INTEGRATING & ARTICULATING ENVIRONMENTS (Integrated Assessment Studies)

INTEGRATING AND ARTICULATING ENVIRONMENTS: A CHALLENGE FOR NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE

INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT STUDIES Series Editors:

P. Martens, J. Rothmans International Centre for Integrative Studies, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

Advisory Board:

M.B. Beck Environmental Informatics and Control Program, Warnell School of Forest Resources, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, USA

J. Robinson Sustainable Development Research Institute and Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

H.J. Schnellnhuber Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, Gemany; Tyndall Centre for Climate Change, Research, Norwich, UK

INTEGRATING AND ARTICULATING ENVIRONMENTS: A CHALLENGE FOR NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN EUROPE

Editors Fatoú Gökúen (Department of Sociology, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey) Ørnulf Seippel (Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway) Martin O’Brien (Department of Applied Social Science, Lancaster University) Ünal Zenginobuz (Department of Economics, Bo÷aziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey) Fikret Adaman (Department of Economics, Bo÷aziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey) Jesper Grolin (The e-Parliament – formerly with Department for Organization and Industrial Sociology, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark)

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CONTENTS THE CONTRIBUTORS .............................................................................. IX PREFACE ................................................................................................ XI LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................. XIII LIST OF TABLES.....................................................................................XV Martin O’Brien, Ørnulf Seippel, Fatoú Gökúen INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 ARTICULATING, INTEGRATING AND LIVING WITH ENVIRONMENTS ......................3 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS ........................................................................................6 CONCLUDING REMARKS ......................................................................................8 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 9

1. Yannis Stavrakakis ARTICULATING NATURE: THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGE OF CONSTRUCTIONISM IN RISK SOCIETIES .......... 11 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................11 ARTICULATING NATURE AND REALITY IN RISK SOCIETIES: FROM OBJECTIVIST ESSENTIALISM TO DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONISM ............................................12 CLARIFYING DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONISM ....................................................14 ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONISM .....17 FROM DE-POLITICIZATION TO RE-POLITICIZATION .............................................21 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................26 REFERENCES .....................................................................................................27

2. Murat Arsel RISK SOCIETY AT EUROPE’S PERIPHERY? THE CASE OF THE BERGAMA RESISTANCE IN TURKEY................................................ 29 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................29 BERGAMA .........................................................................................................30 CYANIDE DEATH? ........................................................................................31 ENVIRONMENTALIST CONCERNS ..................................................................32 ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS ................................................................................32 LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS................................................................................33 RISK SOCIETY ....................................................................................................34 DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BERGAMA MOVEMENT ..............................37 GOLDEN FUTURE? .............................................................................................44 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................46 REFERENCES .....................................................................................................48

3. C.S.A. (KRIS) VAN KOPPEN PARTICIPATORY NATURE MANAGEMENT AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE: GENERAL REFLECTIONS AND ONE SPECIFIC CASE: TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS ................................ 51 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................51 THE ‘NORTHERN’ VIEW OF NATURE ...................................................................52

THE ARCADIAN APPROACH IN NATURE CONSERVATION ...............................54 THE IMPORTANCE OF LIFEWORLD ................................................................56 NATURE POLICY IN DEBATE .........................................................................56 A CASE OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE: TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS ............................................................................................58 SOCIO-CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS ...............................................................58 NATURE VALUATION AND NATURE RECREATION OF TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS ..................................................................................60 EVALUATING THE CASE ...............................................................................61 PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE ........................62 THE BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION PERSPECTIVE ........................................63 THE ECOTOURISM PERSPECTIVE ...................................................................64 THE INTERACTIVE NATURE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE .............................66 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................67 REFERENCES .................................................................................... 68

4. Fikret Adama, Fatoú Gökúen, E. Ünal Zeginobuz POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL...... 73 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................73 METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................76 DESIGN AND SAMPLE OF THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE ....................................76 MEASURES USED IN THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE ...........................................77 DESIGN AND SAMPLE OF THE QUALITATIVE PHASE ......................................79 RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE .............................................................80 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS................................................................................80 BIVARIATE ANALYSIS ..................................................................................84 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS ...........................................................................84 RESULTS OF THE QUALITATIVE PHASE ...............................................................85 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS .........................................................87 REFERENCES .....................................................................................................89

5. Anna Olofsson, Saman Rashid, Susanna, Öhman THE DIVISION OF ATTITUDES TO GM FOOD BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE ....................................................... 91 INTRODUCTION 91 92 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PUBLIC POLICY IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE.................................94 MATERIAL AND METHODS .................................................................................95 VARIABLES USED IN THE MODEL .................................................................96 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION.....................................................................98 INTERPRETATION OF THE SURVEY RESULTS .................................................98 RESULTS............................................................................................................98 ATTITUDES TO GM FOOD IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE .....................99 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................103 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................106

6. Jeppe Laessoe ACQUISITION AND DOMESTICATION OF NEW HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGIES - SOME DYNAMICS BEHIND GROWTH IN MATERIAL CONSUMPTION............................................................... 109 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................109 APPROACH ......................................................................................................110 THE BLIND SPOT OF THE ECOLOGICAL MODERNIST DISCOURSE ..................110 THEORETICAL GUIDELINES ........................................................................113 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH ..................................................................118 FINDINGS.........................................................................................................120 SOME CONSUMPTION-BOOSTING DYNAMICS IN MODERN FAMILIES ............120 LIBIDINOUS ASPECTS .................................................................................131 DOMESTICATION: ASSIMILATION OR ACCOMODATION? .............................133 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................138 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................141

7. Arthur P.J. Mol BALANCING THE CALL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION ...................................................................................... 143 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................143 ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION AND INTEGRATION .........................................144 ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION ..................................................................144 AND INTEGRATION ....................................................................................145 SUB-NATIONAL INTEGRATION: THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND WISE USE MOVEMENTS ....................................................................................146 INTEGRATION WITHIN THE NATION-STATE: THE NETHERLANDS .......................149 SUPRANATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION: WTO, EU AND NAFTA ........152 WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO) .......................................................152 THE EUROPEAN UNION ...............................................................................155 THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) ........................156 SUMMING UP..............................................................................................158 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................159 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................159

THE CONTRIBUTORS Fikret Adaman, Bo÷aziçi University, Turkey Murat Arsel, Cambridge University, U.K. Fatoú Gökúen, Koç University, Turkey Jeppe Laessoe, National Environmental Research Institute, Denmark Arthur P.J. Mol, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands Martin O’Brien, University of Lancaster, UK Susanna Öhman, Mid Sweden University Anna Olofsson, Mid Sweden University Saman Rashid, Mid Sweden University Ørnulf Seippel, Institutt for Samfunnsforskning, Norway Yannis Stavrakakis, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK C.S.A. (Kris) Van Koppen, Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands E. Ünal Zenginobuz, Bo÷aziçi University, Turkey

PREFACE This book grew out of a workshop in September 2000, in Istanbul, Turkey. The aim of the workshop was to bring together members of the Environment and Society Research Network (ESRN) of the European Sociological Association (ESA) around common/distinct environmental problems and understandings in Northern and Southern Europe. The idea for the workshop had been conceived at the conference of the ESA in August 1999 in Amsterdam. A general concern shared by all members of the ESRN was that the environment had lost some of its status in social sciences since late 1980s and early 1990s. The ESRN group in Amsterdam decided to initiate an attempt for the crucial inclusion of environmental matters in social sciences, at least within the body of the ESA. The idea behind this was to find a new balance between our capacity for abstract thinking on environmental matters and local manifestations of environmental politics. It was believed that social science could not only make us aware of the diversity of the various interpretations of the environment in different geographies, but also help us to question issues of social justice, integration and political economy that are necessary for a more inclusive understanding of environment(s). This book represents such a concern. The workshop and the consequent book brought together authors from diverse disciplines (sociology, political science, philosophy, psychology, economics), backgrounds, and geographies (The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Greece, Spain, and Turkey) with the aim of understanding environment(s) as a whole without losing our sensitivity to cultural particularities, processes and situations. It is intended as a platform for both young and experienced researchers to develop more solid contacts across Northern and Southern Europe around common environmental questions and contribute to the European environmental agenda. We are grateful to all those who made the organization of the workshop and publication of this book possible. In addition to all of the workshop’s participants, we would like to extend our special thanks to the European Science Foundation, which provided the financial support for the workshop in Istanbul. We should also like to thank Bo÷aziçi University (especially Prof. Dr. Sabih Tansal, the Rector) for letting us use their facilities as the venue for the workshop and their financial support. The nonlocal organizers, Jesper Grolin, Martin O’Brien and Ørnulf Seippel would very much like to thank the local organizers, Fikret Adaman, Fatoú Gökúen, and Ünal Zenginobuz and their assistants (in particular Ça÷atay Kayı) for having arranged an intellectually stimulating and socially satisfying workshop. Last but not the least, we would like to thank the commissioning editors, Drs. Pim Martens and Jan Rotmans, for their support for the volume, and the staff at Swets & Zeitlinger for speedy and efficient production assistance.

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 5.1: The consequences of economic development on survival and well-being (after Inglehart, p. 65, [10]). For the purpose of this study we assume that the white square to the left in the figure represents the South and one to the right represents the North ...............................................................93 Figure 5.2: Changes between 1996 and 1999 in perceptions of GM food in the North and South of Europe ....................................................................................99 Figure 5.3: Changes between 1996 and 1999 in intention to buy GM food in the North and South of Europe ..................................................................................101

LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1: The blueprint and learning-process approach to biodiversity management and natural resource management (Pimbert & Pretty, [10], p. 303)........................... 53 Table 4.1: Perceived Seriousness of Specific Environmental Problems (n=1565) .....81 Table 4.2: Environmental Attitudes in Daily Life (n=1565) .......................................81 Table 4.3: Environmental Activism (n=1565).............................................................82 Table 4.4: Mean WTP for Environmental Issues (n=524+524+517=1565)................82 Table 4.5 : Reasons given for not contributing (n=780; percentages in parentheses) ..... 83 Table 4.6: Choice of Institutions to be in Charge in Implementing the Project (percent) .................................................................................................................84 Table 4.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables .................................84 Table 4.8: Determinants of Dependent Variables........................................................85 Table 5.1: Description of variables used in the model. ...............................................97 Table 5.2: Percentages holding positive and negative attitudes to GM food in North and South, 1996 and 1999. ........................................................................100 Table 5.3: Estimation results. ....................................................................................102

Introduction Martin O’Brien, Lancaster University, UK Ørnulf Seippel, Institute for Social Research, Norway Fatoú Gökúen, Koç University, Turkey Will mankind survive? Who knows? The question I want to put is more searching: Who cares?’ (Heilbroner, p. 421, [1]) For a short historical period in the late 1980s and early 1990s environmental social science occupied a central place on academic and political agenda across Europe. National governments rolled out ten-year environmental research programmes, charitable Trusts and Foundations allocated parts of their social policy research budgets to environmental questions and the European Commission disbursed funds to scholars across Europe to develop multidisciplinary scientific networks capable of investigating the relationships between natural and social processes. Social scientists of many persuasions found themselves with a sudden, and largely unexpected, interest in environmental change and books, journals and pamphlets began to appear on natural and social impacts on the environment authored from departments of cultural studies, sociology, social policy, politics, economics and psychology. Texts with avowedly green credentials became best-sellers, ‘risk’ became almost de rigeur in environmental studies, ‘ecological modernization’ effected a translation of green agenda into the policy frameworks of establishment organisations, and a new route to personal chairs opened up for the most dedicated and ambitious environmental social scientists. But the giddy heights of topicality did not last the decade and shortly after its half-way point the conference jamborees of national and European social science associations began to attract fewer participants to their environmental subgroupings. Whilst conference themes on consumption, lifestyle and identity became crowded with eager contributors, the environmental thread generally began to resemble a ghost of its former glory. There are, of course, many reasons for the change in fortunes of environmental social science. The saturation of the publishing market with texts on every aspect of environmental change from air travel to computer use and from waste management to food production left fewer niches for new scholars to fill. The winding down of key funding programmes made the research market much more competitive and made it harder for newer scholars to gain a foothold in the environmental research enterprise. Some established scholars who had dipped their toes into environmental waters returned to themes and topics that were more central to their academic profile. Also, of course, whilst the environmental debate had always had a global dimension the topic of globalisation came to the fore in its own right and subsumed parts of the environmental agenda – and especially the question of environment and development - within its remit. It is within this context that the present book has been produced. As a text, it serves several purposes in relation to its potential audiences. First, the book represents a report of work in progress intended to persuade specialist audiences – in

2 INTRODUCTION

the scholarly associations of social science research, for example – that the problems associated with environmental change are not going to go away even if the level of interest in the topic has declined. Second, it is intended as a contribution to social science debates about environmental change in its own right and uses a North-South perspective to contribute some fresh outlooks on environmental social science. Third, it is hoped that a wider audience of social science students and researchers – especially younger or less experienced researchers – will be able to connect with our desire to re-establish the subject as an important and necessary feature of professional social science. In terms of our first purpose, the book grew out of a summer workshop in September 2000, in Istanbul, Turkey. The decision to hold the event had been conceived in the Environment and Society Research Network (ESRN) subgroup at the European Sociological Association (ESA) meeting in August 1998 in Amsterdam. A general concern shared by all members of the ESRN was that environmental issues had lost a deal of status in social sciences since late 1980s and early 1990s. The ESRN group in Amsterdam proposed that there was a need to reinvigorate the environmental agenda within the social sciences and, in particular, to encourage a new generation of scholars and researchers to become involved in the development of social science research into environmental change. The ESRN was specifically concerned to re-establish environmental issues as a crucial agenda item within the work of the ESA. In terms of the second purpose, the intellectual motivation for the workshop was to work towards a new balance between academic and scholarly abstract thinking on environmental issues and local manifestations of environmental politics. It is our commitment that social science not only makes us more aware of the diversity of interpretations of environmental problems in different geographical spaces, it also helps us to raise some questions about social justice, integration and political economy which are necessary for a more inclusive understanding of those problems. It remains the intention of the workshop organisers and editors of this book to maintain a forum in which such issues can be raised regularly by both established and newer scholars alike. In terms of our third – and perhaps most ambitious purpose – our message is that important work on environmental change is still being carried out in the social sciences. That it no longer features so commonly in the high status professional journals does not detract from the fact that, in all the regions of Europe, there are social scientists whose work can and does make an original and telling contribution to understanding environmental change. The Istanbul workshop and this consequent book brought together students and researchers from diverse disciplines (sociology, political science, philosophy, psychology, economics), backgrounds, and geographies (The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Greece, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom) in a demonstration of the abiding significance of social scientific environmental research. In this regard, the present book represents an invitation to become involved in the work of the ESRN and is only the beginning of a longer-term project to secure the place of environmental research in the national and international institutions that direct European social science. The title of the Istanbul workshop - Environmental Discourses, Policies & Perceptions in Northern and Southern Europe – was intended to reflect a range of

M. O’BRIEN, Ø. SEIPPEL, F. GÖKùEN 3

issues that are central both to the ordinary practice of social science research and to the social and political contours of environmental change in Europe. As a whole, this ensuing book maps some of the ways that environmental problems appear as social, cultural and political issues. That is, how, in institutional and everyday life, environmental problems come to the fore discursively, politically and socially. Additionally, the book adopts a comparative agenda in order to shed some light on the differences between how the environment operates as a social, political and cultural issue in different regions and cultures of Europe. The workshop itself was themed along the dimensions of articulating, integrating and living with environments. The selected papers published here do not reflect these topics and approaches fully. Nevertheless, they do provide some insight into the multidimensional agenda that underpinned the workshop’s initial organisation. This agenda was originally intended to do two things. First, it was intended to be inclusive, representing an invitation that would encourage researchers from diverse backgrounds, using various approaches to contribute their research to a group of interested and critical colleagues. Second, it was intended to establish some broad parameters for future comparative projects in environmental social science. Here, our aim was to explore the potentials and pitfalls of combining, for analytical purposes, the discursive, structural and experiential dimensions of people’s relationships to their changing environments. ARTICULATING, INTEGRATING AND LIVING WITH ENVIRONMENTS Like all such projects this collection of materials from the workshop represents the beginning of that process rather than its end product. On reflection, it would have been easier to produce a text of conference papers had that meeting expressed only one theme or agenda. It is certainly the case that discursive, structural and experiential approaches to environmental change offer many opportunities for social scientific understanding. They are also filled with theoretical, conceptual and methodological problems to which we cannot hope to do justice here. Some introductory remarks, however, are called for. The dilemma of a discourse-theoretic approach to understanding environmental change can be summed up neatly by making a slight amendment to Torfing’s definition of the welfare state (p. 225, [2]). Here, he writes: The notion of [the environment] is an empty signifier that functions as a nodal point in the sense that it retroactively constitutes that which it signifies. Whilst there is some validity in the proposition that the notion of the environment (or welfare state) retroactively constitutes in interaction that which it signifies, the embedded claim that the notion and the phenomenon are empirically identical has generated thousands of pages of rebuttal, dismissal and not a few Sokal-style practical jokes. So extensive have been the debates and so vociferous some of the opposition that it would be churlish to suggest that the problem lies in a misunderstanding of what social constructionism is! Opponents and critics of constructionist approaches will recognise this dilemma immediately but beneath Torfing’s constitutive claim lies an important insight, namely, that the environment, as it appears as an issue for people, does not arrive in

4 INTRODUCTION

perception as a raw, unprocessed essence. Instead, it is mediated through structures, cultures and institutions; apprehended and comprehended through different forms of knowledge. Environmental processes and environmental change are interpreted through rational, emotional and intellectual constructs (Seippel, [3]). This is not to propose that environmental problems do not really exist. It is to claim that, in order to understand the latter’s relation to social action, the social constructs that give them meaning and significance in the world must be taken into account. A discourse-theoretic approach opens the way for a clearer awareness of the ways that environmental processes are, at least in part, produced by people. Environments become partially socialised media through which people think, feel and act. This does not imply that mediated environments are unproblematic mental forms or that there is a single mode of environmental articulation that gives access to the social basis of cognition. The ways that aspects of environmental change are articulated represent complex and often contradictory patterns of sense and meaning which themselves circulate within a context of competing, fragmentary and heterogeneous discourses. Thus, a discourse-theoretic approach brings into focus two sets of relationships: those within and between discourses of environmental change and discourses of politics, culture, science, religion, for example, and those within and between the social, cultural and institutional sites that provide the channels and conduits for the former’s articulation. Given the evidence currently available, it is to be expected that environmental discourses will vary by region, class, gender, ethnicity and age. Each of these variables gives an inflection to the social constructs through which people articulate their interests in and concerns over environmental change. The question, in our North-South comparative standpoint, is how, and with what effect, these variables manifest themselves in environment-talk. Are there clear and unambiguous differences in expressed perceptions, opinions and valuations of environmental qualities? Or do environmental discourses generate a flattening effect on perceptions, opinions and valuations? Are there observable transformations in the cultures, societies and political institutions of European societies that produce effective discursive formations around environmental change regardless of region, culture or identity? Certainly, environmental problems possess a discursive dimension but, except in those versions of constructionism alluded to above, this is not their sole worldly being. Such problems also become part of the structural regimes of social and economic management. European environmental policy, for example, represents a vehicle or instrument of struggle around the direction of European trade, aid and political reform. It combines naked economic interest, a meliorative ideological framework and political contestation over the European integrative agenda. European environmental policy is not, in any straightforward sense, about environmental protection or the development of environmental resources. It is, instead, about the Machiavellian politics of balancing social, economic and administrative objectives. (O’Brien and Penna, [4]). This judgment, of course, is not reserved solely for European environmental policy. In a wider context, and in even starker terms, Seager (p. 3, [5]) proposes that:

M. O’BRIEN, Ø. SEIPPEL, F. GÖKùEN 5

The environmental crisis is not just a crisis of physical ecosystems. The real story of the environmental crisis is a story of power and profit and political wrangling; it is a story of the institutional arrangements and settings, the bureaucratic arrangements and the cultural conventions that create the conditions of environmental destruction. In fact, it might be said that there are two stories, here. One is an institutional story of the effective (or otherwise) organisation and administration of the process of environmental change. A second is a political-economic story of the trade-offs between environmental protection, economic development and social control. As environments change so, too, do people’s life-chances and the responses of governments and related institutions to new conditions. Where environments are transformed - globally, locally or both – into threatening and dangerous contexts of action the opportunities, rights and responsibilities of citizens and governments are also transformed. For example, the US Academy of Sciences and the UK Royal Society has estimated that only 0.1 percent of all pesticides used globally actually reaches and affects the target ‘pest’ species. The remaining 99.9 per cent of the chemical product washes around and beyond the ecosystems where the crops are located. A chilling consequence of this pest-control strategy is that there are some half a million poisonings and ten thousand deaths annually, as well as a steadily increasing concentration of pesticides in the human body, arising directly from the mis- and over-use of pesticides (p. 5, [6]). Apart from the truly tragic aspects of this phenomenon it needs to be noted that pesticide use is a small link in a vast chain of political and economic events. The global transformation of agriculture into mass production, high-yield monoculture agribusiness, the subsidised export of chemical products to manage the pest-problems this creates, the increased necessity to filter contaminated water supplies, the cost of repairing or revitalising poisoned soils, rivers, land- and sea-scapes, and so on, are all contexts and conditions of pesticide use. The environmental consequences of chemical pest control are mediated by the global and local institutional procedures that coordinate the social use of pesticides. In what ways are environmental concerns integrated into the social and political matrix of institutions by which European territories are governed? What role does the (alleged) integration of Euroland play in setting or deflecting aspects of the environmental agenda? How does the global project of economic modernization and capitalization affect specific local struggles over mining, water supply, genetically modified foods, for example? Are environmental concerns integrated into the planning and execution of industrial developments or do they continue to remain a separated agenda item to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis, scheme by scheme? Knowing that environmental consequences arise from institutional procedures and doing something about it are two very different enterprises. In this brief introduction we have pointed to some of the discursive and structural sources that condition the mismatch between awareness and action but it is important to avoid the presumption that identifying discursive or institutional influences in themselves can explain why environmental change and its management represent such large problems. It is crucial, also, to recognise that people live with and respond to

6 INTRODUCTION

environmental changes in organised and unorganised ways and, further, that people’s decisions, choices and actions are environmentally consequential. Whether buying a household item, choosing a transport or travel option, dumping rubbish, erecting buildings and structures or owning pets, for example, people’s individual and collective actions make a difference: sometimes infinitesimal, sometimes monumental. People are not simply passive victims of environmental change but can, instead, be central actors and activists directing what kind of environmental change occurs. The clock of environmental change is ticking and it cannot be stopped but what people do and what choices people make can affect the swing of the pendulum – whether it swings towards environmental destruction or towards environmental protection. Recognising that people’s relationships to environmental change are framed in terms of experiential and everyday processes raises an ambitious and difficult intellectual problem. It is ambitious partly because of the conceptual problem of tying the amorphous character of experience to the well-defined parameters of social science research. It is difficult because of the problem of contextualising environmental (or other) problems. Where does the context of an environmental problem begin and end? What aspects of context need to be included in order to understand the kinds of relationships that people develop with environmental change? Which contextual features are active and which are dormant when people respond to specific local environmental problems? How are local and global characteristics of environmental change contextualised in the everyday routines and activities of different cultural groups? OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS The papers included in this book have been selected because, at different levels, they each address more than one of these themes. Although they differ in focus and outlook and although they tie their primary colours to the mast of one or other of these themes they each work towards a multidimensional environmental research agenda. Some are regionally comparative, some are culturally comparative, some focus on specific European regions and some are topic-directed, addressing discourse or integration directly, for example. We have included pieces that debate both theoretical and empirical questions and made a conscious effort to include discussions relating to environmental issues in Turkey in order to foster an exchange of ideas and outlooks relating to environmental matters between Turkish and other European researchers. We have also given most space to a newer generation of scholars and researchers in order to stimulate a continuing engagement with environmental issues in social science. In different ways, the first two chapters use the concept of ‘risk’ to explore the discursive frameworks of environmental policy and action. Yannis Stavrakakis (chapter one) draws on theoretical work by Laclau and Mouffe, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Hayles’ ‘constrained constructivism’ to excavate the political limits of ‘post-democratic’ industrial society. Here, ‘risk’ functions not as a simple threat or danger but as a vehicle of political contestation and antagonism that opens up spaces for both the depoliticisation and repoliticisation of environmental change. In particular, Stavrakakis points out, risk discourse often exposes the highly transitory and uncertain character of the constructions that ostensibly provide

M. O’BRIEN, Ø. SEIPPEL, F. GÖKùEN 7

protection from and safety within the perilous consequences of environmental change. Murat Arsel (chapter two) notes that the concept of ‘risk’ has become an organising motif of environmental policy and he uses an examination of this concept to open a dialogue between what he considers to be a Western European social theory (‘risk society’) and environmental activism in Europe’s South Eastern periphery (the Bergama protest movement). He is particularly concerned to use the issue of risk as a means of exploring the discursive construction of the Bergama environmental protest movement and its transformation into an alternative space of wider political dissent on the Turkish national scene. Drawing on a qualitative study, Arsel documents the situation at Bergama in the 1990s and relates this to political, economic and legal contexts of Turkish society. Kris van Koppen (chapter three) examines the role of cultural difference in the process of managing natural environments. He compares ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ approaches to nature management by investigating the experiences and practices of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. He is at pains to point out that the possibilities of participatory nature management are enabled and constrained as much by sociocultural factors as by political-economic factors. Notwithstanding the importance of power and resources, van Koppen argues, the complexity and dynamism of cultural referents and meanings comprise a crucial determinant of the ways that people interact with natural environments. Maintaining the Turkish theme, Fikret Adaman, Fatoú Gökúen and Ünal Zenginobuz (chapter four) investigate the institutional contexts and the political economic conditions of environmental policy development in Turkey. In particular, based on an attitudinal survey of Istanbul citizens, they argue that, at least in this Southern context, differences between local, regional and global action are less important than questions of which institutions are to be trusted to take forward positive environment-related programmes. Where citizens felt concern about environmental matters, they were equally likely to be concerned about local, regional or global problems. On the other hand, Adaman et al note that citizens place trust in different kinds of organisations to act on those problems. Their argument begins to show some of the complexity of the question of environmental governance in so far as it reveals citizens to be well aware of the potentials and pitfalls of placing trust in different kinds of regulatory agency. Anna Olofsson, Saman Rashid and Susannah Öhman (chapter five) take a different kind of comparative approach. Their analysis of North-South differences in environmental attitudes draws on survey work conducted in Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands (the North) and in Portugal, Spain and Greece (the South). The focus of their comparison is attitudes towards genetically modified (GM) foods but they are at pains to point out that attitudinal surveys must also take into account the differences in policy contexts in different regions. Using data from the 1996 and 1999 Eurobarometer on Biotechnology they note striking differences in Northern and Southern attitudes towards GM foods and, in particular, in the volatility of attitudes between the 1996 and 1999 surveys. They conclude by putting forward various explanations for these differences – including Inglehart’s postmaterialist values thesis, income variables and access to knowledge and information.

8 INTRODUCTION

Where Adaman et al focus on the level of institutions and political economy, and Olofsson et al on individual survey responses, Laessoe (chapter six) focuses on the ‘mediating’ level of households and family lifestyles to explain some dynamics behind the growth in material consumption in Denmark. Through a series of interviews with Danish families, Laessoe proposes that increasing material consumption can be related to several factors that are influencing changes in family forms and family behaviours. These include increasing individualisation within the family, increasing technologization of family activities, multiplication of family chores and domains of activity, children-parent conflicts and a ‘libidinous’ desire to acquire and explore new objects and technologies. The dynamics underpinning the growth of material consumption introduce a series of tensions in the dominant ecological modernist discourse that envelops Danish politics, business, and environmental organisations, creating a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ for this dominant discourse and opening up a potential space for the development of a ‘socioenvironmental’ discourse in its place. Finally, Arthur Mol takes a critical look at calls for ‘integrating’ environmental issues into political, social and economic priorities. He notes that calls for such integration can be traced back at least as far as the Club of Rome and that the meaning of ‘integration’ has varied enormously across the intervening period. Reminding readers that what sounds rhetorically good is not always either practicable or ultimately desirable, Mol looks at issues of integration at the subnational, national and supra-national arena. His argument that the independence of environmental questions – the ‘emancipation’ of environmental interests from their political, economic and social counterparts – is crucial for the dynamic development of environmental action and understanding proposes that, at the least, ‘integration’ should be the other way around. Perhaps the key question facing modern societies, Mol suggests, is how to integrate political, economic and social agenda into environmental priorities. Or, at least, such societies need to face the question of how to balance these agenda, one with the other, rather than attempting to subsume environmental matters within wider social, political and economic objectives. CONCLUDING REMARKS We produced this book, in part, because environmental change must be a priority on the agenda of social sciences – nationally, regionally and globally. We did not produce it to claim a field, to inaugurate a new discipline or to disseminate some kind of environmental enlightenment. Our aims are, in fact, much more modest. They are, simply, to validate some of the important new social scientific contributions to understanding environmental change that are being carried out across Europe and to suggest that the patient, systematic and continuing engagement with environmental issues needs to occupy a central place in the practice of social science research. There is no such thing as a fact ‘in itself’, said Nietszche: facts require faith. The editors place their faith in one fact: if the social sciences fail to connect their leisure, consumption, identity (etc.) agenda to questions of environmental change then we will consign our children (and their children) to the unintended consequences of our environmental inaction. Robert Heilbroner once remarked that

M. O’BRIEN, Ø. SEIPPEL, F. GÖKùEN 9

when he passed the axe of the environmental executioner into his children’s hands, he hoped they would wield it with more wisdom and more concern for their own posterity than his own generation. Individually, social scientists can do no more than anyone else to help or hinder environmental change. Collectively, there is just an outside chance that we may be able to influence the institutional and everyday frameworks in which environmentally consequential decisions, choices and actions are made. If we have chosen to articulate this outlook on environmental social science, here, it is because we each live within the ecologically degrading institutional and discursive frameworks of contemporary industrial capitalism. Surely, there are better fates we can bequeath. REFERENCES 1. Heilbroner, R.: What has posterity ever done for me?. In T. Ball and R. Dagger (eds.) Ideals and Ideologies: A reader. Harper Collins, New York, 1991. 2. Torfing, J.: New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek. Blackwell: Oxford. 3. Seippel, Ø.: Modernity, politics, and the environment: A theoretical approach. In R.E. Dunlap, F. H. Buttel, P. Dickens & A. Gijswijt (eds.) Sociological Theory and the Environment: Classical foundations, contemporary insights, Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, MD, 2002. 4. O’Brien, M. Penna, S.: European policy and the politics of environmental governance. Policy & Politics, 25, 2 (1997), pp. 185-200. 5. Seager, J.: Earth Follies: Feminism, politics and the environment. Earthscan, London, 1993. 6. Rose, J.: Highlights 1, The Planet’s Future. Environmental Management and Health, 4, 1 (1993), pp. 3-5.

Chapter 1 Articulating Nature: The Ethical and Political Challenge of Constructionism in Risk Societies1 Yannis Stavrakakis University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK

1.

INTRODUCTION

From sociology to international relations and from philosophy of science to politics, ‘constructionism’ seems to be the new game in town. Registering this trend, the aim of this chapter is first to formulate a discursive approach to some of the epistemological and theoretical problems surrounding constructionism. The importance of such an approach is presented by the need to supersede the fruitless opposition between essentialist/objectivist conceptions of nature and reality (often emanating from a hard-science perspective and founded on a realist and representationalist epistemology) and a relativist, even solipsist, post-modernism, which questions the existence of a real beyond the field of representation. In this attempt I will draw - inter alia - on the discourse theory formulated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Katharine Hayles’ ‘constrained constructivism’. Today, the emergence of what Ulrich Beck calls ‘Risk Society’ points to the theoretical, practical and ethical importance of adopting such a discursive constructionist framework. It also reveals the challenge faced by contemporary societies: if nature and all risks are discursively constructed; if, furthermore, it is impossible to provide objective representations of risks that would permit their piecemeal technocratic and de-politicized administration, the need for an arena in which environmental risks – but also, and by extension, security, biotechnology, and other risks - should be discussed, constructed and democratically decided becomes urgent. In that sense, the challenge of uncertainty, of the discursively constructed nature of any certainty, is a thoroughly political challenge.

1

This paper was initially prepared for the European Sociological Association workshop on the environment, Bogazici University, Istanbul, 20-24 September 2000. I would like to thank the organizers and the European Science Foundation for funding my trip to Istanbul. Sections of the paper have also been presented at the departmental seminar at the School of Politics, University of Nottingham (November 2000) and at the ‘Finding the Political’ conference, Goldsmith’s College, University of London (January 2001).

12 ARTICULATING NATURE

2.

ARTICULATING NATURE AND REALITY IN RISK SOCIETIES: FROM OBJECTIVIST ESSENTIALISM TO DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONISM

the guest speaker at a meeting in Plymouth had to abandon his talk, entitled How to Cope With a Crisis, when he was called home because his house was on fire2

An avalanche of recent events has made us realize that the world in which we live is not as safe as we have been led to believe. The image of modern societies as societies which, armored with an absolute certainty guaranteed by scientific discourse, are in a position to control the totality of the real is suffering one blow after the other - without, however, this development being able, so far, to put in danger the overall hegemony of techno-scientific civilization. In the grand scale, this gradual dislocation is marked by events like Three mile Island, Chernobyl, the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska, the Bhopal accident in India, and more recently the various food scares which are terrorizing Western public opinions (including problems associated with genetically modified crops and, of course, the BSE crisis). All these events are only the tip of the iceberg, the highlights of a virtually endless list, which, however, are sufficient to reveal the large extent in which our systems are failing us (Royal Society, p. 1, [1]). So, what has gone wrong? What happened to the unqualified optimism promising an unlimited human domination on the totality of the real? What was previously thought to be objective and certain is now suddenly revealed to be the result of a contingent process of discursive construction. Consider, for example, the ‘Mad Cow Disease’ issue. What is revealed now is that the certainties which supported our way of life, which made our way of life possible - an integral part of that way of life was the consumption of meat - were not privileged and undeniable truths - as almost everyone was led to believe - but social constructions with limited duration and validity. In today’s risk society - here Ulrich Beck’s work is of prime importance - every certainty is increasingly being revealed as a discursive construction that can never neutralize and domesticate the real - a real which, after Lacan, we understand as something ultimately impossible to fully represent and control. But what exactly do we mean when we say that the certainties supporting our way of life are nothing but social constructions? At this level of analysis, the notion of construction does not entail any accusations of conscious deception. What it implies is something deeper and constitutive: humans cannot live their lives and develop a knowledge regarding their environment, natural and social, without representing it, without articulating it at the discursive level; without attributing to it 2

The Guardian, 1 March 2000.

Y. STAVRAKAKIS 13

logical coherence and predictability. This ‘logical’, discursive veil which covers over the heterogeneous domains of the real is a phenomenon so massive and systematic that it is impossible to conceive it as a conscious deception (Pecheux, p. 638, [2]). In other words, humans are, in a certain sense, ‘obliged’ to construct their reality due to their constitutive inability of fully knowing and mastering the real, due to their attachment to language and discourse. Humans inhabit language and are inhabited by language and thus have to approach the real indirectly and never in a definitive way; always through incomplete processes of discursive articulation. The problem here is that in spite of this human deficiency - or rather because of it - all human action has to be supported by a discursive framework purporting to master the impossible real; what is illusory in this operation is not that this is a discursive construction but the fact that it promises an absolute mastery of the real.3 Let me briefly clarify this statement. No doubt, humans are required to ‘act’ and indeed ‘act’ all the time, transforming their human and non-human environment, in order to follow the path of their desires and develop their civilization. All these actions presuppose some kind of a priori safety net, a net offered by the field of discursive construction (comprising scientific assumptions, political calculations and institutions, personal plans, insurance policies, welfare state practices etc.).4 What is usually neglected, however, is the relative and transitory character of all these constructions and of the safety they can provide. We demand from science and from our political system complete safety and this is something we are usually promised (remember John Gummer’s reassurances about British beef!). What we are not offered is the knowledge that this supposed safety, even when it is consistent with the results of scientific research in a particular field, is never omnipotent, since science, as all discursive constructions, is not guaranteed a direct access to the deep essence of things. This was clearly the dominant modern view, a view which accepted that scientists - especially natural scientists - where in a position to arrive at safe, ‘objective’ descriptions of nature - of the deep ‘essence’ of nature - and thus to eliminate any uncertainty and risk entailed in human action. This modern view which epitomizes Western metaphysics and was given its almost definitive formulation with the Enlightenment is founded on the idea that ‘all genuine questions can be answered’, that ‘all answers are knowable’ - with all of them being compatible with one another (providing thus a complete, utopian description of an ideal universe) - through the use of (scientific) reason (Berlin, pp. 21-22, [6]). Contemporary epistemology and history of science clearly undermine these assumptions.5 In other words, what is emerging today is the dislocation of scientific objectivism and essentialism. Certainty is not the same as it was. 3

In psychoanalytic terms one could say that this is the hard fantasmatic core within such constructions. 4 Discourse is understood here in the way Ernesto Laclau has defined it: as a network of meaning, a meaningful articulation of elements which are both of linguistic and extralinguistic nature. For a detailed definition of discourse along these lines see Laclau & Mouffe, especially ch. 3, [3]; Laclau, [4]; Howarth & Stavrakakis, [5]. 5 See, for example, in this regard Thomas Kuhn’s seminal Structure of Scientific Revolutions, [7]. For a more recent account of the debate regarding these issues I suggest Delanty [8].

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Today’s societies are faced with the return of uncertainty, with the resurfacing of the inability to master the real (Beck, p. 84, [9]). We are forced, so to speak, to acknowledge the ambiguity of our experience and to approach self-critically our abilities vis-à-vis controlling the real (p. 88). From a past characterized by the quest for scientific, ethical and social certainties we turn to a present where the possibility of reaching absolute certainty – and hence absolute safety and security - is radically questioned. We are probably witnessing the end of a type of rationality which is now proven untenable for our societies (Gulbenkian Commission, p. 61, [10]). The main point here then is the following: if, in the past, it was thought possible to acquire an objective representation or symbolization of the real, even of the deep essence of things, constructionism argues that the failure of all these attempts, of all these reoccupations, the historical and social relativity of human representations, show that reality is always the result of a process of social and political construction at the level of meaning and discourse.6 What we accept as (objective) reality is nothing but a social construction with limited duration. ‘Risk society’ is just one of the possible names for a society which becomes aware of these limits. 3.

CLARIFYING DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONISM

Two extremely important issues have to be clarified at this point. The first one concerns the exact status of constructionist argumentation and will be explored in this section. If today, a rapidly increasing number of theorists and researchers, with their markedly diverse disciplinary rationales and different understandings of construction processes, claim to enter the constructionist camp, then a crucial question emerges: What kind of constructionism do we really need? In answering this question it is also worth responding to a well-known criticism according to which constructionism constitutes a relativist argument with solipsistic consequences. Does not the idea that there is no direct access to some kind of objective extra-discursive reality put into question the existence of the real? The second issue concerns the ethico-political implications of the discursive approach articulated up to now, and will be dealt with in the next section of this chapter. I will try to offer a variety of distinct but interrelated answers to this line of questioning. The first one is articulated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. According to Laclau and Mouffe, to argue that all objects are constituted as objects of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought. Events like earthquakes or the falling of a brick certainly exist independently of our will. However, whether their specificity as objects will be constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’ depends upon their discursive articulation. What is denied here ‘is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence’ (Laclau & Mouffe, p. 108, [3]). This statement is repeated a few years later in the following form: 6

For a genealogy of constructionist argumentation see Sarbin & Kitsuse [11]; Lynch, [12]. An introductory synopsis of the constructionist argument can be found in Burr [13].

Y. STAVRAKAKIS 15

To call something a natural object is a way of conceiving it that depends upon a classificatory system. Again, this does not put into question the fact that this entity which we call stone exists, in the sense of being present here and now, independently of my will; nevertheless the fact of its being a stone depends on a way of classifying objects which is historical and contingent. If there were no human beings on earth, those objects that we call stones would be there nonetheless; but they would not be ‘stones’, because there would be neither mineralogy nor a language capable of classifying them and distinguishing them from other objects. (Laclau & Mouffe, p. 102, [14]}

In that sense discursive constructionism does not entail a solipsist position. According to discourse theory, even natural facts are also discursive facts for the simple reason that ‘nature is not something already there, to be read from the appearances of things, but is itself the result of a slow and complex historical and social construction’ (Laclau & Mouffe, p. 102, [14]), but this assumption does not question the existence of things - of the real - beyond their discursive being. In other words we have to do with two distinct orders of phenomena: discursive being and natural existence. Stressing the importance of the first for human societies does not dispute the irreducibility of the second. One can also have a Lacanian tack to this problem. We have already tried to imply and mark the distinction between being and existence with the different uses of the concepts of the ‘real’ and ‘reality’ in our argument. In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, reality corresponds to the discursively constructed being of objects whereas the real names what is not part and parcel of discourse, what is impossible to inscribe in its totality into any discursive articulation. The gap between the real and reality is unbridgeable but this is also what stimulates the unending (ultimately failed) attempts of reality to colonize and domesticate the real, to fully represent it in discourse. If constructionist argumentation does not manage to incorporate this recognition of the real it will remain in danger of essentializing the field of construction up to the point of solipsism. In fact, when constructionists are led to believe that the universe of social construction includes the totality of the real (and not only of discursive reality), that there is nothing outside social construction, then it is obvious that their argument becomes contaminated not only by solipsist but also by essentialist and objectivist tendencies: construction becomes the new and only essence of our social world, often presented in a quasi-objectivist light.7 In order to safeguard the radicality of the constructionist argument beyond solipsism and any reoccupation of the ground of objectivist essentialism it is necessary then to inscribe the limits of construction within constructionist argumentation itself.

7

For a detailed exposition of this argument see Stavrakakis, pp. 65-70 [15]. Such questions are also discussed in detail in Velody and Williams [16].

16 ARTICULATING NATURE

What is, however, the exact nature of these limits? We can assert that the idea that there is no direct, objective access to the totality of the (extra-discursive) real is not questioning the fact that the real interacts with our (imaginary/symbolic) representations of reality. What is then the mode of interaction between the real and reality, between the natural existence and social being of objects? Without some kind of indication regarding this point constructionism can be easily reduced to a relativist argument: if, apart from the fact that the real and (discursive) reality, natural existence and discursive being, constitute distinct orders, there is no interaction between the two domains, then every discursive identity becomes as good as all the rest. If that were the case there would be no way of judging between different constructions of reality. Fortunately, however, it is possible to give, once more, a variety of responses to the question of the exact nature of this interaction. Laclau and Mouffe, for example, point to the inherent instability and precariousness of every discursive field, to the fact that no discourse can be fully constituted as a self-contained entity (Laclau & Mouffe, p. 109, [14]). In that sense one can infer that one of the factors that obstruct the autonomy of discourse is our continuous ‘encounters with the real’. Of course this statement constitutes a very Lacanian interpretation of Laclau and Mouffe’s argument. In Lacanian theory, although the real is ex definitione outside the field of construction and representation it nevertheless interacts with it by disrupting its ‘normal’ functioning. In fact, psychoanalysis is based on the idea that the real is shown in certain effects persisting within discourse, although it lacks representation per se. The limits of every discursive structure (of the conscious articulation of meaning, for example), the limits dividing the discursive from the extra-discursive, can only be shown in relation to this discursive structure itself (through the subversion of this meaning). Hence Freud’s focus on the formations of the unconscious - dreams, slips of the tongue, symptoms, etc. - the places where ordinary conscious meaning is distorted or disrupted and where another scene - the unconscious - makes its presence felt. To put it in Thomas Kuhn’s vocabulary, ‘anomaly appears only against the background provided by the paradigm’ (Kuhn, p. 65, [7]). In that sense, it is reasonable to conclude that although the natural existence of the real cannot be mirrored in its discursive being, nevertheless the real imposes limits onto discursive reality, continuously disrupts and distorts the discursive field. This is something also stressed by Cornelius Castoriadis when he argues that although nature is only accessible through the magma of meanings instituted by society, natural events create obstacles or impose limits onto these socially instituted meanings (Castoriadis, p. 330, [17]). Following Katharine Hayles, I suggest that we call this approach, which supersedes the fruitless opposition between objectivist essentialism and a relativist, even solipsist, post-modernism, ‘constrained constructivism’. According to Hayles, constrained constructivism is founded on the recognition of the complex interaction between the world of representation, the discursively constructed reality, and the natural limits, the obstacles imposed on it by its encounters with the flux, the unrepresentable real of nature (Hayles, p. 53, [18]). This is a position which clearly avoids relativism in the sense that it makes possible in principle - though not in an algorithmic way - to distinguish discursive

Y. STAVRAKAKIS 17

constructions of reality which are more capable of withstanding - at least partially and temporarily - their encounters with the disrupting real (of nature) from others which are less likely to achieve that.8 4.

ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONISM

Now, what can be the ethical implications of this discursive approach to the articulation of environmental and other risks? Given the context of our argument so far, opening up our discursive resources to uncertainty seems to be the only prudent move we have left.9 What we can know has to be expressed within the structure of discourse but this structure has to incorporate a recognition of its own limits. This is not a development which should cause unease; as Nancy has put it ‘What will become of our world is something we cannot know, and we can no longer believe in being able to predict or command it. But we can act in such a way that this world is a world able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such ... Invention is always without a model and without warranty. But indeed that implies facing up to turmoil, anxiety, even disarray. Where certainties come apart, there too gathers the strength that no certainty can match.’ (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, pp. 157-158, [20]). These brief remarks on the status of knowledge mark a novel understanding of the structuration of the social. What could be some of the parameters of this new organization of the social in our late modern terrain? Beck’s theory seems to be relevant in this respect. According to our reading of Beck’s schema, contemporary societies are faced with the return of uncertainty, a return of the repressed without doubt, and the increasing inability of mastering the totality of the real. We are forced thus to recognize the ambiguity of our experience and to articulate a selfcritical position towards our ability to master the real. It is now revealed that although repressing doubt and uncertainty can provide temporary safety of meaning, it is nevertheless a dangerous strategy. This realization, contrary to any nihilistic or conservative reaction, can become the starting point for new social and political practices and attitudes which, according to Beck, are already emerging around us, together of course with the reactionary attempts to reinstate an aging modernity: ‘Perhaps the decline of the lodestars of primary Enlightenment, the individual, identity, truth, reality, science, technology, and so on, is the prerequisite for the start of an alternative Enlightenment, one which does not fear doubt, but instead makes it the element of its life and survival’ (Beck, pp. 161, [21]). 8

This statement is not articulated from the point of view of an objectivist gaze, able to compare different representations of reality with the real per se. The basic criterion for distinguishing between these different discursive constructions could be their success in registering their own limits, their ultimate inability to fully represent the real. On this point see Stavrakakis, [19]. In that sense, what is needed is a particular form of ‘reflexivity’, one disrupting the possibility of a rational consensus or a final representation and prioritizing the discursive encircling of the limits of discourse. 9 Although not, by any means, the only one possible.

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Within this context, doubt, which threatens our false-certainties, can become the nodal point for another modernity that will respect the right to err: scepticism ‘contrary to a widespread error, makes everything possible again: questions and dialogue of course, as well as faith, science, knowledge, criticism, morality, society, only differently ... things unsuspected and incongruous, with the tolerance based and rooted in the ultimate certainty of error’ (Beck, pp. 163, [21]). Doubts liberate; they make things possible. First of all, the possibility of a new vision for society. An antiutopian vision founded on the principle ‘Dubio ergo sum’ (pp. 162), more close to the subversive doubtfulness of Montaigne than to the deceptive scepticism of Descartes. This is a standpoint both critical and self-critical: there is no foundation ‘of such a scope and elasticity for a critical theory of society (which would then automatically be a self-critical) as doubt’ (Beck, pp. 173, [9]). Doubt, the invigorating champagne of thinking, points to a new modernity ‘more modern than the old, industrial modernity that we know. The latter after all, is based on certainty, on repelling and suppressing doubt’ (Beck, pp. 173, [21]). Beck asks us to fight for ‘a modernity which is beginning to doubt itself, which, if things go well, will make doubt the measure and architect of its self-limitation and self-modification’ (Beck, pp. 163, [21]). He asks us, to use Celan’s phrase to ‘build on inconsistencies’. It is also a standpoint which is profoundly political. This will be a modernity instituting a new politics, a politics recognizing the uncertainty of the moment of the political. It will be a modernity recognizing the constitutivity of the real in the social. A truly political modernity (Beck, pp. 5, [21]). In fact, the elimination of uncertainty from our life on top of being impossible, is also undesirable. Only when there is uncertainty there is room for responsibility, ethics and, crucially, politics. Without uncertainty, in a totally certain world, humans would be reduced to predetermined automata. A world without uncertainty would be a world without freedom. Thus we are led again to the political dimension of our discussion. Uncertainty is not only an ethical but also a deeply political issue. Accordingly, the constrained constructionism articulated in this text is a thoroughly political constructionism. The limits of our constructions are always experienced as a political moment: they open the way for the political articulation of new constructions and usually lead to a hegemonic struggle between alternative competing constructions.10 Furthermore, construction itself should be understood as a mechanism regulating and negotiating the constitutive gap between decision and knowledge, and, as we shall see, what is at stake today is (re)asserting the political form of this negotiation. The only thing that still remains certain is that we will continue to take decisions within an undecidable terrain, within a terrain of uncertainty; no stable support for these decisions can be found in constructing fantasmatic symbolizations/reoccupations of certainty. As Slavoj Zizek has put it: ‘The ultimate deadlock of the risk society lies in the gap between knowledge and decision ... there is no one who ‘‘really knows’’ the global outcome - on the level of positive 10

This dimension is further explored in Stavrakakis, [22].

Y. STAVRAKAKIS 19

knowledge, the situation is radically ‘‘indecidable’’; but we none the less have to decide’ (Zizek, p. 337, [23]). However, this should not necessarily be seen as a deadlock in the negative sense of the word, but also as a challenge in the positive sense.11 Once this is granted what is also opened is the question of the legitimation of these decisions both in terms of ‘who’ decides and in terms of the subjective position required in order to assume responsibility for decisions (and for the outcomes of decisions) taken in an undecidable terrain. The fact that decisions can no longer be legitimized by recourse to an illusory certainty guaranteed by a supposed direct access to the real offers the opportunity to enhance the potential of modern democracy insofar as democracy can be thought as a political regime which is founded on the open recognition and political (antagonistic) negotiation of uncertainty. In other words, the trust in the decision-making process can only depend on the open character of this process. This is then the ethico-political challenge of risk society: the revelation of the constructed character of every certainty, the recognition of the constitutive character of uncertainty in human experience, puts forward the idea of an open political administration of this uncertainty, an administration through democratic procedures and within a culture of openness. What is thus emerging is the profile of a society which discusses the consequences of its decisions before these are taken by someone else (an ‘omnipotent’ scientist, technocrat, company manager or politician). In this form of society decisions that were previously taken behind closed doors, through supposedly de-politicized ‘objective’ procedures, are politicized again.12 Since no one can master a certainty permitting him to decide in a totally safe way on our behalf, it becomes more prudent to decide democratically. Although this way it seems as if are assuming a higher risk, this is only an illusion: the risk is not different. The only difference is that it is assumed by all of us instead of being administered by ‘someone else’: we are all called to accept the (deeply ethical) responsibility for the inherently risky nature of human culture, our culture. In that sense, recognizing uncertainty becomes one of the most important democratic challenges of our age, a difficult task but a task that has to be assumed urgently. It seems that when dealing with this issue Zizek misses the crucial point and is led to what could be construed as an anti-democratic argument. Consider the following quote: ‘The freedom of decision enjoyed by the subject of ‘risk society’’ 11

Zizek’s position is a bit ambiguous here due to his extremely critical attitude towards risk theorists like Giddens and Beck. Without agreeing with the overall jargon of second modernization, our aim here is to highlight some useful insights of risk theory. These insights emerge more clearly when risk theory is approached through a discursive psychoanalytic framework. We will also point out, wherever necessary, the problems with some of Zizek’s criticisms vis-à-vis risk theory. 12 See Grove-White, p. 119, [24]. Although one should always keep in mind that the question is not, strictly speaking, ‘politicization or de-politicization’ understood as a zero-sum game, insofar as de-politicization also constitutes a particular way of political structuration which attempts, however, to conceal its political profile: ‘politics is thus constituted through an essential tension between depoliticizing and repoliticizing tendencies, each of which, paradoxically, is equally ‘‘political’’ ’ (Osborne, p. 7, [25]).

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is ... the anxiety-provoking freedom of someone who is constantly compelled to make decisions without being aware of their consequences. There is no guarantee that the democratic politicization of crucial decisions, the active involvement of thousands of concerned individuals, will necessarily improve the quality and accuracy of decisions, and thus effectively lessen the risks’ (Zizek, p. 338, [23]). Zizek cannot realize that there are indeed good chances that through the repoliticization of the decision making process, risks can, in fact, be lessened. For example, it is conceivable that within such a setting some decisions would be postponed as a result of radically implementing the precautionary principle, instead of being adopted right away (as the technocratic-corporate nexus would wish). However, the importance of democratizing this whole process is not founded solely on such a ‘utilitarian’ argument. That is to say, even if the risk is staying the same, an open process is preferable from a closed ‘de-politicized’ one. In fact, even if the risk is bigger within such a framework (assuming, for the sake of argument, the existence of some kind of suicidal element in civilization), the fact that it is assumed by all of us is an ethical standpoint that remains valid - an ethical standpoint which is not alien to the ethics of psychoanalysis as developed in the Lacanian tradition. Paradoxically, Zizek’s argument seems to agree with the point of view of capitalist technocracy and entails anti-democratic implications especially when he argues that when discussing such issues ‘one is tempted to evoke the answer of a devout Catholic to the atheist liberal criticism that they, Catholics, are so stupid as to believe in the infallibility of the Pope: ‘‘We Catholics at least believe in the infallibility of one and only one person; does not democracy rely on a much more risky notion that the majority of the people, millions of them, are infallible?’’ (p. 338). What is missed here is the fact that democracy is not presented as the best method of accurate risk measurement, but as the best available socio-political arrangement to assume responsibility for the management of our constitutive inability to reach infallible measurements of risk. This task will be difficult in the sense that it entails assuming an ethical and political responsibility of a completely different scale and nature from the one hegemonizing capitalist societies. One is to expect, in other words, a variety of side-effects accompanying the (institutionalized) recognition and politicization of uncertainty. If subjects interpret the symbolic registering of uncertainty as an encounter with the total collapse of their symbolic universe - a total collapse of the big Other in Lacanian terminology - then they can resort to a paranoiac reconstitution of the symbolic order in the real: hence the proliferation of paranoiac scenarios which posit the existence of a hidden ‘Other of the Other’, of a conspiracy or a ‘secret, invisible and all-powerful agent [which] actually ‘‘pulls the strings’’ and runs the show’ behind the collapsing social order (Zizek, p. 362, [23]). However, we do not view this passage from the one to the other as necessary. Here we beg to differ again from Zizek’s position which seems to read in the recognition of uncertainty marking risk theory a direct threat leading to the collapse of the symbolic order. Although one should accept that the recognition of uncertainty can potentially undermine the symbolic order (p. 342), it can also lead

Y. STAVRAKAKIS 21

to an ethico-political reorganization of the whole socio-symbolic field. Both options are still open.13 5.

FROM DE-POLITICIZATION TO RE-POLITICIZATION

These side-effects however are to be expected. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the recognition of uncertainty itself is to blame in such cases. Rather, they point to the inconsistency between the uncertainty marking human life, its symbolic registering, and the still dominant ethics of harmony and (de-politicized) control. If this inconsistency is to be lessened a new ethos is required, an ethos of repoliticization permitting the recognition of uncertainty, a political ethics for the new century. In that sense, the ethico-political implications of risk society, the political challenge of constructionism, has very little to do with the realist utopia of centrist projects like the Third Way, insofar as centrist politics assumes that we are ‘living through the end of political divisions, of social antagonisms’ (Ranciere, p. 3, [26]). In fact, the idea that the moment of the political, of dislocation and division, of political antagonism, can be neutralized, has guided politics for very long in one form or the other. Politics has usually been ‘the art of suppressing the political’, an attempt to pacify political antagonism and reach a harmonious solution to social division. In Edkins’ words, ‘What we call ‘‘politics’’ is an area of activity that in modern Western societies is ‘‘depoliticized’’ or ‘‘technologized’’ ’ (Edkins, p. 1, [27]), a de-politicization which replaces political (democratic) deliberation and decision making with a variety of supposedly neutral technologies of governance.14 Democracy as a political invention, the democractic revolution in Claude Lefort’s terms, is always an attempt to re-inscribe the moment of the political within institutionalized politics, to re-politicize politics.15 In that sense the contemporary 13

An other side-effect to which we will return shortly is to start blaming someone else for the supposed collapse of the socio-symbolic universe, hence the increase in racism and violence in risk societies. 14 This is not of course limited to issues related to the natural environment. A good example of this trend from another area is presented by Edkins herself in her recent book on famine (Edkins, [28]). Today, famine and ‘how it should be combated is depoliticized’ (p. xvi). What is usually sought is technical solutions, but ‘such solutions are inevitably inadequate to the problem, which is not a technical one but one that accompanies specific forms of social and political organization or the emergence of new arrangements’ (p. xvi). 15 Democracy here is understood as ‘neither compromise between interests nor the formation of a common will. Its kind of dialogue is that of a divided community. Not that it is indifferent to the universal, but in politics the universal is always subject to dispute. The political wrong does not get righted. It is addressed as something irreconcilable within a community that is always unstable and heterogeneous’ (Ranciere, p. 103, [26]). This understanding of democracy has a lot in common with Laclau and Mouffe’s and Lefort’s conceptualizations of the democratic revolution. See Laclau & Mouffe, especially ch. 4, [3], and Lefort, [30]. For an account of democracy linking these conceptualizations with the ethics of psychoanalysis see Stavrakakis, especially ch. 4 and 5, [9].

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consensual rationalization of democractic ‘ungovernability’, founded on a suppression of the political, is post-democratic rather than democratic (Ranciere, p.98, [26]): ‘Realism is neither the lucid refusal of the utopia nor the forgetting of the telos. It is just one utopian way of configuring the telos, of recovering the compass of reason within the singularity of the present’ (p. 15). However, there is no repression without the return of the repressed. These are two sides of the same coin. Both Freud and Lacan would agree on that. Accordingly, there can be no repression of the political without a return of the political, to use the title of a relevant book by Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe, [29]). The same applies to projects like Third Way realism: ‘in this world all happiness comes to an end; even the happiness of the end itself [the end of the political]. Realist utopias are, like other kinds, subject to the shock of the real’ (Ranciere, p. 23, [26]). The return of the repressed takes a variety of forms including contemporary social forms of hatred – most notably but not exclusively racism and xenophobia: ‘in the face of the supposed collapse of the political sphere, with the party of the rich and the party of the poor both calling for modernization and nothing else, with the only choice … being to opt for the better-tailored public-relations image; in the face of all of this, what emerged, stunningly, was not consensus but exclusion, not reason … but pure hatred of the Other, a coming together in order to exclude. Where politics was supposed to be catching up with the times, dropping dogmas and taboos, what appeared centre-stage was not what was expected: not the triumph of a modernity without prejudices, but the return of the supremely archaic, of that which precedes all judgment – hatred’.16 Insofar as the real of nature is also repressed or foreclosed by neo-liberal and Third Way politics, insofar as Blair’s attitude towards genetically modified crops is not that different from the Tory attitude leading to the BSE crisis, the return of the repressed also takes the form of a return of the real of nature (through the dislocation of certainties associated with risk taking in agriculture, the food industry etc.) What is to be done within such a context? Ranciere’s answer to this crucial question is the following: ‘the folly of the times is the wish to use consensus to cure the diseases of consensus. What we must do instead is repoliticize conflicts so that they can be addressed, restore names to the people and give politics back its former visibility in the handling of problems and resources’ (Ranciere, p. 106, [26]; my emphasis). The task is clearly to re-politicize politics and replace a dangerous technocratic, supposedly neutralized decision-making process, with a radicalized democratic decision making founded on an ethos of agonism.17 Today such a repoliticization has to encompass at least two levels. First it has to operate at the global, supra-national level in which the new neoliberal/Third Way consensus is 16

Ranciere, p .23, [9]. This is far from being a mere theoretical possibility. See, for example, De Vos, [31], where it is convincingly argued that the ‘sacralization’ of consensus in Belgian politics is an important factor in the rise of extreme right wing, racist parties such as the Vlaams Blok. The recent electoral gains of right wing populist parties in France and the Netherlands can be interpreted in a similar way. 17 See Mouffe, [32].

Y. STAVRAKAKIS 23

currently established, a space which up to now was taken for granted and practically excluded from national political debates and democratic control. It is obvious that one of the arguments sustaining contemporary post-political (post-democratic) trends is the inevitability of economic liberalization due to the pressures of (a faceless, ‘neutral’, a-political) globalization. On the other hand, there is no doubt that this re-politicization must also affect the state insofar as the state, pace globalization, remains a central political actor. The state level is crucial for at least one more reason. It is recent developments at the state level that lead to what has been called a ‘de-democratizing’ or even ‘post-democratic’ direction, involving a considerable weakening and trivialization of democracy. Many analysts have diagnosed a generalized malaise in ‘consolidated’ liberal democracies (Gowan, p. 90, [33]). This state has been very well described by Philippe Schmitter: ‘Privatization of public enterprises; removal of state regulations; liberalization of financial flows … enhancement of the power of ‘‘neutral technical’’ institutions, like central banks, at the expense of ‘‘biased political’’ ones – all these modifications have two features in common: 1). They diminish popular expectations from public choices, and 2). They make it harder to assemble majorities to overcome the resistance of minorities, especially wellentrenched and privileged ones’. Schmitter calls this trend ‘dedemocratization’: ‘whether this process of dedemocratization can continue is, of course, the allimportant question. Its justification rests almost exclusively on the superior economic performance that is supposed to accrue to a liberalized system of production and distribution – along with the deliberate effort to foster a strong normative rejection of politics as such’.18 If this trend, a trend very much linked to 18

Gowan, p. 91. Needless to say, this ‘superior economic performance’ is far from proven or certain; indeed it is arguably non-existent in a variety of crucial contexts. Consider, for example, the failure of the privatization of railways in Britain and the recent and quite ‘spectacular’ collapse of Railtrack. It is true, nevertheless, that for the last decades the democratic left has been unable to resist a trend that pushes discussions on equality and freedom to the limelight and introduces ‘growth’ and ‘economic performance’ as the principal values of the West; what is most important here is that these values are not understood as discursive constructions but as neutral, naturalized criteria that override all other social and political considerations. As a result, growth and affluence are situated beyond political debate and the only question remaining is the extent to which other values and regulative principles are still compatible with the ‘irresistible’ appeal of market ideals (Tsoukalas, pp. 26-29, [34]). A similar problem exists with notions of ‘security’ which increasingly locate themselves in an objective de-politicized state beyond political debate and democratic control. However, these two trends, the elevation of notions of progress/growth/performance and security to overriding principles is not something new; it is a defining characteristic of modernity together with the axes of equality and freedom. After all Hobbes is one of the founders of modern political thought and, as Foucault has pointed out, post-eighteenth century society can be described as a ‘society of security’ (Campbell, p. 202, [35]): ‘it is security, then, which furnishes the foundation of the modern political subject’ (Campbell, p. 29, [36]). It is one of the consequences of risk society and of the globalization of risk now affecting not only our relation with the environment but all sorts of other areas, that it seems to signal the ‘end of growth’ and the ‘end of security’ as we knew

24 ARTICULATING NATURE

economic globalization, is consolidated it is very debatable to what extent action at the level of civil society will be able to reverse it. Some recent writings on ‘post-democracy’ are also relevant in this respect. If Ranciere has used the term ‘post-democracy’ in quite an abstract way (Ranciere, p. 177, [37]), Colin Crouch has introduced a much more concrete conception which is directly relevant to our discussion. For Crouch, post-democracy refers to a system of governance in which ‘while elections certainly exist and can change governments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professionals expert in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues selected by those teams. The mass of the citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to the signals given them. Behind this spectacle of the electoral game politics is really shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites which overwhelmingly represent business interests’ (Crouch, p.2, [38]). Faced with such a prospect, one can only hope that risk society and the challenge of constructionism will help channel a multitude of forces into a re-politicizing struggle capable of re-invigorating our democratic ethos. As Alan Finlayson has put it, it is quite important today even ‘to simply be political; to keep open spaces for contestation and challenge the hypnotic effect of discources of inevitability and the managerialist politics they legitimise’ (Finlayson, p. 1, [39]). What is crucial is the breaking up of the monopolies of knowledge and certainty, the dislocation of everything sustaining political inevitability and the opening of the discussion to intelligent new proposals that challenge current policies from within.19 It is imperative for contemporary societies to prepare for this task since the proliferation of dislocations and risks in the twenty first century will, no doubt, test their rensponsiveness. Such a struggle also has to encompass the sphere of the economy, something that risk theorists and some of the liberal supporters of civil society are not always keen to acknowledge. Here one has to agree with Zizek that what risk theory reveals is a very precisely defined domain within which risks are produced: ‘the domain of the uncontrolled use of science and technology in the conditions of capitalism’ (Zizek, p. 350, [23]). No doubt the paradigmatic case of risk is that of a new scientific invention or technological advance which is put to use by a private corporation (usually in agreement with the state) without proper public democratic debate and control, ‘then generating the spectre of unforseen catastrophic long-term them, as neutralized principles. The question for the democratic left is not, however, to attack these considerations – that would be impossible and even undesirable - but to arrive at a progressive, political articulation between equality, freedom, security and prosperity seen as social constructions through which humans negotiate a ‘risky’ life within a radicalized democratic framework. 19 At the socio-economic level proposals such as the adoption of a 35-hour week and of a tax that could be imposed on global financial flows (the so-called Tobin tax) are moves in the right direction. Also consider, in this respect, the ‘socialization’ and ‘democratization’ of control of the various pension funds (the so-called gray capitalism sector) now managed by financial corporations ‘in the name’ of the alienated stakeholders, discussed by Robin Blackburn (Blackburn, [40]).

Y. STAVRAKAKIS 25

consequences’ (p. 350). In that sense Zizek is right when arguing that repoliticization has to apply to the whole framework of market relations and ‘depoliticized’ global capitalism, something that risk theorists often stop short of accepting (p. 351). On the other hand however, one should be aware of the danger of wholly attributing risk – an ‘ontological’ condition of human decision making to capitalism. Such a view can lead to the fantasy that without capitalism there is no risk in human decisions. In The Ticklish Subject Zizek is very close to adopting such a position although he himself points out that the gap between knowledge and decision (which marks risk society) ‘was there all the time’ (p. 337) and thus (this is our conclusion) is not going to be fully resolved in any kind of post- or lesscapitalist society.20 From a discursive constructionist point of view, it is this impossibility that renders risk a truly political challenge for our societies. There is no doubt that today we are only starting to feel the deeply disruptive and unsettling effects of risk society. It would be extremely shortsighted to ignore the proliferating rhythm at which one risk follows another (from the various food scares to bio-terrorism). But these disruptive moments are also moments calling for our action. Here it is worth considering the lesson from responding to famine: when faced with pictures of hunger ‘people respond. That response is often a call to ethico-political action that goes beyond the technical, depoliticized practices of aid’ (Edkins, p. 103, [28]). Even the Band Aid movement in the 1980s and the Live Aid events, at least initially, re-politicized the issue of famine, exhibiting an almost subversive potential (pp. 121-122). Responding to such events is not always following such a direction but the course taken is always influenced by our action. What is certain is that disruptive events, encounters with the real, call for new symbolizations; it is important to make sure that new symbolizations will take place within an atmosphere and an institutional setting of radicalized and informed democracy. However, we should also keep in mind that even the most subversive attempt at re-politicization always tends to be co-opted or incorporated into the status-quo; this is an inescapable – ontological - reality. Edkins’ aforementioned book examines a series of re-politicization attempts (both theoretical, notably in the work of Amartya Sen, and empirical, as in the Band Aid movement) and their eventual ‘incorporation and institutionalization’ (Edkins, p. xix, [28]) Her conclusion is clear: re-politicization should not be viewed as a ‘once and for all process, but a continuing commitment’ (p. 159), a sort of permanent democratic 20

Our argument here is very close to Laclau’s (post) Marxist argument in New Reflections regarding the role of dislocation in human history. Although, for Laclau, all history is marked by a succession of dislocatory events (leading to a continuous re-articulation of identities and social constructions of objectivity), capitalist societies are characterized by a proliferation of dislocations, by the ‘generalization of dislocatory relations’, by an ‘uncontrolled dislocatory rhythm’. This development is both negative (since dislocations disrupt social and psychical life) but also positive: ‘the accelerated tempo of social transformation and the continual rearticulatory interventions the latter demands lead to a higher awareness of historicity’, to a ‘clear awareness of the constitutive contingency’ of discourse, showing more clearly the historicity of being of objects and thus opening ‘new possibilities for historical action’ (Laclau, p. 39, [41]).

26 ARTICULATING NATURE

revolution. What is crucial, from our point of view, is that democracy provides an institutional setting that encourages this continuous politicization and repoliticization. This also clarifies the role intellectuals have in a democracy: to ‘repoliticize’ (Edkins, p. 59, [27]). Their role is to challenge the repression of the political that naturalizes a contingent political order and legitimizes the technologies of governance sustaining it. 6.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, let me briefly summarize the argument put forward here. What I tried to do in this paper was first to present the outline of a discursive approach to the epistemological and theoretical problems surrounding the issue of representing and articulating the natural environment. However, the relevance of this constructionist framework is by no means limited to the field of representations of the environment.21 The numerous signs of the passage to what Ulrich Beck calls ‘risk society’ reveal that human knowledge and certainty are always constructed at the discursive level. What we accept as (objective) reality – a reality often invested with fantasies of safety and security - is nothing but a discursive articulation with limited duration. Reality is always constructed at the level of discourse and meaning. In that sense discursive constructionism is clearly opposed to any objectivist essentialism and manages to respond in a more satisfactory way to the challenges for our theorization posed by risk society. I have also tried, using a multitude of theoretical interventions, to distinguish discursive constructionism from a relativist, even solipsist, post-modernism, which seems to question the existence of the real. A constrained, political constructionism has to conclude that although the natural existence of the real cannot be mirrored in its discursive being, it nevertheless interacts with discursive reality: it imposes limits onto discursive reality, continuously disrupts and distorts the discursive field. It follows that acknowledging this constitutive deficiency of our discursive attempts to represent the real and drawing the ethical implications of such a standpoint becomes one of the most urgent tasks in our societies. Such a task also entails assuming the political challenge of political constructionism: the need for a re-politicization of decision-making and for a deepening of democracy. The only way to defend politics and democracy today is to challenge post-democratic trends whenever the (numerous and heterogeneous) dislocations, the risks, they produce open – even momentarily – the space for contestation, political antagonism (outside the neoliberal consensus) and the articulation (the socio-political construction) of progressive alternative global futures.22

21

For example, consider the importance of the problematic of risk and danger in foreign policy, discussed in Campbell [35]. 22 Also see in this respect, Tsoukalas, p. 41-44, [34].

Y. STAVRAKAKIS 27

REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

The Royal Society: Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management, Report of a Royal Society Study Group. The Royal Society, London. Pecheux, M.: Discourse: Structure or Event?. Nelson, C. and Grossberg, L. (eds.): Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Macmillan, London, 1988. Laclau, E. & Mouffe, Ch.: Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Verso, London, 1985, Laclau, E.: Discourse. Goodin, R. & Pettit, Ph. (eds): Blackwell’s Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Blackwell, Oxford, 1995. Howarth, D. & Stavrakakis, Y.: Introduction to Discourse Theory and Political Analysis. Howarth, D., Norval, A. & Stavrakakis, Y. (eds): Discourse Theory and Political Analysis. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000. Berlin, I.: The Roots of Romanticism. Pimlico, London, 2000 Kuhn, T. Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1962. Delanty, G.: Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism. Open University Press, Buckingham, 1997. Beck, Ulrich: The Reinvention of Politics. Livanis, Athens, (in Greek), 1996. Gulbenkian Commission: Open the Social Sciences. EKKE, Athens, (in Greek), 1998. Sarbin, Th. & Kitsuse, J.: A Prologue to Constructing the Social. Sarbin, Th. & Kitsuse, J. (eds.): Constructing the Social. Sage, London, 1994. Lynch, M.: Towards a Constructivist Genealogy of Social Constructivism. Velody, I. & Williams, R. (eds.): The Politics of Constructionism. Sage, London, 1998. Burr, V.: An Introduction to Social Constructionism. Routledge, London, 1995. Laclau, E. & Mouffe, Ch.: Post-Marxism Without Apologies. Laclau, E.: New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time. Verso, London, 1990. Stavrakakis, Y.: Lacan and the Political. Routledge, London, 1999. Velody, I. & Williams, R. (eds): The Politics of Constructionism. Sage, London, 1998. Castoriadis, C.: The Imaginary Institution of Society. Rappas, Athens, (in Greek), 1985. Hayles, K.: Searching for Common Ground. Soule, M. & Lease, G. (eds.): Reinventing Nature? Responses to Postmodern Deconstruction. Island Press, Washington, 1995. Stavrakakis, Y.: Theory and Experience: The Lacanian Negotiation of a Constitutive Tension. Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society 4, 2 (1999), pp. 146-150. Lacoue-Labarthe, Ph. & Nancy, J.-L.: Retreating the Political. Routledge, London, 1997. Beck, U.: The Reinvention of Politics. Polity, Cambridge, 1997. Stavrakakis, Y.: Nature and Scientific Discourse in Modern Society: The Constructionist Argument. Georgiadou, V., Louloudis, L. & Stavrakakis, Y.:

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23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

Nature, Society, Science in the Mad Cow Age: Risk and Uncertainty. Nefeli, Athens, (in Greek), 1999. Zizek, Sl.: The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. Verso, London, 1999. Grove-White, R.: Environment, Risk and Democracy. Jacobs, M. (ed.): Greening the Millennium?. Blackwell/The Political Quarterly, London, 1997. Osborne, P.: Radicalism and Philosophy. Radical Philosophy, 103 (2000). Ranciere, J.: On the Shores of Politics. Verso, London, 1995. Edkins, J.: Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In. ynne Rienner, Boulder, 1999. Edkins, J.: Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000 Mouffe, Ch.: The Return of the Political. Verso, London, 1993. Lefort, C.: Democracy and Political Theory. Polity, Cambridge, 1988. De Vos, P.: The Sacralisation of Consensus and the Rise of Right-wing Populism: The Case of the Vlaams Blok. Unpublished manuscript, 2001. Mouffe, Ch.: The Democratic Paradox, Verso, London, 2000. Gowan, P.: Watchdogs of a Liberal Peace. New Left Review, 11 (Second Series), 2001. Tsoukalas, C.: Prolegomena. Bobbio, N.: Right and Left. Polis, Athens, (in Greek), 1995. Campbell, D.: Writing Security. Revised edition. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998. Campbell, D. & Dillon, M.: The End of Philosophy and the End of International Relations. Campbell, D. & Dillon, M. (eds): The Political Subject of Violence, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993. Ranciere, J.: Post-democracy, Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Jacques Ranciere. Angelaki, 1:3, 1995 Crouch, C.: Coping with Post-democracy. The Fabian Society, London, 2000. Finlayson, A.: Editorial. Newslettter of the Post-structuralism and Radical Politics Specialist Group of the PSA, 2, (http://homepages.gold.ac.uk/psrpsg/). Blackburn, R.: The New Collectivism: Pension Reform, Grey Capitalism and Complex Socialism. New Left Review, 233, 1999. Laclau, E.: New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time. Verso, London, 1990.

Chapter 2 Risk Society at Europe’s Periphery? 1The Case of the Bergama Resistance in Turkey Murat Arsel Cambridge University, U.K.

1. INTRODUCTION Since the publication of Ulrich Beck’s Risikogesellschaft in 1986, the study of environmental risk has received a great deal of attention from social scientists (Beck, [1]; [2]; [3]). This interest is not merely an academic affair. From Chernobyl to BSE, recent environmental threats in developed states have brought the debate to the masses (Irwin, [4]). Jasanoff argues that “[i]n the world’s industrial nations, ‘risk’ has become the organizing concept that gives meaning and direction to environmental regulation” (Jasanoff, p.135, original emphasis, [5]). Interest in environmental regulation and risk perception has largely focused on developed nations in Western Europe (Blowers, [6]). However, a review of current literature shows limited applications to the developing world. This paper aims to redress this imbalance by critically examining aspects of an ongoing environmental dispute in Bergama, Turkey. At the heart of this case is the Eurogold Corporation, a subsidiary of the Australian Normandy Mining Limited2, and its plan to extract gold through a controversial cyanide-leaching process. Peasants from villages surrounding the mine have mobilized a potent force against Eurogold based on risks to public health, the agricultural economy, and the ecological integrity of the region. The Turkish state is caught between these two sides, loath to alienate either the much-needed foreign investor or the increasingly valiant civil society.3 This case is particularly relevant 1

I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Newmont (http://www.newmont.com), an American mining company, acquired Normandy (http://www.normandymining.com) and all of its operations in February 2002. With the addition of Franco-Nevada Mining Corporation Limited (http://www.franco-nevada.com), Newmont has become the world’s largest mining corporation (measured by pre-tax income) and controls the largest share in international gold production and reserves. 3 The data used in this chapter comes from over six months of in situ fieldwork in Bergama. In addition to the collection of governmental and secondary literature, interviews were conducted with movement leaders in Bergama and villages, activists, members of the general public in Bergama city and surrounding villages, Eurogold executives and employees, civil servants employed in various governmental positions, elected officials of past and present municipal governments, political party representatives, trade and professional union representatives, local businesspersons and a member of the Turkish parliament from Bergama. These interviews were often semi-structured, though in certain cases structured interviews and free-flow conversations were utilized. Moreover, focus groups and participant observation provided key insights in village settings. The author, a Turkish Cypriot male, conducted the 2

30 RISK SOCIETY AT EUROPE’S PERIPHERY? THE CASE OF THE BERGAMA RESISTANCE IN TURKEY

for a risk society approach as it parallels other documented cases in Western Europe where risk has formed the discursive backbone of the conflict (see, for instance, Wynne, [7] and Irwin et al., [8]). The aim here is not to test the validity of the risk society thesis in non-Western European societies. Such an approach is of limited theoretical value and provides very little insight into our understanding of the Bergama resistance. Instead, this chapter seeks to initiate a dialogue between what is essentially a Western European theory and a society at the Southeastern periphery of the continent. This is accomplished by documenting the discursive construction of the Bergama movement, paying particular attention to its key metaphor, its policy aims, and the underlying political dynamics. The aim is to see whether an encounter between the theory of a risk society and the empirical evidence from Bergama can be used in a mutually constructive way. While most of the necessary empirical evidence comes from the experience of Bergama peasants, the particular socioeconomic, political, and geographical location of Turkey is an essential component of the ensuing analysis. Literally bridging Europe and Asia, Turkey challenges most commonly accepted categories in the social sciences, making such divisions as East-West, North-South, developeddeveloping, and traditional-modern seem confusing at best and irrelevant at worst. This ambiguous position presents a propitious location for stretching the geographical and conceptual boundaries of the study of risk. The following section provides an empirical account of the Bergama movement followed by a brief theoretical assessment of Beck’s risk society thesis. The fourth section documents the “discursive construction of a social movement. A discussion of the political implications of this movement is followed by concluding remarks. 2. BERGAMA The city of Bergama is the fifth most visited tourist destination in Turkey and is surrounded by fertile agricultural lands. Bergama’s mining woes date back to 1989, when Eurogold Madencilik A.S. began exploring for gold in the region. The company was created by a group of international mining establishments. Normandy Mining Limited, initially the majority shareholder, has recently acquired full ownership of Eurogold. Normandy is Australia’s largest gold producer and has mining concessions in 14 other countries, including Canada, the Ivory Coast and Greece. In addition to Bergama, Eurogold plans to initiate similar operations at other locations in Turkey. Initial results of Eurogold explorations revealed commercially viable gold deposits in the region surrounded by the villages of Çamköy, Narlica and Ovacik. Although national and local agencies had guidelines for such investments, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports were, at that time, not legally interviews in Turkish. A Turkish female research assistant was employed to ensure maximum possible input from local peasant women.

M. ARSEL 31

required. Eurogold nevertheless commissioned an Ege University scientist to prepare an EIA report, obtaining the necessary permits by 1992. The plans envisaged an eight-year operation, which would include surface and underground mining. Tests indicated approximately 9 grams of gold in 1 ton of ore. Extracting gold from such deposits requires a chemical process called ‘cyanide leaching’. This process relies on the unique properties of sodium cyanide to separate minute quantities of gold from massive quantities of soil and rock. Once gold is taken out, the remaining mixture of sodium cyanide, heavy metals and sludge needs 4 to be rendered environmentally harmless. Eurogold proposed to build a tailings pond within the site to collect the potentially dangerous mixture. While clay and man-made materials lining the pond would prevent leakage, exposure to sun and open air would break down sodium cyanide into safer compounds. 2.1 CYANIDE DEATH? Unsurprisingly, Bergama and its constituent villages received the news of gold with joy. Eurogold received a warm welcome and faced no resistance from the local population, bureaucratic circles or local politicians. As the Bergama Directorate of Forestry swiftly granted the necessary permission to mine on its property, the company also purchased land from the local population. As Eurogold prepared for construction, however, the first seeds of doubt were planted in the region. Two incidents during the early stages of mine construction caused much confusion. First, during exploratory drilling around the site, local water supplies were polluted. Although Eurogold pronounced the compound harmless, the sight of water turning milky and oily horrified the villagers. Several people received hospital treatment for upset stomachs and headaches. This was followed by controlled explosions within the site. Many families from the villages of Ovacik and Çamköy reported large cracks in their houses. One woman attributed her miscarriage to the explosions. Eurogold once again protested its innocence. In 1993, a group of environmentalist lawyers from Izmir took up the case5. In the ensuing legal struggle, they filed lawsuits on behalf of 582 villagers at courts in Bergama, Izmir and Ankara, mostly without success. In 1994, Eurogold felled 2500 trees within the site. Enraged villagers intensified their protests. Demonstrations were held on the Bosphorus Bridge in Istanbul and outside the Turkish parliament in Ankara. In Bergama, they blockaded a highway, occupied the mine, and organized an international youth meeting to further their cause. While the anti-Eurogold movement was a collective affair, local politician, activist and former mayor Sefa Taskin played a pivotal role in the struggle by commanding resources of the Bergama municipality, as well as bringing valuable public relations experience he gained during his unsuccessful bid to return the Zeus Altar to Bergama from a museum in Berlin. 4

For a comprehensive scientific treatment of gold, see Schmidbaur [9]. Most prominent of them were Noyan Ozkan, the current president of Izmir Bar Association, and Senih Ozay.

5

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2.2 ENVIRONMENTALIST CONCERNS Several risks motivated opposition to the gold mine. Primacy has been given to the risk of discharge from the tailings pond. Opponents argue that this would release potentially toxic levels of cyanide compounds and heavy metals into the underground water reserves on which locals depend for daily consumption and agricultural irrigation. They are wary of the possibility of leakage through the lining, and question the quality of materials used in constructing the pond. They also draw attention the earthquake and flood prone nature of the region. Even if discharges are prevented, some environmentalists argue noxious cyanidebased gases could be emitted during the extraction process or from the tailings pond. Both require constant monitoring for pH and other weather-sensitive indicators. A potential mishap may threaten the local vegetation, wildlife and population. Another potential route for cyanide exposure may come from the transportation and storage of the chemical. Eurogold plans to use approximately 300 tons of sodium cyanide a year in Bergama, which would require regular shipments of new supplies to and storage at the site. Villagers fear road accidents en route to Bergama or an accident during storage that would release the toxic chemical into the environment. Three further issues elicit their concern. First is the release of dust from grinding processes. This may prove a nuisance as well as a health hazard. Second, daily blasts would threaten surrounding structures and create noise pollution. The third arises from the site’s eventual rehabilitation. Villagers express their concern regarding the aesthetic damage caused to the region. More importantly, however, they worry about the long-term implications of the tailings pond, which will be covered and sealed off after operations are concluded. The Bakircay River Catchment grows the highest quality cotton in Turkey, as well as olives, tobacco, sunflowers, and other seasonal produce. While Bergama proper is the region’s commercial hub and home to the ancient city of Pergamon, the surrounding villagers are largely dependent on agriculture, which not only provides local jobs but also seasonal employment for migrant workers. In short, opponents question the wisdom of threatening the rich agricultural resources and the natural beauty of the region, let alone human life, for an economic activity limited to eight years. 2.3 ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS Eurogold has responded in an attempt to assuage the fears of the local population. The site, now fully built and ready for operation, has received numerous additions and improvements over time. The company insists cyanide leaching is a century-old technique with a proven safety record. Moreover, they exemplify numerous other economic activities, ranging from photography to textiles, which use 2500-3000 tons of sodium cyanide every year in Turkey.

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In addition to the tailings pond, the site is now fully equipped with the INCO process, which breaks cyanide into safer compounds. Eurogold claims Bergama is the only gold mine in the world equipped with both the chemical (INCO SO2) and natural (tailings pond) cyanide elimination processes. Furthermore, Eurogold tests indicate only a low-level presence of heavy metals in the region. They claim the tailings pond can withstand an earthquake of 9 on the Richter scale, and the site is protected with flood-preventing mechanisms. The company also guarantees one hundred percent rehabilitation of the site. Eurogold also promises to take strict precautions in transporting, handling and storing sodium cyanide, to prevent excessive release of dust, and to minimize disturbance from daily explosions. The company has recently changed its management. While earlier teams were composed of foreign expatriates with no knowledge of Turkish, the current team is largely made up of Turkish managers with extensive domestic and international experience. Eurogold believes Bergama stands to benefit greatly from the mine, both economically and socially. In addition, they draw attention to the potential economic gains to the Turkish economy if gold mining were to reach its full potential nationwide. 2.4 LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS Amid these debates, the Bergama case eventually reached the Turkish High Court, Danistay. In a landmark ruling the judges sided with the environmentalists, effectively prohibiting mining in Bergama. Citing Article 57 of the Turkish Constitution, they based their arguments on citizens’ right to living in a safe and sound environment. Furthermore, the final report found potential hazards from the mine impossible to eliminate through procedural improvements or out of good will. Environmentalists everywhere in Turkey celebrated the ruling and pressured Eurogold to concede. As expected, the company appealed against the decision but failed to overturn it. For a brief period, the Bergama case seemed resolved, or at least dormant. The mine stayed intact, if not fully staffed, and tension remained low, in part due to the new management’s efforts. However, the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TÜBiTAK) released a controversial report in July 1999. The report, written at the behest of the Prime Minister’s office by a team of expert scientists, argued that Eurogold’s safety precautions in Bergama eliminated environmental and public health hazards completely and posed “zero risk”. The conclusions enraged environmental activists and created a peculiar situation where a state-sponsored scientific organization undermined the judiciary opinion. Some downplayed the move simply as ‘political’, while others believed science and reason had triumphed over misinformed environmentalists. Jubilated Eurogold executives felt they had been vindicated. Since then, the case has returned to the Turkish legal system and gone through another cycle of contradictory

34 RISK SOCIETY AT EUROPE’S PERIPHERY? THE CASE OF THE BERGAMA RESISTANCE IN TURKEY

decisions. However, following the two major financial crises in Turkey, coupled with the devastating earthquake in 1999, the current government strengthened its position regarding the need for foreign direct investment, and environmental activists found it difficult to counter Eurogold’s rhetoric based on economic development. The company was given a trial-permit for 12 months in April 2000, which has now been extended indefinitely. Protesters have launched a fresh legal campaign and the dispute continues. 3. RISK SOCIETY Enlightenment philosophy envisioned the human species standing above and beyond the natural environment, controlling and transforming it with ever more sophisticated technological and scientific innovations, and channeling its resources into the betterment of human condition. This romanticized notion of progress, built on the belief of an indestructible nature and infallible human thinking, found its most recent criticism in the risk society thesis (Beck, [10]; [3]). For Beck “[risk] society means an epoch in which the dark sides of progress increasingly come to dominate social debate” (Beck, p.2). This debate takes place in an “age of catastrophe” and is essentially about the “impending ‘suicide of the species’” (Beck, p.40, [11]). Since, Beck’s ideas are complex and full of contradictions. Next, I will only consider the core notions of his ‘risk society’ thesis. Risk society is an amalgamation of three interrelated and concomitant developments in Western European societies. First, Beck argues that ecological risks of industrial processes have undergone a categorical change. This has led to a qualitatively new and heightened awareness of risks, ushering a new era built on insecurity and uncertainty. Second, the transition from industrial to risk society upsets the traditional dynamics and meanings of work, family life and identity. Third, because of the first two, scientific and technological institutions and their regulators receive a societal dressing down (Irwin). The transformation of dangers and hazards into predictable yet unpreventable risks, especially within the ecological context, forms the basis of Beck’s risk society. These risks are qualitatively different to those threatening industrial societies. Using nuclear technology as an example, Beck argues that late modernity is characterized by enormous risks that have no spatial, societal, or even temporal boundaries. While he refuses to put an analytical fence around the exact definition of these risks, Beck’s formulation is most convincing when applied to nuclear technologies. A nuclear accident such as the failure at Chernobyl threatens entire societies, rich and poor alike, those within its proximity as well as others in far away regions. Worse still, as Beck argues, “the injured of Chernobyl…are not even born yet’ (Beck, p.31, [11]). Beck locates this transition in a three-stage societal development trajectory: pre-industrial society, industrial society, and risk society. In pre-industrial societies, risk comes predominantly in the shape of natural processes with localized impacts such as earthquakes and floods. They come about independently of individual or

M. ARSEL 35

societal decisions, and their genesis is seen as an external or supernatural development that can only be solved or mitigated by the same powers. Risks in the industrial society have different origins, consequences and characteristics. Individual decisions and social forces alike can create risks threatening these societies. New institutions and regulatory mechanisms are put in place to minimize, regulate and mitigate the impacts of these risks. The creation of the insurance industry is realized through the systemic study of risks, making it possible not only to identify the culpable parties but also to calculate with reasonable accuracy the significance and incidence of risks. With the onset of the risk society, argues Beck, the powers unleashed in the Enlightenment era for human progress escape control and create incalculable and unpredictable risks (Goldblatt, [12]). Immanent within Beck’s depiction of the ecological risks are two structural changes of the capitalist mode of production and distribution. In industrial societies, social conflict arises from the distribution of goods. Underproduction creates tension between the haves and have-nots. However, in risk society, the goods are laced with myriad risks and become ‘bads’. Increased output does not solve the distribution problem; in fact, it worsens it. The central organizational problem of the risk society is how to minimize the distribution of risks. The problematic undersupply of material goods suddenly transforms into an overproduction of risks. Similarly, there exists a reasonably clear division between material wealth and protection from risks in industrial societies. With the onset of new age risks, this division disappears and class positions become irrelevant to the distribution of risks. Science and technology are heavily implicated in this state of affairs. They are not only at the root of modern risks but are also essential for risk detection and mediation. The ontological skepticism of modern science, which enabled the detailed probing of all aspects of nature, finally turns its gaze onto itself. In risk society, it is science and scientists themselves that are under the microscope (Peet, [13]). Regulatory bodies, from academic institutions to governmental committees, fail to adequately comprehend and harness the risks unleashed by modern technologies. Nuclear power generation, for instance, was deemed perfectly safe by all parties involved in its design and implementation. With high profile failures such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, public trust in scientists and regulatory bodies also falters. Parallel to the changing societal patterns of risk creation and perception, individuals living in the risk society experience “personal and biographical” risks of their own. Beck unites these two processes under the concept of ‘reflexive modernization’. In the industrial society, the powers of modernization are unleashed on the external world. The risk society sees these powers turning inward. Through reflexivity, society begins to question itself and its institutions. For the individual, this means renegotiating traditional gender roles, family structures and class solidarities. Beck credits these changes with bringing about the rapid rise of environmental activism and identity politics. Beck and others have significantly developed and changed these ideas since the publication of “Risk Society” in 1986. The idea received widespread attention in Western Europe, though it also found currency with the scholars focusing on North

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America. What has been conspicuously missing, however, is a theoretical appraisal and practical application of Beck’s thesis from a developing society perspective. An orthodox interpretation of the risk society would disqualify such an endeavor by arguing that most developing societies have yet to completely their transition from preindustrial to industrial. However, a more nuanced understanding of modern risks, especially in the context of a globalized world lends credence to this project. Two empirical observations set the stage for this encounter. Firstly, the dominance of capitalism has not only linked world societies together in strong economic ties but also created dynamic cultural networks that span the entire globe. The world has indeed become a ‘global village.’6 Secondly, although the post World War II era has brought absolute improvements in economic development for most societies, globalization has done very little to change the geography of the international distribution of wealth. Despite its ‘borderline’ status, Turkey is, and has been for at least a century, comparatively poorer than most Western European states. The salience of these observations is demonstrated by the Chernobyl accident. The question arises as to how, if at all, the Turkish and German experiences of the political and environmental fallout differed, given their roughly equidistant locations from the Ukrainian power plant. For Beck, Chernobyl is a critical milestone towards the German transformation from the industrial society to the risk society. The experience of Chernobyl has permanently transformed the German outlook on modernity, bureaucracy and the twin engines of progress, science and technology. No such account, theoretical or otherwise, exists for Turkey or any other society of a similar economic and political condition7. Applications of Beck’s ideas to peripheral contexts have finally taken root amongst environmental social scientists. In most cases, the risk society thesis is used in conjunction with Arthur Mol’s “ecological modernization theory” (Mol, [14]; Mol and Sonnenfeld, [15]). In an early example, Maurie Cohen combined these two theories within a global environment-development trajectory to question whether the risk society is an inevitable end for all states and to hypothesize possible alternatives for developing societies (Cohen, [16]). The risk society thesis has also been applied to two Eastern European nations. Focusing on the Lithuanian experience, Rinkevicius ([17]) develops the concept of ‘double-risk’ societies, where ecological risks are coupled with socioeconomic uncertainties of transitional economies. Yanitsky ([18]) finds that the risk society has only limited value for the Russian experience, since political and social disturbances negate major ecological concern.

