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India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle
This book traces the triangular strategic relationship of India, Pakistan and China over the second half of the twentieth century, and shows how two enmities – Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani – and one friendship – Sino-Pakistani – defined the distribution of power and the patterns of relationships in a major centre of gravity of international conflict and international change. The three powers are tied to each other and their actions reflect their view of strategic and cultural problems and geo-politics in a volatile area. The book considers internal debates within the three countries; zones of conflict, including northeast and northwest south Asia, the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean; and the impact of developments in nuclear weapons and missile technology. It examines the destructive consequences of China’s harsh methods in Tibet, of China’s encouragement of military rather than democratic regimes in Pakistan, and of China’s delay in dealing with the border disputes with India. Ashok Kapur shows how the Nehru-Zhou rhetoric about “peaceful coexistence” affected the relationship, and how the dynamics of the relationship have changed significantly in recent years as a range of new factors – including India’s increasing closeness to the United States – have moved the relationship into a new phase. Ashok Kapur is Distinguished Professor Emeritus in Political Science, University of Waterloo, Canada. He is author of several major works including India – From Regional to World Power (also published by Routledge), and is co-author of Government & Politics in South Asia, 6th edition.
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Routledge security in Asia series
1 Taiwan’s Security and Air Power Taiwan’s defense against the air threat from Mainland China Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai 2 Asia Pacific Security – Values and Identity Leszek Buszynski 3 Taiwan’s Defense Reform Edited by Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai 4 Maritime Security in Southeast Asia Edited by Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan 5 China’s Security Interests in the 21st Century Russell Ong 6 China’s Rise – Threat or Opportunity? Edited by Herbert S. Yee 7 India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle Ashok Kapur
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India and the South Asian Strategic Triangle
Ashok Kapur
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First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2011. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.
© 2011 Ashok Kapur All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kapur, Ashok. India and the South Asian strategic triangle / Ashok Kapur. p. cm. – (Routledge security in Asia series; 7) Includes index. 1. India–Foreign relations–South Asia. 2. South Asia–Foreign relations– India. 3. India–Foreign relations–1947–1984. 4. India–Foreign relations– 1984– I. Title. DS450.S64K37 2011 2010013814 3550 .033054—dc22 ISBN 0-203-84199-9 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 13: 978-0-415-45466-7 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-84199-0 (ebk)
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Contents
Preface and acknowledgements
vi
1
Introduction
1
2
1950s: from China–India pretensions and complicity to strategic contention
23
Theory of strategic triangles and its relevance in the Indian subcontinent and Himalayan Zone
52
Strategic triangles in the Himalayan Zone; pre-1949 history and 1949–50
77
The making of Sino-Indian conflict: role of bilateral actions-reactions, third party Foreign influences and domestic politics in Foreign policy
100
6
The inevitability of Sino-Indian conflict
115
7
India regrouped, China’s irredentist escalation continued (1962–) and the China–India–Pakistan triangle emerged (1963–)
134
Sino-Indian manoeuvres that led to a strategic stalemate and conflict formation
154
Current dynamics and a look to the future
177
Notes Index
201 210
3
4 5
8
9
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Preface and acknowledgements
Foreign policy is widely recognized by practitioners as an interaction between forces within a country and outside its borders. The historical evolution of India–China–Pakistan relationships shows that their destinies are tied together by a pattern of conflict that affects each country’s territorial security, and its diplomatic and political identity and international position. The pattern indicates that strategic and cultural conflict is inevitable between China and India and India and Pakistan but a future war is not inevitable despite the past history of wars. However, unwinding the intractable history of conflicts is a laborious process which shows that it is easier to hate and to fight than to organize peaceful ties. This book appears at a time of uncertainty in the development of international diplomatic and strategic thought and policy. 2010 is the year of the tiger but who is the tiger or are several in play? One view, a popular one, by Martin Jacques ‘When China rules the world’ (2009) sees China’s remarkable economic performance, military might, Han unity and political determination, along with America’s economic weakness and the disunity of the Western world a sign of China’s ascendancy and Western decline. A different view, Victor Louis’s ‘The coming decline of the Chinese empire’ (1979) points to the coercive pattern of empire building and demographic engineering that negatively affects its governance capacity and internal legitimacy. Louis, widely seen as a KGB operative, was criticized for his provocative approach but the rioting in Tibet and Xinjiang in 2008–9 gives validity to his view. My book takes the position that America still possesses a strong military and economic infrastructure; it possesses significant soft power for example in the vitality of its educational system, and even though it has a capacity for self-deception in its international endeavours it also has a capacity to correct itself through reasoned public debate. China’s ascendancy is not permanent because it lacks the qualities of pluralism, democracy and internal legitimacy, and Beijing is facing a succession issue by 2012. Its experiment with inner party democracy has stalled and it lacks an institutionalized self-corrective mechanism. Yet it must deal with forces within China and outside its borders, especially among its immediate geographical neighbours.
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Preface and acknowledgements
vii
That is, the year of the tiger is not necessarily the year of the Chinese tiger. Realistically it may be described as an era of several caged or inhibited tigers. The interaction between China and India is a story of two tigers in diplomatic and military affairs although India is often compared to a laborious elephant or a noisy duck; however, both systems have advantages and disadvantages. China possesses more hard power and less legitimacy as a world citizen and as a government in relation to its people; India has less hard power compared to China but more soft power as a result of its pluralistic model and status quo and reformist international orientation. China relies on patriotic education to mobilize its nationalism; Indian nationalism on the other hand has stronger roots because it is grounded in a quest for discussion and consent among India and its foreign constituents. As long as Indian practitioners are able to maintain their leverage with hostile neighbours and difficult allies, and are able to maintain a capacity to escalate and negotiate, the asymmetries in the distribution of economic and military power measured statistically are less important than the political skill required to form leverage and manoeuvrability in regional and international politics. It has taken me a long time to prepare a book that is historically accurate, that provides innovative academic insights for the practitioners and is forward looking. The three countries examined do not make an easy study because they have not opened their diplomatic archives for independent scholarly assessments and hence I have had to rely on the open literature and confidential interviews. The backing of Canada’s Social and Humanities Research Council in the course of my academic career enabled me to travel to New Delhi, Beijing, Shanghai, Islamabad and Karachi in addition to Western capitals and to discuss pertinent issues for this book. Often the most informative discussions involved government practitioners who spoke on condition of anonymity. Several key individuals made the completion and publication of this work possible. Peter Sowden, Editor in Asian Studies, Routledge, supported the project. He gave me the freedom to express my views while insisting on high scholarly standards. I thank also the anonymous reviewer who offered critical comments and useful suggestions. Mrs Madhuri Sondhi and her late husband Professor M. L. Sondhi introduced me to a senior official in the Tibetan government in exile in New Delhi and I am grateful for the conversations and the materials provided by him. Shivani Singh provided research assistance. I thank Heidi Cormode for her careful copy editing, and Emma Hart for her admirable care and oversight in the book’s production. I dedicate this book to my wife, Deepika, who has believed in my work and has encouraged me over the years to write and inform but also to be humble about success and hungry for more knowledge, always. Ashok Kapur Waterloo, Ontario January 2010
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1
Introduction
This book examines the strategic approaches and the character of relationships among three major players in the Himalayan-South Asian region since 1947/49. I argue that a strategic triangle exists among the three. It emerged in the early 1960s and it was the culmination of two bilateral conflicts, Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian that involved diplomatic rivalry, conflicting worldviews, and war. The relations among the three have evolved – from diplomatic rivalry to war, and later from war to strategic discourse, but the three have been tied together. The evolution reveals two trends – from diplomatic rivalry to the formation of triangularity that was inspired by the policies of China and Pakistan. India has been a latecomer as a participant in triangular strategic politics but once it joined the game the three players have found it difficult to disengage themselves from it. Hence this triangular pattern of alignments and interactions has developed an institutional and a robust character in a geo-politically sensitive part of world politics. The first trend led to the formation of a tight strategic triangle in the early 1960s that was similar to the period of tight and tense bipolarity between the superpowers during the Cold War. The second trend has evolved since the late 1980s; it represents the current pattern of relationships among the three, and here the three members of the triangle have taken steps, by way of reciprocal action, to tone down the conflictual relationships, to build strategic dialogues and to find common economic and political ground even though the military competition has continued among them. I call the second trend a period of loose triangularity. The formation of the strategic triangle was based on different historical, diplomatic, and leadership imperatives for each country. For China the history of rivalry between imperial (Manchu) China, British India, Russia and Tibet gave its southern policy a geo-political focus that was core to the actions of the Chinese communists vis-à-vis the Tibetans and the Indians after 1949. The pre-1949 experiences were cast in triangular terms, for example, in the interactions between Manchu China, Tibet and British India, and at times between China, Tibet and Russia. Beijing’s leaders also understood the importance of strategic triangles from their internal civil war that brought them to power. They dealt with the US–Kuomintang–communist triangle
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2
Introduction
during the civil war in the 1940s and the KMT–Japan–Chinese communist triangle in the 1930s. Communist China’s ideology and diplomacy recognizes that it cannot pursue its interests unaided. Mao argued. ‘China’s strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this adds to China’s tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy’.1 Zhou Enlai pointed out the character of China’s diplomacy. He made three points. 1. ‘Does diplomacy refer to relations between countries or between peoples? Should we approach states or people? We must unite with the people of all countries not only fraternal countries but also former colonial and semicolonial countries and capitalist countries. But the function of diplomacy is to deal with relations between states’. 2. There are two kinds of friendly countries: those that will be friendly more or less constantly and those that are friendly just for the time being. Even these last differ from each other. Some are our friends for a short time, while others remain so for a relatively long period. 3. ‘We should be flexible in our diplomatic work, relying on the progressives, uniting with the middle-of-the-road forces and splitting the diehards. In this way we will open up new prospects for diplomatic work. It is wrong to think that the world is simply divided into two conflicting camps and that there is nothing we can do to improve it’.2 For Chinese practitioners participation in diplomatic and military triangles is a way to build its fronts, to create leverage for its power, and to exploit contradictions in the enemy camp for China’s advantage. Communist Chinese diplomacy continues to be involved in triangles. In 1972 the Shanghai communiqué represented the formation of the US–PRC–USSR triangle. Currently, there is a US–Japan–China triangle in play in the Far East. Contemporary studies on China’s foreign affairs note the importance of triangular diplomacy.3 Pakistan too has been an enthusiastic seeker of international solutions and triangularity in its fight with India. Indian Muslims who spearheaded the Pakistan movement were keenly aware of their minority position and were aware of the need to secure Western aid to protect their interests and to develop an independent status. Before 1947 Pakistan-oriented Muslims in India sought and formed a triangular relationship between British India government which supported Muslim fears and aspirations vis-à-vis the ‘Hindudominated’ Congress national party. This was the view of the Pakistani Muslims and the British government even though India’s independence leaders projected themselves as a nationalist and a secular organization and movement. From the early 1950s Pakistan’s government sought Western diplomatic and military ties initially with the UK and then with the US, to protect its identity and its territoriality, and to widen its diplomatic and military influence in the Subcontinent and in world politics especially in Middle Eastern affairs. The UK/US–Pakistan vis-à-vis India triangularity had an ideological and a strategic basis because Pakistan was judged to be a part of the inner circle of Western defence against Soviet expansionism during the
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Introduction
3
Cold War, and Indian nonalignment made it an unreliable element in Cold War politics. US military and diplomatic aid to Pakistan commenced in 1954, it affected the Indo-Pakistani military balance and it polarized the political relations between India and Pakistan and India and the US. The US–Pakistan relationship soured when the UK and US provided military and diplomatic aid to India following the war with China in 1962. Pakistan accepted Beijing’s overture to form a common front against India because both shared a common enmity. This aspect of Pakistan’s link with China is stressed in my book because it has developed deep roots and staying power based on geographical contiguity, common strategic purpose to check India’s growing regional and international presence and unresolved territorial issues. This triangularity pertains to core sovereignty and international status issues which did not inform the US–Pakistan–India triangularity of the 1950s. US policy was driven by a concern with communist expansionism into Third World regions. The US did not have a territorial dispute with India, it questioned Nehru’s nonaligned policy and links with communist countries, it, of course, sought to settle the Kashmir dispute to the satisfaction of Pakistan and the US, but when international circumstances changed and the 1962 war happened the US government shifted its policy gears in India’s favour. By doing so it indicated a desire to check China’s expansionism and to preserve India’s territorial integrity. Pakistan and China had no such commitments. Pakistan’s shift to an embrace of China as its international partner from the early 1960s showed its estimate of China as a reliable friend and the US as an unreliable one. Both however, showed the importance of Pakistani leaders’ desire to form triangular relationships to check India’s influence in the region and in the world, and to borrow external power to manage the Indians and to facilitate the presence of the external forces in the strategic game of the Subcontinent. Note that Pakistan is the weakest military power compared to China and India but it has been the most consistent practitioner among the three (or four and five if America and Russia are included) of triangular strategy as a way to advance its diplomatic and military interests since its independence in 1947. Philosophically, Nehru’s India was the least inclined to join a geo-politically driven strategic triangle. Several reasons explain why India was the slowest compared to Pakistan, China, and the US to adapt its diplomacy and military strategy to the requirements of triangularity until after the 1962 war with China forced a reconsideration of the basic tenets of Nehru’s worldview and Indian diplomacy and military strategy. Nehru was the prime Indian decision maker in foreign and military affairs during the 1950s. He had a pronounced attachment to the theory of Indian nonalignment and a policy of peace rather than India’s involvement in foreign alliances or in the use of force to settle diplomatic issues or world problems. He insisted that India’s approach was guided by assessment of issues on their merits while balance of power politics and Cold War politics were deemed to be dangerous to world peace. He emphasized the importance of building bilateral relations with
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4
Introduction
neighbours as well as the major powers in the world. In his speeches he viewed the world system as a constellation of four powers – America, Russia, China and India. The global view over-rode consideration of regional triangularity with Pakistan and China. Second, Nehru had emerged as a major leader in the anti-colonial struggle against Britain. His political ideology and life experiences relied on political action based on high ideals rather than through war or diplomatic negotiations and compromises. Nehru and Gandhi had pushed the exit of Britain from India in 1947 but the framework of the negotiation was based on British and Indian liberal political values, and the participants on both sides were British leaders and Indian leaders who were mentored by British ideas and ideals. India’s political leaders lacked experience with successful negotiations with Pakistani Muslims before 1947; their failure to accommodate and compromise with them was partly responsible for the growth of the Pakistan movement and the theory that Indians would not accommodate themselves to interests of Indian Muslims. Nehru had an internationalist outlook based on his study of fascism in Europe but he did not possess practical experience of war or negotiation. He also took great interest in China’s fight against Japan and Western imperialism but he lacked an insider’s view of the aims and methods of Chinese communists. His assessment of the rise of the USSR and the Bolsheviks was couched in terms of the worldwide struggle against imperialism and colonialism and the need for internal social and economic reform and global reform against balance of power and Cold War politics and alliances. His agenda was to build bridges – East-West, and North-South, to make the world safe against the danger of war and nuclear weapons, and to promote the causes of Russia and China in world affairs. Preventing the rise of regional triangularity and managing its destructive consequences for India was not a major part of Nehru’s worldview. Even as Nehru took a negative view of the US–Pakistan alliance it was seen as an introduction of the Cold War into the Subcontinent (because it would incline Moscow to react against Washington’s move into its southern belly) and a challenge to Indo-Pakistani stability (because it would promote the militarization of Pakistan’s internal politics and its foreign affairs). Four points are relevant in consideration of India’s role in the China– Pakistan–India triangle. First, India was the slowest of the three members to publicly accept the inevitability of its involvement in the triangle as a basis of its regional foreign policy, and more significantly, accept that geo-politics is a stronger basis of foreign affairs rather than the politics of peace and nuclear disarmament. Over time the emphasis on bilateralism and peace or ‘friendly relations with all’ (not the best possible relations with friends and foes) as guiding principles of Indian foreign affairs has been relaxed in favour of attention to international and regional developments that form the context of Indian foreign affairs. Second, once the consciousness emerged in the Indian strategic and political mind about the effect of regional developments on Indian interests, the basis of triangularity incrementally gained ground in Indian thinking and policy planning; but it was a slow, retarded and not
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Introduction
5
a rational development in the 1950s and the 1960s as one would expect of a professionally run government. For instance, China’s forceful takeover of Tibet in 1950 and the use of force against the Tibetans threw up the reality of triangularity between Chinese, Tibetan and Indian actions. Another instance, once the US–Pakistan military alignment was formed in the early 1950s the reality of a US–Pakistan–India diplomatic and military triangle set in. India countered this development by securing an alignment with Moscow, first with Stalin and later with Khrushchev which gave India support on the Kashmir issue and became a source of economic and military aid as well. Here India was participating in the development of these triangles but one looks in vain in Nehru’s speeches or his writings or in Indian official communiqués for an acknowledgement that peace diplomacy or bilateral friendships was not a realistic basis to construct Indian foreign and military affairs. Third, triangularity became pronounced and public in war and crisis situations in regional confrontations – 1962 war with China, and 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan. Fourth and finally, Indian diplomacy now uses both bilateralism and triangularities in the pursuit of its interests. It appears that bilateralism is preferred when India has a military and a diplomatic edge over the other side, as in relations with Pakistan, but strategic triangularity is preferred when the other side has an edge, or when uncertainties exist in a crisis situation, and in these circumstances external diplomatic and military aid is sought along with alignment(s). One can see the growth of triangularities in Indian foreign affairs since the late 1990s. The India–Israel defence and diplomatic links are tied to the rise of Islamist politics in the Middle Eastern-South Asian region. The US–India civil nuclear energy agreement was tied to concerns about Chinese and Pakistani nuclear weapons proliferation and the formation of US–India–China links was motivated by uncertainty about China’s ‘peaceful rise’. The trend towards formation of such triangularities – for instance, between India, Turkey and Israel, is likely to persist when much of the world is in transition. My conclusion is that India was the slowest of the three to join the triangular game in reaction to the policies of her neighbours, and in opposition to the diplomatic ideology of Nehru and his fellow travellers, but now its membership of the regional triangularity has developed a sticky character and it is no longer up to China and Pakistan to induce Indian disengagement without a negotiated settlement of pending issues. My concluding chapter addresses this theme.
This triangle has peculiar characteristics The special characteristics of this triangle include the following: Its three members are geographical neighbours but two of the three have not acted as good neighbours; their diplomatic relations are based on two major diplomatic and military rivalries – between India and Pakistan, and India and China. The rivalries are based on conflicting territorial claims,
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6
Introduction
conflicting worldviews and diplomatic ambitions, conflicting regional ambitions, and asymmetrical distribution of economic and military power among the three. Since the emergence of this triangle in the early 1960s it has acquired a structure and dynamics of its own because of the domestic and external compulsions of each member, and as a result of learning and re-learning by the practitioners. Between the early 1960s and the present the history of these relations indicates that neither member can opt out of the strategic game with each other. They are tied by questions of territorial conflicts, military and nuclear policies, and their international and regional status and political identity. Although the distribution of economic and military power is clearly asymmetrical between India and Pakistan, India does not have a winning strategy to achieve asymmetrical gain with Pakistan because Indian power is checked or balanced by China’s aid to Pakistan and by US pressure on India not to push Pakistan into a diplomatic corner or at a military disadvantage. At the same time despite the asymmetry between Chinese and Indian economic and military power China too does not possess a winning strategy against India because it fears the presence of countervailing American and Russian support for India’s diplomatic and military aims. Historical examples of strategic triangles, as discussed by the foremost student of this phenomenon Professor Martin Wight, had an end game. Either its members had a winning strategy as in the Western-Soviet fight against Germany during the Second World War, or a triangle ended with the collapse of a key member, as in the case of the US–PRC–USSR triangle that ended with the implosion of the USSR. (The characteristics of Martin Wight’s triangles are discussed in a later chapter.) The Pakistan– China–India triangle does not reveal a serious discussion about an end game in the thinking of the practitioners in these countries. This book assesses two opposite possibilities. The first is that the failure of its members to formulate an end game through a winnable strategy means that the three are expected to be locked into triangular strategic relations involving continuous military and economic competition and diplomatic talks that lack the prospect of a negotiated political settlement vis-à-vis each other. The second possibility is that a member of this triangle implodes. The guesswork is that Pakistan is the most likely candidate to do so given the fast pace of the spread of Talibanization from Afghanistan to the Swat valley, to Pakistan’s cultural-political-military heartland, the Punjab. China and India too have their respective internal political and economic problems and these attract serious attention by different experts. The latter changes suggest a weakening of Chinese and Indian power and capacity for internal governance but it does not imply an imminent or inevitable breakdown of the political and military structure of the two countries as do developments within Pakistan at the time of writing. Weakening of China and Indian internal power (even as the two continue their respective
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Introduction
7
military modernizations) implies a loss of state capacity and political will to formulate a winning strategy against regional rivals but it does not imply a breakdown of the state system in the two countries. The first possibility has an implication for the theory of triangles inasmuch as theory does not anticipate a long shelf life for strategic triangles. The second possibility, in this case the implosion of Pakistan and the end of its membership in the triangle would validate Wight’s approach. It is premature at this point to make a call on either possibility. The long shelf life of this triangle is explained in part by the learning and re-learning that occurred in the leadership styles and diplomatic and military machineries of the three players. In the early 1950s, following the flush of victory of communism in China under Mao Beijing had a powerful attitude about its history, about the future of Chinese communism, about the importance of its frontier security and politics and the importance of aggressive military tactics; frontier insecurity and over-confidence in the role of its political will and military tactics were in play in China’s conduct in the 1950s in its southern zone. At the same time Nehru’s diplomatic policy and leadership style had different roots and experiences. He was flushed with a powerful attitude about India’s civilization, its diplomatic strength and high potential as an independent country and a future as a major power along with America, Russia and China. He had no negotiating experience in the world of regional conflicts, and he had a limited interest in determining the aggressive character of China’s military and geo-politically driven moves in the Himalayan region, in determining the location of India’s territorial boundary in relation to China or in negotiating a settlement. He made a subtle and self-serving distinction between talking to the Chinese about the border in the mid to late 1950s but against negotiating with them because he did not recognize that a dispute existed in the 1950s since, in his view, the basis of the boundary was historically determined. Chinese and Indian leadership styles differed in their respective approaches to relations with the ‘imperialists’. Beijing relied on national defence and diplomacy to check the imperialists and to deal with them from a position of strength, and to treat both America and Russia at different times as threats to Chinese interests. Nehru on the other hand sought a position for himself and India as a bridge builder with two of China’s main enemies – America and Russia, and sought to gain their confidence and support for India’s economic and military needs by building ties with them. The diplomatic and the military record of the 1950s shows that Indian practitioners drifted into a military conflict with China in part because of Nehru’s over-confident leadership style, in part because of inter-ministerial disagreements about the actual location of the China– India boundary and the legal position during the 1950s, and because of the unwillingness of Indian practitioners to understand the value of propaganda and deception in China’s statecraft.4 India learned its lessons after its defeat in 1962 and internal reforms led to a process of diplomatic and
8
Introduction
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military engagement with China. By refusing to capitulate to China’s victory, the refusal to accept 1962 as something more than a defeat in a single episode in battle, the engagement established a basis to escalate the controversy and to push China into a scenario to either negotiate with India on Indian terms, or to escalate by building a front against India via Pakistan. As is known, Beijing took the latter route and the game was joined. Here Indian learning and re-learning in the 1960s from its mistakes in the 1950s, and China’s continued determination to check Indian ambitions were twin factors that shaped the triangle and its shelf life.
The existence of this triangle is not self evident because Chinese and Western scholars have ignored its existence China’s practitioners and scholars have ignored the existence and durability of this triangle for several reasons. The People’s Republic of China has had a dismissive public attitude about India’s presence in regional and in international affairs since 1947. As per John Gittings Chinese leaders thought of India as ‘feeble minded bourgeoisie’ that was tied to Western anti-China imperialist forces. China’s leaders had a positive self-image and a negative image of India and her leaders. India was not deemed to be truly independent despite the British withdrawal from India in 1947. In their conversations with President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Mao and Chen Yi openly expressed contempt for Indian philosophy, Gandhian pacifism and India’s freedom struggle.5 Communist Chinese writings on foreign affairs such as the work by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (1988–98) and the strategic journal of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, an authoritative forum for Chinese strategic assessments, have examined the US–USSR– China triangle and the US–Japan–China triangle, but there is no consideration of the China–India–Pakistan triangular relationships. The focus is on bilateral ties, India is bracketed with Pakistan in Chinese political writings, and China’s approach to South Asian diplomatic and military issues is cast in terms of China’s international position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Beijing’s approach since the early 1960s showed a positive institutional bias towards Pakistan that merited significant aid in the form of conventional armament, nuclear and missile technology transfers and diplomatic support and intervention on Pakistan’s behalf in regional wars and crises vis-à-vis the US government and at the United National Security Council. The positive bias towards Pakistan and a negative one towards India reflected Beijing’s assessment in the mid 1950s. As conveyed to the Pakistan government and as reported by a knowledgeable source Rushbrook Williams, Beijing saw a conflict of interest with India but not so with Pakistan and sought a Pakistan linkage
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Introduction
9
on that basis. The negative bias towards India reflected Beijing’s concerns about the orientation and international relations of India. Despite Nehru’s advocacy of Chinese positions with the Western powers the awareness of a Sino-Indian diplomatic competition between Nehru and Zhou Enlai in the Third World coloured Beijing’s attitude. Indian concerns about Beijing’s intervention in Tibet, the collapse of the Tibetan buffer and the sympathy with the Dalai Lama, cast a shadow on the bilateral relationship. For Beijing Nehru’s foreign affairs had the taint of a pro-Russia tilt during the Cold War along with a pro-Western tilt, and given the history of rivalry between Stalin and Mao and the political leadership on both sides, Nehru’s access to Moscow and Washington contrasted with China’s international isolation and lack of full Soviet support for Chinese aims in the Korean War, in relation to the liberation of Taiwan, the Sino-Indian border dispute and the future of Indo-China. Finally, the use of India as a base of CIA covert operation in Tibet was a source of suspicion and animosity.6 The conflict of interest between China and India and the latter’s refusal to accept China’s pre-eminence in Asia or in the Subcontinent has shaped the pattern of strategic interactions of China, India and Pakistan in relation to each other. The aforesaid outline shows why China and India have been on a collision course and are likely to remain in this mode because the diplomatic theories of the two Asian rivals are at odds as are their self-images. Both see themselves as destined to play an important role in Asia and the world. Both see themselves with a legacy as great civilizations. Both possess significant economic and military capacities to engage each other and major members of the world community. But their approaches to international relations vary. During the Mao-Zhou era China saw itself as a revolutionary world power and the pre-eminent power; it did not recognize Japan or India as worthy of the distinction. Indian leaders saw India as one of four major powers – along with America, Russia and China. Mao and Zhou valued armed struggle and liberation theology as the basis of their international legitimacy and as a basis of China’s foreign affairs. Indian leaders sought peaceful discourse and diplomacy as the way to reduce international tensions and to settle controversies through negotiations. (However, as my discussion will show Nehru did not acknowledge the existence of a border dispute with China and while he was willing to talk to China, he was not willing to negotiate a compromise of Indian border claims.) Beijing saw Indian intransigence and hegemonic ambition as the problem in South Asian international relations; India’s leaders saw themselves as a benign and a non-expansionist force in the region and the world. China’s leaders felt that Indian aggressiveness and expansionism was responsible for the border conflict and the war in 1962; India’s leaders argued the opposite case. China adopted a clear national security stance that involved the use of military force to guard its interests in the Korean War (1950–53), in Tibet (1950–) and in the war with India (1962).
