Monmouth, and Bloomington-Normal. Given little disparity in the net benefit per job among zones with different levels of unemployment (Table 3.5), the disparity in the benefit–cost ratios shows that the abatement cost per job is high in high-unemployment areas. This is because of zones like Bloomington-Normal and Decatur, in the high-unemployment group, which represent instances where the B–C ratio is low (respectively 0.57 and 3.10) despite high (higher than average) net benefits per job ($16,500 and $13,500, respectively). This can be attributed to the large abatements given in these two zones. I examined recent data from the Illinois DCEO on jobs created in these zones, and they continue to be a drag on jobs. The Bloomington-Normal zone created 11 jobs in 2002 and only three jobs in 2003. Monmouth zone created only eight jobs in FY 2003, with no jobs having been created in the preceding three years. Thus, given the assumptions, the analysis, although based on 1992 data, is robust even if recent data from the programme were to be used. There does exist an optimum level of incentives to be provided even in highunemployment areas, beyond which cost-effectiveness is not ensured in creating jobs. Scenario two When it is assumed, on the other hand, that all jobs are relocated to enterprise zones in Illinois from elsewhere in the state, the benefit–cost ratios are as expected. When jobs are relocated from IL’s average-unemployment areas to low-unemployment zones (those with unemployment under 8.1 per cent), the benefit–cost ratio is negative. If jobs, however, are relocated to
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 61
high-unemployment areas from elsewhere, the benefits are more than three times the costs. In moderate-unemployment areas, benefits are more than twice as much as costs. This indicates that a redistribution of jobs from an area with about the state’s average unemployment rate to areas with higher unemployment levels, in relation to the state average, can produce benefits for the state as a whole. When all 51 zones are taken into account, the benefits are twice the costs, assuming that all jobs are merely redistributed to EZs from elsewhere (that are assumed to have the state’s average unemployment rate) in Illinois. With the more favourable assumption that all jobs are new, the benefit–cost ratio is close to nine. This is to say that, even if total public costs were more than the direct abatement costs, the net benefits from the zone incentives would still be substantial.
3.8
Summary of the results
The results from this chapter show that the economic development incentives offered in the EZs of IL do not amount to a zero-sum game. On average, net benefits are expected to be about ten times the abatement costs. On average, the net benefits per job are above US$12,000 a year. And, in more than half of the zones (32 of 51), the average net benefit per job is higher than this: at about $15,910 per job. However, when all zones are taken into account, the cost per job is only about $1,350. Even assuming that jobs are only being redistributed from other areas, the benefits per job are about $1,450 on average in the high-unemployment zones of the state. With respect to the second question that was posed at the beginning – that is, whether benefits from jobs are greater than the costs of providing abatements in high-unemployment areas – the response, based on these results, is positive. First, the results show that net benefits per job are higher, despite lower earnings in high-unemployment areas, because of the low level of reservation wages. On average, the dollar amount of net benefits (about $3 million per zone) and net benefits per job (about $12,300 per job) are highest in zones with high unemployment, and the largest number of jobs are created in those areas. Only 2,840 jobs are created in the 16 low-unemployment zones, whereas nearly 3,400 jobs are created in the 16 zones with moderate unemployment, and about 3,500 jobs are created in the 17 high-unemployment areas. Even assuming that gross earnings are lower per job (as is the case in moderate- and high-unemployment zones, compared to low-unemployment zones), low-paid jobs help the unemployed to enter the labour market and can consistently improve their skills to pursue better employment (termed as hysteresis). Thus, each new job produces benefits not indicated in the dollar amount of earnings per job. Even when jobs are assumed to have merely relocated, the net benefits are three times as much as costs in
62 Incentives for Regional Development
high-unemployment areas, and twice as much as costs in moderateunemployment areas (see Table 3.6). However, from a benefit–cost viewpoint, the areas with high unemployment do not produce the highest amount of net benefits from jobs, compared to the abatements provided. This may be because of the larger abatements granted to businesses in the high unemployment zones. With the favourable assumption that jobs are ‘new’, the B–C ratio is, for example, nearly 42 in the moderate-unemployment areas, whereas in the high-unemployment areas, it is about 30. Thus, even though average net benefits and benefits per job are higher in high-unemployment areas than in low-unemployment zones (where the average B–C ratio is, for example, only 15), no clear picture emerges from a comparison of B–C ratios across the zones with differing levels of unemployment. When all of the jobs are assumed to be relocated within Illinois, taking the sum of the benefits and losses for the state as a whole, benefits are twice that of costs. Of course, the magnitude of benefits would be different for the nation as a whole, when a US perspective rather than an Illinois perspective is taken, if one is asked what the national benefits are from this Illinois programme. From a national perspective, a higher proportion of jobs would be redistributed from outside Illinois, rather than ‘new’ jobs to the country as a whole. The alternative reservation wage would be different in these two cases. In any case, these results show that reservation wages are low in highunemployment areas compared with that in low-unemployment areas. Consequently, net benefits per job are higher in the high-unemployment areas. However, the disparity between the dollar amount of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios (in zones like Bloomington-Normal and Decatur) suggests that indiscriminate provision of generous incentives, even in highunemployment zones, is likely to result in a lower cost-effectiveness of the abatement dollars provided. Rather, a strategy of targeting those labourintensive businesses, whose employment and location choices will be affected by a typical abatement package, rather than offering generous abatements, is more likely to be cost-effective. In interpreting these results, care must be exercised because compromises have been made with the data, and these may distort the results to some degree. For example, the cost estimates of the programme, as represented by the measures chosen in this chapter, are conservative, since they consider (as programme costs) only property tax abatements provided to businesses in zones. Further, the measures of benefits necessarily take a labour market perspective. Nevertheless, they have enabled a comparison between costs to create jobs and benefits that can be expected from those jobs created by the programme. The work in this chapter does not carry the analysis to the eventual conclusion of Bartik’s research: since the net benefits from a given number of jobs are higher in high-unemployment areas, does the actual competition for
Evidence from Illinois Enterprise Zones 63
jobs occur in a way that benefits such areas? This question, being whether high-unemployment areas aggressively pursue and use economic development incentives in such a way that the jobs benefit them, may lead to a more determinate relationship between the cost-effectiveness of incentives and their actual practice by regions with certain economic characteristics. We started with the proposition that the benefits of redistributing jobs to high-unemployment areas are likely to be higher because of the lower reservation wages in those areas. The results in this chapter show that, under certain conditions, high-unemployment areas do indeed have low reservation wages; for this reason, net benefits are likely to be higher in those areas. The benefits of redistribution are likely to be higher in high-unemployment areas than in low-unemployment areas. Some benefits of redistribution are illustrated in this chapter. However the intention of this chapter has not been to endorse policies which encourage redistribution itself, but rather to study, in the event of redistribution, what kinds of redistribution can result in net benefits to an area as a whole. The work in this chapter has been the first attempt to estimate reservation wages and measure net benefits from jobs; future research must make the measures of benefits and costs, hence the analysis, more perfect. If regional development policy is to be positive-sum, one possibility is to encourage indigenous entrepreneurship (an entrepreneurial climate) in EZs in order to encourage job growth, and not merely relocation (which a ‘good’ business climate may sometimes encourage). The implications of indigenous entrepreneurship in EZs are to be found only by further research. Chapter 7 provides some evidence of the extent to which place-oriented policies have promoted local entrepreneurship through the offer of infrastructure incentives in the growth centres of India. Before we study that, the next couple of chapters present evidence from Ohio’s enterprise zone programme, another state of the United States, in which the enterprise zone programme stimulated a lot of debate in academic and policy circles through the 1990s.
4 Impact of Tax Incentives on the Unemployment Rate: Evidence From Ohio
4.1 The importance of the problem and the motivation for research As discussed in earlier chapters, many regional development policies that attempt to increase employment do so by providing financial incentives to firms. These have included industrial revenue bonds (IRBs), property tax abatements, direct state loans, and customized industrial training. For various reasons, the effectiveness of such policies – specifically, tax incentives – continues to be questioned. This is because it is unclear whether taxes affect firm location decisions; and even if they do, the nature of their impact on the regional economies adopting them remains unclear. While Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework for understanding the effects of such programmes on their regional economies, this chapter provides empirical support for the effects of tax incentives, from another Midwestern state of the USA. The purpose of this and the next chapter is to examine Ohio’s EZ programme (and other tax incentive programmes). In addition to the IL programme, Ohio’s EZ programme is chosen to provide empirical support to the various propositions in this book, for two central reasons. First, along with Illinois (which was one of the first states in the United States to adopt EZ legislation), Ohio is one of the few states in the United States to have more than 100 zones in its territory. Concern about the benefits of competition between locations has been at the forefront of policy debates in various states of the United States. In Ohio, this debate has been quite extensive because of the existence of a large number of EZs (about 330), when compared to the other states.1 Ohio’s programme contrasts sharply with New Jersey’s Urban Enterprise Zone (UEZ) programme, which allows limited designation. So far there are only 10 zones in New Jersey (Boarnet and Bogart, 1996). However, in Ohio, every area that meets at least one of 64
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 65
six distress criteria or that meets minimum population requirements can potentially apply, and applicants cannot be denied zone designation if they satisfy either population or distress criteria. Most parts of Ohio are thus designated either as EZs or as areas providing tax incentives under other programmes. In fact, legislative discussions surrounding the EZ programme in Ohio frequently centred on the ‘pirating’ of firms in one area by neighbouring areas (Hill, 1994) that offered tax incentives. Whether these incentive programmes and the resulting tax competition is conducive for actual development to occur, remains a debate in both the literature and policy circles (Byrnes, Marvel and Sridhar, 1999). This policy debate is the policy version of the ‘zero-sum’ game argument in the literature. The advantages to the local control of these programmes both in terms of effective targeting of incentives and the importance of meeting the competition of other states have also been cited in the debates. Secondly, Ohio’s programme is one of the few EZ programmes to involve negotiation of terms between local government and individual firms in their EZs. Byrnes, Marvel and Sridhar (1999) contains a model of the bargaining between firms and local governments in Ohio’s EZs. Usually, in other state programmes, the qualified activities are determined when the programme is designed, as in the case of New Jersey’s UEZ programme, and there is thus no room for negotiation. Finally, the Ohio Department of Development has developed a systematic database regarding various aspects of Ohio’s EZ programme that enables the testing of the hypotheses that emerge from Chapter 2 of this book. The purpose of this chapter is to examine if Ohio’s EZs are effective in reducing unemployment in the areas that have adopted them. This question is important to ask because the literature and policy circles are ambiguous about the effect of these programmes. In fact, one of the explicit objectives of the EZ programme in Ohio is to reduce unemployment. In this chapter, I develop an empirical model, supporting the theoretical model outlined in Chapter 2, that shows how tax incentive programmes affect unemployment in the areas that adopt them. The model in Chapter 2 showed that tax incentive programmes can be expected to reduce the area’s unemployment rate, along with other factors, by increasing the capital–labour ratio, and labour productivity. In this chapter, I develop an empirical version of that model, testing it using data from Ohio’s incentive programmes and examining whether tax incentives are responsible for lowering unemployment in Ohio’s census block groups. Empirically, I find that tax incentive programmes have a statistically significant impact in reducing unemployment in the area that adopts them. This indicates that such programmes may not be totally detrimental to the development of areas that adopt them.
66 Incentives for Regional Development
4.2
Overview of the chapter
In the next section, I recall and explore further the analytical model that was developed in Chapter 2 for the purposes of using it for empirical work in this chapter. I then describe Ohio’s EZ programme. I then proceed to explain the data and research methodology used for the estimation. The subsequent sections focus on the results. In these sections, I report the results from the estimation of unemployment rate taking into account the treatment effects problem. The final section of the chapter evaluates the policy implications arising from the estimation.
4.3
A model of unemployment
This chapter attempts to address several gaps in the literature. It explores the cause of unemployment in the EZ, examines the effects of tax incentive programmes, and makes this model the basis for empirical work. As I highlight in Chapter 2, the model of unemployment that is developed here is based on the neoclassical assumption of high reservation wages. This means that individuals in the EZ are unemployed because they have high reservation wages relative to the market wage prevailing in the EZ. The assumption of high reservation wages is valid in the case of the United States because of the existence of various safety net programmes such as unemployment insurance and social security benefits. Generous unemployment benefits mean that an individual’s reservation wages become higher because the benefits reduce his/her costs of remaining unemployed. In fact Feldstein (1978) shows how a combination of a high marginal tax on earnings and no tax on unemployment compensation makes the private cost of unemployment small and causes an individual to remain unemployed by increasing his/her reservation wages. We know from the model outlined in Chapter 2 that the market wage in the EZ area is low because profit-maximizing employers are willing to pay a wage that only matches the skill of the workers. It is reasonable to imagine, as the model points out, that the marginal product of labour in the EZ is less than in the non-EZ area. The literature on EZs points to the blight in these areas (Ge, 1995; Erickson and Friedman, 1989; Levitan and Miller, 1992; Wilder, 1996), which, according to this model, is due to the initially low capital–labour ratio in the EZ. The low capital–labour ratio results in low productivity and wages for those employed as well as those who are unemployed. The labour in the EZ area is immobile because of its psychological ties to the area and also the costs of relocation. The migration literature has shown that those with poor skills and little education are the most likely to be immobile. The most basic data on geographical mobility that control for age group are available from the United States Current Population Reports for
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 67
the period 1987–90. These data show that inter-state migration rates for people in the age group 30–34 were 3.4 per cent for those with nine to eleven years of education, as compared to 8.7 per cent with more than 17 years of education (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994). One would be surprised if data from more recent years did not exhibit the same trend. The low levels of skill among the unemployed in the EZ, coupled with insufficient information regarding job opportunities outside their state (or even the local area for that matter),2 lead them to stay put. Some labour literature has modelled the unemployment status of an individual in a manner similar to that which is adopted here (Barron and Mellow, 1981; Holzer, 1986). Barron and Mellow (1981) estimate a reduced form model while attempting to answer the question as to what factors affect the subsequent labour force status of an unemployed individual. Their data are from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for May and June 1976 and from a special supplemental survey of unemployed respondents in May 1976 regarding current job-seeking activities for a sample of 1,307 individuals. They measure the reservation wages as a response to the question: ‘What is the lowest wage or salary you would accept … for this type of work?’ They estimate the probability of an unemployed individual becoming employed in a given period as a function of the relative reservation wage (the ratio of the reservation wage to the average wage in the local labour market), along with other factors. They find that a higher relative reservation wage reduced employment probability, similar to expectation in this model. In an attempt to explain the ‘shockingly high rates of unemployment which plague black youth’, Holzer (1986) estimates the wage and the duration of unemployment as a function of reservation wage and other factors. Holzer uses data from the youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) in 1979 and 1980. The sample is limited to white and black non-student males, aged 16 to 21 in 1979. The reservation wage is measured in the NLS as the response to the question: ‘What would the wage or salary have to be for you to be willing to take it?’ Holzer finds that young blacks seek wages that are comparable to those of young whites in absolute terms, but the wages the young blacks seek are higher relative to what is actually received by them. He finds that the relatively higher reservation wages of young blacks contribute to the duration of their unemployment and also, to some degree, to their lower, subsequently received wages. He concludes that changes in reservation wages might help to explain the trends in the wages and employment of young blacks in recent years. Thus, the finding from the labour literature is that higher reservation wages relative to market wages lower the probability of an individual finding employment and contribute to their unemployment status, findings consistent with the model developed in this book. Formally, the unemployment status (USij) of individual i living in the jth area is determined by the
68 Incentives for Regional Development
difference between reservation and market wage, as we have learnt from the model in Chapter 2: USij f(wrij wij)
(4.1)
where wijr is the reservation wage and wij is the market wage of the ith individual living in the jth area. As the past literature and the model in Chapter 2 show, the unemployment rate in the jth area is dependent upon the extent to which reservation wages of individuals are higher than market wages in the area. The unemployment rate of the EZ is high since, for a substantial portion of the labour force, reservation wages are high relative to market wage in the area. So prior to the designation of the area as an EZ, profit-maximizing employers have little incentive to hire workers with low levels of skill. Under these circumstances, EZ designation of the area acts as an important placeoriented policy to improve the blighted area through tax abatements. Tax abatements provide firms with incentives for investment, thus increasing the capital–labour ratio, the productivity of workers, and the market wage offered to them. At the point when the market wage exceeds the reservation wage in the EZ, unemployed individuals in the area become willing to work, employment increases, and the unemployment rate falls. As the model in Chapter 2 elaborates, the tax abatement on capital also leads to in-migration of capital into the EZ, and, depending upon the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, results in increases in the employment of labour. With increasing levels of employment, the unemployment rate in the EZ reduces to a level below its initial rate, at the optimum. At this optimum, unemployment in the non-EZ areas remains unchanged. This occurs because, as Tobin demonstrates, an economy operating at a natural rate of unemployment of 5 to 6 per cent still has (more than 20 per cent) excess capacity in its capital stock (Tobin, 1972). Thus, the EZ acts only as a tool to direct the excess capital away from the full-employment areas to high-unemployment areas.3 The model developed in Chapter 2 thus shows how tax incentives, along with wages and reservation wages, affect the unemployment rate of the area adopting it. In this chapter we empirically validate that model by estimating a reduced form model for Ohio, using census data and data on tax incentives in the state.
