Interlinking of Rivers in India: Issues and Concerns

Interlinking of Rivers in India: Issues and Concerns

To my teachers who have enlightened me with their knowledge, care and affection. M. Monirul Qader Mirza

Interlinking of Rivers in India: Issues and Concerns

Edited by M. Monirul Qader Mirza Department of Physical and Environmental Sciences University of Toronto at Scarborough Toronto, Canada Ahsan Uddin Ahmed Centre for Global Change Dhaka, Bangladesh Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP) Dhaka, Bangladesh

CRC Press/Balkema is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2008 Taylor & Francis Group, London, UK Typeset by Charon Tec Ltd (A Macmillan Company), Chennai, India Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire All rights reserved. No part of this publication or the information contained herein may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, by photocopying, recording or otherwise, without written prior permission from the publishers. Although all care is taken to ensure integrity and the quality of this publication and the information herein, no responsibility is assumed by the publishers nor the author for any damage to the property or persons as a result of operation or use of this publication and/or the information contained herein. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Interlinking of rivers in India: issues and concerns/edited by M. Monirul Qader Mirza, Ahsan Uddin Ahmed, Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-415-40469-3 (hbk.) 1. River engineering–India. 2. Rivers–India. 3. Water resources development–India. I. Mirza, M. Monirul Qader. II. Ahmed, Ahsan Uddin. III. Ahmad, Qazi Kholiquzzaman, 1943TC503.I5534 2006 363.6’10954-dc22 2008003168 Published by: CRC Press/Balkema P. O. Box 447, 2300 AK Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] www.crcpress.com – www.taylorandfrancis.co.uk – www.balkema.nl ISBN 13: 978-0-415-40469-3 (Hardback) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-89457-6 (eBook)

Table of Contents Preface About the Editors About the Contributing Authors Acronyms

xi xv xvii xxi

1 INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS M. Monirul Qader Mirza Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad 1.1 Introduction 1.2 India’s Water Resources and Its Development 1.3 Globalization, Rapid Economic Development and Looming Water Crisis 1.4 Interlinking of Rivers in India 1.5 Issues and Concerns 1.6 International Legal Implications 1.7 Alternatives of the ILR 1.8 Regional Cooperation

1 1 4 5 9 13 13 14

2 INTERLINKING OF RIVERS: EXPERIENCE FROM ACROSS THE WORLD Ahsan Uddin Ahmed Daria T. Smeh M. Monirul Qader Mirza 2.1 2.2 2.3

Introduction Experience with IBT from Across the World Concluding Remarks

17 18 31

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3 THE VITAL LINKS Suresh Prabhu 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12

Introduction India: Looking at 2050 Previous Interlinking Proposals The New Initiative Projected Benefits Assessed by the NWDA National Perspective Plan: The Himalayan Rivers Development and Peninsular Rivers Development A Holistic Approach Rehabilitation and Resettlement Urgent Need A Pan-Asian Outlook We Cannot Stop Now Not Big vs Small

35 36 37 38 39 41 45 46 48 48 49 50

4 THE INTERLINKING OF INDIAN RIVERS: QUESTIONS ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PROPOSAL Jayanta Bandyopadhyay Shama Perveen 4.1 Background 4.2 Water Resources in India and the Logic for the Interlinking Project 4.3 Does the Interlinking Project Offer the Most Cost-Effective Option for Domestic Water Security in Drought-Prone Areas in India? 4.4 Is India’s Food Security Critically Dependent on the Interlinking Project? 4.5 Who Will Bridge the Crucial Knowledge Gap on the Himalayan Component? 4.6 Will the Interlinking of Rivers Multiply the Conflicts Related to Water? 4.7 Conclusions

53 55 61 63 66 68 72

5 A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO INTERLINKING RIVERS IN INDIA: AN EXAMINATION OF VIABILITY S.G. Vombatkere 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5

Introduction Design of the ILR Project The ILR Project: Some Key Questions Risk and Consequences of System Failure Conclusions

77 78 80 86 87

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6 IMPACT OF THE INTERLINKING OF RIVERS ON NEPAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS Dwarika N. Dhungel Santa B. Pun 6.1 Introduction 6.2 From Concept to Reality: Walk Through History 6.3 Different Dimensions of the ILR 6.4 Major Concerns to Nepal 6.5 Benefit of Working Together on the Ganga-Brahmaputra Basin 6.6 Professional Cooperation on a Continuous Basis 6.7 Concluding Remarks

91 92 94 95 104 105 105

7 MODELING THE INTERLINKING OF THE GANGES RIVER: SIMULATED CHANGES IN FLOW Sharon Gourdji Carrie Knowlton Kobi Platt Michael J. Wiley 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9

Introduction Hydrology of Ganges Basin HEC-HMS Ganges Model: Overview, Initial Setup and Data Inputs Model Methods and Parameterization Model Calibration and Validation River Linking Simulation River Linking Results Implications for the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty Conclusions

107 109 112 114 116 119 121 123 124

8 INDIA’S ENERGY FUTURE AND INTERLINKING OF RIVERS Kobi Platt Sharon Gourdji Carrie Knowlton Michael J. Wiley 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5

Introduction Balancing Needs: India’s Energy Sector Power Structure: India’s State Electricity Boards (SEBs) Environmental Costs: Restructuring and Privatization Discussion

129 130 133 135 136

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9 POTENTIAL PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA Carrie Knowlton Sharon Gourdji Kobi Platt Michael J. Wiley 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Community Relocation and Resettlement in India 9.3 Water Development and Disease, Pollution and Public Health in India 9.4 Water Quality 9.5 Hydrological Modeling and Water Pollution 9.6 Conclusion

141 142 145 147 150 151

10 LIVING IN THE DOWNSTREAM: DEVELOPMENT IN PERIL Ahsan Uddin Ahmed 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Water: A Key Driver for Bangladesh’s Development 10.3 Learning from the Past: The Ganges Water Diversion and Environmental Hazard 10.4 River Interlinking: Bangladesh’s Hydro-Environmental and Development Security 10.5 Concluding Remarks

153 155 157 160 166

11 ASSESSMENT OF THE INDIA RIVER LINKING PLAN: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE KEN-BETWA PILOT LINK Kelli Krueger Frances Segovia Monique Toubia 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5

Introduction Potential Hydrologic Impacts Potential Impacts to Wildlife Social Impacts of the KBLP Conclusion

169 170 174 181 184

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12 IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH ASIA ON THE INTERLINKING PROJECT OF INDIAN RIVERS Murari Lal 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Available Water Resources in India 12.3 Water and Indian Agriculture 12.4 Southwest Monsoon – The Primary Source of Water in India 12.5 Observed and Projected Climate Change in India 12.6 Implications of Climate Change for the Interlinking Project 12.7 Concluding Remarks

187 189 192 193 195 208 212

13 INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS M. Rafiqul Islam Shawkat Alam 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5

Introduction A Brief Background to the Project The Interests of Bangladesh at Stake in the Project The Rivers Interlinking Project in International Law Conclusion

219 220 221 223 232

14 THE INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS OF WATER MANAGEMENT IN INDIA Rajendra Singh 14.1 The Traditional Transmission of Knowledge in India 14.2 The Loss of Tradition, and Its Consequences 14.3 Re-Awakening the Indigenous Knowledge 14.4 Arwari River Parliament 14.5 Reviving the Indigenous Transmission of Knowledge: Tarun Jal Vidyapeeth 14.6 The Use of Indigenous Knowledge in TBS Work

235 237 238 245 249 249

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15 WATER-BASED COOPERATION IN THE GBM REGION WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5

Background GBM Regional Cooperation Indian Scheme of Interlinking Rivers Tepaimukh and Sapta-Kosi High Dams Conclusion

253 256 257 258 260

16 HYDROLOGICAL IMPACT ON BANGLADESH OF CHINESE AND INDIAN PLANS ON THE BRAHMAPUTRA Stephen Brichieri-Colombi 16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6

Introduction Hydrology of the Brahmaputra Possible Major Developments Hydrological Analysis of Potential Developments Hydrological Impacts on Bangladesh Conclusions

261 261 265 267 268 271

17 COULD BANGLADESH BENEFIT FROM THE RIVER LINKING PROJECT? Stephen Brichieri-Colombi 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5 17.6 17.7

Introduction Legitimate Shares Access to Shares Win-Win Solutions Risks from Upstream Development on the Brahmaputra Meeting WCD Criteria Conclusion

INDEX

275 277 278 280 284 285 287 291

Preface

In October 2002, in response to a public interest litigation case for cleaning of the highly polluted Yamuna River (a tributary of the Ganges), the Supreme Court of India issued notices to the Centre and the States for completing interlinking of rivers by 2016. This landmark directive implies long lasting consequences for water resources development and management in South Asia. The plan includes 30 interlinking canals and hundreds of other engineering infrastructures under its Himalayan and Peninsular components. In compliance with the notices of the Supreme Court, the Centre set up a high powered Task Force under Mr. Suresh Prabhu (a contributor to this anthology), a former Union Minister. India is the largest nation among the co-basin countries of South Asia with diverse climatic regions. The Southwest monsoon generates most of the runoff which has a very high spatial variability. South and western parts are drier than the north and northeastern India. Due to geographical location, orography and circulation pattern of moisture laden monsoon air mass, and longer monsoon duration, northeastern India has more water availability than the other regions of India. The prime objective of the river interlinking plan is to transfer this surplus monsoon water to southern India which is plagued with water shortages. Note that due to high seasonality of flows in the rivers, most of the Indian sub-continent suffers from shortage of water in the dry season. Reactions to the river interlinking plan in India are mixed. Some experts believe that this plan is the panacea for solving water deficits faced in some parts of the country. Population of India is growing and it needs to produce more crops to feed more than 1.5 billion or more people in a few decades. The idea is that the interlinking plan would supply vital water for agriculture. It will also generate huge economic and social benefits. Another group of experts have raised concerns about potential environmental hazards linked with the project such as water logging, salinization, ecosystem losses, population displacement and public health problems. They also believe that water scarcity in some parts of India is more associated with water management than water availability. At least two leading Indian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), namely, the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) and Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) have already proved this notion with implementation of pilot projects in chronic drought hit areas of Gujarat and Rajasthan, respectively.

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PREFACE

The Indian plan of river interlinking has an international dimension because most of the Himalayan Rivers originated beyond the boundary of India and run through countries other than India, both upstream and downstream. Bangladesh located at the downstream drains out flows of the string of mighty Himalayan Rivers to the Bay of Bengal. The plan of large scale water diversion under the river interlinking plan has created serious concerns in Bangladesh. Since 1975, the country has been a great sufferer due to withdrawal of half of the dry season water of the Ganges River by India at Farakka, West Bengal. The purpose of this diversion was to resuscitate the Kolkata Port which lost its navigability over the centuries due to the natural silting process. While the effectiveness of the diversion has been debated for decades, it has created serious hydro-environmental hazards in Bangladesh. Backed up by these past scientific evidences, Bangladesh fears that under the river interlinking project, any diversion of water from the Himalayan Rivers such as the Brahmaputra will create environmental and economic disasters. Nepal, located at the very upstream has also raised its own concerns. While the country will not face water deficit due to the proposed transfer, Nepal’s concerns are different in nature and dimension based on past experiences. India built a number of barrages and other water control structures inside its own territory on some rivers originated in Nepal. These projects already created environmental problems which include inundation of Nepalese land, siltation and river bank erosion. Nepal also fears that river interlinking project would have implications for the hydropower projects being planned on various Himalayan rivers in its territorial jurisdiction that will involve foreign investment. In the backdrop of possible beneficial and adverse effects of river interlinking plan, one group of scientists argues that Bangladesh could benefit from the dams and reservoirs to be built on the Brahmaputra River through interlinking it with the Ganges River. India could also gain some advantages from the Chinese plan of construction of a string of dams/reservoirs on the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra). Although at this stage these ideas are theoretical and are dependent on hydro-engineering and political consensus, they may have some merits. Immediately after delivery of the directive of the Indian Supreme Court on the river interlinking plan, various types of general analyses on its potential implications started appearing in the print and electronic media. Scientific information was found to be very scanty. In this context, the major objective of this anthology is to provide an authentic debate backed up science to the readers. To implement this, scientists belonging to opposing schools of thought from South Asia, Europe, Australia and North America have been assembled. The contents of this anthology provide a scientific basis of understanding regarding the dynamics and implications of large scale water transfer from a network of international and national rivers. This anthology has not tried to draw any general conclusion on the Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) Plan instead it has provided the likely scenarios. Discussions contained in this anthology will facilitate a dialogue on similar projects being implemented or at the planning stage elsewhere in the world.

PREFACE

xiii

Contributors to this anthology who are scattered around four continents did very hard work. A number of reviewers went through between the lines of the chapters and delivered very valuable comments and suggestions. We received constant guidance from Dr Janjaap Blom of Taylor and Francis Group on manuscript preparation. Farzana Abdulhusein patiently prepared the camera ready copy and redrew several graphics within this book. Mr. Kanak Dixit, Editor of HIMAL, Kathmandu, Nepal has kindly consented to let us use the figure on the cover of this anthology. They deserve our heartfelt thanks. Mobilizing contributors, compilation of their contributions and editing them are a time consuming job. We took much time from our families during the preparation process of this anthology. We are grateful to our families for their sacrifice. Finally, views presented in this anthology belong to the authors and do not reflect the views of their respective organizations or of the editors.

M. Monirul Qader Mirza Ahsan Uddin Ahmed Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad

About the Editors

Dr M. Monirul Qader Mirza has extensively conducted research on hydrological and climate extremes; natural hazards and their management; climate change, water resources and their associated vulnerability; and adaptation and environmental impacts of water diversions from the transboundary rivers. Trained as a water resources engineer, he received his PhD in 1998 from the International Global Change Institute (IGCI) at the University of Waikato in Hamilton, New Zealand where he researched on climate change and future flooding in Bangladesh. In 2004, he edited an anthology on analysis into the environmental implications of the diversion of the Ganges waters through a barrage at Farakka, India. Dr. Mirza has been with various assessments of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). He recently co-led the Adaptation Chapter of the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Working Group II of the IPCC and contributed to the IPCC’s Synthesis Report of its AR4. He has further acted as a Coordinating Lead Author (CLA) of the International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) and was also involved with the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment at the capacity of a CLA. He is currently an associate faculty at the Department of Physical and Environmental Sciences, University of Toronto at Scarborough. He is a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Professional Engineers, Ontario, Canada and the Canadian Water Resources Association (CWRA). Dr Ahsan Uddin Ahmed is currently the Executive Director, Centre for Global Change, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He received his PhD in 1992 in chemistry from Clarkson University, New York, USA. He completed his B.Sc. and M.Sc in Chemistry in University of Dhaka. He has comprehensively researched on water and environmental issues of the transboundary rivers in South Asia especially on the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) rivers involving Bangladesh, India and Nepal. He has participated in a number of national and international research initiatives which include: Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Development, Sustainability and Equity (IPCC/RIVM), Climate Change and Human Choice (Battele Press Inc.), Climate Change and Water Resources of South Asia (START/APN) and Bangladesh Water Vision 2025 (South Asia Water Partnership). He was a recipient of the United States – Asia Environmental Partnership Fellowship. Until recently, he was Executive Director of Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP) – an independent research think tank based in Dhaka.

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ABOUT THE EDITORS

Dr Qazi Kholiquzzanan Ahmad is a socio-economic specialist of international repute and has to his credit a wide range of publications and research work on environment and water resources, climate change, policy planning, food and agriculture, rural development, poverty alleviation, human development, technology and employment generation, and gender issues. He extensively studied various issues related to water resources development and cooperation in South Asia. In the late 1980s he pioneered an extensive three country (Bangladesh, India and Nepal) collaborative research program on the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) basins to foster regional cooperation on water and energy development. He received his PhD in Economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science, London University in 1976. He is Chairman and Chief Executive, Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP), a Dhaka based non-government think tank specialized in development issues. He is presently also the President of the Bangladesh Economic Association (BEA). He was the President and International Vice-President of the Association of Development Research and Training Institutes of Asia and the Pacific (ADIPA), Kuala Lumpur and Society for International Development (SID), Rome, respectively. From 2004 to 2007, he acted as a Lead Author to the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). He also contributed to IPCC’s Third Assessment Report as a Coordinating Lead Author.

About the Contributing Authors

Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad is the Chairman of the multidisciplinary research organization-Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP); and President, Bangladesh Economic Association (BEA), Dhaka. He has to his credit a wide range of research works and publications, including on environment and water resources, regional cooperation, climate change, policy planning, food and agriculture, rural development, poverty alleviation, human development, technology, employment generation and gender issues. In early 1990s, Dr Ahmad initiated non-government level water cooperation (also known as Track II water cooperation) research for the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna basins. Ahsan Uddin Ahmed is the Executive Director, the Centre for Global Change, Dhaka, Bangladesh. He is also a Senior Expert in the Climate Change Cell, Department of Environment, Government of Bangladesh. He extensively researched on transboundary waters especially on regional cooperation in flood hazard management. His research focuses on transboundary waters, environment, resource management, regional cooperation, sustainable development, climate change, vulnerability and adaptation. Shawkat Alam is a lecturer in the Department of Law at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia where he teaches in International Law, and International Environmental Law. Dr Alam’s research interests include: WTO and sustainable development, developing countries in global environmental politics, and trade – poverty and environment nexus. Jayanta Bandyopadhyay is Professor and Head, Centre for Development and Environment Policy at the Indian Institute of Management in Calcutta (IIMC), India. He has a PhD in Engineering and focused his professional interests on science, environment and public policy. His research in the past 27 years has been aimed at generation of transdisciplinary public interest knowledge on critical environmental issues, especially on water systems. Stephen Brichieri-Colombi is currently a Research Fellow at King’s College, London University and a Director of SynAquaNon Ltd. He has worked as a consultant in water resources and agricultural development projects for over 30 years in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the UK. Dr Brichieri-Colombi’s experience covers a wide variety of water resources planning, computer modeling, rural water supply, drainage and irrigation, navigation and hydropower. His current interest is in the construct of the world water crisis, especially in the way it affects the management of international rivers, and his book on the subject “The World Water Crisis: A Failure of Resource Management” is scheduled for publication in 2008.

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

Dwarika N. Dhungel was Executive Director and now a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS) – an independent think tank based in Kathmandu, Nepal. He started his career as a Lecturer and entered government’s administrative service in 1970 as an Officer and left in 1998 after serving in various capacities including the Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources. Then he became a freelance social scientist and social activist. His publications include Contemporary Nepal, Governance Situation in Nepal, Good Governance: South Asian Perspective, and Nepal Conflict Resolution and Sustainable Peace and a host of professional articles on different aspects of social sciences. Sharon Gourdji is currently a PhD student in Environmental and Water Resources Engineering at the University of Michigan, USA. She holds a B.A. in Mathematics from Columbia University, and an M.S. in Natural Resources and Environment and an M.A. in Applied Economics from the University of Michigan. She is currently researching the identification and attribution of carbon dioxide sources and sinks at both global and regional levels using geostatistical inverse modeling. M. Rafiqul Islam is a Professor, Division of Law, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. His teaching and research interests include: public international law, international security law, international trade law, international law of foreign investment, law of international economic institutions, international human rights and humanitarian law, law of International organizations, international environmental law, constitutional law of Bangladesh, etc. Before joining Macquarie University, he taught in University of Papua New Guinea and Rajshahi University, Bangladesh. Carrie Knowlton is currently posted at the US Environmental Protection Agency as an Environmental Health Fellow with the Association of Schools of Public Health. In 2006, she received an M.S./M.P.H. in Resource Ecology and Management with a focus on Aquatic Ecosystems from the Schools of Natural Resources and Environment and Public Health at the University of Michigan. From the same school, Ms. Knowlton received a B.S. in Resource Ecology and Management in 1997. Kelli Krueger currently works for The Nature Conservancy at the Oak Openings Project Office outside of Toledo, Ohio, USA. Ms. Krueger has her B.A. in Environmental Policy as well as an M.S. in Resource Ecology and Management, with a focus on Aquatic Ecosystems. Her research interests include the use of Geographic Information Systems as a tool for solving water management issues and other topics related to watershed management. Murari Lal is currently the Chairman, Climate, Energy and Sustainable Development Analysis Centre (CESDAC), New Delhi, India. Prior to this, he was Chief Scientific Officer at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), New Delhi and Professor at University of the South Pacific. His research interests include: global and regional climate, modeling the climate and its variability, regional environmental change-integrated approach, vulnerability assessment and regional adaptation and mitigation potentials.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

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M. Monirul Qader Mirza is an Adjunct Professor, Department of Physical and Environmental Sciences, University of Toronto at Scarborough. His research focuses on transboundary waters, extreme weather events, energy, climate change, vulnerability and adaptation. He has extensively researched on transboundary water issues especially on environmental effects of large scale water withdrawals from the Ganges River at Farakka, India. Kobi Platt currently works as an Industry Economist for the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA). He holds a B.Phil. in Interdisciplinary Studies with a focus in Natural Resource Economics from Miami (OH) University, USA. He has also obtained an M.S. in Natural Resources and Environment and an M.A. in Applied Economics at the University of Michigan. His current research work is focused on forecasting and analysis associated with US natural gas markets in the near-term. Shama Perveen is a final year doctoral student in the Department of Geography at the University of South Carolina. Her primary research interests include water resources management and policy, with particular emphasis on freshwater supply and demand, stress, scarcity and water resource-based vulnerability. She is also interested in studying virtual water as a possible coping strategy for alleviating regional freshwater shortages. She is currently doing research on multi-scale analyses of water resources data. She was previously associated with “Centre for Development and Environment Policy”, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, India. Suresh Prabhu is presently a Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha), India. A professional Chartered Accountant, Mr. Prabhu entered public life with his election to the 11th Lok Sabha (Rajapur constituency of Maharashtra) in 1996 and got elected in the subsequent general elections. He was Union Cabinet Minister for Power, Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Environment & Forests and Industry in different terms. From December 2002 to April 2004, he was Chairman, Task Force on Interlinking of Rivers with the rank and status of a Union Cabinet Minister. Santa B. Pun is an Electrical Engineer, who obtained his B.E. from the then East Pakistan University of Engineering and Technology, Dacca (now renamed BUET). Starting as an Assistant Engineer in 1967 with Nepal Electricity Corporation, he handled transmission, distribution, consumer services and corporate development. He was General Manager of Eastern Electricity Corporation, Biratnagar and Managing Director of Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) in 1995. Before his retirement, he was at the Ministry of Water Resources as Officer on Special Duty (OSD) involved basically with water and power development policies related to multi-lateral donors. He has since then engaged himself with water and power issues contributing papers on topics like dispute over the Ganga waters, regional cooperation on transboundary rivers, national and regional implications of energy policy, etc.

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

Frances Segovia has received her M.S. in Resource Policy and Behavior at the University of Michigan School of Natural Resources and Environment. She is particularly interested in understanding the social aspects of wildlife conservation. Frances graduated from the University of Redlands, California with a B.A. in Environmental Studies. As an undergraduate, she investigated the exploitation of wildlife as exotic pets within the United States. She has worked with various sanctuaries that care for domestic as well as exotic animals and has participated in educational programs to inform the public about action that can be taken to protect wildlife. Rajendra Singh heads Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) – a grassroots level organization based in Alwar District, Rajasthan, India. He started rural development and employment generation in 1985 at Gopalpura village by Water Conservation. Guided by the Mahatma Gandhi’s teachings of local autonomy and self-reliance, he has introduced community led institutions to many villages in Rajasthan. He also initiated several activities in the State in association with Government. Mr. Singh was awarded Ramon Magsaysay Award (named after former President of the Philippines) in 2001 for his contributions towards reviving ancient water conservation techniques, mass awareness and rural development. Daria T. Smeh received her B.A. in Environment and Resource Management in the Department of Geography at University of Toronto and her M.A. in Environment and Development at King’s College London. Her research focuses on the water, waste and forestry sectors, climate change, vulnerability and adaptation in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, Canada, India and Bangladesh. She is currently working as an independent consultant. Monique Toubia is currently assessing a Payment for Environmental Services (PES) project for the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) – Indonesia within their Community Empowerment Unit. Her research and professional interests include the wise use and equitable distribution of natural resources in marginalized and impoverished communities, with a particular focus on water. She has worked for local environmental organizations in the United States, Uganda and India on various projects that encompass environmental interpretation, sustainable livelihood initiatives, land conservation and water management. Monique received her undergraduate degree in Environmental Studies and a graduate degree in Natural Resource Policy with a focus on global environmental justice. S.G. Vombatkere (Major General S.G. Vombatkere) holds a PhD in structural dynamics from Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Madras (now Chennai). He joined the Indian Army in 1961, was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, and retired as Additional Director General (Discipline and Vigilance) in Army Headquarters, New Delhi, in 1996. Settled in Mysore where he is engaged in voluntary work in the social, civic and environmental fields. Since retirement, he is also teaching a semester course on Science, Technology and Sustainable Development for undergraduate students of University of Iowa, USA, Studies in South India at Dhvanyaloka Centre for Indian Studies, Mysore. Michael J. Wiley is a Professor of Aquatic Ecology at the School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. His research interests focus on river ecology, fisheries, and watershed management.

Acronyms

BCM BJP BUP BWDB CAP CEA CEE CGWB COE CPR CRL CWC DEM DPRs EIA FAO FPMC FRs GAP GBM GDP GGD GIS GWT HEC HMGN HPC IBT ICJ IECO IGNP IIDS ILA ILC ILR IPCC IUCN

Billion Cubic Meters Bharatiya Janata Party Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad Bangladesh Water Development Board Central Arizona Project Central Electricity Authority Centre for Environment Education Central Ground Water Board Committee of Experts Centre for Policy Research Chinese River Linking Central Water Commission Digital Elevation Model Detailed Project Reports Energy Information Agency Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Farakka-Paksi-Mawa-Complex Feasibility Reports Ganga Action Plan Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Gross Domestic Product Greater Gangu Dam Geographic Information Systems Ganges Water Treaty Hydrologic Engineering Center His Majesty’s Government of Nepal Himalayan Power Consultants Inter-basin Transfer International Court of Justice International Engineering Company Indira Gandhi Nahar Project Institute for Integrated Development Studies International Law Association International Law Commission Interlinking of rivers Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change World Conservation Union

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ACRONYMS

JCE JCWR JRC KBLP LHWP LMR MCM MDGs MNCs MoF MoWR NCA NCIWRDP NDA NGO NOAA NRM NWDA NWDT OECD PAPs PIL RMG RPT SHGs SNRE SPIESR SPV TBS TGD UNDP UP UPA USAID VWC WARPO WCD WHO WWF

Joint Committee of Experts Joint Committee on Water Resources Joint Rivers Commission Ken-Betwa Link Project Lesotho Highland Water Project Lower Meghna River Million Cubic Meters Millennium Development Goals Multi-National Corporations Ministry of Finance Ministry of Water Resources Net Cultivable Area National Commission for Integrated Water Resource Development Plan National Democratic Alliance Non-Governmental Organization National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration Natural Resources Management National Water Development Agency Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Project Affected Persons Public Interest Litigation Ready-Made Garments Randel Palmer and Tritton Self Help Groups School of Natural Resources & Environment Sardar Patel Institute of economic and Social Research Special Purpose Vehicle Tarun Bharat Sangh Three Gorges Dam United Nations Development Program Uttar Pradesh United Progressive Alliance United Stated Agency for International Development Village Water Council Water Resources Planning Organization World Commission on Dams World Health Organization Worldwide Fund for Nature

1 Interlinking of Rivers in India: Issues and Concerns M. MONIRUL QADER MIRZA QAZI KHOLIQUZZAMAN AHMAD

1.1 INTRODUCTION During our journey throughout the history, many past civilizations in the world were developed around water. In the Indian sub-continent, the Harappa and Mohenjodaro civilizations were evolved in the Indus River basin five thousand years ago. In the modern times, water has also been playing a pivotal role in the development and sustenance of livelihoods of people of India. After independence in 1947, India required millions of tons of food to feed its impoverished growing population. The country became a massive importer of food grains which rose to 10 million tons in 1966. Importation, particularly of food grains, persistently drained out the country’s precious foreign currency and was a cause of its high level of dependence on outside assistance. In a move to attain self sufficiency in food crops, India opted for the ‘green revolution’, beginning with wheat and then expanding to rice (Ahluwalia, 2006). Under this program, the country invested resources in agricultural science and technology and water resources development. 1.2 INDIA’S WATER RESOURCES AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 1.2.1 Water resources of India Like the availability of water in India, precipitation in India is unevenly distributed in time and space. The country receives 4,000 km3 of precipitation in a given year or 1,220 mm. Indian precipitation has two major characteristics. First, temporally, precipitation is highly variable. Annually, about 73 per cent of total annual precipitation occurs during four summer monsoon months (June–September). The remaining 27 per cent occurs in the other eight months of the year (Prabhakar, 2005). Fifty per cent of the precipitation takes place in about 15 days and altogether less than 100 hours in a year. Second, the country is faced with high spatial variability of precipitation (Figure 1.1), which has a distinct pattern of distribution from east to the west. This is mainly because of the direction of the movement of moisture laden monsoon air mass, as well as due to orographic influence. As a result, northeastern India experiences very high rainfall, while the western India is a low rainfall area. The northern extent of the monsoon in India and

2

INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS

Nepal is governed by the presence of the Himalayas. The Western Ghats play a significant role in orographic lifting of moisture-laden southwest monsoon winds, which leads to heavy rainfall along the west coast of India and provides water supply to all major rivers of the peninsular India (Pant and Kumar, 1997).

Fig. 1.1 Spatial distribution of annual precipitation (mm) of India (Source: India Meteorological Department).

Influenced by the precipitation pattern and orography, water resources in India show a high spatial variability. About 62 per cent (1,202 km3) of annual water availability in India generated in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna river systems, which accounts for 33 per cent of the geographical area of the country. On the other hand, 10 per cent is to be found from the west flowing rivers south of Tapi, which covers only 3 per cent of the area, and the remaining 28 per cent comes from the other river systems distributed over 64 per cent of the land area (Kumar et al., 2005). Since, overall the climate is hot; runoff in India is highly influenced by very high evaporation. Of the total precipitation only 47 per cent is transformed into runoff. High

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summer temperature and other meteorological factors evaporate roughly 45 per cent of the precipitation. Only 8.5 per cent of the precipitation replenishes groundwater. Further, the occurrences of droughts are also characteristic of India. Droughts are closely related with precipitation (magnitude, number of spells and their duration, timing, etc.) over a particular area. Droughts are usually caused by lack of or inadequate precipitation. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the national water resources of India. Table 1.1 National water resources of India

Resource Annual precipitation (including snowfall)

Quantity

Precipitation (%)

3

4,000 km

100

Evaporation + groundwater recharge

3

2,131 km

53.3

Average annual potential flows in rivers

1,869 km3

46.7

Estimated utilizable water resources Surface water Groundwater

1,122 km3 690 km3 432 km3*

28.1 17.3 10.8

1 km3 ⫽ 109 m3 ⫽ 1 billion cubic meter (BCM) ⫽ 0.10 million hectare meter. * Natural recharge from rainfall (~342.4 km3) ⫹ potential due to augmentation from canal irrigation system (~89.5 km3). Source: MoWR (1999).

1.2.2 Water resources development: The major thrusts After independence, the development of India’s water resources (Table 1.1) has taken place in the backdrop of high temporal and spatial variability, which has faced several major challenges. First, India inherited some water infrastructures from colonial times, but they were insufficient to satisfy the increasing requirements of the country. A major focus of water development was to expand irrigation facilities by mainly utilizing surface water resources through construction of infrastructure such as dams, reservoirs, barrages, weirs, irrigation canals, etc. Large scale investment was made in canal irrigation infrastructures. Irrigation by canal water (using water from surface sources) was overtaken by groundwater irrigation by the early 1970s. In fact, the area irrigated by canal water was larger than the area irrigated by groundwater until 1972–1973 but the pattern changed since then and currently groundwater irrigated area is nearly double compared to canal irrigated area (Bhattarai and Narayanamoorthy, 2003). Second, India faces the daunting challenge of flood and drought hazard mitigation, which is required to reduce economic losses in agriculture and other sectors; flood mitigation is particularly important for India. During the colonial time, India experienced many famines and many Indians faced hunger, which were partly attributed1 to natural hazards, yet little was done to mitigate the destruction caused by these hazards. Since 1

Natural hazards alone cannot always trigger a famine. Empirical studies from various regions of the world suggest failures of political and administrative factors to respond to an emerging food access problem as well. For example, the 1943 famine in Bengal and 1974 famine in Bangladesh resulted due largely to political and administrative failures to respond to emerging food access crisis (Sen, 2001).

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INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS

independence, both structural and non-structural measures have been implemented to mitigate flood hazard. The area protected prior to 1954 is assessed to have been 3 million hectares (Mha). From 1954 and 2000, 33,630 km of new embankments and 37,904 km of drainage channels have been constructed. In addition, a total of 2,337 town protection works have been completed and 4,705 villages have been raised above flood level. All these measures give reasonable protection to an estimated 15.8 Mha (Planning Commission, 2002). Despite all these structural efforts, the flood vulnerable areas constitute 40 Mha as of 2002 to 2003 (D’Souza, 2003) and the damages caused by floods have been high. Droughts are a more serious natural hazard in India than floods. More than 26 per cent of India’s total population faces the consequences of recurring droughts (Mirza, 2007). In particular, the Indian states of Gujarat, Haryana, Rajasthan and Punjab are highly vulnerable to droughts, particularly their agriculture sector. Droughts can cause significant adverse impact on agriculture and therefore on the national economy. For example, the Tenth Plan (2002 to 2007) of India set agricultural target growth rate at 4 per cent per annum. However, agricultural growth rate in the first year (2002 to 2003) of the Plan was negative (⫺6.9 per cent) due to a severe drought that occurred in 2002 (MoF, 2007). As a result, overall GDP growth rate for the 2002 to 2003 financial years declined to 3.8 per cent from the preceding five-year average of 5.5 per cent. Drought management in India is still ad-hoc and interventions are largely carried out by providing instant relief to prevent starvation. Third, at the time of independence, a very small fraction of the population had access to electricity because it was mainly concentrated in urban areas. At that time, hydroelectric projects were popular for cheap source of energy in many parts of the World, especially in North America. To expand the energy supply, India focused its attention on hydropower from large multipurpose dams. However, by 2002, only 6 per cent of the India’s supply came from hydropower (Planning Commission, 2002). The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) has recently assessed India’s hydro potential to be about 148,700 MW. The hydroelectric capacity currently under operation is about 26,000 MW and 16,083 MW is under various stages of development. The CEA has also identified 56 sites for pumped storage schemes with an estimated aggregate installed capacity of 94,000 MW. Over the years, growth in hydropower generation has actually been slow. There are a host of reasons that explain this slow growth, including a long implementation period, lack of investment particularly foreign, and public opposition to hydro projects (Tehri, Narmada and many others), to name a few. 1.3 GLOBALIZATION, RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LOOMING WATER CRISIS India is the largest country in South Asia and is not far away from becoming one of the largest economies in the world. The country has succeeded in accelerating its economic growth in recent years. India joined the globalization process through a wide-scale economic reform programme initiated in 1991 and has been expanding and deepening the process since then. After decades of slow economic growth, India has, in recent years, sustained a high economic growth which has significantly contributed towards increasing per capita income and reducing poverty (Sachs, 2005), although about 34.7 per cent (UNDP, 2006) of the population still has to make do with less ppp2 $1 a day per person. The 2

Purchasing-power parity theory states that the exchange rate between one currency and another is in equilibrium when their domestic purchasing powers at that rate of exchange are equivalent.

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country’s rapidly growing urban population and income and improved lifestyles of the beneficiaries of the rapid economic growth, expanding industry and development of rural centers have all triggered high water and energy demand. Further, the regional imbalance in water availability, problems emerging from the legacy of past water development policy and fast economic growth has caused India’s water development to face critical challenges. The water crisis in India is alarmingly serious, but how can this be resolved? While the potential negative consequences of past water development projects are widely recognized and debated, many (e.g. government officials and technocrats) still argue that larger-scale dams, irrigation projects, and inter-basin transfers are the only viable solution to the problem of water scarcity in India (Gourdji et al., 2005). However, there are opposing views on resolving this crisis. Many traditional methods have been suggested as alternatives to larger scale projects, including roof-top rainwater harvesting, check dams and other traditional water harvesting techniques, village recharge ponds, increasing irrigation water application efficiency, high yielding crop varieties that require low irrigation, crop diversification, increasing yield in rainfed agriculture, to name a few. There are also many critics of these alternative measures. Adhering to the historical legacy of large scale water infrastructure development policy, policymakers in India eventually opted in 2002 for the option to link major rivers to resolve the looming water crisis. 1.4 INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA The interlinking of rivers in India is not a new idea. In the background of high temporal and spatial variations in the availability of water resources in India, the vision to interlink rivers for the purpose of inter-basin water transfer, at a national scale, has been in the thoughts of well meaning individuals and even engineers for more than a century (Prasad, 2004). 1.4.1 Past proposals During the British colonial rule, eminent civil engineer Sir Arthur Cotton, put forward an interlinking plan for southern India to facilitate trade through navigation canals. More recently, in 1972, Dr K.L. Rao, the Minister of Irrigation in the Cabinet of the late Mrs. Indira Gandhi re-proposed the idea but in a different manner, scale and purpose. In 1977, Captain Dinshaw Dastur, an engineer, but a pilot by profession, proposed the construction of the Garland Canal which mainly consisted of two canals: (a) a 4,200 km long, 300 m wide Himalayan Canal and (b) a 9,300 km long Garland Canal aligned along the southern slopes of the Himalayas, bounded by the Ravi in the west, connected to the Brahmaputra in the east and beyond. The main features of these proposals are presented in Table 1.2. 1.4.2 Present proposal In August 1980, the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) and the Ministry of Water Resources published a report entitled ‘National Perspectives for Water Resources Development’. This document outlined a water development plan comprised of the Himalayan and Peninsular components. The plan was subsequently abandoned because it was a non-starter for various reasons (Iyer, 2003). But the report re-surfaced again when the National Commission for Integrated Water Resource Development Plan (NCIWRDP) finally submitted a report on the original NWDA proposals. The report by the NCIWRDP did not discuss the proposed Himalayan links in detail because the data were classified as

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INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS

confidential, but the report did state that the financial costs involved and the resulting environmental problems would be enormous (Iyer, 2003). The NCIWRDP identified the peninsular component as being unnecessary and recommended intra-basin development as opposed to massive inter-basin water transfer (Gourdji et al., 2005).

Table 1.2 Earlier interlinking proposals and their major features

Proposed by

Year

Features

Sir A. Cotton

1839

He conceived a plan to link rivers in Southern India for inland navigation. While the project was partially implemented, the river linking canals could not survive in the face of rapid development of railways.

Dr K.L. Rao

1972

Linking the northern Ganga (Ganges) River with the southern Couvery River; Diverting 1,700 m3/sec surplus monsoon water through a 2,640 km long canal; Required lifting of water over 450 m; Envisaged to supply water to drought prone areas of South Uttar Pradesh and South Bihar located within the Ganga basin; Discarded because of high financial cost and very large energy requirements.

Captain D.J. Dastur

1977

Proposed the Himalayan and Garland canals to be inter-connected at two points (Delhi and Patna) by five pipelines of 3.7 m in diameter; Surplus waters in the country to be utilized to irrigate 219 Mha of agricultural land; Found to be technically infeasible.

In October 2002, the Supreme Court of India mandated that the Central Government immediately start working on a project that linked all the major Indian rivers so as to provide water to drought prone states in the south for irrigation and other uses. This mandate came in response to a public interest litigation (PIL) filed by one advocate, which he had originally filed for the cleaning of the Yamuna River, a tributary of the Ganges. Thus, in September 2002 for the first time, the issue arose in the Supreme Court of India. Justice B.N. Kirpal, the then Chief Justice of India headed the Supreme Court bench and responded enthusiastically to the PIL. He converted the PIL for the cleaning of the Yamuna into an independent writ petition and issued notices to the Centre and the States for interlinking of rivers (ILR). The proposal that has recently been taken up is based on the work that the NWDA had conducted between 1980 and 2000. There are two main components of the proposal on interlinking of rivers in India (ILR), namely the Himalayan Rivers component and the Peninsular Rivers component (Figures 1.2 and 1.3). The Himilayan component envisaged

M.M.Q. MIRZA AND Q.K. AHMAD

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A

A

GAN

GA

I

Kosi - Mechi Kosi - Ghagra Gandak - Ganga Ghagra - Yamuna* Sarda - Yamuna* Yamuna - Rajasthan Rajasthan - Sebermati

SANKOSH MANAS

TISTA

MECHI

10

NE

9

DA RMA

13

8 14 MA H A

NA

D I

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

A UTR 11 MAP H A R B

AK

NA

SO

N

BE

KE

K A LIS INDH

B AT

SA BAR MATI

GO

GRA

I

PA R

TAPI

2 GHA

MT

TW A

CH

LU

7

3

NG

BAR

NI

GA

1 KOSI

A

UN

L

A MB

GANDAK

M YA

4

SAR DA

5

6

GHAGRA

the transfer of water from the Brahmaputra and Ganga system to flow westwards to southern Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan, and eventually to the southwest Peninsular system. The Peninsular Rivers component is concerned with connecting Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, Pennar and Cauvery, Ken-Betwa, Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal, Par-Tapi-Narmada, Damanganga-Pinjal, etc. There was also a notion to partially divert certain rivers flowing eastward into the Arabian Sea, and link them with rivers flowing into the Bay of Bengal.

SU

DA MO DA RN R AR EK HA

12

BE

8. Chunar - Sone Barrage 9. Sone Dam - Southern Tributaries of Ganga 10. Manas - Sankosh - Tista - Ganga 11. Jogighopa - Tista - Farakka (Alternate) 12. Farakka - Sunderbans 13. Ganga (Farakka) - Damodar - Subernarekha 14. Subernarekha - Mahanadi

* FR Completed

Fig. 1.2 Himalayan component of the ILR (Source: http://www.nwda.gov.in).

The ILR project has been designed such that it will help improve the living standard of people as it will facilitate growth in the Indian economy. The completion of this project would generate regular supply of water for domestic use, agriculture and industries, coupled with flood control and improvements in water flow, navigation, food security, etc. To achieve these results, 334 billion cubic meters of water must be transferred through 30 constructed inter-river links, 36 big dams, 94 tunnels and 10,876 kilometers of canals. Construction of the dams, canals, etc. and their maintenance will create opportunities for new employment, which will check the migration of people from villages to cities (Ali, 2004).

INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS

GA GO NGA MT I

A

14

PENN

5 15 CA UV

AR

ER Y

16

PA LA 8 R

BAY OF BENGAL

9 VA IG

VAIP PAR

ANDAMAN & NICOBAR

AI

INDIAN

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

RA K

1

D AV 3 AR I 4

7

6

ARABIAN SEA

BA

NE

I AR MAT

AB

2

HN

A

DI

IS

MAHAN

DA MO DA RN R AR EK HA

BE

O

KR

A

G

PENGAN GO GA DA VAR I MA NE R

13

A

SU

A MAD

NAR

TAPI

12 PAR

NG

10

WAINGANGA

ATI BARB KALISINDH

S

GA

TR APU HM BRA

SO

I

LUN

BE TW A N

L BA AM H C 11

KE

8

OCEAN

Mahanadi (Manibhadra) - Godavari (Dowislaiswaram) Godavari (Incharmpalli) - Krishna (Nagarjunasagar)* Godavari (Inchampalli) - Krishna (Pulichintala)* Godavari (Polavarem) - Krishna (Vijayawada)* Krishna (Srisailam) - Pennar* Krishna (Nagarjunasagar) - Pennar (Somasila)* Pennar (Somasila) - Palar-Cauvery (Grand Anicut)* Pennar (Somasila) - Palar-Cauvery (Grand Anicut)*

9. 10. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Cauvery (Kattalai) - Veigai - Gunder* Ken - Netwa* Par - Tapi - Narmada* Damangange - Pinjal* Bedti - Varda Netravati - Hemavati Pamba - Achankovil - Vaippar*

Fig. 1.3 Peninsular component of the ILR (Source: http://www.nwda.gov.in).

To oversee the preparation of the feasibility reports, a Task Force (see Chapter 3 for details) was constituted in 2002, headed by Mr. Suresh Prabhu, former Cabinet Minister for Environment and Forests and Power. Feasibility Reports (FRs) of 16 links (14 Peninsular and 2 Himalayan) have so far been completed, but only the FRs of the Peninsular links are available in the NWDA website (http://www.nwda.gov.in) for public scrutiny. Three months before the political change that took place in New Delhi in May 2004, Mr. Prabhu resigned as Chairman of the Task Force to compete in the election. The Task Force was dismantled in August 2004. But a special cell on ILR was constituted in December of the same year to look after the residual routine work of the Task Force. In addition, a separate ‘Committee of Experts’ (COE) was also setup in September 2006. The role of the COE is to investigate the environmental and socio-economic aspects of the interlinking plan and to make recommendations based on their findings (Gourdji et al., 2005). The ILR project has entered into the implementation phase. The Chief Ministers of Uttar Pradesh and Madhaya Pradesh signed a Memorandum of Understanding in August 2005 to implement one link (the Ken-Betwa Link Project or KBLP) of the Peninsular component. Although these two rivers are grouped into the Peninsular component due to

M.M.Q. MIRZA AND Q.K. AHMAD

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their place of origin, they supply water to the Yamuna River, a tributary of the disputed Ganges River. The KBLP involves connecting the Ken and Betwa rivers through creation of water storage and supply infrastructures to divert water for irrigation and other consumptive uses. 1.5 ISSUES AND CONCERNS The interlinking of major rivers as a way to resolve the water crisis has become a highly debated topic in India and in neighboring Bangladesh and Nepal, the two countries which have substantial stakes in this project. The ILR project has also generated interest among academia and researchers from around the world in relation to its likely implications. The major objective of this anthology is to address some of the following issues and concerns. 1.5.1 Experiences from Inter-Basin Water Transfers (IBTs) For over more than a century, many IBT projects have been implemented in many parts of the world especially in the arid and semiarid regions, including in India. Notable IBTs in India include: Periyar Project, Parambikulam Aliyar, Kurnool Cudappah Canal, Telugu Ganga Project, and Ravi-Beas-Sutlej-Indira Gandhi Nahar Project. Descriptions of these projects are available in the website of the NWDA of India (http://www.nwda.gov.in). A number of beneficial impacts generated by these projects are listed, but no information is included on their adverse environmental impacts. Chapters 2, 7, 9 and 11 discuss environmental issues related to large scale water transfer projects with examples from many parts of the world including India. The purpose of these chapters is to brief the readers about the likely environmental impacts of river interlinking/water transfer projects. Overall, an assessment of the available literature demonstrates that, in general, adverse environmental impacts of IBT projects outweigh their beneficial impacts. 1.5.2 Growing food demand and irrigation Indian agricultural growth has reached a point of stagnancy. Despite large scale expansion of irrigation, the introduction of high yielding varieties and the uses of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, the total per hectare yield of crops is substantially lower compared to many other countries in the region. In particular, rice yield is 25 per cent lower than the global average; while wheat yield in neighboring China is 40 per cent higher than that of India. As against a reduced prospect of yields, population is growing and incomes are rising, implying continuously increasing demand for staple foods during the next few decades (Dyson et al., 2000). The projected total cereal requirement for 2020 may vary from 224 million tons to 250 million tons for a population of 1,315 million (Dyson et al., 2000; Bhalla et al., 1997). The major objective of interlinking rivers is to expand food production to meet the growing food demand. It is argued that the agriculture sector would benefit from water transfers making for expanded irrigation and would as a result ensure food security (Chapters 3 and 12). However, opposing views of the ability of ILR to ensure food security is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 1.5.3 Hydrological implications The implementation of the project component(s) will alter the hydrological settings of the river basins. The entire ILR project is designed based on the concept of transferring water

10

INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS

from ‘areas of surplus to the deficit areas’. Many authors (Chapters 4 and 5) have challenged this, the very foundation of the ILR project. The general concept of ‘too much’ water in the monsoon (June–September) and ‘too little’ in the remaining months of the year in the Indian rivers is arguable. A seasonal average water surplus area could face water deficit because, temporally and spatially, water requirements maintain some unique patterns depending on the demands from agriculture, industry, domestic and other economic sectors (Prasad, 2004). Areas downstream of Patna will experience severe water shortages due to river interlinking (Chapter 7). Alteration of hydrological changes could also occur beyond the borders of India. In the upstream, Nepal would likely experience inundations from planned structures as they would be built near the border of India and Nepal. Further, if any structure(s) were built inside Nepal, hydrological changes would also likely occur in the river basins (Chapter 6). In the downstream, due to the ILR, Bangladesh could experience hydrological droughts in the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers (Chapter 10). 1.5.4 Risk and security The Himalayan and the Peninsular components are now treated as independent components but they are actually interconnected. The Peninsular component has two sub-components, one for interlinking the peninsular rivers themselves and the other for linking the Ganges to the peninsular rivers. Water will be transferred either by gravity flows (tunneling through mountains) or by lifting across natural barriers. Critics argue that the entire linking project should be treated from a ‘systemic’ point of view otherwise it will run a risk of failure (Chapter 5). The interlinking infrastructure will also require unprecedented security arrangements and enormous resources, over extending the capacity of defence and police forces (Chapter 5). Similar hydrological and environmental risk and security issues are discussed in more detail later in this book (Chapters 10 and 11). 1.5.5 Flood vs drought mitigation One of the major objectives of the ILR is to mitigate floods and drought hazards by storing waters in reservoirs in the monsoon and releasing it in the dry season. However, in the context of high seasonal variations in the hydrology of Indian rivers, floods and droughts are very complex issues. For example, the highest flood discharge recorded in the Brahmaputra River at Pandu, Assam was 72,748 m3/sec (1962). This magnitude is approximately 25 times the minimum flow observed at exactly the same station that same year (Goswami, 1998). It is very common that a river causes floods in certain parts of its basin while simultaneously the other parts of the basin face droughts (Prasad, 2004). Current plan under the ILR to store water in 36 dams/reservoirs is of insignificant consequence compared to flood flows in the Indian rivers. Similar flood and drought management strategies in the past produced limited success in India. In fact, doubts have been expressed about the planned flood moderation in India under the current plan (Chapter 5) because storing large volumes of water in a normal flooding year will adversely impact agriculture and river morphology in the downstream areas, especially in Bangladesh (Chapter 10).

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1.5.6 Energy future Energy is one of the most important determinants of social and economic development. Per capita energy consumption and percentage of population having access to energy reflects a country’s development situation. India’s per capita total energy consumption is one of the lowest in the world with 479 kgoe (kilograms oil equivalent). India’s consumption is only about 20 per cent of the global average reported in 1997 and compares poorly with the per capita consumption of Thailand (1,319 kgoe), Brazil (1,051 kgoe) and China (907 kgoe) (Planning Commission, 2002). The country’s rising population and changes in lifestyles are consistent with rapid economic growth and have accelerated the energy demand. Estimated energy demand in 2006 to 2007 is 563 mtoe (million tonnes oil equivalent) and projected to rise to 724 mtoe by 2011 to 2012. India’s current power generation capacity falls short of the demand for it by about 30 per cent. To reduce the gap between power demand and supply, hydropower development has become one of the major priorities. Under the ILR, India is planning to develop 34,000 MW of hydropower mainly from the Himalayan component. It is unclear from India’s 10th Five-Year Plan (2002 to 2007) whether hydropower dams or reservoirs are planned under the ILR in the sites already identified. The ILR presents, it is argued, opportunity for India to diversify its energy portfolio that is heavily reliant on fossil fuels. Although hydropower is presently an attractive option due mainly to high energy demand, environmental and social costs are potentially very high. The ILR will require significant energy inputs to lift water across basin boundaries, and this energy requirement could substantially reduce the net electricity generated by the hydropower component of the ILR. Instead of investing resources in the ILR, India can expand its existing cooperation with Bhutan to further develop its hydropower and purchase supplies from there (Chapter 8). 1.5.7 Health concerns Health issues concerning large scale water development projects are well documented. Dams and reservoirs impound water that create favorable environments for the growth of various vectors. An outbreak is more likely to occur because long irrigation canals transport vectors from one area to another. The growth of vectors can cause an outbreak of many infectious and parasitic diseases such as malaria, guinea worm, schistosomiasis (bilharzia), river blindness and various types of diarrhoeal diseases, as recorded in large water projects. In fact, some of these diseases have already been identified in water projects in India (Chapter 9). An environment polluted by fertilizers, pesticides, household effluents and hazardous chemicals and water and soil salinisation endanger the availability of freshwater and jeopardize public health. Under the current ILR scheme, there are many large dams and reservoirs, along with thousands of kilometers of irrigation canals and other associated structures. Combined, these schemes will alter micro-climatic and environmental settings of large areas in India. At this moment, the exact health implications of the interlinking plan are difficult to ascertain. But anecdotal evidence from past projects suggests that heath implications be taken into account during project design and post-implementation monitoring programs (Chapter 9).

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INTERLINKING OF RIVERS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS

1.5.8 Pollution In general Indian rivers are highly polluted, particularly in the dry season, when flows are insignificant compared to the monsoon months. Floods during the monsoon, flush industrial and municipal pollution into the Ganges and into many other rivers that flow out to the ocean. The Ganges is the one of the most polluted rivers in the world (Naser et al., 2004) and will become even more polluted as a result of the reduced flow that will be caused by the diversions planned under the ILR scheme. Diversions at specific reaches below Allahabad in the Ganges will particularly increase the concentration of pollution (Chapter 7). Due to the ILR scheme, the concentration of pollution will also increase and adversely affect the Yamuna River. The state of Haryana and the city of Delhi draw so much water from the Yamuna River that it barely flows beyond Delhi. Due to the reduced flow the water quality in Delhi is very poor. Under the interlinking scheme, water from the Ken River, a tributary of the Yamuna will also be diverted to the Betwa River (Chapter 11). This diversion will reduce the supply of water to the Yamuna River and thus the concentration of pollution may become worse in future. Under the ILR scheme, water from the Ganges will also be transferred to the South through the Ganga-Damodar-Subernarekha and Subernarekha-Mahanadi links (Figure 1.2). As the Ganga is already polluted, the interlinking of a polluted river with a relatively non-polluted one will have adverse impacts on the ecosystems of the latter and the people dependent on its waters. 1.5.9 Climate change and variability Climate change and variability have emerged as the most important environmental challenges. The recently released Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that anthropogenic warming has already caused discernible influence on many physical systems, including changes in snow, ice and glaciers. Himalayan glaciers are melting at a faster rate than before and many of them have significantly shrunk in the last few decades (Cruz et al., 2007). Future changes in the South Asian climates will have significant impacts on water supply and demand, and eventually will have profound effects on various economic sectors and the livelihoods of millions of people. The melting of the Himalayan glaciers is projected to increase water supply within the next two to three decades, but in the long-run water supply will decrease due to the recession of the glaciers. Freshwater availability in South Asia is also projected to decrease due to climate change although monsoon precipitation will increase (Cruz et al., 2007). Climate change will have substantial implications for the ILR scheme (Chapter 12). Many hydrological impacts will be experienced in the economic and engineering life-cycles of interlinking infrastructures. It is therefore important to factor in climate change in the engineering designs of the ILR (Chapter 12). This would be a huge and a highly complex undertaking and may prove intractable in practice, given the size and the multifarious consequences of the scheme. 1.5.10 Water for ecosystem Ecosystems provide invaluable services for human well-being. Healthy water dependent ecosystems contribute to the health of the water resources that sustain our industries and the community’s economic, social and environmental standards (GSA, 2007). Ecosystem integrity, productivity and long term sustainability is highly dependent on adequate water flows which are required in watercourses, riparian zones, wetlands, floodplains, estuaries,

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etc. Flood waters maintain interactions between the floodplain and the water courses, which is especially important for many fish species. Nutrients from flood waters enrich soils in the floodplain and also the growth of blue-green algae supply nutrients to post-flooding planted crops (Chapter 4). Wetlands contribute to storing flood waters and help purifying water. Coastal estuaries play a significant role in the interaction between freshwater and brackish water ecosystems. Adequate supply of freshwater is required for the sustenance of fragile coastal ecosystem. Evidence suggests that the withdrawal of the Ganges waters at Farakka and in other upstream locations has already significantly damaged ‘mangrove ecosystem’ in Bangladesh (Chapter 7 and 10). Freshwater flows also push back the intrusion of saline sea water. Therefore, to maintain morphological balance, watercourses require specific water flows (Chapter 10). 1.5.11 Social and ecological impacts Large scale water projects cause a host of social and ecological impacts relating to population and wildlife displacements (Chapter 2). We have decided to include a Chapter on the Ken-Betwa Link Project (KBLP) to examine the potential social and ecological impacts of ILR. The KBLP is the pilot component of the ILR which has become a primary point of controversy in India. The Indian government has released a Feasibility Report on this project which discusses the potential impacts of the project on the surrounding environment. The chapter uses GIS analysis, literature reviews, and focus group interviews, to discuss three major points of criticism surrounding the KBLP: hydrologic, wildlife, and social impacts. As illustrated in the chapter, it seems that the project planners have not adequately analyzed the social and environmental implications to the landscape and people who depend on it (Chapter 11). 1.6 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS The ILR is not a self contained project within India although it has been made public unilaterally. Official mechanisms for water cooperation exist between India-Bangladesh and India-Nepal. The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) was set up in 1972 to foster water cooperation between India and Bangladesh. A Nepal-India Joint Committee on Water Resources (JCWR), headed by Water Resources Secretaries from the two countries, is functioning to have interactions at higher levels in the water sector, including implementing various cooperative agreements and understandings. Nepal and Bangladesh are, respectively located at the upstream and downstream of the Ganges; each has a large stake in this project. International law governs the utilization of common rivers to ensure just and equitable shares of waters for all competing claimants and interests. It confers specific rights and imposes definite obligations on riparian states so that their legitimate rights are protected and the abusive action prevented. The economic justification from the point of view of a particular nation, India in this case, of the ILR project which involves international rivers is not enough. The planning, construction and commissioning of the project must comply with the rules, principles and norms of international law governing the utilization of international rivers (Chapter 13). 1.7 ALTERNATIVES OF THE ILR The ILR project is the largest inter-basin water transfer initiative ever undertaken in the world. The estimated cost is in the range of US$ 125 to 200 billion, with the lower cost

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estimate totaling more than the value of India’s total export in 2006 (US$ 112 billion). If this project has to be completed in the next 10 years (as per directive of the Supreme Court), India needs to invest US$ 12.5 to 20 billion per year (at 2002 prices). However, due to cost escalation (400 to 500 per cent as is often the case in India), the final project cost would be in the range of US$ 600 to 800 billion. But, are there other alternatives to this costly project? According to some, the answer is yes; and several alternatives have been suggested in some detail. First, a huge amount of water is lost via evapotranspiration, distribution losses, seepage through unlined channels and excess application in the crop fields. Canal irrigation water application efficiency in India is estimated at 35 to 40 per cent, which has remained at the same level for the last six decades. Water losses in the domestic and industrial uses are also believed to be 30 to 40 per cent. Therefore, investment of resources in increasing irrigation, domestic and industrial water use efficiency can reduce demand for water and additional areas can be brought under irrigation with the water saved (Chapter 4). Second, enormous potential exists to increase the productivity of water in agriculture by raising crop productivity, combined with better water management practices. Deep soil chiseling prior to planting can dramatically improve water retention by the soil, while simultaneously reduce runoff and flooding. Crops grown in these conditions require less irrigation and generate much higher yields. Third, the phasing out of subsidies in power and water can save resources by reducing their wasteful uses (Chapter 4). Fourth, increasing the ability to efficiently use the available water for maximum benefit. Rainwater harvesting techniques in both urban and rural environment can substantially enhance the availability of water. Some of these techniques are already in use and some of the ancient techniques have even been revived in many parts of India. Public education on rainwater harvesting and water conservation has been found to be very effective tools in tackling water shortages and droughts (Chapter 14).

1.8 REGIONAL COOPERATION The Himalayan component of the ILR involves two of the largest rivers in South Asia: the Ganges and Brahmaputra. These two rivers are international and their basin areas are shared by China, Nepal, India and Bangladesh. Under the Himalayan component, there are five links which directly involve Nepal: Kosi-Mechi, Kosi-Ghagra, Gandak-Ganga, Ghagra-Yamuna and Sarada-Yamuna. Nepal has to play a very crucial role for the Himalayan component because the Nepalese rivers supply almost half of the annual flow of the Ganges River. In the dry season, 75 per cent of the Ganges flow comes from Nepal. In order to implement these five links, a string of storage reservoirs and other infrastructures must be constructed on the Nepalese soil (Chapter 6). China is also planning to build a number of dams and reservoirs on the Brahmputra (Tsangpo) just above the spot where the river enters India. China’s objective is to transfer large quantities of water to its water starved northern region. The Chinese plan will affect India’s ILR project in relation to the transferring of water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges and eventually to Southern India. At the downstream, Bangladesh is very concerned because over 92 per cent of the water that annually flows through the country is generated in the upstream. Bangladesh and India has 54 common rivers. Thus, the impacts of the ILR on Bangladesh will be the result of many factors, including the alteration of hydrology (both surface and groundwater), river dynamics, ecosystem changes, agricultural productivity, intrusion of salinity, and public heath (Chapter 10). While both Nepal and Bangladesh have crucial

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stakes in this project, they have not been officially notified about plans for the ILR project. The issue of regional cooperation with respect to water resources of the basins of the common river systems, viz the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna (GBM), has been under discussion for 36 years. Yet, so far no significant breakthrough has been achieved (Chapter 15), except for the Ganges [water sharing] Treaty signed in 1996. China, India and Bangladesh may mutually benefit from cooperation on the Brahmaputra River (Chapters 16 and 17). But this concept needs to be comprehensively investigated with the participation of all three countries.

REFERENCES Ahluwalia, M.: Reducing Poverty and Hunger in India: The Role of Agriculture. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, D.C., USA, 2006. Ali: Interlinking of Indian Rivers. Current Science 86(4) (2004), pp. 498–499. Bhalla, G.S. and P. Hazell: Food Grains Demand in India to 2020: A Preliminary Exercise. Economic and Political Weekly, December 27, 1997, pp. 150–164. Bhattarai, M. and Narayanamoorthy, A.: Irrigation and other Factors Contribution to the Agricultural Growth and Development in India: A Cross-State Panel Data Analysis for 1970 to 1994. International Water Management Research Institute (IWMI), Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2003. Cruz, R.V., Harasawa, H., Lal, M. and Shaohong, W.: Asia. In: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson Eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007. D’Souza, R.: Supply-Side Hydrology in India: The Last Gasp. Economic and Political Weekly, September 6, 2003, pp. 3785–3790. Dyson, T. and Hanchate, A.: India’s Demographic and Food Prospects: Statistical Analysis. Economic and Political Weekly 35(46) (2000), pp. 4021–4036. Goswami, D.C.: Fluvial Regime and Flood Hydrology of the Brahmaputra River. In: Flood Studies in India (V.S. Kale Ed.), Geological Society of India, Bangalore, 1998, pp. 53–75. Gourdji, S., Knowlton, C. and Platt, K.: Indian Interlinking of Rivers: A Preliminary Evaluation. Master of Science Thesis, School of Natural Resources and Environment at the University of Michigan, USA, 2005. Government of South Australia: Water for Ecosystem (http://www.dwlbc.sa.gov.au/water/ecosystems/wfe.html), 2007. Iyer, R.R.: Making of a Sub-Continental Fiasco. Himal South Asia, August 2003, pp. 1–8. Kumar, R., Singh, R.D. and Sharma, K.D.: Water Resources of India. Current Science 89(5) (2005), pp. 794–811. Ministry of Finance (MoF): Budget 2007 to 2008. MoF, Government of India, New Delhi. Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR): Integrated Water Resource Development – A Plan for Action. Report of the National Commission for Integrated Water Resources Development Plan, MoWR, Government of India, New Delhi, Vol.1, 1999, p. 515. Mirza, M.M.Q.: Climate and Water Resources in South Asia. In: Climate and Water Resources in South Asia: Vulnerability and Adaptation (A. Muhammed, M.M.Q. Mirza and B. Stewart Eds.), Asianics Agro Development International, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2007, pp. 9–19. Nandargi, S., Dhar, O.N., Mirza, M.M.Q., Enright, B. and Sheikh, M.M.: Hydrometeorology of Floods and Droughts in South Asia – A Brief Appraisal. In: Climate and Water Resources in South Asia: Vulnerability and Adaptation (A. Muhammed, M.M.Q. Mirza and B. Stewart Eds.), Asianics Agro Development International, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2007, pp. 20–39. Naser, M., Rashid, H.U. and Abdulhusein, F.: Watching the Farakka Barrage: Role of Media. In: The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications (M.M.Q. Mirza Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2004, pp. 223–246.

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Pant, G.B. and Kumar, K.R.: Climates of South Asia. John Wiley & Sons Limited, UK, 1997. Planning Commission of India: 10th Five-Year Plan (2002 to 2007). Planning Commission, New Delhi, 2002. Prabhakar, S.V.R.K.: India Drought 2004. Natural Disaster Risk Management Program, World Bank Institute of Distance Learning, Washington, D.C., 2005. Prasad, T.: Interlinking of Rivers for Inter-basin Transfer. Economic and Political Weekly, March 20, 2004, pp. 1220–1226. Sachs, J.D.: The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. The Penguin Press, New York, 2005. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Human Development Report 2006: Power Beyond Poverty and the Global Water Crisis. UNDP, UN Headquarters, New York, 2006.

2 Interlinking of Rivers: Experience from Across the World AHSAN UDDIN AHMED DARIA T. SMEH M. MONIRUL QADER MIRZA

2.1 INTRODUCTION Large scale inter-basin transfer (IBT) of water from one basin to the other is not a new phenomenon. In fact, large dams, and more broadly water transfer projects, have been integral in the development of “civilizations” for thousands of years. For example, Middle Eastern countries that share the waters of Nile River planned to divert water from the basin to replenish the Jordan River as early as 1902. Even now, in many places all over the world, water transfer projects have been implemented and many are continually being conceived. The common purpose of IBT over the past hundred years is due largely to increases in population and subsequent increases in demand for freshwater for agriculture and/or to support urban activities. Most of the planning exercises for these projects have taken place during the past four decades. In fact, significant activities have taken place since the 1960s again in response to increasing population and demand of freshwater, but in circumstances in which demand exceeded the ability of the recipient river basin to provide. The degree to which the current stage of development and construction of IBT projects diverges from the past is in the magnitude of the players and their involvement in the projects. Currently, multi-lateral institutions and multi-national corporations tend “… to propose, negotiate, fund, and set the terms for the feasibility of dams and inter-basin water transfer projects with national governments” (Braun, 2005). This chapter presents evidence about the positive and adverse implications (Box 2.1) that result from large scale water transfers, as well as efforts for micro-scale transfers across different basins in various geographic areas worldwide. The chapter also provides a discussion on the purpose of interlinking rivers in South Asia, as well as, documented experience with ILR in that region. This chapter attempts to present a balanced argument regarding the advantages and disadvantages of IBT. Yet, an overall assessment of the available literature demonstrates that, in general, adverse environmental impacts of IBT projects outweigh their beneficial impacts.

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Box 2.1 Beneficial and adverse impacts of inter-basin water transfer projects Some of the primary potential benefits of inter-basin water transfer include:
Economic growth;
Improved livelihoods; and
Improvements in interregional relationships; and On the other hand, some of the primary adverse implications include (Braun, 2005):












Resettlement, dislocation or lack of relocation; Changes in river basin ecology; Loss of means of production; Loss of arable agricultural land; Loss of dry season grazing land; Changes in fisheries practices, fish life-cycle and fish stocks; Socio-cultural, socio-economic and psycho-physiological effects; Increased risk of impoverishment; Changes in household and community dynamics; Alterations in gender relations; and Changes in natural resource access.

2.2 EXPERIENCE WITH IBT FROM ACROSS THE WORLD The United States planned to transfer large quantum of water from Canada to the semiarid Southeastern states in the 1960s. The Soviet Union planned to meet the challenge of increasing water shortages and the shrinking of the Aral Sea at the expense of Siberian Rivers in 1973. Following the pursuits of the then super powers, Chile planned to divert water from other basins to replenish the Maipo River in the 1980s, in a bid to compensate for the increase in water use by the capital, Santiago. China, as well, has already implemented several large IBT projects. For example, it diverted roughly 10 BCM (billion cubic meters) from the Chang into the Huai basin, and 8 BCM from the lower Huang into the Hai and Huai in 1980 (Nickum, 1997). Recently, in a bid to continue agricultural development in the North China Plain and to provide water in the rapidly growing capital, the city of Beijing decided to implement the proposed middle route of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project. Meanwhile, the northern African country of Libya tried the most drastic measure to address water shortage problems: they created a man-made river and have since been transferring water from the arid south to the coastal regions since 1996. The entire intervention allows the transfer of 6.1 MCM of water through a pipeline network of about 5,000 km, to ensure water supply for 50 to 100 years at a cost of US$ 25 billion (Garay and Sugheiar, 1997). It is intriguing to note that, most of the large scale IBT projects proposed worldwide have never materialized and have remained as wishful proposals despite increasing needs of the respective “recipient basins”. Inaction can be explained by a number of reasons, including: huge capital costs, substantial scope for less capital-intensive alternative water savings, and increasing concerns about negative economic, environmental, and social

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impacts in the exporting basin, such as the potential cutting off of future development opportunities, social disruption, irreparable environmental damage, and rural-urban migration (Rosegrant and Ringler, 1999). Infact, Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for inter-basin transfer projects can usually describe the numerous adverse in-stream ecological effects that are caused by many of these projects. Yet, because EIAs tend to be undertaken after the important project elements have already been designed many of the concerns for these adverse effects are excluded in the decision-making process (Matete and Hassan, 2006).

2.2.1 North America In the US, large scale as well as micro-scale water transfers have been undertaken across basins (Rosegrant and Ringler, 1999). In order to transfer freshwater to LA, the city of Los Angeles plan to construct a large scale water transfer project meant water rights were bought from the Owens Valley of Eastern California. Unfortunately, when the Owens Valley gave away water rights, they suffered irreparable losses in terms of curtailing agricultural opportunities (US Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). In contrast, the Imperial Valley partnered with the Metropolitan Water District in California into a 35-year contract to receive payments for conservation projects in the valley in exchange for water from the valley, only ensuring that its water rights are retained. As a result, the Imperial Valley did not suffer any reduction in levels of water use (Postel, 1992). In the United States, there have also been numerous efforts in recent years to transfer water across river basins at micro-scales. London and Miley (1990) observed that several states in the US have drafted IBT legislation. The state of Texas currently has about 80 active inter-basin transfer permits, in order to serve the rapidly growing cities. It appears to be a general trend in the US to engage in an IBT agreement to solve a water crisis in the recipient basins, particularly in arid and semiarid regions. But by replenishing freshwater from exporting basins, controversies have arisen regarding the environmental concerns, as well as the consideration of other viable economic approaches to solve the problem. The state of Georgia has been implementing about 25 IBT projects over the years, most of which are small scale projects. Although the legislative provisions in the US are strictly followed and respected by all concerned parties, resentments have grown regarding environmental consequences of these IBTs. Since there is a strong possibility that an increasing number of projects or arrangements will have to be put in place to meet the growing requirements, especially to serve the urban sector, it is feared that the old legislative provisions would not be sufficient to resolve the outstanding issues. As observed by DeVinney and Johnson (undated), “… most experts agree that Georgia’s current interbasin transfer policy needs updating”. They also commented that, “… a more detailed inter-basin transfer policy than now exists, or an amendment to current law, could put additional limitations on interbasin water transfers,” implying that the future IBT initiatives could not be successful unless a holistic consideration is put in place. According to DeVinney and Johnson (undated), two concerns are continually being expressed regarding inter-basin transfers in Georgia. The first concern is the perception that the metro Atlanta population growth engine will siphon water from far away places in Georgia to support continued growth, resulting in harm to the water resources, the economy, the environment, and the people of the source basins. The second concern is that interbasin transfers, regardless of the destination of the water, will result in unacceptable adverse effects on the streams in the basins where water is withdrawn but not returned.

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Although some of the adverse effects are as yet unknown, DeVinney and Johnson (undated) anticipated a potential impasse and recommended that “additional new transfers or expansion of existing inter-basin transfers should be allowed only if certain conditions could be met. Those conditions should include, but not be limited to, such things as meeting instream flow requirements and water quality standards in both withdrawal and receiving basins.” The recommendations suggest that instream flow management and water quality maintenance become contagious issues in IBT projects, even if legislative provisions are well defined and obeyed by all parties concerned. 2.2.2 Africa IBT projects have also been commonly documented to exist throughout Africa. In early days of IBT project implementation, the thrust was to provide more irrigation water to water-scarce basins. With economic development, it was soon realized that the solution could lie in designing economic incentives and disincentives and to enhance water use efficiency. Meanwhile, urban areas started to play an increasing economic role, which also drew an increasing number of people and escalated demand for freshwater use. As a solution to growing problems, IBT was chosen to be the viable respite, like the project constructed in South Africa and Lesotho. Adverse ecological implications of other micro and macro IBT schemes in other dryland environments in South Africa have been analyzed by Davies and Snaddon (2000). The results raised grave concerns, not only for the exporting basin, but also for the recipient basin. Since Pretoria’s economic growth has largely been supported by IBT projects, Cyrus et al. (2000) analyzed a number of aspects of environmental consequences of such large scale IBT projects. The scale issue has again been raised by Wishart and Davies (2002a) who concluded that large scale IBT might challenge river basin integrity. The limnological issue of IBT projects in South Africa highlighted the environmental consequence in terms of benthic structure of the aquatic environment and lotic biodiversity (Wishart and Davies, 2002b; Wishart and Davies, 2003). From the South African experience, one can easily see how the country has been managing to sustain its economic growth, almost disregarding the environmental consequence of large scale IBT projects. It is known globally that the heart of economic activity – the Gauteng area – has now been fully dependent on waters imported from outside basins. Of course, the tendency of the pro-IBT groups is to forecast the economic aspects of such projects, frequently undermining concerns raised by environmental groups. Despite the works of a large number of researchers, Muller (undated) commented that “… There remains considerable interest in the ecological effects of IBTs although there are, to date, few indications of major negative impacts”. However, he commented that the receiving rivers, which are often used as a conduit for transferred water, often run into the generic danger of offering conditions favourable for pest species of flora and fauna. Such conditions have been existing in the Great Fish River, part of the transfer route from the Orange River to the Eastern Cape, as a result of almost continuous flow in a previously seasonal river. It is recognized that the biting black fly simulium chutterii has proliferated under this altered hydraulic regime, causing significant stock losses among cattle. In response, the administrator appropriately commented that, “… in addition to rigorous evaluations of social, political and economic implications of IBTs, environmental impact assessments will continue to pay particular attention to such matters” (Muller, undated). By 2003, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) was the largest water transfer infrastructure project being constructed in southern Africa (Keketso, 2003). The

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construction of the project began in 1991 (Boniface, 1999) and was instituted by the LHWP Treaty (1986; Conely and Niekerk, 2000). The project diverts water from the Orange-Senque River in Lesotho to the Vaal River Basin in South Africa; this water is stored in Lesotho and transferred to South Africa by gravity (Matete and Hassan, 2006). The project is composed of 5 dams and 200 km of tunnel and upon completion in 2020, it is expected to generate 182 MW of hydropower for Lesotho and transfer water at 70 m3/sec to Guateng Province, South Africa (Keketso, 2003). Several social and ecological implications have been observed since construction of the LHWP began. Villages along the river where the Katse Dam is constructed have experienced earth tremors, causing damage to traditional houses, etc. (Conely and Niekerk, 2000). The tremors have since forced water project authorities to repair housing infrastructure in the area and construct more resilient infrastructure. Villagers have also been forced to be moved to more secure locations (Braun, 2005; Hoover, undated; Keketso, 2003). Further, villagers in the area have not been connected to a water supply, requiring them to walk long distances to fetch water. Moreover, the water transfer has reduced access to fuel supply that is derived from trees and primarily used for cooking; this is because infrastructure is constructed on or water is now overflowed onto this land (Keketso, 2003). In fact, trees now tend to grow only in the riparian areas, and are scarcer in the mountainous regions (Hoover, undated). The LHWP also appropriated agricultural fields, river basins, and pastoral lands, which comprised most of the arable land in the country. The land was either flooded or had roads and buildings constructed on it (Braun, 2005). The remaining arable land is also subject to poor drainage systems along the roads constructed for the LHWP. The runoff from these culverts creates gullies that are continually widening, which, in some cases, has “forced farmers to plough against the contour of the hillside, accelerating erosion even further” (Hoover, undated, p.7). Materials left over from road construction has also destroyed other fields as the large rocks are either too big to move or there are too many to move making it impossible to plough around (Hoover, undated). Further, although commonly managed resources total the majority of resources lost (e.g. agricultural and non-cultivated lands and river basins), they have not been compensated in the same way “privately owned” fields have been; yet even “privately owned” lands have been poorly compensated as they are compensated based on the values outlined by development authorities and their policies (Braun, 2005). At the micro-scale, in mountain districts located near two major dams in the project area, low and high income households have already and are expected to experience an income loss (Matete and Hassan, 2006). Yields are also declining due to over-exploitation of the limited lands available (Hoover, undated). At the macro-scale, the manufacturing sectors and the economies of both Lesotho and South Africa are estimated to experience financial losses of R. 7.63 million and R. 8.66 million, respectively and R. 33.79 million and R. 26.66 million, respectively (Matete and Hassan, 2006). Economies of both countries are expected to suffer as a result of a loss of employment due to the impact of lost ecological value. Since improper ecosystems functions affect economic activity in both Lesotho and South Africa, the ecological impacts instream of the LHWP “are likely to affect, not only those households directly linked to such projects, but also the entire economies of and regions involved” (Matete and Hassan, 2006, p. 257). Lesotho and South Africa is projected to lose R. 1.88 million and R. 1.91 million, respectively. The unskilled labour force is projected to suffer the worst loss because this includes small scale enterprises in the agricultural and horticultural sector (Matete and Hassan, 2006). To date, Lesotho has received average annual revenues of US$ 18 million,

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rather than the estimated US$ 55 million expected when the project was initially negotiated due to reduced amounts of water available to transfer (Braun, 2005). Since the LWHP was constructed in 1970s, three initial assumptions about the benefits of the projects made by project authorities have been disproven based on an environmental flow assessment conducted by the IUCN in 2003 (Table 2.1). Table 2.1 Pre-project assumptions and post-project effects

Assumption

Actual effect

1. Removal of 95 per cent of the flow would have a relatively small impact on downstream rivers other than those close to the dams.

The EFA showed there would be a significant hydrological, biophysical and socio-economic impacts stretching to the Lesotho border.

2. People downstream of the proposed structures of the scheme have made limited use of the riparian and riverine resources.

A complex relationship exists between the population at risk and the river network.

3. Upstream communities who lost land through the inundation by reservoirs would bear the brunt of the major impacts of the dam.

The EFA demonstrates existing and potential future social and economic affects to downstream communities from the structures.

According to Hoover (undated) downstream impacts from the LHWP are already deemed as “severe” which include the increase in pests, such as black flies. The black fly is a cattle pest, as well as a poultry parasite, which affects the productivity of animal husbandry. Further, severe effects arise from water flows in the reaches below Katse Dam; the water in these reaches is considered too contaminated to drink, and local communities have voiced concern that the water causes skin rashes after they pass through or swim in the river. The low river flows have also resulted in higher algae levels in the river, which creates conditions for disease-carrying snails that causes liver fluke disease. This disease also affects livestock by decreasing their appetites and causing death. Further, since most local people refuse to eat the meat of animals that has been affected by this disease, the protein intake in the local diet is greatly reduced. Low river flows also reduce the abundance of certain local wild vegetables that depend on higher river flows and cause declines in fish stocks. Both vegetables and fish stocks are important nutrition and protein sources for the local diet (Hoover, undated). Aside from the possible adverse implications, some advantages of the LHWP have also already been observed. On a macro-economic scale, the Government of Lesotho has gained access to resources previously viewed to have no value or to be underutilized (Braun, 2005). On a micro-economic scale, some villagers have been able to organize into small agricultural groups and produce cash crops; as well as other income-generating activities. Villagers working in small agricultural groups and as agriculturists have received training in marketing and been able to work in local markets. The construction sector has also experienced benefits, and tourism activities have flourished. The constructed road network diversifies the variety of vegetables available in the market, creates employment in the construction sector and opens access to tourists (Keketso, 2003). Overall, streamflows

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downstream the LHWP dams provide substantial benefits of high importance to sustaining riparian livelihoods (Matete and Hassan, 2006). Further, since the construction of the LHWP, the regional political and economic relationship between Lesotho and South Africa has strengthened. The collaboration involves data sharing of streamflow and rainfall data and monitoring the health of basins and the environment (Conely and Niekerk, 2000). Lesotho and South Africa also jointly incurred the costs to research the project, thereby reducing costs and improving collaborative efforts. In fact, the countries formed the Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC), which is comprised of delegates from both countries and jointly exercises monitoring and advisory powers and activities. The collaboration has been strengthened through the institution of the 1986 LHWP Treaty. This treaty demonstrates the desire from both countries for the project to provide mutual net benefits, to enter into a long term collaborative relationship and to reduce conflicts (Towfique, 2002). Therefore, due to increase openness in collaboration and support from legislation, previous mistrust between the two countries has markedly decreased, thereby strengthening political, legal and institutional support and infrastructure. 2.2.3 Europe The Tagus-Segura Transfer is an inter-basin transfer in Spain that started in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It involved drawing water from the Tajo basin in the Iberian System in central Spain and transferring it to the Lorca valley in the Mediterranean Levant Zone in southeastern Spain (WWF, 2003). The Lorca valley is semiarid with poor arable land when unirrigated; yet, when irrigated, the soil becomes extremely fertile and thrives with subtropical crops. That is, prior to the transfer, the crops in the valley relied on local wells, small watercourses, and diversions from reservoirs in Valdeinfierno and Puenteshe because average annual rainfall and potential evapotranspiration were 300 mm and 700 mm, respectively. Following implementation of the scheme, the average use of irrigated surface and sub-surface water between 1980 and 2000 totaled 74 million m3 annually, of which 69 per cent is derived from groundwater wells and 13.5 per cent is from the Tajo transfers (Ballestero, 2004). Since its initial implementation, the water transfer has been attributed to have significantly increased the intensity of crops in the region. Thus, by the end of the 1990s the flows transferred from the Tajo basin provided relief to the area by mitigating surface water scarcity. These water transfers coupled with excessive groundwater abstraction from wells, enabled Lorca “… to maintain high but critical levels of irrigation” (Ballestero, 2004, p.80). However, the depletion of groundwater causes dramatic environmental damage because extreme extractions are increasing dramatically. Ecologists and farmers are highly concerned about the environmental implications of groundwater extractions, as well as drastic declines in groundwater levels and saline water intrusion. Even the parliament of Spain has declared a state of environmental destruction in the Lorca region (Ballestero, 2004). According to the WWF (2003), the Tagus-Segura water transfer is attributed to causing adverse affects on the environment and socio-economic conditions of the recipient and donor basins, as well as the benefiting region in four ways (Table 2.2).

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Table 2.2 Environmental deteriorations caused by the Tagus-Segura water transfer project

Type of deterioration

Description

1. Overexploitation in the donor basin

There is a diversion of 6.5 million m3 from the donor basin. Due to poor management upstream in the Aranjuez village and a lack of respect to abide by the legal minimum flow requirement (6 m3/sec), not enough water is left at the source.

2. Sharpened water crisis in the recipient regions

The water deficit in the recipient basin has grown from 500 million m3 in the 1970s to approximately 1,000 million m3 as a result of irrigation and tourism needs.

3. Environmental deterioration

Expansion of irrigation and water intensive urban tourism has resulted in the destruction of protected habitat areas and the sweetening and nitrate contamination in the salty wetlands; The transfer connects and mixes the Tagus river water with the other four basin waters in the region; it bring water to the Segura Basin, the Júcar Basin, the Southern Basin and the Guadiana Basin (Tablas de Damiel National Park), which blends the different biophysical characteristics of these rivers and allows alien species to transfer between them; and The over-abstraction of water that is transferred from the donor basin and, subsequently overexploited by both basins has resulted in to the deterioration of the river ecosystem and further contaminated water in Toledo because the clean water in Tagus has absorbed the pollution from rivers coming from Madrid.

4. Creation of black water markets

The final destination of water is left uncontrolled based on the design of the distribution and transfer network. The uncontrolled water results in water that simply “disappears” (possibly to illegal tourist activities, tourism resorts and golf courses); this totaled approximately 113 million m3 between 1999 and 2001.

5. Increased socioeconomic imbalances in the regions

The transfer has not benefited traditional farmers as it has diverted the most benefits to bigger agribusiness and construction enterprises; and Not only are high levels of illegal labour reported in southeastern Spain, but there is a high level of exploitation of immigrants and illegal immigrants.