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Introduction
Nehru’s India lacked this orientation that linked military force and diplomacy; this relied on the time-honoured principle about the linkage between an ability to escalate tensions by threat and war and to negotiate by an ability to create a new situation. ‘Escalate and negotiate’ was the de facto Chinese mantra. ‘Talk and negotiate’ on the basis of goodwill was the Indian mantra of the 1950s. China’s approach was to position itself to negotiate with Moscow and Washington by building a position of military and diplomatic strength. Its approach in the Himalayan region was to assert itself in the direction of the ‘Indian’ subcontinent (and later in relation to India’s immediate neighbours including Pakistan, and the Indian Ocean as well) and to keep India in a defensive position. China’s approach to India was that of a rival (as following chapters will show) and her actions indicated that India was not viewed as an equal or semi-equal of China in the world of powers. Instead, its approach suggested a belief in the British theory of a world with two kinds of relations: between members of a system of independent states, and countries that belonged to the category of a subordinate states’ system. This was evident because the Mao-Zhou theory to build an anti-imperialist front required mobilization of countries in the Third World or the intermediate zone of countries during the Cold War. The Chinese view of peaceful co-existence, which it adopted in agreements with India, Indonesia and Burma in the mid 1950s was tied to its desire to strengthen the antiimperialist (anti-US and anti-USSR) fronts; it differed from the Indian view of peaceful existence as a standalone norm to settle issue peacefully. By mid 1950s the character of the international and regional situations had changed. The superpowers’ détente talks commenced. India’s alignment with Moscow gained ground along with a co-alignment with the US and the mutual and publicly declared desire for friendly relations despite the controversy over US arms aid to Pakistan. At the time the trend towards engagement between India, Russia and America showed a concern about China’s aggressive stance in Asia and in the Himalayan area, and it indicated that Russia, the first advocate of a world revolution by armed struggle and subversion, had changed colours and now sought to develop itself as a major power, indeed, as a co-principal with the US in the international system. Peaceful coexistence became the mantra of Soviet foreign policy although to many it seemed to be structured as competitive rather than cooperative co-existence with the West. The radical shift in the pattern of international and regional (South Asian) relations was significant because this area emerged as the first region where the superpowers’ détente emerged along with the bilateral arms control discourse between Washington and Moscow. In this perspective Beijing’s move to build ties with Pakistan was driven by three different motives: to protect Pakistan against Indian ‘hegemony’; to build up Pakistan as a line of diplomatic and military pressure against India; and to signal to the two superpowers that China could extend itself into a region of secondary international conflict where important Western and Russian strategic interests existed in terms of their respective regional politics.
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If Beijing’s aim was to minimize India’s potential as China’s rival and to teach it a lesson Beijing’s action worked as a catalyst in several ways. It aroused the superpowers to consider the destructive implications of China’s tie-up with Pakistan and against India. Second, it aroused India to come out of Nehru’s stupor about peaceful and non-expansionist China and about the value of India’s peace diplomacy as the basis of world reform, and to accept the inevitability of rivalry with China and the need to adopt counter-measures for a long engagement. Third and finally, it delayed the process of Indo-Pakistani reconciliation and peace making because Chinese aid encouraged Pakistani irredentism vis-à-vis India as a result of the convergence of Pakistani and Chinese views of ‘expansionist’ Indian policies. Only when it became apparent that Pakistani irredentism could not succeed against India even with Chinese aid, and that Chinese pressures in the Himalayan zone could not push India away from its diplomatic and military positions and its policy to establish co-alignment with Moscow and Washington, did the process of confidence-building talks and the bilateral peace processes between India and Pakistan and India and China gain ground. This book argues that the period from the early 1960s to the 1990s was dominated by triangular competitive and conflict-driven interactions, and even as the interactions are competitive in the military activities of India and China in the twenty-first century, the rise of strategic confidence-building dialogues loosened the tight triangularity of the 1960s–90s. Western scholarship has not grasped the existence of this triangle, the regional circumstances that facilitated its formation, the process to loosen it, China’s role in instigating its development, India’s role in carrying it forward, and Pakistan’s potential role in ending it as a result of its internal weakness. India’s role in perpetuating this triangle is emphasized because its refusal to capitulate to China’s demands and to admit defeat despite the result of the 1962 war meant that the strategic-cultural conflict was joined and the two stayed tied to this encounter. Moreover, China realized in the 1950s – mid to late 1950s, the necessity to escalate the conflict by bringing Pakistan into play on China’s side against India and to force Indian concessions to both China and Pakistan. This happened because of Indian determination to stay in the strategic game and to build India’s economic and military capacities and diplomatic alignments to do so. This view implies that India’s capacity to escalate regional rivalries by its refusal to accede to demands of its two neighbours and by its development of military and economic capacities against two-front encounters has been underestimated. The book’s theme is that Indian practitioners are slow to engage and to get out of their reactive mode until a rivalry becomes apparent but once engaged they are slow also to disengage unless there is a negotiated political settlement. ‘Escalate, Stabilise and Negotiate’ seems to be the Indian strategic mantra. This lacuna has occurred because Western scholarly work has been directed to a different agenda since 1947. Given the Hindu–Muslim rivalry that led to Partition the study of India–Pakistan conflict was the obvious thing to do.
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Introduction
Given the Cold War and America’s search for allies against communism, the early emergence of Kashmir as a dispute, American antipathy of Nehru’s neutralism, and acceptance of the Pakistani theory about Kashmir dispute as the core issue in the region and India–Pakistan military and diplomatic balance as the safeguard for Pakistan, UK–US scholarship gave prominence to Indo-Pakistan issues. A few American studies such as John Rowland’s ‘History of Sino-Indian Relations’ (1967) examined the geo-political circumstances and history in the Central Asian and Himalayan region that shaped Sino-Indian relations. This orientation built on the historical analysis of the American scholar Owen Lattimore and British scholars Alistair Lamb and Dorothy Woodman. These works emphasized the pre-1947/49 interactions among empire-minded practitioners in British India, Manchu China, Tsarist Russia, the kingdoms of Nepal, Kashmir and Bhutan, and principalities such as Gilgit and Hunza and protectorates such as Sikkim. Then Tibet was a major part of the geo-political equation. Van Walt van Praag’s expert analysis of ‘The Status of Tibet’ (1987) explained the legal and historical background of Tibetan–Manchu Chinese interactions and the evidence of Tibetan autonomy and at times independence. His work ties together international treaty law, the web of legal conventions that involved the imperial powers and the region’s geo-politics. Nehru’s preoccupation with friendship with China and his rejection of balance of power politics and his emphasis on peace diplomacy closed the study of geo-politics in Indian scholarly circles because the state was the primary source of patronage of scholarship and research funding then and now. Even now the organization of the divisional responsibilities in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs shows the lack of an integrated view of the geo-politics of the Himalayan region. The senior official who deals with Nepal, does not deal with Tibet even though Nepal is the arena between China/Tibet and India because of China’s concern with Nepal as a conduit for Tibetan refugees coming to India. Beijing on the other hand takes an integrated view of its interests in Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh (which it calls ‘Southern Tibet’). American policy priorities in the 1950s set the framework of mainstream scholarship. Pakistan was a Western ally, a part of the inner circle of Western defence against communism; hence a preoccupation with US–Pakistan relations was justified. Nehru’s India and US governments had a difficult relationship but India was a big country, so a study of Indo-US relations was justified. But India’s foreign policy carried several taints – of a tilt towards Moscow and of nonalignment and India’s advocacy of restoration of China’s international position; hence the lack of scholarly attention to the pattern of emerging mistrust between India and China. We learn about this key aspect of the emerging conflict and mistrust in the detailed account by B. N. Mullik, Nehru’s Intelligence chief from 1950 to 1965 in his book ‘My Years with Nehru’ (1971). There were a few hints of the bilateral mistrust but they did not alter the literature’s orientation. Canadian scholar and a Foreign Office official Lorne Kavic wrote a book ‘India’s Quest for Security’ (1967) showing
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Nehru’s concerns with Himalayan defences in the late 1940s, and the US State Department’s assessments by its Intelligence branch in the early 1950s provided insights along these lines but by and large the pattern of interaction and escalation, the thought processes and the results remained uncharted in scholarly works written before 1962. It is noteworthy that White House and Pentagon planners in the Kennedy government grasped and projected the views about the likely destructive consequences of Chinese policies about India and Pakistan, and they did so as Pakistan President Ayub Khan started to flirt with China in the early 1960s before the 1962 war between India and China, and following the war. In hindsight the declassified materials reflect policy wisdom and balanced perspectives by the Kennedy government but on the other hand it is also clear that American scholarship showed a lack of due diligence in examining such materials and to examine the basis of the China–India–Pakistan triangle. The first systematic account of the triangle, its early history and its geo-political context, came from Yaacov Vertzberger, a Jewish-Hebrew University scholar when he published ‘The Enduring Entente’ in 1983. Western scholarship developed a Sino-Indian focus after the 1962 war but the concern lay with a study of the border conflict and the implications of India’s defeat and China’s victory in Asian and world politics and for Chinese and Indian foreign policy. Thereafter India lost its luster as a diplomatic player because of its poor economic and military performance, its international defensiveness, lack of confidence and its dependence on foreign aid. A succession of weak Indian governments created a sense of drift within India and among India observers in the world. These impressions were real but they ignored another reality. Following its military defeat India’s defence machinery was reformed by development of indigenous defence industry with foreign collaboration and a reform of the government machinery to deal with defence questions; a focus on Pakistan and China as strategic problems became ingrained in the Indian political and popular mind. Second, India’s refusal to capitulate to China’s territorial demands produced a diplomatic and a military confrontation; it was tense but neither side wanted another war because India could not manage it and China was concerned about over-extending its military capacity for fear of an adverse reaction from the US and USSR. Throughout its history since 1947 India maintained the momentum of its scientific work to develop nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in the guise of building a dual use capacity. Despite its bad image its activities indicated a commitment to build its internal capacities and to establish a new set of international alignments to support its position vis-à-vis China. For India this period – from 1962 to the 1980s, was taken by a process of re-positioning India in the Subcontinent and in the world. For China the 1962 victory reinforced the belief that India was in the hands of a feeble-minded bourgeois that had feet of clay in strategic affairs and that belonged in the realm of a subordinate states’ system while China belonged to the realm of a truly independent and potential world power; its attitude of indifference and disdain for
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Introduction
Indian power and political culture was reinforced in part because India was seen as a defeated country, and in part because China no longer needed it to carry its messages to the US. American scholars fixated on the threat India’s military development posed for the Indo-Pakistani balance and pressed for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, and they opposed India’s nuclear weapons development as a threat to the nonproliferation regime. Had they factored in Indian perceptions of China as a threat as the key stimulus for India’s nuclear and military modernization during the 1960s–90s, the overemphasis on India–Pakistan competition and the under-emphasis on SinoIndian competition could have been corrected. The perceptual distortions affected the thinking of several Western practitioners. For instance, Canada’s foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy failed to understand the role of China threat in the Indian decision to declare its nuclear weapons status in 1998 and dismissed it publicly even though Indian practitioners noted this key element in their correspondence with the White House and other leaders, and eventually the Clinton White House and the State Department came to accept the Indian concern. A few prominent Western writers did not widen their lens to examine the roots of the Sino-Indian conflict and chose instead to use their microscope to assess the root cause of the Sino-Indian border dispute. Neville Maxwell’s ‘India’s China War’ (1970) neatly shifted the focus on India’s conduct because he had access to the Indian documents and interviews with the practitioners and lacked this on the Chinese side; as well he served a purpose by pointing to Indian actions that caused the conflict in his view. The book is well documented and it provides a blow by blow account of the diplomatic escalation that led to war. It points out that Nehru, India’s main decision maker on China and foreign policy and military policy, did not acknowledge the existence of a border dispute, he insisted on talking but not on negotiations with China and the Indian government was not clear about the boundary line and the policy direction other than to seek friendly relations with China. The implication is that Nehru’s dominance of Indian foreign policy and the poor staff work by officials and an attitude that China would not dare attack India where the boundary line was clearly set caused the 1962 war. Maxwell does not recognize mistakes on the Chinese side which contributed to the war and the long-term conflict. In a similar vein John Gittings argues that the ‘root cause’ of the border dispute was India’s refusal to admit that a border dispute existed.7 Such a view is simplistic and one-sided. It confuses the immediate cause or trigger of a border war with the larger, complex contextual elements that shape a diplomatic, ideological and a military rivalry and conflict and that go beyond a border controversy; the former elements involve subjective perceptions about intangible intentions of the other side and the orientation of its foreign policy; the latter deal with finite ground reality. Both are real and both have to be dealt with ways to prevent the other side from developing an asymmetrical advantage. To balance the approach of Maxwell and Gittings my book points
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to Chinese activities before the 1962 conflict erupted that cast and shadow on Indian thinking. My aim is not to take away from Maxwell’s documented record but to add another side to it. China’s subversive activities in the ‘Indian’ border areas started when China became independent in 1949 and its actions made sense as a revolutionary power, and they contrasted with the Chinese emphasis on proper state-to-state relations. The two countries signed the agreement about peaceful coexistence in 1954 but this happened after a pattern of Chinese low-level intervention in Indian affairs had been established along with links with Indian communists and Nehru had instructed his Intelligence chief B. N. Mullik that Pakistan and China were the two designated intelligence targets for the Intelligence directorate. Since 1954 the principles of peaceful coexistence have not formed the basis of either Chinese or Indian actions except at the rhetorical level. Mao’s long-term strategy was to build China’s military and internal strength, to gain US respect, to support the ‘intermediate zone’ as a front in China’s anti-imperialist struggle, to cast India as an imperial agent and a feeble-minded bourgeoisie, but nonetheless a diplomatic competitor as in the Bandung conference (1954) which attracted considerable Third World attention and which also revealed the Sino-Indian competition and Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic coming out party and his use of charm diplomacy with the Third World countries. The position of China and India in the international system shaped their theoretical assumptions and their diplomatic methods. China was isolated from the major powers in the early 1950s and it fought a bitter war in Korea against a superior military force and with the aid of an unreliable ally, Stalin. In the 1950s China’s political leaders – Mao, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, worked with a theory of contradictions that showed sharp polarities between China and the arch imperialist of the time, the US, and a deep suspicion of Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s Russia, a token friend but an unreliable ally. In this state China saw itself as a revolutionary power which India clearly was not. India was engaged instead with all kinds of major and minor powers in the North and South, East and West, and its aim was to reduce the animosities among the powers and in the Third World towards the ex-colonial powers. It was natural for Beijing to view Indian diplomacy in a negative light because of its proximity to two of China’s major polar points – Washington and Moscow. These differences indicate to me that Gittings’ view of the ‘root cause’ of the conflict is narrow. It confuses cause with effect. No doubt Nehru’s refusal to negotiate the border question with China (‘there is nothing to negotiate because the border is based on sound legal and historical principles and treaties’ is a paraphrase of Nehru’s views) contributed to the deteriorating tone of the boundary discourse between the Indian and Chinese leaders but the causes lay elsewhere. The devil was in the details of the international conventions and border maps but how these were interpreted and the timing of the escalation of a dispute indicated that the devil was in the regional and the international context in which China and India encountered each other during the Cold War, and thereafter.
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Introduction
My analysis turns on a key assessment about China’s strategy and how it played out in relation to India in the 1950s. Gittings calls PRC’s approach as ‘Chinese super-confidence’ with a self-image of China as the ‘anti-imperialist hero’ and the anti-imperialist ‘front line’.8 Beijing’s approach was to highlight the polarities; Nehru’s was to diffuse them by building East-West and NorthSouth linkages and conversations. During the 1950s Chinese leaders set themselves up as the international hub of the anti-imperialist front. Nehru’s China related actions vis-à-vis the UN and the superpowers outwardly sought to argue that by bringing China into the global mainstream its excesses, that were based on a sense of isolation, could be tamed, and its reliance on Moscow could be reduced as Chinese nationalism asserted itself as the elemental force in Chinese foreign affairs. This was Nehru’s line in the 1950s. The 1962 war changed the Nehru/India line on China because the reaction of support by Washington and Moscow indicated the formation of an antiChina front, as did the shift in Indian public opinion from pro-China-ism to anti-China-ism (except in the declarations of Indian communists). In other words, China’s desire to form a firm anti-imperialist front against the US and the USSR was diffused by Nehru’s bridge building between the superpowers, by the development of a bilateral détente between them, and Beijing’s theory of exploiting contradictions lost its edge because of the aforesaid changes. The 1962 war led to front building on the part of the US, USSR and India vis-à-vis China, and it established a Sino-Indian military front in the Himalayas, and subsequently when China turned to Pakistan, a Sino-Pakistani diplomatic and front military was established vis-à-vis India. These developments and the diffusion process complicated front building by China against India in its relations with the superpowers and with India, but it facilitated front building with Pakistan against India. Hence the scorecard had mixed results. Having escalated the diplomatic rivalry into war in 1962, and this is true of Nehru’s actions as well, China’s escalation meant that it had reached the limits of its power and policy in its fight with India; it lost the diplomatic initiative when India declined to sue for peace or to capitulate to Chinese territorial demands. Sun Tzu, whom Mao admired, had argued that the aim of strategy was to disorient the enemy’s mind. The 1962 confrontation fixed the Indian mind to the danger of China to India’s security and its democratic and economic experiment, and it fixed the American and the Russian mind to the destructive consequences of China’s behaviour for the well being of India and Pakistan. Even if it is true that Nehru’s stubbornness in refusing negotiations on the border issue was the cause of the 1962 war and China’s action, Beijing had not thought through the long-term and negative consequences for itself of its decision to fight and inflict defeat on India. Alan Lawrance (1965) provides a good grasp of the root causes of the Sino-Indian rivalry since the 1950s. Beijing’s view of its territorial boundaries was a reaction to the presence of potentially hostile regimes given the past history of imperial manoeuvres in the Himalayan–Tibetan–Pamir region. Post-1947 India was ideologically distasteful to China says the author and it
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was tied to Western imperialism, the Chinese said publicly with reference to the Tibet controversy. The Bandung conference revealed the Sino-Indian diplomatic rivalry.9 I surmise from these assessments that Zhou Enlai and Nehru were manoeuvring themselves vis-à-vis each other and the superpowers so as to position themselves for future relationships. Both leaders played verbal games. Nehru maintained that no border dispute existed.10 This was false because China claimed in the late 1950s that a border dispute existed through the length of the border but in 1954 when Nehru raised the issue about the border maps of China, Zhou had said that the conditions were not ripe for a settlement and there was no time to study the maps and the issue.11 Here Zhou Enlai had been evasive in the mid 1950s while Nehru was positioning himself to avoid negotiations because of doubts within his government including the Ministry of External Affairs where he was the Minister. If Maxwell’s account is correct then India provoked the Chinese by its forward policy but the counterpoint is that the PRC proposed negotiations on its own terms and at a time of its choosing, and it denied the validity of the McMahon Line as a British imperial contrivance but weakened its argument by accepting it as the basis of China–Burma boundary settlement.12 China claimed that India ‘attempted to use armed force to make China submit’.13 Both claims are exaggerated because it is well known from standard Indian and Western sources that India lacked the military means in the 1950s to dislodge China’s forces from Tibet, and as Maxwell reports, the Indian military held to the view that its capacity was limited to manage the Pakistan front and China–India boundary required a diplomatic solution. However, it is plausible that India’s border manoeuvres which were controlled by the Intelligence Bureau of India (IB) with logistical military support were manoeuvres by a branch of the government which was locked into bureaucratic politics that pitted Prime Minister Nehru (who oversaw the intelligence branch) and the Intelligence Bureau and the Ministry of Home Affairs which nominally oversaw the IB against the Ministry of External Affairs and Indian Army HQ. Mullik’s study brings out this aspect clearly. Chinese diplomacy scored a diplomatic point with international audiences by its reasonable position14 that ‘pending future negotiations status quo should be maintained’. The problem was, which status quo, before India’s forward patrolling and establishment of listening posts in areas claimed by China, or thereafter? But despite these quibbles one point must be emphasized. Chen Yi15 said that there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and India, that China did not see India as an enemy, that the border dispute was a ‘brief episode in the history of Sino-Indian friendship’. Chen Yi was completely wrong and here lies a justification for this book. Maxwell and Gittings evaluate the Sino-Indian conflict as a territorial, border issue. Lawrance sees it as an ideological, strategic and a territorial issue. Seen in broader terms one must consider the conflict as a topic where the two countries’ governments have worked to position themselves in the world system and the process of positioning and repositioning is ongoing;
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Introduction
it reflects the effect of policies of other countries on the policies of India and China. My approach follows Lawrance although the details of Indian decision-making in Maxwell’s work shed light on Nehru’s leadership style (vacillating) and the lack of internal unity and consistency in the Indian government’s approach to China. My story begins in the 1950s. The rise of competing Sino-Indian views and interests in the Himalayan region and in global politics took into account the changing foreign policy orientation of the US and the USSR regarding China and India. Washington had a fixation with anti-communism in the early 1950s that ruled out accommodation with the communist states. Nehru objected to this rigidly ideological and militaristic approach and he argued that nationalism in the communist world was the fundamental element that suggested the presence of a fault line between Moscow and Beijing. Nehru was the first world statesman to point this out.16 Nehru was interested in the diffusion of power within the communist world and he was interested in the development of diplomatic space for a country like India (and other Third World nations like Egypt and Yugoslavia – the three founders of the Nonaligned Movement). Despite the American (Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles) disdain for Indian nonalignment and Nehru’s starry-eyed view of China as a peaceful country there was a consensus in American and Indian views about the expansionist tendencies of the communist powers. Nehru’s conversations with US officials as recorded by State Department’s intelligence bureau (cited later) reflect a general consensus but there was disagreement about the likelihood of Soviet or Chinese expansionism, its timing and the use of diplomacy to weaken the Sino-Soviet alignment of the early 1950s. Nehru wanted the US government to recognize Chinese interests in Taiwan and the Far East; he sought US concessions which Washington declined to offer. For the US, China was a dangerous revolutionary power; Mao’s rhetoric confirmed this view. For India, China was a potentially expansionist power and dangerous if left alone, and bringing it into the UN system would expose it to global norms and make it responsible. For Nehru, UN membership would expose China’s leaders to global rules and it would reduce its manoeuvrability in Asia and the world. China’s leaders did not appreciate India’s diplomatic tactics and saw them as a trap. Mullik notes them as the Chinese assessment (cited later). Furthermore, for India the American policy of containment of communism was a luxury India could not afford. The American mainland was safe from China’s threat, and even if India formed an alliance with the US, the physical distance and America’s limited interest in India and preoccupation with the USSR could not insure Indian security. Being an immediate geographical neighbour of two communist powers to its north, and both had assets among the Indian communists, the Indian aim was to secure their neutrality as a minimum, and their cooperation as a maximum aim. The communist danger in India lay in the ability of the two communist states to build their political and subversive fronts within India and political fronts in the Third World that could hinder India’s autonomy
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and manoeuvrability in the Third World and in relation to the major powers. As long as India was making China’s case at the UN and with Washington India and China basked in the theory of peaceful co-existence. However, the honeymoon was short-lived, and mistrust crept in conflict and frontbuilding exercises on the Chinese and the Indian sides. This became obvious after 1962 but the process, and the underlying theory, was formed in the 1950s. Lawrance notes that the US set the pace in developing triangular relationships with China, first during the Korean War and then again in the Vietnam War when the US, USSR and China were tied together and acted in an interactive way with each other; they reacted to each other’s moves and formed and respected boundaries or limits in their actions. In South Asia India–USSR–US set the pace in forming first a diplomatic triangle that was meant to check China’s revolutionary impulses, and this became an ideological and a strategic triangle after 1962; in a diffused form this triangle still exists. The China–Pakistan–India triangle followed the preceding developments. It may be viewed as Beijing’s ‘defensive’ reaction to the rise of a complex diplomatic configuration that it did not understand and control, and the formulae of Messrs Mao, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi were not up to the task to settle the rivalry with India on Chinese terms. My argument in summary is that China and India provoked each other during the 1950s even as they talked about peaceful co-existence, their worldviews and interests were incompatible, both avoided serious negotiations to make a political settlement as the time was not ripe for either side, and when India made forward military moves, China escalated the tension by launching a war across the entire length of the Sino-Indian border and quickly defeated Indian forces. But the story has two complicated twists or unintended consequences. First, India gained the diplomatic initiative against China despite India’s military weakness by gaining the support of Moscow and Washington for its moderate policies in the world sphere, and for its evolving position on the China question. The die was cast in the mid 1950s. As India–USSR links grew, China’s mistrust of India and Soviet Russia too increased; by 1959–60 Moscow made a distinction between ‘friendly India’ and ‘fraternal China’ and its tilt towards India and against China’s military action consolidated the Russia–India–China triangle on the border question and generally in their foreign affairs. Russia was an active part of this triangle because it was the major arms supplier to India. America too was active in this triangular activity more as a diplomatic interlocutor and less as a military supplier to India. India lost the war in the Himalayas but it effectively changed the pattern of alignments vis-à-vis China, and after 1962 went on to alter the distribution of military and economic power in relation to China; India gained two diplomatic and military supporters while China lost support of the USSR and US. Second, China lost control over SinoIndian relations after 1962 when India declined to accept defeat and to capitulate to Chinese conditions.