4.4
Tax incentive programmes in Ohio
In Ohio there are two tax incentive programmes – the EZ and the CRA. The CRA is a tax incentive programme in Ohio that provides tax incentives for property improvements that could result in job creation. The EZ is the major tax incentive programme in the state and is the focus of our study here,
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 69
except where controls for the CRA programme are necessary and data are available. In Ohio’s EZ programme, there are two types of zones that are allowed: full authority zones and limited authority zones. Full authority zones are distress-based. They have to satisfy at least one of six distress criteria: (i) It must have had, during the most recent 12 months, 125 per cent of the state’s average unemployment rate; (ii) At least 10 per cent population loss must have occurred between 1970 and 1990; (iii) A minimum of 5 per cent of vacant, demolished commercial or industrial facilities must be prevalent; (iv) At least 51 per cent of the population must be below 80 per cent of the area’s median income; (v) There must be specific vacant industrial facilities (zone incentives apply only to those facilities); (vi) Income-weighted tax capacity of the school district must be below 70 per cent of the state average. On the other hand, it is sufficient for limited authority zones to demonstrate minimum population requirements for them to be designated as zones. These requirements are that EZs proposed within counties of population greater than 300,000 must have a minimum population of 4,000. Further, EZs proposed within counties of population less than 300,000 must have a minimum population of 1,000. As of December 1997, there were 44 distressbased zones and 278 limited authority zones in Ohio, one of the largest numbers to be found in any state in the United States. This is important because both distressed full-authority zones and nondistressed limited authority zones in Ohio can offer tax incentives to firms that locate there. This could have some implications for the targeting of areas, similar to findings based on empirical work from Illinois EZs in Chapter 3. Once a community receives EZ certification, Ohio state law permits local officials to negotiate a tax incentive agreement with a prospective firm. Once an area is certified as an EZ, firms can then enter into agreements with the local governments (having jurisdiction over the zones) and make commitments regarding investment, job creation, retention and payroll. Ohio law states that the amount and term of the tax exemption are to be negotiated between local officials and the firm. However, the law places limits on the level of incentives. It permits municipalities to exempt real4 and/or personal property5 assessed values of up to 75 per cent for up to 15 years, or an average of 60 per cent over the term of the agreement. The exemption can be provided to new investments in buildings, machinery/equipment and inventory, and improvements to existing land and buildings for a specific project. The state’s EZ law permits unincorporated areas to exempt real and/or personal
70 Incentives for Regional Development
property assessed values of up to 60 per cent for up to 15 years, or an average of 50 per cent over the term of the agreement. As in the case of municipalities, the exemption is allowed on new investments in buildings, machinery/ equipment and inventory and improvements to existing land and buildings for a specific project. All abatements and exemptions may be granted only with approval by the affected Board of Education. Note that all are incentives to capital. Since tax incentives have far-reaching consequences on the allocation of resources, as demonstrated by the model in Chapter 2, we have to study their effects.
4.5
Implementation of the model
The standard approach in the literature to assess the impact of tax incentives has been to estimate an econometric model with an outcome variable of interest. For instance, Papke (1994) estimates unemployment claims in Indiana’s EZ programme as a function of a dummy for the programme, implying the offer of incentives. I adopt a similar approach here by estimating the model shown in equation (4.1) in reduced form.6 Here the outcome variable is the unemployment rate and I estimate it as a function of other variables, including tax incentives. The estimation of unemployment rate in reduced form is consistent with the literature (Pantuosco and Parker, 1998, and other studies summarized earlier in the chapter) which shows that socio-demographic characteristics such as age, race, sex, and education, determine the unemployment rate. Here, these socio-demographic characteristics are used as exogenous variables that explain the unemployment rate, instead of wages and reservation wages, along with tax incentives, as the model in Chapter 2 shows. Figure 4.1 illustrates diagrammatically the determination of unemployment rate. It shows the reduced form of the model in which it is estimable. The basic model of unemployment in the ith
Unemployment rate of area
Aggregate wages
Tax incentive programme
Duration of programme
Aggregate reservation wages
Age, education, race, sex, occupation & industry mix Factors determining zone designation – county unemployment, vacant industrial facilities, poverty rate & population loss
Figure 4.1 Determination of the unemployment rate
Exogenous factors (age, education, race, & gender composition)
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 71
area (census block group, as I explain later, in the section on data) may be summarized in equation (4.2): Ui Dummy for tax incentive programme (EZ or CRA7)i Duration of tax incentive programmei Manufacturing employmenti Service employmenti Employment in technical occupationsi Employment in service occupationsi Proportion African Americani Proportion malei Proportion with bachelor’s degreesi Mean agei ei
(4.2)
The unemployment rate is estimated as a function of the variables shown in equation (4.2). The hypothesis from the conceptual model presented in this book is that areas with tax incentive programmes have a lower unemployment rate than those that have no such programmes. While the theoretical effects are clear, there is an empirical complication in the context of Ohio’s EZ programme. Observe from Figure 4.1 and equation (4.2) that tax incentive programmes and the unemployment rate are determined simultaneously since high unemployment rate is a criterion for zone designation in Ohio (as full authority zone).8 Because of this problem, it is possible that causality can be reversed in a regression of unemployment as a function of tax incentive programmes. I explain the procedure to alleviate the endogeneity between zone designation and unemployment in the section on methodology. In the empirical work, if, after accounting for the treatment effects problem, it were found that the coefficient on the tax incentive variable is negative and significant, then the hypothesis that tax incentives decrease the area’s unemployment rate, would be confirmed, consistent with the model. In addition to the effect of the tax incentive programme on the rate of unemployment, I control for the time period (duration) for which the programme has been in existence in the area.9 One can imagine that the tax incentive programme reduces the unemployment rate of an area, but there could be some optimum period for which it is desirable. This effect makes it necessary to control for duration of the programme by including it as another variable. The duration of the tax incentive programme is treated as being exogenous to the model. Discussions with the Ohio Department of Development (which administers the EZ programme in the state) indicated that the timing of zone designation10 chosen by areas is a non-random process. Specifically, the duration of tax incentive programmes in Ohio depends upon factors such as pro-growth coalitions, political support, and the bureaucratic and institutional structures needed to implement the incentives in the communities. These are, however, not measurable (since there exists no quantifiable data on these characteristics at the zone level), so I am unable to explicitly control for them.
72 Incentives for Regional Development
There is another reason why duration in the sample used for empirical work in this chapter is empirically random with respect to the unemployment rate. If the duration of the tax incentive programme had systematically varied across zones and non-zones, taking zero values only for low unemployment areas, there may have been a bias in the estimates. But in the sample, this problem does not arise because there are a large number of non-zone census block groups with higher unemployment rates (than zones) for which the duration variable takes a zero value.11 The expected impact on the unemployment rate of the duration of the tax incentive programme is ambiguous. Note that the introduction of time introduces some degree of dynamism in the static model.12 One may surmise that the unemployment rate might vary in a non-linear fashion with respect to duration – at first increasing, then decreasing, or decreasing at first and then increasing. In order to track this ambiguity, the squared term of duration was included as an independent variable, along with duration. If duration of the programme had a positive impact and its squared had a negative impact on the unemployment rate, then it may be inferred that the tax incentive programme initially increases but eventually reduces the unemployment rate of the area. The impact of the tax incentive programme can be determined along with the duration variables. If the tax incentive dummy were found to be affecting the unemployment rate significantly, the duration variable would enable us to understand the time period over which the impact of tax incentives can be expected to be valid.13 In the estimation of the unemployment rate, I also control for the occupational composition of the area. Note that different occupations could have different unemployment rates as the result of different demand conditions. For instance, those employed in routine administrative and technical occupations might be less likely to lose their jobs at any given point in the business cycle than those in service occupations such as private household occupations which are much more easily substitutable. In addition, in the estimation, I include measures that reflect the area’s manufacturing base, such as the proportion of total employment in manufacturing as compared to services, in order to test for their effect on the unemployment rate. These measures reflect the importance of these sectors in the area’s economic base, and it is necessary to control for them. I expect the proportion of manufacturing employment in the area to have a positive impact, and the proportion in service employment to have a negative impact on the unemployment rate. This is because of the decreasing importance of manufacturing and the increasing significance of services in the economic base of most of the local economies. Demographic characteristics such as race, age, sex and education influence an area’s unemployment and therefore are also included in the model. I expect areas with larger proportions of African Americans to have higher levels of
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 73
unemployment (positive effect). On the whole, African Americans are likely to have lower education, poorer skills and are more likely to be unemployed. For similar reasons, areas with a higher proportion of women are likely to have higher levels of unemployment. The expected effect is then a negative sign on the proportion male. Areas with higher average levels of education are expected to have lower levels of unemployment. This is because education implies the presence of certain skills. If job opportunities do not exist in the area for these skills, they are likely to move out of the area, reducing the labour force, in which case the unemployment rate of the area would be lower. This is consistent with the conceptual model that points to the immobility of less-educated individuals in the EZ area, and their consequent unemployment. Thus, the unemployment rate of better-educated areas is likely to be lower (due to higher mobility of the better-educated labour force). The sign on the variable representing the proportion with bachelor’s degrees is therefore expected to be negative. Finally, older persons are likely to have greater levels of work experience and will be employed. So areas with higher average age are likely to have a lower unemployment rate. The expected sign on the age variable is negative.
4.6
Data
Unemployment rates did not exist by EZ or tax incentive area in Ohio, but self-reports of personal employment at the block group level were available for 1990 from the (Ohio) Census summary tape files (STF3A), at the time this research was completed. The self-reported data on employment status in the Census are based on the responses to questions asking for detailed information regarding persons’ activity in a reference week. In the Census, all civilians 16 years and over, that are one of the following: (i) ‘at work’ as paid employees, working in their own business, profession, or farm; (ii) ‘with a job, but not at work’ during the reference week due to illnesses, bad weather, industrial dispute, vacation, or other personal reasons; are classified as employed. Those that are not in the categories ‘at work’ or ‘with a job, but not at work’ during the reference week, and (i) have looked for work during the last four weeks; (ii) are available to accept a job; (iii) those waiting to be called back to a job from which they had been laid off; are all classified as unemployed in the US Census.14
74 Incentives for Regional Development
One disadvantage of self-reported data from the Census is that it is very dependent on the reference week, which is not the same for all respondents since the enumeration is not completed in a week. Since persons can change their employment status from one week to the next, the lack of a uniform reference week may mean that the employment data will not reflect the reality of the employment situation of any given week. However, since I am not considering unemployment during any specific period in a year, the reference week is not a limitation. Nevertheless, the superiority of data on self-reported employment when compared to data on unemployment claims which Papke (1994) uses in her evaluation of Indiana’s EZ programme is clear. First, self-reported employment data cover all civilians aged 16 years and over. Although the census data are based on a sample, appropriate weighting is undertaken to ensure the representativeness of the sample.15 Data on unemployment compensation claims, however, exclude the following: (i) Persons who have exhausted their benefit rights; (ii) New workers who have not earned rights to unemployment insurance; and (iii) Persons losing jobs not covered by unemployment insurance systems in the US (including workers in agriculture, domestic services, religious organizations, self-employed and unpaid family workers). Based on self-reported data, I compute unemployment rates for Ohio’s census block groups. Census data was also the only way in which I was able to determine whether or not the census block groups had a tax incentive programme in place. I did this by overlaying a map of Ohio’s 1997 enterprise zones on that of its 1991 census block groups.16 This enabled me to determine which block groups had incentive programmes in place. I find that of the total 11,621 census block groups of the state (Ohio had a total of 11,621 census block groups in 1991), 8,300 block groups had EZs. An additional 1,000 block groups had CRAs. Thus, out of the total of 11,621 census block groups in Ohio, a total of 9,300 (or 80 per cent) block groups were tax incentive areas in 1997, leaving the remaining 2,321 block groups as non-tax incentive areas. The availability of data on other demographic characteristics in the census block group (STF3A) files made it possible to estimate these characteristics for the census block groups of the state. Relevant characteristics in addition to self-reported employment, on which data are available for persons at the census block group level, are age, whether African American, whether male or female and the level of educational attainment. This enabled estimation of the unemployment rate as a function of tax incentive programmes and other socio-demographic characteristics, using these data for Ohio’s census block groups.