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2.2.4 Central Asia Perhaps the worst example of large scale IBT project implementation occurred in Aral sea, which have culminated into the destruction of a very large aquatic ecosystem into a desert (Calder and Lee, 1995; World Bank, 1998; Stone, 1999; UNEP, 2006). The Aral Sea Project began in the 1920s, when Soviet planners decided that irrigating the vast plains of central Asia could provide enough arable land to grow all the cotton needed by the new super-state. To meet agricultural water needs, water from the nearby Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers (tributaries of the Aral Sea) were diverted. The policy worked and the project reaped dividends in its first thirty years of existence thereby meeting its main purpose – to benefit agriculture. As a result, the Soviet Union soon joined China and the United States as the world’s leading cotton exporters. Building on its success, the policy was expanded in the early 1960s. However, it was about this time when some of the ecological damage was first observed. Without water coming in from its feeder rivers, the Aral Sea soon began to shrink (Stone, 1999). Currently, the Aral Sea has lost over 80 per cent of its volume, exposing 3.6 million hectares of seabed. Evaporation and agricultural runoff have left much of the Aral saltier than the ocean; in turn fish catch had declined by over 75 per cent (Stone, 1999; World Bank, 1998). Soil erosion has intensified to reduce agricultural productivity. The irrigation process, that allowed farmers unlimited water for little to no charge, “… has raised the water table, blocking drainage and clogging the fields with as much as 700 tons of salt per hectare” (Stone, 1999). The rising water table has also tainted drinking water supplies. Approximately 15 per cent of surface water supplies in the Aral Sea Basin are polluted, severely affecting the human health and as well as ecological functions of many reservoirs (UNEP, 2006). Rampant anemia and high infant mortality rates are abound. The receding Aral Sea leaves behind chemical pesticides and natural salts which are blown into noxious dust storms, seriously affecting the health of the local people. Pollution puts further pressure on communities already stressed by water shortages and the loss of large areas of valuable ecosystems (UNEP, 2006). Epidemiologist believed that proliferation of such diseases might be due to increase of toxic dust storms that have increased from one every five years in the 1950s, to about five per year now. 2.2.5 East Asia The conceptual advancement of IBT in China took place as early as 1956 when the Yellow River Commission (YRC) proposed construction of Danjiangkou reservoir. This proposal had subsequently been culminated into plans of IBT regarding the east, middle and west routes. In 1973, the diversion structure of the Danjiangkou reservoir was completed under the aegis of the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR). The planning of the middle route had been propelled by the occurrence of the severe droughts from 1978 to 1980. In 1994, a feasibility study of the proposed large scale IBT along the middle route was completed; and by 1995, the EIA report was also prepared. China provided a stamp of approval for the project in 1996 to 1997. Meanwhile, the Chinese society started to accept structural changes and market based economic activities, which eventually gave impetus for the research community within China to seek evidence from past experiences and to challenge such development paradigms on technological, geo-environmental, and economic grounds. Yet, China had its first experience with the IBT of water in 1961, which allowed diversion of the Yangtze water to Huaihe River at a rate of 470 m3/sec over a length of about 400 km. Since 1964, the city of Hong Kong has had transferred water from the Dongjiang river

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basin, with an annual capacity of a mere 0.62 km3. Following the first few encouraging experiments of micro-scale IBT and observing them for about two decades, China embarked on a new era of micro-level IBT projects in the 1980s. These five new projects provide water in a rapidly changing urban mosaic. Early on, the new micro-scale IBT projects showed early symptoms of causing adverse environmental impacts. On a per capita basis, the water endowment of China is rather poor, accounting for only a quarter with respect to annual global average (World Bank, 2002). According to official statistics, the long term averaged total renewable water resource of China is estimated at 2,812 km3 per year (MWREP, 1987), which accounts for only 6.6 per cent of the mean value of renewable global water resources, estimated at 42,750 km3 per year (Shiklomanov, 2000). However, spatial distribution of available resources is acute, leading to inter-regional disparities within the country. According to Qian and Zhang (2001), the Northern Part of China (NPC) refers to an area including the Haihe, Huaihe, Huanghe (Yellow River) basins and the northern part of the inland river basin, which is a water scarce region of the country. The per capita annual renewable water resources in this area is only 700 m3, equating to just one third of that in the Changjiang (Yangtze River) basin, while the population and total area of cropland in the NPC account for 37 and 45 per cent of the national total, respectively. However, serious fluctuations in hydrological conditions, such as sustained drought, also prevail in the NPC, which eventually gave the economic impetus for China to contemplate a mega IBT project to divert water from water rich southern rivers to water scarce northern rivers. This has initiated the birth of the Mega-Project entitled the “Three Gorges Dam” project (Box 2.2), which has raised both hope and concerns not only in China, but also globally.

Box 2.2 China’s Three Gorges Dam The Three Gorges Dam (TGD) is being built on the China’s Yangtze River is the world’s largest hydro-electric project in the world with eventual capacity of 22,500 MW. The size of the TGD is five times that of the Hoover Dam of the USA. Scientists are favoring as well as opposing the TGD. Wu et al. (2003) argued that construction of the dam presents a unique grand-scale natural experiment that would create an opportunity for ecologists to address a range of critical questions concerning the theory and practice of biodiversity conservation. Xie and Shen (2004) opined that the TGD would also pose great challenges to the ecosystem of its reservoir area. The project would affect livelihoods of at least 20 million in the areas upstream of the dam and another 300 million living in the downstream. Resettlement of population displaced by the reservoir, especially farmers, could emerge as presents a formidable obstacle (Jackson and Sleigh, 2000). Within a few years of commissioning, erosion and reservoir siltation may impede navigation and in the longer term will reduce storage volume (Fearnside, 1988).

The Middle Route (MR) seems to be the centerpiece of environmental, as well as ecological concerns. As the plan goes, a substantial amount of water will be diverted from the Hanjiang River through the MR. A plethora of adverse effects might be expected from such an intervention, as mentioned by Wang and Ma (1999), which includes the following:

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Soil salinization as a result of the rise of groundwater table due to channel leakage; The settlement of ground surface in the coal mining area, as the project (middle route) is likely to pass major coal mining area; Liquefaction of sand and consequent environmental effects; Drainage through the left bank of the canal; Geological problem such as the slope instability of swelling clay and rock; and Frozen heave problems in the dykes due to cold weather in the north.

Wang and Ma (1999) argued that, salinization and swampiness problems would develop in a large area along the MR due to the fact that groundwater tables would rise consequently upon its over-recharge by channel seepage. It is apprehended that, due to the risks associated with earth-filling and potential leakage through weak points, some sections might develop swamped land in their neighborhood or wetting belts along the lower areas located alongside the channel (Wang and Ma, 1999). In addition to these adverse environmental impacts, other issues have also been flagged by various authors. For example, the Environmental Impacts Study of the MR project suggested that, the large scale IBT from the Hanjiang River would cause a reduction of the runoff in the downstream section of the River, which in turn would worsen the prevailing eutrophication problem in the downstream reaches (Yin et al., 2001). It is apprehended that stream eutrophication might result in excessive algal mats and oxygen depletion, especially at times of decreased flow regimes (i.e., below 500 m3/sec), sluggish flow velocity (below 0.8 m/sec) and higher temperature (10.5~12.8°C). Yang et al. (2001) reported that the long term progradation rates of the tidal flats at the Yangtze River mouth would be greatly slowed down with sharp decline in riverine sediment caused by the implementation of the Three Gorges project and the South-to-North water transfer coinciding with the rapid relative sea-level rise. Wu and Wang (2002) found that the time and distance of salt-water encroachment up the Yangtze River mouth during the months of October through to December would be slightly higher as a consequence of the operation of the two projects. Not only would the MR project have environmental implications, the East Route (ER) Plan of the South-to-North IBT might also result in serious adverse impacts. The issues of aggravated water pollution, environmental implications of navigation channels and detention lakes, secondary salinization, etc. have all been discussed (Shao et al., 2003). Considering the trends of acute schistosomiasis infection observed by Li et al. (2000) and expansion of snail habitat (as observed by Huang et al., 2000), it is anticipated that the IBT through the ER might result in aggravation of health disorders, especially in the receiving basin.

2.2.6 Latin America The São Francisco River Basin Project is under investigation in the São Francisco River Basin and its coastal zone in Brasilia, Brasil. The project objective is to make water available for the neediest region of the country through the interlinking of basins. The project starts from the São Francisco River and creates a network of canals that distributes water for multiple uses. The aim is to contribute to the sustainable development of the semiarid region (Domingues et al., 2003) by meeting rural water needs for human and agricultural consumption, to promote urban and industrial development by sustaining adequate water supplies and developing irrigated agriculture by producing high value

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crops. As of 1998, the project was designed to transfer water at 64 m3/sec, including 48 m3/sec from the north and 16 m3/sec from the east axes. The conveyance systems extend 722 km, the canals extend 591 km and the pipelines extend 20 km. The twelve tunnels constructed for the system total 22 km and there are 26 expected reservoirs to be integrated into the system (Kemper et al., 2002). The main purpose to transfer the water is for the provision of water for drinking and irrigation. The project aims to improve water management practices in the region by innovatively pricing the usage of water more accurately and accountably. Water allocation will depend upon the willingness to pay for the transfer of water by the states and by private investors for agricultural production. The full cost recovery principle will be utilized and water will only be transferred if the total share of the cost is paid. For drinking water regulation a tariff informed by the rate of water usage will be developed; while for irrigation, the volume of water delivered will depend on how demand management practices and water-saving technologies are implemented by the farmers. The rationale to utilize this principle is to discourage the waste of water (Tortajada, 2006). The main challenges and concerns for the system thus far include the conflicts that may arise from the ten Brazilian states that are affected by the project, the consequences of poorly defined water right and, the need to establish methods for political negotiation. These concerns have arisen as a result of reports that discussions with government and society have already been highly polarized. The economic and financial feasibility, as well as the trade-offs of the project need to be better analyzed because the current proposal focuses on increasing supply, while development of plans for demand management has been poor. Other problems that may compound future possible social and biophysical problems in the future are poorly drawn operation and maintenance plans, little support from environmental organizations and NGOs for completed EIAs and so far, little participation from local affected communities that outline appropriate project and community needs (Kemper et al., 2002). Another interlinking water scheme that originates in Brazil is a project comprised of two hydroelectric dams including in the Madeira River, a tributary feeding through the Amazon; as well as, two dams enabling transport passage to upstream. This infrastructure is to be constructed throughout Brazil, Bolivia and Peru hub and is known as the Initiative for the Integration of South American Infrastructure (IIRSA). A main component of IIRSA is to interconnect South America’s major river systems and creates a large inland canal that links the Caribbean to the South Atlantic, through the Orinoco, Amazonas, Madeira, Paraguay, and Paraná Rivers. Yet, similarly to the São Francisco River Basin Project to transfer water, the interlinking water scheme through the Amazon is still undergoing environmental and social impact analysis so as to understand the depth of its benefits and consequences (IRN, undated).

2.2.7 South Asia Some inter-basin water transfer projects have been implemented in India in the 19th and 20th century with a general aim to facilitate drought proofing, provide drinking water, improve the biophysical environment, promote afforestation, encourage employment, progress rehabilitation and development, project animal wealth and increase agricultural production. Salient features of these projects are shown in Table 2.3. Among these projects, Indira Gandhi Nahar (great canal) Pariyojana (IGNP) is both the largest IBT implemented in Rajasthan State and actually one of the largest IBT projects in the world.

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Table 2.3 Inter-basin water transfer projects in India

Project

Features

1. Periyar

Commissioned in 1895; Transfers water from Periya basin to Vaigai basin, South India; and Comprised of a 1,740 m long tunnel with a discharging capacity of 40.75 m3/sec.

2. Parambikulam Aliyar

Built during 1951–1961; Transfers water from Chelakudi basin to Bharatapuzha and Cauvery basins; and Delivers water to drought prone areas in Coimbatore district of Tamil Nadu and the Chittur area of Kerala states.

3. Kurnool Cudappah Canal

A private company started this scheme in 1863; and Transfers 85 m3/sec water from Krishna basin to Pennar basin though a 8.23 m high anicut and a 304 km long canal.

4. Telugu Ganga

Delivers water to the city of Chennai (formerly Madras); and A inter-state cooperative project involving Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

5. Ravi-Beas-Sutlej Indira Gandhi Nahar Pariyojana (IGNP)

At 649 km long, IGNP is one of the world’s biggest canal projects; Begins at the Sutlej River at Harike Barrage and runs 204 km as a feeder canal before it enters Rajasthan. Within Rajasthan, the canal is 445 km long; and IGNP covers seven districts of Rajasthan: Barmer, Bikaner, Churu, Hanumangarh, Jaisalmer, Jodhpur, and Sriganganagar.

The state of Rajasthan is divided into two geographical regions: the Aravali Range hill system of northern India which traverses the state from northwest to southeast for 560 kilometers, acting as a sharp divide; the region west of Aravali is the extension of the Thar Desert where the IGNP is implemented. This mostly arid and partly semiarid region of the state (100 to 1020 mm annual rainfall) is sparsely populated (165 per sq. km); but the density of livestock is very high (159 per sq. km), comprising 21 per cent of India’s total livestock population. The crop yields are low and show sharp year-to-year variation. From the southeast to the northwest in this region, the agro-climatic conditions become progressively harsher. The IGNP was conceived to: halt the process of desertification; develop agriculture in the command area; create human settlements in the sparsely

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populated area; and provide drinking and industrial-use water to the inhabitants of the project area and adjoining regions. The IGNP is claimed to have generated tremendous socio-economic benefits and miraculously changed the living standard and socio-economic conditions of the people in the area. IGNP has eliminated drought conditions, provided power benefits, transformed desert waste land into an agriculturally productive area by bringing irrigation and vegetation to about two million hectare area, crop production has increased manifolds and livestock survival has improved (NWDA, 2007). Since the introduction of canal irrigation in 1958 been brought under irrigated farming with 179 per cent irrigation intensity. The rainfed pearl millet, guar based cropping system has switched over to highly profitable cotton wheat system (Ram and Chauhan, 2002). This has contributed to increased agricultural production and benefit is estimated at R. 17,500 million (US$ 388 million) annually (NWDA, 2007). The NWDA has not listed any adverse implications of the project. Yet, IGNP has created a host of environmental problems including waterlogging, rising groundwater table, changed water retention properties of the soil, emergence of malaria and changes in biodiversity (Dwivedi and Sreenivas, 2002; Ram and Chauhan, 2002; Tyagi, 2004; UNESCO, 2006; CGWB, 2007). The Central Groundwater Board (CGWB) of India has estimated waterlogged area at 51,300 hectares or 3 per cent of the command area of the project but has been projected that 24 per cent of the project area is likely to be waterlogged if the rise of water level is allowed at the present rate of one meter per year. In the severely waterlogged areas (for example, Hanumangarh circle) no crops could be grown. In some waterlogged areas only one crop paddy could be grown (CGWB, 2007). By analyzing satellite remote sensing imageries, Dwivedi and Sreenivas (2002) found that the paleo-channel (old river course) which supported very good crops in 1975 gradually became waterlogged in the next two decades and thereby resulted in the extinction of croplands. As a result, a number of village settlements are deserted and people have to move to nearby safer sites. In addition, the roads and canals are also abandoned. Levelling of sand dunes and total clearance of shrubs and grasses from agricultural lands has enhanced wind erosion/deposition hazard (Ram and Chauhan, 2002). Tyagi (2004) has reported the emergence of malaria with repeated epidemics in the Thar Desert area. He concluded that nearly all malaria epidemics in the Thar Desert have come about with the progression of canal-irrigation work, particularly the massive IGNP. Halfway through the project development, the number of locally transmitted malaria cases has risen from a few thousand to 300,000 a year. The associated mosquito species succession from Anopheles stephensi to A. culicifacies has resulted in intensified transmission of infection, which has shifted from seasonal to perennial. Between 1980 and 1995, the proportion of Rajasthani malaria cases registered in the desert districts grew from 14.1 per cent to 53.3 per cent, and the share of Plasmodium falciparum cases (the most virulent malaria parasite species) rose from 11.6 per cent to 62.5 per cent. Several factors such as the change in crop pattern, retention of high surface moisture, and excessive canalisation rife with mismanagement of irrigation water have attracted several anophelines, including Anopheles culicifacies, which were earlier unknown in the desert (Tyagi, 2004). Due to changed environment, important natural plant species have also vanished (Ram and Chauhan, 2002; Prakash, 2001). Availability of water through the canal facilitated introduction of invasive plant, insects and animal species and substantially changed the desert landscape. Water hyacinth (E. crassipes) which never occurred in the region has intensively encroached surface of the canal. Waterlogged areas are full of tall grasses such

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as Aurndo, Typha, Phragmitis and others. High nutrient and availability of moisture facilitated introduction of a large number of weeds (Saxena, 1991). It is estimated that about 40 weed species have invaded the desert through various means of transportation such as soil and water, crop seed impurities, migration of birds and animals. Consolidation of soil has posed imminent danger to the reptiles which inhabit extremely loose soil (Prakash, 2001). 2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS Overall, ecological losses as a result of inter-basin water transfer projects can have significant negative impacts on the riparians and to some extent, the general macro and micro economies of the countries involved. It is important to quantify the instream impacts of IBT, which should be included in IBT environmental impact assessments prior to project implementation so as to account for potential losses and adverse implications accurately. From this understanding there is a need to determine mitigation measures and manners in which to compensate for potential losses so as to ensure that a reliable instream flow benefits riparians. Mitigation and compensation measures for adverse affects which arise from IBT may deter unintended negative ecological impacts to occur and ensure long term sustainability of such projects (Matete and Hassan, 2006). The involvement of multiple stakeholders within the communities that currently have IBT projects, as well as those which have projects proposed must continuously be consulted. The rationale for continuously re-evaluating the projects is because stakeholders can take into account changing environments and conditions into IBT decision making that will prove optimal for all stakeholders and the projects themselves.

REFERENCES Ballestero, E.: Inter-Basin Water Transfer Public Agreements: A Decision Approach to Quantity and Price. Water Resources Management 18(2004), pp. 75–88. Boniface, A.: Some Technical Lessons Learnt from Construction of Lesotho Highlands Water Project Transfer Tunnel. Tunneling and Underground Space Technology 14(1) (1999), pp. 29–35. Braun, Y.A.: Feminist Political Ecology in Practice: The Social Impacts of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 2005, pp. 1–229. Central Groundwater Board (CGWB): Indira Gandhi Nahar Paryonjna – Stage-I. Rajasthan (http://cgwb.gov.in/GroundWater/conjunctive_use.htm), 2007. Cyrus, D.P., Wepener, V., MacKay, C.F., Vos, P.M., Viljoen, A. and Weerts, S.P.: Effects of Inter-Basin Water Transfer on the Hydrochemistry, Benthic Invertebrates and Ichthyofauna of the Mhlathuze Estuary and Lake Nseze. Water Reaserch Commission Report K2/720, WRC, Pretoria, South Africa, 2000. Davies, B.R. and Snaddon, K.: Ecological Effects of Inter-Basin Water Transfer Schemes in Dryland Environments. Water Research Commission Report K5/665, WRC, Pretoria, South Africa, 2000. DeVinney, C. and Johnson, N.: Inter-Basin Water Transfer in Georgia (www.georgiaplanning.com/ watertoolkit/Documents/), undated. Domingues, A.F., dos Anjos, N.F.R., de Souza, J.L., Rodriguez, F.A., Holtz, G.P. de Farias, W.S., de Araujo, A.H. and Valerio, M.A.: Integrated Management of Land Based Activities in the Saõ Francisco River Basin Project. Diagnostic Analysis of the Saõ Francisco River Basin and Its Coastal Zone. Final Report, Preliminary Version of the Executive Summary, ANA, GEF, UNEP, OAS, 2003, pp. 1–66.

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Dwivedi, R.S. and Sreenivas, K.: The Vegetation and Waterlogging Dynamics as Derived from Spaceborne Multispectral and Multi-Temporal Data. International Journal of Remote Sensing 23(14) (2002), pp. 2729–2740. Fearnside, P.M.: China’s Three Gorges Dam: “Fatal” Project or Step Toward Modernization? World Development 16(5) (1988), pp. 615–630. Garay, F.J. and M.A. Sugheiar: Libya’s Great Man-Made River. OPEC Bulletin 28(6) (1997), pp. 20–27. Hoover, R.: Pipe Dreams: The World Bank’s Failed Efforts to Restore Lives and Livelihoods of Dam-Affected People in Lesotho. International Rivers Network, 2001, pp. 1–62. Huang, Y., Cai, G. and Wu, F.: Survey on Present Situation of Marshland and Snail Habitat Areas and Study on Control Strategy of Marshland Oncomelania Hupensis in 5 Cities Along the Yangtze River in Jiangsu Province. Chinese Journal of Schistosomiasis Control 12(2) (2000), pp. 86–90. IRN, N.D.: The Amazon Under Threat: Damming the Madeira. International Rivers Network, Berkley, undated. Jackson, S. and Sleigh, A.: Resettlement for China’s Three Gorges Dam: Socio-Economic Impact and Institutional Tensions. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33(2) (2000), pp. 223–241. IUCN: The Lesotho Highlands Water Project: Environmental Flow Allocations in an International River. IUCN Water and Nature Initiatives, 2003, pp. 1–8. Keketso, L.: The Mixed Blessings of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Mountain Research and Development 23(1) (2003), pp. 7–10. Kemper, K., Azevedo, G. and Baltar, A.: Saõ Francisco River Inter-Basin Transfer Project Brazil. Water Forum, The World Bank’s Presentation, Washington, D.C., May 2002. Li, T., Yu, B. and Dai, Y.: Impact and Countermeasures on Acute Schistosomiasis Transmission by Yangtze River Flood. Chinese Journal of Schistosomiasis Control 12(5) (2000), pp. 268–272. London, J.B. and H.W. Miley: The Inter-Basin Transfer of Water: An Issue of Efficiency and Equity. Water International 15(12) (1990), pp. 231–235. Matete, M. and Hassan, R.: Integrated Ecological Economics Approach to Evaluation of Inter-Basin Water Transfers: An Application to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Ecological Economics 60(2006), pp. 246–259. Muller, M.: Inter-Basin Water Sharing to Achieve Water Security – A South African Perspective. Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, South Africa, undated. Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power (MWREP): Appraisal of China’s Water Resources. Water Resources and Hydro Power Press of China, MWREP, Beijing, China (original in Chinese, referred by Shao et al., 2003), 1987. National Water Development Agency (NWDA): Existing Experience. (http://www.nwda.gov.in/ index2.asp?sublinkid⫽45&langid⫽1), 2007. Nickum, J.E.: Issue Paper on Water and Irrigation. Paper prepared for the Project “Strategy and Action for Chinese and Global Food Security,” Millennium Institute, USDA, World Bank, World Watch Institute, Washington, D.C., September 1997. Postel, S.: Last Oasis: Facing Water Scarcity. The Worldwatch Environmental Alert Series, New York, W.W. Norten, 1992. Prakash, I.: Biological Invasion and Loss of Endemic Biodiversity in the Thar Desert. Resonance, 2001, pp. 76–85. Qian, Z. and G. Zhang (ed.): Strategies of Sustainable Development of Water Resources in China. General Report, Chinese Academy of Engineering, Water Resources and Hydropower Press of China, Beijing, China (original in Chinese, referred by Shao et al., 2003), 2001. Ram, B. and Chauhan, J.S.: Impact Assessment of IGNP Canal on Land Use in Hanumangarh District. Rajasthan Using Remotely Sensed Data, Indian Cartographer, 2002, pp. 200–205. Rosegrant and Ringler: Impact on Food Security and Rural Development of Reallocating Water from Agriculture for Other Uses. Background paper for the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, International Food Policy Research Institute and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), 1999. Saxena, S.K.: Impact of Canal Irrigation on the Ecology of Arid Tract of Rajasthan. In: Prospects of Indira Gandhi Canal Project (I.P. Abrol and J. Venkateswarlu Eds.), ICAR, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 65–73.

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Shao, X., Wang, H. and Wang, Z.: Inter-Basin Transfer Projects and Their Implications: A China Case Study. I.J. River Basin Management 1(1) (2003), pp. 5–14. Shiklomanov, I.A.: Appraisal and Assessment of World Water Resources. Water International 25(1) (2000), pp. 11–32. Stone, R.: Coming to Grips with the Aral Sea’s Grim Legacy. Science, New Series 284(5411), April 2, 1999. Tortajada, C.: Saõ Francisco Water Transfer. Human Development Report, Human Development Report Office, Occassional Paper, UNDP, 2006. Towfique, B.: International Bilateral Water Treaties: An Economic and Institutional Analysis. Dissertation, Clemson University, 2002, pp. 1–122. Tyagi, B.K.: A Review of the Emergence of Plasmodium Falciparum – Dominated Malaria in Irrigated Areas of the Thar Desert, India. Acta Tropica 89(2) (2004), pp. 227–239. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP): Global International Waters Assessment: Challenges to International Waters – Regional Assessments in a Global Perspective. UNEP, Nairobi, 2006. United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO): Water: A Shared Responsibility – 2nd UN World Water Development Report. UNESCO, Paris, 2006. US Office of Technology Assessment: Preparing for an Uncertain Climate. Government Printing Office, OTA-O-567, Washington, D.C., (http://enso.unl.edu/ndmc/mitigate/policy/ota), 1993. Wang, L. and Ma, C.: A Study on the Environmental Geology of the Middle Route Project of the South-to-North Water Transfer. Engineering Geology 51(3) (1999), pp. 153–165. Wishart, M.J. and Davies, B.R.: Collaboration, Conservation and the Changing Face of Limnology. Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 12(5) (2002), pp. 567–575. Wishart, M.J. and Davies, B.R.: Beyond Catchment Considerations in the Conservation of Lotic Biodiversity. Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems, 2003. Wishart, M.J. and Davies, B.R.: Considerations of Scale for Conserving River Basin Integrity in Relation to Inter-Basin Water Transfers. Verh. Int. Verein. Limnol. 28, 2002, pp. 471–474. World Bank: World Development Indicators 2002 (www.worldbank.org), 2007 (data for per capita freshwater resources is the same as in the year 2000). WWF: Water Transfers are Increasing the Water Crisis: The Case of the Tagus-Segura Transfer in Spain. Executive Summary of WWF Report “Tagus Segura – Lessons from the Past,” Brussels, May 6, 2003. Wu, J.Y. and Wang, P.: A Comprehensive Analysis on Ecological and Environmental Impacts on the Yangtze River Estuary from South-to-North Water Transfer Project. Science and Technology Review 2 (Keji Daobao), 2002, pp. 13–16 (original in Chinese, referred by Shao et al., 2003). Wu, J., Huang, J., Han, X., Xie, Z. and Gao, X.: Three-Gorges Dam – Experiment in Habitat Fragmentation? Science 300(5623) (2003), pp. 1239–1240. Xie, Z. and Shen, G.: Three Gorges Project: Chance and Challenge. Science 304(5671) (2004), 681 p. Yang, Shi-Lun, Ding, Ping-Xing, Chen Shen-Liang: Changes in Progradation Rate of the Tidal Flats at the Mouth of the Yangtze River, China. Geomorphology 38(1–2) (2001), pp. 167–180. Yin, K., Yuan, H., Liao, Q. and Ruan, Y.: Impact of Middle Route South-to-North Water Transfer Project on Algae Bloom in Middle and Lower Reach of Hanjiang River. Yangtze River (Renmin Changjiang) 32(7) (2001), pp. 31–50 (original in Chinese, referred by Shao et al., 2003).

3 The Vital Links SURESH PRABHU

Gange cha! Yamune chiava! Godavari! Sarasvati! Narmade! Sindhu! Kaveri! Jale asmin sannidhim kuru! In this water, I invoke the presence of holy waters from the rivers Ganga, Yamuna, Godavari, Sarasvati, Narmada, Sindhu and Cauvery! —Traditional Sanskrit Hymn

3.1 INTRODUCTION India has always attributed divinity to her rivers. The sacred rivers like the Sarasvati, the Ganga, the Cauvery, and the Narmada have knit national mythology and traditions for centuries. The ancient Rig Veda1 mentions the mighty river Sarasvati, where in the story of Indra’s slaying of the water-demon Vrtra, the river was dammed and subsequently released. Even today pilgrims undertake the arduous trek to Gaumukh, the origin of the Ganga/Bhagirathi, even though the glacier that gives rise to the river has receded eighteen kilometers away from the Ganga temple that was built a millennia ago at the then source, Gangotri in the Himalayas. Livelihoods, economy, religion and culture of Indians are intertwined with the rivers from the time immemorial. India is home to over one billion people already and is likely to earn the dubious distinction of becoming the most populous country in the world by the year 2050, according to some estimates (UN, 2006). There are various proponents of the population growth theory. Some say people are a resource and the greater the number of people, the greater the wealth, because the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increases. But such proponents seldom consider the consequence that a population explosion will have on supply of natural resources of a country. More people mean a larger demand on land, both for housing and attendant facilities such as schools, health centers, etc. But even more 1

The RigVeda is a collection of over 1,000 hymns, which contain the mythology of the Hindu gods. It is considered to be one of the foundations of the Hindu religion and was composed roughly between 1,700 to 1,100 BCE (the early Vedic period) in the Punjab (Sapta Sindhu) region of the Indian subcontinent.

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THE VITAL LINKS

importantly, the increase will likely cause a decrease in the per capita availability of water, as the pressure on land means the possibility of encroachment of water-bodies. The increased population also demands more agricultural production to feed more mouths than before, which in turn calls for more water usage for agriculture. More people demand more jobs calling for increased economic activity which again translates into more demand for water. The Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) is proposed as one of the methods to meet increasing demand by making water available to the needy population. The idea of ILR is not new and could be as old as the idea of Indian nationhood itself. Though it was called by different names, ILR was proposed by many people at different times and its present consideration has made it a burning national and regional eco-environmental debate. Many politicians, economists and literary figures referred to this idea before, as well as, after India’s independence in 1947. However, the idea of ILR was first put forth logically and in some detail by Dr K.L. Rao, an eminent engineer and Minister of Water and Energy who served in both Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s Cabinets. Dr Rao’s plan was essentially to transfer water from the perennial northern rivers to the seasonal and dry southern ones. Thus, it was popularly known as the Ganga (northern Himalayan flowing River)–Cauvery (southern Indian River in the Deccan plateau) Plan. Yet, the Ganga–Cauvery Plan envisaged to transfer of water from one basin to another in a way that guzzled energy and would have probably consumed more electricity than it would have generated. The purpose of this chapter is to present the chronology of work conducted on the feasibility of interlinking rivers in India as proposed by the National Water Development Agency (NWDA).2 This agency prepared pre-feasibility studies on various water linkages proposed in the National Perspective Plan (NPP) in 1982 during the last term in office of Mrs. Gandhi. Under the NWDA, a Task Force of professionals was assembled that aimed to define holistic approaches for ILR and complete a comprehensive study that presented the overall impact of ILR projects. I was appointed Chairman of this Task Force in 2002 by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government and this chapter details the accounts of the work of the Task Force, particularly my personal experiences within it.

3.2 INDIA: LOOKING AT 2050 India’s demand for water is bound to increase to formidable proportions by 2050 when the population of India is expected to stabilize at around 1,640 million. As a result, gross per capita water availability will decline from ~1,820 m3/yr in 2001 to as low as ~1,140 m3/yr in 2050. Total water requirement of the country for various activities by 2050 has been estimated to be 1,450 km3/yr. This is significantly higher than the current estimate of utilizable water resource potential (1,122 km3/yr) that could be developed through conventional strategies. Therefore, the present availability of water, ~500 km3/yr, needs to be almost tripled to meet estimates for 2050 (Gupta and Deshpande, 2004). India’s neighbor China is learning at great cost that despite phenomenal and unprecedented economic success, the water crisis is likely to stall many of its ambitious schemes. In China, the criticality ratio, an indicator of scarcity (the ratio of water withdrawal to total renewable water), increases from 0.26 in 1995 to 0.33 in 2025 (IFPRI, 2002). Ignoring this scarcity is at India’s own peril and, therefore, the country must plan strategies that account water as 2

The National Water Development Agency (NWDA) was set up in 1982 as a Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 to carry out the detailed studies and detailed surveys and investigations and to prepare feasibility reports of the links under the National Perspective Plan.

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precious resource. Overall, India’s economic as well as human development index (HDI)3 all depend upon the country’s ability to address this most burning problem, water. The Indian water problem seemed to be an impossible conundrum. Due to the spatial and temporal distribution of monsoon precipitation, the eastern, northeastern and some northern parts of India faces devastating floods during the monsoon; while other parts of the country reels under droughts. The land-locked north and particularly the northeast (after the partition of India in 1947), require waterways (which are both environment friendly and cost effective) to supplement road and rail transport. The country’s energy demand has been spiraling. By 2020, India’s demand for commercial energy is expected to increase by more than 2.5 times as a result of population and high economic growth, urbanization, industrial production and transport demand (IEA, 2000). India also requires eco-friendly, green energy that is generated from locally available resources (hydro, wind and solar sources) unlike imported gas or oil. India also desperately needs expansion of irrigation to rainfed agricultural lands (currently 68 per cent of the total net sown area) to reduce dependence on the vagaries of the monsoon. The country has a per capita storage of meager 200 m3/person water, unlike the US who possesses 5,000 m3/person or China who provides 2,000 m3/person. To monsoon-proof India’s water requirement, the need for more storage has to be urgently addressed. Moreover, water is a very contentious political issue throughout India. It has explosive political ramifications which often snowball into violence and riots. The Cauvery water dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is one such example. In this instance, logical and reasonable management of water as a common resource became impossible due to regionalism, sentimentality and emotions taking over the issue on hand. But, questions over the equitable sharing of water commonly arise in India, making water issues very controversial. Thus, the decision to decide on a technically feasible and politically benign ILR project could prove difficult.

3.3 PREVIOUS INTERLINKING PROPOSALS The main component of Dr Rao’s Proposal (1972) was a 2,640 kilometers (km) long link canal to connect the Ganga and the Cauvery rivers and also involved large scale pumping over a head of 550 m. The power requirement for lifting the water was huge, estimated to be 5,000 to 7,000 MW, while the additional irrigated area was a mere 4 million hectares (Mha). The scheme also did not have any flood control benefit. Dr Rao had estimated this proposal to cost about R. 12,5000 million (R. 1,500,000 million at 2002 prices). The Central Water Commission (CWC), which examined the proposal, found it to be grossly underestimated and economically prohibitive (Rao, 1975; Iyer, 2002). A few years later, Captain Dastur, an Airline Pilot proposed an alternative way to accomplish the same objective through another scheme, which was later known as the Garland Scheme (the sketch, when superimposed on India’s map, looked to the poetic eye like a garland around India’s neck). There were many skeptics about this scheme, but few were ready to examine this idea. Captain Dastur’s Proposal (1977) envisaged the construction of two canals – the first was a 4,200 km long Himalayan Canal at the foot of Himalayan slopes running from the Ravi in the west to the Brahmaputra and beyond in the east; and the second was a 9,300 km Garland Canal covering the central and southern parts 3

The HDI is a summary measure of human development. It measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: along and healthy life, knowledge (adult literacy) and a decent standard of living.

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THE VITAL LINKS

of India, with both the canals integrated with numerous lakes and interconnected with pipelines at two points, Delhi and Patna. The cost was estimated by Captain Dastur to be R. 240,950 million. Two committees comprised of experts was assembled, including senior engineers from the Central Water Commission (CWC), officials from state governments, professors from the IIT (Indian Institute of Technology), Delhi and Roorkee University (presently IIT, Roorkee) and scientists from the Geological Survey of India and Indian Meteorological Department. These experts examined the proposal and found it to be technically infeasible (NWDA, 2007). Therefore the idea was abandoned. 3.4 THE NEW INITIATIVE The major role of the NWDA was to prepare pre-feasibility studies on various water linkages proposed in the NPP. As per the provisions (in articles 246 and 262) of the Constitution of India, water remains a subject administered by the various states and only if the rivers are interstate is the central government able to play a role. The Central Government eventually asked the NWDA to involve all the states concerned and work out a mutually acceptable ILR scheme. The NWDA worked for almost 20 years to prepare the pre-feasibility reports. After, a writ Petition No. 724/1994 entitled “and Quiet Flows the Maily Yamuna”, was filed in the Supreme Court in September 2002 by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Senior Advocate (Amicus Curiae) quoting the speech of Honorable President of India (dated 14th August 2002). The petition referenced the need for networking the Indian rivers and asked for appropriate directions from the Court. On October 31, 2002, Supreme Court directed to treat this issue as an independent Public Interest Litigation (PIL) Writ Petition (Civil) No. 512 of 2002 with cause title: “Networking of Rivers” and directed the central government and individual states to respond (NWDA, 2007). The NDA Government responded by appointing a Task Force to examine the issue of ILR in depth. Since the NWDA had already examined the technical aspects of the concept; the objective of the Task Force was to pursue a holistic approach and complete a comprehensive study that presented the overall impact of ILR components. With this objective, some dynamic people of eminence were co-opted as the members of the Task Force. I was appointed Chairman of this Task Force by the NDA government. With the consent of the then Prime Minister of India, I co-opted, along with various other professional members that crossed all political lines. These professionals had expertise in ecology, environment, technology, administration, banking, finance, water issues, law, journalism and public policy. A group of professional resource persons were also involved so as to guide the Task Force on several key political and environmental issues. This group of professionals included former Ambassadors, NGOs, environmentalists, scientists, technologists, sociologists, social activists, foresters, wild life experts, etc. The Task Force expected to compose a detailed analysis of the work to be carried out by the NWDA. They were also very keen to encourage and consider constructive criticism and understood that decisions should be based on transparent scientific studies. As mentioned earlier, we were dealing with the often revised concept of ILR, which had been debated in India for decades. The final decision to implement the ILR was largely based on a cost-benefit analysis. The calculated cost could not be just financial, but would also include ecological and social costs of the project. The benefits had already been projected by the NWDA and the Task Force wanted to quantify and evaluate these in a comprehensive manner. Thus, even if the study was to be rejected, a rejection by the central government needed to be based on a reflection of a detailed analysis. I traveled

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through the length and breadth of India to assess the views of common people so that the whole process and product did not become exclusively an academic exercise.

3.5 PROJECTED BENEFITS ASSESSED BY THE NWDA To understand the projected benefits assessed by the NWDA, a review of the hydrometeorological characteristics of India and its affects on human and natural systems is required. The summer monsoon accounts for more than 75 to 80 per cent of the annual precipitation that India receives (Nandargi et al., 2007). Precipitation in the country is not uniformly distributed and there are large inter-seasonal, seasonal and yearly variations of precipitation in both space and time. Large parts of Haryana, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu not only have deficits in rainfall but these States are also subject to large variations in rainfall, which results in floods and frequent droughts. Excess rainfall during the monsoon season in some parts of the country often causes floods and natural disasters. Nandargi (2007) identified the northeast and northern areas as regions in India which experience floods on widespread scale. The northeast region comprises the Brahmaputra basin and its tributaries and the north Indian region comprises the Ganga basin and its tributaries. These two rivers together generate about 60 per cent of total river flows of India. Flood damages, which were R. 645 million in the decade of (1953 to 1963), have increase to R. 28,810 million between 1990 and 2000. These floods substantially affected infrastructure and livelihoods in the States of Assam, Bihar, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh and caused unquantifiable human sufferings (Mohapatra and Singh, 2003). On average, floods have affected the social and economic stability of about 33 million people between 1953 to 2000 (Mohapatra and Singh, 2003). As much as 85 per cent of drought prone areas in India fall in these States. The water availability even for drinking purposes becomes critical, particularly in the summer months as rivers dry up and groundwater levels recede. Regional variations in rainfall lead to situations when some parts of the country do not have enough water even for raising a single crop. Droughts cause immense hardship to the population and enormous economic loss. For example, in 2002, a drought in Rajasthan caused about one billion dollars in economic loss (Table 3.1) (Rathore, 2005). Irrigation using river water and groundwater has been the prime source of water to raise food grain production in India. The production of food grains increased from 89.36 million tons in 1964 to 1965 to approximately 211.32 million tons in 2001 to 2002. This has lead India to be self sufficient in food production (GoI, 2002); and expansion of irrigation has played a major role in increased stability in food production. The area under irrigation has increased from 22 to 95 Mha during this period. Since the population of India is expected to increase to 1,400 to 1,900 million in the year 2050 (Figure 3.1) (UN, 2006), about 450 million tons of food grains will be required to feed the country (Kumar, 1998). To meet this requirement, it would be necessary to increase irrigation potential to 160 Mha for all crops by 2050. The maximum irrigation potential of India if water is accessed through conventional sources, has been assessed to be about 140 Mha (Dehadrai, 2003). To attain a maximum potential of 160 Mha, other strategies need to be devised.

7.436 5.391 − 45%

Crop damage area (million ha)

Value (million US$)

Rainfall deficiency

3.876

–

3.386

–

–

6.496

29.578

21.507

4.075

–

–

−16%

740.6

7.818

34.56

26.179

23,406

1999

Source: Government of Rajasthan, relief department, Jaipur. Adapted from; Rathore, 2005.

Loss in agriculture employment (estimated) (million man-days)

Loss of land revenue (million US$)

Drinking water supply cost (million US$)

Deficiency (million Kwh)

–

− 3%

37.23

Cattle affected (million)

Hydropower generation

496.4

31.737

Population affected (million)

20,069

36, 252

Village affected

1998

1988

Item

Table 3.1 Impact of drought in Rajasthan

4.663

–

–

−29%

763.4

8.947

39.969

33.041

30,583

2000

1.383

–

–

− 5%

272.2

2.653

6.973

6.97

7,964

2001

6.098

93.4

110.4

1,280.5

− 64%

959.5

11.70

45.20

44.80

40,490

2002

40 THE VITAL LINKS

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2.5 Low Variant Population (billion)

2

Medium Variant High Variant

1.5 1

0.5 0 1950

1970

1990

2010

2030

2050

Year

Fig. 3.1 Future population of India projected by the UN (Source: UN, 2006).

One of the most effective ways to augment the irrigation potential so as to mitigate floods and droughts and reduce regional imbalances in water availability through Inter-Basin Water Transfer (IBWT). An IBWT transfers water from surplus rivers to deficit areas. The Brahmaputra and Ganga, particularly their northern tributaries, as well as Mahanadi, Godavari and west flowing Rivers originating from the Western Ghats are found to be in surplus of water resources. If storage reservoirs are built on these rivers and connected to other parts of the country, regional imbalances could be reduced significantly. Many benefits by way of additional irrigation, domestic and industrial water supply, hydropower generation, navigational facilities could also accrue. Overall, based on the problems identified above, the NWDA argued for a general need in water resources and justified the necessity of ILR; moreover, it claimed more tangible benefits. The National Perspective Plan (NPP) would benefit by adding 25 Mha of irrigated lands from surface waters and 10 Mha through increased groundwater use. In addition, the Plan would provide 34,000 MW of hydropower. The likely incidental benefits to realize irrigation potential include: the mitigation of droughts, flood control, domestic and industrial water supply, navigational facilities, employment generation, fisheries, salinity control, pollution control, recreation facilities, infrastructural development and socioeconomic development. 3.6 NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE PLAN: THE HIMALAYAN RIVERS DEVELOPMENT AND PENINSULAR RIVERS DEVELOPMENT The National Perspective Plan comprises two components viz. Himalayan Rivers Development and Peninsular Rivers Development. 3.6.1 Himalayan Rivers Development The Himalayan Rivers Development Component (Figure 3.2) envisages the construction of storage reservoirs on the principal tributaries of Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers in India,

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Nepal and Bhutan. It also supports the interlinking of river systems to transfer surplus flows of the eastern tributaries of the river Ganga to the west, apart from linking of the main Brahmaputra and its tributaries with Ganga and linking Ganga with the river Mahanadi. The rivers of the Himalayan proposed for water linkages include:

L

A

GO

GRA

GAN

GA

NAR

A MA D

SANKOSH MANAS

TISTA

MECHI

13

8 14 MA H A

NA

D I

Kosi - Mechi Kosi - Ghagra Gandak - Ganga Ghagra - Yamuna* Sarda - Yamuna* Yamuna - Rajasthan Rajasthan - Sebermati

10

9

NE

TW A N

BE I

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

A UTR 11 MAP H A R B

AK

I

KE

K A LIS INDH

B AT

SA BAR MATI

2 GHA

MT

PA R

TAPI

GANDAK

3

NG

A

CH

LU

7

GA

BAR

NI

A MB

1 KOSI

A

N MU YA

4

SAR DA

5

6

GHAGRA

Manas-Sankosh-Tista-Ganga Link Jogighopa-Tista-Farakka Link Ganga-Damodar-Subernarekha Link Subernarekha-Mahanadi Link Farakka-Sunderbans Link Gandak-Ganga Link Ghaghara-Yamuna Link Sarda-Yamuna Link Yamuna-Rajasthan Link Rajasthan-Sabarmati Link Chunar-SoneBarrage Link Sone Dam-Southern Tributaries of Ganga Link Kosi-Ghaghara Link Kosi-Mechi Link.

SO

















SU

12 DA MO RN DAR AR EK HA

BE

8. Chunar - Sone Barrage 9. Sone Dam - Southern Tributaries of Ganga 10. Manas - Sankosh - Tista - Ganga 11. Jogighopa - Tista - Farakka (Alternate) 12. Farakka - Sunderbans 13. Ganga (Farakka) - Damodar - Subernarekha 14. Subernarekha - Mahanadi

Fig. 3.2 The Himalayan Rivers Development Component (NWDA, 2007).

* FR Completed

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Out of the above 14 links, feasibility studies of only 2 links (Indian portion) are complete. The completed feasibility studies include:



Ghaghara-Yamuna Link Sarda-Yamuna Link.

3.6.2 Peninsular Rivers Development Peninsular Rivers Development Component (Figure 3.3) is divided into four major parts viz. Interlinking of Mahanadi-Godavari-Krishna-Cauvery rivers and building storages at potential sites in these basins: this part involves interlinking the major river systems where surpluses from the Mahanadi and the Godavari are intended to be transferred to areas in deficit in the south, through Krishna and Cauvery rivers.

GA GO NGA MT I

ER Y

16

PA L

8

AR

BAY OF BENGAL

9 VA IG

VAIP PAR

ANDAMAN & NICOBAR

AI

INDIAN

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

K RA

AR

15 CA UV

BA

NE

1

PENN

5

DA MO DA RN R AR EK HA

7

6

ARABIAN SEA

DI

A

14

A

BE

D AV 3 AR I 4

2

HN

MAHAN

O

IS

A

G

KR

A

SU

A MAD

PENGAN GO GA DA VAR I MA NE R

13

NG

SO

N

I AR MAT AB

NAR

TAPI

12 PAR

GA

TR APU HM BRA

10

WAINGANGA

ATI BARB KALISINDH

S

BE

I

LUN

TW A

L BA AM H C 11

KE

a.

OCEAN

Mahanadi (Manibhadra) - Godavari (Dowislaiswaram) Godavari (Incharmpalli) - Krishna (Nagarjunasagar)* Godavari (Inchampalli) - Krishna (Pulichintala)* Godavari (Polavarem) - Krishna (Vijayawada)* Krishna (Srisailam) - Pennar* Krishna (Nagarjunasagar) - Pennar (Somasila)* Pennar (Somasila) - Palar-Cauvery (Grand Anicut)* Pennar (Somasila) - Palar-Cauvery (Grand Anicut)*

9. 10. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Cauvery (Kattalai) - Veigai - Gunder* Ken - Netwa* Par - Tapi - Narmada* Damangange - Pinjal* Bedti - Varda Netravati - Hemavati Pamba - Achankovil - Vaippar*

Fig. 3.3 The Peninsular Rivers Development Component (NWDA, 2007).

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THE VITAL LINKS

b.

Interlinking of west flowing rivers, north of Bombay and south of Tapi: this scheme envisages construction of as many optimal storage as possible on these streams and interlinking them to make available appreciable quantums of water for transfer to areas where additional water is needed. The scheme allows for extending the water supply canal to metropolitan areas of Mumbai; it also provides irrigation in the coastal areas in Maharashtra.

c.

Interlinking of Ken-Chambal: the part of the scheme provides for a water grid for Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh and interlinks a canal backed by as many storage options as possible.

d.

Diversion of other west flowing rivers: this part recognizes the high rainfall on the western side of the Western Ghats, which runs down into numerous streams and discharges into the Arabian Sea. The construction of an interlinking canal system backed up by adequate storages could be planned to meet all requirements of Kerala and could also transfer some waters towards the east to meet the needs of drought affected areas.

In the proposals of NPP, the transfer of water has been proposed mostly by gravity; lifts were also kept minimal and confined to around 120 m. Further only surplus flood water has been planned in foreseeable future for transfer to water deficit areas, but this water is only usable if it meets all in-basin requirements. In Peninsular Rivers Development component, the NWDA carried out in-depth water balance studies on the various major river basins including Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, Pennar, Cauvery, Vaigai, west flowing rivers of Kerala, Karnataka, north of Bombay and south of Tapi and southern tributaries of Yamuna. The aim of the water balance studies was to establish water surplus and deficit regions. These studies indicated that while Mahanadi and Godavari basins are water surplus, other basins in Peninsular India such as Krishna, Pennar, Cauvery and Vaigai are water deficit. As the next step, pre-feasibility studies for the following 16 probable links were carried out:

















Kattalai-Vaigai-Gundar Link Inchampalli-Nagarjunasagar Link Inchampalli-Pulichintala Link Polavaram-Vijayawada Link Almatti-Pennar Link Srisailam-Pennar Link Mahanadi-Godavari Link Somasila-Grand Anicut Link Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal Link Pamba-Anchankovil-Vaippar Link Bedti-Varada Link Netravati-Hemavati Link Damanganga-Pinjal Link Par-Tapi-Narmada Link Ken-Betwa Link Nagarjunasagar-Somasila Link.

SURESH PRABHU

45

Feasibility studies for all of these the links have been completed except for two, namely Netravati-Hemavati and Bedti-Varda. These studies suggest that it is technically possible and economically viable to transfer water from the surplus river basins to the deficit ones. Consent from the Government of Karnataka was recently pursued so as to undertake the preparatory work and complete feasibility reports for the two remaining links. Further, only recently has the Government of Karnataka given consent to the NWDA to undertake work on the Bedti-Varada link, which will eventually allow the NWDA to prepare the feasibility report. 3.7 A HOLISTIC APPROACH As a Task Force, we were assigned to independently evaluate the work of NWDA and to ensure that all possible aspects are thoroughly addressed, To ensure comprehensive work was conducted, we decided to use the services of experts in various fields to help guide the research. However, real and updated studies were required and, as such, I decided to have institutions of eminence carry these studies out. If water is transferred from one basin to another, there could be a difference in quality of water in one of these basins, thereby likely to create problems in the other basin. Aquatic life could be adversely impacted as a result of this. There was a general fear that such a transfer could pollute clean and pristine waters of other river systems. My intention was to comprehensively gather scientific analyses on these and about 2,000 other similar issues. Such a massive exercise had never before been carried out to assess the impacts of any water project in India. Thus, I held consultations with the Ministry of Environment and Forests and prepared an exhaustive list of issues that needed to be investigated to conduct proper impact assessment studies. This list was again deliberated on with various other experts and I, was also able to use all the expertise I had previously gained as a Cabinet Minister of Environment and Forests. All technical and scientific issues were referred to experts from various Indian institutes known for their technical competence worldwide. The Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Ahmedabad was appointed to look into all the organizational aspects of ILR. We have seen in the past that corruption is normally associated with all irrigation and water related projects and to avoid this, as well as to ensure timely completion of the work, we appointed an expert group from Information Technology (IT) to ensure transparency in all technical, administrative, financial and others aspects. The new science of GIS, remote sensing, geo-spatial, satellite imagery, etc. had to be undertaken diligently in all the research and so an expert group was also assembled. Since, mathematical modeling and computer simulation can provide various alternative scenarios at the time of the assessment of impact, we approached experts as well as the relevant institutes for this purpose. The rivers flowing from one state to another had several political dimensions. I became personally responsibility to engage in a dialogue with as many political leaders as possible. I met several chief ministers from all concerned states and held several meetings with leaders of political parties. I addressed almost 5,000 small and large gatherings of interested people. From meeting with the people, I realized that there was a lot of opposition to this idea from various NGOs. I, then personally made it a point to meet a number of NGOs in public forums, as well as having one on one talks. A website was launched to disseminate as much information as possible. Following information mining from different sources, I personally wrote a letter to the Minister for Water Resources requesting him to put all of the information we had gathered on a website. It was my

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opinion that unless all the data was available for public scrutiny it would not inspire confidence or encourage engagement. Some of the rivers in India flow into the territories of our neighbors and sharing water from these rivers has been subject to negotiations for many decades. I requested Ambassador C. Dasgupta (former Ambassador of India to the European Union, Belgium and Luxembourg), a very seasoned and competent diplomat, to look into the sensitive issues around ILR and water sharing. We wanted to know what could be the reservations of Bangladesh and how to address them effectively. Some of our members were in touch with the Ambassador’s friends in Bangladesh to ascertain their views. Despite this, in Bangladesh ILR became an emotive issue. Ultimately, the NWDA had stated in their own submission, before the Supreme Court, that the estimated cost of the ILR project would cost approximately US$ 125 billion. But it was at best a guesstimate. A more realistic estimate could have been done only when the Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) were prepared. We decided to prepare a model DPR, at least for one link. We thus decided to work on the Ken-Betwa link as an independent link. The DPR for this link would take into account all possible costs, including social, ecological, etc. It would provide us with an opportunity to work out the real parameters to calculate the overall cost. The challenge was to prepare a proper Terms of Reference (TOR) for the DPR. If the TOR is not properly formulated, the correct answers to many important questions cannot be addressed. We hired Engineers India Ltd (EIL) to conduct the DPR for the Ken-Betwa Link. In addition, a group of experts from different fields were solicited to assist them. When the TOR was finally completed, it was posted on the internet for public scrutiny and comments and feedback in order to ensure the DPR was as comprehensive as possible. The involvement of the EIL was a deliberate attempt to allay any fears felt by the public. That is, the public may have been concerned that the analysis of various government irrigation and water infrastructure projects is looked at only from a civil engineering point of view and tends to overlook several other important environmental and socio-economic aspects that the project should consider. To comprehend some of the possible socio-economic implications our Task Force took some crucial measures. We appointed ICICI, the biggest private sector bank and the second largest bank of India, to look into all possible financing options. They presented a good quality report which was attached as part of our Task Force report that was eventually submitted to the Supreme Court. It was also necessary to examine the project’s economic viability for the country besides its financial feasibility as a project. In a capital deficient country like India, it is an imperative to know how capital is employed. If we allocate resources for the ILR, it should not starve other important social sectors like education, healthcare or other physical infrastructure projects. We thus appointed two premier institutes to look at the project’s economic viability. 3.8 REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT Social issues are of great importance in any project but more so in a grand concept like the ILR. Socially, did we need to implement this? In India since independence, our record of rehabilitation of Project Affected People (PAP) is deplorable, to put it mildly. According to a number of studies, including the WCD (World Commission on Dams) India Country Study, at least 75 per cent of some 40 million people have been displaced and never been resettled for large dam construction in India over the past five decades. I am personally aware of several schemes where the Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) of the PAP’s has not taken place. In fact, in one instance, as the Cabinet Minister of Power of the

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Government of India, I had to personally intervene in the Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) work of Tehri dam.4 What tends to occur is that the R&R does not take place as promised by the Project Implementing Agency (PIA). The PIA loses interest in the R&R as it is not their principal task. In fact, the PIA only promises to complete the R&R only to secure permission to commence work on the project because the normal pre-requisite to undertake a project is to undertake an R&R. The other reason why schemes within the R&R are poorly conducted is due to a lack of resources; R&R funds are initially provided which are later diverted elsewhere. There is also a lack of local geographical and cultural sensitivity on the part of the workers engaged in the work from the PIA. Ultimately, past poor quality work on R&R compounds human tragedy. Based on this knowledge, I thought to pursue a different and holistic approach. Thus, we approached a leading institute of social sciences to investigate social concerns associated with ILR. We understood that in a country like India, with such high population density, some amount of displacement is inevitable when big projects are undertaken. But based on a thorough investigation on social concerns, we planned to keep these quantities down to the barest minimum. We had to be careful to avoid committing the same mistakes of any old R&R. I thought of creating a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for each link separately, which would only be for the purpose of carrying out R&R work; thus, to ensure time and attention was dedicated specifically to the R&R work. The responsibility of the SPVs would be delegated only to those NGOs who have a real commitment to the ILR cause. The R&R cost will be ascertained by an independent body before the commencement of any project work and the entire amount will be irreversibly transferred to the SPV. Execution of the project work will start after funding was secured and transferred. I thought the creation of an SPV would be a very novel way to address the problem of abruptly uprooting people from their own surroundings and then leaving them high and dry. Though humanity has made immense progress and addressed several issues in international forums, in India we still don’t have a proper legal framework to address water issues. In response, we organized a group of eminent lawyers to look at all of the possible legal aspects, both domestically and internationally. We also constituted a critical review group to receive alternate proposals (independently devised of the NWDA). The review group was headed by Professor Subhash Chander and Professor P.B.S. Sarma, both are highly respected professionals. This group, along with independent experts group, was formed to look into all possible alternatives to the already prepared proposals. After identifying the possible barriers and following the formation of review groups, the Task Force prepared two reports as mandated by our terms of reference and submitted it to the authorities. However, in March 2004, I resigned as the Chairman of the Task Force to contest my parliamentary seat for the fourth time. Subsequent to the election of the 14th Lok Shava (the lower house of the Parliament), a change of government meant disbanding and abandoning the work of the Task Force, as well as many of the previously formed groups, selected partnering institutions, and collaborations with experts.

4

The Tehri Dam Project, one of the largest dams in India, consisting of Tehri and Koteshwar dams, is under construction in the Ganga River basin for almost 25 years in the Northern Himalayan state of Uttaranchal.

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3.9 URGENT NEED India has only 2.2 per cent of the land mass of the world, while the share of freshwater resources is only 4 per cent of the world. India’s population is presently 16 per cent of the world population, but will become 18 per cent in next 40 to 45 years (UN, 2006). Thus, worldwide, we have the greatest water resource challenge to address in the future and it needs to be tackled through various means. The most important means to tackle this problem is through demand side management. The agricultural sector accounts for 83 per cent of water consumption, so the water need in this sector is highest. Cropping patterns also need to be scientifically planned to avoid cropping of cash crops in unsuitable locations resulting in water wastage. Some of India’s hydraulic infrastructure is very poorly maintained. Dr Vaidyanathan, an eminent agriculture economist, has pointed out that the water application efficiency of several irrigation projects is abysmally low at 20 per cent. Rain water harvesting also needs to behas not taken place. In fact, in one instance, as the Cabinet Minister of Power of the encouraged. While one looks at all possible means of addressing water problems we need to focus on how irrigation, power generation, waterways, groundwater recharge, etc. can be looked at in an integrated fashion. We have seen in India that such multipurpose projects are never planned scientifically. Therefore, it has resulted in improper siting of projects, which have caused environmental and other disasters. Placing projects in the wrong locations has also happened because various states tend to stake claims on interstate water resources, which has resulted in projects that defy any sound logic. There is a lack of inter-agency cooperation in planning and implementation of water projects in India. At least eight different departments of the central government alone, are engaged in planning different projects on water all at one time. The Power Ministry plans major projects on hydro electricity; the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy works on mini and small hydro projects up to 50 MW; the Shipping Ministry works on inland waterways; the Agriculture Ministry oversees irrigation works; the Rural Development Ministry manages drinking water in rural areas, while the Urban Affairs Ministry oversees drinking water in urban areas; the Environment Ministry is mandated to clean water; the Health Ministry is mandated for safety and quality of water; the Planning Commission monitors various schemes in water sector; and the Water Resources Ministry also manages various areas and issues on water. All of these branches of the same central government are all looking at the same common resource, water. If the ILR is not planned holistically, resources will be wasted as duplication of some issues and neglect for others could occur. As India is considered the largest democracy in the world, questions are bound to be raised by people in raindeficient regions regarding the equitable distribution of available water resources in the country. While, India has spent huge amounts of resources on flood and drought mitigation and management, but a permanent solution is still required for these problems.

3.10 A PAN-ASIAN OUTLOOK Bangladesh, Bhutan China, India and Nepal share water as a common resource. They can benefit immensely if they are able to work together. India buys power generated in Bhutan resulting in Bhutanese per capita income being the highest in the region. But, can the other countries not learn from this? Bramhaputra originates in China and as such Bangladesh and India are both lower riparian and downstream states. It is therefore in the interest of all of these countries to develop a proper water sharing formula and benefit from sharing

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schemes. Regional cooperation is required to avoid and regulate floods. The Swedish Government has already completed a study of four basins where water is shared by several nations. I was personally called by the Swedish Government to offer my comments on the study. Though Bramhaputra was not part of the study, I considered the Asian context and how the co-basin states can work together. I further concluded that all of the states must respect and honor the rights of the lower riparian states. But each one must also recognize and accept the rights of upper riparian states as well. No one should have a veto to obstruct any project which is the legitimate right of a sovereign nation, carried out within the limits of international law. In fact, knowing the dynamics of these political powers, we need to have a fresh look at the international water laws. Every issue should be codified to avoid potential conflicts and a proper dispute settlement mechanism must be put in place. Bangladesh was most concerned about conflict and dispute settlement. I think India and the neighbouring nations must engage this historically good collaborator, friend and neighbor into a constructive dialogue. There is so much suspicion on either side; and this can be removed only by engaging in constant dialogue, sharing information on all issues and working towards constructing projects which will benefit all parties. I am convinced that the dialogue is the best form of resolving any such issue.

3.11 WE CANNOT STOP NOW India’s eastern and northeastern states are a site where an agriculture revolution is waiting to happen. The poverty in these states cannot be removed without growth in agriculture and allied industry. Any program that will help to redress two of their main problems, floods and the lack of scientific water management, will change the face of this hitherto neglected, but potentially most prosperous part of India. A country like India where almost 60 per cent of the population is supported by agricultural activity, has 260 million people who earn less than a dollar a day. If one considers the other definition of poverty, those who live off less than 2 dollars a day, the number of poor will rise to 800 million. Meanwhile, 2006 to 2007 financial year, the services sector accounted for 55.1 per cent of India’s GDP, manufacturing about 26.4 per cent and agriculture 18.5 per cent (MoF, 2007). Overall, 60 per cent of population shares 18.5 per cent of the national income, and clearly this demonstrates the real cause of poverty. Water is the basic resource to bring about growth in agriculture, to bring more land under cultivation and to generate more financial resources for farmers. There are innumerable studies completed about the causes of problems in the agriculture sector in India and all these studies agree on one point: India needs to make more investments in agriculture and more so, public investments. The farmers and their families, including children, toil in the fields during the agriculture season. So obviously labor is not a scarce resource when planning to promote growth in the sector. The only reason why we are continually facing the problems with agriculture is due to paucity of public investments. Farmers need better access to credit at reasonable rates, better prices for the produce, good technological inputs, and assured insurance cover to cover risks to mitigate their woes. But one really cannot ignore the vital role of public investment in infrastructure. For example, the hydraulic infrastructure needs to be the responsibility of the state. ILR raised several controversies, within and outside the country. One of the main controversies was the government’s lack of willingness to share all of the information with the people of India. I have yet to understand the logic of holding everything so close to one’s chest that even the holder also can’t see what he/she is holding. Withholding information has led to suspicions about the intentions of the government. As a result, this

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has led to misinformation provided by the government. The idea for ILR was always considered by successive Indian governments since 1960’s, but more so since the 1980s, when the issue was approached in a structured manner. Several bureaucrats, politicians, technocrats, engineers in the government participated in the processes of working to develop the idea of ILR. In my terms in the government, I had not heard any one opposing the idea. On the contrary, as the government records reveal, government officials supported and allowed work for the ILR to be continued. In fact, the periodic eruption of interstate disputes arising out of sharing of water, between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, two neighboring southern states of India, acted as a trigger for bringing the idea to center stage. Acting as a referee to resolve this potentially volatile political volcano, the then Prime Minister Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee wanted to bring the 20 year long process of continual work of the NWDA, to be brought to a logical end. At the same time, the Supreme Court asked the Government for the reasons for delays in implementation of the ILR. In response, the then Honorable President of India, Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam made an appeal to the people of India in his public address. The purpose of this address to look at the ILR as a means of realizing his vision to make India free from the scourge of poverty and encourage the country to become a super power over the next 20 years. In response, some people raised serious apprehensions over the idea of the ILR. But, in my opinion, if the government had shared the work of NWDA with the people regularly there could have been a more informed debate as access to information is essential for any new idea to be implemented, but more so for a large project like the ILR. The other flaw of the political process to support the ILR was the lack of a multi-disciplinary approach of the NWDA’s work. Very essential elements of the project appraisal, such as, environmental, social issues, hydrology, finance, modern sciences like geo-spatial, political inputs should have been mainstreamed into the project plan and works. In fact, the NWDA’s mandate was not even to make feasibility studies excluding DPR’s; rather it was only to make pre-feasibility studies. If these essential elements were provided to the people, much of the debate could have more meaningful and productive, as was the basis on which the government was trying to move forward on this issue. If all people were reacting to the same data, the information could have enriched the outcome and avoided the resultant pitfalls. In response to these flaws, I launched a massive awareness campaign to overcome this as a shortcoming. Another set of objections to the project were technical. Project skeptics felt the findings of the NWDA were not based on sound technical grounds. To quell any suspicions, I set up various experts group to address any queries. In all my various responsibilities with government as the Cabinet Minister of several portfolios, I am convinced that no government can claim that they are the wisest people in the country. In fact most of my knowledge and wisdom is drawn from my outside experience, rather than within the government. It has thus always been my endeavor to involve as many people into the process of decision making from outside the government. I adopted this same approach to this project as well.

3.12 NOT BIG vs SMALL There were some very basic objections to the ILR. There are people convinced that all big projects are a bad idea. There are others who are convinced that such big ideas are meant to make money for those who implement it. If one goes by past experience one will tend to agree that corruption has been observed in many such programs. The challenge is to avoid it through accountable and transparent systems. As explained earlier, I was trying to a

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address any objections through a multitude of methods. The argument of big versus small should not be a dogmatic approach but be a need based one. We in fact need both big and small projects. Small is required to the extent that it is feasible and to the extent it can satisfy all needs. For example, rain water harvesting has to be exploited fully, but one also must assess its limitation. Rain water harvesting can satisfy drinking water, domestic as well as small agriculture needs, but it cannot generate electricity or create waterways. If a country can afford to live without electricity or waterways, that is fine, but if it is not possible, infrastructure to support such projects are required. As the Chairman of the Task Force, I was fully aware that we should never play with nature, particularly in the water sector. But when the country has a huge population like India, the country has to make some tough choices. Trade-offs have to be attained in a way that minimize risks and maximize benefits. But all decision making must be done in the most scientific and transparent manner. The absence of science and transparency only raises serious questions about personal motives. I think we need to work in the short term to increase the operating efficiency of all our existing projects and demand side management must be given priority. While doing all this one must examine ideas like ILR in their entirety – either to accept in part or even to reject the idea, if it is found that the costs (all types) far out weigh the potential benefits. My campaign of taking the ILR idea closer to the grassroots people has had one tangible result: Water has now become an issue at the top of our national agenda and is an integral part of any national discourse. I don’t think a less concerted effort by our Task Force could have attained making water a priority in the agenda. As it remains currently, this account is the outcome of the ILR debate and I hope it reaches its logical conclusion soon. Any delay will be only to the peril to the nation of India.

REFERENCES Dehadrai, P. V.: Irrigation in India. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 430, FAO, Rome, 2003, pp. 59–69. Government of India (GoI): 10th Five-Year Plan (2002 to 2007). Planning Commission, New Delhi, 2002. Gupta, S.K. and Deshpande, R.D.: Water for India in 2050: First-Order Assessment of Available Options. Current Science 86(9) (2004), pp. 1216–1224. International Energy Agency (IEA): World Energy Outlook 2000. IEA, Vienna, 2000. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI): World Water and Food to 2025: Dealing with Scarcity. IFPRI, Washington, D.C., 2002. Iyer, R.R.: Linking Rivers: Vision or Mirage? Frontline 19(25), December 7 to 20, 2002. Kumar, P.: Food Demand and Supply Projections for India. Agricultural Economics Paper 98-01, Indian Agricultural Research Institute, New Delhi, 1998. Ministry of Finance (MoF): Union Budget 2007 to 2008. Ministry of Finance, Government of India, New Delhi, 2007. Mohapatra, P.K. and Singh, R.D.: Flood Management in India. In: Flood Problem and Management in South Asia (M.M.Q. Mirza, A. Dixit and A. Nishat Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2003, pp. 131–143. Nandargi, S., Dhar, O.N., Mirza, M.M.Q., Enright, B. and Sheik, M.M.: Hydrometeorology of Floods and Droughts in South Asia – A Brief Appraisal. In: Climate and Water Resources in South Asia: Vulnerability and Adaptation (A. Muhammed, M.M.Q. Mirza and B.A. Stewart Eds.), Asianics Agro Development Limited, Islamabad, 2007. National Water Development Agency (NWDA): http://www.nwda.in, accessed in 2007.

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Rao, K.L.: India’s Water Wealth. Orient Longman, New Dehli, 1975. Rathore, M.S.: State Level Analysis of Drought Policies and Impacts in Rajasthan, India. IWMI, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2005. Repetto, R. and Holmes, T.: The Role of Population in Resource Depletion in Developing Countries. Population and Development Review 9(4) (1983), pp. 609–632. United Nations (UN): World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. United Nations Population Division, New York, USA, 2006.

4 The Interlinking of Indian Rivers: Questions on the Scientific, Economic and Environmental Dimensions of the Proposal JAYANTA BANDYOPADHYAY SHAMA PERVEEN

4.1 BACKGROUND The availability of freshwater at various spots on the Earth’s terrestrial surface will continue to be determined by the hydrological cycle, till such a time when technologies like desalination of seawater is practiced on a reasonably extended scale. The rapid growth in the demand of freshwater driven by growth in the global population and of the economies, has led to this natural resource becoming scarce in many parts of the world. As a result, the ratio between the number of people and the available water resource is worsening day by day. By 2020, the global population is projected to be in the range of 7.3 to 7.9 billion, which is 50 per cent larger than that in 1990 (UN, 2006). Because of this rapidly growing human population, the world may see more than a six-fold increase in the number of people living in conditions of water stress - from 470 million today to 3 billion in 2025 (Postel, 1999). In the global picture, India is identified as a country where water scarcity is expected to grow considerably in the coming decades. Further, drought conditions resulting from climatic variability cause considerable human suffering in many parts of the country, in the form of scarcity of water for both satisfaction of domestic needs and for crop protection. The project for interlinking of rivers of India emanates from a desire of the political leadership of the country to bring a permanent solution to the negative impacts of drought and water shortages in these parts (IWRS, 1996). Such a desire is, without question, worthy of applause because satisfaction of domestic water needs should be considered as a human right and be given the top priority. The interlinking project is based on the National Perspective for Water Development as framed by the Ministry of Water Resources in August 1980. The National Water Development Agency (NWDA) was set up in 1982 to carry out detailed studies in the context of the National Perspective. In late 2002, the proposals of the NWDA started to receive great media attention after the Supreme Court of India passed an order in a Public Interest Litigation, that the government should complete the construction of the interlinking project by 2016. In response to this order of the Supreme Court, the Government of India

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appointed a Task Force headed by Mr. Suresh Prabhu. The same order of the apex court made the professionals interested in sustainable development of water resources in India (see Chapter 3), to wake up to the realities and examine the techno-economic feasibility of this project, which is perceived as the largest construction project in the world. It is estimated that only the construction cost of the project may very well be of the order of US$ 125 to 200 billion. One needs to add to this amount, the social, environmental as well as the operational costs. Indeed, any country, whether developing or developed, large or small, would surely take up diverse, strict and open assessments of the techno-economic feasibility before investing in a project, the cost of which is of the order of its annual GDP. Unfortunately, contrary to the above professional expectation, no technical details of the interlinking project are available in the public domain. Excepting a few lines drawn on the map of the country to indicate the rough location of the dams and the canals, nothing is available to the open professional world to verify the justifiability and efficacy of the various official claims of benefits from the project, which are also not substantiated by any data. On 8 February 2003, in an open public debate held in New Delhi, organized for discussing the interlinking project, Mr. Prabhu had appreciated the public request for putting all technical information on the river interlinking project in the public domain, through the web site of the National Water Development Agency (NWDA). Feasibility Reports of 14 Peninsular components are available on but not the technical details. In this background of the total non-availability of the technical details of the project for interlinking of Indian rivers, it is not possible to take any clear position on the technical feasibility or otherwise of the claims made by NWDA. Yet, it is not easy to turn a blind eye to a proposal for such a large investment by the nation, which can also drastically alter the hydrographic picture of the country. As a result, in this chapter, a limited attempt has been made to analyze some crucial policy issues related to the project on interlinking of rivers in India. In making this analysis, the ongoing shift in the paradigm that is going on in the field of water resource management the world over has been kept in mind. This process is of special significance in the case of India, characterized by serious spatial and temporal variations in precipitation, as has been stressed by Bandyopadhyay and Mallik (2003). Considering the reality that the making of water policy in India has so far been guided by a conceptual framework, characteristic of reductionist engineering, the arguments presented in this paper are also indicative of the major generic conceptual problems in water resource management in India.

4.1.1 Decision to interlink the rivers of India Human societies have always tried to expand the spatial extent of availability of water by the diversion of streams or rivers. The idea of drawing water from the rivers in eastern India, which have larger runoff, in comparison to certain places in the peninsular region, where the precipitation levels are much lower, can be seen as an extension of that practice. The idea of linking the rivers of India has its roots in the thoughts of Visveswarya, the stalwart engineer of yesteryears. The idea was further extended by Dr K.L. Rao, the legendary irrigation minister of India (Rao, 1975), and Captain Dastur, a pilot. Dr Rao and Captain Dastur thought of the Ganga-Cauvery Link Canal and the Garland Canals, respectively. Dr Rao’s ideas were based on his identification of some river basins in the country as ‘surplus’, and some others as ‘deficit’, and seeking solution to the problem of water scarcity in many parts of the country by connecting them through a ‘National Water Grid’ (NCIWRDP, 1999a: pp. 179–180). Captain Dastur proposed ‘an impressionistic scheme

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which became known as Garland Canal scheme’ to feed Himalayan waters to the peninsular parts of the country by means of pipelines (for details of this proposal, see Chapter 1 and 3). The National Commission for Integrated Water Resource Development Plan (NCIWRDP) found this scheme prima facie impractical. Both the proposals were examined and were not found worthy of being followed up. The recent revival of the idea of interlinking of ‘surplus’ basins with ‘deficit’ basins has been the result of work done by the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) and bears a conceptual continuity with Dr Rao’s proposal. However, the recent hurry of the government in the execution of the project is rooted in the order of 31 October 2002 by the Supreme Court of India, issued in connection with a Public Interest Litigation (Writ Petition (Civil) No: 512/2002). Commenting on the long time period of 43 years as identified by the NCIWRDP for the completion of the proposed interlinking project, the Supreme Court ordered that: It is difficult to appreciate that in this country with all the resources available to it, there will be a further delay of 43 years for completion of the project to which no State has objection and whose necessity and desirability is recognized and acknowledged by the Union of India … … We do expect that the programme drawn up would try and ensure that the link projects are completed within a reasonable time of not more than ten years. The recent wider interest in the NWDA proposals for interlinking of rivers needs to be seen in the background of the assessment by the Central Water Commission (CWC) of the two earlier proposals by Dr Rao and Captain Dastur. It had mentioned specifically that Dr Rao’s proposal was ‘grossly under-estimated’ and that the scheme ‘will also have no flood control benefits’. Therefore the ‘proposal was not pursued as such’. Regarding the proposal by Captain Dastur, the CWC and the associated experts were of the opinion that, ‘the proposal was technically unsound and economically prohibitive’ (MoWR, 2002). Given the fact that the present proposal on interlinking supports the general idea of transferring water from ‘surplus’ to deficit basins, these projects also need to be examined through a rigorous and open professional assessment. It is in this background that the present analysis is being undertaken.

4.2 WATER RESOURCES IN INDIA AND THE LOGIC FOR THE INTERLINKING PROJECT The country receives about 4,000 km3 of water as precipitation annually (NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.23). However, unlike the precipitation patterns in the temperate regions of the world, precipitation in India is characterized by acute variations in both space and time. A large part of the total precipitation on the country is received in the Himalayan catchments of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) basin (Figure 4.1). The distribution of precipitation over India is predominantly governed by the Monsoon, as a result of which the northeastern quarter of the country receives substantially larger precipitation, in comparison with the northwestern, western and southern parts. For example, in the eastern parts of the GBM basin, Cherrapunji receives an annual precipitation of about 11,000 mm, while Ajmer just outside the western boundary of the GBM basin may receive only 200 mm of annual rainfall. Though the west flowing rivers draining the western aspect of the Western Ghats have substantial runoff, the spatial scope for their wider utilization is limited. For assessing

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the water resources of India, the area of the country has been divided in 24 river-basins in which the west flowing rivers from the Western Ghats have all been clubbed as one.

Fig. 4.1 The Ganges basin and Farakka Barrage. Boundaries of the Brahmaputra and Meghna basins are also shown (Mirza, 2003).

The spatial and temporal variations in the precipitation over India often lead to human sufferings through scarcity of drinking water, inundation of agricultural lands, failure of crops, etc. There is no doubt that the satisfaction of the domestic needs of water should be seen as a basic human right and should receive the highest priority in our water policy. Further, protection of rainfed farm lands from variations in the climate, especially long spells of droughts, should be an equally important and high priority objective in India’s water policy. The logic behind the interlinking project is based on the view that there is ‘surplus’ water in some river basins or sub-basins, which, if transferred to the other ‘deficit’ river basins, would provide a permanent solution to the problem of human sufferings from droughts and water scarcity. On the face of it, this is convincing enough logic for undertaking the project for interlinking of India’s rivers. On the basis of the National Perspective on water resource development, the interlinking project has two components – the Himalayan and the Peninsular. The Himalayan component includes construction of storage dams on the main tributaries of Ganga and Brahmaputra to transfer ‘surplus’ water to the west. The Peninsular component involves connecting rivers like Godavari and Mahanadi that have ‘surplus’ water with rivers like Krishna and Cauvery. Thirty link canals are envisaged, of which 14 will be in the Himalayan component and 16 in the Peninsular component (Figure 4.2). On the whole, the interlinking project is aimed at providing large scale human-induced connectivity for water flows in almost all parts of India. This, indeed, is the largest construction project thought of in the world as of now.

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FPO

Fig. 4.2 Links envisaged as per the national perspective plan.

4.2.1 Changing paradigm for water management Over the past few years, concepts of water resource management all over the world have been undergoing a clear paradigm shift and the need for new water professionals is being heard from the highest international levels (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000; Matsura, 2003). It is indeed expected that the project on the interlinking of India’s rivers, which is also the largest water related project of the world, would base itself on the emerging new knowledge base, rather than the traditional one, which is beating a retreat each passing day. However, such a professional analysis of the interlinking project is not possible, since the necessary detailed technical information on the project has not been made openly available. On that account, the very limited information that one can gather about the project from open sources, does not even permit a good understanding of it, leave apart an examination of the veracity of the proposed links and appurtenant structures. This leaves one with the only option of examining the conceptual basis and policy approach for the project.

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The present estimates available for the construction cost alone of the interlinking project hovers around an astronomical figure of US$ 125 to 200 billion. It needs to be stressed here that no pre-feasibility or feasibility reports have been made available in the public domain for an open professional assessment of the accuracy of this estimate. The cost estimates may turn out to be far higher, if, as and when the detailed project reports are prepared. The period of implementation for this gigantic project, as given in the Supreme Court order, is a mere 10 years from now. However, there are various opinions on the practicability of this time limit. On this point, Verghese (2002), an eminent writer on water resources of India has commented that: The notion that this ‘project’ can be ‘sanctioned’ and implemented in a decade is simplistic in the extreme. … Interlinking of rivers is a highly complex process with huge backward and forward and inter-sectoral linkages that may be accomplished incrementally over the next 50 to 100 years. Further, with the total pending cost for incomplete major, medium and minor irrigation projects coming to R. 1.5 lakh crores1 (Jain, 2003) the logic behind taking up another such a major projects does not seem convincing. Iyer (2002) further points out that, since plan outlays are barely adequate even for the completion of on-going projects, there seems to be little likelihood of finding massive resources for a major river linking undertaking. What is equally surprising is that Mr. Bharat Singh, who chaired the ‘Working Group on Inter-basin Transfer of Water’ of the Ministry of Water Resources (NCIWRDP, 1999b), takes the position that, ‘… there really seems to be no convincing argument or vital national interest which can justify taking up the river linking project in its entirety’ (Singh B., 2003). In this way, it is apparent that there are many important reasons for exploring the logical basis and policy framework for this very costly project. 4.2.2 The concept of ‘surplus’ river basins The starting point for the interlinking project is the subjective concept of the availability of ‘surplus’ flows in some river basins. In the conceptual framework of reductionist engineering it will be a win-win situation if one can simply utilize ‘… the water otherwise going to waste in the surplus river basins’ (NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.181). The official methodology for working out whether a basin has any ‘surplus’ or not, is based on an unpublished paper by Mohile et al. (1998). In this approach, the overall surface water availability in a basin/sub-basin is assessed both at 75 per cent and 50 per cent dependability’s. These are compared with the estimated water requirements for various uses, viz; irrigation, domestic supplies, industrial requirements, hydropower and salinity control, say by 2025. The process for the assessment of irrigation, domestic and industrial needs are given in some details in the Report of the Working Group on Inter-basin Transfer of Water (NCIWRDP, 1999b: p.30). Interestingly, there is no information in this Report on how the assessment of the water need for salinity control or other water needs for the continuation of diverse ecosystems services provided by water in the various parts of the basin, would be made.

1

One lakh ⫽ 105; ten lakh ⫽ one million ⫽ 106; one crore ⫽ 10 million ⫽ 107.

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This is quite expected, because from the viewpoint of reductionist engineering it is not possible to recognize and assess the diverse ecosystem services performed by water in all parts of the river basin, from the moment it gets precipitated to the moment it is drained out into the sea. The arithmetical hydrology of reductionist water resource engineering sees water purely from the point of storage, transfer and allocation for supplies. It is, thus, unable to recognize that in all river basins, from a holistic perspective, one does not see any ‘surplus’ water, because every drop performs some ecological service all the time. The ecosystems evolve by making optimal use of all the water available. If a decision is taken to move some amount of water away from a basin, a proportional damage will be done to the ecosystem, depending on the service provided by that amount of water. Thus, no amount of water in a river basin can be taken out without causing some damage to the ecosystem services. In other words, there is no ‘free’ ‘surplus’ water in a basin that can be taken away without a price. In the narrow perspective of arithmetical hydrology, such perceptions are absent. Hence, there is little difficulty in identifying river basins as ‘surplus’ and taking out, that ‘surplus’ water from the basin without seeing any harm in such an act (Singh R., 2003a). It is so, because, otherwise, the reductionist view concludes that ‘surplus’ water as being lost or wasted, as it flows down to the sea. Prabhu (2003) makes a more clear statement in this regard when he claims that ‘… the (interlinking) project is about rationalization of water that is lost to the sea’. However, when the reductionist vision of arithmetic hydrology is replaced by the holistic perspective of ecohydrology, the outflow of a river to the sea is no more seen as a ‘loss’, nor flood water is seen as a harmful ‘surplus’. In the ecohydrological perspective, there is always some cost, known, unknown or perceived, associated with the transfer of water from one basin to another, whether in small amounts or large. For example, flood water in eastern India may appear to be a harmful surplus from the viewpoint of arithmetical hydrology. Accordingly, the transfer of water from a ‘surplus’ basin in eastern India to a drier one in another part of the country represents something of a win-win situation. On the other hand, from the holistic ecohydrological viewpoint, flood water is seen as the source of free minerals for the land, free recharge for the groundwater resources, free medium for the growth and transportation of fish and conservation of biological diversity, free bumper harvest for the humans, etc. At the macro-level, the flood flows flush the silt from the riverbeds in the plains to the delta areas free of cost. They support the rich fisheries in the estuaries and keep away the saline incursion from the sea. When flood water is diverted away from a basin, the reductionist hydrology sees it as a ‘harmless’ transfer, which has all gains and no losses. From an ecohydrological perspective such transfer of flows affects the processes of many ecosystem services. If any view of the natural ecosystem is unable to recognize and accept the diverse ecosystems services water performs or is incapable of understanding their scientific status, it is likely that the narrow point of view would generate the false concept of ‘surplus’ flows in riparian ecosystems or lakes. Thus, from a holistic viewpoint, there are always costs, big or small, associated with transfer of water from one basin to another, which results in loss to many ecosystem services. One has only to look at the state of the ecology and economy of the Aral Sea today, to find what economic damage can be done by water transfer projects that are not ecologically informed. As a World Bank Report (1992) says:

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This ecological disaster is the consequence of excessive extraction of water for irrigation from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, which feed the Aral Sea. Total river runoff into the sea fell from an average 55 cubic kilometers a year in the 1950s to zero in the early 1980s … … If current trends continue unchecked, the sea will eventually shrink to a saline lake one-sixth of its 1960 size. As the paradigmatic transformation in water resource management advances, the old practice of seeing ‘surplus’ water is also retreating. For example, the Murray-Darling Basin Commission in Australia is seriously contemplating on extending financial encouragement to farmers for saving on their allocation of irrigation water and to allow the savings to remain instream. In another instance, Chile’s National Water Code of 1981 established a system of water rights that are transferable and independent of land use and ownership. The most frequent transaction in Chile’s water markets is the ‘renting’ of water between neighbouring farmers with different water requirements (Gazmuri, 1992). In the USA today, the country which started the old global trend of building large dams, ‘there is a new trend to take out or decommission dams that either no longer serve a useful purpose or have caused such egregious ecological impacts as to warrant removal. Nearly 500 dams in the USA and elsewhere have already been removed and the movement towards river restoration is accelerating’ (Gleick, 2000). The expression of interest in the policy framework and technical details of the interlinking project is not an expression of the opinion that rivers should never be linked. The concern relates to the justifiability or otherwise of such a large national investment. In this regard, even a memorandum has been sent by a group of concerned citizens to the Prime Minister on 22 April 2003, asking for a more comprehensive assessment of the river link proposal before it proceeds further. In that memorandum, it has been suggested that, ‘Where a river linking or long-distance water transfer proposal seems prima facie a good option, (it will be good to) get a thorough, professional feasibility report prepared in a fully interdisciplinary manner, internalizing not merely the techno-economic but also the environmental, human, social, equity, “gender” and other relevant aspects and concerns and put it through a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, rigorous and stringent process of detailed examination, appraisal and approval’. The stand taken here is that if some rivers need to be linked for some proven and unavoidable reasons, it should be undertaken with full recognition of the serious ecological damages that may be caused by the interlinking, and that the benefits would far outweigh these costs. The rapid improvements in the field of ecological economics are making valuation of such damages increasingly accurate. By adopting a holistic approach, projects like the interlinking of rivers can be exposed to a more comprehensive and realistic assessment, thus offering a more mature tool for decision making. Unfortunately, in the absence of any detailed technical information on the proposed interlinking project, the type and extent of ecological damage to be caused by its implementation can not be ascertained or assessed fully. On the basis of such scanty technical details what can, however, be undertaken, is a realistic review of the knowledge base and policy framework for the project and a general examination whether it offers the most cost-effective option for generating the claimed benefits of the project. These benefits are provision of domestic water supplies in dry areas, food security for the country, water supplies for appropriate type of agriculture and industries in the drier areas, flood control, improvement in water flows and navigation, etc., without causing major ecological damages to any part of the concerned river basins. While these objectives are quite appreciable, whether the project actually can address these

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problems and a construction cost of US$ 125 to 200 billion, the operational costs and the cost of consequent environmental damages are justified or not, remains a big question. It is in this background that, in this paper, the interlinking project will be examined through raising the following questions:





Does the interlinking project offer the most cost-effective option for domestic water security in drought-prone areas in India? Is India’s food security critically dependent on the interlinking project? Who will bridge the crucial knowledge gaps on the Himalayan Component? Will the interlinking of rivers multiply the conflicts related to water?