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Introduction
In this context the book takes a view on the sequence in which the three regional players formed and managed the triangle. How was the dance joined? What was the leadership orientation and style of each country’s players? What was the rate of change that led to conflict and conflict formation or stabilization? What is the process of learning or re-learning that has brought about a change from tight triangularity and expectation of a constant conflict and an expectation of loosened triangularity that indicates better conflict management with a ‘no war, no peace’ expectation? The story begins with Pakistan but the key players that shaped the history and current position of this triangle are China and India. Pakistan was the first practitioner of regional triangle formation because it had a strong interest in geo-political frontiers (Kashmir, Afghanistan), Islamic identity, anti-Hinduism and an anti-India attitude that reflected its insecurity. Pakistan had an activist diplomatic and a military tradition but it was weak and it knew that it could not act alone; it needed to borrow outside power to secure asymmetrical gain in a situation of asymmetry vis-à-vis India. In its diplomatic and military history Pakistan has secured outside support and military aid including nuclear assistance as a result of its links with the UK, US, China and friendly Middle Eastern countries. Pakistan has demonstrated considerable skill in ensuring the availability of outside power for its diplomatic and military aims against India. That it failed to defeat India or to balance it was not a result of lack of trying; it was a result of Indian countermeasures. The second leg of the sequence in which the three players joined the triangle occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Using the common enmity between Pakistan and India and India and China as the baseline, China turned to Pakistan, made a boundary settlement in Kashmir, and formed what came to be described as an ‘all weather friendship’. This involved significant changes in China’s policy towards India and Pakistan. It accepted the Pakistani view of the importance of self-determination in Kashmir. It accepted the Pakistani view that India was expansionist and sought regional hegemony. It transferred sensitive nuclear and missile technology and equipment to Pakistan beginning in 1982. It provided conventional arms to Pakistan, built defence industries in Pakistan and provided vital diplomatic support to Pakistan during the wars in 1965 and 1971. Also Sino-Indian relations reached many low points after 1962. The military situation in the border was tense and there was no attempt to resolve it. China opposed India’s nuclear and military development. It claimed an interest in regional stability in the area, a claim which gave it a foothold in sub-continental international relations and a legitimacy to act on Pakistan’s behalf and in opposition to India. 1962 was also a turning point in India’s diplomatic and military behaviour. It marked the reversal of Nehru’s peace policy and the rise of a new culture to build a national security orientation in Indian foreign affairs. It marked the consolidation of a process to build strategic ties with international partners,
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Introduction
21
the major powers, who recognized the danger of China’s rise as a revolutionary power and who saw merit in India’s position as a status quo oriented and internationalist power and not simply a weak, status quo, internationalist country. However, these changes still left India in a defensive position because India was a front for a set of two kinds of opponents. Pakistan and China had territorial and diplomatic interest in their relations with India and sought to check India’s rise within the region and in the international sphere. India’s international partners in the West and Soviet Russia on the other hand supported India’s diplomatic orientation and its political system and economic aspirations but rejected its nuclear and military activities that threatened to alter the Indo-Pakistani balance and that pitted India against China as a military and a diplomatic competitor. Both fronts pressured India between the 1960s and the 1990s. India’s adoption of a geo-political and a military approach to strengthen its diplomacy occurred during this period and despite the pressure from the two fronts against its changing orientation. India’s nuclear tests in 1998 and its declaration of its nuclear weapons status was one culmination of the changing Indian approach and policy. Its effect was profound as it broke the international (Western, Russian, Third World) pressure on India to stay non-nuclear and deny itself the opportunity and the obligation to bring together its capacity to develop chemical explosives for its industrial development and nuclear explosives for its military development. Without the two basic ingredients of power a country cannot claim the right and the ability to escalate a conflict on its terms and at a time of its choice. The international powers understood the Indian message in 1998 and proceeded to stop building an anti-India front in the nuclear and diplomatic sphere. The adoption of the US–India civil nuclear agreement by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in September–October 2008 was a major reversal of past practices to sanction and isolate India in the nuclear and high technology sphere and treat it as an international pariah. China was reluctantly dragged into the 2008 agreements following its failure to stall an international rule and game change in India’s favour. China does not like to lose face in the international community and when it became obvious that international opposition had faded against Indian nuclear weapons it came around and voted for the US–India nuclear accord. The book argues that a subtle shift is taking place from ‘tight triangularity’ of the 1960s to a ‘loosening triangularity’ from the 1990s as a result of three factors. First, China has reached the limits of its power vis-à-vis India because it cannot convert its consideration military and economic clout into asymmetrical gain against India. Second, related to the first point, India has the capacity to maintain a semi-equal position vis-à-vis China and it has the ability to manoeuvre vis-à-vis China and Pakistan because its orientation is status quo and internationalist. Third and finally, Pakistan is a key leg in the Chinese strategy to use a triangle as a front against India but it has become less relevant as it has lost its ability to keep India on edge, to maintain a
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Introduction
balance of power with it, and instead it is preoccupied with a serious internal crisis from the Taliban and the difficulty to form a strong civilian government and democracy. Still, China is not ready to abandon the triangular approach and it maintains its position on the border with India, and it is expanding its naval activities and presence in the Indian Ocean while maintaining its strategic position in Pakistan through its access to the Karakoran highway and the Gwador port in the Arabia sea area. In short there is a game change but it does not represent an abandonment of the triangular game. In theoretical terms the issue is whether Beijing still seeks to build ties with India on the premise that it deserves to be a member of a subordinate states’ system with China as the hub in relations with India and Pakistan and other South Asian states, or whether China acknowledges India and Japan along with others in its advocacy of multipolarity in Asia and the world. The process of ‘loosening triangularity’ in part requires a mind or attitude change that bridges the gap between the talk of multipolarity and the actions which suggested a continuing interest in forming a set of subordinate states’ system that elevate China’s importance. Contemporary Western studies recognize the conflict of interests beyond the territorial question in China–India relations. These studies are more in line with Alan Lawrance than Gittings and Maxwell, but they do not assess the role of triangularity between the three countries and its importance as the core issue in South Asian affairs. Another set of recent studies are seeing a paradigm shift in Chinese foreign affairs as a result of the impact of liberal ideas, global norms and external pressures on traditional Chinese values. I take a sceptical view of this approach in studying the pattern of Chinese interests and actions in the present case. The post-Mao approach of China’s leaders indicates a tonal improvement but it is unclear if Beijing today in relation to India and Pakistan is different from the approach of Zhou Enlai. He emphasized the value of pragmatism, adaptability to a changing environment, yielding to others to gain strength, yielding and lying low and staying competitive; this was also Deng Tsio Ping’s advice.17 Moreover, China’s interests in the Himalayan area have a history in relation to Tibet, there are evolving interests in relation to Nepal, there is a history of territorial and political interests in relation to India’s northeast which China calls ‘Southern Tibet’, and finally there is set of strategic interests in building China’s international presence in the Indian Ocean area and this involves the development and projection of Chinese naval power. As such the presumption of this book is that China’s India–Pakistan policy is likely to maintain the approach of Zhou Enlai and Deng Tsio Ping. Mao’s strategy to attack the enemy’s flanks is also relevant to this study.18
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2
1950s: From China–India pretensions and complicity to strategic contention
Introduction The complexities of the China–India relationships are the background to the formation of the China–India–Pakistan strategic triangle. Subjective and objective elements shaped these relationships. The objective elements were formed by a history of British India–China trade that included the infamous opium trade. Karl Marx is a reliable recorder of scale and importance of this relationship, its effect on the fortunes of the East India Company, and the policy of the British India government and London.1 The second objective element was the history of rivalries among the Chinese (Manchu, Nationalists and Communists), Russian empire, and British India empire concerning Tibet and Central Asia. Van Praag offers a detailed account of the role of Tibet (and Central Asia) as the strategic heart of Asia.2 The pre-1949 history is important because it formed the basis of the Mao-Zhou approach to liberate Tibet and to consolidate China’s national defences against foreign (Russian, Anglo-American and India) ‘machinations’. Tibet and Xinjiang thus became critical parts of China’s ‘Look South’ policy after 1949. Communist China’s geo-politically driven Southern policy is outlined in this chapter. The third objective element was China’s experience with the use of British India as a base to supply KMT (Kuomintang, the government headed by Chiang Kai Shek in China before 1949, and currently the governing party in Taiwan) forces by air over the Himalayas and by land through the China–Burma road. The existence of these channels of military communications sensitized Chinese Communist practitioners about the value of immunizing China from foreign pressures. As part of its ‘Look South policy’ it rebuilt and expanded these road links in the Himalayan region to reverse the flow of Chinese military power and commercial-political influences into the Subcontinent. The formation of military and commercial logistics from China to Pakistan (through air links and Karakoram highway) and by restoration and development of the old China–Burma roads between Yunnan province
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Pretensions and complicity to strategic contention
and Burma represent moves to open up the Subcontinent to China’s influences.3 In other words, the Himalayan Mountains were a barrier against the flow of China’s influences into India only as long as Tibet was a buffer. This changed with its takeover by China in 1950, and thereafter the pre-1947 objective elements came into play as a result of Mao-Zhou policies. The subjective elements were important in shaping two patterns in Sino-Indian relations after 1949. The first pattern was formed by Nehru’s idealist view of the character and importance of China’s revolution, and Nehru’s dream to establish an Asiatic federation based on Sino-Indian cooperation.4 This was Nehru’s dream that clashed with the Mao-Zhou views that shaped their ‘Look South’ policies. Nehru’s friendly policy towards China and a dismissive attitude about Himalayan geo-politics in the 1950s reflected his idealism. China’s policy towards India and Tibet in the 1950s reflects its nonsentimental, non-idealistic geo-political calculations. The two competing worldviews clashed and exploded in 1959–62 when Nehru’s naivete was exposed by revelations of China’s actions and the existence of a boundary dispute. It also exposed a pattern of Nehru’s and his government’s complicity in facilitating China’s policies in Tibet and against Indian interests. Table 2.1 summarizes the pattern of Nehru’s complicity and betrayal of Indian interests. The complicity was made possible by a secretive decision-making culture in India that was entrenched in Nehru’s approach and in the political culture of the Indian government. This chapter outlines four points which are developed in this book. First, the orientation of Sino-Indian relations in the early 1950s showed Nehru’s role as an enabler of China’s takeover of Tibet by brute force without any advantage to India or Nehru. Second, the convergence between Chinese and Indian diplomatic theory about peaceful co-existence and Third World-ism was superficial; it hid sharp territorial differences and competing worldviews between Chinese and Indian practitioners that became public in 1959. Third, India emerged as the swing factor in Sino-Indian relations when the pattern of Nehruvian complicity with China on Tibetan affairs, along with Russian complicity with China and Western indifference towards Tibet’s plight was replaced by Sino-Indian contention on the border issue followed by a diplomatic and military rivalry, by Sino-Soviet contention in Central Asia, and by Western articulation of its view in the early 1960s that China was a destructive element in Indo-Pakistani affairs. Fourth and finally, once India after Nehru swung away from Nehru’s policies towards China, the strategic initiative was lost to China. To maintain its manoeuvrability in the Subcontinent, it was required to increase its intervention but it remains a costly exercise, and it has not produced asymmetrical gain to China as long as India took counter-measures. For China, costly intervention must go on as long as it is committed to its ‘Look South’ policy and attitude.
2. 1950
1. 1950 New Year
Date and event
George Patterson contacted US and British ambassadors in New Delhi about China’s intention to invade Himalayan states (29)
China outlined plan for ‘people’s revolution’ to unite Greater Tibet and to liberate as well Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and India (28)
Robert Ford heard Mao’s speech: PLA must liberate Tibet from speech on radio (14) British and American imperialists (14)
Tibet action
Table 2.1 China’s actions in Tibet and Nehru’s complicity, 1950–59
(Continued)
1. To explore Tibet as supply route to China following closure of China-Burma road 2. In 1949 to check out Tibet as a ‘bastion against Chinese Communism’ – (76) UK’s Tibet file closed in 1950 pleading uncertainty about Tibet’s legal position, as reason to defer UN action – (76) India and the UK knew about China legal basis to invade Tibet but declined to take a moral or diplomatic position against China – (76) (Tibet remained off the UN agenda from 1950 to 1959) (76) 1950–59 Russia provided military and political support to China’s claims and actions in Tibet
Britain: Tibet was remote, India was independent – little Britain could do to help Lhasa (24) India: urged Tibet to settle differences with China peacefully (25) US: refused to receive Tibet peace mission Nepal: declined to help Lhasa Britain: refused permission to Tibet peace mission to travel to Hong Kong to meet Chinese Communists (25) Foreign secret files on Tibet were closed for policy action. CIA’s file (1944–) had two reports by O.S.S. agents:
Foreign action
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October 1950
17 October 1950
26 October 1950
Early 1950s
August 1954
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Date and event
Table 2.1 Continued
New York Times reported on uprising in Eastern Tibet, citing Formosa sources Guardian also reported the fighting (58–9)
Chinese road-building in Tibet started (52)
China announces war in Tibet (44)
Chinese forces move into Chamdo (Tibet) (43)
China attacks Tibet China received information from secret agents in Kalimpong that India, Nepal and Western powers would not aid Tibet; and Tibet had 8500 troops China’s military plan was to attack from the eastern and western Tibet (latter through Aksai Chin) (38–9)
Sept 1954 – New China News Agency published Dalai Lama’s speech that ‘close unity is growing daily among fraternal nationalities, in particular between the Han-Tibetan people; a new and peaceful and friendly atmosphere now prevails in Tibet’ (59) 1954–56 – Khampas take on PLA forces (68 also Ch. 7) 1956 – Dalai Lama praised Mao’s brilliance (72)
Dalai Lama’s peace mission denied fighting in Tibet (Kham) (43)
Tibet action
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Nehru: ‘any differences that might arise between China and Tibet would certainly be settled by peaceful means’ (43)
Foreign action
November 1956
1958
8.
9.
1956
Khambas fighting showed failure of Mao’s Tibet policy and Beijing discussed problem with ‘Great Han’ chauvinism’ in Tibet (109)
Dalai Lama told Nehru that he did not want to return to Tibet. Nehru informed Zhou Enlai, he flew to Delhi and both Nehru and Zhou urged Dalai Lama to return to Tibet (93)
US government re-opened its Tibet file and established Taiwan – US cooperation to help the Khambas fight China (79–81)
Dalai Lama acted to outlaw Khampas and strip his two brothers of Tibetan nationality (102) Dalai Lama’s secret correspondence with Chinese general in Tibet criticized Khamba ‘reactionaries’ (125) and ‘evil elements’ (127) and sought Chinese ‘directives’ to him (128)
Dalai Lama condemned Khampas ‘rebels’ and urged them to lay down arms. He knew the situation but lacked strength to act (90–1)
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(Continued)
India suppressed foreign reporting to Tibetan uprising, and colluded with China in its takeover of Tibet. 1950 – (88–9) India’s position (1954–) emphasized ‘Tibet as an integral part of China’ (108)
PLA attacked the Khambas using superior military strength
11. 19 March 1959
Tibet action
Source: M. Peisel, The Secret War in Tibet, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1972
Tibet appeals to world through India’s consul in Lhasa to witness Tibet’s declaration of independence and cable traffic between India’s consulate and were suppressed by Nehru even within his ministry of External Affairs (139) In March 1959, Khambas organize Dalai Lama’s escape to India. Ch. 10, p 133 Nehru called Tibet’s appeal a ‘bazaar rumour’ – he called it a clash of ‘minds’ not arms (140) and insisted on prospects of its peaceful settlement (141)
10. 9 March 1959
Date and event
Table 2.1 Continued
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Foreign action
Pretensions and complicity to strategic contention
29
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Drivers in Indian and Chinese orientations Chinese and Indian diplomatic aims and methods differed but both had Asian characteristics and their approaches differed from mainstream Western orientation. To understand the purposes and methods of two continental states it is necessary first to grasp the context in which Indian and Chinese actions took shape. Their approaches were radically different from the theoretical orientation of contemporary Western literature. The language of mainstream policy and academic discourse centred on the interests of the superpowers, and the flow of philosophical and policy ideas, military communications and economic exchanges centred on an East-West axis. For China and India the academic and policy discourse emphasized Third World-ism, the issues of social, economic and political development and peace and disarmament. Although China was pre-occupied with its problems with Soviet Russia and the US during the 1950s it developed an international presence as a spokesperson of the Third World in a campaign against superpowers’ hegemony. China’s pre-occupation with India, Pakistan and the Himalayan areas showed its insecurity about a foreign and a dangerous world and a cultural superiority complex.5 Both motives led Communist China to adopt strong military positions against Tibet and India, and to push a China-centric approach to South Asian security. How did China develop these motives in forming a ‘Look South’ policy? How did India deal with the reality of a South Asian strategic triangle? How did the three members of this strategic triangle act to gain manoeuvrability vis-à-vis each and did anyone of the three gain permanent asymmetrical advantage? Or are the three states tied together in a strategic stalemate? In my narrative Nehru was a diplomatic catalyst as a result of his views and diplomacy relating to China’s and India’s importance in world affairs. But Mao was the military catalyst as a result of his decision to liberate Tibet in 1950 and to expand China’s presence in the entire Himalayan region. Mao took a great interest in the study of protracted war and deception.6 Both ideas are relevant to the study of China’s actions vis-à-vis India and Pakistan. Beijing employed other methods as well. Encouraging revolutionary activity in India’s northeastern areas after 1949 was meant to exploit contradictions between ‘Indian reactionaries’ and the Indian people that required ‘liberation’ with Chinese aid. Building a common front with Pakistan against India from the early 1960s showed the application of Mao’s united front strategy in Chinese politics. However, Maoist theorizing is of limited value in an academic study of an operational situation because the theory is incomplete and Chinese communists have not quite resolved their problem with contradictions.7 Following Karl Marx one would expect Chinese communists to develop a theoretical system of a thesis, anti-thesis and a synthesis in its internal constitutional, political and economic arrangements and in its external policies. Thus far
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Chinese actions show a capacity to define a problem – for example about US imperialism, about Soviet imperialism, about Indian reactionaries, and then express the Chinese solution – for example about China’s ‘principled’ opposition to all three at different points in time. In 1949 Mao joined up with Stalin to form a friendship treaty to counter the US; later in 1972 Maoist China joined up with Nixon to counter the Soviet Union. A possible synthesis in these examples is that China is likely to maintain its opposition to other powers given its insecurity. In this case shifts are likely as a continuous process in China’s foreign affairs in response to the actions of its foes. Contention with India is inevitable in this case given the case history of their relationship since 1959. The China–India–Pakistan relationships represent an important sub-set of post-1945 Asia, a region of secondary conflict in the world system where the interests of all major powers are engaged. The region is the base of several major issues. This region holds several critical catalysts and issues that have global significance (e.g. terrorism, nuclear and missile proliferation, religious conflict, drug trade and smuggling, maritime competition among Asian and international powers). Road and air links form a strategic gateway for the flow of military power and commerce from Tibet to Pakistan and the Gulf area, from China to the Himalayan areas and Burma, and in the Indian Ocean. The Himalayan area is a point of diplomatic and military contention between India and China as is the Indian Ocean. My focus initially examines Chinese actions as it was the proactive military force in the region in the 1950s. Its takeover of Tibet in 1950 altered the geopolitics of the Himalayan area. Pakistan too was a proactive agent because of its rivalry with India but its role as a member of the triangle is a secondary one as it alone was not able to alter the distribution of power and the pattern of relations with India. The book pertains to developments in a geographical area that concerns the politics of China’s southern frontiers specifically relating to Tibet, Xinjiang, the Himalayan areas (Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal), Kashmir, and northeastern India. The southern geo-political orientation indicates Chinese, Indian and Pakistani consciousness about frontier politics and foreign threats. Here, history, geography, leadership attitudes and policies, and international legal principles and treaties come together and form a web of diplomatic politics and political intrigue. China is viewed initially in the 1950s as the important player in the sense that its policies achieved the maximum rate of change: between 1949–50 from weakness to strength, from tolerating Tibetan autonomy because of China’s weakness to ending it by use of China’s strength, from accepting Tibet as a buffer between China, British India and Russia to ending the buffer status. Comparatively, Nehru’s India showed no awareness of the importance of projecting a geo-political view of Indian diplomacy during the 1950s until events in China–India relations forced India’s hand, and exposed the naïve basis of Nehru’s China policy. But once India joined the strategic game with China after 1962, rapid change in the
Pretensions and complicity to strategic contention
31
region was replaced by incremental change. Pakistan repeatedly sought a radical change in its relationship with India by its war behaviour but it failed repeatedly. As a result of policies that followed the Sino-Indian War of 1962 I argue that the strategic game was joined, and the rate of change slowed in comparison to the effects of China’s actions in Tibet between 1950 and 1959.
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Importance of this triangle in International Studies The narrative is about the external relationships of three geographically and strategically connected countries – China, India and Pakistan. They have shaped the distribution of military power as well as the pattern of relationships – of war, rivalry, enmity, weapons proliferation, diplomatic alignments and the pattern of economic relations in a major secondary zone of international conflict since the 1940s. Their rivalry represents the inner core of the Himalayan-South Asian-Indian Ocean region. This rivalry and triangularity is a constant element compared to the variability of relationships between members of this triangle, and other states who are outside this triangle. This triangular relationship is emphasized in contrast to many studies that focus on Indo-Pakistani rivalry and relations with South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries. A focus on the triangular relationships has merit because of the intensity and durability of diplomatic and military interactions between the three. The Himalayan boundary was breached by Chinese activities in its southern frontier after 1950. For China South Asia is a gateway to advance China’s influence into the Indian Ocean area (Persian Gulf, the ocean itself, Africa and Southeast Asia). For India China’s activities must be countered to ensure that it does not gain an edge over India in any way. Indian practitioners see a pattern in China’s approach: to form three major strategic wedges between the Subcontinent and the gulf area, between the Subcontinent and Southeast Asia and between India and the Himalayan area. This strategy requires the projection of Chinese military power and diplomatic and economic influence into India’s major strategic flanks. This strategy was formed by China during the Cold War, and its implications were recognized by Indian practitioners, although most Western practitioners and scholars then highlighted East–West strategic issues and South Asia was seen mainly as an Indo-Pakistani issue. China and India recognized their rivalry in the 1950s, and both entrenched it in their diplomatic and military actions after 1962 vis-à-vis each other. The behaviour of Pakistan, India and China during and after the 1962 and 1965 wars recognized the presence of each other’s influence in South Asian diplomatic and military relations. Pakistan’s government expected China’s support against India in the 1965 and 1971 wars. They were disappointed because China was willing to offer military transfers and moral support but it was not willing to join the fight and bring in Russian and American counter-actions. Indians on their part recognized the danger of a two-front conflict – from Pakistan and China,
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they took China’s declaratory threats seriously, but recognized an element of bluff and propaganda on this point given China’s diplomatic and military calculations. When US policy sought to engage China in the early 1970s, the Nixon–Kissinger visits to China provided an opportunity to form a US– PRC–USSR triangle. This triangle had an important side effect: it reinforced China’s diplomacy in South Asia. The Nixon White House and then the Clinton White House recognized ‘legitimate Chinese interest’ in South Asia. Washington and Beijing seemed to agree that India was expansionist and it along with Moscow, had to be contained to prevent a threat to peace.8 Influence of international change and domestic structure on Foreign policy Foreign policy and military policy making represents a continuous interaction between internal and external forces. Three variables are important. International changes create a swing element in foreign and military affairs because volatility throws up choices and dilemmas. Second, a closed or an open decision-making system affects the quality and the integrity of the decision(s), and the ability to correct past mistakes. In my case study each country’s decision apparatus represented a closed system for my period of study (1949 – early twenty-first century). I highlight this feature rather than the fact that India is a democracy, China a communist state and Pakistan for most of its history a military state. In each instance the mindset of the dominant members of the political class shaped the policy line and led to distortions based on imperfect knowledge about the enemy, a concern with the shortterm immediate issue, and utter disregard for the destructive consequences of policies that were adapted. Each case is striking on this point but India’s case is most glaring because it is a democracy. Its policy making reflects an insular and a close-minded elitist culture. The dominant belief was that a small coterie of leaders (or a leader like Nehru in the 1950s) and his/her trusted advisers knew best, and there was no need for a public debate. A stringent Official Secrets Act has reinforced the existence of a closed foreign policy system. India’s Pakistan and China policies were formed in the 1950s and distortions had lingering effects. Nehru’s China and Tibet policies in the 1950s revealed mistakes (see discussion below) that facilitated the inclination by China and Pakistan to exploit Indian weakness. Indian errors became the ally of its enemies. Nehru’s China and Tibet policies reflected his egoism and the problem of a closed foreign policy system that lacked a systematic internal intra-Ministry, inter-Ministry, and intra-Parliament and a national public debate. The closed nature of the foreign policy system is evident by the fact that Indian, Chinese and Pakistani diplomatic archives are still closed beyond the normal 30-year period. The third variable concerns the balance/imbalance between subjective and objective foreign policy behaviour. While practitioners are no doubt concerned about objective elements like geo-politics, enemy threat, historical
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experiences and worldview, a problem arises if they function in a small, closed, personality-dominated government that is lacking the habit of foreign policy making which reflects internal debates and institutional checks and balances. Under the cover of secrecy practitioners in India, China and Pakistan were able to play games with their own people and with foreign governments. By games I mean engagement in activities that entail deception, evasiveness, unwilling to negotiate when an opportunity exists and before an issue becomes an intractable problem, engaging in provocative behaviour, following irrational and poorly thought-out actions with utter disregard of consequences. Such actions produce unanticipated and destructive consequences for one’s own political future, and the country’s well being and its external relationships. Practitioners play games in a closed system because they have opportunities to act without a proper consideration of the common good. In a closed foreign policy system, risks of exposure of mistaken policies are minimal in a non-crisis situation; the fear of punishment of poorly conceived policies is minimal. As a result, the balance is tilted towards subjective and unrealistic calculations in policy making. Here two processes emerge. In closed foreign policy systems game playing flourishes absent a domestic or an international crisis. But the destructive consequences of ‘bad policies’ become obvious and politically intolerable when an externally imposed crisis occurs that produces an internal crisis or a dilemma. The existence of false suppositions of a leader are exposed in a crisis. In this case a closed system is opened to public scrutiny and debate, and a leader or an official has to pay a political price for the failed policy. That is, it takes a crisis to moderate the excess influence of subjective egoistical and careerist considerations that produced the imbalance between subjective and objective calculations. Following a crisis, game playing is exposed and the influence of objective, geo-political, and worldview considerations gain ground. In other words, while game playing and geo-political, worldview considerations are in continuous play in a closed system, the balance of power between the two is tilted towards game playing in a pre-crisis mode; and the balance shifts to the other side following exposure of a failed policy. This formula explains the game playing by Nehru in his China and Tibet policies in the 1950s, and the shift towards a realistic assessment of China’s intentions and capacities after 1962 by Nehru’s successors. I suggest that China, India and Pakistan were at fault in playing games with each other in terms of their methods, purposes and actions which had the characteristics outlined earlier. Game playing reflects the dark side of human conduct and international relations. Although the mix of subjective and objective calculations varied in each case, game playing showed the presence of, and in the Indian case the dominance of, the subjective element that took years to correct. Let us turn briefly to the examples of the games played in the 1950s by India, China and Pakistan that led to the formation of the triangle in the 1960s.