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 75
4.7
Methodology
The estimation of the unemployment rate is carried out by taking into account the treatment effects problem caused by the endogeneity of tax incentives. At the time that this research was completed, of the 322 EZs in Ohio, the majority (278 zones) were designated on the basis of population (being limited authority zones), and the rest (44) were distress-based (satisfying at least one of six criteria outlined in section 4.4). The Ohio Department of Development had no data on how many of the 44 distress-based zones were high-unemployment areas (having 125 per cent of the state’s average for the last 12 months). If a high correlation were to be assumed between the various characteristics of distress, it may be reasonably assumed that the 44 distressed zones are also high-unemployment areas. 4.7.1
Treatment effects problem
The treatment effects problem occurs because of the endogeneity of zone designation in a regression of unemployment on zone designation (or tax incentive dummy). This treatment effects (endogeneity) problem is alleviated by adopting the instrumental variable approach. Exogenous characteristics that determine zone designation (median income, prevalence of vacant commercial or industrial property, population loss, and unemployment) are used as instruments in two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations of the unemployment rate. Note that instruments are those variables that are not influenced by zone designation, at least in the short run, but which do influence zone designation. The area’s poverty rate is used as a measure of the income criterion required for zone designation, and is used as an instrument. Observe that while the long-run poverty rate of the area might be influenced by zone designation, it does not impact zone designation directly, making it desirable as an instrument. Note that criterion (4) for designation as full-authority zone in the state refers to a certain proportion of the population being below 80 per cent of the area’s median income. Another instrument that is used is the proportion of vacant housing units in an area. This is used as a measure of the prevalence of vacant or demolished commercial or industrial facilities in the area, required for EZ designation. Data on housing units are used because only data on residential structures are reported in the census.17 The unemployment rate for the county (in which the census block group is located) at the time of zone designation (1982) is used as another instrument. The county’s unemployment rate undoubtedly influences zone designation, but is not influenced by zone designation, making it desirable as an instrument. Finally, I use two measures of net migration into the area18 – one at the census tract level and the other at the county level – as instruments that determine zone designation. These are used as measures of the population
76 Incentives for Regional Development
loss criterion for zone designation. We expect that areas that experience little in-migration are also those that experience population loss. The tract-level measure is only a dummy because the areas of census tracts changed over the period 1980–90, making direct computation of net change in population at the tract level impossible. At the county level, it is possible to compute the magnitude of the population change and so I use the net change in population over the period 1980–90 as an instrument. Since there was no data on taxable capacity at the census block group or tract level, I was unable to use measures of this variable as an instrument. However, it is easy to imagine that there is a high correlation between the poverty rate of an area and its taxable capacity. Areas that have larger proportions of their populations below the poverty level are frequently those whose school districts have their income-weighted tax capacity below the state average. Therefore the poverty rate, used as an instrument in the estimation, is a good measure of the income-weighted tax capacity criterion as well. Data on all these instruments at the block group level were obtained from the US Census, with the exception of the county-level population change for 1980–90, which was obtained from the state of Ohio census data centre. Equation (4.2) was estimated by OLS and 2SLS, by including as instruments these factors that affect zone designation. 4.7.2
Variable definitions
1. The block group’s unemployment rate (the dependent variable) is computed according to the method recommended by the Ohio Department of Development. According to this procedure, I first estimate the unemployment rate for all the counties based on the ratio of unemployed to total labour force aggregated in the 1990 census at the county level. I then estimate a similar ratio for the block groups, obtaining a raw unemployment rate for every block group. I take the ratio of block group to county unemployment rates computed in this way. This ratio multiplied by the published county unemployment rates (published by the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (OBES)) yields the desired block group unemployment rate for use in the estimation. 2. The indicator for tax incentive programmes, is a dummy equal to one if a tax incentive programme (EZ or CRA) is in place (and zero if not). The definition of the EZ dummy is easily done because of the overlaying of map of the EZs over that of the block groups. The dummy for the CRA programme was more difficult to arrive at. I found whether or not CRA and EZ areas overlap by talking to the 282 CRAs in the state of Ohio (all certified in the pre-1994 period).19 When my discussions with the communities indicated that, in areas having both the CRA and the EZ, the CRA was non-overlapping with the EZ, I identified the census tract numbers for these cities from the census STF3A files and included them as areas having tax incentive programmes. Thus areas that had non-overlapping CRAs and EZs and those that
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 77
did not have EZ, but used the CRA for purposes of job creation (that is, provided CRA abatements to industries) were identified as having a tax incentive programme.20 It is possible for abated residential property to exist in non-tax incentive areas, according to the way in which the variable is defined. Although abatements to residential property could result in job creation (as with the CRA programme), I do not account for these incentives. The tax abatements granted in a majority of the CRAs in Ohio are for commercial and industrial uses (based on my discussion with the CRA administrators). Not accounting for residential incentives of the CRA programme should not affect the results much. Thus, the non-tax incentive areas (with zero for the indicator dummy) in the estimation are those areas in which no tax incentives are provided to commercial/industrial property that resulted in job creation. 3. The duration for which the EZ has been in existence is measured as the time period (in years) since certification of the zone until the end of 1990.21 Although the GIS map I had of Ohio’s zones was from 1996, I defined the duration variable as of 1990 because the census block group map I had of the state was from 1990, and the unit of estimation was the census block group. Thus, zones certified in June 1990 are in place for 0.5 years, those certified in September 1990 have 0.3 years for their duration, and so on. As we expect, zones certified early on in the programme had the longest duration of existence. There are a number of zones that are certified after 1990 and the duration variable for these zones takes a zero value. For the non-EZ block groups, the duration variable takes a zero value. Since even for zone areas, zero is used to represent if it is not in place in 1990, this is a valid representation of the non-EZ areas too, since at that time they are not designated a zone. 4. Duration squared is self-explanatory, it is calculated as duration
duration for every zone. 5. The area’s manufacturing base is measured as the percentage employed in manufacturing industry jobs as a proportion of all employment in the block group.22 6. The area’s service base is the percentage employed in service industry jobs as a proportion of employment in the block group. Note that typically, the variable defined in (5) that in (6) percentage employed in other industries add up to 100 per cent.23 7. The area’s occupational composition in professional specialty, technical and administrative occupations is measured as the percentage of its employment in managerial and professional specialty occupations,24 technical, sales and administrative support occupations.25 8. The area’s base in service occupations refers to the proportion of employment in private household occupations, protective service occupations, and other service occupations. Note that, again, the variable described in (7) that in (8) percentage employed in other occupations add up to 100 per cent.26
78 Incentives for Regional Development
9. A dummy is created at the census tract level if population loss occurred in a census tract over the period 1980–90. If a census tract in 1980 is subdivided in 1990 (into a larger number of block groups, this is usually done if a tract grew over the period) or if its population increased over the period 1980–90, the population loss dummy for the census tract is determined as being zero. Otherwise it is one meaning that population loss occurred in the tract over the period. An alternative measure of the population instrument, net population change (at the county level), is computed as the change in population (in thousands) from 1980 to 1990. It is defined as the difference between the 1990 and 1980 populations for a county. If this variable is positive, the county gained population over the period 1980–90, otherwise it lost. 10. The poverty rate (multiplied by 100 for a percentage) is calculated as the ratio of the number of persons in the block group that had 1989 incomes below the poverty level to all persons in the block group. Note the difference between the way this instrument is calculated, and criterion (4) used for zone designation. Obviously they are different, and we may be reasonably sure that the instrument used here influences, but is not influenced by zone designation, at least in the short-run. 11. The percentage of vacant housing units is calculated as the ratio of vacant housing units to all housing units (occupied and vacant) in the block group (again multiplied by 100 for percentage). 12. For the county unemployment rate, the unemployment rate of the county (in which the block group is located) at the time of zone designation (1982) is used. 13. Age is measured in years. I have excluded ages below 17 in order to ensure that no children are included in the estimations, since we are concerned only with working age groups. 14. The dummy for gender is one if male, and zero if female. 15. The proportion African American is calculated as the ratio of persons with African American origin to all persons in the block group. 16. The proportion with bachelor’s degrees is computed as the ratio of those with bachelor’s degrees to all persons above 17 years in the block group. Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation. The descriptive statistics are for the 11,445 census block groups (the entire state of Ohio consists of 11,621 census block groups) used in the estimation.27 The mean for the tax incentive dummy shows that 78 per cent of areas (that is, 8,961 out of the 11,445 block groups) in the state had a tax incentive programme in place in 1990, leaving only 22 per cent (2,484 block groups) as non-tax incentive areas, a finding that reinforces the extensive nature of such programmes in the state. There is a lot of variation in the unemployment rate, with a high of 83.08 per cent (this being in Lucas County, census tract 25 and block group
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 79 Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for variables Variable
Block group unemployment rate Tax incentive programme Duration of programme Duration of programme squared % African American % bachelors’ degrees % male Age (years) Dummy for population loss County population change (in thousands) % manufacturing employment % service employment % professional employment % service occupation Poverty rate % vacant housing units
Mean
Standard deviation
Minimum
6.85 0.78 1.46 5.94 12.55 9.34 48.15 44.35 0.53 22.14
6.66 0.41 1.95 10.30 26.42 8.88 5.42 5.05 0.50 69.57
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 207
23.37 31.47 51.77 14.79 4.52 6.50
11.14 11.97 17.72 9.31 15.82 7.40
0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum
83.08 1 7 49 100 100 100 73 1 92.31 100 100 100 100 100 100
number seven, which covers part of the City of Toledo EZ28). There are a few census block groups that recorded a zero per cent unemployment rate in 1990.29 On average, as of 1990, the tax incentive areas in Ohio had been in existence for only a little longer than a year, suggesting that there were a large number of new zones designated. As of 1990 some zones/tax incentive areas has been in existence for seven years, having been designated when the tax incentive programme came into existence in the state. The dummy for population loss indicates that, on average, 53 per cent of the state’s census tracts had experienced population loss over the period 1980–90. The data on net population change for the county in which the block group is located reinforce this, indicating that, on average, each county lost about 22,000 residents over the period 1980–90. On average, about 12 per cent of the population in the block groups is African American. On average, the population in the 11,445 block groups is middle-aged, with men and women about equally distributed. Finally, as one expects, the proportion with bachelor’s degrees is less than 10 per cent in all the block groups on average. Based on the average, Ohio’s economic base is largely constituted of services (which has 31 per cent of total employment), and manufacturing employment (which has 23 per cent of total employment on average). In terms of occupational composition, a majority (52 per cent) of the employment is in professional specialty, technical and administrative occupations when compared to service occupations such as household services (about 15 per cent),
80 Incentives for Regional Development
implying a higher level of occupational skills. On average, only about 4 per cent of the population in the block groups had 1989 incomes below the poverty level. Finally, the data for vacant housing units indicate that, on average, about 7 per cent of housing units were vacant at the time of the 1990 Census survey. This implies that a majority of areas would qualify for zone designation as full authority zones, since the prevalence of a minimum of 5 per cent vacant industrial/commercial facilities is required for zone designation in the case of full-authority zones. Does this mean that the large number of limited authority zones in Ohio, would in fact be justified on grounds of distress, as full-authority zones? Note from Table 4.1 that the standard deviation for the proportion of vacant housing units is greater than the mean, showing the huge variability in this variable, as a measure of distress. In the next section, I report the results from the estimation of unemployment rate taking into account the treatment effects problem.
4.8
Results from the estimation
Table 4.2 shows the results from the OLS and 2SLS estimation of the unemployment rate.30 The OLS estimation considers the tax incentive dummy to be exogenous and is a simple regression of unemployment rate as a function of all independent variables shown in equation (4.2). OLS estimates are also presented along with 2SLS estimation results, because the OLS
Table 4.2 Estimation of the unemployment rate Variable Constant Tax incentive programme Duration of programme Duration squared % manufacturing employment % service employment % professional employment % service occupation % African American Mean age Percentage male % bachelors’ degrees N R2
OLS estimates (SE)a
2SLS estimates (SE)a
12.266 (1.678)*** 0.0303 (0.1127) 0.4595 (0.1157)*** 0.0256 (0.0231) 0.0323 (0.0112)*** 0.0332 (0.0113)*** 0.0895 (0.0105)*** 0.0638 (0.0184)*** 0.0649 (0.0039)*** 0.0585 (0.0162)*** 0.0334 (0.0201)* 0.0745 (0.0135)*** 11,445 0.32
16.245 (1.984)*** 4.5263 (0.9469)*** 1.8177 (0.3031)*** 0.2173 (0.0458)*** 0.0342 (0.0113)*** 0.0260 (0.0116) 0.0901 (0.0106)*** 0.0626 (0.0186)*** 0.0616 (0.0040)*** 0.0816 (0.0177)*** 0.0296 (0.0204) 0.0904 (0.0142)*** 11,445 0.26
*** Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. * Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. a. SE refers to standard error of the estimate.
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 81
estimates interestingly show the endogeneity of the tax incentive dummy. The 2SLS estimation considers tax incentives as endogenous, and uses factors that determine zone designation (or tax incentives) as instruments for the endogenous tax incentive dummy. The impact on the unemployment rate of tax incentives shown in the regressions is plausible if the assumptions of the estimation methods are taken into account. The OLS specification shows that tax incentives do not have a statistically significant impact on the unemployment rate of areas. When combined with the statistically significant duration variable and its squared, the coefficient on tax incentives in the OLS estimation may be interpreted as follows. In fact, an area with a tax incentive programme sees an increase in its unemployment rate by about 0.46 percentage points {0.0303 (coefficient on the tax incentive dummy in the OLS estimation, Table 4.2)} {0.4595 (coefficient on the duration variable in the OLS estimation) 1 year} {0.0256 (coefficient on the duration squared variable in the OLS estimation) 12} in a year. Areas that have tax incentive programmes for two years see an increase in their unemployment rate by about 0.84 points (0.0303 0.4595 2 years 0.0256 22), and so forth. Thus, with the OLS estimation, it appears as if tax incentive programmes actually increase unemployment in areas! In reality, however, the tax incentive programme is such that the causality runs in the opposite direction: areas are designated as EZs (full authority zones) or tax incentive areas because they have high unemployment rates (or have one of four other distress criteria). When the endogeneity of tax incentives is taken into account (in the 2SLS specification), the coefficient on the tax incentive dummy has a negative sign, which is statistically significant. This indicates that when their endogeneity in the zone designation process is accounted for, tax incentive programmes have some impact in reducing the unemployment rate of areas, consistent with our expectations. Further, when we consider the impact of the tax incentive along with the duration of its existence, we can say something about its net impact. The net impact of being a tax incentive area versus not being one for periods of one, two, three, four, five, six, and seven years is respectively,31 2.92 percentage points (4.5263 1.8177 1 0.2173 12), 1.76 percentage points (4.5263 1.8177
2 0.2173 4), 1.03, 0.73, 0.87, 1.44, and 2.45 percentage points respectively.32 Thus, if an EZ (or other tax incentive area) had ten unemployed persons out of a labour force of 100 persons in 1982 (when designated, with an unemployment rate of 10 per cent), the model predicts that the area’s unemployment in 1983 would be (2.92 percentage points less) 7.08 per cent. Taking into account the fact that a three percentage point reduction over a period of one year translates to about three persons obtaining gainful employment with the EZ or other tax abatement programme in place, these results are plausible.
82 Incentives for Regional Development
Given that the mean unemployment rate is 6.84 per cent (Table 4.1), should one be sceptical about the estimate, which shows that the unemployment rate moves 2.9 percentage points in the first year? Remember that the estimation of unemployment rate is carried out at the census block group level. The variation in the unemployment rate across the 11,445 census block groups is quite large, with a minimum of zero and a maximum recorded figure of 83.08 per cent (Table 4.1). Given such a large variation, it is easy to see the 2.9 percentage point reduction. Consider the example of a firm that creates 100 jobs in the first year of its existence in the zone. Assume that 97 out of these 100 new jobs are allocated to labour force that might migrate into the area with increased job growth, consistent with what the migration literature (see Bartik (1991) for a summary of this literature) has argued. The remaining three jobs are held by zone residents. Assuming that these three are among the original ten unemployed in the zone, the unemployment of the area decreases by three percentage points (from 10 to 7 per cent) in the first year. Another qualification to this result: it should be remembered that the tax incentive dummy in the regression is used as a measure of a tax abatement programme in place – either the EZ or the CRA tax incentives for job creation. Based on this, from the data, the effectiveness of EZ programme or tax incentives in general is indeed big enough to register. These results, while plausible, appear to be less in their impact than those reported by Papke (1994) in her evaluation of Indiana’s EZ programme. Papke reports a 19 per cent reduction in unemployment claims in Indiana as a result of the existence of the EZ programme. The difference in the magnitude of the impact of tax incentives between this work and Papke’s study could be due to the way in which the presence of the tax incentive programme and the unemployment rate are measured in the two studies. Papke’s variable measures the impact of the EZ considered in isolation. Here, the dummy for tax incentive programme takes into account the other tax incentive programme (CRA) in Ohio, in addition to the EZ. If the other tax incentive programme in Ohio, the CRA programme, is not accounted for, the effect of tax incentives may not have been measured adequately. Therefore, in the context of Ohio, use of the general dummy for tax incentive programmes is more appropriate than the single measure of the EZ that Papke uses. Papke also uses data on unemployment claims in Indiana whereas I use the actual unemployment rate. The superiority of self-reported data on employment when compared to that on unemployment claims is clear, as discussed earlier. From this point of view, the impact of tax incentive programmes obtained here is much more plausible than the 19 per cent reduction in unemployment claims Papke reports as being solely due to the EZ. While the reason for differences in the magnitude of coefficients across Papke’s and this study seems obvious, the results are consistent and both show
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 83
that EZ or CRA programmes have the impact of reducing the unemployment rate of the area adopting it. In general, the other variables in the estimation (shown in Table 4.2) have the expected effects on unemployment. The area’s manufacturing base and the proportion of employment in service occupations, increase an area’s unemployment rate, consistent with expectations. The percentage of employment in technical and administrative occupations has a negative impact on unemployment, showing that the higher the percentage employed in such routine occupations, the lower the unemployment rate the area. This is what one would expect because these are services which would not decline significantly even during periods of high unemployment. The percentage of an area’s employment in the service industry has a positive impact in the OLS specification, contrary to expectation, but loses its significance in the 2SLS version. The demographic structure of an area also influences its unemployment rate. Higher proportions of African Americans increase such areas’ unemployment rate and, as expected, the effect is statistically significant in the regressions. This is because African Americans, on average, have poorer skills. It is also possible that they have family and social ties that make them less mobile than others, increasing unemployment. As expected, younger areas (that is, those where the mean age is lower) and those with a lower proportion of men have higher unemployment rates. Younger persons are likely to have less work experience and hence have a longer search for jobs, thereby increasing the area’s rate of unemployment. Men are more likely to be employed because of better matching of skills and opportunities and they, being the primary income earners in most households, are employed. The percentage with bachelor’s degrees in all the specifications has the expected sign showing that the higher the proportion of college graduates, the lower is the unemployment rate of the area to the extent of about 0.10 percentage points (in the 2SLS specification). Thus better-educated areas have lower unemployment rates, which is to be expected. The R2 indicates that the model explains 26 per cent of the unemployment rate – a fairly low figure. However, it should be remembered that the R2 is only a descriptive statistic. In cross-sectional data, a lower R2 might occur even if the model is a satisfactory one, because of the large variation across individual units of observation (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). This suggests that the R2 alone may not be a suitable measure of the explanatory power of a model. The final table (Table 4.3) replicates the specification in column three of Table 4.2 with the duration variables as dummies rather than as continuous variables, following the literature. In this instance, the same variables as in Table 4.2 are used as instruments for the endogenous tax incentive dummy.