6 For example, Bergama activists not only followed the news of a cyanide spill from the Baia Mare mine in Romania but also quickly reproduced newspaper reports, displaying them prominently in public places 7 Do cyanide related risks qualify as a ‘risk society’ phenomeonon? Yes, partly because it is not just the risk of cyanide that gave rise to the Bergama movement but previous failures, such as Chernobyl. Moreover, activists have constructed a narrative of large scale devastation. Regardless of the scientific accuracy of their claims, their understanding of the conflict has internal consistency and is in line with Beck’s definition of the risk society.

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Finally, in the context of India, Dwivedi ([19]) argues that “risk politics” are effective even in developing society contexts for environmental social movements. 4. DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BERGAMA MOVEMENT This section demonstrates how the peasant-activists have discursively constructed the Bergama movement. It makes clear how the discourse of risk informs the entire movement. The discussion could be broken down to three constitutive sections, each dealing with a different aspect of the concept of risk in Bergama. The first section looks at the key metaphor that informs and sustains the movement. The second section explores the larger policy implications of the movement. The final section identifies the underlying larger societal currents that the peasants refer to in justifying their movement. Prominently marching under the Bergama banner are a number of broad-based environmental NGOs, such as SOS Mediterranean and Greenpeace Turkey, several left-wing political groups from the extreme Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front to the moderate Freedom and Democracy Party, other single-issue environmentalist movements, including the anti-Akkuyu Nuclear Power Station movement, and political alliances such as the opposition to Multilateral Agreement on Investments. Professional organizations such as the Engineers and Architects’ Chamber and its specialized branches, particularly Environmental, Geological and Geophysical, Chemical, and Civil Engineers’ Chambers, Istanbul Union of Medical Practitioners’ Union, the Izmir Bar, as well as numerous university academics have actively taken part in the movement. However, the key constituency has always been the villagers of Bergama, in particular those nearest to the mine site. This article deals almost exclusively with the opinions expressed by the residents of these villages, while recognizing that their views have shown dynamism that reflects their continued engagement with the above listed groups. The discussion below uses a small sample of representative interviews to build a discursive skeleton of the movement8. “Dead don’t wear gold” The issue of cyanide leaching in Bergama is an extremely charged issue. For activist peasants Eurogold and its operations in the region signify certain, impending death and destruction. Discussions on the risks of cyanide leaching invoke many a cultural reference on cyanide-related death, ranging from the Holocaust to a spy from a James Bond movie that committed suicide with a cyanide-laced cigarette. Such exchanges go beyond the typical “what if?” position described in similar risk-related cases. That Eurogold’s operations will bring environmental catastrophe to Bergama is a foregone conclusion amongst the activists. Underlying this seemingly unshakable belief is a carefully articulated discursive strategy built upon two simple premises. 8

See Arsel ([21]) for an extensive study of the activist network and the entire data set utilized for this research.

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The first is a direct association of Eurogold and its operations with cyanide. This strategy has been so successful that Eurogold is now known as “siyanurcu sirket”, which means cyanide-using company. An often-repeated slogan in protest demonstrations is “Siyanurcu sirket, Turkiye’yi terket” (cyanide-using company, leave Turkey). The slogan is extremely effective and national newspapers and television broadcasters have adopted it uncritically. Similarly, former mayor of Bergama Sefa Taskin has published an investigative report on Normandy entitled “Siyanurcu Ahtapot” (Taskin, [20])9. It is not simply Eurogold that is tainted by the pejorative use of cyanide. Eurogold’s product also gets a bad press and is known as “siyanurlu altin”, i.e. cyanide-laden gold. At the height of the protests in 1997, hundreds of motor vehicles and shop fronts in Bergama prominently displayed a decal that read “siyanurlu altina hayir”10. This slogan is pervasive, and simply talking about the mine in Bergama can often create misunderstandings. For example, this extract is from an interview with a retired high school teacher, who professed a strong dislike of Eurogold: M.A.: …I am doing research about the mine, would you mind answering a few questions for me? Teacher: What mine? Do you mean granite? M.A.: Oh, no. I meant the gold mine…Eurogold, that is. Teacher: Ahhh…so you’re investigating the “siyanurlu altin” business. Sure. The second premise is the equation of cyanide with death. Here is an excerpt from a characteristically emotive argument against cyanide use: Huseyin11: Don’t you know the history of World War II? Nazis used cyanide to kill millions of Jews! M.A.: Yes…But the situation in Bergama is rather different, isn’t it? Huseyin: No, no, you don’t understand. Wherever cyanide was used in the world, it brought death and destruction. Just look at what happened in Romania… M.A.: Eurogold claims their technology is better and they promise [interrupted] Huseyin: We won’t be fooled by their promises. They will destroy us and the environment just to get the gold out. It is clear that among these activists cyanide is first and foremost an agent of death. Thus, Eurogold’s association with this compound renders the company extremely unpopular with the peasants. Yet the target of such rhetoric is not simply Eurogold or mining in general but the cyanide compound itself. Arguments raised by the peasants belie a sense of inevitability that posits the destructive capability of cyanide over the arguably beneficial properties that can be unleashed if skillfully 9

Tr.: Cyanide-octopus. Tr.: No to cyanide-laden gold. 11 Only some interviewees requested anonymity though I have made a decision to replace all names with pseudonyms to ensure maximum confidentiality and safety for the participants. 10

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managed. It does not matter why, where, by whom or to what purposes cyanide is utilized; peasants conjure visions of death and destruction from diverse sources, hence decontextualizing its destructive aspect. Divorced from technical, political and spatial specifics, gold’s association with an unmanageable and unpredictable chemical compound renders it synonymous with death and destruction. Activists find gold production and its promised riches irrelevant as they see a cyanide related disaster as an inevitable outcome. This sentiment is best captured in a popular slogan: “Dead don’t wear gold”12. In whose yard? The strong sentiment of fear associated with cyanide leaching unsurprisingly leads to an unequivocal demand to rid Bergama of the controversial chemical. However, the practical implications of this position are extremely complex and the policy vocabulary utilized by the activists reflects a sense of confusion. This is mainly because cyanide is ubiquitously used in Turkey, as it is around the world. Beyond the immediate goal of cyanide-free Bergama, peasants express conflicting opinions on the regulation of gold mining in general and cyanide use in particular. In order to understand how the metaphor of “cyanide death” translates into a specific policy, it is necessary to understand how the activists understand and speak about gold as an object, mining as an industrial activity, and gold mining as a specific instance when these two severely contested topics meet. We need to differentiate between the social and material production and reproduction of gold. Moreover, the specific cultural position of gold necessitates an independent understanding of gold mining from the mining industry in general. Gold plays an important role in Turkish culture. Especially in the relatively less developed rural regions, gold serves both as an ornament and an instrument for capital accumulation. This dual role of gold is best demonstrated at traditional village wedding ceremonies, where the bride receives wedding presents from family members and close friends in the form of gold accessories. Beyond their use as ornaments, these gifts provide the family a reserve of economic assets that can be liquidated in times of economic hardship. Also important to note is that wedding gifts of gold accessories usually remain under the control of women. Despite their vehement opposition to Eurogold, most activists hesitate to denounce the important role gold plays in their lives. Interviews reveal that although somewhat aware of the possible contradictions in their position, the activists continue to make use of gold as before, although there is anecdotal evidence that such use may have declined slightly. If there is any objection to gold among the activists, it remains at a muted symbolic level. For example, at the wedding reception of the daughter of a prominent leader in the movement, guests were invited not to give gifts of gold and yet such gifts were nevertheless accepted. Instead of displaying them prominently on the bride as the custom dictates, however, the gifts were kept in a black plastic bag throughout the ceremony. Such acts of

12

In Turkish: Oluler altin takmaz.

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protests remain rare, as a recent wedding ceremony observed in Pinarkoy showed that gold still remains the wedding present of choice amongst the villagers. It is clear that “green consumerism” is not an issue among the protesters. Instead, their demands remain strictly focused on the supply side of gold mining. This also gives credence to the argument that local agitation arises mainly from the symbolic properties of cyanide. Does this mean therefore that if environmentally sound ways of gold extraction would be accepted in Bergama? When asked whether he would end his opposition to Eurogold if they abandoned cyanide leaching, 24 year old Ali from Camkoy responds with a resounding yes. “Why would we stop them if they find a safe way to get the gold?out. We hear there are different ways to extract gold that are safe. They should use one of those or wait till they find a suitable one. If they can do this without harming anyone then we will be the first to support them.” This position is also consistent with the widespread acceptance of the mining industry in general. For instance, there is already an active granite mine north of Bergama which activists acknowledge as a valuable source of income for the region. There exists very little concern for the potential environmental damages from this mine and similarly most activists concur that mining its underground natural resources is the prerogative of any national economy. According to another peasant activist, Serhan, mining in general is largely desirable because “Turkey would reduce its dependence on foreign countries by extracting its natural resources.” Activists’ positions become more complex on the issue of cyanide leaching for gold elsewhere in Turkey. On the surface, their behavior transcends the traditional not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY). At the earlier stages of the movement’s development, a large number of activists traveled to the village of Dulkadiri in Eskisehir to learn more from their experience living near a mine using cyanide leaching. Dulkadiri has experienced a massive loss of population over time to emigration, as well as a significantly high incidence of cancer related deaths. Bergama activists have not only used this case to highlight their own plight but also offered their support to the residents of Dulkadiri. Similarly, key names in the Bergama struggle have played an important role in educating and organizing environmentalist movements in Esme where the TUPRAG corporation is planning to extract gold through cyanide-leaching. These and other alliances such as the Bergama-Akkuyu13 Alliance clearly demonstrate that Bergama is not simply another example of NIMBY. However, when analyzed in further detail, a different, somewhat contradictory picture emerges. This focus group discussion in Pinarkoy discussed the alternatives to cyanide leaching: M.A.: You are all against cyanide leaching in Bergama. But the Turkish government insists the country needs the income from such

13

Akkuyu is the site chosen for Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. However, recent economic crises have put the project on hold.

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mines. Can you think of a different strategy that will satisfy you and the government? Peasant1: They can dig up whatever they need and take it away on trucks. I don’t care where they take it, as long as they don’t bring cyanide to Bergama. Peasant2: Yes. Eurogold had told us before that they would help us set up a truckers’ cooperative. We had even started saving money for that. Then they decided to extract the gold in Bergama with cyanide. M.A.: Where would they take the ore? Peasant3: To Dikili [nearby shipping port]. M.A.: And from there? Peasant3: I don’t really know. I say they should take it to their country if they think cyanide is so safe. Or somewhere where there isn’t much to harm. The strong objection to cyanide use surfaces in this discussion as well. Moreover, mere extraction of the ore does not faze these discussants either. Their arguments show that other potential problems, such as noise and dust from the mine, could be tolerated as long as the threat of cyanide leakage is averted. Whether Eurogold takes the ore to “their country” or elsewhere for cyanide leaching remains a peripheral problem. When confronted with this issue, another discussant clarifies this position: Peasant4: Turn around and look at these lands. We grow the best cotton and olives in Turkey. It is so bountiful that we can plant it all year around. Why would you poison such a valuable resource? M.A.: If, for example, they discover gold in a really desolate and barren location in Turkey…would you still be against cyanide mining? Peasant4: No…but as long as it doesn’t harm the people. We don’t want another Dulkadiri. Peasant3: We are not against the development of our country. All we’re saying is we don’t want cyanide in Bergama. If they can do this without harming anyone elsewhere, then who are we to object? This rhetorical question reflects a strategically balanced pragmatism that characterizes the Bergama movement. Their stance is neither dogmatically environmental nor blindly developmental. It is evident that a healthy balance between public health and economic gains is what these activists seek. Further evidence of this pragmatism comes from activists’ views on cyanide use in other industries. The Turkish economy consumes around 2500 tons of sodium cyanide a year among textiles, jewelry and photography. Though much publicized by Eurogold, this fact does not seem to affect the opinion in Bergama. “So what?” argues Mehmet, a vocal opponent of Eurogold. “If other industries can use cyanide safely, that's their business. All we’re saying is we don’t trust them with our safety here.” On the surface the Bergama activists seem to contradict themselves with their total rejection of cyanide leaching in Bergama and somewhat permissive stance

42 RISK SOCIETY AT EUROPE’S PERIPHERY? THE CASE OF THE BERGAMA RESISTANCE IN TURKEY

toward cyanide use in certain industries or cyanide leaching in desolate, unpopulated areas. While this contradiction cannot be resolved fully, a careful reading of the evidence suggests a possible explanation that permits such discrepancies in policy recommendations. The movement is as much about preserving ecological integrity as it is about protecting public health or maintaining economic livelihood. This is not to suggest that the activists do not, or cannot, as post-materialists would suggest, care for the environment. Contrarily activists praise the natural beauty, excellent weather and clean air of the region and are aware that such resources should not be taken for granted. However, this conservationist ethic is tempered by their desire to further human development, which they believe can only be accomplished through agriculture and tourism in Bergama. Like the peasant activist quoted above, all activists are extremely proud of their produce and very protective of their key resources, which they see as fertile lands and fair climate. If such paths to development are unavailable, however, it is clear that a trade-off could be accepted as long as risks to public health were adequately managed. Taking care of business? Returning to Mehmet’s “We don’t trust them with our safety here”, it is crucial to understand who “them” refers to and why they are not to be trusted. Understanding this lack of trust is key to explaining why Bergama resistance has come about. As the discussion below makes clear, there are deeper political concerns that underscore the peasant sentiments on business and governmental regulation. At the surface, Eurogold takes the brunt of activists’ criticism. Although both Eurogold and activists agree that initially there existed a mutually beneficial and warm relationship between the sides, this has deteriorated greatly over time. For the last several years, Eurogold has been barred from entering activist villages, especially Camkoy, Pinarkoy and Narlica. In a few instances where Eurogold has crossed the invisible boundary they were met with violent confrontation. At the heart of activists’ strong antipathy toward against Eurogold lies a sense of distrust and betrayal. A prominent activist from Camkoy demonstrates how ingrained these feelings have become when he says, “If Eurogold proclaimed that Allah was the one and only god, I wouldn’t believe that either.” The reasons behind the failure of Eurogold to win or sustain local support lies in their policies from their arrival in Bergama to 1996, when the entire management structure was replaced for the fourth time. Foreign expatriates who had almost no command of Turkish language or understanding of the local culture staffed the first three management cadres almost entirely. Their efforts to win over the debate, ranging from handing out chocolate outside mosques to providing free food during the month of Ramadan, displayed an incredibly naïveté and arrogance. There are also widespread allegations of bribing and unfair dealings in the community. Such failures, which are also acknowledged by the current senior management, and their insistence on cyanide leaching have made Eurogold an extremely unpopular company amongst the activists.

M. ARSEL 43

However, beneath this veneer of anti-Eurogold rhetoric lie systemic problems symptomatic of contemporary Turkey. A prominent activist from the apportions the blame as follows: M.A.: Have you had much contact with various branches of the state? For example, the Ministry of Environment or Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources? Turgay: Yes, there were several bureaucrats from the Ministry of Environment. There is a lot of political scrambling about the mine, so a lot of bureaucrats and politicians visit these villages. M.A.: What is their response to your worries, especially about cyanide? Turgay: Most of them agree with us when they’re here. Then they go back to Ankara and change their tune. Nobody in these villages trusts politicians. Politicians only have one thing in mind… M.A.: What’s that? Turgay: Their self-interest. Such opinions are prevalent amongst the majority of ordinary Turks, not simply the activist peasants of Bergama. Politicians and state bureaucrats consistently rank poorly on confidence polls, which are invariably topped by the military. This lack of confidence is experienced at two levels, state functions and political governance, which are intricately linked in Turkey although a constitutional requirement for the separation of powers exists. Elected officials influence state functions through a variety of means, ranging from cronyism to indirect pressure. Activists frequently speak of “Ankara”, grouping together politicians and bureaucrats. In this political climate, environmentalism is not simply about ecological integrity or public health. A challenge to state policies does not simply signify dissatisfaction with policy choices but questions the validity of the institutions or individuals who are behind them. In other words, the debate is not solely based on the validity of policy recommendations but rather the legitimacy of those behind them. Thus, Bergama activists call for nothing short of radical reformation of “Ankara”. A middle school teacher who actively supports the movement summarizes her vision of what this change might entail: M.A.: You complain that Ankara does not to respond to the peasants’ demands. Why do you think that is? Tulay [pseudonym]: It is not simply that the state does not respond. The state cannot respond because these leeches control everything… M.A.: Who do you mean by that? Tulay: Politicians. MPs, ministers….the whole lot. M.A.: Why do you call them leeches? Tulay: Because they’re plundering our country….We send them to Ankara to serve our country properly, not to poison it with cyanide! M.A.: What do you think needs to be done? Tulay: When they start listening to us, then Turkey will develop, as she did under Ataturk. We need honest leaders.

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According to Tulay, elected officials do not heed their constituencies’ demands and this leads to a weakened, ineffectual state. If Ankara were responsive to the peasants’ demand, the argument goes, then people would respect, if not fully agree with, controversial policy choices such as mining in Bergama. Moreover, once ‘leeching’ stops then the Turkish state would find its true character, finding the strength to make difficult decisions and implement them. It becomes clear that environmentalist policy vocabulary is highly politicized and built around a discourse of transformation. Both Turgay and Tulay express their desire for more responsive and responsible elected officials and for an efficient and effective state. In their absence, Bergama is left with a gap of regulatory authority. Hakan, a typical tobacco and cotton grower from Narlica, explains: M.A.: Eurogold claims you’re breaking the law, that you’re revolting against the Turkish state. Hakan: No, we all love our country and our state. We wouldn’t do anything to harm it. Our forefathers fought occupying enemies and shed their blood to create this country. We’re not revolting. In fact, it’s the opposite. The state is incapable of doing its job in Bergama so we’re doing it for it ourselves. In fact, the struggle to free Turkey from foreign occupation is an oftenrepeated theme in Bergama. When questioned about the underlying motivation of Eurogold to persist for a decade in Bergama peasants, frequently express concern that Eurogold may be a latter-day ANZAC movement aiming to inflict damage on Turkish people and countryside. Others go even further back in the troubled relationship of Turks and Europe, likening Eurogold, the IMF and other similar foreign forces to the Crusades. 5.

GOLDEN FUTURE?

The evidence presented above suggests that the movement has several goals. The first is political reform. This is not merely a demand for a change in the ruling government or even a change of dominant ideologies. Bergama activists call for a change in the way politics is conducted. The second demand is for better rules, regulations and norms to govern the process of modernization. While the activists have unequivocal support for the Kemalist project of catching up with the West, they find unacceptable the haphazard manner in which key decisions are taken. Finally, the Bergama movement calls for accountability of all the players in the project of modernization and they expect politicians, businessmen and scientists alike to be open to public scrutiny. All three demands are in fact enshrined in the Turkish constitution and the movement represents an effort to see these rights translated into actual policies (Oncu and Korcan, [22]). There exists a growing literature inspired by the post-development literature which documents the rise of systemic challenges to global capitalism (Escobar, [23]). It is important to note that the evidence provided above does not place Bergama within this vein. The activists’ demands do not arise from

M. ARSEL 45

disillusionment with the ideas of progress, science or regulation. With the possible exception of ultra-religious conservatism, Turkey’s broad spectrum of political thought has never questioned the necessity or desirability of economic development. Instead, debates since the establishment of the modern republic have focused on the “how” rather than the “if” of development14. In this political climate, the success of the Bergama resistance continues to depend on its position on economic development. Therefore, the movement treads a fine line in opposing Eurogold, making sure not to offend the developmentalist ideology that characterizes both left and right wing political groups. This task is relatively simple, since the core constituency of the movement, Bergama villagers, is largely in favor of continued economic development. Instead of confronting the mining industry or industrial development in general, the movement focuses almost exclusively on Eurogold and the cyanide leaching method. Rather than challenging the goals or policies of development, the movement focuses on environmental risks. Risk has created an entirely new playing field for the environmentalists to capitalize. This new space has made it possible to question state policies without alienating mainstream players. Whereas other challenges to Turkish governance, such as movements based on religious or ethnic identity, received severe and frequently violent reactions from the state, environmental social movements have served as safe vehicles for democratic citizenship movements. The discourse of risk has also made it possible for traditionally opposed political factions to create new alliances. In other words, a discourse coalition was created around environmental risk (Hajer, [25]), which transgressed traditional party political or ideological commitments15. Through this coalition, a constructive criticism of science, progress and regulation has been launched, targeting not only the Turkish state but also the Turkish nation at large. Two developments, one economic and the other environmental, enabled the Bergama movement to effectively use the discourse of environmental risk. The first is the implementation of the post-1983 economic liberalization program, bringing about a decisive shift towards the “Washington Consensus” of liberal political economy. Under former Prime Minister Turgut Ozal’s zealous economic modernization plan, Turkey established linkages with the global economy by privatizing its state industries while aggressively seeking foreign direct investment. Agricultural subsidies diminished while rampant inflation eroded the buying power 14

See Atilla Eralp ([24]) for an excellent history of development debates in Turkish politics. Opponents of the Bergama resistance have long insisted that the movement does not represent an indigenous reaction to Eurogold. Instead, it is argued that the movement is organized and financed by a German-led European conspiracy. Some assert that European central banks are fearful of increased gold production because it would put downward pressure on the price of gold and negatively affect their plans to sell off national gold reserves (see, for instance, “Euro Banks cap gold sales, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/the_economy/458629.stm). Others argue that foreign powers are conspiring to stop the Bergama mine in an effort to prevent Turkish development. The high point of these arguments came with the publication of Necati Hablemitoglu’s book on German NGOs and the Bergama movement ([27]). The poverty of these conspiracy theories is extensively demonstrated in my forthcoming doctoral dissertation (Arsel).

15

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of small-scale farmers such as the cotton and tobacco growers in Bergama. Though the economy registered record levels of growth, income distribution worsened and social safety nets crumbled. The paternal image of the Turkish State was replaced with one of a venture capitalist. For example, an activist from Bergama felt “the state had left [them] at the mercy of international business.” The second is the Chernobyl disaster. Separated from Ukraine by the Black Sea, Turkey was directly subjected to radioactive fallout. The rain soaked teagrowing region of northern Turkey was the worst affected area. Despite the fame of Turkish coffee, tea is the beverage of choice for most Turkish people and given the state monopoly on tea production in Turkey (see Hann, [26]), the country was gripped by a debate on the safety of drinking “radioactive tea”16. Subsequent investigations revealed that the Turkish state and the government of Prime Minister Ozal concealed the true extent of the public health risks involved in consuming produce from the Black Sea region (Greenpeace report). Television images of prominent politicians drinking tea in front of TV cameras have since become emblematic of the difficult relationship between science, risk and politics (Somersan, [28]). To this date, Bergama activists frequently invoke this incident to argue that regulation of the Eurogold facilities would be equally fraught with political and economic interests. As Oncu and Korcan (Oncu and Korcan) explain, the Bergama movement takes place within a political economic era where the logic of the market is dominant. The associated rolling back of the state from daily life creates an environment where the activists need to fend for their own safety. In Western Europe the ‘risk turn’ was a result of the failure of bureaucratic systems in control. In the case of Bergama, risk discourse proliferates because of failure to create effective bureaucratic systems in the first place. Therefore, unlike the Western European case, where the entire modernity project is seen as fraught with contradictions, the activists in Bergama retain their faith in development and see no contradiction in arguing for both better risk regulation and continued Turkish economic development. 6. CONCLUSIONS Given that Bergama represents an effective questioning of the methods of development, rather than the development project itself, what are the implications of the widespread acceptance of Bergama goldmine into the Turkish political landscape? Has Turkey become, or at least set out on the road to becoming, a risk 16

Turkish translation: “radyasyonlu cay”

M. ARSEL 47

society? Is the Bergama movement evidence of a marked change in Turkish understanding, public or bureaucratic, of the nexus of modernity, progress and nature? Answering these and other similarly important questions within this chapter would be a quixotic effort. Instead, the Bergama case study demonstrates the need for such theoretical engagement and sets the stage for a more ambitious undertaking of a nationwide study. As for the validity of a risk society approach to contexts outside Western Europe, the tentative conclusion is one of qualified optimism. In an age of globalization, it is often more accurate to use regions rather than nation-states as units of analysis. The Bergama region represents a particularly affluent section of the Turkish state. The peasant activists whose views are presented here compare well with their counterparts in other rural regions within Europe. Although not all of Beck’s conclusions would apply to Bergama or to the Turkish nation at large, this study demonstrates the utility of using the risk society thesis, at least as a frame of reference when studying environmental regulation at the periphery of the European continent. The Bergama resistance was the first major environmental critique of Turkey’s ambitious developmental goals. It is, however, by no means the only one. Environmental activism has increased, with vocal movements protesting the building of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant on the southern coast and the construction of a Ford motor plant near Golcuk. Similar protest movements are formed against the Aliaga petrochemical refinery, the hydroelectric dam of Firtinaderesi, construction of a third bridge across the Bosphorus, and the recently developing front against genetically modified organisms. Moreover, more mainstream organizations such as TEMA (Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion) and DHKD (Society for the Protection of National Life) have increased their profile and now attract wider audiences. Not all of these movements are successful: the Ford motor plant is now in production, and activists in Aliaga have only managed to bring about an end-of-pipe solution. The Bergama movement has so far failed in its final goal of expelling Eurogold from the city though it has succeeded in bringing about a watershed in Turkish environmental activism. However, the Bergama resistance demonstrates the growing importance of environmental activism in the developing world. It is clear that environmental activism is not limited to affluent societies and stands to grow in societies of similar socioeconomic makeup. Rapidly developing societies such as Turkey are increasingly integrated with the world economy and are faced with the dilemma of providing massive economic gains while maintaining a safe and sound environment. Better legal structures and more integrated decision-making procedures are necessary. Multinational companies need to shoulder part of the responsibility and respect the cultural, historical and political traditions of host states. Further collaboration is needed between states, businesses and the civil society to create and maintain scientific organizations that can resolve scientific and technical disputes in a timely and neutral manner. Finally, it is critical to recognize that the results of environmental activism go above and beyond environmental improvement. The Bergama case opened up a new space for dissent in Turkey. By providing a

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legitimate and non-threatening medium into the political world, this case has strengthened Turkish civil society. REFERENCES 1. Beck, U.: Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt. 1986. (trans. M. Ritter: Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Sage, London, 1991. 2. Beck, U.: Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk. Polity, Cambridge, 1995. 3. Beck, U.: Ecological Enlightenment: Essays on the Politics of the Risk Society. Humanitarian Press, New Jersey, 1995. 4. Irwin, A.: Sociology and the Environment: A Critical Introduction to Society, Nature and Knowledge. Polity Press, Malden, Mass., 2001. 5. Jasanoff, S.: The Songlines of Risk. Environmental Values 8, No: 2, (1999), pp. 135-152. 6. Blowers, A.: Environmental Policy: Ecological Modernization or Risk Society? Urban Studies 34, No: 5 (1997), pp. 845 – 872. 7. Wynne, B.: May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert-lay Knowledge. In: S. Lash, B. Szerszynski, B.Wynne (eds.): Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology. Sage, London, 1996, pp. 44-83. 8. Irwin, A., Simmons, P., Walker, G.: Faulty environments and risk reasoning: the local understanding of industrial hazards. Environment and Planning A, 31(7) (1999),pp. 13111326 July 9. Schmidbaur, H. (ed.): Gold :Progress In Chemistry, Biochemistry and Technology., Wiley, Chichester, 1999. 10. Beck, U.: Risk society : towards a new modernity. Sage, London, 1992. 11. Beck, U.: Risk Society and the Provident State. In: S. Lash, B. Szerszynski, B.Wynne (eds.): Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology. Sage, London, 1996, pp.27-43. 12. Goldblatt, D.: Social Theory and the Environment. Polity, Cambridge, 1996. 13. Peet, R.: Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology by Lash S, Szerszynski B, Wynne B. Journal Of Rural Studies 13 (4) (1997), pp. 477-478 OCT 14. Mol, A.P.J.: The Refinement of Production. Ecological Modernization Theory and The Chemical Industry. Van Arkel, Utrecht, 1995. (http://www.antenna.nl/ibooks/tit979.html) 15. Mol, A.P.J., Sonnenfeld, D.A.: Ecological Modernisation Around the World: Perspectives and Critical Debates. Frank Cass, London, 2000 16. Cohen, M.: Risk Society and Ecological Modernisation. Alternatives for Post-industrial Nations. Futures 29 (2) (1997), pp. 105-119 March (http://wos5.mimas.ac.uk/isicgi/CIW.cgi?PZhD-0_5EFC1148_PZhD 4Jyy90AAAHbiHE0&Func=Abstarct&doc=9/4) 17. Rinkevicius, L.: The Ideology of Ecological Modernization in ‘Double-Risk’ Societies: A Case Study of Lithuanian Environmental Policy. In: G. Spaargaren, A.P.J. Mol, F.H. Buttel (eds): Environment and Global Modernity. Sage, London, 2000, pp. 17 – 40. 18. Yanitsky,O.N.: Sustainability and Risk: the Case of Russia. Innovation 13, No: 3 ( September), 2000. 19. Dwivedi, R: Resisting Dams and 'Development': Contemporary Significance of the Campaign Against the Narmada Projects in India. European Journal of Development Research 10, No: 2 (1998), pp.135-183. 20. Taskin, S.: Siyanürcü Ahtapot. Sel Yayincilik, Cagaloglu, Istanbul, 1998. 21. Arsel, M.: Risking Development or Development Risks: Probing the Environmental Dilemmas of Turkish Modernization. Forthcoming, PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge.

M. ARSEL 49 22. Oncu, A. and Korcan, G.: Democratic Citizenship Movements in the Context of Multilayered Governance: The Case of the Bergama Movement. New Perspectives on Turkey, Spring (2001), pp. 29-57. 23. Escobar, A.: Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton University Press, 1995. 24. Eralp, A.: The Politics of Turkey’s Development Strategies. In: A. Finkel and N. Sirman (eds): Turkish State and Turkish Society. Routledge, London, 1990. 25. Hajer, M. A.: The Politics Of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization And The Policy Process. Clarendon, Oxford, 1995. 26. Hann, C.: Tea and the Domestication of the Turkish State (SOAS Series in Modern Turkish Studies No. 1) Eothen Press, Huntingdon, 1990. 27. Hablemitoglu, N.: Alman Vakiflari ve Bergama Dosyasi. Otopsi Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2001.Somersan, S.: Olagan Ülkeden Olaganüstü Ülkeye: Türkiye'de Çevre Ve Siyaset. Metis Yesil Kitaplar, Cagaloglu, Istanbul, 1993.

Chapter 3 Participatory Nature Management and Cultural Difference: General Reflections and One Specific Case: Turkish Migrants in the Netherlands C.S.A. (Kris) Van Koppen Environmental Policy Group, Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands 1. INTRODUCTION In the past century, the nature conservation movement has developed from small lobby groups with little impact on society into a global network of organisations with significant influence on the international political agenda and powerful claims on land use in virtually every country of the world. This expansive growth, however, did not occur without serious conflicts over land use with local communities. Such conflicts – documented and analysed in a vast number of social studies – have been generated in many regions of the North and the South. The most radical conflicts occur in those regions where local people highly depend on access to nature, and nature conservation claims bring their livelihood and culture under threat, particularly in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.1 Although the character and outcome of these conflicts largely depend on the specific social and physical context, two interrelated factors are frequently stated as general causes. One factor concerns the aims and motives of conservationists, and more particularly the ‘myth of wilderness’ that a priori excludes human use and social development in nature areas. The other factor concerns the top-down and technocratic (or ecocratic) way conservation projects are planned and implemented. Criticism of this conservationist approach is not only levelled by outsiders but also from within nature conservation organisations. In the last two decades representatives of, for example, WWF and IUCN have repeatedly acknowledged that a top-down, exclusive approach is likely to harm the socio-economic development of local people involved and to frustrate the success of conservation projects. Participation of local residents is increasingly regarded as a prerequisite for both ecological and social sustainability. Social change and conservation, published with support of the WWF and co-edited by Michel Pimbert, director of WWF Switzerland, is a good example of this shift in conservationist thinking (Ghimire & Pimbert eds., [1]). The book presents a range of interesting case studies from North 1

Examples of studies: Ghimire and Pimbert., [1] (including cases in Africa, China, India as well as Western Europe and Canada), Peluso, [4] (Kenya, Indonesia), Fisher, [5] (Amazon), Neumann, [6] (Tanzania), Tandon, [7] (Zimbabwe), Donkers, [8] (Netherlands), Clarke, [9] (Pacific).

52 PARTICIPATORY NATURE MANAGEMENT AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

and South that illustrate and underline the aforementioned criticisms. In the last chapter Pimbert and Pretty propose a new, learning process approach as an alternative for a predominant top-down, or Blueprint approach. Table 1, taken from this chapter, illustrates how they envisage this shift. What are the potentials of a participatory approach to nature management? In spite of the many analyses and statements supporting participation, it is far from clear whether the shift in discourse will result in a shift in practices. Many of the current practices, as Pimbert and others acknowledge, are still shaped by top-down technocratic approaches. Parallel to the pleas for participation, other voices in the conservation movement stress the importance of the restoration of pristine nature and the need to withdraw large areas from any human interference (e.g. Terborgh, [2]; Oates, [3]). Against this backdrop this article, based on a workshop presentation in Istanbul, September 2000, aims to explore the perspective of participatory nature management. I have no pretension, however, presenting an overview of empirical studies of participatory nature conservation projects, nor to analyse the comparative influence of concepts and discourses within the conservation movement, useful as these investigations would be. My aim is more modest than that. The article will explore the cultural values that are central to the Northern view of nature conservation and reflect upon the ways diverging cultural views of nature can be taken into account in current perspectives of nature management. To illustrate these general considerations with an empirical example, the article also presents a case study of nature management in a context of cultural difference: the involvement of Turkish migrants in nature recreation and nature education in the Netherlands. The case should be taken as a concrete intermezzo in a more abstract line of reasoning. It is not meant as an ‘average’ or broadly representative case of cultural difference, but it serves, quite on the contrary, to illustrate the complex, situation-specific character of the cultural valuation of nature. The rest of the article consists of three sections. First, I present a concise analysis of the conceptualisation and valuation of nature predominant in the nature conservation movement. Then I describe the case study of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. Both sections are based on previous research (Van Koppen, [11]; [12]). The last section is dedicated to an analysis of three perspectives of participatory nature management and their implications for dealing with cultural difference. 2. THE ‘NORTHERN’ VIEW OF NATURE In the aims and motives of the contemporary conservationist movement two major strands of reasoning can be identified: the ‘resource approach’ and what I will refer to as the ‘arcadian’ approach. Though often interwoven, these approaches are characterised by distinct ways of conceptualising nature and diverging views on the principal aims of nature conservation.2

2

Both approaches are also represented in environmental sociology. A third major approach in environmental sociology, in addition to these two, is that of social constructivism. For a sociological elaboration of the argument of this section, see Van Koppen, [12].

C.S.A. VAN KOPPEN 53

In the resource approach, nature is primarily conceived as a means of production, a good for consumption, and a pre-condition for human health. In other words, as a sustenance base or life support system. The values attributed to nature are instrumental, meaning that nature is only valuable as a means through which other values can be realised. Generally, this approach focuses on those aspects of nature involved in the provision of physical or material needs: food production, health conditions, living space, and the supply of energy and materials. The way nature is defined accords with the natural sciences, which implies that nature is conceived as a system of physico-chemical forces, cycles and processes. Table 1. The blueprint and learning-process approach to biodiversity management and natural resource management (Pimbert & Pretty, [10], p. 303) Blueprint Process Point of departure Keyword Locus of decisionmaking First steps Design Main resources Methods, rules Analytical assumptions Management focus Communication Evaluation Error Relationship with people Associated with Outputs

Nature’s diversity and its potential commercial values Strategic planning Centralized, ideas originate in capital city Data collection and planning Static, by experts Central funds and technicians Standardized, universal, fixed package Reductionist (natural science bias) Spending budgets, completing projects on time Vertical: orders down, reports up External, intermittent Buried Controlling, policing, inducing, motivating, dependency-creating; people seen as ‘beneficiaries’ ‘Normal’ professionalism 1. Diversity in conservation, and uniformity in production (agriculture, forestry, etc.) 2. The empowerment of professionals

The diversity of both people and nature’s values Participation Decentralized, ideas originate in village Awareness and action Evolving, people involved Local people and their assets Diverse, local, varied basket of choices Systemic, holistic Sustained improvement and performance Lateral: mutual learning and sharing experience Internal, continuous Embraced Enabling, supporting, empowering; people seen as actors New professionalism 1. Diversity as a principle of production and conservation 2. The empowerment of rural people

The resource approach makes no principal distinction between environmental protection and nature conservation. Whether one is concerned with smog, oil supply and ozone layer, or with tropical forests, whales, and rare bird species, in all cases what matters is the maintenance of the material sustenance base. Research for nature conservation centres around two principal issues. Firstly, to identify the actual and potential functions of natural areas and species for human health, consumption and

54 PARTICIPATORY NATURE MANAGEMENT AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

production. Secondly, to establish the ecological limits beyond which the sustainable use of these functions is threatened, in other words, to determine the carrying capacity of natural ecosystems. Both issues are heavily dependent on science and technology. The mission of nature conservation is to safeguard the sustainable use of ecosystems according to scientific insights and the principle of precaution. Although the use of resource arguments is as old as nature conservation itself, the resource approach developed its broad and strong influence in the nature conservation movement in the 1970s.3 Its emergence is closely related to the rise of the environmental movement, which gave a strong new impetus to the nature conservation movement, both in thinking and in membership. The prominence of the concept of biodiversity as a new denominator of natural richness, particularly since Rio 1992, gave a further impulse to the resource approach. Taken in a broad sense, the concept of biodiversity encompasses a variety of nature values. The first preamble of the Rio Biodiversity Convention, for example, includes among others ‘ecological’, ‘social’, ‘economic’, ‘scientific’, ‘intrinsic’, ‘cultural’, and ‘aesthetic’ values. In policy and scientific arenas, however, biodiversity is predominantly elaborated as a resource: a “natural stock of genetic material within an ecosystem” (Swanson, p. 7, [13]). Most biodiversity valuation studies give a central place to economic functions in terms of ecosystem resilience, agriculture, and medicine. A workshop on the value of biodiversity motivates this focus on economic values as follows (Bengtsson, p. 336, [14]): “The workshop considered the possibilities of placing an economic value to species and their diversity. It can also be argued that there is an intrinsic value in the diversity of life. However, the persuasive power of such an argument is limited. How should intrinsic value be detected and estimated? Its strength depends on the personal beliefs of its proponents, and may bear little political weight with those who do not share the philosophy.” As this quote indicates, the resource valuation contrasts to another group of values, called ‘intrinsic’ values of nature. These values are central to the arcadian approach of nature conservation, which we will turn to now. 2.1

THE ARCADIAN APPROACH IN NATURE CONSERVATION

The aims and motives of the arcadian approach are in many respects opposite to the resource approach. The term ‘arcadian’ is borrowed from Donald Worster. According to Worster, the arcadian view of the relationship between humans and nature is “devoted to the discovery of intrinsic value and its preservation” in contrast to the imperialist view that lauds “the creation of an instrumentalised world and its exploitation” (Worster, p. xi, [16]). As is clear from this description, the arcadian approach explicitly criticises ‘resourcism’ (which considers nature merely as an instrument for human use) and scientific ‘reductionism’ (which considers nature merely as a set of quantifiable, physico-chemical phenomena). 3

For early use of resource arguments see, for example, Hays, [15], who describes the debate on nature preservation and efficient resource use in the early USA conservation movement.

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While the resource approach is concerned with, as Swanson, p. 7, [13]) puts it, the ‘wasteful and inefficient’ way in which nature is used for economic interests, the central tenet in the arcadian approach is that nature has other, non-instrumental values that need recognition and protection. We may refer to these values as ‘intrinsic’, but a word of caution is needed here. Among proponents of deep ecology it is not uncommon to interpret ‘intrinsic’ values in an ecocentrist and absolute way, with the implication that they are independent of human judgements or interests. It is doubtful whether one can speak meaningfully of such absolute intrinsic values (Krebs, [17]). As I refer to it here, the term intrinsic has the much broader sense of non-instrumental, comparable with the way we speak about the intrinsic value of a piece of art or an historical monument (Hargrove, [18]). The intrinsic values of nature that are central to the arcadian approach have emotional, moral, aesthetic, and scientific dimensions, often in combination. Moreover, they are positive values, which should induce us to preserve them – in contrast to views that value nature in a negative, ambivalent or indifferent way. It is worth mentioning that under this common characteristic of a positive, intrinsic valuation of nature, the arcadian approach accommodates a broad range of possibly conflicting orientations, varying from bioegalitarism to a mere interest in scenic beauty. Many of the non-instrumental values of nature thematised in the arcadian approach have a long tradition in cultural history, which is described in rich detail by authors such as Glacken, [19], Worster, [16], Thomas, [20], and Schama, [21]. Though its roots go back to early history, the take-off point of the arcadian tradition in the West is usually located in the Italian Renaissance. In the sixteenth century, admiration for the natural landscape and the idealisation of rural life could be found amongst court nobility, clergy and urban patricians throughout Europe. This tradition of nature appreciation, fostered by landscape painting and the rural idyll in literature, reached new heights in nineteenth century romanticism. In this period the weakening of institutional Christendom was accompanied by the ascription of a greater religious value to nature. Romantic literature and landscape painting gave expression to a merging of religious, moral and aesthetic feelings towards nature. In addition to a continuing appreciation of rural – that is, cultivated – nature, the romantics developed a special appreciation for wilderness – that is, uncultivated or supposedly uncultivated nature. The wilderness ideal was particularly prominent in North America (Nash, [22]), but as a representation of ‘pure’ nature it was influential in a broad range of countries, including the Netherlands (Van der Windt, [23]), and strongly influenced conservationist efforts in the South (Neumann, [6]). From the nineteenth century onward, appreciation of nature increasingly translated into efforts to preserve natural areas threatened by urban sprawl or rural cultivation. In our century, an ever-widening group of people is influenced by arcadian visions of rural nature and wilderness.