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1950s: Mistaken methods and purposes and their destructive consequences Recall my theme – in closed foreign policy systems there are opportunities to play political (domestic) and diplomatic (external) games and to build a structure of diplomatic and military policy on a pattern of mistaken assumptions, expectations, methods and purposes. The difference between success and failure lies in a retrospective analysis about effects of actions on a country’s interests, on the level of power achieved and the stability and harmony in its external relationships and internal politics. Shifting the direction of movement in relationships is a measure of success/failure. In a relationship of conflict success is indicated if hostile relations are moved by diplomacy and/or military action to a position of neutrality or indifference by the enemy, or if the rivalry is moderated or deflected from a collision course into a positive outcome. Failure is indicated if peaceful relations are transformed into open rivalry or conflict. My premise is that practitioners in China and India expected a rivalry to exist between the two given their strong and competitive civilizational backgrounds and worldviews, but military conflict was not inevitable. The choice was either to keep the rivalry secret and muted, or to open it up and negotiate or dictate a political settlement, or to allow it to rise to the level of a military conflict and open rivalry that was manageable. Recall my second theme – that practitioners follow a mix of geo-political/ national interest calculations and personal/careerist considerations in their diplomatic and military formulations. In peacetime personalized and subjective judgements on crucial matters tend to predominate when practitioners lack experience and wisdom in dealing with outside forces. They believe what they want to believe, and not what the evidence or signs may suggest. It takes a crisis to shift the balance towards a better appreciation of the objective, geopolitical considerations. But even then the policy pendulum may switch from one extreme to another. A policy shift is driven by a concern to react to an outside event (by an outside force and beyond one’s control) and by incensed domestic public opinion that is also beyond leadership control. In the case of Nehru vis-à-vis Mao/Zhou Enlai in the 1950s the shift went from the extremity of ‘policy of friendship’ (whose basis was utopian, not geo-political) to one of ‘no negotiations over the border’.9 In Nehru’s case, the methods, purposes, assumptions and expectations carried an emotional rather than a rational bent and lacked a regard for the necessity to match means to ends, to match ends to knowledge about the nature of the enemy, to balance intuition (Nehru’s) with knowledge; Nehru’s was superficial, and internal sceptics of Nehru’s policy such as V. B. Patel and G. S. Bajpai were ignored or sidelined.10 Balancing intuition, knowledge and action is a major problem as T. E. Lawrence pointed out in his masterly Seven Pillars of Wisdom.11 In Nehru’s China policy there was more of intuition and false suppositions than knowledge and effective action, and policy action and comment in the 1950s was often based on wrong headed thinking.
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In other words, subjectivity and objectivity co-exist in different ratios in different policy situations. In a crisis the subjectivity is reduced as a result of external and internal pressures and the rise of countervailing forces that inject a fear of punishment against wrong policies. The result is a world of competitive co-existence at all times (in situations of war and peace, or of secret or open rivalry) between the subjective and the objective forces that reflect imperfect knowledge as the base of policy action. It is necessary to continually adjust subjective views to objective conditions but this is not an easy or a natural task for opinionated, argumentative, old and tired leaders as were Nehru, Mao, Zhou Enlai and a succession of Pakistani civilian leaders like Z. A. Bhutto and generals. The structures of Chinese, Indian and Pakistani leaders’ worldviews and the ratio of subjectivity/objectivity in the mix of intuition/knowledge/action defined the pattern of their diplomatic and military actions vis-à-vis each other during 1947 and 1949–50s. Their actions validate my two themes. The China–India–Pakistan strategic triangle was formed and gained regional and international practical significance after the 1960s as a result of a major shift in Chinese attitudes and policy towards India and Pakistan; up to the 1950s China relied on bilateralism and its version of a policy of friendship with India. Beginning in the late 1950s and thereafter it placed India in a situation that it had to deal with two diplomatic and military fronts and threats – China and Pakistan. India was on the defensive in both the regional and the international spheres as it was economically and militarily weak, and the aid it received from the West and USSR had conditions which tied India to their goodwill. But at the same time China’s practitioners viewed Nehru’s actions as a threat to their interests. However, the formation of this triangle in the 1960s was not a break from the past. It was built up on attitudes and patterns of behaviour that were apparent in the 1950s. Despite its preoccupation with the Korean War in the early 1950s, China held a historical view of the importance of its southern frontiers. It distinguished between Inner and Outer Asia12 and it sought to consolidate Beijing’s position in Inner Asia that included Tibet and Xinjiang, and with that secured, it sought to expand its influence into Outer Asia. The latter area included the British sphere of influence south of the Himalayas that independent India inherited. China’s impressive military victory in its civil war with the KMT and its fight with Japanese forces reinforced the desire to bring all Chinese frontiers under its influence. So the geo-political impulse was strong in Chinese politics and external affairs generally, and particularly in terms of China/India/Tibet relations. The Tibet question was also connected to the Taiwan question as recovery of its provinces was a core part of Chinese political and military declarations after 1949. The 1950s revealed a process of temporary convergence between Chinese and Indian postures vis-à-vis each other, as noted earlier in this chapter. Both sought peaceful co-existence and a policy of friendship. For China this was the second track of a multi-tracked policy; the first track was its belief in the
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importance of secure frontiers in its southern zone, and they were to be secured by military means, a policy reflecting the Maoist theory that power came from the barrel of a gun. Its actions altered the history of Tibet as a buffer between British India, Russia and China. It made China and India into direct geographical and military neighbours. However, the loss of the Tibetan buffer did not undermine Nehru’s belief in the possibility of peaceful co-existence between the two. Nehru found comfort in a mistaken belief that the two were Asian civilizations with a vaguely common interest in Buddhist influence, trade and scholarly contacts, and thousands of years of friendship. This belief was meant to promote the Indian doctrine of building an Asian federation around Sino-Indian friendship. Here Indian subjectivity was at odds with the reality of China’s push to assert its presence in its Inner Asian frontier and to project it as well in the Outer Asian zone. The reality was that China and India historically lacked constant social and political ties in contrast to the contacts between Indians, Afghans, Greeks, Persians and Muslim invaders since the eleventh century AD. For Nehru, policy of friendship with China was the main policy track, and there was no need for a military track with China as the expectation was that no one would dare attack India for fear of starting a global conflict. No doubt Nehru had a streak of geo-politics when he continued the British policy to watch its interests in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. By 1949 British India treaty relations in these areas were confirmed in treaties between India and its northern neighbours but this was a subset of the Nehruvian over-commitment, to the theory and practice of policy of seeking friendship with Pakistan and China. This policy was maintained despite Pakistan’s military intervention in 1947–48 in Kashmir and Chinese military intervention in Tibet in 1950, and Chinese efforts to undermine Indian authority in the Himalayan zone and in India’s northeast in the 1950s. Chinese policy had a third track in its approach to India during the 1950s, that is, to intervene in India’s border areas. Indian practitioners were aware of the dangerous nature of Chinese policy.13 Yet Nehru maintained his policy of friendship with China and set severe constraints against Indian military modernization in relation to China (or Pakistan) because of his faith in pacifism and his anti-Indian military and anti-military stances.14 Nehru also believed that a conflict with China was not imminent. In sum, in hindsight, four tracks formed the structure of China’s India policies. The first represented a strong cultural-historical geo-political orientation towards its southern zone, which was a point of continuity between its imperial past and communist policy. The second was a temporary diplomatic phase of peaceful co-existence, a possibility in the Chinese view, if India accepted the reality of its subordinate position in the Chinese view of its central position in the Southern zone – the Himalayan area, as per its geopolitical ideas.15 The third track was not evident during 1950–59; it emerged in 1962 when China sought to settle the border dispute by force. The alignment with Pakistan in the 1960s became the fourth track but this too was not
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evident in the 1950s except in a peripheral way; following the Bandang conference Pakistan received a Chinese message to indicate that a conflict of interest was likely with India but not with Pakistan. Pakistan was smaller in size and power compared to China and India but its methods and purposes indicated that it was the most proactive, the first one off the mark to stimulate triangular ideological, diplomatic and military activity vis-à-vis India. Before its independence, as it developed the Pakistan movement, it mobilized the British Raj to accept the view that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations, they could not work together politically, and the situation required British recognition of Muslim parity with Hindu India in the development of constitutional and political arrangements in the Subcontinent. British India happily accepted this view. The Pakistan movement was the first step to form a triangular relationship between the British Raj, Muslims in the Subcontinent and Hindus. The British rulers of India and Jinnah, the leader in the Pakistan movement saw the Hindus as the dominant force in the Indian Congress party.16 Mobilising British practitioners to the defence of the Muslim minority showed the importance of triangularity in Pakistani policy. Their strategy was to develop a British and Muslim identification with a theory that was part falsehood and anti-historical (that Hindus functioned as a majority and represented a threat to minorities); and part truth (that the Congress party showed an unwillingness to share power with Muslim leaders in the formation of pre-1947 Congress-led ministries). Then came the tribal invasion of Kashmir (1947–48) under Jinnah’s sanction. This action militarized the Kashmir region and created a new situation to secure further British sympathy and diplomatic support for the Kashmir cause in London and at the United Nations. In other words by 1948 Pakistan has succeeded in turning London to support its positions in two ways: first came the theory that Hindu–Muslim conflict was inevitable and Hindu India was a threat to regional peace; then came the theory that the Muslim minority and weak Pakistan required Western support. By 1947–48 Pakistan’s influence lay in London, not in Washington. This was a truly amazing period that showed how a smaller country could set the international strategic agenda and to shape the local situation despite its asymmetry in relation to the UK and India. Pakistani diplomacy laid the basis for securing British diplomatic support for its Kashmir cause at the UN. Triangularity existed in the interactions among Pakistani, British and Indian practitioners at the military and diplomatic levels of action. Pakistani military and diplomatic activism on the Kashmir issue was matched by UK’s activism in support of Pakistani aims on the international diplomatic front at the UN Security Council. India’s last Viceroy and the first ‘Indian’ Governor General Lord Louis Mountbatten played a key role in developing this pattern of interdependent triangularity. The Indian government was locked into the policy framework and the military situation formed by Pakistan’s Jinnah, Whitehall, and India’s Mountbatten and Nehru. Mountbatten stopped Indian military planning and action against Pakistan once the UN was seized of
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the issue. As head of India’s Defence Council with strong decision-making powers, Mountbatten functioned as an independent pole of power within India but his actions showed coordination with London. His actions helped Pakistan’s cause militarily in Kashmir, it protected Pakistan from an Indian invasion which he noted would mean the end of Pakistan, and by tying Nehru’s hands to Security Council action following his advice to Nehru to refer it to the UN, Indian diplomacy and military policy were both stalemated in Indo-Pakistan relations and on the world stage at the UN.17 At this point (1947–48), in the hands of President Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall the US government maintained a balance position about Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani affairs. Pakistan tried but it failed to bring Washington around to its view about the threat from India. As early as May 1947, after the Cold War started and before Pakistan became independent, Jinnah asked US embassy officials in Karachi to form a mutually beneficial strategic relationship with Pakistan given the danger of ‘Hindu expansionism’ and ‘Soviet imperialism’.18 Washington did not respond positively but later, with the rise of Dean Acheson as the Secretary of State and a pro-Pakistani set of officials at the State Department under Assistant Secretary George McGhee, the UK–Pakistan versus India triangularity was reinforced by the emergence of the UK–US coalition in support of Pakistani security interests in Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani affairs; this was reinforced by a UK–US belief in Pakistan’s use as an ally in Middle Eastern international relations.19 Beijing was to join this pattern of triangular diplomacy in the Subcontinent later and to adopt its key assumptions and implications. Pakistan’s relations with the US and UK soured in 1962 as a result of Pakistani resentment with Western military aid to India following its defeat by China. Initially China was cautious in accepting Pakistani overtures but when it became clear that it had a relationship of conflict with India and there was no conflict with Pakistan, the two recognized the community of interests in opposing India. In the early 1950s Beijing was mostly indifferent to Pakistan as its focus lay with India but the ground was laid by Pakistani assurance to Beijing that its membership in Western military alliances were not directed at China and were framed in terms of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. It was after the rise of Sino-Indian controversies that the Sino-Pakistan alignment emerged. Three factors shaped the convergence. Indo-Pakistani disagreements were a necessary first factor; it created opportunities for outside powers to become involved in Indo-Pakistan affairs in response to local invitations (by Pakistan), as a response to the referral of the Kashmir question to the UN by Nehru, and finally, by Western fear about the spread of communism as a strategic threat to Western interests in the region. US activism on behalf of Pakistan, in favour of Indo-Pakistani parity and security and against the spread of communist influence in the area was the second factor that shaped the triangularity in relationships between Pakistan, the US (acting with the UK) and India. By the 1960s and the 1970s China’s willingness to support Pakistan was the third factor. The embrace of strategic
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triangularity by China as a successor to the UK–US is discussed in a later chapter. My concern here is to make the point that Pakistani practitioners were able to borrow external power and support in three core areas – ideology of a Muslim state, its military policy and its diplomatic interests – despite or because of the asymmetry in the distribution of actual or potential power between India and Pakistan. Pakistani leaders, like the Chinese, held well-defined ideas and policies about the importance of frontiers.20 Both valued military force and diplomatic aggressiveness as ways to assert power and to create situations to tie India’s hands and tie Indian practitioners to Pakistani and Western policies in Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani affairs; and in China’s case to tie up India to Chinese policies in Tibet and the Himalayan areas – the long Sino-Indian border, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) area. Both lacked Nehru’s idealism and enthusiasm to promote global reform and internationalism. Their policies were dominated by unemotional realism that showed the primacy of each country’s national and institutional interests. Nehru’s India was tied to a general theory about the importance of world peace, avoiding the Third World War, and building the Third World through development and as a peace zone in a world of conflict. Indian policies and values also emphasized several national priorities that had a practical bent: internal economic and social development and promotion of Indian democracy and secularism; internal security and the defence of the Indian political Union. Nehru’s lack of realism was evident however, in his Pakistan and China policies, in his worldviews and his amateurish conduct of foreign affairs and in the lack of professionalism in the Indian Foreign Service.21 The mix of idealism and realism was unbalanced in the foreign and military affairs of the principal players in the Subcontinent. It was tilted towards idealism in Nehruvian India; and it reflected realism in Pakistani and Chinese actions towards India. The mental images and worldviews about India among practitioners differed from Nehru’s. Prominent Pakistani practitioners had the dream to restore Muslim glory in India22; and Chinese practitioners had the theory of liberating Indians, labelled as a ‘running dog of the AngloAmerican imperialists’ by armed struggle and revolution.23 Also, Mao’s military writings express an idealistic view of world peace following successful armed struggle. Their diplomatic and military actions of the 1950s and 1960s showed a commitment to deeply held beliefs and leadership views about their respective national interests. The sharp divergence of leadership beliefs and policies was established during the 1950s and this led to serious consequences for India’s regional and international position in the 1960s onwards. Initially with Western aid and later with Chinese support, Pakistan set up India using Nehruvian naivety and self-importance to create dilemmas for Nehru himself and India; Nehru’s mistakes became the ally of Pakistan and later China. Nehru’s India however, did not have a strategy to set up Pakistan and China with dilemmas. The Indian dilemmas did not become apparent during the 1950s because the
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decision-making machinery was closed and a crisis did not arise till the late 1950s when the dilemmas became apparent. The 1950s however, is important because the setups occurred during this period, and their destructive consequences became apparent later, as did the reality of the triangle between China, India and Pakistan. The character of the policies of China, India and Pakistan and the worldviews of their leaders in the 1950s led to the formation of the triangle among the three. (Chapter 3 outlines the characteristics of a strategic triangle.) It was a culmination of a pattern of actions and reactions by the three countries. The 1950s were important because major shifts and trend lines emerged at the time. The agreement on peaceful co-existence and a policy of friendship, 1949–54, was a point of Sino-Indian convergence but this quickly became a point of divergence, mutual suspicion, rivalry, and border controversy and military conflict between 1959 and 1962. For the most part indifference characterized the Sino-Pakistan relationship in the 1950s despite Chinese questions about Pakistani membership in Western military pacts. Indifference between the two became a point of convergence-border agreement in 1962, and a policy of friendship with economic and military content thereafter. The 1950s was notable because US military aid to Pakistan from 1954, and its pressure on India to make concessions to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, reduced India’s manoeuvrability within the region and in its international diplomacy. Beijing’s open embrace of Pakistan’s view about the importance of self-determination in Kashmir (but not in Tibet or within Pakistan and China), its threat to develop two military fronts against India, and the development of a long-term triangular pattern of Sino-Pakistani pressures on India in peacetime and in war further reduced India’s options. The conduct of each country’s leadership in the 1950s validates my two main themes – that foreign policy decision-making is flawed as a result of the dominance of a closed system (closed to critical inputs, to national debates, and sober assessment of ends and means and the need to build the latter to support the former), and second, leadership behaviour shows a mix of subjectivity as well as geo-political calculations but the mix of idealism, emotion and national interest is unbalanced, it is driven by imperfect information, and in a situation of war or peace the mix of the three elements is unbalanced, volatile and never in equilibrium in the foreign policy sphere; there is no point of calm. Decision makers in all three countries played strategic games that were hidden from public scrutiny and they were outside the realm of public discourse except in a moment of crisis. As closed systems they suffered a deficit of internal checks and balances. Serious consideration was not given to long-term damaging consequences of policies – to others and to themselves. Each decision maker felt compelled to do something in response to the other’s side’s actions and to take advantage of the external situation but little thought went into the recognition of the dilemmas that their actions created for themselves and for others, and the likely public reaction to such dilemmas. Short-term management of an issue and maintenance of a situation of
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manageable instability was the guidepost for policy action but this approach did not create a foundation for a peaceful relationship. Consider several examples of strategic games that were played in my case study. On China, Nehru’s policies had three sides: idealistic, opportunistic and realistic but the three were intertwined, not easily separated, their boundaries were unclear, they were poorly communicated by Nehru among Indians and the Chinese, and his actions oscillated between the three sides. The results were deadly in the long term for Nehru’s career and reputation, and in the short term for Indian diplomatic and strategic interests. He followed British policy by maintaining a special position for India in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Treaty relationships with the three kingdoms were negotiated in 1949. British policy in the Himalayan area had two premises; that China’s influence and power in the Tibetan/Himalayan area was weak and British interests were served by the reality of Tibetan autonomy and by acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet as a safeguard against Russian expansion in the area. Both premises changed in 1949–50. With the rise of a strong China the Tibetan foundation of British buffer policy was lost to Nehru as a result of China’s aggressive military occupation of Tibet in 1950; this was beyond Nehru’s control. But he accepted and facilitated China’s military takeover of Tibet and accepted its sovereignty whereas international lawyers believed that Tibet had independent or at least an autonomous status.24 He ignored the long-term implication of Tibet’s takeover for China’s India policy and their consequences for Indian security interests. His policy actions were in his control, and here he bungled the Tibet file badly – which had costs for the Tibetans, for Indian interests in the region, and for the future of China–India relations.25 Nehru appeased China on Tibet and having failed to satisfy its appetite for liberation of the area from Indian and other foreign influences, Nehru compounded the process by failing to re-assess his China policy in 1950 despite pleas by his deputy Prime Minister, V. B. Patel and Indian diplomatist, G. S. Bajpai. By making it easy for China to absorb Tibet without major international political costs, Nehruvian India feeds China’s (Maoist) beliefs about their cultural and military superiority in relation to Indians, and their territorial rights in the Himalayan area that were based on Nationalist China’s claims rather than a sound reading of the historical record. Nehru’s idealism was expressed in several beliefs: about a peaceful, selfabsorbed China that needed time for internal reconstruction; his theory about China and India as the pillars of Asian security; his belief in promoting China in the international fora to avoid its international isolation so that it did not become dependent on Moscow; his opposition to the US’s containment of China (and containment of Soviet Russia) policy; his belief in peaceful co-existence as a model of modern international relations; and his push to secure China’s rights in the UN. These idealistic beliefs reflected a romantic view of a new and influential China which along with a new, modern India
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would form the basis of a new power structure in the world comprising the US, USSR, China and India. Europe, Japan, Southeast Asia, the Arab, Jewish and Persian Middle East, Africa and the Americas did not find an important place in Nehru’s list of future power centres; they were important in the campaign against Western imperialism and colonialism and racialism and as the focus of a new zone of international peace but they were not likely principals in Nehru’s calculus of world power. This however, was not pure idealism; it had a hidden policy agenda, an element of opportunism to serve Nehru’s and presumably Indian interests in relation to the Big Powers: Nehru’s ambition was to make India join this list. I call this ‘realistic opportunism’. Nehru was playing an intricate diplomatic juggling act, by playing the China card in shaping his relations with Soviet Russia and the US, by playing the Soviet card in shaping his relations with Beijing and Washington, and by playing the US card in shaping his relations with Beijing and Moscow. Nehru’s India was the swing factor in the international diplomatic dance, and it is to his credit that he made Delhi a point of contact and interaction on a variety of important international questions. This was an achievement for a poor country with limited military power and economic capacity. During the early 1950s India worked well as a diplomatic swing factor because of the mutual suspicions among the practitioners in Washington, Moscow and Beijing and because India was a useful interlocutor when the three had limited contact with each other. Nehru’s India played an important role in international negotiations concerning the Korean armistice, Suez peacekeeping, Indo-China negotiations and disarmament discussions during the 1950s and as a moderator in East-West controversies. It gained valued economic and military aid and technical assistance from both Western and Eastern sources by using its nonaligned stance to develop its swing capacity in relation to the Big Powers. Nehru’s career and international prestige blossomed in the early 1950s as the political founder of India and of modern Indian diplomacy. The combination of idealism and policy calculation worked as long as international circumstances were favourable for Indian diplomacy. However, despite the idealism about China and world reform, and his realism in asserting India’s rights and presence in the three Himalayan kingdoms south of Tibet, his Tibet policy and his approach to the SinoIndian boundary question revealed another side of Nehru’s actions – neither realistic nor idealistic. We see Nehru playing games with himself (his mind), with fellow practitioners and the Indian public, with the Chinese and with the general international community. Game playing involves use of lies or half lies, deception, misinformation, evasiveness, talking but not negotiating, and showmanship without careful consideration of costs (material and psychological) for regional stability and international opinion. Game playing is not good governance and it is not effective if policy success is defined as an ability to protect a country’s physical borders, its internal political and economic structure, and its external orientation.
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The Kashmir issue is relevant to my discussion. Usually it is discussed in the context of bilateral Indo-Pakistani relations but it should be studied as well as a part of the Sino-Indian relationship after 1962. Its geographical proximity to Tibet made it an attractive target for Chinese intervention. The demand for its independence, autonomy or takeover by Pakistan, and international pressure on India to settle the issue, made it a field of China’s power politics once it decided on a policy of rivalry with India. In these circumstances it became a part of China–India equation in two ways. It gave China a platform in its triangular strategy. By taking Pakistan’s side Beijing created a pressure point against India. Beijing’s leaders took advantage of Nehru’s pacifist orientation by taking a strategic view of the Kashmir situation, as it did in Tibet; its actions showed the difference between China and India between Nehru’s talk and inaction, and Chinese actions against which India had no defence. Nehru’s approach to the Kashmir and Tibet questions in the 1950s revealed the vulnerability of Nehru to external influences and an ability to dominate a closed foreign policy establishment where he held sway. Both elements played to India’s disadvantage in the Himalayan region in the 1950s. The former because external inputs were game changers in Indian foreign affairs; the latter because a Nehru-centric foreign policy retarded the development of a balanced foreign policy framework. The legal issues in Kashmir (1947–) and Tibet (1950–) were arguable; the moral issues were similar – human rights and political and cultural freedom of the people; finally, should the use of military force, in this case by an agency outside the area, be the basis of change? Nehru reacted differently to both cases. He took the Kashmir issue to the UN but he refused to do so with the Tibet question. Both were policy mistakes that worked to China’s advantage and India’s disadvantage. Yet there was a similarity in Nehru’s handling of the two issues. In both cases his policy pronouncements lacked conviction as demonstrated by his oscillating stance and private musings. Nehru, the father of Indian diplomacy, was often of two or three minds on the same issue, and his vacillation was his enemy’s opportunity to act and to exploit the situation. Nehru’s Kashmir policy showed that he was of many minds. These cannot be black boxed because his views shifted in time depending on domestic and external circumstances. His actions showed a mix of emotion, realism and idealism. He was unwilling to give up Kashmir to the UN or to Pakistan under pressure because of his emotional attachment and background as a Kashmiri Brahmin. He was unwilling to give up Kashmir, but he was willing to talk about it under international pressure without negotiating its surrender. During 1947–48, his decision-making indicated that he was open to persuasion and manipulation by his mentor Lord Louis Mountbatten but he ignored the advice of his military commanders and his deputy Vallabhai Patel. His actions showed a lack of geo-political realism and a strategic view of Kashmiri and Indo-Pakistani politics. Instead they showed idealism: a belief that the UN Security Council would deal fairly with the Indian
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complaint about Pakistani aggression recognizing the reality of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India. He was being legalistic and moralistic and ignored the reality that by referring the issue to the UN Security Council as a threat to international peace and security, he had internationalized the issue. This background is important to my narrative because it was the context in which China first maintained neutrality on the Kashmir question during the 1950s and gave priority to bilateral Sino-Indian ties, but later shifted to a total acceptance of Pakistani views on the subject. To sum up, Nehru’s foreign policy record on China and Pakistan and Kashmir indicates much game playing, and an utter disregard for the destructive strategic consequences of his actions. Nehru made a distinction between talking but not negotiating with Pakistan regarding Kashmir, and with China on the border. This approach produced speeches and distractive noise, while the lack of serious negotiations with intent to settle on the basis of the principle of compromise and compensation meant that game playing dominated the political field. By appeasing Beijing on the Tibet question, Nehru lost the high moral ground for India in relation to the Tibetans. By over-promoting China in international circles, Nehru lost diplomatic leverage with an Asian rival, and the goodwill of the US. By overplaying the theme of a peaceful China and by ignoring India’s defence buildup in the 1950s, Nehru set up India for a fall in 1962. By insisting on a one-man dominated foreign policy machinery Nehru retarded the development of external relations that recognized the value of diplomacy as well as military and economic strength. By keeping Indian Parliament and public opinion in the dark on critical issues relating to China during the 1950s, Nehru undermined one core element of a democratic society, that is, maintaining accountability and transparency about policies relating to the common good. In other words, Nehruvian game playing had serious strategic consequences for Indian decision-making practices and the policy framework. His actions revealed a mix of egoism, opportunism, dreaming, a limited view of geo-politics and a distorted view of Indian interests and diplomatic methods. He failed to recognize the importance of proper methods to deal with foreign rivals. There was a fixation with personal diplomacy as an alternative to military strength. There was a faith in industrial development as the mainstay of national power, and a naïve belief that no one in the world would dare attack India because it was protected by outside powers, and such an attack would be considered a threat to world peace. China’s approach towards its southern zone (Tibet, Xinjiang, Himalayan kingdoms and western and Eastern sections of India’s China border (the five fingers of the ‘Tibetan palm’ according to Mao-tse-tung were Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim, NEFA and Nepal))26 was the product of a complex historical and a cultural context. Its policies had a mix of geo-politics, and a leadership style that showed an utter disregard for sentiment of other peoples and human rights, and showed instead a determination to exploit opportunities to act in China’s interest. In the 1950s Chinese practitioners were in the
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driver’s seat. They had an ideological and a cultural conviction about their superiority and about the inevitability of success following their rise to power in a large and fragmented country. Moreover its counterparts in the southern zone lacked a strategic plan to engage the Chinese government on their own terms and they lacked the military strength to act decisively. Its worldview placed China at the centre of the world, with a strong sense of cultural superiority in relation to other peoples – the ‘barbarians’. Combined with limited world experiences in developing rewarding and durable international economic and strategic relationships, and a history of war and humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, communist Chinese practitioners functioned with two contradictory impulses: an over-confidence based on their culture and entrenched ethnocentricity, and on the other hand an insecurity as a result of its vulnerability to foreign interventions. It had a strong sense of territoriality; it adopted as a given the national boundaries of the Nationalist government and it maintained its ‘principled’ opposition against territories gained by British and Russian ‘imperialists’ through war and unequal treaties. After 1949 Maoism and Zhouism showed the two sides of Chinese policies. The first aspect of its external orientation stressed liberation theology and the value of revolutionary interventions. Here propaganda and political mobilization were more important than diplomacy. The latter relied on the principles of compromise and compensation to adjust conflicting interests among governments while revolutionary violence stressed action against established government(s). Precisely when Moscow was abandoning revolution as the basis of its foreign policy, and it was developing state-to-state relations with the Western and Third World governments, Maoist China maintained its revolutionary stance into the 1950s and the 1960s. The second aspect, associated with premier Zhou Enlai’s diplomacy entailed an opportunistic use of the peaceful co-existence stance in inter-state diplomacy. India’s conduct on the Tibet question raised the confidence of China’s leaders in their ethnocentric beliefs, and the easy acceptance by the world community of China’s view that Tibet was a part of China. Because the UK and US deferred to India’s position on Tibet, Nehru’s acquiescence was useful for Chinese policy on Tibet. The 1950s was not a period of Chinese learning except that the Zhouist line adapted to the Nehruvian language of peaceful co-existence and Beijing sought a negotiated settlement of the northeastern border – the McMahon Line.27 The Zhouist line took advantage of Nehru’s advocacy that China was a peaceful-loving and internationalist country. Nehru was wrong to ignore signs about China as a destructive force because its theory of revolutionary violence was at work in India’s northeastern area precisely when the two countries were propagating peaceful co-existence. Indian diplomatic practitioners overplayed the China factor in Asia, ignored the Japan factor and criticised the US factor. Nehru projected a worldview with four major powers – the US, Russia, China and India. China however, had no place for India in its scheme of world powers. It saw itself in a world of three major
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powers that excluded India and Japan. In hindsight the Zhouist adaptations were clever and opportunistic. They hid the reality of the rivalry with India in the regional and the global spheres.