84 Incentives for Regional Development Table 4.3 Estimation of the unemployment rate with dummies for duration Variable Constant Dummy for tax incentive programme % manufacturing employment % service employment % professional employment % service occupation % African American Mean age Percentage male % bachelors’ degrees Duration of programmes: 0–1 year Duration of programmes: 1–3 years Duration of programmes: 3–5 years Duration of programmes: 5–7 years N R2
2SLS estimates SE 18.949 (1.669)*** 6.9831 (0.8635)*** 0.0314 (0.0086)*** 0.0289 (0.0091)*** 0.0850 (0.0080)*** 0.0392 (0.0142)*** 0.0534 (0.0033)*** 0.1087 (0.0149)*** 0.0335 (0.0166)** 0.1037 (0.0117)*** 3.5911 (0.4059)*** 3.8050 (0.4024)*** 4.6721 (0.4240)*** 4.7664 (0.5926)*** 11,445 0.16
*** Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. ** Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
In Table 4.3, signs on most independent variables (except that on the proportion of employment in service industry) remain as in the previous estimation, consistent with our expectations. The proportion of employment in the service industry has a positive impact on the unemployment rate, indicating that the higher the proportion of jobs in the service industry, the higher is the unemployment rate in the area. This effect is due to the fact that there are areas in the sample that have no service industry employment, but also have a low unemployment rate. This also explains why this variable has a positive impact in the OLS specification in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 shows that tax incentives continue to have the expected negative sign, which is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. When combined with the effect of the signs on the duration dummies, the impact for areas that have been tax incentive areas for a year is a decrease in their unemployment rate to the extent of 6.9831 3.5911 1 3.39 percentage points. The impact for an area that has been providing tax incentives anywhere between one and three years is (6.9831 (3.8050 2)) 0.63 percentage points. The impacts for areas having tax incentives from three to five years and five to seven years are, respectively, increases in their unemployment rate to the extent of 12 (6.9831 (4.6721 4)) and 22 percentage (6.9831 (4.7664 6)) points respectively.33 It is a robust finding across the estimations that, initially, tax incentives have a statistically significant impact in reducing unemployment in those areas that
Tax Incentives and Unemployment in Ohio 85
adopt them, consistent with the objective for which the programme was initiated in Ohio in 1982. Beyond the initial period, however, if tax incentives are continued, the unemployment problems of areas will recur.
4.9
Policy implications
While the regressions as a whole support the hypothesis that areas with tax incentives witness a reduction in their levels of unemployment, there is less consensus regarding the duration over which the tax incentives should be offered. The regression in which durations are included as dummies, suggests that three to five years could be the optimum period for maximizing the effect of tax incentives on unemployment rate, after which it is preferable that the area ceases to offer incentives. In terms of policy action, this translates into decertifying areas that have been tax incentive (EZ or CRA) areas for longer than five years. If incentives continue for periods of longer than three to five years, it is likely that their unemployment problems will return. The reason for this is that, after a while, tax incentives could degenerate into employment redistribution games that have the effect of increasing the unemployment in those areas that lose firms. However, it should be remembered that this research does not throw any light on the zero-sum nature of tax incentive policies such as EZs. I have not undertaken any analysis, real or hypothetical (as in Chapter 3), to show the effects of redistributing employment from one area to another. Further, this chapter does not consider the question of whether the high cost of generating a few jobs with generous tax abatements is worth the modest gains in reducing unemployment, something that will be dealt with in the following chapter. It must be acknowledged that tax incentives, being place-oriented policies, are only one way of increasing employment. There might be other, more efficient ways of reducing area unemployment – for example, peopleoriented schemes such as relocation and training programmes.
4.10
Concluding remarks
In any case, increasing employment has the effect of increasing households’ labour force participation rates (measured as the ratio of employment to population). This has hysteresis effects on the labour market, as Bartik (1991) rightly argued. Hysteresis is used to explain how the electromagnetic properties of certain metals are permanently affected by the temporary application of certain magnetic forces. When applied to the labour market, this means that the increase in the labour force participation rate as the result of increased employment increases households’ employability (due to training and acquisition of skills) in the long run. From this point of view, tax incentive programmes in Ohio most probably created these hysteresis effects in
86 Incentives for Regional Development
the labour market through increasing productivity, employment, and labour force participation. It should be noted that this chapter has only considered the impact of the existence or otherwise of tax incentive programmes on the unemployment rate. It has not, however, made an examination of the counterfactual, in which identical control groups are used, and the tax incentive treatment effect is introduced in both in order to assess its effects. Given this result, the next chapter considers the benefit–cost analysis of Ohio’s EZ programme, making various assumptions about employment created in the zones.
5 Benefits and Costs of Regional Development: Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zone Programme
5.1
Introduction
As highlighted in Chapter 4, the challenge that has been raised against Ohio’s enterprise zone programme is that it is a means of lobbying by regions to get zone designation. Thus, most areas in Ohio enjoy the associated benefits of being able to offer incentives even though they may not deserve to be doing so, as in the case of limited authority zones. This results in the proliferation of such programmes, ending in the ‘pirating’ of firms and jobs from one place to another, that eventually become zero-sum in their effects. This challenge, which has been the topic of many legislative discussions in Ohio and elsewhere, provides the motivation for the research in this chapter. Further, in this chapter, as in Chapter 3, I test the theoretical model we developed in Chapter 2. The question of whether or not the cost of the EZ programme exceeds the economic rent from jobs created in the EZ, at equilibrium, forms the basis for the benefit–cost analysis reported in this chapter. The objective of this chapter is to answer the questions: Are enterprise zones (EZs) efficient? And, further, are they efficient if they are adopted by high-unemployment areas? I evaluate Ohio’s enterprise zone programme and perform a benefit–cost analysis of employment created in these zones. One of the ideas underlying the evaluation of such programmes is to estimate whether the programme is successful in having some impact on the area. The standard approach to this question is to estimate an econometric model (of the outcome of interest) for small areas and include a variable that characterizes the programme under consideration. Chapter 4 takes this approach, and estimates the unemployment rate of Ohio’s census block groups as a function of the tax incentive programme and other variables that labour economics shows determine the rate of unemployment in an area. That chapter reports the finding that tax incentive programmes 87
88 Incentives for Regional Development
(the EZ and CRA programmes) have a significant impact in reducing the unemployment rate in the areas adopting them. This finding forms the basis of the benefit–cost analysis performed of Ohio’s enterprise zone programme in this chapter. That is, since Ohio’s tax incentive programmes have been effective in reducing the unemployment rates of areas that adopt them, it is also worth examining whether the dollar benefits of the EZ programme are worth their costs. In this chapter, I also test a hypothesis that Bartik (1991) developed regarding the relationship between net benefits from employment and the local unemployment rate. Net benefit, or economic rent, is the difference between the wages paid and the wage at which a person is willing to accept a job (or the reservation wage). Bartik argued that the reservation wage would be lower in high-unemployment areas because of the high value the unemployed in a high-unemployment area place on the importance of having a job. This suggests that the relationship between net benefits and unemployment rate can be expected to be positive. 5.1.1
Overview of the chapter
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively review relevant literature and Ohio’s EZ programme only briefly, since Chapter 2 provided a suggestive and critical review of the literature on evaluation of EZs. Further, Ohio’s EZ programme has been described in detail in Chapter 4. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 of this chapter describe the data and methodology adopted to perform benefit–cost analyses of Ohio’s EZ programme, and how it is different from the B–C analyses of the IL programme in Chapter 3. Section 5.5 describes how I impute reservation wages for Ohio’s EZs to estimate net benefits from employment, and how I arrive at measures of programme costs. I then present the benefit–cost analysis of Ohio’s EZs making different assumptions about employment in the zones. The policy implications follow in the final section.
5.2
Past literature
There is a vast body of policy and empirical literature that evaluates enterprise zones. As noted in the earlier chapters, the evidence is mixed. Some of the studies (US Department of HUD, 1986; Erickson and Friedman, 1989; Rubin and Armstrong, 1989; Papke, 1994) are more optimistic, while others (Seyfried, 1990; Dabney, 1991; Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Dowall, 1996) are pessimistic with regard to enterprise zone effects. Recall that Chapter 2 develops an analytical framework to understand the impact of the enterprise zone on the economy and the general equilibrium response of the tax abatement given to firms in the enterprise zone. This model provides a framework for performing benefit–cost analysis in the empirical work in this chapter. Further, Chapter 3 takes into account net
Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zones 89
benefits from employment, and performs a B–C analysis of enterprise zones in Illinois. That chapter reports the net benefits from employment to be several times the costs, even if it were assumed that all employment relocated to the Illinois EZs from elsewhere, and assuming that the relocation took place from low- to high-unemployment areas. However, this result has to be viewed with caution since the reservation wage estimates (and hence the net benefit estimates) in Chapter 3 are based on a single cross-section of the 1987 panel of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Further, the reservation wage estimates reported in Chapter 3 do not take into account the bias arising from sample selection, since reservation wages are observed only for the unemployed, in the PSID. In this chapter, I use reservation wage estimates that are based on a pooled cross-section and time-series (1984–7) dataset and are corrected for the bias arising from sample selection. Chapter 4 describes results from the standard econometric model and reports that tax incentive programmes in Ohio did make a difference to the rate of unemployment of areas adopting them. We learnt that the unemployment rate was not the same in areas with and without the tax abatement. Further, that tax incentives caused to decrease the unemployment rate by roughly three percentage points in areas having them when compared to those without, with the appropriate caveats about the period for which such incentives can be offered. Thus, while some studies of EZs and tax incentives are more robust than others, the effectiveness of EZs appears to be an unresolved issue in the literature. In this chapter, I perform benefit–cost analysis of Ohio’s enterprise zone programme using more comprehensive measures of net benefits and costs, making different assumptions about employment at the firm level and at the zone level. I find results that are robust to several different assumptions.
5.3
Ohio’s enterprise zone programme
In the state of Ohio, in order for an area to be designated as an enterprise zone, local communities must identify the EZ’s geographical area. The defined area must meet minimum population requirements and have a single continuous boundary. In addition, the area may also fulfil certain other distress criteria that are relevant. I have elaborated on these criteria specified by state’s Department of Development, in Chapter 4 (in Section 4.4). Further, I have also described in that chapter, the tax incentives available to firms locating in EZs, and the limits to tax incentives specified by the law. Recall that Ohio law permits municipalities to exempt real and/or personal property assessed values of up to 75 per cent for up to ten years, or an average of 60 per cent over the term of the agreement. The state’s EZ law permits unincorporated areas to exempt real and/or personal property assessed values of up to 60 per cent for up to ten years or an average of 50 per cent over the term of the agreement.
90 Incentives for Regional Development
It is important for empirical work in this chapter to recall that, in Ohio’s enterprise zone programme, there are two types of zones that are allowed: full authority zones and limited authority zones. Full authority zones are distressbased, and have to satisfy at least one of the six distress criteria described in Chapter 4. As explained there, it is sufficient for the limited authority zones to demonstrate minimum population requirements to be designated as zones. Note that the only check placed on limited authority zones is that they cannot consider intra-state relocation projects unless a waiver is obtained from the Director, Ohio Department of Development. Otherwise, both full and limited authority zones are free to offer tax incentives to firms locating there. As of December 1997, there were 44 distress-based zones and 278 limited authority zones in Ohio, which was one of the few states with a large number of zones in its territory. Specifically, note the large number of limited authority zones designated on the basis of non-distress criteria. The benefit–cost analysis reported in this chapter is based on all zones (full and limited authority zones) of the state for which all data were available.
5.4
Data
In Ohio, the Department of Development administers the enterprise zone programme. The database from the Ohio Department of Development contained information regarding zone number, agreement number, agreement date, expiration date, company name, and its SIC code. The database also contained information on firms’ actual performance with respect to jobs created, retained, payroll from employment created and retained, investment, amount of investment granted exemption, terms (period) of the exemption, property (real and personal property) taxes paid and forgone, and corporation taxes paid. All these performance data were cumulative and included information on all projects in the period 1984–95. This was thus a rich database that allowed testing of the hypotheses of the theoretical model and the research questions by permitting to perform benefit–cost analysis of the programme.
5.5 5.5.1
Benefit–cost methodology Measures of benefits
Measures of programme benefits that were chosen are net benefits from employment – defined as actual wages minus the reservation wage.1 Over and above a labour market perspective attributing benefits to the employed, one might ask whether benefits to the government such as increased income tax revenue and/or decreased unemployment insurance payments are relevant to be taken into account, given that EZs are government-funded. Remember that any increases in income tax revenue or decreases in unemployment insurance are distributional in their effects, merely transferring income from
Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zones 91
taxpayers to government or vice versa. They do not represent real benefits. On the other hand, net benefit from a job is similar to consumer’s surplus (in a goods market) which is the difference between the actual price and that the consumer would have been willing to pay for the good, and so is a measure of increase in welfare. As discussed in Chapter 3, McDonald (1997) argues that job creation is not a valid measure of gain. This is because job creation, at least in Illinois, is coincident with a firm obtaining a building permit to qualify for the sales tax exemption on building materials as shown in Redfield and McDonald (1991), whereas building permits are continually issued and jobs created in the local economy. McDonald argues that it is not clear if this can be attributed to the existence of the EZ or to the tax incentives. In Ohio’s programme, job creation is not tied to the issue of building permits as it is in the Illinois programme. The laws that guide the programme and eligibility in Ohio are tied to the commencement of physical construction. The law speaks of the increase in the assessed value of real property. A company locating in Ohio’s EZ discusses its proposed employment positions at the time it makes its application for the enterprise zone programme (again, an application that has nothing to do with the building permit). The company is allowed some time to create these jobs, typically three years from the date it enters into the enterprise zone agreement. Thus, note that, while the problems with job creation being coincident with building permits (as McDonald (1997) points out), are certainly applicable to Illinois’ programme, they do not apply to Ohio’s programme. In order to compute net benefits from employment (since net benefits are defined as actual wages minus reservation wage), data on reservation wages for Ohio labour force were necessary. Reservation wages estimated from the Panel Study for Income Dynamics (PSID) from Sridhar (1998) were used to impute reservation wages for Ohio’s enterprise zones.2 The PSID is a national panel data set of 6,000 American families, which has been published by the Survey Research Centre at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, since 1969. In the PSID, responses to the question ‘What is the lowest wage you would be willing to take home as pay?’ is measured as the reservation wage of the individual in a new job. This question was asked of respondents in the PSID consecutively for eight years from 1980 to 1987. Table 5.1, from Sridhar (1998), shows a model of the reservation wage. The model shows the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to individual demographic characteristics, labour market characteristics (primarily the unemployment rate) and other job search characteristics (including the duration of job search) for the United States. Note some distinctive characteristics of the reservation wage estimates reported in Table 5.1, from Sridhar (1998), when compared to those reported in Chapter 3 (Table 3.4): (i) The estimates in Table 5.1 are based on data for the period 1984–7; those in Table 3.4 are based on 1987 PSID data only.
92 Incentives for Regional Development Table 5.1 Switching regression model of reservation wage with sample selection (dependent variable: log of reservation wage) Variable
Constant Age Grades completed Work experience Whether African American (1 Yes; 0 No) Male (1)/Female (0) Marital status Number of children Predicted value of duration of search Predicted value of duration of search squared Unemployment rate of county of residence Log of past wage Log of weekly minimum unemployment benefits allowable under state law Log of weekly maximum unemployment benefits Waiting (0 or 1 week) for unemployment benefits r Dependent variable R2 N
Coefficient (standard error) 13.973 (12.71) 0.0709 (0.0624) 0.1559 (0.1428) 0.1119 (0.0899) 1.4125 (1.254)
Means (standard deviation)
39.82 11.76 12.43 0.31
(11.05) (2.47) (13.82) (0.46)
0.06344 (0.6223) 0.9112 (0.9353) 0.1602 (0.1825) 0.1353 (0.0798)* 0.0012 (0.0082)
0.71 0.46 1.15 1.92 6.46
(0.45) (0.50) (1.33) (1.67) (8.32)
0.0324 (0.0543)
7.10 (2.80)
0.5502 (0.0397)*** 0.1108 (0.1189) 1.6533 (1.227) 0.7234 (0.8183) 2.7901 (2.173)
$3.17 (2.71) $23.91 (1.60) $169.13 (1.26) 0.91 (0.29) 2.14 (0.49) $3.25 (2.36)
0.40 737
Notes: * Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. *** Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Source: Sridhar (1998).