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2.2

THE IMPORTANCE OF LIFEWORLD

Though the ideal types of arcadian nature – the rural idyll and wilderness – are virtual images rather than reflections of concrete experience, it would be a mistake to conclude that the aesthetic and ethical valuation of nature in the arcadian tradition is only a matter of symbolic construction. Concrete experiences that emerge from dealing with nature in practice have an important role to play. The arcadian tradition would not have developed if it was not underpinned by what Thomas calls a ‘profound shift in sensibilities’ towards animals, plants and landscape (Thomas, p. 15, [20]). These sensibilities became manifest in concrete, sensual experiences of birds, flowers and landscapes, and in feelings of sympathy towards animals. The arcadian tradition was influenced by these experiences and, in turn, contributed to their articulation and social acceptance. It is closely connected with the emergence and spread of new social practices of enjoying and protecting nature. Urbanisation and industrialisation implied that an increasing number of people experienced living nature less as part of their productive labour, and more as a part of their private lifeworld: the nature of their neighbourhood, their gardens, their pets, and their trips to the countryside. In this non-productive domain we witness the social spread of activities, such as strolls in the park, gardening, keeping animals for pleasure, and in relation to those, social practices such as nature recreation and naturalist investigation of nature. All these practices provide people with concrete experiences of nature from a non-resource point of view. The conceptualisation of nature in the arcadian tradition, therefore, is best understood as a complex interplay of cultural symbol and sensual experience. Although they are influenced by the arcadian idealtypes, personal concepts of nature are much more diverse, and are adapted to concrete social and physical circumstances. These lifeworld experiences of nature are a vital factor in the development of the arcadian approach (Van Koppen, [24]; [12]). Such concepts of nature, however, are often dismissed by conservationists because they do not represent ‘real’ nature. ‘Real’ nature – ironically – refers to the highly symbolic ideal of wilderness. 2.3

NATURE POLICY IN DEBATE

In contemporary pleas for nature conservation resource and arcadian arguments are both influential. While resource arguments are frequently put forward in arenas of politics and natural science, arcadian values appear to prevail in the personal motivations of both the leaders and the membership of nature organisations.4 Moreover, arcadian motives have not ceased to play a central role in the designation and management of natural areas. As Neumann observes when analysing national 4

E.g., Gill [33] reports that a majority of Sierra Club members regard aesthetic and spiritual experiences as being a more important motive for wilderness preservation than recreation or resource conservation. A Dutch public survey (Buijs and Volker, [29]) shows that ‘immaterial’ functions of nature (e.g. ‘intrinsic’ values) are considered most important, followed by ‘aesthetic-recreate’ functions, while ‘material functions’ (e.g. economic values) are rated least important.

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parks in the North and the South “(e)cological rationalizations for park establishment (...) do not diminish the importance of an Anglo-American nature aesthetic to the origins of the concept and to continued policy and management decisions.” (Neumann, p. 25, [6]). We can trace a combination of resource and arcadian notions in what seems to be the prototype conservation argument of today: that we need areas of pristine nature (wilderness) as a safeguard for planetary survival (a life support system). The life support motive fits in with the resource approach; the emphasis on wilderness echoes Northern romanticism. A well-known example of such an argument is the statement that tropical rainforests constitute the ‘green lungs’ of the earth. Both resource arguments and arcadian motives have been subject to criticism. With regard to resource arguments, it is in many cases difficult to underpin the actual efforts of nature conservationists with scientifically sound resource arguments. Rainforests do not provide us with oxygen, and although there are good reasons for protecting the spotted owl, the rhinoceros, or the orang-utan, it is very unlikely that agriculture, medicine, water retention or ecosystem resilience will be seriously impacted by their extinction. Arcadian motives have been under fire as well: many studies have pointed out characteristics of the Northern arcadian view that raise doubt about their value as a universal guideline for nature conservation (Neumann, [6], Keulartz, [25], Cronon, [26], Van Koppen, [27] and [12], Ghimire and Pimbert, [28]). One of these characteristics is the contextuality of the Northern view. The idealisation of wilderness is a typical product of the highly industrialised and urbanised North and although nature and society are regarded as opposites in the Northern arcadian tradition, in fact the admiration of wild nature is complementary to the technological control of nature in industrial societies. Another, related characteristic is the anti-social and static view of nature that is implied in the wilderness ideal: nature is regarded as a social vacuum where no people – or only fauna-like ‘nature people’ – live. As the aforementioned studies (and many others) demonstrate, the wilderness myth is often in contradiction to the actual situation in nature areas, which is much more dynamic and moulded by human practices. Such criticism of the aims and motives of nature conservation has helped to create room within policy arenas for more participatory ways of implementing nature conservation and more diversity in concepts and motives directing conservation. This policy development is in line with the learning-process approach, described in the introduction. In the Netherlands, for example, the government has funded a series of research projects exploring the diversity of nature views in Dutch society (among others Buijs and Volker, [29], Reneman et al., [30], Coeterier and Schöne, [31]). In the new Dutch nature policy plan, Nature for people, people for nature, nature is explicitly taken in a broad sense, encompassing the diversity of nature views among the population (Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, [32]). The plan, however sheds little light on how this broader view will translate into other, more participatory ways of nature policy and management. The Northern view, notwithstanding the inner tensions between arcadian ideal types and concepts and between arcadian values and resource argumentation continues to be a powerful factor in world-wide nature conservation. It remains

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unclear what the pleas for a broader conceptualisation of nature and more participation will effectively mean for nature conservation policy and practice. This issue is particularly relevant to situations where the nature view of groups involved significantly diverges from the central concepts in the existing nature policies. 3. A CASE OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE: TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS Most obviously, the issue of nature management and cultural difference arises where the predominant view of nature conservation is, so to speak, ‘exported’ to a region and a community with different cultural views on nature. Many of the cases reported in literature deal with such a conflict setting. The case that I will present here, however, deals with another situation: one where the cultural difference is ‘imported’ within a context of a Northern nature conservation practice. For nature conservation, therefore, the case may appear somewhat untypical (though not uncharacteristic for a globalizing world where country borders and cultural differences become less coincident). As I hope to show, it still can provide a meaningful illustration of the issues at stake. Against the background of the increasingly multicultural character of Dutch society several studies have been carried out to explore the way nature is conceived and dealt with by allochthonous groups in the Netherlands (for references, see below). Since it is not helpful to generalise over groups of different cultural origin, I will focus on one major, still far from homogeneous group, that of Turkish Islamic migrants in the Netherlands. I will first touch upon the socio-cultural backgrounds of this group, and then go into practices of dealing with nature. 3.1

SOCIO-CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS

There are fair number of studies describing the position of nature and nature protection in the Islam. Here, I draw primarily on Zaidi [34], El-Deen Hamed [35], Wersal [36], and Izzi Deen [37], studies that interpret Islam from a positive stance. The characterisation of nature emerging from these studies can be briefly summarised as follows. Nature is part of God’s creation and testifies to the greatness of the Creator. Everything that happens, happens according to the laws of God and people have to respect these laws. Within the created world, humans are the first community, but not the only one. All living creatures are worth protecting. Animal suffering has to be avoided and care for non-human creatures is rewarded. The harmony and balance of the created world need to be preserved. Nature is a gift of God to all generations. No other creature is capable of preserving nature; this is a task administered by humans.

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The role of humans is to employ nature for their well-being. This encompasses control, adaptation, and utilisation of nature, but also contemplation and enjoyment of natural beauty. Islam, according to these studies, offers a fertile ground for nature protection, not only in the interest of people, but also by virtue of a religious mission of humankind vis-à-vis creation. The Islamic tradition harbours specific institutions for the conservation of natural areas (e.g. hima and harim). Human well-being is central in these institutions; there is no issue of a romanticist wilderness appreciation. Briefly, the role of humans vis-à-vis nature can be characterised as cultivation (including cultivation of nature’s beauty) and stewardship. If we compare these interpretations with likewise positive interpretations of Christian religion (cf. Kay, [38]), we find many similarities. This is not surprising if we realise that both traditions are – as far as the human-nature relationship is concerned – rooted in largely the same traditions of thought (Platti, [39]). In terms of the analytical framework presented earlier, we can conclude that the Islamic tradition offers openings to a resource as well as an arcadian approach of nature conservation. With regard to the arcadian aspect, aesthetic values are predominant; for a moralisation of wilderness, apart from human society, is little ground. We do however find references to nature (earth, water) as a source of purity. Although the nature values embedded in Islam and Christianity have much in common, there is a clear difference between Turkish-Muslim migrants and Dutch autochthons concerning the cultural influence of religion. As was mentioned earlier, the rise of the romantic appreciation for wilderness was related to a decline in the cultural influence of institutional Christianity. In Turkey, too, a process of secularisation has occurred (Zürcher, [40]). As a consequence, the position of the state is independent of Islamic religion, although this position is subject to heated political debates. The secularisation of culture, however, is limited. Islam continues to play an important role in Turkish culture, and this is even more so for the Turkish cultural traditions that are fostered by the Turkish migrants in the Netherlands (a large majority of which adheres to Islam). Urbanisation and industrialisation – processes that had a decisive influence on the Northern nature view – took off in Turkey from the mid 20th century. Nowadays, a major part of the Turkish population lives in urban metropolises, such as Ankara, Istanbul or Izmir, where industrial activities are strongly expanding. In the context of urbanisation, industrialisation and increasing freedom of organisation, nature conservation organisations and an environmental movement have emerged. The first independent nature organisation (Türkiye Tabiatını Koruma Derne÷i) was founded in 1955. The growth of an environmental movement is of more recent date. In 1988 a Green Party was established, but it dissolved in 1992. The environmental movement encompasses a spectrum of radical and more reformist groups that is quite similar to that in the Netherlands or Germany. Their membership and social base, however, is smaller (Nohl, [41]). Environmental education has an established place in primary and secondary schools (General Directorate for External Relations, [42]). Since the 1950s and particularly since 1980 many national parks and nature reserves have been established, attracting substantial numbers of visitors.

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Nature conservation and nature education, therefore, are developing fast and in a direction that is in many respects similar to Northern Europe. As yet, there appears to be a wide distance between progressive urban elites and the people living in traditional, rural areas. Most Turkish migrants to the Netherlands come from these rural areas. How they are influenced by the social and economic changes in Turkey also depends on the time of migration. The period of migration covers more than 30 years, and two, sometimes even three generations. 3.2

NATURE VALUATION AND NATURE RECREATION OF TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE NETHERLANDS

The ways migrants think about and deal with nature is investigated in different ways, particularly in the context of leisure and recreation (Schmeink and Wolde, [43], Jókövi, [44]) and nature education (Hesselink and Blanken, [45], Korkmaz, [46], Van Koppen, [11]). These studies provide a fairly consistent picture of Turkish migrants’ nature views. Nature is valued because of its beauty and as a place of rest and recreation; it is also valued as a healthy environment, and a source of food. Rather than being the primary aim of a trip or walk, green areas are generally regarded as an environment for meeting family and friends. Group activities, such as having a picnic or barbecue, are central. Some respondents explicitly attach moral and religious values to nature e.g. sensitising one’s natural intuition or experiencing one’s dependence (Schmeink and Wolde, [43]). Respondents acknowledge the importance of Islam to their view of nature (Korkmaz, [46]). Compared to autochthons, more Turkish people visit city parks and fewer go to recreational areas and beaches outside the city (but those who do visit these areas as frequently as autochthons, about 10 times a year). Natural areas such as moors or lakes and agricultural areas appear to be unattractive, also for the younger people of the second generation (Jókövi, [44]). Allotment gardens are quite popular among Turkish inhabitants of large cities. While autochthons often cultivate these gardens as a recreational place, with ornamental plants, Turkish migrants put a greater emphasis on their utility and mostly cultivate vegetables (Schmeink and Wolde, [43]). Nature valuation is a dynamic process and that certainly applies to the allochthonous groups discussed here. It would be a mistake to easily identify nature views of Turkish migrants with the ones prevalent in their culture of origin. Living in another country affects both the daily practices and the cultural identifications of migrants. It would also be a mistake to assume that second and third generations will readily assimilate the practices and views of autochthonous groups. It is expected that Turkish people in the future will closer resemble autochthons in their view of nature (Schmeink and Wolde, [43]) and that other factors, affecting allochthonous as well as autochthonous groups, such as income, education, and urban vs. rural dwelling will become more important compared to cultural difference. It is not possible, however, to say how and when social and cultural orientations will change. Young people of the second generation regard themselves as more modern and more

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‘Dutch’ than their parents, but at the same time identify themselves primarily as Turkish. Their recreational activities in many respects resemble those of their autochthonous peers, but at the same time bear many traits of the first generation (Jókövi, [44]). Thus, there are no simple rules for better representing and involving these allochthonous groups in nature management. On some occasions, existing nature areas provide for the needs of Turkish migrants (e.g. beach areas), or can be adapted by minor changes (e.g. barbecue facilities), on other occasions a shift in emphasis is needed (e.g. from ‘wild’ nature recreation areas at a distance to more park-like areas nearby). Similarly, in some instances of nature education separate projects for allochthonous groups are more successful (e.g. by lowering the threshold for participation of women), while in other situations one and the same approach for both allochthonous and autochthonous groups is preferable (as appears to be the case for nature education in school textbooks, Van Koppen, [11]). 3.3

EVALUATING THE CASE

I have presented the case of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands to illustrate some points relevant to cultural difference in nature management. To start with the obvious, there is such a thing as cultural difference. Turkish migrants in the Netherlands have cultural patterns of dealing with nature that, in some aspects, differ significantly from groups in comparable socio-economic positions but with an autochthonous cultural background. Though certainly not homogeneous and fixed, these patterns are fairly consistent and enduring, and clearly relate to the specific cultural backgrounds as well as the daily practices of the people involved. This point, trivial perhaps, corroborates the argument of taking cultural differences into account in nature management. The nature view of Turkish migrants comprises both resource and arcadian elements. Nature is a source of health, a source of food, and a nice place to meet family and friends, but also a source of beauty and of moral meaning. However, a particular ethical or aesthetic appreciation of wilderness appears to be almost absent. This is in line with the more general argument that the romanticist preoccupation with wilderness is typically a Northern approach of nature. As was stated before, the wilderness ideal has been very influential in the USA, (colonial) Great Britain, as well as other Western countries such as the Netherlands. However, even in a Western country such as France, the controversies between rural and wilderness concepts of nature are much less profound, and conservationists are less restrictive in their view on cultivation (Finger-Stich and Ghimire, [47], p. 177). It is important to note that the absence of wilderness appreciation does not mean – as sometimes is presumed in conservationist circles – that nature is only valued in instrumental ways. The case also shows that cultural meanings attached to nature are complex and dynamic. They are under the influence of parental traditions, social environments, daily practices, socio-economic conditions, and cultural identifications. Within this multifaceted context, cultural orientations may stabilise (as is, in some respects, the

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case with Turkish migrant groups when compared to cultural changes in Turkey itself). In other situations, however, cultural meanings may rapidly shift. Ellen & Bernstein, for example, describe how in Brunei traditional cultural meanings associated with the forest have given way to a recreational orientation: “the rainforest is being incorporated into the peri-urban economy and transformed into a Bruneian version ‘green and pleasant land’ (...), a thoroughly tamed rural idyll with just a hint of danger’” (Ellen and Bernstein, p. 18, [48]). This process occurs in the context of oil-based prosperity and rapid urbanisation, but is also influenced by the national, Islam oriented, ideology. To conclude, taking cultural difference into account means broadening the bandwidth of relevant nature views, to include the multitude of ways that nature can be valued instrumentally and non-instrumentally. The Northern view though powerful in its influence, is only one of these ways. Cultural traditions are an important key to understanding the way people deal with nature, but other factors are important too. Being the result of a complex interplay, cultural orientations to nature cannot be predicted from simple models. To adequately take them into account in nature management, they have to be established for the specific situation and the specific cultural groups. This can be done directly, by giving these groups a say in the process of management, and indirectly, by doing close empirical investigations into cultural traditions, daily practices and the interplay of both. 4. PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE Traditional strategies and new perspectives In this last section I return to the general issue of participatory nature management, partly drawing on the considerations of the previous sections. To further explore the issue I will discuss different perspectives on nature management strategy in relation to participation and cultural diversity. Historically, two strategies of nature management have been predominant. Some of the oldest efforts of nature conservation were based on private ownership. In many countries, societies for nature conservation were able to buy nature areas in order to protect them. Their strategy is characterised by Swanson (p. 92, [13]) as ‘buy it and bank it’. Notwithstanding the importance of private nature management, for instance in countries such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, its scope is restricted because of the limited financial capacities of nature organisations and because of public resistance to private ownership when large nature areas are concerned. To date, most protected nature areas have been established under the authority of national governments, e.g. as ‘national parks’. A major argument for governments to do so, is that the nature reserves are considered to a be common good and part of the national heritage. As such, they legitimately fall under the authority of the government, and their designation and management largely depend on national administrative decision-making. Under the present conditions of liberalisation and globalisation, however, new perspectives on nature management are gaining ground. While national governments remain central actors in nature

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conservation, new strategies for nature management are being developed. In this section I will focus on three perspectives characteristic of these new developments. Central to these perspectives are arguments of biodiversity conservation, ecotourism, and local development. 4.1

THE BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION PERSPECTIVE

The biodiversity conservation perspective is predominant in international conservation literature, particularly in literature addressing the issue of biodiversity conservation. This perspective is, for instance, represented by Swanson [13] and by the biodiversity volume of Gaston [49]. The framework of global biodiversity conservation is summarised by Swanson in three protocols (Swanson, p. xiii, [13]): “the creation of a common scientific framework for the analysis of the global facets of the biodiversity problem; the elision of all concern ancillary to the global problem, i.e. the segregation of all other parts of the problem which do not absolutely necessitate international action for their resolution; and the integration of all of the ancestral conservation movements concerned with diversity into this single framework.” Succinctly, this strategy is described by Vane-Wright, as an effort “to place biologically determined priorities within an appropriate socio-political framework” (Vane-Wright,p. 333, [50]). The aims of nature management, in this perspective, are set by science, in particular conservation biology. To substantiate the absolute necessity of action, biodiversity conservation is primarily motivated by resource arguments: biodiversity constitutes “a unique body of information” that is needed for the sustenance of economic functions and the survival of life on this planet (Swanson, p. 9, [13]). The perspective of biodiversity conservation in many respects resembles the Blueprint paradigm described in the introduction. Many of its proponents, however, are not blind to the weaknesses of this approach, and therefore advocate more participatory ways of action. Participation, in this context, primarily means that (1) nature management is better geared to local access to natural resources, as far as the latter is beneficial, or at least not harmful to the aim of conservation and (2) financial compensation is rewarded for the resource losses suffered by the local population and the conservation services rendered by them (e.g. Gadgil, [51], Swanson, [13]). After Pimbert and Pretty [10] we may call this functional participation, that is, local people are consulted and practically involved at the moment and to the extent that they are functional to an external strategy. The aims and motives of that strategy are predetermined in other fora – in this case the forum of conservation biology, which bases its priorities on the ‘calculus of biodiversity’ (Vane-Wright, [50]). The biodiversity conservation perspective, in a way, discards cultural differences. It overrules both the Northern nature aesthetic and local cultural orientations to nature, and gives priority to other, science-based motives of global

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resource conservation. In departing from a morally induced appreciation of wilderness, it opens up the possibility of the sustainable use of nature. In the biodiversity debate, it is now generally acknowledged that forms of human activity have even contributed to the biodiversity value of nature areas (e.g. Furze et al., [52]). Principally, this perspective is one that, in the interest of global life support, sets limits on the use of nature for both economic and cultural purposes. In practice, however, it is often disputable whether this principle is valid. A great deal of the actual nature conservation projects can not be motivated in such a way. As pointed out before, many of these projects are rooted in the arcadian tradition of the North rather than in a ‘calculus of biodiversity’. When issues of global life support are really at stake, and fair compensation is indeed provided, the biodiversity conservation perspective is justified; when such an argument fails, however, this perspective easily turns into a pseudo-scientific wrap for other conservationist interests5. In addition to that, a practical weakness is that there is as yet no effective base for structural payment for access restrictions or biodiversity conservation services. The one time financial compensations that are sometimes rewarded for in-situ research or bioprospecting are not an adequate base for long term participation (Swanson, [13], Pimbert & Pretty, [10], p. 309). 4.2

THE ECOTOURISM PERSPECTIVE

When options are investigated to make nature conservation financially rewarding for local residents, ecotourism is often put forward. In the ecotourist perspective, nature conservation is stimulated by means of the tourist market, and arcadian values rather than resource values are central. Although nature conservationists might not consider it a nature management perspective at all, it is worth discussing here for at least two reasons. First, the aims and motives guiding ecotourism are as much at the roots of conservation efforts as are genetic resource arguments – in many respects even more. Ecotourist motives are closely related to the Northern nature aesthetic that guided the conservation movement in North and South. In the ecotourism perspective, producers and consumers of arcadian nature meet as actors on the tourist market. In some respects, this brings them on a more equal footing than in the biodiversity framework, although we have to realise that the distribution of economic power is very uneven. Second, ecotourism has – at least until now – proven to be a much more effective way for countries and regions to get revenues from nature reserves than mechanisms of biodiversity compensation.6 Estimations of

5

Such arguments are also an easy prey for anti-environmentalist ‘debunkers’ such as, Philip Stott [53]. 6 According to a UNEP report of 1996, the value of biodiversity related ecotourism in Costa Rica is USD 500 per acre per year. According to another study, of the $288 that foreign ecotourists spent on an average per day, only $110 goes to local Costa Rican entrepreneurs (Caalders et al., [54], p. 5, 33).

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the monetary value of biodiversity – for what they are worth – attribute higher values to ecotourism then to agriculture or medicine7. The type of participation that emerges in this perspective might be called entrepreneurial participation. Local people can benefit from nature areas by providing lodging and guiding services, by selling local products, and by locally redistributing entrance fees. Participation from an ecotourist perspective, however, can not be left to market forces alone. Regulatory, communicative, and scientific measures remain necessary. On the one hand, they are needed to ensure that local people indeed get the opportunity to benefit from the tourist market. On the other hand, market mechanisms have to be geared in such a way that tourism does not result in destruction of the nature values at stake and that part of the revenues flow to the protection of these values, for instance by mechanisms of common property management. Cultural difference, in the ecotourist perspective, is dealt with by the market. Those who enjoy watching and travelling in the nature areas pay for their cultural preferences in the enjoyment of nature. Local residents can provide these nature services if they decide to do so, whether they share the tourists’ cultural values or not. In many rural development situations, the ecotourist perspective may be a justified and feasible approach to nature management. However, this perspective has its weaknesses, too. On the conservationist side, it should be observed that only part of the arcadian values are marketable. The arcadian view of nature that is at the heart of the conservation movement values nature not only as a source of immediate enjoyment, but also as a heritage for future generations and as a community with a moral right to exist. It would be difficult and perhaps impossible to incorporate these aspects into a tourism framework. On the side of local society, there is the risk of what we might call ‘arcadian colonisation’. Nature, as a product on the tourist market, will tend to be managed according to the preferences of consumers. Under the present conditions these preferences are predominantly fashioned after the arcadian ideal-types of rural idyll and, in particular for long distance tourism, wilderness.8 As we have stressed, these ideal types often are in conflict with the actual ways of managing the landscape and local cultural meanings attached to nature. Tourist money flows and the nature expectations they are connected with can have the effect of freezing the local community into an open air museum, and inhibiting socio-cultural and economic developments in other directions.

7

Dobson ([55], p. 234-235), for example, presents the following estimates for world market value (USD): tropical forestry 7 billion, pharmaceutics 120-200 pillion, and ecotourism 2000 billion. 8 To give one illustration: in surveys (in 1977 and 1989) among foreign tourists in the region of Trabzon, Turkey, “Unspoiled nature” and “Beauty of nature” ranked at the top of the characteristics appreciated by the respondents (Gülez, [58]).

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4.3

THE INTERACTIVE NATURE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE

Inspired by the criticism top-down approaches to nature conservation, many initiatives have been taken to involve local residents in nature conservation efforts. These projects, which have spread over the world since the 1980s, are known by the names of ‘community-based conservation’, ‘integrated conservation and development projects’, ‘community-based natural resources management’, and etc. Perhaps the most well-known examples are the CAMPFIRE projects (Communal Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) in Zimbabwe and South Africa (McIvor, [56], Koch, [57]). Although widely varying in aims and practices, most of these projects try to establish a high degree of local participation, defined by Pimbert & Pretty as interactive participation. In interactive participation, the people involved participate in the analysis, planning, implementation, and continuing management of nature protection. Multiple perspectives of the issues are taken into account, including the views of local groups involved, and the project as a whole is organised as a joint learning process (Pimbert and Pretty, p. 309, [10]). Changes over time in the management of nature can not be precluded in this perspective. Since local practices of dealing with nature will continue to develop, management practices cannot be fixed to, for instance, traditional patterns of nature management and use. Therefore, the term nature development is perhaps more appropriate than nature conservation. Often, the projects mentioned focus on local resource use and financial revenues from nature areas. Most CAMPFIRE projects, for instance, centre around the exploitation of wildlife tourism. However, several authors in this field have argued that diversity in cultural values has to be taken into account as well (Hyndman, [59], Oldfield and Alcorn, [60], Furze et al., [52], Infield, [61]). If we acknowledge that the international efforts of nature conservation are rooted in a cultural tradition (one that I have characterised earlier as ‘arcadian tradition’), if we observe that to date, this tradition clearly has a Northern bias, and if we conceive of interactive participation as a joint learning process, then it is plausible that not only resource access and financial incentives should be included in such a learning process but also cultural differences in the valuation of nature. Interactive nature development should, according to this argument, include dialog and negotiation on cultural values of nature, so that conservation can be debated and justified in terms that are meaningful to local communities (cf. Infield, [61]). By consequence, nature conservationists should accept that this process results in nature conservation objectives that diverge from the Northern ideal types of nature. It may – referring back to the case study – result in establishing a recreational park instead of a wilderness area, or in introducing barbecue facilities rather than large predators into nature areas. In the context of rural development in the South, it would for instance mean that wild nature is also considered as a threat, and that cultivation is regarded as enrichment of the moral and aesthetic values of the landscape. Although interactive participation is a perspective much sympathised with in social studies and rightfully so, in my view we must take caution not to romanticise it. Up to now, the results of community-based conservation projects are ambiguous,

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though in many cases it is not clear whether negative results are a consequence of interactive participation or caused by the lack of it in the actual implementation of the project. It is useful to observe that interactive nature development, as such, does not generate any revenues for the local groups involved. Indirectly it may contribute to local development, by generating better opportunities for combining nature management with socio-economic development in other sectors. To provide direct benefits, however, it has to be complemented by payments in the framework of biodiversity conservation, by income from ecotourism, or in the traditional strategies, by funding through state agencies or nature organisations. Such complementary sources of income, however, could match very well with an interactive approach. It could be argued that interactive nature development has much to offer for conservationists who are willing to look beyond the biodiversity calculus, and for ecotourists who want to look beyond the stereotypes of wilderness. However, as yet, such arguments are not often put into practice. It is also important to observe that ‘local’ is an increasingly difficult concept in a globalizing world. A rural village in Turkey may have numerous biographical and economic links with a group of Turkish migrants in a Dutch metropolis, many of which return in summer to enjoy holidays in their village of origin. Such a context makes it difficult to speak of the ‘local’ cultural meanings attached to nature. Moreover, local participation is often as much lobbied for in national and international arenas as debated in the region. The concept of local itself, therefore, is as complex and dynamic as are the meanings attached to nature. 5. CONCLUSION Three perspectives of nature management that are characteristic for current trends in nature management have been distinguished: biodiversity conservation, ecotourism, and interactive nature development. Each of these perspectives has implications for participation of local communities, and the role of cultural values in nature conservation. It should be stressed that they are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, in many situations all three perspectives apply in a parallel or complementary way. Functional participation is typical for the biodiversity conservation perspective. It is justified as far as life support functions are at stake that transcend the local interests and as long as local residents are compensated for unequal restrictions in resource access. Entrepreneurial participation is typical for ecotourism, and adequate to the extent that aesthetic preferences of tourists can be marketed in a way that contributes to local development and does not harm the nature areas it feeds upon. Interactive participation is typical for the perspective that I have called interactive nature development. In this perspective, the aim is to involve local residents intensively and continuously in a process of nature management that is conceived of as a joint and open learning process of local people and nature conservation organisations. I have argued that in such a process, local cultural values have to be taken seriously, even if this means that the objectives of the projects diverge from the arcadian ideal-types of nature, cherished by nature conservation organisations. Although interactive nature development is surrounded

68 PARTICIPATORY NATURE MANAGEMENT AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

by many difficulties and uncertainties, it seems an important road towards empowerment of local actors and genuine, long term support for nature management. Experiences with nature management in a context of cultural difference – in the article the case of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands was presented by way of illustration – suggest that particularly the appreciation of wilderness may widely diverge between Northern and other views of nature. They also show that cultural appreciation of nature is dynamic and highly complex, and can not easily be predicted. It has to be elaborated for each specific situation, by giving a say to the local actors involved, and by dedicated and perceptive social research. REFERENCES 1.

Ghimire, K.B. & M.P. Pimbert (eds.): Social change and conservation. Environmental politics and impacts of national parks and protected areas. Earthscan, London, 1997. 2. Terborgh, J.W.: Requiem for nature. Island Press, Washington, 1999. 3. Oates, J.F.: Myth and reality in the rain forest. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1999. 4. Peluso, N.L.: “Reserving” value: conservation ideology and state protection of resources. In: M. Dupuis and P. Vandergeest (eds.): Creating the countryside. The politics of rural and environmental discourse. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1996, pp. 135-165. 5. Fisher, W.H.: Native Amazonians and the making of the Amazon wilderness: from discourse of riches and sloth to underdevelopment. In: M. Dupuis & P. Vandergeest (eds.): Creating the countryside. The politics of rural and environmental discourse. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1996, pp. 166203. 6. Neumann, R.P.: Imposing wilderness. Struggles over livelihood and nature preservation in Africa. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1998. 7. Tandon, Y.: Village contradictions in Africa. In: W. Sachs (ed.): Global Ecology. Zed Books, London, 1993, pp. 208-223. 8. Donkers, H.: Landbouw en natuur: huwelijk of scheiding (Agriculture and nature: marriage or divorce). In: K. Waagmeester (red.): Ontstolen welvaart. Platform voor Duurzame Ontwikkeling, Utrecht, 1995, pp. 160-184. 9. Clarke, W.C.: Traditional conservation and development in the Pacific. The Contemporary Pacific 2 (1990), pp. 233-253. 10. Pimbert, M.P. & J.N. Pretty: Parks, people and professionals: putting ‘participation’ in protected areas management. In: K.B. Ghimire & M.P. Pimbert (eds.): Social change and conservation. Earthscan, London, 1997, pp. 297-330. 11. Van Koppen, C.S.A.: Natuureducatie in een multiculturele context (Nature education in a multicultural context). In: M. Margadant & C.S. van den Berg (eds.): Natuur in pluralistisch perspectief. CDß-Press, Utrecht, 2000a, pp. 133147.

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12. Van Koppen, C.S.A.: Resource, Arcadia, Lifeworld. Nature Concepts in Environmental Sociology. Sociologia Ruralis 40, 3 (2000b), pp. 300-318. 13. Swanson, T.: Global action for biodiversity. Earthscan, London, 1997. 14. Bengtsson, J., H. Jones & H. Setälä: The value of biodiversity. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 12, 9 (1997), pp. 334-336. 15. Hays, S.: Conservation and the gospel of efficiency: the progressive conservation movement, 1890-1920. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1959. 16. Worster, D.: Nature’s economy: a history of ecological ideas. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985. 17. Krebs, A.: “Ich würde gern mitunter aus dem Hause tretend ein paar Bäume sehen.” Philosophische Überlegungen zum Eigenwert der Natur (“Coming out of the house I would like to see a few trees.” Philosophical reflections on the intrinsic value of nature). In: H.G. Nützinger (ed.): Naturschutz – Ethik – Ökonomie. Metropolis, Marburg, 1996. 18. Hargrove, E.C.: Foundations of environmental ethics. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1989. 19. Glacken, G.: Traces on the Rhodian shore. Nature and culture in Western thought from ancient times to the end of the eighteenth century. University of California Press, Englewood Cliffs, 1967. 20. Thomas, K.: Man and the natural world: changing attitudes in England 15001800. Penguin Books, London, 1993. 21. Schama, S.: Landscape and memory. HarperCollins, London, 1995. 22. Nash, R.F.: Wilderness and the American mind. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. 23. Van der Windt, H.: En dan: wat is natuur nog in dit land? Natuurbescherming in Nederland 1880-1990 (And then: what is nature in this land? Nature conservation in the Netherlands 1880-1990). Boom, Meppel, 1995. 24. Van Koppen, C.S.A.: Terug van Arcadië (Back from Arcadia). In: J. Keulartz & M. Korthals (eds.): Museum Aarde. Boom, Amsterdam, 1997. 25. Keulartz, J.: Strijd om de natuur. Kritiek van de sociale ecologie (Struggle for nature. Critique of the social ecology). Boom, Meppel, 1995. 26. Cronon, W.: The trouble with wilderness; or, getting back to the wrong nature. In: W. Cronon (ed.): Uncommon ground. Toward reinventing nature. Norton, New York, 1995, pp. 69-90. 27. Van Koppen, C.S.A.: Claims of culture. In: H. de Haan & N. Long (eds.): Images and realities of rural life. Van Gorcum, Assen, 1997. 28. Ghimire, K.B. & M.P. Pimbert: Social change and conservation: an overview of issues and concepts. In: K.B. Ghimire & M.P. Pimbert (eds.): Social change and conservation. Earthscan, London, 1997, pp. 1-45. 29. Buijs, A.E. & C.M. Volker: Publiek draagvlak voor natuur en natuurbeleid (Public support for nature and nature policy). DLO-Staringcentrum, Wageningen, 1997. 30. Reneman, D. et al.: Mensenwensen. De wensen van Nederlanders ten aanzien van natuur en groen in de leefomgeving (People’s wishes. The wishes of the Dutch in regard to nature and green in the living environment). Intomart, Hilversum, 1999.

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31. Coeterier, J.F. & M.B. Schöne: Struinen en landschapsbeleving (Strolling and landscape experience). DLO-Staring Centrum, Wageningen, 1999. 32. Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries. Nature for people, people for nature. Policy document for nature, forest and landscape in the 21st century. Ministerie LNV, Den Haag, 2000. 33. Gill, K.: Preservation and re-creation. Sierra Club Bulletin 60, 1975, p. 15. 34. Zaidi, I.H.: On the ethics of man’s interaction with the environment: an Islamic approach. Environmental Ethics 3 (1981), pp. 35-47. 35. El-Deen Hamed, S.: Seeing the environment through Islamic eyes: application of Shariah to natural resource planning and management. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 6, 2 (1993), pp. 145-164. 36. Wersal, L.: Islam and environmental ethics: tradition responds to contemporary challenges. Zygon 30, 3 (1995), pp. 451-459. 37. Izzi Deen (Samarrai), M.Y.: Islamic environmental ethics, law, and society. In: Armstrong, S.J. & R.G. Botzler (eds.): Environmental ethics. Divergence and convergence. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1998, pp. 235-242. 38. Kay, J.: Concepts of nature in the Hebrew Bible. Environmental Ethics 10 (1988), pp. 309-327. 39. Platti, E.: Een andere bijbelse godsdienst. Naar een christelijke omgang met de Islam (Another biblical religion. Towards a Christian co-operation with Islam). Tijdschrift voor Theologie 37 (1997), pp. 6-23. 40. Zürcher, E.J.: Islam en politiek: Turkije. (Islam and politics: Turkey) In: H. Driessen (ed.): In het huis van de islam. Sun, Nijmegen, 1997, pp. 361-369. 41. Nohl, A.: Erziehung und Lernen in der türkischen Ökologiebewegung (Education and learning in the Turkish ecological movement). Forschungsgruppe Umweltbildung FU Berlin, Berlin, 1995. 42. General Directorate for External Relations: Environmental education in Turkey. Ministry of National Education, Ankara, 1994. 43. Schmeink, H. & S.J. ten Wold: Allochtonen en recreatie (Allochthons and recreation). Stichting Recreatie, Kennis- en Innovatiecentrum, Den Haag, 1998. 44. Jókövi, E.M.: Recreatie van Turken, Marokkanen en Surinamers in Rotterdam en Amsterdam (Recreation of Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese in Rotterdam and Amsterdam). Alterra, Wageningen, 2000. 45. Hesselink, F. & H. Blanken (red.): Reader Zeister Kring 5: ‘Multiculturele aanpak van NME’ (Reader Zeist Circle 5: ‘Multicultural approach of environmental education’). NCDO, Amsterdam, 1998. 46. Korkmaz, N.: NME en allochtone leerlingen. Onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden van NME lessen voor allochtone leerlingen (Environmental education and allochthonous schoolchildren. A study of the possibilities of environmental education lessons for allochthonous schoolchildren). Dienst Recreatie, afdeling Natuur- en Milieu-edukatie RMO, Rotterdam, 1995. 47. Finger-Stich, A. & K. B. Ghimire: Local development and parks in France In: K.B. Ghimire & M.P. Pimbert (eds.): Social change and conservation. Earthscan, London, 1997, pp. 158-186. 48. Ellen, R. & J. Bernstein: Urbs in rure. Cultural transformations of the rainforest in modern Brunei. AnthropologyTtoday 10, 4 (1994), pp. 16-19.

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49. Gaston, K.J. (ed.): Biodiversity. A biology of numbers and difference. Blackwell, Oxford, 1996. 50. Vane-Wright, R.I.: Identifying priorities for the conservation of biodiversity: systematic biological criteria within a socio-political framework In: K.J. Gaston (ed.): Biodiversity. A biology of numbers and difference. Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, pp. 309-344. 51. Gadgil, M.: Managing biodiversity. In: K.J. Gaston (ed.): Biodiversity. A biology of numbers and difference. Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, pp. 345-366. 52. Furze, B., T. De Lacy & J. Birckhead: Culture, conservation and biodiversity. The social dimensions of linking local level development and conservation through protected areas. Wiley, Chichester, 1996. 53. Stott, P.: Tropical rainforests: a political ecology of hegemonic myth making. Institute for Economic Affairs, London, 1999. 54. Caalders, J., et al.: Tourism and biodiversity. Impacts and perspectives on interventions in the Netherlands and Costa Rica. BUITEN Consultancy, Arnhem, 1999. 55. Dobson, A.P.: Conservation and biodiversity. Scientific American Library, New York, 1995. 56. McIvor, C.: Management of wildlife, tourism and local communities in Zimbabwe. In: K.B. Ghimire & M.P. Pimbert (eds.): Social change and conservation. Earthscan, London, 1997, pp. 239-269. 57. Koch, E.: Ecotourism and rural reconstruction in South Africa: reality or rhetoric? In: K.B. Ghimire & M.P. Pimbert (eds.): Social change and conservation. Earthscan, London, 1997, pp. 214-238. 58. Gülez, S.: Green tourism: a case study. Annals of Tourism Research 21, 2 (1994), pp. 413-415. 59. Hyndman, D.: Conservation through self-determination: promoting the interdependence of cultural and biological diversity. Human Organization 53, 3 (1994), pp. 296-302. 60. Oldfield, M.L. & J.B Alcorn (eds.): Biodiversity. Culture, conservation, and ecodevelopment. Westview Press, Boulder, 1991. 61. Infield, M.: Cultural values: a forgotten strategy for building community support for protected areas in Africa. Conservation Biology 15, 3 (2001), pp. 800-802.

Chapter 4 Political Economy of Citizens’ Participation in Environmental Improvement: The case of 1 Istanbul Fikret Adaman Bo÷aziçi University, Turkey

Fatoú Gökúen Koç University, Turkey

E. Ünal Zenginobuz Bo÷aziçi University, Turkey

1.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to the analysis of the political economy of Istanbul citizens’ participation in environmental improvement. More specifically, the paper seeks to focus on, on the basis of the results of a survey study conducted in December 1998 with a sample size of 1565, regarding Istanbul citizens’ concerns and attitudes towards the protection of the environment, together with the relationship between their willingness to contribute to projects aiming at easing or solving environmental problems and their trust in different political and social institutions. To better interpret the results of this survey, a set of complementary in-depth interviews was also carried out with representatives of business, NGOs, trade unions and bureaucrats, with regard to their positions on, and their preferred solutions to, environmental problems. These in-depth interviews also probed respondents’ positions on possible actions that can be taken at local/national/global levels with regard to environmental protection and their 1

This paper is based on a research undertaken with an award under the Middle East Research Awards Program in Population and Development (MEAwards) of the Population Council (Project: MEA 385), for which the authors are grateful. The authors would also like to thank, without implicating, Begüm Özkaynak for her very able assistance, the FREKANS Research Company for their careful work in conducting the survey, and Cem Behar, Ali Çarko÷lu, Korel Göymen, O÷uz Iúık, Martin O’Brian, Begüm Özkaynak, ønsan Tunalı and Tansel Yılmazer for their stimulating comments. This paper has some overlapping points with an earlier paper of one of us (Adaman, [1]) as well as two companion papers (Zenginobuz et al., [2], Gökúen et al., [3]) that are based on the mentioned study.

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reactions to the possibility of forming a co-ordinating agency to seek and sustain a consensus among different interest groups on environmental issues. Environmental degradation, occurring as a result of both the overuse of natural resources and the disposal of waste above the assimilative capacity of the ecosystem, is threatening Turkey in many ways. These environmental problems, which have been exacerbated in the post-1970 era as a consequence of rapid industrialisation, completely disorganised urbanisation and ill-managed tourism activities, as well as of the worsening of wealth and income distribution leaving many under the poverty line and thus forcing them to overuse natural resources, are of great magnitude today. Among the main environmental problems hitting Turkey are air pollution in most cities (especially in the shanty towns around them) and industrial areas; household and industrial discharges polluting ground, thermal and mineral waters, rivers, lakes and coastal zones; discharges coupled with inappropriate use of fertilisers polluting the soil; heavy soil erosion in most parts of the country; early and excessive grazing, as well as building and infrastructure construction, threatening forests, pastures and grasslands; and noise pollution in most cities (see, e.g., National Report on Sustainable Development, [4]; Türkiye Çevre Vakfı, [5]; OECD, [6]). On the other hand, even a quick glimpse will show that Turkey has a substantial body of legislation regarding environmental protection, with well-defined responsibilities and duties that are assigned to different public institutions (see, e.g., Adaman, [1]; Yaúamıú, [7]; Keleú and Hamamcı, [8]). Not only have environmental rights been clearly defined in the Constitution, but also public authorities have been empowered within a well-constructed organisational and structural scheme to deal with environmental issues. This paradoxical situation of having, on the one hand, a regulatory mandate and, on the other hand, an ongoing degradation of nature needs an explanation: One possibility could be that governments (be they local or central) do not in fact consider environmental problems as a top priority issue and thus do not pay much attention to the implementation of environmental regulations (some of which might well have been enacted just to create a pro-environmentalist image or for instrumental reasons such as being seen as preconditions for joining the European Union). A second possibility could be that corruption has been causing government failures, blocking the implementation of environmental regulations. As in most instances environmental policies alter, in an implicit or explicit way, the income and wealth distribution of societies (see, e.g., Boyce, [9]), those who will be worse off after the implementation of a policy will have a clear incentive to bribe public authorities, asking them not to (fully) implement the regulations—their success depending of course on the extent to which politicians and civil servants are open to such deals. These two causes may of course co-exist (for a detailed discussion, see Adaman, [1]).2 2 It is a well-established fact that a distorted wealth and income distribution coupled with the existence of a relatively high portion of society living under the poverty line would make environmental degradation more aggravated (see, e.g., Inglehart, [10] and [11], Boyce, [9];

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Whatever the explanation might be for the rather poor performance of public authorities with regard to regulating environmental degradation, a reform initiative emerges as a necessary step if Turkey wants to pay due attention to its environmental problems. As important as the institutional framework are individuals’ concerns, attitudes and behaviours towards environmental protection. To what degree are individuals concerned with environmental problems? Do they make a differentiation between local and global environmental problems? To what extent do they act in an environmentally-friendly way? Are they politically active in relation to environmental issues? Are they fully committed to the environmental cause? Are they ready to make sacrifices, if necessary? These and other similar questions are of course crucially important in understanding individuals’ (and public authorities’) positions in relation to environmental issues. Needless to say, the “personal attributes” and the “rules of the game” should be considered as being in interaction with each other, and the exploration of this interaction in the specific case of environmental problems in Istanbul constitutes the subject matter of this paper. Istanbul, a city of approximately 10 million, is certainly the leading city of Turkey in terms of financial, manufacturing, tourism and service sector activities, and it is the intellectual heart of Turkey.3 The quantitative part of the survey study, which this paper draws on, aimed at shedding light on the position of Istanbul citizens on environmental issues and contained questions to draw out the concerns, the attitudes, the extent of environmental activism, and the commitment of Istanbul citizens on environmental issues. Special attention was paid to the commitment dimension, through asking the respondents to reveal their willingness to pay (WTP) for hypothetical scenarios of environmental improvement through the so-called Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). Within this framework, three separate environmental issues were chosen in order to address the issue of the distinction between local versus national versus global environmental problems. Specifically, respondents were asked to express how much they would be willing to pay for the financing of (hypothetical) projects that would reduce sea pollution in Istanbul (the Bosphorus), soil erosion in Turkey and ozone depletion at the global level. Sea pollution in Istanbul (the Bosphorus) was chosen as the local environmental problem to be valued, since it is a concrete environmental issue for the citizens of Istanbul. Soil erosion, which is not particularly a problem for Istanbul but a major environmental issue at the national level, was chosen as the national environmental problem. Finally, ozone depletion was the global environmental issue to be valued. As such, the survey probed at understanding whether citizens would differentiate among these categorically different environmental problems (see Gökúen et al., [3] for further details).

Brechin and Kempton, [12], and Duraiappah, [13]). 3 Geographically the city is mainly located along the Bosphorus, a 60 km long strait that connects the Black Sea to the Marmara Sea.