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Theory: difficulty in resolving contradictions in Sino-Indian relations S. B. Cohen emphasizes the effect of a country’s locational perspective on its foreign policy and its mythology, that is, its view of facts as seen by its ruling elite and as conveyed to its internal and international publics. Myths are often half-truths but they are real because they filter the inputs and shape the outputs of a country’s foreign policy. Whether or not myths change depends on the pressure of a crisis in internal and/or international politics and its effect on national decision-making. According to Cohen Chinese egocentrism produced a threefold locational perspective based on the theme of geographical and cultural unity locally/nationally in the Central Kingdom, and a desire to manage the regional environment – comprising the Inner Asian zone and the Outer Asian zone (and other frontier zones). The historical boundary of the Inner Asian zone included the geo-political areas in the Himalayan–Pamir– Kashmir areas mentioned above. Tibet was the political junction where Russian, British and Chinese power meet, where several interlocking territorial and power rivalries existed – that is, Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indian (earlier British Indian), Indo-Pakistani and Sino-US. My study projects that the Chinese theme of geographical and cultural unity of its national frontiers depends on Beijing’s ability to control its frontier zone(s) by political consent (trade, diplomacy and moral suasion) and by use of force in its frontier zones. Its control over its frontier zone, that is, Tibet and Uighar areas since 1950 has been exercised by military force, by mass Han migration (demographic engineering) and by political manipulation of ‘foreign devils’ or the ‘barbarians’ to induce acceptance of Chinese national claims. These policies are required to nourish the myth of territorial and cultural unity in the frontier areas. It is necessary for Chinese authorities to push its influence in the outer Asian zone because, as Cohen points out, having a pro-Chinese Outer Asian zone is vital for the integrity of its national geographical and cultural space and mythology. This explains (but it does not justify) its aggressive actions in relation to its border areas (e.g. Uighurs) and its national areas (Tibet and Taiwan). In other words, there is a connection between Beijing’s control over its national geographical and cultural space based on Nationalist maps and its management of its Outer Asian zone because the latter has the potential to infringe on the national space; the influence of the periphery on Beijing’s authority in inner Asia is a part of Chinese insecurity. Chinese actions in the Himalayan-Tibetan area since 1950 are consistent with Cohen’s analysis. The ‘national-regional’ nexus is important in the study of Chinese methods and aims. Following its defeat of Japanese and KMT forces in a civil war in China, China was tied to major international issues in the Korean peninsula
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(a hot war), in the Far East as a result of the US’s military presence in Japan, Taiwan and the Taiwan straits (a cold war) and as a result of its desire to assert itself in the Himalayan zone (a rivalry that became a hot war). It had to deal simultaneously with challenges in its national and its regional space; the latter sphere was dominated by two major international players – Russia and America. Its confrontations in two major conflict zones in its north and its south were managed with a complicated baggage: ethnocentric culture and a tradition of forceful action; and a revolutionary attitude based on Mao’s thoughts and a belief in the power of human will in war. This was Beijing’s rule set that shaped its actions. But on the other hand, Chinese practitioners had a limited knowledge of practical world politics other than their relations with Stalinist Russia. The locational perspective of Chinese practitioners is more developed and entrenched in China’s history and politics. In comparison Indian practitioners historically lacked cultural and political unity and lacked consciousness about Indian geo-politics. (Kautilya’s ‘Arthasastra’ had a view of local geopolitics and neighbourly rivalries but Hindu kings lacked an all-Indian geo-political orientation; Mughal and British empire-builders however, had a geo-political view of India’s strategic place.) As a result of the asymmetry between Chinese and Indian (and between Pakistani and Indian) geo-political and cultural belief systems, Chinese and Pakistani actions had the advantage of pro-activity vis-à-vis India, and a disadvantage in unwinding deeply held but erroneous beliefs about rivals. In such cases it is difficult to adjust the balance between subjective beliefs and objective realities. Absent a process of adjustment, the contradiction and tension between subjective and objective considerations is likely to persist and grow. The book argues that the contradictions have grown in the PRC’s India– Pakistan policies because contradictory impulses exist in China’s conduct and it has thus far failed to resolve them. China’s tilt towards Pakistan and its rivalry with India is tying Beijing into policy knots which required settlement by a protracted struggle within China’s political elite about the China and India questions. For example its alliance with Pakistan in the Himalayan zone was meant to put pressure on India by creating two military and diplomatic fronts against it. This pressure, however, stimulated counter-measures by India and its international allies. India learnt to manage the two-front threat by increasing its military modernisation without sacrificing its democratic system and commitments to internal nation building; and the major powers came to India’s defence against Chinese pressures. Moreover, in the long-term perspective Pakistan is a debilitated state, it cannot deliver military victory against India to China, and its internal viability is doubtful unless it substantially reforms its political structure and sheds military rule. Pakistan is now known for its ability to export ‘made in Pakistan’ terrorists and nuclear materials and missiles made originally in China and North Korea. Even with significant Chinese aid and a record of irredentism Pakistan has failed to change the regional structure of power and the pattern of relationships.
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Pakistani threats to India have been contained by Indian and international actions, and China’s role has been exposed as a harmful one to the global effort against nuclear and missile proliferation. Left unresolved the contradictions produce oscillating or ambivalent actions that cause apprehension about the wisdom of the PRC’s decision-making apparatus. I submit that Beijing has not thus far mastered the dialectics in its foreign affairs because Maoist or Zhouist theoretical guidance was deficient. As a result the process of adaptation has been slow in China’s case. In India’s case the rate of change vis-à-vis China and Pakistan was rapid following lessons it learned by confrontations with her two neighbours. I will show that short-term gains have emerged as long-term problems for China, and hence I call them mistakes. For instance, China participated in the Korean War in part to defend itself against General Douglas MacArthur’s actions, in part because of Stalin’s direction and in part to break up the US–Japan alliance. As a result of its military intervention the US–Japan relationship solidified, and now Japan is a military rival of China, and North Korea is emerging as a potential US partner in the Korean peninsula. This is not a victory for communist China that at one time dreamed of unifying the Korean region under the North and bringing it under Chinese protection. Similarly, whatever the causes of Sino-Indian confrontation, Chinese actions turned the Indian political class and the people against China and the 1962 war did not settle the rivalry between the two; it intensified it, politicized and militarized it and it led India to turn to Russia and America in its strategic and economic development. China emerged as the point of opposition in the policies of the three countries. Sun Tzu would disapprove the formation of an anti-China orientation in this case when his advice was to disrupt the enemy’s alliance, not to foster them. The book argues that China faces an uphill task in dealing with the Sino-Indian–Pakistan relationships because its policies have a rigid framework. The three countries exist in a core geo-political area. They are tied together strategically as well, but the rate of change of the process of adaptation and re-learning for each country is different. India started to change in 1962 with the failure of Nehru’s China policy; and Indian public opinion forced the Indian practitioners to recognize the importance of military and economic strength as the basis of Indian diplomacy, and to use the tools to engage China and Pakistan from a position of strength. While Indian practitioners changed their orientation after 1962, Chinese practitioners saw no need to do so. The international situation – the US’s need to play the China card to offset Russian ambitions and China’s importance in the US–Soviet– China triangle, gave it room to manoeuvre in the international sphere. There was no imminent pressure on China by India or by the US to change its policies in the Subcontinent. The Nixon–Kissinger–Clinton policy of according China legitimate interests in the Subcontinent gave it a special position and manoeuvre space in the region. Thus Beijing did not need to change its policy; neither did Pakistan which enjoyed Chinese and US support. But with
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changing Indian and US policies in the region, China’s room to manoeuvre is not guaranteed.
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Summing up My case study provides a rich universe of policy mistakes, of widespread use of bullying tactics, half-truths and myths in an opportunistic way especially in the 1950s; they produced short-term gains and long-term dilemmas for the three players. The menu of policy mistakes included the following. Nehru charmed fellow Indian citizens by his foreign policy positions. He succeeded for a while as a result of his personal popularity with the Indian people along with popular apathy with foreign and military affairs and the support he enjoyed from careerist foreign office personnel. On Kashmir and the India–China border Nehru was deceptive and evasive; he repeatedly made a distinction between talking with the opposite side but not negotiating differences with it; the first was a matter of form, the second a matter of principle according to Nehru. Such Brahmin-like subtlety muddied the diplomatic waters and created mistrust rather than build confidence for conflict resolution. He tried charm and evasiveness with Zhou Enlai but here Nehru’s charm failed him as the history of the border controversy and its buildup to a war showed. It is significant that both Nehru and Zhou Enlai used the myth of a thousand years of friendship as the basis of their declarations about peaceful coexistence. Policy mistakes lie undetected until a crisis occurs. Once discovered a policy error becomes a point of opposition within a country; as such it requires remedial action. In this case, a closed and subjectively driven foreign policy system gains openness. Policy mistakes become powerful agents of academic and policy discourse when they create a public identification about the existence of a problem that must be addressed; and there are political costs attached to inaction by the government concerned. Policy mistakes show what practitioners ought not to do. They serve as a road map for future actions and the development of means and methods to shape a desired pattern of relationships with friend and foe. Rivalries and mistakes are catalysts of policy development to reorganize the distribution of power and the pattern of relations, in this case of China, India and Pakistan. Mistakes are important not when they occur but when they are publicly exposed because governments control their mistakes when they become costly to the practitioners in crisis. In this case, Nehru, the Indian Cabinet, Indian civil servants, Pakistani Presidents, its generals and civil servants, and Chinese leaders and members of their diplomatic and military services had immunity against public pressure to explain and to reform their policies during the 1950s because they were able to act secretly in closed systems for the most part. During the 1950s Nehru was also using charm to woo the Chinese by appeasing their interests in Tibet, by pushing their case for UN membership
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and by projecting its position in the Third World. This was the pattern of Nehru’s conduct from 1950 to 1959. But when border difficulties and controversies emerged in the second half of the 1950s Nehru tried to intimidate the Chinese by supporting Tibetans in their opposition to Chinese rule, and by denying that there was anything to negotiate on the boundary question. But Nehru’s forward policy in 1961–62 crossed the line from the Chinese point of view and it resulted in the 1962 war and military defeat for India, and Nehru’s reputation lay in tatters. Finally, in the first half of the 1950s Chinese leaders too used charm and intimidation vis-à-vis India. By promoting the myth of thousands of years of friendship and peaceful coexistence Zhou Enlai was using soft words to placate Nehruvian India and the Third World, but simultaneously China adopted a policy of low-key, low risk to China, and a high risk to India policy of supporting insurgent groups in India’s northeastern areas, along with claims that a border dispute existed. Chinese diplomacy with India during the 1950s was deceptive (charming) and opportunistic, but its policy of ‘people’ to ‘people’ support in the Indian northeast along was meant to disturb India’s authority in the area and the stability of the Indian Union. These actions led Indians to think that China had crossed lines in terms of the accepted principle of non-intervention in modern inter-state relations. Was China’s India policy successful? The test of a country’s diplomatic and military prowess lies in its ability to alter a rival’s domestic structure and its external orientation to its advantage. Chinese leadership actions during the 1950s turned India around from the Nehruvian faith in a peace policy to a policy based on military and economic development, and from a policy based on working with China to a policy that sought military and economic alignment with the Western world in part to check China’s expanding presence in India’s strategic neighbourhood. At the same time China was unable to alter India’s domestic structure; it remained committed to democracy, internal economic and social development, internal security and the integrity of the Indian Union. These core values and aims remained unchanged while external relationships changed to China’s detriment. In each instance, the policy mistakes of the practitioners showed a tendency to over-reach, to cross important red lines of the other side, and to reveal clearly to the other side the nature of the problem. With this background Chapter 3 outlines a theory about triangles which helps us understand South Asian triangles: Pakistan and the US vis-à-vis India in the first instance (1947–54, then India, China and Soviet Russia (1949–54), and finally, India, China and Tibet (1950–60)). The players fell into three categories: 1. Nehru’s China and Pakistan policies did not recognize the importance of triangular diplomacy in strategic affairs, indeed it did not recognize the importance of geo-politics for India. The importance of the China–India–Tibet strategic triangle remained unrecognized by Nehru and his inner circle of advisers. 2(a). On the other hand, China’s India and Pakistan policies showed an understanding about the China–India–Tibet
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interface along with the involvement of Soviet Russia and the US in the field of power politics in the Central Asia/Himalayan/Pamir zone. Its policy had a geo-political basis. 2(b). Pakistan too understood the importance of strategic triangle(s) in developing its regional and international position. It did so initially by joining up with the US in 1953, and later with China. Also, China and Pakistan recognized the importance of military strategy as the basis of their diplomacy, and of the volatile strategic context in which it had to function. 3. Tibet occupied the third category. On the one hand it was the centre of geo-political gravity in the Himalayan region; but on the other hand it was militarily powerless against China and mostly friendless in the area and in the international sphere. It became a part of a strategic triangle because of its location, and ended up as a victim of the great game that emerged after 1950.
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Theory of strategic triangles and its relevance in the Indian subcontinent and Himalayan Zone
The conduct of external relations as a part of a strategic triangle is a frequent, not a rare occurrence in international history and politics. What are strategic triangles? Why are they formed? What do they do? Are states the sole type of member of a triangle or can non-state organizations participate in its activities? A triangular (or a multipolar) relationship between countries is strategic when polarities are deeply entrenched and the issues in conflict are either settled by war – as in the case of Nazi Germany versus the US/UK and USSR triangle during the Second World War; or there is a prolonged confrontation that involves military preparations and military fights, ideological and status disputes and diplomatic controversies, as in the case of relationships between China, India and Pakistan. In the former case, the shelf life of the triangle was short, ending in victory for the Allies and their military and diplomatic interests and their opposition to Nazi values; this triangle was strategic because it had a strategic aim to defeat the rise of Nazism and the threat it posed to the West and Soviet Russia interests, and it was strategic because it produced a massive restructuring of the domestic and external orientation of Germany and Japan following the end of the campaigns in Europe and Asia. In the latter case an endgame is not in sight, the contention among the three countries is prolonged and dangerous, it has an escalatory potential but the division of economic and military power among the three countries precludes dominance by one or the other side. In the former instance, a triangle was formed to deal with the imminent danger of Nazi aggression and it was addressed by a war strategy that had an endgame. In the latter instance the triangle was formed because the diplomatic and military aims of the three countries that are involved in the Himalayan conflict zone (that includes Kashmir, Afghanistan, the SinoIndian border, 4000 km long which is the longest contested border in the world, and Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh which China calls ‘Southern Tibet’), and the fourthparty Tibetans in Tibet and Tibetans in India (Chinese and Indian Tibetans who are a separate but related entity) have significant differences.
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Whether or not a triangle has a long or short shelf life depends on the following circumstances. In either case a diplomatic-military triangle arises when practitioners possess a geo-political view of the international situation or its external affairs, when irreconcilable differences exist between the vital interests of the countries concerned, when power is divided and there is an expectation that neither side can prevail by fighting alone but neither side can be indifferent to the actions of its rivals. Participation in a triangle is the efficient or perhaps the only way to pursue one’s interests by borrowing the power of likeminded allies to deal with a stronger enemy along with a buildup of a country’s economic and military strength; that is, a recognition that a country is not able to pursue its interests unaided is critical to the formation of a triangular relationship. In the first case the war strategy of the Allies restructured the domestic and international orientation of two major industrial powers – Germany and Japan; the distribution of power and the pattern of relationships was altered in a significant, hence a strategic or a long-term way. In the second case the Sino-Indian war of 1962 did not settle the rivalry between China and India, just as Indo-Pakistani wars failed to settle Indo-Pakistani rivalry, but the 1962 war had a strategic or long-term effect: it altered India’s diplomatic and military orientation towards China and later towards the Sino-Pakistani alignment. While the three countries continued to develop their escalatory potential and military and economic capacities vis-à-vis each other, none of them saw value in fighting a war to the finish. Within the framework of their prolonged – in actual time and expectation of the practitioners – contention they found diplomatic ways to regulate their conflict relationships to a manageable level; this implied neither victory through a war strategy nor peace (harmony or absence of mistrust and tensions) through a negotiated settlement. Triangles develop an end game if the combined power of the allies is sufficient to defeat the enemy, and the triangle can be used as a closed system with limited membership of the principals. This is a short hand description of the triangular activity of the Allies in the Second World War. The main work was done by the Allies and proxies such as the French resistance, played a supporting role. The aim was strategic, that is, to defeat Hitler’s armies and to create a new order in Europe. The method was to rely on warfare to secure a resolution of the danger. The result too was strategic, that is, it altered the domestic politics and foreign policies of Germany and Japan to correspond to American interests. The Sino-Indian–Pakistani triangle shares similarities with Martin Wight’s theory and with the general orientation of a strategic triangle but some salient differences should be noted. It has the attributes of a triangle as noted above – the adoption of geo-politics as a basis of foreign policy, existence of irreconcilable differences, buildup of economic and military strength, attention to the actions of rivals, a reliance on policies to build pressure on each other rather than to settle vital issues by negotiations, and finally, to borrow
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external power to balance the rivals even as the countries build their strength. The differences however, are significant. This triangle is not based on an expectation that war or a negotiated settlement is imminent; rather an atmosphere of no war, no peace is the mainstream expectation. War is not a realistic option because the 1962 war did not resolve the controversy between China and India, and instead it exacerbated the rivalry when China sought to build Pakistan into the status of its proxy against India. In my case study, regional proxies (India’s neighbours) play an important role as a line of pressure, and as such the triangular system is not closed to the principals or the Allies as in the Second World War. Another difference is that my case does not appear to have a discernable end game and it has a long shelf life. Still it is an efficient way to organize regional rivalries in the Himalayan and South Asian and Indian Ocean zones of contention. The case study is different because it deals with geographically connected neighbours who possess geopolitical views, who have policies to mobilize their economic and military capacities in a dangerous neighbourhood that offer challenges as well as opportunities to them. Lastly my case is different because it brings into play a non-state actor – the Tibetans in China and those in India. The assumption is that the interface between Chinese and Indian Tibetans is likely to continue post-Dalai Lama or even if Beijing continues to refuse negotiation with the Dalai Lama about autonomy for Tibet. The theoretical implication is that strategic triangles deal primarily with state actors but the involvement of nonstate actors (the Tibetans and supporters of Tibet in the world community) is not excluded if the issues raised by the non-state actor(s) is a part of the diplomatic discourse among nation-states. My study recognizes the important role of strategic triangles in two of the three phases of evolution of diplomatic and military relationships in the region that extends from the Himalayan to the Indian Ocean areas and is currently the centre of NATO involvement in Afghanistan, a nasty insurgency in Pakistan, spread of Islamist forces into China’s southern zone, insurgency within India, military and naval competition among the sub-continental players and repositioning by the three members of the triangle in relation to the region and the external powers. The first phase centred on the Himalayan area and revolved around the policy of British India in the nineteenth century to maintain a stable buffer zone in the Himalayas that took into account the policies of Tibet, China and Russia as well as British interests. In this phase all the players held a geo-political approach even though their military strength varied. In the second phase, Nehru (1947–62) generally rejected publicly the balance of power approach, choosing instead an emphasis on peace diplomacy and a quest to build bilateral ties with China and Pakistan. Nehru’s approach was dysfunctional compared to the geo-political impulses in the policies of Pakistan and China vis-à-vis India and the major powers. The third phase, 1962 to the present, is ongoing. It has a robust character, the rivalries between China and India, and between India and Pakistan, are institutionalized, they are not likely to unwind soon and the geographical
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sphere of diplomatic and military operations of the three members of the South Asian triangle is likely to grow because the practitioners are now conducting themselves in geo-political terms. The balance of the chapter seeks theoretical guidance from Martin Wight’s work and refers to the pre-history of the current South Asian strategic triangle. Two historical experiences are relevant. The British India–Tibet–China triangle dominated British India’s policy in the Himalayan area in the nineteenth century. This three-cornered relationship was driven by strategic concerns, it was expressed in treaty terms, and it showed a consciousness among British, Tibetan and Chinese/Manchu practitioners about the triangularity and the implications of their actions and the nature of the relationships in the power politics of the region. Even though the triangular relationships did not lead to war, the military, legal and diplomatic aspects showed the relevance of triangularity. This triangle was terminated by the British withdrawal from India in 1947. The second triangle was a legacy of the first but it had a short shelf life. British India was replaced by Nehru’s India. The latter lacked a geo-political vision and a concern with frontier politics in the Himalayan area. Moreover, the strategic situation in the Himalayan area after 1949 differed from the previous period. China under the Manchus was a weak power in Tibetan politics in the first triangle. After 1949 Communist China displayed both military strength and a political will to use brute force to force the Tibet question. China’s military takeover of Tibet, Nehru’s acceptance of Chinese sovereignty, and Tibet’s inability to mount military resistance against Chinese rule crushed Tibet’s autonomy. In other words, the first triangle was organized by British India and it ended with Britain’s withdrawal from India. The second one ended quickly with China’s takeover of Tibet. However, we should study the second triangle because the question of Tibetan autonomy is a controversial issue in modern international diplomacy. China’s rule presently does not enjoy Tibetan consent. As the process of internal political reforms evolves within China, Tibetans may gain autonomy if there is diffusion of power within China. Moreover, post-Nehru Indian practitioners now recognize the destructive consequences of Chinese policies in the Himalayan area. In other words, China is physically strong in Tibet but weak in terms of its legitimacy, and India now is thinking more along the geo-political lines of British India strategists. As a result the game in the second triangle is not over. The seeds of this triangle are, in my view, dormant, not dead. Martin Wight did not inquire about a South Asian triangle but its existence can be extrapolated on the basis of Wight’s features of triangles. The fit is not exact but it is close enough to merit consideration as per his terms of reference. The difference, however, between Wight’s approach and ours should be set out. Wight saw a triangle as a finite process like a tennis championship with rounds one and two, semi-finals and a final. A strategic triangle to him was a three-cornered relationship with rivalries and conflicts of interests
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among three power centres of comparable calibre. This relationship would likely move towards a military duel and monopoly of power for one winner (the tennis champion). The system had specific features: it existed as a system of states (either a suzerain states system or an independent states system – discussed later); there was regularity of diplomatic intercourse. The relationships were based on mutual suspicion, tension, rivalry, hostility that made it impossible for the two to combine against the third. Wight argues that triangles are resolved by war and there is a tendency towards shifting alliances and negotiations.1
Distinctive features and results of the Sino-Indian–Pakistani triangles Before I review the early history it is essential to set out the differences between Wight’s approach and ours. My case study has two bipolar components: India–Pakistan and China–India; the Sino-Indian–Pakistan triangle is based on the two bipolarities. The two bipolarities are cause; the triangle is effect. Remove the cause and the triangle loses its effectiveness. The implication is that the triangularities are rigid when the bipolarities are firm, and conversely, weakening in the latter, loosens the triangularity. The bipolarities are firm when there is a fully developed ideological clash between two civilizational/political cultures: in this case it involves Muslim versus Hindu, and Chinese versus Indian cultures and strategies. The militaries on both sides (India–Pakistan, and China–India) are fully armed and ready to confront a military crisis, so neither has an advantage; and diplomatic traditions and actions among the three reveal a long-standing rivalry. In my scheme there was attempted resolution by war – as in 1947–48, 1962, 1965 and 1971 among members of the triangle. Diplomatic and military encounters continue to occur among the three as in Wight’s scheme but they do not lead to a monopoly of power as Wight expects. Wight views a triangle as a closed system, that is, no external power(s) can move into the system and alter its balance. To quote: ‘It is in a closed system that a triangle or duel can be best identified and observed. In open systems such political constellations are ragged and transient’.2 This throws up an important difference and a point for development in my analysis. My case study reveals that the system tends to be closed between India/Pakistan; India/China; and the China–India–Pakistan triangle in peace time. But it invariably opens up to international pressures and interventions when a war erupts and a danger to regional and world peace emerges. In my case study, there is a pattern of great powers and UN Security Council intervention in each South Asian war but when the danger passed with the establishment of a ceasefire, it reverted to its closed position. The theoretical guidance is that a regional war that threatens world peace is a trigger that opens up the closed system to international interventions but the opening is a passing phase.