(ii) The estimates in Table 5.1 take into account sample selection bias, arising because reservation wages are observed only for the unemployed, in the PSID. The OLS estimates in Chapter 3 do not correct for the sample selection bias. Note the sample selection correction factor is reported in Table 5.1, correcting for a major econometric problem. Since the PSID is a nationally representative sample (see Sridhar (1998) for a description of the weighting scheme employed in the PSID to ensure representativeness), it is assumed that the elasticities based on United States data represent the responsiveness of reservation wages in Ohio as well, to analogous socio-economic characteristics.
Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zones 93
The imputed reservation wage estimates were applied to the various characteristics of persons in Ohio’s enterprise zones to predict reservation wages for them. This was possible because I overlaid a map of Ohio’s census block groups on one showing its enterprise zones.3 This enabled me to determine the census block groups that each enterprise zone in Ohio was comprised of, and to apply the block groups’ characteristics to the zones. This was especially useful because no data on socio-demographic characteristics were available by zone in Ohio. Profile of zones and non-zones Available data on socio-demographic characteristics for persons at the census block group level for Ohio from the STF3A files of the Census were whether unemployed or not, whether African American, male or female, their age, education (grades completed), marital status, and number of children. I computed the unemployment rate (based on self-reported employment status of persons), average age (of persons), mean number of children per family, mean grades completed, and mean proportion African American, proportion married, and male, for Ohio’s census block groups. I used the geographical overlaying to estimate these characteristics for Ohio’s zones and for the non-zone areas. The ultimate objective being to predict reservation wages for Ohio’s EZs, based on these characteristics, which the labour literature shows determine reservation wages, as in Table 5.1. This is much needed for estimation of net benefits from jobs. Before reporting results from the imputation of reservation wages for Ohio, I summarize profiles of the socio-economic characteristics for Ohio’s zones and non-zone areas. Table 5.2 summarizes the profile for the zones. Table 5.2 Profile of Ohio’s enterprise zones, 1997 Characteristic Unemployment rateb (%) Age (in years) Grades completed Proportion African Americanc Proportion malec Proportion marriedc Number of children per family
0th percentile a
50th percentile
100th percentile
0.73 6.57 11.27 0
6.23 44.45 12.08 0.01
16.95 49.53 13.73 0.79
0.44 0.32 0.56
0.49 0.61 0.91
0.56 0.75 1.30
Mean (standard deviation) 6.34 44.43 12.17 0.05
(2.44) (1.86) (0.47) (0.10)
0.49 (0.01) 0.59 (0.07) 0.91 (0.11)
Notes: a. The nth percentile of a distribution is the number below which n per cent of observations lie. The 0th percentile is the minimum. The 100th percentile is the maximum. b. The unemployment rate is multiplied by 100 and expressed in percentage terms. c. If these proportions are multiplied by 100, they will be expressed in percentage terms.
94 Incentives for Regional Development Table 5.3 Profile of Ohio’s non-zone census block groups, 1997 Characteristic Unemployment ratea (%) Age (in years) Grades completed Proportion African Americanb Proportion maleb Proportion marriedb Number of children per family
0th percentile
50th percentile
100th percentile
0 19.05 8.07 0
3.57 44.38 12.54 0
59.16 69.13 16.24 1.00
0.22 0 0
0.48 0.61 0.83
1.00 1.00 2.85
Mean (standard deviation) 4.66 44.63 12.72 0.08
(4.40) (5.27) (1.04) (0.20)
0.48 (0.05) 0.57 (0.15) 0.84 (0.29)
Notes: a. The unemployment rate is multiplied by 100 and expressed in percentage terms. b. If these proportions are multiplied by 100, they will be expressed in percentage terms.
Table 5.2 shows that the 280 enterprise zones in Ohio had substantial variability in their unemployment rate,4 had a middle-aged population,5 with high school (about 12 grades of school) completed on average, the distribution of women and men being equal and majority of them married. Table 5.3 shows the profile of characteristics for non-zone areas in Ohio. Table 5.3 is based on the 3,331 census block groups of the state that were not enterprise zones in 1997. It shows that some of the non-zone areas of the state had higher unemployment rates than the areas designated as zones (observe that the maximum unemployment rate for non-zone groups is 59 per cent, much higher than that for zones, 17 per cent). However, it may be noted that the average unemployment rate for the non-zone areas was lower than it was for the zone areas, indicating higher levels of distress in zones, and thereby supporting the theoretical model of Chapter 2. It may also be noted that, on average, the populations in the non-zone areas in Ohio were of the same age but slightly more educated than the population in the zone areas.6 This, if true, and with a sharper contrast than is shown by the data here, is consistent with the notion of EZs as blighted areas, as the model in Chapter 2 points out.7 From a comparison of Tables 5.2 and 5.3, note that the zones are also a little different from the non-zones in that they have slightly larger families (seen in the average number of children per family) than their non-zone counterparts. Imputation of reservation wages The imputation of the reservation wage to jobs created in Ohio’s EZs was undertaken using the estimates in Table 5.1 and the zone characteristics summarized in Table 5.2. In addition to the characteristics reported for Ohio’s enterprise zones in Table 5.2, data on the duration of unemployment,
Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zones 95 Table 5.4 Distribution of reservation wages imputed for Ohio’s enterprise zones nth percentile 0th percentile (minimum) 50th percentile (median) Mean (standard deviation) 100th percentile (maximum)
Reservation wage ($ per hour) 2.60 4.09 4.88 (1.48) 16.98
past wages and work experience (see Table 5.1) were substituted from the PSID for the imputation. The minimum weekly unemployment benefit ($12.15), maximum weekly unemployment benefit ($245.44),8 and the waiting period for unemployment benefit (one week) eligibility that were applied to the estimates in Table 5.1 for the imputation, were for Ohio. The imputed reservation wage for an average Ohio zone turned out to be about $4.88 an hour in constant dollars, with 1982–4 100 (or about $10,150 annually, assuming 40 hours a week and 52 weeks a year), quite plausible. The distribution of imputed reservation wages is shown in Table 5.4, with a minimum of $2.60 and a maximum of $16.98 an hour (or about $35,000 annually, assuming 52 regular work weeks), depending on zone characteristics (all in constant dollars, with 1982–4 100). When I apply the reservation wage estimates in Table 5.1 to characteristics of the non-EZ block groups of the state, the mean reservation wage turns out to be $5.67 per hour, higher than that in the zones, as we would expect. The next step was to estimate net benefits for the employment created in Ohio’s zones. Because the reservation wages imputed from the PSID were hourly, they were converted to an annual amount (the Ohio Department of Development reports annual earnings from employment)9 assuming that persons work full-time (40 hours a week, 52 weeks a year). The earnings reported for jobs created in Ohio’s zones were made net of the imputed reservation wages to arrive at an estimate of net benefit for every job. 5.5.2
Measures of programme costs
It may be useful to note that actual property tax abatements offered to firms in the zones were used as programme costs in the benefit–cost analysis of Ohio’s programme in this chapter. Infrastructure costs are also real resource costs. Since these data were not routinely collected at the state level in Ohio in early 1998, a survey was sent to the EZ administrators of the 44 distressed Ohio EZs. The objective of the survey was to obtain some idea of the costs of providing infrastructure services to firms. It was assumed that the cost of providing public services in distressed areas define the upper limit of the cost of making infrastructure improvements for a firm that locates in any zone. One may expect the non-distressed areas (those which are designated as (limited authority) zones in Ohio) to have the basic infrastructure such as
96 Incentives for Regional Development
state highways, county roads, sewer and water lines in place. Even if they do not, it was assumed that the cost of constructing the infrastructure in these non-distressed areas would be at the most, the same, if not higher than, that in the distressed areas. Based on an analysis of 39 of the 44 distressed zones that responded to the survey, the average cost of providing basic infrastructure services to a firm that locates in a zone turned out to be $24,200. There were several zones (17 out of 39) in which the cost to the local government of providing infrastructure to firms was zero because it was either covered by federal grants or was paid for by the firm.10 It is relevant at this point to recall the hypothetical illustration in Chapter 3 (in Table 3.3) that compared property tax revenues to the cost of providing public services. Based on data from the 1,974 contracts in Ohio’s EZs formalized over the period 1984–95, I find the average tax abatement (forgone) is about $107,963. Even when the cost of providing public services (from the above-mentioned survey) is included, this abatement turns out to be $132,163. For the 1,974 contracts, the average local (personal, and real property and local corporation) tax revenue paid by a firm is roughly $3.5 million. Then the property tax revenue (even with the abatement) is, on average, several times higher than the average taxes forgone. So, according to the argument we developed in Chapter 3, it must be the case that in Ohio’s zones, the cost of the programme might well have been less than the abatement dollars provided to firms. And that the new industry generated a fiscal surplus which could be used to finance the incentives at least in part. In addition to the costs of providing infrastructure to firms, respondents were also asked about any administrative costs of negotiating the EZ agreement with the firm. Most (92 per cent of the respondents) reported that there was no cost involved in negotiating the contract with the firm. Based on those who reported administrative costs, the average cost of negotiating an agreement with a firm was around $1,000.11 The costs of infrastructure and administrative costs for providing services to EZ firms were taken into account along with property tax abatement costs and the cost of any other local incentives to estimate programme costs in the benefit–cost analysis.12 It may be noted that these measures of costs ignore commuting effects, which could be substantial, depending upon the size of the zone. The large number of zones in Ohio suggests relatively small zones. Further, it is assumed that jobs created by zone firms are held by zone residents. The empirical evidence is that, on average, about 50 per cent of the jobs created in the EZ are held by zone residents. As reported in Chapter 2, the US Department of HUD (1986) found that 70 per cent each of jobs created in the Bridgeport EZ, CT, and the Chicago EZ, IL, 46 per cent in Macon EZ, MO, 19 per cent in Michigan City, IN, and 30 per cent in the Tampa zone (FL) were held by zone residents. In the Louisville (Kentucky) zone, it was found
Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zones 97
that 31 per cent of the jobs created were held by persons who were either lower income or zone residents. Based on a survey of local enterprise zone coordinators conducted by the US Department of HUD, Erickson and Friedman (1989) found that the mean share of jobs held by zone residents was over 61 per cent with a median of over 68 per cent. Immergluck (1997), based on data from the Chicago EZ, indicated that the barriers between EZ residents and jobs are dependent on some factors. He found that local employment was much higher in Latino parts of the zone and in African American neighbourhoods where there were more public sector jobs, very small firms and few manufacturers. The comparatively small size of Ohio’s zones, along with the assumption that a majority of jobs are held by zone residents, implied that substantial commuting to get to work, does not take place. In the event that commuting exists, they could reduce the benefits imputed here. The net benefits were compared to programme costs in order to estimate the benefit–cost ratio. It may be noted that the benefit–cost ratios computed in this manner refer only to local government investment, which helped to determine in which zones local government investment was worth the net benefits from employment. Given the financial autonomy of local governments in the United States, they are the appropriate unit of analysis. Moreover, this is a programme that depends to a considerable extent on the local government’s financial resources, as is clear from the description of Ohio’s EZ programme. Even if the benefits that accrue from the programme were not essentially local in the long run (for example, multiplier effects that could have spillover effects on the region’s employment), the local government incurs programme costs. Therefore it was appropriate to perform benefit– cost analysis at the level of the local government that spends its resources on the programme.
5.6
Benefit–cost analysis
Given the finding in Chapter 4 regarding the effectiveness of Ohio’s tax incentives, B–C analysis of the programme is performed and reported in three scenarios reflecting various assumptions about employment created in the zones. The assumptions which form the basis for the three scenarios are succinctly: 1. Scenario one: Net benefits estimated from all employment reported as being created and retained by the firms. 2. Scenario two: Net benefits estimated from employment reported as being created (excludes jobs retained from scenario one). The use of employment created as a measure of programme impact is supported by evidence of the impact of tax incentives on (un)employment, presented in Chapter 4.
98 Incentives for Regional Development
3. Scenario three: Net benefits estimated from a proportion of the total employment (those created and retained) attributable to the tax incentive making two assumptions of elasticity. The assumptions were made to arrive at the various scenarios for two reasons: (i) The sensitivity or robustness of the B–C results to the various assumptions presents a range of multiple alternatives, according to assumptions or value judgment. (ii) Retained employment cannot be considered as being held by the unemployed, because they are, by definition, already held by someone.13 Alternatively, it is important to examine the benefits and costs when the jobs are held by the formerly unemployed. So when we take into account only jobs that are newly created, can the assumption of the jobs being held by unemployed be plausible.14 The assumption in scenario two reflects this. In addition, also note that retained employment is not a very reliable measure of programme impact. A pre-existing firm negotiates a tax incentive with officials and claims that its jobs would have otherwise moved. However, it is quite possible that the firm would have stayed where it was even in the absence of the programme. Moreover, data from the Ohio Department of Development on retained jobs (and their earnings) are not very reliable, especially for the earlier years (from 1984 to the early 1990s). So, in scenario two, I am able to overcome the data and other substantive limitations with retained employment. The net benefits, costs per job and benefit–cost ratios (all for local government investment) are computed at two levels: at the level of the enterprise zone and at the level of the firm within the zones, in all the scenarios. The justification, from a policy perspective, for computing B–C ratios for firms and zones is that they can indicate whether or not particular firms or particular zones should be targeted.
5.6.1
Scenario one
In this scenario, all of the jobs that were reported as being created and retained were taken into account in the computation of the benefit–cost ratios. The results are reported for 531 firms that did not relocate from within or outside the state in the 143 zones and those that received some tax incentives from their local governments.15 Table 5.5 shows the distribution of total employment (created/retained by firms in the zones), net benefits from jobs, costs and benefit–cost ratios per job at the level of the contracts that are negotiated with 531 firms in Ohio’s enterprise zones. Up to 1995, the 531 firms in the 143 zones had created and retained 104,840 jobs. Table 5.5 shows at the level of these firms a disaggregated distribution of employment, earnings, net benefits, costs and B–C ratio per job.
Table 5.5 Distribution of average net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for the (531) firms in Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 1
Total employmenta Annual deflated earnings per job ($) (1982–4 100) Net benefit per job ($)b Costs per job ($)c
B–C ratiod Unemployment rate (%)
Mean (min, max) for firms: 0th–25th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 25th–50th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 50th–75th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 75th–100th percentile
Unweighted mean for all firms (std dev.) e
Weighted mean for all firms (weighted std dev.) f
12.07 (1, 23) 12,553.57 (10,148.45, 14,497.31) 11.69 (8,897.97, 3,508.82) 180.21 (21.99, 330.87) 2.5 (59.53, 2.71) 7.46 (3.05, 11.66)
40.32 (24, 63) 16,546.02 (14,497.71, 18,714.21) 5,819.81 (3,564.41, 8,161.69) 524.42 (336.14, 762.76) 5.85 (2.72, 9.36) 7.03 (2.05, 13.49)
95.51 (64, 152) 21,913.32 (18,764.75, 24,985.60) 11,185.96 (8,168.76, 14,369.24) 1,126.24 (764.53, 1,791.36) 15.22 (9.48, 24.14) 6.69 (2.36, 13.49)
646.91 (153, 11,000) 32,078.04 (25,100.70, 49,636.24) 20,624.94 (14,372.16, 36,913.09) 8,962.99 (1,795.12, 1,273,982.19) 80.25 (24.41, 1,448.75) 6.80 (2.85, 13.49)
197.44 (789.22) 20,821.28 (8,012.17)
197.44 (382.91) 20,766.91 (2,449.43)
9,458.97 (8,388.51)
9,407.17 (2,996.77)
5,085.54 (56,142.42)
2,691.40 (5,007.54)
24.73 (74.04)
24.73 (37.12) 6.99 (2.25)
6.34 (2.44)
Notes: The notes below are applicable to Tables 5.5–5.12. Min and max respectively refer to minimum and maximum, and std dev. refers to standard deviation in all the tables. Annual deflated earnings in all the tables refer to 1982–4 100 as the base year. a. b. c. d.