76 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL

A separate part of the survey study had questions to indicate which institutional body Istanbul citizens would prefer to see in charge of implementing the environmental improvement projects to which they were being asked to make a contribution. The motivation of exploring the preferred institution was simply the fact that commitment presupposes not only a personal sacrifice but also a high degree of trust for agencies that would be in charge of running a public project. We hope that the results and our interpretation will help formulate better policy designs that are centred on the issue of environmental protection. We further hope that these results will constitute the first step of similar research on people living in Istanbul and/or in the region, with the help of which it would be possible to conduct more detailed analyses. The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology of the survey, and provides information on the design and the sample of the survey, as well as on the measures that will be used throughout the analysis. Section 3 starts first by presenting the results obtained by using the measures and then reports the outcomes of statistical and econometric analyses that were conducted to understand the relationship between different parameters. Findings from the in-depth interviews are provided in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 2. METHODOLOGY The design of the study consisted of a qualitative and a quantitative phase. The quantitative phase of the study included a cross-sectional survey of Istanbul citizens on environmental concern and attitudes, WTP for environmental improvement and responsible agencies for the improvement. The qualitative phase, which had been conducted prior to the quantitative phase, involved in-depth interviews with representatives of industry, NGO’s, local and central government authorities, and labour unions. 2.1

DESIGN AND SAMPLE OF THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE

The questionnaire of our study was administered between December 10-31, 1998 to a total of 1565 households drawn from metropolitan Istanbul by using a clustered random sample. First, 125 districts were drawn from a total of 567 districts (with probabilities proportionate to their population counts); second, in each district four blocks were selected randomly; finally, three households were chosen in each block using a table of random numbers.4 All households were asked questions on general environmental issues (viz. concern, attitudes and environmental activism) and on demographic characteristics. Concerning the questions on commitment (WTP), the total sample was divided into three, with a view to extracting people’s willingness to 4

Lists of voter registration that were constructed for the 1995 parliamentary elections were taken as the base for the sampling, according to which the population above 18 years of age was known as 4,869,598.

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make sacrifices in monetary terms for three different environmental issues. Each household in a block was assigned a version that involved a different environmental issue to be considered, which assured that there were three sub-samples, one for sea pollution in Istanbul (n=524), one for soil erosion in Turkey (n=524) and one for global ozone depletion (n=517), roughly of each equal size. The statistical analysis revealed that the three sub-groups are not statistically different from each other in terms of demographic characteristics. The basic characteristics of our sample are as follows: 39.4 percent of the respondents fell into the age category of 18-30, 33.5 percent into 31-45 one, and 27.1 percent into 46-81 one; 55.1 percent of the sample were women and 44.9 percent men; 7.7 percent of the respondents were either illiterate or completed the primary school without getting a certificate, 36.7 percent had a primary school diploma (five years education), 13.4 percent had a secondary school diploma (three/four years after primary school), 29.3 percent had a high school diploma (three years after secondary school), and 13 percent had a university diploma and higher (four and more years) . The mean education level was computed to be 8.3 years. 2.2

MEASURES USED IN THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE

The first part of the survey aimed at measuring, as different dimensions, the respondents’ concern for a set of environmental problems, the attitudes towards a list of pro-environmentalist actions, the intensity of environmental activism, and the commitment towards environment protection. At the design stage of the survey, we thought that, in parallel to similar studies conducted earlier, these four somehow related but in fact different dimensions would provide a detailed picture of our respondents’ positions on the issue of environmental degradation and protection. Environmental Concern: The question that probed environmental concern listed a total of 15 different environmental problems, and respondents were asked to report their degree of concern for each problem. The answers consisted of “not concerned”, “somewhat concerned”, “much concerned” and “never heard of”. These problems were air pollution, water pollution, soil pollution, sea pollution, global warming and the greenhouse effect, soil erosion, deforestation, tropical deforestation, ozone depletion, acid rains, solid waste, industrial waste, nuclear waste, noise pollution, and extinction of species. Environmental Attitudes: Expressing concern is one thing, but showing a proenvironmentalist attitude is another. To unravel this, respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes towards a list of four pro-environmentalist actions with regard to their daily behaviour: (1) To carry out litter for themselves if no litter bins are available nearby; (2) To put aside glass, plastics and metals from the rest of the garbage for recycling purposes; (3) To put aside newspapers and other papers from the rest of the garbage for recycling purposes; (4) To bring along their own bag

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while shopping. All such activities require a personal cost, however minimal in some cases, and their return is very seldom a personal gain. Hence, an affirmative answer is understood as a pro-environmentalist action. Environmental Activism: To have a pro-environmentalist attitude in daily life is certainly an important demarcation line, but to be politically active in the fight against the degradation of nature is yet another dimension, especially when one acknowledges the well-known collective action problems (Olson, [14]). To probe this dimension, respondents were asked to report whether or not they undertook a political action on the issue of environmental protection in the form of (1) participating in a campaign, (2) writing a letter of concern to an official institution, and (3) informing the media on environmental issues. Commitment Towards Environment Protection: Willingness-to-pay in conjunction with Bosphorus pollution/soil erosion/ozone depletion problems. As there are no markets for almost all environmental goods and services, individuals’ valuations of such goods and services are to be estimated by using other means. The CVM technique is one such method, and it involves asking through surveys individuals’ monetary contribution commitments towards the realisation of hypothetical environmental improvement projects (for further details, see, e.g., Pearce and Turner, [15]).5 Our survey study aimed at capturing the intensity of commitment towards environmental protection by asking about people’s willingness to pay for specific improvements of the well-defined environmental problems of Bosphorus pollution/soil erosion/ozone depletion. The CVM module started with a detailed description of the environmental problem included in the version (Bosphorus pollution/soil erosion/ozone depletion) that was assigned to the respondent. In each case verbal information was complemented with visual information in the form of figures and charts. The description of the problem was followed by the description of a project, which, if adopted, would bring about, again, well-defined improvements in the quality of the environmental good under consideration (through setting up abatement facilities along the Bosphorus, taking preventive measures to help fight soil erosion in Turkey, contributing to world-wide efforts to halt the ongoing depletion of the ozone layer, respectively). The willingness to pay question used, following Carson et al., [16], a “binary discrete-choice referendum elicitation” format, asking whether the respondent would approve (vote for) the proposed project that would solve the problem at hand if it cost a specified amount that would be paid by their household (as a one-time payment).6 In order to cover a wide range of possible willingness to pay amounts, 5 The assumption here is that valuation of environmental goods and services and commitment towards environmental protection are closely related to each other. 6 This type of question, also called as a take-it-or-leave-it question, requests the respondent to give a yes-or-no response to a specific cost. Each respondent was then administered a doublebounded dichotomous choice question where the respondent was asked to give a yes-or-no response to a second pre-specified higher amount if the response to the initial take-it-or-leave-

F. ADAMAN, F. GÖKùEN, E. Ü. ZENGINOBUZ 79

four different versions, each with a different starting Turkish Lira amount as the first take-it-or-leave-it amount, were used for each of the three environmental scenarios. Before asking the willingness to pay questions, respondents were reminded that it was equally socially acceptable to be against the implementation of the proposed project or not to agree to pay anything towards the program. Preferred Institutional Body Responsible for Implementing the Three Environment Projects: The next question put forward to those who would make a contribution was which institutional body among the choice set of the Parliament, the government, the municipality, NGOs, and the United Nations should be given the task of implementing the improvement project. This question was expected to reveal important information especially in case a reform initiative would be undertaken. Material Security: Factor analysis was performed on occupation rankings, per capita consumption (monthly expenditure divided by household size), and the summative scale of household belongings. Factor loadings of the analysis were saved as the variable of Material Security and then these were coded as low, middle, and high.7 Urbanity: The Urbanity measure was computed from the variables of place of birth (metropolitan area, city, town, or village) and the number of years lived in Istanbul weighted by age. If the respondent was born either in the metropolitan area or in a city and lived at least 50 percent of his or her life in Istanbul, it was coded as urban; otherwise it was coded as rural.8 2.3

DESIGN AND SAMPLE OF THE QUALITATIVE PHASE

A set of in-depth interviews (n=16) were conducted with representatives of industry, NGO’s, local and central government authorities, and labour unions, with a view to better elaborating the results of the survey and to eliciting more specific attitudes, concerns, priorities and perceptions about improving environmental quality. Information sought included, among other things, their positions on possible environmental actions to be taken and their reactions to the possibility of forming a co-ordinating agency to seek and sustain a consensus among different interest groups on environmental issues. All interviews were conducted before the household survey, between February and March 1998. In-depth interviews were conducted with the following persons representing their respective institutions: the Director of the Division of Education, Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions of Turkey (DøSK); a member of the Executive it question is “Yes” and to a pre-specified lower amount if the initial response is “No”. A onetime single payment was chosen as the payment vehicle. For a detailed description of the approach used, see Zenginobuz et al., [2], and Gökúen et al., [3]. 7 Note that 13.1 percent of our sample are categorised as low, 70.1 percent as middle, and 16.8 percent as high. 8 Note that 40.1 percent of our sample happens to be rural, and the remaining 59.9 percent urban.

80 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL

Board of Association of Independent Industrialists and Business Persons (MÜSøAD); the Director of the Office of Environmental Protection of Municipality of Beúiktaú (a main commercial district of the city with a population of approximately 220,000); the Director of Association for Human Settlement (an NGO working on urban and environmental problems); an industrialist (a former President of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry); the Director of the Research Department of the Istanbul Chamber of Trade; the Head of the Office of Environmental Protection of the Municipality of Greater Metropolitan Istanbul; a former Vice Governor of Istanbul; the Secretary General, the Assistant to the Secretary General and the Expert in charge of environmental issues of the Association of Industrialists and Business Persons of Turkey (TÜSøAD); three members of the Environment Unit of Istanbul Chamber of Industry (øTO), the Director General; and the Director of Projects of the Association for the Preservation of Natural Life (DHKD). 3. RESULTS OF THE QUANTITATIVE PHASE 3.1

UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Starting with results of the quantitative data with regard to the perceived seriousness of specific environmental problems, Table 1 provides the percentages of the answers “much concerned” and “never heard”. As the table makes clear, people in Istanbul seem to be much concerned with not all but most environmental problems. These figures are in conformity with the earlier work that was conducted by Dunlap et al. (17).9 In the statistical estimations, however, instead of taking these 15 items separately, we have constructed a 0-1 point scale, as the variable of environmental concern, on the basis of the factor loadings that were obtained through a factor analysis. A telling initial observation is that the level of knowledge drops when the issues of tropical deforestation, acid rain, and global warming and the greenhouse effect are questioned. More specifically, more than a quarter of our sample have indicated that they had not heard of the problems of global warming and the greenhouse effect, despite their being under media coverage for some time. This indicates that a group of citizens of Istanbul are not aware of some of the surrounding environmental problems.10 9

When a factor analysis is conducted, air pollution, soil pollution, sea pollution, soil erosion and solid waste (garbage) turn out to constitute one group (that can be labeled as “local environmental concern”), whereas global warming and the green house effect, tropical deforestation, ozone depletion, acid rain, nuclear waste and extinction of species turn out to constitute another group (that can be labelled as “global environmental concern”). Further analyses indicate that the mean of the local concern is statistically higher than that of the global one. (For details, see Gökúen et al. [3].) 10 Note that lack of awareness/knowledgeability of environmental issues was tested further. When the symbol for recycling was shown and respondents were asked to reveal what is signified only 29 percent succeeded in giving the correct answer; also despite the fact that the impact of NGOs in the environmental political arena in Turkey can by no means be categorised as marginal, of our sample, close to three-fifths (58 percent) were unable to spell correctly the name of at least one such organization.

F. ADAMAN, F. GÖKùEN, E. Ü. ZENGINOBUZ 81 Table 1. Perceived Seriousness of Specific Environmental Problems (n=1565) Environmental issues Concerned Not Concerned Never Heard (percent) (percent) (percent) Deforestation 98.4 0.8 0.8 Sea pollution 96.4 2.4 1.2 Industrial waste 95 3.3 1.7 Solid waste (garbage) 95.1 4.2 0.8 Extinction of species 94.2 3.8 2.1 Water pollution 95.7 4.3 0.2 Air pollution 95.7 4.3 0.3 Soil erosion 88.6 5.8 5.6 Ozone depletion 85.8 5.2 8.9 Nuclear waste 86.0 6.8 7.7 Noise pollution 89 8.2 3.0 Tropical deforestation 78.2 6.3 15.5 Acid rains 72.6 6.6 20.8 Soil pollution 77.2 12.7 10.2 Global warming and greenhouse effect 61.3 12.5 26.2

With regard to environmental attitudes in daily life, the answers provided by respondents are tabulated in Table 2. For use in statistical computations, however, the following recording was designed: The one who indicated “always” or “sometimes” for one item was given a score of 1, and “never” was given a score of 0. The scores were then aggregated for each individual, the maximum score for an individual being 4 and the minimum one being 0. Table 2. Environmental Attitudes in Daily Life (n=1565) Environmental Attitudes in Daily Life Never Sometimes Always (percent) (percent) (percent) To carry out litter with themselves if no litter bins are 8.4 19.6 71.8 available nearby To put aside glasses, plastics and metals from the rest 54.9 21.1 22.7 of the garbage for recycling To put aside newspapers and other papers from the rest 46.6 17.0 35.6 of the garbage for recycling To bring their own bag while shopping 63.6 15.5 19.6

The results with regard to environmental activism are presented in Table 3. For use in statistical computations, however, the following recording was devised: Those who gave a “No” answer to all the three questions were coded as “not active”, while those who gave one “Yes” answer or more were coded as “active”.

82 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL Table 3. Environmental Activism (n=1565) Type of Action

Yes No (percent) (percent) To be a member of an environmentalist NGO or active in an 4.1 95.9 environmentalist campaign (in the last 2 years) To make an inquiry on environmental protection to an official 9.2 90.8 institution To write a concern letter on environmental protection to the press 4.9 95.1

Finally, the construction of the willingness to pay variable was carried out as follows: The willingness to pay for each respondent was identified as the minimum amount the respondent expressed willingness to pay for by saying “Yes” to that amount. The binary discrete-choice referendum elicitation format gave for each respondent an interval within which his or her true willingness to pay lay. The estimate we arrived at by using the lower bound of this interval is therefore a very conservative estimate for true willingness to pay. The average figures for the three different environmental projects are presented in Table 4. Note that respondents are willing to pay lesser amounts as we move from the local environmental problem to national and global environmental problems; however, the pair-wise differences between the means are not found as statistically significant. Table 4. Mean WTP for Environmental Issues (n=524+524+517=1565) N Mean (Million TL) Sea Pollution (Bosphorus) in Istanbul (Local Issue) 524 10.53 Soil Erosion (National Issue) 524 9.86 Ozone Depletion (Global Issue) 517 9.51 Note: 1 USD was approximately equal to 400,000 TL at the time of the fieldwork.

We were also interested in people’s explanations for refusing to make any contributions. Note that half of the sample (780 out of 1565) has in fact indicated that they would not make the contribution that was asked for. Thus, we asked those who refused to make the announced contribution to reveal their reasons for their choice (Table 5). The first noteworthy observation is that the proportions of those who do not make a contribution in each case are very close to each other (252, 259 and 269 cases were reported for sea pollution, soil erosion, and ozone depletion, respectively, corresponding to 48, 49 and 52 percentages of the three sub-samples). This being noted, we then observe that an overwhelming majority (around three quarters) of the respondents across the three cases who refused to pay showed their insufficient financial means as the reason for not paying the amount for environmental improvement. Attention should also be given to the fact that around fifteen percent of those who refused to pay in all three cases expressed concern with regard to the success of the projects. Thus, of our sample, around 8 percent (118 out of 1565) indicated that they were not convinced of the workability of the scenarios. In the same vein, 25 persons (accounting for the 2 percent of our sample) who

F. ADAMAN, F. GÖKùEN, E. Ü. ZENGINOBUZ 83

refused to pay revealed that they had no trust that the collected money would be used for environmental purposes. A final noteworthy observation is the existence of 45 people (accounting for 3 percent of our sample), who in fact protested the whole idea of asking for voluntary contributions, on the grounds that others and not themselves were responsible for these environmental problems (the fact that the relative share increases for the case of sea pollution in the Bosphorus might at least be partially explained by the two devastating tanker accidents that have occurred on the Bosphorus in the last 25 years). Table 5. Reasons given for not contributing (n=780; percentages in parentheses) Sea Pollution Soil Erosion Ozone WTP Combined Depletion Cannot afford 175 (70%) 195 (75%) 203 (75%) 573 (73%) No faith to the success 38 (15%) 38 (15%) 42 (16%) 118 (15%) of the project I’m not responsible-the 23 (9%) 11 (4%) 11 (4%) 45 (6%) responsible should pay Collected money will 13 (5%) 10 (4%) 2 (1%) 25 (3%) not be used for this purpose Not a big issue 1 (1%) 2 (1%) 7 (3%) 10 (1%) Other 2 (1%) 3 (1%) 4 (1%) 9 (1%) Total 252 (100%) 259 (100%) 269 (100%) 780 (100%)

With regard to the preferred institution that would be in charge of implementing the specific environmental project, Table 6 provides the results for the three cases. The choice among a set of five institutions was expected to reflect citizens’ views with regard to the capability of an institution to implement a specific environmental improvement (thus the perceived competence of an institution) together with the trust felt towards an institution in not mismanaging it (say, acting in a corrupt way). As the table makes clear, close to half of our sample indicated that NGOs should take the responsibility, and approximately one-fifth thought the municipality should. Note that the support given to the municipality reaches its highest value of 26.5 percent in the case of the Bosphorus and its lowest value of 17.7 percent in the ozone problem. The Parliament and the government each received just a bit more than 10 percent support. The United Nations option was supported at around six percent for the cases of the Bosphorus and erosion, while this climbed to 12 percent regarding the ozone issue. Finally, the “other” option was also given to check whether or not any institution was left outside the given options, but it turned out that suggested names other than the five were of minimal importance.11 11

Note that a question probing what would be their “preferred institution” was not asked to those who refused to make a contribution. Although such a question would have provided interesting information, we thought that a question like “if you were giving money which institution do you think should be in charge” might be awkward to some, and even perhaps intimidating for some others. We therefore decided not to include such a question.

84 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL Table 6. Choice of Institutions to be in Charge in Implementing the Project (percent) Bosphorus Erosion Ozone WTP combined Parliament 12.8 10.0 11.3 11.4 Government 13.2 12.8 12.1 12.7 Municipalities 26.5 22.0 17.7 22.3 Environmental NGOs 38.1 47.6 42.9 42.6 United Nations 6.6 5.6 12.1 7.5 Other 3.8 2.0 3.9 3.5

3.2

BIVARIATE ANALYSIS

With the aim of understanding whether or not our measurements discussed above are correlated with each other, in Table 7 we present the Pearson correlation coefficients. The matrix indicates that although there is a statistically significant positive correlation between concern and attitude, concern and environmental activism, concern and WTP, attitude and environmental activism, and environmental activism and WTP, the degree of correlation in all cases is very close to zero. The matrix therefore suggests that environmental concern, pro-environmentalist attitude, environmental activism towards environmental protection, and WTP (as a proxy for environmental commitment) represent different dimensions, despite being very loosely correlated with each other (see, for further discussions, Stern et al. [18] and Gökúen et al. [3]). These results should not be surprising: The literature by and large indicates that these dimensions are indeed independent dimensions, each measuring a different aspect of individuals’ position on the issue of environmental issues. Our results confirmed this. Table 7. Pearson Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables Concern Attitudes Environmental activism **

Concern X 0.132 Attitudes 0.132** X 0.131** Environmental activism 0.133** WTP 0.068** 0.03 ** Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

3.3

**

0.133 0.131** X 0.081**

WTP 0.068** 0.03 0.081** X

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

The second set of analysis is concerned with searching the determinants of the dependent variables. Towards that aim, age, gender, education, material security, and urbanity were used as independent variables. The summary of econometric analyses aiming at finding the determinants of our dependent variables is given in Table 8.12 The results indicate that increased age has 12

For the environmental activism variable, the logistic technique was used; for the remaining ones, the OLS technique was applied. Detailed econometric results can be obtained from the corresponding author.

F. ADAMAN, F. GÖKùEN, E. Ü. ZENGINOBUZ 85

a positive effect on environmental attitudes and environmental activism; women had increased environmental concern and attitudes, whereas men were environmentally more active; increased education turns out to have a positive impact over all the dependent variables; more material security means more environmental concern, higher environmental activity and more WTP; urbanity, finally, turns out to increase one’s environmental concern and attitudes. Table 8. Determinants of Dependent Variables Concern Attitudes Environmental activism Age Gender Women** Education +** Material Security +* Urbanity +** ** Significant at 0.01 level. * Significant at 0.05 level.

Old** Women** +**

Old* Men** +* +**

WTP

+** +**

+**

4. RESULTS OF THE QUALITATIVE PHASE To start with, all the interviewees agreed that environmental degradation was of great magnitude in Turkey, almost all referring—with different emphasis—to problems associated with pollution and the overuse of natural resources. Similarly, they tended to agree that not much action had been taken so far in dealing with the ongoing degradation, and that there was not much optimism for the future in terms of improving environmental conditions unless radical measures were undertaken. However, when two interrelated questions were raised regarding (i) what the reasons were for the failure of regulating the economic and social aspects of life with the aim of protecting the environment, and (ii) what needed to be done to change the failure story into a success one, positions differed a great deal. Regarding the reasons for failure, interviewees from the central and local governments put emphasis on the lack of effectiveness and the remaining ambiguities in the existing legislation, especially underlining the fact that the division of the responsibilities between municipalities and representative institutions of the central government were not always clearly defined. However, both also pointed out that if they wanted to fully apply the legislation, by resolving or bypassing these imperfect points, they would have faced much resistance from diverse sources. In this regard, four main headings were noted for the case of Istanbul: First, the existence of a large informal sector, bringing about the difficulty of control over mostly small/medium-sized ateliers that have been practically impossible to regulate; second, the continued increasing of demand for new buildings, most but not all derived from immigration to the city of Istanbul; third, the lack of funds for undertaking large projects, as in the case of setting abatement facilities to solve the sewage problem, which would render the city more environmentally friendly; and fourth, political interference in terms of demands to

86 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL

favour some specific groups. NGO representatives, on the other hand, pinpointed the rent-seeking activities that translate themselves into patronage networks as the main source of continued degradation, as well as the absence of civil engagement in political decision-making processes that could put pressure on public authorities towards implementing the legislation on the environment. They further stressed that the lack of people’s participation should be seen as the main reason for the existence of corruptive activities that had roots in governments, local or central. Industry representatives mainly blamed national poverty, i.e. the low level of development, as the main reason for environmental degradation. They claimed, more specifically, that the existence of a large informal sector in Istanbul, as one of the main sources of industrial pollution, had to be accepted as a reality; otherwise, the major industries would not be able to compete in international markets and thus unemployment would rise drastically. Finally, the representative of one of the main labour unions made clear that the unions so far preferred to direct their attention towards pollution within firms that might have implications for their members’ health and that they approached the issue of environmentalism mainly within the “capital-labour” relationship. When the issue of “what is to be done” is raised, the representatives of the central and local governments demanded modifications to the existing legislation, making it more effective in terms of procedure and incentive structure. They also underlined that fighting corruption should be equally important and therefore be incorporated in environmental legislation, under the assumption that there would always be a core of bureaucrats ready to implement the legislation. NGO representatives placed emphasis on the transformative dynamics of civil engagement and also underlined the fact that rent-seeking activities, the motives behind corruption, could only be stopped through wider participation of interested parties. The industry representatives were rather optimistic about the future, on the grounds that at a higher industrialisation phase the informal sector would dissolve, thus reducing pollution at a greater rate. They added that the trend in international markets was moving towards environmentally-friendly processes and goods, and therefore the industry in Istanbul, largely under the pressure of international competition, would follow that trend. They also noted that, to the extent that a local demand for environmentally-friendly produced goods arose, then production would inevitably follow this demand, further increasing the environmental sensitivity of the industry. They finally insisted that consensus-building should be sought for in the environmental policy arena, as co-operation turned out to be a driving force in implementing projects that would have different impacts on different parties. Finally, the labour union representative indicated that unless the power relation of the whole society was redefined, environmental degradation that was present within and outside production units could not be stopped. Complementary insights were therefore obtained from the in-depth interviews that were conducted with representatives of industry, NGO’s, local and central government authorities, and labour unions, in that there seems to be an acknowledgement, perhaps with different accentuation, that the present legislative system on environmental protection is to a greater extent non-functional in dealing

F. ADAMAN, F. GÖKùEN, E. Ü. ZENGINOBUZ 87

with the ongoing degradation, mainly because of the existence of corrupt elements or patronage networks. To be able to deal with the patron-client type networks that basically disable this legislative body, emphasis was given, again at different levels, to reforming the existing legislation and to demanding more civil engagement and participation. Finally, in-depth interviews unanimously indicated that combating poverty should be targeted in tackling environmental issues. 5. DISCUSSION and CONCLUDING REMARKS To recapitulate the main results, we have found that: 9Respondents indicated a great deal of concern for environmental problems provided that they were aware of them. 9However, when environmental attitudes in daily life were questioned, it was observed that a rather small percentage of our respondents revealed that they were paying attention in their daily life to not harming the environment. 9Similarly, only a small percentage of our respondents appeared to have been ready to take political action in support of environmental cause. 9When commitment was questioned, through the willingness to pay to projects that aim at improving three different environmental problems, it was observed that half opted not to make any contributions. The main reason was given as their insufficient financial capacity. Furthermore, of those who indicated that they were ready to make a contribution, no significant differences were obtained between the projects that were designed for local/national/global environmental problems. 9Although these four dimensions seem to be affected by similar parameters (such as education), our correlation analysis revealed the fact that these dimensions are basically independent of each other. Education and, to some extent, material security were found to be positively correlated with these dimensions, suggesting that more spending on education and more evenly distributed income and wealth would increase the overall population’s attention and commitment to environmental issues. Any reform project, we think, should take this finding as an important pivotal point. 9When the in-charge institutions were questioned, the majority of our respondents gave their support to the NGOs working on environmental issues and, to a lesser extent, municipalities. It is telling that the Parliament and governments could only get support of around ten percent each. This may well be a reflection of the lack of trust among citizens in the central government, as documented in many studies (see, e.g., Adaman and Çarko÷lu [19] and Adamanet al. [20] and [21]).13 People also made a differentiation between municipalities and NGOs with regard to the 13 A lack of trust may be either because of insufficient competence on the part of public institutions, or because of the existence of corrupt activities, or both. In a recent survey on this topic conducted with 3021 households as representatives of the urban population of Turkey, Adaman et al. [20] showed that households gave, on average, the scores of 3.9, 3.2, and 2.1 out of 10, where 10 was meant full trust and 0 no trust at all, in the central government, the Parliament, and the political parties, respectively (see also Adaman and Çarko÷lu, [19], and Esmer, [22]).

88 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CITIZENS’ PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: THE CASE OF ISTANBUL

nature of the project at hand (take note, e.g., that support for municipalities goes down whereas that of NGOs goes up when the issue is altered from the Bosphorus project to the erosion one). It is also interesting to note that the support for the UN doubled when the issue turned out to be the ozone layer. 9By and large in-depth interviews confirmed our findings. Furthermore, they shed light on two issues that were claimed to be of importance with regard to environmental problems: first, the existence of poverty, especially in the informal sector circles of big cities, was pinpointed as one of the hot spots for environmental pollution; second, patronage networks, coupled with bribery, were said to be blocking effective implementation of the legislative body. This paper aimed at understanding several dimensions of citizens’ orientation toward the creation of much-needed alliances between the citizenry and public and civil institutional bodies to combat pollution and depletion. A finding that is worthy of attention is that people at large do differentiate the institutional context of undertaking environmental policies for local/national/global problems. However, one should note to the fact that a framework that would prove to be successful in combating one issue may not be so in combating another one. Another point that came out strongly in both the quantitative part of our study and in the in-depth interviews is that material security and education were very important in terms of determining individuals’ orientation toward environmental problems and through the selection of the means to tackle them. It is evident that investing in education and combating poverty would have a positive effect to environmental preservation in the specific case of Istanbul, and hence much attention should be given on the interdependency between poverty, education and environmental improvement. Both sets of findings made clear that the means and mechanisms that increase civil engagement in environmental policies would bring about success in the fight against environmental degradation. Behind this claim one can search for two rationales: First, corruptive activities and patronage networks can best be fought by increased accountability and public participation; second, NGOs might have a higher competency level for issues they have an interest on it. However, once again, one should also note that, generally speaking, the civil society plays a role of resistance or opposition with much success, but when the issue of creating an alternative program is at hand, civil engagement’s stories are not so successful. One may even speculate, within this framework, that success is usually tied to the existence of an alliance between state (central and local) actors and social movements (see, e.g., Held, [23]). The implication of these arguments is that if central/local governments and social groups manage to avoid traditional patterns of co-optation and confrontation in policy making, the end result would be beneficial to all parties (see, e.g., Lemos, [24], for such a success story in Brazil). The results that were presented for the case of Istanbul may be a starting point in forming the framework of such an alliance. However, it should be noted that stakeholders’ participation and cooperation is not an easy or straightforward process. There are various ways and formats through which different stakeholders may come together, and the appropriate mechanism(s) may not always be easy to establish. Finally, there

F. ADAMAN, F. GÖKùEN, E. Ü. ZENGINOBUZ 89

is not much work available discussing the relevance and success of different forms of participation in the case of Turkey (see, however, Belge and Bilgit, [25], and Adaman et al., [26]). REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

Adaman, F.: The political economy of the environment in Turkey. New Perspectives in Turkey. Fall 17 (1997), pp. 129-150. Zenginobuz, E. Ü., Adaman, F., Gökúen, F.: Local vs. national vs. global environmental goods: Does it make any difference in terms of willingness to pay?—Evidence from a contingent valuation survey in Istanbul. Mimeo, 2000. Gökúen, F., Adaman, F., Zenginobuz, E. Ü.: On environmental concern, willingness to pay, and postmaterialist values: Evidence from Istanbul. Environment and Behavior, 34, 5 (2002), pp. 616-633. National Report on Sustainable Development, 2002. Ministry of Environment and UNDP, Ankara. Türkiye Çevre Vakfı: Türkiyenin Çevre Sorunları. Ankara, Türkiye Çevre Vakfı, Ankara, 1999. OECD, Çevresel Baúarı Raporu, Türkiye. OECD Publications, Ankara. Yaúamıú, F. D.: Turkish Environmental Law: an overview of legal principles. Mimeo, 1999. Keleú, R., Hamamcı, C.: Çevrebilim. ømge, Ankara, 1993. Boyce, J. K.: Inequality as a cause of environmental degradation. Ecological Economics, 11 (1994), pp. 169-178. Inglehart, R.: Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990. Inglehart, R.: Public support for environmental protection: Objective problems and subjective values in 43 societies. Political Science and Politics, 28 (1995), pp. 57-72. Brechin, S. R, Willett, K.: Global environmentalism: A challenge to the postmaterialism thesis, Social Science Quarterly, 51 (1994), pp. 121-137. Duraiappah, A. K.: Poverty and environmental degradation: A review and analysis of the nexus. World Development, 26, 12 (1998), pp. 2169-2179. Olson, M.: The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. Pearce, D. W., Turner, K. R.: Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1990. Carson, R. T., Mitchell, R. C., Hanemann, W. M., Kopp, R. J., Presser, S., Ruud, P. A.: A contingent valuation study of lost passive use values resulting from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. A report to the Attorney General of the State of Alaska, November 19, 1992. Dunlap, R. E., Gallup, G. H., Gallup, A. M.: Of global concern: results of the Health of the Planet Survey. Environment, 35 (1993), pp. 33-39. Stern, P., Dietz, T., Kalof, L.: Value orientations, gender, and environmental concern. Environment and Behavior, 25:3 (1993), pp. 322-348.

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19. Adaman, F., Çarko÷lu, A.: Türkiye’de Yerel ve Merkezi Yönetimlerde Hizmetlerden Tatmin, Patronaj øliúkileri ve Reform. TESEV, Istanbul, 2000. 20. Adaman, F., Çarko÷lu A., ùenatalar, B.: Hanehalkı Gözünden Türkiye’de Yolsuzlu÷un Nedenleri ve Önlenmesine øliúkin Öneriler. Tesev, Istanbul, 2001. 21. Adaman, F., Çarko÷lu A., ùenatalar, B.: øúdünyası Gözünden Türkiye’de Yolsuzlu÷un Nedenleri ve Önlenmesine øliúkin Öneriler. Tesev, Istanbul, 2003f. 22. Esmer, Y.: Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye’de Sosyal, Siyasal, Ekonomik De÷erler. TESEV, Istanbul, 1999. 23. Held, D.: Models of Democracy. 2nd edition. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996. 24. Lemos, M. C.: The politics of pollution control in Brazil: State actors and social movements cleaning up Cubatão. World Development, 26, 1 (1998), pp. 75-87. 25. Belge, T., Bilgit, O. (eds): Yurttaú Katılımı: Sivil Toplum Kuruluúları ve Yerel Yönetimler Arasında Ortaklık ve øúbirli÷i. Burfaú, Bursa, 1997. 26. Adaman, F., Mandalinci, S., Madra Y.: The prospects of co-determination: The textile industry in Turkey. In Adaman, F., Devine, P. (eds), Reciprocity, Redistribution and Exchange Revisited. Blackrose, Montreal, 2002, pp. 414-439.

Chapter 5 The Division of Attitudes to GM Food between the North and South of Europe1 Anna Olofsson, Saman Rashid and Susanna Öhman Mid Sweden University 1. INTRODUCTION Genetic engineering is a broad field with many applications involving, for example, medicine, human reproduction, agriculture, pharmaceutics, foodstuffs and the environment in general. Depending on where to put the emphasis, it could be framed as “life saving” by way of new medicine and curing methods; “bringing ethics to an end” by questioning the foundation of our moral beliefs; or “opening Pandora’s box” by potentially dangerous breeding and cultivation methods. For many years, silence characterised the public sphere in regard to genetic engineering. The public was either not interested or did not have knowledge about this developing technology. Now and then an event caught the public’s attention but it was not until the introduction of GM2 food on the market in the middle of the 1990’s that the European public became aware, or interested, in the technology. What finally caught broad public attention was the cloning of Dolly, early 1997. In this article we take a closer look at the issue that first attracted, and still attracts, the attention of the European public, namely genetically modified food. Earlier studies show that people in different European countries vary in perception and valuation of GM food.3 A survey of all EU countries in 1996 showed that people in the South of Europe are less sceptical to GM food compared to people in the North.4 In this article we try to explore whether this is a stable difference or not and we will also try to explain these differences in attitudes to GM food between the North (Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands) and the South of Europe (Portugal, Spain and Greece). Earlier studies show that there are weak relations between traditional segmentation variables like age, gender and knowledge and attitudes to genetic engineering. By 1

This article is based on the findings from a Concerted Action of the European Commission (BI04/CT95/0043), “Biotechnology and the European Public”, coordinated by Martin Bauer, John Durant and George Gaskell, London, UK. 2 GM stands for genetically modified. Sometimes the shortening GMO is used, which stands for genetically modified organisms. 3 Biotechnology and the European Public Concerted Action Group [1]; Fjæstad & Olsson [2]; Gaskell et al. [3]; Öhman [4] 4 There are exceptions. Finland, for example, is as positive as most of the southern countries and Austria is the most negative country of all the European countries. For a more in depth analysis of all European countries in 1996, see Durant et al. [5].

92 THE DIVISION OF ATTITUDES TO GM FOOD BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE

adding economical and post-materialist aspects this article will attempt to evaluate alternative explanations of the North – South division of attitudes. 2.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The main object of study is people’s attitudes to GM food. Attitudes can be defined as “more or less stable structures in the memory, representing acquired predispositions to react in a consistently favourable or unfavourable way to a specific object” (see Oskamp, [6] and Heijs and Midden, [7]). Attitudes are based on and consist of both cognitive factors and emotions. Cognitive elements and emotions are also determined by individual and structural characteristics like knowledge, interest, involvement and information. Knowledge5 may increase the individual’s capacity to understand new information and arguments and personal involvement may lead to a more critical consideration of the arguments. Lack of knowledge or interest, on the other hand, usually means that an attitude is based less on the content and more on the context of the information, e.g. the media (Petty and Cacioppo, [8]). Demographic characteristics can also influence how people adapt to new information. Higher education can, for instance, lead to more cognitive-based attitudes (Heijs and Midden, [7]). Inglehart [9] and [10] has launched the idea of modern society transforming into a postmaterialist society. Individual level value systems or attitude patterns reflect the core societal project of different types of societies. During modernisation, the emphasis in society was on science and technology –and economic growth and scientific discoveries constituted progress. In the post-modern society on the other hand, values have shifted to a concern for how progress affects the environment. Post-materialists tend to have little confidence that science will help society or that more emphasis on technology would be a good thing. Post-modern values also reflect the assumption that survival can be taken for granted, which leads to a growing emphasis on self-expression (Inglehart, [10]). Although culture can shape the economic and political life, the opposite is also true; major socio-economic changes reshape culture. “The shift from Modernization to Postmodernization reflects the diminishing marginal utility of economic determinism: economic factors tend to play a decisive role under conditions of economic scarcity, but as scarcity diminishes, other factors shape society to an increasing degree” (Inglehart, p. 59, [10]). There are several examples on this, e.g. life expectancy, caloric intake, literacy rates, number of physicians per capita and other objective measures. The curve rises steeply with relatively modest increases in wealth until it reaches a GDP of a certain level. Thereafter the curve levels off. According to Inglehart [10], this threshold of development lies at about Portugal’s level. Economic factors then become less decisive and lifestyle factors more so. Non-economic aspects of life become increasingly important. According to Inglehart9 this also applies to people’s subjective well-being (see Figure 1). This shift may, according to Inglehart [10], be linked to the fact that survival begins to be taken for granted in society and that significant numbers of people holding post5

In this study knowledge represent the amount of external information, so called book knowledge, an individual possesses about the subject.

A. OLOFSSON, S. RASHID, S. ÖHMAN 93

materialist values begin to emerge. This helps the reshaping of individual level beliefs, attitudes and values among the public, and the best example of this is the shift from materialist to post-materialist values in Western societies the last few decades. The linkage between post-materialism and subjective well-being lies on the cultural level. It reflects that societies with high levels of economic development have high levels of objective need satisfaction as well as subjective security and well-being, which leads to an intergenerational shift toward post-materialist values. On the individual level, however, people with post-materialist values do not report relatively high levels of subjective well-being. This is not a paradox since post-materialists take economic6 security for granted and have relatively demanding standards for other aspects of life. Generally, the rich show higher levels of subjective well-being than the poor, but postmaterialists are an exception. They are richer and better educated but they do not rank higher on subjective well-being than other people do. This reflects the gaining of a level of diminishing marginal utility at which maximising economic gains (for the individual) or economic growth (for the society) no longer give higher levels of subjective wellbeing (Inglehart, [10]).

Lifestyle

Survival and wellbeing

Economic gains

GNP/Capita Figure 1. The consequences of economic development on survival and well-being (after Inglehart, p. 65, [10]). For the purpose of this study we assume that the white square to the left in the figure represents the South and one to the right represents the North.

This could have implications for the attitudes with regard to modern biotechnology and GM food. In the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, the proportion of postmaterialists is high and in the southern European countries the proportion is low. If post-materialists view new technology with some scepticism it may be important to

94 THE DIVISION OF ATTITUDES TO GM FOOD BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE

explore these relations with regard to the North-South division of attitudes. Since postmaterialist values according to the theory are related to the national level of welfare, one could argue that economic factors can play a role in the formation of attitudes. Income as an indicator of economic gain is also important to explore in this context of diminishing marginal utility and its relation to attitudes to a new technology with potentially widespread environmental effects. If we position the countries we selected in accordance to the two dimensions suggested by Inglehart [10], that is, security and well-being on one hand and economic development on the other hand, they form two clusters. The North is on the far end of economic growth with a high level of subjective well-being. The South, on the other hand, has medium economic development and a relatively high level of subjective well-being (see Figure 1). The positions of the two clusters of countries could be said to represent the point of diminishing marginal utility to the South, and the affluent post-materialist societies to the North. 2.1

PUBLIC POLICY IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE

When it comes to issues such as genetic engineering, it is important to take into account external sources in the understanding of attitude formation. It is evident that there might be differences in media coverage, policy decisions and other culturally based sources of information when comparing the South with the North of Europe. The objective of this background is to give a short summary of the situation concerning genetic engineering in each cluster of countries in the South and the North of Europe. Activity concerning genetic engineering has been much greater in the North compared to the South and we will therefore begin with the Northern countries. Already in the middle of the 1970’s both Swedish scientists and politicians became aware of the potential hazards with regard to genetic engineering and official investigations were made (Fjæstad et al., [11]). A similar development can be found in Denmark and The Netherlands, even though it was not until the beginning of the 1980’s that genetic engineering became an issue (Jelsøe et al., [12] and [13]; Midden et al., [14]). At an early stage, the Netherlands as well as Sweden invested strongly in the development of the new technology and Sweden rapidly became one of the leading nations in medical biotechnology. In Denmark it was the agro-industry that began to use and develop genetic engineering in the late 1980’s. However, already in 1983-84 the plans for the first industrial applications of biotechnology called to attention and created controversies between groups for and against (Jelsøe et al., [13]). Denmark was also the first country to have a so-called consensus conference7 in 1987. The beginning of the 1990s was characterised by silence both in Denmark and Sweden. Even if media attention was stable, or only slightly increased, nothing in particular happened. All in all, the media attention has on the whole been more positive than negative. It has slowly increased over the years and peaked at times of controversy (Fjæstad et al., 7

The consensus conferences concerned genetic engineering in agriculture and industry and involved people from various parts of society.

A. OLOFSSON, S. RASHID, S. ÖHMAN 95

[11]; Jelsøe et al., [12]; Midden, [14]; Olofsson, [15]). After the cloning of Dolly, in the beginning of 1997, the media coverage increased. Although, in the long run it was not Dolly that caught most attention but rather the introduction of GM soy and maize. This in turn led to an increased activity of NGO’s like Greenpeace and other new organisations in all three countries. The silence of the first half of the 1990’s was broken and in Denmark these last years were characterised by controversy and debate. To some extent, this is also true for Sweden, even though the amount of controversy was not high. In The Netherlands, on the other hand, Dolly and GM food does not seem to have caused any larger debate or controversy. Until 1996, relatively little attention was given to genetic engineering in the South8. This includes media coverage, policy, national research, NGO’s and general public interest (Marouda-Chatjoulis et al., [16]; Correia Jesuino et al., [17]). Both Greece and Portugal lagged behind other European countries concerning scientific research. Membership of the EU has increased funding, stimulating both academic as well as industrial research in these countries. Especially Greece seems to have more or less ignored biotechnology before 1996. There were no initiatives taken by the state to adopt national policies, nor did national industry show any interest regarding potential involvement in biotech business. Media also ignored the issue and there was almost no coverage at all before 1996 (Marouda-Chatjoulis et al., [16]; Sakellaris and Chatjouli, [18]). In Portugal a similar picture has emerged, even though the amount of media coverage has been slightly higher (Correia Jesuino et al., [17]). After 1996 the picture changed. In Greece NGO’s, a forerunner was Greenpeace, started a series of anti-GM campaigns, attracting vast media attention. Also, media coverage in general increased in a significant way during the time-period 1997 – 1999 (Sakellaris and Chatjouli, [18]). The same goes for Portugal where media coverage had been low and stable, but after 1996 increased almost to the double (Correia Jesuino et al., [17]). However, this does not mean that genetic engineering is a big issue in Portugal. On the contrary not even political actors seem to be engaged in the debate, but give an impression of lacking clear strategies how to handle the issue. To sum it up, it is apparent that the North has had an awareness and engagement in issues concerning genetic engineering much longer than the countries in the South. One could almost say that genetic engineering did not exist as an issue in the public sphere before 1997 in the South. Never the less, the cloning of Dolly and the introduction of genetic engineering with regard to food production has caught attention and made a shift in societal awareness of the technology in the South. It also seems to have an effect in the North although this is not as significant as in the South. 3. MATERIAL AND METHODS To monitor the public perception of GM food in the South and North of Europe, data from the 1996 and 1999 Eurobarometer on Biotechnology (46.1 and 52.1) was used. The surveys consist of 16,000 interviews, representing the population in the EU over the age 8

Unfortunately we have not been able to find information about the situation in Spain, so the résumé for the South of Europe is based on the situation in Greece and Portugal.

96 THE DIVISION OF ATTITUDES TO GM FOOD BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE

of 15, made at the end of 1996 and 1999. In this present study the responses from Portugal, Spain and Greece constitute the southern cluster, and responses from Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands represent the northern group.9 1,000 people were interviewed in each country and the sampling principal applied was a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each country, a number of sampling points were drawn with probability proportional to population size (to cover the entire country) and population density. All interviews were carried out face-to-face in the respondent’s home and in the appropriate national language. The Eurobarometer was developed within the project “Biotechnology and the European Public”. The survey was based on the questionnaire employed in two previous Eurobarometer surveys on biotechnology (35.1 in 1991 and 39.1 in 1993). General questions about biotechnology and questions about specific applications were asked as well as questions about attitudes, knowledge, trust, and regulation. 3.1

VARIABLES USED IN THE MODEL

The dependent variable encouragement of GM food was examined before it was used in the model since a filter question was added in 1999. In the 1999 survey the question “Please tell me whether you have heard of this application of biotechnology before, or not?” was asked before the GM food question. To examine how this affected the response pattern, the probabilities for each and every response alternative were calculated. Between 1996 and 1999 the “don’t know” answers increased by 5 % in the North (Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) and by 20% in the South (Greece, Portugal and Spain). This indicates that the filter question has increased the amount of “don’t know” answers. As both knowledge and the media coverage of GM food have increased between 1996 and 1999, it seems unlikely that the amount of “don’t know” answers should in fact have increased by 5 and 20%. To try to limit this effect, the “don’t know” answers were deleted from superseding analyses. The independent variables used are considered to be exogenous and can be categorised as socio-demographic variables (gender, age, education and knowledge10), economical (income) and value based (political affiliation, religiosity and post9

Inglehart [10] has categorised countries according to two axis of values, survival-well-being and traditional authority-secular rational authority. The countries we selected cluster nicely together; the Nordic countries together with the Netherlands in one group and Spain and Portugal in another group. Unfortunately Greece is not included in this analysis. 10 The knowledge variable is not an absolute measurement of objective knowledge but an indicator of people’s knowledge, a way of discriminate between people and groups concerning their understanding of genetic engineering. It might not be the best indicator of knowledge. There are a range of ways of defining and measuring knowledge, but we still find it useful since we are interested in the changes over time and the same variables have been used both in 1996 and in 1999. When it comes to knowledge it is important to stress that there is nothing that says that its relation to attitudes is self-evident. Hisschemoller and Midden [21] argue that the relationship depends on the evaluation of attributes connected to, in this case, a particular technology. Then, knowledge may influence the attributes that are part in forming the attitude, which in turn gives an indirect effect on the attitude forming process.