4.3 DOES THE INTERLINKING PROJECT OFFER THE MOST COST-EFFECTIVE OPTION FOR DOMESTIC WATER SECURITY IN DROUGHT-PRONE AREAS IN INDIA? One of the claimed benefits of the interlinking project is that it will provide drinking water to large areas in the country facing drought and water scarcity. The task of providing domestic water supplies, including for sanitation, should obviously receive the highest priority. Solution to this problem is of particular importance in the case of rural India, where water for sanitation is still not available to many people. Domestic water requirements are very important in terms of priority, but account for a very small part of the total national water needs. The official process for the identification of river basins as ‘surplus’ or ‘deficit’ clubs together all water needs, and agricultural requirements dominates that classification. If the domestic water needs are considered separately, and not clubbed with their irrigational or industrial requirements, and compared with the water availability over smaller watersheds and sub-basins, a completely different picture of availability will surely emerge. In that picture, not many areas in India will come out as water deficit in a water balance study. With this assessment in mind, a few case studies had been undertaken by the UNICEF and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) in a few areas of the country where scarcity of water supplies during the pre-monsoon months becomes a problem. From the report that emerged, it becomes clear that if the precipitation within the watersheds or sub-basins is harvested and conserved properly, satisfaction of domestic water needs will not be a problem in most parts of the country (Nigam et al., 1997). This observation is completely in consonance with the result of numerous community initiatives for water harvesting, whether in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttaranchal, or anywhere else in the country. The Prime Minister’s call to promote water harvesting in India as a people’s movement is directed to this immense potential of local level water harvesting and conservation in providing domestic water security in the dry areas of India. In contrast, the interlinking project tries to supply domestic water through collection at far away points and distribution through long canals or existing riverbeds. However, no cost estimate for the supply of drinking water from the related dams and canals is available. As a result, a clear comparison of the cost of water supply from the interlinking project can not be made with the small and localized community initiatives. Indications are however quite clear that from the point of both the financial cost and the amount of water lost; the centralized interlinking project will be much costlier than the decentralized ones. While the whole country needed about 30 km3 of water for satisfying annual domestic needs in 1997 to 1998, India managed to lose 36 km3 of water in that year only through evaporation from the reservoirs. By the year 2010, while the annual domestic requirements of India

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would become 42 km3, an equal amount would be lost through evaporation (NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.69). Indeed, the centralized collection at far away points and long distance distribution in the interlinking project is a very water wasteful way of supplying domestic water needs. In the large rural areas, specially the arid and semiarid areas, the economic efficacy and optimality of the proven technology of local level harvesting and conservation in providing domestic water security, has not been disproved by any analysis. Through the popularization of the promises of the interlinking project, a policy obsession has started to grow in the country that the ‘surplus’ basins have all the solutions in store, for addressing the problem of water scarcity in the rest of the country. One has only to wait for the US$ 125 to 200 billion project to be completed, to have all the water scarcity problems solved. This has brought the country to such a situation of costly sedation, that if Rajasthan receives rainfall above average, as a result of the integral variability of climate, as has been the case in the summer of 2003, no serious governmental steps for harvesting and conservation of the rainwater at the micro-level is noticed. However, in many villages of Rajasthan, micro-level harvesting and conservation structures have been built through non-governmental initiatives (for more details see Chapter 15). In those villages people will probably enjoy security of domestic water supplies, in the drier periods. In other places, their water security is flowing out with the local runoff, making an unrealistic and artificial justification for dependence on long distance transfers. This need for harvesting and conservation of water is equally true whether it is in rain-scarce Ajmer (550 mm annually) or rain-covered Cherrapunji (11,000 mm annually). In the words of Verghese (2003) the interlinking project: is not a single stand-alone panacea for the country’s water problems but the apex of a progression of integrated micro to mega measures in an over all but unarticulated national water strategy. There is a clear danger in believing that the interlinking project is the last word for domestic water security all over the country. The problem of providing domestic water supplies in areas away from the rivers will largely remain unsolved, even if the interlinking project is completed. Moreover, as far as only the domestic water needs are concerned, and not extraction for meeting the irrigation requirements, the existing flows in the rivers may be enough in most locations near the rivers. The interlinking will not have much effect on improving the supply situations in the vast dry areas which are in the higher parts of the basins and away from the rivers to be interlinked rivers, and hence, most critically dependent on local rain water. It needs to be stressed that the poor and the vulnerable populations in arid regions usually reside in the upper parts of the watersheds or basins, while the rich live on the water rich lands at the lowest parts of the basins. The interlinking project, which will make more water flow along the riverbeds, will have very marginal reach to these poorer populations. The NCIWRDP (1999a: p.152) has given a clear indication that for secure domestic water security local level arrangements worked out by popular participation needs to be promoted. Local level harvesting and conservation has not only satisfied the domestic water needs in many such arid and semiarid areas, in many cases, it has also provided protective irrigation to rainfed farmlands.

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Similarly, along the long coast-line of India, several technological options for supply of domestic water requirements are emerging in the form of desalination. Capacity for desalinating water has increased globally from 1.5 million m3 per day to the current figure of more than 20 million m3 per day. This has reduced the cost-price of desalinated water to less than US$ 1.00/m3 for seawater and less than US$ 0.50/m3 for brackish water, largely by cutting the energy requirements of desalination plants (Anon, 1999). As a result, companies are now ready to market drinking water at a price of 5 paise (0.1 cent) per litre (New Indian Express, 2003). The emerging technology of rapid spray evaporation (RSE) is expected to further bring down the price level (Ellis, 2003). The interlinking project needs to be examined from this point, otherwise, after all the huge construction in the name of delivering water to the water scarce areas, it may soon prove to be not the most costeffective way of doing so. In short, in the absence of comparative cost figures, answers to the questions related to the desirability or otherwise of this gigantic project for promoting domestic water security in India can not be found. However, the primary importance in this respect, of local level harvesting and conservation of rainwater remains unchallenged. There is, however, a good case for long distance water transfer projects, whether interbasin, or otherwise, when large urban areas need to be supplied with adequate domestic water. However, such transfer projects do not need a great amount of water, when compared with irrigation. It will be wiser to address the issue of urban water security in India as a priority issue, separate from irrigation. For the domestic water security of most of the rural areas suffering from water scarcity, there is no alternative to intensive and extensive promotion of local level harvesting of water. For these areas, the option of long distance transfer should be the last one, not the first. 4.4 IS INDIA’S FOOD SECURITY CRITICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE INTERLINKING PROJECT? The growth in irrigated area, along with improvements in farming technologies and plant genetics, has been responsible for the rapid growth in crop production over the last few decades in our country. The total irrigation potential created till the 9th Plan period is about 107 million hectares (Mha) (NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.79). Using an additional 173 billion cubic meters (BCM) of water, the interlinking project plans to bring under irrigation an additional 34 Mha of land with the objective of meeting ‘the requirements of increasing food and fibre production for a growing and increasingly prosperous population’ (Vaidyanathan, 2003). Recent agricultural statistics reveal that we have achieved a record food grain production of 209 million tons in 2005–2006 which is 11 million tonnes more than that of the previous year (MoF, 2006). The data from the Food Corporation of India (FCI) indicates that the national buffer stock stands at an all time high of 62 million tons. The Government of India has issued a statement saying that there is no problem in the food front. Food security is, however, not a matter of food production alone. Good production and good distribution together can deliver food security. Despite the huge buffer stock of food grains in India, an estimated 200 million people are underfed and 50 million are reportedly cringing below starvation (Goyal, 2002). Food security in India, accordingly, is as much a matter of access and distribution, as production. The growth of the population in India is expected to flatten towards the middle of the present century. There will be a consequent flattening of food requirements. Food production is a matter of area under agriculture and yield. India has the largest irrigation network and second largest arable area in the world. However, in spite of the

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availability of good water and land, our agricultural productivity stands very low when compared with other countries of the world. Our neighbouring country, China faces problems similar to ours, in a more acute manner. It has a larger population to feed, with much less arable land. However, as Swaminathan (1999: p.73) has pointed out, China produces 13 per cent more food grains per capita than India. Data from the FAO (CWC, 1998: pp. 223–224) indicates that while the cereal yield for India stood at 2,134 kg per ha in 1995, the same for China stood at 4,664 kg per ha (Figure 4.3).

Fig. 4.3 Country wise tield of cereals in kg per ha (Source: Water and related statistics, central water commission, 1998).

Eminent agricultural scientists in India are foreseeing great technological breakthroughs in agricultural productivity in the coming years. The NCIWRDP has pointed out that the yield of wheat in experimental farms in India has already exceeded 6,000 kg per ha. However, the calculations of India’s food production in the coming decades, made for showing the interlinking project as an essential step for food security, are made with the assumption that even after 50 years from now, India will attain yield levels only two-thirds of what has already been achieved in the experimental farms. The NCIWRDP (1999a: p.57) has taken yield levels of 4,000 kg per ha in irrigated land, as the basis for making projection for food crop production in 2050. Similarly, in the rain fed land, NCIWRDP has projected that the food crop yield is expected to grow from the present 1,000 kg per ha to 1,500 kg per ha only in 2050. The other important way to look at the justification or otherwise of the projected essentiality of the interlinking project, is to look at food grain productivity per unit volume of water. Singh (2003) takes the view that India is ‘already producing enough food; production can be further increased by at least 25 per cent from existing irrigated area itself by improved inputs and agricultural technology’. This view is reiterated by Carruthers and Morrison (1994), when they say that ‘we do not anticipate or call for an increased rate of capital intensive investment in irrigation infrastructure but we do need to see that more

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is achieved with what is presently developed’. Thus, the justification for such a costly physical expansion of irrigation based on macro-level collection and long distance transfer of large volumes of water does not have universal support. It is important to note that China, with only half as much arable land per capita as India, today is not thinking in terms of drastically increasing the use of water in agriculture but increasing the water use efficiency in the existing irrigated areas. Wang (2002: p.15 and p.110), the Water Resource Minister of China, writes that, ‘Irrigation is no longer ‘watering the land’ but supplying water for growth of crops … At present, the average agricultural water use efficiency is 0.43 in China. If water saving irrigation is extended to raise the figure up to 0.55 (some experts consider 0.6), food security can be guaranteed when the population increases to 1.6 billion in 2030 without increase of total agricultural water use’. In the case of India, blessed with more arable land and more irrigation potential, while similar figures for the improvement in the efficiency of the use of irrigation water (from 0.35 at present to 0.60 in 2050) are being projected (NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.58), probably with a weaker conviction, there is no clear policy perspective for achieving higher water use efficiency and reach the declared targets. Thus, the perceived dependence of India’s food security on the continued physical expansion of irrigation will remain inextricably linked with the interlinking project. However, as Swaminathan (1999: p.93) has cautioned that: the inefficient and negligent use of water in agriculture is one of the most serious barriers to sustainable expansion of agricultural production. Public policy regarding the cost of water supplied by major irrigation projects and low-cost or free distribution of power for pumping underground water aggravate the problem … … Water consumption can be reduced radically, by as much as five-to-ten fold, at the same time as significantly increasing crop yields. Vaidyanathan (2003), who has examined the methodology and estimates in the NCIWRDP Report, questions the very concept of this efficiency underlying the measures. He says that: the present available efficiency of surface irrigation, according to the figures cited in the report, ranges between 30 and 50 per cent. … … The concept of efficiency not being specified, their relation to projections cannot be verified without comparable estimates of current and future water balances and irrigation efficiencies overall for the two major sources separately. The World Bank Irrigation Sector Report on India takes a similar view on irrigation and takes the position that ‘from the past heavy emphasis on physical expansion, effort now needs to turn to a much greater emphasis on productivity enhancement’ (World Bank, 1999: p.11). It is clear that the view that physical expansion of irrigation is the best possible and the most cost-effective option for India maintaining food security is open to scrutiny. The above makes it clear that the line of linkage between the interlinking project and India’s food security is not uniquely established. There are many other ways to sustain food security and they need to be seriously explored. Hence, before such a gigantic and expensive project is taken up, comparisons of the costs for maintaining food security along all possible technological options, is a pre-requisite. Particular attention should be given as to why, even after 50 long years, yield from India’s irrigated fields will not be

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even two-thirds of the yield that has already been achieved in experimental farms (6,000 kg per ha). In addition to this, before the decision for further physical expansion of irrigation is cleared, one needs to examine the use of the quantity and quality of the use of the irrigation potential already created. Till the end of the 9th Plan, the irrigation potential created and utilisation achieved in India was reported as 106.6 Mha and 93.4 Mha, respectively (NCIWRDP, 1999a: p.79). The reasons for taking the figure of 77 Mha as the projected irrigated cropped area as far away in future, as in 2010 needs to be examined from the point whether it is a conservative figure. It is quite logical for the country to expect that the irrigation potential already created be achieved with the projected high level of efficiency. In such a situation, the need for the interlinking project would have to be reassessed. In addition, the interlinking project envisages that 30 per cent of the irrigated area would be used for the cultivation of non-food crops. Thus, it is very reasonable to expect that the additional irrigation potential of 34 Mha to be created by the interlinking project would actually mean some at most another 17 to 18 Mha for irrigated food crop cultivation. Does the expenditure of US$ 125 to 200 billlion seem justified for such a limited return at the national level? Of course, the ready availability additional water and absence of any legal control on its use may encourage the growth of water intensive industries and commercial crops in the dry areas, notwithstanding their natural limitations. This makes the case for the ‘surplus’ basins supplying that water to ‘deficit’ basins to receive a good price for the water, the use of which would make a good amount of value addition. In fact, inter-state water markets can flourish and solve the problem without a huge national investment. In fact, if such a market is established, there may be a beginning of mutually agreed inter basin transfers, making the very expensive interlinking project redundant. From the above analysis, it becomes clear that though the main declared justification of the interlinking project comes from its claim about providing additional 173 BCM of water, reportedly for India’s food security, much less expensive options are possibly available. It is imperative that comparative costs of all the possible paths to food security like introduction of qualitative changes in agriculture, technological improvements including more efficient use of water in irrigated areas, be assessed and only then appropriate decision taken. Otherwise, as Postel (1999) has cautioned, ‘… it is not enough to meet a short term goal of feeding the global population. If we do so by consuming so much land and water that ecosystems cease to function, we will have, not a claim to victory, but a recipe for economic and social decline’. However, ignoring the serious questions raised above on the official justifications, the interlinking project may still be pushed through without any open professional assessment. In that event, several more serious questions will come to the fore. Part of these questions relates to the lack an adequate knowledge base, and part, to the conflicts, that are inherent in the project idea and will express themselves as and when the realization of the project starts. In the following sections, these questions are being explained.

4.5 WHO WILL BRIDGE THE CRUCIAL KNOWLEDGE GAP ON THE HIMALAYAN COMPONENT? The mountains play a very significant role in providing the supplies of water the human societies need (Bandyopadhyay et al., 1997). Like all major mountains, the Himalaya is the source of many large rivers, like the Yangtse, Irrawadi, Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra, Ganga, Indus, Amu Darya, etc. Indeed, the Himalaya can be called the ‘water tower of Asia’. There is little surprise that the basic idea of the interlinking project in India is to

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transfer water from Himalayan river basins to others. The interlinking project has a Himalayan component that envisages construction of several dams on the Himalayan rivers and 14 links. The complexity of the ecology of the Himalaya is well known and Ives and Messerli (1989) have described quite well the uncertainty associated with taking a mechanical and traditional view of Himalayan development. Bandyopadhyay and Gyawali (1994) have presented a more detailed analysis of the ecological and political challenges associated with the development of Himalayan waters. They have identified several important gaps in knowledge in the conventional approach to development of the Himalayan rivers based on dams and embankments. Bandyopadhyay (2002) has made a detailed analysis of the problems associated with dams on the Himalayan rivers, in respect of the Report of the World Commission on Dams. Of special significance in terms of the safety of Himalayan dams is the knowledge about the seismic hazard, the gaps on which have been articulated by Gaur (1993). Thus, the significant gaps in knowledge can be summarized as on: a)

the mechanism of the generation and draining out of flood waters in the Himalayan foothills and floodplains b) the dynamics of the generation, transportation and deposition of sediments all along the course of the Himalayan rivers c) the nature of seismic risks associated with high dams in the Himalaya d) the impacts of structural interventions in the Himalayan rivers, like embankments e) the impact of the four points above on the economic feasibility of water development projects. Recognizing the seriousness of the gaps in knowledge mentioned above, the NCIWRDP (1999a: p.187–188) took the wise view that: the Himalayan component would require more detailed study using systems analysis techniques. Actual implementation is unlikely to be undertaken in the immediate coming decades. The problem of the knowledge gap was not limited to theories or concepts alone. Even as a National Commission, the NCIWRDP could not have access to data related to the Himalayan component (NCIWRDP, 1999: p.187). Thus, a large part of water development projects and the related knowledge will have to be accepted without any open professional assessment. It is not clear what are the reasons behind this non-availability of data on the Himalayan rivers, in the absence of which it would become difficult to get an open scientific picture of India’s huge water resources. Recognizing the urgent need for open professional research on the Himalayan rivers, the NCIWRDP (1999: p.370) has further stressed that, ‘hydrological data of all the basins need to be made available to the public on demand’. It was in this background, that the order from the Supreme Court was made directing that all the construction activities related to the interlinking project needs to be completed in the next 10 years. Does it mean that the order clears the path for investment in and construction of the project without any dependable and open professional examination based on detailed hydrological data and growing body of technical knowledge about the Himalayan ecohydrology (Chalise and Khanal, 1996)? Will the proponents of the project be correct in saying that the order of the Apex Court makes the need for a scientific and technical examination of the project redundant? Or, otherwise, does the order mean that all

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scientific and technical research related to Himalayan waters are to be completed within the stipulated period? If so, is it possible to complete all the research studies within that period? Or, in view of the confidentiality associated with hydrological data on the Himalayan rivers, no such need for an open professional research and assessment is envisaged? This leaves one with the vital question that – in the event of the Himalayan component being taken up for implementation, who would bridge the above knowledge gap? To any professional involved in serious research on ecohydrology of the Himalayan rivers, it is no news that only the development of systematic knowledge needed for making credible impact assessment of the dams and canals proposed in the interlinking project would need quite a long time. If such an exercise gets completed in an open and professional manner, in all probability, many large projects may turn out to be technically and economically unfeasible. One example of the significance of the knowledge gap is related to the declared benefits of ‘flood control’ from the interlinking project. Floods in the Himalayan foothills and the adjoining plains are the result of a complex ecological process, and much of it is not well understood. Simplistic engineering claims about projects that will control floods in the Himalayan rivers are not new, and have been made over decades. The only thing missing is a good scientific support to the claims; because the real life observations do not substantiate the claims and floods in the Himalayan rivers have certainly not declined over the years. There is a clear case for a transparent and professional examination of the claims of ‘flood control’ by the interlinking project. In addition, it is clear to a layman that the realization of the Himalayan component is critically dependent on the agreement of neighbouring countries of Nepal and Bhutan to the proposed constructions, especially of dams, in their respective territories. Bangladesh, as a downstream country, will be an affected party, and needs to be taken into confidence. No progress has been made in the direction of officially informing the neighbouring countries about the interlinking project. This is evident from a statement from the then Nepalese Water Resource Secretary, Aryal (2003) or the recent writing of Vidal (2003). The Himalayan component, thus, runs the risk of becoming a non-starter. In case there is an attempt to give it an immediate push start, the genuine question by whom and how will the crucial knowledge gap on the Himalayan rivers be bridged, will remain unanswered. Can India afford to make huge investments in such a gigantic 21st century project on the basis of an outdated knowledge base?

4.6 WILL THE INTERLINKING OF RIVERS MULTIPLY THE CONFLICTS RELATED TO WATER? India is known for major water related conflicts, whether it is between Haryana and Punjab in the north, or between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in the south. More recently, serious conflicts have emerged among the states sharing the Krishna river basin. Away from the conflicts among the states, India has experienced a large number of water related conflicts between the officials and the people. The lack of an easy access to information about projects and the limited nature of the framework for project appraisal and approval as used at present in India make such conflicts an inevitable part of project execution. It is so because the calculation of benefits and cost of the projects are undertaken according to some very old guidelines. For example, the recommendations of the Third Conference of the State Irrigation Ministers held in 1977 is the latest contribution to the guidelines (NCIWRDP, 1999b: p.165). Naturally, these guidelines are old and are unable to address the present day scientific, social or environmental consciousness. If the administrative rules

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are not keeping up with time, it is not surprising that conflicts are becoming inevitable. As a result, the courts are increasingly taking up the administration of water resources in India. On this basis, the interlinking project is seen to have the potential for generating four distinct types of conflicts. They are:





over compensations for resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced, over compensation for environmental damages from the project, over sharing the benefits and costs of the project among the states of India, and over cooperative management of the project in an international river basins.

4.6.1 Compensations for resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced Conventionally, in making the benefit-cost analysis of developmental projects in India, the social costs are invariably downplayed. Most significant of the social costs are the costs suffered by the people from involuntary displacement. The burden of displacement thus remains unaccounted for and relocation causes profound economic and cultural disruption to the individuals affected as well as to the social fabric of local communities (Cernea, 1988). In this context, Roy (1999) states that, ‘In India, fifty million people are estimated to have been displaced in last five decades by the construction of dams, power plants, highways and such other infrastructure development projects. Subsequently no more than one-fourth of them could be assisted to regain their livelihoods’. Wolfensohn (1995) rightly surmises the situation that, ‘Such social injustice can destroy economic and political advances’. In the case of the interlinking project, no official figure is available for the number of people to be displaced. It is estimated that the network of canals extending to about 10,500 km would displace about 5.5 million people, who are mostly tribals and farmers (Vombatkere, 2003). One has to add to it the people to be displaced by the various reservoirs that may be built, in India or in the neighboring countries. In view of the fact that the river interlinking proposal has been slotted as the largest construction project ever in the world, the above-mentioned figure for the number displaced seems a probable underestimation of the true picture. This gets compounded with the fact that the government is yet to commit itself on a sound and clearly spelt out resettlement and rehabilitation policy. If this crucial step is not completed the issue of the resettlement and rehabilitation related to the interlinking project is sure to generate a great number of protests and public interest litigation, the cost of which will be enormous.

4.6.2 Compensation for environmental damages from the project As has been stressed earlier in this paper, the existence of ‘surplus’ water in one basin and its transfer to another does not constitute a win-win situation. In correctly assessing the environmental costs, as Vaidyanathan (2003) suggests, ‘One needs to know when, for what duration and how much water can be drawn from each basin, for transfer to the next, and how well it matches the irrigation requirements in the recipient basin’. The ruinous results of ecologically un-informed economic development activities, like widespread waterlogging, salinization and the resulting desertification in the command areas of many large irrigation projects, can be cited. In the absence of an appropriate study for determining the actual water needs in an area, the river link plan can similarly prove to be ecologically disastrous.

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Guided by the aspiration of rapid economic growth, quest for every drop of water becomes the practice. There is little in the proposed interlinking project, for promoting protection against drought. It plans to extend the conventional intensive irrigation to the arid areas. The result is that heavily water-demanding crops start to be grown in arid areas. One is aware that the roots of the conflict over the famous Cauvery waters were in the adoption of water intensive cropping systems and the abandonment of many traditional water harvesting structures. In this situation of increasing emphasis on the commercialization of some crops at the cost of staple food grains, Athavale et al., (2003) fears that:

In irrigated areas, the provision of additional water from outside based on questionable calculations of water-deficits, may weaken the motivation for improving the efficiency of water-conveyance and water-use, further encourage the recourse to water-intensive crops and induce the repetition of some of the ills associated with the Green Revolution approaches. In arid or drought-prone areas, it may even lead to the introduction of irrigated agriculture of a kind more appropriate to wet areas.

On the other hand, the experiences in the successful promotion of water harvesting and resilience against drought in dry land farming systems, as gained from nongovernmental initiatives like the Pani Panchayat in Maharashtra, are almost externalized from the interlinking project. On 23 May 2003, the Ministry of Environment and Forests had put out a 23-point concern about the environmental implications of the proposed interlinking project. These included the submergence of forests and cultivable areas, displacement and resettlement and serious implications in terms of bio-diversity loss (Hazarika, 2003). Bandyopadhyay (2003) has raised the question ‘How are the environmental damages that may be caused by the interlinking project identified and their financial costs estimated, if at all?’ Martin (2003) warned that linking rivers like straight pipelines without looking at the ecological impact could lead to serious repercussions. Factorization of environmental impacts into project planning is an absolute necessity and more important are the monetized costs of environmental impacts in evaluation approaches to develop prices for environmental services and amenities. Decisions, which include these impacts, support sustainability. Scientists are also skeptical of the fact that river diversion would bring in significant changes in the physical and chemical compositions of the sediment load, river morphology and the shape of the delta formed at the river mouth. All these downstream processes have serious economic and livelihood implications, presently ignored by the project.

4.6.3 Sharing the benefits and costs of the project among the states of India Whether it’s the erratic water supply forcing families to shift out of Chennai, or the procession in Gujarat to protest against the lack in water supply or fights of the farmers over opening of field channels in Haryana or Punjab, the ‘central conflict over water resources revolves around the question of ownership, access and control over water’ (Upadhyay, 2001). In the last decade, there have been reports of violence and deaths on account of conflicts over water rights between upstream and downstream areas in many

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river basins in India – Narmada, Cauvery, Krishna, Godavari basins are some examples for such incidents (Rajagopal, 2002). States have always enjoyed right over water for apportionment and allocation. If under the centralized scheme of river linking, the riparian rights of the states gets disturbed and right over the same gets transferred, then the issue which emanates from the same would also need to be resolved. Singh (2003b) the additional secretary in the MoWR has empathetically enquired whether there are any hard and fast rules, conventions, best practices, executive fiats, which require intra-basin disputes to be resolved first before seeking to resolve inter-basin issues. Two clear roots for new inter-state conflicts are seen in the interlinking project. The first one is on the description of the total requirement of the states in the ‘surplus’ basins, for example, Assam or West Bengal. While the arithmetical hydrology will be able to calculate the obvious and supply oriented requirements and project them in both space and time, the problem will arise on the requirements that arithmetical hydrology can not recognize. Take for example, how would one scientifically arrive at the need for minimum flow in Padma (the other name of the Ganges in Bangladesh) or Meghna or the Hooghly-Bhagirathi for the sustainability of the livelihoods of the millions involved in fishing in southern Bangladesh and the state of West Bengal? What will be the impact of the diversion of the 10 per cent of the lean season flow from ‘surplus’ river basins on the groundwater resources and saline incursion in the downstream areas? These estimates are not easy to make. However, it is also not easy to ignore them. In assessing the full requirements, the states need to liberate themselves from the limits of arithmetical hydrology and use ecohydrology as the knowledge base for the estimation of these water requirements. Indeed, there will be a great conflict of worldviews when such claims would be put forward by the ‘surplus’ states. The second part of the potential for conflict is related to the limits that will be imposed on the ‘surplus’ states, if, as and when the interlinking project gets realized. By virtue of the principle of prior extraction, the ‘deficit’ states would have the luxury of promoting water intensive export oriented agriculture or polluting industries that are not otherwise feasible or sustainable in those areas. Economic growth is good, when all damages from the growth are paid according to the principle of full costing. What market mechanism would be instituted for the ‘surplus’ states to receive the price for water that would be used by the ‘deficit’ states commercially for large profits? If this is not sorted out, the project is bound to face constant problems, as is seen in the case of Cauvery waters today. In this commotion, people of the country also deserve to know whether this centralized plan is a step for ‘nationalization’ for subsequent privatization of water. There have been several articles put up in the print media both in support of and strongly critical of the interlinking project. Athavale et al. (2003) says that: Even if we assume that the conflict at one end (i.e., in a ‘water short’ river basin) is eased by the importation of external water, we may be initiating a new conflict at the other end (the donor basin). The project has already led to strong objections form several states and it now appears that several new inter-state conflicts may arise because of this project. Singh (2003) points out that, ‘Looking at the on-going disputes between states, inter-state agreements would be extremely difficult to achieve’.

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4.6.4 Cooperative management of the project in international river basins About half of the world’s terrestrial surface belongs to international river basins. A large part of India also belongs to the two large international basins, the Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna (GBM) and the Indus. The interlinking project is fundamentally related to the development and transfer of water, particularly within and from the GBM basin. Worldwide shared water resources are covered by over 2,000 bilateral agreements on various aspects of navigation, research, fishing, water quotas and flood control (McNeely, 1999). These principles of international law have thus been developed to allocate water within a river basin and to prevent or resolve international water disputes regarding the extent of upstream and downstream use of water. Unfortunately, they rarely are easy to apply and often are contradictory. Sharing river water is particularly difficult because the effects are one-way, with upstream-downstream supply dispute being among the most common (Kilgour and Dinar, 1995). Referring to the GBM basin, Gately (1995) has commented that: A tussle is simmering in South Asia’s Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin, where Bangladesh, India, and Nepal dispute the best uses of water. India and Nepal want to exploit the basin’s huge water resources, whereas Bangladesh wants the water managed in such a way as to minimize flooding during monsoon months and water shortages during dry months. Of equal concern are the water conflicts between states in India that share river basins, such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, which border the Cauvery River. The ideal way to address the development of water resources in an international river basin is to recognize the ecological integrity of the basin, take a basin-wide approach and involve all co-riparian countries in the process of conceptualization of a project. In the case of the GBM basin, separate and bilateral agreements on smaller aspects exist between India and the three other countries, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. Indeed, much of the success of the Himalayan component depends on the ability of India to get these three countries to endorse the interlinking project. As it appears now, no concrete and positive steps have been taken so far in that direction. On the contrary, it appears from Vidal (2003) that Bangladesh is thinking of taking the matter of the interlinking project up to the UN. For India, the opening of the discussion with Nepal is even more difficult, in the background of the present and serious political instability in that country. Thus, together with interstate conflicts, the interlinking project is sure to generate important inter-country conflicts, reducing the political feasibility of the project. However, even if all the negotiations are supposedly concluded successfully, the final battle at the financial front will remain. As Rath (2003) has cautioned, the enormity of the financial requirement may be the most useful tool for India to rethink giving the people too many ‘pie-in-the-sky’ type of slogan for addressing the challenge of water resource development. 4.7 CONCLUSIONS At the end of the above review and analysis made on the basis of whatever open information is available on the project for interlinking the rivers in India, there appears a great inconsistency in the declared claims of the project, and their feasibility. Indeed, the confidentiality associated with the technical information on water resource projects comes

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as a great obstacle to its transparent professional assessment. The first and foremost commitment of a water project should be for providing domestic water supply. The indicative policy assessment show that the approach based on dams and canals is not the best choice for promoting domestic water security in India. Such a technology is wasteful of water and of a low level of dependency. Domestic water security in drought-prone rural areas can be better achieved through local level harvesting and conservation. There is, however, a need for long distance transfers to provide large urban areas with domestic water supplies. Physical expansion of irrigation by 34 Mha is the main plank for the interlinking project. The food security of India has been shown to be fully dependent on the interlinking project. However, this dependence has not been clearly established. This choice of the most effective approach to food security of India will depend on the nature of the progress of Indian agriculture in the coming decades. Fifty years is a long period and in the next 50 years, the projected yield of food crops in both irrigated and rain fed lands may increase substantially, deviating from the present low rate of growth. Similarly, if the agricultural water use efficiency goes up from 0.35 at present to 0.60 in 2050, there may not be a great increase in demand for irrigation water for producing these amounts of food crops. However, as assumed by the NCIWRDP, if Indian agriculture does keep a very low profile and maintains the present low growth of only 1 per cent per year over the next 5 decades, then the projected yields in 2050 will be about 4,000 and 1,500 kg per ha, in irrigated and rainfed lands. In such a scenario, if the water use efficiency remains low, the weaknesses of agriculture will have to be made up by better utilization of the available potential as well as physical expansion of irrigation. Whether that expansion will be achieved through the interlinking project, or by giving greater stress on micro- and meso-level water harvesting and conservation, will have to be decided on the basis of their economics. Thus, the picture of the interlinking project as the only instrument for maintaining India’s food security under a scenario of low agricultural development is not clearly established. Accordingly, there is more reason for an open and professional assessment of the project proposal. The interlinking project, even to start with, will have to face many potential inter-state conflicts. If the so called ‘surplus’ basin areas use ecohydrological arguments, and not be guided by arithmetical hydrology, in calculating their maximum water demands, then there will be quite a disagreement on what is the ‘surplus’ that can be transferred. The second point of discontent will be on the sharing of the all-important flows in the pre-monsoon period, when ‘surplus’ states cease to be so and need the water in the river as much as the ‘deficit’ basins. If the past is any indicator of the trends in future, and if the perception of the water resource engineers remains unchanged, the interlinking project may lead to so many water related conflicts, as a result of which, the Supreme Court may soon get fully overburdened with them. The interlinking project, as described now, looks like a set of linkages, developed primarily for irrigation, but looking for diverse other justifications, of drought proofing, drinking water supply, flood control, etc. Its idea of providing domestic water supply to large urban areas in dry regions is very plausible. Other claims are not that convincing. The Himalayan component is not based on any open and professionally assessed knowledge base. This is a source of serious concern. In the interest of the people of India, justifications put forward for such a gigantic project should be assessed in an open and professional manner. There is a clear need for examining the presuppositions on which the whole interlinking project has been put. The need to study the feasibility of the

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independent links will arise only after the premises are found agreeable. If the old practice of getting feasibility studies on water related projects conducted away from the public view is continued, it will be against the expectations of the changing times of openness and transparency.

REFERENCES Anon: Desalination: A Real Alternative for Water Supply in the 21st Century Annual Report. The Hague, NEDECO (www.nedeco.nl/files/jv99.pdf), 1999. Aryal, K.B.: As quoted in S. Pant, Nepal has No Official Knowledge of Mammoth Indian Project. The Kathmandu Post, July 29, 2003. Athavale, R.N. et al.: Stop This River Link Project. The Statesman, Kolkata, May 17, 2003. Bandyopadhyay, J.: A Critical Look at the Report of the World Commission on Dams in the Context of the Debate on Large Dams on the Himalayan Rivers. International Journal of Water Resource Development 18(1), March 2002, pp. 127–145. Bandyopadhyay, J.: And Quiet Flows the River Project. The Hindu Business Line (Chennai), March 14, 2003. Bandyopadhyay, J., J.C. Rodda, R. Kattelmann, Z. Kundzewicz and D. Kraemer: Highland Waters: A Resource of Global Significance. In: Mountain of the World: A Global Priority (Messerli, B and J.D. Ives Eds.), Carnforth, Parthenon, 1997, pp. 131–156. Bandyopadhyay, J. and B. Mallik: Population and Water Resources in India: Crucial Gaps in Knowledge for Sustainable Use in Future. In: Challenge of Sustainable Development: The Indian Dynamics (Sengupta, R. and A.K. Sinha Eds.), Kolkata, CDEP-IIMC and New Delhi, Manak Publishers, 2003, pp. 81–111. Bandyopadhyay, J. and D. Gyawali: Himalayan Water Resources: Ecological and Political Aspects of Management. Mountain Research and Development 14(1) (1994), pp. 1–24. Carruthers, I. and J. Morrison: 2020 Vision – Dramatic Changes in the World Agricultural and Industrial Production Systems. IIMI Review 8(1) (1994), pp. 14–20. Central Water Commission (CWC): Water and Related Statistics. CWC, New Delhi, 1998. Cernea, M.: Involuntary Resettlement in Development Projects: Policy Guidelines in World-Bank Financed Projects. World Bank Technical Paper 80, Washington, D.C., 1988. Chalise, S.R. and N.R. Khanal: Extended Abstracts: International Conference on Ecohydrology of High Mountain Areas. ICIMOD, Kathmandu, 1996. Cosgrove, W. and F.R. Rijsberman: World Water Vision: Making Water Everybody’s Business. Earthscan, London, 2000. Ellis, C.: Hot Mist Strips Salt from the Sea. New Scientist 179(2403) (July 12, 2003), p. 15. Gately, D.: Potential for International and National Water Conflicts is High in Coming Years According to Research Organization. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C., USA (http://www.ifpri.org/pressrel/061495c.htm), June 1995. Gaur, V.K. (ed.): Earthquake Hazard and Large Dams in the Himalaya. Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage, New Delhi, 1993. Gazmuri, R.: Chilean Water Policy Experience. Paper presented at the Ninth Annual Irrigation and Drainage Seminar, Agriculture and Water Resources Department, World Bank, Washington D.C., USA, 1992. Gleick, P.H.: The World’s Water 2000 to 2001: The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources. Island Press, Washington D.C., USA, 2000. Goyal, P.: Food Security in India. Online Edition (www.hinduonnet.com/the hindu/biz/ 2002/01/10/ stories/ 200201000440200.htm), January 2002. Hazarika, S.: Climb-Down on River Linking. The Statesman, May 28, 2003. Indian Water Resources Society (IWRS): Theme Paper on Inter-basin Transfers of Water for National Development: Problems and Perspectives. IWRS, 1996.

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Ives, J.D. and B. Messerli: The Himalayan Dilemma. Routledge, London, 1989. Iyer, R.R.: Rivers of Discord? The Times of India, New Delhi, November 9, 2002. Jain, S.: The River Sutra. Indian Express, New Delhi, March 2, 2003. Kilgour, M. and A. Dinar: Are Stable Agreements for Sharing International River Waters Now Possible? Working Paper 1474, The World Bank, Washington D.C., USA, 1995. Martin, C: Dams, Rivers and People 1(2–3) (March–April 2003). Also in Hindustan Times, New Delhi (http://www.narmada.org/sandrp/apr2003_1.doc), February 10, 2003. Matsura, K.: Quoted in http://www.edie.net/news/Arch, 2003. McNeely, J.: Freshwater Management: From Conflict to Cooperation. Gland, IUCN(http:// www.iucn.org/bookstore/bulletin/1999/wc2/content/conflict.pdf), 1996. Mohile, A.D.: India’s Water and Its Plausible Balance in Distant Future, 1998. Unpublished paper as cited in NCIWRDP (1999a: p.29). Ministry of Finance (MoF): Economic Survey 2006 to 2007. MoF, New Delhi, 2006. Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR): Inter-basin Transfer: Planning for Inter-basin Transfers (http://wrmin.nic.in/interbasin/header8.htm), 2002. Mirza, M.M.Q., A. Dixit and A. Nishat (eds.): Flood Problem and Management in South Asia. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2003. National Commission on Integrated Water Resource Development Plan (NCIWRDP): Integrated Water Resource Development: A Plan for Action. New Delhi, NCIWRDP, MoWR, 1999a. National Commission on Integrated Water Resource Development Plan (NCIWRDP): Report of the Working Group on Inter-basin Transfer of Water. New Delhi, NCIWRDP, MoWR, 1999b. New Indian Express: Bangalore, June 13, 2003. Nigam, A., B. Gujja, J. Bandyopadhyay and R. Talbot: Freshwater for India’s Children and Nature. WWF and UNICEF, New Delhi, 1997. Postel, S.: Pillar of Sand, Can the Irrigation Miracle Last? WW Norton, New York, 1999. Prabhu, Suresh: Interview in Indian Express. New Delhi, March 2, 2003. Rajagopal, A.: Aquaculture ‘Prosperity’ – Some Reflections from India. South Asian Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies, Hyderabad, 2002. Rath, N.: Linking Rivers: Some Elementary Arithmetic. Economic and Political Weekly 38(29) (2003), p. 3033. Rao, K.L.: India’s Water Wealth. Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1975. Roy, A.: The Greater Common Good. India Book Distributors (Bombay) Limited, Bombay, 1999. Singh, B.: A Big Dream of Little Logic. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 9, 2003. Singh, R.: The Linking will Augment the Flow of Ganga. Indian Express, New Delhi, March 2, 2003a. Singh, R.: Interlinking of Rivers. Economic and Political Weekly 38(19), May 10, 2003b, pp. 1885–1886. Swaminathan, M.S.: A Century of Hope: Harmony with Nature and Freedom from Hunger. East West Books, Madras, 1999. United Nations (UN): World Population Prospects: 2005 Revision. United Nations Population Division, New York, USA, 2006. Upadhyay, V.: Legal Conflicts Over Land, Forests and Water in India: A Review of Cases and Concepts. Aga Khan Foundation, 2001. Vaidyanathan, A.: Interlinking of Rivers. The Hindu, Chennai, March 26, 2003. Verghese, B.G.: Rivers of Discord. The Times of India, New Delhi, November 9, 2002. Verghese, B.G.: Waiting for Godaganga. Outlook Magazine, June 30, 2003. Vidal, J.: Troubled Waters for Bangladesh as India Presses on with Plan to Divert Major Rivers: UN Urged to Act Amid Warnings of Social and Ecological Disaster. The Guardian, London, July 24, 2003. Vombatkere, S.G.: Interlinking: Salvation or Folly – II? India Together (http://www.indiatogether.org/ 2003/jan/wtr-sgvintlink02.htm), January 2003. Wang, Shucheng: Resource Oriented Water Management. China WaterPower Press, Beijing, 2002.

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Wolfensohn, James D.: Address at the Annual Meeting of the World Bank and IMF. World Bank, Washington, D.C., USA, October 1995. World Bank: World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment. Oxford University Press, New York, 1992. World Bank: India: Water Resource Management – The Irrigation Sector. Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1999.

5 A Systems Approach to Interlinking Rivers in India: An Examination of Viability S.G. VOMBATKERE

5.1 INTRODUCTION Interlinking of rivers (ILR) is not simply a scheme to connect rivers by canals. It is a complicated system to connect high-discharge, fast-flowing Himalayan rivers with the seasonal rivers of peninsular India, transferring large quantities of water between river basins. The main aim of the mega-project, as stated in the National Water Policy of 2002 (GoI, 2002)1 and reiterated frequently by many national leaders of India, is to transfer surplus water from flood-prone river basins to deficit river basins to solve flood and drought problems at the same time. This aim has been frequently repeated by former President Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam in his doubtless well intentioned but untiring promotion of ILR. Since ILR is estimated (in 2002) to cost at least R. 5,600 billion (approximately US$ 125 billion), occupy around 600,000 hectares of forest, agricultural and other land, and displace hundreds of thousands of people in many states. ILR is probably the biggest project of its kind in the world; it should have been discussed in the Lok Sabha (lower house of the Parliament), but this has not happened. On the other hand, questions about the project from concerned and informed citizens have been stone-walled and opposition by potentially affected people, intellectuals, experts and activists has been criticized. The website created by the Ministry of Water Resources to provide information contained only the outlines of the ILR, but details were missing. Several feasibility studies have been conducted but the Feasibility Reports (FRs) were made available only after activists agitated the matter up to the level of the Supreme Court. Any thinking person would wonder why there is so much calculated official opacity for a project of such enormous magnitude that promises such obvious benefits like solving flood and drought at the same time. Due to the lack of transparency on the part of government, there is growing, deep distrust regarding the ILR project.

1

Article 19.1 of the National Water Policy (2002) of India states “Drought-prone areas should be made less vulnerable to drought-associated problems through soil-moisture conservation measures, water harvesting practices, minimization of evaporation losses, development of the groundwater potential including including recharging and the transfer of surface water from surplus areas where feasible and appropriate. Pastures, forestry or other modes of development which are relatively less water demanding should be encouraged. In planning water resource development projects, the needs of drought-prone areas should be given priority.”

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Based on past evidence from the large scale water projects in India and elsewhere, it is anticipated that ILR will have serious social, environmental and economic adverse effects (discussed in other chapters of this book). Large scale social impacts will stem from involuntary displacement of hundreds of thousands of project affected families (PAFs) from the forest, rural and urban land to be acquired for dams and canals, roads and bridges, and other connected structures. This assumes significance since governments have a miserable track record of rehabilitation over the past six decades due to overbearing and/or corrupt officials. Based on a survey of 54 projects, Roy (2000) estimated the people displaced by large dams in India from 1947 to 1999 to be 33 million, and most of them were not resettled (Roy, 2000). Though the present article focuses on the systems view of ILR and its technical aspects, it does not in anyway dilute the seriousness of the social problems that will accrue from forcible displacement of populations. 5.2 DESIGN OF THE ILR PROJECT Any project of national interest is meant to benefit people, but it is undisputed that it also affects some people adversely. A project that involves people, especially very large numbers, cannot be successfully designed, leave alone executed and operated, unless it takes into account the benefits and costs to people. The benefit:cost (B:C) ratio2 is inherently an inaccurate parameter because of the impossibility of quantifying intangibles (like social and environmental costs) and for several other reasons, not the least important of which is the fact that those who bear the cost by displacement and consequent loss of land and livelihood are not those who benefit from the project. The inaccuracy of calculation and arbitrariness of the acceptable B:C ratio together go to make it a dehumanized parameter, which however appears to be acceptable to engineers, economists and bureaucrats. The technical design of any system has to be based upon what are known as design assumptions. The successful functioning of the completed system is only as good as the design, which in turn depends upon the validity of the basic data which form the design assumptions. For example, consider construction of a dam across a river – it is a geotechnical system to impound a certain (designed) quantity of water. If the dam is designed to withstand an earthquake of a certain assumed intensity (called the “design earthquake”), and it is subjected to an earthquake of much higher intensity, it may collapse catastrophically. If the actual earthquake is only slightly more than the design earthquake, the dam may not collapse but may develop defects that may or may not be repairable but will reduce the functional effectiveness and life of the dam. This indicates the importance of the initial assumptions in carrying out the design. Though the design assumptions of individual dam-canals in the ILR project may be obtained from the FRs, the design assumptions for the ILR project as a whole have not been defined. The ILR system has three major flaws, and while it is true that every system has drawbacks, the ILR system is different on account of scale. One, the system envisages mass transfer of water during flood in the monsoon (July–September), when the water in rivers carries a large load of sand and silt. The total measured flow of suspended sediment in the tributaries to the Ganga is 488 ⫻ 106 tons/year, while the quantity of sediment moving 2

Different approaches for BCA have been evolved over time. Two principal approaches for BCA, namely the UNIDO approach and Little-Mirlees approach have emerged in the seventies. Later, various agencies and institutions have modified these approaches and institutions for their use in appraisal and evaluation of projects. For environmental project evaluation, the valuation approach has been used in recent years.

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SUSPENDED SEDMENT (Q s) ha.m.

in the Ganga at Farakka (18 kilometers from the Bangladesh border) is 729 ⫻ 106 tons/year (Wasson, 2003). Goswami (1985) estimated 400 million tons of suspended sediment load in the Brahmaputra during flood season at Pandu, Assam. The relation between discharge and sediment load is shown in Figure 5.1 (Kale, 1998). The power function relationship between flow and sediment transport in the river as shown on the sediment rating curve indicates a high degree of correlation between the two. Any mass transfer of water will therefore inevitably involve transfer of substantial volumes of sediment along with the water. This will clog canals in a very short time, reducing the flow in the canal and making it inefficient, necessitating heavy recurring expenditure to dredge the canals. Two, rivers like Ganga and Brahmaputra shift their courses by up to one or two kilometers over a period of a few years and are apt to leave the canal head works dry or with reduced capacity for off-take of water. This necessitates expensive “river training” maintenance works like groynes and spurs to be constructed almost every year so as to maintain supply to the canal. The example of Farakka Barrage across Ganga is a case in point, where large sums3 are being spent every year just to prevent the Ganga from by-passing the barrage, making it useless. Mazumder (2004) discussed this issue in detail. Due to the meandering tendency of the Ganga, the districts of Malda and Murshidabad in West Bengal have been subjected to unprecedented erosion after construction of the barrage. And three, water flowing in canals over very long distances involves heavy evaporation and seepage losses of water, resulting in increased cost of water delivered. In the Ganga basin, twothirds of annual precipitation is lost to evaporation because of influence of high temperature and other meteorological factors.

10 3

MONSOON PERIOD

NON-MONSOON PERIOD 10 2

10

10 1

10 0

10 0 10 3

1

–1

10 4

10 5

10

DISCHARGE (Q)

10 3

10 4

m3sec –1

Fig. 5.1 Power function relationship between flow (Q) and sediment transport (Qs) for the monsoon (log Qs ⫽ 1.79*logQ-6296) and the non-monsoon (logQs ⫽ 2.018*logQ-7307). Kale, 1998.

3

To look into the excessive bank erosion in the districts of Malda and Murshidabad in West Bengal, the Planning Commission of India set up an expert committee with Member (River Management), Central Water Commission as its Chairman. The Commission recommended long and short term measures costing R. 9,270 million (US$ 202 million) out of which short term measures would cost R. 3,150 million (US$ 68 million) (MoWR, 2001).

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In the prevailing situation of social and political unrest, deliberate interference with any link canal or canal head works by one or more of several methods of sabotage to cause system failure, cannot be ruled out. For example, a US$ 4.4 billion 336 mile (540 km) length 80 ft (24 m) top width, 16.5 ft (5 m) deep canal (The Central Arizona Project or the CAP canal) from Lake Havasu which supplies about 44 billion gallons of water each year to Tucson, USA, is fenced on both sides for its entire length, there is continuous land and air patrolling, and electronic alarms at all key structures along the length. If similar security levels are to be provided for the ILR system of about 14,000 km length to prevent interference, the cost of security will add to the cost of water delivered at any point in the system, making it uneconomical. The recurring heavy cost of security, maintenance and water losses needs to be considered in computing the economic viability of the system of link canals. There is no evidence that this has been taken into consideration during design of the ILR system.

5.3 THE ILR PROJECT: SOME KEY QUESTIONS The National Water Development Agency (NWDA) of MoWR has published a map indicating the link canals, 14 in the Himalayan region and 16 in the Peninsular region, as shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.4, respectively. For water to be transferred from a river, it is necessary to construct structures for storage of water, i.e., a dam (or a barrage, if the river is broad and sloping gently, like in the lower reaches of Ganga or Brahmaputra) to feed water into a canal. The ILR project may involve construction of about 150 large dams, but MoWR has not stated how many dams would be involved, though it proposes 30 large canals. An important consideration is the fact that out of 1,300 irrigation projects taken up for implementation since 1951, only about 900 have been completed, while 400 are incomplete, and on-going major and minor irrigation projects are languishing in various stages of progress for want of funds to the extent of R. 800 billion. Over the years, the cost of irrigation from large surface water irrigation projects has also increased significantly. According to Government of India statistics (GoI, 1989), the cost per hectare of irrigation (at 1970 to 1971 prices) rose from about R. 3,300 in the first plan to R. 5,400 in the seventh plan period. The questions here, that MoWR is not about to answer, are: a. b.

Are the incomplete projects being abandoned or being integrated into the ILR system? If R. 800 billion are not available to complete the projects in progress, what is the justification or financial-economic wisdom in incurring a fresh expenditure of R. 5,600 billion (US$ 125 billion).

5.3.1 Relieving drought or flood? Ganga in the Himalayan sub-system (Figure 5.2) has been identified as a “surplus basin”. Considering that in many parts of the Ganga basin (especially in Bihar, from where a canal is to divert water southwards to Subarnarekha) flood and drought occur simultaneously a mere couple of kilometers apart, the logic of assuming Ganga as a surplus basin is questionable. Even so, the claim of relieving flood by diverting water needs to be examined.

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* FR Completed

Fig. 5.2 The Himalayan sub-system.

Ganga peak discharge is 55,415 cubic metres per second (cumecs) at Farakka during the four monsoon months (Figure 5.3), while for technical reasons a 100 m wide 10 m deep canal can divert at most 2,000 cumecs to provide 4 per cent relief, that too only downstream of the off-take point. Likewise, Brahmaputra floods at over 60,000 cumecs, and a similar canal can provide at best 3 per cent relief. However, for the balance 8 nonmonsoon months every year, Ganga flows at an average 5,280 cumecs, and diversion of 2,000 cumecs will deny Bihar 38 per cent of Ganga water when it is needed most, even if the demand of lower riparian Bangladesh can be neglected. Thus, clearly, the claim of relieving flood in Ganga or Brahmaputra by canals cannot make economic sense. The diversion of 38 per cent of Ganga water in the dry season can only lead to the most serious socio-economic consequences. The alternative of using the canal for the 4 monsoon months (to divert a mere 4 per cent) and keeping it idle for 8 months would, of course, be economic nonsense. Based on the presented facts it is evident that ILR cannot relieve flood in Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers. It may be seen from the map showing the Peninsular sub-system (Figure 5.4), that some canals draw water from rivers that are not flood-prone like their north and northeast Indian counterparts. In the last century, major floods occurred in the Godavari only on five occasions (1953, 1958, 1959, 1976, and 1986). The Krishna experienced major floods on two occasions (1903 and 1964) (Kale, 1998). Links 2 and 3 start on upper Godavari in areas that are actually drought-prone, and draw water for release into upper Krishna, while Link 4 takes water from lower Godavari to release it into lower Krishna. Also Links 5 and 6 draw

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water from upper Krishna and deliver water to upper Pennar. Link 8 takes water from Pennar to Cauvery. All these links do not serve the main purpose of ILR, namely, relieving flood and drought. They are merely links that complicate management and interfere with the existing stable ayacut4 system.

Fig. 5.3 Annual peak discharge (m3/sec) of the Ganges River at Farakka, West Bengal. The thick horizontal line indicates average peak discharge value of 55,415 (m3/sec). Data source: UNESCO 1976. Peak discharge data after 1975 is not available.

5.3.2 Systems view of ILR Mr. Suresh Prabhu in his capacity as Chairman of ILR Task Force (TF) stated that the ILR project would be a network of canals linking 37 national rivers (for details see Chapter 3). Emphasizing the necessity of the ILR project, he had compared the proposed network of canals to the road, rail and electric power network in India; however, the fact is that water in canals flows only in one direction not in both directions as in other utility networks. Although, in a sense, Mr. Prabhu is correct if we substitute the word “system” for “network”. The success of the ILR scheme is based on functioning of a system of canals, in which northern river basins supply water to river basins that are more to the south by link canals forming a “chain of supply”. The Peninsular sub-system depends upon the Himalayan sub-system for Brahmaputra water to be transferred to Ganga, and Ganga water to Subarnarekha, and so on southwards to Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, Pennar and Palar to finally deliver water to Cauvery in Tamil Nadu. Apart from providing water for the Peninsular sub-system, the Himalayan sub-system also supplies water to Rajasthan and 4 In earlier days, for example, in South India, there were thousands of ponds, lakes, and tanks. These water bodies played a very important role in local agriculture. The technology was very nature-friendly, and the management of these systems was done by the people themselves. They have called this “Ayacut system”, where people themselves gathered around the lakes, and made decisions about irrigation management. The command area for each “ayacut” was usually 50 hectares or so. These systems are still functioning in South India.

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Gujarat through a series of links to transfer water from Kosi to Ghaghara, Gandak to upstream Ganga (across Ghagahara and Gomti), upstream Ghaghara to Jamuna (across Ganga), and from Sharada to Sabarmati (across Ganga, Jamuna and Luni). These links may be seen in Figure 5.2. Barring Brahmaputra, which only supplies water but receives none, the functioning of both sub-systems is dependent upon chain-supply of water, each river basin donating water in exchange for water received from a river basin to its north. The concept of donating water in exchange of water received, being the basic assumption for the ILR system to function, is mentioned in the FRs.

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9. 10. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Cauvery (Kattalai) - Veigai - Gunder* Ken - Netwa* Par - Tapi - Narmada* Damangange - Pinjal* Bedti - Varda Netravati - Hemavati Pamba - Achankovil - Vaippar*

Fig. 5.4 The proposed inter-basin water transfer links (The Pennisular sub-system).

Here we come up against an anomalous situation. Page 9 of Volume I of the Report of the National Commission for Integrated Water Resource Development states, “… The Himalayan river linking data is not freely available, but on the basis of public information, it appears that the Himalayan river linking component is not feasible for the period of review up to 2050” (NCIWRD, 1999: p.9). From a system viewpoint therefore, this statement of a national document raises the following important question:

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If the Himalayan sub-system is not feasible, then what is the source of water to feed Subarnarekha basin and onward to the river basins to its south (Mahanadi, Godavari, and so on) for each basin to supply water to the next basin in exchange of water received? According to the “exchange concept”, if a (recipient) river basin does not receive water from another (donor) river basin for any reason whatever, it will not be in a position to feed water (as a donor) into the next link canal in the system. For water to reach Cauvery, all the links have to function as a system, conveying water from North to South, and also from West to East (the Bedti-Varada and Nethravathi-Hemavathi links) (Figure 5.4). But even neglecting the absence of water supplied from the unfeasible Himalayan sub-system, let us discuss the Peninsular sub-system. In his capacity as Chairman of the ILR Task Force Mr. Suresh Prabhu assured that links not found feasible will not be constructed (Thakkar, 2003). It is of course known that engineers are not above manipulating FRs and B:C ratios to establish feasibility and obtain sanction for a project. But there are other causes for any particular link canal not functioning adequately or not at all, such as siltation of canals, canal breaching, political agitations against release of water, etc. The following three links require 4,000 MW of dedicated electric power for lifting water: Ganga-Subarnarekha 60 m, Subarnarekha-Mahanadi 48 m, and Godavari-Krishna 116 m. If any of the pumped lifts between Ganga and Krishna fail to function for any reason whatever (equipment failure, power failure, etc.), the recipient basin will not only not receive water, but there will also be severe flooding at the pump input point besides disrupting systemic water flow. In the Peninsular sub-system (Figure 5.4), supply to Cauvery is predicated on the reliable and continuous operation of the chain of links to its north, that is, SubarnarekhaMahanadi-Godavari-Krishna-Pennar-Palar. Suppose, for example, that Krishna-Pennar Links 5 and 6 fail to operate for some reason or are not found feasible and therefore not constructed. In such circumstances, Cauvery at the tail end cannot receive the quantity of water that it is supposed to receive, because farmers of the Pennar basin will certainly interfere with release of water southward since it will directly and immediately reduce water availability to them. Therefore the Peninsular sub-system of ILR cannot function without water donated by the Himalayan sub-system. Therefore, even neglecting the argument that canals cannot relieve flood in Ganga or Brahmaputra as already demonstrated above, with the Himalayan links not being feasible, there is no reason to take up the Peninsular links because water from Brahmaputra or Ganga will not reach Mahanadi, and the system of water supply to Cauvery will necessarily fail. The ILR system flow plan – if indeed MoWR engineers have prepared one – indicating the design flow quantities has not been made public by ILR TF or MoWR. The FRs consider each link separately and there is no evidence that NWDA or ILR TF have considered all of them together to take a systems view of ILR. In sum, the ILR system is delicate, failure-prone and subject to many if’s and but’s, mainly because it is too complicated to be practical, and the risk of system failure is high. Thus, from a system standpoint, the entire ILR scheme is unworkable. 5.3.3 Objections by states Reference “Comments of various State Governments on Inter-Basin Water Transfer Proposals of National Water Development Agency” as made available by NWDA, the Government of Andhra Pradesh has raised the following objections with regard to the

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Peninsular sub-system: (1) Nagarjunasagar ayacut, now getting dependable Krishna waters by gravity has to depend upon Godavari water pumped from Inchampalli Project nearly 300 km away, (2) Srisailam and Nagarjunasagar Power Stations may have to be shutdown, (3) Proposed Inchampalli and Polavaram Power Stations may not materialize due to lack of flows, (4) Dependable flows will be diverted and instead Andhra Pradesh will be made dependent on flood flows, and (5) Andhra Pradesh reiterated a number of times that there is no balance water (out of dependable yield) in Godavari, after meeting the requirements of basins States. Thus, in the balance, it would appear that Andhra Pradesh stands to lose by becoming a part of the ILR system. The Government of Orissa has questioned NWDA’s assumption that Mahanadi (at Manibhadra) has surplus flow that can be transferred to Godavari, and has objected to the submergence of productive lands by the proposed Polavaram dam on Godavari. There are also various objections by state governments of Chhatisgarh, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. Even Gujarat, one of the most vocal of ILR proponents that receives water from Sharada in the Ganga basin, objects to parting with water from Damanganga for supplying Mumbai with water (Link 13, Figure 5.2). Gujarat argues that transfer to surplus Pinjal basin in Maharashtra is against the national policy since it “… diverts water from surplus basin to surplus basin …” while “… (emphasizing) diversion of water from surplus to deficit basin”. Whether the argument is valid or not, the truth is that Gujarat does not want to part with water. Kerala, despite its high annual rainfall, suffers from serious water shortage in the non-monsoon months, and as far as ILR is concerned, is always only a donor state. It has passed a resolution in the Legislative Assembly that it opposes ILR. Tamil Nadu, which is always a recipient and has always been in favour of ILR, has objected to a dam proposed on Pennar by (upstream) Andhra Pradesh, on the grounds that it will deplete flow in Tamil Nadu – a simple case of wanting more! Thus it is clear that no state would like to spare water even though every state is keen to receive water – such attitude is also present at intra-state levels. In this general ambience of water demand, cobbling together inter-state consensus regarding water sharing can only be a pipe dream. Orders by the Supreme Court regarding water sharing will have to be implemented by state governments, but such orders are impractical since they can never be truly accepted at the farmers’ level. If a Chief Minister is forced to share (release) water even when his own state is running short, he will have to face the political consequences of such obedience to a distant judicial power (the Supreme Court), as erstwhile Karnataka CM Mr. S.M. Krishna did in the elections ensuing release of water to Tamil Nadu in the Cauvery water dispute with Tamil Nadu in 2003. In the well-known case of sharing water of the Cauvery basin (see Box 5.1), upper riparian Karnataka and lower riparian Tamil Nadu have been at loggerheads for several decades, Tamil Nadu demanding more water and Karnataka claiming that it is deficit of water especially in the lower rainfall years. While adjudicating in accusations traded between the two states of the same river basin, the Supreme Court had occasion to berate Karnataka, saying that water should be shared in times of scarcity. Given the above few examples of objections from states regarding ILR, it passes understanding how a water sharing dispute between states of different river basins may be resolved by a similar fiat of the Supreme Court, and what will be its local and national political cost. There is no doubt that realistic agricultural policy can result in more effective and efficient use of water, but the long term interests of any region or state with regard to water will not change, even if Ministers or governments change.

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Box 5.1 The Cauvery water dispute Dispute over the Cauvery River water is 125 years old. This south Indian River originates in the Brahmagiri ranges of Kodagu district and the basin is shared by Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry states. The dispute first erupted in 1883 when the Diwan of the Mysore Princely State launched a scheme to utilize waters of the Cauvery River for irrigation. The Madras Presidency under the British Raj resented the Diwan’s move. A 50-year agreement over sharing of the waters reached between the two states in 1924. Under the Agreement, Mysore was permitted to construct a dam in Kannambadi village to impound 44.8 thousand million cubic (tmc) feet of water. Madras appropriated to itself the right to construct a dam in Mettur in Selam district to impound 93.5 tmc ft. In 1959, Karnataka (former Mysore) drew attention of Tamil Nadu to several clauses and suggested changes. The plea was rejected by Tamil Nadu and said it would be contemplated only after the expiry of the Agreement in 1974. To resolve the crisis, countless rounds of talks have taken place without any success. The Cauvery Water Tribunal set up in 1991 in its interim award ordered that Karnataka release 205 tmc of water to Tamil Nadu during one water year (May to June). It also stipulated a weekly quantum of flow. The Karnataka felt betrayed and this led to large-scale violence against Tamils living in Karnataka. On February 5, 2007 the Tribunal finally announced its ruling. It awarded: 419 tmc ft for Tamil Nadu, 270 tmc ft for Karnataka, 30 tmc ft for Kerala and 7 tmc ft for Pondicherry. The option for approaching the Supreme Court is open to all parties.

Local farmers’ perceptions of water needs cannot be countered by calculations in an engineer’s office, nor by an agreement or MOU signed between Chief Ministers. It is common knowledge that politicians and bureaucrats can be induced to agree to almost anything (in this case, sparing “surplus” water) by application of political pressures, or offer of personal and/or party benefits, or threats of exposing past indiscretions, etc. But finally, the will of the people must supervene. ILR cannot function as a system. 5.4 RISK AND CONSEQUENCES OF SYSTEM FAILURE Any system can fail. The failure can be minor and dealt with easily, or major with serious consequences. When a system fails there is some loss to people, immediate and/or distant in both time and space. It is axiomatic that the consequences of system failure become more serious as the system gets more complex. An airline operator takes insurance against system failure (like say the crash of a passenger aircraft) to enable payment of compensation to survivors and next-of-kin, but strict inspections for airworthiness and safety procedures, etc., are a part of the insurer’s conditions. In this straightforward example, the passengers were in the ill-fated aircraft by choice and the compensation is paid to the victims of the failure. However, the ILR system is not only entirely different in nature but is on a gargantuan scale compared to an aircraft. The ILR project is an extremely complex system of dams, canals, appurtenant structures and ancillary projects like power generation, bridges, buildings and roads. The risk of failure of each sub-system like a dam is the equivalent of many passenger aircraft. Physical failure of even a part of a sub-system has long range (in time and space) physical,

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social, environmental, economic and political consequences. Contemplating the effects of systemic failure of the ILR project is unpleasant. Suppose for a moment that the completed ILR project does not function because of an erroneous basic assumption such as “water is surplus in the Ganga basin in Bihar”. In such a failure situation, all the money spent would be a colossal waste, all the people who were displaced would have been displaced in vain, the national debt would not be repaid because benefits would not accrue from the project, India’s economic standing and credit in the international arena would be lost, etc. This is the reason for people asking to know what are the basic assumptions on which the ILR project is based, and also questioning the assumptions that have been put out, such as declaring a river basin as surplus, simultaneously relieving flood and drought, generation of 30,000 MW of net electric power, etc. The risk that there may be flaws in basic assumptions is too great to leave unquestioned. Hence the basic assumptions and the performance criteria of the completed ILR project need to be spelt out, and discussed transparently at district, state and national level. The ILR project is a system with multi-dimensional uncertainties and whole volumes of imponderables, that affect not only millions of people alive today but also millions more as yet unborn, who will be willy-nilly affected by the ILR project, whether they believe that it is a good project or not, whether they oppose it and it gets going despite opposition, or even if they know nothing at all about it. They (especially future generations) are not a party to the ILR project, never having been consulted and becoming “beneficiaries” or “victims” of the project willy-nilly and not by choice. It does not need amplification that if the ILR system should fail, the number of beneficiaries will shrink to negligible numbers (though they also stand to lose in the long run as the economy collapses under the weight of debt) and the number of victims will expand out of all proportion. The ILR project cannot be insured and the victims of failure cannot be identified, and therefore can never be compensated in case of system failure. Though the risk of failure of the ILR project is essentially unassessable, it is clearly immense. India has about 4,500 large dams and it is pertinent to mention here that to date, no transparent review of the completed dam projects, each one a system in itself, has been done to verify if it has met the technical and economic performance criteria that were stipulated at the time the projects were designed and sanctioned. This opaque technical-cum-administrative track record, combined with the unwholesome track record of rehabilitation of about 40 million displaced families since 1947 naturally causes any informed and socially sensitive citizen to question the basis and demand a risk assessment of the ILR project. The risk of failure of the ILR system is of such magnitude and type that no nation, leave alone a poor, developing one like India, can afford to take. The social risk already taken by displacing about 40 million people (since 1950) is manifesting itself in the display of heightened social tensions in both rural and urban contexts in the past several years.

5.5 CONCLUSIONS Water is the “product” of the ILR project. Cost of water supplied will be determined by the interest on borrowings and operation-maintenance costs. The economic feasibility of a project can be determined only when there are comparisons of expected cost of the product with present cost, considering affordability and present availability. The cost of water based on alternative scheme(s) of watershed management needs to be compared, but even without doing so, determination of economic feasibility of the ILR project as a whole has not been carried out. The best planning can go awry if the end product is not

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economical. Privatization in India’s electric power sector has demonstrated this adequately by producing power at unaffordable cost, leading to breakdown of agreements, expensive litigation and continuing shortage of the product (Godbole, 2002). There is no doubt that India possesses the technical and management resources necessary to construct all the dams and link canals planned in the ILR project, and that financial resources can perhaps also be found. However, the matter at issue is not whether ILR can be constructed, but whether it should be constructed and whether, if constructed, it can perform what it is designed to perform. (India also has the scientific intellectual resources to assess potential effects and side effects, and to decide whether it should be done at all, but where is the evidence of that knowledge being deployed?). The accepted planning method in which alternatives, such as watershed management in the instant case, are considered and evaluated and the best alternative, or the best combination of available alternatives, are evaluated environmentally, technically and economically, has not been followed in the ILR project. Rather, a perverse, inverted planning method has been followed by which ILR has been assumed as the solution and then a network of canals has been prepared without consideration of the performance of the project as a system. The ILR project is a system of dams and canals that is meant to operate by each river basin supplying water to another river basin in exchange of water received from another “surplus” river basin. The concept of “surplus” water is one on which different states have different perceptions, and the quantification of “surplus” is even more contentious. Thus the design basis of the ILR project is itself delightfully vague, while the functioning of the system of canals cannot be ensured especially since the “source” of “surplus” water, namely Brahmaputra and Ganga are in the Himalayan region where, by admission of MoWR itself, ILR is not feasible. Entering into this R. 5,60,000 crores (US$ 125 billion) project which is a colossal system design failure that cannot perform, can only end in social, environmental, economic and political ruin for India. As a final perspective, with the IPCC Report on global warming that threatens reduced rainfall in peninsular India and speeding up of recession of Himalayan glaciers that feed Ganga and Brahmaputra (IPCC, 2007), all calculations of river flow (and consequent “surpluses”) are certain to go haywire, making the ILR system even more, not less, unviable. India can be saved from very serious water shortages and consequent widespread unrest if and only if a. b. c.

Immediate investment is made in local watershed management and rainwater harvesting, The ILR project is shelved permanently as being misconceived and unworkable, and The apparently limitless greed of industrial and commercial corporations and individuals in power is curbed by democratic process.

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REFERENCES Godbole, M.: Power Sector Reforms: If Wishes were Horses. Economic and Political Weekly 37(7) (2002), pp. 621–626. Goswami, D.C.: Brahmaputra River, Assam, India: Physiography, Basin Denudation, and Channel Aggradation. Water Resources Research 21(1985), pp. 959–978. Government of India (GoI): Report of the Working Group on Major and Medium Projects for the Eighth Plan (1990 to 1995). Government of India, New Delhi, 1989. Government of India (GoI): National Water Policy. Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India, New Delhi, 2002. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): Asia (Chapter 10). In: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Working Group II Contribution to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007. Kale, V.: Monsoon Floods in India: A Hydro-Geomorphic Perspective. In: Flood Studies in India (V.S. Kale Ed.), Geological Society of India, Bangalore, 1998, pp. 229–256. Mazumder, S.K.: Role of Farakka Barrage on the Disastrous 1998 Flood in Malda (West Bengal). In: The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications (M.M.Q. Mirza Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2004. Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR): Annual Report 2001. MoWR, New Delhi, 2001. National Commission for Integrated Water Resources Development (NCIWRD): 1999. Roy, A.: The Cost of Living. Frontline 15(3), February 5 to 8, 2000. Thakkar, H.: Let’s Have Feet on Ground – Mr. Prabhu. Dams, Rivers and People 1(2–3) (2003), pp. 5–6. UNESCO: World Catalogue of Large Floods. UNESCO, Paris, 1976. Wasson, R.J.: A Sediment Budget for the Ganga-Brahmaputra Catchment. Current Science 84(3) (2003), pp. 1041–1047.

6 Impact of the Interlinking of Rivers on Nepal: A Critical Analysis DWARIKA N. DHUNGEL SANTA B. PUN

6.1 INTRODUCTION Following an order passed by the Supreme Court of India on 31 October 2002 in response to an application filed by a senior advocate, Ranjit Kumar in a public interest litigation on the basis of a reference made by President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam of India, in his speech on the eve of India’s Independence Day, to the interlinking of rivers, the Government of India (GoI) passed a resolution for such interlinking and formed an eight (three full-time and five part-time)-member Task Force under the chairpersonship of Mr. Suresh Prabhu (see Chapter 3) to get thirty-seven major rivers (Shankari, 2004) interlinked by 2016. Basically, the scheme is ‘for transfer of water from surplus basins to water deficit basins for optimum utilization of water resources.’ (Lok Sabha (India), Press Release on Linking of Rivers, undated). The current government, led by the Indian National Congress, has supported this proposal, adopted by the previous government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Since the adoption of the resolution and formation of the Prabhu Task Force, the proposed ambitious R. 5,600 billion (US$ 186 billion at 2002 price) Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) Project, with fourteen inter-basin water transfer links under the Himalayan rivers development component and sixteen similar links under the Peninsular rivers development component, has attracted much attention of water experts, environmentalists, economists, etc in India. This has also become a subject of serious concern to the countries of South Asia, especially to the governments, professionals and non-government/civil societies of Nepal and Bangladesh. While the proposed links and their details of the Peninsular component are available, no information on the Himalayan component is available. Nonetheless, the proposed project also aims to transfer the Himalayan waters to the Peninsular south through the Subarnarekha-Mahanadi-Godavari links. This reveals the grandiose nature of the plan. It is the Himalayan component – the Brahmaputra-Ganga-Gandak and Kosi-Ghagra-SardaYamuna-Rajasthan-Sabarmati – that would have serious implications for both Nepal and Bangladesh. The Government of Bangladesh has already opposed the proposed project and has requested GoI not to go ahead with it as the project would have serious implications for her. His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (HMGN), however, is yet to come

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out with a stand on this matter. This chapter therefore, deals with the implications of the proposed scheme for Nepal in the light of the contribution of the rivers flowing from Nepal to the Ganges River, the existing treaty regime Nepal has with India and the implications of the proposed scheme for Nepal.

6.2 FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY: WALK THROUGH HISTORY As indicated above, the immediate cause that led to the filing of the public interest litigation at India’s Supreme Court and on whose order, i.e. of 31 October 2002, the GoI decided to go ahead with the ILR, was the speech of the President of India, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who in his address of 2002 (14 August 2002) had stated: ‘Let us now look at a long term problem. It is paradoxical to see floods in one part of our country while some other parts face drought. This drought-flood phenomenon is a recurring feature. The need of the hour is to have a water mission, which will enable availability of water to the fields, villages, towns, and industries throughout the year, even while maintaining environmental purity. One major part of the water mission would be networking of our rivers. Technological and project management capabilities of our country can rise to the occasion and make this river networking a reality with long term planning and proper investment … Such programmes should have large scale people participation even at the conceptual and project planning stages. The entire programme should revolve around economic viability, leading to continued prosperity for our people with larger employment potential, environmental sustainability, grassroot-level motivation and benefit sharing.’ (Quoted from Shankari, 2004). But the history of the proposed project as a concept goes back to the time of the British-India Government (Thakkar, 2003; Dixit, 2003). It was in the mid-nineteenth century that Sir Arthur Cotton of the British-India Government, for the first time had proposed ‘the possible links of river, he was concerned primarily with navigation though irrigation [was] also a part of it’ (Dixit, 2003). In more recent times, ‘it was in 1972 that Dr K.L. Rao came forward with the Ganga-Cauvery link proposal, which was dumped by the Ministry of Water Resources after the Central Water Commission found it to be ‘grossly under estimated’. Earlier, Captain Dastur had proposed a garland of canals connecting the Himalayan rivers and the Peninsular rivers, which the Ministry of Water Resources declared ‘technically unsound and economically prohibitive’ (Thakkar, 2003). GoI then decided to prepare a National Water Master Plan with inter-basin water transfer, and in July 1982, the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) was created for carrying out surveys and to prepare feasibility studies on river linking projects. The National Water Policy, adopted in 1987, had proposed the interlinking of rivers as its prime goal. Similarly, the revised 2002 National Water Policy of India reiterated this concept which iterates: ‘Water should be made available to water-short areas by transfer from other areas, including transfers from one river basin to another, based on a national perspective, after taking into account the requirements of the areas/basins’ (GoI, 2002: p.3).

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‘NWDA has, after carrying out detailed studies, identified 30 links for preparation of feasibility reports and has prepared feasibility study reports of such six links. The various basin States have expressed divergent views about the studies and feasibility reports prepared by NWDA’ (Ministry of Water Resources [GoI] 13 December 2002). Therefore, pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court, GoI decided to form the Prabhu Task Force as the latest in a series of efforts to translate the idea mooted by Sir Arthur Cotton more than 150 years ago. The purpose of the Task Force was to bring about consensus among the states and to provide guidance on norms of appraisal of individual projects and modalities for funding of the project, etc. (Box 6.1).

Box 6.1 Terms of reference of the Suresh Prabhu task force 1. Provide guidance on norms appraisal of individual projects in respect of economic viability, soico-economic impacts, environmental impacts and preparation of resettlement plans; 2. Devise suitable mechanism for brining about speedy consensus amongst States; prioritize the different project components for preparation of detailed project reports and implementation; 3. Propose suitable organizational structure for implementing the project; 4. Consider various modalities for project funding; and 5. Consider international dimensions that may be involved in some project components.

In fact, NWDA has by November 2006 completed feasibility studies of 13 of the 16 Peninsular components (Box 6.2). However, no information is available on the 14 Himalayan component links (Shankari, 2004). The feasibility studies of these 14 links were expected to be completed by December 2005 (MoWR GoI).

Box 6.2 Completed feasibility studies of the Peninsular components 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Feasibility Report of Ken-Betwa Link Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal Link Polavaram-Vijayawada Link Damanganga-Pinjal Link Mahanadi-Godavari Link Inchampalli-Pulichintala Link Inchampalli-Nagarjunasagar Link Almatti-Pennar Link Srisailam-Pennar Link Nagarjunasagar-Somasila Link Pennar-Palar-Cauvery Link Cauvery-Vaigai-Gundar Link Pamba-Achankovil-Vaippar Link Par-Tapi-Narmada Link.

Source: NWDA, 2006.

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IMPACTS OF INTERLINKING ON NEPAL

6.3 DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF THE ILR The proposed inter-basin water transfer links ‘Mostly envisage using existing storage reservoirs or storage reservoirs proposed to be constructed by the States under their plan proposals. Construction of storage reservoirs, as part of the project proposals, is also envisaged wherever necessary’ (Lok Sabha (India), Press Release on Linking of Rivers, undated). With regard to the envisaged benefits from the proposed ILR, the Himalayan component with 14 links, 9 big dams, and 6,099 kilometer (km) of canals, will provide 200 to 250 billion cubic metres (BCM) additional water and irrigation benefits to 22 million hectares (Mha) of land, generate 30,000 megawatts (MW) of hydropower, and provide 1,120 cumecs of water to the Kolkata Port. Note that this quantum of water for the Kolkata Port is equivalent to the original diversion plan through the feeder canal of Farakka Barrage. The Peninsular component with 16 links, 27 big dams, 4,777 km (including 94 tunnels) would provide 84 BCM of additional water and irrigation to 13 Mha of land and generate 4,000 MW of hydropower (Akhtar Hossain, 2004; India Today, 2003). Of the 9 major dams under the Himalayan component, except the near complete Tehri dam, other dams like Pancheshwar on the Mahakali (Sarda), Saptakosi on the Kosi, the Chisapani on the Karnali and the Budhi Gandaki on the Gandak, are some of the major dams under discussion between the two countries. Also Nepal and India have taken up Bagmati and Kamala storage dams as well. This means that Nepal would, thus, have to bear the brunt of this ILR. 6.3.1 Nepal-related links Nepal, with a population of 26 million (2003 estimate), has a mere 13 per cent of the total Ganga basin catchment area. But her large snow-fed Kosi, Gandak, Karnali and Mahakali rivers contribute 47 per cent of the average annual flow of the Ganges. Of the 14 Himalayan component links, the 5 mentioned below are Nepal-related links and would be of concern to it as they envisage the use of the waters of the rivers flowing from Nepal in the following manner: i.

Kosi-Mechi Link: This link, in all probability, will originate from the 269 metre (mt) high Kosi High Dam with a live storage of 9.37 BCM (Comprehensive Plan of Flood Control of the Kosi sub-basin, 1983) in Nepal and travel east to the Indo-Nepal border river Mechi, catching the Kankai river enroute. The Mechi river, like the Kankai, will hook up with Mahananda, which in turn will join the Ganges ahead of the Farakka in West Bengal.

ii. Kosi-Ghagra (Karnali) Link: This link will probably also originate from the Kosi High Dam in Nepal and appears to be the most ambitious link. The link travels westwards, feeding major rivers enroute such as Kamala, Bagmati, Budhi Gandak and Gandak. Technically, this link will in all likelihood replicate the existing Ghagra/Girijapur-Saryu-Rapti/Laxmanpur barrage links. Ultimately, this link will join the Ghagra in the district of Saran in Bihar just above Ghagra-Ganges junction near Chapra. It may be stated that the existing canals of the Kosi Barrage in Nepal serve the state of Bihar extensively – as far west as Dharbhanga across the Kamala towards Bagmati and in the east and south as far as Purnia and Katihar.

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iii. Gandak-Ganga Link: This link appears to originate from the existing Gandak Barrage on the Indo-Nepal border and flows west, feeding major rivers such as Rapti, Ghagra, Gomati in the Ghagra-Saryu-Rapti Barrages link, in the same style as mentioned above. The Gandak-Ganga link is envisaged to hook up with the Ganga (tributary) just above their junction at Allahabad. Like the Kosi barrage, as mentioned above, the existing Gandak barrage on the Indo-Nepal border serves the states of both Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP) from the Bagmati basin in the east to the district of Saran in the south, plus the hinterlands of Rapti river basin in the west. iv. Ghagra-Yamuna Link: This link appears to originate from the famed 270 mt high Karnali/Chisapani dam, with a live storage of 16.2 BCM (Karnali/Chisapani Multipurpose Project Feasibility Study Report, 1989), envisaged in Nepal since the early 1960s. The link will travel west, again feeding the major rivers, Sarada and Ganges, in the same Ghagra-Saryu-Rapti barrages style to ultimately hook up with the Yamuna near the junction where the Chambal river from the south joins the Yamuna river. The Girijapur barrage on the Karnali/Ghagra river already links the Babai/Saryu and the Rapti rivers in the east and the Mahakali/ Sarada river in the west. v. Sarada-Yamuna Link: This link with India’s 260.5 mt high Tehri Dam, with a live storage of 2.6 BCM (Tehri Hydro Development Corporation, 2001), and IndoNepal’s 315 mt high Pancheshwar Dam, with a live storage of 6.56 BCM (Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project Report, 1995), augmented flows will again travel west, feeding the Ganges and joining the Yamuna just near New Delhi, which has a population of 13.8 million (Census of India, 2001). With the exception of the Kosi-Mechi link, all the above 4 links push the waters from the east to the west, i.e. from the ‘surplus basins to the deficit basins’ (Lok Sabha: India, Press Release). In order to achieve this, the Kosi river is envisaged to serve the lower reaches of the Gandak river basin through the Kosi-Ghagra link; the Gandak river through the Gandak-Ganga link is envisaged to serve the lower reaches of the Ghagra river basin; the Ghagra-Yamuna link has been similarly planned to serve the lower reaches of the Ganga (tributary) river basin, thus making available the waters of the Sarada and Yamuna rivers through the Sarada-Yamuna link, to be pushed to the Luna and Sabarmati rivers in the semi-deserts of Rajasthan and Gujarat.