99
Total employment in this scenario includes jobs created and retained. Net benefit is defined as earnings per job – annual reservation wage. Costs per job include property tax abatements, other local incentives, and costs of infrastructure. BC ratio is defined as the ratio of net benefit to costs per job. Note that it is not average net benefit per job (row 3) divided by average cost per job (row 4). If I calculate BC ratios based on average net benefit and cost per job (rows 3 and 4 respectively), I would not reveal valuable information on the individual firm’s BC ratios which I have calculated as the ratio of individual firms’ net benefits to costs per job. The minimum and maximum values for the distribution of BC ratios should make clear the average values of the BC distribution, when we compare them to the net benefit and cost distribution. e. Unweighted means are the raw averages of the relevant variable for all the firms. f. Weighted means are weighted averages in which the weights are the number of firms in each category (firms in 0th–25th percentile, those in the 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th percentiles) of the relevant distributions. For the weighted means, the weights are multiplied by the means for firms in each category and sum of the weights and the means are divided by the total number of firms. A similar procedure is used to calculate weighted standard deviations for the various distributions.
100 Incentives for Regional Development
From Table 5.5, it is clear that there has been considerable variation in the employment created by the various firms in the state’s zones. The high-cost zones were those in which few jobs were created. With the variation, it may be noted that the benefits are greater than costs in the average contract negotiated in Ohio’s zones. The net benefits per job are approximately equal to earnings less the mean annual reservation wage (about $10,000 per job). Also observe the large variation in the costs incurred for every job created, ranging from less than $25 a job to about $1.27 million per job in Table 5.5. The highest costs (abatements and other incentives) were incurred for those firms that made the largest investments in personal and real property. Note the property tax abatement is an incentive to capital. Given that first-order effects dominate, as in the model (Chapter 2), and these capital-intensive firms did not create much employment, the costs per job are high. There was also considerable variation in the benefit–cost ratios (for local government investment) across zones. The benefit–cost ratio was less than one for about 10 per cent of the firms, indicating that costs were greater than benefits for these firms. The low benefit areas were those that awarded large abatements because of firms’ investments in capital (personal and tangible property), resulting in high costs to create employment. However, for firms in majority of the distribution, the (unweighted) B–C ratio was well above one, indicating that net benefits per job were substantially higher than costs per job in the case of these firms. In the data, at the aggregate level, there was little relationship between net benefits from employment and the rate of unemployment. In fact, there was a negative, but insignificant correlation between the net benefits from jobs created in the zones and the unemployment rate of the zone in which these firms are located, casting doubt on Bartik’s hypothesis about the relationship between net benefits from jobs and the unemployment rate. Table 5.6 shows the distribution of the employment, net benefits, costs and benefit–cost ratios by zone in this scenario. It shows that in 50 per cent of the zones the cost of creating a job was less than $1,000. In the average zone, the net benefit was above $10,000 per job, substantially higher than the costs per job. The difference between the earnings and the net benefit per job is equal to an amount in the range of the annual reservation wage reported earlier (about $10,000 per job). On average, the unweighted B–C ratio in this scenario at the zone level is about 27 (being 25 at the firm level, Table 5.5). The weighted B–C ratio (25.5) is also consistent with this, indicating that net benefits were 25 times greater than the costs of creating employment. I found that the correlation between the zone unemployment rate and net benefit per job was positive and stronger at the zone level, than that found at the firm level, being 0.09, with many lower B–C ratios found in the low-unemployment zones, and more consistent with Bartik’s hypothesis.
Table 5.6 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios in Ohio’s (143) enterprise zones, scenario 1
Total employmenta Annual deflated earnings per job ($) Net benefit per job ($)b Costs per job ($)c B–C ratiod Unemployment rate (%)
Mean (min, max) for zones: 0th–25th percentile
Mean (min, max) for zones: 25th– 50th percentile
Mean (min, max) for zones: 50th– 75th percentile
Mean (min, max) for zones: 75th– 100th percentile
Unweighted mean for all zones (std dev.)e
Weighted mean for all zones (weighted std dev.)f
36.97 (1, 82)
153.75 (83, 231) 17,611.45 (15,310.28, 19,974.22) 7,048.75 (5,282.18, 8,950.70) 408.01 (268.69, 573.82) 8.11 (4.69, 11.55) 5.85 (2.36, 11.17)
335.83 (236, 533) 22,152.01 (20,020.53, 24,177.00) 12,002.45 (9,121.22, 14,443.00) 897.30 (581.38, 1,299.17) 22.18 (11.93, 35.66) 6.44 (2.85, 13.49)
2,453.83 (549, 26,360) 31,549.11 (24,534.56, 45,281.78) 20,454.63 (14,575.34, 36,121.29) 14,154.65 (1,383.08, 156,491.30) 72.34 (36.15, 224.84) 6.63 (2.88, 11.66)
733.15 (2,369.38) 21,089.35 (7,725.08)
733.14 (1,113.75) 21,089.35 (2,684.22)
10,666.51 (7,544.38)
10,487.25 (2,563.70)
4,927.96 (19,853.35) 26.95 (38.24)
3,860.62 (7,148.55) 25.55 (13.03)
6.34 (2.44)
6.51 (2.13)
13,074.35 (10,148.45, 15,154.95) 2,739.62 (2,120.76, 5,262.69) 179.80 (85.09, 267.59) 1.79 (3.17, 4.61) 7.13 (2.05, 10.71)
Notes: The notes below are applicable to Tables 5.5–5.12. Min and max respectively refer to minimum and maximum, and std dev. refers to standard deviation in all the tables. Annual deflated earnings in all the tables refer to 1982–4 100 as the base year. a. b. c. d.
101
Total employment in this scenario includes jobs created and retained. Net benefit is defined as earnings per job – annual reservation wage. Costs per job include property tax abatements, other local incentives, and costs of infrastructure. BC ratio is defined as the ratio of net benefit to costs per job. Note that it is not average net benefit per job (row 3) divided by average cost per job (row 4). If I calculate BC ratios based on average net benefit and cost per job (rows 3 and 4 respectively), I would not reveal valuable information on the individual firm’s BC ratios which I have calculated as the ratio of individual firms’ net benefits to costs per job. The minimum and maximum values for the distribution of BC ratios should make clear the average values of the BC distribution, when we compare them to the net benefit and cost distribution. e. Unweighted means are the raw averages of the relevant variable for all the firms. f. Weighted means are weighted averages in which the weights are the number of firms in each category (firms in 0th–25th percentile, those in the 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th percentiles) of the relevant distributions. For the weighted means, the weights are multiplied by the means for firms in each category and sum of the weights and the means are divided by the total number of firms. A similar procedure is used to calculate weighted standard deviations for the various distributions.
102 Incentives for Regional Development
5.6.2
Scenario two
In this scenario, the B–C ratios reported at the firm level and the zone level take into account only that proportion of employment that is newly created. The results in this scenario are based on jobs created by 575 firms in 148 zones.16 As explained earlier, retained jobs were excluded from the B–C analysis. Table 5.7 shows the distribution of B–C ratios at the firm level when calculated based on new jobs. As of 1997, the total employment created by firms in the zones was 33,896. The remaining 70,944 of the total of 104,840 jobs considered in scenario one were retained. The net benefit in this scenario was about $10,000 on average, and about $10,000 lower than the earnings per job, which was approximately equal to the annual mean reservation wage. The B–C ratios were less than one till roughly up to the 25th percentile, indicating that for more than 20 per cent of the firms, the costs of creating employment were greater than the benefits from local government investment. The firms with B–C ratios less than one were those that created few jobs (usually less than ten jobs) or were offered large abatements and were randomly distributed across low-unemployment and high-unemployment zones. I found that most of the firms with B–C ratios in higher percentiles of the distribution were located in the zones with high unemployment rates (had unemployment rates greater than 125 per cent of the state’s average for 1990). The correlation, however, between net benefits and unemployment rate of the zone (in which firm had located) was negative, though not statistically significant, being 0.1, similar to that found at the firm level, in scenario one. The same pattern of B–C ratios essentially repeated itself when zone-level performance was studied in scenario two, the results from which are reported in Table 5.8. Table 5.8 shows that the mean earnings per job was reasonable (around $20,000), concurring with the expectation of the Ohio Department of Development regarding the nature of jobs created by the firms typically locating in the zones. The high-cost areas were those in which firms made large investments in personal and real property and, as a result, large abatements were provided. Zones with B–C ratios less than one were those with low net benefits because of low earnings from employment. Thus, the lowest net benefits from employment were in zones in which the earnings per job were below average or when reservation wages were high because of the area’s low unemployment rate (confirmed by the negative, but statistically insignificant, sign on the unemployment rate, in Table 5.1). Lower net benefits were found in some high unemployment zones, with correlation between net benefits and unemployment rate at the zone level also being 0.1. 5.6.3
Scenario three17
Tables 5.9–5.12 show the results from the net benefits from employment and B–C ratios for respectively 198 (in 62 zones) and 91 firms (in 32 zones).18 The
Table 5.7 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for the (575) firms in Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 2
Total employmenta Annual deflated earnings per job ($) Net benefit per job ($)b
Costs per job ($)c BC ratiod Unemployment rate (%)
Mean (min, max) for firms: 0th–25th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 25th–50th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 50th–75th percentile
6.37 (1, 11) 12,409.71 (10,076.12, 14,554.11) 121.06 (10,138.02, 3,670.92) 462.65 (80.04, 754.12) 0.76 (46.43, 1.40) 7.57 (2.05, 11.66)
17.56 (12, 27) 16,472.92 (14,634.91, 18,596.79) 5,921.91 (3,692.26, 7,882.93) 1,086.88 (759.82, 1,501.95) 2.94 (1.49, 4.71) 6.76 (2.76, 11.66)
170.79 (69, 1023) 43.88 (28, 68) 21,491.57 31,477.84 (24,816.45, (18,600.32, 24,635.04) 48,436.18) 10,713.90 20,381.02 (7,921.71, (14,127.23, 14,097.20) 37,980.23) 2,173.33 14,062.94 (1,512.89, 3039.92) (3,041.45, 1,273,982.19f) 25.58 (11.59, 106.88) 7.82 (4.77, 11.47) 6.59 (2.36, 13.49) 6.76 (2.76, 11.66)
Mean (min, max) for firms: 75th–100th percentile
Unweighted mean for all firms (std dev.)e
Weighted mean for firms (weighted std dev.)f
58.95 (92.61) 20,534.26 (7,881.70)
58.95 (37.23) 20,534.26 (2,513.02)
9,331.02 (8,161.65)
9,281.10 (2,856.89)
6,623.86 (54,776.70) 9.05 (14.11) 6.34 (2.44)
4,415.92 (6,639.01) 8.88 (6.20) 6.87 (2.19)
Notes: The notes below are applicable to Tables 5.5–5.12. Min and max respectively refer to minimum and maximum, and std dev. refers to standard deviation in all the tables. Annual deflated earnings in all the tables refer to 1982–4 100 as the base year. a. b. c. d.
103
Total employment in this scenario includes jobs created and retained. Net benefit is defined as earnings per job – annual reservation wage. Costs per job include property tax abatements, other local incentives, and costs of infrastructure. BC ratio is defined as the ratio of net benefit to costs per job. Note that it is not average net benefit per job (row 3) divided by average cost per job (row 4). If I calculate BC ratios based on average net benefit and cost per job (rows 3 and 4 respectively), I would not reveal valuable information on the individual firm’s BC ratios which I have calculated as the ratio of individual firms’ net benefits to costs per job. The minimum and maximum values for the distribution of BC ratios should make clear the average values of the BC distribution, when we compare them to the net benefit and cost distribution. e. Unweighted means are the raw averages of the relevant variable for all the firms. f. Weighted means are weighted averages in which the weights are the number of firms in each category (firms in 0th–25th percentile, those in the 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th percentiles) of the relevant distributions. For the weighted means, the weights are multiplied by the means for firms in each category and sum of the weights and the means are divided by the total number of firms. A similar procedure is used to calculate weighted standard deviations for the various distributions.
Table 5.8 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for (148) Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 2
Net benefit per job ($)b
Costs per job ($)c B–C ratiod Unemployment rate (%)
Mean (min, max) for zones: 25th–50th percentile
Mean (min, max) for zones: 50th–75th percentile
Mean (min, max) for zones: 75th–100th percentile
Unweighted mean for all zones (std dev.)e
Weighted mean for zones (weighted std dev.)f
19.87 (1, 42) 13,337.93 (10,148.45, 15,311.77) 2,952.61 (755.87, 5,036.53) 440.94 (134.61, 662.61) 1.01 (0.59, 3.17) 7.30 (2.05, 11.17)
74.69 (43, 106) 17,706.85 (15,438.60, 19,707.11) 7,118.41 (5,194.37, 8,950.70) 915.05 (668.12, 1,233.86) 4.96 (3.20, 6.69) 5.90 (2.67, 10.30)
191.40 (107, 288) 21,468.59 (19,757.39, 23,618.26) 11,224.33 (8,964.85, 13,440.43) 1,723.47 (1,265.99, 2,428.51) 9.95 (6.77, 13.76) 5.99 (2.36, 11.66)
631.62 (290, 1,431) 29,282.95 (23,861.97, 47,345.77) 18,495.26 (13,702.25, 37,980.67) 19,970.69 (2,464.24, 182,954.77) 24.77 (13.90, 67.03) 6.65 (3.05, 13.49)
229.03 (280.56) 20,449.08 (6,574.58)
229.02 (93.06) 20,449.08 (2,326.66)
10,079.31 (6,643.42)
9,957.24 (2,172.44)
5,762.54 (20,148.18)
5,762.54 (9,452.37)
10.17 (10.96) 6.34 (2.44)
10.17 (4.16) 6.46 (2.11)
Notes: The notes below are applicable to Tables 5.5–5.12. Min and max respectively refer to minimum and maximum, and std dev. refers to standard deviation in all the tables. Annual deflated earnings in all the tables refer to 1982–4 100 as the base year. a. b. c. d.
Total employment in this scenario includes jobs created and retained. Net benefit is defined as earnings per job – annual reservation wage. Costs per job include property tax abatements, other local incentives, and costs of infrastructure. BC ratio is defined as the ratio of net benefit to costs per job. Note that it is not average net benefit per job (row 3) divided by average cost per job (row 4). If I calculate BC ratios based on average net benefit and cost per job (rows 3 and 4 respectively), I would not reveal valuable information on the individual firm’s BC ratios which I have calculated as the ratio of individual firms’ net benefits to costs per job. The minimum and maximum values for the distribution of BC ratios should make clear the average values of the BC distribution, when we compare them to the net benefit and cost distribution. e. Unweighted means are the raw averages of the relevant variable for all the firms. f. Weighted means are weighted averages in which the weights are the number of firms in each category (firms in 0th–25th percentile, those in the 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th percentiles) of the relevant distributions. For the weighted means, the weights are multiplied by the means for firms in each category and sum of the weights and the means are divided by the total number of firms. A similar procedure is used to calculate weighted standard deviations for the various distributions.
104
Total employmenta Annual deflated earnings per job ($)
Mean (min, max) for zones: 0th–25th percentile
Table 5.9 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for (198) firms in Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 3 (assumed elasticity 0.3)
Total employmenta Annual deflated earnings per job ($) Net benefit per job ($)b Costs per job ($)c BC ratiod Unemployment rate (%)
Mean (min, max) for firms: 0th–25th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 25th–50th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 50th–75th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 75th–100th percentile
Unweighted mean for all firms (std dev.)e
Weighted mean for firms (weighted std dev.)f
3.53 (0.91, 6) 13,636.09 (10,177.08, 17,207.95) 2,075.81 (15,703.50, 6,272.03) 614.57 (16.22, 1,051.17) 0.18 (10.28, 1.73) 7.31 (3.05, 11.61)
9.29 (6.16, 12.51) 21,584.98 (17,274.79, 25,880.46) 10,959.53 (6,755.28, 15,741.49) 1,642.51 (1,073.13, 2,255.08) 3.49 (1.73, 5.60) 7.23 (2.88, 11.98)
18.33 (12.61, 25) 30,591.50 (25,919.16, 35,455.71) 20,199.52 (15,936.28, 24,809.38) 3,166.89 (2,264.07, 4,326.76) 9.41 (5.88, 15.21) 7.95 (3.70, 13.49)
148.18 (26, 1200) 42,440.13 (35,862.24, 49,737.04) 31,510.01 (25,017.49, 40,862.68) 16,051.59 (4,435.09, 1,273,982.19) 96.61 (15.50, 2,159.17) 6.61 (3.44, 13.49)
44.40 (124.41) 27,073.02 (11,198.61)
44.40 (56.47) 27,073.02 (2,898.34)
16,135.22 (11,518.54)
16,135.22 (3,538.53)
11,692.13 (91,494.86)
5,284.57 (7,456.57)
27.65 (159.40) 6.34 (2.44)
27.65 (79.54) 7.27 (2.18)
Notes: The notes below are applicable to Tables 5.5–5.12. Min and max respectively refer to minimum and maximum, and std dev. refers to standard deviation in all the tables. Annual deflated earnings in all the tables refer to 1982–4 100 as the base year. a. b. c. d.