A. OLOFSSON, S. RASHID, S. ÖHMAN 97

materialism). The selection of independent variables is based on earlier studies concerning environmental issues and new technology (Bennulf, [19]; Ester et al., [20]; Heijs and Midden, [7]). The variables used in the model are described in Table 1. Table 1. Description of variables used in the model. Variable

Label

food_dk

Encouragement 1) Strongly disagree of GM food 2) Disagree 3) Agree 4) Strongly agree

d10

Gender

d11_b

Age

d8_b

Years of education

d29ny_1

Income

ks_tot

Knowledge of genetic engineering

d1ny

Political affiliation

rel4 postmat4

Variable values

Description To what extent do you agree or disagree that this application should be encouraged? Use modern biotechnology in the production of foods, for example to give them a higher protein content, greater storage value or change the taste. “Don’t know” answers are treated as missing values.

1) Man 2) Woman 1) 15-24 years 2) 25-39 years 3) 40-54 years 4) 55+ years 1) Up to 15 years 2) 16-19 years 3) 20 + years Grades 1 to 4, where 1 = lowest and 4 = highest income

People still being educated are treated as missing values

0 to 9 correct answers on knowledge test –96 0 to 10 correct answers on knowledge test –99

Examples of questions: - Ordinary tomatoes do not contain genes, while genetically modified tomatoes do. - Genetically modified animals are always bigger than ordinary ones. Knowledge questions vary somewhat between –96 and –99.

1) Left 2) Neutral 3) Right Religiosity Grades 1 to 4, where 1 = religious and 4 = not religious Post-materialist Grades 1 to 3 where values 1 = materialist and 3 = post-materialist – 96 Grades 1 to 4 where 1 = materialist and 4 = post-materialist -99

Harmonised income scale where “don’t know” or “do not want to answer” are replaced by nearby median.

Based on Inglehart’s questions on values: - Maintaining order in the country - Giving the people more say in important government decisions - Fighting rising prices - Protecting freedom of speech

98 THE DIVISION OF ATTITUDES TO GM FOOD BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE

3.2

ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION

Scientists usually do not observe individual “underlying” preferences or responses. In such cases, that is to say, when variables are censored, the outcome will be discrete values. As we can see in table 1, people’s underlying responses to GM food (food_dk) are observed only through four kinds of categories, which are inherently ordered. A proper model to employ is the ordered logit model. t* We thus denote the individual’s underlying responses (attitude) as (food_dk)ij , where j denotes whether the individual i is from the North or the South and t denotes whether the responses are observed in 1996 or 1999. Since we only observe the category to which the individual’s responses belong, as mentioned above, we define t (food_dk)ij (see Table 1). We thus have: t t t t t t t t t (food_dk)ij w 1j (postmat)ij  w 2j (rel)ij  w 3j (ks_tot)ij  w 4j (d1_ny)ij  t t t t t t t t t w 5j (d11_b)ij  w 6j (d8_b)ij  w7j (d29ny_b)ij  w 8j (d10)ij  İ ij (1) where the variables in brackets are assumed to be exogenous explanatory variables, and H is the residual. Since the depended variable is observed only ordinally, we assume that H is logistically distributed across observations (Greene, [22]; Maddala, [23]). 3.3

INTERPRETATION OF THE SURVEY RESULTS

As always in survey research it is important to remember the drawbacks and pitfalls with this kind of research. In relation to the Eurobarometer survey there are some specific issues that should be kept in mind when examining the results. First, it is important to remember that surveys only provide a snapshot of public perception at a certain point of time. A second limitation is one that is inevitable in all crossnational studies of this kind. The Eurobarometer questionnaire was fielded in the different languages across Europe. It is a rather complicated and difficult business to accurately translate the key terms into so many languages. All of the key terms in the survey - biotechnology, gene technology, genetic manipulation, etc.- have linguistic and other connotations that are partly culture-specific. It should therefore be remembered that unavoidable semantic differences might occasionally affect results. Furthermore, it is always possible that other cultural differences (including differences in the way that respondents report knowledge, attitudes, etc.) may affect the results. Another drawback in this study is the relatively low response rate on the key questions about income and attitude to GM food, especially in the South.

A. OLOFSSON, S. RASHID, S. ÖHMAN 99

4. RESULTS In this article our aim is to explore whether the difference in attitudes to GM food between the South and North of Europe is a stable difference or not. In addition to this we will try to explain these differences. The structure of this section applies to this and begins with a presentation of some relevant descriptive results from the two investigated surveys, and then the statistical analysis of the results is presented. 4.1

ATTITUDES TO GM FOOD IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE

The 1996 Eurobarometer showed that there was a division in attitudes toward GM food between the South and the North of Europe (see Figure 2). While people in the South viewed GM food as something slightly agreeable (m=2.59), people in the North found it quite disagreeable and negative (m=2.18). Interestingly, three years later, in 1999, this discrepancy disappears. People in the North are still sceptical and negative. The mean value is almost the same as in 1996 (m=2.13), but there has been a shift in the South showing that people’s attitudes have become more negative and are now almost at the same level as people in the North (m=2.18). Needless to say, this means that there is a more stable overall attitude in the North and a more changeable attitude in the South.

Attitudes to GM food

3

2,5 North South 2

1,5

-96

-99 Year

Figure 2. Changes between 1996 and 1999 in perceptions of GM food in the North and South of Europe.

100 THE DIVISION OF ATTITUDES TO GM FOOD BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE

The answers to four questions; whether GM food is useful, risky, morally acceptable and if it should be encouraged or not, have been used to describe the attitude patterns for the two clusters of countries. Examining the attitudes to GM food, the general trend found in the overall attitude presented in Figure 2 is confirmed. People in the North have not changed their attitudes towards genetic engineering in any essential way (see Table 2). Table 2. Percentages holding positive and negative attitudes to GM food in North and South, 1996 and 1999. North –96 Agree Disagree

North –99 Agree Disagree

South –96 Agree Disagree

South -99 Agree Disagree

GM food useful for society

55.1%

44.9%

57.1%

42.9%

64.5%

35.5%

50.8%

49.2%

GM food risky for society

74.0%

26.0%

78.2%

21.8%

68.3%

31.7%

74.4%

25.6%

GM food morally acceptable

52.7%

47.3%

49.9%

50.1%

59.4%

40.6%

45.4%

54.6%

GM food should be encouraged

42.4%

57.6%

39.5%

60.5%

59.3%

40.7

42.0%

58.0%

Little more than 50 percent of the respondents agree that GM food is useful for society in both the 1996 and 1999 studies and the same goes for the question as to whether GM food is morally acceptable. Fewer respondents, about 40 percent, think that GM food should be encouraged and as many as 75 percent answered that GM food is risky for society. Both these results are stable over a period of time. In the South we find another pattern. Primarily, in 1996, people in the South agreed to a larger extent with the questions regarding the usefulness, moral acceptability and encouragement compared to people in the North. Here, in contrast to the North, large changes have occurred. In the second study in 1999 the people in the South are on a level with, or rather more negative than the North when it comes to these statements. Less than 50 percent agree with any of these questions and 75 percent perceive GM food as risky for society, which is more or less equal to reactions from the North. Interestingly, answers to the question concerning possible risks of GM food do not differ much between the clusters. Even if the North is more convinced that GM food is risky both in 1996 and 1999, the South shows a similar startingpoint and an identical trend.

A. OLOFSSON, S. RASHID, S. ÖHMAN 101

Both in 1996 and 1999 there was a question regarding the intention to buy GM food if the food tasted better than non-GM food. Figure 3 shows that fewer people, in both the South and North, would buy GM food in 1999 compared to 1996. In the North there is no greater change, from 30 percent in 1996 to 25 percent in 1999. However, in the South we once again find a significant change; in 1996 35 percent answered that they would buy a GM fruit if it tasted better while only 20 percent answered the same in 1999. 40 35 Percent

30 25

North South

20

15

96

Year

99

Figure 3. Changes between 1996 and 1999 in intention to buy GM food in the North and South of Europe.

This calls for a more thorough examination of the individual variables that influence people’s attitudes to ascertain what might cause the difference between the North and the South of Europe. What has actually happened between 1996 and 1999? Beginning by once again looking at the overall picture, we find a rather striking difference between the two regions (see Table 3). In the North, as many as half of the eight variables that significantly contributed to explain people’s attitudes to GM food showed exactly the same pattern in 1999 as in 1996. Religiosity was not significant in either 1996 or 1999, which gives us changes in only three variables in the North. This also indicates stability when it comes to individual explanatory variables. However, one of the variables that did change was income. It did not contribute to the formation of attitudes in 1996 but did so in 1999. The same change occurred in the South and we will return to this later in this section. When it comes to the overall pattern in the South we find that only one variable, knowledge, is stable over time. All other variables have either changed or do not contribute in a significant way. The above observations point in the same direction - stability in the North and instability in the South.

102 THE DIVISION OF ATTITUDES TO GM FOOD BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF EUROPE

Table 3. Estimation results. North-96 North-99 0,097* Knowledge of genetic engineering 0,066* (4,45) (Ks_tot) (3,32)1 Political affiliation 0,242* 0,165* (d1ny) (5,62) (3,20) Gender -0,555* -0,58* (d10) (7,87) (7,46) Age -0,118* -0,085* (d11_b) (3,37) (2,17) Income 0,0077 0,122* (d29ny_1) (0,218) (3,23) Years of education 0,0077 -0,075* (d8_b) (0,21) (1,86) Post-materialist values 0,0278 -0,092* (postmat4) (0,59) (2,20) Religiosity -0,00034 0,032 (rel4) (1,04) (0,70) Pseudo R22 0,018 0,016 N-obs 2772 2236

South-96 0,156* (7,61) 0,008 (0,17) -0,19* (2,47) -0,079* (2,12) 0,174 (0,42) 0,006 (0,14) -0,002 (0,03) -0,00 (0,24) 0,016 2396

South-99 0,064* (2,41) -0,147* (2,10) -0,068 (0,68) -0,05 (1,02) -0,135* (2,42) 0,088 (1,62) 0,059 (1,15) 0,216* (3,78) 0,014 1380

1

z-value goodness of fit * significant at least at 0.05 level

2

Seeking further explanations of the different patterns we will look at each variable specifically to see whether they have changed or not, over a period of time. As one can see, the number of significant variables contributing to the model has increased in the North 1999 compared to 1996. This is not the case in the South. It is important to point out that the individual variables and the model as a whole, do not explain much of the variation in attitudes to GM food. Although this can be viewed as a drawback in this context, we want to draw the attention not to the strength of the relationships, but rather to the stability or instability within the model. The variable Knowledge of genetic engineering has, as we anticipated, a positive and significant effect on attitudes to GM food. That is, the more people know about GM food, the more positive attitude they have. This result is valid for the North as well as the South and it is stable over the years. Furthermore the results indicate that Political affiliation has a positive and significant effect on attitude to GM food for people from the North in both years. The effect, however, varies for people in the South. While the effect is not significant in 1996, it is significant in 1999. Moreover, the effect is negative, which is in contrast to people in the North. Gender has a negative effect for both regions, meaning that women have a less positive attitude to GM food than men. Yet the effect is significant in both years for people in the North, which implies that gender is a stable variable contributing to people’s attitude formation. For people in the South, the gender effect was significant in 1996, but not in 1999. Age appears to have negative effect, since older

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people are more negative to GM food than younger people. This effect, however, is not significant for people in the South in 1996, but is shown in 1999. The effect of Income is positive, yet was not significant for either the North or the South in 1996. It is notable that, in 1999, income has positive effects on attitudes for people in the North and negative effects on attitudes for people in the South. Thus, the results indicate that incomes have become more important for people’s attitude, but in opposite ways in the North as compared to the South. Years of education has become a significant variable in the North in 1999 indicating that people with longer education are more negative than people with less education. This variable was not significant in the South, neither in 1996 nor 1999. Inglehart [10] has shown that variables such as Materialism versus Post-materialism could have an impact on people’s attitudes. However, our results show that this is not the case, at least not in the South. This variable has a pattern in relation to years of education. In the North post-materialist values become significant in 1999, showing that people with post-materialist values are less positive to GM food compared to materialistic individuals.11 Last, but not least, we have the measurement of Religiosity that did not contribute in any significant way in the North, neither in 1996 nor 1999. In the South, on the other hand, it has changed over a period of time. It did not contribute in any significant way in the first survey, but did so in the second one, in 1999. The correlation is positive, that is, the more religious, the more negative people are to GM food. 5. CONCLUSION As we have shown, the gap in attitudes between North and South of Europe concerning GM food has closed during the three years between 1996 and 1999. This result can also be confirmed in a comparative qualitative study of public perceptions of agricultural biotechnologies in Europe (PABE) (Marris et al., [24]). The following discussion will deal with possible explanations as well as the stability or instability of these attitudes. We will focus on post-materialist and economical aspects. Inglehart [10] postulates that modern society is associated to progress through economical and technological development and that post-materialism or postmodern society is related to more sceptical attitudes to science and technology. Following Inglehart, we assume that the position of the South is equivalent to the point of diminishing marginal utility, that is, the transition point between modern and post-modern society. Similarly, that of the North is equivalent to postmaterialist or post-modern society. We would then expect people in the South to be more positive to GM food due to their more materialist values and people in the North to be relatively more negative due to a larger proportion of post-materialists in 11

Important to notice is, however, that the question in the survey was slightly changed in 1999 compared to 1996.

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the population. This assumption holds true for the attitudes in 1996 but when we reach 1999 the difference has disappeared. Possible explanations on the macro level are that the South has moved closer to the North, due to a shift towards a more postmaterialist society, or that the heated public debate in the South has highlighted GM food. The first explanation is not supported by the data, since there is not a substantial increase in the number of post-materialists in the South between 1996 and 1999. The other explanation, however, may hold. Public debate in the South has increased and the focus has been on GM food and the possible negative outcomes of the new technology. By 1999, regulation and media attention have also put GM food on the agenda in the South. Nevertheless, if we turn to the individual level of analysis, there is some support for Inglehart’s idea that post-materialist values are related to negative attitudes to new, unknown technology - in this case GM food but only in the North in 1999. It is interesting to note that, in the North, the factors influencing the attitude to GM food are relatively stable over time. Knowledge, gender, age and political affiliation all contribute in the same way in 1996 and 1999. What happens is that even more factors contribute in 1999 - income, education and post-materialist values. This indicates that the attitudes in the North are relatively stable. Even if the relationships are not strong, the pattern is clear. This could indicate that people in the North are “ahead” of people in the South in the attitude formation process. Our results, showing that more variables contribute in a significant way, confirm this hypothesis, meaning that the attitudes are more based on internalised values and embedded in socio-economical factors. Another reason could also be the relatively higher level of knowledge in the North. It is plausible that a more knowledgeable public seeks, or at least acknowledges, more accurate and balanced information. One input to the forming of attitudes may in this case be the media coverage with regard to modern biotechnology in general and GM food in particular. The less knowledgeable on the other hand, are more likely to be influenced by the light press and tabloids, reporting more simplified, changing and stereotypic images of GM food. This could be one explanation for the more unstable attitudes in the South. Cultural effects are, of course, also a likely explanation. As we saw in the public policy section, the North has for a long time paid attention to genetic engineering and its consequences and media coverage has increased steadily over the years. In the South, on the other hand, genetic engineering has not been a matter of public debate, either in media or in politics, until the last part of the 1990’s when a significant change occurred. This is a likely explanation for the different stability patterns. People in the North have been aware of the new technology for a longer time than people in the South. This makes their attitudes more stable over time while, for people in the South, genetic engineering is more or less something new and unknown. Because of this, negative media images and NGO campaigns may more easily have influenced these people’s attitudes. If we turn to the examination of the economic aspects, an interesting finding is that income becomes significant in 1999, while this was is not the case in 1996. However, it behaves differently in the North compared to the South. While income has a positive effect on people’s attitude in the North, it has a negative effect in the

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South. That is, in the North, people with a higher income are more positive to GM food than people with a lower income. While in the South, the case is the opposite, people with lower income are more positive. This result, however, is not easy to explain in a straightforward way. On the one hand, one can imagine that individual attitudes may be affected by the expected profit (return on risk capital) that GM industry can generate. It is well known that the GM food industry has raised the amount of food production many times over and that this trend could continue. This could implicate higher expected profit or pay-off for individuals who invest in this industry. Assuming that individuals maximise income, people with a high income tend to have positive attitudes to GM food, because it offers them high returns (profits). Consequently, people with a low income, who could invest less in the GM-food industry, tend to have a less positive attitude to GM food. On the other hand, one could imagine that people’s attitudes may be affected by the “quality” of GM food, or the risk that GM food could have on people’s health. People with low income may have positive attitudes, since they may believe that the GM industry’s increasing food production leads to reduced food prices. Then they could consume more, or at least cheaper, food, even if the GM food may mean “bad quality”. People with high income, on the other hand, may have less positive attitudes, since they would not want to jeopardise their health with GM food. Even if the “non-GM food” prices may increase, for instance due to population growth in relation to food production, they could, however, still afford to purchase “non-GM food”. It is quite obvious that none of these explanations fit the estimated effect of income for both the North and South. While the first idea might only explain the pattern in the North, the second idea is only suitable for the South. This brings us to a point where we have to search for region-specific explanations. People in the South and the North with a similar income may have different attitudes to GM-food due to cultural differences, differences in post-materialist level, differences in the amount of public debate, etc. For instance, as we mentioned earlier, the biotech industry is almost exclusively located in the North. This could affect people in the North, while people in the South is less likely to be influenced. Another example is Inglehart [10] who also shows that the relation between income and attitudes and values can be ambiguous. On the one hand, post-materialists with a high income are likely to be sceptical to new technology, while materialists with a high income are likely to hold positive views with regard to technology. This is due to the prevailing values in the different societies. Yet another explanation as to why the income effect differs between the North and South could be a measurement error and/or a selectivity bias problem in our data set. For example people with low income may tend to not admit to their income level or may under/over-state their income. To summarise, the main focus has been on the difference in stability of attitudes to GM food between the North and South of Europe and the potential impact of economic factors and post-materialist values on public perception. Nevertheless, in order to draw further conclusions about the stability and the impact of economic and post-materialist factors, a longer time series is preferable. With additional measuring

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points it would not only be possible to see whether the instability in the South continues or if it stabilises at the same level as the North. It would also be possible to see if economical and post-materialist factors continue to play a role.

REFERENCES 1. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

Biotechnology and the European Public Concerted Action Group: Europe ambivalent on biotechnology, Nature, 387, 26 June (1997), pp. 845-847. Fjæstad, B., Olsson, S.: Ny stor undersökning: Därför gillar vi inte gentekniken. Forskning & Framsteg, 6, (1997), pp. 11-15. Gaskell, G., Bauer, M. W., Durant, J.: Public Perceptions of Biotechnology in 1996: Eurobarometer 46.1. In Durant, J., Bauer, M. W., Gaskell, G. (eds.): Biotechnology in the Public Sphere. A European Sourcebook. Science Museum, London, 1998. Öhman. S.: Public Perceptions of Gene Technology. On the Edge of Risk Society?, Umeå University, Umeå, 2002. Durant, J., Bauer, M. W., and Gaskell, G. (eds.): Biotechnology in the Public Sphere. A European Sourcebook. Science Museum, London, 1998. Oskamp, S.: Attitudes and Opinions. London: Prentice-Hall, 1991. Heijs, W., Midden, C.: Explaining attitudes towards biotechnology. In Lundin S., Ideland. S. (eds.): Gene Technology and the Public. An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Nordic Academic Press, Lund, 1997. Petty, R., Cacioppo, J.: Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1986. Inglehart, R.: The Silent Revolution. Oxford, Princeton, 1977. Inglehart, R.: Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1997. Fjæstad, B., Öhman, S., Olofsson, A., von Bergmann-Winberg, M-L., Seger, N.: Sweden: The lid is on, but for how long? In M.W. Bauer & G. Gaskell. (eds.): Biotechnology 1996-2000: The years of controversy. Science Museum, London, 2001. Jelsøe, E., Lassen, J., Thing Mortensen, A., Fredriksen, H., Wambuti Kamara, M.: Denmark. In Durant, J., Bauer, M. W., Gaskell, G. (eds.): Biotechnology in the Public Sphere. A European Sourcebook. Science Museum, London, 1998. Jelsøe, E., Lassen, J., Thing Mortensen, A., Fredriksen, H., Wambuti Kamara, M.: Denmark: the revival of national controversy over biotechnology. In Gaskell, G., Bauer, M: W. (eds.): Biotechnology 1996-2000: The years of controversy. Science Museum, London, 2001. Midden, C, Hamstra, A, Gutteling, J, Smink, C.: The Netherlands. In Durant, J., Bauer, M. W., Gaskell, G. (eds.): Biotechnology in the Public Sphere. A European Sourcebook. Science Museum, London, 1998. Olofsson, A.: Waves of Controversy. Gene Thechnoloy in Dagens Nyheter 197396. Umeå University, Umeå, 2002.

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16. Marouda-Chatjoulis, A, Stathopoulou, A, Sakellaris, G.: Greece. In Durant, J., Bauer, M. W., Gaskell, G. (eds.): Biotechnology in the Public Sphere. A European Sourcebook. Science Museum, London, 1998. 17. Correia Jesuino, J, Arriscado Nunes, J, Diego, C, Costa, S, Matias, M, Alcântara, P.: Portugal. In Gaskell, G., Bauer, M: W. (eds.): Biotechnology 1996-2000: The years of controversy. Science Museum, London, 2001. 18. Sakellaris, G., Chatjouli, A.: Greece. The Greek Public is Loosing Faith and Reacting Against Biotechnology. In Gaskell, G., Bauer, M: W. (eds.): Biotechnology 1996-2000: The years of controversy. Science Museum, London, 2001. 19. Bennulf, M.: Miljöopinionen i Sverige. Dialogos, Lund, 1994. 20. Ester, P, Halman, L, de Moor, R.: The Individualising Society. Value Change in Europe and North America. Tilburg University Press, Tilburg, 1994. 21. Hisschemoller, M. H, Midden, C.: Improving the usability of research on the public perception of science and technology for policy making. Public Understanding of Science, 8, 1 (1999), pp. 17-33. 22. Greene, W.H.: Econometric Analysis. 2nd ed. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1993. 23. Maddala, G.S.: Limited-Depended and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 24. Marris, C., Wynne, B., Simmons, P., Weldon, S.: Public Perceptions of Agricultural Biotechnologies in Europe. Final report of the PABE research project, 2001.

Chapter 6 Acquisition and Domestication of New Household Technologies - Some Dynamics Behind Growth in Material Consumption1 Jeppe Laessoe National Environmental Research Institute, Denmark 1.

INTRODUCTION

Although nations in Northern Europe like to see themselves as the avant-garde of the environmental political movement they practically ignore their own ongoing lifestyle changes and growth in material consumption, both of which threaten to undermine their efforts to promote a sustainable development. Obviously, the growth of consumption is propelled by the functioning of the economic systems – the driving forces of competition currently extend the markets and give rise to continuous technological development. The political system supports this development by breaking down trade barriers and by providing better infrastructure. Changes in these conditions at macro level interact with dynamics at micro level. The growth in household consumption is not just about ’more of the same thing’; it is invariably tied up with the interplay between changed social conditions and individual dreams of a better life. One of those changes in our external context is the continuing influx of new technologies for use in everyday life that continue to offer consumers increased diversification and specialization, standard improvements, increased individual independence, increased mobility, mechanization of household chores, intensification of time-use, and introduction of new activities (Røpke, [1]). These types of technological options all enable increased consumption, and thus produce a greater impact on the environment. However they can also change the way we organise our everyday lives, and thus introduce new – potentially more consumption-intensive – patterns of behaviour. Røpke, in a taxonomy of the different properties of novelty associated with new everyday technologies, pointed out that the most radical changes in everyday life will happen whenever a new technology leads to new processes in familiar functions, or to completely new functions/forms of activity (Røpke, [2]). However consumers are by no means the passive victims of market supply. Viewed from each person’s psycho-social conditions in our present modern world, the dynamics of the growth of consumption are concerned with normative social pressure, signalling 1

The project on Consumers and New Household Technologies in Ecological Transformation was carried out together with Inge Røpke, and this paper owes much to discussions with her.

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social identity, the aesthetic demands triggered by changes of styles – and the an unending struggle to create an equilibrium in a labile and vulnerable Self; one that both nurtures an incessant exploration of the countless possibilities for creative selffulfilment, and a quest for experience and narratives that create fullness and meaning, and thus protect us against an existential void (Læssøe, [3]). The ambition of the present contribution is not to delve into the macrosociological or the micro-individual dynamics behind growth in material consumption, but to focus on households and family lifestyles as the mediating level. The world is changing, and as modern individuals we are sensitive and active participants in this change. This is why we found it reasonable to probe into this complex intermediary level when searching for processes that could deepen our knowledge about dynamics that promote or impede growth in material consumption. This is what we did in the qualitative study - “Consumers and New Household Technologies in Ecological Transformation”.2 Nine different Danish families were interviewed about how they related to new technological options and why. Findings from this research will be presented in the main sections of this article. Three consumption-boosting dynamics existing at family level will be described, and the domestication of new technologies elucidated. Before this, however, the first three sections will clarify our approach. The first section will relate our approach to the predominant ecological modernist conception of sustainable consumption. Our theoretical sources and basic concepts will then be explained. And finally, the third section will give a brief presentation of the empirical design of our study. 2.

APPROACH

2.1. THE BLIND SPOT OF THE ECOLOGICAL MODERNIST DISCOURSE When the Danish environmentalist movement first emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was a response to a foot-dragging political system that – together with business and science – for several years had been turning a deaf ear to the emerging criticism of pollution in the mass media and in international publications. The environmental cause became part and parcel of the Youth Revolt and therefore bore the strong imprint of the alternative political culture following in its wake. In a matter of a few years young environmental activists were able to put an end to the collective blind spot of the established political culture and make their mark on the environmental discourse by their critique of values and the politico-economical causes of pollution and growth (Læssøe and Jamison, pp. 67-90, [4]). In the latter part of the 1970s the environmentalist movement grew and brought more and more new aspects of environmental problems into the public debate. In particular, the struggle against nuclear power attracted considerable popular support – a fact, however that also made the environmentalist movement shift its focus 2 The project was carried out with Inge Røpke, and was financed by The Danish Environmental Research Programme.

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towards individual cases and success, rather than principles and values. At the same time the state, the economic sector, and the academic world began to take an active stand on environmental issues. This led to a professionalisation and institutionalisation that influenced the environmental discourse, in part turning it towards rather more technocratic views on management (Læssøe and Jamison, pp. 90-119, [4]). These tendencies have developed continuously, so today a layman can hardly tell the difference between the views of environmental organisations and those of the government and the more progressive parts of corporate culture. Hajer’s description of an epochal shift towards ’the ecological modernisation discourse’ is more or less in accord with the development seen in Denmark (Hajer, [5]). Today there is a widespread consensus on the importance of safeguarding a sustainable development and on the view that ’prevention of pollution pays’. Importance is attached to a radical revision of all community institutions, and to involvement of all stakeholders – not least the lay consumer-citizen. The general involvement of the populace may indicate that the consensus and the confident attitude of the environmental discourse have created a synergism. Not that there is a general concord all round, and when it comes to farming and foodstuff production clashes of interest are quite significant. However, because of the general positive focus on environmental issues in Denmark, the occurrence of practices either hazardous to or beneficial to the environment are today heavily charged with symbolic meaning, so they have become a major element in the formation of social identity (Ger et al., [6]).3 However the evolution of the environmental discourse, from its initial radical political critique and towards a widespread consensus on the ecological modernisation project, failed to include an aspect that, within a few years, could place it in a crisis of legitimacy: This is the issue of continuing growth in material consumption confounding the results of eco-technical optimisation and behavioural adjustments. What we are doing actually amounts to ‘losing on the roundabouts what we have gained on the swings’. Or in the words of one environmentally active family, in an appraisal of their own efforts: In spite of all our intentions and plans we ascertained that a lot of the qualitative progress we made hasn’t been able to keep step with the quantitative deteriorations: The car does not use leaded petrol anymore, and it does many kilometres per litre, but it is driven still more kilometres. The detergents are less harmful to the environment, but the clothes are washed more often. The recycling 3

What we have is no longer a tiny green minority against a majority of dismissive and indifferent citizens. An opinion poll last year showed that 62 percent of the population had bought eco-foodstuffs within the previous week (Thulstrup et al., p. 69ff, [7]). In another survey 29 percent indicated that the environment goes before price and quality when they are shopping on a workday (Jarlbro et al., p. 35, [8]). Notwithstanding such differing motives and any uncertainty as to whether people actually do as they say, then such figures do demonstrate considerable attention to the environment/consumption relation.

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of waste is close to being caught up by the consumption, so in spite of recycling the amount of waste is increasing. The electrical consumer goods use less energy, but the number of devices is steadily increasing. (Læssøe et al., p. 73, [9]) On a national level the growth in consumption means that environment policy targets for reducing CO2 levels and waste quantities will be hard to reach as planned, despite considerable improvements in power technology and the establishment of recycling systems (Munksgaard et al., p. 14, [10]). Technological development will potentially continue to reduce environmental impacts per consumer unit, even if the most obvious energy saving potential – often called the ‘easiest cherries’ – has been reaped already. Yet the growth in material consumption is still in full swing – and by and large ignored by the ecological modernist discourse. The present situation is not the result of coincidence. As already mentioned the ecological discourse is characterised by its consensus-oriented and optimistic view of environmental problems as a ’progressive stimulus’, a dynamo to drive our modern, industrial society on. In that light economic and normative interventions to reduce material consumption will appear to be a counterproductive and defensive undertaking. They will clash with the interests of corporate business and consumer expectations as well – thus undermining the present consensus. Moreover the issue does not ’fit into’ the strategy of the environmental discourse and the mechanisms that have been applied to realise it, and which is largely based on optimising technological development. We have a regular army of experts and bureaucrats in our public and private environment sector, ready to probe the state of the environment and promote practical innovation in environmental technologies. But what can they resort to when the issue at hand is challenging social values and the very lifestyle development of citizens? Admittedly the ecological modernist discourse does imply a participatory approach, by which citizens are made co-responsible and included in efforts for a sustainable development (Hajer, p. 28f, [5]). However the very perspective from which participation is sought to be implemented is a restricted one – especially in terms of the consumption growth issue. We could describe the concept as ’environment-centred:’ The awareness and practices of citizens/consumers are viewed from a purely environmentalist standpoint. People’s views of nature, environmental awareness, environmental behaviour, attitudes towards one product beneficial to the environment versus the other are analysed – while excluding everything else that occupies them, filling and affecting their everyday life and existence. Not that such studies are irrelevant; but by themselves they cannot provide an adequate basis of knowledge for a sustainable development strategy. We lack knowledge of the socio-cultural dynamics that influence people’s practices and lifestyle development, while realising that they are a prerequisite for any strategy of change. We lack attention to whatever social goals/values/visions that environmental solutions might collide with or draw upon. And we are yet to understand how social and cultural growth and learning processes can be promoted (Læssøe and Røpke,

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[11]). From the environment-centred approach, public participation amounts merely to environmental info campaigns and funding for environmental activities, leaving out people’s everyday problems, their plans, their structural conditions, and their social values. And the absence of a coupling between social aspects and environmental efforts is obstructing any attempts to deal with the issue of consumption growth. A major aim of environmental sociology is to describe the changes in the environmental discourse in a society, and their impact on society as such. However, the opposite approach is equally important, i.e. applying a wider scope of sociological studies on socio-cultural relations, to place the environmental discourse in a critical perspective, and as a productive contribution to its development. In order that consumption growth be reintroduced into the environmental discourse, the aforesaid shortcomings of the discourse of ecological modernisation need to be transcended and replaced by an adequate basis of understanding, from which new pathways for developing the strategies of a sustainable societal development can be outlined. 2.2. THEORETICAL GUIDELINES Our empirical project was a sequel to a previous, purely theoretical project, during which we examined the socio-cultural dynamics underlying the growth in material consumption. Though definitely relevant, these theories still constitute more general theoretical contributions concerning families, everyday life, consumer culture and technology, while our own question (what makes consumption grow?) is outside scope.4 Thus, we found an empirical inquiry justified, in order to provide some empirical knowledge for inspiration. A complete account of the entire theoretical basis would be beyond the scope of this article. Thus, in the following, I will merely refer to concepts and angles with direct bearing to the study’s empirical design. As already mentioned, the purpose of the qualitative empirical study was: 1.

4

to reveal some of the consumption dynamics that operate on the family level and compel most consumers in the rich countries to be willing contributors to the growing consumption.

That project drew upon theories and studies carried out in three different, but partly overlapping fields. First, since our focus was on families as the central unit to be explored, we were inspired by theoretical contributions on the modern family and on everyday life (i.e. Gullestad, [12]; Dencik and Jørgensen, [13]; Hochschild, [14]). Second, our preoccupation with the socio-cultural forces behind consumption patterns made it relevant to draw on anthropological and sociological perspectives on consumption (i.e. Miller, [15]; McCracken, [16]; Warde, [17]). Third, our interest in new domestic technologies and how they are integrated and used by families caused us to look into studies in the sociology of technology (i.e. Silverstone & Hirsch, [18]; Lie & Sørensen, [19]). Knowledge from these disciplines proved itself obviously relevant for the issue at hand (cf. Røpke, [20], and Røpke, [2]).

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2.

to investigate how the families use the new technologies, and how these technologies eventually become integrated in gradual changes of lifestyle, because – in the long run – the changes of lifestyles can be decisive for the development of the consumption dynamics and for the related environmental impacts.

We wished to probe the consumer dynamics at family level, where the internal dynamics of family life meet with the continuous bombardment from the market with new everyday life technologies. How is that meeting enacted? How do families relate to the new technological options, and why? Could that knowledge help an understanding of why we are purchasing more and more gadgets? And can it elucidate the consequences in lifestyle development? As will be seen, consumption dynamics are considered in a tension field between, on the one hand, the day-to-day lives/lifestyles of the families, and on the other hand the market with new everyday life technologies. For a start, both these key concepts are defined below. After that, we will deal with two concepts that are essential in comprehending the relationship between lifestyle development and the new domestic technologies. First, the concept of dynamics is defined, and the distinction between discursive and sensuous-emotional processes is drawn up. Next, the concept of domestication is defined, since useful in understanding how new domestic technologies are integrated and used. This concept, too, is differentiated, since a distinction is made between assimilative and accomodative processes. Lifestyle and everyday life: The lifestyle concept is defined and understood vastly differently within humanities and social studies respectively (Wikström, [21]; Johansson & Miegel, [22]). In the present context it is understood as ”the specific interplay of life opportunities (nature-wise & social), social relations and subjective predispositions, all of which are expressed in the organisation of everyday life practices and in the associated pattern of meaning” (cf. Læssøe, p. 13, [23]). Everyday life is understood as ”the social and individual life created by people when transforming socially created conditions of life into everyday living” (BeckJørgensen, [24]). So the lifestyle concept focuses more specifically on the set-up of that everyday life, and on the dynamics and meaning underlying such an organisation. As such it is relevant for this study, in the following respects: First, by underlining that everyday life is not a sequence of isolated practices; to some extent it has the character of a pattern that ensures an amount of functional and symbolic order, dynamically speaking. It may have to do with rhythmicity in everyday pace, the relationship between work, chores and leisure, task allocation within the family, gender relations, etc. This pattern character and order can motivate the acquisition of new things if they fit in, or it can produce resistance if the purchase threatens to jeopardise the existing order.5 Second, the lifestyle concept is relevant because it emphasises that, dynamically speaking, the organisation of everyday life and its ascribed meanings spring from an 5

Giddens, inspired by Kierkegaard and Winnicut, described this emotional reaction as ”ontological safety”, cf. Giddens [25].

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interplay of our socio-structural conditions, the specific history of life orientations within a family and its members – and the inherent social context and cultural influences. Therefore lifestyle development runs along different paths, and a person’s acquisition and domestication of new technologies may differ, too. As we know the major part of lifestyle research is about typologising these lifestyles. There is every reason to be wary with the use of such pure-bred ideal types, and in our case no such mapping is intended. However, we do find it interesting whether or not such lifestyle differences also imply different living strategies – i.e. a fund of values, reaction patterns to new impulses, and people’s wishes for their own lifestyle development – that will decide if people acquire new domestic technologies, and if so, how they are used.6 New everyday life technologies: What is considered to be a new technology is not the same from the viewpoint of a producer as from the viewpoint of the consumer. To a producer a new key technology – i.e. a technology that can potentially be incorporated in many different products and processes – can mean radical changes in qualification requirements and production methods, while a consumer may basically experience the end product as practically identical. By contrast, to the consumer, new technologies introduce new functional and handling properties, new features in day-to-day use. ‘New’ may denote different forms of ’novelty’ (Campbell, [26]). First and foremost, something can be new in the sense that it has not been used before. This form of novelty is not included in our research as the focus is on renewal in the sense of ”different from before”. Here we distinguish between cases where the novelty aspect is the different application of a familiar product, and those in which the product proper is the novelty. We have focused on the latter case, and distinguish between new products with familiar versus new functionalities, and finally – in those with familiar functions – between those based on previously known and used processes and those replacing them with new ones (for more detail, comp. Røpke, [2]). We use the concept of ’technology’ to denote tools, though always aware that any technology unfolds only with its applications. The artefact proper has a script: its anticipated use and meaning have been incorporated into its design. However that does not preclude that consumers may perceive and use it differently. Also, it is often seen that an artefact’s use and meaning will change, from its initial introduction as something new and different and until it functions as an trivial everyday object (Koskijoki and Pantzar, [27]). That distinction - between an artefact’s script and its use - is significant when dealing with technology’s lifestyle impacts, as in the present case. The main focus point of the present study was neither lifestyles nor new everyday life technologies in their own right. What we wished to bring to the fore 6 The concept ’living strategy’ is our own construct. It relates to, yet also differs from, mainstream conceptions of lifestyle. On the one hand lifestyle, in the sociological sense, is related to the habitus of social groups, while the psychological conception is concerned with each individual’s character and approach to the social world. By using the term ‘living strategy’ we mean to emphasise coping structures that develop on the family level – surely influenced by the external social context and the personality of individual members as well.

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was: What happens at the intersection between lifestyle and technologies? Here, as we said, the concepts of dynamics and domestication are significant: Dynamics: We use the concept ‘dynamics’ in a comprehensive sense. First, dynamics are not just forces that make things change. They are also forces that counteract change. Second, the internal dynamics in family decision-making are not just about inter-personal conflicts and negotiations. They are also about external structural and cultural pressure, as well as intra-psychological emotional needs, reflected motives and dilemmas, evolved throughout a given family member’s life and experience. In actual situations we expect to find a complex constellation of dynamics, rather than purely causal relations that determine whether or not a family will choose to buy this or that. Instead of taking the underlying motive of a consumer choice to be an unambiguous experienced need, we should rather view their motives in the same way as a work of art: as a gestalt, composed by several, often contrasting elements. Moreover, when it comes to family decisions and practices, the ambivalences of each family member become part of a role play involving more or less explicit negotiations. Our concern with why families decide to buy new things could easily convey the impression that our focus is on people’s consciously reflected attitudes to the choice and use of consumer goods. However we think a line should be drawn between discursive and practical awareness (cf. Giddens, p. 49ff, [25], for that distinction). Deliberations made before buying new appliances are not just about the pros and cons, but also about fascination and greed. As for use, they are mainly concerning routines (Ilmonen, [28]). Furthermore, when it comes to considering how things influence us, then we see they are ascribed meaning by discursive processes; however, by the same token, they also work by their symbolic imagery on a preconscious level, closely linked to our emotions (Miller, [15]). Giddens, Ilmonen and others have described our practical awareness as static and repetitive. But zur Lippe has shown this to be a basic sensuous-emotional mode of experience: We observe and compare what we perceive with our previous experiences, then we act and experience the impact, and thus acquire a proficiency knowledge in close association with what those actions mean to us (zur Lippe, [29]). The discursive and sensuousemotional processes interact, which not necessarily implies that they are in concord. Actually we should pay attention to their mutual conflicts. Thus the integration of new technology can happen at several levels: A family’s attitudes and agreements do not necessarily reflect what they do and experience. New things do not only have an impact on their users on a discursive level, but also on a corporeal one: They have material effects on the use of space, perceptions of time and so forth; however active the mind that socializes with the keyboard, the body is tied to a chair. One might ask, therefore, what kind of persons people are making of themselves out of these things (Strathern, p. x, [30]).

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Domestication: Material objects will influence our scope of options, and hence also our practices and development of experience (Østerberg, [31]). At the same time material objects have cultural connotations, so how we go about using them also mediates our cultural orientation patterns (Douglas and Isherwood, [32]). Yet, though that happens latently by a sensuous appropriation process, and though the culture mediation process associated with objects helps to stabilise and structure our universe, this is not a passive process of assimilation. Consumption, not least under modern industrial conditions, opens up to new interpretations and uses. In Miller’s words: Consumption then, is more than just purchasing, it is better understood as a struggle which begins with the problem that in the modern world we increasingly live with institutions and objects that we do not see ourselves as having created. We start then with a kind of second-hand relationship to the cultural world. We may not, however, accept this passively; our aim is often to appropriate and use these forms for our own purposes (Miller, p. 26, [33]). This two-way process in which technology influences the users’ practice, which in turn moulds technology itself is what techno-sociology has termed ‘domestication’. This is a metaphorical reference to the process by which man once domesticated wild animals. Now the technologies, which designers hand over to us, have to be tamed so they can fit into our households (cf. Lie and Sørensen, [19]). This domestication process undergoes a number of phases, from a first meeting with the product via advertisements, talking with friends at one’s workplace etc., and until its interplay with different needs, attitudes and power positions inside the family, and in certain cases also influenced by the external positioning of the family (Røpke, [2]). Once a new technology has been appropriated and domesticated, it is interesting to examine if it has been adapted to and/or has transformed an existing lifestyle. Inspired by the development psychologist Jean Piaget we distinguish between domestication as “assimilative” and “accomodative” processes. In the first case domestication concerns trying to integrate new technologies into the existing lifestyle, while accomodative domestication implies a challenge to, and reconstruction of, the present lifestyle (Piaget, [34]). History has ample examples of new technologies, introduced in people’s everyday lives, that have changed social structures and lifestyles in major ways: Just think of the introduction of such things as the watch, the car, the telephone, and the television. The introduction of the electric cooker, the refrigerator, the vacuum cleaner and the washing machine did not merely take part in the change of household work. They influenced the entire familiar structure, by making the nuclear family possible, without servants and with the husband and children away from home most of the day (Cowan, [35]). Given the countless technical products on the market, one might ask if a similar synthesis of social dynamics and new technological possibilities is going on at the present

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moment, influencing our entire lifestyle and thus contributing to new practices and needs (that will in turn translate into environmental impacts), or if they are instead being domesticated by adaptation to existing lifestyles? The following section will show how these theoretical guidelines and concepts have influenced the design of our qualitative interviews in a major way. 2.3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH As indicated the empirical project was preceded by a theoretical study. However that does not imply a hypothetical-deductive procedure. Consumers buy things for a host of reasons, and we wished to remain open to new aspects and complexities by way of a qualitative, explorative study, instead of just reducing those reasons into a few abstract motives, such as utility or formation of identity. On the other hand the project was not conducted as a purely inductive-phenomenological study. Our presentation of the basic concepts makes it clear that this was a theoretically informed study. This is why we would call our research method an abductive one; it consists in a to-and-fro movement between theory and empiricism, between abstract and concrete, in an effort to avoid reducing these entities to each other, and instead sharpen our own understanding of the issue by letting each one reflect the other. Our material consists of nine in-depth interviews with Danish families. Given the small number of families, we had to limit the variation in answers by selecting a group of families with some basic features in common. We chose to focus on families in a certain phase of life, in order to avoid variations due to life phase differences. We chose to study families with children, for the following reasons: x

x x

These families are usually well established, so they can be expected to have already acquired ordinary furniture and other furnishings for the home. This would render it more likely that our questions - regarding the acquisition of goods new to the family - would produce a discussion of some new domestic technologies. Simultaneously, these families will typically be aware of and interested in new technologies – and have the necessary funds to buy them. Families with children will typically experience special dynamics of consumption related to the children, and these can be important in relation to new technologies.