6.4 MAJOR CONCERNS TO NEPAL 6.4.1 Nepal’s river flows Table 6.1 indicates that the average annual discharge of the 9 large and medium rivers of Nepal is 5,675 cumecs. The 1949 to 1985 average annual discharge of the Ganges at Farakka is 12,323 cumecs (Figure 6.1) (Mirza, 1998) which means that the Nepalese rivers contribute a significant 46 per cent of the annual average flow of the Ganges at Farakka. If one is to again compare the average flows of the three lean months (March, April and May) of the Nepal flows (1,442 cumecs) with that of the Farakka flows (1,917 cumecs), this gives an astounding 75 per cent. This huge 75 per cent lean season contribution from Nepal is mainly attributed to the heavy Ganges withdrawal in India for the rabi crops and the fact that the Himalayan snowmelts have yet to impact the Farakka flows. That is why storage projects in Nepal are very critical to Ganges augmentation and thus India’s proposed ILR.

’64–’85

’63–’85

’65–’79

’57–’69

’77–’85

’72–’84

West Rapti

Narayani

Bagmati

Kamala

Saptakoshi

Kankai 1,170

12

364

7

19

351

28

1,005

9

315

5

17

286

23

15

335

156

Feb

988

8

318

4

15

264

18

13

348

149

1,272

11

424

3

17

348

14

10

445

182

Mar Apr

2,066

21

705

8

32

568

15

15

702

266

May

198

4,110

130

539

4,210

298

222

3,290

1,579

July

145

4,340

160

513

4,970

388

241

4,370

1,332

Aug 577

Oct

147

95

45

137

106

51

3,460 1,460

102

338

3,420 1,600

355

232

3,020 1,320

1,489

Sept

23

795

17

51

790

57

36

632

227

Nov

5,271 12,997 15,127 11,033 4,855 2,401

72

1,660

46

214

1,610

93

56

1,520

560

June

1,548

15

501

11

27

492

33

23

446

198

5,675

56

1,550

45

161

1,590

123

82

1,410

658

Average Dec discharge (in cumecs)

Sources HMGN, Hydrological Records of Nepal, Department of Hydrology and Meteorology, June 15, 1988; BB Thapa and BB Pradhan, Water Resources Development Nepalese Perspectives, IIDS/Kathmandu 1995, Ajyaya Dixit, Resource Endowment and Associated Uncertainty of Water Resources and NK Agrawal: Agriculture and Irrigation in BB Thapa and BB Pradhan, Water Resources Development Nepalese Perspectives, IIDS/Kathmandu 1995.

Total

’67–’85

Babai

19

370

’62–’86

Karnali

Jan 167

Average years

Mahakali

River name

Table 6.1 Average monthly and yearly flows (in cumecs) of the four major rivers and five medium rivers of Nepal

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Fig. 6.1 Annual mean discharge of the Ganges River at Farakka for the period 1949–1985. The horizontal solid line indicates mean annual discharge of 12,323 cumecs (Mirza, 1998).

6.4.1.1 Schematic diagrams of existing Himalayan river links in India and their canal capacity Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 illustrate that the Himalayan river links already do exist in India. While the wetter Kosi/Gandak basins in Bihar have bare skeleton links, the drier Ghagra/Sarada basins in UP already have in place more mature and extensive links. In Bihar, the Kosi is already linked with the Kamala river. It is just the Bagmati river that separates the waters of the Kosi river from that of the Gandak river. But in UP, the Sarada, Ghagra, Saryu and Rapti rivers already have mature interlinks. The water of the Rapti and that of the Gandak is in the process of being linked up. The capacities of the canals emanating from the barrages on Kosi, Gandak, Girijapur and Sarada are indicated in Table 6.2. It also displays the average dry season flows (February, March and April) of those rivers. It is seen that the capacities of all the main canals were over-designed to accommodate the lean season flows by over two to three times. In other words, the main canals of these barrages were technically designed to deal with the future augmented flows from the storage reservoirs upstream in Nepal. Thus, it is evident, that without the creation of storage facilities in Nepal, India’s proposed Himalayan ILR would not bear fruit. But, so far, India has not informed Nepal officially about it. According to India’s former Ambassador to Nepal, Shyam Saran, the ILR so far is merely a concept (Spotlight, 2004). However, recent bilateral talks on water resources have centered very much on the storage projects at Pancheshwar, Saptakosi, Karnali/Chisapani, including those on Kamala and Bagmati (Joint Statement, 2004). Observers note that, if the proposed ILR was simply a concept, there was no necessity on the part of India to concentrate her attention on these projects during the Nepal-India Joint Committee on water resources meeting at New Delhi in October 2004.

Fig. 6.2 Schematic diagrams of existing Himalayan river links in India and existing Kosi/Gandak linking (Mishra, 1990).

98 IMPACTS OF INTERLINKING ON NEPAL

Fig. 6.3 Existing Mahakali (Sarada)/Karnali (Ghagra)/Babai (Saryu)/Rapti linking in India (HPC, 1989).

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Table 6.2 Main canal capacities of the existing barrages in India

Canal

Capacity

Kosi Barrage Canals1

Eastern canal: 425 cumecs Western canal: 241 cumecs Total Kosi Barrage Canal flow capacity: 666 cumecs; Kosi river’s lean season flow (February, March and April) averages to 352 cumecs

Gandak Barrage Canals1

Eastern canal: 443 cumecs Western canal: 510 cumecs Total Gandak Barrage canal flow capacity: 953 cumecs, Gandak river’s lean season flow (February, March and April) averages to 299 cumecs.

Karnali/Girijapur Barrage Canals2

Eastern link with Saryu/Rapti 360 cumecs Western link with Sarda/Mahakali: 480 cumecs Total Karnali/Girijapur barrage canal: flow capacity 840 cumecs Karnali river’s lean season flow (February, March and April) averages to 376 cumecs

Mahakali/Sarda Banbasa Barrage Canal2

Total Sarda Banbasa canal flow capacity: 396 cumecs Mahakali river’s lean season flow (February, March and April) averages to 162 cumecs

Sources 1 Dinesh K. Misra, Badh Se Trasta-Sinchai Se Pasta: Uttar Bihar Ki Byatha Katha (in Hindi), Patna, Samata Prakashan Pvt. Ltd., 1990. 2 HMGN, Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Projects; Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, Ministry of Water Resources, Himalayan Power Consultants, Kathmandu, December, 1989.

6.4.2 The Ganges augmentation efforts In order to push the Ganges waters to the west, the Ganges needs precious augmentation. So, when India diverted the Ganges water at Farakka for the Kolkata Port, Article IX of the 1977 Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on the Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka stipulated that the two countries ‘shall carry out investigation and study of scheme relating to the augmentation of the dry season flows of the Ganges, proposed or to be proposed by either Government with a view to finding a solution which is economical and feasible’ (Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on the Farakka 1977. Details of the Agreement can be read in Mirza, 2004). Pursuant to the provision of this article, India and Bangladesh, in May, 1979 decided to approach Nepal ‘for study/investigation of the projects in Nepal … identify the specific areas where the cooperation of Nepal is necessary…’ Prior to the Nepal visit, there was clearly a major difference between India and Bangladesh on the manner of approaching Nepal. India considered that it would be

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adequate if Nepal could be requested to make available to the study team all relevant information on various storage sites in Nepal and Nepal’s uses from these rivers and assists the team in site inspections. Bangladesh, on the other hand, considered that to ensure Nepal’s fullest cooperation for a thorough assessment of the augmentation possibilities from storage projects in Nepal, a team of India, Nepal and Bangladesh should jointly conduct the study. The Indo-Bangladesh study focus then was on the Bangladesh initiated 13 large storage reservoirs on 3 major Nepalese rivers: (1) Karnali Basin: i. Chisapani, ii. Lakarpata, iii. Surkhet, iv. Thapna (2) Gandak Basin: i. Devighat, ii. Kali Gandaki-I, iii. Kali Gandaki-II, iv. Burhi Gandaki, v. Marsyangdi vi. Seti, (3) Kosi Basin: i. Kothar, ii. Sunkosi High Dam, iii. Arun and Tamur. It was only on 29 to 31 October 1986 that the Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) from India and Bangladesh finally visited Nepal to seek information and data needed for the study of the possibility of augmenting the Ganges flow at Farakka through the construction of 7 storage projects in Nepal: i. Chisapani on Karnali river, ii. Kali Gandaki-I, iii. Kali Gandaki-II, iv. Trisuliganga on Trisuli river, v. Seti on Seti river, vi. Sapta Kosi on Kosi river, vii. Pancheshwar on Mahakali river. Table 6.3 indicates some of the more salient features of the 3 large storage schemes: Pancheshwar, Saptakosi and Karnali/ Chisapani.

Table 6.3 Some salient features of the three major identified storage reservoirs on the Mahakali, Karnali (Ghagra) and Kosi Rivers

Mahakali1

Karnali2

Kosi3

Pancheshwar

Chisapani

Sapta-Kosi

12,100

43,679

59,539

582

1,410

1,550

Gross storage (BCM)

12.26

–

13.45

Live storage (BCM)

6.56

16.2

9.37

Dam height (m)

315

270

269

Installed capacity (MW)

6,480

10,800

3,000

Average energy (Gwh)

10,671

20,842

15,732

River Project name Catchment area (sq. km) Average flow (cumecs)

Note: These three storages alone would provide a live storage of 32.13 BCM of water submerging Nepal’s valuable, fertile valleys with the infrastructures built with scarce resources and displacing over a lack agricultural dependent Nepalese population. Sources 1 HMGN, Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project Report: Executive Summary, Electricity Development Centre, Kathmandu, 1995. 2 HMGN, Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Projects; Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, Ministry of Water Resources, Himalayan Power Consultants, Kathmandu, December, 1989. 3 GoI, Comprehensive Plan of Flood Control of the Kosi sub-basin, Ganga Flood Control Commission, Ministry of Irrigation, Patna, December, 1983.

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Nepal expressed her dissatisfaction to the Indo-Bangladesh JCE when it became clear to her at the meeting that while the JCE was interested to procure data from Nepal for the Indo-Bangladesh projects, they were yet not willing to involve Nepal in the joint study team. Nepal, therefore, clearly spelt out that the sharing of data was not a problem provided that it was involved in the joint study from the very beginning so that its interests would also be covered by the study. The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Committee expressed its inability to do this as this was not possible within the prescribed time limit (the JCE was clearly not given the mandate to include Nepal in the study) and the committee’s own term was to expire in November 1986. So the trilateral/regional approach of involving Nepal in the Ganges augmentation schemes failed. While some in Nepal were dismayed that Bangladesh surprisingly approached her in tandem with India, others in India have wrongly construed this 1986 failure of talks as a result of the ‘quarrel’ that ensued between Bangladesh and Nepal (ORF, 2004). The Ganges augmentation is stressed by Article VIII of the 1996 Indo-Bangladesh Treaty on the Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka thus: ‘The two Governments recognize the need to cooperate with each other in finding a solution to the long term problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganga/Ganges during the dry season.’ Subsequent to the devastating flood of 1988 in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bangladesh jointly conducted a study and in November 1989 submitted a report on flood mitigation measures and multipurpose use of water resources. The report pointed out that due to the high water-holding capacity of monsoon flow in the potential reservoir sites of Nepal (77 BCM, or about 68 per cent of total monsoon flow), creation of storage reservoirs could be an effective measure for flood mitigation for downstream reaches. But it may not be techno-economically very attractive, if the activity is considered only from the point of view of flood mitigation. The report recommended that this needs to be looked into ‘from wider perspective of finding durable solutions to the problems of floods and droughts through multiple and optimal use of the water resources in hydro-electricity generation, navigation and irrigation by means of flow regulation, including power systems interconnection and, therefore, calls for regional cooperation. For concrete programming of this activity all the beneficiaries (Nepal, India and Bangladesh) should get together and work in a common forum’ (Bangladesh-Nepal Joint Study Report, 1989). India, however, was comfortable with the bilateral approach and believed that regional approach was a ‘… gang up of sorts on the part of Nepal and Bangladesh on the question of Ganga waters and the construction of reservoirs in Nepal’ (ORF, 2004).

6.4.3 Protection of water rights If one looks at the available quantum of water in the rivers of Nepal and factors it against its consumptive uses, the country is not in an uncomfortable position at present. But water is getting scarce day by day. Therefore, not only has Nepal to protect its right over this dwindling resource but also safeguard its availability for its future generations. In other words, Nepal’s major concern is how to protect its water use rights over the waters available within its territory. So far, Nepal has signed three treaties with its southern neighbour, India, on water resources. They are: the Kosi Treaty of 1954 (revised 1966), the Gandak Treaty of 1959 (amended 1964) and the Mahakali Treaty of 1996. The first two treaties guarantee Nepal the ‘right to withdraw for irrigation and for any other purpose in Nepal water’ from the two rivers or their tributaries, as may be required from time to time. The Gandak agreement, however, has the qualification that for ‘trans-valley uses of Gandak waters’, a separate agreement between the two governments

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would be required for the use of water ‘in the months of February to April only’. While the Kosi agreement is valid for a period of 199 years from 19 December 1966, the Gandak agreement is for perpetuity as there is no mention of the validity period. The more recent Mahakali agreement, valid for 75 years, does mention that ‘… water requirements of Nepal shall be given prime consideration in the utilization of the waters of the Mahakali River’. But another clause of the same agreement states ‘… equal entitlement in the utilization of the waters of the Mahakali River without prejudice to their respective existing consumptive uses of the waters of the Mahakali River.’ The Mahakali Treaty has, thus, endorsed the concept of the protection of the existing consumptive uses. This ‘prior use right’ claim made by India in the lower Sarada command area, which is 160 km downstream of the Sarada Barrage has been one of the stumbling blocks in the finalization of the detailed project report of the Pancheshwor Multipurpose Project to be developed on the Mahakali river (called Sarada river in India) as a bi-national project. On the utilization of the waters of the ‘commonly shared rivers’ (Bhasin, 1994), India has been stressing that this would need to be ‘subject to the protection of the existing uses on the rivers’ (Bhasin, 1994). Furthermore, India has already built extensive canals all along the borders with Nepal, as already indicated in the schematic chart above. It, thus, can claim that it has already been using the waters flowing from Nepal. It is in this light that Nepal sees India blocking the European Union funding to Nepal to develop the Babai/Sikta project in the western Nepal. Although HMGN has yet to make its position clear on the proposed ILR on the ground that it has not been officially informed by the GoI, the primary concern for Nepal is to ensure that the ILR will not be prejudicial to its water rights both for the present and for the future Nepalese generations.

6.4.4 Prior use claims and unilateral construction along the border As per the proposed ILR, the Mahakali (Sarada) water would be diverted all the way to the states of Rajasthan and Gujarat in western India. The main purpose of this ambitious ILR is to divert the water for use during the critical lean season. Meeting this objective pre-supposes the creation of infrastructure under both the components of the proposed link. If the prior use claim for the lower Sarada is to be taken as a precedent, then, India will, in all likelihood, make the claim over all the infrastructures developed to divert the water, even if they were developed without the prior information/concurrence of Nepal. It may be recalled that one of the major irritants in the Nepal-India relation on water resource has been the infrastructures developed by India through unilateral action. These infrastructures have created adverse impact particularly inundation and flooding, in the bordering Nepalese territories: Banke district in west Nepal due to Laxmanpur barrage on the Rapti river, Kapilavastu district, west Nepal due to the construction of Mahali Sagar on the Masai Nala, Koilabas in the district of Dang, west Nepal due to the construction of a dam on the Dara Khola, Marchwar in Rupandehi, west Nepal due to the construction of embankments from Kunauli to Rasiawalkhurd dam, constricting the drainage of Ghongi, Danav and Kothi river, Gaur in Rautahat, central Nepal, constricting the drainage of Lalbakaiya and Bagmati rivers, etc.

6.4.5 Submergence of Nepalese lands, but for what/whose benefit? Five of the fourteen links of the proposed ILR, as indicated above, are related to the rivers flowing from Nepal. From information available on them, the more suitable sites for storage

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of waters on these rivers are in Nepal such as the Kosi high dam at Barahchhetra, Chisapani high dam at Karnali and a number of medium ones on the Gandak. This means that, without the consent of Nepal, India will not be able to undertake these five links of the Himalayan component. In other words, without the consent or approval of Nepal, India would not be able to achieve its principal objective of the Himalayan component of pushing the waters to its western region. Furthermore, the authorization for the implementation of a multipurpose project, such as the Karnali Multipurpose Project, with a dam height of 270 mt would displace 60,000 people in Nepal with substantial environmental impact, according to the feasibility study report of 1989. Most of the benefits, especially the irrigation and flood control benefits accruing from this project, would go to India, especially to the state of Uttar Pradesh. According to this study, the irrigation potentiality of the project is 3,000,000 ha of land of Saryu and Sarda Sahayak command area in India, whereas for Nepal it would provide irrigation to only 191,000 ha of largely undeveloped areas. There were major differences of opinion between the two countries on the method of calculating the benefits accruing from the project (KCC, 1992). It is understood that on the Pancheshwar project this difference of opinion has again cropped up between the two countries when the Letters of Exchange of the Mahakali Treaty clearly mentions that ‘Irrigation benefit shall be assessed on the basis of incremental and additional benefits …’ Because of the historical legacy, especially the huge difference in irrigation benefits enjoyed by Nepal and India from the Kosi and Gandak projects, the question that normally comes in the minds of the Nepalese is why Nepal should allow a project that submerges large tracts of its land for providing benefits to the people living across the border. In other words, Nepal is very concerned as to why it should allow the submergence of large tracts of its scarce fertile land, displace for perpetuity over hundreds of thousands of people subsisting on agriculture and lose the valuable flora and fauna of the Himalayan region for the benefit of downstream users. If Nepal is to endorse the proposed ILR of India, then it would like to know before hand what it will exactly get in return. Power benefits alone, with India striving to pull down the tariffs to abysmally low rates, from storage projects in Nepal would not suffice. 6.5 BENEFIT OF WORKING TOGETHER ON THE GANGA-BRAHMAPUTRA BASIN Indeed, water has been one of the most sensitive issues in Nepal, especially due to the legacy of the past treaties it has had with India. There is a general feeling among the Nepalese that Nepal has not been fairly treated by the treaties it has, so far, signed with India. No government and professionals can forget this when the use of water or cooperation with it neighbours for the optimal use of this resource crops up. Therefore, the primary concern for Nepal is to ensure that its right over water is protected. Because of the fact that about 75 per cent of the average flow of the Ganges during the lean season is contributed by the Nepalese rivers and the fact that Nepal has large storage potentials on these rivers, Nepal believes that this resource could be an engine of economic growth for the three countries of the sub-continent. But for this, there must be genuine willingness among these countries to cooperate with each other. As indicated above, India has, so far, pursued its policy of bilateralism on water issues, refusing to take them up as a subject of trilateral cooperation. India needs to come out and address adequately Nepal’s fear that the latter country will not be treated unfairly as in the past. Unless these fears are addressed, the chances of fruitful cooperation on water resources between the three countries are remote. Article VIII of the 1996 Indo-Bangladesh Ganges Treaty on finding a

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solution to the long term problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganges would continue to remain in paper only. 6.6 PROFESSIONAL COOPERATION ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS A new era of cooperation in water resources will be possible only when India realizes the importance of cooperation at the regional level, starts taking her neighbours into confidence prior to taking any decision on the transboundary rivers, the people of Nepal are assured that their interest and those of their future generations will not be compromised, and they will receive adequate benefits/compensation for the loss of their livelihood, lands, flora and fauna, etc. that might result from the storage projects in Nepal for the ILR. For this, unlike the present system of having interaction programmes only when issues crop up, we propose cooperation on a continuous basis among research and academic institutions of the three countries. For example, three institutions of the region, Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS), Kathmandu, the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP), Dhaka and the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi, have worked together before on different issues. Such institutions could join hands with a view to undertaking water-related studies, developing a store house of information on waterrelated matters and above all monitoring the policies and programmes of the countries on the subject and flag out issues.

6.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS Thus, one can conclude that India already has in place river links in one form or the other from Kosi through Gandak, Karnali and Mahakali, picking up the medium Kamala, Bagmati, Rapti, etc on the way. The canal capacities from these barrages were deliberately designed oversize to cater to the future augmented flows from storage reservoirs upstream in Nepal. Nepal cannot compromise the interests of its future generations. It needs to know what social and environmental costs it would have to pay to accommodate in Nepal these large storage projects for India’s ILR. Pancheshwar, Saptakosi and Karnali/Chisapani would submerge, once and for all, the scarce fertile valleys of the mountainous and agricultural dependent Nepal. Where would all the displaced and marginalized Nepalese go for their livelihood? As it is, due to lack of employment opportunities and extreme poverty, over 800 thousand Nepalese have already been forced to go out of the country in search of ‘dirty and dangerous jobs’. Would the much-vaunted power sales to India more than compensate the overall costs to Nepal? Nepal wants to know WHAT BENEFIT IT WILL EXACTLY GET BEFORE THE STORAGE PROJECTS ARE BUILT!

REFERENCES Akhtar Hossain, A.N.H.: The Indian River Linking Project and its Probable Impact on Bangladesh. Third South Asia Water Forum, Dhaka, 2004. Bhasin, A.S.: Nepal’s Relations with India and China (Documents 1947–1992) Siba. Exim. Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1994. Census of India: (http://www.censusindia.net/), 2001. Dixit, A.: Rivers of Collective Belonging. Himal 16(10) (October 2003). Government of India (GoI): National Water Policy. Ministry of Water Resources, New Delhi, 2002.

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Government of India (GoI) and Government of UP: Tehri Hydro Development Corporation: Profile, Tehri (Garahwal), August 2001. —, Comprehensive Plan of Flood Control of the Kosi sub-basin. Ganga Flood Control Commission, Ministry of Irrigation, Patna, December, 1983. HMGN: Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Projects; Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, Ministry of Water Resources, Himalayan Power Consultants, Kathmandu, December 1989. —, Ministry of Water Resources and Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control, Bangladesh-Nepal Joint Study Team Report on Flood Mitigation Measures and Multipurpose Use of Water Resources, November 1989. —, Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project Report: Executive Summary, Electricity Development Centre, Kathmandu, 1995. —, Revised Agreement between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India on the Gandak Project, Ministry of Water and Power, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1975. —, Revised Agreement between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India on the Kosi Project, Ministry of Water and Power, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1975. —, Treaty Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India Concerning the Integrated Development of the Mahakali River Including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and Pancheswar Project, Kathmandu, ND. Himalayan Power Consultants (HPC): Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Project Report. Ministry of Water Resources, Kathmandu, Nepal, 1989. Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on the Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka. In: Politics of Himalayan River Waters (B.C. Upreti), Nirala Series 32(November 5, 1977). Joint Statement of the 7 to 8 October 2004 JCWR Meeting at New Delhi, Spotlight, October 15, 2004. Lok Sabha: Press Release on Linking of Rivers, nd. Minutes of Ninth Meeting, Karnali Coordination Committee (KCC), Kathmandu, March 12 to 14, 1992. Mirza, M.M.Q.: Diversion of the Ganges Water at Farakka and Its Effects on Salinity in Bangladesh. Environmental Management 22(1998). Mirza, M.M.Q. (ed.): The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2004. Mishra, D.K.: Badh Se Trasht-Sinchai Se Pasta: Uttar Bihar Ki Byatha Katha (in Hindi). Samata Publishing Pvt. Ltd, Patna, 1990. National Water Development Agency (NWDA): NWDA Proposals (www.nwda.gov.in), 2006. ORF: Nepal-India Relations: The Challenge Ahead, Rupa-Co in association with Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2004. Shankari, U.: Interlinking Rivers, Contradictions and Confrontations, South Asian Dialogue on Ecological Democracy and Center for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, 2004. Summary Record of Discussion of the Second Meeting of the Indo-Nepal Sub-Commission in Water Resources held at New Delhi, April 15 to 18, 1991. Thakkar, H.: Flood of Nonsense: How to Manufacture Consensus on River Linking. Himal South Asia, Kathmandu, August 2003. Thapa, B.B. and B.B. Pradhan: Water Resources Development Nepalese Perspective. Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd, Delhi, 1995. Treaty Between the Government of Republic of India and the Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh on the Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka, 1996.

NEWSPAPERS Spotlight, July 16, 2004. India Today, January 22, 2003. http//:www.easdis.aml.gov/rivdis/STATIONS/TEXT/INDIA/883/SUMMARY.HTML.

7 Modeling the Interlinking of the Ganges River: Simulated Changes in Flow SHARON GOURDJI CARRIE KNOWLTON KOBI PLATT MICHAEL J. WILEY

7.1 INTRODUCTION The Indian Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) proposal contains a total of 30 links, with 14 links in the Himalayan component and 16 links in the Peninsular component. While many of the links provide water for irrigation within a given basin, some of the links create inter-basin transfers to augment flow in “water-deficit” regions. Although few engineering plans are in the public domain, it is supposed that large storage reservoirs will collect excess water during the monsoon season, particularly in the northern half of the country, and then release it slowly during the longer dry season from October through May. This chapter describes an application of the Hydrologic Engineering Center’s Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS, version 2.2.2) in the Indian part of the Ganges River basin (Figure 7.1). HEC-HMS is developed and maintained by a branch of the United States Army Corps of Engineers and is freely available on the web with supporting documentation (HEC, 2003). The model is calibrated using flow data at the Farakka Barrage from 1965 to 1968 (before flow became classified information in 1973), and it is then used to simulate both seasonal and annual changes in flow at Allahabad, Patna and Farakka after construction of the Himalayan component of the ILR (Figure 7.2). This relatively simple model could also be used for future simulations in the Ganges basin when and if more detailed information about the proposed links becomes available or for simulations related to climate change or other planned diversions within the basin. Allahabad, Patna and Farakka are all situated relatively equidistant from each other on the main-stem of the Ganges (Figure 7.3). Allahabad is a city at the confluence of the Upper Ganges River and the Yamuna River, one of the largest tributaries of the Ganges, while Patna is downstream of Allahabad, at the confluence with the Gandak River, and after the confluences with three other major Himalayan and southern tributaries: the Gomti, Sone and Ghaghara rivers. By examining changes in flow conditions at Allahabad and Patna, particularly in the dry season, the model provides insights into how river linking might impact the already poor water quality in these areas (water quality issues have been further elaborated in Chapter 9).

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AF GA NI

ST AN

Ganges Watershed in South Asia

N

C H I N A Lahore PAKISTAN

Kathmandu

New Delhi

Thimpu NEPAL BHUTAN

Patna

BANGLADESH

Kolkata

Dhaka

I N D I A

Mumbai

Bay of Bengal

Chennai Major cities Ganges and major tributaries South Asian countries

0

250

500 kilometers

Ganges Watershed

Fig. 7.1 The Ganges watershed in South Asia.

The Farakka Barrage, near the Ganges delta 18 km upstream of Bangladesh, is downstream of both Allahabad and Patna. Since commissioning of the Farakka Barrage in 1975, saltwater intrusion in the Ganges delta has had negative impacts on drinking water supplies, agricultural fertility and the large commercial fishery in the Sundarbans mangrove ecosystem (Mirza, 1998). By analyzing predicted changes in flow at Farakka after river linking, projections are made about India’s future ability to meet its flow obligations towards Bangladesh and the probability of further saltwater intrusion in the Ganges delta. Also discussed is whether the river linking plan would function effectively

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as a flood control measure in the downstream areas of the Ganges during monsoon season. 7.2 HYDROLOGY OF GANGES BASIN

A

A

GO

GRA

GAN

GA

AD ARM

I

Kosi - Mechi Kosi - Ghagra Gandak - Ganga Ghagra - Yamuna* Sarda - Yamuna* Yamuna - Rajasthan Rajasthan - Sebermati

SANKOSH MANAS

TISTA

BAR

13

8

A

14 MA H A

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D I

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

10

9

NE SO

N

BE

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A UTR 11 MAP BRAH

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I

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SA BAR MATI

B AT

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PA R

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3

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MECHI

A

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1 KOSI

UN

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A MB

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M YA

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SAR DA

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GHAGRA

The Ganges River originates in the Himalayas of northwest India and then flows southeast across the Indo-Gangetic plain until it reaches Bangladesh, where it joins together with the Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers and flows out into the Indian Ocean. Covering a total of 1,060,000 km2 in India, the Ganges drainage basin contains 26.3 per cent of India’s total land area (Figure 7.1) and represents about 25 per cent of India’s water resources (Shiva and Jalees, 2003). The average annual discharge of the Ganges River at Farakka is 13,159 m3/sec (Mirza, 2004).

SU

12 DA MO RN DAR AR EK HA

BE

8. Chunar - Sone Barrage 9. Sone Dam - Southern Tributaries of Ganga 10. Manas - Sankosh - Tista - Ganga 11. Jogighopa - Tista - Farakka (Alternate) 12. Farakka - Sunderbans 13. Ganga (Farakka) - Damodar - Subernarekha 14. Subernarekha - Mahanadi

* FR Completed

Fig. 7.2 Proposed links in the Himalayan Component of the Indian Interlinking of Rivers (NWDA, 2004).

The Ganges is fed by eighteen major tributaries, seven originating in the Himalayas and flowing into the Ganges from the north, six joining from the south, and five joining the River Hooghly in the downstream reaches (Figure 7.3). The Hooghly distributary branches off from the Ganges after Farakka and delivers water to Kolkata, a major Indian port city. High slopes in the Himalayas leads to rapid surface runoff of precipitation, although much of this precipitation falls as snow, or freezes into glaciers, which melt throughout the year.

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Precipitation falling as rain in the plains south of the Himalayas tends to have slower hydrologic pathways due to low slopes and deep alluvium which supports large groundwater aquifers. Average watershed slope varies from about 22 per cent in the upper reaches of the Ganges near Rishikesh in the Himalayas to about 0.2 per cent in the Gomti subbasin in the Indo-Gangetic plains (Table 7.1). Agriculture represents about 90 per cent of the land cover in the alluvial plains near the main stem of the Ganges, while the Himalayan headlands also contain forests, grass and shrublands (NIMA, 1997).

New Delhi Gha

Kathmandu

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k

il

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tw a Dhasan

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River Segments Ganga Discharge Gages Ganga Subbasins Rain Gauges Major Cities

Kolkata 0

135

270

540

kilometers

Fig. 7.3 Map of Ganges basin divided into 17 sub-basins used in HEC-HMS model. Map also shows locations of large cities and rain and discharge gauges used in model.

About 85 per cent of yearly precipitation received in the Ganges basin arrives during the four-month monsoon season from June to September (NOAA, 1991). In the eastern half of the basin near the delta the monsoon lasts longer, from about May to October. For example, Kolkata, near the Ganges delta, receives about 1,600 mm of rain per year on average whereas Delhi on the western edge of the basin receives only 640 mm. At the end of the dry season by May of each year, temperatures rise higher than 40°C across the plains and the landscape is parched. Some of the same areas that flood during the monsoon season suffer from drought before the monsoon arrives.

Upper Ganga – Himalayas Gandak – Himalayas Ghaghara – Himalayas Yamuna – Himalayas Kosi – Himalayas Upper Sone Lower Sone Lower Chambal Ken Upper Chambal Betwa – Dhasan Ghaghara – Plains Kosi – Plains Upper Ganga – Plains Yamuna – Plains Gandak – Plains Gomti

Sub-basin name

SCS curve number 81 74 74 81 74 73 73 78 74 85 74 75 73 76 75 79 75

Average watershed slope (%) 22.4 21.45 21.44 20.19 16.61 1.77 1.35 0.89 0.87 0.8 0.7 0.43 0.39 0.37 0.3 0.29 0.21

Area (km2) 43,926 40,738 69,197 11,580 64,496 68,943 73,507 110,404 37,651 33,641 67,140 66,785 32,196 68,513 38,197 22,730 41,018

Table 7.1 Sub-basins and relevant parameters used in HEC-HMS model

12 17 21 10 29 67 133 121 127 115 126 280 154 317 417 137 411

SCS time lag (hr) 0 0 0 0.33 0.03 0 0.33 0.14 0.05 0.35 0.26 0.2 0.46 0.52 1.34 0.33 0.51

% Impervious

Soil max. infiltration rate (mm/hr) 0.8 3.3 3 1 3.3 3.3 9.5 0.6 1.7 0.5 1.7 1.7 9.5 1.7 1.7 19.1 1.7

Canopy storage (mm) 19 15 19 13 10 10 13 13 13 10 13 13 13 13 13 13 13

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7.3 HEC-HMS GANGES MODEL: OVERVIEW, INITIAL SETUP AND DATA INPUTS Hydrologic river models attempt to describe the routing of water over time and space as it moves through the landscape and is influenced by the natural hydrologic cycle (Figure 7.4). Hydrologic models are used extensively as tools in water resource planning, e.g. to forecast flooding in a watershed (in conjunction with hydraulic models), estimate hydropower potential, simulate the response of a watershed to climate and land-use change and predict the impact of various water development activities such as the building of dams, levees and irrigation canals. Hydrologic river models can also be linked to hydraulic models that track processes of sediment and pollutant transport in rivers, which may in turn affect channel shape and water quality.

Precipitation evaporation evaporation

evaporation

transpiration

Vegetation

Stemflow & throughfall

Land Surface infiltration capillary rise

Soil percolation capillary rise

Flood

Water Body

overland flow interflow

Stream channel

baseflow recharge

Groundwater aquifer Watershed discharge

Fig. 7.4 Schematic of hydrologic cycle (HEC, 2000).

In the simulation process of a hydrologic model, uncertainty is introduced in the form of measurement uncertainty of model parameters, inputs and calibration data, unknowns about the processes represented in the model, and nonlinear interactions among components of the model in a dynamic, complex system. In the case of India, further uncertainty is introduced by the lack of high quality data inputs for hydrologic modeling, specifically datasets related to flow, precipitation, evapotranspiration and soil hydraulic conductivity. HEC-HMS (version 2.2.2) is a flexible system that allows the user to choose from a variety of methods for estimating the volume and timing of surface runoff and baseflow in a stream channel. This flexibility also puts a strong burden on the model user to choose methods appropriately, to define sub-basins and reaches for the watershed under analysis, and to correctly parameterize the model using hydrologic characteristics at sub-basin scales. One major limitation of the version of HEC-HMS used here is the lack of a snow and glacial melt method (although the subsequent release of version 3.0 in December 2005

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incorporated a snowmelt method.) During the dry season, baseflow in the Ganges is fed by a combination of groundwater inputs and snow and glacial melt in the Himalayas. Due to a high number of days with freezing temperatures in the Himalayas, there should be little snowmelt in the winter months from November to March. However, the model calculates baseflow in an equal manner for every month of the year assuming that baseflow comes entirely from groundwater aquifers. Therefore, it is likely that the timing of baseflow contributed by the Himalayan sub-basins in the model presented here has some limitations. Also, none of the existing diversions, dams and reservoirs in the Ganges basin was accounted for in this model. Some of the water diverted for irrigation purposes returns to the channel, but more is lost from the system by evapotranspiration. For the Ganges watershed, seventeen sub-basins and thirty-seven reaches delivering water up to the Farakka Barrage were defined in the basin model of HEC-HMS (Figures 7.3 and 7.5, Table 7.1). Sub-basins represent watersheds with relatively constant hydrologic characteristics (e.g. climate, slope, soil type, etc.), and reaches represent channels with significant storage capacity. The sub-basins defined in this model represent the major tributaries of the Ganges, although the larger tributaries were split into upstream and downstream sub-basins connected by one or more reaches. In the case of the Himalayan tributaries, the upstream sub-basins represent flow originating in the Himalayas and the downstream sub-basins represent flow originating in the Indo-Gangetic plains. Reaches are also defined in the model along the main stem of the Ganges up to the Farakka Barrage. Lower Yamuna

Upper Yamuna Ganga-Himalayas

Upper Chambal Upper Ganga-Plains

Gomti Yamuna Chambal

Juntion 2 Chambal to Betwa

Betwa to Ken Ken to Allahabad

Lower Chambal

Sone Ken Belwa-Dhasan

Gange to Allahabad Upper Ghaghara

Ghaghara Allahabad Allahabad to Gonti Gadak

Upper Gandak

Gomti to Ghagra Ghagra to Palna Palna Kosi

Lower Ghaghara

Palna to Kosi Upper Sone

Lower Sone

Upper Kosi

Kosi to Farakka

Lower Gandak Lower Kosi

Fig. 7.5 HEC-HMS basin model with sub-basins, reaches and junctions defined for the Ganges basin.

Monthly precipitation data was obtained for the years 1965 to 1968 from the Global Historical Climatology Network (Peterson and Vose, 1997), available from the National Climatic Data Center of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (www.ncdc.noaa.gov). The years, 1965 to 1968 represented four years containing enough precipitation data for which publicly available flow data also existed at Farakka (flow data at Farakka is publicly available from 1949 to 1973, except for 1961 to 1964). The precipitation dataset contains data at about five hundred rain gauges within the Ganges basin, although

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not all gauges have data for all years. One precipitation data record was created per sub-basin by averaging about ten gauges distributed evenly throughout the area. Given that only monthly precipitation data was available for the Ganges basin from 1965 to 1968, daily variability was replicated using daily 2003 to 2004 precipitation from the Global Surface Summary of the Day (FCC, 2003) scaled up or down for each month by the average monthly totals from 1965 to 1968. For this scaling process, one central gauge within each sub-basin was chosen from the daily dataset. Relatively accurate daily precipitation variability is necessary in a daily hydrologic model, since the alternative of dividing up monthly precipitation data to fall equally on each day of the month allows almost all of the water time to percolate into groundwater reservoirs instead of contributing to surface runoff, which poorly reproduces observed flow. No daily precipitation data was available from either source from 1965 to 1968. Monthly evapotranspiration was estimated for each sub-basin from four seasonal contour maps of evapotranspiration over the Indian sub-continent (Bruijnzeel and Bremmer, 1989). Since the values derived from these maps seemed to be unrealistically low compared to evapotranspiration rates in other continents, the values were somewhat arbitrarily multiplied by 10. These new values, which range from 35 mm per month in the winter to 185 mm per month before the monsoon in May and June, better match an annual evapotranspiration contour map published by Athavale (2003). All the pan coefficients were set to 0.75, a somewhat arbitrary value reflecting the fact that actual evapotranspiration is rarely as high as potential evapotranspiration.

7.4 MODEL METHODS AND PARAMETERIZATION For each sub-basin in the model, HEC-HMS requires the definition of three methods to: a. calculate the volume of surface runoff and baseflow and their relative allocation (Loss), b. determine the timing of direct runoff to the channel (Transform), and c. determine the timing of groundwater input to the channel (Baseflow). This model of the Ganges used Soil Moisture Accounting (SMA) for Losses, the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) Time to Peak for the Transform, and the Linear Reservoir model for Baseflow. SMA is the only option for a continuous hydrologic model that tracks water in between rainfall events. The SCS Time to Peak is the most commonly used method for determining the rate of surface runoff, and although the formulas for this method were derived empirically in North American watersheds, the method is widely applied in India (Deshmukh et al., 2004). The Linear Reservoir model works in conjunction with SMA. These same three methods were used for all sub-basins in the model. The SMA method conceptualizes storage as taking place in five vertical layers: the canopy, surface, soil, and two layers of groundwater (Fleming and Neary, 2004; HEC, 2000). The model tracks water from when it first falls as precipitation and then as it moves through each of the storage layers and eventually to the stream channel. A storage capacity is defined for each layer and maximum infiltration and percolation rates describe the movement of water into the soil and then to the groundwater reservoirs. When precipitation is not occurring, evapotranspiration returns water to the atmosphere from the canopy, surface and soil storage layers. Since inland water bodies take up less than 1 per cent of the area of each sub-basin, surface water storage was set to zero in this model. Canopy storage was estimated based on land cover in each sub-basin, and ranged from zero for built-up land to one inch for forested areas (Table 7.1). Soil storage and groundwater storage for both layers was initially set to 10 inches (25 cm) for every sub-basin in the model; however, during the

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calibration process, soil storage was reduced to seven inches in order to increase surface runoff. Soil infiltration rates were estimated from published hydraulic conductivity tables for the Green-Ampt infiltration method (Rawls et al., 1983) and soil texture data in the Ganges basin (FAO-UNESCO, 1987). During calibration, the infiltration rates for sub-basins in the Indo-Gangetic plains closest to the main stem of the Ganges (the “lower” half of the major tributaries) were reduced to one half of their original estimated values. Reducing the infiltration rates in the Indo-Gangetic plains reduced groundwater flow and increased the volume of surface runoff, providing a better fit to observational flow data. Percolation rates into the first and second groundwater layers were set equal to soil infiltration rates for all sub-basins. Initially, the rate of deep percolation (or loss of water from the system) was set equal to soil infiltration rates for each sub-basin, although this removed too much water from the system before it could reach the channel. Therefore, the value for deep percolation was reduced to 0.38 mm per hour for all sub-basins, slightly less than the lowest soil infiltration rate in the model. HEC-HMS determines the volume of surface runoff from the SMA method and then calculates how fast the surface runoff reaches the channel with the SCS Time to Peak. The SCS Time to Peak represents how many hours after a precipitation event observed flow in a channel reaches its peak, and is calculated using the following equation (Bedient and Huber, 1992):

tp ⫽

l 0.8 ( S ⫹ 1)0.7 1900 y 0.5

(7.1)

where tp ⫽ lag time (hr) l ⫽ channel length (ft) y ⫽ average watershed slope (%) S ⫽ (1000/SCS Curve Number) ⫺ 10 (inches) Channel length and slope were determined from Geographic Information System (GIS) data layers in the Ganges basin, while the SCS Curve Numbers were determined by computing per cent area of various land cover (NIMA, 1997) and soil texture (FAO-UNESCO, 1987) combinations in each sub-basin, and then comparing these values to a published table of curve numbers (Bedient and Huber, 1992). Curve numbers can range from 0 to 100, with 100 representing a completely impervious surface with no soil moisture storage. However, the lowest published value of an SCS Curve Number is 25 for forested land with good cover and sandy soils. In the Ganges basin, SCS Curve Numbers were assigned ranging from 73 to 85, where each of these values represented averages of land use and soil texture across an entire sub-basin. The calculated values for the SCS Time to Peak (Equation 7.1) ranged from a minimum of 10 hours in the Himalayan half of the Yamuna sub-basin where slopes are high to 417 hours in the southern plains portion of the Yamuna (Table 7.1). For the SMA groundwater parameterization, a “ballpark” guess was made that groundwater reaches the channel about twenty times more slowly than surface runoff, and therefore the groundwater storage coefficients for each sub-basin (or the rate of inflow and outflow for the two groundwater layers) were determined by multiplying the SCS Time to Peak by twenty. The number of reservoirs in each groundwater layer was made proportional to the area of each sub-basin. These parameters did not change during the calibration process.

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A routing method describing the movement and storage of water within a channel was also defined for each reach in the model. The Muskingum-Cunge method (Cunge, 1969), a relatively simple hydrologic routing method was chosen, where the required parameters are channel length, channel slope, bottom width, side slope and a Manning’s roughness coefficient, which describes resistance to flow on the channel bed. Channel length and channel slope were estimated from a river network GIS layer and a Digital Elevation Model. Bottom width was estimated from the inland water polygons of a land cover map (NIMA, 1997). Given the lack of empirical data for side slope and the Manning’s roughness coefficient (n), side slope was estimated at 0.5 and Manning’s n at 0.04 for all reaches in the model, with both of these values being in the middle of their possible ranges. Since the Muskingum-Cunge method does not handle channel lengths longer than 175 km, the larger tributaries and the main stem of the Ganges were divided into multiple reaches.

7.5 MODEL CALIBRATION AND VALIDATION Model parameters were calibrated using precipitation and flow data from 1965 and 1966 and then the model was tested from 1967 to 1968. The model was calibrated using monthly average observed flow data at the Farakka Barrage (Vorosmarty et al., 1998), although the model was run at a daily time-step. At Patna and Allahabad, upstream of Farakka, twelve monthly flow observations were available averaged across 1965 to 1981 for Patna and 1970 to 1981 for Allahabad (Ray, 1998); however, given the lack of yearspecific data at these sites, neither was used for calibration. The calibration process involved a visual inspection of model results after each run, and then a change of one parameter at a time for the next run. After adjusting soil storage, evapotranspiration coefficients, soil infiltration rates, and the rate of deep percolation as described previously, the model output began to match observed flow data fairly well. Intermediate model outputs also showed good agreement with other published results. For example, model output shows that yearly precipitation turns into about 23 per cent evapotranspiration and 77 per cent runoff in the Himalayan half of the Kosi basin during 1965 and 1966, which compares favorably with the estimates of 30 and 70 per cent from Sharma et al. (2000). Also, the model shows net annual recharge into the first groundwater layer in the Yamuna plains near New Delhi of 79 mm per year, which compares favorably with the 80 mm per year predicted by Rangarajan and Athavale’s (2000) regression equations for estimating groundwater recharge in India. For the lower Kosi sub-basin, the closest sub-basin in the model to Kolkata, the net annual recharge is 210 mm per year, which also compares favorably with Rangarajan and Athavale’s (2000) estimate of 240 mm per year for Kolkata. Overall, the timing and volume of water produced by model output agrees fairly well with observed flow at Farakka, Patna and Allahabad. However, slight differences exist within and between years. In 1965, the model overproduced water at Farakka compared to the observed flow in March and April, but under produced water for the other months of the year excluding October (Figure 7.6). The model output fit observed flow most closely in 1966, when the model produced 111 per cent of the volume of water produced by observations. Overall in 1965 and 1966, the model produced 98 per cent of the water produced by observed flow over this two year period. In 1967 and 1968 (the testing period), the model again overestimated baseflow and underestimated the peaks during the monsoon season at Farakka as in 1965. The model also under produced the total amount of water that actually flowed during the testing period.

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1965 - 1968 Farakka Model vs. Observed Flow Model Output

50000

Observed Flow

45000

Flow- M 3 / ec (cms)

40000 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000

Jan-69

Nov-68

Jul-68

Sept-68

May-68

Jan-68

Mar-68

Nov-67

Jul-67

Sept-67

May-67

Jan-67

Mar-67

Nov-66

Jul-66

Sept-66

May-66

Nov-65 Jan-66 Mar-66

Jul-65

Sept-65

Mar-65 May-65

Jan-65

0

Fig. 7.6 HEC-HMS model output vs. monthly average observed flow (Vorosmarty et al., 1998) at the Farakka Barrage from 1965 to 1968. The model produced 84 per cent of the annual observed flow in 1965, 111 per cent in 1966, 95 per cent in 1967 and 91 per cent in 1968.

Model output from 1965 to 1968 in Patna and Allahabad follows the general pattern and magnitude of observed (annually-averaged) monthly flow (Figures 7.7 and 7.8). It is not clear if the Patna and Allahabad observed flow data were measured before or after the confluences with the tributaries on which these cities are cited. Therefore, in Figures 7.7 and 7.8, flow is graphed before the confluence with the Gandak for Patna and after the confluence with the Yamuna for Allahabad, since these model outputs provided a better fit with observed flow. At Patna, model output seems to overestimate baseflow, and possibly underestimate monsoon flow. From 1965 to 1968, model output produced 99 per cent of the water produced by average observed flow for four years. At Allahabad, model output again tends to overestimate baseflow in January through April. Overall from 1965 to 1968, the model produced 117 per cent of the water produced by average observed flow at Allahabad for four years. The overestimation of water at Allahabad could be influenced by the fact that this model does not account for existing diversions on the Ganges, specifically the Upper Ganges Canal upstream of Allahabad constructed in the 19th century for irrigation purposes. The model testing period from 1967 to 1968 at Farakka shows that the hydrologic processes hypothesized in this HEC-HMS model of the Ganges basin do not fit physical reality exactly. For example, the overestimation of baseflow at Farakka, Patna and Allahabad is likely due to the lack of a snowmelt method in version 2.2.2 of HEC-HMS. Due to the simplified nature of the parameterization and the large scale of the Ganges basin, this model best hopes to capture the general timing and magnitude of high and low flow events on a seasonal basis.

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1965 - 1968 Patna Model vs. Observed Flow Model Output

Observed Flow

40000 35000

Flow-(cms)

30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000

Sept-68

Jul-68

Mar-68

Jan-68

Oct-67

Jul-67

Mar-67

Jan-67

Sept-66

Jul-66

Apr-66

Jan-66

Oct-65

Jul-65

Apr-65

Jan-65

0

Fig. 7.7 HEC-HMS model output from 1965 to 1968 at Patna before the confluence with the Gandak vs. monthly average observed flow from 1965 to 1981 (Ray, 1998).

1965 - 1968 Allahabad Model vs. Observed Flow Model Output

30000

Observed Flow

25000

Flow-(cms)

20000

15000 10000 5000

Oct-68

Jul-68

Apr-68

Jan-68

Oct-67

Jul-67

Apr-67

Jan-67

Oct-66

Jul-66

Apr-66

Jan-66

Oct-65

Jul-65

Apr-65

Jan-65

0

Fig. 7.8 HEC-HMS model output from 1965 to 1968 at Allahabad after the confluence with the Yamuna vs. monthly average observed flow from 1970 to 1981 (Ray, 1998).

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7.6 RIVER LINKING SIMULATION To account for inter-basin transfers proposed under the ILR, hypothetical water diversions and inputs as proposed under the river linking plan were added into the HEC-HMS basin model described earlier. Some of the links in the Himalayan component of the plan would provide irrigation water within the basin and some of the links would transfer water into and out of the Ganges basin (Figure 7.2). The main inter-basin transfer into the Ganges is the Manas-Sankosh-Tista-Ganges (MSTG) link which would bring in water from the Brahmaputra basin to the Ganges just upstream of the Farakka Barrage. This water would be used to flush Kolkata port, with the remainder transferred south towards the Mahanadi basin, eventually linking up with the Peninsular component of the plan. Water would also be transferred west across multiple Himalayan tributaries of the Ganges. Some of this water would be removed from the western part of the Ganges basin and piped towards the desert areas in Rajasthan. However, the majority of the links in the Himalayan component of the plan would provide irrigation to arid areas within the Ganges basin during the dry season. This water is represented as lost to the Ganges in the simulation described here. Diagrams from the National Water Development Agency of India, collected by Carrie Knowlton during a trip to India in summer 2004 (NWDA, 2004), were used in order to simulate river linking flows. These diagrams contain yearly totals of water input, transmission losses, irrigation use and output for the main linkages in the Himalayan component of the plan. In the model, it was assumed that the river linking plan would store “excess” water in reservoirs during the monsoon season, and then pipe this water out through canals at a constant rate throughout the year. Therefore, diversions were modeled as taking place primarily during the monsoon season, and the diversion of flow was avoided during the dry season. This was not always possible; for example in the Gandak and Ghaghara basins it was necessary to divert water throughout the year to produce the requisite annual amount of water as called for in the river linking plan. Diversion curves were constructed in HEC-HMS through trial and error until the river linking simulation correctly diverted the total amount of water on an annual basis (Table 7.2). Inputs to reaches were modeled as a constant flow throughout the year. Nine diversions were added to the model removing water either for irrigation purposes within the sub-basin or inter-basin transfer. Some of these diversions were lumped together when they affected the same reach as defined in the model. The diversions in the model represent the following links:








A total of 13,086 million cubic meters (MCM) per year removed in two separate diversions from the Kosi River (Kosi-Mechi and Kosi-Ghaghara links). 32,746 MCM per year removed from the Gandak in the Gandak-Ganges link, only about 25 per cent of which is returned to the Ganges upstream of Allahabad. 32,646 MCM per year removed from the Ghaghara as part of the Ghaghara-Yamuna link, about 25 per cent of which is returned to the Yamuna. 11,680 MCM removed from the Sarda, a tributary of the Ghaghara, as part of the Sarda-Yamuna link; this link would be augmented by a 2,248 MCM removal of water from the Upper Ganges and then mostly transported out of the Ganges basin towards Rajasthan. 2,512 MCM diverted from the Sone in the Sone-Southern Tributaries of the Ganges link.

0

100

500

1,400

7,000

2,000

5,000

10,000

75,000

Diversion

0

Flow

Ken

11,250 75,000 375,000

100,000

500,000

7,500

2,500

500

0

Diversion

15,000

10,000

5,000

2,000

0

Flow

Kosi

35,000 40,000 100,000 400,000

40,000 100,000 400,000

20,000

10,000

5,000

2,000

1,000

0

Diversion

35,000

20,000

10,000

5,000

2,000

1,000

0

Flow

Gandak

0

500,000

100,000

75,000

45,000

5,000

2,000

0

Diversion

1,000,000 1,000,000

500,000

100,000

75,000

50,000

10,000

5,000

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Ghaghara

0

400,000

100,000

25,000

5,000

2,000

1,000

Flow

160,000

40,000

10,000

2,500

200

0

0

Diversion

Sone

0

8,000 8,000 8,000

1,000,000 1,500,000

8,000

8,000

2,500

0

0

0

0

Diversion

500,000

300,000

100,000

10,000

5,000

2,000

1,000

Flow

Ganga between Yamuna & Ghaghara (Chunar-Sone Link)

Table 7.2 Diversion curves for river linking simulation. HEC-HMS diverted water from reach flow at each model time-step by interpolation from these curves in order to divert the correct amount of water on an annual basis for each diversion defined in the model. All values are in cubic feet per second (cfs) where 35.3147 cfs ⫽ 1 cms

120 INTERLINKING OF THE GANGES RIVER: SIMULATED CHANGES IN FLOW

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4,988 MCM diverted from the Ganges between the Yamuna and the Ghaghara as part of the Chunar-Sone link. The Chunar, a small tributary, was not represented in the model. 361 MCM lost from the Ken basin on a net basis as part of the Ken-Betwa link.

The links added to the model also contained two inflows:



7,386 MCM per year added to the Ganges upstream of Allahabad (originally diverted from the Gandak as part of the Gandak- Ganges link) minus 2,248 MCM per year diverted to the Sarda-Yamuna link canal (total inflow of 5,138 MCM). 7,769 MCM per year added to the Yamuna near the confluence with the Chambal (originally diverted from the Ghaghara as part of the Ghaghara-Yamuna link).

The only planned link in the Ganges basin affecting the water balance that was not represented in the model was the Parbati-Kalisindh-Chambal link, given that no information was available about the amount of water diverted by this link. The main BrahmaputraGanges link canal (MSTG) was not represented in the model either, since all water proposed to be added to the Ganges upstream of Farakka in the MSTG link (37,915 MCM per year) will be removed at Farakka for transfer to the Peninsular component through the Farakka-Sundarbans, Ganges-Damodar-Subernarekha and Subernarekha-Mahanadi links.

7.7 RIVER LINKING RESULTS The model was run from 1965 to 1966 for the purposes of comparing model output pre- and post-linking. Starting the run in 1965 allowed time for the model to get started and avoid unusual results due to the initial storage quantities. However, model output for our three chosen locations was only compared in 1966. Observed average annual discharge in 1966 at Farakka was below long term averages from 1949 to 1973 by about 29 per cent; however, the relative reduction or augmentation in flow under river linking shown here can more generally be applied to any year. Model results show a 4 per cent increase in total annual volume of water in 1966 at Allahabad, a 22 per cent decrease at Patna and 34 per cent decrease at Farakka. The reduction or augmentation of flow at each site also changes seasonally, as shown in Figure 7.9 and Table 7.3. For example, at Allahabad, the linking scenario shows a 234 per cent increase in flow over pre-linking conditions in January, but a 6 per cent reduction in flow in August during the monsoon season. In the dry season from October through May, flow is augmented at Allahabad, on average, by 510 m3/sec, a 40 per cent increase over pre-linking conditions, while flow is reduced slightly during the monsoon season. This is due to the fact that inputs from the Gandak-Ganges and Ghaghara-Yamuna links augment the flow at Allahabad at a constant rate throughout the year, but the Ken-Betwa link removes water from the Yamuna upstream of Allahabad mostly during the monsoon season. Similarly at Patna, post-river linking flow is 27 per cent less in August, but 47 per cent more in May compared to pre-linking conditions. Overall, in the dry season, flow is reduced on average by 610 m3/sec or about 20 per cent relative to pre-linking conditions. The diversion of the Gandak and Ghaghara rivers creates an especially large impact on monsoon flow at Patna. From June to September, flow is reduced by 33 per cent on average, or around 6,900 m3/sec. The model has to divert almost the entire flow of these

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M 3 /SeC (CMS)

two tributaries in order to produce the required amount of water per the NWDA documents. It seems unlikely that the river linking plan could divert all the water in the Ghaghara and Gandak for inter-basin transfer considering the large number of people living alongside these rivers that depend on the flow for their livelihoods. It is possible that the model is under-producing flow for these sub-basins given that direct calibration data is not available for either tributary, or that the NWDA has not yet realized the implications of their planned diversions.

1000 0 ⫺1000

Allahabad

M 3 /SeC (CMS)

⫺2000 0 ⫺500 0 ⫺1000 0

Patna

M 3 /SeC (CMS)

⫺1500 0 0 ⫺500 0 ⫺1000 0

Farakka

⫺1500 0 Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Fig. 7.9 Results of river linking simulation: augmentation (⫹) or reduction (⫺) in flow due to river linking diversions and inputs at Allahabad, Patna and Farraka.

Table 7.3 Average daily model output flow in pre-linking scenario and average daily change from pre- to post-linking scenarios. All values in cms

Dry season (Oct–May)

Monsoon season (June–Sept)

Pre-linking flow

Change

Pre-linking flow

Change

Allahabad

1,250

510

12,660

–360

Patna

2,900

–610

20,830

–6,880

Farakka

3,510

–940

21,700

–7,840

At Farakka, flow is reduced in both the dry and monsoon seasons. Flow is 49 per cent less in January under river linking but only 1 per cent less in May. On average, during the dry season, flow is reduced by 27 per cent, or 940 m3/sec. During the monsoon season from June to September, flow is reduced on average by 36 per cent.

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7.8 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GANGES WATER SHARING TREATY Currently, the Ganges is said to “… provide water to 37 per cent of the geographical area of Bangladesh, over which one third of the population depends (Singh, 2003).” However, the simulated reductions in flow at Farakka during the dry season strongly call into question India’s commitment to meet its flow obligations towards Bangladesh under the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty (in place until 2026) if river linking construction proceeds as planned. Water disputes between India and Bangladesh date back to 1951, when the overnment of India announced the scheduled construction of a barrage at Farakka, just 18 km from the Bangladesh border – which, at the time, was known as East Pakistan. Though the plans were not immediately carried out, the announced plan sparked several years of turmoil surrounding water sharing issues between the two countries. After nearly twenty years of negotiations, stretching as far as the United Nations (UN), India acted to unilaterally construct the Farakka Barrage and divert flow away from Bangladesh towards the Hooghly River to distribute water to the Indian delta and the city of Kolkata. After Bangladesh became established in 1971, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission (JRC) was formed. Then, in 1975, India did sign an initial agreement with Bangladesh upon completion of the Farakka barrage that allowed for significantly less 3 diversion (311 to 454 m /sec) by the Indian government than originally planned. Next two dry seasons water withdrawal continued without any bilateral agreement. The first formal agreement between India and Bangladesh was signed in 1977 for a period of five years and was extended on two separate occasions before it finally expired in 1988. The next eight years were characterized by an escalating deadlock between the two countries during which India withdrew water unilaterally. Various proposals were devised, exchanged, evaluated and ignored until a political breakthrough, on 12 December 1996 when Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina Wajed of Bangladesh and H.D. Deve Gowda of India signed the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty. The main features of the Treaty are (Chanda and Gupta, 2000):










Validity for thirty years (1996 to 2026) subject to review by the two governments at 5-year intervals or as desired by either signatory. The schedule is based on the average 40-year flow data (1949 to 1988) to be applied to the sharing formula which actually governs the treaty. Either party can seek the first review after two years to assess the impact. Sharing to be by 10-day periods from January 1 to May 31 every year. Sharing will be on a 50:50 basis, if the availability at Farakka is less than 70,000 cubic feet of flow per second (cfs). Bangladesh will get 35,000 cfs and India the balance of flow if the availability at Farakka is between 70,000 and 75,000 cfs. India will receive 40,000 cfs and Bangladesh the rest in case of availability of 75,000 cfs or more. During the critical month (April) Bangladesh will get a guaranteed flow of 35,000 cfs in the first and last ten days of April, and 27,633 cfs during the period 11 to 20 of April. If flow falls below 50,000 cfs in any 10-day period, the two governments will enter into immediate consultations to make emergency adjustments.

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Joint Committee of equal number of representatives to be formed for daily monitoring of flows from January to May at the feeder canal and the navigation lock in Farakka, India and at Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh and to submit annual reports to the two governments.

Comparing model output from the pre- to post-linking scenario in 1966, the number of days where flow is below 50,000 cfs rises from 12 to 55 in the January 1 to May 31 sharing period between India and Bangladesh. Therefore, this projected reduction in dry season flow under the river linking plan will most likely require a renegotiation of the Water Sharing Treaty, if not compensatory action by the Indian government. It is unclear how, and in what forum, the discrepancies between the ILR and the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty will be resolved. 7.9 CONCLUSIONS The river linking simulation shown here allows us to begin to make informed predictions about the consequences of river linking as they relate to flooding, water quality and water supply throughout the Ganges basin, saltwater intrusion in the Ganges delta, and impacts on Bangladesh, India’s downstream riparian neighbor. Any reduction in baseflow in the Ganges watershed during the dry season will have negative impacts on populations that depend on river water for drinking, sanitation and irrigation. Therefore, agricultural areas along the Ganges from Patna downstream that currently suffer water shortages during the lean season will experience more severe shortages under river linking, according to the results of this simulation. The model also shows that populations living along the Gandak and Ghaghara rivers will be severely impacted year-round by the proposed diversions. The reduction in flow at Farakka during the dry season would certainly create further political tensions with Bangladesh and call into question India’s ability to meet its obligations to Bangladesh per their latest water sharing treaty. It seems likely that Kolkata, an Indian city downstream of Farakka, would be less impacted by the river linking plan than Bangladesh, since one of the river links in the ILR (Farakka- Sundarbans link) plans to bring water from the Brahmaputra-Ganges link to flush Kolkata port. This diversion from the Brahmaputra through Indian territories will also reduce the amount of water flowing from India into Bangladesh, further inflaming tensions. Less water in the Ganges delta, downstream of Farakka, would worsen salinity intrusion into the channel and groundwater aquifers which harms both drinking water supplies and agricultural production. Also, reduced flow in the delta would negatively impact the Sundarbans, a mangrove ecosystem highly sensitive to the relative balance of saltwater and freshwater inputs from upstream (Wahid et al., 2007). If the Himalayan reservoirs operate as planned, the diversion of water during monsoon season and the consequent reduction in flow from June to August at Patna and Farakka might indeed reduce catastrophic flooding in the downstream areas of the Ganges. However, if river linking does take place and communities become accustomed to reduced flow conditions by settling further within the floodplain, seasonal variability in river flow could still create damage. As flow is reduced, sediments begin to settle out of the river, which may lead to channel aggradations and/or channel migration, also possibly harming populations living in the floodplain. Impacts on water quality due to river linking would likely be different at different points within the Ganges watershed. Increases in flow would dilute the existing load of pollutants in the water, helping to reduce their toxic qualities and carry them out to sea,

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while reductions in flow would have the opposite effect. Therefore, at Allahabad, the predicted increase in baseflow might help to improve water quality during the dry season, but the reduction at Patna could lead to a further deterioration of water quality in that area. Also, many authors have pointed out that river linking may actually spread not only water, but water pollution from fecal contamination and heavy metals throughout India (Misra et al., 2007). For example, water diverted out of the Ganges basin may be linked with relatively cleaner waters in the Peninsular component of the plan. However, within the Ganges basin, the Himalayan component of the ILR mainly diverts water in relatively pristine Himalayan upstream watersheds, and this would likely have a positive effect on water quality near the confluence of the Upper Ganges and Yamuna rivers. Chapter 9 discusses changes in water quality due to the ILR in more detail. The amount of water in the Ganges varies from year to year and will be affected by climate change (see Chapter 12), land use change, and increasing water withdrawals in the coming years. This particular hydrologic model and river linking simulation does not take into account any of these factors. However, it should capture the general timing and magnitude of discharge in the Ganges basin in the near future, and can be used as a starting point for further simulations related to river linking or other alterations to the hydrology of the Ganges basin.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The master’s project, upon which this work was based, received support from many people and institutions. Dr Mike Wiley at the School of Natural Resources and Environment (SNRE), University of Michigan served as faculty advisor for the project and provided extensive academic support, scientific expertise and constructive criticism without which the work would not have been possible. Also at the University of Michigan, Dr Mohammad Omair, Shaw Lacy and the Map Library provided invaluable instruction, research advice, personnel contacts, data and encouragement. In India, Rakesh Jaiswal of EcoFriends in Kanpur and his family generously provided home base for preliminary research on the project. Also, Dr Ram Boojh at the Centre for Environment Education (CEE) North in Lucknow (currently at UNESCO in Delhi) was essential in organizing research activities and disseminating results. The project received financial support from the Educational Foundation of America, Rackham Discretionary Funds, the SNRE Travel Grant and the SNRE Alumni Incentive Award. Diana Woodworth and Mary Martinowicz at SNRE helped to secure funds and manage the budget. Finally, this work was a contribution within the University of Michigan’s Ganga River Partnership Project (http://rivers.snre.umich.edu/ganga/), established in 2002 by Drs Wiley and Omair (University of Michigan), Dr Boojh (CEE-North, Lucknow and UNESCO, Delhi) and Dr R.K. Sinha (Patna University, Science College).

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REFERENCES Athavale, R.N.: Water Harvesting and Sustainable Supply in India. Rawat Publications, Jaipur and New Delhi, 2003. Bedient, P.B. and W.C. Huber: Hydrology and Floodplain Analysis. Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1992. Bruijnzeel, L.A. and C.N. Bremmer: Highland Lowland Interaction in the Ganges Brahmaputra River Basin – A Review of Published Literature. International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Kathmandu, ICIMOD Occasional Paper 11(1989). Chanda, S. and Gupta, A.K.: The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty: Genesis and Significance. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies: South Asia (http://www.ipcs.org/South_Asia_articles2.jsp?action⫽ showView&kValue⫽670&country⫽1016&status⫽article&mod⫽a), January 24, 2000. Cunge, K.A.: On the Subject of a Flood Propagation Method (Muskingum Method). Journal of Hydrologic Research 78(1969), pp. 205–230. Deshmukh, A.G., E.P. Rao, and T.I. Eldho: Surface Runoff Estimation Using Remote Sensing, GIS and SCS Method. International Conference on Advanced Modeling Techniques for Sustainable Management of Water Resources, NIT Warangal, January 2004. FAO-UNESCO: Digital Soil Map of the World from http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/EART/fao.html, based on Soils of the World. Elsevier Science Publishing Co. Inc., New York, 1987. Federal Climate Complex: Global Surface Summary of Day Data. Version 6 (www.ncdc.noaa.gov), 2003. Fleming, M. and V. Neary: Continuous Hydrologic Modeling Study with the Hydrologic Modeling System. Journal of Hydrologic Engineering 9(3), pp. 175–183. Hydrologic Engineering Center: HEC-HMS Technical Reference Manual. US Army Corps of Engineers, March 2000. Hydrologic Engineering Center: Hydrologic Modeling System. US Army Corps of Engineers, Executable, Version 2.2.2. (http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/software/hec-hms/hechms-hechms. html), May 2002. Knowlton, C., Gourdji, S. and K. Platt: Indian Interlinking of Rivers: A Preliminary Evaluation. Master’s Project, School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, May 2005. Mirza, M.M.Q (ed.): The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2004, pp. 13–37. Mirza, M.M.Q.: Diversion of the Ganges Water at Farakka and Its Effects on Salinity in Bangladesh. Environmental Management 22(1998), pp. 711–722. Misra, A.K., A. Saxena, M. Yaduvanshi, A. Mishra, Y. Bhadauriya, and A. Thakur: Proposed River Linking Project of India: A Boon or Bane to Nature. Environmental Geology 51(2007), pp. 1361–1376. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA): US Government. Vector Map Level 0: Land-Use Dataset, 1997. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA): US Department of Commerce. Climates of the World: Historical Climatology Series 6-4, 1991. National Water Development Agency (NWDA): Unpublished photocopies of Himalayan Component River Linking Diagrams Collected by Carrie Knowlton, Government of India, 2004. Peterson, Thomas, C. and Russell, S. Vose: An Overview of the Global Historical Climatology Network Temperature Database. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 78(1997), pp. 2837–2849. Rangarajan, R. and R.N. Athavale: Annual Replenishable Groundwater Potential of India – An Estimate Based on Injected Tritium Studies. Journal of Hydrology 234(2000), pp. 38–53. Rawls, W.J., D.L. Brakensiek and N. Miller: Green-Ampt Infiltration Parameters from Soils Data. Journal of Hydraulic Engineering, ASCE 109(1) (1983), pp. 62–70. Ray, P.: Ecological Imbalance of the Ganga River System. Daya Publishing House, New Delhi, 1998. Sharma, K.P., C.J. Vorosmarty and B. Moore III: Sensitivity of the Himalayan Hydrology to LandUse and Climatic Changes. Climatic Change 47(2000), pp. 117–139.

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Shiva, V. and K. Jalees: Sujalam: Living Waters, the Impact of the River Linking Project. Navdanya, New Delhi, 2003. Singh, Arun Kumar: Interlinking of Rivers in India: A Preliminary Assessment. The Other Media, New Delhi, 2003. Vorosmarty, C.J., B. Fekete, and B.A. Tucker: River Discharge Database. Version 1.1 (RivDIS v1.0 supplement), 1998. Available through the Institute for the Study of Earth, Oceans, and Space/ University of New Hampshire, Durham NH (USA) at http://www.rivdis.sr.unh.edu/. Wahid, S.M., M.S. Babel, and A.R. Bhuiyan: Hydrologic Monitoring and Analysis in the Sundarbans Mangrove Ecosystem, Bangladesh. Journal of Hydrology 332(2007), pp. 381–395.

8 India’s Energy Future and Interlinking of Rivers KOBI PLATT SHARON GOURDJI CARRIE KNOWLTON MICHAEL J. WILEY

8.1 INTRODUCTION As India’s economy surges forward, access to reliable and affordable energy becomes evermore critical. India’s real GDP grew 8.5 per cent in 2006, expanding at an annual rate of 7.8 per cent between 2002 and 2006 (CIA, 2007). According to World Bank statistics for 2005, India’s economy was the10th largest in the world (World Bank, 2007). Economic expansion, coupled with significant population growth, has led to rising energy demand in nearly every sector of the economy. Still, with ever present limitations of the nation’s energy supply, there are few signs that India will curb its growth anytime soon. Of the various energy sources domestically available to fuel India’s economic growth, hydropower has emerged as a leading option. Globally, hydropower is third behind natural gas and coal when used to generate electricity. Regenerative characteristics of hydropower, due to relative constancy of precipitation, have led to its classification as a renewable (and carbon-free) energy resource. These characteristics contribute to the rising debate about the role of hydropower in the context of global climate change objectives. In recent years, development of hydro resources in India has placed the India’s Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) plan at the center stage. If completed, the ILR is expected to provide some 34,000 MW of generation capacity to India – or about a 25 per cent increase of the current domestic energy production. At present, India’s energy supply mix is characterized by a large dependence on coal, causing both comfort and concern for the county’s political leaders. Coal combustion, while a source of cheap and reliable energy, is responsible for atmospheric emissions of many harmful gases including carbon dioxide (CO2) and its concentration, the foremost cause of global warming. Interestingly, emerging research indicates that net CO2 emissions from hydropower reservoirs – those that include an account of the total pass-through of methane (CH4 ) gas, with a high CO2 equivalent, based on alterations to the watershed – are also significant. Indeed, a 1990 study performed by Philip Fearnside at that Brazilian National Institute for Research showed that net equivalent CO2 emissions from the Tucurui dam in Brazil were roughly 32 million tons (McCully, 2004). During the generation process of hydropower methane is released when the water is discharged through the turbines (McCully, 2004). Methane at the bottom of the reservoir becomes more soluble under the

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high pressure from the water above and condenses (McCully, 2004). When the water is released through the spillway the pressure decreases and the methane is released (McCully, 2004). By comparison, methane has a much more potent global warming potential than CO2 (McCully, 2004). By comparison, Fearnside states, a natural gas combined cycle power plant comparable to the Tucurui dam would produce only about 8.1 million tons of CO2 equivalent gas (McCully, 2004). In addition to the emerging science about greenhouse gas emissions from hydro projects, many hydropower facilities have been linked to water quality loss and habitat destruction that negatively affects both human and environmental health. In both cases, whether hydropower or coal combustion, the economic and environmental trade-offs are extremely difficult to measure. For India specifically, under developed transmission infrastructure and political inefficiencies only create further complications toward securing a reliable future energy supply from the ILR. This chapter provides a glimpse of the ILR in the context of India’s need for energy development. The analysis begins with an overview of the supply and demand status in India’s energy sector. The text includes an examination of the present and future challenges associated with the role of energy and continued economic expansion, with emphasis on the positive and negative attributes of the ILR. Close attention is paid to the political infrastructure and the environmental concerns governing India’s options for energy development. Finally, a brief summary of cost-benefit analysis of other high level water development projects is included, the ILR is placed in a regional context, and broad concerns are summarized.

8.2 BALANCING NEEDS: INDIA’S ENERGY SECTOR India consumed roughly 15.417 quads1 of energy in 2005 (US EIA, 2007). Coal (53 per cent) was the dominant fuel source, followed by petroleum (33 per cent) and natural gas (8 per cent) (EIA, 2007). India’s total energy consumption ranked 5th in the world for 2005, behind the United States, China, Russia, and Japan (EIA, 2007). On a global scale, experts at the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) predict that energy consumption will rise by 57 per cent between 2002 and 2025 in attempt to keep pace with economic growth (EIA, 2005). Energy generation from fossil fuels is expected to increase, with oils, coals and other forms of biomass continuing to constitute the majority of supply. The United Nation’s Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that with continued world economic growth (average 2.7 per cent per year) energy demand in 2020 will be roughly 50 per cent higher than it was in 1998 (UNDP, 2000). Furthermore, the UNDP states that without major improvements in energy efficiency, demand over this period could rise by 80 per cent (UNDP, 2000). In addition to the tightening balance of overall resources, political and social instability in the oil rich countries around the world will only serve to hinder the future reliability of crude oil. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, questions about the economic well-being of Russian oil development, and OPEC production skirting near capacity, all suggest future price shocks are inevitable (Bangerjee, 2004). Disruptions of this sort have a profound impact on consumers in the developing world where the ability to keep pace with rising prices and adjust to changes in supply is not great. Thus, for reasons related to reliability and access of supply, coal has re-emerged as the fossil fuel of choice for many nations. 1

1 quad ⫽ 1 quadrillion BTU.

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World coal consumption peaked in 1988, followed by a notable decline in the early 1990s when many of the world’s leading energy consumers shifted significant portions of their production capital to natural gas (EIA, 2006). On the heels of supply limitations and rising natural gas prices, however, reliance on coal has rebounded (EIA, 2004a). World coal consumption has increased each year since. According to EIA, India possesses roughly 100 billion short tons of economically recoverable coal reserves. In 2004, India consumed about 250 million short tons of coal and the demand for coal has steadily increased at the rate of 6 per cent since 1992 to 1993 (EIA, 2004b). Assuming the current rate of consumption holds, India’s coal reserves will be sustained for over 400 years. Exploitative development practices and out-dated energy technologies continue to threaten the health of India’s natural resources (e.g. water and arable land). The degree to which India is able to stimulate future economic growth will be dependent on its ability to obtain an affordable mix of sustainable energy resources. To that end, the ILR represents one of the most significant natural resource development plans on the Indian subcontinent, both in its mission and scale. Outlined in its primary objectives, the plan highlights increased electricity generation capacity of 34,000 megawatts (MW) from newly constructed hydropower facilities. Presently, India makes use of roughly 20,000 MW of installed electricity generating capacity, and plans to expand by 100,000 MW over the coming decade (EIA, 2004). Beyond India’s ambitious plans to develop new energy resources, the lack of adequate transmission infrastructure means that new power supply may never connect with consumer demand. Government records indicate that while 84 per cent of the 587,000 villages in India are served by power lines, only 55 per cent of the households in India actually have access to electricity (Singh, 2006). Though coal makes up the largest share of total energy consumption in India, the potential role of the ILR presents an opportunity for India to diversify its energy portfolio that is heavily reliant on fossil fuels. Also evident is India’s energy deficit, shown here in Table 8.1. The shortage depicted has led to an increased dependence on energy imports from around the world, and represents a growing vulnerability to their burgeoning economy.

Table 8.1 India: Total primary energy production vs. Total primary energy consumption (Quads) 1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Total primary energy production

7.33

7.49

8.00

9.48

8.75

9.17

9.37

9.59

9.81

10.21

10.41

Total primary energy consumption

8.86

9.24

9.97

11.49

11.15

11.76

12.17

12.74

13.48

13.84

13.98

Source: Lynch, 2002.

In a 2002 report published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) suggests that financial shortcomings and technical deficiencies have created a tremendous need for policy reform within India’s energy sector. Moreover, a 2003 collaborative analysis published by The Energy Research Institute (TERI) in New Delhi and the Graduate School of Energy Science in Kyoto, Japan showed a 9 per cent annual increase in energy demand in India over the

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past decade – one of the highest rates observed worldwide (Mathur et al., 2003). In 1996 to 1997, for example, coal consumption by the utilities was 199.6 million tons (Mt), increasing to approximately 250 Mt by 2000 to 2001. This number is expected to nearly double in the next five years – official estimates by the Ministry of Coal estimate that consumption by the utilities will reach 415 Mt by 2011 to 2012 (Mathur et al., 2003). Yet, despite strong increases in the rate of consumption, the expansion of energy capacity in India has not kept pace with rapid growth in demand. Indeed, an analysis of the March 2002 energy demand by the Centre for Energy Studies at the Indian Institute of Technology indicated 12.6 per cent peak energy deficit (Thakur et al., 2005). Figure 8.1 shows energy consumption across India’s economic sectors. While the residential sector has emerged as the country’s most significant energy sink, the shift that India’s industrial sector has made to captive power (because of a lack of reliability in the public sector) has been incredibly dramatic. Peaking shortages – energy shortage during a period of peak demand – reached a high of nearly 21 per cent in 1992 to 1993, while total energy shortages leveled off in 1996 to 1997 at 11.7 per cent (Singh, 2006). In terms of power capacity, India’s Ministry of Power estimates the need for an additional 10,000 MW each year at a cost of US$ 10 billion per annum over the next 10 to 12 year time horizon to meet demand at expected rates of growth (Thakur et al., 2005). Many of these scenarios are based on the government’s publicized goal of providing nationwide power to all by 2012 (Thakur et al., 2005).

Fig. 8.1 India’s energy consumption by economic sector, 1990 and 1999 (IEA).

However, operational shortcomings within the political arena, including a lack of accountability in the regulatory and financial framework, have contributed to large disparities in the amount of electricity consumed and that which is actually billed. In short, barrier to entry within the energy industry caused by this investment risk associated with billing complications have caused a decline in overall growth of energy consumption relative to the rise in economic output.

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It [India’s electricity supply industry] is currently running a growing risk of bankruptcy. This has created a serious impediment to investments in the sector at a time when India desperately needs them. This is reflected in the sharp decrease of the ratio of electricity consumption growth to GDP growth in the 1990s. In otherwords, in the past decade, electricity consumption growth did not follow economic growth (IEA and OECD, 2002). According to a report released by the India’s Ministry of Power in 2001, only 55 per cent of total electricity generated was billed and 41 per cent was paid with regularity. Among rates that are being paid, prices reflect roughly 75 per cent of real average cost to suppliers. In fact, “the recovery of average financial cost of supply through average revenue realized has declined from 76.7 per cent in 1996 to 1997 to 68.6 per cent in 2001 to 2002” (Thakur et al., 2005: p.1). Similarly, in 1995 to 1996 nine out of nineteen State Electricity Boards (SEB’s) reported financial losses, in 2001 to 2002 all of them did (Thakur et al., 2005). These market conditions – including high taxes and unreliable service have forced many industrial consumers to shift to captive power – power produced on-site instead of purchased off the grid (Singh, 2006). The net effect has lost SEBs their most valuable customers. Indeed, the agriculture and residential sectors’ dependence on government subsidies that have kept electricity prices reasonable, which has long hindered the formulation of a natural pricing structure, is no longer fiscally viable or politically sustainable (IEA and OECD, 2002; Singh, 2006). The result has created a serious financial burden within the industry that has discouraged new investment and slowed India’s economic growth potential. 8.3 POWER STRUCTURE: INDIA’S STATE ELECTRICITY BOARDS (SEBs) The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) provides technical and economic assistance in the evaluation of energy-related projects that call upon funding from agencies within India’s central government (Dossani, 2004). However, the balance of responsibility to coordinate the energy sector’s generation, transmission, distribution and pricing responsibilities rests in the hands of SEBs. The Indian Constitution grants pricing and tariff rights to the SEBs, not the central government. Thus, most of the nation’s capital assets – generation, transmission and distribution – operate under state control. Efforts to keep pace with economic growth, combined with the increasing popularization of energy market deregulation, led the central government to invite private investors into the utility market in the early 1990s. In October 1991, the central government issued its first official policy reform targeting the financial needs of the SEBs. The statement allowed “the private sector to set up thermal [coal] projects, hydroelectric projects, and wind/solar energy projects of any size” including 100 per cent foreign ownership that guaranteed a 16 per cent return on equity called a power purchase agreement (PPA) with exchange rate protection (Dossani, 2004). By 1996, however, the reform provisions put forth in 1991 had all but failed. Though investment in privatized generating capacity had been adequately encouraged, privatization in the distribution market was not pursued. This compromising detail within the reform plan made potential investors wary of the financial health of the comprehensive energy system. Given these shortcomings, the Ministry of Power once again proposed a new approach to privatization called the Common Minimum National Action Plan for Power (CMNAP). Among its many policy mechanisms, the plan called for the following points:

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incorporation of SEBs beginning with reliance on public ownership, while private investors were gradually phased in; efficiency improvements for generation and distribution of SEBs; creation of independent state electricity regulatory commissions (SERCs) answering only to the state’s High Court.

Again, these policy prescriptions lacked the necessary integration with the distribution sector. Despite the change in the overall model intended to eventually make SEBs private, potential investors remained concerned about the state’s financial health. In attempting to offer some regulatory structure at the national level, the government passed the Electricity Amendment Act that established the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) in 1998. In addition, the legislation officially “… separated transmission from distribution and created the national Power Grid Corporation to own and operate inter-state transmission lines (Dossani, 2004: p.16).” In that same year, the Ministry of Power took action with the SEBs and mandated that all states:




set up SERCs; corporatize the SEB’s and unbundled the SEBs generation, transmission and distribution activities; and open transmission to the private sector (Dossani, 2004).

The states abided by the Ministry’s calls to reform, but change has been slow. Much to the chagrin of the SEB’s, less than favorable market conditions related to political corruption that created a multitude of financial obstacles continually discouraged investment, particularly with regard to transmission and distribution. In fact, by March 2002, private investors held a scant 11 per cent of installed capacity (Thakur et al., 2005). Between 1992 and 2002, private investors only added a scant 6,500 MW to 95,000 MW generating capacity that existed prior to the opening of energy markets (Singh, 2006). The most recent legislation governing India’s power supply is the Electricity Act of 2003. In sum, its purpose is: “… to consolidate the laws relating to generation, transmission, distribution, trading and use of electricity and generally for taking measures conducive to development of electricity industry, promoting competition therein, protecting interest of consumers and supply of electricity to all areas …”. (Thakur et al., 2005: p.2). Most importantly, the Act changes the long standing model that has traditionally supported a single buyer. Ideally, the new policy would encourage multiple players to engage at different stages within the power industry. One concrete illustration of this approach to hasten private investment can be cited in the policy’s elimination of licensing restrictions for traditional (coal) generation facilities. At present, however, private markets remain small and have not yet been adequately managed in conjunction within the public sector. As the implementation phase of the Electricity Act’s provisions plays out, questions about the environmental implications of the reform remain. The next section begins with a brief discussion of utility deregulation and the development of private sector investment in developing countries like India. Finally, the examination turns to the air quality and environmental concerns associated with the primary pollutants in the combustion of coal.

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8.4 ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS: RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION As a developing nation, transition toward deregulation of energy industry in India raises several questions to the extent environmental considerations will be incorporated. While much has been documented about the political success associated with clean technologies in places like the United Kingdom (UK), the focus has tended to be on independent power producers (IPPs) (Perkins, 2005). For example, the UK has decreased air concentrations of sulfur dioxide (the pollutant responsible for acid rain) from 179 ␮g/m3 to 14 ␮g/m3 since 1962 (UK Environment Agency, 2005). This improvement in air quality is largely due to a combination of government regulation and private sector investment in pollution control or clean energy technologies. “Most IPPs are private firms. Some of these are large, transnational developers with projects in a number of different markets across the world, while other independents are locally owned and operated (Perkins, 2005).” However, very little is actually known about the choices of IPPs in developing countries, namely India, and how they may or may not differ from those in developed countries.

The India power sector has traditionally been dominated by stateowned utilities producing electricity, for the most part, using coal in relatively old, inefficient and polluting plants. As such, one might expect IPP developers using modern, environment-efficient generating technologies to reduce the pollution-intensity of electricity production. Yet, on the other, a combination of weak environmental regulations, abundant coal supplies and stringent cost pressures on project developers might suggest that they will be reluctant to invest in environmentally sound generating options, many of which are more expensive an a capital-cost basis (Perkins, 2005).