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My case study deals with three complexities that affect the dynamics of the triangle in South Asia. 1. The nature of the triangular system is closed as well as open. 2. The members of the system function as either suzerain or sovereign types and their position may change during the life of the triangular system. 3. Finally, the triangular system may be unstable or stable; and it may move from an unstable to a stable condition, and towards loose triangularity in the latter case. To a discussion of these aspects we now turn.
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The pre-1947 triangle The Sino-Indian–Pakistani triangle was formed as a result of the effects of three developments: the state forms of India and China changed in 1947 and 1949, respectively; the geo-political context of South Asia underwent a radical change following the breakup of British India; and the character of India’s foreign policy changed under Nehru. In the pre-1947 history the first triangle consisted of a strong British India with a history of active involvement in Afghanistan, Himalayan and northeastern Indian frontier politics and a pattern of geo-politically driven diplomatic and military engagement with external imperial powers – Russia and Manchu China. The second member of the triangle, Tibet had a history of autonomy, a consciousness about its cultural and religious traditions, and it sought political independence in relation to historical pressures from Manchu rulers in China. This attitude prevailed up to 1912. Tibet had an awareness of its diplomatic and political position in the triangle, and British India provided a balance to Manchu and Russian pressures on Tibet. The relationship between British India and Tibet recognized Tibet’s autonomy. But there was an ambiguity in British Tibet policy. Manchu China was the third corner of the triangle but it was not deemed to enjoy sovereignty in Tibet in British policy. Treaty relations between Tibet, China and Britain defined Tibet’s autonomous position. To ward off Russian pressures, and in recognition of the ‘patron/guardian’ (China) and ‘religious mentor’ (Tibet) relationship between the two, Britain was willing to accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet ‘only on the understanding that the latter was autonomous’.3 In sum, the pre-1947 history represented a complex strategic – legal – diplomatic – cultural mix of interactions. 1. Autonomous Tibet possessed a religious and a political culture that resisted Manchu (and other foreign) pressures and later Chinese pressures. British India accepted this arrangement. 2. British India participated in imperial politics recognizing Tibet as a point of pressure in Russian and Manchu-Chinese policies that had implications for British India interests in its northern frontiers. 3. A weak Manchu China recognized the importance of security of its frontier in relation to Russia and British India, it recognized a connection between developments in Mongolia and Tibet and the Himalayan zone including India’s northeast but its weakness precluded military action to enforce its will in the Southern region. The character of the three-cornered relationship changed as a result of major developments prior to 1949. The weak Manchu China Empire was
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dissolved by the rise of a Republican China under Sun Yat Sen in 1912. Subsequently the communist victory in China brought into play Mao’s emphasis on the power of the gun and the importance of liberating Chinese territories and safeguarding national defences. These claims were based on Nationalist Chinese declarations rather than the actual history of politicalmilitary relations and treaty arrangements with Tibet and between Tibet, British India, Nepal, Mongolia, and the Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Sikkim. The changing state forms in China – from Manchu imperial China to republican China to communist China – and in India – from British India to independent India – produced a radical change in the aims and methods used by the players. Precisely when China was moving from military weakness to strength during the first half of the twentieth century, India was moving in the opposite direction. The geographically united British India was changed into a bipolar system of communal and strategic division between India and Pakistan. The British tradition of preoccupation with strategic frontiers was replaced by the Nehruvian tradition of peace diplomacy and rejection of the ‘evils’ of balance of power politics. The rise of Maoist China – meant a radical change in its political organization, and its strategic outlook that emphasized the use of military power to consolidate China’s defences in its southern zone. The Chinese political system shifted from an openness to international (Russian, British, Japanese, and American) influences during 1912–49, to a closed Mao-dominated militaristic policy system. The victory of China’s communists shaped a polarity in Chinese thinking between its selfimportance and superiority and the inferiority of weak southern neighbours. An antagonistic difference between the Chinese and the non-Chinese occupants of the Himalayan zone emerged. The new, communist China was seen as a sovereign; the non-Chinese occupants in the Himalayan area and the southern zone were deemed to possess suzerain status in the Maoist-Zhouist worldview. The rise of Nehruvian India conveyed different messages: it was internationalist and pacifist. It was concerned with world peace and it emphasized diplomatic bilateralism rather than effective participation in strategic triangularity as in the past. The new Indian system shifted from the closed foreign policy and military system of British India (whose policies reflected the decisions of London and the Government of India which was in the hands of the British India Viceroy), into an open system. Nehru’s India craved international attention and was therefore opened up to British, American, Russian, Chinese and Third World influences. Nehru’s approach, however, did not impress China’s new leaders. Nehru’s India believed that it was independent and gloated in the role of the Congress leaders in liberating India from British colonialism. But outside observers noted that it was not a sovereign state in the sense that the power of independent decision in strategic affairs rested in foreign hands. For example, India’s policies towards Kashmir and Pakistan were shaped by Lord Louis Mountbatten, and less so by the Indian Cabinet and the Indian Parliament.
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Even Nehru was unable to alter the parameters laid out by Mountbatten and his officers. India’s China policy was determined as a reaction to Chinese actions and showed Nehru’s, and his advisers’, mistaken views of Chinese intentions.4 In this case Nehru’s India was nominally sovereign; it had a flag and legal international status but it did not show an ability to make decisions that changed the course of events; it remained mired informally in a suzerain-type status in relation to foreign powers. The juxtaposition of the changes – the rise of a strong China along with the weakening of India – produced an asymmetry between the two Asian countries. It affected the pattern of actions and the relationships among the three. China’s military takeover of Tibet in 1950, and Nehru’s collaboration with China put an end to Tibet’s independence and altered fundamentally a key element in the three-cornered relationship, that is, an autonomous Tibet that functioned as a buffer between India and China was eliminated. However, the 1950 event did not rise to the point of an end game. It inaugurated a curious pattern of uneasy co-existence between the first and the second rounds of the strategic game as per Martin Wight’s theoretical guidance. It had the character of the first round in the sense that an unstable set of bilateral relationships between India and Pakistan and India and China took shape during the 1950s but China did not then, until the early 1960s, tilt towards Pakistan, and sharpen its anti-India tilt and make it into a threecornered relationship. At the same time it had the character of the second round in the sense that developments of the 1950s in both pairs created the basis for the development of triangularity in the 1960s onwards. Martin Wight’s theoretical guidance is useful to my case study in the sense that it is partially applicable, and my case study serves as a basis to amend Wight’s theoretical insights. Using the analogy of a tennis tournament he speaks of an endgame5 with a sequence of round one, round two, semi-final and final. My analysis avoids this linear approach. The narrative indicates a transformation of round one – with bilateral India–Pakistan and India–China polarities in the 1950s – into round two – with the rise of a China–India– Pakistan triangle since the 1960s. But beyond this the tournament analogy breaks down. My premise is that China wanted a closed system of a threecornered relationship, with China as the sovereign centrepiece with two suzerains tied to China as the regional hub. This would imply a desire to build on the British theory of the Subcontinent as a region that was tied to the British sovereign in a suzerain type of states’ system. Wight acknowledges India’s position as a part of the suzerain type of states’ system under British rule.6 Here pre-1947 Indian history fits in nicely with the Chinese conception of the Middle Kingdom. China was not alone in thinking along this line. UK–US policy during the Cold War was consistently promoting the theory of an Indo-Pakistani balance and parity, and several US governments – Nixon– Kissinger, and Clinton – recognized China’s ‘legitimate interests’ in South Asia. The theory of India as a part of a suzerain type of a states’ system was believable because this was the reality of India’s political and military history
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since India came under Mughal and British rule. This reality lends credence to the belief among foreign observers that India had a choice about the foreign ruler. Karl Marx first posed the question, ‘who shall rule India’? Is it better to be ruled by the aggressive Mughals or by the civilizing Britishers? Marx opted in favour of the British recognizing that Indians could not govern themselves and Indian history proved that.7 It appears that Communist China followed Marx and UK–US policy in the 1950s to bring Pakistan to its side as an ally in relation to Middle Eastern and South Asian strategic affairs. Like UK and US practitioners China recognized that Pakistan would accept China’s leadership to counter the Indians and in exchange for aid and support against the Indians, Pakistan would accept a subordinate status to China. But to succeed the system had to stay closed to a three-cornered relationship without outside interference. China’s strategy has not worked thus far. China’s great game is to close the system to a three-cornered type where China and Pakistan hold an advantage over India; and India’s great game is to open it up to Russian and American influences to counter-balance Sino-Pakistani pressures against it. These great games have persisted since India and China gained independence because their rivalries are tied as well to three other international geo-political rivalries – US–Soviet/Russian, US–PRC, and Sino-Soviet/Russian. For China and Pakistan the operative diplomatic principle is to maintain a balance of power in the South Asian and the Himalayan region. However, China’s strategy has not worked thus far for several reasons. 1. The US and Soviet Union/Russia did not tolerate the development of an unmanageable conflict between India and China, or between India and Pakistan, and they intervened in all major South Asian wars, 1947–48, 1962, 1965 and 1971. 2. They did not allow either side of the conflict to be placed in a position of permanent disadvantage. 3. They intervened to prevent the dissolution of the China–India–Pakistan triangle as that would terminate their access to the region and end their role as conflict managers and guardians of international peace in the Subcontinent; like bridge players they need access to the ‘dummy’ from their side of the play. In sum, the motivation of the regional and the international players is to stay in the game, and not to seek an end game that would effectively end the game and their position in it. 4. Finally, as noted earlier, the India–Pakistan and India–China rivalries represent a closed system in peacetime that require minimal great power interventions (other than to maintain normal bilateral relationships) and it becomes an open system under crisis conditions when third parties are likely to step in to prevent unmanageable regional instability. This combination of a durable ‘closed and open’ system depends on an expectation that a regional war is dangerous as is the prospect of dominance of any power in the triangle. Such dangers have in the past triggered great power intervention(s) followed by their non-intervention when the danger has passed. China’s strategy has not worked because this combination of ‘closed and open’ system in South Asia is unique, and China can’t control the outcome in such a system.
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Another implication is theoretical. The emergence of a closed and open system in South Asia is not a part of Martin Wight’s conceptual scheme. Wight argued, ‘It is in a closed system that a triangle or duel can be best identified and observed. In open systems, such political constellations are ragged and transient’.8 China could have controlled a closed, three-way system but an open system has forced it to consider the risks to China should it miscalculate in its moves towards India and Pakistan. China’s approach has not worked for another reason. India informally accepted a suzereign states’ system status under Nehru by being tied to Anglo-American, Russian, and Chinese policies during the Cold War. Following the humiliating defeat in 1962 post-Nehruvian India determined to find the economic and military means and the political will to shift India’s policy and its status from a suzerain type to a sovereign style and status. The process of transformation has been slow given the vagaries of Indian democracy, the lack of strong leadership and the inability of the bureaucracy to think outside the Nehru box. India’s political class was slow to make India into a major power. It was slow to reject peace diplomacy as the primary basis of national policy. It was slow to adopt geo-politics as a basis of its national policy. For example, it took the Indian political establishment about 30 years to shift its policy from Nehru’s nuclear option to a declared nuclear weapons position. It took India about 35 years to recognize that a China–Pakistan–India strategic (military, diplomatic and nuclear) triangle posed a threat to Indian security. It took the Indian political and military establishment about 30 years to make the transition from conventional military defence to nuclear deterrence. China may be excused for thinking that Indians were a nation of talkers and that its political class had feet of clay as in the 1962 war. Absent clear Indian signals about its intention to fight and then negotiate, China expected Indians to act as per Indian history, that is, to acknowledge the superiority of foreign imperialism and intervention. China’s over-confidence in its ability to manage the suzerain type of a states’ system of India–Pakistan and other South Asian states rests on a crucial basis of power politics. Recall Wight’s differentiation between a suzerain and a sovereign inter-state type of states’ system.9 My assertion is that formal Indian independence in 1947 did not automatically shift India’s position from a suzerain to a sovereign inter-state type. Nehru mistook India’s access to world capitals as a recognition of India’s influence but he failed to appreciate that such influence lasted as long as India was useful as a post office between the principals. With the advancement of direct great powers’ dialogues India lost its position as an interlocutor in the Big Three capitals. As is the custom of great powers they are interested mainly in settling the bargains among themselves, the principals, and cut out the secondary, client states. That China operated by the principles of great powers’ games and bargains was lost on Nehru and his advisers who continued to believe in a delusional way that China and India were the two pillars of Asian security; this view was
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Indo-centric but it was not shared by the Chinese political class. In other words the theoretical guidance is that a shift from suzerain to sovereign status has to be earned by practical actions and results. It is earned by actions that demonstrate power transition in a world of powers. China’s practitioners believed that they had earned the right to be taken seriously as a major power but India was a feeble country. My case study probes another aspect of Wight’s approach. He maintains that when interests of three parties in a triangle are close and conflicted, the choices are to unite or to fight. This idea generally works well in my case study but not completely. China and India fought in 1962, and China and Pakistan united thereafter. China and Pakistan undertook a series of actions to show their solidarity. There was a boundary agreement on Kashmir (1962). Both stood against Indian and Soviet expansionism: China adopted Pakistan’s position on Kashmiri self-determination; China became Pakistan’s supplier of conventional and nuclear armament; the two improved military and commercial communications by building the Karakoran highway that linked Tibet to Pakistani highways and the Karachi seaport. Both stimulated Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka to adopt positions against India, both encouraged insurgency in India’s northeast and other parts of India (especially in the Jharkant–Orissa-central Indian region). Both opposed India’s nuclearization and its military buildup; and both maintained territorial disputes with India and a policy of military-political pressure on India. Pakistan’s declared aim was to develop Indo-Pakistani parity; Indians believed that China’s undeclared aim was to promote Indian acceptance of a suzerain status as per China’s views about its central position and about India’s secondary status as a sub-regional force in the Subcontinent. Later I will outline Beijing’s views about clubbing together with the great powers – either in a P-5 setting at the UN or in a G2 setting with the US. However, Sino-Pakistani uniting and fighting produced a third choice, that is, a protracted conflict. While Pakistan accepted a subordinate position in relation to China and recognized the latter as the largest (and presumably the strongest) Asian power, India, especially post-Nehru, declined to accept the implication of a subordinate status. It sought instead a transformation based on its growing internal economic and military strength, and its democratic system; it sought to build itself to counter China’s pressures. Given India’s refusal to capitulate to Chinese and Pakistani demands, and absent China’s and Pakistan’s inability to form a winning strategy, and their unwillingness to adapt to India’s rising power, the process of close and conflicted threecornered relationships results in a protracted conflict. I argue that although Mao was optimistic about winning a protracted conflict because of superiority of Chinese communist ideology and political, military and psychological warfare tactics, his expectation has not been borne out in the China–Pakistan–India case thus far. My view is that a closed and conflicted triangle presents three choices to its members to unite, to fight or to engage in protracted conflict.
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How the strategic game in the subcontinent shifted from the first to the second round and led to protracted conflict The formation and evolution of China–Pakistan–India relations turn on Martin Wight’s outline of the first and second rounds of a three-cornered relationship but it does not necessarily lead to semi-final or a final or an end game and termination of the triangle. The narrative explains the character of the first round, and the circumstances that led to the second round when the triangle was formed. Let me outline and explain the features of the two rounds. The first round, in the 1950s, consisted of ideological – cultural differences (Hindus versus Muslims; Indian secularism versus Pakistani Islamist theory; competitive co-existence between Indian and Chinese civilizations), diplomatic controversies (Indo-Pakistani diplomacy on Kashmir and worldviews in general; India–China rivalry and disagreement relating to Tibet, China’s negative view of India’s relations with the US and USSR, India’s claim to co-equal status with China in world affairs which was ignored by China), and military duels involving India, China and Pakistan (1947–48, 1962, 1965 and 1971). The issues indicated a pattern of bilaterized conflicts of interests. China did not tilt towards Pakistan in the 1950s against India. It maintained a balanced stance in Indo-Pakistani affairs, and it sought to resolve its boundary question with India by negotiations. The two bilateralized conflicts – India–Pakistan and India–China – remained close and conflicted in the 1950s. But I arrive at a crucial point in the discussion. In his study of the Peloponnesian War,10 Wight indicates that the bipolar conflict was subordinate to the triangle that was formed by the presence and involvement of a third party (Persia, in relation to the Athens-Sparta conflict). My case study shows that the India–Pakistan and India–China conflicts also had a triangular context as a result of the presence of two third parties with strong interests in Subcontinental international relations in the 1950s. The US was the third party in India–Pakistan relations in the 1950s; the USSR and US were the third parties in India–China relations in the 1950s. But the India– Pakistan and India–China relationships were then not ‘subordinate’ to the triangular contexts that existed at the time. India and Pakistan, and China and India pursued their controversies in a bilateral framework. China triggered the formation of the China–Pakistan–India triangle in the 1960s when China and Pakistan formed a three-cornered relationship so that Sino-Pakistani alignment was levered against India. This relationship created a new situation: Americans and Russians felt compelled to react to the dynamics of the China–Pakistan–India triangle of the 1960s because of the danger of an uncontrolled conflict and because of a concern about the dangerous consequences of the China–India war and China’s tilt towards Pakistan. Thereafter, the three geographical neighbours were tied together constantly in a triangular fashion while the US and USSR reacted to developments in this triangle.
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The war situations that involved China, Pakistan and India had a dangerous escalatory potential. This potential compelled the P2 powers – the US and Soviet Russia, to seek stability in the Subcontinent and to stay involved in regional issues of the Subcontinent. The three-cornered (China–India–Pakistan) fight had a dangerous potential because two members of the triangle – Pakistan and China – were motivated by territorial irredentism. They wanted territorial changes in Kashmir and the Himalayan border areas, respectively, that required major Indian concessions. By the 1990s the issues were pronounced with the widespread recognition that Pakistan was the epicentre of global terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation, and China had a hand in promoting the latter. But at the same time Pakistan’s geographical location made it necessary for the Western countries to remain aligned with it. The second round in the strategic game emerged in the early 1960s when the two bilateralized conflicts became a three-cornered fight that intensified military duels and diplomatic controversies. Pakistan took China’s side in the Sino-Indian border dispute, blaming India, and the two condemned Indian expansionism and provocation. China and Pakistan signed a border agreement that led to transfer of portions of Kashmir to China that India protested. This way China became a party to the bilateral India–Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. The territorial agreement between China and Pakistan, Pakistan’s support of China’s case against India on the Himalayan border issue, and China’s support of Pakistan’s case in the Kashmir dispute cemented the shift from bilateralized controversies into a three-way structure of diplomatic and military conflict. At the same time the Sino-Indian War and the Sino-Pakistani realignment led to actions by Washington and Moscow to buttress India’s military and diplomatic position vis-à-vis China. This development transformed the China–Pakistan–India triangle into a pentagonal formation involving continuous interaction by five players. This formation had two characteristics. First, it was a closed system that tied China, Pakistan and India to the diplomatic and military actions of the three regarding major issues of war and peace in the Subcontinent. Second, America and Russia were involved with the three countries when fights erupted and they appeared to have a dangerous escalatory potential; in this case the closed three-cornered system was opened up by American and Russian intervention in a crisis situation. For example, the three-way system was closed when the Sino-Pakistani alignment and Sino-Indian border controversy occurred in the late 1950s– early 1960s, but the system was opened up when South Asian wars occurred in 1962, 1965 and 1971 and when regional confrontations in 1999 (Kargil), and 2002 (attack on India’s Parliament) threatened to escalate tensions into a hot war. The conduct of the US and USSR revealed an interesting pattern. The great powers joined the strategic game to check the danger of regional dominance of the Subcontinent by a single power, but neither America nor Russia meant to prevent the rise of the three-cornered regional conflict; nor did they possess the means to do so.