105
Total employment in this scenario includes jobs created and retained. Net benefit is defined as earnings per job – annual reservation wage. Costs per job include property tax abatements, other local incentives, and costs of infrastructure. BC ratio is defined as the ratio of net benefit to costs per job. Note that it is not average net benefit per job (row 3) divided by average cost per job (row 4). If I calculate BC ratios based on average net benefit and cost per job (rows 3 and 4 respectively), I would not reveal valuable information on the individual firm’s BC ratios which I have calculated as the ratio of individual firms’ net benefits to costs per job. The minimum and maximum values for the distribution of BC ratios should make clear the average values of the BC distribution, when we compare them to the net benefit and cost distribution. e. Unweighted means are the raw averages of the relevant variable for all the firms. f. Weighted means are weighted averages in which the weights are the number of firms in each category (firms in 0th–25th percentile, those in the 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th percentiles) of the relevant distributions. For the weighted means, the weights are multiplied by the means for firms in each category and sum of the weights and the means are divided by the total number of firms. A similar procedure is used to calculate weighted standard deviations for the various distributions.
Total employmenta Annual deflated earnings per job ($) Net benefit per job ($)b Costs per job ($)c
BC ratiod Unemployment rate (%)
Mean (min, max) for firms: 0th–25th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 5th–50th percentile
Mean (min, max) for firms: 50th–75th percentile
Mean (Min, max) for firms: 75th–100th percentile
Unweighted mean for all firms (std dev.)e
Weighted mean for firms (weighted std dev.)f
1.96 (0.37, 3.73) 13,962.83 (11,013.22, 16,497.22) 3,586.48 (125.77, 6,272.03) 750.35 (40.25, 1,028.13)
5.87 (4, 8.53) 20,016.23 (17,134.53, 24,146.00) 9,514.91 (6,899.56, 13,466.98) 2,254.77 (1,038.42, 3,587.38) 2.37 (1.40, 3.62) 7.20 (2.88, 11.61)
14.14 (8.89, 21) 30,263.82 (24,709.70, 35,165.22) 19,601.75 (13,585.95, 26,671.05) 5,516.82 (3,609.37, 9,016.16) 5.56 (3.69, 7.98) 7.44 (4.26, 11.98)
72.43 (21.5, 387) 41,796.84 (36,306.58, 49,292.28) 32,005.81 (26,974.90, 36,384.07) 27,686.49 (9,548.63, 152,773.40) 42.31 (8.62, 422.78) 6.54 (2.05, 13.49)
23.15 (48.62) 26,617.57 (11,100.76)
23.23 (21.40) 26,365.62 (2,636.23)
16,135.39 (11,002.71)
16,348.94 (2,731.12)
10,517.92 (23,761.22)
8,937.30 (8,125.57)
12.80 (45.36) 6.34 (2.44)
12.80 (22.11) 6.61 (2.02)
0.66 (0.03, 1.38) 7.08 (3.05, 9.35)
Notes: The notes below are applicable to Tables 5.5–5.12. Min and max respectively refer to minimum and maximum, and std dev. refers to standard deviation in all the tables. Annual deflated earnings in all the tables refer to 1982–4 100 as the base year. a. b. c. d.
Total employment in this scenario includes jobs created and retained. Net benefit is defined as earnings per job – annual reservation wage. Costs per job include property tax abatements, other local incentives, and costs of infrastructure. BC ratio is defined as the ratio of net benefit to costs per job. Note that it is not average net benefit per job (row 3) divided by average cost per job (row 4). If I calculate BC ratios based on average net benefit and cost per job (rows 3 and 4 respectively), I would not reveal valuable information on the individual firm’s BC ratios which I have calculated as the ratio of individual firms’ net benefits to costs per job. The minimum and maximum values for the distribution of BC ratios should make clear the average values of the BC distribution, when we compare them to the net benefit and cost distribution. e. Unweighted means are the raw averages of the relevant variable for all the firms. f. Weighted means are weighted averages in which the weights are the number of firms in each category (firms in 0th–25th percentile, those in the 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th percentiles) of the relevant distributions. For the weighted means, the weights are multiplied by the means for firms in each category and sum of the weights and the means are divided by the total number of firms. A similar procedure is used to calculate weighted standard deviations for the various distributions.
106
Table 5.10 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for (91) firms in Ohio’s enterprise zones, scenario 3 (assumed elasticity 0.1)
Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zones 107
results in Table 5.9 are based on the assumption that the elasticity of employment with respect to taxes is 0.3 (the upper range for the elasticity, in Bartik’s summary of econometric studies) and they are reported at the firm level. Table 5.10 shows the results for the firm level assuming that the elasticity of employment with respect to taxes is 0.1 (the lower range in Bartik’s summary). Thus, the employment and net benefits that are reported in these tables refer to the portion of annual employment created and retained that is actually attributable to the tax incentive making two different assumptions of elasticity (0.3 and 0.1).19 Tables 5.11 and 5.12 report the results of benefit–cost analyses at the zone level for these two assumptions of elasticity. With an assumed elasticity of employment with respect to taxes equal to 0.3, of the 19,990 jobs that were reported by the firms to be created and retained, about 8,791 (44 per cent) are actually attributable to the tax incentive. With an assumed elasticity of 0.1, only about 1,894 (a smaller proportion, about 31 per cent) of the 5,974 jobs that were created are actually attributable to the tax incentive. This is consistent with what we expect. For firms in the lower end of the employment distribution, the number of jobs attributable to the tax incentive (dy) was always less when compared to the actual number of jobs created and retained.20 For firms in the upper part of the employment distribution, it was found that a majority of the employment they reported as being created and/or retained was due to the tax incentive, for either elasticity. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 provide a range for the benefit–cost ratio for local government investment at the firm level and Tables 5.11 and 5.12 provide a range for the ratio at the zone level, if we assumed elasticity in the range 0.3 to 0.1. Tables 5.9–5.10 show that, on average, the (weighted as well as unweighted) B–C ratio at the firm level (zone level) can be expected to be in the range 28 (14) (with an elasticity of 0.3) to 13 (10) (with an elasticity of 0.1). As we expect, with the assumption of elasticity in the lower range, the benefits from creating employment are lower when compared to costs. However, with either assumption of elasticity, it should be noted that for firms in the upper quintile of the B–C distribution, the net benefits from jobs are substantially greater than costs. A similar pattern repeated for zone-level performance (Tables 5.11–5.12), with the two assumed elasticities. At the zone level (unweighted) average B–C ratios were slightly lower than at the firm level. The correlation between net benefits from employment and zone unemployment rates with an assumed elasticity of 0.3 was negative, but small and insignificant, being about 0.03. With an elasticity assumption of 0.1, this correlation was positive and higher, being 0.12, confirming Bartik’s hypothesis regarding the positive relationship between net benefits and the unemployment rate. The zones in the top portion of the B–C ratio distribution were those with higher net benefits relative to lower costs of creating employment. The average unemployment
Total employmenta Annual deflated earnings per job ($) Net benefit per job ($)b Costs per job ($)c
BC ratiod Unemployment rate (%)
Mean (min, max) for zones: 0th–25th percentile
Mean (min, max) for zones: 25th–50th percentile
Mean (min, max) for zones: 50th–75th percentile
Mean (min, max) for zones: 75th–100th percentile
Unweighted mean for all zones (std dev.)e
Weighted mean for zones (weighted std dev.)f
7.56 (1.41,12.61) 15,508.67 (10,894.26, 19,022.55) 3,988.64 (4,990.01, 8,491.40) 672.67 (51.17, 1,120.73) 1.11 (4.15,2.98) 7.28 (3.05, 10.20)
26.77 (13.15,41.29) 22,630.06 (19,041.19, 27,154.26) 12,565.93 (8,506.76, 16,857.30) 1,354.99 (1,126.21, 1,735.04) 5.44 (3.00, 7.76) 7.74 (4.26,11.00)
95.81 (43.74,157.46) 29,532.43 (27,379.72, 32,714.84) 19,629.91 (17,688.55, 23,154.76) 2,535.31 (1,767.29, 3,394.43) 11.03 (7.93,15.55) 7.39 (4.76,11.17)
454.88 (162,1,570) 41,133.26 (33,360.46, 48,587.09) 30,809.09 (23,298.23, 39,143.82) 8,772.99 (3,618.97, 1,273,982.19) 38.63 (15.86, 150.33 ) 6.69 (3.49,13.49)
143.51 (268.11) 27,357.45 (10,212.04)
143.51 (112.24) 27,009.42 (2,574.45)
16,589.07 (10,458.32)
16,589.07 (3,262.76)
23,684.78 (161,479.00)
3,188.10 (2,394.90)
21.36 (63.55)
13.84 (10.61)
6.34 (2.44)
7.27 (2.14)
Notes: The notes below are applicable to Tables 5.5–5.12. Min and max respectively refer to minimum and maximum, and std dev. refers to standard deviation in all the tables. Annual deflated earnings in all the tables refer to 1982–4 100 as the base year. a. b. c. d.
Total employment in this scenario includes jobs created and retained. Net benefit is defined as earnings per job – annual reservation wage. Costs per job include property tax abatements, other local incentives, and costs of infrastructure. BC ratio is defined as the ratio of net benefit to costs per job. Note that it is not average net benefit per job (row 3) divided by average cost per job (row 4). If I calculate BC ratios based on average net benefit and cost per job (rows 3 and 4 respectively), I would not reveal valuable information on the individual firm’s BC ratios which I have calculated as the ratio of individual firms’ net benefits to costs per job. The minimum and maximum values for the distribution of BC ratios should make clear the average values of the BC distribution, when we compare them to the net benefit and cost distribution. e. Unweighted means are the raw averages of the relevant variable for all the firms. f. Weighted means are weighted averages in which the weights are the number of firms in each category (firms in 0th–25th percentile, those in the 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th percentiles) of the relevant distributions. For the weighted means, the weights are multiplied by the means for firms in each category and sum of the weights and the means are divided by the total number of firms. A similar procedure is used to calculate weighted standard deviations for the various distributions.
108
Table 5.11 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for Ohio’s (62) enterprise zones, scenario 3 (assumed elasticity 0.3)
Table 5.12 Distribution of net benefits and benefit–cost ratios for Ohio’s (32) enterprise zones, scenario 3 (assumed elasticity 0.1)
Total employmenta Annual deflated earnings per job ($) Net benefit per job ($)b Costs per job ($)c
BC ratiod Unemployment rate (%)
Mean (min,max) for zones: 0th–25th percentile
Mean (min,max) for zones: 25th–50th percentile
Mean (min,max) for zones: 50th–75th percentile
Mean (min,max) for zones: 75th–100th percentile
Unweighted mean for all zones (std dev.)e
Weighted mean for zones (weighted std dev.)f
4.50 (1.55, 7.42) 15,085.66 (11,013.22, 18,899.14) 5,148.80 (125.77, 8,692.74) 952.72 (199.66, 1,827.23) 0.56 (0.03,1.61) 5.40 (3.05,6.88)
11.34 (8,16.14) 21,350.98 (18,905.91, 25,450.02) 10,728.34 (8,800.55, 13,272.49) 2,435.89 (1,925.31, 3,175.07) 2.20 (1.88,2.39) 7.97 (5.24,9.35)
38.85 (27.97, 48.72) 28,404.33 (25,844.22, 32,716.81) 17,587.70 (14,066.98, 22,528.87) 5,605.98 (3,669.23, 10,585.77) 5.79 (3.69,8.76) 7.97 (4.76,11.00)
182.11 (64.01, 523) 39,968.96 (34,347.08, 43,895.87) 30,119.24 (25,039.41, 36,384.07) 34,076.44 (11,433.87, 97,277.84) 30.38 (9.48, 111.97 ) 6.87 (2.05,13.49)
59.20 (106.01) 26,202.48 (9,866.44)
59.20 (43.49)
15,896.02 (10,019.75)
15,896.02 (3,288.36)
12,742.80 (23,168.14)
10,015.86 (6,572.82)
9.73 (20.48) 6.34 (2.44)
9.73 (9.27)
26,202.48 (3,099.63)
7.05 (2.01)
Notes: The notes below are applicable to Tables 5.5–5.12. Min and max respectively refer to minimum and maximum, and std dev. refers to standard deviation in all the tables. Annual deflated earnings in all the tables refer to 1982–4 100 as the base year. a. b. c. d.
109
Total employment in this scenario includes jobs created and retained. Net benefit is defined as earnings per job – annual reservation wage. Costs per job include property tax abatements, other local incentives, and costs of infrastructure. BC ratio is defined as the ratio of net benefit to costs per job. Note that it is not average net benefit per job (row 3) divided by average cost per job (row 4). If I calculate BC ratios based on average net benefit and cost per job (rows 3 and 4 respectively), I would not reveal valuable information on the individual firm’s BC ratios which I have calculated as the ratio of individual firms’ net benefits to costs per job. The minimum and maximum values for the distribution of BC ratios should make clear the average values of the BC distribution, when we compare them to the net benefit and cost distribution. e. Unweighted means are the raw averages of the relevant variable for all the firms. f. Weighted means are weighted averages in which the weights are the number of firms in each category (firms in 0th–25th percentile, those in the 25th–50th, 50th–75th, and 75th–100th percentiles) of the relevant distributions. For the weighted means, the weights are multiplied by the means for firms in each category and sum of the weights and the means are divided by the total number of firms. A similar procedure is used to calculate weighted standard deviations for the various distributions.
110 Incentives for Regional Development
rate for the (two) zones with a B–C ratio greater than 100 (with an assumed elasticity of 0.3) was 9.9 per cent, higher than 120 per cent of the state’s average unemployment rate in 1990. With an assumed elasticity of 0.1, the only zone that had a B–C ratio greater than 100 (111.97) had high unemployment rate, being 8.13 per cent in 1990. 5.6.4
Summary of the B–C analysis
Table 5.13 summarizes the weighted and unweighted average B–C ratios for the various scenarios at the firm and the zone level. The summary in Table 5.13 conforms to our expectations. The most optimistic zone-level B–C ratios are in scenario one, which makes favourable assumptions regarding job creation and retention. These ratios become smaller when only those jobs that were attributable to the tax incentive are taken into account (especially with the lower assumed elasticity). B–C ratios are considerably lower when only jobs created were taken into account, also as expected.21 Thus, on average, the B–C ratio for firm-level and zone-level performance for local government investment indicated that the local net benefits from employment can be expected to be greater than the local costs of generating them. Certain caveats have to be noted immediately. The results from the B–C analyses refer only to local government investment, rather than to all government investment. Second, the summary in Table 5.13 is based on averages. This indicates that, while, on average, net benefits from jobs can be expected to be greater than the costs of generating them, it is not a good strategy for all zones to adopt tax incentives in order to create employment. The policy implications of the findings relate to programme design and focus on targeting of areas for zone designation and targeting of certain kinds of firms.