Given the financial difficulties combined with shortcomings in supply, Perkins’ thesis seems entirely appropriate. In fact, a pervasive incentive for IPP’s to rely on proven technologies that minimize risk and enhance cost-effectiveness is inherent in the observations being made in the developing world (Torrens and Stenzel, 1998). A significant amount of uncertainty still exists regarding future energy development and the ability to meet demand in India strictly because of the lackluster investment within the industry. As discussed in the section above, involvement of the private sector in deregulated energy markets has been disappointing at best (Perkins, 2005). The lack of investment has made it difficult to determine how the private sector would influence certain environmental concerns related to energy production. Least-cost investment often translates to a shortfall in what are deemed costly pollution controls. However, the provision of incentives for pollution control technology within the private sector through market-based regulation (emissions taxes or trading schemes) has bolstered innovation in clean – or cleaner – energy. Historically, India has done little to combat emissions from its predominantly coal-fired power industry, and no aspects of present political conditions – including the 2003 Electricity Act – seem to be concerned with such factors (Thakur et al., 2005). Given the likely perpetuation of unmitigated reliance on coal in India, it’s appropriate at this point to turn to a discussion of coal as a fuel stock as well as the emissions considerations associated with it.

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8.5 DISCUSSION Results of previous benefit-cost scenarios illuminate the difficulty of assessing many of the uncertainties related to the spread of disease, degradation of water quality and species loss associated with large water projects. In 2000, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) revealed that the actual benefit cost ratios (BCR) of large scale water projects have been lower than their projected values. The report goes on to state “direct agricultural benefits fall short of costs” and that in six of nine projects analyzed, the economic rate of return (ERR) was found to be less than 9 per cent – the cut-off recommended for approval of irrigation projects (Rangachari et al., 2000). In terms of the benefits associated with hydropower, the WCD study attributes large gains mainly to the high cost of power to consumers in India and the relatively low operating costs of hydropower facilities. For all projects evaluated in the WCD study, the benefits “… alone cover the reported cost of the entire project (including canal costs) in both the WB (World Bank) and SPIESR (Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and Social Research) estimates”. Table 8.2 provides a demonstration of the disparity. Table 8.2 Benefits and costs of hydropower (million R.)

Benefit Cost

SPIESR

World bank analysis

260,203

149,974

15,408

14,266

While these figures serve as a useful tool to evaluate the inclusion of hydropower in a large scale water development project, further examination of empirical data would enhance the reliability of these projections. Specifically, data that would be more helpful in evaluating development decisions may include cost calculations of ecological service parameters – nutrient cycling, erosion potential, and evapotransporation – both before and after dam construction. The most significant assumption made in this analysis is that the development of hydropower will lead to decreased reliance on coal as an energy source. In all reality, it is quite possible that India will simply bolster its energy production with the implementation of hydropower, having no mitigating effect on the growing coal industry whatsoever. It has also been noted by many critics of the ILR that the inter-basin transfer component of the ILR will require significant energy inputs to lift water across basin boundaries. This energy requirement could significantly reduce the net electricity generated by the hydropower component of the ILR. Finally, the calculations made in the above section could be greatly enhanced with more detailed information on the degree to which emissions from coal combustion contribute to air quality in specific locations. We know, for instance, that India generates roughly 70 per cent of its electricity from coal and that there are eleven coal-fired power plants supplying over 100 MW in Uttar Pradesh (Energy Managing, 2002). The share of the emissions of these individual units that contribute to local air quality, and projected growth of the energy sector in any given region are unknowns. It is also assumed that the transition from dependence on thermal (coal) power to hydropower is seamless – or relatively so. In fact, a deeper analysis may attempt to incorporate the burden on society brought about by a shift in infrastructure – including,

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but not limited to power access and reliance, energy independence, biodiversity loss associated with ecosystem alteration, and population displacement. Bhutan serves as an excellent example of what other nations in South Asia are doing to meet ambitious energy objectives. With an estimated hydropower potential of 30,000 MW, Bhutan expects all the citizens of their nation to have access to electricity by the year 2020. At present, however, a mere 1.6 per cent of this potential capacity has been tapped yet still constitutes roughly 45 per cent of the gross national revenue. Despite lagging development, Bhutan has emerged as a net exporter of energy. Each year, approximately 70 per cent of Bhutan’s present generation capacity, some 300 MW, is sold to energy-deficient India. Not surprisingly, India was party to a bilateral agreement that set the first major Bhutanese hydropower project into motion in 1974 (WEC, 2005). In the event of further hydropower development in the region and international energy import, India could become vulnerable to regional conflict or price fluctuation related to their economic activities. Alternatively, the Indian government may choose to delay the large infrastructural investment associated with the ILR’s hydropower project until a better forecast of Bhutan’s capacity growth can be determined. Bhutan’s electricity demand in 2003 was 105 MW, 99.5 per cent of which was provided from hydropower resources. As transmission infrastructure expands, Bhutan will divert more of its domestic generation to local consumers. As transmission capabilities improve, the growth rate of generating capacity is expected to vastly outpace the growth in demand. Government officials expect to bring 1,020 MW of new generation capacity online within the next eighteen months. This event will mark the completion of their greatest hydropower project yet, and a significant step toward achieving the 20-year Master Plan of national electricity supply by 2020 (Sharma, 2003). Of course, the ILR is not the only way to quench India’s thirst for energy. Other than coal, traditional energy resources such as natural gas provide opportunity for future development. However, consensus estimates show that India only possess about 37 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves compared to roughly 200 Tcf of natural gas reserves in the United States and about 1,700 Tcf of reserves in Russia (EIA, 2007). In recent years the Indian government has attempted to broker a deal to construct $7.5 billion natural gas pipeline that would transport roughly 2 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) into the country from Iran (Energy Daily, 2007). The proposed pipeline would run through Pakistan, and so far progress toward an agreement has been slowed by negotiations involving transportation tariffs. Though operation is expected to begin no earlier than 2011, the pipeline would increase the volume of natural gas India consumed in 2005 by almost 60 per cent. In addition to opportunities for fossil fuel based energy sources, India’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy estimates that the country’s technically recoverable wind power potential is roughly 13,000 MW – gross potential is similarly estimated to be about 45,000 MW (MNES, 2007). The World Wind Energy Association ranked India fourth, behind Germany, Spain and the United States, in terms of total installed wind capacity at the end of 2005 (WWEA, 2006). The World Bank recently assisted in the installation of about 50 MW of distributed or off-grid wind capacity (Martinot et al., 2001). Still, India’s current wind power capacity utilizes about a third of the technically available resource potential. Despite the marked increase of India’s windpower generation, the financial risk and technical barriers associated with potential alternative energy development initiatives (particularly in rural parts of the country) has limited the necessary investment to drive large scale growth.

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While Bhutan’s seemingly successful hydro-development bodes well for India, and the prospects of wind and natural gas development are promising, the scale of India’s production need makes potential the impacts difficult to measure or compare. The channeling, reservoir construction and water diversion proposed in the ILR is certainly unlike any other hydro project that has been undertaken in the region. With the potential to cause serious public health and environmental damage, organization and planning associated with the ILR must include a careful examination of the cultural, political, social, economic and engineering interests involved. If and when a global reduction in carbon dioxide emissions is made a priority, the competition and political debate surrounding India’s plans for coal, natural gas and hydropower will be fiercely contested. Apart from any eventual climate change objectives, each of India’s energy development options is coupled with a unique set of present and future challenges. In addition, a lack of billing accountability, underinvestment, and a failing transmission infrastructure pose serious problems that must be resolved regardless of how the energy is generated. Although the ILR carries the promise of an affordable and reliable energy source, all of India’s energy development projects must be combined with careful management and systematic restructuring if they are going to fuel sustainable economic growth.

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Perkins, R.: Electricity Sector Restructuring in India: An Environmentally Beneficial Policy? Energy Policy 33(4) (2005), pp. 439–449. Rangachari, R., Sengupta, N., Iyer, R.R., Banerji, P. and Singh, S.: Large Dams: India’s Experience. World Commission on Dams (WCD), Earthscan, UK, 2000, pp. 57–58. Sharma, D.: Hydropower Development in Bhutan. International Centre for Hydropower, Trondheim, Norway, 2003. Singh, A.: Power Sector Reform in India: Current Issues and Prospects. Energy Policy 34(6) (2006), pp. 2480–2490. Thakur, T., Deshmukh, S.G., Kaushik, S.C. and Kulshrestha, M.: Impact Assessment of the Electricity Act 2003 on the Indian Power Sector. Energy Policy 33(9) (2005), pp. 1187–1198. Torrens, I.M. and Stenzel, W.C.: Regional Trends in Energy Efficient, Coal-Fired, Power Generation Technologies: Appendix V – Increasing the Efficiency of Coal-Fired Power Generation. State of Technology: Reliability and Perception, OECD/IEA, Paris, 1998. United Kingdom Environment Agency: Air Quality – Sulphur Dioxide (http://www.environmentagency.gov.uk/yourenv/eff/air/222825/223005/?version=1&lang=_e), July 14, 2005. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Energy and the Challenge of Sustainability. New York (http://www.undp.org/energy/activities/wea/pdfs/chapter4.pdf), 2005. United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA): Natural Gas Prices for Electricity Generation. USEIA, Washington, D.C., 2004. United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA): A South Asia Regional Overview (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nepal.html#coal), December 15, 2004. United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA): India (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ cabs/india.html), October 2005. United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA): International Coal Consumption Data (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/coal.html#Consumption), 2005. United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA): International Energy Outlook 2005 (http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/), September 1, 2005. United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA): World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas. Most Recent Estimates (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html), January 9, 2007. The World Bank: Data and Statistics (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:2039924~menuPK:1504474~pagePK:64133150~piPK: 64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html), 2007. World Energy Council: Renewable Energy in Southeast Asia: Bhutan (http://www.worldenergy.org/ wec-geis/publications/reports/renewable/country_reports/chap_2_2.asp), May 10, 2005. World Wind Energy Association: Worldwide Wind Energy Boom in 2005: 58.982 MW Capacity Installed. Wind Sector has become Globally Booming High-Tech Sector with more than 235,000 Employees. Asia shows Highest Growth Rates with India Overtaking Denmark (http:// www.wwindea.org/home/index.php?option⫽com_content&task⫽view&id⫽88&Itemid⫽43), March 2006.

9 Potential Public Health Implications of Interlinking of Rivers in India CARRIE KNOWLTON SHARON GOURDJI KOBI PLATT MICHAEL J. WILEY

9.1 INTRODUCTION In the quest to provide water and hydropower to populations in the developing world and eradicate disease associated with malnutrition and poor sanitation, new epidemics known as “diseases of development” associated with large scale water development projects are emerging around the world. These include infectious and parasitic diseases such as malaria, guinea worm, schistosomiasis (bilharzia), river blindness, and a variety of diarrheal diseases, as well as numerous psychosocial and other indirect health effects. When juxtaposed with the numerous health benefits that are incurred by increased access to clean water, improved food security from irrigation projects and potential clean sources of energy, the issues surrounding water development become increasingly complex. The proposed Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) in India is no different, and while we do not have enough technical information available to conduct thorough health impact assessments and pinpoint what the exact benefits and costs might be, this chapter serves as an overview of other water development projects, in India and around the world, with particular emphasis on the issue of community displacement, malaria, diarrheal diseases such as cholera, and the emergence of parasitic diseases such as schistosomiasis. This overview can hopefully serve as a starting point for conducting a more thorough health impact assessment of the ILR as more information becomes available. Increased storage capacity due to dams, reservoirs and irrigation channels as would be associated with the ILR, by definition results in decreased flow velocity. This, in turn, leads to accumulation of suspended loads, which favor eutrophication, reduced oxygen concentrations and sedimentation. These conditions typically force a shift in ecological community structure towards organisms that are tolerant of poor water quality with reduced oxygen content: ideal conditions for important vectors of water-borne disease including both snails and biting flies. While the benefits of hydropower, irrigation, improved access to clean water, and improved transportation infrastructure are surely arguments in favor of large dams, these benefits must be weighed against future costs, some of which are more difficult to assess. The environmental consequences of dams

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often have indirect effects on human health. Salinization and waterlogging of soils due to over-irrigation, sedimentation and erosion, alteration of seasonal flow patterns (affecting downstream users and ecology), damage to fisheries, deforestation, and increased use of and exposure to pesticides with an increase in arable land area can all lead to adverse impacts on human health. The international health community has been slow to respond to the syndrome created by water development projects – focusing instead on the eradication of single diseases or finding a piecemeal technological, biomedical fix to repeated problems. In the end, most remedies fail to address root causes. While environmental and social impact assessments are often mandatory in the water resource development policies of many countries, including India, health assessments are often not included, even though health is related to both the environmental and social consequences of water resource development. The World Health Organization (WHO) has encouraged the World Commission on Dams to incorporate health assessment policies into its recommendations to developing countries, but has no specific initiative of its own to mitigate the negative health consequences of water resource development (WHO, 2000). India began to require that all water development projects undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in 1978, but no clear specifications describe how this must be accomplished. Frequently, EIAs are undertaken after the project has already entered the construction phase, and there are no institutions in place to enforce the improvements that are deemed necessary in order to receive environmental clearance. As a result, while EIAs are mandatory in India, they carry little weight while projects are in the construction phase (Rangachari et al., 2000). 9.2 COMMUNITY RELOCATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN INDIA After Independence from Britain in 1947, water resource development became a major focus of the Indian government, which has constructed aproximately 4,000 dams in the last 60 years and more than half of them built between 1971 and 1989 (Rangachari et al., 2000). Reservoirs behind such dams submerged land area of 37,500 square kilometers – almost the size of Switzerland (IRN, 2007). In a country as densely populated as India, the number of people displaced is enormous, on average 44,182 people per dam (Roy, 1999). The focus of water development projects in India, especially in the 1960’s, was on population relocation rather than rehabilitation and restoration of livelihoods and property. Rehabilitation schemes are often described as “crisis management” reactionary measures rather than coherent, thought-out policy, and had frequently disastrous consequences. Resettlement packages can vary widely among groups. Landowners who invest their compensation frequently can restore their standard of living to what it was prior to displacement. Lower castes and tribal groups, who may occupy inundated land but not own substantial amounts, frequently receive less glamorous packages, and are often forced into migrant labor or to cities (Hemadri, 2000). Resettled communities are often promised, but rarely see the electricity provided by hydroelectric facilities, which is instead usually directed to the urban upper and middle class. Compensation packages tend to undervalue the actual financial costs to the displaced, much less the intangible social and emotional impacts due to loss of community cohesion. The people who are affected by the construction of dams and irrigation schemes can be divided into three groups. The first group is the project affected people (PAPs). This group consists of people forced to relocate because their former homes are to be

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submerged by reservoirs or irrigation channels. In addition to compensation packages offered by the government, they often see some benefits, such as irrigation canals for agriculture or electricity, from the development project. Yet, the intangible costs are great. Communities are typically not resettled as a unit, they are scattered among “host” communities that are frequently not receptive, if not hostile, to the new residents. Loss of sense of community is perhaps the largest and most intangible consequence of displacement, and takes an untold toll on mental health. Increases in morbidity and mortality, including an increase in malnutrition, have also been documented (Hemadri, 2000). These increases in morbidity and mortality can have obvious effects on mental health as well, as stress levels increase among the survivors. Few epidemiological studies on the effects of displacement on mental health have been carried out in India, but there are numerous anecdotal accounts that belie the extreme stress that people undergo after being removed from their homes and forcibly relocated. The India People’s Tribunal on the Bargi Dam in Madhya Pradesh reported on a man whose family was relocated for whom “… fear was a constant companion for he never knew when the flowing water would submerge his home and carry away not only his meager belongings but also members of his family” (Hemadri, 2000). Similarly, Arundathi Roy in her book The Cost of Living writes of a man displaced by the Sardar Sarovar project: The man’s mind was far away from the troubles of his sick baby. He was making me a list of the fruit he used to pick in the forest. He counted forty-eight kinds. He told me that he didn’t think he or his children would ever be able to afford to eat any fruit again. Not unless he stole it. I asked him what was wrong with his baby. He said it would be better for the baby to die than to have to live like this. I asked what the baby’s mother thought about that. She didn’t reply. She just stared (Roy, 1999). Outside of India, mental health consequences such as depression and increased suicide rates associated with water development projects have been well-documented, purportedly due to stress associated with adjusting to new surroundings. The indigenous North American band of Cree, affected by the James Bay Project in Quebec, Canada, is one such example of this. In this case, spousal abuse and suicide, as well as the incidence of STDs increased after the project was implemented (Scudder, 1973). Cree elders attributed these changes not only to stress, but to an erosion of Cree cultural values due to a loss of community cohesion following relocation. Stress results not only from the need for the displaced to adjust to new physical surroundings. In cases where the displaced are relocated to already established communities, stress can also result from interactions with established community members who may be opposed to the presence of outsiders (Scudder, 1973). The terms under which PAPs are relocated have been the source of much controversy because the issue of relocation is seen as not merely a cost-benefit decision, but an issue of human rights. In the Morse Report, an independent review undertaken for the World Bank of the Sardar Sarovar project in Gujarat, the dilemma is posed: “It is not, however, simply a question of weighing the numbers on each side, not simply a question of statistical relativism, but a question of human rights” (Morse, 1993). The national resettlement policy in India has been somewhat piecemeal in the making, with provisions made as needed, with no pre-determined basis for coherent policy. In 1979, the Narmada

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Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT), a judicial body constituted by the government of India in October 1969 to resolve water disputes between four States of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Rajasthan, declared for the first time that displaced people were to be awarded land for land and a chance at social and economic progress. Concurrently with development of a national policy in India, the World Bank was developing its own policy on funding projects that would physically disrupt communities, essentially stating that the Bank would only assist in funding projects in which concrete resettlement plans that restore the oustees to a standard of living at least equal to their previous standard are part of the loan negotiations. It must be recognized that this is more of a challenge than simply providing an amount of land equal in value to the amount originally owned. In general, the less land owned by an oustee, the less they benefit from resettlement packages, as the resources that they lose, such as loss of community structure and access to public goods such as traditional fishing waters and forest land are not easy to quantify or replace. Simple monetary compensation is insufficient, as expendable resources do nothing to ensure future livelihoods when the previous source of subsistence is gone. The second group of people affected by water-development projects is those who are affected by the dams, but are not forced to resettle because of them. These people tend to suffer silently from dam development, compared to PAP’s, as they often do not receive compensation for the negative impacts dams have on their communities, and usually represent the poor and marginalized members of society who see little benefit from the hydropower or irrigation systems that are often the driving force behind these huge dams. In the case of the Sardar Sarovar project, this group included people who were displaced by the irrigation canal portion of the project and were not covered under the resettlement plan for those displaced by the dam reservoir. Those displaced by the canal system informed the Independent Review of lost crops, wells, and community cohesion due to canals rendering land unreachable except by distant bridges, but no compensation was offered. Impacts on communities downstream of dam reservoirs that are not displaced can be equally severe. Many traditional agricultural societies have developed along floodplains and depend on them for their livelihoods. Decreased flow and nutrient loads downstream can concentrate pollutants, decrease water quality, decrease agricultural and fisheries productivity, and ultimately affect food security and public health. Lack of food security has profound public health implications, as improper nutrition can cause and exacerbate the effects of any number of diseases. Communicable diseases often increase, as well, due to increased stress levels and overcrowding in cases where those who are displaced are relocated to a site with a smaller physical area. The third group of people that are affected by dams are the immigrants who relocate to be near the dam site and have procured employment with the project in some way, either in manual activities like construction or in higher level activities associated with planning and implementing the project. While the previous two groups described tend to suffer, this group usually tends to benefit the most. These people frequently out compete the local population for resources and jobs, and, in many cases, can introduce urban health problems into rural communities. With migrant worker populations often come increased prostitution and multiple-partner sex, consequently adding HIV-AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases to the list of diseases brought on by development projects (Cernea, 1995).

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9.3 WATER DEVELOPMENT AND DISEASE, POLLUTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN INDIA While displacement has been a major political issue in India, particularly surrounding the Narmada Dam in Gujarat, little attention has been focused on the public health consequences of dams. These must be taken into account when assessing the benefits and costs of a project such as the ILR. Irrigation and hydropower may improve the standard of living for some, but the increased incidence of infectious diseases may reduce quality of life for others. Health benefits and disease outcomes are very difficult to quantify, but a cost can be placed on disease control and treatment, and this can be weighed against the potential benefits of hydropower, improved agricultural yield, and even improvements in health for some because of access to clean water, better nutrition, or increased availability of electricity. Trade-offs in public health are made all the time, in developing as well as developed countries such as the United States, but from a human rights perspective, the overall burden of disease should be minimized. There are also engineering methods that reduce habitat for disease-carrying vectors during dam and canal construction and operation. These methods can improve health outcomes for communities living in proximity to large dams that should be considered if the risk of disease associated with a particular project is great (Jobin, 1999). It should also be noted that some positive health effects of large water development projects are also possible. During the construction phase, new infrastructure such as roads and communication systems are often brought in. These roads can provide better access to hospitals and health care, and improve the flow of information into a community. After the construction project is completed, food security and access to safe drinking water can improve. 9.3.1 Malaria Malaria is a parasitic infection transmitted by the Anopheles mosquito. Mosquito larvae thrive in stagnant water, and increased incidence of malaria is often associated with irrigation projects and dams in areas of seasonal malaria transmission (Klinkenberg, 2003). Year-round standing water can lengthen the season of transmission and increase the range of the vector by changing micro-climatic conditions, and create an endemic area from an area previously affected only by sporadic epidemics (Jobin, 1999). In the case of the Thar Desert in Rajasthan, malaria epidemics have been associated with construction of the Indira Gandhi Nahar (Canal) Project (IGNP) for irrigation purposes. Reduced flow due to sedimentation and plant growth in the irrigation canals creates an ideal breeding ground for the mosquito vector, an abundance of pools of standing water along the canal itself, and the initial delay in construction leading to stagnation of the water all have contributed to the negative health consequences of this particular water development project. Irrigation has increased the crop yields and relative incomes of people that may be most at risk for malaria, therefore increasing their access to health care and treatment options, but no studies have been conducted to assess the true cost of the increased burden of disease (Tyagi, 2004) (also see Chapter 2). The IGNP not the only irrigation project in India that has been associated with an increase in incidence of mosquito-borne illnesses. Tungabahdra Dam in Karnataka, Sriramsagar and Ukai all reported higher incidence of malaria after completion of the projects. Communities around the Sardar Sarovar in Gujarat reported up to a six-fold increase in incidence of malaria as project construction peaked. The Indian government has, to an

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extent, recognized that this problem exists, and has included an analysis of potential increase in vector-borne disease in 13 of the 67 dams examined in the World Commission on Dams’ India Country Report (Rangachari et al., 2000). Even so, the Ministry of Health is typically not involved in planning water development projects, and remedial measures are usually proposed as solutions, rather than preventative measures to minimize amount of standing water and maximize drainage. Remedial recommendations have included establishment of Primary Health Centers to treat affected individuals or distribution of insecticides to kill the mosquito larvae. These measures have their own associated costs. The use of insecticides, in particular, has potentially negative health consequences (WHO, 2006). Because malaria is only endemic at altitudes less thanextent, recognized that this problem exists, and has included an analysis of potential increase in vector-borne disease in 13 of the 67 dams examined in the World Commission on Dams’ India Country Report (Rangachari et al., 2000). Even so, the Ministry of Health is typically not involved in planning water development projects, and remedial measures are usually proposed as solutions, rather than preventative measures to minimize amount of standing water and maximize drainage. Remedial recommendations 2,000 meters, the Himalayan reservoirs associated with the Ganga basin component of the ILR, assumed to be located at altitudes prohibitive to the survival of the malaria parasite, are unlikely to increase risk of malaria. However, irrigation canals and future waterlogged areas can increase the risk of malaria as it has ocurred in the IGNP. The same cannot be assumed, however, of canals and reservoirs located at lower altitudes in the Peninsular component of the ILR, and appropriate engineering controls and precautions must be put in place to ensure that an increase in malaria incidence does not negate any potential benefits of the project.

9.3.2 Schistosomiasis Schistosomiasis, also known as bilharzia, is a parasitic illness transmitted by a snail vector that thrives in slow-moving water. The parasite typically infects either the urinary or intestinal tracts, and while one can live for years with no acute effects, the chronic effects are crippling and often fatal. The illness is due to eggs released by the female worm once lodged in the target organ of the body. The eggs can cause calcification of the bladder, painful urination, blood in the urine, and, ultimately, damage to the urethra, kidneys, bladder, and, in advanced cases, bladder cancer. In the intestine, eggs lodged in the intestinal tissues can result in progressive enlargement of the liver and spleen, and hypertension and bleeding in the abdominal blood vessels that can ultimately lead to death. This disease has become tragically epidemic around large dams in much of the developing world; in places such as the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, the Diama Dam on the Senegal River, and the Three Gorges Dam in China. It has not, however, been recently detected in India, but with increased water development, researchers have become increasingly concerned about the possibility of establishing the disease. The low prevalence of schistosomiasis in India as compared with neighboring China can be partially explained by the high intensity of rainfall in India during the monsoon season. In general, when mean annual rainfall is greater than 2,500 millimeters, the relative wetness and high flows during the monsoon season will preclude the survival of some species of parasite-carrying snail vectors (Jobin, 1999). However, three of the four snail species capable of harboring the parasite are endemic in Indian water bodies. The most important studies on schistosomiasis in India took place in Gimvi Village in Maharashtra State since the 1950’s. In 1952, 205 people were reported to be infected with the parasite, in this area. Further investigation indicated that the vector of the disease was the small snail species

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Ferrissia tenuis (Southgate and Agarwal, 1990). This genus is not associated with the parasite in other parts of India, nor in parts of Africa where both this genus and the schistosome parasite are well established. However, parasite-host relationships evolve quickly, and it would not be unusual for a parasite to adapt to a new vector or host in new environs. Infected F. tenuis were detected in Gimvi as recently as 1983, but have not been recently detected in Gimvi or elsewhere in India (Sathe and Renapurkar, 1983). To date, the epidemiology of the Gimvi outbreak is poorly understood, but the fact that the disease has been documented on the Indian sub-continent raises a red flag as to the possibility of establishment of the disease. Continued monitoring of snail populations should inform future water development decisions. 9.3.3 Cholera Because of decreasing water quality and increased fecal coliform levels, cholera is a serious risk in India. Cholera is a serious diarrheal illness caused by the bacteria Vibrio cholera. Incidence of cholera has a cyclic relationship with the monsoon season in India. Populations of Vibrio cholera have been shown to be regulated by bacterial viruses known as phages. After periods of heavy rain or severe flooding, phage concentrations in aquatic environments tend to be low, allowing the bacteria population to flourish (Faruqi, 2003). The cholera bacterium is also associated with various aquatic organisms, especially zooplankton with chitinous skeletons, such as copepods (Lipp, 2002). As aquatic ecosystems become more productive due to increased nutrient loads, it can sustain more microorganisms including cholera bacteria. It has also been suggested by some studies in the Ganga that some egg masses of the midge Chironomus (family Chironimidae) are able to harbor the Vibrio cholera bacteria that causes cholera (Halpern, 2004). Members of the family Chironimidae are found in a wide variety of habitats and water quality conditions. However, in situations where flow has been reduced and oxygen levels decreased, as in dam reservoirs or irrigation canals, other tax less tolerant of poor water quality (such as members of the orders Ephemeroptera, Plecoptera, and Trichoptera) are excluded, often allowing Chironomus to flourish and reach exceptionally high numbers. In addition, because Vibrio cholera is typically associated with moderately saline environments found in coastal and estuarine water bodies, it is possible that the diversion of water from the Ganga could increase saltwater intrusion into Bangladeshi estuaries and create an environment favorable to a cholera outbreak (Colwell, 1996). No epidemiological studies have been conducted to determine the correlation between abundance of chironomids, cholera bacteria, and incidence of cholera in humans, but it is another reason to be concerned about the proposed massive reconfiguration of the Indian river network.

9.4 WATER QUALITY The Ganga River Basin already is struggling with water quality problems due to pollution from untreated sewage, industrial effluent, and urban and agricultural runoff. Pollution in the Ganga includes both domestic sewage and industrial effluents, and can come from both point and non-point sources. Common biological pollutants include fecal coliform and human pathogens discharged into the river from point sources, undiverted wastewater drains and improperly functioning waste treatment plants. Chemical pollutants include common products of organic decomposition, inorganic heavy metals such as chromium emitted from industrial point sources, and phosphates and nitrates from agricultural runoff, a non-point source.

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There are tremendous public health consequences for the high pollution loads seen in surface water so intimately intertwined with the livelihoods of many millions of people. People in cities and towns that receive their water supplies directly from the Ganga suffer from diarrheal diseases such as cholera as well as toxic effects from unregulated industrial effluents. Inter-basin transfer, as in the ILR, can either augment or reduce the flow in a given stretch of river, and contribute to the flushing or concentration of pollutants. Dams themselves can have both positive and negative effects, and in some cases, such as Gandhisagar dam in Madhya Pradesh, a positive effect on water quality has been reported. In other instances, where flow is greatly reduced and pollution levels remain the same, the water quality is sure to decline. This has been the case with the Tajewale barrage that divides the Yamuna into the Upper and Lower Yamuna Canal. The flow in the Yamuna has been seriously compromised, and downstream communities, especially those downstream of New Delhi, are at risk (Rangachari et al., 2000). Dams can negatively impact groundwater as well as surface water quality. In the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, “knock-knee” (Genu valgum), a crippling bone disease due to increased consumption of fluoride, has been associated with the construction of the Junasagar Dam. Seepage from reservoirs and irrigation channels increased sub-soil water levels, increasing fluoride concentration in groundwater where fluoride was already present. This syndrome has also been associated with at least two other dams in India: Parambikulam in Columbatore and Hosptet dam in Karnataka (WHO, 2000). Incidence of fluorosis has also been recorded in naturally waterlogged areas in Kanpur district, Uttar Pradesh, and could conceivably increase with increased irrigation activities (Faruqi, 2003). Conversely, some argue that when more surface water is available for human consumption, the pressure on groundwater reserves will decrease, therefore avoiding the consumption of naturally occurring contaminants such as fluoride and arsenic. This is the argument put forth by proponents of the Sardar Sarovar dam in Gujarat, where fluorosis is a major health problem in the arid Kutch region (Vyas, 2001). However, no actual decrease in incidence of fluorosis or improvement in groundwater quality has been documented in this region due to construction of the dam. While we can only speculate on the possibility of increased incidence of malaria and schistosomiasis in India due to the creation of irrigation canals and dam reservoirs, hydrological models presented can give some indication as to how flow, and hence, water quality will be affected by the ILR, and how this may affect human health in certain locations. Following is a case study of one community on the Ganga that already suffers from poor water quality. 9.4.1 Case study: Kanpur Kanpur, a highly industrialized city of 2.5 million residents in the state of Uttar Pradesh, is an excellent example of the problematic nature of water pollution in the Ganga River Basin. Often called the “Manchester of the East” due to the huge number of industries that it supports, Kanpur is home to approximately 300 leather tanneries concentrated mainly in the Jajmau area, most of which release their effluent directly into the Ganga. Leather industries produce a large amount of effluent concentrated with pollutants, particularly the toxic heavy metal Chromium. In addition, the Jajmau tanneries produce about 400 tons of solid waste daily, mostly consisting of crushed bark and nuts that are used as a natural dye for the leather. This biodegradable waste is contaminated with toxins from the leather making process and usually disposed of improperly. The total sewage generated in Kanpur is around 360 MLD (million liters per day) out of which 160 MLD was proposed to be

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diverted to sewage treatment plants under Phase I of the Ganga Action Plan (GAP). The remaining sewage was to be treated in the second phase of GAP. The goal for these plants was to treat this 160 MLD of domestic sewage and 9 MLD of tannery effluent and either supply the treated wastewater to nearby villages to irrigate their farmlands or directly discharge it into the Ganga. Four intermediate pumping stations were built along the Ganga, and all wastewater drains, or nallas, were to be intercepted and diverted to the pumping stations. The pumping stations were to release the wastewater into a common waste-pipe leading to the main pumping station, which filters out solid waste and then pumps the remaining wastewater into one of three sewage treatment plants (Jaiswal, www.ecofriends.org). Under the Ganga Action Plan, the larger tanneries were required to install Effluent Treatment Plants, and Combined Effluent Treatment Plants were slated for construction to process the effluent of tanneries that were too small to afford their own plants. These goals were laudable, but difficult to achieve, and to date many of the tanneries have still not removed the chromium from their effluent before diversion to the river or the waste treatment plant. The chromium present in the raw sewage as well as Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) levels, an index of organic material in the water, exceed the capacity of the treatment plants. In most cases, the water discharged to the river still exceeds the appropriate levels (Tare, 2003). There have been major development and diversion projects all along the river, however, reducing the flow and decreasing the river’s capacity to dilute pollution levels. Much of the dry weather flow is diverted to the Upper Ganga Canal at Haridwar, upstream of Kanpur, and flow regenerated between Haridwar and Aligarh is again diverted to the Lower Ganga Canal near Aligarh, downstream of Kanpur. As a result, the heavy inflow of pollutants at Kanpur meets a river with highly reduced volume of water during the dry season. The Ganga receives over 60 per cent of its water from the Yamuna, Ghagra, Kosi and Gandak, tributaries all joining the mainstem at or at points below Allahabad, downstream of Kanpur. The Kanpur-Allahabad stretch is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to a high pollution concentration due to lost diluting volume. Fecal coliform levels due to large amounts of human waste discharged into the river are also high in Kanpur. In order for water quality to meet the criteria for Class “B” (bathing class), total coliform levels must be below 500 MPN/100 mL. Fecal coliform itself is naturally found in the human digestive system and is not harmful to people, but is found in association with fecal material, and is used as an indicator of the presence of other, more harmful bacterial communities such as Vibrio cholera. Table 9.1 shows the levels in 1987 and 1998 for two monitoring stations: Ranighat, upstream of the city, and Jajmau pumping station, which is downstream of the city.

Table 9.1 Average fecal coliform levels (MPN/100 mL) for two sampling stations in Kanpur (Central Pollution Control Board, 2001a)

1987 Ranighat Jajmau pumping station

1998

5,551

149,941

2,629,641

1,500,037

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In villages near the Jajmau area of Kanpur, poorly treated, chromium contaminated effluent is piped directly to villages for irrigation purposes. This effluent is meant to be treated by the GAP waste treatment facilities, but due to their poor performance, the people who come into frequent contact with this water have shown skin lesions, stomach problems, and the blackening of the fingernails common to people chronically exposed to chromium. While no epidemiological studies have been performed on these populations, but it seems probable that these health problems are strongly correlated with exposure to toxic waste. There is also a fear that groundwater in the area is becoming contaminated by surface water percolation into aquifers, leaving people with no viable source of safe and clean water, as Ganga water is the source of drinking water for the majority of residents of Kanpur. 9.5 HYDROLOGICAL MODELING AND WATER POLLUTION Application of the HEC-HMS hydrological model for the ILR in India (see Chapter 7) (Table 9.2), we can make speculations, if not predictions of precise concentrations of pollutants. In general, water quality will be improved with increased volume and subsequent dilution of pollutants. The Ganga HEC-HMS Model shows that at Allahabad dry season flow will be augmented, while it will decrease at Patna and Farakka. Table 9.2 Hydrological model flow predictions and current water quality status for Allahabad, Patna and Farakka (Central Pollution Control Board, 2001b)

Predicted change

Current water quality status

Pollution concentration

Allahabad (downstream)

Increase flow

D

Likely decrease

Patna (downstream)

Decrease flow

D

Likely increase

Farakka

Decrease flow

D

Likely increase

In 2001, water at all three sites where a change in flow can be predicted with our hydrological model, share the poor water quality rating of “D”. The Indian government’s Central Pollution Control Board considers water of the “D” class to be suitable for the propagation of fisheries and wildlife, but unsuitable for bathing (Class “B”), a major use of the river Ganga. The critical parameter that prevents most sites on the Ganga from meeting the standards of the B class are total coliform and BOD levels, largely due to the emission of untreated sewage into the river. Water in Class D must have a pH level between 6.5 to 8.5, dissolved oxygen of 4 mg/L or more, and a nitrogen level of 2.2 mg/l or less, but the total coliform levels are unspecified for classes below “C”. Class “C” requires that the annual average total coliform levels must be less than 5,000 MPN/100 mL, while class “B” requires that total coliform be below 500 MPN/100 mL, have a dissolved oxygen level of 5 mg/L, and BOD level of 3 mg or less. While we can make quantitative predictions at only these three sites in our model, we can speculate that flow will generally be augmented in the mid-section of the river (Allahabad), where water quality will improve, while water quality will decrease where flow is decreased. Therefore, in terms of surface water quality in the channel, the ILR can be seen as both a positive or negative development, depending on the portion of the channel affected. It is worth noting that in Allahabad, where the flow

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is augmented, it is to a lesser degree than the flow is decreased at Patna and Farakka. Water quality will also be affected at the downstream stretch of the Ganga in Bangladesh. If only these three points are taken into consideration, the ILR can be seen to have more of a negative effect than a positive one overall. Regardless, the ideal solution would not be to simply dilute pollution, but restore water quality by placing controls on the sources of the pollution themselves. 9.6 CONCLUSION Until details of the engineering aspect of the ILR are released, it will be difficult to make predictions about public health changes related to the implementation of the project. Potential water quality issues, as well as changes in patterns of vector-borne disease must be considered with assessing the potential benefits and costs of a river linkage. Given the ILR’s potential to improve drinking water and food security for some, and the possibility of improved air quality due to hydropower, public health outcomes are extremely complex, but critical to understand.

REFERENCES Central Pollution Control Board: Water Quality – Status and Statistics 1998. Delhi, 2001a. Central Pollution Control Board: (http://www.cpcb.nic.in/cpcb/water/waternew/waterc.php), 2001b. Cernea, Michael: Understanding and Preventing Impoverishment from Displacement: The State of Knowledge in Resettlement. Journal of Refugee Studies, 1995, pp. 245–264. Colwell, R.R.: Global Climate and Infectious Disease: The Cholera Paradigm. Science 274(1996), pp. 2025–2031. Faruqi, N.H.: In Abstracts: Workshop on Medical Geology. Geological Survey of India, Nagpur, February 3 to 4, 2003. Halpern, M.: Chironomid Egg Masses as a Natural Reservoir of Vibrio Cholera Non-O1 and Non-0139 in Freshwater Habitats. Microbial Ecology 47(2004), pp. 341–349. Hemadri, R.: Dams, Displacement, Policy and Law in India. Contributing Paper to World Commission on Dams (http://www.dams.org), 2000. International Rivers Network (IRN): International Rivers Network’s Capaigns in India (www.irn.org/ programs/india/), 2007. Jaiswal, Rakesh: EcoFriends. Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh (www.ecofriends.org). Jobin, W.: Dams and Disease: Ecological Design and Health Impacts of Large Dams, Canals, and Irrigation Systems. E and FN Spon, New York, 1999. Klinkenberg, E.: Malaria and Agriculture – A Temporal and Spatial Risk Analysis in Southern Sri Lanka. IWMI Research Report 68(2003). Lipp, Erin K.: Effects of Global Climate on Infectious Disease: The Cholera Model. Clinical Microbiology Reviews 15(4) (2002). Morse, B.: Sardar Sarovar: Report of the Independent Review. Resource Futures International, 1993. Rangachari, R., Sengupta, N., Iyer, R.R., Banerji, P. and Singh, S.: Large Dams: India’s Experience. A WCD Case Study Prepared as An Input to the World Commission on Dams, Cape Town (www.dams.org), 2000. Roy, A.: The Cost of Living. New York: The Modern Library, 1999. Sathe, B.D. and D.M. Renapurkar: Studies on Snails in Village Gimvi – A Focus of Human Schistosomiasis in India. Bulletin of Haffkine Institute 11(3) (1983). Scudder, Thayer: The Human Ecology of Big Projects: River Basin Development and Resettlement. Annual Review of Anthropology 2(1973), pp. 45–55.

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Southgate, V.R. and M.C. Agrawal: Human Schistosomiasis in India? Parasitology Today 6(5) (1990). Tare, V.: Suggestions for a Modified Approach Towards Implementation and Assessment of Ganga Action Plan and Other Similar River Action Plans in India. Water Quality Research Journal of Canada 38(4) (2003), pp. 607–626. Tyagi, B.K.: A Review of the Emergence of Plasmodium Falciparum Dominated Malaria in Irrigated Areas of the Thar Desert, India. Acta Trop 89(2004), p.227. Vyas, J.N.: Water and Energy for Development in Gujarat with Special Focus on the Sardar Sarovar Project. Water Resources Development 17(1) (2001), pp. 37–54. World Health Organization (WHO): Human Health and Dams: The World Health Organization’s Submission to the World Commission on Dams. Protection of the Human Environment: Water, Sanitation and Health Series, Geneva, January 2000.

10 Living in the Downstream: Development in Peril AHSAN UDDIN AHMED

10.1 INTRODUCTION Living in the downstream, as a total of 140 million are living in Bangladesh, is not easy. It is a part of the largest delta on Earth, created by the three mighty eastern Himalayan Rivers: the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna (GBM) (Figure 10.1). The lowlying delta has been created over millennia by the sediments carried by the water of the GBM systems, the combined flow of which is the second largest after the Amazon River. The monsoon circulation has generally brought moisture aplenty, while fertile lands have given adequate food grains for consumption and wealth creation. No wonder, several globe trotters have described the land the most prosperous country on Earth (Batuta, 1355). Simultaneously though, the happy going farming communities had to suffer through frequent water-related hazards, mostly in the form of floods. Then came a particular time in human civilization, which witnessed an unprecedented exploitation of earthly resources coupled with rapid growth in human population. As a by product of anthropogenic interference, the downstream areas of the GBM systems saw artificial obstacles to natural flows, created for the benefit of quick transportation of goods, cultivation in the lands that were designated as hazard-prone, and diversion of water from the river itself! The latter appeared to bring in the ultimate horror: hydrological balance denied, ecosystem destroyed, crop suitability perished, livelihoods at the brink of collapse and economy doomed. It is of little relevance now to invest large sums of money and to engage state-ofthe-art technologies to strive for development, the fruit of such thoughtful steps can no longer guarantee a quality living in Bangladesh. Safeguarding development processes and results has become the foremost challenge to policymakers. Living in downstream of GBM has already become a hazardous proposition to those hanging around. Historically, Bangladesh has been dependent on the regional flows coming through the GBM River systems. Although the country occupies only about 7 per cent of the total catchment areas of the three rivers combined, it drains over 92 per cent of all surface flows of the catchment areas to the sea (Rahman et al., 1990). Although on an average per capita basis, water availability is one of the highest in the world, in effect over 80 per cent of all surface waters are available only during the monsoon months: from June to September. This precarious distribution of water on an annual scale has given rise to two distinct features: (i) too much water in peak monsoon leading to inundation of low lying lands and occurrence of floods, and (ii) too little water during the dry season leading to moisture stress on top soils and ingress of salinity along the coastal rivers. The spatial distribution

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of surface water is further complicated by spatial distribution of the resources: the eastern part along with part of the coastal zone is much wetter than the dry western parts of the country (Halcrow-WARPO, 2000).

Fig. 10.1 GBM basins spread over the eastern Himalayan region (Mirza, 2003).

Availability of water in right time and in right quantum, in the forms of rainfall, its runoff along the streams, and stored underneath the ground, allows crop agriculture – the source of livelihoods of majority of the population in Bangladesh. Water and land together generally shape up household-based economy in Bangladesh (GED-PC, 2005). Water availability creates natural conditions for a good harvest and ensures micro-level food security of millions of marginal farmers. However, water often induces water-related hazards: either in the form of too much water to cause flood or having too little to cause both moisture stress and salinity intrusion – all having detrimental consequences. A few of these water-related hazards assume disastrous proportions, devastate national economy, cause deaths and destruction of livelihoods, inflict upon hunger and perpetuate poverty (Ahmad and Ahmed, 2002). If the above issues are placed in the backdrop of high population growth forecasts, rapid urbanization, and further degradation of environmental quality, it would already be frustrating for many people. However, to add to this dismal scenario, one has to deal with future hazards such as the proposed Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) in India. The proposed project has a total of 30 components, a few of which would deal with diversion of the Brahmaputra flows to the southern parts of India. Unfortunately, this would certainly jeopardize the hydrological scene of the GBM system and being the downstream country in the GBM region, Bangladesh will have to face the brunt of such changes. This article analyzes the complexities of such proposed diversion of flows from the regional rivers on which the downstream country depends the most.

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10.2 WATER: A KEY DRIVER FOR BANGLADESH’S DEVELOPMENT To an outsider, Bangladesh is a land of water, virtually floating on it. To a common Bangladeshi, water is a resource which defines lives and livelihoods of people and simultaneously, it is both boon and bane. In one hand, water resources create conditions suitable for agricultural activities, while on the other, water in excess of drainage capacity of rivers can induce flooding and deficit of water on topsoils can be detrimental for crop growth. Until recently, Bangladesh experienced an agrarian economy (Faruqee, 1998). During the past three decades, the relative importance of agriculture has been gradually declining while that for service and industrial sectors has been increasing. Agriculture sector is providing for only 19.2 per cent of the GDP (2005 to 2006 fiscal year), while it was contributing 47.1 per cent in 1970s. Despite such structural shift in relative contribution to the economy of the country, the importance of agriculture, especially that of crop agriculture is still very high. Despite the recent boom in Ready-Made Garments (RMG) manufacturing sector, which primarily fuelled the shift in the structure of the economy, agriculture sector is providing for about 51.7 per cent of the direct employment in the country (MoF, 2005). Micro-level food security (at individual households) is totally determined by own and local production, as revealed by a recent survey (Ahmed et al., 2006). The importance of agriculture in the economy therefore cannot be overemphasized. Interestingly, such an important activity is thoroughly dependent on timely availability of water and in adequate quantum. Aman and Boro are the two generic paddy varieties which together occupy about 76 per cent of the net cultivable area (NCA) and are grown in monsoon (i.e., Kharif-II) and dry (i.e., Rabi) seasons, respectively. Since Aman is grown in monsoon, water requirement for its growth is mostly met by abundant natural rainfall, supplemented by in stream flows and stored water bodies including wetlands. The initial moisture deficit, which is observed only in November and December,1 is primarily met by water stored/available in surface water systems (wetlands, ponds, rivulets, rivers etc.) and also by exploiting groundwater aquifers. Since Aman is dependent on naturally available water, drier than average monsoon (as in 2006) and/or late recession of flood waters (as in 1998) can adversely affect Aman production and inflict upon micro-level food insecurity. On the other hand, any improvement towards containing floodwaters and/or facilitating drainage contributes to a good harvest and socioeconomic advancement (Ahmed, 2000). In contrast, cultivation of Boro paddy is predominantly dependent on groundwater sources as surface sources other than large rivers get almost dried up by March and acute moisture deficit in the top soils is experienced due to increasing evapotranspiration. Figure 10.2 graphically represents crop calendar and month wise soil moisture conditions in terms of potential evapotranspiration as against monthly averaged rainfall and temperature variability. Currently, groundwater based irrigation is applied in about 3.42 Mha areas under Boro, which accounts for about 45 per cent of total irrigation potential in the country. In the dry season (i.e., November to mid-April), in addition to suffering from moisture stress, the coastal lands also face ingress of salinity. With drastic fall in flow volume of major rivers and diminishing winter rainfall, the coastal river system experiences salinity ingress which automatically restricts surface irrigation potential. A combination of

1

By December, Aman is harvested. However, moisture stress in the top soil continues until April, well into the Boro cropping season (Figure 10.2).

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LIVING IN THE DOWNSTREAM: DEVELOPMENT IN PERIL

non-availability of rainfall and increasing desiccation from top soils due to capillary rise, salinity of top soils along the coastal zones increases significantly and reduces potential for crop production (Karim et al., 1990). In order to solve dry season water-related problems, management of the scarce resource appears to be a critical factor, which again contributes to socio-economic advancement profusely.

Fig. 10.2 Rice and wheat crop calendar in relation to seasonal flooding, rainfall and temperature.

It is perhaps needless to emphasize the importance of water for drinking purposes. In recent years, the country achieved 97 per cent coverage of safe drinking water, owing to sinking of millions of hand tube wells. However, high concentration of arsenic has been found in tube well water which raised concerns over the health implications caused by contaminated water. The southwestern parts of the country have been suffering from non-availability of saline-free drinking water. A large number of hand tube wells reportedly have become inoperable during peak flood season, while many other tube wells cannot draw groundwater for drinking due to rapid draw down in the peak dry season. For all the above reasons, the well being of general population is severely compromised due to lack of quality drinking water. It is reported that over 70 per cent of all illness in the country is

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related to water quality. Therefore, the importance of water is paramount considering future development in health care in Bangladesh. As indicated above, the importance of industrial sector in national GDP is increasing gradually. It is believed that future employment potential can only be realized by a thriving industrial sector, a glimpse of which has already been observed with the recent growth of RMG sector. However, processing industries would most likely demand quality process water, which can only be provided along the large rivers of the country. Since water levels reach the lowest during the dry season, it is of paramount importance to have adequate flow regime during the months of March and April when flows are at their respective minimum in the major rivers. Waterways play a vital role in the transportation sector of the country. Among all forms of transportation for both freight and passengers, water transport is the cheapest mode of transportation. However, the vast waterways in the monsoon can no longer remain operational during the dry season for lack of draft, even complete choking of river systems. The problem of decreasing water levels in navigational routes becomes acute during March and April, particularly for larger vessels. For a thriving water transport sector, maintenance of adequate flow regime during critical dry period is a prerequisite. From the above discussions, it is evident that water plays a critical role in human livelihoods and national’s development processes. The role of water towards shaping up poor’s lives relative to other sections of the society is much higher, because poor’s food security and livelihoods are inseparable from available water regime (Ahmad, 2003). Since the poor constitute almost half the current population (of about 140 million), any major change in water sector that might affect scenarios concerning water availability can have serious implications on the country’s population. In the backdrop of above mentioned realities, it is of great concern to understand how the proposed ILR, with its Himalayan (i.e., non-peninsular) components, would change the already precarious water distribution in the downstream – the low lying deltaic Bangladesh – which is striving to achieve sustainable development with the highest population density on earth and dwindling resource base. 10.3 LEARNING FROM THE PAST: THE GANGES WATER DIVERSION AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD In the wake of such a mammoth project, there have been relentless concerns2 in the region and beyond regarding the plausible implications of the project, as outlined unilaterally by the Indian Government (Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 9). To many, it appears that the downstream areas in both India and Bangladesh might be adversely affected due to changes in hydraulic conditions and their consequences on landscape, peoples’ livelihoods and economy (Parkar, 2004). However, the extent of such changes remains to be uncertain due to vagueness in the outlines of the project and its sub-projects (particularly ones dealing with Himalayan Rivers) and lack of information. Officially, there hasn’t been any communication from the Government of India to its Bangladesh counterpart indicating how much of water will be diverted from large rivers such as the Brahmaputra, the Teesta and the Ganges, and more importantly, in which particular time of the year (also see 2

One may find large number articles that include newspaper articles (PTI, 2003; Indian Express, 2003; The New Sunday Express, 2003; Hindustan Times, 2003; Vidal, 2003 in the Guardian), dialogues in various fora and conferences (SCES, 2003; CPSS-SANDRP, 2003; Shankari, 2004a; Singh, 2002; Ahmed et al., 2004; Patil, 2003), and academic/research-based papers (Iyer, 2003; Shankari, 2004b; Mahanta, 2003; Singh and Srivastava, 2006).

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Chapter 15). The latter information is extremely important, since both the abundance of water in monsoon and scarcity of it in the dry season (i.e., winter and early summer) have long been identified as causes of destruction of lives and livelihoods in Bangladesh. Since the full information regarding the project is yet to be known, it is almost impossible to assume how the effects will complicate hydrological aspects as well as people’s livelihoods in the downstream. One can, therefore, only take resort to past similar changes and learn from those experiences. The unilateral diversion of the Ganges waters by constructing a barrage at Farakka – some 18 km upstream of the entry point of the river into Bangladesh – has been giving rise enough evidence since its commissioning in 1975 on how such a gigantic project might jeopardize hydrology of the Ganges Dependent Areas (GDA) in Bangladesh and livelihoods of those living in GDA and/or out-migrating from the GDA. The implications of the Farakka Barrage provide an open advertisement of the potential adverse effects of the ILR and perhaps a rude awakening to the Indian proposal. The Ganges River system in Bangladesh depends on upstream basins as the only source of water. However, the importance of Ganges flows is high, as it provide freshwater to one-third of the area of the country (Mirza, 2004). The relevance of the Ganges flow is particularly high for the ecologically sensitive southwestern region (SW) of the country which receives freshwater flows through the Gorai River – the major distributary (Figure 10.1). Due to upstream withdrawal in the post-Farakka period it is found that discharge in the Ganges system in Bangladesh has reduced significantly. As expected, the dramatic change in flow regime has observed in the dry season, which accounts for almost 50 per cent reduction of pre-Farakka flow (Mirza, 2004). Statistical analysis of flow regime during both pre- and post-Farakka periods suggest that flow regulation by the barrage has induced non-homogeneity in the annual peak flow. Moreover, statistical tests found most of the hydrological changes significant. The Gorai River of course faced the brunt of such changes. The Gorai was practically disconnected from its intake point during the dry seasons between 1990 and 1996, a revealed by satellite imageries. The diversion also accelerated siltation of the Gorai River, which in turn affected annual peak discharge capacity and increased flood vulnerability downstream areas of Gorai River. The most dramatic change that had been taken place may be identified as the increase in instream salinity along the coastal distributaries of the Ganges River those are fed by the flows of Gorai River. The following table (Table 10.1) provides information on how such changes had been taken place at four stations in the southwest region of the country. It is intriguing to note that drastic increase in surface water salinity, as presented above, reduced the potential for surface water based irrigation for all stations mentioned above and for the entire Boro cropping season as the FAO recommended threshold of salinity in irrigation water has been set at 750 micro-mhos/cm (FAO, 1976). Not only the salinity of river water has been found to increase as a consequence of diversion of water from the Ganges, similar trends have also been noticed with groundwater resource in Bangladesh (Rahman et al., 2000). Even the soil samples taken from the SW region exhibited increased salinity during the months of March, April and May. Mirza and Hossain (2004) reported that, in 1992 to 1993 the area affected due to increased salinity was 23,408 ha. The maximum yield loss was estimated to be about 86 per cent in case of HYV Boro followed by L.T. Aman3 (71 per cent). The salinity ingress in the SW region has been so critical that a large number of farmers (in Satkhira, Khulna and Bagerhat Districts) are forced to forfeit Boro cropping and generally resort to low-value crops such as chillis. 3

Local Aman varieties which are generally transplanted.

340 2,600 2,300

Goalpara

Chalna

Mongla

5,200

6,280

515

1,254

Post-F

Post-F

Pre-F

Post-F

March Pre-F

Post-F

April

3,900

2,625

397

371

7,880

11,510

1,303

3,396

7,500

8,950

750

467

11,075

17,310

4,422

8,305

11,800

8,675

1,320

1,626

17,150

21,927

7,422

12,149

Salinity in micro-mhos/cm (measured at 25°C)

Pre-F

February

Note: Pre-F and Post-F represent pre-Farakka and post-Farakka situations. Source: Modified from Mirza and Sarker, 2004.

293

Pre-F

January

Khulna

Station

Period

Table 10.1 Pre- and post-Farakka monthly maximum salinity at four stations in the SW region

13,500

12,000

786

1,508

Pre-F

17,100

19,009

5,456

11,208

Post-F

May

AHSAN UDDIN AHMED 159

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LIVING IN THE DOWNSTREAM: DEVELOPMENT IN PERIL

Moreover, salinity wrecked havoc on the vegetation of the entire SW region, especially in the Sundarbans mangrove forest. Most of the common local tree species seen elsewhere are no longer observed in the southern parts of the three Districts mentioned above. The most affected ecosystem is the Sundarbans forest – a Global Heritage Site declared by the UNESCO for its natural beauty and wealth of few endemic species – where a distinct change is distribution of mangrove species has been correlated with change in flow regime and salinity along the distributaries of the Ganges River feeding the area (Karim, 2004). Swain (1996) reported an estimated loss of US$ 320 million due to salinity induced damage to timber production from the forest. Increasing salinity along the rivers in the SW region not only has devastated agriculture potential of the area (Mirza and Hossain, 2004), it also adversely affected industrial development potential of the area (Swain, 1996). The losses resulted from a number of factors such as increased cost of freshwater importation from far away places, increased corrosion of industrial equipments, frequent disruption of power supply etc. Soon after the commissioning of the Farakka Barrage, IECO (1977) estimated that the industrial losses during December 1975 to June 1976 at US$ 8 million due to hazards caused by increasing salinity. Rahman et al. (2003) identified the issue of increasing salinity as a consequence of the Farakka Barrage as a threat to human security for the SW region of Bangladesh. Perhaps the worst impact of water diversion from the Ganges River has been on poor people living in the SW of Bangladesh. By decreasing crop production potential of the area, the livelihoods of the poor have gradually been brought into a hopeless condition. Poor people haven’t found adequate food to eat, hardly found any water potable due to high salinity, and their dwelling units have perished earlier than expected due to salinity induced corrosion. Continuous ingestion of high salinity often induced high blood pressure and abortion of fetus, with high health and social cost on poor women (Ahmed and Haque, 2006). Attendance of primary students in school has reduced since they are forced to fetch drinking water with lesser salinity than that available in the neighbourhood (Ahmed, 2004). Many poor families found no other option but to abandon their ancestral houses and out-migrate to urban areas. The barrage at Farakka has initiated a human tragedy in the SW region of Bangladesh.

10.4 RIVER INTERLINKING: BANGLADESH’S HYDRO-ENVIRONMENTAL AND DEVELOPMENT SECURITY In absence of any official information on actual diversion of water, an attempt has been made in Bangladesh to assess average potential diversion. The assessment considered 2001 to 2002 hydrological year as the baseline, known to be a moderate monsoon year, while the demand for irrigation at various dry regions of India (where the diverted water will be delivered, as per ILR) has been estimated from available sources. The following table (Table 10.2) provides month wise diversion of flows from the Himalayan Rivers. 10.4.1 Impacts on hydrology On an average hydrological year, about 23 per cent of the landmass of Bangladesh is flooded (Hofer, 1998). If Indian claim for diverting only the monsoon flow is taken for granted, a significant proportion of flood-prone areas will be inundated to a much lesser extent. However, in the same token a large proportion of shallow-flooded plains – the famous wetlands of the country – will not at all be flooded, which might significantly

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change the natural setting of the wetlands. Reduction of the Brahmaputra flow during falling stage of flood flows (i.e., September to October) and recession period of dry season would adversely affect the hydro-environmental setting in a number of different ways (Chowdhury, 2003), which include the following:







Reduced recharge of groundwater through the wetlands; Reduced water holding capacity of beels ecosystems in the northwest region; Much reduced inflows to the major rivers such as the Ganges (at the confluence with the Brahmaputra) and the Lower Meghna River and to the distributaries in the north-central and south-central regions; Consequently, reduced inflow to spill channels of the Lower Meghna in the south-central region; Severe changes in morphology due to aggravated erosion and deposition; Tidal propagation in the Lower Meghna and the Ganges Rivers.

Table 10.2 Potential diversion of water

Month June July August

Potential diversion of flow (in %)

Comment

0 15.11 3.25

September

47.17

October

34.38

November

0

December

0

Might require diversion of flow in a ‘dry year’

Note: Modified from (Kamal et al., 2004).

However, the scheme involving diversion of the Brahmaputra River would also allow diversion of the Teesta flows, perhaps at the same annual timeframe. A reduction of instream flow of the Teesta and other rivers in the northwest region would adversely affect a few hydro-environmental aspects as above: lack of groundwater recharge, drying up of wetlands and reduced inflow into the Brahmaputra system. Due to lack of monsoon flows, irrigation schemes based on surface flows of major rivers in the northwestern parts of Bangladesh, namely Teesta, Dharala and Dundhkumar, cannot be kept operational. Application of mathematical models on the above hypothetical withdrawal scenario suggests that, with diversion of water towards the end of monsoon season would significantly change river bed morphological dynamics of the two major rivers, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra (Kamal et al., 2004). However, gradual rise in river bed level would in turn increase flood susceptibility of the two rivers in the long run. Therefore, the early lowering in flood susceptibility might not remain to be true in the long run. There will be other simultaneous effects on hydrology of other rivers. With substantial withdrawal of flows along the late flood season (as indicated in Table 10.2), flood waters will recede faster than that observed currently. Lean flow regime will therefore

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begin much earlier than expected. As a consequence, major distributaries of the main rivers such as Baral, Gorai, Arial Khan, Dhaleswari, and Old Brahmaputra Rivers will reach lean season flow much earlier than usual. These cascading effects on river systems of Bangladesh will have detrimental effect on floodplain ecology and biodiversity depending upon the floodplains. As indicated above, the unilateral diversion of water from the Ganges River in the past has significantly changed the hydrological and environmental conditions of the SW region of Bangladesh. Consequently, the affected area has observed rapid ingress of salinity along the coastal rivers, particularly in the dry season. There are reasons to fear that withdrawal of already lean dry season flow from any major regional river would lead to further degradation of environmental condition, which in turn would complicate social and economic realities of large poverty ridden population of Bangladesh. To maintain brackish water mixing zones in their current levels, the freshwater flow of the Lower Meghna River (LMR) plays a key role. It is found from earlier studies that approximately 70 per cent of the freshwater flow of March (i.e., part of the critical dry period) to the LMR is contributed by the Brahmaputra River (Halcrow-WARPO, 2000). It is also known that the about 40 per cent of the Lower Meghna flow goes to the south-central (SC) region via a distributary system consisting of rivers such as Tetulia, Galachipa-Lohalia, Burishwar, and Bishkhali, which essentially maintains the salinity limits in the estuary when the flow of LMR is at the lowest (Chowdhury and Haque, 1989). The above facts suggest that the flow of Brahmaputra River is critical for salinity control along the SC estuarine rivers. It is intriguing to note that, if maintenance of flow of freshwater is the dry season is the driving force towards opting for the ILR, it is almost certain that the dry season flow of the Brahmaputra River will also be diverted in the lean season and its consequences will have to be faced by downstream, Bangladesh. Indeed, an attempt has been made to analyze the minimum freshwater flow that might be required to prevent saline water intrusion in the SC region. For this analysis, 80 per cent dependable flow condition and constraints on salinity on river water utilized for irrigation have been considered, while a relationship between freshwater flow rate and saline has been employed for the analysis. The results showed that, even a small withdrawal of water at 1,000 m3/sec of flow would result in a decreased flow in 3 months of the dry season below the minimum required flow regime to prevent saline water ingress along the SC region (Chowdhury and Datta, 2004). If, however, the withdrawal is continued for two months into the dry season, the decrease in flow volume could be 600 to 350 m3/sec below compared to that for wet season transfer. Table 10.3 shows the results of predicted Brahmaputra flow in relation to a hypothetical reduction of the same during first two months of the dry season in Bangladesh. Of course, a large area in the SC region will be affected by salinity if Brahmaputra water is diverted in the dry season. Based on the potential flow withdrawal scenario mentioned above (Table 10.3), an attempt has been made to analyze salinity ingress along the Bay of Bengal. It is found that the sea water salinity would penetrate inland by about 80 km due to reduction in monsoon flow (Kamal et al., 2004). The worst hit area would be the southwest region where the high salinity currently observed during the critical dry season along the Passur-Gorai systems would penetrate 50 km upstream. The 2 ppt isohaline line will shift inland by 15 and 30 km towards west and east, respectively.

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Table 10.3 Predicted flow of the Brahmaputra River at Bahadurabad by considering a flow reduction of 1000 m3/s during September through December

80% Dependable flow

Month

Reduction of flow

Resultant flow (as predicted)

(m3/sec) November

9,215

1,000

7,571

December

5,869

1,000

3,990

January

4,335

No further reduction

2,572

February

3,687

No further reduction

2,029

March

3,709

No further reduction

2,610

Source: Chowdhury and Datta, 2004.

10.4.2

Adverse impacts on agriculture

The relationship between flow patterns in the river systems and crop agriculture clearly suggests that crop agriculture – the most important source of livelihoods of millions of people living in Bangladesh – will become extremely difficult if the ILR becomes operational. The major Kharif crop, high yielding Aman paddy providing about 43 per cent of total staple cereal for the country, would face the first blow as it would become extremely difficult to meet water demand with decreasing flow regime in November and December – the reproductive period for Aman. Irrigation schemes dependent upon flows of Teesta (over 0.5 Mha), Chandpur and Meghna-Dhonagoda projects in southeast region, Bhola and Barisal irrigation projects in the south-central region and Ganges-Kobadak project in the southwest region will all face water scarcity for meeting water demands from surface sources (Chowdhury, 2003). The impact on crop agriculture would be even more dramatic during Rabi cropping season, when Boro paddy is grown. The Rabi season is dominated by high yielding Boro paddy which is almost entirely dependent on groundwater irrigation, as the rivers cannot provide adequate surface water during lean period. Since the lean season will start early and the recharge of groundwater sources would be reduced due to drying up of wetlands, continued irrigation by exploiting groundwater sources would lead to mining from aquifer system. It would have two socio-economic consequences: (a) draw-down of aquifers from shallow levels would require increased energy and investment for maintaining irrigation and growing Boro rice, which might appear to be impossible for marginal farmers and share-croppers; and (b) long term sustainability of cropping-based livelihoods would be at serious risk with dwindling groundwater resources. With decrease in piezometric surface of the shallow aquifer system the low-cost pumping appliances such as low-lift pumps and shallow rube-wells would become inoperable in many areas. Since the only other alternative technology, the deep tube-well, requires high investments, maintaining livelihoods by poor farmers would become nest to impossible. Currently, groundwater resource is the lifeline for rural poor farmers. Any constraint imposed on this vital resource will cause loss of livelihoods and trigger large scale pauperization.

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The other major issue regarding crop agriculture is increase in salinity, especially along the southwest and south-central regions. A large area in the southwestern region has become saline affected due to diversion of the Ganges flows (Halcrow-WARPO, 2000). Increased salinity has become a limiting factor for Boro and wheat cropping in the southwestern parts of the country, especially along the western side of the Gorai River – the major distributary of the Ganges River. The farmers cannot grow the two most preferred crops as the reproductive stages of the crops coincide with the period when salinity in surface water and soils surpass their respective thresholds for the crops. In anticipation of certain crop loss, farmers either keep the land fallow or resort to crops of lesser economic/ livelihood importance. This reality may easily be considered as a prelude to an engineered catastrophe if the salinity-affected area is extended further towards north and east of current saline zone.

10.4.3 Adverse impacts on ecosystems With the anticipated/modeled changes in hydrology, it may easily be inferred that the wetland ecosystems of Bangladesh will be severely affected as a consequence of implementation of the proposed ILR. Bangladesh has been known globally as a natural habitat for a large number of freshwater species including fish, mollusks, reptiles, riverine dolphins, plants etc. – a few of which are endemic species (Hussain and Acharya, 1994). Early choking of smaller rivers would lead to fragmentation of freshwater habitat. With decreasing wetland areas and early recession of monsoon flows, many wetland species might find it difficult to maintain their lifecycles. With landward movement of brackish water zone, spawning grounds for many species would shift, while increase in salinity along coastal rivers during critical dry season would limit naturally available spawning areas for freshwater fish species, which might be detrimental for fisheries diversity in Bangladesh. The effect of salinity ingress on the Sundarbans as a consequence of diversion of the Ganges flows has been well understood (Karim, 2004). Any further decrease in flow regime along the Gorai River during the critical dry period (i.e., March and April) might jeopardize the ecosystem health of the unique mangrove forest, the Sundarbans. For example, the vegetation succession processes in the forest are expected to change with increasing salinity (Karim, 1994), which would result into gradual replacement of high value timber species such as H. fomes to low value shrubs. With changing vegetation, one can only anticipate simultaneous changes occurring in biodiversity which are dependent on the forest species. The largest patch of productive mangrove forest, a pride possession of the humanity where the majestic Bengal tiger (P. tigris) found its habitat, would be deteriorated completely. The other interesting adverse effect would be on migratory species, which travel thousands of kilometers to avoid harsh winter in the northwest and spend six to eight weeks of ‘mild weather’ on the vast shallow wetlands of the Bengal delta, full of fish and other aquatic species. Unfortunately, diversion of flows during September and October and early recession of water from the wetlands would severely affect temporary habitats of these migratory species.

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10.4.4 Adverse impacts of industrial development Bangladesh has been gradually developing its industrial sector. Over the past three decades, contribution of industrial sector to GDP has increased from 14.6 per cent in the 1970s to about 16.6 per cent (Bayes et al., 1998; MoF, 2005). It has played its due role in creation of employment opportunities and achieving GDP growth rate of around 5 per cent over the past two decades. However, the increased salinity along the southwestern region not only restricted industrial expansion, it has driven away industrial units requiring large quantum of process water. The only state-operated newsprint processing industry in the country is running on losses due to high operating costs for the collection of non-saline water from 100 to 150 km north of its location along the bank of Passur River. In this backdrop, it is anticipated that further industrial development in the southwestern and south-central regions will be severely constrained due to increase in salinity. In addition to salinity, choking of small rivers/rivulets and lowering of water levels in many rivers would restrict expansion of industries in respective areas (Chowdhury, 2003). The large industrial units currently located along major rivers that ensure year-round process water might require reduction in production capacity according to availability of water. The banks of Brahmaputra River will no longer be an automatic choice for large industrial installations. 10.4.5 Adverse impacts on waterways and navigation Inland waterways provide the cheapest mode of transportation of both commodities and passenger freights. Living in a riverine country, Bangladeshi people have been accustomed to use as well as enjoy waterways as an important mode of transportation. The prerequisite for maintaining navigational routes and inland waterways is to have adequate draft even during the lean period. Unfortunately, the implementation of the ILR would choke many smaller channels and lower the available draft even in moderate-sized rivers which would restrict passage through these rivers (Chowdhury, 2003). 10.4.6 Economic and social implications As highlighted above, future potential for industrialization will be diminished as a consequence of reduction in flow regime and subsequent salinization. Not only economy will be deprived of their contributions, the consequent effect on employment would create enormous social tension. The country has already witnessed the extent of out-migration from the southwestern region and subsequent expansion of urban slums in Dhaka, Khulna and Chittagong. The proposed ILR would only add to ongoing social problems. About 51.7 per cent of all employment in the country is directly related to crop agriculture (BBS, 2005). Over 18 million households find their livelihoods from crop agriculture. A large proportion of these people are share-cropper too. Unfortunately, any reduction in opportunities for Boro due to loss of irrigation potential might leave no room for the marginal farmers to continue crop agriculture and maintain their subsistence economy. It would have multi-dimensional effects on nation’s weak economy. Not only the nation’s food security would be at high risk, a large proportion of its foreign exchange will have to be spent on procuring food from international sources. This would have macroeconomic implications.

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Simultaneously, on micro-levels it would be extremely difficult to maintain food security and livelihoods for households who are dependent on either share cropping or a very small chunk of land. Loss of food security and lack of employment in rural areas would drive out the marginal farmers to throng into urban areas and accept otherwise unacceptable living conditions in urban slums. In the backdrop of ever increasing population and growing inequality in the society, the social and economic implications of the proposed ILR would further complicate the situation, which in turn would continue to rupture the social fabric of the poverty ridden nation. Achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and ensuring a better life for all would remain a distant dream for the lackluster population of Bangladesh. 10.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS In the backdrop of ever increasing population crowded together in a small landmass and having a large poverty-stricken people, Bangladesh has been struggling hard to offer minimum quality of life for its citizenry and maintain food self-sufficiency. In this pursuit, water-related hazards and disasters have always pushed the country backward and denied her strive towards development. On top, the unilateral withdrawal of water from the Ganges River by India wrecked havoc to natural environment of the Ganges Dependent Areas in Bangladesh, with huge economic and social adverse implications. Any new attempt to jeopardize the region’s water resources scenario, even if it is to serve people elsewhere in the region, would have devastating effects on geo-physical, biological and human aspects of the most downstream country, Bangladesh. The proposed ILR would perhaps induce the greatest human tragedy in the history. It is urged upon the current leadership in India to carefully analyze the situation carefully and consider pragmatic win-win decisions. Let the laws of nature prevail over the laws of human beings that denies river water reaching its downstream and destroys potential for development.

REFERENCES Ahmed, A.U.: Adaptability of Bangladesh’s Crop Agriculture to Climate Change: Possibilities and Limitations. Asia Pacific Journal on Environment and Development 7(1) (2000), pp. 71–93. Ahmed, A.U.: Addressing Issues of Salinity in Potable Water in National Policies: Perspectives on Adaptation to Climate Change in Bangladesh. Reducing Vulnerability to Climate Change (RVCC) Project, CARE-RVCC, Khulna, 2004. Ahmed, A.U. and Haque, N.: Tala Report, 2006. Ahmed, A.U., Munim, K., Alam, M.S., Hussain, S.G. and Hossain, M.: Characterization of Food Systems in IGP-5: A Case Study on Greater Faridpur District. Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP) in collaboration with the GECAFS Secretariat, Dhaka (mimeo), 2006. Ahmed, F., Q.K. Ahmad and M. Khalequzzaman (eds.): Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Rivers: Impact of the Indian River Linking Project. A Compilation of Papers of the International Conference on Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Rivers, Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon (BAPA), Dhaka, December 17 to 19, 2004, p. 540. Ahmad, Q.K. and Ahmed, A.U. (eds.): Bangladesh: Citizens’ Perspectives on Sustainable Development. Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP), Dhaka, 2002, p. 225. Ahmad, Q.K.: Towards Poverty Alleviation: The Water Sector Perspectives. Water Resources Development 19(2) (2003), pp. 263–277. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS): Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh: 2004, 24th Edition, BBS, Dhaka, 2005, p. 838.

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Batuta, I. (Shams-Ad Din): Memoirs of Ibn Batuta. Translated in several languages, 1355. Bayes, A., Neelormi, S., Begum, F. and Quibria, C.G.: Industrialization in Bangladesh: Policies and Performance. In: Bangladesh at 25: An Analytical Discourse on Development (A. Bayes and A. Muhammed Eds.), University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1998, pp. 89–107. Chalakudy Puzha Samrakshana Samithi (CPSS) and South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP): Linking Rivers, De-linking India, Proceedings of Two Day National Workshop on the Proposed Interlinking of Rivers in India. CPSS-SANDRP, Thrissur, India, July 12 to 13, 2003. Chowdhury, J.U.: Impacts of Proposed Inter-basin Water Transfer by India. Paper presented & distributed at the National Workshop on the same topic at the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), organized by the Institute of Water and Flood Management, Dhaka, September 13, 2003. Chowdhury, J.U. and Datta, A.R.: Effect of Transfer of Brahmaputra Water by Indian RLP on Slaine Water Intrusion. In: Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Rivers (F. Ahmed, Q.K. Ahmad and M. Khalequzzaman Eds.), Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon (BAPA), Dhaka, 2004, pp. 143–158. Chowdhury, J.U. and Haque, M.A.: Numerical Simulation of Tides and Saline Water Intrusion in the Meghna Delta, Report No. R03/89. Institute of Flood Control and Drainage Research, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, Dhaka, 1989. Faruqee, R. (ed.): Bangladesh Agriculture in the 21st Century, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1998, 275 p. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO): Water Quality for Agriculture. FAO Irrigation and Drainage Paper 29, FAO, Rome, 1976. General Economics Division (GED) and Planning Commission (PC): Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction. GED-PC, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2005, p. 349. Halcrow-WARPO: Land and Water Resources, Topic Paper No. 7, Background Paper Series for the National Water Management Plan (NWMP) Project. Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO), Dhaka, 2000. Hindustan Times: Linking of Rivers Can Affect Ecology: Warns WWF Chief, New Delhi, February 10, 2003. Hofer, T.: Floods in Bangladesh: A Highland-Lowland Interaction? Institute of Geography, University of Berne, Switzerland, 1998, p. 171. Hussain, Z. and Acharya, G. (eds.): Mangroves of the Sundarbans, IUCN, Glantz, 1994. Indian Express: River Linking Plan to have Big Impact on Environment, Chandigarh, May 5, 2003. International Engineering Company (IECO): Special Studies, IECO, Dhaka, 1977. Iyer, R.: Linking of Rivers: Judicial Activism or Error? Economic and Political Weekly; cited in South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, The Mindlessness Called River Linking Proposals, November 16, 2003, p. 5. Kamal, M.M., Rahman, S.M.M., Hye, J.M.A. and Ahmad, E.: Impacts of the Indian River Linking Project on Bangladesh: A Pilot Study, Institute of Water Modeling (IWM), Dhaka, 2004. Karim, A.: Implications on Ecosystems in Bangladesh. In: The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications (Mirza, M.M.Q. Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2004, pp. 125–161. Karim, Z., Hussain, S.G. and Ahmed, M.: Salinity Problems and Crop Intensification in the Coastal Regions of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Agriculture Research Council (BARC), Dhaka, 1990. Mahanta, C.K.: River Linking and Assam’s Interests. The South Asian (http://www.thesouthasian.org/ archives/2003/ riverlinking_and_assams_intere.html), December 13, 2003. Mirza, M.M.Q.: Three Recent Extreme Floods in Bangladesh: A Hydro-Meteorological Analysis. In: Flood Problem and Management in South Asia (M. M. Q. Mirza, A. Dixit and A. Nishat Eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2003, pp. 35–64. Mirza, M.M.Q. (ed.): The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2004, p. 364.

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Mirza, M.M.Q. and Hossain, M.A.: Adverse Effects on Agriculture in the Ganges Basin in Bangladesh. In: The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications (Mirza, M.M.Q. Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2004, pp. 177–196. Mirza, M.M.Q. and Sarker, M.H.: Effects on Water Salinity in Bangladesh. In: The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effects and Implications (Mirza, M.M.Q. Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2004, pp. 81–102. Ministry of Finance (MoF): Bangladesh Economic Review, Economic Adviser’s Wing, Finance Division, MoF, Dhaka, 2005, p. 308. Novak, J.J.: Bangladesh: Reflections on the Water, Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 235. Patil, S.: Interlinking of Indian Rivers, presentation made in WAREM Seminar at Universitat Stuttgart, Stuttgart, December 23, 2003. Parkar, M. (ed): River Linking: A Millennium Folly? The National Alliance of People’s Movement and Initiatives, New Delhi, 2004. PTI: River Linking Project: Bangladesh Threatens to Move International Court at the Hague, published in the Indian Express, New Dehli, November 1, 2003. Rahman, A.A., Chowdhury, Z.H. and Ahmed, A.U.: Environment and Security in Bangladesh. In: Environment, Development and Human Security: Perspectives from South Asia (A. Najam Ed.), University Press of America, Lanham, 2003, pp. 103–128. Rahman, A.A., S. Huq, and G.R. Conway (eds.): Environmental Aspects of Surface Water Systems of Bangladesh, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1990, p. 258. Rahman, M.M., Hasab, M.Q., Islam, M.S. and Shamsad, S.Z.K.M.: Environmental Impact on Water Quality Deterioration Caused by the Decreased Ganges Outflow and Saline Water Intrusion in South Western Bangladesh. Environmental Geology 40(1–2) (2000), pp. 31–40. Samya Centre for Equity Studies (SCES): Linking of Indian Rivers: Some Concerns and Issues, SCES, New Delhi, 2003. Shankari, U.: Interlinking Rivers – Contradictions and Confrontations, South Asian Dialogue on Ecological Democracy and Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, 2004a. Shankari, U. (ed.): Interlinking of Rivers – Contradictions and Confrontations, World Wildlife Fund and Action Aid, New Delhi, 2004b. Singh, B.: Inter-basin Water Transfer – Review of Need and Problems. Proceedings of All India Seminar on Water and Environment – Issues and Challenges, Roorkee, October 12 to 13, 2002, pp. 3–18. Singh, S.R and M.P. Srivastava (eds.): River Interlinking in India: The Dream and Reality. Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 2006, p. 379. Swain, A.: The Environmental Trap: The Ganges River Diversion. Bangladeshi Migration and Conflicts in India, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Upsala University, Sweden, 1996. The New Sunday Express: Interlinking of Rivers Will Disturb Geography of Nation, Kochi, July 13, 2003. Vidal, J.: Troubled Waters for Bangladesh as India Presses on with Plan to Divert Major Rivers: UN Urged to Act Amid Warnings of Social and Ecological Disaster. The Guardian, London, July 24, 2003.

11 Assessment of the India River Linking Plan: A Closer Look at the Ken-Betwa Pilot Link1 KELLI KRUEGER FRANCES SEGOVIA MONIQUE TOUBIA

11.1 INTRODUCTION The Ken-Betwa Link Project (KBLP) (Figure 11.1) – under the ILR, is one of the 30 river links proposed by the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) in the Bundelkhand region of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, India. While no links have so far been implemented, the KBLP is being pursued as the pilot project of the national program to serve as a “litmus test” for the national ILR plan (The Hindu, 2005). Critics suggest that the KBLP has been chosen as the premiere project as a result of its remote location, which minimizes opportunity for controversy. Additionally, the physical construction required for the KBLP is relatively minimal as a result of the close proximity of the Ken and Betwa rivers to each other (Boojh, 2005). This project involves connecting the Ken and Betwa rivers through the creation of a string of dams, reservoirs, and canal to provide storage for excess rainfall during the monsoon as a means to divert water for domestic and industrial consumptions and irrigation purposes. To do this, a 73.8 m high dam called the Greater Gangau Dam (GGD), is proposed on Ken River near Daudhan village, on the border of Chhatarpur and Panna districts in Madhya Pradesh, 2.5 km upstream from the existing Gangau Weir. The water is to be transferred to the Betwa River through a 231.45 km long concrete lined link canal, which is to drop water upstream of the existing Barwasagar reservoir in Jhansi district in Uttar Pradesh. While construction of five additional dams as a part of this project is mentioned, their details have not been included in the Feasibility Report (FR). Therefore the entire FR and our subsequent analysis are based off of the information provided on this dam only. The total cost of the project is estimated to be R. 19,890 million or US$ 452 million at 2006 prices. It is also stated that construction of the dam and reservoir will result in the displacement of 900 families from 10 villages. The total number displaced is estimated at 8,550. Additionally, it is estimated that 6,400 hectares of the area to be submerged is forested, with 4,500 hectares (approximately 70 per cent) of this area located in Panna National Park and Tiger Reserve, a designated wildlife refuge. 1

Full document can be found at: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/50483.

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Fig. 11.1 Layout of the Ken-Betwa Link Project illustrates the proposed plan for construction of the dams, reservoirs, and canals.