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There were significant changes in the pattern of diplomatic and military alignments between the first (1950s) and the second (1960s onwards) rounds. In the first round the US tilted towards Pakistan and became its diplomatic supporter on the Kashmir issue; it was a military ally and it opposed Nehru’s nonalignment policy as well as India’s policy towards Kashmir and Pakistan. During the 1950s China remained on the sidelines in Indo-Pakistani and Indo-US controversies even though the USSR had tilted towards India in the 1950s by supporting its claim to Kashmir. China was preoccupied by its internal situation, and its push into Tibet showed its priority to consolidate its border defences vis-à-vis the USSR and India. In the first round China’s India policy had two characteristics. First, it advertised Mao’s theory of revolutionary change in India along with Chinese territorial claims in the Himalayan area. But neither point was pressed to the point of confrontation; and second, the theory of Sino-Indian peaceful coexistence was stressed. Chinese diplomatic theory made a distinction between the liberation of Tibet by force because this was a sovereignty issue and an internal question for China, and on the other hand, peaceful settlement of international issues was emphasized. Both approaches were in full play during the first round in Sino-Indian relations but the public posture stressed peacefulness in inter-state relations between China and India. China and the US both intervened in Subcontinental affairs in the 1950s but the nature of their interventions varied significantly. Both sought to wear down India. By pushing its links with an irredentist Pakistan, the US aim was to protect Pakistan, and to build it as a modern, moderate Muslim ally of the West in South Asian and Middle Eastern affairs.11 The US sought to pressure India towards a Kashmir settlement on Pakistani terms. However, Washington did not have any territorial claims of its own. Still, many Indians criticised the US’s Pakistan policy because it promoted a link between religion and politics within Pakistan and in the region, it undermined the Indian theory of secularism and religious tolerance as the basis of political development and change, and it facilitated militarization of the Subcontinent by the injection of a major power and its military aid into regional controversies. But Indians also appreciated US aid for India’s economic development, its support of Indian democratic ideals, its appreciation of India’s role as an interlocutor and a moderator of the harsh aspects of Stalinist/Soviet policies, and as a moderator of radical elements in the Third World. Washington’s India policy was complex and nuanced but this was lost to the general public as a result of the military buildup of Pakistan and the noise Indian leftists, Krishna Menon, S. Radhakrishnan, and Nehru made about America as a provocative element in Cold War politics. India’s China policy contrasted with the sharp tone in US–India relations in the 1950s. China’s India policy had a destructive character but it was disguised by declarations about peaceful co-existence and by Nehru’s tolerance of Chinese actions in Tibet. Nehruvian India understood well the implications for Indian security of US–UK military aid to Pakistan, the militarization of Pakistan politics,
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and the danger of giving up Kashmir on grounds of religion. But it is a point of contrast that Nehru’s India failed to advertise the implications of Chinese policies for Indian security interests and its international prestige at the time. In the second round the Subcontinental system opened up. China joined Pakistan against India along with the decision to militarize the Sino-Indian border. The 1962 conflict was a signal event in two ways. First, it brought the Sino-Indian rivalry into the open and revealed that geo-political considerations were in play and had been in play in China’s policy since the 1950s. Second, it brought the US and USSR on India’s side in the dispute but the policy of giving military aid to India against China was linked to India’s willingness to accommodate Pakistan’s interests on Kashmir.12 The US’s India policy changed in the 1970s. India’s actions in the Bangladesh War (1971) were deemed to be aggressive by President Richard Nixon and his senior advisor Henry Kissinger. Both were preoccupied with a major concern to build and to form a strategic triangle against Russia. This approach led Nixon and Kissinger to tilt itself openly towards Pakistan, and ignore its genocidal policies. Nixon and Kissinger adopted a benign view of China in 1970–71 and a malign view of India at this time. The shift in US policy was significant. In 1962, Washington and Moscow had come to India’s defence by their military aid and diplomatic support. Their actions indicated a desire not to allow China to rise to a dominant position in the region. Washington’s practitioners were following the balance of power principle. Their involvement in Sino-Indian controversy signalled China to exercise restraint; this came with Beijing’s unilateral ceasefire in the Himalayan War in 1962. By 1972 US policy under Nixon–Kissinger policy had changed. The US uncritically adopted the attitudes in the governments of China and Pakistan against India. Their actions were driven by Nixon’s known anti-Indian antipathy that fed into Mao’s and Zhou Enlai’s antipathy of Nehru, and Kissinger’s opportunism. Two other elements were in play as well: China knew that Moscow could pressure it militarily if China pressured India militarily by opening a second front against it; and Kissinger knew that Indians were militarily stronger and they were likely to win the Bangladesh campaign and to resist China’s pressure. The Nixon–Kissinger tilt towards Pakistan and China in the Bangladesh campaign failed to help Pakistani or Chinese interests but the major tilt was a trigger in the development of the second round. The motives varied in China–Pakistan and US policies towards India in 1970–71 but there were also points of convergence in their actions, and both had implications for India. Consider the following. When Nixon and Kissinger tilted towards Pakistan in 1971, and the two leaders agreed with the Chinese leaders to oppose India in the 1971 war, the three-cornered fight became a five-cornered one. The diplomatic polarity was between the US + Pakistan + China versus India + the USSR. The polarity in the conduct of military operations was between Indian military + Bangladeshi guerrillas versus Pakistani military along with the Chinese threat to open up a second military front, and the US threat to pressure India by the deployment
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of US navy in the Bay of Bengal.13 Great Powers diplomacy in the 1971–72 crisis was subordinated to the US–USSR–PRC triangle because the US and PRC reacted to the crisis partly in terms of their negative views about Soviet and Indian conduct. US and PRC diplomatic action in the UN Security Council was framed in the traditional way, that is, to call for an immediate ceasefire between India and Pakistan, to restore the status quo on the ground, and to consider the issue in terms of the Indo-Pakistani balance. Since India had the military initiative in this war, and it had the USSR’s support as a result of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, the ceasefire call was intended to pressure India into not acting militarily and to save Pakistan from a military defeat. Kissinger was realistic in recognizing that India would win the military campaign. Both the US and China recognized that Pakistani military leaders had made mistakes in dealing with the East Pakistan crisis. But Kissinger wanted to deny India the military and diplomatic victory and maintain the UN’s and the great powers’ role as the guardian of Indo-Pakistani peace. The US/UN/PRC line of action failed and India’s military action and diplomacy put an end to the traditional frame of reference as noted above. Still, the game had the character of the second round, and not a move towards the final. The 1971 war led to the breakup of Pakistan and the rise of a new state in Bangladesh but the triangle of China–Pakistan–India retained its salience and characteristics. By 1972, the crisis had passed, and the players returned to their pre-war modes of action. That is, India’s military victory in 1971 was not a game changer, indeed, it entrenched the polarities among the players, and their affinities as well. China and Pakistan maintained and expanded their ‘all weather friendship’. The US returned to its pattern of ‘on-off friendship’ with Pakistan, supporting it when it was needed (as in the 1980s in Afghanistan) and pulling back from it when it was no longer needed for the US’s regional interests. Russia’s links with India were strong as an arms supplier but with the end of the Cold War, the relationship reverted to a normal stance compared to the special relationships during the Cold War. In the context of these variations, the China–Pakistan–India triangle maintained its robust character. The conduct of China in the Bangladesh War revealed an interesting element of restraint in its diplomacy and war behaviour. At the UN, the US and China agitated against India and the USSR, but when the time came to walk the talk, Beijing adopted a cautious policy. The archival record reveals that Kissinger encouraged China to take military action against India and assured it of US support. This was a shameful line of proposed action that revealed the Nixon–Kissinger animus towards India, a democratic country, an American preference to promote China’s intervention in South Asian affairs, and to help a genocidal military regime maintain its grip on power, and to maintain a policy to pressure India. Here is an example of a dishonourable way to conduct foreign policy; the US, a democracy sought to subvert India, another democracy, by encouraging military action by China against India.14
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Interestingly, Beijing did not accept Kissinger’s repeated pleas. One may speculate that they saw it as bait that could produce an unpleasant result for China if Chinese military action stimulated a Soviet military response against China. Was Kissinger devious in seeking a realpolitik solution by getting the Chinese tiger and the Soviet bear to come down from their mountain tops and fight each other? Or was Kissinger desperate that US Congressional and public opposition to the White House policy handcuffed US military options and he wanted China to do its work? It is also conceivable that having threatened India with military action in mid 1971, the Cultural Revolution and internal pre-occupations made it difficult for Beijing to adopt an aggressive military stance in the Himalayas in December 1971, whereas a strong diplomatic stance at the UN had limited political costs. The diplomatic records and secondary materials do not answer these questions but it suggests a level of polarity between the US and PRC concerning their commitment to Pakistan’s integrity and region strategy of the Pakistani military, and second, concerning their level of opposition of India’s policies. The record indicates that Kissinger and Nixon recognized the rise of India as a power in Asia and acknowledged the value of building friendly relations with it. In contrast China’s diplomacy did not acknowledge India’s importance in any way, at the time or in the future.15 The US–PRC–Pakistan combination in 1970–71 had a history. After 1949 the US believed that Indian intransigence was holding up settlement of the Kashmir; consequently, its pressure was on India to accommodate Pakistani interests. The US government believed that Kashmir should have joined Pakistan on two grounds. Morally, because Kashmir had a majority Muslim population; and politically, because Kashmir’s economic and geographical lines of communications tied it to Pakistan. The State Department argued that the instrument of accession was legal but provisional.16 When China adopted Pakistan’s case on Kashmir and India in the 1960s, the diplomatic pressure on India came from three sources – the US, Pakistan and China. After 1960 the China–Pakistan–India triangle was in play. In 1970–71, this triangle was reinforced by the three-cornered relationship between the US, Pakistan and China vis-à-vis India and Russia. But the latter orientation had a short shelf life and it did not survive the events of 1971–72 (the Indian victory and establishment of Bangladesh). Later, in 1974 and 1998, when India conducted its nuclear tests, the temporary convergence between the US and China reappeared. The Western countries imposed sanctions; and China along with many others, sought India’s nuclear disarmament. The intended effect was to legitimize the US–PRC policy to freeze the nuclear asymmetry in favour of China, and to assign India to a position of permanent strategic inferiority. In this case India would forever need to bid for great powers’ support for its national security because it would lack the means and the right to involve itself in international and regional conflict at a time and opportunity of its choice. On these issues, China and Pakistan had an important friend in the US. Although Pakistan also was subject to Western sanctions, China’s
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policy to provide Pakistan with nuclear and missile aid along with conventional armament, provided it with China’s strategic umbrella again India. The convergence between American-Chinese-Pakistani policies was significant because Kashmir and nuclear weapons were core issues for India. The nuclear question was vital in terms of India’s future position as a major power, and in relation to its regional and international main rival, China and its regional rival, Pakistan. The psychological context was also significant. Western practitioners expressed their disappointment with India’s economic and diplomatic performance. The late Alastair Buchan, the respected director of the Institute for Strategic Studies, London captured the sense of Western disillusionment as did Canada’s former High Commissioner to India, Escott Reid and the former Australian High Commissioner to India, W. R. Crocker.17 They believed that Indians had missed a historic opportunity to advance in the economic and the diplomatic spheres because of mistaken Nehruvian policies despite the early successes of India’s diplomacy in the early 1950s; they felt it was devoid of leadership ideas and potential, and it was lacking in effect in the international sphere. India was seen as self-destructive, China was seen as rising. The implication was that Indians could wallow in their miseries – inflicted by others and themselves. Chinese practitioners welcomed such Western assessments of India and China. Two characteristics defined the second round in India’s relations with China and Pakistan. First, India did not capitulate to China even though it received a blow militarily but still it managed to stay in the game. It refused to accept a suzerain status. It maintained the border controversy and its claim that China was the aggressor. It gained lukewarm US and Soviet support in its controversy with China. It built its public opinion against China. And it moved actively to adjust its diplomacy and its military preparations in relation to China. China’s military victory over India was negated by the fact that both the US and USSR came on India’s side (1962–65). China’s military victory became a diplomatic dilemma for China because it is a cardinal principle in diplomacy to avoid the rise of an unfavourable diplomatic alignment against oneself. India no doubt lost the support of many members of the Third World in its argument against China about the Sino-Indian border controversy. The even-handed approach of the non-aligned countries indicated their reluctance to alienate China, but this loss to India was made up by its gain of support from Washington and Moscow. Both world capitals had their concerns about the character of Chinese politics and policies and their support was worth more than that of Third World countries. 1962 marked the beginning of an Indian policy and process to re-position itself vis-à-vis China and to view Pakistan as an extension of China’s policies vis-à-vis India. Second, Sino-Indian controversy firmed up Indian public opinion, it tightened Indian decision-making and it opened up a closed system. In the 1950s India’s diplomatic actions were dominated by Nehru and an inner circle of mostly leftist, anti-US advisers: Krishna Menon, S. Radhakrishnan and K. M. Panikkar. Subjectivity prevailed in India’s China policy. India’s Pakistan
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policy also suffered from distortions. It was the work of the British Governor General of India Lord Louis Mountbatten and Nehru himself, although Menon provided an animated defence of India’s Kashmir case at the UN. But his animus towards Pakistan and the US and brazen tactics earned him and India a bad name. His talk lacked effect. But the 1962 war, China’s alignment with Pakistan, and India’s alignment with the superpowers opened up the two systems of conflict to internal and international debate and re-alignment. The opening up released a multitude of ‘nationalist’ voices across the spectrum of Indian politics, and it opened up Indian diplomatic machinery to multiple inputs. Indian policy-making process was freed of the stranglehold of Nehru and his small circle of advisers on foreign affairs. These were major changes in Nehruvian India but they were counterbalanced by persistent pressures on several issues and fronts. China and Pakistan kept their pressure on Kashmir and the Himalayan border issue. The US government kept its pressure on India to sign the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) or at least not to move towards nuclearization. Thus, the second round inaugurated a process of protracted conflict for India. Indian practitioners did not shed their obsession with secrecy and elitism but there was a difference in that more voices were at the decision-making table, and the credibility of Nehru and his advisers was lost because the China War had exposed many fallacies in the Nehru approach; also, China’s peace diplomacy was exposed as an opportunistic tactic. With these changes the interactions between different Indian voices in the post-Nehru environment and external pressures increased and intensified. The scale and intensity of the new Indian voices precluded Indian capitulation to China in 1962 and after. Also, the new situation liberated India from Nehru’s fascination with world peace and his lack of understanding about the role of war and geo-politics in statecraft. China’s military action in 1962, rather than Pakistan’s military operation in 1947–48, started a trend to make India a military force in the region. It triggered a debate about guns and butter replacing the debate about guns versus butter in the Nehru days. Nehru’s fascination with world peace and anti-militarism was lost on his successors including his daughter Indira Gandhi; she did not hesitate to use military force against Pakistan in 1971. The point is that a military blow does not guarantee capitulation until a country concedes defeat. India did not act like a defeated power in 1962. It did not act like a defeated country when the NPT adopted a new global norm against nuclear weapons development by India. After 1962 Indians learnt to stay in the game; winning and losing was secondary. In this perspective we judge the second round as eventful but not decisive. Several reasons justify this view. First, the Bangladesh War occurred in the second round but its result did not create an Indian monopoly of power in the Subcontinent. Pakistan continued to enjoy support of China and the US following its defeat in 1971. At the same time the US tilt towards China and Pakistan in the 1970–71 crisis was eventful but not decisive because China
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was checked by the USSR, and both the US and China were morally discredited as a result of their support of a genocidal regime in Pakistan. Furthermore, both lost credibility because of their inability to restrain India and the USSR. Second, the nuclear controversy between India and Western countries was exacerbated in the second round as a result of the Indian nuclear test in 1974, but despite the imposition of nuclear sanctions the nuclear question remained unsettled. India’s 1974 test was an event but it was not a game changer because India did not claim a nuclear weapons state status in 1974, as it did in 1998. During the second round international anti-nuclear proliferators continued to pressure India to accept the NPT and to abandon its nuclear weapons option. Such moves, however, did not form a tipping point for either side. India maintained its nuclear weapons option, and the anti-proliferators maintained their pressure against India from 1974 to 1998. Third, during the second round, Pakistan expanded its terror campaign by providing ISI-organized support for groups against Indian targets in Kashmir, Indian Punjab and other border areas. This was a significant escalation in Pakistan’s policy since the 1980s. It meant that Pakistan’s issue with India was not limited to Kashmir, a disputed territory in Pakistan’s view; it involved promotion of internal dissent in parts of India that were not a matter of dispute between India and Pakistan. By adopting a stance in favour of India’s balkanization, Pakistan’s military adopted the Maoist approach to promote revolutionary violence within India. The only difference was that China’s actions in India’s northeast were stimulated by the leftist theory of armed struggle, and Pakistan’s action in India’s Western areas (Kashmir and Punjab) was stimulated by the rightist theory of Indo-Pakistani parity and Islamist militancy. Both approaches however, shared a common purpose, that is, to weaken the Indian Union and to complicate its internal security by moving the political-military fronts beyond the borders into India itself. The second round was significant inasmuch as Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian rivalries had gone beyond the issues of border security. But despite the escalation in the aims and methods of Pakistan’s and Chinese pressures, India did not crack up. It did not wear down and incidents of terrorism did not knock India out of the Subcontinental and global games. Nor did pressures on the nuclear question lead to India’s nuclear disarmament.
Theoretical guidance for the case study My case study requires theoretical guidance to help understand the elements of the South Asian strategic triangle as Indians see it; it outlines our view of catalysts that moved the relationships from the first to the second round. 1. I begin by noting that China, India and Pakistan each had a closed foreign policy system during the 1950s. The actions of a small circle of decision makers were not guided by a robust public debate and independent scrutiny of leaderships’ beliefs, assumptions and policies. Each country’s practitioners shared a rigid ideology and a personalized system of decision-making that
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lacked a self-correcting mechanism to anticipate a looming problem. The political leadership was serviced by an amateurish bureaucracy that attended to the political needs of the political master(s). It did not offer a robust definition of the public good for fear of offending their political masters; and also it lacked confidence and expertise in their subject(s). This system worked well in a peaceful environment but it could not withstand an external crisis; hence a closed system tends to be temporary and unstable in my view. 2. When an external event confronted a closed system in South Asia – for example China’s military action against Tibet in 1950 and China’s military action against India in 1962, it resulted in either capitulation – as for instance by Tibet and by Nehru to the Chinese fait accompli in 1950; or it created a danger to national interests as in 1962. With capitulation the system remained closed. However, in 1962 the closed China–India–Pakistan system was opened up by the entry of two outside powers. The driving element for Washington and Moscow was that neither power welcomed the prospect of unmanageable regional instability that could suck them into an international conflict. This point has general validity. Fear of unmanageable escalation in South Asian conflicts induced great powers’ intervention in South Asian wars in 1947–48, 1962, 1965, and 1971; such a fear opened up a closed system. Such international interventions in South Asian strategic relationships gave them an element of stability (or manageable instability) and predictability. International interventions in South Asia signalled the existence of red lines that members of the regional triangle could not cross without expecting an external intervention. Generally, external interventions in South Asian wars occurred when the rivalries among China–India–Pakistan appeared to get out of control. Two results were likely. One, intra-systemic competition among members of the China–India–Pakistan strategic triangle could intensify provided it remained within the limits set by the systemic boundaries. The theoretical implication is that intensified and protracted conflict is inevitable as long as there is no likelihood of defeat of a key member of the triangle. In this case China, Pakistan and India are essential members because the international powers will not allow the dismemberment of either country; also, they possess the military means to avoid defeat. Two, intervention by powers outside the triangle is vital to set the system boundaries or red lines for the regional system’s stability. In this regard note that UN-sanctioned ceasefires between India and Pakistan (1948-present) or China’s unilateral ceasefire in 1962 and the agreement to have a line of actual control in the Sino-Indian border are examples of system boundaries that put a lid against escalation of military conflict to a dangerous point. 3. My case study shows a relationship between decision-making style and approach to external relations and the country’s historical experiences. A country either acts as a member of a sovereign states or imperial system, or as a member of a suzerain states’ system. China’s experiences placed it in the first category; India’s experiences placed it in the second category. In the second round (1962–), China, Pakistan and the US resisted Indian attempts to act as
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a member of the system of sovereign states. They were used to Nehru’s major foreign policy actions that showed deference to interests of foreign powers. His actions lacked independence in several issues that were central to Indian security: Kashmir – where he deferred to Mountbatten’s advice to take the issue to the UN and to avoid war as a policy option; Tibet – where he deferred to China’s interests; China – where he ignored high-level warnings among Indian practitioners against trusting China; and finally, his neglect of Indian military defences. In contrast Pakistan’s historical experience was framed by the history of Mughal rule over the Hindus for centuries. China’s historical experience was conditioned by its belief in the cultural and military superiority of the Middle Kingdom. India shaped the second round when Nehru’s successors moved away from Nehru’s foreign policy orientation The shift from the first to the second round was a profound shift in the aims and methods of Indian practitioners. Moving into the second round had several implications: landing a knock out blow against a rival, seeking monopoly of power to end the duels with an enemy, or having an expectation that one or another member of the triangle can be worn down became irrelevant. When the two superpowers came on India’s side in the 1962 conflict, and India’s military buildup started along with its rejection of Chinese terms for a Himalayan settlement, China lost the ability to knock out India. Instead, China and Pakistan developed a policy to wear down India by their actions. These included the development of military communications and infrastructure in the Tibetan–Himalayan–Pakistan–Myanmar areas, the development of diplomatic pressure in the region against ‘Indian hegemony’, the militarization and nuclearization of Pakistan, the attempt to de-nuclearize India, and to seek settlement of the Kashmir issue on Pakistani/UN terms. These efforts did not succeed to wear down India. The second round in the China–India–Pakistan triangle revealed several such attempts. Z. A. Bhutto wanted to knock out India in Kashmir in 1965 but his plan failed. In response the Indian government decided to unleash the Indian army against Pakistan by crossing into Pakistan rather than to limit military operations to the ‘disputed’ Kashmir area. Here the Indian Prime Minister L. B. Shastri changed the rulebook. The Nehru–Mountbatten policy line was not to attack Pakistan militarily and not to threaten a general war. Shastri’s policy change shocked Pakistan’s practitioners and public opinion even though the war ended in a great powers mandated stalemate. Between 1965 and 1971 no Pakistani leader tried to either knock out or wear down India in Kashmir or elsewhere but recriminations continued at the diplomatic level. In the 1971 war India knocked out Pakistani military forces in Bangladesh (East Pakistan) but great powers’ interventions ensured that India was not in a position to knock out the heartland of Pakistan in the West. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the regional context.
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With Zia-ul-Haq as Pakistan’s new leader and with the strong support of various branches of the US government Pakistan saw an opportunity to expand its strategic space in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Indian Punjab. With the active support and direction of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency, Pakistani trained terrorists pushed hard against Indian targets, going beyond the Kashmir region. The theory was to inflict a thousand cuts against India, and to force it to negotiate a surrender in Kashmir on Pakistani’s terms; the old dream of liberating Kashmir and Indian Muslims was revived with new tactics, that is, to take the terror war into India and to balkanize the Indian Union. This was Pakistan’s strategy to wear down India’s political and military machinery. The result was a protracted conflict but it did not lead to Indian capitulation; it had the opposite effect of strengthening Indian political and military determination to fight and defeat Pakistan’s diplomatic and military campaign. In sum, the second round saw the rise of the China–India–Pakistan triangle as well as a significant shift in Chinese and Pakistani thinking from a policy of seeking a knock out blow to a policy of wearing India down. Conversely, India joined the strategic fray by a process of military modernization that increased the costs to China and Pakistan of a policy to wear it down. As a result today (2010) there is no expectation among practitioners in the Subcontinent or in the developed world that China can deliver a knock out blow against India, or that India can knock out Pakistan, or that the China– Pakistan combination can create a monopoly of power in the region, or that India can dominate the region. All three players and the external participants in the region are here to stay. The system has been irreversibly opened up and stabilized as a result. War is not a realistic option for any player. If it breaks out it is expected to be mutually destructive. Martin Wight spoke of a tendency in a triangle to ‘lash out’.18 This idea is relevant to my study. It is interesting that Pakistan lashed out against India during the 1950s when India was militarily weak and under pressure from the US, and Pakistan received massive military aid from the US. It expected that international pressure would bring India to a settlement with Pakistan. Pakistan’s lashing out was a sign of its failure to settle the Kashmir question by war or bilateral diplomacy, while China’s lack of lashing out against India in the 1950s showed a desire to gain Indian goodwill and time for China’s strategy to develop until time was ripe for military actions and a border confrontation. Note that China started to lash out against India on core issues (Kashmir, nuclear weapons, Pakistan, relations with the US, regional policies) when it became clear that India did not accept defeat following the 1962 war. China lashed out against ‘Indian hegemony’ when it is a known fact that India has neither the history (since the 1100s) nor the capacity to dominate the Subcontinent given its internal problems and requirements to meet growing internal economic, social and political needs. China, a nuclear weapon power and a promoter of nuclear and missile proliferation in Pakistan and Iran since the 1980s, lashed out against India’s nuclear weapons development.
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China objected to India’s Pakistan and Kashmir policies, and its support of the Dalai Lama. Pakistan, a military dictatorship for most of its political history, lashed out at India’s human rights record and lack of democracy in Kashmir. In China’s worldview India ought to be a member of a subordinate states’ system whereas India’s worldview merits a position as a co-equal of China. Pakistan has lashed out at India for spoiling its policy of IndoPakistani parity after 1947. Between India–Pakistan and India–China their diplomatic and military duels have not settled the controversies and rivalries. My view is that deadlocked duel situations increase the compulsion for the irredentist members of a strategic triangle to lash out. This is a sign of frustration to alter Indian behaviour by charm, intimidation or war, and to either knock out India or to wear it down to accept Pakistani and Chinese terms.
Summing up The chapter outlined Professor Martin Wight’s approach to strategic triangles and its partial relevance to my case study. With amendments his approach is relevant to my study. The China–India–Pakistan triangle did not emerge in a vacuum. It took shape in the context of Manchu–China strategic and cultural ideas and frontier practices; and Pakistan inherited and absorbed British geo-political and frontier practices. India, the legal successor to British India moved away from British-style regional geo-politics during the Nehru era. This chapter shows that China and Pakistan functioned according to the principles of irredentism and revolutionary violence. Both shared a common approach even though Pakistan came at the issue from an Islamist perspective and China came at it from a leftist one. The convergence formed a deadly and a critical mass of ideological controversies (democracy and secularism versus theocratic and military rule; and peaceful change versus armed struggle), diplomatic controversies pertaining to Kashmir and Himalayan disputes, and military duels – 1947–48, 1962, 1965 and 1971, and border tensions as well as terrorist incidents. But when India decided after its military defeat in 1962 to adjust its policies to the world of realpolitik, the frame of reference of Indian policies underwent a fundamental albeit a subtle change while the pattern of Pakistan and Chinese conduct in the second round was maintained to intensify the pressures on India. By joining the great strategic game Indian practitioners determined to pursue a protracted conflict with China and Pakistan and their supporters in the West. The next chapter assesses two early examples of strategic triangles in the Himalayan zone. The first one involved British India, Manchu China and Tibet. It had a long history which is well documented and it showed the strategic interactions among the main players of the time. This triangle ended with Britain’s withdrawal from the Subcontinent in 1947 as a result of a change in the cast of political characters. The importance of strategic triangles was planted in Pakistani minds by Pakistani-Western interactions. In its rivalry with India, Pakistan developed and used strategic triangles initially
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with US help and later with China’s involvement. For its part, China quickly grasped the importance of the pre-1947 British India–Manchu China–Tibet history and altered the frame of reference by pushing its military presence to the Indian/Nepal borders. The second early example of a triangle may be dubbed either as a still born triangle; or if it is believed that the Tibet question is still important in world affairs, then this triangle may be described as a Delhi–Beijing–Dharamsala triangle. The early history is important because it had a fall-out on the practitioners involved in northern Indian and Himalayan affairs. We turn now to a discussion of these aspects.
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Strategic triangles in the Himalayan Zone; pre-1949 history and 1949–50
Introduction In a study commissioned by the International Peace Academy (New York) and the Monterey Institute of International Studies it is alleged that China did not take the South Asian region seriously as an area of strategic importance to Chinese interests until 1998 when India conducted its nuclear tests. Sidhu and Yuan base this assessment on their reading of China’s defence papers.1 This view is at odds with the history of Chinese involvement – initially by imperial Manchu China in the promotion of its frontier policy in Mongolia, Tibet, its northern and western borders, and in the Himalayan area – Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal and northeast India. There were other pre-1949 channels of contact between China and India. British India promoted opium exports to China that led to war (1839–42) and defeat and formed a historical memory about the ill-effects of British imperialism on China. The China-Burma road was used to ferry supplies to China to support the Chiang Kai-Shek war effort against Japan and the communists. This road re-emerged as a physical gateway between China, Burma and India, and is currently, since the early 1980s, an active strategic corridor. The territorial claims of the Chinese Nationalist government (1912–67) were assumed by China’s communist government and remain an issue between China and India since 1949. China’s involvement was at times indirect and unstable as in relation to Tibet; at times it was direct and unstable as in relation to development of trade along the Silk route but Chinese imperial history and accounts of reputable Western scholars like Owen Lattimore, Alastair Lamb, John Rowland, S. B. Cohen, Michael C. van Walt van Praag, A. B. Bozeman, C. P. Fitzgerald and others record imperial China’s strong interest and involvement in the frontier areas of the Indian Subcontinent and Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Beijing projects a public view of India as a sub-regional (South Asian) force in the contemporary world.2 However, in my view, the PRC’s dismissive pose about India is not a serious indication of the nature and scope of China’s India policy. My view is that the PRC follows an active China-centric policy in its approach to India; it takes it seriously as a strategic rival, and acts to contain its regional and international presence. The retreat of the European
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empires from south and Southeast Asia gave the PRC an opportunity to enlarge its territorial and strategic frontiers. Its belief in the need to reform the world system through Chinese pressures came from Maoist confidence in its aims and methods in war and peace issues. For China, India was the main regional rival for influence in the southern zone. It had access to the major world capitals since the early 1950s as a result of Nehru’s diplomacy. It had influence as a moderating force in a bipolarized Cold War and in relation to radical elements in the Third World. Also, Nehru’s ability to play on Sino-Soviet, Sino-US, and US–Soviet rivalries added to China’s mistrust of Nehru’s policies and the role of China’s rivals in the strategic Himalayan area. Because of India’s geographical location and diplomatic capacity to get involved in big power games in Asia, China’s leaders could not leave India alone. Its democratic credentials made it an attractive alternative to radical China. From its perspective China adopted a realist perspective towards India. It saw it as a ‘reactionary’ force that was aligned with two Chinese enemies – US and Soviet ‘imperialisms’. This line was consistent with Mao’s politics of hate and western diplomatic practices that require formation of ‘us versus them’ distinctions to build coalitions against enemies. Demeaning ‘Indians’, their leaders and their institutions and capacities is a form of psychological warfare. The chapter shows the rise of the Tibetan-Himalayan area as the southern epicentre of Chinese military and diplomatic strategy in 1950 just as the Korean peninsula, Japan and Taiwan emerged as the northern epicentre of its military and diplomatic strategy. Both strategic flanks engaged Beijing’s attention and both emerged as points of strategic interactions between China and the world. The 1940–50 period was one of high activism in communist Chinese strategy towards the area. It had several significant drivers. 1. Territorial – where China was driven to assert its territorial interests in Tibet and to consolidate its frontiers with Soviet Union and India and to manage its physical security in its southern region. 2. Legal – where China was driven to assert its legal rights on the basis of Nationalist claims and treaty negotiations with British India and Tibet before 1947. 3. Geo-political – where China was driven to assess its position in relation to the geo-politics of the Tibet–Himalayan region, the cockpit of rivalries between British India, imperial Russia and imperial China with Tibet as a historical buffer between Russia, British India and China. 4. Ideological – where China was driven to liberate the Tibetans from feudalism and to check the policies of Indian ‘reactionaries’ and their ‘imperialist’ associates. In Maoist view, Tibet was the palm with five fingers – Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh-Xinjiang and India’s northeastern area, and the area was a focus of China-inspired revolutionary change. The early experiences with two strategic triangles occurred in the context of rapidly changing state forms in India and China, the retreat of European
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empires from Asia, the failure of US and Japanese interventions in China in the 1930s and the 1940s and the rise of a centrally organized, highly motivated and militarized Communist China. It gained the confidence that its stronger political will, better political and military organization, psychological preparation of the Chinese people and united front tactics could defeat superior Japanese and US/KMT military power. These triangles had three tipping points. The first related to the retreat of the British India Empire in 1947 from the Himalayan scene and the breakup of the unity of its frontier policy in Afghanistan, northwest and northeast India and the Himalayan area as a result of the geographical and political division of British India. The second related to the rise of a communist controlled China with internal political unity and military strength in 1949 where a militarily weak country had waged a successful rebellion against foreign powers. The third related to the decision to use military intervention to force China’s occupation of Tibet without Tibetan consent. These tipping points altered the distribution of military power in the region. It had been asymmetrical in favour of British India and against a weak Manchu China and an autonomous Tibet before 1947. Nehru’s policy emphasized political diplomacy over development of Indian military strength; he did not understand the importance of geo-politically driven diplomacy. As a result his policy increased the asymmetrical distribution of military power in the Himalayan region. The pattern of inter-state relationships also changed in a fundamental way. In the pre-1947 British India–Tibet–Manchu China triangle the involvement of British India and Manchu China in Tibetan affairs was indirect and stable for Britain because Tibet’s internal institutions, the treaty arrangements, its political consciousness and capacity to negotiate with outside powers gave it autonomy; and Britain used Tibet’s autonomy, and China’s suzerainty in Tibet as a way to keep Russia out of Tibet. Manchu weakness, however, kept its influence indirect and unstable in Tibet. The calculated ambiguity in British India’s Tibet policy on the one hand managed the British India–Tibet–Manchu China triangle, and on the other hand contained Russian expansion. It played as well on China’s interest to maintain Tibetan autonomy as a check against Russian expansion, a common interest of imperial Britain and imperial China vis-à-vis imperial Russia. This delicate pattern of relationships was altered as a result of changing state forms and regional policies with only one thread of continuity: the Russia–China rivalry of the imperial past was replaced by the strategic and ideological rivalry between the two communist neighbours. As a result of China’s military intervention in 1950 in Tibet its indirect influence was replaced by direct military occupation. Following the surrender of Indian rights in Tibet and acknowledgement that Tibet was a part of China, the government of India abandoned its position in the Himalayan triangle. The pre-1947 British India–Tibet–Manchu China triangle was replaced by a new triangle between China, India, the Dalai Lama’s government in exile in Dharamsala (Northern India) and the world community.