5.7
Policy implications
The results from the B–C analyses call for more selective designation criteria that can possibly result in a reduction of competition by reducing the number Table 5.13 Summary of average B–C ratios in various scenarios at firm level and zone level Firm-level
Scenario 1 (all employment taken into account) Scenario 2 (only jobs created taken into account) Scenario 3: elasticity 0.3 Scenario 3: elasticity 0.1
Zone-level
Unweighted
Weighted
Unweighted
Weighted
24.7
24.7
27.0
25.6
9.1
8.9
10.2
10.2
27.7 12.8
27.7 12.8
21.4 9.7
13.8 9.7
Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zones 111 Table 5.14 Proportion of zones with B–C ratios 1 in various scenarios Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario
Percentage of zones 1 2 3 (assumed elasticity: 0.3) 3 (assumed elasticity: 0.1)
90 75 80 78
of zones in this state. In this context, it must be enlightening to know that, as of 1997, Ohio was one of only three states in the United States (along with Louisiana and Arkansas) to have more than 75 enterprise zones in its territory. Recently the conventional state of Iowa in the Midwestern United States passed enterprise zone legislation, and as of September 2002, 332 EZs were certified in this state, as I highlight in Chapter 1. As of the end of 2003, Ohio had 391 enterprise zones. Based on the results found here, one implication is to decertify zones that perform poorly in terms of B–C ratios. Table 5.14 shows the proportion of zones that had unweighted B–C ratios greater than one in various scenarios.22 Table 5.14 shows that, as might be expected, the proportion of zones with B–C ratios greater than one is the highest in scenario one. In scenario two, only 75 per cent of zones have B–C ratios greater than one. In scenario three, the proportion of zones with B–C ratios greater than one is higher (being 80 per cent) with a higher assumed elasticity than with the lower assumed elasticity (where it is about 78 per cent), which is again consistent with what we would expect. What are the factors that distinguish zones with B–C ratios greater than one from those that have B–C ratios less than one, and what are the policy implications from these findings? I explain this at the end of this section. Based on the B–C ratios, it is possible to evaluate the efficiency implications of decertifying the poorest performing zones. Efficiency loss is defined as the extent to which costs exceed benefits in the zones (defined as poorperforming) in which the B–C ratio was less than one. Table 5.15 summarizes these efficiency losses in the poorest performing zones in various scenarios. When I studied total employment (created and retained) created by the firms (scenario one), I found that most (eight) of the (11) zones that had B–C ratios less than one were limited authority zones at the time, that is, were designated on the basis of their population, rather than on high unemployment. The cumulative efficiency loss in the form of property tax abatements and other incentives provided by the local governments of these (eight) limited authority zones amounts to $44 million (or about $5.5 million per zone).23 When we take into account only those jobs that are created (as in scenario two), the efficiency loss turns out to be of higher magnitude, as we would expect. More zones (21) turn out to be inefficient in this scenario than in
112 Incentives for Regional Development Table 5.15 Efficiency losses in various scenarios Scenario Scenario 1 (created and retained employment taken into account) Scenario 2 (only created employment taken into account) Scenario 3: assumed elasticity 0.3 Scenario 3: assumed elasticity 0.1
Efficiency losses (million $) 44.2
44.9 16.1 4.2
scenario one (8), with the assumption being more restrictive. The property tax abatements, provision of infrastructure and other incentives to firms in the 21 zones with B–C ratios less than one in this scenario amounts to $45 million (or about $2 million per zone). Understandably, many of the zones that perform poorly in scenario one are also the ones that perform poorly as well in this scenario. The average unemployment rate for the 21 zones that had negative B–C ratios is 6.92 per cent, only average unemployment by state standards (just about 120 per cent of the state of Ohio’s average unemployment rate of 5.7 per cent for 1990). In scenario three, the efficiency loss with the higher elasticity assumption is higher than with the low elasticity. With the assumed elasticity of employment with respect to taxes being 0.3, the cumulative efficiency loss is $16 million for six zones, the average unemployment rate for them being 6.73 per cent. If the elasticity were assumed to be 0.1, then the efficiency loss is $4 million for five zones (approximately $850,000 per zone) whose average unemployment rate was just 6 per cent for 1990. Overall, when I examine zones with B–C ratios less than one and their unemployment rates in various scenarios, I find that, consistent with Bartik’s hypothesis, they are mostly low-unemployment areas. I find that all of the firms and zones with negative B–C ratios and positive B–C ratios less than one are ones in which the earnings from jobs are low relative to reservation wages. This is because of the areas’ lower unemployment rate in relation to the state average (this follows from Table 5.1), leading to low net benefits and consequently low B–C ratios from employment. On the other hand, wherever firms that located in high-unemployment zones with low reservation wages create well-paid jobs, high net benefits and high B–C ratios are found. Some of the zones in which the net benefit from employment could have been high due for this reason, have lower B–C ratios because of the large abatements given to firms that located in them. I find, based on my analysis, that even when skilled or unskilled (respectively well- or poorly-paid) jobs are created in low-unemployment zones, the B–C ratios are low because of higher reservation wages in such low-unemployment zones. The first implication that emerges from this analysis is that it is beneficial for local government investment when skilled (that is, well-paid) jobs are
Evidence from Ohio’s Enterprise Zones 113
created in high-unemployment zones since they are lower reservation wage areas. This maximizes the net benefits from employment. The creation of well-paid jobs in high-unemployment areas can be induced by providing incentives (similar to current state-level incentives that exist relating to Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) employees) to firms in the area to provide training to their low-skilled employees in order to help them obtain the necessary skills. Since the rate of unemployment tends to be higher in areas where the labour force is less skilled, in the absence of incentives, firms would have little incentive to offer skilled jobs to unemployed zone residents. Secondly, it is necessary for local governments to ensure strict compliance from firms in terms of job commitment so that they create the employment stated in the agreement. This implies a larger role for the tax incentive review council (TIRC) which has been constituted for this purpose. It is also necessary to place a ceiling on the amount of the abatement to be given to a single firm, based on the findings in this chapter. As of now, the legislation states the limits of the incentives only in terms of the percentage of assessed values of the property (see section 5.3 and Chapter 4). The location of firms that create low-skilled jobs in low-unemployment areas is not beneficial for either the state or for local government and hence should not be encouraged. As of now, retail operations are not eligible for tax incentives within zones and this is a step in the right direction, based on the results found from work in this chapter. Finally, it may be necessary to decertify any zones that perform poorly, depending on the assumption regarding employment. It may be noted from Table 5.15 that total efficiency losses are at their greatest in scenario two (a restrictive assumption involving only jobs newly created) and at their lowest in scenario three (with an assumed elasticity of employment with respect to taxes being 0.1). The analysis with scenario three (with an assumed elasticity of 0.3) provides a middle ground.24 These are a few zones that perform poorly in all the scenarios. The implication is that these zones can be decertified, thereby avoiding these efficiency losses. Alternatively, if one were to apply the model developed here only to new jobs created (when they are held by the local unemployed), the implication would be that we should decertify the zones that do not perform well in scenario two. Thus, it has to be recognized that the decertification implications for the programme depend upon the assumptions one makes. This final implication is consistent with what is reported in Chapter 4. While work in that chapter found support for the robust result that areas with tax incentives do observe a reduction in their unemployment rate, it concludes by discussing that there is less consensus regarding the duration for which the tax incentives should be offered. Based on the findings, that chapter suggests three to five years to be the optimum period for maximizing the effect of tax incentives on the unemployment rate, after which it is
114 Incentives for Regional Development
preferable that the area stop offering incentives. In terms of policy action, this translates into decertifying areas that have been tax incentive areas for longer than five years. It is easy to see why it is likely that unemployment problems return if incentives continue for long periods of time. With time, tax incentives encourage lobbying for such programmes and degenerate into employment redistribution games that increase the unemployment in those areas that lose firms. Also, we may note that, although decertification depends upon the assumptions we want to make, certain bottom-line results appear to be valid in every case. More selective designation criteria are to be used for zone designation – these could be distress criteria relating to high unemployment. This implies the decertification of zones that do not qualify on the basis of unemployment or other distress criteria. Appropriate incentive structures and monitoring mechanisms must be devised that reward labour-intensive firms (those with high labour–output ratios) that create skilled jobs along with on-the-job training. Since labour-intensive firms create employment, they must be made eligible for incentives to train labour to move up the value chain of producing a product or service. If these criteria are taken into account in the design of the programme and targeting, the EZ programme in Ohio can be capable of generating greater employment for its high-unemployment areas and reducing wasteful competition. Such enlightened programmes can provide a positive response to the policy debate and to the challenges that have been raised in the literature regarding such traditional tax incentive programmes. In the next part of the book, we will consider place-oriented regional development policies that focus primarily on infrastructure rather than tax incentives. The next couple of chapters present evidence from infrastructure incentives offered in the growth centres of India, as a contrast to the experience from tax incentives. The final chapter and part compares the lessons learnt from the two approaches to regional development.
Part III Infrastructure Incentives: Theory and Evidence
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6 Impact of Growth Centres on Unemployment and Firm Location: Evidence from India
6.1
Introduction
In this part of the book, we move the focus away from incentives that are primarily financial, to physical incentives offered by state and local governments to attract firms. The most important of these physical incentives is infrastructure. In Part III of this book, consisting of this chapter and the next, I focus on infrastructure incentives. I present evidence from India’s growth centres (GCs), areas which offer incentives such as power, water, telecom, and banking to enable the states to attract industries. When we consider a developing country such as India, we find much greater regional disparities than those observed in developed countries. Because of this, the debate on convergence has occupied a great deal of attention in the development literature. Convergence implies that in a steady state, poorer regions can be expected to grow more rapidly than their richer counterparts. This occurs mainly as a result of the free flow of capital to the poorer regions (because of capital shortage, the rate of return to capital in such regions will be higher). Convergence also occurs because poorer regions need not reinvent the wheel: they can imitate the technological changes adopted by the richer regions. The debate on convergence in Indian states is divided, but the majority view has been that the disparities between the poorer and richer states and regions have widened enormously (Rao, Shand and Kalirajan, 1999; Ahluwalia, 2000; Srivastava, 2001; Singh and Srinivasan, 2002; Cashin and Sahay, 1996; Rao and Sen, 1997; Nagaraj, Varoudakis and Veganzones, 1998). This counter-intuitive observation is understandable because while the economic reforms initiated in India in the 1990s had a positive influence on economic growth and the richer states, the poorer states grew quite slowly. The extent of ‘trickle-down’ of growth in developing countries primarily dependent upon agriculture is determined by the employment elasticity of agricultural output, which has remained stagnant in India. Further, non-agricultural employment in rural 117
118 Incentives for Regional Development
India has not grown rapidly enough to absorb the expanding labour force. The infrastructure has remained a bottleneck and has hampered the ‘trickle-down’ of growth and employment opportunity. Thus, regional disparities in India have not diminished in recent years. The Government of India introduced the growth centres (GCs) programme in June 1988 to give impetus to industrialization processes in backward regions. Under the programme, 71 GCs were set up across the country that were supposed to be allotted to the various states on the basis of a set of combined criteria of area, population and the extent of industrial backwardness. These GCs, that continue to be in existence at the time of writing, provide basic industrial infrastructure like power, water, telecom, and banking to enable the states to attract industries. Central government funds for the programme are to be leveraged by the states for purposes of financing.
6.2 The importance of and the motivation for research A number of studies consider the effect of taxes on firm location decisions and the local economies, holding public services constant (see, for example, Bartik, 1991). The chapters in Part I of the book contain an exhaustive review of the literature. Here we will merely note that there are few studies dealing with the effect of non-tax incentives, but many with tax incentives (Steinnes, 1984; Papke, 1987, 1991; Tannenwald and Kendrick, 1995; Tannenwald, 1996, cited in Fisher and Peters, 1998). The work in this chapter is an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, and uses empirical evidence from India’s GCs programme, as a representation of the infrastructure incentives, that state and local governments can offer to firms. Consistent with the idea of place-oriented policies, growth centres in India are similar to the enterprise zones of the United States since they primarily offer infrastructure incentives for investors that locate there. As highlighted in Chapter 1, the GCs programme assumes particular significance in light of a recent decision to stop the war of tax incentives among the Indian states. Until recently, in a policy similar to that of their US counterparts, various states in India had been offering tax incentives to investors in order to persuade them to locate in their states, make investments and create employment. There are several instances of competition for firms among the Indian states in the post-liberalization (1991) period. Recently, the south Indian states, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, had been competing fiercely to secure the location of Microsoft’s newest India facility by attempting to showcase their pool of technical talent and skilled workforce, stable leadership and governance, and market potential. Furthermore, in terms of actual tax incentives, the past decade in India had witnessed several instances of generous abatements to firms.
India’s Growth Centres and Unemployment 119
In November 1999 a conference of state chief ministers and the Union Finance Minister, Government of India, decided to stop this tax war among the Indian states. This is noteworthy in view of the fact that even states in the United States have not taken this bold step, despite the point that a number of American economists and those in US policy circles continue to be worried about the effect of tax incentives on the fiscal health of states and their ability to provide public services (for instance see Netzer, 1991). The decision was taken by the Indian states because the offer of tax incentives, in addition to affecting the general fiscal health of the states, produced financial constraints on the states’ ability to provide infrastructure services, given that sales tax revenue accounts for nearly one-quarter of own source revenue for the majority of Indian states. Further, to alleviate the complex and cascading tax structure in the Indian states, a unified value added tax (VAT) is proposed to be introduced from April 2005.1
6.3
Objectives
The objectives of this chapter are to answer the following questions: 1. To examine empirically the effect of infrastructure incentives (GCs) on unemployment rate, as in the literature. 2. To study the effect of infrastructure, where GCs have been established, on firm location. In addition to the secondary data I obtained from DIPP regarding the functioning and effectiveness of GCs, secondary, district-level data from all Indian states (containing GCs) are obtained to answer the above questions to evaluate their effectiveness. In an attempt to answer the first question, I estimate the unemployment rate, using data from the Census of India, analogous to work undertaken in Chapter 4. To answer the second question, I estimate the impact of GCs on firm location, as depending on the existence of infrastructure. This chapter is organized as follows. The next section explains why the growth centres programme is relevant in the Indian context. This is followed by a description of relevant literature in the context of developing countries. The chapter then describes the growth centres programme, followed by an exposition of the theory and the empirical model that form the basis of the work. This is followed by a summary of the secondary data, and the results from two estimations: the estimation of the unemployment rate; and the estimation of the performance of the GCs. The final section summarizes the policy implications of the research. 6.3.1
Why growth centres?
There are several reasons why the GC programme is relevant for India’s industrial and urban policy. For example, the costs of infrastructure, specifically,
120 Incentives for Regional Development
real estate (see Sridhar, 2004), for some recent evidence regarding this phenomenon) in the major cities of the country make it difficult for Indian firms to win the price war. Faced with the transitions that occur with city growth, industry in India must relocate to smaller and medium-sized towns, as the GCs programme rightly emphasizes. If state and local governments invest in improving the physical infrastructure in small and medium-sized towns, they can compete as alternative locations for firms which are considering new investment or diversification decisions. This can reduce operational costs (such as rental or leasing costs) for firms that would find such costs to be much higher in metropolitan areas. In smaller and medium-sized towns, where the GCs are located, firms will be able to secure an adequately trained labour force at a relatively low cost. This is because the cost-of-living adjusted wage is itself lower in smaller and medium-sized towns, holding quality constant. Industries are keen to exploit this advantage. If industry were to locate in semi-urban and rural areas (the emphasis of the GC programme) this would change the areas’ economic base. As the Todaro model shows, rural–urban migration in most developing countries occurs for reasons of employment. Data compiled by India’s National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA) show that more than half of the men that migrated from rural to the urban areas of India in 1991 did so for employment opportunities. Relocation of industry to rural and semi-urban areas would help the rural poor and surplus labour to find alternative employment in their own localities. This acts as a brake on urban migration, thereby alleviating housing pressures and preventing the creation of slums. In addition, the relocation of industry would also help in the co-ordination of the government’s poverty alleviation programmes. So far, it has been found that recipients of various employment training programmes in India have been unable to find suitable employment in rural areas. The location of firms in semi-urban and rural areas would help in matching the demand for and supply of skills. Finally, the development of smaller and medium-sized towns might imply that they are self-contained communities, but eventually automotive ties have to develop between urban areas and their satellite towns. This implies that the development of an adequate road and highway system, which has been neglected for a long time in India, will finally receive the attention it needs. The GC approach is a test of the alternative to the tax war among the states. It is also a test of the attempt to foster convergence among Indian states. This chapter analyzes the effect of infrastructure incentives on firm location decisions and on the area’s unemployment rate. Note that Bartik’s (1991) work showed conclusively that tax incentives have an impact on firm location decisions, holding public services (infrastructure) constant. If there
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were to be a moratorium on tax incentives, will infrastructure incentives become more important to firm location decisions? Can other countries learn from the Indian experience to say no to tax incentives? This chapter is an attempt to understand the role of infrastructure incentives in firm location decisions, and their impact upon the local unemployment rate of the local economies that adopt them. In order to do this, it uses evidence from India, and is partly analogous to Chapter 4 which reports similar results from tax incentives offered in Ohio, from the Midwestern United States. Further, as I highlighted in Chapter 1, in relation to enterprise zones and tax incentives in the United States, there is a lot of scepticism in Indian academic and policy circles regarding GCs and particularly as regards their effectiveness in attracting firms. Some commentators