The potential environmental impacts of the project are minimally discussed in its Feasibility Report (FR), the only published information by the NWDA, Government of India. Due to the general nature of the FR, there is insufficient evidence to determine if the KBLP is the appropriate management policy for this area. Criticisms of the project cannot be justified or disputed based solely on this document which warranted carrying out further research to assess the feasibility of the KBLP. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analysis, literature reviews, and focus group interviews, this chapter addresses three major issues of criticism surrounding the KBLP: hydrologic, wildlife, and social impacts. The research presented here focuses on the construction of the Greater Gangau Dam, as it is the only published information currently available for analysis. The intention of addressing these impacts is to gain a better understanding of this pilot link that if successfully implemented, will serve to influence the implementation of the ILR nationwide. 11.2 POTENTIAL HYDROLOGIC IMPACTS While the KBLP might provide benefits by developing water resources, it is equally important to consider the potentially negative environmental impacts, including those that could have long term consequences. There are many well-documented examples of such unanticipated environmental consequences associated with dams including loss of habitat, changes in downstream morphology, changes in downstream water quality, and reduced of biodiversity (Goudie, 2000). In addition, potential negative impacts result from the pattern of dam operation including changes in downstream hydrology such as

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alterations in total and seasonal flows or extreme high and low flows. While these impacts might not initially seem serious, elimination or alteration of natural floods can frequently lead to a reduction in the larger floodplain habitat diversity (IDSN, 1998). Though construction of dams has been a prevalent water management strategy in India, public opposition to the ILR indicates that large dam projects like the KBLP will face tougher scrutiny in future water development plans (Rangachari et al., 2000). In this part of the analysis, we examine the potential environmental impacts of the KBLP, specifically discussing potential hydrologic impacts using GIS. The GIS model developed in this project was used for further analysis to identify areas within the Ken and Betwa watersheds that are at risk of being impacted by the KBLP. The analysis is undertaken by assessing the environmental factors that indicate vulnerability to hydrologic change. High-risk areas were identified based on vulnerability and mapped with an objective that this information will enable NGOs, local communities, and other stakeholders to visualize and understand in the future how environmental impacts are spatially distributed throughout the area. The FR for the KBLP was released by the Indian government and provided a very basic description of current hydrological conditions. However, it dedicated only one chapter to addressing environmental aspects of the project. The hydrologic conditions considered in designing a dam and a canal complex that were cited in the report included rainfall, water quantity, sedimentation rates, and sediment distribution. In some places of the feasibility report, specifically Chapter 4: Surveys and Investigations, several data sources were identified. Elsewhere in the report, collection of data available from 1901 to 1994 was generally completed by other government departments. Little explanation of data collection methodology or overall data reliability was furnished, making it difficult to assess the accuracy of the FR’s statements. The FR cited environmental benefits of long term flood control measures and increased production of fish from the creation of the reservoir and addressed some potential environmental impacts to wildlife, seismic, or the regional climate. However, these impacts were generally dismissed with little to no supportive evidence. Interestingly, the report did not directly addressed impacts on water quality. Instead, they must be inferred from descriptions on impacts on fish habitats and sedimentation. In terms of hydrologic impacts, though the FR noted that the groundwater table was expected to rise due to the impoundment and submerged area, it provided no data to support how this change in water distribution would impact the area. The FR also described calculations to estimate sedimentation and indicated that measures would be taken to minimize sedimentation, but again provided neither detail of what these measures would be nor from what the sources data for these calculations come. There were clearly going to be difficulties in assessing the appropriateness of the KBLP based solely on the Feasibility Report. Quantitative data such as stream flow data, was either unavailable to the public or, like groundwater data, did not exist. Our study therefore, utilized readily available data for use in GIS to characterize the current environmental conditions of the area and assess the area’s vulnerability to potential hydrologic impacts resulting from the construction of the KBLP by adopting the following three steps. First, topographic characteristics, watershed boundaries, and high flow accumulation areas were derived from a Digital Elevation Model (DEM); Second, land cover was classified from Landsat 7 ETM ⫹ imagery; and third, with the inclusion of soils data obtained for two districts within the project area, this study identified specific

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localities that were at risk of being impacted by the KBLP in three potential areas of vulnerability: erosion, inundation, and surface water quality degradation. A Weighted Linear Combination2 was used to assess vulnerability based on criteria derived from this data, specifically, proximity to surface water, elevation, slope, proximity to developed land cover, and erosion and drainage characteristics of soil type (Eastman et al., 1995a). Vulnerability to potential impacts was determined by applying a weight to each of the contributing criteria followed by a summation of the results to yield a vulnerability map. The formula to determine this weight is: V ⫽

∑ wi xi

where V is vulnerability, wi is the weight of the criteria, and xi is the criterion score for impact i (Eastman et al., 1995b). Specific terrain, soil, and land cover characteristics derived from the data were used as the criteria to create a vulnerability value for three impact factors: inundation, erosion, and surface water quality degradation. While this process is explained in more detail in the complete document, the factors used for each impact combination are outlined in Table 11.1. The analysis resulted in maps (Figures 11.2 to 11.6) illustrating the spatial distribution of vulnerability to the three potential impacts, and from this assessment, high-risk areas were identified.3 Vulnerability maps for each of the three potential impacts suggested that the proposed project site and areas downstream of the dam were particularly vulnerable to inundation, erosion, and water quality degradation. Specifically with respect to inundation, the closer image showed that all of the villages designated to be submerged fall within an area identified by the analysis as having high vulnerability to inundation. The image for the entire extent of the analysis indicated that areas further downstream were extremely vulnerable to inundation. While this could have justified the construction of a dam for flood damage reduction purposes, there were also other factors that needed to be considered. Land cover classification indicated the downstream area was primarily agricultural. Seasonal flooding would be necessary for successful agricultural yields (Adams, 1985). The impacts of dams and their likely failures in contributing to worse flood damage conditions will be discussed later in this section. Both the erosion combination and water quality combination exhibit vulnerability in similar areas, this may be due to the fact that soils’ values were categorical and despite being weighted, still had stronger influence in the combinations. In the closer images of erosion and water quality, the portion of the Ken River upstream of the proposed dam site was particularly vulnerable to both impacts. This raises concerns over the contribution of this section of the Ken River to sedimentation and water quality degradation of the reservoir. Additionally, the entire downstream portion of the Ken River and areas immediately adjacent to it appeared to be vulnerable to erosion and water quality degradation, and changes in the hydrology of the area would amplify these vulnerabilities.

2

The weighted linear combination (WLC) technique is a decision rule for deriving composite maps using GIS. 3 More information about the methods used in this assessment can be found in the complete version of this research document at: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/50483.

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Table 11.1 Vulnerability impacts and criteria factors Potential impact Criteria Distance to surface water

Inundation

Erosion

Negative

Distance to developed land cover Elevation

Negative

Slope

Negative

Plan curvature

Positive

Surface water quality

Justification

i Negative

Determines how much movement is required to get the water into/out of surface water bodies

Negative

Determines how much movement is required in the transport of runoff pollutants Determines movement of water into/out of surface water bodies

Positive

Determines water flow, flooding, erosion, soil depth, travel cost, and geology Determines topographic convergence (high values) and divergence (low values)

Profile curvature

Negative

Drainage r characteristics of soil

Negative

i Negative

Determines the capacity of water to move through soil. Used as a surrogate for permeability.

Erosion characteristics of soil

Positive

Positive

Determines erodibility of soil surface.

Determines rate of change of the potential gradient which contributes to flow velocity and sediment transport (negative values indicate accelerated flow)

Note: Adapted from: Galant and Wilson (2000); Goudie (2000); and Goodchild et al., (1993). In Table 11.1, the indicator “Positive Factor” means that as the values of the factor increase, the vulnerability to a particular impact increases as well. The indicator “Negative Factor” means that as the value of the factor increases, vulnerability to a particular impact will decease.

Although understanding vulnerability of the project area was important, more information was needed about water quantities and surface and groundwater interactions in order to evaluate the feasibility of the KBLP more thoroughly. For example, the hydrologic regime of a lake or reservoir is strongly influenced by the regional groundwater flow system in which it is located (USACE, 1999). The recharge of groundwater from monsoon floods, current availability of groundwater, extraction of groundwater by the local people, and the interactions between surface water bodies and surrounding groundwater could potentially influence the maximum potential reservoir level and the amount of water that can be captured and distributed by the KBLP. Ultimately, the changes to these interactions through the construction of a dam and reservoir will also impact the groundwater/surface water interaction in areas upstream and downstream of the dam. The results indicated that it is important to collect more current data on the availability, location, and movement of groundwater in the project area in order to take this analysis further. A thorough understanding of current conditions could help determine appropriateness of KBLP and could provide more information for anticipating hydrologic changes that will result from the construction of such a project. There is no argument that the development of water resources can provide tremendous benefits such as minimizing flood damage and providing water for irrigation and consumption purposes. However, with these benefits, significant risks of severe impacts on the environment are associated. Ultimately, these impacts could outweigh the integrity of the perceived benefits, as flood damage and the security of future water

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supplies remain concerns in spite of the construction of the development project. Discussion on the wildlife and social impacts supports the need for water management practices, which do not merely rely on large scale construction projects but rather consider conservation policies that are more suitable for the Ken-Betwa region.

High

Low Dam Submerged Villages

Inundation Vulnerability

N 1:1,000,000

Fig. 11.2 Results for inundation combination.

11.3 POTENTIAL IMPACTS TO WILDLIFE Scientists generally agree that the most significant threat to biological diversity is loss of habitat. Exotic species, pollution, and overexploitation are also important factors (Raven and Berg, 2001). Habitat loss, the greatest threat of all, is occurring at an alarming rate as the human population continues to grow. India is no exception, as it is one of the fastest growing populations in the world, and its soaring demand for food, timber and housing has contributed to the destruction of India’s natural wildlife habitats and its wildlife

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heritage (Oza and Oza, 1998). In addition, numerous forest and wilderness areas, which served as vital repositories of wildlife and biodiversity, have been severely reduced in extent or completely lost to increasing agricultural and industrial expansion (Dwivedi, 2003). Unfortunately, this has led to India having 30 mammals placed on the threatened species list in the Red Data Book of the World Conservation Union (IUCN), and ranking India number one in the world for having the largest number of threatened mammals (Oza and Oza, 1998). The pressures of human population growth and the need for expansion serve as a clear example of the constant competition between wildlife and humans for survival in a limited resource environment. This dilemma is further exacerbated in India as the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) attempts to address the pressing issue of water availability by implementing the KBLP as a pilot project which has raised concerns regarding wildlife. Other interlinking components will also impact wildlife.

Inundation Vulnerability High

Low Submerged Villages

N 1:1,300,000

Dam

Fig. 11.3 Results for inundation combination, closer view of project site.

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High

Low Dam Submerged Villages

Inundation Vulnerability

N 1:1,000,000

Fig. 11.4 Results for erosion combination.

These concerns were derived from the claims made in the NWDA’s KBLP Feasibility Report. According to this report, construction of the link would require submergence of forested areas that include part of the Panna National Park and Tiger Reserve (PNPTR). In an effort to raise awareness and understanding of the situation, this section provides insight into the KBLP feasibility report as well as other ILR reports as they pertain to wildlife. Of particular relevance in the KBLP FR was the chapter entitled Environmental and Ecological Aspects of the Project where it is stated that construction of the KBLP would result in a total submergence area of 8,650 hectares, of which 6,400 hectares are forested (approximately 74 per cent) (NWDA, 2005). These forested areas are home to various species of carnivores, herbivores, birds, and reptiles that are commonly found in and around the area to potentially be submerged for the KBLP, and provide some insight into the rich variety of wildlife in the PNPTR (NIC, 2006) (NWDA, 2005).

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High

Low Dam Submerged Villages

Erosion Vulnerability

N 300,000

Fig. 11.5 Results for erosion combination, closer view of project site.

Within the PNPTR, a number of endangered species listed in Schedule I of the Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 (WPA) which include the tiger, leopard, carcal, fourhorned antelope, Indian wolf, Pangolin, Rusty Spotted Cat, Sloth Bear and Gharial (NIC, 2006). As noted in the KBLP FR and listed in the WPA 1972, tiger is one species that is found in and around the submergence area. Notably the tiger has been the target of many conservation campaigns and for good reason, since it is considered one of the most endangered species in the world. Madhya Pradesh (MP) has 19 per cent of India’s and 10 per cent of the world’s tiger population, with an estimated 710 in MP and 31 tigers in the PNPTR (FD, 2007). Loss of habitat is one of the main reasons for the drastic decline in the tiger population. Any further loss of forested areas due to submergence could be catastrophic to the tiger population of the PNPTR.

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High

Low Dam Submerged Villages

Inundation Vulnerability

N 1:1,000,000

Fig. 11.6 Results of water quality degradation combination.

However, the KBLP FR stated that “… impact of the submergence on the wildlife of the park will be nil, as the area coming under submergence is only about 9 per cent of the total area of the national park and the wildlife has got its own natural characteristic of moving to the interior forest” (p.120). However, this claim has neither supported by substantive assessment of wildlife of the area or consideration given to existing research that demonstrate the impacts of similar nature experienced in other water development projects like the KBLP (Gubbi, 2004; McAllister et al., 2001; Rangachari et al., 2000; Rosenberg et al., 2000). Similar statements regarding impacts to wildlife were made in other ILR feasibility reports (fourteen in all) that were made available through the NWDA’s website. Eleven of the fourteen reports provided information about wildlife impacts, as summarized in Table 11.2. Two important issues arose from a review of these reports, first, that the areas coming under submergence were recognized as being inhabited by wildlife. Therefore, it could be inferred that collectively the ILR would accelerate habitat loss throughout India, and

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exacerbating a serious problem already threatening wildlife. Second, statements on the potential wildlife impacts continuously ranged from “minimum” to “nil”, with no supporting data from wildlife assessments of the areas.

High

Low Dam Submerged Villages

N 1:1,000,000

Inundation Vulnerability Fig. 11.7 Results of water quality degradation combination, a closer view of project site.

In addition to the loss of habitat through submergence, wildlife is threatened by the lack of preventative measures from the NWDA to assist wildlife in coping with development. The feasibility reports repeatedly note that wildlife would react instinctively to development effects like submergence, by migrating to neighboring habitats. Indeed, a final report prepared for the World Commission on Dams (WCD) regarding India’s experience with large water projects expressed similar expectations (Rangachari et al., 2000). The expressed expectations are considered to be inappropriate for two reasons. First, because the areas where these animals would migrate to have their own complement of wildlife and cannot be considered “vacant habitats” (Rangachari et al., 2000). Second,

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wildlife does not always move down corridors of forest as the flood waters advance, as they may not be aware of corridors, are rightly wary of leaving their own territory, or become panic stricken when the waters roll in. In some cases, animals are nocturnal, or roam during the day, or live underground, in trees, or in caves (Rangachari et al., 2000). Table 11.2 Summary of the statements regarding the individual links impacts to wildlife. Links

Impacts on flora and fauna

Proposed submergence

Ken-Betwa Link

“Nil”

8,650 hectares; 6,400 hectares of forested area

Parbati-KalisindhChambal Link

“Very little”

17,308 hectares; 244 hectares of forested area

Polavaram-Vijayawada Link

No statement made

Number of hectares not reported

Damanganga-Pingal Link

“No significant impact is expected”

3,641 hectares; 1,624 hectares of forested area

Mahanadi-Godavari Link

“The reservoir submergence will not effect the habitation of wildlife”

63,000 hectares; 4,000 hectares of forested area

Inchampalli-Pulichintala Link

“The proposed dam site is the breeding area for a number of wildlife but at present no information as to whether the area fall under migration routes of wildlife.”

92,555 hectares; 21,734 hectares of forested area

Inchampalli-NagarjunaSagar Link

Same information as InchampalliPulichinatla Link

94,620 hectares; 30,170 hectares of forested areas

Almatti-Pennar Link

“Will partially effect wildlife”

Number of hectares not reported

NagarjunasagarSomasila Link

“No adverse impact are expected”

895 hectares

Pennar-Palar-Cauvery Link

“No adverse impact are expected”

9,895 hectares; 1,025 hectares of forested area

Cauvery-Vaigai-Gundar Link

“No adverse impact are expected”

3,174 hectares

Par-Tapi-Narmada Link

“Due to activities in forest, wild animals are likely to migrate to safer places”

7,599 hectares; 3,572 hectares of forest area

Source: NWDA (2005).

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The findings of the WCD report mirrored those in the KBLP as well as other feasibility reports, namely, that there would be “no adverse” impact, and like the KBLP report, the studies in the WCD cited no hard data in support of these claims. Therefore, it was concluded that there was a need to more closely examine the KBLP to truly understand the implication of this project on wildlife. Wildlife in India is considered one of the most threatened in the world, and the wildlife in the KBLP area in particular, face many challenges for survival. In the Panna National Park and Tiger Reserve, threats come from such sources as the growing population, illegal grazing of domestic livestock and collection of natural resources and direct human-wildlife interactions (Singh, 2006). The KBLP has the potential to contribute to these current challenges through the submergence of forest areas, and further even greater loss of forested areas is expected with the implementation of ILR nationwide. The magnitude of the loss of India’s forests and the implications this entails might not be fully appreciated and understood initially for two reasons. First, only after a thorough review of the KBLP’s and other links’ feasibility reports, does it become clear that submergence is the primary method for achieving the interlinking of rivers. This leads to the second reason, that this focus on method omitted meaningful examination and analysis into the potential impacts on the surrounding environment and species that inhabit he area. For example, the KBLP feasibility report indicates that there is 6,400 hectares of forest that will be submerged. This area might be considered relatively small, were it not for a consideration of the much larger submergence connected with the construction of the other links. Consequently, the combined submergence associated with the completion of the ILR could serve to accelerate habitat loss throughout India, and initiate an unprecedented decline in biological diversity. It is important that the scale of the overall project be considered when assessing the implications to wildlife, as the amount of submerged forest increases throughout the country with each link. The loss of habitat that will result from this project is an issue that should be addressed to help ensure that this project does not deal with one problem, water management issues, and create another, the extinction of India’s wildlife.

11.4 SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE KBLP Seen as the answer to India’s potential future water crises, the KBLP is the pilot for the much larger nationwide plan. It is important, therefore, to determine if the benefits and burdens of this resource use would be evenly spread across different social groups as a key question of environmental justice. Although there is a need for development in the economically depressed and environmentally depredated Bundelkhand region, the KBLP FR has not provided adequate information on the potential negative impacts to the already marginalized project affected persons (PAPs) and the ecosystems on which they depend. Nor has the FR adequately discussed the relocation of PAPs and long term livelihood impacts on the general population. Given India’s history of low participation levels from local communities, inadequate rehabilitation programs and negative impacts on fragile ecosystems as a result of large scale development projects, there is risk of irreversible damage to the region’s people and their land. This damage could adversely impact the most vulnerable groups in the region if socio-economic factors are not properly addressed by the implementing government agency. In order to address the socio-economic gaps in the FR analysis, this research synthesizes information gathered from existing quantitative information on the water needs of the surplus region, anecdotal experience in several of the PAP villages and two interlinking

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opponent activist meetings. This research provides a third party perspective of the social justice movement that surrounds the controversy of the KBLP and river interlinking in general. Thus far it appears as though the movements addressing the KBLP and river linking are emotionally fueled on the activist side and politically motivated on the government side. The overall aim of the discussion that follows is an attempt to synthesize existing information on the project and to bring the activist and local views together in order to identify gaps and highlight the need for better communication among all concerned parties. Until this point, it appears as though communication has been limited and that participation has been sparse or not very effective. Madhya Pradesh (MP) is one of the poorest states in India with a per capita income of only about $180 in 1998, and about 40 per cent of its 60 million people living below the poverty line (ADB, 2001). In addition, MP ranks extremely low nationwide on all indicators of human development indices, such as per capita state domestic product, life expectancy, education levels, literacy, and infant mortality rates (GoMP, 2002). More than 80 per cent of the poor live in rural areas, with high concentrations in the study area. The majority of the rural population depends on agriculture and associated industries for their livelihood. Out of this population, 20 per cent work as agricultural labors (GoMP, 2002). One third of the population also belongs to socially and economically disadvantaged groups officially designated as Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Scheduled Castes (SCs). Three villages scheduled for submergence with the construction of the Daudhan reservoir were visited in this study. The NWDA estimates that 17,650 hectares of the study area will be submerged resulting in the relocation of 900 families and a currently unidentified number of people from peripheral villages (NWDA, 2005). To ascertain regional differences, two additional villages were visited in the study area to assess current water resource needs and problems. All of the villages are located in the Chhatarpur district of MP. To complement information collected from the villages, other segments of the Indian society with a vested interest in the outcome of the KBLP were also asked for information on their work with local populations in and around the study area and their opinions of the KBLP. Given their familiarity with centrally planned water resource development in India, they were also asked to comment on their level of participation in the planning process. The participants from this group were generally employed by NGOs or local government agencies, which are funded by relevant central and state government or international agencies. Many poverty extension workers are involved in local watershed management or establishing sustainable agriculture based on the revitalization of traditional methods. One of the key findings from this research was that project affected persons were indeed aware of the project, yet their water and livelihood needs and concerns were not fully assessed in the FR. Therefore, these needs and concerns are not reflected in its overall design. Even more surprising, participation by activists and local extension workers in the project’s planning process was even less apparent. Moreover, results indicated that the proposed KBLP might very well exacerbate existing water conflicts in this impoverished region, given the problems local communities already faced with interstate water sharing, making it very clear that the public was not integrally involved in the decision making process. Another issue that came up in the village visits was the problem of resource conflicts, as the study area seemed to be full of antagonist’s such as the timber mafia and the forest bandits. Submerging forestland is likely to intensify the harassment of the local populations by armed timber mafia, since already scarce timber resources would be further impacted by the KBLP. These conflicts, when taken into consideration with the impacts of relocation, would only exacerbate the vicious cycle of poverty for marginalized

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populations. For the similar reasons forest bandits and other land encroachment conflicts in and around the just out side the park, will also likely be intensified when that area is submerged and new claims must be staked. Finally, these conflicts would further increase the challenges to equitable water and forest resource access. The visual assessment of the study area and the Ken river basin in general, did not indicate the presence of surplus water. For instance, many of the regions reservoirs and tanks remained low well into the monsoon season. While the participants in the submergence focus groups did not complain about inadequate water levels, they did mention that the rainfall has not been sufficient in the last few years and throughout the surplus basin many towns and villages were facing severe water shortages. In many cases, water trucks brought in water from elsewhere at a high cost to meet the needs of residents. Perhaps one of the most telling anecdotes came from a town center that had absolutely no water in nearby rivers or existing wells, and as a result had to have water trucked in. Apparently the situation remained so critical that a man reportedly had to escort his mother to the well with a gun. It is hard to imagine what would happen if the relocates were forced to migrate to these situations. Several notable consensuses emerged from the information gathered in meetings conducted with local NGO representatives and activists. First that the Ken basin was not a surplus, though this was supported by the participants’ personal experiences in the region rather than through scientific analysis of relevant data. Secondly, that implementation of the KBLP would have negative impacts on the resource-based livelihoods in the region. The people in the KBLP region were viewed as uninformed and in need of empowerment to advance the practice of bottom up decision making. Additionally, many participants felt that the majority of the project’s benefits were likely to go to the wealthier segments of the local community, with the poor and marginalized populations adversely impacted by negative externalities. Thirdly, traditional water resource methodology should be revived. It was very strongly felt that only these methods, in combination with afforestation programs and other holistic approaches to resource management, would solve the water resource needs of the region. Finally, common strategies for moving forward were suggested such as, to better inform local communities, present independent scientific assessments conducted in rebuttal to the FR, and improve dialogue between the various movements and the government. To date, there has been no indication that these strategies have been pursued. The major recommendation based on findings from this research is to integrate a working participatory framework into the development plans for the entire KBLP impacted region. The overall benefit of this approach would be identification of successful water management practices, with a particular focus on the Betwa basin, through discussions with the users and local managers themselves. Furthermore, it would be important to include NGO and activist groups in this participatory planning process. Not only would government planners benefit from the knowledge such groups have of the local communities, they would also satisfy concerns about transparency and accountability in the development process. Subsequent analyses of data collected within this new participatory framework could assist in identifying any inequities of water distribution and other factors fueling water conflicts in the region. A holistic approach to water management plans could then be developed based on clearer understanding of the needs and practices of the water users. The results from this type of approach could have far-reaching benefits for the KBLP, increasing its efficiency and effectiveness while also enabling it to provide sustainable and equitable management of water resources in the area.

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Missing also from this research, and others similar to it, is an analysis of the Betwa basin beneficiaries and their current water resource management and distribution practices. Ignoring this important component could undermine the long term viability of the project by failing to identify those factors and practices that contributed to the designation of the Betwa basin as a deficit area.

11.5 CONCLUSION The results from our study raised serious concerns about the suitability of the proposed KBLP as a water management strategy for the Ken and Betwa region in India. The Feasibility Report for the KBLP, the only official government document covering the project, contains outdated, flawed and inadequate data, and failed to address substantive issues in three critical areas: the potential hydrologic, wildlife, and social impacts of the project. This research highlighted several important areas for future exploration as alternative or complementary approaches to water resource management, which may provide more efficient and sustainable results for India in the long run. A common theme in our chapter, published critiques of the KBLP, and the FR itself, is a continual focus on the Ken River and the project construction area as the scope for arguments over the feasibility of the KBLP. However, it is important to consider that there are presently over 24 dams in the Betwa basin on the Betwa River and its tributaries, varying in size and function from small weirs to large hydropower and irrigation projects (Thakkar, 2005). It would seem vitally important to determine why these dam and reservoir projects have not met the needs of the Betwa region, since this could alter significant details and dimensions in the proposed KBLP. If improvements in water resource management could be shown to increase water availability in both the Betwa and Ken river watersheds, the KBLP’s size and scope could be considerably reduced, thus lessening its impacts on the people and environment. Another theme that emerges from our chapter is the need for action at a smaller scale to avoid creating negative impacts on the larger scale. For instance, our research has already shown in discussions on the impact to wildlife, how actions taken at a local scale will influence the national scale of ecosystems. If the KBLP is to be used as a “litmus test” for future national ILR projects a more thorough and responsible approach must be taken in developing an appropriate strategy for solving the water supply issues of the area. Therefore, at the local level, data on surface and groundwater availability and true water use patterns must be obtained and made public in order to determine the accuracy of statements made in the FR and to ensure success of the water distribution capabilities of the KBLP. While alternative or complementary water management practices such as water harvesting, conjunctive use management, participatory management, and educational programs promoting efficient irrigation have been suggested earlier in this chapter, there are also many other innovative approaches being considered by countries and organizations around the world. Some examples include: commodity water pricing, benefit sharing, and recycling wastewater. All of these strategies too have related costs and benefits, it is important to consider the full palate of alternatives to approaching water management challenges (IWMI, 2007). The ILR plan is only one of a myriad of possible solutions available and more innovative and diverse management systems may be better choices to consider in solving India’s water management challenges. As a nation with increasingly severe water management issues, it is imperative that India look to diversify the range of solutions

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it considers in addressing these issues. The vision of the Indian Government in water management should extend beyond hard path solutions and look toward creative strategies that promote efficient and sustainable water use and management.

REFERENCES Adams, W.M.: The Downstream Impacts of Dam Construction: A Case Study from Nigeria. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 10(3) (1985), pp. 292–302. Asian Development Bank (ADB): Technical Assistance to India for the Madhya Pradesh Integrated Water Resources Management Strategy (http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/IND/tar_ ind35045.pdf, cited 17 February 2007), 2001. Boojh, R.: Presentation on KBLP at the University of Michigan. Center for Environmental Education, India, October 25, 2005. Dwivedi, A.P.: Protected Areas of Madhya Pradesh. Bhopal, Government Printing Press, 2003. Eastman, J.R., Jin, W., Kyem, P. and Toledano, J.: Raster Procedures for Multi-Criteria. Multi-Objective Decisions, Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing 61(5) (1995), pp. 539–547. Forest Department (FD): Madhya Pradesh, 2007. Forest Protection (http://www.forest.mp.gov.in/ forestprotection.html, cited 2 January 2007), 2007. Galant, J.C. and Wilson, J.: Terrain Analysis: Principles and Applications. John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, USA, 2000. Goodchild, M.F., Parks, B.O., and Steyaert, T.L. eds.: Environmental Modeling with GIS. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. Goudie, A.: The Human Impact on the Natural Environment. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2000. Government of Madhya Pradesh (GoMP): The Madhya Pradesh Development Report (http://www.mp.nic.in/difmp/MPHDR2002_Book_English.pdf, cited 15 January 2007), 2002. Gubbi, S.: Temples that Turned Graveyards of Wildlife. Deccan Herald, 2004. International Development Studies Network (IDSN): Dams in Development: Perspectives (http://www.idsnet.org/Resources/Dams/Development/impact-enviro.html, cited 31 January 2007), 1998. International Water Management Institute (IWMI): Annual Reports (hitting the headline article) (http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/index.htm, cited 7 March 2007), 2007. McAllister, D., Craig, J., Davidson, N., Delany, S. and M. Seddon: Biodiversity Impacts of Large Dams. World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (http://intranet.iucn.org/webfiles/doc/archive/2001/IUCN850.pdf, cited 1 December 2006), 2001. National Informatics Centre (NIC): Panna City of Diamonds: Tiger Reserve (http://panna.nic.in/ tiger.htm, cited 1 December 2006), 2006. National Water Development Agency (NWDA): Feasibility Report of Ken-Betwa Link Project (http://nwda.gov.in/index3.asp?sublink2id⫽25&langid⫽1, cited 15 December 2006), 2005. National Water Development Agency (NWDA): Feasibility Report of Ken-Betwa Link Project (http://nwda.gov.in/index3.asp?sublink2id⫽25&langid⫽1, cited 1 January 2007), 2005. Oza, G.M. and Oza, P.G.: Wildlife Conservation in India. The Environmentalist 18 (1998), pp. 219–222. Rangachari, R., Sengupta, N., Iyer, R.R., Banerji, P. and Singh, S.: Large Dams: India’s Experience: A WCD Case Study. Prepared an Input to the World Commission on Dams (WCD), Capetown, 2000. Raven, P.H. and Berg, L.R.: Environment, Third edition. Harcourt College Publishers, Fort Worth, 2001. Rosenberg, D.M, McCully, P. and C.M. Pringle: Global-Scale Environmental Effects of Hydrological Alterations: Introduction. BioScience 50(9) (2000), pp. 746–751.

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Save the Tigers: Save India’s Tigers (hitting the headline article) (http://www.saveindiastigers.co.uk/ panthera-tigris-tigris-india.html, cited 4 April 2007), updated August 17, 2006. Singh, K.: Interview with Frances Segovia on May 28, 2006, Panna, India. Thakkar, H.: Ken-Betwa Link: Why It Won’t Click (http://www.sadrp.in/riverlinking/knbtwalink.pdf), 2005. The Hindu: Ken-Betwa Link. The Litmus Test, The Hindu, Online Edition (http://www.hindu.com/ 2005/08/29/ stories/2005082902561000.htm, cited 1 November 2006), 2005. United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE): Chapter 6: Interaction Between Surface Water and Groundwater. Engineering Manual: Groundwater Hydrology, 1999.

12 Implications of Climate Change in South Asia on the Interlinking Project of Indian Rivers MURARI LAL

12.1 INTRODUCTION India is identified as a country where water scarcity is expected to grow considerably in the coming decades due to increasing demand linked to population growth, agriculture expansion and rapid industrialization. Further, droughts resulting from climatic variability cause considerable human suffering in many parts of the country, in the form of scarcity of water for both domestic needs and crop protection. The project for interlinking of rivers of India emanates from a desire of the political leadership of the country to bring a permanent solution to the negative impacts of drought and water shortages in these parts (NWDA, 2003). This project has been designed with the concept that it will improve the living status of people in India, with growth in our economy. The completion of this project will result in constant water supply for domestic use, agriculture and industries along with flood control, improvement in water flow, navigation, food security, etc. Construction of dams, canals, etc. and their maintenance will create opportunities for new jobs, which will check the migration of people from villages to cities. The interlinking project is to bring an extra 34 million hectare (Mha) of land under irrigation using 173 billion cubic meters (BCM) of additional water created in this project. Production of hydropower (34 gigawatts) in this project is expected, which may be inexpensive and eco-friendly. However, several scientists and others are concerned about river diversion, which would disturb the entire hydrological cycle by stopping the rivers from performing their normal ecological functions (Gurjar, 2003; Radhakrishna, 2003). It is therefore necessary that the ecological damages that may be caused by interlinking rivers on top of the climate change be assessed comprehensively and realistically before the project is implemented. Even though blessed with abundance, India’s water resources are unevenly distributed in space and time. While one part of the country is reeling under severe water scarcity, floods are known to cause catastrophic damage in another part. In fact, India lies between a distinct climate divide – droughts (stretching from Horn of Africa in the west to Pakistan and west India) and floods (marching eastwards Bangladesh, Cambodia and Vietnam). Almost 329 Mha of geographical area of India experiences climatic extremes year after year including 40 Mha of flood prone areas and 51 Mha of drought prone areas (CWC, 2001). Floods affect an average area of around 9 Mha. Water in the Brahmaputra and Ganges basin located in northern and eastern India make up 60 per cent of the country’s

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total resources. In contrast, water resources in Gujarat’s Sabarmati basin located in western India account for only 0.2 per cent of India’s total resources. Hence the Brahmaputra region is the most flood-prone region while Sabarmati the most drought-prone (CWC, 2001). Some rivers are perennially dry and some rivers discharge huge quantum of water to the sea every year. Flood damages, which were of the order of R. 520 million (US$ 13 million) in 1953, went up to R. 58,460 million (US $ 1,461.5 million) in 1998 with an annual average of R. 13,430 million (US$ 335.75 million) (CWC, 2001), affecting mostly agriculture and infrastructure in Assam, Bihar, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh besides causing untold human sufferings. On the other hand, large areas in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu face recurring droughts. In 2002, India incurred a loss of R. 250 billion (US$ 6.25 billion) just on account of drought affected crop loss (DES, 2003). Unlike floods, which are generally restricted to eastern India, droughts persist over a much bigger geographical area (IMD, 2000 to 2003). As a result, the impact on the economy because of lack of water is much more severe. With 22 per cent of India’s GDP coming from agriculture, the 2002 drought year resulted in a 3.2 per cent decline in agricultural GDP, a US$ 9 billion loss in agricultural income and the loss of a staggering 1.3 billion person-days in rural employment due to shrinkage of agricultural operations. Most of the flow in practically all north Indian rivers occurs during the southwest monsoon (June to September). The monsoon happens to be the season when rainfall in the aggregate is adequate for crop growth. Of course in some regions, such as Rajasthan and parts of Gujarat and the Deccan, even the kharif 1 rain is far too low and variable for productive agriculture. Published data from official sources show that 90 per cent of the flow in south Indian rivers occurs between May and November (MoWR, 1999). Data on the Indo-Gangetic and Brahmaputra river basins are mostly classified although some unclassified data is available from various sources. Being perennial, the proportion of the total flow occurring during these months may be somewhat smaller. For instance, over 80 per cent of the annual flow in the Kosi is between May and November; and almost three fourths between June and October (MoWR, 1999). Since the surplus occurs in the rainy season and the demand is in the dry season, accurate and reliable information on the water resource system is required for strategic management of the resource. Acquiring quantified knowledge about the spatial and temporal distribution of the different components of the local, regional and national hydrological cycle is vital to plan and develop water resources of the country at different scales at the least cost to ecology and environment, social fabric and economy over the next half a century and beyond. These knowledge systems are very vital for India’s Interlinking of Rivers Plan (ILR). Inappropriate water-management decisions of such large scale as envisaged in river interlinking project can have catastrophic environmental, physical, social and economic impacts that would be widespread and pervasive. The experience of the Indira Gandhi Canal is a stark example of the problems arising in the wake of bringing in vast amounts of water without adequate understanding of and concern for its impact on the fragile desert ecology. The river interlinking project, however, claims to involve multidisciplinary considerations on hydrological, environmental, agricultural, socio-economic and political aspects seemingly without bringing out in public a comprehensive assessment of its feasibility, desirability and viability. It is not enough to merely transfer a quantum of water through different link canals from one point to another. Large storages will be necessary requiring the quantum of water to be stored, and the availability of potential sites of appropriate scale, and their likely impact on environment and human displacement. 1

The kharif season in India coincides with the monsoon rains, extending from June to September.

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The policymakers dealing with water management in India must be aware that the fundamental question of whether more than 6 billion humans, by adding to the greenhouse effect, have caused the world to warm up in recent decades, has already been answered in the affirmative (IPCC, 2001). There is compelling scientific evidence that ongoing climate change will pose serious challenges to the people of south Asia as complex impacts affecting every sector of society, including, especially, the nation’s water resources, now seem unavoidable (Lal et al., 2001a). The evidence suggests that certain aspects of our water resources are very sensitive to projected climate variability and changes and to how we choose to manage our complex water systems to the stresses imposed by growing populations, industrialization, and land-use changes (Roy, 1990; Jha et al., 2000). This paper summarizes the implications of both existing climate variability and future climate change for India’s water resources. The findings reported here must be considered just a snapshot in time, a summary of what we think we know, and would like to know at the beginning of the 21st century. Also discusses possible implications of climate change on the ILR.

12.2 AVAILABLE WATER RESOURCES IN INDIA The two main sources of water in India are rainfall and the snowmelt of glaciers in the Himalayas. Although reliable data on snow cover in India are not available, it is estimated that some 5,000 glaciers cover about 43,000 km2 in the Himalayas with a total volume of locked water estimated at 3,870 km3 (ICIMOD/UNEP, 2001). Considering that about 10,000 km2 are located in Indian territory, the total water yield from snowmelt contributing to the river runoff in India may be of the order of 200 km3 per year (Mool et al., 2001). Although snow and glaciers are poor producers of freshwater, they are good distributors as they yield at the time of need, in the hot season. Indeed, about 80 per cent of the flow of rivers in India occurs during the four months of the southwest monsoon season (Kaul, 1999). The rivers of India can be classified into the following four groups:







the Himalayan rivers, which are formed by melting snow and glaciers and therefore have a continuous flow throughout the year. As this region receives very heavy rainfall during the monsoon period, the rivers swell and cause frequent floods; the rivers of the Deccan plateau, which are rainfed and fluctuate in volume, many of them being non-perennial; the coastal rivers, which, especially on the west coast, are short in length with limited catchment areas, most of them being non-perennial; the rivers of the inland drainage basin in western Rajasthan, which are ephemeral, drain towards the silt lakes such as the Sambhar, or are lost in the sands.

The domination of the southwest monsoon in the making of India’s climate results in wide spatial and temporal variations in the availability of the most critical resource – water. About 75 per cent of the annual precipitation occurs during the monsoon months (Shukla, 1987). The numbers of rainy days vary from about 5 in Rajasthan to about 150 in northeastern India (Rao, 1976). Mean annual rainfall varies from 100 mm in west Rajasthan to over 10,000 mm at Cherrapunji in Meghalaya (Shukla, 1987). As presented in Table 12.1, the total surface flow, including regenerating flow from groundwater and the flow from neighbouring countries, is estimated at 1,869 km3 per year, of which only 690 km3 are considered as utilizable in view of the constraints of the present

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technology for water storage and inter-state issues (CWC, 2001). A significant part (647.2 km3 per year) of these estimated water resources comes from neighbouring countries: 210.2 km3 per year from Nepal, 347 km3 per year from China (Chinese data) and 90 km3 per year from Bhutan. An important part of the surface water resources leaves the country before it reaches the sea: 20 km3 per year to Myanmar, 181.37 km3 per year to Pakistan (Pakistani information) and 1105.6 km3 per year to Bangladesh. A bare minimum live storage of 385 km3 is estimated as needed to balance seasonal flows to achieve ~690 km3 per year estimated utilizable surface water (EUSW) for irrigation of 76 million hectare (Mha). Sedimentation in reservoirs reduces utilizable resource. Replenishable groundwater (RGW) resource is estimated to be ~432 km3 – RGW is the sum of natural recharge from rainfall (342 km3) and potential due to recharge augmentation from canal irrigation system (90 km3). The Central Water Commission estimates the groundwater resources at 418.5 km3 per year (CWC, 2001). Part of this amount, estimated at 380 km3 per year, constitutes the base flow of the rivers. The total renewable water resources of India are therefore estimated at 1907.8 km3 per year (CWC, 2001). Table 12.1 India’s water resource at a glance

Resource

Quantity

Annual precipitation (including snowfall)

4,000 km3

*

Evaporation + groundwater

Average annual potential flow in rivers Per capita water availability (1997) Estimated utilizable water resources Surface water Replenishable groundwater

Precipitation (%) 100

3

53.3

3

46.7

2,131 km

1,869 km 3

1,967 m

– 3

28.1

3

17.3

3**

10.8

1,122 km

690 km 432 km

(Source: MoWR, 1999). 1 km3 ⫽ 109 m3 ⫽ 1 billion cubic meter (bcm) ⫽ 0.1 million ha m. * About 10% of India’s GDP, 70% of its irrigated areas, 70 to 80% of its rural population and 70 to 80% of its farm output and incomes are linked to ground water. ** Natural recharge from rainfall (~342.4 km3) and potential due to recharge augmentation from canal irrigation system (~89.5 km3).

As the annual per capita availability of water in India declined from around 5,177 cubic meters in 1951 to 1,869 cubic meters in 2001 (Gupta and Deshpande, 2004), the country is approaching a regime of water stress (Figure 12.1). This is because of increase in population and changes in its consumption pattern. With an annual precipitation of about 4,000 cubic kilometers, India is a better endowed country for water. It has 2.45 per cent of the Earth’s land mass, but it receives about 4 per cent of its water resources (Molden and Fraiture, 2004). The scenario changes drastically when we consider that about 16 per cent of the population of the planet lives in this country and depends on this 4 per cent share of the world’s water (Postal, 1998). As water becomes increasingly scarce, attempts by all stakeholders to gain control over larger and larger volumes of water can be expected. India

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plans to address this challenge of evolving a more equitable and sustainable way of using its water resources in the shaping of its social and economic future through the interlinking of rivers project.

Various parts of India are already water-stressed, and things could get worse

Occasional Water Problem Water Stress (<1700/cum/ca/anum) Water Scarcity (<1000/cum/ca/anum) Absolute Scarcity (<1000/cum/ca/anum) “Cum/ca/anum” is a ratio of total water to total population and stands for cubic meters of water availability per person per annum Fig. 12.1 Spatial distribution of current water stress conditions in India.

The Task Force on Interlinking of Rivers has projected the population of India to stabilize around 1,640 million by the year 2050 corresponding to the UN’ middle variant (TF-ILR, 2003). For a population estimate of 1,800 million in 2050, the gross per capita water availability (obtained by dividing the average annual potential river flow of ~1,869 km3 by the population estimate) will decline from ~1,820 m3 per year in 2001 to as low as ~1,140 m3. Viewed in the international perspective of ‘⬍1,700 m3 per person per year as water-stressed’ and ‘⬍1000 m3 per person per year as water scarce’, India is water-stressed today and is likely to be water-scarce by 2050. Total water requirement of the country for various

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IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INTERLINKING PROJECT

activities around the year 2050 has been assessed to 1450 km3 per year (TF-ILR, 2003). This is significantly more than the current estimate of utilizable water resource potential (1122 km3 per year) through conventional development strategies (Figure 12.2). The estimate of utilizable water resource of 1,122 km3 per year (surface water ⫽ 690; groundwater ⫽ 432) indicates the necessity to harness additional 475 to 950 km3 per year for the range of population estimates over the present availability of ~500 km 3 per year (Gupta and Deshpande, 2004). 1700

630 900

83.3

Irrigation % 78.3

1450 72.0

Total 66.7

100 100

GW % 36.6

35.6

36.0

35.2

Irrigation Domestic

Km 3 / year

Evaporation Industry 50

Power Ecology Inland Navigation

0 1998

2010

2025

2050

YEAR

Fig. 12.2 Anticipated sector-specific water requirement in India. The proportion of water used for irrigation is expected to decline as requirement of all other sectors increases. Also, the proportion of groundwater is expected to decrease. The total water requirement is expected to increase by ~120 per cent (Source: Gupta and Deshpande, 2004).

In India, by far, the largest user of harnessed water is agriculture. Water for domestic use currently accounts for a mere 5 per cent of the total use of water harnessed through canals, tanks, wells and tube-wells. In the next section, we briefly present a snapshot of the importance of water in agricultural sector. 12.3 WATER AND INDIAN AGRICULTURE Currently, more than 85 per cent of water from canals, tanks and wells and tube-wells is used for irrigation. And yet, rainfed areas account for 70 per cent of the net cultivated area in India (DES, 2003). About 30 per cent of this area is under dryland agriculture wherein the annual rainfall is under 400 mm only (DES, 2003). The demand of water for irrigation is growing and will continue to be, by far, the biggest claimant on available supplies. The need for irrigation arises in regions and seasons when rainfall is inadequate for raising crops and obtaining optimum yields. The summer monsoon rainfall meets to a large extent crop water requirement in the kharif season over many parts of the country except in Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, parts of Gujarat, Tamil Nadu – which need irrigation during the kharif season. Irrigation is required practically everywhere between November and June

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essentially to tide over inadequate soil moisture during dry spells. This requirement continues to be met from stored monsoon surplus water and by exploiting groundwater. In India, some 60 per cent of the irrigated food grain production now depends on irrigation from groundwater wells (Mudrakartha, 1999). However, canal irrigated areas suffering from waterlogging and salinization at 6 million in the early 1970s have increased substantially. Aquifer pollution – from both point and non-point sources – is also becoming extensive. In North Arcot district in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu, coconut water was reported to contain 0.2 per cent of residual chromium derived from chrome-tanning process-based tanneries that contaminated the groundwater (K. Sarabhai in foreword to Mudrakartha 1999). In the State of Gujarat, groundwater pollution by textile processing and the rapidly growing chemical industry earned such notoriety that, in 1998, acting suo moto, the State’s High Court ordered an entire industrial estate – housing over 1,200 manufacturing units, 70 per cent of them chemical – closed, pending the establishment of a wastewater treatment and disposal system. India has the largest irrigation network and second largest arable area in the world. The total cultivable area in India is estimated at 183.95 Mha, or about 56 per cent of the total area. The total cultivated area was estimated at 142.5 Mha in 1995. In the recent past, the evolution of cultivated area has presented two distinct phases. From 1950 to 1970, the cultivated area rose by 18 per cent per year, while the cropping intensity increased to 130 per cent (DES, 2003). The major cereals grown in India are bajra (spiked millet), barley, jowar (great millet), common millet, maize, ragi, rice and wheat. The average cereal yield increased from 522 kg/ha in 1950 to 1,457 kg/ha in 1992, i.e. an average annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent (MoA, 1996). About 56 per cent of total agricultural production comes from irrigated agriculture, which is approximately 35 per cent of the net sown area (MoA, 1996). Irrigation is mainly provided on wheat (84 per cent of the total area sown with wheat is irrigated), rice (47 per cent) and sugar cane (88 per cent). Cotton (33 per cent), pulses (10 per cent) and coarse cereals (10 per cent) are also irrigated to a lesser extent. Trends show that irrigation has been used mainly for wheat (3 Mha irrigated in 1950; 20 Mha in 1990) and rice (10 Mha in 1950, 20 Mha in 1993), while coarse cereals and maize have not benefited much from irrigation (Figure 12.3). It may be worthwhile to note here that eminent agricultural scientist Swaminathan (1999) has cautioned that “… the inefficient and negligent use of water in agriculture is one of the most serious barriers to sustainable expansion of agricultural production in India. What India needs more urgently is improvement in the efficiency of the use of irrigation water (from 0.35 at present to 0.60 in 2050).”

12.4 SOUTHWEST MONSOON – THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF WATER IN INDIA The long term average annual rainfall for the country as a whole is 1,160 mm – the highest for a land of comparable size in the world. But this rainfall is highly variable both in time and space. The percentage aerial distribution of annual rainfall over India is given in Table 12.2. The area-averaged, long term mean summer monsoon rainfall over India (based on data for 1871 to 2004) is 890 mm, with a standard deviation of ⫾78 mm (coefficient of variation is 9.3 per cent). The maximum rainfall occurs in July and August during the southwest monsoon season (Rao, 1976). Significant interannual variations in the dates of onset of monsoon rains and intraseasonal variability in the observed monsoon rainfall are also displayed over the Indian sub-continent.

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Fig. 12.3 Evolution of irrigated area in India during 1950 to 2000.

The summer monsoon rainfall oscillates between active spells with good monsoon rains (above normal) and weak spells or the breaks in the monsoon when deficient to scanty (ⱕ20 per cent) rain occur for a few days at a stretch (Nanjundiah et al., 1992). Weak and active spells of the summer monsoon are determined by the position of the monsoon trough extending from the northwestern end over the Rajasthan desert to the head of the Bay of Bengal. The monsoon trough oscillates either south or north of this normal position over the Gangetic plains. When the trough is to the south or close to the normal position,active spells result and when it is near the foothills, weak monsoon conditions prevail (Rao, 1976).

Table 12.2 Percentage a real distribution of annual rainfall over India

Mean annual rainfall

Corresponding % area

0–750 mm

30%

750–1,250 mm

42%

1,250–2,000 mm

20%

>2,000 mm

8%

The spatial pattern in observed mean monsoon precipitation is, however, fairly complex. The heaviest rains occur over the hilly states in the northeast and along the mountainous west coast. Orissa, east Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, and the northeastern states of India, the western coast, and the Ghats receive more than 1,000 mm of rainfall during the monsoon season. The submontane region extending from north Bihar to Jammu also receives more than 1,000 mm. The heavy rainfalls in the northeastern states, west coast, the Ghats, and the submontane regions are influenced by the orography. The peninsular India south of 15°N gets less than 500 mm rainfall (Rao, 1976). There is a sharp

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gradient in monsoon rainfall from the west coast to the east coast over peninsular India. The lowest rainfall is received in the extreme southeast portion of the peninsula. The west and the northwest regions of the country receive about 500 mm of rain in the season. The rainfall decreases rapidly to less than 100 mm in west Rajasthan. Regions above 500 mm in the season are classified as wet and those less than 500 mm as dry parts of India. The rainfall fluctuations in India have been largely random over a century, with no systematic change detectable on either annual or seasonal scale. However, the linear trends of monsoon rainfall during 1871 to 2001 at each of over 300 observing stations spread over India show statistically significant trends in some broad contiguous areas (Lal, 2003). The increasing trends in the seasonal rainfall have been observed over Punjab, Delhi, Haryana, and Chandigarh, no significant change along the west coast, and the decreasing trends over East Madhya Pradesh and the northeast states of India during recent years (Kripalani et al., 2001). Intense deforestation activities have taken place along the foothills of Himalayas and in the Assam region, and land use patterns have undergone definite changes over parts of Rajasthan and Punjab (northwest India). Surface cooling with significant increase in rainfall has also been observed in the peripheral regions of the Rajasthan desert and it is believed that the increased area under irrigation is one of the main casual factors. However, all India monsoon rainfall exhibits rather stable long term characteristics, with extremes being a part of its natural variability. The two monsoon seasons (the southwest monsoon during June to September and the northeast monsoon during November to December) bring forth rains – often in intensities and amounts sufficient to cause serious floods, creating hazardous (and often disastrous) situations. Moreover, cyclonic storms in the pre-monsoon (April to May) and the post-monsoon months (October to November) cause large scale inundation, destruction, and death. In fact, droughts, floods and cyclones are the key natural hazards that visit India quite often (Webster et al., 1998). The adverse impacts of these two natural hazards cannot be assessed merely in economic terms based on destruction of crops, property, and infrastructure because the toll of human misery in the form of death, disease, injury, loss of employment, psychological trauma, and above all the setback to development is too difficult to evaluate (Khole and De, 2001). Moreover, the instances of more frequent extreme weather events in India during the past decade point to an unusually strong manifestation of a long term problem – global warming. The available water resources in India in space and time could be severely impacted by likely changes in the behaviour of monsoon characteristics including its intra-seasonal and inter-annual variability due to climate change. The recent trends in climatic elements and plausible climate change over the Indian sub-continent by the mid-21st century are discussed in the following section.

12.5 OBSERVED AND PROJECTED CLIMATE CHANGE IN INDIA The scientific evidence that humans are changing the climate is increasingly compelling. Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global mean sea level. This is one of the major conclusions drawn in the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC, 2007). The updated 100-year linear trend (1906 to 2005) of 0.74°C (0.56°C to 0.92°C) was found to be larger than the corresponding trend of 0.6°C (0.4°C to 0.8°C) for 1901 to 2000 calculated in the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the IPCC. The AR4 further concluded

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IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INTERLINKING PROJECT

that most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century was very likely (>90 per cent probability of occurrence) due to the increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations. Recent observations indicate that the year 2005 was the warmest since records began in the mid-19th century (NOAA, 2006). The warming is accelerating and the IPCC Report projected 0.2°C per decade for the next 20 years for a range of SRES scenarios. Concomitant with this temperature increase, global average sea level rose at an average rate of 1.8 [1.3 to 2.3] mm per year over 1961 to 2003. The rate was faster over 1993 to 2003 about 3.1 [2.4 to 3.8] mm per year. In the last 100 years, temperatures in the Arctic regions increased at a rate twice as the global average. Satellite data since 1978 show that annual average arctic sea ice extent has shrunk by 2.7 [2.1 to 3.3] per cent per decade, with larger decreases in summer of 7.4 [5.0 to 9.8] per cent per decade (IPCC, 2007). There has been an increase in the frequency of heavy rainfall events. The global climate models project that global average surface temperature will increase by 1.1 to 6.4°C by 2100 (Figure 12.4). Increases in the amount of precipitation are very likely in high latitudes, while decreases are likely in most subtropical land regions (Figure 12.5). Global mean sea level is projected to increase between 0.18 to 0.59 m for a range of SRES scenarios (IPCC, 2007). As shown in Table 12.3 below, all India annual mean surface temperature has increased by about 0.8°C over the 1881 to 2002 period (Singh and Sontakke, 2001; Lal, 2003). This warming is mainly contributed by the post-monsoon and winter seasons (Table 12.4). A relatively more pronounced trend in maximum day time temperatures has been found compared to minimum night time temperatures (Roy and Balling, 2005). The heat-related fatalities in the thousands during pre-monsoon season are no longer uncommon. India has seen the number of deaths due to heat climb over the years as populations have grown and temperatures have risen (De and Mukhopadhyay, 1998). The State of Orissa has been reeling under contrasting extreme weather conditions for more than a decade: from heat waves to cyclones and from droughts to floods. Since 1965, calamities are not only becoming more frequent but also striking areas that never have been vulnerable (De et al., 2004). A heat wave in 1998 killed around 1,500 people in coastal Orissa, a region otherwise known for its moderate temperature (Pai et al., 2004). In May 2003, peak temperatures of 45 to 49°C claimed over 1,600 lives throughout the country. In the state of Andhra Pradesh alone, some 1,200 people died due the heat waves. A year earlier, a one-week heat wave with temperatures topping 51°C took over 1,000 lives (IMD, 2000 to 2003). The death toll due to heat waves during March to May in Rajasthan, Punjab, Gujarat, and Bihar is also on the rise in recent years (Kalsi and Pareek, 2001). Extreme drought and flood events are also becoming increasingly common (in terms of their spatial coverage and frequency) and severe (in terms of intensity) in India. The Orissa drought in 2001 engulfed districts like Sundergarh and the Kendrapada, which historically were drought-free. Since the great famine of 1866, 2001 was the first time that drought affected 25 of the Orissa’s 30 districts. By February 2001, Orissa’s western districts were reeling under a severe water crisis and people started migrating. The worst affected districts like Kalahandi and Balangir reported 60 per cent less rainfall than normal (De et al., 2005). The situation in nine western districts was severe as it was the second consecutive drought. By May 2001, 61 starvation deaths had already been reported. The state government put the economic loss due to crop damage at R. 64,289 billion (US$ 1.71 billion). The Orissa drought in 2001 affected the lives of 11 million people. In 1994, monsoon rainfall was deficient (by between 20 and 43 per cent) in 10 of the 35 meteorological subdivisions of India. Gujarat, West Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala had

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deficient monsoon rainfall during 1999 (Roy and Balling, 2004). In Gujarat, low monsoon rainfall in 1999 and 2000 led to all the reservoirs containing only 50 per cent or less of installed capacity. The drought in 2000 was the worst to hit Gujarat in the past 100 years. Sixteen of its 27 districts and 26 of adjoining Rajasthan’s 32 districts were affected (De et al., 2005). The situation was further aggravated because it followed the 1999 drought. According to official sources, out of 143 dams and other reservoirs in Kutch, Saurashtra, and North Gujarat, 107 had gone dry in the pre-monsoon months of 2001. In the year 2002, rainfall deficiency for the country as a whole amounted to 19 per cent and drought conditions (among the four major droughts of the century) impacted 29 per cent of India’s geographical area. Failure of monsoon this year in Rajasthan saw all the 32 districts of this state reeling under drought causing severe shortage of food, fodder, drinking water and employment opportunities. Droughts in western and central India, as well as flooding in eastern India and Bangladesh during 2004 impacted adversely the rice production.

A2 A1B B1 Year 2000 Constant Concentrations

5.0

20th Century

4.0 A2

3.0 2.0

AB1 B1

1.0

1900

2000 Year

A1F1

A2

A1B

B1

-1.0

B2

0.0 A1T

Global surface warming ( C)

6.0

2100

Fig. 12.4 Multi-model global averaging of surface warming (relative to 1980 to 1999) for SRES scenarios A2, A1B and B1 shown as continuations of 20th century simulations. Also shown is the best estimate and likely range assessed for these scenarios. Shading denotes X1 standard deviations range of individual model annual averages. The grey bars at right indicate the best estimate (solid line within each bar) and the likely range assessed for the six SRES scenarios (Source: IPCC, 2007).

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IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INTERLINKING PROJECT

Fig. 12.5 Relative changes in precipitation (in per cent) for the period 2090 to 2099, relative to 1980 to 1999. Values are multi-model averages based on the SRES A1B scenario for December to February (left) and June to August (right). White areas are where less than 66 per cent of the models agree in the sign of the change and stippled areas are where more than 90 per cent of the models agree in the sign of the change.

Table 12.3 Observed changes in temperature (oC) during different seasons in India during 1901–2002

Period

Mean

Maximum

Minimum

Annual

0.8

0.7

0.15

Winter

1.1

0.8

0.05

Pre-monsoon

0.6

0.4

0.05

Monsoon

0.5

0.3

–0.2

Post-monsoon

1.1

0.9

0.5

Table 12.4 Observed changes in temperature (oC) in different regions of India during 1901–2002

Period

Maximum

Minimum

Northwest

0.45

–0.35

North-central

0.75

–0.25

Northeast

1.05

–0.20

Interior peninsular

0.25

0.45

East coast

0.55

0.25

West coast

1.15

0.15

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The monsoon-driven floods in the state of Andhra Pradesh left thousands homeless, brought misery to millions, and damaged or destroyed large areas of crops in August 2000 leaving at least 165 people dead. Over 240 mm of rain were recorded in Hyderabad, the state capital on 9 August – the highest amount in more than five decades. In coastal Orissa, almost 490,000 hectares of fertile lands have been waterlogged, salinated, and sandcasted by cyclones and floods in recent years (The Hindu, 2001). The devastating floods in 2001 (15 floods were reported between 8 July and 10 August 2001) induced crop failures worth R. 150 billion (US$ 3.75 billion). The incessant rain for 40 days starting from the first week of July 2001 was largely responsible for the worst ever flood recorded in the last century (BBC News, 2001). The 2001 floods (more devastating than the 1982 floods) were deadly because the Mahanadi, the Brahmani, and the Baitarani rivers, sharing a common delta, flooded simultaneously. These floods inundated 25 of the 30 districts, including hilly areas like Kalahandi and Phulbani, and affected one-third of their 30 million residents. About 2.12 million hectares of standing crops were also damaged. In Vidarbha (in the state of Maharashtra), heavy downpours in August 2002 amounted to 800 mm of rainfall, compared to 950 mm of normal seasonal rainfall. On 2 to 3 September, 250 mm of rainfall was recorded, which lifted the water level of Sardar Sarovar dam along the Narmada River to 12 m above its full capacity of 95 m, inundating hundreds of villages in the region (De et al., 2005). The monsoon wreaked havoc in seven districts of Maharashtra from 1 to 3 September 2002, claiming 35 lives and causing massive damage to crops and throwing normal life out of gear. The Gujarat government issued a ‘high alert’ for 15 big and small dams after those three days of incessant rains in the state. More than half of Assam State was flooded as heavy rains burst dams and caused rivers to overflow, inundating more than 5,000 villages and destroying hundreds of thousands of houses in July and August 2002 (De et al., 2005). About 2.5 million people fled to take shelter on higher ground. Overwhelmed by incessant monsoon rains and melting snow running down from the Himalaya, the Indo-Gangetic plains of Northern India’s Bihar state was flooded and over 400,000 people got stranded in July 2004. Such intense rainfall events have become more frequent in recent years in many parts of India, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Tropical cyclones are not part of the monsoons per se but they do cause devastating floods in the coastal states of India. Severe tropical cyclones generally develop during the pre-monsoon or post-monsoon seasons (generally the cyclone seasons are October to November and March to June). The eastern coast of India along Bengal, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh is prone to such tropical cyclones. Observational records suggest that, although the sea surface temperature over the Bay of Bengal has risen since 1951, the numbers of monsoon depressions and tropical cyclones forming over the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea have declined since 1970 (Figure 12.6). However, the intensity of tropical cyclones in Bay of Bengal seems to have increased in recent past (Srivastava et al., 2000; Bhaskar Rao et al., 2001; Singh et al., 2001). On 6 November 1996, a deadly cyclone with winds approaching 100 miles per hour and extremely heavy rains (8.8 inches in some areas) devastated India’s southeastern coast in the state of Andhra Pradesh. At least 500 thousand homes were destroyed; 1.5 million acres of rice, sugar cane, cotton, and tobacco were flooded (one-third of the entire agricultural output of Andhra Pradesh); millions of banana plants, lime, and mango trees were uprooted; and countless cattle, sheep, and chickens were killed. Crop and property damage was estimated at about R. 60 billion (US$ 1.5 billion), more than the annual budget of the state government. The tropical cyclone of 29 October 1999 hit the coast of Orissa with wind speed of 135 knots (~260 mph) and heavy rains that caused severe floods. This was the worst cyclone to hit the region in three decades and ranked highest in the damage caused in terms of both life

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and property (Sridharan and Muthuchami, 2002). According to the official records, 9,885 people lost their lives; 2,142 people were injured; 370,297 head of cattle perished; and 1,617,000 hectares of paddy field and 33,000 hectares of other crops were damaged (BBC News, 1999). Several villages had been completely wiped out and over a million made homeless with storm surge of height 9 m above astronomical tide level at Paradip, which penetrated 35 km inland. This ‘super cyclone’ was more or less stationary (with slight southward drift) over the region after making landfall, and this led to excessive destruction of the infrastructure. Today, coastal regions in India and Bangladesh are subjected to stronger wind and flood damage because of storm surges associated with more intense tropical storms (De et al., 2005). Frequent inundation of low-lying areas, drowning of coastal marshes and wetlands, enhanced erosion of beaches, more flooding, and increased salinity of rivers, bays, and aquifers in the coastal regions of India have occurred.

Fig. 12.6 Observed trends in number of monsoon depressions and cyclones in Indian Seas.

The area-averaged annual mean surface temperature rise over land regions of the Indian sub-continent by the middle of 21st century is projected to range between 1.5 and 3.5oC (Lal et al., 2001b). An intensification of the summer monsoon and an enhancement in precipitation variability with increased greenhouse gases has been projected in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (Giorgi and Hewitson, 2001). The aerosols could weaken the intensification of the mean rainfall, but the magnitude of the change would depend on the size of the forcing. The effect of aerosols on Indian summer monsoon precipitation would be to dampen the strength of the monsoon compared to that seen with greenhouse gases only (Mitchell et al., 1995; Lal et al., 1995a; Hasselmann et al., 1995; Cubasch et al., 1996;

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Roeckner et al., 1999). The overall effect of the combined forcing would be at least partly dependent on the land/sea distribution of the aerosol forcing and if the indirect effect were included as well as the direct effect. A recent study suggests that anthropogenic perturbations of planetary albedo due to changes in the concentrations of scattering aerosols and land-cover conversion could trigger a transition to a summer monsoon regime over South Asia characterized by much lower precipitation than today’s (Zickfeld et al., 2005). This finding acquires particular relevance in the light of observational evidence revealing that a large cloud of anthropogenic haze spreads over south and southeast Asia (Lelieveld et al., 2001; Krishnan and Ramanathan, 2002). It is likely that, after a partial suppression of the Asian summer monsoon over the next decades, aerosol control policies (meant to mitigate intolerable impacts on human health, food production and ecosystems) take effect, while global economic growth pushes atmospheric CO2 concentrations to record levels. The latter developments could reestablish the ‘wet monsoon’ mode – possibly at increased strength – within a few years only. Such a dynamics would seriously challenge the adaptive capabilities of the rural society in South Asia. Several studies (Kattenberg et al., 1996; Kitoh et al., 1997; Lal et al., 2000; May, 2004a; Giorgi and Bi, 2005) have confirmed an increase in the interannual variability of daily precipitation in the Asian summer monsoon with increased anthropogenic forcings. The primary cause for enhanced monsoon variability in the future has been attributed to alterations in Walker circulation due to higher sea surface temperatures in the central and eastern tropical Pacific (Vecchi et al., 2006). The study further suggests that, while the warmer Indian Ocean would contribute to increases in summer monsoon precipitation over South Asia (Lal et al., 2000), the warmer Pacific Ocean would weaken the monsoon flow and reduce the monsoon precipitation (Meehl and Arblaster, 2003). An intensification of the Asian summer monsoon with increased greenhouse gases has also been projected (Meehl and Arblaster, 2003; May, 2004b). Large increases in rainfall intensity over northern Pakistan, northwest India and Bangladesh are also projected (May, 2004a). However, these projections are subject to choices in the future emission scenarios of greenhouse gases and aerosols. None of these studies consider the likely changes in the aerosol forcings. The enhanced anomalous warming of the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean in the future has implications for increasing the likelihood of droughts and floods during summer. A week Asian summer monsoon has been suggested following a strong wintertime El Niño and increased spring and summer snow pack on the Tibetan Plateau (Krishnamurti and Goswami, 2000; Kripalani et al., 2001; Shaman and Tziperman, 2005). Moreover, the state of ENSO during Northern Hemispheric summer may influence monsoon rainfall more directly via changes in circulation, temperature and subsidence patterns within the tropics. An increased frequency of ENSO events and a shift in their seasonal cycle has been projected in a warmer atmosphere: the maximum occurs between August and October rather than around January as currently observed (Meehl and Arblaster, 1998; Collins, 1999). In many of the South Asian countries, drought disasters are reported to be more frequent during years following ENSO warm events than in normal years (Glantz, 2001; Goswami and Xavier, 2005; Webster et al., 1998). The projected enhanced anomalous warming of the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean will have implications for the frequency of droughts and floods during summer (Kripalani et al., 2003). Future seasonal precipitation extremes in India associated with a given ENSO event are likely to be more intense (Ashrit et al., 2003; Kharin and Zwiers, 2000; Kinter et al., 2002). India is already vulnerable to extreme climate events and changes in climate could exacerbate these vulnerabilities.

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The projected seasonal changes in surface air temperature and precipitation over India under SRES A1FI (highest future emission trajectory) and B1 (lowest future emission trajectory) pathways for two time slices, namely 2020s and 2050s as inferred from an ensemble of results from five A-O GCM experiments, namely those of CCSR-NIES (Japan), CSIRO (Australia), ECHAM4 (Germany), HADCM3 (UK) and NCAR-PCM (USA) are given in Table 12.5. Table 12.5 Projected changes in surface air temperature and precipitation in India under SRES A1FI (highest future emission trajectory) and B1 (lowest future emission trajectory) pathways for two time slices, namely 2020s and 2050s 2010 to 2039 Season

o

Temperature, ( C)

2040 to 2069

Precipitation, (%)

Temperature, (oC)

Precipitation, (%)

A1FI

B1

A1FI

B1

A1FI

B1

A1FI

B1

DJF

1.21

1.09

–5

–1

3.62

2.09

–17

–3

MAM

1.38

1.12

6

7

3.09

1.88

21

16

JJS

0.58

0.61

5

9

1.78

0.96

10

11

SON

0.81

0.87

1

4

2.47

1.64

9

6

It may be noted from Table 12.5 above that the projected increase in area-averaged summer monsoon rainfall over India is within the currently observed range of interannual variability which is sufficiently large to cause devastating floods or serious droughts. During winter, South Asia may experience between 5 and 15 per cent decline in rainfall. The decline in wintertime rainfall is likely to be significant and may lead to droughts during the dry summer months. A change in drought or flood risks is one of the potential effects of climate change which will have the greatest implications for the hydrological system and water resources in India (NWDA, 2003). Lal et al. (1995b) found no significant change in the number and intensity of monsoon depressions (largely responsible for the observed interannual variability of rainfall in the central plains of India) in the Bay of Bengal in a warmer climate. More recent studies suggest that, while there is no evidence that tropical cyclone frequency may change (Trenberth, 2005), a possible increase in cyclone intensity (including the near-storm precipitation rates and destructive potential) of 8 to 16 per cent for a rise in sea surface temperature of 2 to 4oC relative to the current threshold temperature is very likely (Emanuel, 1999; Emanuel, 2005; Knutson et al., 1998; Knutson and Tuleya, 2004; Lal, 2001; Roger et al., 1998; Walsh, 2004). Amplification in storm surge heights should result from stronger winds and low pressures associated with tropical storms. This could lead to higher storm surges and an enhanced risk of coastal disasters along the Indian coastline. Attempts have been made recently to generate climate change scenarios at local scales using the data from climate change experiments attempted with high resolution regional climate model (RCM) following rigorous mathematical/statistical procedures (Lal et al., 1998; Lal, 2003). Some of the key characteristics of monsoon rainfall at selected stations over India as simulated by the RCM nested in the CGCM for the present-day atmosphere (1990s) and for the middle of 21st century (2050s) due to changes in anthropogenic radiative forcing suggest the following: (i) for Bangalore (south India), a marginal decline in total rainfall during monsoon is simulated for 2050s relative to

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present-day conditions, with fewer wet days during the season and a decline in rainfall intensity and reduced contribution of upper 10 per cent quantile of daily rainfall to the total seasonal rainfall as inferred from the trends obtained in an analysis of 20 year mean data; (ii) over Delhi (north India), the results suggest a reduction in total monsoon rainfall with fewer wet days during the season, a marginal decline in rainfall intensity, and an increased contribution of the upper 10 per cent quantile of daily rainfall to the total seasonal rainfall; (iii) for Jorhat (northeast India), an increase in total monsoon rainfall but fewer wet days during the season and higher rainfall intensity with an increased contribution of the upper 10 per cent quantile of daily rainfall to the total seasonal rainfall is simulated; (iv) the model simulates an increase in total monsoon rainfall with more wet days during the season and more intense daily rainfall but a lesser contribution of the upper 10 per cent quantile of daily rainfall to the total seasonal rainfall over Srinagar in the Himalayan region; and (v) for Udaipur (northwest India), a decrease in total monsoon rainfall but fewer wet days during the season and more intense daily rainfall with a higher contribution of the upper 10 per cent quantile of daily rainfall to the total seasonal rainfall is simulated. Using high resolution (0.44o ⫻ 0.44o lat./long.) daily weather data simulated by the regional climate model for the present-day (20-year period from 1981 to 2000) and for the future (20-year period from 2041 to 2060), we have computed likely changes in water balance for major river basins of the India which are summarized in Table 12.6. It is assumed in these preliminary computations that there will be no major change in the land use pattern and in soil properties over the period. It is noteworthy from Table 12.6 that the impacts of climate change are different in the selected river basins of India. An increase in rainfall over a river basin does not necessarily translate into an increase in surface runoff and vice versa. For example, in Krishna and Cauvery basins, surface runoff is projected to decline even through an increase in rainfall is simulated. This is attributed to an increase in evapotranspiration as a consequence of rise in surface temperature and increase in rainfall intensity. Similarly, in Tapti and Narmada basins, surface runoff is projected to increase even through a decrease in rainfall is simulated for the future. This is essentially a consequence of decline in number of wet days per year in the region. The climate change induced change in annual surface runoff is projected to decline in Krishna, Cauvery, Pennar, Luni and Mahi river basins. This may lead to more severe drought conditions in future in these river basins. The findings reported in Table 12.6 also indicate that the annual mean surface flow in river basins in Krishna, Pennar, Cauvery, Luni, Tapti, Narmada, Mahi and Sabarmati river basins will decline implying that water resources in these river basins will become scarce due to enhanced vulnerability by the mid-21st century. On the other hand, the annual surface flow in Himalayan river basins is projected to increase due to climate change resulting in enhanced probability of floods in this region. The increase in spring (dry summer months of March to May) and monsoon (June to September) season surface flow is likely to be more pronounced in eastern Himalayan river basins than in western Himalayan river basins for two to three decades when a reversal in trend is expected such that the seasonal surface runoff may decline. However, the increase in monsoon season surface runoff in western Himalayan river basins is likely to continue unabated for the next 50 years during the monsoon season contributing to increase in flood frequency in foothills of Himalaya. It may be noted here that the likely future changes in annual surface flow projected here provide only a gross picture in the catchment area. These findings also suggest serious implications for the project on interlinking of Indian rivers.

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IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INTERLINKING PROJECT

Table 12.6 Plausible changes in water balance components and annual surface flow in major river basins of India by the mid-21st century due to climate change as simulated by a high resolution climate model Major river basins (within India’s territorial border only) Indus

Change in annual mean rainfall/ snowfall (mm)

Likely change in annual Surface flow by mid-21st century (%)

Change in annual mean surface runoff (mm)

Change in annual mean evapotranspiration (ET) (mm)

+232

+114

– 28

73

17.6

Currently reported* average surface flow BCM/year

Brahmaputra

+148

+54

+35

586

8.4

Ganga

+165

+83

+74

525

9.7

Mahanadi

+217

+108

+49

67

11.1

Brahmani

+216

+137

+82

28

14.8

Godavari

+76

+42

+7

110

19.2

Krishna

+64

–38

+24

78

– 6.3

Pennar

–51

–27

–9

7

–4.9

Cauvery

+43

–12

+39

21

– 2.8

Luni

–124

–15

–94

15

–3.7

Tapti

–52

+14

– 45

12

– 0.6

Narmada

–229

+9

–22

46

–3.4

Mahi

–118

– 36

–83

11

– 8.1

Sabarmati

–212

–48

–126

4

–12.3

* Source: Data obtained from IWMI, Delhi.

In summary, the nature of expected climate change, as understood today, is likely to be such that:








Global-average and all-India mean surface temperatures will continue to increase above the historical levels unless there are substantial changes in international energy and land-use patterns (very high confidence). As greenhouse gas emissions continue into the future, the size of these temperature increases will become larger over time. The regional and seasonal pattern of temperature increases across the country will vary (very high confidence; Figure 12.7a). We have medium confidence in estimates of detailed regional/local scale anomalies in surface air temperatures from the larger scale changes. As atmospheric greenhouse-gas concentrations continue to rise, global average precipitation will increase (very high confidence). There will be changes in the timing and regional patterns of precipitation (medium confidence). We have relatively low confidence in detailed projections for specific locations because of rather large inter-model differences. Nonetheless, high resolution regional model projections now available do provide us some valuable insights on the likely changes in mean (Figure 12.7b) and variance in location specific rainfall over Indian sub-continent.

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205

Drought frequencies in some drought prone areas of India are likely to increase (high confidence). The net risks to society from such changes have not yet been evaluated and specific projections of where such changes will occur are rather qualitative. Model projections, however, do suggest that the frequency and severity of droughts in some areas would increase as a result of regional decreases in winter and/or monsoon rainfall, more frequent dry spells, and higher evaporation.

Fig. 12.7 Spatial distribution of likely changes in (a) annual mean surface temperature, and (b) annual mean rainfall over the Indian sub-continent by the mid-21st century.

206

IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INTERLINKING PROJECT


























Climate change will enhance the frequency and intensity of the heavy precipitation events in India (high confidence); tropical cyclones hitting the east coast of India could be more severe in a warmer world. Projections on likely changes in cyclone frequency needs more research, especially to address the mismatch between the resolution of models and the scales at which extreme events can occur. Mean sea level has risen between 100 and 200 mm since the 1890s (very high confidence). The average global rate of rise throughout the 20th century was 15.2 mm per decade. Satellite measurements show that sea levels have risen by 30 mm in the past decade. Higher sea levels associated with thermal expansion of the oceans and increased melting of glaciers will push salt water further inland in rivers, deltas, and coastal aquifers (high confidence). It is well understood that such advances would adversely affect the quality and quantity of freshwater supplies in many coastal areas of India. Water quality problems will worsen where rising temperatures are the predominant climate change (high confidence). Where there are changes in surface flow, complex positive and negative changes in water quality will occur. Specific regional projections are still being established based on expected changes in regional flows. Preliminary results suggest that surface flow in river basins in Krishna, Pennar, Cauvery, Luni, Tapti, Narmada, Mahi and Sabarmati river basins will decline by mid-21st century and this will have implications for droughts and scarcity of available water resources in these river basins. The annual surface flow in Himalayan river basins is projected to increase due to climate change (Figure 12.8) resulting in enhanced probability of floods in this region. Increased atmospheric carbon dioxide will affect the use of water by vegetation (high confidence), the net effects of this and other competing influences on future irrigation demand need yet to be worked out. Increasing CO2 concentrations can increase plant growth, leading to a larger area of transpiring tissue and a corresponding increase in transpiration. This in turn would tend to decrease runoff since more water is returned directly to the atmosphere by such vegetation, allowing a smaller share of precipitation to reach streams or aquifers. Aquatic ecosystems can be highly sensitive to hydro-climatic factors, particularly water temperature, water quality, the probability of extreme events, and flow volumes, rates, and timing. Determining the impacts on particular species or ecosystems requires more extensive region-specific and ecosystem specific research in India. Climate change will produce a shift in species distributions northward, with extinctions of temperate species at lower latitudes, and range expansion of warm water species into northern latitudes in India.

Available literatures strongly suggest that current policies affecting water use, management, and development in India are unresponsive to changing climate. Information about how our summer monsoon will be affected due to climate change is vitally important to better understand its impact on future water availability in India. It is vital to better understand how climate changes might affect groundwater aquifers, including quality, recharge rates, and flow dynamics. Furthermore, population growth,

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changes in land use, restructuring of the industrial sector, and demands for ecosystem protection and restoration are influencing the hydrological system and water resources in India. In the absence of explicit efforts to address these issues, the societal costs of water problems are likely to rise as competition for water grows and supply and demand conditions change. The ongoing climate change also has implications for retreat of glaciers in the Himalaya-Hindukush region which provide water in north Indian rivers originating from Himalayas during the lean dry periods. In the next section, we discuss the likely impacts of climate change on the proposed interlinking project.

TAJIKISTAN

INDIA

AFGHANISTAN In

du

s

Ch

The numbers represent reported average surface flow in bcm/year and percent change likely by mid 21st century

en

Be

as

ab

PAKISTAN

N

RIVER BASINS

Indus Basin 73 (+17.6%)

TIBET NEP AL

ar

bh

m

Sa

sin i Ba Lun 13.7%) ( 15

BHUTAN r aput Branm

Ganges Basin 525 (+9.7%)

l ba

am

Ch

Ganga

n

O

asin a da B Narm6 (-3.4%) 4

mb

ha

l

Tapti Basin 12 (-0.6%)

ha

Pe n

fK lf o Gu

Mahanadi Basin 67 (-11.1%)

ga

ava

ri

ng

a

O

th

n ish Kr

im

Ba s in th er s

Kaladan Basin

a ang of G Mouth

er s

Manipur Basin

Ba

MYANMAR (BURMA)

Subarmarekha Basin Brahmani Basin 28 (+14.8%)

a

a

Krishna Basin 78 (-6.3%)

a Krishn

Bay of Bengal

Arabian Sea

Pennar

Pennar Basin 7 (-4.9%)

Lak

Palar

Ca

a sh

ea

b ar Is

Palk Strait

Va lg

al

Gulf of Manar

INDIAN

s land

r

ya

ri Pe

Vembanad

o nd Nic

dw

ee pS

Basin boundary Sub-basin boundary

Ponnaiyar u Basin 21 very (-2 Ba .8% si ) n

Andaman a

Pulical

Lakshadweep Islands

ak

r Ba

Godavari Basin 110 (-19.2%)

Bh

Sahyadri Basin 7 (-4.9%)

si

BANGLADESH Dam oda r

God

tra pu ) ma ah asin4.1% r B B 8. (+ 6 a 58

SRILANKA

OCEAN

0

200

400 kilometres

Fig. 12.8 Currently reported average surface flow (in BCM per year) in selected river basins of India and projected percent change by the mid-21st century.

208

IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INTERLINKING PROJECT

12.6 IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR THE INTERLINKING PROJECT The geomorphic and climatic factors result in the larger rivers of India originating from the Himalaya and passing through the northern and eastern parts of the country. With rapidly growing population, demands on water for domestic supplies, irrigation and industry have continued to increase. On the other hand, there is little doubt that, the glaciers of the Himalaya-Hindukush region are melting and that the melting is accompanied by a long term increase of near-surface air temperature. The western Himalayas get more snowfall than the eastern Himalaya during winter. During the monsoon season, there is more rainfall in the eastern Himalaya and Nepal than in the western Himalaya (Shrestha et al., 2000). Rising temperatures mean that not only will there be more rain and less snow in the mountains, but also that snow will melt earlier in the year, resulting in rivers and streams carrying more water, much earlier than normal (Borys et al., 2003). It has been reported that the entire Himalaya-Hindukush ice mass (the third-largest on earth) has shrinked in the last two decades due to less snow accumulation in the winter and an earlier peak runoff in the spring (Dyurgerov and Meier, 2005; Fushimi, 1999; Naithani et al., 2001). Furthermore, the rate of melting seems to be accelerating: a regression of the maximum spring stream flow period in the annual cycle by about 30 days and an unprecedented increase in glacier melt runoff by 33 to 38 per cent in past decade has been reported (Meier and Dyurgerov, 2002; Singh, 2003). The melting glaciers provide a key source of water for the region in the summer months: as much as 70 per cent of the summer flow in the Ganges and 50 to 60 per cent of the flow in other major rivers (Singh and Bengtsson, 2004; Singh and Kumar, 1997; Singh and Jain, 2002). The HimalayaHindukush region is the most critical region in which vanishing glaciers (example: the Gangotri Glacier) will negatively affect water supply in the next few decades, because of the region’s huge population (about 50 to 60 per cent of the world’s population) and weak water infrastructure. All future plans for managing India’s water resources would have to be looked into in the context of the now receding snowlines of the Himalaya (Figure 12.9). The joint interaction of clouds and aerosols represents one of the major challenges to climate modelers today. Recent observational studies show that locally, over India, the total aerosol effect (direct plus indirect) has been associated with a surface cooling of 0.3°C over the last three decades (Ramanthan et al., 2001; Krishnan and Ramanathan, 2002). This is close to the warming expected from greenhouse gases. However, the aerosols are observed to be associated with warming in the lower to middle troposphere – the regions inhabited by the glacier fields. In this case the aerosols may be enhancing the direct temperature forcing by contributing to the melting of the high glaciers of the Himalaya-Hindukush region. Aerosols are found to alter cloud physics in a manner that reduces precipitation downstream from the pollution source (Rosenfeld, 1999; Rosenfeld, 2000). This also reduces the snow particle rime growth, resulting in lower snow water equivalent, a result obtained from direct field measurements (Rosenfeld, 2000; Borys et al., 2003; Givati and Rosenfeld, 2004). A common aerosol, black carbon, could decrease the surface albedo, causing the snow/ice to absorb solar energy more readily and thereby melt sooner. Proper inclusion of aerosols in global climate models will increase early melting of snow packs and, especially, glaciers and sea ice (Hansen and Nazarenko, 2004).

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Fig. 12.9 This composite image from the ASTER (Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Rediometer) instrument aboard NASA’s Terra satellite shows how the Gangotri Glacier terminus has retracted since 1780 (courtesy of NASA EROS Data Center, September 9, 2001).

210

IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INTERLINKING PROJECT

Some of the observed changes with the most relevance for hydrology and water resources of India are summarized on the next page:









The Indian sub-continent has, on an average, warmed by two-thirds of a degree Celsius since 1900 (very high confidence). Warming-induced changes to evapotranspiration and surface runoff may affect regional water availability. Mountain glaciers are currently melting at rates unprecedented in recorded history (high confidence). Temperature increase in mountainous areas such as Himalaya will lead to increases in the ratio of rain to snow and decreases in the length of the snow storage season (high confidence). There is evidence of historical trends of both increasing and decreasing precipitation in Himalayan region of the Indian sub-continent since 1870. The intensity of precipitation here has increased for heavy and extreme precipitation days. Initial results suggest that flood frequencies in foothills of Himalaya would increase, although the details on amount of increase for any given month and season are yet to be explored. The timing of runoff in snowmelt-dominated rivers in north India appears to be changing, with a decrease in summer runoff and an increase in winter runoff. The reductions in snowfall and earlier snowmelt and runoff would increase the probability of flooding early in the year and reduce the runoff of water during summer. The Indo-Gangetic Plains are particularly vulnerable to such shifts.

In view of above, it is prudent to take note of the following observations and recommendations particular to the ILR:













Prudent planning requires that decisions about future long term water planning and management be flexible, and that expensive and irreversible actions be avoided in climate-sensitive areas. Better methods of planning under climate uncertainty should be developed and applied. Decision makers at all levels should reevaluate technical and economic approaches for managing water resources in the light of potential climate changes. The government should ask all States managing national water systems to begin assessing both climate impacts and the effectiveness of different operation and management options. Improvements in the efficiency of end uses and the intentional management of water demands must now be considered major tools for meeting future water needs, particularly in water-scarce regions. Water demand management and institutional adaptation are the primary components for increasing system flexibility to meet uncertainties of climate change. Water managers should begin a systematic re-examination of engineering designs, operating rules, contingency plans, and water allocation policies under a wider range of climate conditions and extremes than have been used traditionally. For example, the standard engineering practice of designing for the worst case in the historical observational record may no longer be adequate. Cooperation between water agencies and leading scientific organizations can facilitate the exchange of information on the state-of-the-art thinking about climate change and impacts on water resources.

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211

The timely flows of information among the scientific global change community and the water-management community are valuable. Such lines of communication need to be developed. Traditional and alternative forms of water supply can play a role in addressing changes in both demands and supplies caused by climate changes and variability. Options to be considered include wastewater reclamation and reuse and even limited desalination where less costly alternatives are not available. None of these alternatives, however, is likely to alter the trend toward higher water demand. Prices and markets are increasingly important for balancing supply and demand. Because new construction and projects can be expensive, environmentally damaging, and politically controversial, the proper application of economics and water management can provide incentives to use less and produce more. Among the new tools that need to be explored are water banking and conjunctive use of groundwater. Even without climate change, efforts are needed to update and improve legal tools for managing and allocating water resources. Water is managed in different ways in different states around the country, leading to complex and often conflicting water laws.