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Relevant scholarship These changes came about as a result of the emergence of communist China as the catalyst. Hence it is necessary to review its approach both pre-1949 and post-1949/50. S. B. Cohen provides the conceptual framework of China’s approach.3 He distinguishes between three facets of China’s locational (spatial) perspectives: local, regional and international. The local (national) assumes China’s cultural and territorial unity. In the Chinese view Tibet fell in this sphere even though the Tibetans are culturally different than the majority Han population. Here territoriality and strategic imperative trumps cultural and political differences between the Han Chinese and Tibetans. One way to resolve the differences is to populate the Tibetan area with Han migrants and marginalize or eliminate the Tibetan population. In the local/ national area, which is the locational core, communist China, like imperial China, was meant to be the controlling power and centre of authority. This area merits full attention if Beijing is to control and to organize political authority, military capacity, cultural unity, internal improvements and defence against ‘foreign aggression’. This area requires identification of national policy and public opinion with territoriality. Hence Beijing’s emphasis on ‘patriotic education’ following the unrest in Tibet in 2008. China’s locational view was based on a concentric scheme which recognized that Chinese power was likely to taper off as it moved from the China centre to the Inner Asian zone, and then to the non-Chinese world – outer Asia and the outer world. The Inner Asia and the Outer Asia zones included Korean peninsula, Formosa/Taiwan, North Borneo, Mainland Southeast Asia, Assam, Himalayan kingdoms, eastern Soviet Central Asia, Mongolia, Manchuria, east Siberia, Sakhalin and Trans-Amur. Inner Asia included Manchuria, Tibet and Xinjiang. This was the pre-1947 scheme that was partially executed successfully by Chinese communists. Direct control was established in Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang. But the success in this area was also partial; China’s rule in Tibet and Xinjiang is enforced by force and absent local consent it is unstable. However, note that Chinese domination over this area is vital to China’s sense of security that it controls the entire national space. China’s policy in the Himalayas is a two-part story. 1. Outwardly, China was confident in its posture that it had defeated a stronger set of powers – Japan and the US by its victory in 1949. 2. Inwardly it was insecure as a result of its international isolation in 1949, and its rivalries with Moscow and Washington which the Korean War and the policies of Stalin and US government exacerbated. In this perspective the connection between the local/ national area and the regional area in the concentric circle explained by Cohen assumes significance. Because of the physical proximity between the two, it was vital for Beijing to establish its domination in the core local/ national area and to establish its access and a special diplomatic-military position – by forming friendly alignments in the Outer Asian zone. The aim
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was to prevent a challenge from Outer Asia against China’s national space. The theory is that the national and the regional settings require an interaction in Beijing’s strategic thinking, and it has employed two tools to this end. First is to build diplomatic and military ties with countries in Outer Asia like Pakistan, Myanmar and Nepal so that Chinese access to these countries’ policy-making process is ensured. Economic and military aid and diplomatic support facilitate this approach. The second method is to build the infrastructure in the region from China’s end that extends into the neighbourhood. China has maintained an active schedule to develop its infrastructure in the region citing its economic and developmental requirements and underplaying the military potential of the infrastructure. The main examples are the development of the Karakoran highway linking China/Tibet to Pakistan through an all weather road that can handle heavy tanks and transport; the establishment of an extensive rail/road and air network of military and commercial communications in Tibet itself with roads leading to points in Nepal and Indian border areas; and the revival of the China/Burma road that was a lifeline for military supplies by the Allies into China and is now tied to the development by China of naval facilities in the Bay of Bengal, and Gwador in Pakistan, along with roads within Myanmar leading to the Indian Ocean.4 The national/regional interface in China’s southern zone is relevant for my case study more than the China/international world interface – the third element in the concentric scheme. Beijing’s international presence and success is obvious. It moved from a position of isolation in the 1950s to that of a recognized participant in the strategic triangle with Moscow and Washington in the 1970s. Its rise as a fast growing economy and a powerful player in the global economy highlights its international presence. However, the national/ regional interface is important because the southern zone is the PRC’s sole geo-political platform for the extension of its political, economic and military influence into the region and beyond (from Pakistan to the Gulf/Middle East area; and from the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean to Africa; and from China and the South China seas into Southeast Asia). Its ability to expand in the Far East is circumscribed by the involvement of the US, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia in Far Eastern affairs. Despite Beijing’s claim about its peaceful rise, the southern region has emerged as a point of diplomatic engagement by China and as a point of opposition by heightened military preparations by many neighbours of China, Japan, India, Australia, Singapore and others, to guard against the possibility of Chinese military expansion. How Beijing balances its position as a point of attraction, and conversely as a point of opposition, is a major challenge for Chinese diplomacy. It cannot be dealt with by public declarations about its peaceful intentions. Its inability, however, to develop hegemonic relationships in the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, mainland Southeast Asia, India’s northeast, the Himalayan kingdoms, Siberia and Central Asia is a sign that its policies are likely to remain mired in international and domestic controversies about aims and methods.
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Other scholarly works validate my approach. Lattimore explains China’s continuous pre-occupation with frontier zones in Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia and in the southern areas – Turkestan, Xinjiang and Tibet.5 Lamb explains that No state in Asia has a longer land frontier than China, and no state in Asia has been concerned with problems of frontier policy over a longer period. For more than 2000 years, the history of Chinese intentions and actions on the frontier has been recorded in considerable detail. Modern Chinese statesmen know what their predecessors did. … China exhibits a continuity of frontier policy which is not to be found elsewhere.6 The pre-1949 history had three characteristics. 1. Consciousness about the superiority of Chinese civilization and the importance of bringing ‘foreign barbarians’ into contact with China to tame them. 2. The importance of building infrastructure within the Chinese sphere in the form of irrigation and railway expansion and to build trade and tributary links with the non-Chinese world. 3. To recognize that expansion had its limits defined by the range of Chinese power and interests. Lattimore makes these points convincingly in his work. Manchu China limited its frontier activities north of the Himalayas; Communist China’s power and interests enabled it to advance its frontier activities south of the Himalayas. This is a new element in Communist China’s policy that was built on its pre-1949 orientation. Lamb divides the Asian world into three geo-political zones – Russian, Chinese and Southern. In the nineteenth century the Southern zone extended from the Middle East-east of the Mediterranean Sea, to Southeast Asia. British and French empires dominated this zone, and controlled its land and sea communications as well as its commerce and political organizations. These empires were based on the principle of ‘armed trading’ because European military power – Portuguese, English, French and Dutch – used military force to redefine existing Indian Ocean trading relationships. European armed trading disrupted traditional links among Arab, Indian and Chinese traders which were peaceful in the fourteenth century; the changed attitude and policy facilitated European military and naval development, empire building and European prosperity. Of the three zones the Russian and Chinese remained cohesive in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but the Southern zone became an object of intense geo-political rivalries among Americans, Russians and Chinese following the breakdown of European empires. The two early experiments in strategic triangles before 1949/50 took place in the Southern zone in a period of massive change in regional power politics. This zone offered great profit in terms of commercial and strategic gain because the opportunity costs were low for China, and the value added to China’s interests and prestige was great when it acted quickly and decisively in the Tibetan/Xinjiang area in 1950. In asserting its territorial rights in
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Tibet and on the India–China border it took advantage of its position as a beneficiary of Nationalist Chinese territorial claims. Under the British Empire the major Indian frontier area – the Himalayan kingdoms, the Indian northwest and northeast – were under British control. With the India–Pakistan partition the geo-political and political unity of British India was broken. Pakistan inherited the northwestern frontier and it gained a UK–US acknowledgement that Pakistan was essential for Western defence against Soviet pressures in the area in the Cold War. India inherited the Himalayan and the northeastern frontier areas along with a view in the West that it was not a part of the inner circle of Western defence as Pakistan was. A significant part of Nehru’s nonaligned policy was to promote the image of China as a peace-loving state, and a view that responsibility for the Cold War lay in part with US aggressiveness towards the communist world. These were propagated by Indian ambassador to Moscow S. Radhakrishnan and by Nehru and his officials in various world capitals.7 With this mindset, neither the Indian government, nor the UK and US gave serious attention to the Himalayan zone as a major geo-political epicentre of China. In hindsight, the asymmetry in the frontier policies of China and India was obvious but it was not relevant for Indian decision makers in the 1950s. As a result two different strategic cultures emerged. Beijing’s rulers inherited the Chinese protectorate system where Tibet and Xinjiang belonged to the inner Chinese zone and Myanmar, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, Ladakh, Hunza and Vietnam belonged to the outer frontier of China.8 India got Nehru’s diplomatic theory about peace zones and peaceful co-existence with China rather than serious policies to engage China on its own terms in the Himalayas and to manage the area through a mix of military strength and diplomacy. Communist China took advantage of this asymmetry and the breakup in the geographical and political unity of the Subcontinent. The two historical examples of strategic triangles in the 1800s-1949/50 time frame reveal two points. One, China, Tibet and other Himalayan kingdoms were acutely conscious about the strategic and commercial interactions in the region that affected their interests, and their interactions were subordinate to activities of three imperial powers – Russia, Britain and Manchu China. The three formed the triangle, they were the principal players; and the Himalayan kingdoms and Tibet along with Ladakh and Kashmir were secondary but important players in the sense that they enjoyed independence of action and their political organizations and military capacities enabled them to participate in regional affairs. The lesser players were participants as well as objects of attention of the imperial powers. Two, despite this lively and important history of strategic and commercial intercourse in the Himalayan zone that extended from Afghanistan to British India’s northeast areas and Burma, the lessons of this history were largely ignored by the Indian Congress party and its main maker of foreign affairs, Nehru. Opposition to British imperialism was an ideological fixation in Nehru’s thinking, and it led him to minimize the importance of attending to Himalayan affairs on a geo-political basis.
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The strategic and commercial importance of the Himalayan zone did not end with Indian independence in 1947 but its course was altered by Indian policies that reduced India’s power in the region. The asymmetry in the mental outlooks and strategic calculations of the players had important consequences. While China, Pakistan and other Himalayan areas acted according to geo-political calculations, India acted on the basis of utopianism. The former set of players approached foreign affairs according to the logic of a geo-political environment. India chose the language of peace and false propaganda about China’s peacefulness. China stayed in the great strategic game; India mostly opted out of it and sought glory in the diplomatic arena of world capitals. China, Pakistan and the local Himalayan players tailored their policies to the changed geographical and diplomatic circumstances as a result of British withdrawal from India and the rise of communist China. The Government of India adapted itself to Nehru’s intuitive views of foreign affairs rather than the ground realities in the Himalayas. (These are discussed later in this chapter in the second triangle, 1949–50.)
The first triangle The first triangle was active from the 1700s to 1947; it showed a pattern of continuous strategic and commercial interactions between Manchu China, British India and Tibet, along with the participation of Burma, Ladakh, Kashmir and the Himalayan kingdoms, particularly Nepal. The Himalayan area was a frontier zone where three empires – Russia, British India and China interacted. Tibet enjoyed autonomy but not complete sovereignty. It was the object of Manchu military interventions and political involvement in Tibetan affairs, and British involvement was driven mainly by its frontiers strategy. Historically China’s influence was often indirect (but not always) and usually unstable for several reasons. 1. British India promoted Tibet as a buffer zone between itself and Russia. The British–Tibetan–Chinese interaction was subordinate to the bipolar one with Russia. With a weak Manchu China, independent-minded Tibet and a cautiously assertive and generally attentive British India, the triangularity was maintained in a direct manner. 2. Tibet sought links with British India and the kingdoms in the Himalayan areas where it had strategic and commercial interests to offset Chinese pressures and Nepalese interventions. 3. British India accommodated Manchu claims in Tibet by accepting the theory of Chinese suzerainty but not its sovereignty; and it recognized Tibetan autonomy. British Tibet policy was formalized by treaties that involved negotiations with Tibet and Manchu and Nationalist China. The provisions were subject to negotiation and re-negotiation, and in the early 1900s they became contentious. The British approach to Tibet and China was based on twin calculations: to check Russian advances in the Himalayan area and to build trade links with China.
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In sum, the triangle had a framework. It had a political and legal structure with conceptual benchmarks and room to manoeuvre in the field of Himalayan power politics. This triangle was framed in the context of involvement of three empires in the strategic heart of Asia. It showed a pattern of uneasy co-existence between British India and Manchu China, between Manchu China and Tibet and between British India and Tibet.
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Worldviews and methods of the players For two centuries up to 1911 the Manchu-Tibet relationship was based on a ‘Priest-Patron’ attitude where the Dalai Lama stood for spiritual authority and the Manchu emperor stood for secular authority and he was expected to provide military protection when Tibet was attacked, for example by Gorkhas and Nepal (1788–92). The Manchus maintained political representation in Tibet in the form of two ‘Ambans’ (ambassadors) and a military garrison from the eighteenth century to 1911. Although the pattern of relationships between Tibet, Manchu China, Gorkhas and Nepal, and British India fluctuated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from Tibet’s standpoint the Priest-Patron relationship was fixed as the basis of the relationship. But after 1949 the issue gained a legalistic and power political tone because communist China asserted its right to liberate Tibet and rid it of feudalism and it claimed that Tibet was ‘an integral part of China for centuries’.9 Franz Michael, an eminent China scholar, however questions it on grounds of historical fact and claims that the ideological foundation of the pre-modern Chinese empire was that of a world state, of the Middle Kingdom that had a mandate from heaven for the universe. But this was an idea, not a historical fact or an idea that is recognized in modern international law.10 In other words, the Chinese claim to historical and legal rights in Tibet is arguable and contested. It gained possession of Tibet in 1949/50 by force, and not by Tibetan consent or authority of international law. It gained it by a unilateral claim to a right over Tibet and by tacit consent of the world community as a result of acceptance of Chinese military action by India, the UK, US and the UN; none of them contested China’s military actions at the UN or in an international legal forum or directly with China itself. The claims reveal tension between different worldviews and methods of the major and minor players who were involved in the strategic, legal and demographic/cultural drama in the Himalayan area. The controversy involves the following considerations. 1. Communist China inherited the Manchu worldview. It distorted the historical record to suit its political-strategic interests, claimed Tibet on this basis, and by the use of its military strength. 2. Following his exile to India in 1959 the Dalai Lama sought a political accommodation with Beijing on the basis of its acknowledgement of Tibet’s autonomy but Beijing is not interested as it enjoys physical control over Tibet. The controversy over the Tibet issue is still unresolved and it spills into China–India relations. Chinese communist diplomatic and legal theory
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regarding Tibet is based on pre-modern Manchu conceptions, just as Chinese border claims vis-à-vis India are based on pre-1949 Nationalist Chinese claims and maps. In sum, communist China’s theory and practice vis-à-vis Tibetan and Sino-Indian affairs has two pedigrees – Manchu and Nationalist Chinese. It shows a skill and an attitude to selectively adapt views and events that suit its current purposes. Hsiung documents the use of selectivity and legal rationalization in communist China’s approach to law and policy in its foreign affairs.11 British India’s approach to Tibet and China questions was based on power political, legal and commercial calculations. They revealed a decision-making process based on interactions between the British India’s Government of India (the Indian Viceroy) and London, as well as interactions between British interests in China, Tibet, the Himalayan kingdoms and Russian imperialism and Burma. British India sought to maintain its position in the frontier zone in the Himalayas by building a system of buffers, and direct contact between British and Chinese power in the Himalayas was avoided. Several reputable scholars such as Alastair Lamb, Dorothy Woodman, Neville Maxwell note this fundamental aspect of British India policy.12 The British India method was to avoid direct contact with China but to maintain commercial and political links to ensure a manageable relationship between British India and Chinese Central Asia that kept Russian expansion at bay. This was the basis of British diplomacy vis-à-vis Tibet, China and Russia. While the motive was to avoid a military engagement with either China or Russia in the Himalayan zone, the method was to use diplomacy and treaty arrangements to keep Russia out of Tibetan affairs by convention. The 1907 Anglo-Russia accord required that Britain and Russia were obliged to avoid political relations with Tibet except through China.13 Such actions deflected Russian energies away from the Himalayan area and preserved frontiers in the Himalayan arc. Trade and strategy interacted continuously in British-Manchu Chinese relations but the position of Tibet and China varied in British calculations. Before 1793 the British government of Bengal sought trade with Tibet to enhance the profitability of the East India Company. Also through war, treaty and trade British India maintained an active stance in relation to Tibet. To quote Praag: ‘The British had bound all the Himalayan states, most of whom had close religious, commercial and political ties with Lhasa to the expanding British empire by means of a series of wars, annexations and agreements, and the Tibetans feared an imminent advance into Tibet’. [Their treaties with Sikkim (1817 and 1861) provided access to Tibet, and treaties with Gulab Singh in Lahore (1846) and Bhutan (1865) strengthened British position south of Tibet.]14 This was problematic for China as it created a platform for European powers to push into a weakening Manchu empire. Tibet however, lost its allure as a trading post as Indian opium trade with the Chinese under British India auspices helped the coffers of the East India
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Company, and the Opium war led to British victory and Chinese treaty port and trade concessions to Britain by the Treaty of Nanking (1842). Still, China’s place as a patron in Tibetan affairs gained value in British thinking in the context of Asian geo-politics and imperial rivalries. Lamb notes that balance of power considerations meant that the British India–Tibet–Manchu links were continuously viewed in the framework of British–Russian and Russo-Chinese rivalries. At the international level these rivalries made it advantageous for Britain to support China’s presence at the regional level precisely because Manchu China was weak, and Russia was seen as aggressive by both Britain and China. In sum, British India followed a dual policy of building ground realities with an emphasis of building buffers as well as a legal fiction about China’s suzerain rights in Tibet in its approach to deflect Russian and Chinese pressures on British and Tibetan interests. Its military actions, treaty arrangements and political links with Himalayan rulers showed the role of British military power, its skilled non-use, and the use of geo-political intelligence and political intrigue to build treaty rights and relationships to maintain Britain’s balancing role in the region, to check the ambitions of Central Asian Empires, and to retain the cooperation of local rulers. Its approach to China revealed a soft touch in British strategy and a policy of calculated ambiguity about territorial borders. The ambiguity was functional because it had the backing of British India military power in the area and it sufficed to keep foreign imperialism at bay; and ambiguity was desirable because there was no strategic justification to expand Britain’s territorial frontiers. London understood the value of recognizing its limits.15 Constant attention to developments in the area, and active engagement in military, diplomatic, and commercial affairs with autonomous kingdoms was the first element of British India policy. Acknowledging ‘an undefined authority of the imperial government [Manchu China] over Tibet’ was the second element. This element was retained even though China’s defeat by Japan (1894–95) and its weakness vis-à-vis Russian expansion led Britain to acknowledge Chinese weakness in Tibet as rulers in name but without power and authority. By the late 1800s differences in attitude, power and authority, interests, and methods of action of the three members of the triangle became obvious. The existence of a triangle was also obvious because the three were tied together – voluntarily and involuntarily to each other. The fear of Russian expansion and the desire to keep Tibet free of foreign influences tied British India to China and visa-versa. China feared both Britain and Russia, the latter more than the former but saw in British India a partner against the common threat of Russia. Britain feared Russia’s not China’s expansion because of the latter’s weakness, and adopted a policy to build its nominal authority in Tibet, which the Tibetans rejected and resented. Britain and British India were also tied to China by direct trading links that were greater in importance than trade links with Tibet. The opium trade linked Calcutta with Canton and it produced a signal event in Britain–China relations: the Opium war and China’s defeat
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produced the Treaty of Nanking (1842) and significant Chinese treaty port concessions to Britain and other Western powers. So British India’s position in the Himalayas was framed in the context of its international interests and policies. Tibet’s attitude and interest was to fear all foreign powers but given its isolation and military weakness and vulnerability to foreign interventions, it sought tactical links and negotiations with foreign powers – British India, Manchu China and imperial Russia. A combination of activism and calculated ambiguity became obvious in British India policies in the late 1800s. With a weak Manchu China, Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India (1899–1905) feared a power vacuum in Tibet which Russia could fill, and this was deemed dangerous because it created the possibility that a hostile force would come close to British India frontiers especially in the northwestern area (Kashmir, Ladakh, western Tibet, Afghanistan). Curzon’s position was a part of a debate in London and in India about the value of a forward policy in the frontier areas to check Russian advances. However, this advocacy remained a tendency not an established policy in British India as others felt that the cost of maintaining a forward stance was high and the policy was unnecessary; that is, it was better to maintain ambiguity about the borders in the areas. Curzon wanted to deal directly with Tibet rather than through China but London maintained its policy to recognize Manchu position and responsibility for Tibet so that Britain and China kept to a friendly course.16 At the same time three threads of policy appeared in Tibetan thinking and actions. 1. When Curzon sought direct contact with Tibet, it evaded this by arguing that China had forbidden such contact. China thus provided a cover for tactical Tibetan evasiveness. 2. Tibet recognized by the late 1800s that the Patron-Priest relationship was frayed; Manchus had failed to protect Tibet against Dogra and Nepalese military interventions, and China could not defend itself against British and Japanese wars. 3. The Dalai Lama feared Britain more than Russia (in contrast with British and Chinese fears of Russia) and he turned to Russia for diplomatic support. These were tendencies in Tibetan politics but while the purpose was to maintain Tibet’s independence the tactical shifts revealed an oscillation in its politics. The fiction of China’s authority was used by Tibetan practitioners when it suited their purpose.17 This history and pattern of activism and triangular interactions nevertheless had an ending. While the triangularity persisted, it was dominated by the interests and power of external players especially British India and China. Tibet was an object of external influence and intervention, and in this history, if there is a trend line in Tibetan political and diplomacy, it revealed a gradual shrinking of its internal and international political and strategic space between the 1700s–1800s and the 1900s. Several conventions were signed during this period; the ones signed in the 1900s were subject to revision, reinterpretation and controversy that showed the effects of the distribution of power among the players and the changing circumstances. The major
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differences in the worldviews, interests and their methods of action of the first triangle in the region, revealed that differences produced triangularity because no single player could act alone or in concert with a combination at the expense of the third member of the triangle. All three were essential players despite the asymmetries in their power, and all three maintained active diplomatic activities vis-à-vis each other. The differences also revealed that absent a meeting of minds on issues and interests, treaties and conventions remain open to reinterpretation and revision as a result of outcomes of wars and changing diplomatic interests and alignments. Finally, even though the triangle formally ended with Britain’s departure from the Subcontinent, the strands of thinking (assumptions, worldviews and beliefs of practitioners) and the treaties remained part of the mental maps of the players although the strategic discourse in the Himalayas was altered by the rise of communist China and its militaristic stance in the Himalayas in 1950s. The first triangle paved the way for the second one, and we turn now to a review of the nature of the China-Tibet-India triangle, 1949–50.
The second triangle The second triangle had a short shelf life, from 1947 (India’s independence) to 1950 (China’s military takeover of Tibet) but it is significant because it brought out the character of Chinese policies in the Himalayan area, and it shaped the controversies that were to grow between China and India in subsequent years. As the following chapters show the volatility in the relationship between China and India after 1950 reflected the history of the two historical triangles. This triangle involved interactions between democratic India, communist China and Buddhist Tibet. The interactions were diplomatically intense, physically violent, brief, but presented radical consequences: they changed the region’s geo-political balance compared to the pattern in the first triangle; they destroyed Tibet’s political autonomy and cultural life. The legal position of Manchu China’s suzerainty in Tibet was replaced by China’s unilateral declaration of sovereignty and this was accepted by India and the US among others. These changes altered the pattern of China–India relations and they eliminated Tibet’s membership in triangular strategy in the first triangle. The second triangle had an overhang of geo-political and ideological rivalry between two Communist powers – China and Russia, in Xinjiang where Moscow’s interest to preserve its mineral concessions and access to Xinjiang clashed with Beijing’s interest to secure its borders and eliminate international rivalries in the heart of Himalayan frontier zones. The second triangle emerged in the context of major changes in a newly emerging Asia. The European empires were retreating, nationalism had emerged as the basis of popular movements in Asia, the Cold War had started but the two superpowers lacked the capacity to fill the power vacuum in continental Asia, and the local powers in South and Southeast Asia were
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internally pre-occupied; they lacked the means, and generally (China and Pakistan were exceptions) a vision to think in geo-political terms. Their values emphasized national development, and global political and economic reforms, and an end to Western imperialist practices. The changes in state forms were significant. British India was replaced by Nehruvian India and significantly British India’s geo-political strategy in the Himalayan zone was replaced by Nehruvian pacifism, internationalism and a pro-China policy. The Indian tilt towards China and its acceptance of its peaceful intentions which Chinese propaganda promoted was accompanied by an Indian and a Chinese tilt against US and Western policies. Second, a weak Manchu and Republican China was replaced by a centrally controlled, assertive and confident communist system in China that sought to escape international isolation and to push the limits of its influence in its southern zone. Precisely when communist China was internally unified and externally aggressive in Tibet in 1950 and relied on brute force to secure its positions Nehru’s India was internally divided, pacifist, reactive and defensive, and its policy had an opportunistic character; to curry favour with China and to sacrifice Tibetan and Indian interests in the short and the long run. Still, despite Nehru’s and China’s policies and the short life of this triangle, there were two unintended consequences. First, the Tibetans did not capitulate to Chinese rule, and absent Tibetan consent, China’s rule was based on power, not legitimacy. After 1950 China’s power in Tibet was direct but unstable compared to Manchu China’s position that was indirect and unstable in the first triangle. One must not exclude the possibility that should the authority of Beijing weaken internally as a result of its economic and social disruptions, its position in the frontier provinces could also weaken, and the