While it was necessary to concentrate on a specific family type it was, on the other hand, important to have a large variation within the group in order to fulfil the aim of an explorative study: a broad coverage of motives and actions. This variation was secured by choosing families from both urban and rural areas, from different housing sectors, with different educational background, occupations and income. The families were selected randomly from telephone directories in different housing areas, where we could expect to find a relatively high number of families with children. A brief telephone interview gave some basic information about the

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families so that we could choose a varied selection of families for the study. Each family received a £12 gift voucher for their interview, to avoid that not only families with a positive interest of the topic wished to take part. Before the in-depth interview we sent them a list of selected products marketed over the last few years, in order to help the family recall what they had bought themselves within the last 45 years. Each interview took place in the family’s home, whenever possible including both adults (and in a few cases the children), and lasted 1 ½ - 2 hours. As already mentioned, the project design was influenced by our theoretical guidelines: We started our interviews by trying to get a general impression of each family’s lifestyle. Moreover the general interview enabled us, in a hermeneutical way, to adjust our general impression and describe particular features in the individual family’s living strategy. x We inquired about new product purchases in the families, i.e. those bought within the last five years. Moreover all families were asked about their acceptance or rejection of three rather recent technologies, all characterised by offering new processes or functions: the microwave oven, the home computer and the cellphone. x Focus was both on the purchase and the use (domestication) of such new technologies in their homes. x We tried to elicit both a family’s reasoned attitudes and their practical experience from use. In addition we also intended to make visible the family’s sensuousemotional relationship to new things, by asking for their spontaneous associations when shown videotaped sketches illustrating possible future domestic technologies. For the purpose we had provided a video, produced by Philips, in which actors and special effects with prototypes of new potential domestic technologies deliver a number of quite concrete ideas of how such technologies could become part of our everyday lives in a foreseeable future. Following each clip, we went over what the example had shown and then asked each family member to write down a few keywords describing their immediate impression of what they had seen. These in turn made the starting point of their subsequent comments. However, we found that the method did not work quite as it was planned – since the participants’ responses were obviously based on their intellectual interpretative preparedness. But then, on the other hand, it gave us an idea of this preparedness, and also helped clarify those families’ hopes and wishes for the future. x

We all know that interviewing people about their everyday lives is a difficult undertaking, because everyday life, if anything, is a self-evident continuous flow of practices, so those involved cannot ‘see the wood for trees’ and explain why they do as they do. For that reason we had feared problems when we asked families to explain what new things they had purchased, and how they were used. However, our fears proved completely unjustified. Despite widely different families what we saw was a surprising amount of involvement and reflection regarding the purchase and use of new technologies. Obviously, given the small qualitative material, we cannot

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prove in any way that our findings would apply in general. However they could be taken to indicate that people’s encounters with the new technologies offered by the market could be the very things to trigger the moments in everyday life when families go beyond their routines - by inspiring them to rethink and negotiate their lifestyle in a very manifest manner, as related to this or that new technological option. Such reflection and negotiation can concern how they imagine they would potentially use the new product, and what its benefits and drawbacks in terms of family life could be. But apparently, in some families, negotiations are not just addressing a renewal of lifestyle, but also a confirmation of their present lifestyle, by criticism and dismissal of the new technology. This also holds a positioning aspect, regarding the norms on what ’we’ have and do not have in ‘our’ social circle. E.g. one family said that they talk a lot about their choices ”precisely because we’ve had relatives and friends who wondered incredulously because we didn’t own this and that”. In such cases it is safe to say that new things give rise to a ‘retelling of lifestyle’ – cf. Giddens’ description of lifestyle as a current narrative of self-identity (Giddens, p. 100, [25]). 3.

FINDINGS

The findings of the study are presented below, in two parts. The first part brings out three dynamic aspects in families that can lead to increased consumption and reflect on the libidinous aspects of consumption. The second part focuses on their use of new domestic technologies, and on their impacts on lifestyle. 3.1. SOME CONSUMPTION-BOOSTING DYNAMICS IN MODERN FAMILIES The list of products that the families had acquired during the last 4-5 years, and which they had not owned before, became quite long: Computer, CD-ROM, internet access, play station, access to a large number of TV channels, Discman, wireless telephone, cellphone, answer-phone, phone number indicator, video cam, microwave oven, mini oven, ceramic cooker, blood pressure monitor, smoke alarm, large lawn mover, grass border cutter, sanding machine, solar heating system, high-pressure washer etc Notwithstanding the big differences in family consumption, and that some families consider new purchases for quite a while and are pretty modest compared to other families in our study, then their shared feature is that they add new technologies to their households and thus increase their consumption. We have identified a number of different consumption-boosting motives in our interview material. As for the present context we will stick to the three underlying motives that have family life as their inherent dynamic. These are 1) motives associated with time and the conflict between different domains of everyday life, 2) the tension between family cohesion and individualisation, and 3) the parent-children relationship 7. 7

Left-out consumption-boosting dynamics include aesthetic and hygienic motives, collector’s and ’bargain-chasing’ motives, acquirements initiated or supported by others, gift-giving, equipment dimensioned to meet peak level situations, such as when entertaining.

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After presenting these three dynamics this part, on motives for purchasing new domestic technologies is rounded off with a few observations on the libidinous aspects of consumption. 3.1.1. THE DOMAIN CONFLICT What I see as the biggest problem, that’s really that there are several worlds with too little time for all of us to live optimally, so a time machine... I’d like to be swift now. I’m spending two hours to go there and back. An instrument that without spending energy could ‘transform me’ from one place to the other. But mind you, in person – not as a screen image. It’s not because I want to save time. It’s not the dishwasher that shortens the washing-up by ten minutes. It’s my wish for 30 hour-days instead of 24 hour ones, though with the same wishes for what I do now. Then I’d have six hours more: three more hours for the children, and three more hours for work. It’s not that I want the things I do to take less time. The frustration expressed by this interviewee is what we term the domain conflict. The splitting of everyday life into different spheres marks life in our present modern society: The work, the home and different non-work activities outside the home. This division implies that the individual often will experience domain-conflicts. Each domain has its own logic and demands and tends to press for spreading over larger parts of everyday life. Being in one domain, a person is inclined to let this expand into other domains and to forget about the demands of those other domains. However, once the person later shifts to another domain, the perspective usually changes again. The contradiction between the demands of different domains is a core conflict in modern everyday life (Hochschild, [14]). It is embedded in the time and space that limit the possibilities of thriving in all domains. The limitations give rise to the frustrations related to the tension between, on the one hand, the ideals and wishes regarding what to achieve in each domain, and on the other hand, their actual realisation. This domain conflict constitutes a strong driving force behind consumption that translates into an interest in technologies that can reduce the tension. In our interviews this also expressed itself in one family’s dream about ’the intelligent home’: We did talk about a little R2-D2. I don’t know if you know Star Wars? A little robot that would run about and vacuum-clean and take care that it was clean here. Such things, it’s beyond me... of course it’s because inventors are men... why doesn’t someone invent such a thing. That would be really great. The family also mentioned a remote control for their oven, an automatic lawn mower, a computerised refrigerator that would order required goods on its own, and

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a computer-controlled navigation system in the car. When asked what was behind such wishes, they answered: He: ”We could save some time”. She (to him): ”We could save some of the time and energy spent on remembering to think about it, like that. You forget things all the time: ’Oh no, now I forgot... how annoying!’ Because there are so many other things one has to remember”. So the argument here is that new technologies should, if possible, make everyday life less complicated. Another family expressed the same view in their positive response to a video clip showing a family whose child was examined by a doctor via an electronic test and Internet module: He: ”And I’ll tell you this much: Something’s wrong with the children, and should we... should we get a doctor, or what should we do? Then you may need to make several calls before getting through to the emergency service.” She: ”Well, all those deliberations, they... that required a major job.” He: ”Yes, that’s just precisely what it is, isn’t it.” She: ”’Cause one actually has to think over who’s got the time to stay home. Who has got time to spare to go to the emergency service. You see, it’s about... how does one get to coordinate the whole thing??” Considered in isolation, this could convey the impression that these families yearn for greater simplicity in their lives. Yet that is not the case. The following statement, by the female part in the former of both families cited above, shows that any time saved will be used to pursue other and more pleasurable options: And obviously any family with work and children and the whole merry-go-round who wants to live too, they don’t care to run about doing all sorts of sickening housework, do they? Kitchen work, vacuum cleaning and.... Of course it is kind of fun mowing the grass and things like that, but one way or the other it would be nice if you could cut out a few of those things. I suppose it’s also... you see, I know that with things such as the dishwasher and the washing machine, I’d cry if I had to do without them. Because they mean that I’ve got the time to do all sorts of other things, don’t they. Like time to go the theatre, and time for things that are fun, you see.

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Lifestyles in the participant families differ in terms of the time pressure they generate. Two families live rather unhurried everyday lives; consequently they are not into new time-saving technology; nor do they think of it as a desirable contribution to their lifestyle development. By contrast other families experience the everyday bustle as an almost permanent problem, producing a never-ending series of time-saving projects. One family, whose lifestyle is characterised by two adults with a big workload and lots of leisure activities frequently use their microwave oven, since it enables them to do their cooking for two days at a time, and then give their meal a quick re-heating on the second day. This family also owns several other timesaving devices and are strongly motivated for more. A faster PC and buying groceries in bulk via the Internet is likely to be their next move. Household work in particular is not a domain that the families wish to have extended. Yet the time issue remains linked up with their dilemma – that both adults are full-time wage earners, and also have wishes and plans for their free time. Historically, time-saving household technologies are a familiar phenomenon; however, in a future with microwave ovens and fast food, with automatic lawn mowers and household robots, there are still a few possibilities of reducing the domain conflict along these lines. Yet, as Cowan demonstrated with a number of historical examples, the benefit risks being a short-lived one, since time saved (e.g. on laundry) tends to produce a higher level of ambition, so people wash their clothes more often (Cowan, [35]). However, there is another and more recent trend. As will be seen from the quotations they also concern everyday life as a composite of chores. The image of everyday life as mainly routine is only a partial truth, when it comes to the busy modern family. With each family member busy and following his or her own time schedule it requires constant planning and a good memory to make everyday life work. Therefore technological solutions have considerable appeal in terms of optimising the timing of the numerous tasks and the ’packing’ of everyday life activities as densely as possible and without causing friction(cf. Warde, Shove & Southerton, [36]). The collected interviews have several examples. Some are about technology choices that enable a reshuffling of everyday activities, to reduce friction. An example is a family that hooks up to the Internet and home banking, because then they do not have to go the bank during the day, but can straighten out their finances, once the children are in bed. The answering machine is yet another example of a technology, used by some families to get peace from phone calls and answer them when they have time. The mobile phone, enabling contact any time, also reduces the friction. Additional possibilities are available in what could be called ’condensation technologies’, in that they let you do several things at once. For instance, one woman finds it nice that the cordless phone lets her go and switch off the tumble dryer and pour coffee, while she is having a conversation. She has also acquired a stepper so that she can attend to her fitness, while she is watching TV. While conflicts between domains constitute a consumption boosting dynamic since some consumer goods promise to relieve the tensions - our material shows that it does not always necessarily lead to increased consumption, because some people feel time-saving and condensing technologies to be negative. This is expressed most

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clearly by the man quoted in the start of the present chapter. As appears from the quote he experiences the domain conflict quite keenly. However his response is quite the opposite of the one seen in the family with a demand for ’the intelligent home’: Where they want more technology to solve their problem, he opposes more technology in his home because, in his view, it has a disturbing and structuring effect on activities. They have opted out on the dishwasher because he actually likes to do the dishes – preferably in the pleasant company of others. He does have a mobile phone, though he only uses it for making calls. Otherwise it is switched off, since he does not want to be disturbed and be available at any time. The family owns a microwave oven, and his wife uses it, while he feels it forces him into a rhythm that does not suit him: I don’t like an instrument like that. I don’t know why. I don’t use it, either. What can this be the start of? I believe it’s mostly because when I’m cooking, then I feel fine about an oven and such where things go a bit slow, so I can keep pace. That microwave... I feel it requires more expertise...or the potatoes will be completely squashy and dry, or they end up hard. I find it difficult to control, compared with the other things I am used to. In one other family resistance is based on a notion that all these smart technologies proffered to make everyday life more free of friction and efficient will promote sedateness and indolence. Moreover the trend towards condensation is seen as a stress factor. Thus, when shown one of our video clips with scenes illustrating possible future technologies for convenience, they have the following comment: She: “Really, you can look for information if you need it. But it doesn’t have to be in the bathroom. I mean, you can say ’Now I’ll just brush my teeth, and then go and watch the weather forecast afterwards. You see, I feel there’s... it’s like the other example, there’s such a noise all the time, and... He: “Well, his (the husband in the video) day-to-day life, he never gets the time to think things over by himself. He doesn’t get the time for his mind to deal with his everyday life. ‘Cause if he is sitting in his car he will be called by his buddies, and when he is sitting in the living-room, then he’ll be watching the telly or talking to his wife via the wall screen. And when he goes to the bathroom – well, then he brushes his teeth and also watches the weather forecast. So he never gets the time to deal with his current life or his activities, in his own mind. There can’t possibly be any time left for that.” Such a tension – between technology as a means to resolve the pressure of domain conflict and the resistance to the constraints and impaired quality of life caused by the very same technologies – is also evident in another family. Here the tension is

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enacted as an ongoing discussion between husband and wife, with her as the one wanting the friction-reducing technologies, and him as the one pointing to their potentially negative consequences. That is, the dynamic of the domain conflict does not necessarily work without conflicts. It can also trigger reactions against technologisation. Moreover it is of course very different how strong the dynamic is. One family with smaller children have cut down their leisure activities – so they do not have so many domains and activities that need to be fitted into everyday life. Admittedly some of our families do not experience a pressure of time and problems making the activities of the different everyday domains fit together; yet, the conflict and the consumptionboosting dynamic are generally relevant, and are not unique to the families in our study.

3.1.2. THE FAMILY DILEMMA Another significant dilemma in modern family life is the tension between cohesion and separation. On the one hand, the family is very important as a secure base in a world where the individual often has to face large challenges and uncertainties, and where identity is not given by the social circumstances. On the other hand, the liberation of the modern individual from the irksome fetters of tradition implies a strong urge for individual development, which might put the cohesion of the family to the test (Livingstone, [37]; Dencik, [38]). Simultaneously keeping the family together and giving each family member opportunities for individual development, is a key dilemma in modern family life. When we relate this dilemma to development of consumption, our material reveals several ways in which the tension between family ties and individual concerns lead to increased consumption: As already pointed out family togetherness is at a premium in the interviewed families. In one family which is quite explicit about it, the woman puts it as follows: The thing that has been very important to us in our family life, was taking care to make sure that we had some common values – meaning that we had some things to share, and that we had a pleasant mutuality around us. And we’ve kind of built that up. The particular way they go about it is by sharing leisure activities, such as going to the theatre or the swimming baths together; however it is also linked up with the purchase and use of things, like when mother and children go out shopping for the fun of it, or the family PC is deliberately placed in their living-room, so as not to stop them from being together. Whenever the object of their togetherness is their house proper, shared family activities tend to be distinctly more consumption

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boosting. Löfgren described the modern family unity around ’home building’ as an infinite process: This family project called the home is never finished. People are busy redecorating, fixing, planning, day-dreaming, producing new sofa cushions, putting in new floors, ripping out old ones, changing wall-paper, driving to the hardware store, leafing through furniture catalogues, taking the whole family to IKEA, moving things around and moving the family on. In a way the family is constantly being repaired and renovated. The home builds the family together, creates a common ground of interests as well as conflicts between spouses and generations (Löfgren, [39]). The interviewee families differed a lot in terms of the weight they attached to home decorating. One family, with two workaholic adults, lived in a home in which furniture was something they showed no interest in nor spend any money on. Given their lifestyle, with lots of leisure activities, their home was more like a activity centre, the framework of their many different belongings, rather than an aesthetical project. However, in order to make room for family time together and occasional relaxation, they had bought a weekend cottage, to allow them an occasional escape from the hustle and bustle of everyday life. In another family time was not such a problem, and the distinctive feature of their lifestyle was just precisely the aesthetical and creative homebuilding project. It was typically the woman who introduced ideas for new projects: I make a point of the place being pleasant and tidy-looking. And that I’m happy with the things here. We just changed our kitchen working top this last Autumn, because the old one... it was just horrid. It was five years old and horrid. And that’s the kind of thing that sometimes starts nagging me in a small way, when things don’t look proper. So I was really happy to have the new working top mounted. I feel it means a lot to me, liking the things around here. And most of the time things end up as I want them. Her husband was the one to carry out these projects. His creativity lay with the process proper, and with their handicraft-related challenges: He: ”Making major changes is cool. Like tearing down a wall. Actually I’d like to do that”. She: ”You mean something that really makes a difference?” He: ”Yes, you see - something where we can see that something’s happening”.

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This family’s big dream is to buy a house of their own – a ’craftsman’s offer’ [a house that needs a lot of repair] that they will restore themselves and shape to fit their particular wishes. We found that another family practised a similar continuous construction and rebuilding of their home. They had added a living room, rebuilt their kitchen, were now busy revamping part of the basement, and their top priority was an extra bathroom. When asked why they would want the latter, they replied: He: ”Well, that’s to do with ... if we take the long view, you see. Can you picture me and two teenage lasses and then my wife? How would I ever get to go to the lavatory? Of course that’s a luxury problem, but we’d like to allow ourselves that”. While the extra bathroom is a project in the family’s current rebuilding of their home, the quotation also tells about the opposite pole – family unity as a drag on individual self-fulfilment. An extra bathroom is convenient – creates less friction. In the same way several families mentioned the purchase of new technologies as their ’conflict solution’, whenever the individual needs of family members created frictions between them. With the increasing number of channels the television set – once the place where family members would get together - is becoming something that each person has in his/her room. Some families have qualms that their children may be watching too much TV; yet they choose to purchase one or more extra TV sets, so they do not have to listen to their children squabbling about it, or to noisy cartoons. In one family with several older children each had his or her own a TV, stereo, disc-man, and camera. In that sense individualisation implies that a home will have several of each item. While both family unity and individual concerns can motivate new acquisitions, the threat of individualisation against family unity can also cause a family to desist from new individualising acquisitions. One example is a family who decided to not purchase a microwave oven: Their point of departure was the weight they attached to their evening meal, as it brings the whole family together. He: ”In the old community they always had their dinner table. The hardworking father would normally be there. So there they had the dinner table where they gathered around. And that was like what you could call a tribal ritual. I mean, in a purely emotional sense one could say that if things come up, big and small, sad and happy – that matter, of course - then both children and grown-ups really have an opportunity there every day, so you don’t get a long... I mean, period of accumulation so something can develop – or whatever – without it being thoroughly debated”.

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After which his wife explains the problem about the microwave in these words: ”There [at her workplace] we then use a microwave, see – and it’s great for that; but I don’t think it fits in in our home, because back there... well, we eat when we’re together. With a micro oven you have good excuse for being late, because then you can just eat an hour or two later”. The family dilemma of cohesion versus separation is a generally relevant dynamic that contributes towards boosting consumption. At the same time – as with the domain conflict – we need to point out that the process involved is in no way an automatic one. Families can relate to the dilemma actively and in different ways, and as demonstrated it can even cause families to desist from a potential new purchase. 3.1.3. THE PARENT-CHILDREN RELATIONSHIP The authoritarian family of the past has been superseded by what some term the ’negotiation family’. This is consistent with our impression of the parent-children relationship in the interviewed families. The children are active fellow players and will often put pressure on parents to make them buy some of the new innovations on the market. This is basically because their reality differs from that of the grown-ups, and because new things mean something else to them: According to Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton children initially develop by kinetic feedback, i.e. by manipulating objects. This activity is about the physical-sensuous testing of all kinds of things. Later, as teenagers, their object relations change and are more about controlling impulses and emotions. This is what their fascination with TV, musical instruments, film, computer games, etc. is about – using such things is well suited for regulating their emotions. Once they grow up, their cultivation of the Self by interaction with objects becomes more specialised and rather assumes the character of functional mastering of tools. During adolescence things are linked up with the process of building independence while, in adult age they are increasingly appreciated as instrumental to social integration (Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg Halton, p. 96, [40]). We need to maintain that the sensuous-emotional relationship to material objects is a dynamic that cannot be reduced to the linguistic and social formation of meaning related to objects (cf. Miller, pp. 85-108). We included that relationship as a possible explanation of the children’s far more unreserved fascination with new things that we met or heard of in the families; yet our method of study was not suited to illuminating this aspect of the matter. On the other hand the significance of the socio-cultural context became quite clear. For example in the exchange of words below in a family, who for a period were a test family for

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the electronics market, and among other things had been given mobile phones for both grown-ups and their two children: Interviewer: ”Are there any other things you are using it for – or other good reasons?” Younger child: ”Playing with it. For writing messages if you can do it”. Mother: ”Well, yes – you do use it a lot with Karina, don’t you. Write – Anne [the elder child] does, anyway”. Younger child: ”Mum, she will write a message on my mobile phone, and I’ll send her an e-mail”. Mother (to the interviewer): ”Yes, I can hear it sounds luxury-like”. Father: ”Yes, it sure does”. Mother: ”Well, it does. But anyhow, that’s a luxury we’ve got here. So that’s quite alright, I’d say”. Elder child: ”Dad, nearly all children get... nearly all children have a mobile phone”. Mother: ”Yes, now you’re the one being old-fashioned”. Elder child: ”Everyone in my class has a mobile phone”. Father: ”Yes, but there’s no way its having improved things enormously. But I can easily... it wasn’t any big change, was it”. Mother: ”No”. Younger child: ”And soon all the girls in my class, they’ll have one each”. Here we can see the fascination with the mobile phone as a toy, and the childrens’ reference to their friends where it seems important to have one. below. For most children it seems very important to have the same things as their companions, probably both to take part in the play going on, to be able to discuss the most topical issues and, not least, to be able to show off in the right way. The last part not only reflects their fear of not being able to ’keep up’ with their friends, but also – as

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indicated by the following quote – their desire for positive social response by having the lead in getting a new gadget: Younger child: ”The first time they all saw my mobile phone, they said, ’I want to have one like that.’ Unfortunately it costs a thousand”. (laughs). Generally speaking, the parents in our respondent families object very strongly to their children’s fascination with toys and to their reference to the norm among their friends. The father’s attitude in the above exchange of words is typical. In particular his comment that they do not need the mobile phone. To the parents the mobile phone is a practical device. Play and prestige are not legitimate reasons. Another reason for the parent’s opposition is their fear that the children’s fascination will lead to over-consumption. As one mother remarked: I’ve been saying all along that if some time I suddenly found that my child refused to go out and play, because she wanted to sit in front of a computer or a TV screen, then I would get really seriously worried. Because then it’s no longer life itself that’s interesting. Then it’s something (I believe) the child cannot control any more that is controlling it. And then I’d be scared, you see. The play between the children’s desire and their parent’s practical arguments constitutes an element in – and is coloured by – the general relationship between parents and their offspring. Occasionally the parents’ reaction makes them veto acquisitions and introduce rules for their use; yet, because of the children’s relentless pressure, they can be hard to resist. The parent’s indulgence is to do with the fact that they are often ambivalent, since there may be reasonable grounds for accepting the children’s wishes. A mobile phone could be used not just as a toy, but also to give the parents peace of mind because their children can always call if something is the matter. The home computer is another example. Here it is about their wish to ensure their children the best possible prospects in the future world of the adults. For this purpose, most parents find it very important for their children to acquire the qualifications needed in a modern society. As one father said, about the purchase of the home computer: You don’t want your children to fall behind that development. We can’t allow ourselves to do that. So the children’s pressure is not being met by purely unappreciative, negative parents, but by parents, who are often ambivalent because the new domestic technologies can be both beneficial and harmful to their children’s development.

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Thus, we have now identified and described three potentially consumptionboosting dynamics at the family-lifestyle level: 1) The domain conflict, where the hassle of managing a bustling and complex everyday life, and ambitions of getting to do more in the various spheres of everyday life, generate stress and a sense of time pressure that feed the interest in new domestic technologies. 2) The family dilemma, in which the tension between conviviality and personal freedom within the family motivates for common housebuilding projects and individual products as well. 3) The parent-children relationship, in which the offspring’s special fascination with new gadgets is confronted with their parents’ practical reasoning, which yet is ambivalent and can therefore cause them to accept their children’s desire for new things. We have also shown that those dynamics can be coped with in different ways. Dilemmas are not always and by necessity sought to be solved by new acquisitions. New things are also met with scepticism and give rise to internal family discussions on their potential lifestyle impacts. On the other hand, in the period covered, all our respondent families increased the number of objects their households owned. This makes it relevant to consider if there could be inherent consumption-boosting emotional motives underlying their practical and reasoned deliberations on everyday dilemmas.

3.2. LIBIDINOUS ASPECTS In our study the qualitative interview approach proved less suitable for clarifying the libidinous aspect of this ambivalence, i.e. the interviewees’ desires, their choice of products based on motives such as pleasure, enjoyment, and entertainment, and their fascination with new things. Other methods should be applied to expose these aspects (cf. Belk, Ger & Askegaard, [41]). Still we do have a few examples. One family in particular stands out, in terms of expressing their fascination with and desire for new technologies. The husband experiences joy mingled with curiosity about what you can do with new technologies.. He is fascinated with new things, and buys them in order to try them out, play with them, and acquire the skills needed to use them: One could say it’s mostly curiosity about a technology ‘Wonder what this one can be used for?’ And then find some purpose that may be …well, why not do photo manipulations while learning to use Photoshop [a computer application programme]. Or I constructed a database, because I didn’t know how to make databases. Or when I was to learn spreadsheets, then we did budgets on the computer, you see. So to me it’s mostly curiosity about what you can do with a technology.

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Such avidness for acquiring and testing new technological facilities is not merely fed by the fact that new things are currently being marketed. It is virtually self-feeding – in the sense that acquiring new technologies develops new skills that in turn kindle the need for new technologies. The computer leads to the purchase of a scanner, which again feeds the need for a digi-cam.8 Such playful and creative appropriation of a technology could be more pronounced in men than in women. While the woman in the family mentioned above also shows a remarkable fascination with new technologies, it is for the product rather than the process, like being able to make coffee in a new and exciting way: No, I fancy kitchen equipment. I become fascinated with kitchen equipment…I don’t suppose there are any ways of making coffee that we don’t have in our place. We have just about EVERY coffee-making device there is. As for the remaining families we only found sporadic examples of fascination, mostly associated with their aesthetical arguments for purchases, e.g. “The ceramic cooker looks nicer”. “Digital TV with surround sound dramatically improves your experience when watching films on the television”. “The dishwasher puts an end to the messy heap of dirty tableware on the kitchen working top”. “One of those new flat screen televisions would look super on the wall”. There are also instances of purely comfort-related arguments, e.g. wishing for an adjustable bed and an integrated telephone and e-mail reader. In the cases where the children took part in the interview the motive of pleasure was much more apparent in their statements. This probably reflects an actual difference between parents’ and children’s motives, and perhaps also a certain reluctance in the parents to reveal hedonistic arguments for their purchases. Their interest in new things appears to be intricately linked up with their functional-practical properties, i.e., can this or that product serve a useful purpose? The purchase of a mini oven is motivated with its being quicker to warm up when you want warm buns for breakfast. The home computer lets you work more flexibly. The mobile phone offers peace of mind. A spare TV set puts an end to discussions on what programme to watch. In general the families do not perceive themselves as hedonistic consumers; instead they argue that their new purchases (and the ensuing consumption growth) are all things that unburden their everyday lives. Our description of the domain conflict, the family dilemma, and the parentchildren relationship merely serves to confirm that these are central dynamics in everyday family life. Yet, as shown in this section on libidinous aspects, other and less rational motives may underly new acquisitions. When all families (but for one) emphasise their rational arguments for new acquisitions, this is fair enough, yet can also be a normative self representation understating the weight of the libidinous aspects. A closer investigation of this aspect would, however, require a different study using different methods. 8

This chain reaction resembles the ”Diderot effect” described by McCracken. In that case, however the point was that new things can feed a desire for replacing old things because they don’t match in terms of aesthetics.

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3.3. DOMESTICATION: ASSIMILATION OR ACCOMMODATION? As shown by the description of our problem outline and theoretical guidelines, we were, from an environmental perspective, not just interested in probing the dynamics underlying the acquisition of new everyday life technologies. We also wished to investigate how these things were used, once acquired, since in particular the technologies implying new functionalities and processes can be expected to have lifestyle impacts, which in turn can impinge on environmental behaviour. The term domestication underscored the fact that technologies do not determine how people behave, but impact on them, and conversely, that people actively transform or adapt those technologies per their practice. Given this dialectical perspective, it is essential not to presuppose an identity between the motives underlying new acquisitions, and their subsequent practical use. We tried to build an impression of the domestication by asking the families how they used their new acquisitions bought within the last five years, and about the motives that caused them to make those purchases in the first place. In particular, we wanted to know if the domestication process was an assimilative one – meaning that those new technologies were integrated in their preexisting lifestyle – or if it was accomodative – that is, changed their lifestyles. As indicated the keynote of the families reflections is what impact these technologies could have on family life.9 Family as an asset – the importance of having time to spend together – is a pervading trait in the families’ living strategies. This should not be considered as a traditional norm, but rather in the light of their daily hustle and bustle and problems with time planning, increasing individualisation and socialisation of their children. Thus the issue - do new technologies underpin or undermine family ties? – is an extremely sensitive theme in their considerations, not only when the achievements of a new technology is on the agenda but also when it comes to the use of new products. Advertisements and mass media tend to let us perceive new products as unequivocal advances that will open up new opportunities and increase our quality of life. However the material collected during our interviews leaves the impression that family reflections regarding any purchase of new things are not similarly unequivocal – very much the reverse; they are distinctly conflictual and ambivalent. When the question is: what motivates the purchase of new technologies? then their ability to relieve the domain conflict, the family dilemma and tensions between parents and children proved important. On the other hand, even after a new technology has been acquired, there will often be lingering ambivalent feelings towards it that will influence its process of domestication. To the families a new thing is not just a set of opportunities for something different and perhaps superior; to some extent it also threatens the existing order of things and its inherent 9

Only one of our families has environmental concerns as part of their reflections regarding new household technologies.

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qualities.10 This duality has been described as a fundamental, existential tension between a drive towards development and a need for stabilisation (Johnstad, [42]). In the field of consumer research this tension has been dealt with by Lunt & Livingstone, in a study of mass consumption and personal identity. Their study describes consumers as having an active internal negotiation during their everyday shopping, their encounter with new payment systems, etc. In this regard their conclusions are as follows: The added value of consumerism is celebrated, while the loss of community and self-control is mourned. Among ordinary people, the basic debate about consumption and identity is ongoing – is involvement in material culture a liberation or an entrapment?” (Lunt and Livingstone, p. 149, [43]) In short, people experience a contradiction between the desire to embrace the opportunities of modern consumer society and the fear of inevitable loss involved in the new social order. New developments – credit cards, shopping centres, compact disc players – are regarded with ambivalence” (Lunt and Livingstone, p. 166f, [43]). Resistance is associated primarily with the social risks of new technologies; above all that relations with objects will replace relations between people, or degrade human contact by acting as a ’filter’ that creates more distance. To exemplify his dislike of ”the technical progress reducing us into shallow people” one father relates that his son had just broken up with his girlfriend using the SMS function of his mobile phone. In other families we found the same critique in a more specific form, as a dislike of home computers leading to isolation in front of the screen instead of social communication, that television sets in the children’s bedrooms do the same thing, that fast food prepared in the microwave puts an end to shared meals, etc. Ambivalence is present in all of the families. However people deal with it in different ways. Thus the female party of the family mentioned above for its obvious fascination with new technologies said that she had reconsidered her own resistance after realising that it had been somewhat exaggerated: 10

When introducing the families to our project we emphasised that we would like to know what kind of things families with young children were interested in, what they buy, why they do so, and how they use them. We did not place our questions in an environmental perspective, since we did not want our interviewees to understand them as normative interrogations. Nor did they. So the fact that they actually expressed considerable dislike for new domestic technologies should, we feel, not be put down to any attempts to ‘please’ us by adjusting to our presumed attitudes. Quite the opposite – the qualitative interview approach has proved well suited to disclose their deliberations and their resistance as a part hereof.

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Then I find that many people feel alienated, too. They feel it’s cold and shallow and so on. I used to feel the same way, too. I have a thing with e-mails, see? It is a COLD way for people to communicate, isn’t it? And what I now have to admit – which is why I take it as a lesson in relation to how we react in terms of these things – is that it actually makes people form closer ties. Same thing with the computer debate: It is an incredible social phenomenon: When I watch my children – it’s such a social activity being together at the computer. Then there is the thing about alienation, and when things go electronic and are stored inside machines and so on – that’s what we figure things will be like, but once you are right in the middle of it, you’ll learn. While this woman considers the de-fusing of her resistance as a maturation process, others fear a gradual slide. One woman who deliberately makes a big point of having time for shared activities within the family, and who is very positively interested in new domestic technologies, expresses her fears in these words: I have contact with many people every day. And in my experience many people’s lives have fallen apart because of things such as these. And they don’t discuss it with one another, you see. It’s just that... it gradually sneaks in on them, and suddenly the family’s gone crazy and nobody’s given it a thought, and nobody ever talked about it. As already described most of the families’ life strategies have been considerably reflected, and they will purchase things based on their deliberations as to whether these are useful and can facilitate their present everyday life. In this perspective the use of new technologies would appear to be an active and controlled process, during which the families stick to their values and lifestyle and make sure that new things are integrated into, and thus consolidate, their existing lifestyle (assimilation). But does this impression hold true? Or do the new technologies, rapidly or gradually, change their lifestyles, thus creating new consumer needs (accommodation)? A few examples in our material demonstrate the process of domesticating new things as an assimilation to existing lifestyle. For instance several families have set limits to their children’s TV viewing. They accept the purchase of a digital TV, or more than one television set; but they limit their use, by not allowing a TV set to be on in the background, by limiting the number of hours the children can watch TV – or by refusing the children’s wish for a video for their private TV set. In a similar way some families restrict computer use. The family that has a mobile phone, but lets it stay off, so nobody can call up, is another example of controlled use. They fear that by leaving it on, they will willy-nilly get used to always making themselves available for others. Instead, to prevent that, they have decided that the mobile phone will remain off, to be used for outward calls only. However, there are only a

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few examples of this kind of controlled assimilation in the material on a whole. Most of the time people do not take precautions, once they have decided on a new acquisition. That does not imply that they do not have a preparedness regarding unintended effects of the purchase – but probably that it is mostly of a rather more reactive nature. People experience no direct problems, but should they come up, then they will react - perhaps. In some cases families told us about it: One family once had a car. However their life with it did not turn out as they had expected: Well, we had a car for a while, and found out that it was a pest. You know, it must be parked right at the front door, and we couldn’t bring ourselves to walk 10 metres down to the supermarket. And what we had been dreaming about was that now we could go out to all kinds of things. And we found that we didn’t, not at all. You know, we were still staying home on all week nights. And then, when we started enumerating the pros and cons, like when we went out on weekends to visit some friends, then one of us could never ever drink.... Not that we are big drinkers, but anyhow... then we couldn’t. And really, that was really annoying, wasn’t it? Another family did not own a television, but had had one in their weekend cottage. However, they had realised that it changed their day in an undesired way: When we are there [in the weekend cottage] we rushed to the television. And then we found out that we were organising our days to fit in with the TV. We’d have our evening meal in relation to the children’s programmes, and if there was a newscast at 10 pm that we’d like to watch, then we’d chase the children to bed, because it’s a damned nuisance that we can’t watch it, because they are not allowed to watch in case there are war pictures. These are two unusual examples, since once a family has got used to a car or a television it will normally find it quite difficult to be without one. But the interesting thing here is that the acquisition of an everyday technology proved to have other practical consequences than was expected. Probably the gradual change of lifestyle this family experienced is also taking place in many other families, but who do not want to ditch their car or television set. We found a third example in the family that had been a test panel for new electronic consumer devices, and had taken part with the firm belief that they – a family that was extremely aware of and active in safeguarding their family unity – would be able to prove that they could integrate the new electronic products and benefit from them, without letting their family life suffer. Subsequently, however, they had to admit that things did not work out as they anticipated:

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And some way or the other we believed – at least I had a naïve belief that it couldn’t – wouldn’t capture us the way it actually did. And maybe that’s what makes me even more concerned today”....”Of course – you could probably find families that worked even better than we did – but anyhow, some foundation at least, that we had given much thought to building up in a reasonable way. Yet, we got so hooked on it. It captured us incredibly. And the two most technical people in our family got hooked.”.... “Well, we’re different there, so we’ve probably pulled a bit in both directions. And M and A can also be captured by it a lot, very much, really – where N and I are more like, ’Well, how about going for a walk now?’ Here the changes experienced reflect the way new technologies have a different appeal to the different family members. Moreover, with many technologies in a home, doing things together or following each other’s activities becomes exceedingly difficult. The family, who set great store by their common things, suddenly found the new technologies were exposing their differences, and that one was knowledgeable about the computer, while the other had acquainted herself with the programmable sewing machine. They had made a deliberate effort to neutralise it by talking with each other about the things they did; yet they felt it to be difficult: I think that if we don’t watch out, then things will fall apart again. Really, that’s beyond doubt. And then each can do their own thing. In the described cases a slide takes place in practice – the families’ lifestyle begins to change – but they react to it, become aware of it and change their practice. However the practical domestication of new things can also take place without leading to any counter-reactions. By way of exemplification, one family is happy with how they live and critical as to the impacts of technical innovation. When their baby was little they bought a microwave oven, so they could quickly heat up baby food. When asked if they were also using it for other purposes they replied that it has not replaced the cooker, except that they are using it more than before to unfreeze deep-frozen goods. They still do their cooking the same way. However evidence elsewhere in that interview indicates that ’he’ uses it for warming up his evening meal when he is late back from work, and they also use it when they have been out and come in late, so they need to prepare a quick meal for their child. So although they went for an assimilative adaptation of the microwave oven to their existing lifestyle, it has indeed enabled him to get a hot meal when late back from work, and they can be away from home longer and still manage to prepare a hot meal for their child. The microwave oven opens up new opportunities that shift their time schedule, even though this was not what they had in mind when they first purchased it. This serves to exemplify that domestication can be a continuous

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process, in which a previously acquired technology is later used for other purposes and changes its meaning. In the domain of consumer sociology the constructivist wave has rebuked critical theory’s image of consumers as the passive victims of an alienating consumption, and has pointed to consumers as being active, and their consumption as a creative, social process. Gronow and Warde ([44]) choose to differ from both poles, and point out that much consumption is of a routine nature. We do not want to dismiss their point, but agree with Halkier who describes reflection and routine (unreflected practice) as two aspects of consumption that cannot entirely be separated (Halkier, [45]). The present study confirms that consumers actively consider their consumption, at the same time as the above examples indicate that the practical use of new things can impinge on people’s lifestyle in ways they had not foreseen. In principle an active consumer can take steps against it; however we will not preclude that other gradual lifestyle changes occur that consumers have no way of controlling. Whether or not such lifestyle changes will generate new needs and more consumption is a question that cannot be answered on the basis of our study. Yet we would suggest that if the trends towards individualisation and time economy / time condensation continue, then each one of us will increasingly need our own equipment, and if the time made available is used for increasing our levels of activity, then there is every probability that the result will be a surge in material consumption. 4.

CONCLUSION

With the present study we attempted to go beyond the prevalent fixation of the ecological modernist discourse on the environmental aspects of people’s knowledge and practice. Instead our study looked at the consumers’ everyday lives, in which setting we focused on the encounter between the unending flow of new domestic technologies and the dynamics of family life. Our object was to contribute to a better understanding of some of the dynamics that cause the growth in material consumption to continue in Denmark, already a materially comfortable nation as it is. The inherent dynamics of the growth of consumption can be investigated on several levels, and even within everyday family life there exist more reasons for increased consumption than the ones we have brought to light. If for instance we had included products used for leisure activities, entertainment and appearances to a higher extent, our study would probably have exposed more of people’s fascination with new things as a driving force for acquisition. On the other hand, with the new types of communication and information technologies and the new kitchen technologies as our most prominent examples, we were able to acquire knowledge in a field – domestic technologies – where social dynamics and new technologies are in the process right now. As far as this area is

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concerned our study showed that the growth of consumption had different dynamics than those we normally associate with consumerism. In fact, people can easily combine a critical attitude towards consumerism with a high level of consumption, as is reflected in many parents’ reaction to the consumption desires of their children. People’s different acquisitions are embedded in their efforts to make their everyday lives ‘work’ better - as expressed by a reflected, utility-oriented attitude - and they see them to be legitimate as well as adding to their quality of life. We identified three dynamics behind this effort to provide for an improved everyday life – dynamics that can, but do not necessarily boost consumption, since families develop different strategies in relation to these dynamics. The first dynamic is the domain conflict, in which time becomes a problem, and technologies to save time or ‘compress’ it more densely and friction-free become the interesting solutions. The second dynamic is the family conflict that embraces a tension between family unity and individualisation. Here consumption growth can be seen both as part of a family’s creative, unifying activities and as a solution to the constraints and conflicts that arise from sharing consumer goods. The third dynamic is about the parent-children relationship. Here the parents are being pressured by their children’s fascination with new things and sensitivity to prestige in their companion group. The parents react against it; yet they also occasionally indulge their children, with reference to their socialisation. We deliberately chose to not look into the household technologies that have the highest impact on the environment. Ranking technologies according to their impact on the environment would seem logical from an environment-centred point of view. Yet what we intended was in fact to go beyond that limitation, by investigating the inherent dynamics of consumption growth that cannot be comprehended from this perspective, but are vital for comprehending the potentialities for a sustainable development in the long term. Furthermore our choice was based on our interest in technologies that impinge on lifestyle because they introduce new processes or entirely new functions into everyday life. From the same perspective we also looked into the domestication of new technologies. Investigating this problematic is an elusive undertaking, and our method was not the most adequate for the purpose. We used a few examples to underline that although the families think consciously about their values and the proper use of things, the actual domestication process evolves in practice, and whenever the dynamics behind lifestyle changes concern individualisation and time optimisation, this process will lead to a gradual shift in lifestyle that risks developing into increased consumption. On the other hand we also saw that such shift in lifestyle can have undesired effects and in these cases cause counter-reactions from the families. Within the ecological modernist discourse, studies of lifestyle and environmental awareness and behaviour are often motivated by a need for operational tools that will enable environmental policies to handle ‘the human factor’. But what about

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studies such as the present one that investigates the inherent dynamics of consumption growth? Do they have any relevance for application at all? Are they based on the notion that people will then be told about their wrongdoings and admonished for increasing their consumption and compromising our environment? Or on a notion that an insight into these dynamics on the micro level can be put to use for some kind of social engineering that - manipulatively, behind people’s backs – can make them change their behaviour? Quite the opposite: Our ambition is to extend the environmental discourse, and let it transcend the environmental moralism that results from analysing the problems from a purely environmental viewpoint. Such analyses may well be operational, but in practice they lead to questionable initiatives, since they do not try to comprehend why people act the way they do – that is, by understanding their present life situation, what are the requirements, dilemmas and social objectives that motivate them, and what are their resources and options. So instead of trying to repress all their motives with environmental arguments and demands, and later on coming to wonder why we failed, we need to take these aspects seriously, by integrating them in a more astute policy to promote solutions that will also address the needs, dilemmas and other forms of social dynamics revealed in this study. A socio-ecological approach of this kind is not easy to operationalise. That it can be done by using a form of manipulative social engineering is an alarming, but probably unrealistic notion: Given the present complexity, with a large number of agents and dynamics, any attempt to do so would contribute to unruliness, rather than to a successful manipulation. On the contrary, an operationalisation would have to deal with developing solutions with people, instead of for people. In that perspective understanding the dynamics in people’s everyday lives is important, so we can motivate their active participation in solving the problems. When, as here, the problem is about consumption growth, we have to both take those dynamics seriously, as something really important that preoccupies modern individuals, and appreciate the potentials of an involvement in lifestyle development that lie with people’s reflectivity and their interest in solving the ambivalences and conflicts they face in everyday life. In the past century new technology has been the key to increased quality of life, embodied by increased freedom and more opportunities for self-fulfilment. Yet the stepped-up level of activity and the subsequently more and more densely packed everyday life are in themselves gradually impairing the quality of life. If that acceleration continues, our sense of freedom may shift to one of enchainment, and self-fulfilment to a feeling of stress and shallowness. This reveals a social motivation for relating sustainable consumption to quality of life and lifestyle development that is far more potent than any environmental arguments for doing it.