The impacts of climate change on India’s water resources also have the potential to affect international relations with Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan as international agreements covering the shared waters do not include provisions for explicitly addressing the risks of climate-induced changes in water availability or quality. A tussle is already simmering in Ganges-Brahmaputra basins, where Bangladesh, India, and Nepal dispute the best uses of water. India and Nepal want to exploit the basins’ huge, whereas Bangladesh wants the water managed in such a way as to minimize flooding during monsoon months and water shortages during dry months. Of equal concern are the water conflicts between states in India that share river basins, such as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, which border the Cauvery River. Apart from the uncertainties on the future availability of water in major river basins under the projected climate change scenarios and its intra-seasonal or inter-annual variability in space, it is also true that the river interlinking project would change the composition of the sediment load, river morphology and the shape of the delta formed at the river mouth. Moreover, construction of dams and canals will get villages dislocated, flood towns and cut through millions of hectares of agricultural land. The large network of dams and canals will also alter natural drainage such that occasional flooding and waterlogging will inundate millions of hectares of agricultural land. Moulding of natural flood water will reduce land fertility gradually and over the years the fertile land will change into desert, affecting agricultural production. An increase in agricultural activities may result in increase in nitrogen compounds and emission of methane further contributing to the ongoing climate change. None-the-less, to meet the growing requirements of water for various applications in India, it is imperative not only to develop the new water sources but to conserve, recycle and reuse water wherever possible. Various alternate options to intra- and inter-basin transfer of water must be considered in quantitative terms as possible sources to augment the anticipated deficit of available water. It has been shown that conservation of water through rainwater harvesting and artificial groundwater recharge can generate about 125 km3 per year of additional water. Similarly, recycling of municipal and industrial

212

IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INTERLINKING PROJECT

wastewater can regenerate additional ~177 km3 per year water. In the short term the maximum amount of water can be generated locally through rainwater harvesting and artificial groundwater recharge projects, wherein people and communities not only participate due to the low level of technologies involved but are also the direct beneficiaries. In recycling and reuse of wastewater, local bodies such as municipalities and industries are required to carry out the development work. The gestation period for such activities can be a couple of years as the required technology becomes more advanced and the capital intensive. There is still untapped potential of almost 550 km3 per year comprising groundwater and conventional run-of-the-river schemes. India has to initiate action on all fronts for developing its water resources. The planning for both intra- and inter-basin transfer of water has to clearly begin in a step-wise manner and based on priorities and needs of the states (e.g., hydropower, inland navigation and ecological considerations), because of the long gestation period involved due to the complex political, technological and financial requirements. It needs to be ensured that the benefits of intra- and inter-basin transfer of water outweigh the costs of implementation. Perhaps the side effects of this mammoth project on the environment and human beings can be avoided by proper scientific planning before its execution. 12.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS Available literatures strongly suggest that current policies affecting water use, management, and development in India are unresponsive to changing climate. Information about how Indian summer monsoon will be affected due to climate change is vitally important to better understand its impact on future water availability. It is vital to better understand how climate changes might affect groundwater aquifers, including quality, recharge rates, and flow dynamics. Furthermore, population growth, changes in land use, restructuring of the industrial sector, and demands for ecosystem protection and restoration are influencing the hydrological system and water resources in India. In the absence of explicit efforts to address these issues, the societal costs of water problems are likely to rise as competition for water grows and supply and demand conditions change. It is therefore necessary that a significant national effort be devoted to limit the population growth. At the same time, it is also necessary that projections of population and demand of water be reviewed at regular intervals so that corrective actions can be taken in time. In the short term the maximum amount of water can be generated locally through rainwater harvesting and artificial groundwater recharge projects, wherein people and communities not only participate but are also the direct beneficiaries. Another area of immediate emphasis has to be the recycling and reuse of water, because it not only generates water for subsequent use but also prevents pollution and ecological hazards. The impact of conservation, recycle and reuse is largely local but widespread and is the only way to drought-proof the country. India has to initiate action on all fronts for developing its water resources. The priority of action, however, must be for rainwater harvesting and groundwater recharge, followed by renovation and reuse of wastewater and then inter-basin transfers. The planning for both intra- and inter-basin transfer of water has to clearly begin now in a step-wise manner and based on priorities and needs of the states (e.g., hydropower, inland navigation and ecological considerations), because of the long gestation period involved due to the complex political, technological and financial requirements. Many uncertainties remain; indeed, we expect that uncertainties will always remain. The nature and intensity of future greenhouse gas emissions depend upon future

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decisions of governments and individuals, the speed of deployment of alternative energy systems, population sizes and life styles, and many more factors. The global and regional climate models that simulate the role of these greenhouse gases in our atmosphere are yet imperfect. There are significant limitations in the ability of climate models to incorporate and reproduce important aspects of the hydrologic cycle. Many fundamental hydrologic processes, such as the formation and distribution of clouds and precipitation, occur on a spatial scale smaller than most global climate models are able to resolve. All of the future regional climate predictions still have uncertainties. In some cases, the uncertainties have to do with the models’ inability to reproduce today’s climate, casting doubt on future climate predictions. Predictions using regional, high-spatial-resolution models, of the type needed for regional hydrological studies, are only now starting to come into their own in the greenhouse arena, but they carry a whole set of problems in addition to those associated with the coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation models (CGCMs). However, such high-resolution regional models are essential for good quantitative estimates of potential future water problems in the Himalaya – Hindu Kush region. Even regional data on water availability and use are often poor. Tools for quantifying many impacts are imperfect, at best. However, not everything is uncertain. The research done to date provides us many details, both positive and negative, about how hydrology and available water resources could be affected by climate variability and change. We know much less about how the water cycle will change than we would like in order to make appropriate decisions about how to plan, manage, and operate water systems. We still need to learn about the vulnerability and sensitivity of water systems and management practices, and we should explore the strengths and weaknesses of technologies and policies that might help us cope with adverse impacts and take advantage of possible beneficial effects. It is vital that uncertainties not be used to delay or avoid taking certain kinds of action now. Prudent planning requires that a strong national climate and water research program be developed and maintained, that decisions about future water planning and management be flexible, and that the risks and benefits of climate change be incorporated into all long term water planning. Rigid, expensive, and irreversible actions in climate-sensitive areas can increase vulnerability and long term costs. Water managers and policymakers must start considering climate change as a factor in all decisions about water investments and the operation of existing facilities and systems.

REFERENCES Ashrit, R., H. Douville and K. Rupa Kumar: Response of the Indian Monsoon and ENSOMonsoon Teleconnection to Enhanced Greenhouse Effect in the CNRM Coupled Model. J. Meteor. Soc. Japan 81(2003), pp. 779–803. BBC News: Super-Cyclone Wreaks Havoc in India (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/ stories/october/29/newsid_3691000/3691573), 1999. BBC News: Indian Floods Cause Chaos – Flooded Area of Orissa (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ south_asia/1532007.stm), 2001. Bhaskar Rao, D.V., Naidu, C.V. and Srinivasa Rao, B.R.: Trends and Fluctuations of the Cyclonic Systems Over North Indian Ocean. Mausam – Special Issue on Climate Change 52(1) (2001), pp. 37–46. Borys, R.D., Lowenthal, D.H., Cohn, S.A. and Brown, W.O.J.: Mountaintop and Radar Measurements of Anthropogenic Aerosol Effects on Snow Growth and Snowfall Rate. Geophys. Res. Lett. 30(10) (2003), pp. 45.1–45.4.

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13 Interlinking of Rivers in India: International and Regional Legal Aspects M. RAFIQUL ISLAM SHAWKAT ALAM

13.1 INTRODUCTION India is in the process of embarking on a project to interlink some of the rivers flowing across its territory in a bid to overcome its chronic problem of floods during the Monsoon and draught in the dry season. These rivers include some of the major international rivers of the sub-continent with both upstream and downstream riparian states. The project involves the diversion of water from and into the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers, which draw massive amount of water from their tributaries originating from the upstream Nepal and empty into the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh, the downstream riparian state. Being in the downstream and at the delta of these two mighty international rivers, Bangladesh bears the full brunt of Monsoon floods every year and draught during the dry months. The ongoing operation of the Farakka Barrage in India for the diversion of the Ganges water immediately before its entry into Bangladesh has but added to the problem of too much and too little water in Bangladesh. The Farakka Barrage has been a bone of contention between India and Bangladesh ever since the commission of the barrage in 1975. This new scheme for interlinking rivers in India has become a grave cause of concern in Bangladesh and created new tensions with India. Bangladesh expressed its concerns over the potential impact of India’s project on interlinking of transboundary rivers on the economy and environment of Bangladesh.1 India has conceived the project unilaterally without any consultation whatsoever with its upstream Nepal and downstream Bangladesh. Bangladesh has diplomatic channels with India and instruments such as the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission, which could have been used in the best interest of all stakeholders in the project. The scientific feasibility, and economic and environmental impact, studies on the project have not been made public. India has been criticised by its own civil society for its failure to release any of the eight pre-feasibility

1

Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS): National News Agency of Bangladesh, August 13, 2004, http://www.bssnews.net.

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study reports on the project.2 Consequently, this project has become an important issue in the discourse of the civil societies in both India and Bangladesh. Many are now apprehensive of its viability and detrimental effects. The controversy surrounding the project is steadily outgrowing the national arena of Bangladesh and India and gradually attracting the interests and involvement of various groups representing expatriate Bangladeshi and Indians.3 If the Farakka experience is any guide, it may not be difficult to surmise the potential adverse consequences of such a huge upstream water diversion project on the economy, ecology, the environment, biology and sustainable development of Bangladesh and the morphology of its river-systems. These consequences call for special analytical attention and constitute the subject-maters in other chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an international legal analysis of the project. It examines the rights and obligations of the riparian states in sharing and utilising their common water of international rivers. It outlines the responsibility and liability of riparian states, such as India, for their action in diverting the waters of international rivers causing serious detriment to the use and rightful share of co-riparian states, such as Bangladesh. Since the project is still in its planning stage, certain legal advises and viable options are offered for a just yet friendly resolution of the dispute. 13.2 A BRIEF BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT The Supreme Court of India, in response to a writ petition (civil no. 512/2002)4 has authorized the interlinking of Indian rivers with a view to the diversion of huge amount of waters from the major internationally shared rivers, which includes among others the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers. There are two components of the project. Its first component aims to link 14 Himalayan rivers in northern India. And the second component would connect 16 peninsular rivers in southern India.5 The first component involves the establishment of connection with the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, which is of special interest to Bangladesh. India seeks to complete this ambitious project by 2016. The cost of this mega project is estimated to be more than US$ 118 billion. Its primary objective is to ensure adequate water supply for the domestic, industrial and agricultural use. The project is thought to be improving the water flow, food security and navigation in India. It would also create jobs for rural people and stop the migration of people from rural to urban areas.6 India reasons that the project would reduce flood and drought conditions in the northern and southern parts of India in general and generate hydropower and irrigation in particular. It is a bid for India to ensure its internal water security. This project, if completed

2

See Times of India: February 13, 2004, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com. See also Upendra Gautam, “Blatant Unilateralism: India’s River Linking Project” Environment NEPAL 2, http:// www.environmentnepal.com accessed on June 4, 2004. 3 For details see Bangladesh Environment Network, http://www.ben-center.org. See also Shobha Warrier, “NRIs Keen on River Linking Project” Sustainable Development Networking Programme Bangladesh, http://www.sdnpbd.org. 4 See Record of Proceedings, Supreme Court of India, “In Re: Networking of Rivers,” October 31, 2002, http://www.riverlinksdialogue.org/html/supreme.htm. 5 This includes among others river basins of “Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, Pennar, Cauvery, Vaigai, West flowing rivers of Kerala, Karnataka, north of Bombay and south of Tapi and southern tributaries of Yamuna.” See also Task Force on Interlinking of Rivers, http://www.riverlinks.nic.in. 6 See “About Interlinking Proposal: The Need” ibid.

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successfully, is likely “to add 35 to 37 million hectares of irrigated land, generate 34,000 million kilowatt of electricity, control flood in the flood-prone states, and increase in navigational efficiency”.7 However, India’s own record of past fifty years of dam building shows that its drought prone areas have increased not decreased.8 This position appears to contradict the wisdom inherent in the rationales behind the project. Better alternatives, such as building watersheds and improving local water reservoir system, may be relied upon to address the problem of flood and drought. 13.3 THE INTERESTS OF BANGLADESH AT STAKE IN THE PROJECT Bangladesh confronts many pressing water resources related problems, which among others include flood controls during wet and the scarcity of water in dry seasons. “Water is central to the way of life in Bangladesh”9 and the protection of this important resource is vital in maintaining the well being of the ever-growing large population of 120 million. Increasing deterioration in salinity, water pollution, river sedimentation, outbreak of arsenic are just the few to name of the insurmountable challenges that Bangladesh need to confront with its very limited resources. The dilemma of Bangladesh is echoed in its National Water Policy: All of these have to be accomplished under severe constraints, such as the lack of control over rivers originating outside the country’s borders, the difficulty of managing the deltaic plain, and the virtual absence of unsettled land for building water structures.10 Management of river basins serves as an important factor in national water resource development. The efficient and better management of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna basins could bring plenty of economic opportunities for Bangladesh. It is indeed critical for Bangladesh to find a lasting solution to the proposed rivers linking project of India in order to ensure its due and equitable share in the common resources of international rivers. This is extremely crucial for its much needed economic development and arresting its delta from turning into a desert. Recent studies on the proposed project seem to suggest the lack of its compliance with sound economic policies and credible environmental principles. One of these studies has identified a number of possible adverse effects of the project on Bangladesh. These effects in the main include:11


7

Massive change in sediments transport due to reduction and redistribution of water flow;

Upendra Gautam, above note 2, at 1. Himanshu Thakkar, “Let’s Have Our Feet on Ground, Mr. Prabhu”, March to April (2003) 1: 2–3, Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP) 3, www.narmada.org/sandrp. 9 National Water Policy of Bangladesh, see Sustainable Development Networking Programme, http:// www.sdnpbd.org/river_basin/waterpolicy/water_policy_bangladesh.htm accessed on May 31, 2004. 10 Ibid. 11 Jahir Uddin Chowdhury, “India’s River Diversion Plan and Its Impact on Bangladesh”, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, NETWORK for Information, Response and Preparedness Activities on Disaster, accessed on September 17, 2004, http://nirapad.org/care_nirapad/ Home/Interview/html/jan2004/India’s River Diversion Plan and Its Impact on Bangladesh. 8

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Reduction of flow of the tributaries in the northwest region, and consequently shrinking of wetlands in the region; Reduction of inflow to the distributaries in the north-central, southwest and south-central regions; Advancement of tidal propagation further upstream; Increase in the salinity intrusion into the Lower Meghna that would create risks of salinity intrusion in the south-central and north-central regions; Increase in the frequency of very large and very small floods; Intensification of river bank erosion, silt up of river bed and extensive char formation; Increase in scarcity of water during dry season; Decrease in the recharge to the wetlands and groundwater in the wet season; Lowering of groundwater level; Massive scale drain out of water from Beels in the northwest region and Haors in the northeast region; Release of water from the reservoirs of Brahmaputra during heavy rainfall would increase the risk of high magnitude flood. In 2000, southwest region of Bangladesh experienced such flood due to release from the reservoirs in West Bengal.

An environment group conjectured that as a result of this project more than 7,800 square kilometers of land is likely to be flooded, displacing 3 million people off their land.12 Scientists estimate that even the barest minimum 10 to 20 per cent reduction in water flow caused by the project would be enough to dry up the vast areas of Bangladesh, threatening the livelihoods of more than 100 million people with its consequential effects on economy, ecology, morphology and bio-diversity.13 Under the current proposal, “India wants to divert 173 billion cubic meters of water per year from the Brahmaputra amounting to 193,703 cubic feet per second which is greater than total flow in the Brahmaputra during the lean season.”14 The Brahmaputra will lose its flow during the time when the water is diverted, which is likely to threaten its very existence during the dry season. It is likely to affect many irrigation projects dependant on the Brahmaputra for their water supplies. The Brahmaputra helps controlling salinity because of its flow during the dry seasons. The reduction of water in the Brahmaputra means the increase of salinity during the dry season, with the possibility of leaving a totally dry river bed for Bangladesh. In addition “due to change in the velocity and depth of water, seasonal flow variability and nutrient flow in the river, fisheries resources are likely to be impacted adversely.”15 Fisheries, flora and fauna are intricately connected with the economic development in Bangladesh. The fundamental objectives of the economy are poverty alleviation, generation of employment and sustainable development. These sectors will be seriously affected due to the scarcity of water and salinity in the rivers as a result of the river linking project. 12

Bangladesh Environment Network, above note 3. John Vidal, “India’s Dream, Bangladesh’s Disaster.” The Guardian, July 24, 2003, accessed from www.countercurrents.org on June 4, 2004. See also “India’s Mega Water Offensive” Editorial, The Daily Star, August 22, 2003, www.thedailystar.net. 14 M. Khalequzzaman, “Historic Perspectives of the Indian River Linking Project” eMela, Inc, www.e-mela.com/Bangladesh/River_Indian_History_Khalequzzaman20031108 accessed on August 16, 2004. 15 Jahir Uddin Chowdhury, above note 11. 13

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The natural environment of Bangladesh is closely linked to its water resources. Continuous and consistent flow of water in the rivers is fundamental for the protection, restoration and preservation of the environment and bio-diversity.16 Increased soil erosion, sedimentation and salination would result in the loss of endangered species and coastal zone habitat.17 The lack of enough waters in major river basins will severely affect natural water bodies such as beels, haors, baors, which are linked to rivers through khals and used for fish production and development. This situation will pose a threat to the survival of many fishermen, who preserve in the dry season a significant portion of water and provide a habitat for the aquatic flora. These water bodies also help transferring the wastes discharged from the domestic sources through the khals into the river’s drainage system.18 Reduction in the flow of water in the rivers will dry them up destroying the natural capture fisheries and aquatic environment and blocking the flow of wastes into the drainage. In the proposed plan, the Farakka-Sundarban is another link canal. It has been argued “… that there is a possibility to withdraw water from the Ganges in the dry season in addition to currently being diverted by Farakka Barrage to ensure the navigability of the Kolkata Port India.”19 Should this apprehension eventuate, the southwestern region of Bangladesh would suffer further from the loss of water diversion. The possible environmental impacts of the river linking project would be the slow death of the Bangladeshi segments of all successive international rivers that flow from India. This eventuality may not be gain said in view of the Farakka Barrage experience. Immediate result of this impact is that “about 17 per cent of the total Sundari trees of the Sundarbans, the world’s largest estuarine swamp, have already prey to the top dying syndrome due to increased salinity, according to forest department officials.”20 The Farakka-Sundarban would further exacerbate the ongoing tree-dying syndrome, throwing coastal industries such as prawn fisheries out of business.21 The intrusions of salinity would render the groundwater contaminated and undrinkable causing scarcity in pure drinking water and a threat to public health. 13.4 THE RIVERS INTERLINKING PROJECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW International law governs the utilisation of common rivers in order to ensure the just and equitable share of waters for all competing claimants and interests. It confers specific rights and imposes definite obligations on riparian states so that their legitimate rights are protected and the abusive exercise of right is prevented. Adherence to this orderly normative regime of the rightful and proper utilisation of common water resources is indispensable not only to ensure fairness and equity but also to avoid over exploitation. Some of the international legal principles and normative standards relevant to the Indian rivers linking project are highlighted and commented upon below.

16

See “Water for the Environment” in National Water Policy: Bangladesh, Paragraph 4.12, www.sdnpbd. org accessed on May 31, 2004. 17 Ibid. 18 “Water for Preservation of Haors, Boars, and Beels”, Paragraph 4.13, ibid. 19 Jahir Uddin Chowdhury, above note 11. 20 Inam Ahmed and Aasha Mehreen Amin, “Bangladesh Waiting for a Miracle” 15:3 People and the Planet, 2, 1996. 21 Ibid.

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13.4.1 The nature and extent of territorial sovereignty over common waters Three and a half centuries ago, a Dutch scholar in international law, Hugo Grotius, articulated the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty on rivers, be they national or international. He viewed “a river, … as a stream, is the property of the people through whose territory it flows, or the ruler under whose sway that people is … to them all things produced in the river belong.”22 This notion of sovereignty over international rivers certainly favours upper riparian states more often than not at the expense of lower riparian states. An upstream state can use its territorial water whatever way it deems necessary without any consideration of the effects of such uses on the lower or co-riparian states. This was precisely the legal opinion rendered by the US Attorney General Judson Harmon as a justification for the diversion of the Rio Grande water in 1895 leaving hardly any water for the downstream state Mexico.23 The Harmon doctrine was based on the notion of absolute sovereignty of riparian states on the subject of sharing of water of international rivers. Understandably this is the preferred position of upstream powerful riparian states, such as the US, Austria and India in negotiations on river disputes. The US asserted this absolute right in its disputes with Mexico over the sharing of Rio Grande and Colorado waters, and with Canada over the Columbia water. Austria made a similar claim in relation to the sharing of the Rissbach river water with Bavaria.24 India pursued its absolute claim as a justification for the construction of Farakka Barrage on the Ganges River in 1961. India maintained that “the construction of such a dam is ‘the natural right of any country’, and that any water collected behind the dam belongs exclusively to the country that collected it.” 25 This claim of absolute territorial sovereignty over common rivers is no more than a legal myth and fiction, which has never been practised unconditionally even by its proponents.26 The US compromised its position in resolving all disputes over the sharing of common rivers with Mexico and Canada through the conclusion of international agreements conceding the legitimate and rightful shares of co-riparian states.27 Austria also resolved its dispute with Bavaria on the basis of mutual recognition of rights by 22 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, vol. 2, ch. 2, 12 (Kelsey trans., 7th ed. 1646) cited in Aaron Schwabach, “Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and International Freshwater Law” (1996) 14 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 325. 23 This doctrine was originally proposed by the Attorney General of the US Judson Harmon in 1895 to justify the US position of allocating the water of the Rio Grande river between the US and Mexico. (1895) 21 Opinion of Attorney-General, 274–83; J.B. Moore, “Diversion of Waters” (1906) 1 Digest of International Law, 654. 24 Dr. Gieseke, the Director of the Institute of Water Rights at Bonn University made this claim, see C. Eagleton, “The Use of the Waters of International Rivers” (1955) 33 Canadian Bar Rev, 1020. 25 Joseph W. Dellapenna, “The Two Rivers and the Lands Between: Mesopotamia and the International Law of Transboundary Waters”, (1996) 10 Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law, 213, 230–31; cited in Scott L. Cunningham, “Do Brothers Divide Shares Forever? Obstacles to the Effective Use of International Law in Euphrates River Basin Water Issues” (2000) 21 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 145. 26 E. Arechaga, “International Legal Rules Governing Use of International Watercourses” 2 Inter-Am l Rev, 330, 1960. 27 For all these agreements, see UN Legislative Series: Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilisation of International Rivers for other Purposes than Navigation, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12, 206, 232, 1963.

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concluding a treaty in 1948.28 In a similar vein, India resolved its Indus river dispute with Pakistan by concluding a treaty in 1960, which duly conceded the right of Pakistan in the Indus water.29 The conclusion of the Farakka Barrage commissioning agreement in 1975 and subsequent agreements on the sharing of the Ganges water with Bangladesh in 1977, 1982, 1985 and 1996 may be cited to the same effect. There is a qualitative difference between sovereignty over static and flowing components within a territory. The former is perpetually stationary, whilst the latter is constantly on the move. If uninterrupted, the flow of a river flows downstream automatically in its natural course. The segment of international rivers waters which is under the sovereignty of India flows into the sovereignty of Bangladesh and then beyond to empty into the Bay of Bengal. It is more comparable with the migratory habit of flying birds rather than with any static components under territorial sovereignty. It is therefore erroneous, if not a distortion, to argue that a riparian state, regardless of its geographical location, can enjoy absolute right to, and control over, the segment of international rivers within its territory. The assertion of territorial sovereignty on international rivers, however widely and passionately asserted, must bend before the obligation to respect the lawful right of co-riparians to the same water. This act of mutual respect for each other’s right itself is a limitation on the exercise of sovereignty over international rivers. It is possible to prepare an endless list of state practice of riparians, both upstream and downstream alike, repudiating the unilateral use of international rivers by any riparian to the exclusion of co-riparians. The evidentiary value of this widespread uniform state practice is clearly international law creating. The international legal posture referred to militates against the right of India to unilaterally interconnect the upstream segments of international rivers within its territory, which has the potential of depriving downstream Bangladesh of its rightful shares of waters. The right and control of India over the segments of international rivers within its territory is not unassailable but subject to the accommodation of legal rights and equitable shares of its co-riparian Bangladesh. This is what India followed in its Indus Water Treaty in 1960 with Pakistan and successive agreements on the sharing of the Ganges water with Bangladesh. 13.4.2 Principle of good neighbourliness The UN recognises and fosters mutual respects among its members, particularly those which are neighbours. To this end, the UN Charter embodies the general principle of good neighbourliness, due account being given to the interests and well-being of the rest of the world in social, economic, and commercial matters (Art. 74). This is precisely the objective of international economic cooperation under Chapter IX (Art. 55) of the UN Charter. All UN members “pledge” themselves in Article 56 of the UN Charter to attain this objective through individual and collective efforts. The expression “pledge” entails precise legal obligations for UN member states. Relying on this principle, it has been argued in a similar situation that a lower riparian country like Bangladesh “may demand the continuation of

28

P. Sevette, “Legal Aspects of the Hydro-Electric Development of Rivers and Lakes of Common Interests” UN Doc. E/ECE/136, 49, 1952. 29 F.J. Barber, “The Indus Water Dispute” (1957) 6 Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, 46; for the text of the treaty, see (1961) 55 Am J I L, 797.

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the full flow of [water] from an upper riparian state, free from any diminution in quantity or quality.”30 It is this spirit of mutual cooperation for each others interests and needs that India has adhered to in its bilateral treaty with Bangladesh on the sharing of the Ganges water in 1996 (preamble).31 In view of this principle, India in undertaking the project is expected to take into account the living standards and conditions of economic and social progress and development in Bangladesh. It would be a defiance of this principle should the Indian project cause deterioration in living conditions and socio-economic development in neighbouring Bangladesh. 13.4.3 Obligation not to cause injury to others One of the fundamental principles of international law is that the holder of a right must exercise it in a manner not injurious to others. It corresponds to the Roman law proverb sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas which means that “you use your own so as not to injure another”. This obligation requires a state not to use its territory to the detriment of another state. The Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997 (hereafter the Convention on Non-navigational Watercourses) embodies the principle of “no significant harm” in Article 7. This Article affirms the duty of the watercourse states to take all appropriate measures while utilising international watercourse in their territories to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse states. In addition, where such harm is caused to another state, the state that causes this harm shall take appropriate measures in consultation with affected states to eliminate such harm and to discuss the issue of compensation if necessary. There exists a whole range of national and international judicial decisions and arbitral awards in support of the principle that no state can use its territory to the detriment of another. Some of these international and national judicial expositions of the principle are explained below. In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dispute between Hungary and Slovakia in 1997,32 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provided important and significant guidelines in relation to the use and ownership of shared water resources. The ICJ, in deciding the effect of the construction of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube, held that Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming jurisdiction over shared watercourse, deprived Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources and consequently failed to respect the principle of international law. In the French Nuclear Test case between Australia and France in 1973, the ICJ in its interim order asked France not to carry out its atmospheric nuclear testing in the Pacific in a manner that caused the radio-active fall-out in the territory of Australia (and New Zealand).33 The ICJ in the Corfu Channel case between Great Britain and Albania in 1949 held that “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”34 30

Aaron Schwabach, “Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and International Freshwater Law”, (1996) 14 Berkeley J. Int’ L. 290, 326. 31 Treaty on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, December 12, 1996, Bangla-India, (1997) 36 ILM 523. 32 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo - Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 ICJ Rep 92 (order of February 5). 33 1974 ICJ Rep 253. 34 Corfu Channel (UK vs. Alb.), 1949 ICJ Rep 22.

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The Lac Lanoux Arbitration between Spain and France in 195735 has applied the principles established by the Corfu Channel case and the Trail Smelter Arbitration (below) to the issues relating to the navigation of international watercourses. It has stated that according to the rules of good faith, the upstream state is under the obligation to take into consideration the various interests involved, to seek to give them every satisfaction compatible with the pursuit of its own interests, and to show that in this regard it is genuinely concerned to reconcile the interests of the other riparian State with its own.36 The Trail Smelter Arbitration between the US and Canada in 1941 decided that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or person therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”37 Relevant decisions of municipal courts may be cited to the same effect. Though these decisions are not binding upon other states, they may be used as a source of international law as “the general principle of law” under Article 38(1c) of the Statute of the ICJ. The US Supreme Court resorted to the rules and principles of international law of rivers in deciding its inter-state river water sharing disputes.38 Some of these decisions have dealt with the effects of river diversion and are “judicial decisions within the meaning of the statute and are also evidence of state practice.”39 In the Donauversinkung case (Baden v. Wurttemberg), it was held that When utilizing an international watercourse in its territory every State is bound by the principle springing from the idea of the community of nations based on international law: that it may not injure another member of the international community. Due consideration must be given to one another by the various States which have a watercourse in common. No State may substantially impair the use of a watercourse, made possible by nature, by another state.40

35

Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain vs. Fr.), (1957) 12 RIAA 281; (1959) 53 Am J. Int’l L, 156. Ibid, at 315. 37 Trail Smelter (US vs. Can.), 3 RIAA 1965; (1941) 35 Am J. Int’l L 684. 38 For example: Kansas vs. Colorado (1902) 185 US 143 and (1907) 206 US 46; Wyoming vs. Colorado (1922) 159 US 419; North Dakota vs. Minnesota (1923) 263 US 365; Connecticut vs. Massachusetts (1931) 282 US 660; New Jersey vs. New York (1931) 283 US 336; Arizona vs. California (1931) 283 US 449; Nebraska vs. Wyoming (1945) 325 US 589; see also J. Austin, ‘Canada-US Practice and Theory Respecting the International Law of International Rivers: A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine’ (1959) 37 Canadian Bar Review, 432-434; (1932) 13 British Yearbook of International Law, 189. 39 Above note 30 at 329. 40 Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses 366 (1984) at 434 cited in above note 30 at 329. 36

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In Societe Energie Electrique, the Court stated that international law recognizes the right of every riparian state to enjoy, as a participant of a kind of partnership created by the river, all the advantages deriving from it. A State cannot disregard the international duty not to impede or to destroy the opportunity of the other States to avail themselves of the flow of water for their own national needs.41 The only inevitable conclusion one can draw from all these persuasive authorities is plain and simple. An upper riparian may use waters of international rivers in whatever way it pleases without interfering with the rights of the lower riparians to use the same international rivers. India understands this legal principle and normative expectation, which it has incorporated in its treaty with Bangladesh on the sharing of the Ganges water in 1996 (Art. 9). The predictable effects of the Indian rivers linking project on Bangladesh have already been briefly mentioned before. They are indeed too serious, distinct and imminent warranting an urgent attention. The international legal obligation of India in undertaking its rivers linking project now is to take appropriate measures not to cause any significant harm to Bangladesh.

13.4.4 Principle of reasonable and equitable sharing The International Law Association perceives that any denial by a basin state of the rights of co-basin states to the equitable sharing of uses of water “conflicts with the community of interests of all basin states”.42 The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers 1966 (herein after the Helsinki Rules) affirm that the right of a riparian state to its international rivers is limited. It is limited to the extent that a riparian state has the right “within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.”43 Article V of the Helsinki Rules specifies an inclusive list of factors that need to be taken into account in determining what constitutes a state’s “reasonable and equitable share”. These factors include climate, geography and hydrology of the basin, past and present uses of the waters, economic and social needs of each basin state, population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin state, cost of alternative means, availability of other resources, avoidance of unnecessary waste, practicability of compensation to other co-basin states as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses. The Helsinki Rules adopt a “substantial injury” test/standard in determining whether the use of common water by a state is reasonable and equitable.44

41

Judgment of February 13, 1939, Corte cass. Italy, 64 Foro It. I 1036, 1046, digested in (1938 to 1939) 3 Dig. of Int’l L. 1050–1051 cited in above note 30 at 330. 42 International Law Association in its commentary to Article X of the Helsinki Rules see, Slavko Bogdanovic, International Law of Water Resources, Kluwer Law International, the Hague, The Netherlands, 2001, 114. 43 Helsinki Rules on the Use of the Waters of International Rivers, Art. IV, cmt. (a), (1966) 52 ILA 477, 486–487. 44 Art. V (2) (k), Helsinki Rules.

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According to the Convention on Non-navigational Watercourses, one of the fundamental principles of non-navigational uses of transboundary waterways is the equitable utilisation. Its Article 5 outlines this principle in the following manner: Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present Convention. Again what constitutes an equitable utilisation is determined by geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors, social and economic needs of watercourse states involved, population dependent on the watercourse of watercourse states, effects of use of the watercourses in one watercourse state on other watercourse states, existing and potential uses of the watercourse, conservation, and availability of alternatives of comparable value to a particular planned or existing use.45 The unilateral assumption and commission of the Indian rivers linking project would be an unfair and unjust approach to the development of common water resources. It would certainly compromise the lawful rights and entitlements of Bangladesh to its international rivers. This “principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party” is the essence of Article 9 of the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty on the Sharing of the Ganges Water at Farakka 1996. India is obliged under international law not to undertake and operate the project in a manner that undermines the equitable shares of Bangladesh. The ongoing Ganges water diversion at Farakka by India has already diluted the right of Bangladesh to reasonable and fair share of its international rivers. The proposed project is fraught with the possibility of eroding this right even further. 13.4.5 Principle of prior notice There are some procedural principles and obligations in international law warranting a riparian state desirous of undertaking a project in common rivers to comply with. These include the duty to serve adequate prior notice of intention and the factual state of affairs, to actively engage in consultation, negotiation and mediation and to suspend the proposed project pending the peaceful settlement of the dispute.46 The Helsinki Rules in its Article XXIX further obliges any state which is planning to develop construction or installation that would alter the regime of the basin should furnish notice to the lower riparian which is likely to be affected due to the change in the water system. The notice would include essential facts which enable the recipient to make an assessment of the probable effect of the proposed alteration.47 The Convention on Non-navigational Watercourses contains specific provisions for such prior notification and information sharing. Articles 11–17 require parties to exchange information on the possible effects of

45

Article 6, Ibid. C.B. Bourne, “Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins: Notice and Exchange of Information” (1972) 22 Univ. Toronto L J, 172; for an analysis of this procedural requirement, see M.R. Islam, Ganges Water Dispute: Its International Legal Aspects, The University Press Limited, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1987, 62–101; M.R. Islam, “The Ganges Water Dispute: An Appraisal of a Third Party Settlement” (1987) 27:8 Asian Survey, 918–934. 47 Art. XXIX, Helsinki Rules. 46

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planned measures on the condition of an international watercourse, timely notification accompanied by available technical data and information, of planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States. India has carefully designed the rivers interconnection plan after carrying out necessary surveys and preparing feasibility reports in 1987. India proposed to interlink the Ganga and the Cauvery in 1972 followed by the creation of the National Water Development Authority in 1982 with the primary objective of interlinking of national rivers. After many unsuccessful attempts and scrutiny, the ruling National Democratic Alliance of India formulated the National Water Policy in 2002. It appointed a Special Task Force to supervise the interlinking of Indian rivers project in December 2002. India has already approached various international financial institutions for funding the project. Mr. Suresh Prabhu, Chairman of the Special Task Force, has visited the US and met with Texas Governor Rick Perry to seek technical and financial assistance for the project. Apparently, Texas agreed to be a partner in implementing the project. Mr. Suresh Prabhu has reportedly been assured of the assistance for the project through USAID and the World Bank.48 Notwithstanding all these developments, India is yet to serve any notice or inform Bangladesh about the intention of building the proposed project. Should India continue to pursue the project beyond the knowledge and consent of Bangladesh, it would have the effect of contravening the established procedural rules of international law that ensures the fairness of a development project in international rivers. Bangladesh has no control over the flow of rivers entering into its borders from upstream India. Bangladesh is constantly and consistently trying to solve its water resource management problems through cooperation with other co-riparians including India in exchanging information on aspects of hydrology, morphology, environmental aspects on sharing common water sources. The National Water Policy of Bangladesh emphasises this need to work jointly with co-riparian countries to harness, develop, and share the water resources of the international rivers to mitigate floods and augment flows of water during the dry season.49 These collaborative efforts resulted in the 1996 Treaty on the sharing of the Ganges Waters and a number of memoranda of understanding with India. These efforts are yet to solve the disputes between them over the sharing of common international rivers. Past bilateralism has not worked to benefit of Bangladesh. India has reaped the benefit of the bilateral arrangement either by withdrawing more than it was entitled to or violating the provisions of the bilateral treaties.50 Against this backdrop of bilateralism endeavours, the proposed Indian river linking project is widely seen as yet another decisive means of marginalising Bangladesh by its powerful neighbour by depriving the former of its right and share in common river waters.

48 See Shobha Warrier, “NRIs Keen on River Linking Project” Sustainable Development Networking Programme Bangladesh, http://www.sdnpbd.org/river_basin/persons_behind/nri_ready.htm. 49 Above note 9. 50 For an analysis of the Indo-Bangladesh bilateral process see generally, Joel McGregor, “The Internationalisation of Disputes Over Water: The Case of Bangladesh and India.” Paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, ANU, Canberra, October 3 to 6, 2000.

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13.4.6 The UN approach The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 1972 recognises that states have sovereign rights to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.51 Agenda 21 of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration) 1992 in Chapter 18 adopts an integrated approach to the management of shared water resources. It emphasises that “long term development of global freshwater requires holistic management of resources and a recognition of the interconnectedness of the elements related to freshwater and freshwater quality.”52 It further explains the interconnectedness and organic unity of the river system in the following words: “the complex interconnectedness of freshwater systems demands that freshwater management be holistic (taking a catchment management approach) and based on a balanced consideration of the needs of people and the environment.”53 The Report of the UN Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina in 1977 emphasised that “it is necessary for States to cooperate in the case of shared water resources in recognition of the growing economic, environmental, and physical interdependencies across international frontiers.”54 The inseparable interdependence of any river system is aptly explained by James Kraska: International drainage basins link riparian states into a common and interdependent freshwater system that connects the agriculture, industry, energy, and transportation sectors into an integrated regional unit. Action by one riparian may affect the quantity and quality of river water available to neighbouring states, imposing direct costs on other states in the basin. Basin nations share not just a river, but an entire ecosphere. Consequently, the potential for conflict, and the possibility of compromise and cooperation, exist side by side.55 Scientists predict that the Indian rivers linking project can upset the hydrological cycle by changing their directions. This would change the composition of the sediment load, river morphology and the shape of the delta formed at the river mouth. Construction of dams and canals will get villages dislocated, flood towns and cut through

51

Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972 UN Doc. A/CONF.48/ 14/Rev.1 (1972). 52 Agenda 21, June 13, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vols. I–III) (1992), paragraph 18.35. 53 Agenda 21, June 13, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vols. I–III) (1992), paragraph 18.36. 54 Report of the United Nations Water Conference; Mar del Plata, Argentina, 1977 UN Doc. E/CONF.70/29, at 53 (1977). 55 James Kraska, “Sustainable Development Is Security: The Role of Transboundary River Agreements as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in South Asia” (2003) 28 Yale J. Int’l L 481.

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millions of hectares of agricultural land. The large network of dams and canals will also alter natural drainage such that occasional flooding and waterlogging will inundate millions of hectares of agricultural land. Moulding of natural flood water will reduce land fertility gradually and over the years the fertile land will change into desert, affecting agricultural production.56 It is incumbent upon India to appreciate the fact that the river system in the sub-continent is a physical and geographical unity and as such indivisible. Any development project that artificially interrupts the physical unity and interdependence of the river system must ascertain and address the possible damages to the basin and its co-users.

13.5 CONCLUSION Existing and available resources need to be developed for economic growth. In this pursuit, the Indian rivers linkage project may not be seen as entirely unmerited. However, the proposed development must be a sustainable one not only from the Indian economic perspective but also from the economic standpoint of Bangladesh, which shares those rivers under consideration for the project. The need for an increase in the flow of water cannot be overstated for the maintenance of ecological balance and sustainable development in Bangladesh. There is an increasing demand for freshwater to meet up the need for growing population and the pursuit of economic and social development. Failure to secure a fair and rightful share of water from its international rivers will expose the economy, public health and industrial development of Bangladesh to uncertainty and grave risk. Severe deforestation, soil salinisation and waterlogging, drought and flooding, water pollution are some of the environmental impact that might follow from the river linking project. This project may adversely affect the lives of hundreds of millions of people with a detrimental effect on the whole economy of Bangladesh. Consequently the quest for sustainable development may be quite elusive. The economic justification for such a project in international rivers is not enough. Its planning, construction and commissioning must comply with the rules, principles and norms of international law governing the utilisation of international rivers. And a close legal scrutiny of the Indian project in terms of applicable international law suggests that the project so far suffers from a legitimacy crisis. Bangladesh, being the co-riparian of the rivers involved, has an equitable share recognised in and protected by international law. The current secretive and unilateral stand of India is seemingly not subsumable in international law and falls short of its obligation to respect the right of its co-riparian, Bangladesh. It is in the best interest of both India and Bangladesh that they avoid unilateralism and resort to constructive bilateralism in exploiting their common water resources. Mutual confidence and cooperation between the two co-riparians in managing their transboundary river basins will help attain the goal of sustainable development and bring regional peace and security. The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) can also play a crucial role not only ironing out the differences between India

56

Imran Ali, “Interlinking of Indian Rivers”, (2004) 86:4 Current Science, 499.

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and Bangladesh on the project, but also assist in undertaking an integrated and comprehensive sub-regional common water resources management scheme for the greater benefit of all SAARC countries. Adherence to such a collaborative approach would minimise, if not overcome, various international legal issues and their implications arising out of the project. Simultaneously it would maximise the optimum utilisation of sub-continental water resources towards efficient flood management, irrigation, river system development hydro-electric power generation for the well-being of poverty-stricken people in both countries.

14 The Indigenous Knowledge Systems of Water Management in India RAJENDRA SINGH

14.1 THE TRADITIONAL TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN INDIA In Indian tradition, the knowledge was transmitted through practical work under the direction of respected elders and gurus. Thus the people engaged in practical work were really the pupils of the indigenous knowledge system. The poor pupils, the prosperous pupils, and the State joined hands for the conservation of water and the preservation of knowledge. The prosperous pupils provided help to the poorest who were working for water conservation, and the State provided only the land. It was a pupil-driven decentralized water management, which is another name for indigenous water management.

This functional management of water had wisdom of every drop of rain. These drops of rain were the life of the Indian pupil. This indigenous knowledge system respected the agro-ecological zone diversity, and had developed a specific science, a relevant engineering and a technology appropriate to each and every part of the country. Abhaneri Baori, Dausa

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WATER MANAGEMENT

The lowest rainfall in India is in the arid districts of Jaisalmer and Badmer. There the people have a Tanka in every house for drinking and domestic use. They also have a pond (Talab) for common use and drinking water for animals. They also use Kuinya, for harvesting drinking water present in the form of sand moisture in the sub-surface, where the aquifer is brackish and separated from the layers above it by a layer of gypsum.

The ancient indigenous engineering was not much documented in the modern sense, because the technical aspects were transmitted through practice and words of mouth, and gradually perfected by tradition. But in some cases the legal and administrative aspects were written, for example in Kautilya’s Arthasastra (Treatise of Administration written by Kautilya, advisor and minister of the first Indian emperor Chandragupta Maurya, 321-297 BC). One chapter of the Arthasastra gives a testimony of very comprehensive and detailed administrative rules, covering the whole range of legal and economic implications of a decentralized communitydriven water management, facilitated by the State. Making a Kuinya

Cross-section above the gypsum layer

The ruler had to provide land, roads, trees and equipment to those who participated to the construction of waterworks. Those who did not participate were made to pay a contribution, but were not entitled to benefit directly from the structure. The methods of ownership and maintenance of new, ancient and repaired structures were described in details. All users of irrigation facilities had to pay a tax, even when they had their own waterworks. But exemption of tax was granted for a number of years to those who build new structures. However, these administrative rules were only safeguards and practical provisions for the economic consequences of the implementation of waterworks. The real motivation came from another side: The participation to construction of community ponds, tanks and waterworks was a matter of pride and of religious devotion. Gadhsisar Tank, Jaisalmer: The level of water is measured with the sculptures of different animals, for an easy recognition of water level and its consequences.

In Bihar, the problem is not lack of water but excessive water. Every year, devastating floods spread havoc in the state. The ancient indigenous knowledge had developed a method which puts to use the excess water, called “Ahar-Pyne”, which is in

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fact a “flood water harvesting system”. The excess water from the Ganges was driven by channels called “pyne” deep inside the land, up to 30 to 40 km, to fill tanks called “ahar”. This ensured a long-lasting retention of water throughout the year, and a better distribution of silt. The local Indigenous Knowledge in India has always developed practical ways for Society to live in a sustainable manner with Nature, in full respect with the diversity of agro-ecological climatic zones, even those that seems the most difficult and inhospitable.

14.2 THE LOSS OF TRADITION, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES The conservation of forest, water bodies and other natural resources in an extremely healthy state over the past thousands of years even under difficult climatic and geographic conditions and with a growing population and demand, was essentially due to an extremely eco-friendly cultural traditions (dharma/parampara) of “live within what Nature sustainability release, don’t be greedy”. The traditional knowledge and practices of every area imbibed a thorough understanding of ecological balances and technologies to harness natural resources in a sustainable and eco-friendly manner, though these had never been documented. For centuries, the line of thinking that soil, water, forest, wildlife and the whole environment are the common asset of the local people bestowed by the almighty to be managed as a “trust”, was the commonly accepted worldview. This age-old balance has been disturbed at an accelerating pace in the last 200 years, and every revolution and counter-revolution has indeed increased the depth of the fall: the industrial revolution, the education revolution, the agricultural “green” revolution, the “development” revolution, and now the “privatization” and “information technology” revolutions. The European colonizers brought the idea that Nature was to be “exploited”, and undermined the feeling of responsibility for Nature. The modern State (colonial or independent) dispossessed the rural communities of their rights and responsibilities, and in the name of common good and conservation, has been selling bit by bit the forests and rivers, either legally (tree felling licenses, water rights) or illegally (corruption). The education revolution convinced the people that traditions and oral knowledge were the causes of poverty, the “development” and socialist “welfare” post-independence State promoted the illusion that everything has to be taken care of only by an all-powerful government, and now that the reality of its incompetence has become clear, the capitalistic empires, Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and high-technologies (IT, GMO, etc.) are called to the rescue, most likely to result in further and deeper degradation. To make things even more difficult, the language itself has become corrupted. For example, the official jargon for the undisciplined water extraction technology is “groundwater development”. And, when educated engineers seem to re-discover the ancient tradition of responsible management of common resources, unfortunately they create abstractions and awkward technologies, like “artificial groundwater recharge”, ignoring the proved local traditions like Johads. Even when they begin to understand a traditional technology like the Tanka, they feel compelled to “improve” it, like using cement instead of lime, or Rainforest or Cement Concrete (RCC) slabs instead of brick domes, thus degrading the tradition and its relevance, to the level of their limited understanding. The natural methods are not only forgotten, their vestiges are day after day more deeply dug into the ground.

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To sum-up, the difficulties that we are facing can be categorized as such: 14.2.1 Paradigm change Exploitation and disintegration has taken the place of “feeling together” and integration. 14.2.2 State takeover community functions The State has dispossessed the Communities of their traditional rights and responsibilities. 14.2.3

Syndrome of dependence

Wherever the State succeeded (even partially or for a short period) in implementing modern amenities like water supply, sewage or power, the communities have lost their initiative. 14.2.4

Neglect of traditional systems

Due to implementation or expectation of modern facilities, the traditional systems have been neglected. 14.2.5

Disintegration of community institutions

The modern education and hollow dreams of modernity have disintegrated the Community Institutions. 14.2.6

Inability to cope with increasing human and livestock population

The general degradation of natural and social conditions has led to the inability of communities to face the problems created by a growing demand. The rural communities have lost their food and livelihood security, their living conditions have become more difficult, resulting in forced migration to big cities in search of survival in indecent and exploitative conditions.

14.3

RE-AWAKENING THE INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE

14.3.1

Traditional water harvesting systems in India

There are various types of methods of Water Harvesting in India. The main common features of all systems are:





Use of local resources and technology. Community based operation. Community driven de-centralized water management. Sustainable conservation and use of natural resources.

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14.3.3

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Revival of systems using indigenous knowledge Interventions understanding traditional systems and use of indigenous knowledge. Mobilization of community around land, water, and forest. Participation in rejuvenating old structures and construction of new structures. Creation of new village level and river basin institutions. How Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) has revived the tradition of Johad

On the night of 2 October 1985, when I got down at the last stop of the bus at Bheekampura, with four of my friends, we only had a single agenda, which was “to fight injustice against the people”. And we only knew one way to do it, by spreading literacy in the villages. So we promptly started a literacy drive. But the people suffered from a severe scarcity of water. The Region that once sustained the eco-system of the “Aravalli” had become barren.

It was difficult to find young people in the villages, all of them had fled in search of employment, women trudged long distances to fetch a mere pot full of water. Crops failed regularly, lack of vegetation led to soil degradation; monsoon runoff washed away the topsoil. I remember there was not a single blade of grass in the region and we often stumbled on the carcass of cattle. Barely 3 per cent of cultivable area was irrigated. Life was difficult and hardship endless. One day, Mangu Patel, the wise old man of this village told me, “we do not want your literacy, we want Water”. But where was the Water? I did not know anything about Water. Mangu explained to me about the rich tradition existing in this region of building “Johads”, which were a prime example of the ingenuity of inexpensive simple traditional technology that was quite remarkable in terms of recharging groundwater of the entire region. “Johads” are simple mud and concave shaped barriers built across the slope to arrest the rainwater runoff with a high embankment on three sides while the fourth side is left open for the water to enter. The height of the embankment is such that the capacity of the “Johad” is more than the volume of runoff coming from the catchment based on a rough estimation of maximum possible runoff that could come into it. Therefore the height varies from one “Johad” to another, depending on the site, water flow, and pressure etc. In some cases to ease the water pressure a masonry structure called “Afra” is also made for the outlet of excess water. The water storage area varies from 2 hectares to a maximum of 100 hectares. The Water collected in a “Johad” during monsoon penetrates into the sub-soil. This recharges the groundwater and improves the soil moisture in vast areas, mostly down

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stream. The groundwater can be drawn from traditional open wells, built and maintained by the villagers themselves without any input from outside. As the percolation process takes sometime, depending on the soil, depth of water etc. during this temporary period (sometimes several months), the water in the Johad is directly used for irrigation, drinking of animals, and other domestic purposes. The advantage of this structure is that apart from arresting and storing rainwater, it checks the soil erosion, mitigates the floods, and ensures water availability in wells even for several successive drought years, like we had here in the last 5 years. Also, during the dry season when the water gradually recedes in the Johad, the land inside the Johad itself becomes available for cultivation. This land receives periodically good silt and moisture, and that allows growing crops without any irrigation. So the Johad does not take away valuable arable land from cultivation. The distinctiveness of this structure is that it is based on simple and cheap technology with locally available resources, mostly labour and soil, and sometimes when necessary, stones, sand, and lime, all locally available. All the estimations are based on the villagers experience and intuition, without any physical measurements. When I went to Bheekampura in 1985, this unique traditional water management system was still alive in the collective memory of the people remained alienated from the global environment. On the advice by Mangu Patel, we became a catalyst to building “Johads”, the local authorities were dead against us as we by-passed all bureaucratic channels and dealt with the people directly to fulfill their requirements in the manner they decided. The first “Johad” took three years to build, in the fourth year we built 50 “Johads”, in the fifth we built almost 100 in 2001 we built around 1,000 water structures and in total we have built nearly 9,000 water harvesting structures in more than 1,000 villages. When we started working, our area was classified by the government as “dark zone”, it means with severe water shortage and the water level had receded to difficult depths. The same area after 10 years was classified as “white zone”, which means underground water level are satisfactory and it does not need attention from the government. No Engineer was called for consultation; we were guided entirely by the traditional wisdom of the people who have maintained the ecological balance for generations. These water structures were built with the active participation of the community in its construction from identification of the site to the designing of the structure and by contribution in the cost of its construction and latter in its maintenance, which ensured that all the structures were need based.

The construction of Johad is going on.

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As a result, water became abundant; more water meant better crops, better conditions of soil, time for the girls to go to schools, and rich community life. It helped forestation in the area and development of wildlife.

Due to the Water Level, growing of vegetables without irrigation has become possible in the once barren land of Nimbi Village (picture on the right).

Girls in a village school (in 1988).

Groundwater level in wells of the village buja before and after Johad Water level of well after Johad, 1994 (in feet)

No.

Total depth of well (in feet) 1988

1.

81.0

Dry completely

44.5

2.

73.0

Dry completely

37.0

3.

67.0

3 feet

40.5

4.

55.5

4 feet (dry most of the time)

27.0

5.

81.0

10 feet

66.0

Water level before Johad

6.

69.0

20 feet

50.0

7.

43.0

15 feet

35.0

8.

83.0

20 feet

58.0

9.

80.5

19 feet

55.0

10.

66.5

Dry completely

25.0

Prosperity returned back to the region, agriculture became productive and due to availability of fodder cattle rearing started, resulting in increased production of milk. Higher water levels also meant less money on the diesel for pump set.

Source: Kishore (undated).

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Small Inputs, Great Returns In 1985 only 20 per cent of the agricultural land was cultivated, now it is 100 per cent, and villages started selling surplus grains in market for the first time. Studies have shown that an investment of R.100 per capita on a “Johad” raises the economic production in the village by as much as R. 400 per capita per annum.

4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200 1400 1600

(Rise in Annual Gross Village Product in Rs. Per Capita against Investment in Water Conservation Per Capita. Source: G.D. Agrawal, 1996).

As village mobilized themselves to improve their quality of life by contributing in building “Johads”, this participation of the people promoted the community to become self-reliant optimizing social cohesion and emotive bonding in the community. Since people realized that members were responsible not only for individual but also collective action, they became more aware of their rights taking on an activist stance to stop employment of children in the carpet industry and fought a legal battle up to the Supreme Court of India to stop indiscriminate mining on Forest Land. An enlightened and active community also enforced self-discipline for the common good of the village. They strictly enforced their own rules to stop deforestation, hunting wildlife and consumption of liquor. The development of community participation through the “Gram Sabha” or Village Assembly, gave each and everyone an opportunity to freely discuss, decide and implement a common decision taken for the general benefit. This process also made them reflects on the problems of others in there community and helps each other in solving them. While the community became active in social and economic change, the crime rate dropped in the villages as economic conditions improved of the entire region. This momentum in the community caused by the construction of “Johads”, has encouraged the villagers to go further looking for innovative methods of Social Change. Now the greatest challenge before them is to sustain those traditional values that started this movement in the face of the transformation of the community due to progress and prosperity.

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The rebirth of Arvari River

From 1985 onwards we have been helping people to build Johads. These Johads are traditional earthen dams. These small scales, low cost structures do not look like very much, but taken together in hundreds and thousands they have changed the face of our part of India (Rajasthan). TBS has helped people to build more than 9,000 Johads, Check Dams, and Anicuts for Harvesting the Rain Water. In 1996 we were amazed to find Arvari River flowing even at the peak of summer.

River Goes Dry

River is Flowing

Excess withdrawal of Groundwater.

Increased Groundwater Recharge. Less Groundwater Extraction.

Since then four more rivers, Sarsa, Ruparel, Bhagani and Jahajwali have become perennial. When there was plenty of water in Arvari, there was natural growth of fish, which went on multiplying. Seeing that the government wanted to get hold of fish and brought in a contractor. The people resisted and the Government had to cancel the contract. It is not that the local people wanted control over the fish. Far from it. They are all vegetarians and do not eat fish, but they realized that today it was fish tomorrow it would be water.

Since 1940s the Arvari River had been degraded to a mere monsoon drain, witnessing only brief and strong flows of muddy water. We had been building these structures over the years without realizing that we were in fact recharging the river through percolation underground. Now the water is clear and flows gently throughout the year.

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The same place, on 10 February 2005.

Since 1940s, the Arvari had become a monsoon drain (photo 1990) (to the right). The changed face of Arvari. Since 1996, the river is flowing again perennially (above).

The government through the contractor was intruding into community’s domain, its right over the use of water. Water as a resource was developed by them and they wanted to have full control over it. If they had allowed that intrusion to succeed, the leadership would have failed the community to protect its right over water. But since they resisted and won, one can see the shift in the centre of power as far as’ control over use of Arvari water is concerned. Then there was fear that intrusion having taken place once could take place again. Besides there were differences over sharing of Arvari waters within the community. This led to the formation of Arvari Sansad (Parliament) representing 72 villages and it has framed 11 rules for use of Arvari water. This Parliament meets 2 times a year. In this example, you see community leadership in action in protecting a resource.



First people work on their priority i.e. water, and develop this resource through rainwater harvesting. Second when resource is fully developed there is an intrusion to demolish the concept of people’s right over water.

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Third community puts up a strong resistance and removes intrusion. Fourth community consolidates and takes responsibility. It gets a mandate from 72 Villages.

Finally a lesson – the Community initiated work unites people and builds bonds of cooperation between different constituent groups. The restoration of the River Arvari to life is also the story of various watersheds linked to each other. Contrary to the impractical engineer’s dream (or nightmare?) of interlinking of rivers” (current project of massive inter-basin water transfer), it is a logical conclusion of decades of water conservation work by the people, and a practical and efficient step towards retrieving the link between the people and their river in a meaningful and useful manner. The Arvari river is the lifeline of prosperity for 72 villages situated along its bank, and the Arvari River Parliament acknowledges this fact and just draws the logical conclusion: This river has to be taken care of, in a civilized, concerted and responsible manner.

14.4 ARWARI RIVER PARLIAMENT 14.4.1 Need for Arwari Parliament Why should people come together to form a parliament around natural resources is a big question? It would have been impossible to think of river parliament without the TBS intervention in formation of new institutions, such as, Village Water Council and Women Self Help Groups (SHG), and construction of different kinds of water harnessing structures directly benefiting the population. Rise in groundwater level and increase in area under cultivation and irrigation tempted people to listen to the TBS idea of formation of the River Parliament. The awareness built by various discussion, group meetings, training’s, exposure trips etc. also contributed in mobilizing and sensitizing community to form a group to address inter and intra village land, water and vegetation related issues and to resolve conflicts if any. Also events, such as conflict between state and community in reaping benefits of water stored and conflicting claims over ownership and control over surface water harnessed through various structures triggered the idea of coming together and protecting the interest of the community.1 14.4.2 Arwari parliament The concept of river basin approach was applied to Arwari River Basin in Alwar district of Rajasthan using community centre water management approach. On December 28, 1998 a River Parliament of 70 villages with the membership of 205 was formed in the catchment area of Arwari River. The parliament meets twice a year at the interval of six months. The Arwari Parliament met 14 times since its formation.

1 Water harnessing structure called Jabbar Sagar dam in Hamirpur village was constructed by Tarun Bharat Sangh. The State Government tried to claim ownership and control over water by floating tender for fishery activities in 1996. One fine morning a contractor came to collect fish from the dam. The village community was taken by surprise as they were under the impression that water belongs to them. The community fought with the State and finally won their claim over water and fish resources.

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The Arwari River Basin has got 46 micro watersheds. There are broadly two major streams starting from the top of the basin and joining at the dam called Sainthal Sagar. Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS) – continuously constructing water harvesting structures in the catchment area along with other watershed management activities. It resulted into rise in groundwater table in the basin and increase in the longevity of flow in the Arwari River. Holistic view in management of natural resources by undertaking land, water, vegetation related activities was the objective of TBS. As the existing formal state structure i.e. the different department of government, namely Forest, Irrigation, Groundwater and Revenue department have almost failed to check the deteriorating condition of natural resources, TBS tried to educate people on the NRM issues by forming a Village Water Council in each village. The objective of this village institution was mainly to protect, conserve and manage the natural resources in a sustainable way by community participation. After long years of hard work these councils made a dent in natural resource management by forming certain informal rules, acceptable to all the village members. However, water and vegetation are common pool resource and do not belong to only a single village as was contemplated while planning Arwari River Parliament. More than one village had access to and use of forest and water resources. It was decided to form a River Basin Parliament comprising of several micro watersheds. It was planned that each Village Water Council (VWC) will be represented by nominating two or three members in the parliament. A working group of 20 members including few co-opted members from outside basin to guide the proceedings and activities of Arwari Parliament was also proposed. It was planned to have at least two meetings of full house and more than twice of the Management Committee or Working Group as and when needed. The main goal of this parliament was to create a larger vision or perspective i.e. thinking beyond a village, in management of common pool resources. The specific objectives were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Sustainable management of natural resources through Arwari Parliament; Control usages of water by treating it a scarce resource; Managing the soil fertility and checking land erosion by construction of anicuts, mairbandi and johads; Stopping illegal mining activity negatively affecting the land, water and vegetation; Generating self-employment and alternative livelihood options through better management of land, water and forest resources; Sensitizing and building awareness among women groups on water relates issues and seek their active participation; Increase agricultural productivity by growing water saving crops with local seeds and manure.

In the first meeting of parliament certain guidelines were drawn to regulate the behaviour of people, foresee future problems in management of NRM, resolve conflicts if any related to access and use of resources, provide guidelines for conservation, protection and management of resources, and treat water and forest as a community resource rather than private property. The specific informal rules formulated are as follows: 1. 2.

Ban on sale of fish produced in the water stored by anicuts or johad to contractor; Ban on use of pumps to lift water from anicuts;

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Not to sale land for mining or quarrying or industrial activity; Encouraging people to grow water saving crops; Restrict use of chemical fertilizer; Limiting production of cotton and sugarcane crop only for self-consumption; Construction of anicut, johad and mairbandi to check free flow of rainwater; Construction of mairbandi to check degradation of farmlands; The issues related to land, water and vegetation to be dealt by combined effort of village community by ensuring maximum participation of households in a village.

These informal rules are discussed in each parliament meeting to highlight practical problems in their implementation and suggest new guidelines if needed. Suggestions if any are also debated and discussed to see that the members agree to implement in their respective villages. In the parliament meeting members report their efforts in implementing the objectives of the parliament and seek guidance for resolving conflicts if any. Most of the conflicts pertaining to access control and management of resources are resolved in the meetings of Village Water Council. 14.4.3

The organization of parliament

The basin level institution created by TBS is expected to perform several roles such as: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

To conserve water resources and emphasize on demand side management; To ensure community control and management over water resources; Equitable distribution of resources; Provide equal access to all sections of the society; Ensure sustainable use of water resource to protect interest of future generation; To resolve conflict if any around water resources; and To organize and empower people through natural resource management.

It was the part of the scheme to ensure equal participation of women on all its activities and see that they too are empowered in the process. In the organization structure it was planned to have both men and women representatives. Presently women are actively participating in all the activities. Being a very young organization and first of its kind it will take sometime to understand and act. Different stakeholders are taking lot of time to understand the concept of river parliament and get in practice. As it requires change in perception from individual, private, narrow profit maximization approach to a broad, village and basin level community approach to water resource management. People gradually understand the benefits of coming together and managing natural resources. So far they were having all the freedom to use land, water and forest resources to meet not only domestic requirement but derive livelihood at the cost of complete degradation or deterioration of the natural resource. The social sanctions approved by the parliament are adhered by most of the villagers. It has made lot of dent on their behaviour pattern towards natural resource management. Arwari Parliament has provided people a platform to address their needs, prioritize them and design use patterns, which can maintain health of the resources. It has also provided opportunity for young local leaders to come up and safeguard the interest of the community. The discussion in meetings of Arwari Parliament is quite open

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providing equal opportunity both for men and women to express their views. Despite all these benefits there are objectives yet partially attended. It is not that people do not want to address those issues but the process of evolution in any institution takes lot of time and energy to arrive at major issues of equity and access in use of natural resources. There were traditional norms for sharing of water from a well in case of joint ownership. These are still in practice. The major problem attaining the objectives of equity and access is the multiple and undefined nature of property regimes. The ownership and control rights are loosely defined, rarely understood in a proper perspective and practiced. In case of water, surface and groundwater is governed by different laws related to private property, state property and community property. Groundwater is completely privately controlled and managed. On the other hand surface water harnessed by construction of structures both by state and community are legally owned by state. Also the water laws are directly in favour of the state government and people are mostly unaware of these laws. Groundwater is treated as private property and therefore used in a fashion to maximize individual profits at the cost of over exploitation of the resource to the extent that has negative environmental impact. However in case of forest resources ownership rights are clear and therefore, better managed by community compare to water resources. The community efforts in water resources are mostly in the form of harnessing of rainwater by creation of different types of surface structures. Community participation is ensured while construction of the structures right from the beginning and therefore people show interest in Arwari Parliament. 14.4.4

Impact of Arwari Parliament

There are direct and indirect impact of Arwari Parliament. These can be categorized into three broad aspects namely, Physical, Economic and Social. In category of Physical impact, it is mostly the protection of water resources, increase in area under cultivation, improvement in the quality of land and forest resources and most important of all is physical community control over land, water, and forest resources. Economic impact is largely manifested in change in livelihood pattern because of improved access to water resources in general and groundwater specifically. Increase in water availability has led to several commercial activities such as production of tomato and other vegetables, increase in employment and trade activities. Because of increase in agricultural production of both commercial and other nature, marketing in activities came up in a big way, exporting produce from river basin to metropolitan cities, establishment of commercial states and activities of middle men and other businessmen dealing with the produce, transport activity, emergence of service such as agro service centres, commercial shops, dhabas, tea stalls etc. This has also led to diversification in livelihood activities. Several livelihood alternative came up which has engaged large number of population and stop them migrating outside in search of jobs. The social impacts, is quite significant as the Arwari parliament empowered people to fight for their claims over resources, question state bureaucracy of their programmes and plans, and better implementation of programmes at ground level. Further it also help drawing plans for future use of natural resources. It is particularly the women who had no chance to put forward their views and opinion in any of the policy matter or activities in a village got platform to represent their case. Now they are participating in all the activities organized at village or basin level. It is also important to note that the Self-Help Groups formed by women are all active and doing well compare to the failure of groups

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formed by men. Women SHG’s have changed status of women in the household activities and decision making. 14.4.5

Challenges faced by the Arvari River Parliament

There is a lack of clarity regarding the Ownership and Responsibility for Water Harvesting Structures and the resulting Water Resources. The Aravari Parliament attempts to retrieve the ancient tradition of Community responsibility towards Common Resources, in a difficult legal and administrative environment, with its impractical and counterproductive provisions, which lets the so-called “owner” of a plot of land, do virtually anything with the soil and water, including for example emptying the whole aquifer or polluting the soil for ever, but which puts a lot of obstruction in the way of any initiative for community-based management of the common resources. One of these obstructions is the Irrigation and Drainage Act, 1954, which does not recognize the indigenous water management system. In all this, workers of TBS function as facilitators with Gram Sabhas and their leaders. But all this is possible when every member of Village Community has a feeling of Ownership. This feeling of ownership is very important and is a product of one’s contribution, participation, and sharing. 14.5 REVIVING THE INDIGENOUS TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE: TARUN JAL VIDYAPEETH After having run a 9-month training for its own volunteers for many years, Tarun Bharat Sangh has started in 2005 a Professional School of Water: Tarun Jal Vidyapeeth. The Vidyapeeth offers different courses open to all and specifically designed to fulfill the needs of young village boys and girls. The course design process itself involves the active participation of the students, to ensure a “need-based” course and their full commitment and responsibility for the revival of the indigenous knowledge system of water management. 14.6 THE USE OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IN TBS WORK Awareness in the Community




Awareness of various aspects of water management. Respect for culture, traditions and historical practices. Will to work together for community’s common interest.

Working Strategy





Constitution of Village Councils – Monthly meetings of all grown ups. Maximum possible use of traditional technology with advice from engineers if needed. All decisions including technical (sitting, materials, design etc.) by Gram Sabha. All decisions by consensus, and not majority.

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Role of women in helping reach consensus. Minimum of 30 per cent of total cost contribution is by the community – rest from support agencies thru TBS.

Operation and Maintenance


Total responsibility assumed by the community.

A Gram Sabha (Village Council) in 2005.

Water Abstraction and Use Management



River Parliament (Arvari Sansad) with all 72 villages of Arvari Basin represented. Responsible for planning and enforcing sustainable use of water, particularly in agriculture.

A map of village Bhaonta-Kolyala at the upper ridge of Arvari River, showing the Johads, the water streams, wells, habitations, mountains and forest.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Agarwal, A. and Narain, S.: Dying Wisdom, Center for Science and Environment. New Delhi, 1997. Agrawal, G.D.: An Engineer’s Evaluation of Water Conservation Efforts of Tarun Bharat Sangh in 36 Villages of Alwar District, 1996 (unpublished). Agrawal, G.D.: Turning th Odds into Advantages, How Tarun Bharat Sangh Overcame the Threat to the River System of Rajasthan, 2004 (unpublished). Kishore, A.: Taking Control of Their Lives, undated. Mishra, A.: Aj bhi kare hai talab. Gandhi Peace Foundation, New Delhi, 1993. Mishra, A.: Rajasthan ki rajat bunde (The radiant raindrops of Rajasthan). Gandhi Peace Foundation, New Delhi, 1995. Rathore, M.S.: Arvari River Parliament, 2003 (unpublished). Singh, R.: Indian Water Management. Water Philosophy and Alternatives in Gandhiji’s Philosophy. Singh, R.: Acceptance Speech for the Magsaysay Award, 2001 (unpublished). Singh, R.: Paryavara astha ebong bharatiya parampara. Environmental Conservation and Indian Consciousness, Jaipur, 2004.

15 Water-Based Cooperation in the GBM Region with Particular Focus on Interlinking of Rivers in India QAZI KHOLIQUZZAMAN AHMAD

15.1 BACKGROUND Nature has irrevocably destined the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Bhutan to be geographical neighbours and to share three mighty common river systems, namely, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the Meghna (GBM) (Figure 15.1). It stands to reason, therefore, that they work together within a mutually beneficial framework to develop and manage the waters of these river systems and equitably share the benefits in terms of direct uses of water (for example, in household, agriculture, industry, fishery, and forestry) and the use of hydro-electricity generated as well as from improved flood and drought management. The GBM region is endowed with huge water resources on an annual basis as a result of heavy precipitation and the Himalayan snowmelt, but largely for concentrated during the five monsoon months, June to September. This region, therefore, suffers from floods during the monsoon, although some parts face drought even in this season. But, there is widespread scarcity of water in the region during the dry months from January to May, particularly in March and April. In Bangladesh, over 80 per cent of the annual runoff is concentrated during the four monsoon months from June to September. One myth may be dispelled quickly, which is that some people talk about Bangladesh being endowed with so much water resources that by storing monsoon waters it can solve its problem of water shortages during the dry months. Topographically, Bangladesh is mostly flat and storing of monsoon waters of any significance is not possible, and the monsoon flows that belt down furiously cannot even be regulated, let alone storing water out of those flows even if the geographic scope existed. Hence, any talk about storing monsoon waters to solve Bangladesh’s dry season water scarcities reflects sheer ignorance about the reality. Of the huge runoff over Bangladesh during the monsoon, 92 per cent or more enters the country from India, the immediate upper riparian, to go down to the Bay of Bengal. Between 20 and 30 per cent of the country is flooded every year and from time to time devastating floods occur inundating up to two-thirds or even more of the country. Devastating floods have been becoming increasingly frequent over the past 50 years. There was an interregnum of 19 years between the devastating floods occurring in 1955 and 1974, which declined to 14 years to the next devastating flood in 1988, to 10 years to the next one in 1998, and to 3 years to the more recent one in 2007 (Figure 15.2). It is very likely that climate change

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caused by global warming will lead to intensified precipitation and consequent devastating floods in the region more frequently; and, with sea-level rise, also as a consequence of global warming, these floods would be of longer duration, as water flows to the sea will be impeded as a result. These floods usually cause large scale losses and damages involving crops, roperty, livestock, industry, infrastructure, and other sectors as well as widespread human suffering due to breakdown of the livelihoods and health hazards arising from vector- and water-borne diseases. Human lives are also lost (Ahmad et al., 2000).

Fig. 15.1 The Ganges basin and Farakka Barrage. Boundaries of the Brahmaputra and Meghna basins are also shown (Mirza, 2003).

70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20%

0%

1955 1956 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

10%

Fig. 15.2 Flooded area from 1954 to 2007. Note: 2007 is estimated but not final.

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On the other hand, the shortages of water in the dry season has been causing serious damages to agriculture, fishery, livestock, industry as well as other sectors of the economy, particularly in the northwest and southwest of Bangladesh, significantly reducing the sectoral productivities, economic benefits, and employment opportunities. Bangladesh, therefore, has to find ways of managing floods more effectively on one hand and augment its lean season water availability on the other in order to pursue the goals of increasing economic growth, enhancing employment opportunities, and reducing poverty at accelerated rates. The commitment to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Box 15.1), particularly the goal of reducing poverty ratio to half by 2015 relative to 2002 (as modified in the Bangladesh Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper from the MDG base year of 1990) is a challenge that cannot be met with any reasonable success unless the above mentioned two serious water-related problems of floods and water shortages can be minimized.

Box 15.1 Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations The Goals

1

Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

2

Achieve universal primary education

3

Promote gender equality and empower women

4

Reduce child mortality

5

Improve maternal health

6

Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

7

Ensure environmental sustainability

8

Develop a global partnership for development

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15.2 GBM REGIONAL COOPERATION In the context of finding the solution to both these water sectors problems, GBM regional cooperation has a key role to play. Indeed, it has been shown by various studies that GBM regional water-based cooperation is beneficial to all the co-riparians as cooperation will enlarge the cake (in terms of augmentation of dry season water flows, minimization of flood risks and impacts, hydro-electricity generation, irrigation opportunities, expanded economic activity, improved productivities, expanded employment and income earning opportunities, etc.) to be shared. There are very large win-win, water-based cooperation prospects, which the regional countries can exploit for mutual benefit. Since the GBM region is home to the largest concentration of the world’s poor (about 40 per cent or 480 million out of 1.2 billion poor people worldwide), there is a growing need for regional cooperation to expand the economic activity, broaden the opportunities of employment generation for the downtrodden and accelerate poverty reduction in all the co-riparians. But, unfortunately, GBM regional cooperation has not even been taken up as a serious project. Bilateralism is favoured by India. Indeed, there is merit to bilateralism for solving bilateral problems such as the sharing of the existing flows of the common rivers. But, there are regional issues such as augmentation of dry season flows of common rivers running across several regional countries, which must be addressed regionally. A cooperation regime has, therefore, to be established in the GBM region, which will allow any two neighbours to address bilateral issues between them and, also, several regional countries to come together when the concerned issues are regional. This proposition stands to logic and I do not think anybody will disagree with the logic of this approach. Unfortunately, this comprehensive approach is not acceptable to India, which continues to insist on bilateralism only. A set of basic principles of cooperation on common rivers has been outlined in both the Mahakali (between India and Nepal) and Ganges (between Bangladesh and India) Treaties, signed in January and December 1996, respectively. It has been agreed and set out in the two Treaties that, in respect of any intervention on any common river, the principles of equity, fairness, and no harm to other co-riparians will be adhered to. Given this policy framework I do not see why the Water Resources Ministers of the GBM regional countries cannot meet and produce a mutually beneficial cooperation framework, involving both bilateral and regional water and related issues. Studies conducted during the 1990s by the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (BUP), Dhaka; the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi; and the Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS), Kathmandu generated useful background material and analysis in respect of a number of mutually beneficial potential areas of bilateral (between Bangladesh and India; and between India and Nepal) and regional (involving all the three countries) cooperation. There are also other studies conducted by the same group since then as well as by other professional groups and, of course, there are materials available with the governments. Thus, a strong information and analysis base exists to build on. It is possible to move forward, given determined political will on the part of all co-riparians. If necessary, the process may even begin with a meeting of the Heads of State or Government to agree to build mutually beneficial water-based cooperation in the region and then mandate the Water Resource Ministers of the countries to take up the matter with earnestness and start showing results as quickly as possible. One major stumbling block is the bureaucracy in all the countries. If a strong collective political will emerges in the region to cooperate on water and related issues for mutual benefit, then bureaucracy should be given a clear direction to find solutions and not remain cocooned in the old

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mindsets of non-cooperation. An ardent believer in regional cooperation, not only within water sector but wherever potentials exist in other sectors, which can be tremendously beneficial to all the regional countries, I hope that the political leaderships of the regional countries will rise above narrow mindsets and resolve to move forward together, as this makes sense in terms of larger economic and social benefits for all as well as for peaceful, friendly co-existence. 15.3 INDIAN SCHEME OF INTERLINKING RIVERS The proposed ILR consists of, broadly, two components: (i) the Himalayan Rivers Component and (ii) Peninsular Rivers Component. The Himalayan component envisages a number of links and the general idea is to transfer waters from ‘surplus’ eastern rivers to central, western, and southern regions. The Peninsular component also involves a number of links and the idea is to transfer the surpluses estimated to exist mainly in the Mahanadi and the Godavari to the deficit southern basins, Cauvery and Vaigai. Other links in this component include those that would transfer estimated surpluses from such rivers as Ken Parbati, Tapi, Damanganga, etc. to various deficit southern basins (details discussed in Chapter 3). I am told that it has been mentioned by Indian leaders/officials that India might concentrate on the Peninsular component of the project, leaving aside the Himalayan component. In so far as the Peninsular component is concerned, there may not be enough surpluses available from the identified rivers for transfer to the southern basins for the component to be operated usefully and profitably. This is, perhaps, why a link between the Himalayan and the Peninsular components appears to have been envisaged, which is Ganga-Damodar-Subarnarekha-Mahanadi. Therefore, even if only the Peninsular component is implemented, this inter-component link may have to be constructed, which could have adverse implications for Bangladesh. This observation may or may not be valid, but it certainly calls for the facts to be jointly determined by Bangladesh and India so that, if this view is not correct, it can be put to rest. Following the Indian Supreme Court’s suggestion in October 2002 and the Indian Government’s announcement soon thereafter that the ILR would go ahead, Bangladeshis and the Government of Bangladesh became very concerned about its possible severe consequences for Bangladesh through further reduction of the dry season river flows to Bangladesh, and they started to voice their protests through seminars, writings, and participation in international conferences. It is often complained by some of my Indian friends and, perhaps, also by Indian government officials that the voices raised in Bangladesh have been unreasonable and without any basis as the ILR is still only a concept. But, the ILR has to be much more than just a concept for it to have instigated the setting up of a high level civil society group in India with the purpose of understanding and disseminating more fully the project’s magnitude and complexity, technical aspects, financial and economic implications, social and equity implications and likely ecological consequences. This group is headed by a former Indian Minister, Y. K. Alagh and includes in its membership well-known water professionals, former secretaries to the Government of India, and civil society leaders, among whom is a former UN Under Secretary General, Nitin Desai. The members of the group have been drawn from among those who support the project and those who oppose it. It is also suggested by the protagonists of the project in India that the project is not to divert dry season flows from the GBM river systems but to store flood waters during the monsoon for transfer during the dry season, from which Bangladesh would in fact benefit in terms of flood moderation while there would be no adverse impact on the dry season

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river flows into Bangladesh. But, the people of Bangladesh have had a rather unpalatable experience, given that the Farakka Barrage was constructed in the absence of proper consultation. Of course, the construction of the Farakka Barrage was started when India and Pakistan were not very friendly nations. But, when it was commissioned, Bangladesh had already emerged as an independent country and it has to be gratefully recognized that India played a very important role in the process of Bangladesh’s emergence by extending all possible help to and participating in its War of Liberation. And, yet, although Farakka Barrage was commissioned on agreement with Bangladesh for a 41-day trial-run in the dry season of 1975, its operation continued for two more dry seasons without further agreement. In November 1977, a five-year Ganges Water Sharing Agreement was signed, followed by two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) for a total of five more years. Then there was no understanding or agreement until the Ganges Treaty was signed in December 1996. The diversion of the Ganges waters at Farakka in India, by reducing the flows into Bangladesh, has been a major reason behind the steep reduction of freshwater flows to southwest Bangladesh, which constitutes one-third of the country and contains about one-third of the total national population, during the dry season. This region of the country has as a result encountered severe adverse environmental and socio-economic consequences. The emotion that Bangladeshis have shown in response to the proposed ILR, particularly to its Himalayan component, may be justified, given the Farakka experience. Not only that Bangladesh and India should be very friendly countries but that they have agreed to observe the principles of equity, fairness, and no harm to either country in respect of any intervention on a common river. Hence, even if there was nothing concrete to discuss when the Task Force on ILR was appointed, in the interest of good neighbourly relations, Bangladesh should have been officially informed about the project or “the concept” being studied and assured that consultations would be conducted as the results of the relevant studies would be available. That would certainly have dispelled any doubts in the minds of Bangladeshis, as they would as a result have been ensured that no harm would come to Bangladesh through the ILR given that Bangladesh would have the opportunity of discussing the pros and cons in so far as its interests are concerned. After political change that took place in India in May 2004, both the Indian Prime Minister and the Indian Water Resources Minister said that any sub-link project that could have adverse implications for Bangladesh would not be undertaken and that, if necessary, consultation with Bangladesh would be arranged at appropriate times. The announcement of the Indian Prime Minister and the Indian Water Resources Minister are very positive but what is necessary is adequate timely follow-through in terms of providing information to and consultation with Bangladesh on a regular basis in order that neither country’s interests are harmed in any way. 15.4 TEPAIMUKH AND SAPTA-KOSI HIGH DAMS I would like to mention two other projects now being actively pursued by India. One is the Tepaimukh High Dam on the Barak in Manipur. In fact, this project was proposed by Bangladesh in 1972 to be initiated, constructed, and operated jointly by India and Bangladesh. Unfortunately, there has been no progress on a joint approach to this project. India is now ready to go ahead with the project but Bangladesh has not been consulted in respect of its design and other relevant aspects. What would be its impact on Bangladesh is not therefore known to Bangladesh authorities and civil society. In the absence of a joint approach to this project on a common river, Bangladesh should be informed about the

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details and consulted in respect of its possible impact on Bangladesh. It is claimed that Bangladesh would also benefit from the project in terms of flood moderation, improved navigation, and, perhaps, a share of the electricity generated. These were the considerations when Bangladesh proposed this project. Now Bangladesh does not know whether or not, in its present design and location, the project would benefit or harm Bangladesh. Harm could be in terms of waterlogging or flooding as a result of augmented lean season flows. Why can’t an arrangement be made for the Indian and Bangladeshi experts and decision makers to sit together and review the project design and determine the facts, which makes perfect sense. The Ganges Treaty, except for the initial teething problems and occasional blemishes since then, has so far worked well in terms of availability of the stipulated flows of water to Bangladesh. But, the dry season flow at Farakka is inadequate for the needs of both the countries; and the needs are growing further as a result of expanding economic activity and increasing population. It has been recognized in the Treaty that the two countries would work together to augment the dry season Ganges flows. In this regard, in 1984 Bangladesh proposed the construction of seven high dams in Nepal. Of course, in addition to the augmentation of the dry season Ganges flows, these dams would generate other benefits, including electricity generation, flood moderation, and irrigation waters, which could be shared by all the countries. This proposal did not go anywhere, just as the Indian proposal of transferring water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges did not go anywhere. However, recently India and Nepal have moved ahead together to prepare the detailed project report (DPR) for the Sapta-Kosi High Dam. A project office has been set up in Kathmandu and Indian and Nepali experts have been working. The project is one of the seven dams proposed by Bangladesh in 1984. It is expected to generate 3,000 to 3,500 MW of electricity and substantial augmentation (about 1,900 m3/sec during January to May as shown by one study) of the dry season Ganges flows. And, of course, there would be flood moderation and other benefits. But, Bangladesh has not been taken on board, although the Sapta-Kosi is a tributary of the Ganges and, hence, a transboundary river, of which Bangladesh is a co-riparian along with India and Nepal. According to the agreed principles of equity, fairness, and no harm to other co-riparians, Bangladesh should be a party to this project so that its concerns and interests find full expression in the project development and design and, in due time, it has access to its legitimate share of the benefits. Obviously, Bangladesh should bear the appropriate share of the costs. Furthermore, there are negotiations taking place between India and Nepal for Mahakali (Pancheshwar) High Dam in Nepal. Also, Karnali High Dam in Nepal is being mentioned for consideration. Both these projects are also among the seven high dams earlier proposed by Bangladesh; and, indeed, given its co-riparian status, Bangladesh’s concerns and interests should appropriately feature in the development and design of these projects as well. It is, therefore, important for Bangladesh to seek its inclusion as an active partner in the Sapta-Kosi High Dam project right away. It should also seek its participation in Mahakali and Karnali projects as well as any other similar projects that may be taken up. Obviously, inclusion of Bangladesh in these projects would make the projects regional, which in fact is the geographical reality. In upholding the earlier mentioned agreed principles and in the interest of promoting regional cooperation for mutual benefit, it is important that the Indian position of only bilateralism is changed to regionalism when the issues/projects are regional.

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15.5 CONCLUSION In concluding, let me suggest that the leaderships of the GBM regional countries need to develop positive mindsets in favour of cooperation and adherence to the agreed principles to move ahead with cooperation building in water and other sectors, bilateral and regional, as dictated by the specificity of the issues to be addressed, for mutual benefit. Studies have shown that cooperation in potential areas generate much larger benefits for each country than when national approaches are adopted in such cases. The options before the region are: continued self-abnegation through non-cooperation or a shift to a cooperative regime for mutual benefit, progress, and peace. The choice is obvious. But, will sense and logic prevail all round to overcome the persisting negative mindsets and generate the political will in favour of cooperation in the region?

BIBLIOGRAPHY Ahmad, Q.K.: Indian Grand Scheme of Interlinking Rivers: Bangladesh Perspectives. The Daily Star, Dhaka, September 22, 2004. Ahmad, Q.K.: Potential for Sharing of Common Regional Resources in the Eastern Himalayan Region: Focus on Sapta Kosi High Dama Project. Study Report of the Sustainable Environmental Management Programme (SEMP), Component No. 1.1.4.1 conducted by BUP under MoU with Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), Government of Bangladesh (GoB), funded by UNDP Bangladesh, June 2004. Ahmad, Q.K., Chowdhury, A.K.A., Iman, H. and Sarker, M. (eds.): Perspectives on Flood 1998, University Press Limited, Dhaka. Mirza, M.M.Q., A. Dixit and A. Nishat (eds.): Flood Problem and Management in South Asia. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2003. Ramaswamy, R. Iyer: River Linking Project: Many Questions. In: River Linking: A Millennium Folly (Medha Patkar Ed.), National Alliance of People’s Movements, Mumbai/Maharashtra, India, 2004. Verghese, B.G.: Cooperating to Live Together, unpublished, 2005.