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Røpke, I.: The environmental impact of changing consumption patterns. Paper presented at the Fifth Biennial Meeting of the International Society for Ecological Economics; Beyond Growth: Policies and Institutions for Sustainability, Santiago, Chile, November 15-19, 1998. Røpke, I.: New technology in everyday life – social processes and environmental impact Forthcoming in Ecological Economics, 38 (2001), pp. 403-442. Læssøe, J.: Forbrugsvækst og miljøpolitisk strategi. Paper presented at the Nordisk forskningskonference; Forskning om konsumenternas villkor och värderingar i en ny ti, Lillehammer, Norge, November 11-14, 1998. Læssøe, J. & Jamison, A.: The Making of the New Environmentalism in Denmark. In A. Jamison, R. Eyerman, & J. Cramer (eds.): The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness. Edinburgh University Press, 1990. Hajer, M.A.: The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995. Ger, G., Wilhite, H., Halkier, B., Læssøe, J., Godskesen, M., & Røpke, I.: Symbolic meanings of high and low impact daily consumption practices in different cultures. Paper presented at the ESF-workshop on Consumption, Everyday Life and Sustainability, Center for the Study of Environmental Change, Lancaster University, March 27-29, 1998. Available at: www.lancs.ac.uk/users/scistud/efs/laessoeh.htm. Thulstrup, J., Bauer, C., Levine, S., & Madsen, L.H.: Danskerne 2000 – På vej mod et nyt årtusinde. Institut for Konjunktur-Analyse, 1999. Jarlbro, G & Palm, L.: Nordiska konsumenter om Svanen – livsstil, kännedom, attityd och förtroende. Nordisk Ministerråd, TemaNord, 1999, p.592. Læssøe, J., Hansen, F. & Jørgensen, M.S.: Grønne Familier – miljøvenlige levemåder og mulighederne for at støtte udviklingen af dem. Report, Institut for Teknologi og Samfund, Danmarks Tekniske Universitet, 1995. Munksgaard, J., Pedersen, K.A. & Wier, M.: Miljøeffekter af forbrug. AKF-forlaget, 1998. Læssøe, J. & Røpke, I.: Livsstilsforandringer, forbrug og miljø – hvilken indsigt er nødvendig? Forthcoming in: S. Kuehn, P. Gundelach (eds.): Energi og livsstil, Energiministeriets Forskningsprogram, 2000. Gullestad, M.: Kultur og hverdagsliv. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1989. Dencik, L, & Jørgensen, P. S.: Børn og familie i det postmoderne samfund. Reitzels Forlag, København, 1999. Hochschild, A.R.: The Time Bind: When work becomes home and home becomes work. Metropolitan Books, New York, 1997. Miller, D.: Material Culture and Mass Consumption. Blackwell, Oxford, 1995. McCracken, G.: Culture and Consumption. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988. Warde, A.: Consumption, Identity-formation and Uncertainty. Sociology, 28, 4 (1994), pp. 877-898. Silverstone, R. & Hirsch, E. (eds.): Consuming Technologies. Media and information in domestic spaces. Routledge, London and New York, 1992. Lie, M. & Sørensen, K.H. (eds.): Making Technology Our Own? Domesticating Technology into Everyday Life. Scandinavian University Press, Oslo, 1996. Røpke, I.: The dynamics of willingness to consume. Ecological Economics, 28 (1999), pp. 399-420. Wikström, T.: Livsstil og livsform - två begrepp för mångfald i boendet. Nordisk Arkitekturforskning, 1 (1992), pp. 11-28. Johanson, T. & Miegel, F.: Do The Right Thing - Lifestyle and Identities in Contemporary Youth Culture. Almqvist och Wiksell International, Stockholm, 1992.

142 ACQUISITION AND DOMESTICATION OF NEW HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGIES 23. Læssøe, J.: Forskning i energi, miljø og livsstil. Forthcoming in: S.Kuehn, & P. Gundelach (eds.): Energi og livsstil. Energiministeriets Forskningsprogram, 2000. 24. Beck-Jørgensen, B.: Hvorfor gør de ikke noget? In: C. Bloch, et al. (eds.): Hverdagsliv, kultur og subjektivitet. Kultursociologiske skrifter 25, Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen, 1994, p.116. 25. Giddens, A.: Modernity and Self-identity. Policy Press, Cambridge, 1991. 26. Campbell, C.: The desire for the new: its nature and social location as presented in theories of fashion and modern consumerism. In: R. Silverstone & E. Hirsch (eds.): Consuming Technologies. Media and information in domestic spaces. Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 48-66. 27. Koskijoki, M. & Pantzar, M.: Consumers as players, consumers as scientists and consumers as artists – looking for valid consumption critique. Paper presented at the Take a look at the user! – Perspectives on Users and Usefulness Seminar on useroriented product evaluation and development. University of Art and Design UIAH, Helsinki, Finland, September 3, 1996. 28. Ilmonen, K.: Consumption and routine. Paper presented at the ESA Essex Congress, August 27-30, 1997. 29. zur Lippe, R.: Am eigenen Leibe – Zur Ökonomie des Leben. Syndikat, Frankfurt am Main, 1979. 30. Strathern, M.: Foreword: The mirror of technology. In : R. Silverstone, & E. Hirsch (eds.): Consuming Technologies. Media and information in domestic spaces. Routledge, London, 1992. 31. Østerberg, D.: Makt og materiel. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 1986. 32. Douglas, M. & Isherwood, B.: The World of Goods. Towards an anthropology of consumption. Penguin Books, London, 1980. 33. Miller, D.: Consumption and its consequences. In: H. Mackay (ed.): Consumption and Everyday Life. Sage, London, 1997, pp. 13-63. Piaget, J: Six études de psychologies, Gonthier, Genève / Ligevægtsbegrebets rolle i psykologien. In Illeris, K. Læring, Roskilde Universitetsforlag, Roskilde. 1959/2000, pp. 26-36. 34. Cowan, R.S.: More work for mother. Basic Books, USA, 1983. 35. Warde, A., Shove, E., Southerton, D.: Convenience, schedules and sustainability. Paper presented at the ESF TERM Programme Workshop. Centre for the Study of Environmental Change, Lancaster University, March 27-29, 1998. 36. Livingstone, S.M.: The meaning of domestic technologies: a personal construct analysis of familial gender relations. In: R. Silverstone, & E. Hirsch (eds.): Consuming Technologies. Media and information in domestic spaces. Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 113-130. 37. Dencik, L: Familjen i välfärdstatens förvandlingsprocess. Dansk Sociologi, 1 (1996). 38. Löfgren, O.: Consuming Interests. Culture & History 7, 1990, pp. 7-36. 39. Csikszentmihalyi, M. & Rochberg-Halton, E.: The Meaning of Things. Cambridge University Press, 1981. 40. Belk, R.W., Ger, G. & Askegaard, S.: Consumer Desire in Three Cultures: Results from Projective Research. Advances in Consumer Research, 24 (1997). 41. Johnstad, T.: Livs- og dødstemaer i organisationer, i Haslebo, G. et al. (red): Magt og påvirkning i systemer. Hans Reitzel, København, 1973. 42. Lunt, P.K & Livingstone, S.M.: Mass Consumption and Personal Identity. Open University Press, 1992. 43. Gronow, J. & Warde, A.: Introduction. In: J. Gronow & A. Warde (eds.): Ordinary Consumption. Routledge, 2001. 44. Halkier; B.: Everyday Life Strikes Back: Routinization or Reflection in Consumers Dealing with Normative Claims for Environmental Consideration? In: J. Gronow & A. Warde (eds.): Ordinary Consumption. Routledge, 2001.

Chapter 7 Balancing the Call for Environmental Integration Arthur P.J. Mol Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands

1. INTRODUCTION Integration is one of those concepts that have accompanied the development of environmental discourses and policies from its initial stages in the late 1960s up till the present, whether it is in the form of organisational, procedural or substantial integration. The idea or concept of environmental integration refers to the integration of environmental objectives/goals, environmental policies and/or environmental agencies with other goals, policies and agencies. In the quest for environmental integration special attention is usually paid to the integration of environmental with economic objectives and interests, not in the last following the often quoted tensions between the two. The call for integration by environmentalists resounded as much in the 1972 Blueprint for Survival, in the Brundtland report (WCED, [1]), as more recently in the report of the Group of Lisbon [2]. In all these – and many other – documents environmental integration has always a positive connotation: more integration is believed to be better for the environment. The better the environment (that is: environmental authorities, environmental goals and environmental procedures) is integrated with, among others, economic and social equivalents, the more successful a society is in preserving the environment and maintaining a high environmental quality. All solutions to environmental problems are then believed to go via integration, as integration lets environmental interests also count in non-environmental social practices and institutions. The fact that integration has been on the political agenda of the environment for such a long time, and still continues to prevail in environmental discourses all over the world, points at the difficulties of actually integrating environmental objectives, policies and organisations with economic counterparts. But rather than stressing the difficulties and often quoted failures of environmental integration, I will challenge in this article the fundamental idea that environmental integration is always beneficial for protecting the environment and for realising environmental objectives and goals. In a number of cases, articulating environmental organisations, procedures and goals next to economic or social counterparts will help us much further, than integrating the two. In assessing the value of environmental integration processes and practices for environmental protection this paper looks at a limited number of examples and experiences of environmental integration. The objective is not so much to review and evaluate systematically the various attempts at environmental integration. I have a

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more limited and specific objective: the cases I present and analyse serve to put the plea for environmental integration into perspective and to balance the sometimes ‘blind’ calls for only more integration. Using an ecological modernisation perspective I will especially argue for keeping a strong environmental foothold in all integration processes and point to potentially ‘detrimental’ consequences of environmental integration for the preservation of the environment. So rather than systematically evaluating a representative sample of environmental integration practices and attempts, I will deliberately be biased by concentrating on the possible drawbacks of environmental integration. Though selective, the examples and analyses are far from marginal and trivial. After an introduction on ecological modernisation and integration I will analyse examples of environmental integration at three different domains: sub-national and non-state environmental integration practices, nation-state policies, and environmental integration at the supra-national level. 2. ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION AND INTEGRATION 2.1

ECOLOGICAL MODERNISATION

Ecological modernisation theory is a perspective that helps us to analyse how modern society transforms following the growing importance attached to environmental interests and ideas. Basic premise in ecological modernisation theory is the centripetal movement of ecological interests, ideas and considerations in social practices and institutional developments, which results in a constant ecological restructuring of modern societies. Ecological restructuring refers to the ecology-inspired and environment-induced processes of transformation and reform going on in the central institutions of modern society. Institutional restructuring should, of course, not be interpreted as a new phenomenon in modern societies, but rather as a continuous process that has accelerated in the phase that is often labelled late, reflexive or global modernity. The present phase differs from the pre-1980s, however, in the increasing importance of environmental considerations in these institutional transformation processes in industrial societies. In that sense, environmental interests and ideas are to some extent catching up with economic interests as triggers of institutional transformation. Within ecological modernisation theory this has been conceptualised on an analytical level as the growing autonomy, independence or differentiation of an ecological rationality and ecological institutions vis-à-vis other rationalities and institutions (cf. Mol, [3] and [4]; Spaargaren, [5]). Environmental interests and ideas are increasingly articulated ànd institutionalised, (relatively) independent from other interests and ideas. In the domains of policies, politics and ideologies some notable environmental articulation and institutionalisation took already place in the seventies and early eighties. The construction of governmental organisations, departments, laws and planning dealing specifically with environmental issues date from that era. While in the seventies a separate green ideology – materialised and institutionalised

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in for instance environmental NGOs and environmental periodicals – started to emerge, it is especially in the 1980s that this ideology became more and more independent from, and could no longer be interpreted in terms of, the old political ideologies of socialism, liberalism and conservatism, as for instance Cotgrove [6], Paehlke [7] and Giddens [8] have emphasised. But the crucial transformation, which makes the conceptualisation of growing autonomy, independence and differentiation of an ecological rationality and ecological institutionalisation especially relevant, is of more recent origin. After that ecological rationality and ecological institutions have become relatively independent in the political and socio-ideological domians in the 1970s and 1980s, this process of growing independence extends to the economic domain of production and consumption in the late 1980s and 1990s. In this economic domain we witness the articulation and institutionalisation of environmental interests and ideas, relative independent from economic ones. And as – according to most scholars – this economic domain and economic rationality proves especially consequential to ‘the ecological question’, this last step of ecological differentiation and articulation is the most decisive one. The consequence will be that – slowly but steadily – economic processes of production and consumption will be and are increasingly analysed and judged as well as designed and organised from an economic and an ecological point of view. Some first profound environmentally motivated institutional changes have started to appear from the late 1980s onward in the economic domain of production and consumption. Among these changes are the widespread emergence of environmental management systems in industrial production and utilities, the introduction of economic valuations of environmental goods via among others eco-taxes, the use of environment-inspired liability and insurance systems, the increasing importance of environmental goals among public and private utility enterprises such as natural resource saving and recycling, and the articulation of environmental considerations in economic supply and demand. The fact that we should analyse these transformations as institutional changes includes their semi-permanent character. Although the process of ecology-induced transformation should not be interpreted as linear and irreversible as was common in the modernisation theories in the 1950s and 1960s, the changes have some permanency and are not easily reversed. 2.2

AND INTEGRATION

This process of growing autonomy and independence of environmental interests is essential and a precondition for any successful and far-reaching process of environmental reform. It is only after this ‘emancipation’ of environmental rationalities, logics and interests from its economic, social and political counterparts that a process of ecologising production and consumption can successfully take place, according to ecological modernisation scholars. The central objective of these dynamics and changes should be the balancing and bringing on a par of economic, political and social interests and preferences with ecological ones. Integration can be one of the strategies or means to do so and different forms can be given to a process of integra-

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tion: integration of organisations, integration of policies or procedures and integration of objectives. But equalising environmental interests with, for instance, economic ones can also take place via other mechanisms, means and strategies. Empowering, valuating or stimulating articulated environmental rationalities can equally give additional weight and importance to an often subsumed environmental interest vis-á-vis its economic counterpart in social practices and institutional developments. Equalising economy and environment does not necessarily have to take the form of bringing both together under one substantial, organisational or procedural denominator, as is often the case in integration processes. Integration should thus be seen as a strategy or mechanism to link and balance environmental interests with other preferences and interests. It should not be understood as a goal in itself, no matter how much the concept of integration has in it the idea of balancing of different interests and rationalities. This is important to acknowledge because any strategy of trying to balance different – and more than incidentally opposing – interests may be confronted with unequal powers supporting each of these interests. In situations of unequal power integration is most likely to work to the benefit of the powerful. We may even put it stronger: the goal of integration may mask these differences in power, and thus suggest just and balanced outcomes while in fact some interests are and remain disadvantaged and subsumed. Environmental sociologists and political scientists – also those working in an ecological modernisation tradition – will be the first to admit that, although the process of empowering environmental interests might be advancing, up till now it has not brought environmental interests on a par with economic ones. In most social practices and institutional designs, environmental ideas and interests, as well as those actors representing them, are often overruled by other interests and interest groups. As integration is a social process, paralleled with power struggles, it should not surprise us if we find the weaker interests becoming subsumed in integration processes, while the stronger interests profit. This makes that environmental integration can and should no longer be only interpreted as a desirable principle or process for advancing society’s path to sustainability, but should also be understood as a potential powerful tool for advancing non-environmental objectives and goals. In order to explore this claim of potentially devastating effects of integration strategies on environmental interest articulation, I will elaborate case studies of integration in three quite distinct domains in the subsequent three sections. In each section the focus will be on analysing whether the pitfalls and drawbacks of integration processes have indeed weakened the environment vis-à-vis other interests 3. SUB-NATIONAL INTEGRATION: THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND WISE USE MOVEMENTS In most Western countries the modern environmental movement has its origin in the 1960s and arguably became an ‘independent’ movement in the 1970s. Throughout its history several fractions and organisations within the environmental movement have sought to link struggles for environmental improvements with other objectives

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and often also other movements. In the seventies we have witnessed in various countries strong relations between environmental organisations and the labour movement and the women movement. Later on (sometimes successful) attempts were made to link environmental NGOs with the peace movement, the so-called Third World movement in the Western countries, and recently even with more economic groups and actors (e.g. farmers, fishermen). The degree and form of ‘integration’ differed strongly: sometimes one organisation or one organisational platform was constructed, at other occasions one common label was invented (e.g. anti-globalisation), or distinct movements and organisations just worked together in joint activities, protests, programs or a common goal (e.g. banning nuclear energy). The motives for these ‘integration’ attempts were mixed. Sometimes collaboration, linking and joint activities and programs were rather strategic – and often temporary – attempts to enlarge a critical mass to reach a common goal. On other occasions these integration efforts were rooted in fundamental beliefs that all contemporary social problems are related and that only integrated solutions will do in the end. Finally, a common ‘enemy’ could ‘integrate’ different organisations and movements, such as capitalism and more recently economic globalisation One of the more successful and remarkable attempts to integrate the struggle for environmental improvement with the advancement of other social objectives is the emergence of the environmental justice movement, especially in the United States. The starting point is often identified as the 1987 study Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, by the United Church of Christ [9], documenting racial discrimination in the siting of hazardous waste facilities across the USA. This report started not only a lively debate on whether race or class was the primary determinant of corporate or public agency decisions on siting. It also triggered the emergence of local and regional environmental justice networks, followed by governmental activities and policies in this field. Groups that have traditionally been at the periphery of mainstream environmentalism – poor people, working people, and people of colour – have been engaged in struggles for a healthier environment, linking these with historical quests for civil rights and social justice. This movement bypassed to a major extent the mainstream US environmental organisations – the big 10, especially operating in Washington D.C. – in setting the new environmental agenda in the USA for the last decade of the second millennium. In this decade a rich literature has developed on environmental justice movements and discourses, predominantly in the USA (e.g. Ringquist, [10]; Szasz and Meuser, [11]; Fritz, [12]; Faber, [13]; American Behavioral Scientist special issue vol. 43, no.4). The emergence of the environmental justice groups and movements is partly a reaction against the mainstream environmental organisations. The latter both failed to take sufficiently into account the ideas of grassroots and local organisations and their supporters, and neglected broader issues of social inequality, unequal distribution and social and economic side effects of environmental policies towards oppressed groups (whether these be categorised by race, class or gender). A too heavy focus on the Washington D.C. policy processes, a preoccupation with the core national and international private and public actors and too much willingness to compromise with funders, sponsors, corporations and leading politicians and policy

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makers are generally seen as important factors in the bottom-up emergence of the environmental justice agenda and movement. Where mainstream organisations were strongly concentrating on safeguarding the environment in a rather narrow, segregated way, local and grass-root organisations started increasingly to integrate environmental improvements with social justice. From the early 1990s onward it was especially this environmental justice movement that was celebrated by environmental commentators and social scientists, for its innovative grass-root approach, its politisation of the environmental agenda, and its anti-technocratic and integrated dealing with the environmental crisis and the wider problems of sustainability. At the other side of the environmental spectrum the ‘wise use’ movement emerged almost simultaneously in the USA: a well-organised and intelligent coalition of ultraconservative politicians, economic interest groups, right-wing scientific institutions (cf. McCright and Dunlap, [14]) and citizen-consumers that feel threatened by environmentalists for various reasons. Opposition against environmental interests and their representatives is of course not new; in fact, such opposition has paralleled environmental concerns from the early days of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. What is new, however, is the organisation of this often heterogeneous and diverging opposition and including in it major segments of the population, to become one movement that uses similar kinds of strategies as the environmental movement. In analysing the success of this anti-environment coalition and movement in the USA Rowell [15] points at, among others things, the failures of the environmental movement itself, including: its incorporation into the domains of power; its evolution into an one-issue movement without concern for the social consequences of environmental reforms; and the fact that the ‘top’ of the movement has lost sight of its grassroot organisations and their support. In that sense, the emergence of both movements seems to have at least partially similar foundations. They both are a reaction upon a lack of integration, and they both construct an alternative via integrating environmental considerations with other interests. But while the environmental justice movement is seen by most environmentalists and environmental commentators as a positive form of integrating environmental interests with social and political-economy questions, the ‘wise use’ movement is often condemned by these very same analysts, although it also integrates environmental interests with primarily economic ones. The main message of the ‘wise use’ movement is that environmental interests have become too powerful in American society and consequently jeopardise economic development, the continuity of corporations, employment, consumption and other non-environmental values and goals of ordinary working class Americans. A ‘wise use’ of the environment can be attained via a much lower level of environmental restrictions on production, consumption, and economic activities such as fishing, forest exploitation and oil and gas production. Environmental interests are then ‘integrated’ with the interests of the ‘old political paradigm’ (Offe, [16]): labour and capital. Obviously, in a situation in which the dominant environmental interest representation is no longer taken for granted and under threat for various reasons, integration of environmental objectives with others can move in different directions. Both movements correct the mainstream organisations in their narrow focus on Washing-

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ton, their isolation from grass-root organisations and supporters, and their ‘isolated’ view on environmental problems and sustainability. And both movements find their answer in an integration of environmental interests with other interests. But this analysis makes clear that from an environmental point of view it would be one bridge too far to argue against any one-issue environmental movement, and plea for an all-integrative social movement (if such a thing could exist). 4. INTEGRATION WITHIN THE NATION-STATE: THE NETHERLANDS In national environmental policies, we can experience similar calls for integrating environmental goals and interests with economic, agricultural, industrial and others. In most European countries Ministries for the Environment1, decentralised environmental state agencies as well as advocates of environmental interests outside the state have from the early days of environmental policy-making argued and pushed for more integration of environmental goals, targets and activities with their economic and other equivalents. State agencies that are often more hostile towards environmental interests were one of the key addressees. The leading idea behind this call for integration is that the environment can only be protected in a pro-active and preventive way, when non-environmental state agencies take environmental interests into account and make these interests part and parcel of their routine operations and policies. Taking one of the environmental frontrunning European nation-states, the Netherlands, as an example I will especially look into the dark-side of integration strategies and practices as put forward by the Dutch Ministry of the Environment in the last decade. The Netherlands has arguably one of the most developed systems of environmental policy-making in Europe, not only according to the Dutch Ministry for the Environment itself but also according to less suspected sources (e.g. Weale, [17]; Andersen and Liefferink, [18]). Confronted with dense population, scarce space, an open economy, an industrial structure dominated by heavy petro-chemical industries, a large transport sector and a location downstream some major European river systems (Rhine, Meuse), the country was among the first to witness severe environmental degradation and the need for an active political response by the state. From the launching of the first environmental planning document in 1971 (Urgentienota Milieuhygiëne, VoMil [19]), the issue of integration was put on the agenda of national environmental policy-making and implementation, first especially as internal integration (that is integrating water pollution policy with for instance air and solid waste policies). From the mid 1980s, and especially with the start of the series of National Environmental Policy Plans (NEPP, VROM [20]) in 1989, the need for external integration was emphasised: 1

Often, state agencies dealing with the environment have also other policy field under one Minister, but that has often little to do with substantive integration, and more with historical developments and political games during the formation of (coalition) governments. In the Netherlands Environment is under one Ministry with Spatial Planning and Housing, in Austria it is together with Youth and Family, in Denmark with Energy, while in Asian states Environment is often with Science and Technology.

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integration of environmental policy with the policy domains of especially Economic Affairs (including Energy), Agriculture and Fisheries, Foreign Affairs, and Transport and Public Works. It was widely believed that only via external integration a sustainable development could be put successfully on the trail. In the early days of the NEPPs integration took especially place via a so-called target group policy, in which the most significant polluters were invited (in the best traditions of neo-corporatist policy-making) to develop four-year plans on how to deal with the environmental requirements in relation to economic and other interests and goals. In the mid 1990s the strategy for external integration gained new momentum when the Ministry for the environment planned to actually shift tasks and responsibilities to other departments. Staff of the Ministry of the Environment was exchanged with staff of other ministries, joint task groups were set up to deal with, for instance, manure, foreign environmental policy and energy/greenhouse gasses, and responsibilities were incidentally moved to other Ministries. This was paralleled by significant budget and personnel cuts of 15-20% over 4 years (from 1000 to 800 staff), and legitimised by the idea that partly tasks could be integrated in other ministries and that the Ministry for the Environment should develop increasingly into a mediator between different private interests and between sectoral ministries linked to these interests. The ambition of the Ministry for the Environment was to become a small ministry that only co-ordinates and integrates conflicting claims on environmental resources, rather than a ‘sectoral’ agency that has environmental protection as its core business. Integration thus means that a major share of the environmental protection agenda can be shifted to and integrated in the core business of other Ministries, with only co-ordination and limited judicial review by the Ministry for the Environment. The Danish Ministry for the Environment was often quoted as an example of a successful, powerful but small environmental state agency that directs to a significant extent the environmental activities of other ministries. Three main reasons can be identified behind the Ministry’s strategy towards integration via the sectoral ministries. First, compared to the Ministry for the Environment these sectoral departments had better relations with, access to and more knowledge of the private actors directly responsible for environmental devastations: farmers, fisherman, industrial enterprises, infrastructure developers, the building sector and the like. These sectoral ministries were believed to be more successful in dealing with and regulating economic interest groups, and in making radical transformations of the economy towards sustainable development acceptable. Second, the Ministry for the Environment believed that by making these sectoral departments responsible for part of the environmental agenda, the interdepartmental struggles on the environment would show new divisions of power that were more favourable for the environment. Environmental interest representation within the Council of Ministers is then no longer carried out by the Ministry for the Environment in isolation, but also by other Ministries (be it each on different subjects). Lastly, the Ministry for the Environment believed that the growing environmental agenda and the growing complexity of environmental policy-making (not in the least due to globalisation and inherent uncertainties on causes and solutions) could no longer be dealt with in isolation by one state agency, especially in a time of constant parliamentary calls for

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budget cuts, deregulation and smaller national Ministries. External integration and the shift of tasks and responsibilities gave the Ministry of the Environment the legitimation to cut in its staff and budget without cutting in environmental protection (as environmental advocates outside the state claimed). Needless to say that in a situation in which most interests, co-ordination mechanisms and divisions of power are still favourable to economic and agricultural entities and interests rather than environmental ones, such an integration strategy runs the danger of having severe drawbacks. Especially in a time when the environmental issue-attention cycle is going down (which was the case in the Netherlands after 1993) these integration strategies can easily turn out to undermine rather than to strengthen environmental interests. This is indeed what more or less happened in the Netherlands. While the Ministry for the Environment acted as if they were in the heydays of the third wave of environmental consciousness and concern and assumed that environmental pressure from society at large was sufficient to turn the above mentioned integration path into a favourable enterprise for environmental protection, the sectoral ministries faced decreasing social and political pressure to take up environmental protection tasks seriously. It was only by the end of the 1990s that the Ministry for the Environment, now under the new political leader minister Jan Pronk, left its strategy of far going external integration and budget cuts, to turn again to a ‘conventional’, ‘sectoral’ Ministry that takes interest representation of the environment more seriously as its core business. However, much harm had already been done to the environmental agenda. One of the consequences of, among others, this integration strategy is that the environmental movement lost confidence in their natural state ally, the Ministry of the Environment. Although the changes in the role of the Ministry towards a coordinator and mediator of conflicting interests regarding environmental goods, the transfer of environmental state tasks to other departments and the budget cuts that the Ministry took almost voluntary might not be the only causes behind a reorientation of the environmental movement, they certainly facilitated the movement’s reorientation. The integration developments proved to be fertile ground for the emergence of what has been labelled the ‘Green Poldermodel’ (Duyvendak et al., [21]): an increasingly institutionalised form of subpolitics in which environmental NGOs increasingly turn to non-state actors in building coalitions. In stead of a natural and stable coalition between the Ministry for the Environment and the environmental movement, which was more or less common in the 1970s and 1980s, today the environmental movement builds rather flexible and ad hoc coalitions with different private and public actors, depending on the environmental issues at stake. This strategy can also be interpreted as a form of ‘integration’, be it of a different kind as the original one designed by the Ministry, and arguably less detrimental for the protection of environmental interests and the articulation of environmental rationalities.

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5. SUPRANATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION: WTO, EU AND NAFTA Compared to the national political arena, in supra-national politics and policymaking environmental arrangements and agreements are even more segregated from economic and other areas. The core of international environmental policy is institutionalised in an expanding number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, most of which focus on one or a limited number of environmental issues (such as MEAs on the protection of the ozone layer, the export of waste, transboundary air pollution, the protection of the oceans, or the Framework Convention on Climate Change). Although they remain a set of ‘piecemeal arrangements’ (Young, [22]), the expanding number of multilateral environmental agreements are increasingly moving towards common denominators in terms of legal and policy principles (via spill-over and other mechanisms), and thus becoming more relevant as building blocks for universal international environmental law and policy. At the ‘other’ side of the international spectrum we have a growing number of economic, trade and investment agreements and institutions. Not many scholars in international politics, international relations and international law would oppose the conclusion that in the international or global arena, even more than in the national ones, economic interests and rationalities dominate above environmental ones. Although formally or legally, multilateral environmental agreements are equal to regional or global trade or investment agreements, in practice the former are significantly less powerful (Cameron, [23]). The environmental integration debate, as it functions in the international relations and political science literature, takes usually the form of analysing, arguing for, or opposing the growing introduction of environmental interests and rationalities in predominantly economic arrangements and institutions, rather than the other way around: looking for possibilities to integrate economic logics and interests into MEAs.2 Given the unequal balance of power of the two in international and global politics, this is understandable. Several attempts have been made – and are still going on – to integrate environmental interests into the dominant economic logics and institutions. I will shortly look into integration experiences within the framework of the World Trade Organisation WTO, and within two regional institutions: the EU and NAFTA. These experiences will contribute to our understanding of the potentials and desirability of integration in the international arena. 5.1

WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (WTO)

One of the major complaints voiced at the finalising of the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations was the limited attention paid to environment-and-trade issues. Conse2

The emergence of trade provisions in MEAs to limit free trade for the sake of the environment might be considered as such an integration of economic logics in MEAs. Out of the over 180 MEAs only some 20 have such trade provisions, often strongly criticised by some WTO members (cf. Mol, [24]).

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quently, in Marrakech (1994), at the concluding meeting following this Uruguay round of negotiations, it was decided to establish a trade and environment work program and a Committee on Trade and Environment, and to start working on this issue in preparation for a new round of negotiations. This very same Committee concluded, however, that the WTO is not very likely to become the main international designer and enforcer of environmental rules, since “the competence of the multilateral trading system is limited to trade policies and those trade-related aspects of environmental policies which may result in significant trade effects for its members” (WTO-CTE, 1996).3 This is not to say that the GATT/WTO does not require any ‘greening’, as the present provisions (basically article XX of the GATT on exceptions) cannot even fulfil a limited role in levelling environment and global trade. Several minimal and more far-reaching improvements on GATT procedures and contents have been suggested from different sides, ranging from procedural changes in the dispute settlement procedures, hiring additional environmental staffing at the WTO, environmental assessments of any substantial trade negotiation, increasing transparency regarding decision-making and information dissemination, up to more substantial reforms such as designing a new WTO Agreement on MEAs similar to the ones on Agriculture and on Technical Barriers to Trade, standards for assessing the legitimacy of environmental trade measures, and the introduction of a trade balancing test in article XX (e.g. Brack, [26]; Wallach and Sforza, [27]). There are indeed some indications that the WTO is becoming more sensitive to criticism from an environmental point of view and to other protests and arguments. During the preparations for the Seattle ministerial meeting in November 1999 highlevel WTO officials made it clear that they felt the negative environmental image was a major concern. Also, the fact that multinationals were given preferential access to this Seattle meeting – at the initiative of the main organiser of the meeting, Microsoft leader Bill Gates! – was sharply criticised by both the EU Commission and the US White House. By contrast, the official Dutch delegation to Seattle included a representative of Greenpeace as well as a representative from the main business association VNO/NCW. Apparently, there is a growing conviction that trade liberalisation issues can no longer remain restricted to a select audience of ‘technical’ negotiators, politicians and business lobbyists, but have become subject to more open debate outside these niches of power. This is also one of the conclusions from a series of high level meetings between WTO staff and UNEP staff in 2001 (UNEP, [28]). But substantial greening of GATT/WTO will prove difficult, as Esty (p. 206, [29]) summarises, due to fundamental international differences of opinion on “the appropriate trade-off (if any) between economic growth and environmental protection, the changing nature of sovereignty, the use of power in the international realm, the optimum structure for democratic decision-making, and the proper role of interest groups in governmental processes”. And indeed, the WTO summit in Seattle, November 1999, showed a variety of problems such as these. Meant to set the 3

This committee, dominated by trade experts, had little if any results to show after 5 years, Esty reports (p. 200, [25]).

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agenda for a new round of trade liberalisation, the Seattle summit resulted in a fiasco due to a number of problems, including differences of opinion on agricultural liberalisation (in relation to agro-environmental issues such as multifunctional agriculture and beef containing hormones), major and well-organised criticism coming from both reformist and radical environmental and other NGOs (both at a distance and in Seattle town itself), poor preparation and an American chair that seemed too much influenced/dominated by domestic business interests. Any greening will always remain a compromise within what is predominantly an economic trade regime.4 The maturation of the WTO into something similar to the European Union, acquiring sufficient supranational powers, democratic properties (sic!) and more fully integrating environmental with economic objectives, would be a promising strategic trajectory, but even more difficult to accomplish. Not surprisingly, the idea re-emerges at regular intervals that, instead of attempting to integrate the two objectives into one global organisational framework and regime, one should seek to set up a separate international environmental organisation with enough power, mandate and competence to counterbalance GATT/WTO in an era of globalisation. Few see possibilities to build such an institution from the existing United Nations organisations, UNEP being the most likely candidate. A new global environmental organisation, it is felt, should formulate the basic principles of global environmental policy-making from an ‘ecological rationality’ perspective, parallel to what the GATT/WTO has done from an economic perspective. This idea has for instance been launched by the former WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero, the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (at the UN General Assembly Special Session, ‘Earth Summit 2’, June 1997), and by scholars such as Daniel Esty.5 Only the construction of such a parallel institution can lead to a more balanced integration of economic and trade liberalisation on the one hand and environmental protection on the other. In such a perspective, the common principles underlying an increasing number of multilateral environmental agreements can be combined into one common organisational and legal basis, thus not only improving the consistency of this piecemeal regime development but also strengthening environmental interests vis-à-vis economic ones. It goes without saying that for many scholars such a strategic goal is ‘beyond imagination’ and for some it is even undesirable. But, taking the trends of ongoing global economic integration seriously, an ecological modernisation perspective would guide us in this direction. From such a more equal starting point an integration strategy balancing environment on the one hand and trade and investment on the other looks more promising. 4

Williams and Ford [30] have noted that the strategies of environmental movements towards the WTO have a similar duality. Part of the movement engages critically in reforming the WTO in more environmentally sound directions, while others reject the WTO and look for alternative institutional structures of global governance that give more precedence to environmental interests. Neither of the two strategies, the authors claim, has had more than limited influence on actual developments up until the end of the second millennium. 5 While Esty, one of the leading authors in this area, originally (1994) strongly argued for a GEO (a Global Environmental Organization) to articulate environmental interests vis-à-vis the WTO, he has been arguing the case for a restructuring of the WTO as the most strategic and feasible option more recently (Esty, p. 202ff, [25]).

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5.2

THE EUROPEAN UNION

In analysing environmental integration in the EU two almost opposite perspectives can be identified in the literature. On the one side, most environmental scholars and commentators looking into EU environmental politics, consider EU environmental policy to be rather fragmentary and scattered, poorly integrated in other EU policy fields, failing to come up with a more systematic and overall outline of an EU environmental reform program that can seriously counteract the often devastating influence of the dynamic process of economic integration. Environmental interest and criteria are hardly playing an important role in any of the core policy fields of the Commission, according to most scholars. The environmental action programs – the fifth launched in 1993 and the sixth in 2001 – give the impression of at least some coherence, vision and direction. But they should be judged as rather toothless exercises, compared to the EU measures that really make a difference: Directives and Regulations. The development of these latter environmental instruments seems to follow a logic that is definitely not related to any environmental basis, overall idea of sustainability or systematic plan. On the other side, notwithstanding the validity of these and other6 reservations held by commentators on the environmental dimensions of EU politics, most scholars in global (environmental) politics and globalisation studies stress the historic process that is taking place in the EU: the development of political mechanisms that integrate on a supra-national level economic globalisation in an increasingly liberalised region/world with environmental protection and reform. Thus globalisation scholars as diverse as the Group of Lisbon [2], David Held [31], Martin and Schumann [32] and Ulrich Beck [33] join politicians such as German foreign minister Joska Fisher (Die Grünen) to celebrate the unique way in which the EU manages to combine economic liberalisation with the environmental and social agendas. They argue that in our globalising world there exists no other example of how to move to such ‘integration’ beyond the nation-state. The principles and rules developed in the EU (or developed elsewhere but vigorously applied in EU legislation and policymaking; e.g. the precautionary principle) alter the structure and functioning of market processes on a regional, that is supra-national, level in a number of distinct ways. The capital drain, caused by the fact that the places with the lowest environmental standards and poorest environmental institutions used to achieve a preferential competitive position, has largely been stopped, since a kind of common environmental denominator has come about within the EU. Harmonisation of environmental product and process standards within the European Union – or the future promise and perspective of harmonisation – leads to homogenisation of increasingly larger-scale production units across the continent and prevents the dumping of lower quality

6

E.g. the not very democratic structure of the EU, in which the European Parliament (often considered to be greener than the other institutions) has only little influence in decisionmaking; the unequal allocation of budgets and resources favouring the more productive sectors, most prominently the agricultural sector; the limited integration of the environment in other policy fields; a number of institutional characteristics; etc.

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products or the concentration of (unpatented) old production processes in certain EU areas. So while in day-to-day policy-making processes environmental integration seems to be out of sight in the EU, from a global perspective the EU shows one of the best examples of balancing economic liberalisation and growth with environmental protection (and parts of the social agenda). Obviously, to be relatively successful, balancing distinct and sometimes even conflicting interests does not have to take place via fully integrating these opposite goals and interest into one organisational unit, policy or goal/objective. Clear and transparent procedures, balancing powerful (public and private) interest representatives, easy and equal access of these interest representatives to decision-making processes, and democratic (sic!) rules can work to deal with conflicting interest up until at least a certain level. Largely, that is of course also what most European nation-states have done in dealing with conflicting interests up till now, rather than successfully integrating them. Compared to all other regions around the world (but also compared to the global level of WTOMEAs) the European region has been most successful in finding a certain kind of balance between trade and investment liberalisation and environmental protection. This is of course not to say that economic and environmental interests in the EU have been put on a par; far from that! 5.3

THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA)

Distinct from the EU and more like the WTO, NAFTA is a Free Trade Agreement with limited supranational powers. Government officials of the member countries (e.g. US EPA administrator William Reilly; US Trade Representative Carla Hills) as well as large numbers of NAFTA analysts have called the final NAFTA treaty the ‘greenest’ (multilateral) trade agreement ever concluded (cf. Kumar, et al., [34]; Vogel, [35]; Hudson, [36]; Johnson and Beaulieu, [37]; Roberts, [38]; Hogenboom, [39]; Esty, [25]). What was the final result of the NAFTA negotiations and to what extent does NAFTA succeed in integrating trade provisions with environmental protection in a balanced way? If we are to assess the environmental gains of NAFTA we should look at both the treaty itself and the environmental side-agreement. In the treaty itself (as well as in the route towards it7) several environmental innovations can be identified. Firstly, in the event of an inconsistency between specific trade obligations set out in specified multilateral environmental agreements and the NAFTA, the obligations in the former prevail. This explicit formulation runs against what is generally perceived as the dominant interpretation of GATT/WTO (cf. Brack, [26]).8 Secondly, with re7

An innovation in the process towards the NAFTA was the environmental review of NAFTA, covering a large range of potentially negative environmental effects of NAFTA and providing specific policy recommendations to minimise or overcome these dangers. The review was criticised by environmental NGOs, among others, for being incomplete (cf. Esty, [29]; Hogenboom, [39]). 8 This is generally seen as a direct response to the famous tuna-dolphin case of the

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spect to environmental standards, NAFTA clearly states that international standards are not ‘ceilings’, but that member states can establish whatever levels of environmental protection they consider necessary, provided that such measures apply equally to domestic and foreign investors. Thirdly, while the GATT/WTO protects countries from an unwanted influx of polluting industries, NAFTA’s investment chapter to some extent prohibits countries lowering their environmental standards to attract polluting industries (see for a more detailed analysis: Johnson and Beaulieu, [37]). But perhaps the most innovative step can be found in the environmental sideagreement (NAEEC) that is not officially part of NAFTA. The supplemental environmental agreement establishes a Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), headed by a Council of senior environmental officials of all three countries, supported by a Secretariat and advised by representatives of environmental organisations. Not only states can raise complaints, citizens also have the right to make submissions to the commission on any environmental issue. Moreover, the commission was given the authority to review the environmental implications of both production processes and products, diverging from WTO’s limitation to products. In the enforcement procedures, designed to safeguard effective national enforcement of domestic legislation, the commission is also authorised to use trade sanctions and fines in cases of non-enforcement of new or existing environmental laws. These significant institutional improvements have made some scholars rather optimistic (cf. Johnson and Beaulieu, [37]; Audley, [40]), and even led them to call the agreement a major move towards regional governance (Munton and Kirton, [41]). Despite these environmental innovations, several limitations are regularly mentioned: the Secretariat does not have major investigative powers, it is strictly controlled by the Council and thus by the NAFTA parties, and the procedures for public complaints are different from those for complaints coming from NAFTA parties, to the detriment of the public (cf. Kumar, et al., [34]; Mumme and Duncan, [42]). In addition, the CEC has performed successfully in conservation issues (birds, butterflies, biodiversity) and some brown areas (sound management of chemicals, continental pathways of air pollution, transboundary impact assessment). However, its record on environmental standards, enforcement and pollution prevention has been rather poor and highly symbolic up until the late 1990s, while it has kept far removed from the more controversial – but for integration essential – ‘trade and environment’ issues, and from issues regarding Mexican environmental performance. The NAFTA Free Trade Commission and the CEC have not met in eight years (Sanchez, [43]), giving evidence of rather poor integration of the two fields. Moreover, NAFTA only provides possibilities to upgrade international environmental standards into more stringent standards, but no incentives to actually do so. Much to the disappointment of more critical environmental groups, sustainable trade and investment has not been put on the agenda via the NAFTA. Or as Johnson and Beaulieu (p. 250, [37]) correctly put it, the NAFTA treaty is “rooted in the belief that the impact of GATT/WTO, in which a GATT dispute settlement panel recommended against the US imposition of a trade ban against Mexican tuna to support US dolphin protection efforts (cf. Esty, [29]; Vogel, [35]).

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environmental policies on North American trade are more worrying than the impact of trade policies on the North American environment”. It remains first of all a trade agreement and consequently trade interests come first. The question is what difference these environmental provisions make in practice. Several authors have done some initial analyses of the work of the various organisational structures under NAFTA and NAAEC, showing that the environmental records are indeed not overwhelming. The trade community managed to strengthen its role during NAFTA implementation, allowing the governments to interpret the environmental provisions in a minimal way. The lawsuit by the Ethyl Corporation, American-owned producer of the gasoline additive MMT, against the Canadian government gives evidence of potentially dangerous environmental consequences of NAFTA.9 In addition, the CEC has not yet turned out to function as a regional form of environmental governance, as a predecessor of an EU-like institution with supranational powers. Rather, much of the reluctance of the parties to give the CEC major powers is rooted in the parties’ defence of their sovereignty and their unwillingness to create an image of a supranational CEC. If sovereignty was undermined during the NAFTA process it was rather via the empowerment of non-state actors. During the creation of the NAFTA treaty it was especially the environmental NGOs that managed to secure a major role in environmental politics. The lack of interest, commitment and involvement of these NGOs in the implementation phase raises questions about the role of these organisations in environmental governance. In the implementation phase, the market actors managed to challenge environmental regulations without political supports from their national governments, especially via the dispute settlement scheme. 5.4

SUMMING UP

In the international arena the environment has been dealt with predominantly via numerous multilateral environmental agreements, most of which focus on one environmental issue. Although they remain a set of ‘piecemeal arrangements’, they jointly contribute to the emergence of a relatively independent environmental realm in global politics. We can witness different forms and degrees of environmental ‘integration’ in international institutions that have originally an economic signature: the EU, NAFTA and the WTO. Most of these economic institutions show only limited forms of environmental integration and certainly not a strong balancing of economic with environmental interests. The EU seems to some extent the exception to that rule, and with some reason it does no longer carry the label European Economic Community.

9 The web site of the Canadian Environmental Law Association (http://www.web.net/cela/sbnn.htm) and the web site of Public Citizen (http://www.citizen.org/trade/nafta/CH_11/articles.cfm?ID=1177) list other Chapter 11 state investor cases.

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6. CONCLUSION This paper should not be understood as an argument for a strong segregation of environmental interests, objectives and ideas from economic, agricultural, social or other equivalents. And it is certainly not a plea for downplaying or ignoring the side effects of a radical environmental reform programme on other social interests. Unequal distributional consequences of certain environmental policies and measures, as for instance put successfully on the agenda by the environmental justice movement in the United States, or dangerous right-wing or even racist tendencies that go sometimes together with the call for 'naturalness' should be condemned as much as the disastrous environmental side-effects of economic policies or ‘simple’ modernisation paths. A narrow environmental focus is just as undesirable as a narrow economic focus. Fortunately, in an era of reflexive modernity we are increasingly better able to reflect at an early stage on the various unintentional consequences of modernity and modernisation paths, whether these paths are economic-technological or ecological. Correcting these unintentional and often undesirable consequences of modern developments can successfully take place via integration. The main argument of this paper is that integration can be a feasible and successful trajectory to deal with conflicting claims, to balance diverging interests, or satisfy different – or even opposite – objectives. But in a number of social settings environmental integration does not help us much further, certainly not if we want to let subsumed environmental interests and objectives to ‘catch up’ with more dominant (often economic) ones. That is of course also what happens regularly with the call for sustainable development, when economic interests succeed in ‘colonising’ this integration concept for primarily their own purpose. It is also one of the dangers that lie ahead in attempts to mix environmental indicators with economic and other indicators. Other ways of bringing environmental objectives and interest on a par with, for instance, economic ones can than be more fruitful, especially in cases where the environment is lacking sufficient ‘power’ and powerful social representatives. As in the end, that is what we aim for: a balancing of interests. Integration is sometimes a helpful method for that, sometimes not. In this paper I have put some emphasis on those cases where integration does not really helps us in protecting the environment; often on the contrary. Consequently, the rather automatic or ‘blind’ embracing of environmental integration by environmental advocates within and outside governmental agencies can no longer taken for granted and such calls for integration should be balanced. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3.

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INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT STUDIES 1.

Transitions in A Globalising World. Edited by Pim Martens and Jan Rotmans 2002. ISBN 90 265 1921 4 (hardbound)

2.

Scaling in Integrated Assessment. Edited by Pim Martens and Dale S. Rothman 2003. ISBN 90 265 1947 8 (hardbound)

3.

Integrating and Articulating Environments: A Challenge for Northern and Southern Europe. Edited by Fatoú Gökúen, Martin O’Brien, Ornulf Seippel, Ünal Zenginobuz, Fikret Adaman and Jesper Grolin 2003. ISBN 90 5809 616 5 (hardbound)