16 Hydrological Impact on Bangladesh of Chinese and Indian Plans on the Brahmaputra STEPHEN BRICHIERI-COLOMBI

16.1 INTRODUCTION The Brahmaputra is, in terms of annual discharge, one of the world’s largest rivers, with an annual average flow at Bahadurabad (allowing for spill into the Old Brahmaputra channel) of 20,000 m³/sec. To date, there are only two dams of significance on it, in China (Tibet), and in Bhutan, both designed primarily for hydropower. With the current perceptions of a world water crisis, and the demand of the fast developing countries of India and China for cheaper energy in the face of rising competition for fossil fuels, it is likely that increasing attention will be focused on ways to harness the resources of this great river. How, and by whom, this is done, will have major consequences for Bangladesh, the lower riparian, both in terms of attenuation of the peak monsoon flow, and the reduction or augmentation of the dry season flow. This article summarizes what data is available in the public domain, and what can be deduced from this and the few reports that have been published.

16.2 HYDROLOGY OF THE BRAHMAPUTRA The Brahmaputra (Figure 16.1) rises in Tibet, where it is known as the TsangPo, and flows several hundred kilometres eastwards in a wide, gently sloping valley that drains the Tibetan plateau and the northern slopes of the Himalayas. At Nuxia, just below the confluence with a major left bank tributary, the river starts its dramatic descent round the Great Bend, a 270 degree clockwise turn around the 7,756 m high peak of Namche Barwa, to flow south through the Himalayas, where it is known as the Dihang, into the Assam valley. There it is joined by many other rivers draining both sides of the valley to form the Brahmaputra, which flows southwest and then south into Bangladesh, spilling some of its monsoon flow into the Old Brahmaputra channel. In Bangladesh, it is joined by the Ganges (average flow arriving at Farakka 12,600 m³/sec) and the much smaller Meghna (average flow for the two branches in Bangladesh, 1,100 m³/sec). Against the rules of geographical nomenclature, it enters the sea through a channel referred to as the Meghna Estuary. On the plateau, annual precipitation (300 to 600 mm) and evaporation (⬍1,000 mm) are both low, but both increase sharply in the Assam valley, and in the hills to the south occur some of the highest annual rainfall totals (⬎10,000 mm) in the world.

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HYDROLOGICAL IMPACT ON BANGLADESH

N

Yellow

C H I N A

Indus

BHUTAN

GREAT BEND

Yangt ze

TsangPo Ga ng e dy Ir ra wa d

Xi Jian

g

BURMA en

I N D I A Myanmar

Salwe

s

NEPAL

Mekong

0

400

800 kilometers

Fig. 16.1 Location map.

The flow is measured at three gauging stations in Tibet, Nugesha, Nangcun and Nuxia, the last of these just before the descent from the plateau starts. It is further measured at 29th Mile on the Dihang, and at Pandu on the main Brahmaputra, both stations in India, and at Bahadurabad in Bangladesh. Figures obtained from various sources as listed in Table 16.1 are plotted in Figure 16.2 to show how annual average discharge increases with catchment area. Figure 16.3 shows the monthly flow hydrographs at Nangcun (where the flow is more regular due to snowmelt), Pandu and Bahadurabad. The hydrograph at Pandu is anomalous, with flows in the dry season that are frequently above those at Bahadurabad. This anomaly was analyzed in studies for the Joint Rivers Commission (BWBD, 1986), where it was shown from double mass plots of dry season flows at Pandu that there is a sudden and unexplained change in the relationship between the two stations in 1975. Statistical analysis show the pre- and post-1975 flows at Pandu are extremely unlikely (probability ⬍0.001) to be from the same population. Accordingly, in the analysis in this chapter, only the Bahadurabad station has been used. The fall of 2,400 m around Namche Barwa in a distance of around 110 km makes this one of the most powerful rivers in the world, as measured by indices of erosion (Finlayson et al., 2002). The gorge of the river in this reach is believed to be the deepest and longest in the world, measuring some 6,000 m from the mountaintop to riverbed level. It is also a highly seismic region, marking the eastern end of the Indian plate that subducts under the Himalayas.

TsangPo TsangPo TsangPo TsangPo Dihang Ganges Ganges Jamuna Old Brahmaputra Meghna (Surma) Meghna (Kushiyara) TsangPo Bramaputra Jamuna

River 89.42 91.58 94.34 94.34 n/a – – 89.4 – – – 91.58 91.70 89.40

Easting 29.21 29.18 29.27 29.27 n/a – – 25.1 – – – 29.18 26.13 25.10

Northing 106,378 153,191 189,843 189,843 249,000 951,600 975,000 501,000 – 700 26,000 153,191 405,000 501,000

Area (km2) 1956–1967 1956–1967 1956–1967 1979–2001 n/a 1948–1985 1948–1985 1968–1985 1964–1985 1969–1985 1969–1985 1956–1982 1956–1979 1956–1985

Period Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly

Flows

1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4

Source

Source 1 Prof. Bernard Hallet, Quarternary Research Center and the Department of Earth and Space Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195, USA: Pers comm. 2 Office of the C.E. (P and D), Brahmaputra Board, Basistha, Guwahati – 781 029, Assam. 3 Expert Study Group, Bangladesh Water Development Board, Dhaka, Bangladesh. 4 Global Runoff Data Centre, Koblenz, Germany.

Nugesha Yangcun Nuxia Nuxia 29th Mile Farakka Hardinge Bridge Bahadurabad Mymensingh Kanaighat Sheola Yangcun Pandu Bahadurabad

Station

Table 16.1 Sources of hydrological data

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Brahmaputra average annual runoff v. area 25000 Bahadurabad

Annual runoff, m3/s

20000 Pandu 15000

10000 29th mile 5000 Nugesha

Yangcun

Nuxia

0 0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

Area, km2

Fig. 16.2 Brahmaputra average annual runoff and area at six locations.

Hydrographs at Brahmaputra gauging stations 400

Annual runoff, m3/s

350

Yancun Other Assamese tributaries Brahmaputra Pandu (not used)

300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Fig. 16.3 Hydrographs at Brahmaputra gauging stations.

Monsoon floods cause the Brahmaputra to overflow its banks almost every year. In Assam, efforts to control them by the construction of embankments have largely been abandoned. In Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra right embankment is a major work, which will require an ongoing annual investment of many millions of dollars to improve and maintain

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to control westwards migration of the rivers, and protect the approaches to the bridge, which spans it (BWDB, 1994). Economic development in the basin of the Brahmaputra is low, with little demand for industrial energy or water for irrigation. Low temperatures on the Tibetan plateau constrain agricultural output, while in the Assam valley, good drainage is needed more than irrigation. On the slopes of the Assam valley, particularly in Bhutan, there is a shortage of agricultural land. In the dry season, the flow of the Brahmaputra controls the position of the saline front in the Meghna estuary. Various estimates have been made of the flow required to maintain the front at a point where large islands in the estuary and south central region of Bangladesh that depend on freshwater for irrigation of some 350,000 hectares would be adversely affected by salinity. This flow is estimated to be 2,000 m³/sec and 3,000 m³/sec, depending on the guidelines adopted for salt tolerance of crops (BWDB, 1986; Chowdhury and Datta, 2004). The economic justification for reserving a large flow for this purpose has been challenged (Brichieri-Colombi, 1999). 16.3 POSSIBLE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS In the spirit of the hydraulic mission, many proposals have been made to “harness the resources” of the Brahmaputra in the region of the Great Bend by the riparian countries (Figure 16.4). China has considered proposals to regulate the flow of the TsangPo at Nuxia, to generate hydropower by channelling the flow across the Great Bend, or to augment the water stressed basin of the Yellow River 800 km away, generating hydropower en route, or a combination of the two (Anderson, 1996; Verghese, 1999; Tibet Voice, 2003; Trin-GyiPho-Nya, 2003a and 2003b). India has considered proposals to regulate the Dihang above 29th Mile, generating hydropower and then diverting the water round or through Bangladesh to the Ganges at Farakka and on to the Mahanadi, a distance of up to 1,100 km, as part of the Himalayan component of India’s Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) scheme (Task Force on Interlinking of Rivers, 2004). Further large dams on other major tributaries, such as the Subansiri, are also under consideration (GOI, 1978). Bhutan is already generating hydropower on the Sunkosh tributary and exporting energy to India. This provides a small benefit to Bangladesh, by augmenting dry season flow. Bangladesh has studied proposals for a barrage at Bahadurabad (WARPO, 2001) to irrigate large areas on both banks, and generate hydropower in the dry season, but the economics of this project are even less attractive than the proposed barrage on the Ganges, which fails to meet criteria for investment (WARPO, 2002). It has also argued in favour of flood control reservoirs in the upstream countries to attenuate the annual floods, which inundate much of the country (BWDB, 1984 and 1986). Whether these developments are implemented or not will, according to precedent, depend more on the determination of national self-interest by the upper riparians than considerations of international law or regional cooperation. None of the four upper riparians has ever consulted with Bangladesh over the design or construction of dams and barrages in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. Discussions have taken place between India and Bangladesh over operation of barrages on the Ganges at Farakka and on the Teesta only after they have been constructed.

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Link Canal Nagong Dam

Nuxia Dam

Dihang Dam

Fig. 16.4 Possible projects in the Great Bend.

On the TsangPo, as on the other rivers flowing out of China such as the Salween (flowing into Burma), the Mekong (into Burma and Laos) and the Ili (into Kazakhstan), China is proceeding with dam construction without reference to the lower riparians. On the Meghna, India is making decisions on the Tipaimukh dam without consultation with Bangladesh, and has already conducted advanced studies on the Dihang and Subansiri dams, and a link canal route around Bangladesh. There is little reason to suppose that this attitude will change, especially as the reaction from Bangladesh to proposed developments is invariably negative. While this attitude persists, Bangladesh is unlikely to be able to influence the decisions to any great degree except by increasing public awareness of the social and environmental implications of these projects. Examples of this include the organization of the conference in Dhaka in December 2004 on the proposed ILR scheme, where participants from India and Nepal joined those from Bangladesh to express their concerns about the scheme, hampered though they were by the dearth of information or feasibility reports on the proposed links. The problem with this approach is that little attention is given to alternatives, whether they be variants on the proposed schemes, or solutions which approach the problem of satisfying demands for energy, water and food in a completely different way. Politicians leave such meetings with the same problems they came with, and no sense of which direction they should follow to resolve them. Bangladesh may not be able to influence the decisions, but it would be wise to try to understand to the maximum degree possible what impact they would have. The analysis below uses the little information available to assess how the annual hydrograph of the Brahmaputra in Bangladesh would be affected by the implementation of various combinations of upstream projects.

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16.4 HYDROLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS The annual discharge of the TsangPo at Nuxia is available for a number of years, and averages 1,867 m³/sec, but its monthly distribution is not. The distribution is therefore assumed here to be the same as at the upstream station of Yangcun. To fully regulate this flow, for diversion of hydropower, a large reservoir with a capacity of some 30 km³ live storage would be required. Evaporation losses would exceed rainfall, so there would be some net losses, and an allowance of 5 per cent is made for these losses, and unavoidable spill. It is also assumed that a minimum release of 100 m³/sec (around 5 per cent of average annual flow) would be made for recreational and environmental purposes. The major tributary between Nuxia and the next gauging station, 29th Mile on the lower Dihang, is the Nagong Chu or Po TsangPo, which joins the TsangPo on the northernmost point of the Great Bend, but no flow records are available. It drains approximately half the catchment area between Nuxia and 29th Mile, but although the average rainfall is much higher at around 1,000 mm a year than that of the TsangPo, it is lower than the 2,500 mm on the remainder of the Dihang catchment rainfall (UNESCO, 1978). Thus the runoff from this catchment may be estimated at around 33 per cent of the incremental flow at 29th Mile, or a little over 1,200 m³/sec. This could also be fully regulated by a dam (referred to here as the Nagong) on the Po TsangPo with a lesser storage capacity than the dam at Nuxia. The Great Bend hydropower project would harness the 2,400 m fall from an altitude of 2,900 m at Nuxia, just above the bend, to 500 m on the Indian Border. The distance around the bend is some 160 km, but the minimum straight line distance across the bend is about 30 km, and according to Chen (1998), the project would comprise a 15 km tunnel across the bend, which would feed into one of the tributaries draining the southern flank of Namche Barwa into the TsangPo. Here a cascade of turbines operating at 90 per cent efficiency produce some 36,500 MW using conventional high-head turbine technology, and generate up to 320 TWh/year of renewable energy, equal to 23 per cent of total Chinese electrical production in the year 2000. There would, of course, be formidable obstacles building the dam, tunnels and power stations in such an isolated area, in a seismically active and rapidly eroding region, and very high (0.6 to 1.0 million volt) transmission lines would be required to link the site to load centres, whether in China, Bangladesh or India. However, the project would be likely to meet the criteria that have in the past justified government investment in such works. Hydropower could also be developed on the Nagong Chu, as it also drops into the same gorge. No information is available on a dam site here, but the principle would be the same, with retention a similar level, and a cascade of weirs down the gorge. Losses would be fewer, as rainfall equals evaporation, and compensation flows would be smaller. Such a dam could generate a further 25,000 MW, and bring the combined energy generated to 40 per cent of the 2,000 total. If the Chinese River Linking (CRL) scheme went ahead, linking the Brahmaputra to the Yellow River, the diversion would probably be from the Nagong Chu, as this would reduce the canal length by approximately 100 km. For technical reasons, the maximum size of diversion canal is unlikely to exceed 1,200 m³/sec, about the same as the annual flow of the tributary. Since there is a large fall available between this point and the Yellow River, water velocities could be kept high, perhaps as much as 4 m/sec if erosive sediment were first settled out, reducing the canal water section area to some 300 m². A canal 55 m wide, 5 m deep, with a slope of 33 cm/km, could convey this flow with a friction loss of 230 m in 700 km. Where necessary, the canal could be passed through four parallel 10 m-diameter

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tunnels. To minimise costs, the canal would be designed for round-the year operation, on the assumption that the flows on the other rivers would be fully committed for hydropower or other purposes. The straight-line route to the closest point on the Yellow River would involve the crossing the Salween (Nu), Mekong (Zachu) and Yangtze (Jinsha) rivers in a distance of 200 km. The problems of crossing the rivers themselves would be considerably facilitated if dams were to be constructed on these rivers, and indeed there are such plans (13 are envisaged on the Salween (Nu) alone (Yunnan Daily, 2004) and a 292 m dam is planned on the Mekong (Lancing), for completion in 2013 (Tibet Voice, 2003). Water could be channelled into each river in turn, and diverted from the reservoirs, at the same location, or further downstream after passing through turbines at the proposed dam sites. The problems of construction in such mountainous terrain would be formidable, so much so that there has even been discussion of the use of nuclear explosives for excavation (Horgan, 1996). However, there is a history of long distance water transfers in China, and evidence of a great willingness to invest in them (Biswas et al., 1983). Within China, the water could be used to generate hydropower en route to the Yellow River, and from there to the sea, in the net fall of 2,650 m (altitude at departure point less the friction and other losses in the canal of some 250 m). Natural losses in the river would probably absorb at lease half of this head, but even with 1,000 m net head, 10,000 MW could be generated. The water could also, with some loss of generation potential, be made available for irrigation and municipal water supply in North China, a region of 550 million people that is extremely short of water. Given the current rate of economic expansion in China, it is unlikely that there would be any shortage of demand for power or water made available, and it is thus likely that the persistent stories that one or other of these projects, or a combination, would be under active consideration. It is far from clear that a water diversion from the Nagong Chu would, in fact, be preferable to the generation of hydropower there. Water diversions, if needed, could be made from the Salween, which is closer to the Yellow River. The loss of hydropower generation on the Salween due to diversion from that river would compensated by the hydropower generated from the Nagong Chu, and it would be cheaper to convey water than electricity between the Nagong and Salween. However, since the diversion is possible and has been discussed, and the adverse impacts on Bangladesh are far greater, it is included in the scenario analysis below. In respect of Nagong Chu diversions, these should therefore be considered “worst case” scenarios.

16.5 HYDROLOGICAL IMPACTS ON BANGLADESH These projects will have impacts on the quantity of flow entering Bangladesh from the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna system. For the period June to December, the Ganges inflow is assumed to be equal to the long term average flow for each month as measured at Hardinge Bridge. For the period January to May, the Ganges inflow is taken as the average release each month that would have been made from Farakka under the GWT had it been in operation since 1948, corrected for small downstream abstractions by India. The gauges at Bahadurabad and Mymensingh together measure the flow of the Brahmaputra, including the Teesta, Dharla and Dudkomar tributaries. The gauges at Sheola on the Surma and Kanairghat on the Kushiyara together measure the inflow on the Meghna (known as the Barak in India), which bifurcates at the Indo-Bangladeshi border to form

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these two rivers. In addition, there are around 16 rivers, some gauged, others not, which flow directly into the Sylhet basin from the surrounding hills and contribute to the flow of the Meghna. Compared with the three major rivers, their flows are small and are excluded from the analysis. The impacts of these various developments on the annual quantity of flow entering Bangladesh are assessed in Table 16.2. Table 16.2 Scenarios and impacts Scenario

Project

–1

0

1

2

All ganges

Base case

Chinese hydro, no river links

3

Chinese Chinese and Indian hydro, hydro, with CRL CRL

4

5

Chinese hydro, CRL, IRL

Chinese and Indian hydro, CRL and IRL Yes

Nuxia HE

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Nagong HE

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Chinese River Link (CRL)

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Dihang HE

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

47,459

47,459

44,435

43,235

39,570

43,235

39,570

5,606

5,606

7,694

6,494

8,323

5,294

7,123

Maximum flow:

0%

0%

–6%

–9%

–17%

–9%

–17%

Dec-Apr average flow:

0%

0%

37%

16%

48%

–6%

27%

Annual volume:

33,742

32,534

32,438

31,238

31,238

30,038

30,038

Maximum flow:

90,180

86,771

79,073

77,873

75,374

76,673

74,174

Minimum flow:

6,599

5,244

7,418

6,218

8,251

5,018

7,051

Dec-Apr average flow:

8,410

7,459

9,546

8,346

10,175

7,146

8,975

4%

0%

0%

–4%

–4%

–8%

–8%

Maximum flow:

4%

0%

–9%

–10%

–13%

–12%

–15%

Minimum flow:

26%

0%

41%

19%

57%

–4%

34%

Dec-Apr average flow:

13%

0%

28%

12%

36%

–4%

20%

Bahadurabad Maximum flow: Dec-Apr average flow:

Major River Inflows

Annual volume:

Four characteristics of the total flow are considered:





The average annual quantity of water entering the Bay of Bengal. A reduction of this flow could alter the salinity balance in the Bay of Bengal (IWM, 2004). The average maximum flow, which affects the water level in the Meghna estuary and hence the flood level in the Meghna basin, which is subject to widespread floods every year. The average minimum flow, which affects the location of the saline front in the Meghna Estuary and around Bhola Island. The average flow in the dry season, which affects the quantity of water that Bangladesh could abstract or divert into other rivers for a variety of uses such as irrigation, navigation, salinity control and municipal supply, without adversely affecting conditions in the Meghna estuary.

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HYDROLOGICAL IMPACT ON BANGLADESH

In addition, two impacts on the flow of the Brahmaputra at Bahadurabad are estimated:



The average maximum flow, which affects the level of flooding in the northern areas of the country. The average flow in the dry season, which affects the navigability of the Brahmaputra.

The way in which these flows change has been assessed by looking at the monthly pattern of flows and reservoir operations under the following scenarios: Scenario 0: This represents the base case, with no dams and no diversions from the Brahmaputra, and the existing Ganges Water Treaty. Scenario -1: This considers what would have been the case had the entire flow of the Ganges, as measured at Farakka, entered Bangladesh, with no other construction on the Brahmaputra. From Bangladesh’s viewpoint, this represents the ideal case, although it probably never occurred, as historically there was always some spill into the Hooghly and other Indian distributaries. Flows at Bahadurabad are unchanged, but the average dry season flow in the Meghna Estuary would have been 13 per cent higher than the base case. This provides a measure of the upper limit of natural dry season flows. Scenario 1: This shows the impact of the construction of dams at Nuxia and Nagong, were they both to be operated for hydropower generation, with no additional storage in India. The main impact is a 9 per cent reduction in annual flood flows, and a 41 per cent increase in minimum flow. The average dry season flow increases by 28 per cent, to a level that compensates for reductions at Farakka by a substantial amount. The sustained dry season flow would maintain the saline front in the Meghna Estuary far further out than has ever occurred naturally, and would probably bring about some environmental changes there. Scenario 2: This examines the impact were Nuxia built for hydropower, and Nagong for regulation and diversion of 1,200 m³/sec to the Yellow River. There would be a small (4 per cent) reduction in annual volume, and a 9 per cent reduction in flood flows at Bahadurabad. In the dry season, the lowest flow would be increased by 19 per cent and the average low flow by 12 per cent, creating a situation similar to that prior to the construction of Farakka. Scenario 3: This is similar to Scenario 2, but includes the effect of additional regulation at Dihang for hydropower generation there. Maximum flows at Bahadurabad are attenuated slightly more (17 per cent), but the main effect is to augment dry season flows by a massive 57 per cent for the lowest month, and by 36 per cent over the 5-month period. This might well be enough to bring about substantial changes to the ecology of the Lower Meghna.

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Scenario 4: This is also similar to Scenario 2, but includes the effect of the ILR in the absence of additional regulation at Dihang (or elsewhere in Assam). The effect is to reduce the annual volume by 10 per cent, and the maximum flows 9 per cent. In the dry season, the minimum flow is reduced by 4 per cent and the average flow also by 4 per cent, the full impact of Indian abstraction being offset to some extent by regulation at Nuxia. Scenario 5: This final scenario examines the impact of Scenario 2, with both regulation at Dihang and the construction of the ILR. As with Scenario 4, the annual volume is reduced by 8 per cent. Annual maximum flows at Bahadurabad are reduced by 17 per cent. In the dry season, minimum estuarial flows are increased by 34 per cent, and average flows by 20 per cent, while average flows on the Brahmaputra are increased by 27 per cent, useful to improve navigation. The results for this scenario are compared with those of the base scenario in Figures 16.5 and 16.6. Note that all these scenarios are based on average dry season flows, not reliable (80 per cent dependable) flows, which are often used for the design of engineering works. Since dependable flows are lower, and the augmentation would be similar, the percentage increase on dependable flows would be greater than that shown above.

Brahmaputra below Teesta (Scenario 5) Monthly Average m3/s

50000 45000

Natural flow

40000

Modified

35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 Jan

Feb Mar Apr May Jun

Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Fig. 16.5 Brahmaputra below Teesta – Scenarios 0 and 5.

16.6 CONCLUSIONS The rapid growth of both the Chinese and Indian economies are creating unprecedented demands for energy, and both countries have been taking commercially aggressive steps to secure energy sources of fossil fuels, putting upward pressure on oil

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HYDROLOGICAL IMPACT ON BANGLADESH

and gas prices. This will make major sources of sustainable hydropower, such as those on the Brahmaputra, increasingly attractive. Development of the region has been inhibited by boundary disputes in Aranchal Pradesh, but there are indications that China and India are determined not to let such disputes inhibit better relations and wider cooperation, and cooperation is evident in the sharing of river data on the TsangPo (Bhattacharyya, 2003). China in particular has demonstrated a willingness to invest in hydropower even where there are serious social and environmental concerns, requiring the displacement of very large numbers of people, such as on the Mekong dam project, where 39,000 will be displaced (PRC, 2003), and the Three Gorges Dam, where 1.2 million people are being displaced (CNN, 1999). In the region of the Great Bend dams, the low population density will limit the social impacts. In India, such concerns have inhibited the development of major storage in the Dihang, but the storage can be greatly reduced if China goes ahead with its projects. This observation should not in any way be taken as endorsing the Great Bend projects, which are located in an area of incredible scenic drama and environmental interest, but simply a recognition of realpolitiks.

Fig. 16.6 Major River Inflows – Scenario 0 and 5.

Thus it seems likely that, if China starts dam construction, India will follow suit. Equally, it would be far better from India’s viewpoint to act in concert with China, rather than go ahead with a major dam at Dihang that could be quickly made redundant by upstream developments. This may explain why India has indicated it is not immediately proceeding with the Himalayan component of the ILR. If China were to precede with hydropower at Nuxia and diversion at Nagong, and India do nothing, Bangladesh would almost certainly benefit significantly, despite the overall reduction in the annual flow volume on the Brahmaputra. If India went ahead with a dam at Dihang with reduced storage, flood reduction benefits would be enhanced in Bangladesh, and so would dry season flows. However, it is likely that India would want to

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divert these flows to drier parts of peninsular India. Based on the impact on flows entering the country, Bangladesh would find it difficult to object to such a proposal, since the overall impacts are largely beneficial and reflect exactly the arguments Bangladesh has previously used to justify dam building in Nepal (flood alleviation, power generation and dry season augmentation). Bangladesh would be able to object on the grounds that the works required to build the link canal caused significant harm, should this be the case. High-level canal routes from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges that go through the “chicken neck” between Bangladesh and Nepal may well fall into this category. However, there appears to be a route that uses the Brahmaputra-Ganges channel (Brichieri-Colombi, 1999; Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock, 2003), allowing both India and Bangladesh to benefit, and this would need to be evaluated under a cooperative study. Refusal to engage in such studies would allow India to legitimately claim it was forced to circum navigate Bangladesh because of a lack of co-operation, and that any damages to Bangladesh were therefore self-inflicted. In the event that all proposed works went ahead, minimum flows in the Lower Meghna would rise from 5,250 to 5,850 m³/sec, well above the level needed to control salinity in the estuary. Thus Bangladesh would be able to make significant abstractions for water supply, irrigation, and salinity control in the southwest delta, the area of greatest concern. The reduction in peak flow of 17 per cent on the Brahmaputra would be welcome, but not make a major impact, as the relationship between flood flow and flood level is extremely flat. The result might be to reduce flood levels by around 0.2 m. Since flooding is a major source of recharge for the groundwater that supplies over half of Bangladesh’s total food supply, care is needed to ensure managed flooding continues. A reduction in flood levels, and increased dry season discharge, would both be welcome in the event that global climate change leads to significant sea-level rise. Thus it would appear that Bangladesh has much to gain from co-operation between India and China in possible upstream investments on the Brahmaputra. It is unlikely that it could influence the major decisions on the dams, but it could play a lesser role by offering alignments for major power lines, access to Chittagong Port for construction materials and equipment, and taking in return access to relatively low-cost energy when national gas reserves dwindle. If India is determined to go ahead with its river linking scheme, Bangladesh would be unable to prevent the project, but would have the option of either co-operating to find a joint venture project bringing net benefits to both countries, or not co-operating and managing alone any adverse impacts caused by the high level route.

REFERENCES Anderson A.H.: World Tibet Network News. Tibet Support Committee, Denmark, May 8, 1996. Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB): Augmentation of the Dry Season Flows of the Ganges, Vol 2 Bangladesh Proposal for Regulation by Storage Reservoirs. Expert Study Group, Dhaka, 1984. Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB): Proposal for Augmentation of Ganges Flows. Expert Study Group, Dhaka, 1986. Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB): Dependable Flows on the Border Rivers, Vols I and II. Sir William Halcrow and Partners, Expert Study Group, Dhaka, 1986a. Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB): Saline Intrusion in the Meghna Estuary, Vols I and II. Sir William Halcrow and Partners, Expert Study Group, Dhaka, 1986b.

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Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB): River Training Studies of the Brahmaputra Rivers: Master Plan Report. Sir William Halcrow and Partners, Dhaka, 1994. Bhattacharyya, R.: Clarification on Sharing Hydrological Data. The Telegraph, New Delhi, India, November 7, 2003. Biswas A.K., Zuo, D., Nickum, J.E. and Liu, C. (eds.). Long-Distance Water Transfer: A Chinese Case Study and International Experiences. Water Resources Series, Volume 3, United Nations University, 1983. Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.: Cooperative Development of the Lower GBM: Technical Outline of a Farakka-Paksi-Mawa Barrage Complex. Asia Pacific Journal of Environment and Development, Dhaka, December 1999. Brichieri-Colombi, J.S. and Bradnock, R.: The Politics of Sharing the GBM: Prospects for the FarakkaPaksi-Mawa Complex. Geographical Journal, London, March 2003. Chen, C.: Television Interview on Die Welt. ZDF, Germany, January 7, 1998. Chowdhury, J.U. and Datta, A.R.: Effect of Transfer of Brahmaputra Water by Indian RLP on Saline Water Intrusion. International Conference on Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Rivers: Impact of the Indian River Linking Project, Dhaka, December 17 to 19, 2004. CNN: In Depth Special – View of China (www.cnn.com/speacials/1999/china.50/asia.superpower/ three.gorges), 1999. Finlayson, D.R., Montgomery, D.R. and Mallet, B.: Spatial Coincidence of Rapid Inferred Erosion with Young Metamorphic Massifs in the Himalayas. Geology 30(3), March 2002, pp. 219–222. Government of India (GoI): Proposal for the Augmentation of the Dry Season Flow of the Ganga. Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Department of Irrigation, New Delhi, 1978. Horgan, J.: Focus: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. Scientific American (www.sciam.com), June 1996. Institute of Water Management (IWM): Report on River Linking. IWM, Dhaka, 2004. People’s Republic of China (PRC): White Paper on Ecological Improvement and Environmental Protection in Tibet. Information Office of the PRC State Council (http://english.peopledaily. com.cn/whitepaper/ tbpaper/tb1.html), March 10, 2003. Task Force on Interlinking of Rivers: (http://riverlinks.nic.in/taskforce.asp), 2004. Tibet Voice: Tibet 2003 State of the Environment. Department of Information and International Relations, Dharamsala, July 2003. Trin-Gyi-Pho-Nya: Tibet’s Environment and Development News Digest (2003a, June): Debates on Alternatives to the Western Route of South-North Water Diversion Project (citing article in Sichuan Water Power (quarterly journal), Vol. 22, No.1, March 2003). Tibet Justice Center, 2288 Fulton Street, Suite 312, Berkeley, CA 94704. Trin-Gyi-Pho-Nya: Tibet’s Environment and Development News Digest (2003b, August 29): Studies conducted to harness Yarlung Tsangpo for the World’s Greatest Hydro-Project. Tibet Justice Center, 2288 Fulton Street, Suite 312, Berkeley, CA 94704. UNESCO: Atlas of World Water Balance, UNESCO Press, Paris, 1978. Verghese, G.: Waters of Hope: From Vision to Reality in Himalayan-Ganga Development Cooperation. University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1999. Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO): National Water Management Plan, Vol. 2: Main Report and Vol. 3: Investment Portfolio. Ministry of Water Resources, Dhaka, 2001. Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO): National Water Management Plan: Options for the Ganges Development Area, Vol. 2, Prefeasibilty Study of the Ganges Barrage Project. Ministry of Water Resources, Dhaka, 2002. Yunnan Daily: Thirteen Dam-Cascade Project on Gyalmo Ngulchu River, August 15, 2004.

17 Could Bangladesh Benefit from the River Linking Project? STEPHEN BRICHIERI-COLOMBI

17. 1 INTRODUCTION The National Water Development Authority (NWDA) of India describes plans for linking Indian Rivers, and states that the proposals essentially comprise three major links (NWDA, 2004): 1. 2. 3.

Southern Water Grid – interlinking Mahanadi, Godavari, Pennar, Cauvery and Vaigai in Peninsular India, Interlinking of Brahmaputra with Ganga, Subernarekha and Mahanadi, and Interlinking Gandak, Ghaghara, Sarda and Yamuna to Rajasthan and Sabarmati.

The last two of these three links affect Bangladesh, as they would withdraw water from the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) river system, which is shared by five counties, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India and Nepal. The NWDA separates the GBM into three river systems, labeling the Brahmaputra basin one of water surplus and the Ganges as one of marginal surplus. The Meghna (Barak) is not categorised. Diversions from the Ganges can be made entirely within Indian Territory, and the concern for Bangladesh is that a minimum flow continues to enter the country. A treaty covering flows for the five-month dry seasons has already been signed, and provided it is respected, the treaty provides the necessary safeguards to Bangladesh. However, proposals that include major upstream storage would reduce flows in the rest of the year, and this could have adverse effects on Bangladesh. A treaty covering abstraction throughout the year is therefore needed. Diversions from the Brahmaputra would, according to the NWDA schematic, require construction of a link canal that would cut across virtually all rivers draining into northwest Bangladesh, and transfer water to the Ganges for onward distribution into peninsular India (Figure 17.1). Except on the Ganges, there is no treaty between India and Bangladesh concerning flows entering the country. Thus, this component of the river linking plan gives rise to great concern in Bangladesh. Furthermore, a recent article (BEN, 2004a) made the point that the transfer from the Brahmaputra is the lynchpin of the Indian river linking scheme, as, apart from the Mahanadi and the Western Ghats, it is the only basin with a significant surplus in the sub-continent.

276

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Within Bangladesh, the Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO) and its predecessors have also made plans to divert water in the dry season from the main rivers by means of barrages and canals into areas of apparent shortfall, in accordance with the National Water Policy (GoB, 2000). Although geographically more limited because of the size of the country, WARPO’s plans do not differ in principle from those of Indian planners. The main rivers are seen as having surplus resources and the command areas as deficit regions. The economic, social and environmental issues are fundamentally similar, although on a smaller scale.

Fig. 17.1 Possible routes for Brahmaputra link.

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Given this situation, a joint planning exercise would seem to be the natural way forward. However, no such exercise appears to be underway. NWDA reports that feasibility studies for various links have been initiated or completed, but only by Indian planners. Thus, opportunities to examine options that might benefit both countries have been missed. The purpose of this paper is to examine if there is a possible solution that meets both countries’ objectives. If such a possibility can be demonstrated, then it is possible that the leaders of the two countries would countenance co-operation in the pursuit of shared goals.

17.2 LEGITIMATE SHARES NWDA does not define what it means by surplus, or marginally surplus. In this paper, the phrase is interpreted to mean that the water in the basin that can be economically managed for human use, after a reserve is made to meet environmental needs, exceeds human demands. The term “economically” means that the total cost of providing the water to the different categories of users is less than the total benefits the water provides, irrespective of who pays and who benefits. What is meant by human demands is addressed later in this chapter. Any riparian country making such assessment must consider the needs of the other riparian countries and take into account each country’s legitimate share of the basin water resources. What then is a legitimate share? 17.2.1

International law

The need for an international law for watercourses was recognised in 1970, when the United Nations (UN) recommended that the International Law Commission (ILC) take up the study of the law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN, 1999). After 24 years, the ILC produced draft articles, which were submitted to the UN in December 1994. On 21 May 1997, the Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses was adopted by the UN and opened for signature for a period of three years. The Convention sets out factors to consider when co-riparians are determining their legitimate shares of international rivers, such as rainfall and population. However, these factors are not amenable to a formulaic derivation of a legitimate share (Brichieri-Colombi, 1996). The key criteria are “equitable utilization” and the obligation that States may not cause “significant harm” to other States. Neither of these terms can be operationalized, and Waterbury (2002), in his study of the Nile, described the language as “inoperable pap”. The Convention was to enter into force 90 days after 35 countries had signed, but by the closing date, only 18 countries had done so. None were GMB riparians. There is, thus, no international convention in force. 17.2.2

De facto arrangements

Most rules of international law come from one of two sources (McCaffrey, 1995 and 2001): the 2,000-odd treaties that have been signed between states, as listed by FAO (1978), and international custom, as represented in interpretations of law by recognised individuals and organizations. Dellapenna (1997) notes that custom is not prescriptive but evolves from the process and the outcome of the process – that is, the corpus of previous treaties. Thus, the only real source of law is this corpus.

278

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On the GBM, this corpus consists at most of five international agreements (Ganges Water Treaty (1996), India-Nepal Power Trade Agreement (1996), Mahakali Treaty for the Pancheswar Dam (1996), India-Bhutan Agreement for the Tala Hydropower Project (1996) and the tentative four-nation (India, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh) agreement on economic co-operation (1997)). The latter is included because it was seen by Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary as being centred on the shared rivers of the region. The key feature common to both the Ganges Water Treaty and the Mahakali Treaty is that, in each case, the two countries agree to share the flows of the rivers concerned more-or-less equally. Neither treaty is concerned with a process to establish “equitable” shares. Although no treaty has yet been signed on the Teesta, the indications are that both sides are considering an equal entitlement. This feature is probably advantageous for Bangladesh. Quite apart from the reality of India’s greater economic strength, the factors in the UN Convention tend to favour a greater share for India. Custom and precedent suggest that the Brahmaputra and other transboundary rivers would be shared equally by Indian and Bangladesh under any future treaty arrangements. Such a solution has the added advantage that, in political terms, it is far easier to convey the message that a fair and just solution has been found when two sovereign nations agree to share a common resource equally. The dry season (November to March) flows in the Brahmaputra average 3,700 m³/sec, and in the Ganges, 1,700 m³/sec, a total of 5,400 m³/sec. Thus, following precedent, each country would get 2,700 m³/sec.

17.3 ACCESS TO SHARES Legal and political arrangements create an enabling framework in which to study the technical options available for accessing river water. For instream demands – environmental protection, fisheries, navigation, amenity, recreation and salinity control – works of civil engineering may not be needed. For out-of-stream demands – municipal and industrial water supply, and irrigation – major works are usually required to abstract and distribute the water. On large alluvial rivers such as the Ganges and Brahmaputra, relatively small quantities can be abstracted by fixed or floating pump stations where permanent low-flow channels cling close to the bank. One such example occurs at the Ganges-Kobadak fixed pump station. This pump station has had a history of maintenance problems, however, due to low intake water levels and siltation in the approach channel, even though the quantities abstracted are relatively small. For large abstractions, a barrage is usually constructed to raise dry season water levels to the level of the maximum flood in a normal year. This level tends to be close to bank-full level, allowing the water to be distributed into a canal from the barrage by gravity. The Teesta and Farakka Barrages are examples of such works, and the latter, completed in 1970, demonstrates the feasibility of constructing a barrage on a river the size of the Ganges. Since the size and cost of a barrage on an alluvial river is determined by the amplitude of the annual maximum flood, and the floods on the Ganges and Brahmaputra are of similar magnitudes, the indications are that further barrages similar to Farakka could be built in the lower reaches of the Brahmaputra and Ganges. The Jamuna Bridge over the Brahmaputra shows large scale construction is possible on this river, and pre-feasibility studies have been completed for a bridge over the Padma (RPT, 1999).

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Barrages in alluvial rivers also have maintenance problems, as shown by the experience of Farakka. They are liable to silt accumulation at the gates, and, like bridges, suffer from the consequences of, and may accelerate, bank erosion upstream and downstream. They also create a backwater effect, raising flood levels marginally for many tens of kilometres upstream. These effects, and measures to alleviate them, must be considered in the design and projected maintenance costs and operations. Large canals to distribute water are not difficult to construct with modern earthmoving equipment, but can cause waterlogging and salinization of adjacent land and interrupt overland drainage. There are considerable technical difficulties where they traverse large rivers liable to spate flows. In soils that are liable to liquefaction, canals can be protected against collapse in earthquakes using vertical sand drains, but only at high cost. In heavily populated areas, they create many social problems and disrupt other transportation infrastructure. 17.3.1

Bangladesh proposals for access

The Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) of the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has at various times commissioned pre-feasibility studies for barrages and associated canals at locations on both the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers (MoWR, 1998). None of these studies has attracted finance to go to full feasibility stage, so the costs and issues raised must be considered only indicative. These works would have led water into the north-central, northwest and southwest areas of Bangladesh. In the latter case, short canals from the Ganges Barrage would lead water into the moribund rivers of the delta, using them to distribute water for salinity control in the Sundarbans, abstraction for domestic and industrial water supply, and irrigation. The study Options for the Ganges Dependant Area (OGDA) reviewed abstraction of a total of 619 m³/sec from the Ganges from a barrage at Tagorbari, 26 km downstream of the Paksey bridge, for distribution on both banks (Halcrow, 2002). It concluded that the cost of the barrage could not be justified by the quantity and unit value of water abstracted. 17.3.2 Indian proposals for access The technical problem for India to access Ganges flows has been resolved by the construction of Farakka and the navigation canal to the Hooghly River. Despite operational difficulties, the barrage serves the original stated purpose of diverting water to Calcutta. Whether this has solved the problems of Calcutta is an issue beyond the scope of this chapter. NWDA states that it has completed pre-feasibility studies on links southwards from the Ganges, through the Ganga-Damodar-Subernarekha link and the SubernarekhaMahanadi link. It also states that it has completed similar studies for the Manas-SankoshTista-Ganga link, (around northwest Bangladesh) the Jogighopa-Tista-Farakka link (through northwest Bangladesh), and the Farakka-Sundarbans link (into the mangrove forest that straddles the border). All the three latter canals involve Bangladesh, but the studies were conducted without its participation, and so they must be considered preliminary. The Jogighopha-Farakka link was proposed by the Government of India (GoI) to augment the Ganges at Farakka (GoI, 1983), and included storage dams in the Brahmaputra and its tributaries and a barrage at Jogighopa. The proposal was examined and costed by a GoB/International Consultants team, led by the author, which concluded that the link

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was not feasible (MoWR, 1984). One major technical problem was that the soils through which the canal was to be excavated were liable to liquefaction in earthquakes such as the one in 1954 in Assam. The same problem would be encountered in excavating a major canal through the piedmont soils in the gooseneck. In 1999, the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), India, stated that the Assam-West Bengal Link Canal is “no longer on the table” (CPR, 1999). The NWDA, unfortunately, does not appear to have accepted CPR’s conclusion.

17.4 WIN-WIN SOLUTIONS Although there has never been formal collaboration between planners from India and Bangladesh, proposals have been made that would benefit both countries. Unfortunately, to date nothing tangible has emerged. Nehru suggested to Ayub Khan in 1961 that the countries build Farakka “in such a way as to benefit both countries”, and Ayub Khan responded with a proposal for a joint barrage on the Ganges at Lagola, where one bank is in India and the other in what is now Bangladesh. The proposal would have allowed both countries to share the Ganges from a single structure, but it was rejected as “considerable work has already been done of the Farakka Barrage and the Indian Government did not intend to give it up” (Crow et al., 1995). The GoB also undertook studies what became to be known as the New Line, a proposal to build barrages on the Brahmaputra and Ganges within Bangladesh, and link them with a canal further south, which would avoid the soils liable to liquefaction (Crow et al., 1995). The proposal would have allowed India access to all the waters of the Ganges, and Bangladesh to all those of the Brahmaputra, under essentially a quid pro quo arrangement that seems to have been, unofficially at least, acceptable to leaders of both countries when originally proposed. This again foundered, for internal political reasons in Bangladesh. The Farakka-Paksi-Mawa Complex (FPMC) of barrages, Figure 17.2, was suggested by the author during the preparation of the National Water Management Plan (BrichieriColombi, 2001; Brichieri-Colombi and Bradnock, 2003). This proposal was designed to allow both countries to abstract their legitimate share of water from the main rivers, while avoiding some of the problems associated with previous proposals. The FPMC proposal has been researched only in outline, with no funding from any source, and therefore the conclusions must be regarded as very preliminary. However, it does indicate that there is a win-win solution for both countries, should they choose to co-operate with each other and share the dry season water resources of the two main rivers equally. The proposal includes a bridge-barrage complex at Mawa, a second one at Paksi, plus the works necessary to distribute each country’s share from the main rivers to the locations where water is needed (Table 17.1). This would enable each country to use half the combined flow, an average of 2,800 m³/sec each. Bangladesh would abstract 700 m³/sec of its share (12 per cent more than the diversion envisaged by the Ganges Barrage), leaving 2000 m³/sec instream for salinity control in the Meghna Estuary. India would divert all its share, either upstream of Farakka, or into the Hooghly, where some of it would be released to the estuary through the port of Calcutta.

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Fig. 17.2 Farakka-Paksi-Mawa complex.

17.4.1

Benefits

The net additional dry season flow made available by the FPMC project would be 22.5 km³ to India and 13.5 km³ to Bangladesh, a total of 39 km³. More could be made available if storage were constructed in the Brahmaputra headwaters. Bangladesh’s share would be distributed to the north-south, south-central and southeast regions. It includes a flow of 300 m³/sec to Dhaka via the Dhaleswari, the subject of R. 693 crore taka (US$ 119 million) project now under study (BEN, 2004b). A regulator, built in the context of the FPMC scheme, would be cheaper in both capital and operating costs. India’s share would be distributed in accordance with NWDA’s plans, part via the Paksi pond, and part via the Farakka pond. Paksi could probably command the Indian part

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Table 17.1 Distribution of average dry season flows (m³/s) Location

Inflow

Outflow

Return

Net

Mawa Pond

3,700

3,700

350

3,350

Brahmaputra

3,700

Dhaleswari to north-central region

350

250

100

Bangladesh

Gorai to southwest region

250

0

250

Bangladesh

Arial Khan to south-central region

Country

250

100

150

Bangladesh

Pumping to Paksi

1,200

0

1,200

Recycled

Release to Estuary

1,650

0

1,650

Recycled

1,200

0

1,200

0

0

Recycled

Paksi Pond

1,200

Pumping from Mawa

1,200

Pumping to Farakka

200

0

200

Recycled

Matabangha to Sundarbans

800

0

800

India

Kobadak to Sundarbans

200

0

200

Bangladesh

1,900

0

1,900

0

0

Recycled

Farakka Pond

1,900

Ganges

1,700

Pumping from Paksi

200

Feeder Canal to Calcutta

300

0

300

India

Mahanandi to Peninsular

1,600

0

1,600

India

2,000

0

2,000

Estuary

2,000

Release from Mawa

1,650

0

Recycled

Return from Dhaleswari

250

0

Recycled

Return from Arial Khan

100

Outflow to Bay of Bengal

2,000

Total for Bangladesh

2,700 (of which 700 abstracted)

Total for India

2,700

0

Recycled

2,000

Bangladesh

of the Sundarbans via the Gorai river or other distributaries of the southwest delta, obviating the need for the Farakka-Sundarbans link. Farakka would feed the Ganga-Damodar-Subernarekha link and points south. India’s share of water from the Brahmaputra would have to be pumped 10 m up from the Mawa pond to the Paksi pond.1 The water needed at Farakka would have to pump a further 8 m up from the Paksi pond to the Farakka pond, a total lift of 18 m. This is low by 1

The Pump Station at Paksi would be large, consuming almost 150 MW. The technology would be similar to the tidal power barrage at La Rance, in northern France. There, 24 low head (15 m) reversible bulb turbines produce 10 MW each. Paksi could incorporate 15 Such units in a 200 m wide section, more likely, all 74 sluice sections would incorporate smaller, 2 MW units, incorporated into caissons, as proposed in 1986 for the Bahadurabad barrage. The 26 MW pump station at Farakka would be much smaller.

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comparison with other links: NWDA notes that “Brahmaputra water after reaching Ganga has to be lifted by 60 m to reach Subernarekha and by about 48 m for further transfer to Mahanadi-Godavari link.” Large pump and generating stations would be required to pump the water, using natural gas from Bangladesh. The large idle generating capacity in the wet season could be used for agricultural drainage, which is likely to become an increasing problem if global climate change results in increased sea and river levels. The benefits associated with the FPMC may be summarised as: For Bangladesh









Irrigation supply to areas short of groundwater in northwest and southwest Salinity control in southwest and south-central areas Bridges over Ganges and Padma Freshwater to Sundarbans in Bangladesh Water for Dhaka Improved navigation on main rivers and around Dhaka Erosion control in vicinity for barrages Drainage pumping in wet season.

For India

17.4.2

Access to a 50 per cent share of the Brahmaputra for use in the peninsula Freshwater to Sundarbans in India. Costs and cost sharing

Total capital costs of the FPMC would be in the order of US$ 3.6 billion, after deducting the cost of works associated with building bridges that are envisaged at Mawa and Paksi. How these costs might be shared is discussed in the author’s 2003 paper, where it is concluded that a reasonable formula would be around 80 per cent for India, 20 per cent for Bangladesh. This would lead to average costs for Bangladesh of 0.7 ¢/m³ (US cents per cubic meter), and for India, 2.5 ¢/m³. Costs for India are higher, because the water has to be pumped, and because it appears that the value of water in the India economy is higher. The value of water made available by the Ganges barrage can be estimated from the OGDA study by dividing the tabulated annual benefit at full development of US$ 76 million (excluding road transportation benefits) by the annual quantity of water diverted at the barrage (619 m³/sec for 153 days, or 8,185 million m³), which comes to 0.9 ¢/m³. Thus the value of water in the economy exceeds the costs of making it available under the FPMC scheme by a margin of over 20 per cent.2 Unfortunately, NWDA provide no comparative figures for the cost of water provided under the river linking scheme. However, the alternative ways of supplying water from the Brahmaputra river to the Ganges by the FPMC, and other barrage-canal schemes were compared in the author’s technical paper (Brichieri-Colombi, 2001). The respective costs were, for Bangladesh, 1.9 ¢/m³, and for India, 3.6 ¢/m³, excluding the costs of ameliorating social and environmental impacts that are included in the FPMC costs. In both cases, 2 As noted earlier, the OGDA report shows the Ganges barrage to be uneconomic with these benefits. The FPMC scheme becomes economic because of the far larger volume of water made available to the two countries from shared works.

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water supplied under the FPMC is significantly less expensive than the alternatives proposed previously. 17.4.3

Social and environmental issues

The use of the main river system to transfer water for India through Bangladesh avoids the need major link canals, and the associated social and environmental costs. Barrages would create problems wherever they are built, in Assam or in Bangladesh, but, unlike dams, they do not displace large numbers of people, neither do they flood fertile farmland. However, as experiences in the region have shown (bridges over the Brahmaputra (Jamuna) and the Meghna, and barrages over the Ganges (Farakka) and Teesta), works on major rivers do bring about social and environmental problems that need to be addressed from the very outset of any investigation. The most affected social group will be char land dwellers who occupy seasonally exposed chars (sandbanks) along the banks and in the river upstream of the barrages. Seasonally flooded chars close to the barrage will be permanently under water, as dry season water levels will be raised around 8 m, to close to normal maximum flood level. At the Mawa barrage, the increase in water level would diminish to almost zero at Paksi, and similarly, the effect upstream of Paksi barrage diminish to almost zero at Farakka. In the wet season, the afflux caused by a barrage will increase flood levels by about a metre at the barrage, reducing to almost zero some 50 km upstream. Of the estimated 1993 population of 4.3 million char dwellers (FAP 19, 1993) some 1.4 million on the Ganges, Padma and lower Jamuna might be affected. This is a large number, and, although the impacts for many would be small, a huge effort is required to assess the total effect. Navigation locks would be provided through the barrages, and would permit the passage of larger ships from the Meghna Estuary to the Ganges above Farakka. Increased flows down the Dhaleswari would make navigation possible for large vessels in and around Dhaka, and up to the Brahmaputra. In contrast, there would be problems for country boats seeking to move between the river reaches, as they would have to use the locks. Fish passes can mitigate impacts on fish breeding, but there would be unavoidable negative impacts. The construction of Farakka had adverse effects on the movement of Hilsha, which move from their spawning grounds in the lower Meghna estuary up the main rivers. By contrast, there would be benefits to fisheries in rejuvenated rivers of the southwest. Bank erosion is already a major issue in Bangladesh, as, unlike seasonal flooding, it destroys livelihoods and there are few coping mechanisms. Works to protect the barrages would reduce the effects of erosion in the immediate vicinity, but erosion might increase elsewhere. Barrages and bridges would need to be designed as an integral part of an overall plan for bank protection works on the main rivers, as suggested in the National Water Management Plan, rather than considered piecemeal.

17.5 RISKS FROM UPSTREAM DEVELOPMENT ON THE BRAHMAPUTRA The review so far has considered only the natural flow of the Brahmaputra. However, in addition to the ILR, other projects have been proposed upstream on the Brahmaputra that could significantly alter the dry season flow arriving in Bangladesh. These include hydroelectric and storage dams on the Dihang and Subansiri rivers, and in Tibet, on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra, where it is known as the TsangPo.

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Just upstream of the so called Great Bend, proposals have been made to build storage dams to regulate the flow of the TsangPo to a constant 1,700 m³/sec, and its tributary the Po TsangPo to 1,200 m³/sec, and generate hydropower using the available head of around 2,400 m. Alternatively, a flow of around 1,200 m3/sec water could be diverted northeast from one of these sites northeast in a Chinese River Linking scheme (CRL), transferring water from the Brahmaputra to the Salween, Yangtze and HuangHe (Yellow River). The HuangHe is a basin of 550 million people which is extremely short of water. These proposals have been assessed by the author (Brichieri-Colombi, 2007), who notes that the rapid expansion of the Chinese and Indian economies is driving their search for increased water and energy supplies, so that projects that were previously thought to be too expensive are being revisited. He also notes that their would be great benefits if China and India went ahead, each with their own dams, maximising the use of storage and transmission lines. The upper reservoirs would require a much smaller storage dam on the Dihang than previously proposed, making the project more acceptable to local peoples in India. Although data is scanty, it was possible to estimate that, in the monsoon season, retention of flows to fill the reservoirs could attenuate peak flows on the Brahmaputra in Bangladesh by up to 15 per cent, reducing flood levels by around 0.2 m. This would reduce flood damages with little likelihood of significantly reducing groundwater recharge. In the dry season, the net effect of regulation at the three sites on the TsangPo, Po TsangPo and Dihang would more than offset the impact of abstraction of 1,200 m³/sec each by China and India. Minimum flows in the Lower Meghna Estuary would increase by around 600 m³/sec, almost equal to Bangladesh’s requirement of 700 m³/sec estimated above. Thus, even with the FPMC (which accommodates the ILR), the position of the saline front would be virtually unchanged from the present conditions. If the dam on the Po TsangPo were operated for hydropower rather than river diversion, which appears to be the more likely scenario, then the augmentation would increase by a corresponding amount, and the saline front would be pushed further out to sea. Further detailed studies need to be done, but at first sight it appears that the risk from upstream development is minimal, provided abstraction is accompanied by regulation either in China or India. The main danger to Bangladesh would be that India would route the ILR around Bangladesh, as currently proposed, with the attendant social and environmental risks to Bangladesh.

17.6 MEETING WCD CRITERIA The World Commission on Dams (Asmal, 2000) suggested that two tests be applied to any proposal for the construction of high dams. These are equally applicable to the components of the river linking scheme. Further tests are suggested, if and when a dam is selected, but that is at a much later stage than considered in this chapter. 17.6.1

Needs assessment

The NWDA justifies the river linking project in terms of what others have described as the hydraulic mission (Allan, 2000). In essence, this approach defines the objective in terms of a pre-determined solution. To quote NWDA:

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“The main objectives of the ILR programme are manifold. Benefits from ILR are augmentation of irrigated agriculture (35 million hectares), potable water for the rural and urban areas, industrial water-supply, hydropower (34,000 MW), inland navigation, ecological up gradation due to minimum flow guarantee in rivers, sizeable employment generation, flood and drought mitigation, increased tree farming and many other indirect benefits. The Programme is likely to unite the Nation and the interdependence of regions for the overall welfare will act like a catalyst in this regard.” Under this “hydrocentric” approach (Brichieri-Colombi, 2004), rivers are seen as resources to be exploited to meet the demands of societies, and dams and canals as the means to do so. The approach is characterised by an excessive focus on water as the solution to problems that can be solved by other means. Augmentation of agricultural production is undoubtedly required to match the needs of a growing population without excessive recourse to food imports. However, there are many ways of achieving this, though expansion of agricultural area, improvements to yields using hybrid and GM crops, and investment in rainfed agriculture, rainwater harvesting, and better marketing and distribution. Domestic and industrial water supplies need to be improved, but the problems are far more to do with investment in treatment, distribution, management and cost recovery than the availability of water on a large scale. Energy is needed for a society that is urbanising fast, but hydropower is but one of several ways of generating it. Dams can be built to generate hydropower, where they are justified, but the river linking scheme would be a net user of energy, not a supplier of it. Where hydropower dams are economic in comparison with alternative generation, there is usually no problem in finding private-sector finance, provided adequate guarantees are provided by government. However, there is scant evidence to date that the private sector is willing to get involved in large scale hydropower generation in the GBM region. In his paper on hydrocentricity, the author demonstrates that, for the GBM and Nile, the expectations of the riparian countries up to the year 2030 can be met through a variety of interventions in the broader economy without increasing overall abstraction from rivers above the level of abstraction in the year 2000.

17.6.2 Selecting alternatives The costs of alternative ways of supplying water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges by the FPMC, and other barrage-canal schemes, are discussed above, where it is shown that the FPMC is likely to be much less expensive. There is thus a prima facie case to investigate the FPMC alternative. However, these figures, even if confirmed by further study, would not justify the FPMC scheme. If, as argued above, additional abstraction from rivers is not essential to the riparian economies, then costs and impacts of the most favourable barrage-canal scheme need to be compared with the costs and impacts of alternative interventions outside the water sector, for both countries. As yet, no such studies appear to have been made.

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17.7 CONCLUSION Precedent and treaty suggest that India and Bangladesh would be prepared to share the dry season flow of the GBM equally between them, and water resource planners in both countries have, for many decades, envisaged abstracting water from the shared system. Their planned projects to do this have generally differed, but their overall objectives have been very similar. Twice, very briefly, opportunities for co-operation have arisen (the Lagola barrage and the New Line), but they have not been grasped. A third opportunity, the FPMC, has been suggested, as yet with no reaction. The outcome of these missed opportunities is that India has unilaterally constructed a barrage at Farakka, which allows it to access its 50 per cent share of the Ganges, while Bangladesh has been unable to construct works to access its 50 per cent. Neither country has been able to access a share of the Brahmaputra, except the small proportion of the flow represented by the Teesta, where both countries have built their own barrages. This outcome is unsatisfactory for both countries, but particularly for Bangladesh, which has suffered from the impacts of Farakka, and seen no benefits from decades of negotiation except a treaty that protects it from further adverse impacts (Crow and Singh, 2000). India’s Interlinking of Rivers Project (ILR) presents Bangladesh with an opportunity to rethink its previous strategy with respect to development of the main rivers, which has achieved so little to date. Whatever opportunities there might be to develop dams in the upper reaches of these rivers, they are, de facto, likely to be realised by the upper riparians without the involvement of Bangladesh. However, it appears that the developments under consideration would, in hydrological terms, be highly favourable to Bangladesh. By acknowledging India’s right to a share of the Brahmaputra, and facilitating access to that share, Bangladesh could set the stage for a co-operative venture which enables both countries to examine, jointly, a project that meets both their goals. The cost of the FPMC project is large, but there appears to be in both countries a willingness to commit large funds for water development and bridge construction. 17.7.1 Could Bangladesh benefit from the river linking project? What then is the answer to the question posed by this chapter? If the BrahmaputraGanges link passes through or around the northwest of the country, the answer, as established by the 1980’s studies, is no, Bangladesh could not benefit. However, if the main river system is the link, via barrages designed to provide access to dry season water in both countries, then the answer is yes, Bangladesh could benefit. Whether the FPMC or any other river linking project should be built is a question that, in accordance with WCD criteria, can only be answered by undertaking studies:



to determine which is the most cost-effective solution to providing dry season water, when all technical, economic, social and environmental issues have been properly addressed. to ascertain whether, in fact, there are cheaper alternative ways to meet emerging needs without increasing the current level of water abstraction from rivers.

Neither study can be conducted alone by either country. Only through joint study and co-operation can the questions be asked, and the right answers be discovered.

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REFERENCES Allan, J.: The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy. I.B.Taurus, London, 2000. Asmal, K.: Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making The Report of the World Commission on Dams. Earthscan Publications, London, 2000. BEN (2004a): Interlinking Rivers: More Than Meets The Eye. BEN Digest May 24 to 25, 2004 (2004–73) with source quoted as People’s Democracy (Weekly Organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), Vol. XXVII, No. 11, March 16, 2003. BEN (2004b): Buriganga Water Augmentation Project – Feasibility Report will be ready by July 2004. BEN Digest July 1 to 3, 2004 (2004–107) with source quoted as New Age, July 3, 2004. Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A.: Equitable Use and the Sharing of the Nile. Proc. IV Nile 2002 Conference, Kampala, Uganda, 1996. Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A.: Co-operative Development of the Lower GBM: Technical Outline of a Farakka-Paksi-Mawa Barrage Complex. Asia Pacific Journal on Environment and Development, BUP, Dhaka, December 2001. Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A.: Hydrocentricity: A Limited Approach to Achieving Food and Water Security. Water International 9(3) (2004). Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A.: Hydrological Impact on Bangladesh of Chinese and Indian Plans on the Brahmaputra. In: Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Waters: Impact of the Indian River-Linking Project (Feroze Ahmed, Q.K. Ahmad, and Md. Khalequzzaman, Eds.), Compilation of Conference Papers, Dhaka, December 2004, 2007. Brichieri-Colombi, J.S.A. and Bradnock, R.: The Politics of Sharing the GBM: Prospects for a Farakka-Paksi-Mawa Complex. Geographical Journal, UK, March 2003. Centre for Political Research (CPR): India Water Vision in Draft Conference Documents of a Framework for Sustainable Development of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Region. Dhaka, New Dehli, India, December 4 to 5, 1999. Crow, B. and Singh, N.: Impediments and Innovation in International Rivers: The Waters of South Asia. World Development 28(11) (2000), pp. 1907–1925. Crow, B., Lindquist, A. and Wilson, D.: Sharing the Ganges: The Politics and Technology of River Development. Sage, New Delhi, 1995. Dellapenna, C.J.: The Nile as Legal and Political Structure in Brans, H.J. The Scarcity of Water: Emerging Legal and Political Issues, Kluwer International, London – The Hague, 1997. FAO: Systematic Index of International Water Resource Treaties, Declarations, Acts and Cases by Basin. Legislative Study No. 15, FAO, Rome, 1978. FAP: Flood Action Plan Report No 19: Geographic Information System, Dhaka, 1995. Government of Bangladesh (GoB): National Water Policy. Ministry of Water Resources, Dhaka, August 2000. Government of India (GoI): Proposal for the Augmentation of the Dry Season Flow of the Ganga. Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Department of Irrigation, New Delhi, 1983. Halcrow: Options for the Ganges Dependant Area. WARPO Bangladesh, 2002. McCaffery, S.: The Law of International Watercourses: Some Recent Developments and Unanswered Questions. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Colorado, USA, 1995. McCaffery, S.: International Water Law. OUP, Oxford, UK, 2001. Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR): Augmentation of the Dry Season Flows of the Ganges: Vol II Indian Proposal for the Brahmaputra-Ganges Link Canal. Bangladesh Water Development Board, Dhaka, 1984. Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR): The Ganges: Water Sharing and the Resulting Opportunities. Background Information for the International Seminar on Water Resources Management in Bangladesh with a particular reference to the Ganges River, Dhaka, 1998. National Water Development Authority (NWDA): Task Force Documentation (www.riverlinks.nic), 2004.

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RPT: Padma Bridge Study Phase I Final Report. Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Authority, Dhaka, 1999. UN: UN Convention on Non-Navigable Uses of International Watercourses, New York, 1999. Waterbury, J.: National Determinants of Collective Action, Yale UP, New Haven, London, 2002.

Index

A Adaptation 15, 51, 89, 166, 210, 215 Agriculture 3–5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 25, 27, 29, 32, 36, 40, 48, 49, 51, 60, 63, 65, 66, 70, 71, 73, 74, 82, 96, 104, 110, 132, 133, 143, 151, 154, 155, 160, 163–168, 182, 187, 188, 192, 193, 216, 217, 231, 241, 250, 253, 255, 274, 286, 288 Ancient 14, 35, 236, 237, 249 Annual – discharge 95, 97, 109, 121, 261, 267 – runoff 253, 264 Arabian 7, 44, 199 Arable 18, 21, 23, 25, 63–65, 131, 142, 193, 240

B Bangladesh 3, 9, 10, 13–15, 46, 48, 49, 64, 68, 71, 72, 75, 79, 81, 91, 100–102, 104–106, 108, 109, 123, 124, 126, 127, 147, 151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 160–168, 187, 190, 197, 199, 200, 201, 211, 219–223, 225, 226, 228–230, 232, 233, 253, 255–270, 272, 273, 275, 276, 278–285, 287, 288 Base flow 112–114, 116, 117, 124, 125, 190 Bhutan 11, 42, 48, 68, 72, 137, 138, 139, 190, 253, 261, 265, 275, 278 Bilharza 11, 141, 146 Brahmaputra 2, 5, 7, 10, 14, 15, 37, 39, 41, 42, 55, 56, 66, 72, 79, 80–84, 88, 89, 91, 104, 109, 119, 121, 124, 126, 153, 154, 157, 161–163, 165, 167, 187, 188, 204, 211, 219–222, 253, 254, 259, 261–268, 270–276, 278–288

C Canal 3, 5–7, 9, 11, 14, 27–30, 32, 37, 38, 44, 54–56, 61, 68, 69, 73, 77–82, 84, 86, 88, 92, 94, 97, 98, 100, 103, 105, 112, 117, 119, 121, 124, 136, 143–149, 151, 169–171, 187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 211, 223, 231, 232, 266–268 Cauvery 7, 29, 35–37, 43, 44, 54, 56, 70–72, 82, 84–86, 92, 93, 180, 203, 204, 206, 211, 220, 230, 257, 275 China 9, 11, 14, 15, 18, 25, 26, 32, 33, 36, 37, 48, 64, 65, 75, 105, 130, 146, 180, 190, 261, 265, 266–268, 272–275, 285 Chisapani 94, 95, 97, 100, 101, 104–106

292

INDEX

Cholera 141, 147, 148, 149, 151 Climate change 12, 15, 89, 107, 125, 129, 138, 166, 187, 189, 195, 202–204, 207, 208, 210–217, 253, 273, 283 Climate variability 189, 213 Coliform 147, 149, 150 Cooperation – regional 14, 15, 49, 102, 166, 167, 232, 256, 257, 259, 265, 274, 288 Cooperative management 69, 72 Cotton 5, 6, 25, 30, 92, 93, 193, 199, 247 Cultivable area 70, 155, 193, 239 Cultivated 21, 192, 193, 242 Cultural 18, 33, 47, 69, 74, 138, 237 Culture 35, 249

D Dam (s) Delhi 6, 8, 12, 15, 16, 32, 38, 51, 54, 74–76, 89, 95, 97, 105, 106, 110, 116, 125–127, 131, 148, 151, 167, 168, 195, 203, 204, 214, 216, 217, 251, 256, 274, 288 Desert 25, 29–33, 95, 119, 145, 152, 188, 194, 195, 211, 221, 232 Development 1, 3–6, 11, 15–21, 26–28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 41–44, 48, 51–56, 67–69, 72–77, 80, 83, 84, 89, 91, 92, 95, 96, 101, 105, 106, 112, 119, 126, 129–131, 134–139, 141–147, 149–155, 157, 160, 165–169, 171, 173–175, 178, 179, 181–183, 185, 192, 195, 206, 212, 216, 217, 220–223, 225, 226, 229–233, 237, 241, 242, 255, 256, 259, 263, 265–267, 269, 272–275, 283–285, 287, 288 Dhaka 105, 165–168, 229, 256, 260, 263, 266, 273, 274, 281, 283, 284, 288, 289 Diarrheal diseases 141, 148 Discharge 10, 44, 77, 79, 81, 82, 95, 96, 97, 109, 110, 121, 125, 127, 149, 158, 188, 223, 261, 262, 267, 273 Downstream 10, 13, 14, 22, 23, 26, 27, 48, 68, 70–72, 81, 102–104, 107–109, 113, 124, 142, 144, 148–151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 162, 166, 170, 172, 173, 185, 208, 219, 224, 225, 268, 279 Drainage – basin 109, 189, 228, 229, 231 – channel 4 – systems 21, 25, 27, 74, 103, 146, 155, 167, 172, 173, 211, 223, 232, 249, 265, 279, 283 Drought 3, 4, 6, 10, 14–16, 25, 26, 28-30, 37, 39–41, 44, 48, 51–53, 56, 61, 70, 73, 77, 80–82, 87, 92, 102, 110, 187, 188, 195–197, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 212, 220, 221, 232, 240, 253, 286 Dry season 10, 12, 14, 18, 81, 97, 100, 102, 107, 110, 113, 119, 121–125, 149, 150, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 188, 219, 221–223, 230, 240, 253, 255–259, 261, 262, 265, 269–276, 278, 280, 282, 284, 285, 287, 288

E El Nino 201, 214–216 Empirical model 3, 114, 116, 136

INDEX

293

Energy – demand 4–6, 11, 36, 37, 48, 51, 63, 101, 129, 130–139, 152, 163, 204, 208, 261, 265, 266, 271, 273, 286 – supply 4, 11, 36, 48, 51, 63, 101, 129–139, 141, 152, 163, 213, 265, 267, 271, 273, 285, 286 Environment 8, 11, 13–15, 19, 20, 23, 28, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, 45, 48, 70, 76, 125, 126, 135, 139, 147, 152, 166–168, 173, 175, 181, 184, 185, 188, 212, 219, 220, 222, 223, 231, 237, 240, 249, 251, 260, 274, 288 Environmental – impacts 6, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 17–20, 22–24, 26–28, 30–33, 36, 38, 46, 48, 50, 53, 54, 60, 61, 68, 69, 70, 78, 87–89, 92, 93, 104–106, 126, 130, 134, 135, 138, 139, 141, 142, 154, 157, 160, 162, 167, 168, 170, 171, 176, 181, 185, 188, 215, 217, 219, 221, 223, 230–232, 248, 251, 255, 258, 260, 266, 272, 274, 276– 278, 283–285, 287 – pollution 10, 12, 24, 25, 27, 41, 61, 125, 134, 135, 145, 147–151, 174, 193, 208, 212, 221, 232

F Farakka 13, 15, 42, 56, 79, 81, 82, 89, 94, 95, 97, 100–102, 106–109, 113, 116, 117, 119, 121–124, 126, 150, 151, 158–160, 219, 220, 223–226, 229, 254, 258, 259, 261, 263, 265, 268, 270, 274, 278–282, 284, 287, 288 Fauna 20, 104, 105, 180, 222 Fisheries 18, 41, 51, 59, 142, 144, 150, 164, 222, 223, 278, 284 Flood – control 7, 37, 41, 55, 60, 68, 72, 73, 94, 101, 104, 106, 109, 167, 171, 187, 221, 265 – damage 4, 39, 172, 173, 188, 200, 285 – embankments 4, 67, 103, 264 – forecasting 112, 137, 154 – frequency 196, 201–203, 205, 206, 217, 222 – management 4, 10, 20, 48, 51, 57, 60, 75, 233, 253, 260 – mitigation 3, 10, 31, 41, 48, 102, 106, 286 – riverine 22, 27, 164, 165 – urban 4, 5, 14, 17, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 48, 63, 73, 78, 147, 165, 166, 220, 286 Flora 20, 104, 105, 180, 222, 223 Food – production 9, 18, 28, 30, 36, 39, 63–65, 74, 124, 129, 155, 156, 160, 193, 197, 201, 211, 216, 223, 232, 241, 242, 246, 248, 286 – security 7, 9, 32, 60, 61, 63–66, 73, 74, 141, 144, 145, 151, 154, 155, 157, 165, 166, 187, 220, 238, 288 – supply 13, 51, 273 Forest 8, 45, 70, 75, 77, 78, 110, 143, 144, 160, 164, 175, 178, 180–183, 185, 216, 223, 237, 239, 242, 246–250, 260, 279 Freshwater 11–13, 17, 19, 20, 33, 48, 53, 74, 75, 124, 151, 158, 160, 162, 164, 189, 206, 224, 226, 231, 232, 258, 265, 283

294

INDEX

G Gandak 14, 42, 83, 91, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100–107, 111, 117–122, 124, 149, 275 Ganga 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 29, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 47, 54, 56, 66, 75, 78–85, 87–89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 101, 102, 104, 106, 111, 120, 125, 126, 146–152, 204, 226, 230, 257, 274, 275, 279, 282, 283, 288 Ganges – river 6, 9, 14, 82, 92, 97, 107, 109, 158, 160–162, 164, 166, 168, 224, 288 – water treaty 225, 270, 278 GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 4, 35, 49, 54, 129, 133, 155, 157, 165, 188, 190 Ghagra 14, 91, 94, 95, 97, 99, 101, 149 Glacier 12, 35, 88, 109, 189, 206–210, 214–217 Global warming 88, 129, 130, 195, 215, 217, 254 Godavari 7, 35, 41, 43, 44, 56, 71, 81, 82, 84, 85, 91, 93, 180, 204, 220, 257, 275, 283 Government Policy 5, 19, 25, 38, 54, 56–58, 60, 62, 65, 69, 73, 77, 85, 92, 104, 105, 131, 133, 134, 142–144, 170, 221, 223, 230, 248, 256, 276, 280, 288 Groundwater 3, 14, 23, 27, 30, 31, 39, 41, 48, 59, 71, 77, 110, 113–116, 124, 126, 148, 150, 155, 156, 158, 161, 163, 171, 173, 184, 186, 189, 190, 192, 193, 206, 211, 212, 216, 222, 223, 237, 239, 240, 241, 243, 245, 246, 248, 273, 283, 285 Gujarat 4, 39, 61, 70, 83, 85, 95, 103, 143–145, 148, 152, 188, 192, 193, 196, 197, 199

H Health 11, 12, 23, 25, 27, 35, 48, 130, 131, 133, 134, 138, 141–146, 148, 150–152, 156, 157, 160, 164, 201, 223, 232, 237, 247, 254, 255 HEC 107, 110–115, 117–120, 126, 150 High Yielding Variety 5, 9, 163 Himalayas 2, 5, 35, 109, 110, 111, 113, 189, 195, 207, 208, 214, 261, 262, 274 Hydrologic cycle 112, 213 Hydrologic model 107, 112, 114, 125, 126 Hydrology 10, 14, 15, 50, 59, 71, 73, 96, 109, 125–127, 158, 160, 161, 164, 170, 172, 186, 209, 213, 228, 230, 261 Hydrometeorology 15, 39, 51 Hydropower 4, 11, 21, 40, 41, 58, 94, 112, 129–131, 136–139, 141, 144, 145, 151, 184, 187, 212, 220, 261, 265, 267, 268, 270, 272, 278, 285, 286

I Impacts 9, 12–15, 17–22, 26, 27, 31, 33, 45, 52, 53, 60, 67, 70, 78, 89, 92, 93, 108, 124, 138, 142, 144, 151, 160, 163–165, 167, 170–174, 178–185, 187–189, 201, 203, 206, 207, 210, 211, 213, 215, 223, 248, 256, 268–270, 272, 273, 283, 284, 286, 287 India 1–16, 28–30, 32, 33, 35–39, 41, 43–82, 86–89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97–109, 112, 114, 116, 119, 123–127, 129–139, 141–148, 150–152, 154, 157, 158, 160, 166–171, 174, 175, 177–179, 181, 182, 184–217, 219–226, 228–232, 235–238, 242, 243, 251, 253, 256–262, 265–285 Indigenous 143, 235–239, 249 Indus – river 1, 225 Industrial growth 4, 5, 20, 37, 71, 104, 129–133, 136–138, 145, 165, 232, 255, 271

INDEX

295

Industry 5, 10, 49, 132–136, 165, 193, 208, 231, 242, 253–255 Industrial water demand 12, 14, 27, 30, 37, 41, 58, 61, 74, 88, 165, 169, 265, 278, 279, 286 Infrastructure 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 20, 21, 23, 28, 39, 46, 48, 49, 51, 64, 69, 101, 103, 130, 131, 136–138, 141, 145, 188, 195, 200, 208, 254, 279 Inter-basin transfer 5, 6, 9, 13, 16–20, 23, 28, 29, 31–33, 41, 58, 63, 74, 75, 83, 84, 91, 92, 94, 107, 119, 122, 136, 148, 167, 168, 211, 212, 217, 245 Interlinking – rivers 9, 17, 36, 77, 106, 168, 187, 219, 257, 260, 288 International 13–15, 32, 33, 47, 49, 51, 57, 69, 72, 74, 75, 87, 93, 126, 131, 137–139, 142, 151, 165–168, 182, 185, 191, 204, 211, 215, 217, 219–221, 223–233, 257, 265, 274, 277, 278, 279, 288, 289 IPCC 12, 15, 88, 89, 189, 195–197, 200, 214, 215 Irrigation 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 14, 15, 20, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32, 37, 39, 41, 44–46, 48, 51, 54, 58, 60, 62, 63–66, 68–70, 73–76, 80, 82, 86, 92, 94, 96, 101, 102, 104, 106, 107, 112, 113, 117, 119, 124, 136, 141–148, 150, 151, 155, 158, 160–163, 165, 167, 169, 173, 184, 187, 190, 192, 193, 195, 206, 208, 220, 222, 233, 236, 240, 241, 245, 246, 249, 256, 259, 265, 268, 269, 273, 274, 278, 279, 283, 288

K Kanpur 125, 149–151 Karnali 94–97, 99–101, 104–106, 259 Ken-Betwa 7, 8, 13, 44, 46, 93, 121, 169, 170, 174, 180, 185, 186 Kharif 155, 163, 188, 192 Khulna 158, 159, 165, 166 Kosi 14, 42, 83, 91, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100–106, 111, 116, 119, 120, 149, 188, 258–260

L Land use 32, 60, 112, 115, 125, 126, 189, 195, 203, 204, 207, 212, 215 Legal 13, 23, 24, 47, 66, 75, 211, 219, 220, 223–225, 228, 229, 232, 233, 236, 242, 249, 278, 288 Litigation 6, 38, 53, 55, 69, 88, 91, 92 Low flow 117, 171, 270, 278

M Mahanadi 7, 12, 41–44, 56, 82, 84, 85, 91, 93, 119, 121, 180, 199, 204, 220, 257, 265, 275, 279, 283 Malaria 11, 30, 33, 141, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 255 Mangroves 13, 108, 124, 127, 160, 164, 167, 279 Mean annual discharge 95, 97, 109, 121, 261, 267 Meghna 2, 15, 55, 56, 71, 72, 109, 153, 161–163, 167, 221, 222, 253, 254, 261, 263, 265, 266, 268–270, 273, 275, 280, 284, 285, 288 Monsoon 1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 37, 39, 55, 61, 72, 73, 78, 79, 81, 85, 89, 102, 107, 109, 110, 114, 116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 124, 146, 147, 153, 155, 157, 158, 160–162, 164, 169, 173, 183, 188, 189, 192–203, 205, 206, 208, 211–219, 219, 239, 243, 253, 257, 261, 264, 285 Morphology 10, 70, 161, 170, 211, 220, 222, 230, 231

296

INDEX

N Narmada 4, 7, 35, 44, 71, 75, 93, 143, 145, 180, 199, 203, 204, 206, 221 National Water Policy – Bangladesh 221, 223, 230, 276, 288 – India 77, 89, 92, 105, 230 Nepal 2, 9, 10, 13, 14, 42, 48, 68, 72, 74, 91, 92, 94–98, 100–106, 139, 190, 199, 208, 211, 214, 216, 217, 219, 220, 253, 256, 259, 266, 273, 275, 278 Non-structural 4

O Occurrence 3, 25, 153, 196, 217

P Peak discharge 81, 82, 158 Population 1, 4, 5, 9, 11, 13, 17, 19, 22, 25, 26, 29, 35–37, 39–41, 47–49, 51–53, 62–66, 74, 75, 78, 94, 95, 101, 123, 124, 129, 137, 141, 142, 144, 147, 150, 153, 154, 156, 157, 162, 166, 174, 175, 177, 181–183, 187, 189, 190–192, 196, 206, 208, 212, 213, 217, 221, 228, 229, 232, 237, 238, 245, 248, 258, 259, 262, 272, 277, 284, 286 Precipitation 1–3, 12, 37, 39, 54–56, 61, 79, 109, 110, 112–116, 129, 189, 190, 194, 196, 198, 200, 201, 202, 204, 206, 208, 210 Productivity 12, 14, 22, 25, 64, 65, 144, 246

R Rabi 95, 155, 163 Rainfall 1–3, 23, 29, 39, 40, 44, 55, 62, 85, 88, 114, 146, 154–156, 169, 171, 183, 188–190, 192–197, 199–205, 208, 215–217, 222, 236, 261, 267, 277 Rajasthan 4, 7, 28–32, 39, 40, 42, 44, 52, 61, 62, 82, 91, 95, 103, 119, 144, 145, 188, 189, 192, 194–197, 243, 245, 251, 275 RCM (Regional Climate Model) 202, 203, 213–215 Recharge 3, 5, 27, 48, 59, 116, 161, 163, 173, 190, 206, 211, 212, 222, 237, 239, 243, 273, 285 Regional Cooperation 14, 15, 49, 102, 166, 167, 232, 256, 257, 259, 265, 274, 288 Rehabilitation 28, 46, 47, 69, 78, 87, 142, 181 Reservoir 3, 10, 11, 14, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 41, 61, 69, 94, 97, 101, 102, 105, 107, 113–115, 119, 124, 129, 138, 141–144, 146–148, 151, 169–173, 180, 182–184, 190, 197, 221, 222, 265, 267, 268, 270, 273, 285 Resettlement 18, 26, 32, 45, 47, 69, 70, 74, 93, 142–144, 151 Rice 9, 156, 163, 193, 197, 199 Risk 10, 16, 18, 22, 27, 49, 51, 67, 68, 84, 86, 87, 132, 133, 135, 137, 145–148, 151, 163, 165, 171–173, 181, 202, 205, 211, 213, 222, 232, 256, 284, 285 Runoff 2, 14, 21, 25, 27, 54, 55, 60, 62, 109, 112, 114–116, 126, 147, 154, 173, 189, 203, 204, 206, 208, 210, 217, 239, 253, 263, 264, 267

INDEX

297

S Salinity 14, 41, 58, 106, 124, 126, 153–156, 158–160, 162, 164–168, 200, 221–223, 265, 269, 273, 278–280, 283 Salinization 27, 69, 142, 165, 193, 279 Schistosomiasis 11, 27, 32, 141, 146, 148, 151, 152 Sea water 13, 162 Sea level rise 27, 195, 196, 206, 254, 273 Sedimentation 141, 142, 145, 171, 172, 190, 221, 223 Semi-arid 9, 18, 19, 23, 27, 29, 62 Siltation 26, 84, 158, 278 Simulated 107, 123, 202–204, 215 Simulation 45, 107, 112, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125, 167, 197, 214–216 Socio-economic 8, 18, 22–24, 30, 32, 41, 46, 81, 155, 156, 163, 181, 188, 215, 226, 258 South Asia 4, 12, 14–17, 28, 51, 72, 75, 91, 105, 106, 108, 126, 137, 139, 167, 168, 187, 189, 201, 202, 213, 214, 216, 217, 231, 232, 253, 260, 288 SRES 196–198, 202 Sri Lanka 15, 52, 151 Summer monsoon 1, 39, 192–194, 200–202, 206, 212, 215–217 Sundarbans 108, 121, 124, 127, 160, 164, 167, 223, 279, 282, 283 Supply – water 2, 6, 7, 9, 12–14, 18, 21, 40, 41, 44, 61–63, 65, 66, 70, 72–74, 82–85, 88, 124, 126, 184, 187, 207, 208, 211, 212, 220, 238, 268, 273, 278, 279, 283, 286 Surface water 3, 23, 25, 41, 58, 77, 80, 114, 148, 150, 153–155, 158, 163, 164, 168, 172, 173, 186, 190, 192, 245, 248 Sustainable 27, 32, 54, 65, 71, 74, 126, 131, 133, 138, 157, 166, 182–185, 191, 193, 220–222, 230–232, 237, 238, 246–247, 250, 260, 272, 288 Systems 2, 12, 15, 21, 28, 39, 42, 43, 45, 50, 67, 70, 74, 77, 78, 82–84, 102, 144, 145, 151, 153, 155, 157, 162, 163, 166, 168, 170, 184, 188, 189, 210, 213, 220, 231, 235, 238, 239, 253, 257, 275

T Temperature 3, 27, 79, 110, 113, 126, 155, 156, 195, 196, 198–206, 208, 210, 217, 265 Temporal 3, 5, 32, 37, 54, 56, 151, 188, 189 Traditional 5, 21, 24, 35, 57, 67, 70, 134, 137, 144, 182, 183, 211, 235, 237–240, 242, 248, 249

W Water balance 44, 61, 65, 121, 203, 204, 274 Water demand – agriculture 70, 73, 77, 163 – industrial 85, 210, 211 Water levels 148, 157, 165, 183, 241, 278, 284 Water logging 30, 32, 69, 142, 193, 211, 232, 259, 279 Water management 14, 15, 28, 49, 57, 75, 167, 171, 174, 181, 183–185, 188, 189, 211, 235, 236, 238, 240, 245, 249, 251, 274, 280, 284

298

INDEX

Water quality 12, 20, 107, 112, 124, 125, 130, 136, 141, 144, 147–152, 157, 167, 168, 170–173, 178, 179, 206 Water sharing 15, 32, 46, 48, 85, 123, 124, 126, 182, 227, 258, 288 Wheat 1, 9, 30, 64, 156, 164, 193 Wildlife 13, 150, 168–171, 174–181, 184, 185, 237, 241, 242 World Bank 16, 25, 32, 33, 59, 65, 74–76, 129, 136–139, 143, 144, 230

Y Yamuna 6, 9, 12, 14, 35, 38, 42–44, 91, 95, 107, 111, 115–121, 125, 148, 149, 220, 275